

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

**June 1980**

II

**Minutes**

**Official Report of Debates**

WEU

PARIS



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
PARIS



The Proceedings of the First Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I : Assembly Documents.

Volume II: Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.



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## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSSENS Hugo	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PVV
HANIN Charles	Soc. Chr.
MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
PEETERS Renaat	Soc. Chr.
TANGHE Francis	Soc. Chr.
van WATERSCHOOT John	Soc. Chr.

#### Substitutes

MM. BRASSEUR Guy	FDF
DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
LAGNEAU André	PRL
LAMBIOTTE Fortuné	Socialist
MICHEL Joseph	Soc. Chr.
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS, Nora	Soc. Chr.
Mr. VAN DER ELST Frans	Volksunie

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

MM. BIZET Emile	RPR (App.)
BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF
DEPIETRI César	Communist
DESCHAMPS Bernard	Communist
FERRETTI Henri	UDF
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
JAGER René	UCDP
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
PÉRIDIER Jean	Socialist
PÉRONNET Gabriel	UDF (App.)
PETIT Camille	RPR
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
TALON Bernard	RPR
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

#### Substitutes

MM. BAUMÉL Jacques	RPR
BECHTER Jean-Pierre	RPR
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BERRIER Noël	Socialist
BOZZI Jean	RPR
COUDÉRC Pierre	UDF
DRUON Maurice	RPR
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KOEHL Emile	UDF

MM. LAGOURGUE Pierre	UDF
LEMAIRE Marcel	CNIP
LEMOINE Georges	Socialist
MALVY Martin	Socialist
MÉNARD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
VISSE René	Communist
WARGNIES Claude	Communist

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### Representatives

Mr. AHRENS Karl	SPD
Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
EVERS Hans	CDU/CSU
FLÄMIG Gerhard	SPD
GESSNER Manfred-Achim	SPD
HANDLOS Franz	CDU/CSU
von HASSEL Kai-Uwe	CDU/CSU
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU/CSU
MILZ Peter	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP

#### Substitutes

MM. ALBER Siegbert	CDU/CSU
AMREHN Franz	CDU/CSU
BARDENS Hans	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
MATTICK Kurt	SPD
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHEFFLER Hermann	SPD
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM	CDU/CSU
Adolf	
UEBERHORST Reinhard	SPD
WITTMANN Fritz	CDU/CSU
ZEBISCH Franz Josef	SPD



## ITALY

## Representatives

MM. AGRIMI Alessandro	Chr. Dem.
ANTONI Varese	Communist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FORMA Renzo	Chr. Dem.
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
LABRIOLA Silvano	Socialist
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PETRILLI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
TALAMONA Augusto	Socialist
TRIPODI Antonio	MSI
VALIANTE Mario	Chr. Dem.
VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

## Substitutes

MM. AJELLO Aldo	Republican
BATTAGLIA Adolfo	Republican
BEMPORAD Alberto	Socialist
BENEDIKTER Johann Hans	SVP
CAFIERO Luca	PDUP
CALICE Giovanni	Communist
CONTI PERSINI Gianfranco	PSDI
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
MARTINO Leopoldo	Communist
02 Attilio	
ORIONE Franco Luigi	Chr. Dem.
PATRIARCA Francesco	Chr. Dem.
POZZO Cesare	MSI
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
Mrs. ROSOLEN Angela Maria	Communist
MM. SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STERPA Egidio	Liberal

## LUXEMBOURG

## Representatives

MM. MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
MART René	Dem.
THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

## Substitutes

MM. GLESENER Jean-Pierre	Soc. Chr.
KRIEPS Robert	Soc. Workers
MEINTZ Carlo	Dem.

## NETHERLANDS

## Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	CDA
van HULST Johan	CDA
de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
VOOGD Johan	Labour

## Substitutes

MM. van den BERGH Harry	Labour
KONINGS Martin	Labour
LAMBERTS J. H.	Labour
MOMMERSTEEG Joseph	CDA
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA

## UNITED KINGDOM

## Representatives

Mr. Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Thomas COX	Labour
Anthony GRANT	Conservative
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
MM. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Anthony KERSHAW	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
MM. Fred MULLEY	Labour
President of the Assembly Cranley ONSLOW	Conservative
John PAGE	Conservative
Lord REAY	Conservative
Mr. Thomas URWIN	Labour

## Substitutes

MM. David ATKINSON	Conservative
Robert BANKS	Conservative
Ronald BROWN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Robert EDWARDS	Labour
Thomas ELLIS	Labour
Raymond FLETCHER	Labour
George FOULKES	Labour
Edward GARRETT	Labour
James HILL	Conservative
Lord McNAIR	Liberal
Lord NORTHFIELD	Labour
MM. John OSBORN	Conservative
Laurence PAVITT	Labour
Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Keith STAINTON	Conservative
John WILKINSON	Conservative
Sir Thomas WILLIAMS	Labour



**I**

**MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS**

# FIRST SITTING

Monday, 2nd June 1980

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Opening of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly.</li><li>2. Examination of Credentials.</li><li>3. Election of the President of the Assembly.</li><li>4. Address by the President of the Assembly.</li><li>5. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.</li></ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session (Doc. 832).</li><li>7. New weapons and defence strategy (<i>Votes on the draft Recommendations postponed from the last session, Doc. 827</i>).</li><li>8. Nomination of members to Committees.</li></ol> |
|--|---|

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 11.10 a.m. with Mr. Jager, Provisional President, in the Chair.*

### **1. Opening of the Session**

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2, 4, 5 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

### **2. Attendance Register**

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

### **3. Address by the Provisional President**

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

### **4. Examination of Credentials**

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stating that that Assembly had ratified the credentials of the Representatives and Substitutes listed in Notice No. 1.

### **5. Election of the President of the Assembly**

One candidate only was proposed for the post of President, namely Mr. Mulley.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the President by acclamation.

Mr. Mulley was elected President by acclamation.

At the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. Mulley took the Chair.

### **6. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The President addressed the Assembly.

### **7. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly**

Three candidates had been proposed for the six posts of Vice-President, namely: MM. Talamona, Reddemann and Tanghe.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

MM. Talamona, Reddemann and Tanghe were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

The Assembly decided that the order of seniority would be determined when the six Vice-Presidents were elected.

### 8. *Observers*

The President welcomed eight parliamentary observers: Mr. Budtz and Mr. Henriksen, members of the Danish Folketing; Mr. Vyzas and Mr. Koutsogeorgas, deputies from Greece; Mr. Udjus and Mr. Øvregard, members of the Norwegian Storting; Mr. Roseta and Mr. Tito de Moraes, deputies from Portugal.

### 9. *Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session*

(Doc. 832)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session.

*Speakers* (points of order): Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Hanin, Urwin and Jessel.

On the proposal of Mrs. von Bothmer it was agreed to hold separate debates on the report submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett on the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security and on the report submitted by Mr. Vohrer on the international situation and European security. The presentation of the report by Mr. Vohrer was postponed from Monday, 2nd June (afternoon sitting) until Tuesday, 3rd June (morning sitting).

Subject to these changes, the Assembly adopted the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session.

### 10. *New weapons and defence strategy*

(*Votes on the draft Recommendations postponed from the last session, Doc. 827*)

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the first draft Recommendation on new weapons and defence strategy – modernisation of theatre nuclear forces.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 41 votes to 9 with 6 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 345)<sup>1</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the second draft Recommendation on new weapons and defence strategy – the impact of technology.

*Speaker* (point of order): Mr. von Hassel.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix III) by 51 votes to 2 with 3 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 346)<sup>2</sup>.

### 11. *Nomination of members to Committees*

In accordance with Rules 39 (6) and 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the membership of the six Committees as follows:

#### 1. COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS (27 seats)

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Bonnel Dejardin Tanghe	MM. Van der Elst Lambiotte Mrs. Staels-Dompas
<i>France:</i>	MM. Bizet Boucheny Bozzi Ménard Péronnet	MM. Bechter Caro Ferretti Jung Schleiter

1. See page 21.

2. See page 22.

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Ahrens Handlos Lemmrich Pawelczyk Hermann Schmidt	MM. Büchner Lenzer Klepsch Mattick Vohrer
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Bernini Cavaliere Fosson Labriola Pecchioli	MM. Tripodi Foschi Talamona Calice Giust
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Meintz	Mr. Glesener
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van den Bergh de Koster Scholten	MM. Tummers Mommersteeg van Hulst
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Banks Cox Edwards Grant Onslow	Lord Duncan-Sandys Mr. Brown Dr. Miller Mr. Beith Sir Frederic Bennett

## 2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (27 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Hanin Lagneau Mangelschots	MM. Michel Van der Elst van Waterschoot
<i>France:</i>	MM. Berrier Brugnon Deschamps Druon Péridier	MM. Baumel Couderc Forni Grussenmeyer Koehl
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Gessner Mende Müller Reddemann	MM. Büchner Hansheinrich Schmidt Amrehn Evers Hermann Schmidt
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Conti Persini De Poi Talamona Valiante Vecchietti	MM. Patriarca Benedikter Rubbi Cavaliere Calamandrei

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Thoss	Mr. Mart
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Mommersteeg Portheine Voogd	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra MM. Schlingemann Lamberts
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Hardy Lord McNair Lord Reay Mr. Urwin	MM. Page Pavitt Kershaw Atkinson Sir Thomas Williams

### 3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Adriaensens van Waterschoot	MM. Brasseur Peeters
<i>France:</i>	MM. Malvy Péronnet Talon Valleix	MM. Bizet Wagnies Petit Lagourgue
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Lenzer Müller Scheffler Ueberhorst	N... MM. Spies von Büllenheim Flämig Zebisch
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Antoni Fiandrotti Forma Foschi	Mrs. Rosolen MM. Labriola Spitella Orione
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Mart	Mr. Thoss
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Cornelissen Konings	MM. Portheine Lamberts
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Garrett Hawkins McGuire Wilkinson	MM. Foulkes Onslow Ellis Jessel

### 4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Adriaensens Peeters	MM. Mangelschots Bonnell
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	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>France:</i>	MM. Depietri Jager Jeambrun Schleiter	MM. Lemoine Belin Pignion Lemaire
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Ahrens Alber Evers Vohrer	MM. Schulte Kittelmann Bardens Ueberhorst
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Martino Orione Petrilli Pozzo	MM. Cafiero Agrimi Bonalumi Ajello
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Krieps	Mr. Margue
<i>Netherlands:</i>	Mr. Tummers Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra	MM. Voogd van Hulst
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Mr. Fletcher Lord Hughes MM. Smith Stainton	Mr. Urwin Lord McNair MM. Kershaw Grieve

## 5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Brasseur Michel	MM. Lagneau Lambiotte
<i>France:</i>	MM. Bozzi Lagourgue Lemaire Pignion	MM. Périquier Bechter N... Talon
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Marquardt Schäuble Zebisch N...	MM. Büchner Evers Pawelczyk Handlos
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Battaglia Giust Maravalle Sterpa	MM. Patriarca Spitella Fiandrotti Romano
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Glesener	Mr. Margue
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van Hulst Voogd	MM. Cornelissen Stoffelen



	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Edwards Grieve Mrs. Knight Mr. Mulley	MM. Cox Osborn Jessel Sir Thomas Williams

6. COMMITTEE FOR RELATIONS WITH PARLIAMENTS (*14 seats*)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Bonnel Tanghe	MM. Dejardin Hanin
<i>France:</i>	MM. Lemoine Visse	MM. Jeambrun Sénès
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Böhm Enders	MM. Müller Bardens
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Agrimi Rubbi	MM. Forma Maravalle
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	MM. Glesener Meintz	MM. Thoss Mart
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Schlingemann Stoffelen	MM. Mommersteeg Lamberts
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Mr. Hill Lord Northfield	Mrs. Knight Mr. Foulkes

**12. *Date and time of the next Sitting***

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day  
at 3 p.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 12.05 p.m.*

## APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Mende <i>Spies von Büllenheim</i> (Milz) Müller <i>Büchner</i> (Pawelczyk) Reddemann <i>Bardens</i> (Hermann Schmidt) Vohrer	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Bonnel Hanin <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) Peeters Tanghe		MM. <i>van den Bergh</i> (van Hulst) <i>Portheine</i> (de Koster) <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen Tummers <i>Lamberts</i> (Voogd)
<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	
MM. <i>Bozzi</i> (Bizet) Boucheny Caro Jager <i>Jung</i> (Péronnet) Petit Schleiter Valleix	MM. <i>Spitella</i> (Agrimi) Antoni Bernini <i>Conti Persini</i> (Calamandrei) Cavaliere De Poi Forma <i>Giust</i> (Foschi) Fosson <i>Maravalle</i> (Labriola) Petrilli Talamona Tripodi Valiante Vecchietti	<b>United Kingdom</b>
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) Sir Frederic Bennett Lord <i>Northfield</i> (Cox) MM. <i>Banks</i> (Grant) Grieve Hardy Hawkins <i>Pavitt</i> (Lord Hughes) Jessel <i>Smith</i> (Kershaw) Mrs. Knight MM. <i>Brown</i> (McGuire) <i>Ellis</i> (Miller) Mulley Onslow Page Lord Reay Mr. Urwin
Mr. Ahrens Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders <i>Alber</i> (Evers) <i>Mattick</i> (Gessner) <i>Lenzer</i> (Handlos) von Hassel Kittelmann <i>Amrehn</i> (Lagershausen) <i>Scheffler</i> (Marquardt)	Mr. Margue	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Jeambrun Péridier Pignion Sénès Talon	<b>Italy</b>
MM. Adriaensens van Waterschoot		MM. Bonalumi Pecchioli Rubbi
<b>France</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
MM. Brugnon Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Grussenmeyer	MM. Mart Thoss	<b>Netherlands</b>
	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Mr. Cornelissen
	Mr. Flämig	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on new weapons and defence strategy – modernisation of theatre nuclear forces (Doc. 827)<sup>1</sup> :

Ayes .....	41
Noes .....	9
Abstentions .....	6

*Ayes:*

MM. <i>Spitella</i> (Agrimi)	MM. Grieve	MM. Onslow
Ahrens	<i>Lenzer</i> (Handlos)	Page
Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)	Hanin	<i>Büchner</i> (Pawelczyk)
Sir Frederic Bennett	Hardy	<i>Jung</i> (Péronnet)
Mrs. von Bothmer	von Hassel	Petrilli
Mr. Cavaliere	Hawkins	Lord Reay
Lord <i>Northfield</i> (Cox)	Jessel	MM. Reddemann
MM. De Poi	Mrs. Knight	<i>Bardens</i> (Hermann)
Enders	MM. <i>Amrehn</i> (Lagershausen)	Schmidt)
Forma	<i>Brown</i> (McGuire)	Tanghe
<i>Giust</i> (Foschi)	Margue	Tripodi
Fosson	<i>Scheffler</i> (Marquardt)	Urwin
<i>Mattick</i> (Gessner)	Mende	Valiante
<i>Banks</i> (Grant)	<i>Ellis</i> (Miller)	Vohrer

*Noes:*

MM. Antoni	MM. Bonnel	MM. Stoffelen
Bernini	<i>van den Bergh</i> (van Hulst)	Tummers
<i>Bozzi</i> (Bizet)	<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	Valleix

*Abstentions:*

MM. Caro	MM. <i>Maravalle</i> (Labriola)	MM. Schleiter
Jager	Peeters	Talamona

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## APPENDIX III

Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on new weapons and defence strategy – the impact of technology (Doc. 827)<sup>1</sup>:

Ayes .....	51
Noes .....	2
Abstentions .....	3

*Ayes:*

Mr. Ahrens	MM. von Hassel	MM. Page
Sir Frederic Bennett	Hawkins	<i>Büchner</i> (Pawelczyk)
Mr. Bonnel	<i>van den Bergh</i> (van Hulst)	Peeters
Mrs. von Bothmer	Jessel	<i>Jung</i> (Péronnet)
MM. Caro	Kittellmann	Petrilli
Cavaliere	Mrs. Knight	Lord Reay
Lord <i>Northfield</i> (Cox)	MM. <i>Portheine</i> (de Koster)	MM. Reddemann
MM. De Poi	<i>Maravalle</i> (Labriola)	<i>Bardens</i> (Hermann)
Enders	<i>Amrehn</i> (Lagershausen)	Schmidt)
<i>Alber</i> (Evers)	<i>Brown</i> (McGuire)	Stoffelen
Forma	Margue	Talamona
<i>Giust</i> (Foschi)	<i>Scheffler</i> (Marquardt)	Tanghe
Fosson	Mende	Tripodi
<i>Banks</i> (Grant)	<i>Ellis</i> (Miller)	Tummers
Grieve	<i>Spies von Büllesheim</i>	Urwin
<i>Lenzer</i> (Handlos)	(Milz)	Valiante
Hanin	Müller	Vohrer
Hardy	Onslow	

*Noes:*

MM. *Bozzi* (Bizet)  
Valleix

*Abstentions:*

MM. Jager  
*Dejardin* (Mangelschots)  
Schleiter

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 345*****on new weapons and defence strategy – modernisation of theatre nuclear forces***

The Assembly,

- (i) Regretting the deterioration in the military balance resulting from the steady increase in levels of many Soviet weapons systems, and deploring in particular the increased nuclear threat posed by the deployment by the Soviet Union of new medium-range nuclear weapons – the SS-20 missile and Backfire bomber – and large numbers of battlefield nuclear weapons;
- (ii) Believing it essential for the Alliance to maintain and update whenever necessary a complete range of weapons systems to ensure a credible military capability in all parts of the triad of conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons on which the strategy of deterrence through a capacity for flexible response is based;
- (iii) Believing further that political responsibility for and the risks of this policy must be shared by all countries of the Alliance, in particular, while recognising various national conditions, through readiness to accept the stationing on their territory of such weapons as may be necessary for its implementation;
- (iv) Believing the essential continuity between the three parts of the triad would be dangerously weakened if the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20 missiles and Backfire bomber were not to be countered by the Alliance's overall strategic capabilities;
- (v) Recalling moreover that the policy of the Alliance is to seek security through détente as well as deterrence, and that reliable arms control agreements and confidence-building measures can contribute as much to the establishment of military balance as the provision of adequate weapons systems;
- (vi) Noting therefore that Mr. Brezhnev's speech in East Berlin on 6th October 1979 may be a sign that the Soviet Union now understands that the NATO countries consider the deployment of the SS-20 a serious threat, and is prepared for negotiations on the whole question of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, although many points still have to be clarified,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call on the North Atlantic Council :

To seek to redress the military balance, now threatened in particular by the deployment of new Soviet nuclear weapons systems:

- (a) by taking the decisions necessary to ensure that the growing imbalance between Warsaw Pact and NATO long-range theatre nuclear forces is corrected in due course;
- (b) by accompanying these decisions by a firm offer to enter into arms control negotiations with a view to limiting long-range theatre nuclear force deployments on both sides;
- (c) by continuing to seek agreement on significant reductions in present numbers of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons;
- (d) by relying meanwhile on the whole range of existing weapons systems based in Europe, at sea, and in the United States to counter the threat posed by present levels of Soviet weapons;
- (e) by seeking any opportunity for agreement on mutual and balanced reductions of central and theatre nuclear weapons and of conventional forces and weapons.

**RECOMMENDATION 346*****on new weapons and defence strategy – the impact of technology***

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The Assembly,

(i) Noting with approval that NATO strategy has placed progressively greater emphasis on the rôle of conventional weapons in recent years and that new precision-guided conventional weapons have replaced nuclear weapons in certain specific military applications;

(ii) Recognising that the application of new technologies to defence purposes may have unexpected repercussions on the military balance and on arms control arrangements, and calling therefore for continued proper political control to be exercised over such application,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

A. Call on the North Atlantic Council:

1. To take into account the implications of the application of new defence technologies on arms control negotiations such as SALT III and MBFR;

2. To continue actively the present policy of replacing nuclear weapons systems by conventional systems where militarily feasible and of equal deterrent value;

B. Urge member governments:

1. To establish machinery to ensure that the application of new technologies to defence purposes continues to be subject to deliberate and properly informed governmental decision;

2. To submit annually to their parliaments reports on the arms control implications of all new defence equipment programmes.

## SECOND SITTING

Monday, 2nd June 1980

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Political developments in Europe – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Docs. 834 and 836 and Amendments).
2. Twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*, Docs. 833 and 846).
3. Political developments in Europe – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (*Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendations*, Docs 834 and 836 and Amendments).
4. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (*Presentation of the Report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 844 and Amendments).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Talamona, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

#### 3. Political developments in Europe – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council

##### *Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council*

*(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 834 and 836 and Amendments)*

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Page, Rapporteur.

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur.

The Joint Debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Antoni, Jung and von Hassel.

(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The Joint Debate was adjourned.

#### 4. Twenty-fifth annual report of the Council

*(Presentation by Mr. van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 833 and 846)*

The Report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mr. van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van der Klaauw replied to questions put by MM. Valleix, Konings, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Jung, Pignion, Stainton, Mommersteeg and van den Bergh.

#### 5. Political developments in Europe – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council

##### *Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council*

*(Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Docs. 834 and 836 and Amendments)*

The Joint Debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Urwin, Bozzi, Valleix, Dejaradin, Mommersteeg and Hanin.

Mr. Page, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, and Mrs. von Bothmer, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Joint Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation in Document 834.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to, note being taken of 4 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 347)<sup>1</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation in Document 836.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Bozzi:

3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "supplement" and insert "be preceded" and, at the beginning of line 2, insert "by".

*Speakers:* MM. Bozzi and Tanghe.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. van den Bergh:

6. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "urgent".

Amendment 6 was not moved.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Bozzi:

4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, at the beginning insert "Invite the states concerned, subject to the agreement of the Federal Republic of Germany, to".

*Speakers:* MM. Bozzi and Tanghe.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett:

1. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Arrange" and insert "Delete".

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Bozzi:

5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Arrange" and insert "Examine the possibility of arranging".

*Speakers:* Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bozzi and Tanghe.

Amendment 1 was agreed to.

Amendment 5 was not moved.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Ahrens:

2. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "elsewhere".

*Speakers:* MM. Ahrens and Tanghe.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation in Document 836.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote was postponed until the next Sitting.

#### **6. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 3rd June, at 10 a.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.*

<sup>1</sup>. See page 26.



## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. <i>Spies von Büllenheim</i> (Milz) Müller Reddemann	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. <i>Lambiotte</i> (Adriaensens) Bonnel Hanin <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) Peeters Tanghe <i>Michel</i> (van Waterschoot)	<b>Italy</b>	MM. Cornelissen <i>van den Bergh</i> (van Hulst) <i>Portheine</i> (de Koster) <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen Tummers <i>Konings</i> (Voogd)
<b>France</b>	MM. Agrimi Antoni Bernini <i>Spitella</i> (Bonalumi) <i>Conti Persini</i> (Calamandrei) Cavaliere De Poi Forma <i>Giust</i> (Foschi) Fosson <i>Maravalle</i> (Labriola) Petrilli Talamona Tripodi Valiante Vecchietti	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. <i>Bozzi</i> (Bizet) <i>Jung</i> (Péronnet) Pignion Valleix		Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Cox <i>Stainton</i> (Grant) Grieve Hardy <i>Garrett</i> (Lord Hughes) Jessel <i>Smith</i> (Kershaw) Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire Dr. Miller MM. <i>Brown</i> (Mulley) Page Lord Reay Mr. Urwin
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
Mr. Ahrens Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders <i>Böhm</i> (Evers) Fläming von Hassel Kittelmann <i>Amrehn</i> (Lagershausen) <i>Scheffler</i> (Marquardt) Mende	MM. Margue <i>Meintz</i> (Mart) Thoss	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>France</b>	MM. Schleiter Sénès Talon	<b>Italy</b>
MM. Boucheny Brugnon Caro Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Grussenmeyer Jeambrun Péridier Petit	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	MM. Pecchioli Rubbi
	MM. Gessner Handlos Pawelczyk Hermann Schmidt Vohrer	<b>United Kingdom</b>
		MM. Hawkins Onslow

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 347*****on political developments in Europe –  
reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Remembering that the year 1980 marks the beginning of the second half of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and welcoming the fact that the relationship between the WEU Council and the Assembly rests on a sound basis;

Noting with appreciation that the Council has again shown its intention to continue the dialogue with the Assembly on the various questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and also the flexible and effective manner in which it has generally provided information, particularly concerning the results of the study being carried out by the Standing Armaments Committee;

Considering that while Article I of the modified Brussels Treaty is opposed to duplication of work, it also advocates affording the most effective assistance to “the work of other economic organisations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented”;

Welcoming the fact that at its joint meetings with Assembly Committees the Council proposes to incorporate an informal procedure “so that each member of the Council can give his government’s views” along with the expression of its collective views;

Anticipating that, in due course, WEU may be expected to participate in a wider framework of European co-operation and that the General Affairs Committee should examine any consequential changes in the organisation of WEU;

Aware that Europe, in order to be master of its destiny, would have to be politically organised, based on genuinely integrated and co-ordinated foreign and defence policies,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Continue its effort to keep the Assembly regularly informed, by all appropriate means, about:
  - (a) the progress of work in the Independent European Programme Group, particularly in the Assembly’s specific fields of interest;
  - (b) those parts of the study undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee which have been completed and which are not covered by military secrecy;
  - (c) matters important to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when they are dealt with by the member governments within other organisations;
2. Should not omit, in informing the Assembly of the results of political co-operation between member states, to report also on subjects on which satisfactory results have not been obtained or even sought;
3. To this end, seek better liaison both between governments and between NATO and other relevant organisations, so that questions not dealt with in these organisations may be the subject of exchanges of views within the framework of the WEU Council;
4. Examine, with the President of the Assembly, the ways in which questions to be raised in joint meetings by members of relevant Committees may receive “collective” answers;
5. Examine the organisational measures to be taken now so that, when the time is ripe, WEU may be prepared to take its place in a wider framework of European co-operation.

## THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd June 1980

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 844 and Amendments*).
2. The international situation and European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 845*).
3. Application of the Brussels Treaty + reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 836*).
4. Address by Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

#### 3. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Three candidates had been proposed for the three remaining posts of Vice-President, namely MM. Cornelissen, Mart and Valleix.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation and that the Vice-Presidents should rank according to age, namely: MM. Tanghe, Talamona, Mart, Valleix, Reddemann, Cornelissen.

#### 4. Changes in the membership of Committees

In accordance with Rule 39(6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following nominations to Committees proposed by the Italian Delegation:

- Mr. Maravalle as a titular member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in place of Mr. Labriola;

- Mr. Maravalle as an alternate member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in place of Mr. Labriola.

#### 5. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 844 and Amendments)*

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers:* Mr. Vecchietti, Lord Reay, MM. Mattick and Jung.

*(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

*Speakers:* MM. Beith and Deschamps.

The Debate was adjourned.

#### 6. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council

*(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 836)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 55 votes to 6 with 2 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 348)<sup>1</sup>.

**7. Address by Mr. Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom**

Mr. Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Hurd replied to questions put by MM. Bozzi, Cavaliere, Grant, Jager, Lord Reay, Mrs. Knight, MM. Pignion and Osborn.

**8. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security**

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 844 and Amendments)*

The Debate was resumed.

*Speakers:* MM. Müller, Hardy, Stoffelen, van den Bergh and Mommersteeg.

The Debate was adjourned.

**9. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m.*

<sup>1</sup>. See page 31.

## APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. <i>Scheffler</i> (Marquardt) Mende <i>Spies von Büllesheim</i> (Milz) Müller <i>Büchner</i> (Pawelczyk) Reddemann <i>Bardens</i> (Hermann Schmidt) Vohrer	<b>Luxembourg</b> MM. Margue Mart <i>Glesener</i> (Thoss)
Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i> (Adriaensens)		
MM. Bonnel Hanin <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) Peeters Tanghe van Waterschoot		<b>Netherlands</b> MM. Cornelissen <i>Konings</i> (van Hulst) <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen Tummers <i>van den Bergh</i> (Voogd)
<b>France</b>		
MM. <i>Bozzi</i> (Bizet) Boucheny Deschamps <i>Baumel</i> (Grussenmeyer) Jager <i>Jung</i> (Péronnet) Pignon Valleix	<b>Italy</b> MM. Agrimi Bernini <i>Spitella</i> (Bonalumi) <i>Conti Persini</i> (Calamandrei) Cavaliere De Poi Forma <i>Giust</i> (Foschi) Fosson <i>Maravalle</i> (Labriola) Petrilli <i>Orione</i> (Rubbi) Talamona Tripodi Valiante Vecchietti	<b>United Kingdom</b> Mr. Beith Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Cox Grant Grieve Hardy Hawkins Jessel <i>Smith</i> (Kershaw) Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Pavitt</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller MM. <i>Edwards</i> (Mulley) Onslow Page Lord Reay Mr. <i>Ellis</i> (Urwin)
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>		
Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders <i>Wittmann</i> (Evers) Fläming <i>Mattick</i> (Gessner) <i>Lenzer</i> (Handlos) von Hassel Kittelman <i>Böhm</i> (Lagershausen)		

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>France</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Brugnon Caro Depietri Ferretti Jeambrun Péridier Petit Schleiter Sénès Talon	Mr. Ahrens	Mr. de Koster
	<b>Italy</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
	MM. Antoni Pecchioli	Lord Hughes

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## APPENDIX II

Vote No. 3 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on the application of the Brussels Treaty following the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union (Doc. 836)<sup>1</sup>:

Ayes .....	55
Noes .....	6
Abstentions .....	2

*Ayes:*

Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i> (Adriaensens)	MM. Grieve <i>Lenzer</i> (Handlos)	MM. Onslow Page <i>Büchner</i> (Pawelczyk)
MM. Agrimi Beith	Hanin Hardy	Peeters <i>Jung</i> (Péronnet)
Sir Frederic Bennett	von Hassel	<i>Petrilli</i>
Mr. Bonnel	Hawkins	Lord Reay
Mrs. von Bothmer	<i>Konings</i> (van Hulst)	MM. Reddemann
MM. <i>Conti Persini</i> (Calamandrei)	Jager	<i>Bardens</i> (Hermann)
Cavaliere	Kittelmann	Schmidt)
Cox	Mrs. Knight	Stoffelen
Cornelissen	MM. <i>Böhm</i> (Lagershausen)	Tanghe
De Poi	<i>Pavitt</i> (McGuire)	<i>Glesener</i> (Thoss)
Enders	Margue	Tummers
<i>Wittmann</i> (Evers)	<i>Scheffler</i> (Marquardt)	<i>Ellis</i> (Urwin)
Flämig	Mende	Valiante
Forma	Dr. Miller	Vohrer
Fosson	MM. <i>Spies von Büllesheim</i> (Milz)	<i>van den Bergh</i> (Voogd)
<i>Mattick</i> (Gessner)	Müller	van Waterschoot
Grant	<i>Edwards</i> (Mulley)	

*Noes:*

MM. Bernini Boucheny	MM. Deschamps <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	MM. Pignion <i>Orione</i> (Rubbi)
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*Abstentions:*

MM. <i>Bozzi</i> (Bizet) Valleix
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1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## RECOMMENDATION 348

*on the application of the Brussels Treaty  
following the invasion of Afghanistan  
by the Soviet Union*

---

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that at a time when the forces of the Soviet Union have just invaded a non-member country of the Warsaw Pact it is essential to reaffirm the mutual defence obligations of Articles IV, V and VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (ii) Recalling the recommendations in the report on strategic mobility prepared by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments\*;
- (iii) Considering that no provision of the modified Brussels Treaty should jeopardise the security of the Alliance and noting that the Council applies only partially the controls provided for in Protocol No. III;
- (iv) Anxious to clarify the state of commitments entered into in the framework of the treaty,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Consider that consultations in the North Atlantic Council may supplement, where appropriate, those provided for in Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty, thus reaffirming the proper responsibilities of each of the seven member countries and the respective provisions of the Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties;
2. Call for the strengthening of the defence of all member states through the urgent implementation by the states concerned of measures of the long-term defence programme to take account in particular of the situation in the Middle East;
3. Approve, in the appropriate NATO bodies, the assignment of German naval forces to SACLANT and to SACEUR with the sole aim of making the best use of all available allied forces for the common defence;
4. Delete paragraph V of Annex III to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty;
5. Make use of the procedure whereby NATO may provide material for replies to appropriate Assembly recommendations;
6. Amplify, in future annual reports, the present reference to United Kingdom land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe by a corresponding reference to the United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force and any redeployment of such forces liable to affect the accuracy of the figures given;
7. Clarify, in its twenty-sixth annual report, the present situation as regards stocks of chemical weapons held by member countries and publish in it the list approved by the Council, currently in force, of chemical products to be controlled by the Agency.

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\* Document 758.

## FOURTH SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd June 1980

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 844 and Amendments*).
2. The international situation and European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 845*).
3. Interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 843*).
4. Co-operation between WEU member countries on video communication systems (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 839*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

#### 3. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee Doc. 844 and Amendments)*

The Debate was resumed.

*Speakers:* MM. Grieve, Pavitt, Dr. Miller, MM. Pignion, Jessel, McGuire and De Poi.

*(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

*Speakers:* MM. Grant, Valleix and MM. Vyzas and Koutsogeorgas (*Observers from Greece*).

Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was adjourned.

#### 4. Welcome of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium

The President welcomed to the Sitting Mr. Nothomb, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium.

Mr. Nothomb addressed the Assembly.

#### 5. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 844 and Amendments)*

The Debate was resumed.

Mrs. von Bothmer, outgoing Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Valleix:

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "on the most appropriate basis"

*Speakers:* Mr. Valleix and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by MM. Urwin and Hardy:



2. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, line 1, after "every" insert "peaceful" and in line 2 leave out "intervention in" and insert "invasion of".

*Speakers:* MM. Hardy, Cavaliere, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Hardy.

A manuscript Amendment was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett:

In paragraph 3, line 1, to leave out "every" and insert "all"; to delete from the proposed amendment "peaceful" and to insert in the draft recommendation after "countries" the words "without resort to military measures".

The manuscript Amendment was agreed to.

The Amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by MM. Hardy and Stoffelen.

1. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "the economic assistance necessary for" and insert "economic support to assist in".

*Speakers:* Mr. Hardy and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Valleix:

4. Leave out paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"8. Propose that the United Nations Security Council guarantee respect for an overall settlement ensuring *inter alia* the security of Israel in a specific, concrete and binding manner;".

*Speakers:* MM. Valleix, Dejardin and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was negated.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Valleix:

5. In paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "before that conference" and insert "prior"; after "participants" insert "in this settlement".

*Speakers:* Mr. Valleix and Sir Frederic Bennett.

Part 1 of the Amendment was not moved; part 2 was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

*Speakers* (explanation of vote): Dr. Miller and Mr. Reddemann.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 39 votes to 5 with 13 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 349)¹.

### **6. Interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure**

*(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Doc. 843)*

On the proposal of Mr. Grieve, Rapporteur and Chairman of the Committee, the Report was referred back to the Committee.

*Speaker* (point of order): Sir Frederic Bennett.

### **7. The international situation and European security**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 845)*

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Vohrer, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Atkinson and Ellis.

*(Mr. Talamona, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

*Speakers:* MM. Brown and Depietri.

Mr. Vohrer, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote on the draft Recommendation was postponed until the next Sitting.

### **8. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 4th June, at 10 a.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 6.35 p.m.*

1. See page 36.

## APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. <i>Scheffler</i> (Gessner) <i>Lenzer</i> (Handlos) von Hassel Kittelmann Marquardt Reddemann Vohrer	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. <i>Lambiotte</i> (Adriaensens) Bonnell Hanin <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) Peeters Tanghe van Waterschoot		MM. Cornelissen <i>Konings</i> (van Hulst) <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen <i>Lamberts</i> (Voogd)
	<b>Italy</b>	
<b>France</b>	MM. Agrimi Bernini <i>Spitella</i> (Bonalumi) Cavaliere De Poi Forma <i>Giust</i> (Foschi) Fosson <i>Maravalle</i> (Labriola) Petrilli <i>Orione</i> (Rubbi) Talamona Tripodi Valiante Vecchietti	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Boucheny Brugnon Depietri Deschamps <i>Baumel</i> (Grussenmeyer) Jager <i>Jung</i> (Péronnet) Petit Pignon Sénès Valleix		Sir Frederic Bennett Sir <i>Thomas Williams</i> (Cox) MM. Grant Grieve Hardy Hawkins <i>Brown</i> (Lord Hughes) Jessel <i>Atkinson</i> (Kershaw) Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire Dr. Miller MM. <i>Edwards</i> (Mulley) Onslow Page Lord Reay Mr. <i>Ellis</i> (Urwin)
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders <i>Wittmann</i> (Evers) Fläming	Mr. Margue <i>Glesener</i> (Thoss)	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>France</b>	MM. Mende Milz Müller Pawelczyk Hermann Schmidt	<b>Luxembourg</b>
MM. Bizet Caro Ferretti Jeambrun Péridier Schleiter Talon		MM. Mart
	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	MM. Antoni Calamandrei Pecchioli	MM. de Koster Tummers
MM. Ahrens Lagerhausen		<b>United Kingdom</b>
		Mr. Beith

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## APPENDIX II

Vote No. 4 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (Doc. 844)<sup>1</sup>:

Ayes .....	39
Noes .....	5
Abstentions .....	13

*Ayes:*

Mr. Agrimi	MM. <i>Lenzer</i> (Handlos)	MM. <i>Edwards</i> (Mulley)
Sir Frederic Bennett	Hanin	Onslow
MM. Bonnel	Hardy	Page
Cavaliere	von Hassel	Peeters
Sir <i>Thomas Williams</i> (Cox)	Hawkins	Petrilli
MM. De Poi	<i>Konings</i> (van Hulst)	Lord Reay
Enders	<i>Atkinson</i> (Kershaw)	MM. Stoffelen
Flämig	Mrs. Knight	Talamona
Forma	MM. <i>Maravalle</i> (Labriola)	Tanghe
Fosson	McGuire	<i>Ellis</i> (Urwin)
<i>Scheffler</i> (Gessner)	<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	Vohrer
Grant	Margue	<i>Lamberts</i> (Voogd)
Grieve	Marquardt	van Waterschoot

*Noes:*

MM. Boucheny	Mr. Deschamps	Mr. <i>Jung</i> (Péronnet)
Depietri	Dr. Miller	

*Abstentions:*

MM. <i>Lambiotte</i> (Adriaensens)	MM. Jessel	MM. <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten)
Bernini	Petit	Sénès
Brugnon	Pignion	Valleix
Cornelissen	Reddemann	Vecchietti
<i>Wittmann</i> (Evers)		

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 349*****on the impact of the evolving situation  
in the Near and Middle East on Western European security***

The Assembly,

Considering that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is a threat to the fundamental principles of international law and is a serious threat to the balance and peace in an area which is vital for the security of the western world;

Believing that this intervention makes it essential to take urgent measures to guarantee the maintenance of peace in the Middle East;

Considering furthermore that democratic countries must make use of all the peaceful means at their disposal to demonstrate their non-acceptance of the *fait accompli*;

Considering also that the holding of United States diplomats as hostages in Tehran is an intolerable violation of international law and a threat to peace in Asia and prevents the improvement of relations with Iran;

Believing that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan makes it essential to strengthen without delay the defence means of the members of the Atlantic Alliance and considering that in this context the establishment of just and lasting peace in Palestine is essential for stability in the area;

Recalling that in their declaration of 29th June 1977 the Nine said that fair and lasting peace could only be established in the Middle East in an overall context. Such a settlement must be based on relevant resolutions of the Security Council and establish the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland, through self-determination, without prejudicing the existence of Israel as an independent state within internationally secure and recognised boundaries;

Recalling that the Nine deplored the policy of settlements pursued by the Israeli Government in the occupied territories, which is illegal from the point of view of international law and contrary to decisions of the Security Council in its most recent resolution;

Noting that the Palestine Liberation Organisation is the only body recognised as representing the Palestinian people by the Arab states as early as in 1974;

Noting that an increasing number of western countries, including several WEU member states, have acknowledged that a solution of the Palestine problem is difficult, if not impossible, to attain without the participation of the PLO;

Considering that Europe, when it manages to speak with a single voice, could be in a position to make an effective contribution to the maintenance of peace with justice in the Near and Middle East;

Recalling and reiterating all the as yet unfulfilled and still relevant recommendations in Recommendation 341, approved by the Assembly of WEU in December 1979 ;

Noting with approval the declaration on the international situation adopted by the Nine on 28th April 1980 affecting the matters raised in the present document,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Intensify consultations between its members on all questions concerning the balance and security in areas not covered by the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to agreeing on joint action whenever and wherever possible;
2. Develop forthwith the means of defence at Europe's disposal and reinforce, on the most appropriate basis, the capacity of Pakistan and other threatened countries in the region to defend their territorial integrity;
3. Make use of all means at the disposal of member countries without resort to military measures to demonstrate collectively their non-acceptance of the *fait accompli* by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan;

4. Demonstrate their solidarity in requiring Iran to free the United States diplomats now being held hostage;
5. Supply Turkey with economic support to assist in overcoming the difficulties it is encountering and for associating that country as closely as possible with the economy of Western Europe;
6. Initiate, after 26th May 1980, new steps necessary to contribute to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in Palestine;
7. Urge the Security Council either to review and supplement Resolution 242 to express beyond argument the original fundamental purposes and scope of that resolution; or else to consider and declare a new composite resolution on the one hand designed to provide adequate security for the integrity of Israel within secure and internationally-recognised boundaries whilst on the other hand assuring Palestinians of an inherent right of self-determination on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip to establish their own homeland;
8. Propose, thereafter, the preparation of a conference between Israel, all adjacent Arab countries, a delegation truly representative of the Palestinian people, the United States and Western European countries in a position to contribute to its success;
9. To this end, endeavour to secure before that conference unequivocal declarations by the Arab participants in this settlement recognising Israel's right to exist and by Israel recognising the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

## FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th June 1980

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Co-operation between WEU member countries on video communication systems (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 839*).
2. The international situation and European security (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 845*).
3. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 838 and Amendments*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

#### 3. Change in the membership of a Committee

In accordance with Rule 39(6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following nomination to a Committee proposed by the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany:

- Mr. Reddemann as an alternate member of the General Affairs Committee in place of Mr. Evers.

#### 4. Co-operation between WEU member countries on video communication systems

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 839)*

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Forma and Lenzer.

Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 44 votes to 1 with 0 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 350)<sup>1</sup>.

#### 5. The international situation and European security

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 845)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

*Speakers:* Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Hawkins (point of order).

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix III) by 44 votes to 3 with 0 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 351)<sup>2</sup>.

#### 6. Retirement of the Clerk of the Assembly

The President announced the forthcoming retirement of the Clerk of the Assembly, Mr.

1. See page 43.

2. See page 44.

Francis Humblet, and paid tribute to his contribution to the work of the Assembly.

### **7. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 838 and Amendments)*

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Banks, Rapporteur.

*(Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Bernini, Hardy, Dr. Miller, MM. Jager, Smith, Dejardin, Grant, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Brown and Valleix.

Mr. Banks, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

*(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by MM. Ahrens and Büchner:

1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, line 2, leave out "use" and insert "production".

*Speakers:* MM. Ahrens and Banks.

A manuscript Amendment was tabled by Mr. Banks:

In paragraph (iii) of the preamble, before "use" insert "manufacture, stockpiling or".

The manuscript Amendment was agreed to.

The Amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by MM. Ahrens and Büchner:

In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "an equality of retaliatory and defensive capability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact" and insert "maintaining a complete deterrent and defensive capability as required by MC 14/3".

*Speakers:* MM. Ahrens and Banks.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by MM. Ahrens and Büchner:

3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"2. To investigate within NATO the requirement for a deterrent and retaliatory capability consisting of chemical weapons and the legal limitations with respect to their use;"

*Speakers:* MM. Ahrens and Banks.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by MM. Ahrens and Büchner:

4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "use" and insert "transfer".

*Speakers:* MM. Ahrens and Banks.

A manuscript Amendment was tabled by Mr. Banks:

In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation, after "stockpiling" insert "transfer".

The manuscript Amendment was agreed to.

The Amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Brown and others:

5. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

*Speakers:* MM. Brown, Jessel, Hardy, Dr. Miller and Mr. Banks.

The Amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote was postponed until the next Sitting.

*Speaker (point of order):* Mrs. Knight.

### **8. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.*

## APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Kittelmann <i>Schäuble</i> (Lagershausen) Marquardt Mende Müller <i>Büchner</i> (Pawelczyk) Reddemann <i>Scheffler</i> (Hermann Schmidt)	<b>Netherlands</b> MM. Cornelissen <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen <i>Lamberts</i> (Tummers) <i>Konings</i> (Voogd)
MM. <i>Lambiotte</i> (Adriaensens) Bonnell <i>Michel</i> (Hanin) <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) Tanghe van Waterschoot		
<b>France</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Boucheny Brugnon Depietri Jager Pignon Sénès Valleix	MM. Agrimi Bernini <i>Spitella</i> (Bonalumi) De Poi Forma <i>Giust</i> (Foschi) Fosson Petrilli Talamona	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Cox Grant <i>Wilkinson</i> (Grieve) Hardy Hawkins Lord Hughes MM. Jessel <i>Smith</i> (Kershaw) Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire Dr. Miller MM. <i>Edwards</i> (Mulley) Onslow <i>Osborn</i> (Page) <i>Banks</i> (Lord Reay) <i>Brown</i> (Urwin)
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
Mr. Ahrens Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders Fläming <i>Lenzer</i> (Handlos) von Hassel	MM. Margue Mart	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Périquier Péronnet Petit Schleiter Talon	<b>Italy</b> MM. Antoni Calamandrei Cavaliere Labriola Pecchioli Rubbi Tripodi Valiante Vecchiotti
Mr. Peeters		
<b>France</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	
MM. Bizet Caro Deschamps Ferretti Grussenmeyer Jeambrun	MM. Evers Gessner Milz Vohrer	<b>Luxembourg</b> Mr. Thoss

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.



## APPENDIX II

Vote No. 5 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on co-operation between WEU member countries on video communication systems (Doc. 839)<sup>1</sup>:

Ayes .....	44
Noes .....	1
Abstentions .....	0

*Ayes:*

Mr. Agrimi	MM. von Hassel	MM. Onslow
Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)	Hawkins	<i>Osborn</i> (Page)
Sir Frederic Bennett	Lord Hughes	<i>Büchner</i> (Pawelczyk)
MM. Bernini	MM. Jager	Petrilli
<i>Spitella</i> (Bonalumi)	Jessel	<i>Banks</i> (Lord Reay)
Mrs. von Bothmer	<i>Smith</i> (Kershaw)	Reddemann
MM. Cox	Kittelmann	<i>Scheffler</i> (Hermann
De Poi	<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	Schmidt)
Enders	Margue	Stoffelen
Forma	Marquardt	Talamona
<i>Giust</i> (Foschi)	Mart	Tanghe
Grant	Mende	<i>Lamberts</i> (Tummers)
<i>Lenzer</i> (Handlos)	Dr. Müller	<i>Brown</i> (Urwin)
<i>Michel</i> (Hanin)	MM. Müller	Valleix
Hardy	<i>Edwards</i> (Mulley)	<i>Konings</i> (Voogd)

*Noes:*

Mr. Depietri

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## APPENDIX III

Vote No. 6 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on the international situation and European security (Doc. 845):

Ayes .....	44
Noes .....	3
Abstentions .....	0

*Ayes:*

Lord *McNair* (Beith)  
 Sir Frederic Bennett  
 Mr. *Spitella* (Bonalumi)  
 Mrs. von Bothmer  
 MM. Cox  
 Cornelissen  
 De Poi  
 Enders  
 Flämig  
 Forma  
*Giust* (Foschi)  
 Grant  
*Lenzer* (Handlos)  
*Michel* (Hanin)  
 Hardy

MM. von Hassel  
 Hawkins  
 Lord Hughes  
 MM. Jager  
 Jessel  
*Smith* (Kershaw)  
 Kittelmann  
 Mrs. Knight  
 MM. McGuire  
 Margue  
 Marquardt  
 Mende  
 Dr. Miller  
 MM. Müller  
*Edwards* (Mulley)

MM. Onslow  
*Osborn* (Page)  
*Büchner* (Pawelczyk)  
 Petrilli  
*Banks* (Lord Reay)  
 Reddemann  
*Scheffler* (Hermann  
 Schmidt)  
 Stoffelen  
 Talamona  
 Tanghe  
*Lamberts* (Tummers)  
*Brown* (Urwin)  
 Valleix  
*Konings* (Voogd)

*Noes:*

MM. Bernini  
 Depietri  
*Dejardin* (Mangelschots)

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 350*****on co-operation between WEU member countries on  
video communication systems***

The Assembly,

Having become acquainted with recent developments in the United Kingdom with the Prestel view-data system, in France with the Antiope videotex system and in other member countries in this field;

Aware that in the absence of appropriate American developments in this area the United States Federal Communications Committee is studying the abovementioned and similar systems and is considering their adaptability for the American market;

Recalling that current developments are sponsored jointly by government departments and private enterprises;

Convinced that these new communications systems will also have a significant impact on military communications systems;

Seeking to promote co-operation among European countries so as to foster the possibility of gaining access to American and world markets,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES**

1. To concert their efforts to establish European standards for video communication systems applicable to world markets through the CEPT and, to this end, to approach the bodies or firms concerned;
2. To urge all authorities and industries concerned to promote co-operation with each other in these matters.

**RECOMMENDATION 351*****on the international situation and European security***

The Assembly,

Considering that the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan is a pure violation of the law of nations as defined *inter alia* in the Charter of the United Nations and the final act signed in Helsinki;

Considering that Soviet expansion in the Middle East is a threat to stability in that area which is of vital interest to the West;

Considering that the deployment of new weapons in Eastern Europe is also liable to upset the balance on which peace depends;

Considering that consultations between members of the Atlantic Alliance were not held quickly enough or in sufficient detail to allow a joint policy to be drawn up in face of these threats;

Deploring in particular that these countries were not in a position to define jointly the measures made necessary by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan;

Recognising nevertheless the need for the decision taken by the members of NATO to increase progressively the proportion of their expenditure allocated to joint defence;

Endorsing the proposal by the Nine to seek the departure of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, a status of neutrality and non-alignment being conferred on that country by agreement between the parties;

Considering that the search for a balance of forces and armaments in Europe at the lowest possible level, even if this cannot be achieved in the short term, is still in conformity with the interests of the West;

Considering that it is in the interest of all to develop contacts and exchanges of all kinds between Eastern and Western Europe;

Considering that the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all countries is still one of the West's major objectives,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Ensure that the European members of the Atlantic Alliance concert regularly and efficiently the policies they pursue outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;
2. Ensure that the members of the Atlantic Alliance agree on effective measures to be taken to convince the Soviet Union of their unanimous condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan;
3. Ensure that its members pursue their efforts to sustain the defensive capacity of the Atlantic Alliance in face of new Soviet weapons;
4. Ensure the pursuit of negotiations with the Soviet Union and its allies to achieve a limitation and reduction of forces and armaments to establish a true balance in forces and in conventional weapons and continental-range nuclear missiles at the lowest possible level;
5. Ensure that the application of the final act signed in Helsinki is the subject of strict and exhaustive scrutiny at the Madrid conference.

## SIXTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th June 1980

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 837 and Amendment*).
2. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 838*).
3. Defence-related information technology (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 840*).
4. State of European aerospace activities – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 841*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. *Adoption of the Minutes*

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. *Attendance Register*

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

#### 3. *Changes in the membership of Committees*

In accordance with Rule 39(6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following nominations to Committees proposed by the Belgian Delegation:

- Mr. Peeters as an alternate member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in place of Mrs. Staels-Dompas;
- Mrs. Staels-Dompas as an alternate member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in place of Mr. Peeters.

#### 4. *The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands*

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 837 and Amendment)*

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur.

The previous question was moved by Mr. Boucheny and others under Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, Document 847.

*Speakers:* MM. Boucheny, Reddemann and Ahrens.

The previous question was negatived.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Hardy, Wilkinson and De Jardin.

Mr. Ahrens, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

1. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “North Atlantic Council” and insert “appropriate military authorities of NATO”.

*Speakers:* MM. Hardy and Ahrens.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote was postponed until the next Sitting.

#### 5. *Nuclear, biological and chemical protection*

*(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 838)*

In the absence of a quorum, the vote was postponed until the next Sitting.

### 6. *Changes in the membership of Committees*

In accordance with Rule 39(6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following nominations to Committees proposed by the Italian Delegation:

- Mr. Spitella as an alternate member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in place of Mr. Foschi;
- Mr. Foschi as an alternate member of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges in place of Mr. Spitella.

### 7. *Defence-related information technology*

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 840)*

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Basseur, Rapporteur.

*(Mr. Mart, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The Debate was opened.

*Speaker:* Mr. Osborn.

Mr. Basseur, Rapporteur, and Mr. Lenzer, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speaker.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 352)<sup>1</sup>.

### 8. *State of European aerospace activities – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council*

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 841)*

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Wilkinson, Konings and Osborn.

Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur, and Mr. Lenzer, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

### 9. *Date and time of the next Sitting*

The next Sitting was fixed for Thursday, 5th June, at 10 a.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 5.50 p.m.*

<sup>1</sup>. See page 48.

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Marquardt Mende Reddemann <i>Scheffler</i> (Hermann Schmidt)	MM. Tummers <i>Konings</i> (Voogd)
Mr. <i>Lambiotte</i> (Adriaensens) Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i> (Hanin) <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) Peeters <i>Brasseur</i> (Tanghe) <i>Michel</i> (van Waterschoot)	<b>Italy</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
	MM. Agrimi De Poi Forma	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) MM. <i>Banks</i> (Sir Frederic Bennett) Cox Grant Grieve Hardy <i>Wilkinson</i> (Hawkins)
<b>France</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Lord Hughes MM. <i>Atkinson</i> (Jessel) <i>Smith</i> (Kershaw) Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Foulkes</i> (McGuire) Dr. Miller
MM. Boucheny Valleix	MM. Margue Mart <i>Glesener</i> (Thoss)	MM. <i>Edwards</i> (Mulley) <i>Stainton</i> (Onslow) <i>Osborn</i> (Page) Lord Reay Mr. <i>Brown</i> (Urwin)
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	
Mr. Ahrens Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Flämig <i>Lenzer</i> (Handlos) von Hassel Kittelmann Lagershausen	MM. van Hulst <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Schleiter Sénès Talon	MM. Bonalumi Calamandrei Cavaliere Foschi Fosson Labriola Pecchioli Petrilli Rubbi Talamona Tripodi Valiante Vecchietti
Mr. Bonnel	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	
<b>France</b>	MM. Enders Evers Gessner Milz Müller Pawelczyk Vohrer	
MM. Bizet Brugnon Caro Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Grussenmeyer Jager Jeambrun Péridier Péronnet Petit Pignion	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
	MM. Antoni Bernini	MM. Cornelissen de Koster

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 352*****on defence-related information technology***

The Assembly,

Conscious that in the crucial sector of microelectronic components Europe imports more than 80 % of its requirements in integrated circuits;

Aware that European computer firms supply only 16 % of the world market and that Japan has made remarkable progress in this field;

Regretting that Europe has not so far exploited the fact that it itself constitutes a continental-size market and has not followed Japan in pursuing a coherent policy and commercial strategy to capture part of the world market;

Considering the link between telecommunications equipment for civil and military purposes,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To promote European collaboration at governmental level and between European industries concerned with microelectronics, communications and telematics, computers and software, and the production of interface equipment with users so as to ensure the establishment of a sound European industrial base in this field to counter American and Japanese activities in European and world markets;
2. To establish a truly homogenous European market for telematic equipment and services for both civil and military uses;
3. To make an effort to co-ordinate orders from both civil and military public authorities so as *inter alia* to allow interoperability of equipment when justified.



# SEVENTH SITTING

Thursday, 5th June 1980

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. A European earth resources detection satellite programme (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 842*).
2. State of European aerospace activities – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 841*).
3. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection; The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands (*Votes on the amended draft Recommendations, Docs 838 and 837*).
4. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 835*).

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

### 3. A European earth resources detection satellite programme

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 842)*

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speaker:* Mr. Valleix, Chairman of the Committee.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No 353)<sup>1</sup>.

### 4. Relations with Parliaments

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 835)*

The Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Mommersteeg in place of Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speaker:* Mr. Osborn.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly took note of the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

### 5. State of European aerospace activities – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 841)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 354)<sup>2</sup>.

1. See page 52.

2. See page 53.

**6. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection*****The northern flank and the Atlantic  
and Channel commands***

*(Vote on the amended draft Recommendations, Docs. 837  
and 838)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation in Document 838.

*Speaker* (point of order): Sir Frederic Bennett.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote was postponed until the Second Part of the Session.

In the absence of a quorum, the vote on the amended draft Recommendation in Document 837 was postponed until the Second Part of the Session.

**7. Adjournment of the Session**

The President adjourned the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

*The Sitting was closed at 10.55 a.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Marquardt <i>Scheffler</i> (Hermann Schmidt)	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) van Waterschoot		Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) Sir Frederic Bennett
<b>France</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	MM. Cox Grant Grieve Hardy <i>Wilkinson</i> (Hawkins)
Mr. Valleix	MM. Margue Mart <i>Glesener</i> (Thoss)	Lord Hughes
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	MM. <i>Atkinson</i> (Jessel) <i>Smith</i> (Kershaw) <i>Brown</i> (McGuire)
Mr. Ahrens Mrs. von Bothmer MM. <i>Alber</i> (Evers) Fläming <i>Lenzer</i> (Handlos) Lagershausen	MM. van Hulst <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen Tummers <i>Konings</i> (Voogd)	Dr. Miller MM. <i>Edwards</i> (Mulley) <i>Osborn</i> (Page) Lord Reay Mr. <i>Ellis</i> (Urwin)

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Schleiter Sénès Talon	MM. Calamandrei Cavaliere De Poi Forma Foschi Fosson Labriola Pecchioli Petrilli Rubbi Talamona Tripodi Valiante Vecchietti
MM. Adriaensens Bonnell Hanin Peeters Tanghe	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	
<b>France</b>	MM. Enders Gessner von Hassel Kittelmann Mende Milz Müller Pawelczyk Reddemann Vohrer	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Bizet Boucheny Brugnon Caro Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Grussenmeyer Jager Jeambrun Péridier Péronnet Petit Pignion	<b>Italy</b>	MM. Cornelissen de Koster
	MM. Agrimi Antoni Bernini Bonalumi	<b>United Kingdom</b>
		Mrs. Knight Mr. Onslow

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 353*****on a European earth resources detection satellite programme***

The Assembly,

Aware of the success of the United States Landsat, Seasat, Nimbus and Goes satellite programmes in the earth resources, oceanographic and meteorological fields respectively;

Conscious of the important infrastructure for the acquisition and dissemination of remote-sensing satellite data which exists in a number of European countries under the ESA Earthnet and Meteosat programmes and the success of a number of ESA-sponsored space projects to date;

Believing that European experience through the first Meteosat meteorological satellite points to the positive benefits derived from further European remote-sensing satellite programmes;

Considering that current developments within Europe through the Spacelab and French Spot programmes should be regarded as the foundation for further endeavours on a European collaborative basis in the realm of earth resources satellite programmes;

Confident that the studies so far undertaken within and on behalf of the European Space Agency, especially regarding land applications satellite systems (LASS) and coastal ocean monitoring satellite systems (COMSS), indicate both technical feasibility within the resources potentially available to Europe and worthwhile returns for these projects;

Mindful of the military surveillance and reconnaissance implications which in addition to the long-term commercial desirability of a European remote-sensing satellite programme enhance its strategic importance to European nations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the member states:

1. To put greater political emphasis on the final definition and initiation of an agreed earth resources satellite programme and on the continuation of the Meteosat meteorological programme;
2. To co-ordinate their efforts in remote sensing by satellite through the European Space Agency, for which they should evolve a European space policy and a more closely involved political direction of the Agency, and invite the Italian Minister in charge of space questions, Chairman-in-Office of the ESA Ministerial Council, to prepare and convene a Council meeting in the near future to establish that European policy since ESA is at a crossroad for its new programmes;
3. To build on existing national programmes such as the French Spot system, either by a renewed effort at their Europeanisation or by integrating such programmes with an approved ESA schedule of compatible earth resources satellite launches;
4. To devote adequate funding for a worthwhile European earth resources satellite programme through the European Space Agency as being the most cost-effective instrument for its development so as to be able to exploit the industrial, technical, environmental and strategic benefits of a substantial and carefully prepared remote-sensing satellite programme;
5. To evolve the most appropriate mechanisms both for the practical application of remote-sensing satellite observations and the commercial exploitation of such satellite systems;
6. To encourage within the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) the concerted study of the military requirements for remote-sensing satellites on a European basis, the definition of any resulting satellite projects and their economic and efficient procurement;
7. To urge the Councils of the European Communities and the Council of Europe to co-ordinate the possible application of European earth resources satellite programmes to the benefit of European overseas aid programmes and the economic development of poorer countries of the third world.

**RECOMMENDATION 354*****on the state of European aerospace activities –  
reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

Considering that the ESA convention has been in existence since 30th May 1975 and that France, although playing an important rôle in the Agency which has its seat in Paris, has still not yet ratified the convention;

Considering the separate development of French and German national direct broadcasting spacecraft and ESA's large satellite;

Agreeing with the Council on the European industry's need to receive a fair share of orders for military application satellites;

Aware of the deteriorating situation with regard to Western Europe's energy supplies and the consequent threat to Europe's political and military posture;

Gratified that several member countries are nearing agreement on a development plan for a tactical fighter aircraft – the European combat aircraft – for the 1990s;

Welcoming the establishment of a European Airbus family of aircraft, but regretting that the Fokker-29 development programme is not yet associated with the Airbus programme,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Urge the French Government to ratify the ESA convention in 1980;
2. Invite the governments of the member states of the European Space Agency to take appropriate steps to ensure a close link between the French and German national programmes for direct broadcasting spacecraft and the ESA L-sat programme so that European space interests will not be divided on the world scene and in the world market;
3. Invite the governments of the member states of ESA to consider the political importance of space co-operation for Europe and the need to take decisions concerning the future of the Agency at an appropriate political level;
4. In view of the threat to Europe's security, urge member governments to decide on the necessary practical application measures further to the resolution adopted in Dublin in November 1979 to develop a more effective energy policy for the European Community and to elaborate a common European energy plan up to 1990;
5. Invite
  - (a) the governments of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom to ensure the implementation of the industrial feasibility study which has been carried out on the European combat aircraft; and
  - (b) the other member countries to be associated with this important European venture and to participate in the production of this aircraft;
6. Invite the Netherlands Government to use its political and financial influence to promote a European solution associating the Fokker-29 programme with the Airbus programme.



**II**

**OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES**

# FIRST SITTING

Monday, 2nd June 1980

## SUMMARY

1. Opening of the Session.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Address by the Provisional President
4. Examination of Credentials.
5. Election of the President of the Assembly.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
7. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
8. Observers.
9. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session (Doc. 832).  
*Speakers*: The President; (points of order): Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. Hanin, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Jessel; the President.
10. New weapons and defence strategy (*Votes on the draft Recommendations postponed from the last session*, Doc. 827).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Valleix, Mr. von Hassel (point of order).
11. Nomination of members to Committees
12. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 11.10 a.m. with Mr. Jager, Provisional President, in the Chair.*

### 1. *Opening of the Session*

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— The Sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2, 4, 5 and 17 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

### 2. *Attendance Register*

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 3. *Address by the Provisional President*

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— Ladies and Gentlemen, this morning I have the honour of addressing you for the second year running as Provisional President of the Assembly.

Last year I referred to three threats which seemed to me fundamental as regards the future of our liberal democracies: the excessive armament of the Soviets, the destabilisation of

the southern flank of the Alliance, and uncertainty in Europe. It is a sad satisfaction to find that these threats are weighing still more heavily on us today and have even on occasion been translated into action.

Excessive Soviet armament. This basic phenomenon, which had been noticed only by the specialists, has come to be a key factor in East-West relations. The second half of 1979 was marked by the problem of the SS-20s, as a result of which the Europeans realised that all – I repeat, all – the strategic centres of their countries could be destroyed by these mobile Soviet missiles with their four nuclear warheads. A single SS-20 rocket could destroy four French towns like Rouen, Orleans, Amiens and Rheims. Finally, the Backfire bombers, for which there is at present no equivalent in the NATO forces, would be capable, in conjunction with the SS-20s, of crushing the whole of Europe including Britain in under an hour and of inflicting considerable losses on our surface fleets.

Excessive armament not only in the nuclear field, but in the conventional field too. Recent examples have demonstrated that the Soviet Union has the air capacity to transport a large expeditionary force over a long distance. Even more recently, we have seen that the Russians have not hesitated to turn Afghanistan into a testing ground for poison gases, fragmentation bombs and other sinister devices.

1. See page 18.



*The President (continued)*

At a time when the memory of Munich is again coming to the fore in some people's minds, I have no hesitation in saying that what is happening in Afghanistan reminds me of the war in Spain, a country once transformed by the Fascist dictatorships into a field for experiments in the use of tactical support aircraft and other military techniques subsequently employed against the European democracies.

Excessive Soviet armament, and at the same time destabilisation of the southern flank.

Iran continues to pose a formidable problem for the stability of the region and, in a broader context, for world stability. We must in particular be mindful of the potentially contagious effect of an Islamic religious revolution on certain Gulf states. The memory of events in Mecca has not faded so far that we can rule out attempts to destabilise Saudi Arabia. Let us remember that the Shiite faith is the religion of the majority of Iraqis and of a part of the people of Turkey.

Afghanistan is a second source of crises in the region. After the Cuban interventions in Angola and Ethiopia, and the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, the Soviet Union has dropped its mask and intervened openly in Afghanistan. This invasion raises doubts about the reality of détente, even if we must maintain our calm and keep our heads clear. To quote Mr. Vohrer's excellent report :

" It is clear that the presence of Soviet troops on the frontiers of Eastern Iran and Pakistan gives the Soviet Union a means of intervening in those countries, both weakened, Pakistan by its recent war against India, and Iran by the 1979 revolution and the ensuing period of unrest and international isolation. Moreover, only a territory dominated by the Baluchis whom neither Iran, Afghanistan nor Pakistan has ever been able to control effectively, now separates the Soviet Union from the shores of the Indian Ocean near the Strait of Hormuz through which most of Western Europe's oil supplies passes. "

Excessive armament, destabilisation after destabilisation and, finally, uncertainty in Europe. In the face of these dangers, which can still be averted if a homogeneous reaction emerges, Europe continues to show too many signs of hesitation, of weaknesses and of contradictions. In my view there are two reasons: the sometimes unpredictable nature of the strategy of our chief ally, the United States, and the short-sighted character of certain European policies.

Looking at the situation, what do we find?

The Europeans are divided as to the sanctions to be adopted against Iran. They are

unable to reach a joint position on participation in the Moscow Olympics. They differ about maintaining or modifying their relations with Soviet leaders. They do not yet appear to be in a position to implement the decisions taken by the NATO Council last December, since certain countries give the impression, to an uninitiated observer like myself, of jibbing at the idea of deploying Pershing or cruise missiles on their territory from 1983. Finally, at the institutional level, there is confrontation between those who support extension of the European Parliament's powers beyond the treaties and those who adamantly defend the exclusive prerogatives of Western European Union.

I shall not paint an even more gloomy picture by going over the debates about the respective merits of interoperability versus standardisation, the demarcation between the responsibilities of the SAC and the Eurogroup, the uncertainties of the two-way street, the deals of the century, forward strategy, lowering the threshold of deterrence by tactical nuclear weapons and the consequent uncoupling of Europe from the United States, as opposed to sanctuarisation of an area guaranteed by a strategy of massive counter-city retaliation. And could I be so rash as to mention SALT and MBFR?

We can, however, no longer be content simply to assess the situation. The time has come to pull ourselves together, to close our ranks, to seek out every means of restoring the reality of détente, to get the arms limitation talks started again and to clear up misunderstandings between allies. There are already some encouraging signs: the Community plan for the neutralisation of Afghanistan, the maintenance of the Madrid Conference despite present tensions, the meeting of Chairman Brezhnev with President Giscard d'Estaing, to be followed soon by another with Chancellor Schmidt. Détente is the main achievement of the past twenty years. We must find ways of preserving it.

Allow me - and I apologise for having spoken at some length - to close by listing what appear to me to be the main elements of French military policy within the framework of European defence. They are three in number: no effective defence outside the framework of the Alliance; the involvement of France in the defence of Europe; elaboration of a European defence strategy.

Point one. The Atlantic Alliance is for France a factor in its defence which complements and is far from conflicting with its own nuclear deterrence. This firmly makes France part of a civilisation based on freedom and excludes a neutrality ruled out by its geogra-

*The President (continued)*

phical situation, by its history, by the part it plays in the world, and by simple common sense.

Point two. The security of France might be decided in the very first battle in Europe. There must therefore be no doubt about the French forces playing their part, and no ambiguity as to France's commitment. It must define its contribution to the battle without hedging, even if it reserves the right to decide on the moment at which to commit its forces and on the use of its nuclear weapons.

Point three. There can be no question of seeking to replace the Atlantic Alliance by a European defence organisation without the Americans, and even less one directed against them. Within the framework of this Alliance – which, as has been said, remains vital in view of the threat with which we are faced – we have to identify the specific problems involved in the defence of the old world, to use to best advantage the contributions made by the countries of which it is composed, to accept responsibility in the task before us, and to work towards the day when it will be possible to satisfy a European ambition which will perforce include that element of sovereignty constituted by an ability to undertake one's own defence. The objective for which a consensus can be reached is that of the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

This is the message which a convinced European, trained in the school of Robert Schuman, is naïve or bold enough to offer you. Let us remember the forceful words of Robert Schuman: "A united Europe was not achieved and we had war". At a time when we have just celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the birth of the ECSC, our Assembly must consider it a point of honour to contribute within its allotted field to the rebirth of the European spirit. Let us reject the cold war and the fetters of ideology. Let us look for lines of convergence and the revival of détente. But let us do so with heads held high, without side-stepping and without retreating. Thank you. (*Applause*)

**4. Examination of Credentials**

The PRESIDENT(Translation).–The Orders of the Day provide for the examination of credentials.

The list of Representatives and Substitutes attending the twenty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union has been published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, all the credentials have been attested

by the statement on ratification carried out on 21st April 1980 by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and communicated to us by the President of that Assembly.

**5. Election of the President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT (Translation).– The Orders of the Day provide for the election of the President of the Assembly.

In accordance with the provisions of Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure, no Representative may stand as a candidate for the office of President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more Representatives. Representatives who are members of governments are not eligible for nomination for the Bureau of the Assembly.

Moreover, Rule 7 (2) lays down that Substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

I have received only one nomination, for Mr. Fred Mulley.

He has been nominated in due form as prescribed by the Rules of Procedure. If the Assembly is unanimously in favour, I propose electing Mr. Fred Mulley by acclamation. (*Applause*)

Is there anyone against?...

The Assembly has decided unanimously.

I therefore declare Mr. Fred Mulley President of the Assembly of Western European Union and invite him to take the Chair. As oldest Representative it is my privilege to offer him my personal congratulations and those of the entire Assembly on your behalf. (*Applause*)

(*Mr. Mulley then took the Chair*)

**6. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT.– Members of the Assembly, I am sure that you will wish me, on your behalf, to congratulate the Provisional President, our *doyen d'âge*, on the excellent manner in which he conducted the beginning of our proceedings, which I am sure will stimulate our remarks. It was timely that he reminded us of the importance of the European spirit which in its early days the Assembly did so much to promote.

Secondly, I am sure that it is the wish of all representatives that I should put on record our appreciation of the services of Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel for his three years as President of the Assembly. (*Applause*) He brought to the

*The President (continued)*

task the same dedication as he has given to his ministerial and parliamentary duties in Germany, and, as well as pursuing his competent and diligent conduct of affairs in this Assembly, he did much to enhance the standing of this body outside.

Thirdly, I am sure that it would be your wish that I should say how delighted we are to find our Clerk, Mr. Humblet, sufficiently well recovered from his serious illness to be with us today and that I should say how much we missed him last December. (*Applause*)

I wish to express my grateful thanks and pleasure at the great honour you have paid me in electing me as your President. Not in this Assembly but in another body, I believe that there was an occasion when somebody was called to the chair and produced from his pocket a long speech which began with the words "I wish to say how very unexpected it is that you have paid me this honour of electing me to the office of President..." I am afraid that I cannot rely on that beginning because you have paid me the additional compliment of electing me without opposition. Indeed, I find myself in the unusual situation of having accepted an invitation to attend a reception this evening and now finding that I shall be the host. Certainly, my wife and I look forward to receiving most of you on that occasion this evening.

It was with very real pleasure that I returned, as I did last year, to this Assembly after an absence of twenty years. Little did I think, when I was a Rapporteur and Vice-President in 1960, that twenty years later you would pay me the honour of electing me as your President. I learned an immense amount during my period as a representative, and probably that was the reason why my first and my last ministerial offices were in the area of defence.

I also recall with pleasure the celebrations we had in Bonn on the twentieth anniversary of the Assembly, when I had the privilege of representing the United Kingdom Government. I wish to thank you again for the courtesy you accorded me when inviting me to address the Assembly two years ago in my capacity as Secretary of State for Defence. Therefore, it is with great pleasure that I have the honour to be your President, and I assure you that I shall do all I can to sustain and enhance the standing of the Assembly.

As our *doyen d'âge* reminded us, we live in extremely difficult times. Indeed, matters have become very much more difficult since we last met in this Assembly in this very building last December. Few of us then thought that American hostages in Iran would still be in

captivity, and we certainly did not then expect the armed intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

As was pointed out by the Provisional President, matters in the Near and Far East have also not improved. I do not intend to anticipate the debates that we shall be having on these matters on the reports which come before you. I want only to say that I believe that in these matters the Assembly has a real rôle to play. We must try to avoid seeking the over-simple solutions that I sometimes feel – if I may be permitted the indiscretion – our North American friends are somewhat inclined to seek.

I recall the story of the man who was told that in railway accidents it was the people in the first and last coaches who tended to suffer the greater injuries. His solution was that there should be no first and last coaches on trains; they should simply be removed. We have to avoid thinking that in international circumstances we can find simplistic solutions of that kind. We must not forget that the ultimate answer that we must always try to find to the danger of war is through the medium of arms control, disarmament and détente.

I did not in any sense think it inconsistent that, having been Minister for Disarmament in my country and having sponsored what was recently described as the only successful multilateral disarmament measure since the war – namely, the convention against biological weapons – I should later become Minister for Defence. We have to seek proper multinational verifiable arms control and disarmament arrangements whenever possible, despite all the other difficulties which exist.

What is, perhaps, the central problem for our countries, for Western Europe and for NATO is the consultation within the Alliance. Since we last met, it has been very clear that the consultative arrangements are far from satisfactory. Indeed, it would be very difficult, perhaps, to arrive at a system that would avoid difficulties when decisions have to be taken often at short notice. This is an area in which the Assembly has a particular contribution to make.

Despite the differences between national delegations – and, indeed, within national delegations – on the current issues of the day, if we debate them here and are not afraid to express our views and come to decisions, we shall help the process of consultation in Europe, which is just as important as consultation between Europe and our North American allies. This is something that the Assembly can do. Its standing as an Assembly will depend upon the amount of time and effort that members of the Assembly are prepared to devote to the work of its Committees and to the debates within the Assembly. It is the quality of the reports and

*The President (continued)*

the debates that will determine whether as an Assembly we have influence on our national parliaments and on our national public opinion. The Assembly has a rôle to play in this regard.

We have a big agenda before us and, therefore, I think that it would be appropriate now to proceed with the business. Thank you again for the great honour that you have done me. I hope that I may do sufficient to show that I have deserved it. (*Applause*)

**7. Election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT.— The Orders of the Day call for the election of the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure provides that no Representative may be a candidate for Vice-President unless he has been nominated — as in the case of the President — by three Representatives, and to be a member of the Bureau a candidate must be a Representative.

I understand that in the Office of the Clerk there are only three nominations: Mr. Talamona (Italy), Mr. Reddemann (Germany) and Mr. Tanghe (Belgium).

If it is the wish and agreement of the Assembly, I propose that these candidates be elected by acclamation, and that the places of the remaining countries be filled when nominations are received.

Is it agreed that Mr. Talamona, Mr. Reddemann and Mr. Tanghe be elected Vice-Presidents of the Assembly?... (*Applause*)

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

The candidates are elected.

The order of seniority of the Vice-Presidents will be determined when all six have been elected.

**8. Observers**

The PRESIDENT.— I now welcome, on behalf of the Assembly, the parliamentarians who are doing us the honour of following our work this week in the capacity of observers. They are Mr. Budtz and Mr. Henriksen, members of the Danish Folketing; Mr. Vyzas and Mr. Koutsogeorgas, deputies from Greece; Mr. Udjus and Mr. Øvregard, members of the Norwegian Storting; and Mr. Roseta and Mr. Tito de Morais, deputies from Portugal. We are very pleased to have these observers with us during the week.

**9. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the First Part of the Session**

(Doc. 832)

The PRESIDENT.— The next Order of the Day is the adoption by the Assembly of the draft Order of Business for the first part of the twenty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly.

The draft Order of Business has been distributed as Document 832 dated 5th May 1980.

Are there any objections to the adoption of this Order of Business?...

As there are no objections, the draft Order of Business is adopted.

In the light of that decision, the next Order of the Day for this morning...

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation).— Mr. President, I gather that the intention is to discuss Sir Frederic's report together with Mr. Vohrer's, in other words that the discussion of the two reports be combined.

I should like to suggest that we should not do this. We have done so on previous occasions, and it did not work out well. If we discuss the reports together, some delegates lose the thread, and in particular the press loses the thread. There is no logic in combining the individual subjects in this way. We can vote on them together, but we should not discuss them together.

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation).— On behalf of the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and British Conservatives, I intended to ask for an adjournment of the sitting. The groups had little time for consultation this morning and have not finished their discussions.

However, if — as indicated on the Orders of the Day — we now confined ourselves exclusively to voting, which would take little time, it is clear that no difficulties would arise, for your election, Mr. President, was so rapid that we saved precious time by not having had to vote on it.

I would not press my request for an adjournment if I knew that we were going to confine ourselves to voting and would therefore complete our Orders of the Day quickly. I would be glad if you could clarify this matter.

The PRESIDENT.— It is my intention that we should, as soon as we have adopted the Orders of the Day, proceed to the vote. There cannot be discussion on the next business, and so I think it is a point for an adjournment. We should be able to do that quite quickly. Would Mrs. von Bothmer permit me to look at

*The President (continued)*

the possibilities for dividing the two items of business? Part of the problem is that the Chairman of the Committee will, of course, have to reply to both reports. In that sense, they cannot really be separated completely. The votes will be put separately. I think it would save time if the Chairman and the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee would agree to the Order of the Day as presented by the Presidential Committee. This should have been supported by the Presidential Committee, of which, of course, I was not a member. Will the Assembly agree to that?

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation).— I do not know whether I have been correctly understood. If, in a long discussion, one delegate speaks to the Bennett report and the next one to the Vohrer report, and so on, this creates a confusion which I should like to avoid. We did this once before, and it was in fact generally agreed that it is not a good idea.

The PRESIDENT.— It is a matter for the Assembly. But if people who put their names down to speak on these reports will indicate whether it is the Page or Tanghe report to which they wish to speak, we shall try to organise the debate in that way, if that is agreeable, with the understanding that we shall seek to meet the wishes of the General Affairs Committee. Will the Assembly now adopt the Orders of the Day and the draft Order of Business?

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*).— Mr. President, I am not entirely satisfied with the answers you have given to Mrs. von Bothmer insofar as some delegates will experience great difficulty indeed in determining to which of the two reports they wish to address themselves. It is within the bounds of possibility that some delegates will wish to speak to both reports. They cannot, therefore, be limited to an address to the Assembly on one report when they have an interest in both. In that situation, do we not risk the possibility of delegates making long speeches when they wish to deal with extracts from both reports? In that situation, may I urge you, Mr. President, during the luncheon adjournment to look more closely at this problem with a view to acceding to the request made by Mrs. von Bothmer?

The PRESIDENT.— The rules permit the Assembly to be master of its own business. We have before us the draft Order of Business from the outgoing Presidential Committee.

Mrs. von Bothmer has proposed an amendment. It is best that the amendment be put to the vote of the Assembly. It has been proposed by the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, Mrs. von Bothmer, that this afternoon at three o'clock, instead of two reports being presented one after the other and a general debate taking place on the report of the Council and our replies to it, there should be two separate and distinct debates.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*).— Mr. President, I think you are referring to the Bennett report and the Vohrer report after four o'clock, and not the Page and Tanghe reports after three o'clock.

The PRESIDENT.— I understood that it was the debates on the Page and Tanghe reports that it was proposed should be separated. Mrs. von Bothmer, which reports do you wish to be separated?

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation).— The Bennett report and the Vohrer report.

The PRESIDENT.— I misunderstood. I thought that it was the two reports at the beginning of the afternoon. It is the Bennett and Vohrer reports. Please accept my apologies. I was not involved in these arrangements. The amendment is to the effect that, instead of there being a general debate on both reports from the General Affairs Committee, one by Sir Frederic Bennett and the other by Mr. Vohrer, there should be separate debates on these two reports. It is for the Assembly to decide. The Presidential Committee recommended that the reports should be taken together and that there should be one debate. It has now been proposed by way of an amendment that there should be two debates. This is something we can decide by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

Clearly, it is the wish of the Assembly that there should be two separate debates, and, therefore, the Order of Business will be amended so that Sir Frederic Bennett's report will be presented this afternoon, and Mr. Vohrer's report will have to come after the Bennett report has been dealt with — it is hoped fairly early tomorrow. I stress that we have a large agenda to get through in three and a half days.

With that amendment of business, is the Order of Business approved?...

There is no objection. That is approved.

### 10. *New weapons and defence strategy*

*(Votes on the draft Recommendations postponed from the last session, Doc. 827)*

The PRESIDENT.— We now move to the draft recommendations contained in Document 827, new weapons and defence strategy, carried over from our last session. The debate and amendments to the recommendations were taken at the twelfth and thirteenth sittings of the last session, but at the thirteenth and fourteenth sittings there was no quorum. Therefore, in accordance with Rule 36 (4), the votes on the draft recommendations must be taken at this sitting.

It is right that the two draft recommendations should be taken separately. As I explained earlier, there can be no further debate. Since it is clear that there are differences of opinion, we should proceed on draft recommendation I by means of a roll-call vote. I take it that it would not be accepted unanimously by the Assembly.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Urwin.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows<sup>1</sup> :

Number of votes cast .....	56
Ayes .....	41
Noes .....	9
Abstentions .....	6

That fulfils the quorum requirement.

*The draft recommendation is therefore adopted<sup>2</sup>.*

We shall now vote on the second draft recommendation on new weapons and defence strategy – the impact of technology.

I believe that it has been the practice of the Assembly to dispense with a roll-call if there is unanimity.

Is there unanimity?...

Does anyone object to proceeding without a roll-call vote, in order to save time?...

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation).— I request a vote by roll-call.

The PRESIDENT.— I see that Mr. Valleix properly exercises his right to object. We must therefore have a roll-call vote on the second draft recommendation.

The roll-call will again begin with the name of Mr. Urwin.

Mr. von HASSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*).— On a point of order, Mr. President. May I ask you to ring the bell? Representatives who are outside the Chamber will not know of the vote.

The PRESIDENT.— I thought that the bell had been rung. It was rung at the beginning of the first vote, but we need to ring it again. Thank you very much, Mr. von Hassel, for reminding us.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows<sup>1</sup> :

Number of votes cast ....	56
Ayes .....	51
Noes .....	2
Abstentions .....	3

*The second draft recommendation is also adopted<sup>2</sup>.*

### 11. *Nomination of members to Committees*

The PRESIDENT.— The only remaining business envisaged this morning is the nomination of members to committees. The candidates for the five permanent committees of the Assembly and for the Committee for Relations with Parliaments have been published in an appendix to Notice No. 1 which has been distributed. They are submitted for ratification by the Assembly in accordance with Rule 39 (6) and Rule 42 *bis* (2) of the Rules of Procedure.

Is there any opposition to the endorsement of the appointment by the national delegations to those committees?...

The nominations are agreed to.

1. See page 19.

2. See page 21.

1. See page 20.

2. See page 22.

## 12. *Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting*

The PRESIDENT.— In the light of the requests that I have received for an adjournment, I propose that we adjourn now and that the next public Sitting be held this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Political developments in Europe – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Documents 834 and 836 and Amendments).
2. Twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (Presentation by Mr. van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Documents 833 and 846).

3. Political developments in Europe – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendations, Documents 834 and 836 and Amendments).
4. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (Presentation of the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 844 and Amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 12.05 p.m.)*

## SECOND SITTING

Monday, 2nd June 1980

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Political developments in Europe – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Docs. 834 and 836 and Amendments).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Page (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Tanghe (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Antoni, Mr. Jung, Mr. von Hassel.
4. Twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*, Docs. 833 and 846).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. van der Klaauw (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*).
5. Political developments in Europe – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council; Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (*Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendations*, Docs. 834 and 836 and Amendments).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Bozzi, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Mommersteeg, Mr. Hanin, Mr. Page (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Tanghe (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mrs. von Bothmer (*Chairman of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Bozzi, Mr. Tanghe, Mr. Bozzi, Mr. Tanghe, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Bozzi, Mr. Tanghe, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Tanghe.
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 3.05. p.m. with Mr. Talamona, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation).– The Sitting is open.

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation).– In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

#### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation).– The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 25.

#### 3. Political developments in Europe – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council

*(Presentation of and Joint Debate on the Reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Docs. 834 and 836 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation).– The Orders of the Day now provide for the presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee on political developments in Europe – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council, Document 834.

I call Mr. Page, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*).– It is a great honour to present this report on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. I cannot say that I am happy that our Chairman, who has conducted our affairs for so many years, is taking her seat for the last time. Let me at least say that she has been a happy, conciliatory and friendly Chairman during her period of office.

As the first speaker from the Assembly after the election of the new President of the Assem-



*Mr. Page (continued)*

bly, I wish Mr. Mulley good fortune in his important rôle in leading the Assembly in the next few years.

The report takes the form of a reply on behalf of the Assembly to the annual report of the Council. I have read through many previous reports and replies, and it is difficult to find something new to say. I have tried to find a parallel for the relationship between the Assembly and the Council. Is it closer to a business partnership or to a marriage? I think that it is probably closer to a marriage, because if a business partnership is unsuccessful and breaks up, its individual members can continue to operate on their own. However, if the partnership is closer to a marriage and there is a divorce, the marriage is over and the parties cannot continue to operate successfully.

This is the twenty-fifth anniversary of the marriage between the Council and the Assembly, because the modified treaty was signed on 23rd October 1954 and we are now celebrating our silver wedding. It can truly be said that there have been ups and downs, but I am sure it will be agreed that it has been a reasonably successful and, at present, happy marriage. There have been moments of friction, but they have always been overcome. The present relationship between the partners can be said to be a warm one.

I am happy to say that the marriage has not produced too many children, because I should not be happy if there were too great a proliferation of bureaucratic organisations. Nevertheless, one can say that the members of the marriage comprise a wider international family. We have our cousins and our in-laws, such as the EEC, NATO, OECD and the Council of Europe. However, all these relatives are also growing older. They have widened their spheres of influence; they wish to look to the future; they also have grown in their own way and have a larger family membership than, indeed, do we. However, there is nothing to complain about, because the other organisations, including NATO on defence matters and the Nine in the sphere of political consultations, effectively exercise certain responsibilities which statutorily belong to the Council of WEU.

We must never forget that WEU is alone and singular in its responsibilities on defence matters.

It is obvious that because of the growth of other organisations the Council has lost much of its political influence. The Council now meets only once a year at ministerial level and, as was seen from its last meeting at Luxembourg on 14th May last, apart from the Chairman-in-Office, very few principal Ministers for

Foreign Affairs or even junior ministers actually took part in the meeting. The decision taken by the ministers to meet in the WEU framework in Luxembourg on 14th May did not prevent but, indeed, facilitated the same ministers going to Brussels in the afternoon for a meeting of NATO. It would seem evident to many of us that it was in the framework of NATO that the intergovernmental consultations were held. Because of this, the WEU Council could hardly discuss anything other than the administration of the organisation, which is rather pedestrian, and this did not require the effective presence of ministers.

It is the Permanent Council that administers WEU on behalf of the governments, and I pay tribute to the many distinguished friends we have who are diplomats – members of the foreign service of their countries – and to our senior civil servants. They have a certain dignity of their own which, I think, precludes them in some ways from taking political initiatives. Here we have to be grateful as politicians although perhaps sad as members of WEU.

It often seems that much of the work of the Permanent Council consists of answering questions from the Assembly. Sometimes – to use a cricketering term known to the British and to those from the Netherlands who play cricket – there is a tendency, in answering the questions, to glance the ball away without hitting it very straightforwardly towards the Assembly.

In terms of European defence co-operation, the WEU Council is not perhaps the driving force that it was. I think that the Chairman and other members of the General Affairs Committee feel that this was acknowledged in the report that came from the Council. The result is that, in spite of the Council's sincere desire for a dialogue with the Assembly, this dialogue is not always very easy to arrange. The Assembly still retains all the prerogatives that it was originally given.

As the order of business shows, at this meeting of the Assembly – as on previous occasions – we seriously debate important political matters and constantly put questions to the Council on matters to which we perhaps feel that the Council could give greater attention.

We in the Assembly put a lot of work into our reports and we sometimes feel that in the replies they are not accorded all the influence that they deserve. Perhaps the trouble – this may be a lesson for parliamentary colleagues in the Assembly – is that we put out too many reports, and that if fewer reports emanated from the Assembly they would be treated as a greater delicacy by the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council. It might, therefore, be

*Mr. Page (continued)*

wise for the Assembly to adopt a degree of self-denial and rationing.

I speak without nearly as much experience as the previous Chairman of the Committee and many other members here, but I also think that in our dealings with the Council we often feel that we are dealing with the Chairman-in-Office of the day rather than with the Council as a whole. This leads, perhaps, to the fact that fewer and fewer senior – or even junior – ministers seem to attend our debates. In the Assembly we look to our governments to proclaim their wish to keep WEU healthy and strong. We therefore ask for their ministers to attend our meetings as often as possible in order to encourage those who serve in the organisation. We, as parliamentarians, cannot be satisfied with the state of the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly. Although we believe that the Council shows willing, there must be ways of improving this dialogue.

In this connection, the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council suggests that a new procedure might be adopted which the Assembly could find satisfactory if it were effectively practised. The Council says that if certain questions were communicated to it beforehand, it would be in a position to give collegiate and collective answers. We long for a collective view from the Council of Ministers, but if we receive a collective view there is a danger that it may become more and more anodyne. Perhaps the individual views of different governments could produce a cocktail that would be stronger than the collective views.

But we hope that the Council of Ministers will realise the value of working together to provide collective answers to questions. If they had had more experience in this, perhaps the member countries and the wider European Community might have made a more effective answer to the problems of Iran and Afghanistan than they have been able to make up till now.

The General Affairs Committee seized this opportunity, and at its meeting on 28th April it prepared the seven questions which were sent to the Council immediately to be dealt with at the joint meeting to be held on 14th May. I hope that the Assembly will forgive me for noting that, however well-intended the Council may have been, and however talented – this is well recognised – the Chairman-in-Office, the members of the General Affairs Committee who attended the joint meeting still did not feel that they were being given satisfactory united, unified and collegiate answers from the Council.

The draft recommendation in the report of the General Affairs Committee suggests that there should be further discussion between the new President of the Assembly and the Chair-

man of the Council with a view to examining how better procedures might be evolved.

There is another field of communication in which we have to find a satisfactory means of informing the Assembly of the actions of other bodies. A satisfactory communication was carried out in connection with part of the Standing Armaments Committee inquiry. We believe that there is another chapter of the Standing Armaments Committee study about the financial aspects of our problems which has recently gone to the Council. We in the General Affairs Committee sincerely hope that the Council will find equally satisfactory and equally prompt means of informing the Assembly of the results of this.

Secondly, the Assembly notes from the report that we are discussing today, to which I am replying on behalf of the Committee, that the Council promises to keep the Assembly informed of the activities of the Independent European Programme Group. We note that although this promise of response came from the Council, it was surrounded by a kind of hedge of reservations. We hope that the hedge will not grow so high that the report will be too woolly by the time it reaches us.

Finally, after a long and turgid speech, Mr. President, for which I apologise, may I turn to certain of the draft recommendations in our report and recommend to the Assembly two particular suggestions coming from the General Affairs Committee in which we feel that the Council could, and should, play a rôle. The first is the suggestion that Western European Union should specialise in the study of certain matters which are not handled within the framework of NATO but which nevertheless deeply concern the security and defence of Western Europe.

I believe that we have an optimistic approach here from the Council, which has examined the bilateral relations between member countries and Eastern European countries. We believe that this is a most helpful route for the Council to follow.

In the same way, we believe that it might be possible for the Council also to concentrate on certain vital areas concerning European security and defence which suddenly one finds are outside the scope of NATO.

Secondly, we must, as an Assembly, take note of the intention of the European Community to deal with all industrial matters which concern our member countries, including those which relate to the European armaments industry. The General Affairs Committee feels that Western European Union might be properly used to guide the work of the Community in this field of responsibilities because we have a

*Mr. Page (continued)*

special responsibility, a special aptitude and special expertise in military questions which are, naturally, because of the statutes, beyond the purview of the Community.

This leads me to the final and simple suggestion which comes out of our response, and that is that in looking into the second twenty-five years, looking towards our golden jubilee, everybody must realise that Western European Union cannot, should not, and will not be the same exactly in its performance and its organisation in twenty-five years' time as it is today. At this half-way stage, I wonder whether my parliamentary colleagues would feel that this is just the moment when we should stand back, not too many paces but just at arm's length, and look at our organisation as it is, decide how we might reconstitute our committees and decide on new lines of thought and new channels of activity which, within the framework of the wider European Community which exists today and which did not exist twenty-five years ago, we shall be able to play a more important part than perhaps we are doing at the moment. I believe that it is only if we revise our structure to meet the present-day facts of life that we shall revive our influence.

Mr. President, in all the twenty-five years of our existence I doubt whether the climate of the world, so far as security and defence are concerned, has ever appeared more threatening; and I doubt whether for the countries of the world – the old countries which are members of WEU and the new countries – there has ever been a period of such destabilisation of economic life, of currency, of political thought and of moral standards. We have to remodel our organisation so that in the next twenty-five years, and in the next weeks and months following the meetings we are holding in Paris now, we can feel that as Western European Union we have played our part in trying to increase stability, understanding and the strength of the beliefs which our countries collectively hold so dear.

Mr. President, on behalf of the General Affairs Committee I recommend the adoption of this report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation).– The Orders of the Day provide for the presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council, Document 836 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation).– Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report I am presenting is an annual report just like the Council report to which it is the reply and

reaction, and it closely follows the preceding report as regards the matters it deals with, apart from one chapter which is of a more topical nature.

Yet one must not underestimate the work accomplished by the Committee in its attempt to evaluate the activities of the Council of Ministers over the past year in the important sector of defence and armaments. After all, one of the major tasks of both the Council and the Assembly is to ensure the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols in the field of common defence.

The Presidential Committee of the Assembly appears to share this view, for it instructed our Committee to examine in this annual report the state of European security in the light of the invasion of Afghanistan.

This examination – which forms the new, unaccustomed chapter of this report – is undertaken in the context of defence matters handled by the WEU Council in accordance with the mutual defence provisions of the modified treaty, especially Articles IV, V and VIII.3, the last of which provides for the immediate convocation of the Council at the request of a member state to allow consultations “with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability”.

Chapter II B of the report contains this examination. It is not a detailed study of the invasion and its political effects, for the General Affairs Committee was instructed to deal with that question. Our Committee confined itself to the repercussions of the invasion on European security.

So for the first time since the second world war, complete units of the Red Army have invaded a non-member country of the Warsaw Pact. These Soviet forces, numbering between 80,000 and 100,000 men, now in Afghanistan, were not withdrawn from the forces facing Europe on the northern, central or southern fronts, which means that, on the central front, the superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces especially in tanks and troops remains unchanged.

The recent introduction of some 90 SS-20 missiles, a number which is increasing by five a month, aimed at the European allied countries, together with the 500 SS-4 and 90 SS-5 missiles already installed, continue to place NATO at a disadvantage in Europe.

In 1978, the Soviet Union maintained some eight to ten warships and the same number of support units in the Indian Ocean; the United States had a permanent force of some three surface combat vessels plus an aircraft-carrier

*Mr. Tanghe (continued)*

group which visited the area every three months. Last March, there were 29 Soviet units in the area, including 13 combat vessels, and the United States had 22 combat units plus 7 support vessels there.

The French presence, with its principal base in Reunion, consists of the command ship/tanker *La Charente*, accompanied by a destroyer and four frigates. Germany has sent two destroyers, accompanied by two support vessels, there for other purposes.

This reaction by the United States and some of its allies is proof of their resolve and their ability to resist, by force if necessary, any possible use of force against the vital interests of the West in this part of the world.

The following conclusions can be drawn for European security from this new situation:

The first is the need to underline the solidarity of the Alliance by stressing the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty which concern mutual defence, i.e. Articles IV, V and VIII.3 already referred to. As the annual report of the Council puts it: "the Council ensure that the treaty and its protocols are applied and observed both as part of their own activities and in connection with work in which member governments participate elsewhere, in particular, political co-operation between the Nine, the North Atlantic Council and the Independent European Programme Group".

The second conclusion is the vital need to maintain a certain balance in Europe, *inter alia* by pursuing the long-term defence programme approved in NATO and the programme for the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe until such time as the negotiations with the Soviet Union lead to a dismantling of existing SS-20 missiles.

A third conclusion is that the countries of the Alliance with appropriate means should be prepared to back the United States in protecting Europe's interests outside the North Atlantic Treaty area and to take over from the United States in European waters when certain American ships leave for the Middle East.

The last and not least important conclusion concerns some provisions of the modified treaty which still restrict any expansion of the German navy.

According to Article II of Protocol No. II, "the naval forces of the Federal Republic of Germany [assigned to NATO commands] shall consist of the vessels and formations necessary for the defensive missions assigned to it by NATO within the limits laid down in the special agreement... [annexed to the treaty of the European Defence Community]". That was long ago.

But Article III of the same protocol provides that if at any time during the NATO review recommendations are put forward, the effect of which would be to increase the level of forces above the specified limits, their acceptance shall be subject to the unanimous approval of the member states expressed either in the WEU Council or in NATO.

The Committee may well ask whether this is not the time to apply that article and provide the necessary reinforcement for the naval forces of the Alliance.

In his report on the northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands, Mr. Ahrens noted that German naval forces, with the exception of a destroyer assigned to STANAV-FORLANT, had been assigned only to SACEUR, which in fact limited them to the Baltic Sea or the west coast of Denmark. In the present situation, it would surely be advisable to recommend that German naval forces be henceforth assigned to all NATO commands, depending on requirements and capabilities.

Later, in Protocol No. III, in Annex III, paragraph V, the modified Brussels Treaty limits naval shipbuilding in Germany to eight 6,000-ton destroyers, other surface combat vessels being limited to 3,000 tons and auxiliary vessels to 6,000 tons.

Last year, the Assembly adopted our recommendation that the Council delete the reference to naval auxiliary vessels from the list of armaments which may not be produced on German territory. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in a letter to the President of our Committee, welcomed this.

Now the Committee is proposing that the Council, as it is entitled to do, arrange this paragraph of Annex III to Protocol No. III which still imposes limits on naval shipbuilding in Germany, since such restrictions have become detrimental to European security.

I will touch briefly on the other, more customary matters dealt with in this report.

In its annual report, the Council, going back on its earlier refusal, communicated for the first time the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1979, giving the figure of 55,650. So the commitment entered into last year by the United Kingdom was respected.

But unlike earlier reports, this annual report mentions neither the presence of the United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force nor the redeployment of units of the British Army of the Rhine from Germany towards Northern Ireland. The Committee therefore insists once again on clarification of those two points.

*Mr. Tanghe (continued)*

We learn from the annual report that the study of the armaments industries in member countries undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee, and in particular the economic chapter, has still to be completed. We also know, from a statement by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, that once the study is completed, the Council will consider procedures for informing the Assembly of its content and main conclusions.

We also welcome the fact that the Council has complied with Recommendation 331 of the Assembly and agreed to consider the possibility of entrusting the SAC with work on subjects which may be suggested by the Assembly.

The twenty-fifth annual report announces no progress in the control of armaments but, on the contrary, records a slight regression.

These controls do not apply to the territory of the United Kingdom. Furthermore, according to the annual report, "one member state" has declared that its nuclear capability as a whole is directed to one and the same objective of deterrence and that its missiles with nuclear capability and its tracked launchers are no longer subject to control. So the French Pluton tactical nuclear missiles have been withdrawn from Agency control while Lance missiles and other similar missiles equipping Belgian, German, Italian, Netherlands and United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe are still controlled by the Agency.

Nor does the Agency apply any controls to biological weapons. We learn from the annual report that in the case of chemical weapons, only non-production controls take place; no quantitative controls are made since none of the member states has declared possessing such armaments. And yet, according to government statements or reliable publications, certain member countries hold, or have held in the recent past, stocks of chemical weapons. According to the annual reports, the list of chemical weapons for control does not seem to have been modified since 1965. That may be true. In any case, the Committee asks the Council to publish the full list now in force in its next annual report.

We may conclude with the Committee, as it has done before, that the usefulness of the few controls still applied is now disputed.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this report, slightly amended by your Committee, was adopted by fourteen votes in favour, none against and only one abstention. Let us hope the Assembly takes the same line. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— Ladies and Gentlemen, before calling the speakers whose names have been entered for this debate, may I remind you that the Bureau of the President has allocated a speaking time of ten minutes each.

I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation).— Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we should first like to congratulate Mr. Page on his objective treatment of the complexities of the Council's report, with emphasis on the positive aspects of its activities, but not seeking to evade the problems or differences which exist, particularly in views concerning the rights and duties of the Assembly to which the Council should pay ever-increasing attention and regard. Indeed, any move against the Assembly's powers and duties would be disastrous, quite apart from being contrary to the spirit of the constituent agreements.

We have already had occasion to argue in this Assembly that the election of the European Parliament and the enlargement of the European Community do not necessarily mean that WEU is becoming useless. We have here contested opinions and tendencies supporting that view and we have claimed a specific rôle for WEU in the field of defence and armaments, including concertation with industry. We further believe that it rests with our institution to maintain prestige and authority by way of correct choices, which in our view are impossible without major participation by the Assembly.

WEU's authority stems from the parliamentary character of the Assembly and parliamentary assemblies are the best expression of the common will of the people of Europe. We feel that it is lowering ourselves to say that the place reserved for WEU will be "modest" but we share the view that WEU can play an essential part in a Europe moving towards the enlargement of the Community and the progressive establishment of genuine European union. Once again, what matters is the soundness of policies and political choices and that they should match the wishes of our peoples. Today, the complexity and gravity of the international situation and the way it has been and is being affected by decisions concerning armaments, the major defence issues and the urgent need for practical moves to further détente and peace again require us to demand that the original treaties be interpreted faithfully and as intended. For this reason also, we must resist any attempt to reduce the powers of the Assembly which is the most appropriate forum for the basic decisions and choices.

*Mr. Antoni (continued)*

In this context, it is highly significant that Mr. Page calls on the Council to provide the Assembly with fuller and more regular information on the work of the Independent European Programme Group, and of the Standing Armaments Committee and on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty. It is no less significant that the Council is recommended not to omit to keep the Assembly informed on all aspects of political co-operation between member states even when it fails to produce satisfactory results. And in this part of the recommendation we insist that the Council of Ministers should provide the Assembly with more detailed information on two subjects in particular.

The first of these is the work of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), in association with the Conference of National Armaments Directors, on co-production projects for the replacement of approved NATO armaments. The obstacles raised by the Council on this subject must be overcome. This information – as was also stressed at the Brussels symposium – is needed in order to interest national parliaments in the available opportunities for co-production, so that preference can be given to joint European projects which will not only bring down costs and therefore military expenditure and meet the need to improve the operational efficiency of the NATO defence system but will facilitate rather than hinder possible control measures and efforts to reach agreement on the reduction of armaments and on disarmament. We reaffirm the central importance of the political issue of a Europe increasingly responsible for its own defence, particularly in the case of conventional and tactical atomic weapons, and reiterate our opposition to the restructuration of the European armaments industry and the purchase of defence equipment under the aegis of the European Community.

In this Assembly, last December, Mr. Bernini spelled out the reasons for our opposition; among these, I feel that it would be appropriate to repeat our objection that such a move would circumvent the arms control and limitation obligations laid down by the Brussels Treaty, not only for the Federal Republic of Germany but also for all the other European countries. This does not remove the need for greater European arms co-operation on an equal footing, from production to use, and in advanced research and studies. We fail to see how European co-operation can advance, unless political decisions in favour of European options are left entirely to national parliaments and to WEU itself.

Secondly, we draw attention to the need for more detailed information on the trend and content of recent measures taken in response to serious international problems which have arisen, such as the Afghan crisis, Iran, the situation in the Middle East and regarding important future commitments such as the Madrid conference on security and co-operation in Europe and the negotiations for the reduction of military forces in Central Europe. This is essential so that the Assembly can express an opinion on the policies adopted, which should aim at breaking the logic of the use of armed force and of retaliation in international relations and at returning to a policy of negotiation and mutual concessions aimed at resolving the problems which have arisen and to a policy of détente and co-operation in the interests of the security of Europe and of the whole world.

At this historic moment, one of the elements in security is quite obviously a balance of force between the two blocs; no one can want or accept dangerous imbalances or discrepancies. But for this very reason an effort must be made to further détente in every way and thus create the conditions for achieving a balance at a lower level. This will not be achieved by rearmament or by forcing the Brussels Treaty in that direction. But the draft recommendation introduced by Mr. Tanghe seeks rather to shift security from political negotiation to the arms race, and in fact to go as far as amending the modified Brussels Treaty itself. In our view, this is a road which should not be taken.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, in accordance with the arguments we have advanced and with the position we maintained throughout the year covered by the Council's twenty-fifth annual report, we are opposed to the line taken in Mr. Tanghe's recommendation in its present form which we consider to be dangerous and we shall therefore be obliged to vote against it unless it is substantially amended. After equally close and careful consideration of Mr. Page's report and recommendation we find that it has a few negative aspects but several positive ones. For the reasons I have stated, I shall abstain.

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— I call Mr. Jung.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation).— Mr. President, I beg to differ with the last speaker. I would like to congratulate the Rapporteur, Mr. Tanghe, who has, I am convinced, presented us on behalf of the Committee with an extremely important report. Although, as he pointed out, this report is tabled each year, I believe that in 1980 it is of capital importance.

*Mr. Jung (continued)*

Ladies and Gentlemen, we cannot escape the consequences of our actions, and I am afraid that the judgment of history on the period through which we have just lived may prove to be very severe. Indeed, I have the impression that we are not always conscious of our responsibilities in regard to the defence of Europe. What changes have taken place on this continent since the treaty we are discussing was signed!

On the one side: over-armament, which Mr. Tanghe has described in detail, Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces and a large increase in the number of nuclear submarines. On the other: the impression that all of us elected representatives are, together with our governments, wasting time fighting – and fighting each other – over the price of milk or mutton. We have not reached agreement on joint armaments. We are involved in lengthy discussions about the different forms of military co-operation with our allies, especially the United States. It is of course true that, from our side, many questions are put to them about their commitment. Some among us are advocating, with varying degrees of frankness, scenarios that would end in the Finlandisation of Europe, with all that that would mean. Not only that, but certain political parties, who keep quiet about the enormous rearmament of the Soviet Union, are asking us to reduce expenditure on the defence of our own countries.

All this puts us after all in a very difficult position. I, who, together with many of our friends, am an advocate of détente, with a great deal of admiration for the culture of the Russian people, wish with all my heart for an improvement in East-West relations. But it would in my opinion be a mistake for us, as leaders of the democratic countries of Europe, not to have the courage to change policy and become conscious of our duty to unite our defence capabilities in a situation of apparent strategic vacuum.

It seems to me that to be discussing in 1980 the adaptation of the German navy shows that we are not aware of the reality of the dangers in which we live. I hope that our governments and our parliaments, including that of my own country, will speedily move towards a common defence of Europe. That would be the best way to safeguard peace and freedom for our peoples. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation).— I call Mr. von Hassel.

Mr. von HASSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation).— Mr. President, I asked for the floor because I wished, as outgoing Pre-

sident, to express my gratitude for the kind words with which the President elected today has expressed appreciation for the three years' work which I have had the honour to do in this Assembly. I am grateful for having been allowed to combine with my thanks, in which I also include the Secretary-General's office in London and the staff in this building, a few political observations which I should like to make to you in the presence of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. I have a few remarks to make which are directed to the Council and I am grateful to the Minister for his willingness to listen to me for a few minutes.

I should like to go back to the report presented by Mr. Page, which we heard three-quarters of an hour ago. This report deals with the political activity of the Council of Ministers and looks at the present state of Western European Union. It also invites us to examine the future rôle of Western European Union in the context of evolution towards a European union. I should like to devote a few minutes to this question of the future of our Assembly, to make a few remarks in my capacity as outgoing President and on the basis of my thirty years' experience as an elected member of parliament.

My three years in office as President of this Assembly, a period during which I had the support of a small but efficient secretariat, were often a source of great satisfaction to me. At the same time I recognised the fundamental weakness of Western European Union and its Assembly and pondered on the problem of how the work of these two institutions could be made more effective.

Mr. President, we all know the weak points of Western European Union at ministerial level, and we have just heard about them from Mr. Page, as Rapporteur, and also from Mr. Tanghe. I should like to give a brief summary of these weak points as I see them.

The Council meets formally only once a year, just for a brief session, a sort of "birthday party" – and then certainly not at top level. The Rapporteur, our colleague Mr. Page, said this an hour ago, putting it, with the special charm peculiar to the British, much more delicately – but the meaning was exactly the same. Admittedly Mr. Page excuses the Council by saying that we submit too many reports and that the Council may not be able to study them all carefully. He asks us to consider whether we should not put out fewer reports.

I am a member of the European Parliament. A few months ago that body published statistics which show that the European Parliament puts

*Mr. von Hassel (continued)*

out 150 million sheets of paper per year – 150 million sheets of paper! All that has to be read, and indeed by four times as many delegates as there are in the Assembly of Western European Union, and by a Council of Ministers of the Nine and not of the Seven. The number of reports is not, therefore, the decisive factor governing whether or not the Council of Ministers can cope with the work.

So my first remark is this: the Council of Ministers meets only once a year, for a sort of “birthday party”, and not at the highest level.

My second remark is that our Council ignores – and this, too, Mr. Page has mentioned – Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. I drew attention to this once before, in my statement of 18th January in connection with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Our Council – as I said then – never meets when there is an economic or other kind of threat to the member states of the Union, no member government has ever called for an immediate meeting of the Council in a specific situation – and yet God knows we are being threatened enough these days!

I should like to thank Mr. Tanghe for also having just now made an appeal to the same effect.

Our Council – and I say this with no disrespect to the two guest speakers who are going to address us during the present session – does not always send the ministers themselves to our debates. We are told that the ministers have other commitments, yet some of them do find time, for instance, to come and address the Political Committee of the European Parliament, of which I am a member. If they do not come to us, therefore, it would seem to be because we are not important enough in the eyes of the Council. This, Mr. President, must be changed, and I will support you in achieving this aim.

We thus have a situation where the Assembly of Western European Union, which is the assembly which deals with the defence of Europe, is the only European assembly which has to deal with a ministerial body which really cannot find much on which to report and has little to show for its efforts. This, it seems to me, is of very special importance for the credibility and prestige of this Assembly.

Many people may have got used to this state of affairs. I have not! And that is why I made some proposals last April about the future of Western European Union. Today I should like to concentrate on something which in my opinion could be done immediately, virtually overnight, to make the work of this Assembly

more effective, independently of what else our Council does or does not do. I should like to repeat a simple proposal which requires no action of any kind by governments and no additional expenditure. For we know – and you, Mr. President, will become only too aware of this – what money means in Western European Union; here we count not in ECUs but in halfpence.

Without its having to amend a single article of the Brussels Treaty, this Assembly can at a stroke emphasise its unique status as Europe’s defence forum by inviting the political groups of the European Parliament to send a number of observers to its next sessions, on the basis of proportional representation and at their own expense. Later, this practice could possibly be extended to the Committees.

I know what an indignant outcry this proposal caused in some quarters when I first made it last October, at the WEU symposium in Brussels. These people always see a danger that some sinister forces or other, some schemers or other, may be plotting to rob Western European Union of its responsibility for defence questions and to transfer this to other European bodies.

Mr. President, nothing could be further from my mind in making my proposal. I would remind these people that the Brussels Treaty is not their personal property, a kind of enclosure where they can bury their heads in the sand and resist any kind of progress. The Brussels Treaty belongs to Europe. It is the only military treaty between European states capable of providing a foundation on which it would be possible to build that European pillar of the Alliance for which President Kennedy called as far back as 1962 and which is so painfully lacking today.

We have a situation today where there are two parliamentary assemblies in Europe that have really important functions to perform: on the one hand, the directly-elected European Parliament with four hundred members, many of them prominent political personalities, a parliament which represents 200 million Europeans and has an important say in the shaping of our Community, but which under the Treaty of Rome has practically no voice in the development of European defence; on the other hand, the small Assembly of Western European Union, which has responsibilities in the field of defence, but is faced with a lethargic Council, ignored by the principal ministers concerned and whose strictly limited consultative function does not even entitle it to administer its own budget.

Mr. President, there cannot forever be a plurality of Europes, the Europe of the Nine



*Mr. von Hassel (continued)*

under the Treaty of Rome and the Europe of the Seven under the Brussels Treaty. We must pave the way for an eventual fusion of the two, and we know that time and Brezhnev are working against us.

This Assembly traditionally invites to its sessions observers, in connection with points on the agenda which are of interest to them, from European countries which are not members of Western European Union. During my period of office as President we have had, among others, observers from Norway, Denmark (as today), Greece and Spain. So why should we not also invite observers from the European Parliament, whose expenses would be paid by their political groups and who would of course be given the right to speak at our sessions, but not the right to vote?

This would be the best way of ensuring that the European Parliament would not be constantly concerning itself with questions of defence, which is just what is so greatly feared by those who today once again feel obliged to oppose this proposal. The proposal implies, of course, that the European Parliament would also invite us to send observers when it deals in Strasbourg with questions which affect us.

Mr. President, I hope that this proposal of mine will be taken seriously. The defence of Europe is too serious a matter for us to indulge in institutional rivalries, and we are all of us, after all, Europeans, whether we are operating under the flag of Western European Union or that of the European Community.

We must find ways of achieving co-operation between the Europe of the Nine, which is already a reality, and the Europe of the Seven. Each organisation must of course respect the identity of the other if we are to speak with one voice in the Council of the Atlantic Alliance and in the world community of nations.

To pick up the idea just put forward by Mr. Page, we must re-think and re-model our organisation so as to increase our security and stability. This is in my opinion the first step that we must take in order to add a new dimension to the consultative Assembly of Western European Union, breathe new life into it and preserve it from the danger of developing into a purely academic institution divorced from reality. It urgently needs new political blood to enable it to make itself heard by unresponsive governments and to bring its influence to bear on the development of a common European defence and foreign policy. *(Applause)*

*(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT.— Thank you very much, Mr. von Hassel.

It is appropriate that my distinguished predecessor should speak on the report of the Council immediately before the presentation of the report which is the next item on our Orders of the Day.

#### 4. *Twenty-fifth annual report of the Council*

*(Presentation by Mr. van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Docs. 833 and 846)*

The PRESIDENT.— The presentation of the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council is by Dr. Christoph van der Klaauw, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, who is the Chairman-in-Office of the Council. Mr. Minister, we are extremely grateful that you are able to present the report to us this afternoon, and I warmly invite you to come to the rostrum and deliver your address. I am also grateful to know that you are willing to answer questions at the conclusion of your remarks.

Mr. van der KLAUW *(Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council)*.— Mr. President, let me first of all congratulate you very sincerely, both on behalf of myself as well as on behalf of the Council of WEU, on your election this morning as President of the Assembly and extend my best wishes for a fruitful first year in office. Your long and wide experience both in parliament and in government will surely benefit you in exercising your duties as President of this Assembly. I am confident that under your able chairmanship the relationship between your Assembly and our Council will continue to develop in a harmonious and mutually useful way.

Having said that to you, Mr. President, I feel bound to say a cordial farewell to your predecessor, Mr. Kai-Uwe von Hassel, who has occupied the presidency for the last three years. On behalf of the Council, I should like to express our appreciation of the way in which Mr. von Hassel devoted his never-ceasing energy to the furthering of the interests of this Assembly. Although there have been some occasional differences of opinion between the Assembly and our Council, co-operation as well as understanding for each other's preoccupations have been good. This has always been a basic aim in Mr. von Hassel's efforts, for which I thank him once again. *(Applause)*

Mr. President, I turn now to the actual task before me — that is, presenting in this parliamentary Assembly in my capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council the twenty-fifth annual report on the activities of the Council in 1979.

*Mr. van der Klaauw (continued)*

I feel honoured and privileged to fulfil this tradition in accordance with Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. It gives me even more pleasure to do so because this is an opportunity for me to renew acquaintance with the Assembly with which I dealt not in a political but in an official capacity in the early sixties, when I headed the political desk of the NATO and WEU Directorate in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in The Hague.

As the text of the annual report has already been submitted to you, I shall confine myself to some comments and observations on the contents of it. Chapter I deals with the important subject of the relations between the Council and the Assembly. I can assure you that we attach much value to maintaining a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with the Assembly. This is shown both by the communication as early as possible of the twenty-fifth annual report and by the carefully considered and hopefully useful responses we give to the recommendations and written questions of your Assembly. Admittedly, there has sometimes been a slight delay in forwarding the answers, but this was beyond our will, and I will do my best to better our performance in this respect.

Of course, the Council has always been, and will continue to be, prepared to provide information to the Assembly on issues arising from the implementation of the provisions of the Brussels Treaty. One of the means to accomplish this is a more direct dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, as has been the case for the meeting between the Council and the General Affairs Committee in Luxembourg on 14th May last, as well as for the dinner that the Presidential Committee gave the same evening. This kind of informal dialogue enables us to exchange views in a fruitful way, avoiding somewhat the formal procedures which regulate our normal contacts.

However, one has to be realistic as to the depth and range of such informal gatherings, because the Assembly will be interested not so much in the personal opinions of individual ministers, however interesting these may be, but in thoughts which are generally held by the seven member states together. Inevitably, ministers will have to co-ordinate these views, and this puts some limits to the possibilities of spontaneous discussions. We shall both have thus to accommodate our views somewhat in order to further deepen and extend these meetings. There will be another occasion for such a meeting next spring in the Netherlands. I look forward to seeing many of you there.

One other opportunity for a dialogue between members of the Council and the Assembly is, of course, the participation of ministers or secretaries of state in the semi-annual meetings of the Assembly here in Paris. As stated in the annual report, the Council is aware of the Assembly's interest in the attendance of members of governments. We are also aware of the fact that our noble intentions in this field have not always been put into practice. We regret that as much as you do, and I assure distinguished delegates that we will make every effort to guarantee you a presence on our behalf which takes into account the importance we attach to the deliberations of your Assembly.

Last but not least, I should like to touch on the most interesting symposium on a European armaments policy, held last October in Brussels and arranged by the Assembly. Some members of the Council, as well as numerous representatives of governments, attended the symposium, which has been much appreciated. It is not my task to direct the work of your Assembly, Mr. President, but to my mind this could be a useful precedent for further activities. In concluding this part of my presentation, I should like to give special thanks to my predecessor, Mr. Thorn, through you, Mr. Ambassador, for the excellent manner in which he fulfilled his presidential duties in the past year.

Chapters II, III and IV of the annual report deal with the implementation of the Brussels Treaty by the Council and its subsidiary bodies. By and large, these chapters speak for themselves. The Council continues to keep under close scrutiny the scrupulous implementation of the provisions of the Brussels Treaty and its protocols. All the procedures which stem from that task have functioned normally. This being the case, I feel compelled to repeat once again here in this forum the great importance that our governments attach to the Brussels Treaty and our determination to fulfil the obligations of that treaty. I should especially mention Article V of that treaty, in which member states have promised each other mutual assistance in case of outside aggression. This article remains one of the central elements of the security system of the signatory countries, and there is no reason whatever to belittle the significance of it.

I should now like to say a few words on the political activities of the Council. You were able to read about the general contents of our deliberations in the annual report. I will dwell on one of the subjects mentioned – East-West relations – later. Let me just add now that, as you are undoubtedly aware, the Council has to respect the division of work between the various European and Atlantic organisations, which has, also in accordance with the Brussels

*Mr. van der Klaauw (continued)*

Treaty, grown over the years. The existence of the Council of Europe, the European Community, including European political co-operation, and NATO limits the scope of WEU. This does not diminish the essential value of WEU as an organisation, but it puts a realistic limit to its current functioning. We appreciate your rôle as the only European parliamentary body competent for questions of European defence and security. I refer here also to what Mr. von Hassel has just said. From your side, I hope that you will not set your expectations of what we can offer you too high in view of the limitations that I have just mentioned.

I turn now to the important subject of the study by the Standing Armaments Committee of the armaments industries of the member countries. You know that the second part of this study, on the economic component of the armaments industry, has been finished recently. The Council has just received this report and is studying it carefully. As the General Affairs Committee has been told already last month in Luxembourg, we will make a decision in due course on the form in which the study could be transmitted to your Assembly. Suffice it to say now that we appreciate your patience in this respect. We are aware of the very keen interest you have in this study and I can assure you that the Council attaches as much importance to the study as you do, and we will therefore consider carefully ways and means to inform you.

Mr. President, I should now like to speak as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. You will understand that I will focus on the very great problems that we face today because of developments in South-West Asia and their impact on the relations between East and West.

I think we all agree how serious is the new political and strategic situation created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Its dangerous nature becomes even more complex by events elsewhere in the area. The turmoil in Iran is an example of developments which threaten stability in a region of vital strategic and economic importance for the West.

Today I would, above all, like to dwell for a moment on the prospects for the policy of détente that we have arduously worked for during the last decade. It is my firm belief that we must continue the search for détente ; but we must also recognise that the Soviet military operations in Afghanistan have put an extremely heavy burden on the political climate in which the process of détente has to be pursued.

Soviet propaganda accuses the West, in particular the United States, of wanting to go back to the cold war. And Pravda, trying to drive a wedge between Europe and its transatlantic allies, said that Europe had to choose between détente and the United States. This, of course, is turning things upside down, for it is clear to everyone that it is the Soviets who are playing havoc with détente.

In whatever way one looks at it, it will always take two to make détente work. By using military means to extend its influence, Moscow has violated the rules of the game, and the continuing presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan will present a barrier to a return of confidence.

In a situation like the present, it is understandable that historical comparisons are made, and parallels have been drawn with the situation existing before World War I or World War II. I, for one, as a historian, have always been very interested in such historical analyses, but what has struck me most in such studies is that one must be very cautious indeed in drawing parallels, because in fact history never repeats itself. Circumstances today differ very much from those in either 1914 or 1938. But one can, of course, draw valuable lessons from the past. One such lesson is that one can never solve a crisis by choosing the way of appeasement.

When we look, therefore, at the question of what possibilities remain for détente after Afghanistan, we must keep our heads cool. The reasons for which we embarked on the process of détente are as valid as ever, and we must assume that the Soviet Union is well aware of that truth.

As far as we in the West are concerned, Mr. President, let us first of all remember that a precondition for détente is that Europeans and Americans must work together in close harmony. There can be no détente between Western Europe and the Soviet Union unless this endeavour is undertaken together with our American friends. Going it alone would seriously endanger the very basis of our security, which, as I see it, can be guaranteed only in maintaining the Atlantic relationship.

It is evident that in an alliance of fifteen independent countries that have all their own political priorities and geographical characteristics varieties of opinion will make themselves felt. One should, however, never consider this as a weakness but rather as a sign of strength.

First, this variety of views confirms as it were the basic acceptance by all of the same political and social ideals of a pluralistic and democratic society with full respect for the rule of law and for human rights. The second reason for

*Mr. van der Klaauw (continued)*

judging our diversities in a positive manner is that the Alliance members have the possibility to make good use of their different characters in their contacts with others. This is valid as well for the domain of strict East-West relations as for relations with the countries of the third world. We should, however, take very great care that we never let this strength develop into a weakness. Variety must not become divergence or division. Intensive consultations within the Alliance and within the European Community are of the utmost importance. Divided we fall, united we stand!

Mr. President, in our détente policy we have always been conscious of the conceptual gulf that has separated the two blocs right from the beginning of their détente effort. As we all know, the Soviets have never given up their doctrine of ideological struggle with the other bloc. The West, on the other hand, while ready for ideological discussions with the East, has always maintained that for détente to work a minimum of respect for a kind of code of conduct in actual behaviour is an absolute necessity. As we see it, détente is the process that should bring us, whatever the existing differences, to a stage where a solid network of co-operative relationships would improve our life on this planet in an atmosphere of mutual security, stability and equilibrium.

If we look at détente in this fundamental way, it is clear that various aspects of Soviet policy put obstacles in the way of that détente. In the first place, the continuing build-up endangers the balance of forces which is the basis for our security. Secondly, regular violations of human rights are a cause of great concern. They are absolutely wrong in themselves, they are contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Helsinki final act and they stand in the way of building confidence. I need not tell you that public opinion in the Netherlands – and it goes for the West in general – is very indignant about the treatment of Sakharov and other dissidents who are being punished for claiming the very rights of personal freedom which have been guaranteed in solemn undertakings.

In the third place, events in Afghanistan have emphasised the truth of the dictum that détente cannot be seen as a process of unconnected elements. Although it lies geographically outside the NATO area, what happens in Afghanistan crucially affects us – in the narrow sense because of the implications for our security, in the wider sense because it colours our whole outlook concerning the East-West relationship. Afghanistan makes clear once and for all that détente cannot be enjoyed à la carte and that it is indivisible.

The countries of the West have taken various measures in their relationship with the Soviet Union in order to make clear that its actions against Afghanistan have been and continue to be unacceptable. Members of NATO have also consulted together about the implications for the common defence. I believe that the meeting of the Defence Planning Committee, two weeks ago, where Ministers for Foreign Affairs joined their defence colleagues, was a very good session. It brought out once again our solidarity and it provided guidelines for the improvement of our collective defences. I can assure distinguished delegates that the Netherlands is fully prepared to play its part.

At the same time, Mr. President, given our unity and our readiness to maintain the balance of security with the East, the West must proceed with its efforts for détente and we must continue to use the structural possibilities which have become an essential part of détente policy, in particular CSCE and arms control.

As for CSCE, my government do not feel that the Madrid meeting should be deferred. We must, on the contrary, try to make that meeting as substantive and meaningful as possible. After all, the obligations which the thirty-five signatories have taken upon themselves in the final act of Helsinki are essential if we want to make détente a permanent and stable process. For that reason, a major task for the Madrid meeting will be to review how these undertakings are being put into practice. Without looking for unnecessary controversies, we must, therefore, not beat about the bush but be frank about each other's shortcomings. It is clear that all important aspects of the final act should receive due attention at Madrid. This includes such questions as military security matters, but also human rights and human contacts.

The second major field of East-West negotiations is arms control. Recent developments have in no way diminished the need for arms control. In fact, the recognition that arms control is a necessary basis of security together with defence has been a major step in the development of stabilising policies since the cold war. This underlines the importance of SALT and MBFR, but I should like to stress here the urgent need for getting negotiations started on long-range theatre nuclear forces. It is very regrettable that the Soviets have rejected so far the repeated offers of negotiation without preconditions on this crucial matter. We must continue to urge them to change that attitude.

Mr. President, next to the kind of multilateral or bilateral negotiations I have just mentioned, I think we must also attach great importance to our frequent bilateral contacts with our Eastern European neighbours. According to my experience, these countries are in their different

*Mr. van der Klaauw (continued)*

ways convinced of the need for and of the advantages of détente. By explaining to them in all clarity our views on the international situation, we may contribute in some measure to influence the Soviet leadership.

As regards the Soviet Union itself, I agree that channels of communication should remain open so that there should be no risk of unintended misunderstandings about each other's views leading to crisis situations. When the conditions are favourable, meetings between western and Soviet statesmen may serve a useful purpose in this respect if great care is taken to see that such meetings take place in the light of western cohesion and on the basis of thorough consultation within the European and the Atlantic framework.

Mr. President, looking beyond the realm of East-West contacts, the West will certainly have to devote much thought to the changing strategic situation in the outside world, and especially in the region of South-West Asia. Those changes were already becoming visible for some time, but they have become more acute because of recent developments. As for the military aspects, I should like to underline that there is no task for NATO beyond the treaty boundaries. It will mainly fall to the United States to take security measures in those areas. But all western countries must be aware that their interests are also at stake and they should, in their political and economic policies, try to contribute to the stability of the countries in that area. The proposal for increased economic co-operation between the members of the European Economic Community and the states in the Gulf area are also an example of such policies.

In saying this, I should like to emphasise that Afghanistan and its consequences should not be seen as a matter between East and West alone. On the contrary, this problem is of special importance for the countries of the third world; and without their active contribution it will hardly be possible to find satisfactory solutions. They, too, are in constant need of security and stability. They have developed a fully justified feeling of national pride and of aversion to interference in their internal affairs. I think that the Soviet Union is now being taught that lesson in Afghanistan.

We must continue to point out to the Soviet Union that the only satisfactory way out of the present crisis is to undo the invasion of Afghanistan and to let that unhappy country freely determine its own future. If arrangements which would guarantee that country's position as a neutral and non-aligned country could help to bring about that situation, this

would, of course, be most welcome. This was the purpose of the ideas initiated within the sphere of European political co-operation. I also view with great interest the active contribution of the Islamic countries in this respect.

An arrangement which would ensure permanent Soviet dominance over Afghanistan would not be a satisfactory outcome. It would be dangerous for the long-term security of South-West Asia, and we can also say that it would be contrary to the indivisibility of détente. Our hope must be that the Soviets will ultimately see that their best interests lie in a return to the ways of détente. In order to make that clear, the members of the Alliance, European and North American, must stand together. Last week the European members of the Nine put the Community back on the rails again. The fact that we succeeded will not only have a positive influence on our economic co-operation but will certainly be a factor of strength in European political co-operation. But while the strength of European political co-operation is vitally important, it is not sufficient. For our security and our freedom, the partnership with our North American friends and the other European allies is essential. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT.— I am sure that I speak for all representatives in thanking you, Mr. van der Klaauw, for your clear exposition of the Council's report and particularly, if I may use your own words, for the stimulating thoughts and commentary which you gave us in your capacity as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

I also wish to thank you for your kind personal remarks about my election to the chair and for your good wishes — wishes which I shall certainly need, for already the Assembly is running very late.

I hope that in putting questions to the Minister, which he has kindly undertaken to answer, representatives will put one question and not be tempted, as are all parliamentarians, to make speeches in the form of questions.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation).— The Chairman-in-Office of the Council has been kind enough to note our impatience, and we are grateful for his understanding. We are still waiting, but we know that he will ensure that we soon receive the fullest possible information.

My first question is as follows.

Does the economic study undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee seem to him something that could be of use to the IEPG, one of whose working groups is particularly

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

concerned with the industrial aspects of European co-operation on armaments?

My second question concerns something quite different.

He has informed us of his conception of Europe's attitude to the ECSC. I have more reservations than he has, and I am a little concerned that Europe should be going to Madrid in the present situation.

Still, I will explain the way I see things.

According to a recent report in the newspapers, the Netherlands Government has proposed the creation of a new integrated NATO squadron in addition to STANAVFORLANT, to be assigned to the Mediterranean.

Might the strengthening of NATO's military presence in this area not be seen as conflicting with projects for European mediation in the Middle East conflict? Might it not carry the risk of making the Mediterranean somewhat more prey to inter-bloc rivalry?

If such risks exist, would it not be better to strengthen European security through concerted national efforts?

The PRESIDENT.— I hope that other representatives will not speak for quite as long as Mr. Valleix, who, having said that his question had largely been answered, took some time in putting it.

Does the Minister wish to answer each question individually?

Mr. van der KLAUW (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation).— The question just put to me is one that is repeated from time to time; apparently the Assembly is not satisfied on this point.

The problem seems to be that we, the Council, are not fully in a position to provide the desired information. However, I promise to look into this matter again personally.

On the second question, the Netherlands proposal put forward at the NATO meeting two weeks ago for a study of a new squadron to be assigned to the Mediterranean, our thinking is directed towards the Atlantic, where the first squadron is stationed, rather than towards the Mediterranean.

Of course, the Mediterranean is also part of our defence zone and I would not rule out the possibility of the navies of North Sea countries also visiting the Mediterranean. The squadron too may go there. But our thoughts are directed, as in the case of the first squadron, rather towards the North Atlantic.

The PRESIDENT.— Are there any other questions?

I call Mr. Konings.

Mr. KONINGS (*Netherlands*) (Translation).— Mr. President, the Minister spoke about the very topical subject of getting the European Community back on the rails, but said nothing about the meeting between Mr. Giscard d'Estaing and Mr. Brezhnev. It is plain, however, that there was no prior consultation about this among the partners in WEU. What is the Council's view of this initiative and its outcome? What is going to be done to try to see that there are no further individual initiatives of this kind, and that the WEU countries are not again presented with *faits accomplis* like this?

The PRESIDENT.— I call Mr. van der Klaauw.

Mr. van der KLAUW (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation).— I think it would be a good idea, Mr. President, if Mr. Konings were to read through the text of my speech again later. Courtesy is one of the basic characteristics demanded from any foreign minister and diplomat. I have however made myself quite clear on this subject, without naming names. Besides, the WEU Council has not yet met to discuss the matter.

The PRESIDENT.— I call Mrs. von Bothmer.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation).— The Minister mentioned that the report of the Standing Armaments Committee will be submitted in due course. May I ask what we are to understand by "in due course"? Does it mean this year or next?

The PRESIDENT.— I call Mr. van der Klaauw.

Mr. van der KLAUW (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation).— In reply to Mrs. von Bothmer's question I would say that in my opinion the time needed for submission of the SAC's report will be a matter of years.

The PRESIDENT.— I call Mr. Jung.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation).— I would like to ask the Minister what the Council of Ministers thinks about the fact that France has invited five navies to a joint exercise in the Atlantic. What action has the Council taken on this initiative?

In accordance with a recent debate in the European Parliament, does the Council not think that the European countries should co-ordinate their naval strategy with a view to protecting the supply lines for energy and vital raw materials?

The PRESIDENT.— I call Mr. van der Klaauw.

Mr. van der KLAAUW (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation).— In my address I pointed out that the limits of the North Atlantic Treaty must be retained. I think this is also the view of the other allied countries. We can of course together look into this important question of the route round the Cape of Good Hope, but I do not think that it is for NATO to discuss it.

The PRESIDENT.— I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation).— Perhaps I am asking the Minister to relax the rules of due reserve and courtesy, but I would like to know whether, where it says in the report presented by our colleague, Mr. Tanghe, that a country had decided no longer to submit certain types of armaments to Agency control, the Council was informed.

If so, what was its judgment on this withdrawal?

Like the Minister, I am being extremely careful in my choice of words.

The PRESIDENT.— I call Mr. van der Klaauw.

Mr. van der KLAAUW (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation).— The Council has noted the matter, but it is not for the Council to pronounce on it.

The PRESIDENT.— I call Mr. Stainton.

Mr. STAINTON (*United Kingdom*).— Many informed and sympathetic observers in the United Kingdom deplore the non-existence there of effective civil defence. This has been referred to as the third but missing leg of the defence triangle. Will the Minister, in his capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Council, please say whether — and, if so, how — WEU can activate proper steps in this sphere throughout Western Europe? We await the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. We also anxiously await advice on civil defence.

The PRESIDENT.— I call Mr. van der Klaauw.

Mr. van der KLAAUW (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*).— Civil defence, I quite agree, is a very important matter, and we should look hard at it. But I think that it is wiser to deal with it in the context of NATO than in the context of WEU. The knowledge and possibilities available in NATO are much greater than are available in WEU. I feel that it is

much better to go forward on this question in NATO. I assure you that we are working hard on these problems in Brussels in the NATO context.

The PRESIDENT.— Thank you, Mr. van der Klaauw.

Are there any other questions?

I call Mr. Mommersteeg.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*) (Translation).— Like so many others, Mr. President, the Chairman of the Council has said détente must be maintained. Leaving aside a discussion about whether détente is divisible or not, the Madrid conference forms part of this whole question. Is there not now a danger — of a conference will soon be upon us — of a vehement confrontation between the Warsaw Pact countries and the countries of the West, a confrontation that might make the whole climate of relations still worse?

The PRESIDENT.— I call Mr. van der Klaauw.

Mr. van der KLAAUW (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation).— This danger is always present; it depends on the reactions. What we have in Madrid is not so much a conference as a review conference, it is to check whether the Helsinki final act is being complied with. We are not looking for a confrontation; we want that act to be observed. If the other side reacts in such a way that there is a question of a confrontation, then the meaning of a review conference is not being properly understood. We shall be glad, on the basis of the checks made in Madrid, to look at what the further possibilities are.

There had, besides, been intensive consultations prior to the events in Afghanistan with the Warsaw Pact countries and, one must not forget, with the neutral countries that were also involved. We are ready to go ahead with these, though events in Afghanistan have certainly put a very severe damper on things.

The PRESIDENT.— Thank you, Minister.

Are there any other questions? The next question should be the last, because we are running very late.

I call Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation).— Mr. President, the Chairman of the Council has spoken about not extending the NATO area, but he also said that substantial interests of the western countries are undoubtedly at stake when events take place outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. I appreciate that militarily the United States

*Mr. van den Bergh (continued)*

carries the prime responsibility in connection with these events, and that Europe does have political and economic responsibilities. Am I now right in understanding that if the United States makes greater efforts outside the North Atlantic Treaty area the European countries are going to make extra military efforts inside Europe itself to compensate for this American commitment?

The PRESIDENT.— I call Mr. van der Klaauw.

Mr. van der KLAUW (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation).— In answer to the question, I can say that during the meeting of the Defence Planning Committee two weeks ago, at which the Foreign Ministers too were present, it was clearly stated that all the NATO countries would continue to fulfil to the best of their ability the commitment undertaken in Washington — I mean the 3%. This does not mean that there were agreements about further efforts to be made; it is reaffirming what was already agreed on long since. I cannot give an answer now to the question of how far various matters might lead to a shift in tasks. This matter has, besides, not yet been raised officially.

The PRESIDENT.— I think, Minister, that the Assembly would wish me to express our appreciation of the manner in which you have answered questions and for the undertakings, which I am sure you will honour, as to further information. There will never be a time when everyone agrees with the Council, but I am sure that under your chairmanship we shall have good and close relations. Thank you very much indeed.

**5. Political developments in Europe —  
reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the  
Council**

**Application of the Brussels Treaty — reply to the  
twenty-fifth annual report of the Council**

*(Resumed Joint Debate on the Reports  
of the General Affairs  
Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and  
Armaments and Votes on the draft Recommendations,  
Docs. 834 and 836 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT.— We now resume the debate on the recommendations in Documents 834 and 836. I must advise the Assembly that we still have five speakers inscribed for this debate. There are six amendments tabled to one of the draft recommendations. Having regard to this being our first day and also because of the reception which is to follow, I

hope that we shall be able to adjourn the Assembly between six o'clock and half-past six. I ask those who are to take part in the debate to do their maximum to abbreviate their remarks.

The next speaker is Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*).— Thank you, Mr. President. I shall attempt to comply with your request for relative brevity. At the same time, I trust that you will allow me to take one or two minutes to offer to you personally warm and sincere congratulations on your election as President, especially as you enjoyed the luxury of an unopposed election earlier this morning. I offer those congratulations in the full knowledge that, with the abundance of experience that you have behind you as a parliamentarian and as a minister in a former Labour government with especial responsibility for defence questions, you will be a resounding success in the presidential chair of Western European Union.

I should also like to congratulate Mr. Page on his reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council to the Assembly. If I sound a little mournful during the course of my dissertation on that report, it is due to the fact that I, as a fairly long-standing delegate to the Western European Assembly, in common with many of my colleagues, have for some time expressed deep concern about the future of WEU. There is evidence before us over a period of time so far as individual governments are concerned of, shall I say, a lack of warmth towards the organisation of Western European Union. Indeed, it has been alleged that some governments would not be unwilling to see WEU wither away on the branch.

It is in this context that I pick up some of the comments made by Mr. Page in his report. He begins at paragraph 3 with a reference to the decreasing frequency of meetings between the Council and the Assembly. He goes on to deplore the fact that there is also a decrease in the frequency of meetings between the Council and the Committees of the Western European Assembly. I can say in passing that less than three weeks ago in Luxembourg, as a member of the General Affairs Committee, I had the useful experience, not for the first time, of participating in a meeting with the members of the Council under the chairmanship of Mr. Thorn. Without equivocation, I am prepared to say that in my experience that was by far the most useful and most successful meeting in which I have participated.

Having said that, I must pick up one or two comments made by Mr. Page. I refer particularly to the work of the Standing Armaments Committee. Even though the Minister made a



*M. Urwin (continued)*

reference to that in his presentation this afternoon, I want to reiterate as firmly as I can the dissatisfaction which spreads through the ranks of parliamentarians because of the lack of information communicated to us concerning the work of the Standing Armaments Committee. I repeat the same criticism about information concerning the work of the Independent European Programme Group.

Mr. Page, at the beginning of his report, has the first sub-title: "WEU at the half-way stage". There are those in this Assembly who might be prepared to describe the half-way stage as something of a watershed. Mr. Page has rehearsed the arguments not only in this paragraph but later in his report about other developments in Europe which to some extent influence, or, indeed, can threaten, the work and continuing existence of WEU. Mr. von Hassel had some critical comments to make about institutional rivalry. So far as I am concerned, I have never sought to precipitate any arguments about institutional rivalry. However, the use of that terminology rather provokes me into that kind of participation.

Mr. Page reminds us of the onset of the European Economic Community and of the challenging situation so far as WEU is concerned of direct elections to the European Parliament last year. As realistic politicians, we have to face the fact that in the European Parliament members of that parliament are still desperately searching for a rôle to play in European politics. Indeed, I go further and suggest that there are one or two members of the European Parliament who are encountering so much difficulty in determining what their rôle actually is that they spend far too much of their time, so far as the United Kingdom is concerned, in trespassing on the fields of elected members of the national Westminster Parliament.

I can understand the physical problem with which European parliamentarians are faced. Having said that, unquestionably there is an increasingly developing tendency towards the ideal European union. I still maintain, and proudly make the claim, that WEU, under the modified Brussels Treaty, has the sole responsibility for the defence of Europe.

If the argument as it develops is in favour of assigning some – or, indeed, all – of the WEU responsibilities under the treaties to the European Parliament, I must avowedly declare my position as being totally against such a move. One of the reasons for this is that the nine member states comprising the European Community are not all members of Western European Union. If there is to be a concerted move towards European union rather than the

responsibility being vested in the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, with its much wider responsibilities in the European sense, would be a more nearly ideal vehicle for such a union to begin.

In paragraph 11 of his report, Mr. Page mentions the question: "whether the European Communities would develop to the detriment of Western European Union". We must face up to this question.

In response to your request for brevity, Mr President, I conclude by calling attention to recommendation 5, which says that the Council should:

"Examine the organisational measures to be taken now so that, when the time is ripe, WEU may be prepared to take its place in a wider framework of European co-operation."

There must be an affirmative answer as regards the continuing responsibility of WEU, which should not be subsumed by another organisation but should retain its sovereignty with regard to the defence policy of Europe.

The PRESIDENT.— Thank you, Mr. Urwin, particularly for your kind personal reference.

I call Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). — As those colleagues who are members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments will no doubt remember, I took an active part in the discussions in Bonn on the excellent report by Mr. Tanghe. In my view, one of the special merits of this report is that it reaffirms the original character and value of the treaty linking the states we represent. Indeed, Article V of the Brussels Treaty gives concrete expression to the solidarity between the states of Europe by formally providing for automatic mutual assistance if any one of them should be the object of an armed attack.

Article VIII of the Brussels Treaty bases this military commitment on a political co-operation which, according to the text, is continuous insofar as the WEU Council is required to consult, at the request of any member state, with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace.

Furthermore, I am well aware that Article IV incorporates European co-operation in the much wider framework of the Atlantic Alliance, since it provides that the member states shall work in close co-operation with NATO in the execution of the treaty.

The point I wish to emphasise is that the provisions of Article IV introduce a concept which is supplementary to the concepts on which the provisions of Articles V and VIII are

*Mr. Bozzi (continued)*

based. But it would be wrong to think that Article IV could lead to Europe's political resolve and military strategy simply being watered down within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The desirable co-operation between WEU and NATO could not possibly involve the political and military fusion of WEU into any integrated organisation.

The object of the continuous political co-operation between the states is not the regional implementation of North Atlantic Council decisions; European military solidarity reflects complementary shared interests, as I am quite prepared to recognise, but which may be quite distinct from Atlantic solidarity. Now it seems to me, although I hope I am wrong, that some of my colleague's proposals are not fully in line with what I regard as a balanced concept of the allied relationship between Europe and the United States.

For instance, it is stated in paragraph 2.17 that the WEU countries should merely "back the United States in protecting Europe's interests". The spirit of the Brussels Treaty would seem to call for something quite different, namely for Europe to work out proposals in line with its own interests, rather than systematically surrendering its responsibilities to a third power, be it our dear, old and close ally, the powerful American nation.

Nor can one disregard the oddity of this position. At a time when Europe seems to be preparing to offer to mediate in the Middle East conflict, the tensions of which could affect both its security and its economic stability, and when American action taken, alas, without adequate prior consultation, appears to have aggravated the tensions rather than effectively dissuading the Soviet Union, it does not seem sensible to deprive Europe of the possibility of making its own voice heard.

Recent developments in the Moslem countries illustrate the drawbacks of any policy which slavishly copies that of the United States. To give only one example: whereas at first the Moslem world severely condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a certain indecisiveness – not to use too harsh a word – in American policy towards Iran, and the fact that the Egypt-Israel negotiations unilaterally advocated by Washington without consulting its European allies have unfortunately reached an impasse, have together led to a complete reversal in the attitude of the Islamic conference. Its members – one need only read what they have written and listen to what they say – now direct their main or at least most bitter

criticism at the West. So we now have the paradoxical situation in which the countries at the receiving end of Soviet aggression hesitate to condemn it as strongly as they no doubt should, for fear of seeming to belong to the same camp as the United States.

Now Europe, if it is able to exploit its long-standing knowledge of the Arab and Moslem world and more generally – since I am speaking to a Belgian, he knows what I am talking about – of the third world, Europe can, I maintain, exert a decisive influence in closing the breach which is threatening to open up between the third world and the West and thereby help to dissuade the developing countries from allying themselves – as some are periodically tempted to do – with the USSR. Such alliances are without doubt one of the greatest threats to European security at present. Moreover, Europe must be able to speak with one voice, to use the customary phrase, and make itself heard by its American ally. Surely this means first of all that it must speak only with its own voice and not merely as the almost perfect echo of another voice.

That is the aim of the first part of the amendment which I shall table in a short while and which provides that where necessary – which certainly seems the case at present – European political consultation between our members shall precede discussions in the North Atlantic Council.

Strengthening European unity obviously also means ensuring the participation of each state, on an equal footing, while respecting its fundamental national options.

This leads me to repeat, once again, that one cannot disregard the special position of France vis-à-vis NATO's integrated military structures. This is a *de facto* situation which must be taken into account in any proposal for European co-operation in defence matters. I do not think Mr. Tanghe is entirely convinced of this need, although his point of view seems to me to have moved in a positive direction during the Committee's work. In any case, I voted in favour of his report in Committee.

Furthermore, the question of the Federal Republic of Germany's special status, particularly as regards the modest size of its battle fleet and the other restrictions imposed on its conventional armaments, can definitely be examined by the WEU Council, which has sole competence in this area. However, first we must know the point of view of our German friends and allies and any proposals they may wish to make. That is the purpose of another amendment I will be tabling soon. I think that unless we take that approach, which is a prudent one and also one that respects the Federal

*Mr. Bozzi (continued)*

Republic of Germany's own national responsibilities, we may be risking failure and, what is worse, as a result of that failure find ourselves witnessing the re-emergence of the nationalistic feelings or resentment which it is the aim of Europe, our European organisation and our Assembly to overcome.

My final remarks on Mr. Tanghe's report concern a matter which may look technical, i.e. the question of armaments control, but which touches on the very concept of European co-operation in security matters.

As I have said, this co-operation must be realistic. It cannot disregard such fundamental facts as the priority France accords to its strategic nuclear weapons. By their nature, these weapons are not subject to the armaments control provisions introduced in 1954, at a time when France had no strategic force. So they cannot come under these provisions.

The question of chemical weapons is of a radically different nature; I am mentioning them because our colleague's report also refers to them, although it seems to lump together all the countries with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.

At any rate, according to my information, the European states are not currently contemplating the deployment of chemical weapons; rather they seem to me to be in favour of banning them under an appropriate international convention. France shares this attitude and the information contained in the explanatory memorandum of my colleague's report as regards the production of considerable quantities of chemical weapons in France is, thank God, quite unfounded and must be formally denied, as I denied it in Committee. The Toulouse factory to which Mr. Tanghe alludes in fact closed down in 1977.

All these remarks lead me to hope that Mr. Tanghe will accept the amendments I will be moving and that, in general, he will take account of my remarks which are inspired by a very keen desire to ensure that Europe can indeed collaborate and co-operate in every way with our great and powerful Atlantic ally, but can do so under optimum conditions, allowing it to retain its originality and assert a policy that is its own policy. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT.— The next speaker is Mr. Valleix. I ask speakers to limit their speeches to ten minutes, which is generous, bearing in mind our very pressed timetable.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation).— I should like to begin with a few comments on Mr. Page's report. I shall be fairly brief, since

the quality of your report, Mr. Page, does not give us much cause for reservations, and also because Mr. Urwin has had occasion to offer some comments which in fact already raise the main points I wanted to bring up myself — including, therefore, the criticisms of the penultimate paragraph of the preamble, “anticipating that, in due course, WEU may be expected to participate in a wider framework of European co-operation...”, and of paragraph 5 of the recommendation proper.

Why these reservations? The ambiguity of the actual wording is such that it could lend itself to very different interpretations. Some of these, in my view, would have to be rejected outright, as for example the removal, pure and simple, of all the restraints contained in the Brussels Treaty. Only a detailed examination would have made it possible to determine the respective share of each member state in the defence of Europe, in the case both of states belonging to the integrated sections of NATO and of states that have retained control of their military capabilities.

It is possible that certain relaxations might be considered after twenty-five years of practice. Indeed, it should be remembered that such relaxations are the subject of periodic Council decisions. But a fundamental revision of the rules on conventional armaments requires an overall examination of all the political and military implications both for the place of Europe in the Alliance and for its relations with the eastern bloc countries.

Another possible interpretation is a rapprochement between WEU and the European Community. Mr. von Hassel pointed a short while ago to the usefulness, as he sees it, of a rapprochement of this kind. I shall take up his remarks in his presence, when I shall be more at ease in affirming that European defence is important enough for WEU, which is exclusively responsible for it on Europe's behalf, to assume this task and for the other European organisations to draw the consequences of the guidelines laid down by WEU.

Without wishing to labour the point, nor in the least to contemplate such a step, I would point out that on the day when Community observers were admitted to this Assembly the Communities would rightly expect reports of their observations, their comments, or WEU's conclusions. This makes me afraid that the Communities, which already bring up defence problems outside the orbit of the Treaty of Rome, might thereby find a procedure and a natural way, if I may say so, to take up problems beyond their terms of reference.

I would add that the Communities already have enough problems — nine on one side,

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

seven on the other, to refer once again to Mr. Urwin's comment – for there to be a risk that if the two assemblies were merged into a nine-power assembly then WEU, already accused of being inefficient, would become even more inefficient, as regards this serious problem of defence.

I would therefore be glad if Mr. Page would make the two paragraphs of the recommendation, especially paragraph 5, more precise in order to avoid any misinterpretation.

Finally I would like to tell Mr. Tanghe how much I appreciate the great contribution his report has made to our work. Only, I would be happy if he could see his way to accepting Amendment 3 by Mr. Bozzi which strengthens paragraph 1 of the recommendation. I believe that, insofar as it is possible for WEU and the Council to consult together before the consultations in the North Atlantic Council, prior and closer consultation at European level should lead to a more coherent discussion on the part of the member states individually, but above all collectively as representatives of Europe within the North Atlantic Council.

I would therefore be happy if this point could be accepted by the Rapporteur.

For the rest, I shall say no more, as it seems that all our colleagues understand the legitimate aspirations of Germany to somewhat wider responsibilities. But this is a matter on which we have to proceed with great caution. I believe the recommendation respects the need for caution in the positive sense, that is in terms of what Germany might express through its government. Now, I do not think that we have for the time being been presented with explicit demands by the German Government. The recommendation, then, with the added emphasis of a couple of amendments, appears to be well balanced, and I simply would like us to make a number of small improvements if it is still possible to do so.

The PRESIDENT.– Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

I now call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation).– Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I put forward a point of view in this Assembly which may not come as a surprise to some of you but at any rate – to my regret – seems more original than most; that is to say, I shall speak to the WEU Assembly in the voice calling for peace, not for armed peace, that contemporary imitation of the *Pax Romana* built on cemeteries, but for peace through détente and understanding between people. Replying to violence by violence is not the way to promote civilisation and the happiness of mankind.

I regret to say, Mr. President, that when one analyses most of the reports put before us during this session – and some of those submitted at the last session – a tougher attitude is perceptible, almost a call for a hard-line approach. This is evident in the excellent report of my friend Mr. Tanghe, excellent in its construction, the depth of its research and its serious approach, but less excellent in my view in its political foundation, its judgment and the policy it advocates, as seen in paragraph 2.14, for example, which begins:

“The Committee welcomes the fact that the United States and some of its allies having appropriate resources are reacting in this way, thus proving their ability to resist by force...”

Mr. President, one can question the capacity and credibility of the United States, at any rate its political capacity. Will we ever know the true explanation of the dramatic and unhappy outcome of the apparent attempt to invade Iran by American troops? Will we ever know the real reasons behind it and why it failed? And need we recall what happened in previous years in cases of American intervention all over the world?

Mr. President, I wish to mention here the reports submitted to us by Mr. Vohrer and Mr. Ahrens which, when dealing with strategic mobility, also refer to what Mr. Tanghe described as “the need for the armed forces of certain allied countries to have ready access to areas of the world where those countries exercise responsibilities.” This repeated call, which was explained in detail at the October meeting in Bonn of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, in which I took part and in which, incidentally, I abstained on Mr. Tanghe's report, is a call to go beyond the limits imposed by the North Atlantic Treaty, especially as regards the Tropic of Cancer.

Can one regard this as a real threat or an effective ambition, now that the Belgian Government, in its recent government statement, actually specified that there was no question of going beyond the limits imposed by the treaty, either directly or indirectly?

May I reiterate the warnings of my colleagues and what I understood Mr. Urwin to say about developments that can threaten WEU. I think we are witnessing a kind of shift. Mr. Urwin said WEU was at the half-way stage. I would like someone to explain half-way to what? Half-way to disintegration or half-way towards co-operation between the allied countries in WEU? Paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation recommends that the Council: “Consider that consultations in the North Atlantic Council may supplement, where appropriate,

*Mr. Dejardin (continued)*

those provided for in Article...” So I shall vote for Mr. Bozzi’s amendment since what I fear is precisely that imperceptible but steady shift of WEU’s competences towards another body, the North Atlantic Council or NATO. I cannot accept the continued signs of American dominance in NATO. My ambition is that I shall take part one day in the construction of a European unity, a European sovereignty, which also includes the defence of Europe, and here I may be expressing an opinion that differs from that of my French colleagues.

Mr. President, may I also express my reservations as regards paragraph 2 of the recommendation. I cannot agree with a proposal to call for the strengthening of defence through the urgent implementation by the states concerned of measures of the long-term defence programme, for I wish to remain consistent in what I say here, in Brussels and to my constituents in Liège. I cannot accept that, if the situation arose, our western countries, faced with financial and budgetary difficulties, found their social budgets cut while their military budgets were left untouched.

May I remind you that the Belgian Government, which has our confidence, including that of Mr. Tanghe, provides in its government statement for a 2.2 % cut in its national defence budget in 1980 and for limiting expenditure or investment in military material to 6 % at constant prices.

If the governments were to follow the recommendation, that would without doubt mean increasing the military expenditure in our countries’ budgets, and I say here and now that I do not intend to take part in such an operation at a time when large sections of the population in our various countries are not receiving according to their needs, especially as regards social welfare.

Mr. President, perhaps I will be accused of ill-will, but I am simply reading the texts proposed to me.

In paragraph 7, I note a further allusion to the question of chemical weapons; and I compare this text to the Banks report which discusses the protection of the population against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and then calls for the member countries to be equipped with stocks of chemical weapons, which would lead to an escalation of horror. But this will be the subject of another debate, on the Banks report.

Because of all this I abstained in the vote in Committee. I cannot abstain in the final vote because of the development of the international situation, the proliferation of statements in all

directions, which are too aggressive for my taste, and the details given during the debate. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT.— Thank you very much, Mr. Dejardin.

The next speaker is Mr. Mommersteeg.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*) (Translation).— In view of the time, Mr. President, I shall limit myself to one or two remarks on the draft recommendation attached to the report by Mr. Page.

I think both Rapporteurs have done most valuable work.

In the first paragraph of the preamble the point is made that the relationship between the Assembly and the Council rests on a sound basis. A number of speakers have already questioned that statement; even Mr. von Hassel has indeed offered some criticism of this, and I too wonder whether the statement is correct. It is in the nature of things that the importance of, particularly, political discussion within the Council of WEU should have lessened over the years, as European political co-operation has grown in extent, depth and in the machinery available for it. We all know that this political co-operation involves very intensive consultation between the countries, and also provides a framework for communication between the various foreign ministers. Obviously, therefore, political consultation in the WEU Council has now a lesser significance. This is not something I regret, because this European political co-operation is enormously important.

The Chairman of the Council has just told us that he is glad that the European Community, the counterpart of European political co-operation, is back on the rails again. I shall have to see, over the days ahead, whether this is in fact so. There is the row in Bonn, for instance.

I have to wonder, too, about what is happening in London, bearing in mind the recent about-turn in London in connection with the recently-agreed sanctions against Iran. The antagonisms have not been removed, and structural reforms have still not been begun. Initiatives that have been promised, such as those on a common industrial policy from which the United Kingdom might draw considerable advantage, have not been taken further. So I would put a very big question-mark against what is said in the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

The final paragraph of the preamble says that Europe must have genuinely integrated and co-ordinated foreign and defence policies. There undoubtedly is a genuinely co-ordinated policy — that is what happens in the system of Euro-

*Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)*

pean political co-operation. But genuinely integrated? What do the governments of the countries whose parliaments we represent here think about that? I think we are still a long way off integrated policies, though I am very much in favour of them.

Paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation raises the question of what WEU's place is. This does not seem clear to me, and I would ask Mr. Page to go into this in more detail, and to say exactly what he means by this. For me, the Brussels Treaty is the real heart of the matter. The central provision of the Brussels Treaty – and this does not feature in any other treaty – is automatic mutual support in the event of an attack. This is the central point from which we must proceed. This means that the Assembly has to concentrate on the central issue, that is to say on defence as an element of international policy. When considering defence, one must think not only of armaments. Within a policy of ensuring security, the control of armaments forms an equally valid component.

This draft recommendation ought to merit a very much fuller speech. This is not possible. We can go into points it contains when we are discussing other reports; and I shall not fail to do so.

The PRESIDENT.– Thank you, Mr. Mommersteeg.

I call Mr. Hanin.

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation).– Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I had not intended to speak during this debate, but having heard the speech by my friend and fellow countryman, Claude Dejardin, I think it might be useful to explain why I and my group shall be voting for Mr. Tanghe's report.

I fully understand Mr. Dejardin's feelings. I can very well understand the fear inspired by the escalation of violence and armaments, and the reasons for asking oneself how one can possibly put an end to it. I accept that one should try to end the escalation and I personally fully share the desire to do so.

But unilateral disarmament and unilateral concessions may not be the best road towards peace.

After re-reading those passages of Peter the Great's will that are devoted to the policy to be followed in Europe as long ago as that, I could not help thinking that he had found some rather surprising successors who fully shared his ideas about the way in which, not the Tsarist or Soviet régime but Russia as such, should conduct its policy in Europe and the world.

I am convinced that at the present time our capacity to resist is being weighed up. Some people think we ought not to install new missiles in Europe. It is not desirable. Certainly, we ought not to do so if, prior to this, the others had not begun, without consulting anyone, to replace outdated missiles by missiles that are more recent and infinitely more formidable. It is a very strange conception of détente to begin installing new weapons and then intimate that your adversary should not redress the balance on the grounds that to do so would compromise the détente process.

Moreover, the same country has, in terms of world geography, chalked up an indisputably important point by managing if not to neutralise then at least to seize hold of a country as important as Afghanistan.

Against this background, an attempt has been made to compare social and military budgets. In this respect the first thing to safeguard is peace, for if peace is not safeguarded, every social budget will be annihilated. In reality, what concerns us at the moment is to decide whether we are capable not of conducting an aggressive policy but of showing that in any event we are quite determined not to accept passively the attempted spread of Russian domination.

As to our relations with the United States, I do not desire American supremacy in NATO or anywhere else, although I would remind you that not so very long ago, in 1943 or 1944, we accepted such supremacy in our struggle for liberation.

For the rest, I share Mr. Dejardin's feelings. Like him, I would like Europe to be able to speak with one voice and to constitute a defence force that could speak to the Americans as an equal. In this respect we missed an exceptional opportunity – whatever the reasons put forward at the time – by rejecting the European Defence Community. Unfortunately, however, we are no longer in the same situation. My ally in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the one with whom I would wish to be able to speak on an equal footing, is the United States of America. To claim that the American incursion in Iran was a military invasion is perverse, when its purpose was to release people taken hostage in defiance of the human rights that we defend in Strasbourg. It is a funny way to look at things.

Europe, therefore, must not be prepared to accept a passive rôle in this matter. On the contrary, it must be capable of taking initiatives in order to break through the vicious circle of permanent rearmament. It must not disarm unilaterally because there are, unfortunately, certain governments that only understand the language of resistance. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT.— Thank you very much, Mr. Hanin.

The joint debate is now closed.

Do the Rapporteurs wish to reply? Mr. Page?

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*).— I was, fortunately, asked questions by only two colleagues, Mr. Valleix and Mr. Mommersteeg, neither of whom, I believe, is present, which makes it easier to answer them. Both points raised by these two colleagues concerned the question of general affairs thinking: that the Assembly should stand back and take a look at the future. What I can say, and I should have emphasised in my speech, is that the modified Brussels Treaty must, and shall, stay as the centrepiece of European defence.

Where our position needs looking at again is how our relationship stands in relation to these different organisations. The most eloquent speech of Mr. von Hassel pointed that out. All we are doing is not changing our situation but taking stock of our present relationships.

That is what I would say. I hope very much that the Chairman will be able to make a summary of some of the other points that have been raised.

The PRESIDENT.— Thank you, Mr. Page.

Mr. Tanghe, do you wish to speak?

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation).— Mr. President, there are two reasons for me to be brief. The first is the lateness of the hour. The second is that Mr. Hanin, whom I know to be a very pacific person, a supporter of peace throughout the world, has just replied to all those speakers in this debate who have expressed the fear that in certain reports, and perhaps in mine too, there is a certain hardening, a call for a "tougher" attitude.

Listening to them brought to my mind the famous cartoon character, Popeye the sailor, who, seeing his opponent's biceps swell eats a tin of spinach and watches his own do the same. You must understand, my dear colleague, that when there is a call for disarmament on one side and we see, on the other, the invasion of a country not belonging to the Warsaw Pact, an invasion accepted by no one — not the members of NATO, nor the neutral countries, nor the countries of the third world — when we are being asked to refrain from installing the Pershing and other missiles but the other side is continuing to install SS-20s — there are already ninety in position and five new ones are built every month — we are entitled to ask ourselves what we have to do on our side in order to be strong enough to prevent war, in order for it not to happen, in order to preserve peace and avoid an attack by one side or the other.

I shall not reply to the individual speakers. I will simply say to Mr. Bozzi and Mr. Valleix that I have for many years understood the quite special position of France. I remember the time when the NATO headquarters moved from France to Belgium. I am aware of all the consequences of this special position and I know that already — several times in certain committees — there has been agreement to accept amendments which made certain recommendations more acceptable. Mr. Bozzi knows this. It was the case on this occasion.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation).— That is correct.

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation).— All the same, I cannot go too far. I know that in order to handle delicate objects it is sometimes necessary to put on kid gloves. But if you put two pairs on at once you can no longer feel the object you are touching, and that too is dangerous.

Mr. Antoni said that he would not vote for the recommendation — and others too, no doubt — but he promised that if other amendments were accepted he would be able to change his mind. I hope so for him and for the Assembly.

I shall confine myself to these remarks, after the speech by Mr. Hanin, with whom I am in total agreement.

The PRESIDENT.— Thank you, Mr. Tanghe.

Does the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee wish to say anything?

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation).— Mr. President, would you allow me, taking the floor for the last time as Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, to speak to the Page report.

To me, too, it seems difficult to find a satisfactory solution to the problem dealt with in this report. For we encounter, from the Council of Ministers, permanent, albeit polite, reticence; at the same time, however, we are always being warmly assured by the Council that what we do is of immense importance and that nothing is as important to our governments as the support of WEU.

We therefore find ourselves swinging between spells of resignation and of faint optimism. Yet we talk about the special tasks and the special responsibility resting upon us. We see that we have a special responsibility; but apparently we really are the only ones who do see it.

If then we have a special task, how should we, how can we do justice to it? How can we play an important part in the field of defence and security when our governments keep us on a long leash with an attitude of lukewarm

*Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)*

benevolence? It is indeed difficult for this Assembly to play a useful rôle when we are not kept adequately informed by the Council. Despite the existence of the treaties, we repeatedly have to ask for co-operation and yet receive little more than promises.

But when we hear – and that, too, has already become clear today – that the Council at its brief meetings has hardly any discussion at all about the subjects which are of interest to us and on which we put questions to it, and consequently that, as far as I can see it is quite incapable of adopting on Afghanistan, Iran or the Middle East a position that is really in line with the latest developments, then I do not know, either, how the position is to be improved. The Council ought perhaps to give some thought to how it, for its part, can fulfil the duty to the Assembly which, after all, rests upon it under the treaties. Mr. Mommersteeg is undoubtedly quite right when he speaks of the need for genuine integration. For what otherwise is the use of all the talk about a common foreign policy? In my view, it is here in particular that we simply must have a genuine will to achieve integration. It is perhaps only then that we – as Europeans – will be able to avoid being the victims of the armaments race. I refer here to the words spoken by Mr. Hanin.

Since we have all this clearly in mind, I think that the draft recommendation formulated by Mr. Page and approved by the Committee is extraordinarily important. It formulates clearly and objectively, although very politely, what we are asking for. I have just put these points rather more bluntly. I think, as the recommendation is so polite and not in fact quite as blunt as it really ought to be, everyone will be able to agree to it.

The PRESIDENT.– Thank you, Mrs. von Bothmer. I am sure that I speak for all members of the Assembly when I express our thanks for the work you have done over three years as Chairman of the General Affairs Committee. *(Applause)*

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in Document 834.

No amendments have been tabled to it.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

I note that there are abstentions. Does the Assembly accept that the abstentions be recorded without there being a roll-call?

It is agreed.

There are four abstentions.

*The draft recommendation is agreed to<sup>1</sup>.*

We now proceed to the draft recommendation in Document 836, to which six amendments have been tabled. Before we can vote on the draft recommendation, we must dispose of the amendments. The first in sequence is Amendment 3, tabled by Mr. Bozzi, which reads as follows:

3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “supplement” and insert “be preceded” and, at the beginning of line 2, insert “by”.

Mr. Bozzi spoke about the amendment in his speech earlier. Does he wish to say anything further in support of it?

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation).– I shall be very brief since I am simply repeating what I said a short while ago.

The purpose of my amendment is to reaffirm the specific nature of and need for consultations among Europeans prior to the discussions conducted regularly in the Atlantic framework. These are two things which logic and awareness of Europe’s legitimate interests require us to keep separate. Furthermore, European consultations will not be fully effective unless they precede the meeting of the Atlantic Council.

That is the purpose of my amendment.

The PRESIDENT.– Does anyone else wish to speak to the amendment?...

Does the Rapporteur wish to comment?

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation).– As Rapporteur, I do not think that we can accept this amendment. The wording was already weakened in Committee by another amendment of Mr. Bozzi’s.

In fact, in the original text the verb “replace” stood instead of the verb “supplement”, which was subsequently accepted by way of amendment. And now we are being asked to weaken the text still further by amending the beginning of paragraph 1 of the recommendation to read as follows: “Consider that consultations in the North Atlantic Council may be preceded, where appropriate, by those...”.

I therefore cannot accept the amendment.

<sup>1</sup>. See page 26.



The PRESIDENT.— I now put Mr. Bozzi's amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 3 is negatived.*

The next amendment is No. 6 tabled by Mr. van den Bergh:

6. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "urgent".

Mr. van den Bergh does not appear to be present to move it.

Amendment 6 is not moved.

We come next to Amendment 4, tabled by Mr. Bozzi, which reads as follows:

4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, at the beginning insert "Invite the states concerned, subject to the agreement of the Federal Republic of Germany, to".

I call Mr. Bozzi to support the amendment.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation).— The point of the amendment is simply to take full account of the freedom of decision and the responsibility of the member states of WEU, in this case to take account of the wishes that might be expressed by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The PRESIDENT.— Does anyone wish to speak?...

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation).— This amendment is a further attempt to "water down" the text.

The PRESIDENT.— Thank you.

In that case I shall put the amendment to the vote.

*(A vote then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 4 is negatived.*

The next amendment is No. 1, to be moved by Sir Frederic Bennett. It reads as follows:

1. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Arrange" and insert "Delete".

With it we shall discuss Amendment 5 which reads:

5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Arrange" and insert "Examine the possibility of arranging".

Amendment 1 will have priority when we vote.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*).— Mr. President, I move this amendment for two reasons, one of substance and one procedural. I begin with the matter of substance. In the report, as it was originally considered by the Committee, the word was "delete". It was removed by the Committee only at the eleventh hour before the document came here. It seems to me — and I hope that I do not speak alone on this matter in Europe — that as we are speaking only of conventional weapons and not seeking to set out a new principle, it is time, twenty-five years after the end of the second world war, that we treated Germany as an equal member of the Alliance along with the rest of us. To try to continue to impose restrictions on Germany in the area of conventional weapons — and I stress the important difference between that and the nuclear aspect — is to seek to perpetuate history when Germany has been a loyal and friendly ally of France, Britain, Italy and the rest of us for many years. I find that repugnant.

I move to the point about procedure. There is no way, if we are to have two languages in this Assembly, in which the text can stand as it is in English. It is entirely meaningless and there is no way in which it can mean anything, unless we wish to make fools of ourselves over paragraph 4.

I have been a member of the House of Commons for twenty-eight years, and I have never heard of the term "arrange" in relation to any document. Whether or not my amendment is adopted or rejected, we shall have to think again about this matter, or you, Mr. President, on your first day in office, will pass into history as the President who allowed a piece of complete nonsense in the English language to go forward in a document emanating from this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT.— I must offer a correction. According to the Rules of Procedure, the President cannot speak or vote and, therefore, I can take no responsibility for any of these matters.

Will Amendment 5 be proposed?

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation).— I shall move the amendment briefly.

On the substance of the matter I have no objection to what Sir Frederic Bennett has just said. I would simply point out that as far as the form is concerned — and you will grant me that in regard to international treaties the form has some importance — the treaty as it now stands allows for consultations with a view to any modification. It lays down only one condition: that the modification be adopted unanimously.

*Mr. Bozzi (continued)*

Given that the Federal Republic of Germany has made no specific proposal – and I am making no judgment as to the substance – I think it would be wise to proceed with caution and not surreptitiously to adopt a text that involves a fundamental change and in fact modifies the treaty.

The PRESIDENT.– Thank you, Mr. Bozzi.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation).– When a proposal for amending the list of arms that shall not be manufactured on German territory is tabled in the Council, the latter must decide on the matter by a two-thirds majority.

Sir Frederic Bennett's amendment is designed to put back the word "delete" which was in the Committee's original proposal but subsequently amended. Personally, I am in favour of Sir Frederic Bennett's amendment, which means I am against Mr. Bozzi's, since Sir Frederic's goes further than Mr. Bozzi's Amendment 5.

The PRESIDENT.– I will put to the Assembly the amendment in the name of Sir Frederic Bennett.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

Consequently Amendment 5 is not moved.

The remaining amendment is No. 2.

I call Mr. Ahrens to move his amendment which is:

2. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "elsewhere".

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation).– Mr. President, the amendment which I submitted does not make any material change. I merely think that the word "elsewhere" or, in French, "ailleurs", might allow it to be inferred that the NATO countries' troops are employed practically all over the world. We think that any redeployment should be reported. We should therefore delete the word "elsewhere" or "ailleurs". I believe that the Rapporteur might agree to this, since it in no way alters the material content of the report.

The PRESIDENT.– Does anyone else wish to speak?...

Mr. TANGHE (*Belgium*) (Translation).– I agree.

The PRESIDENT.– I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 2 is agreed to.*

The Assembly will vote now on the draft recommendation in Document 836 as amended.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

I understand that there are three abstentions, Mr. Bozzi, Mr. Valleix and Mr. Pignion.

Is that otherwise agreed?

If there is opposition, we must have a roll-call. There is no alternative.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. von Hassel.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

There appears to be some difficulty in the voting because some representatives have voted who have not been notified as substitutes. It appears that we do not have a quorum. Therefore, under Rule 36 we must vote again tomorrow.

#### **6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT.– I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday 3rd June, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 844 and Amendments).
2. The international situation and European security (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 845).
3. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Document 836).

*The President (continued)*

4. Address by Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.)*

## THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd June 1980

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
4. Changes in the membership of Committees.
5. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 844 and Amendments*)  
*Speakers:* The President, Sir Frederic Bennett (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Vecchietti, Lord Reay, Mr. Mattick, Mr. Jung, Mr. Beith, Mr. Deschamps.
6. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 836*).
7. Address by Mr. Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Hurd (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*).  
*Replies by Mr. Hurd to questions put by:* Mr. Bozzi, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Grant, Mr. Jager, Lord Reay, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Osborn.
8. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 844 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Müller, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. van den Bergh, Mr. Mommersteeg.
9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. – The Sitting is open.

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

#### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### 3. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – Yesterday the Assembly was called upon to elect the six Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. Three places were reserved for France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, to be decided upon later.

<sup>1</sup> See page 29.

I have received the following candidatures, in alphabetical order: Mr. Cornelissen (Netherlands), Mr. Mart (Luxembourg) and Mr. Valleix (France).

Is the Assembly unanimous in approving these candidatures?...

I therefore declare them elected as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly of Western European Union.

I recall that all the Vice-Presidents have been elected by acclamation. The order of precedence is in this case determined by age.

The Bureau of the Assembly is now composed of the following: President: Mr. Mulley; Vice-Presidents: Mr. Tanghe, Mr. Talamona, Mr. Mart, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Reddemann and Mr. Cornelissen.

#### 4. Changes in the membership of Committees

The PRESIDENT. – The Italian Delegation has proposed the following changes in the membership of Committees: Mr. Maravalle as titular member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in place of Mr. Labriola; Mr. Maravalle as an alternate member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in place of Mr. Labriola.

Are there any objections?...

The nominations are agreed to.

### 5. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 844 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the impact of the evolution in the Near and Middle East on Western European security, Document 844 and Amendments.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I should like first to indicate that, owing to the confidence of my colleagues, I have just been elected Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, responsible for this report. It will be a little difficult for me, having been Rapporteur of the Committee, to function effectively during the course of the ensuing debate if I am trying to do both things at the same time. As Mrs. von Bothmer was Chairman of the Committee when the report was conducted through the Committee, I hope you will agree, Mr. President, that she may remain as a *de facto* or *de jure* Chairman – I note that she is not yet in her place – in order to give me a little assistance. I think it is right that the Assembly should hear from the former Chairman, who is reflecting the views of the Committee as a whole, and not just from the Rapporteur, who had a particular point of view when he wrote the report.

It seems only yesterday that I stood at this rostrum to talk about a paper with a title very similar to the present one, although not so large in scope. When I came to prepare my notes for my introduction this morning, I came to the melancholy conclusion that, with very few exceptions, nothing has changed since I addressed you on this general subject last December, except for the worse. It is, therefore, not a particularly pleasant task that I have to fulfil.

The fears that I, as Rapporteur, the Chairman and members of the Committee and members of the Assembly as a whole expressed about a worsening situation have, with one or two small exceptions, regrettably become true and are becoming more true with every week or month that passes.

It is a melancholy scenario that I have to put before you. In the first place, I think it is right to say that most of us last December would have hoped that by the time we met in June at least the American hostage question would have been resolved. It would have been a very

pessimistic person who really believed last December that the hostages would not only still be in Iran but would be in a worse position, being dispersed around the country with even more difficult consequences as regards obtaining their collective release.

Yet it remains something which we must re-emphasise today that we should not in this Assembly regard this as simply a matter of argument on the basis that this is a matter between the United States of America and Iran. As long as this situation continues, it has grave international consequences in that there has been a gross breach of historic convention and understanding about the treatment of diplomats in one another's countries and the breach remains. There is an old saying:

“Never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”

I should be less than fair if I did not think that if this situation continues unresolved it will be followed by other breaches of international law of very grave consequence indeed to all of us. We have already seen some of them in my own country which were resolved only with great difficulty.

It is a very serious matter indeed and one that stands in the way of building confidence and peace between nations when their diplomatic representatives are subjected to threats and stresses of this sort in the conduct of their work. Therefore, I make no apology at all today for making these remarks in the forefront of my speech, because the longer this continues the more dangerous the whole process of peace-building and bridge-building between countries becomes.

More dramatic than this continuing miserable situation about the hostages is the fact that of course, when I last addressed you in December, the military aggression against Afghanistan had not taken place. At that time, what we were considering was only the fact that there appeared to be under way another example of creeping political subversion – which is a feature of the Soviet Union's policies – to take over another country. But I do not think that many of us at the beginning of last December really contemplated a massive military invasion against a country which had not previously been in any way part of the Brezhnev doctrine or part of the so-called Yalta spheres of allocated interests.

What is so dangerous about this is that there appears little or no prospect, unless we want to indulge in flights of fancy, in thinking that there is any early possibility, or even medium-term possibility, of getting the Soviet Union to take its forces out of Afghanistan. This, in my submission, is for two reasons. The first is that

*Sir Frederic Bennet (continued)*

once the Soviet Union voluntarily relinquishes its military hold on another country, this would obviously carry with it the seeds of a further break-up of the present Soviet empire among the other increasingly restive peoples over whom the Kremlin rules at the present time. Secondly, why I myself can see no early likelihood of the Soviet Union withdrawing its forces, whether in favour of a neutralist non-aligned nation or anything else, is that because of what has happened in Afghanistan – and I had the opportunity only during the last few days of meeting some of the Afghans who have escaped – the Afghan puppet government that was left behind would not last five minutes. There is not the slightest doubt that so far, because of the brutality of the invasion and the continuing brutality of the occupation, any Afghan politician or leader who tried to remain in office after the Soviet forces had withdrawn would literally not last five minutes before there was a revolution and total destruction of that government.

Therefore, I can only be pessimistic about the early chances of a Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan, although, of course, we must continue our best efforts. It seems to me – and I have tried to draw this out in my report – that the limited best we can do in the circumstances to which I have referred is to ensure that the Soviet Union knows that it really cannot hope to repeat this kind of adventure without much more grave consequences.

Although people say that historic parallels are not always correct, some of us at least have been saying that if Hitler and Germany before the war had learned much earlier the full disquiet that their expansionist efforts were causing, we might have been able to avoid the last conflict. We shall never know that, because that is in the realm of hypothesis.

Certainly there has been a healthy awareness of the threat that faces us. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union has learnt, I believe to its surprise and shock, the full extent of the indignation among not just western or allied countries but of many third world countries as well. They must know now at least that if they proceed further on their path of expansionism by military means, or military threat, they are increasingly going to come up against resistance not just from a group of western nations but from the world as a whole. That at least is a bonus on our side. In the same context, Pakistan itself, which I have had the privilege of visiting since I last addressed this Assembly in December and since the invasion of Afghanistan, is now in a peculiarly difficult and delicate and exposed position and is now right in the front line.

Because of constraint of time, I want to venture into only three small points. First of all, the tension has been increased directly, so far as Pakistan's precarious position is concerned, because of its alliance and friendship on the one hand with China. Therefore, we have another frontier on which there is a potential confrontation not only between Pakistan and the Soviet Union but between Pakistan, linked with China, and the Soviet Union in occupation of Afghanistan. I do not need to spell out the potential dangers of that situation.

The second unhappy aspect that I found when I went to Pakistan is that there is a great deal of subversion, and attempted subversion, and training in so-called educational establishments outside Pakistan of the Baluchis, who have never found a particularly happy permanent home within Pakistan under any government there. This is not because of any particular faults of any government there but because the Baluchis themselves are, like the Kurds, people who are spread out not in one country but in two or three countries.

It is dangerous to have a potentially dissatisfied group of people, some of whom are in Pakistan, some in Iran, some in Oman and some in Afghanistan, grouped together in a situation in which the opportunities of exploitation and disquiet are great.

Perhaps the most dangerous situation of all is one to which the press has, unhappily, paid little attention. Pakistan is having to cope as a single country with the biggest invasion of refugees the world has ever seen – far more than have gone into any country as a result of the troubles in South-East Asia. About the same number have left, but it is Pakistan alone that is having to cope with a situation that is not only very expensive economically but politically very dangerous. The Afghan refugees are not refugees of the kind that we historically associate with that word. They are desperately looking not for a home elsewhere but for the opportunity to return and continue the battle against those who expelled them from their homes and took over their country.

I have seen many unhappy refugees in my life. For the most part they have expressed the wish for food, comfort and sanctuary. If one goes to the borders of Afghanistan, as I have, up into the tribal areas and down into Pakistan, one finds that it is arms and equipment to go on with the fight that are requested of any visitor from the outside world. The explosive possibilities do not need underlining.

I have not touched on every part of my report, but other speakers may do so. For example, I have not touched on the position in

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

Turkey, where the dangers are also great but where, happily, there is understanding by the western allies. There is a tribute in the report to West Germany. Things are a little better in Turkey. They are a good deal better in Oman. But I should be here far too long if I dealt with each country that is covered in my report.

Therefore, I end with a brief but essential reference to the chief subject under discussion last December – the continuing Arab-Israeli dispute. Here again, the position is worsening. It is worse than when I addressed the Assembly on the last occasion. Not only is it worsening, but new, dangerous tensions are being created in that part of the world, because, as many of us expected, the Camp David peace process did not achieve any contribution towards dealing with the autonomy question by 26th May. Tensions that are now arising there could lead to serious developments which could affect not only the peace of the world but, very materially, essential European and other western interests during the months ahead unless something is done to take the steam out of the situation.

I am aware that, for a variety of reasons that I do not need to spell out, the United States President does not wish any European initiative such as I have outlined, or any other, to take place. But I am addressing a European Assembly, and my first responsibilities must be to my own country and to Europe as a whole.

Although we fully understand the feelings and attitude of the American Government, the position has become worse since the resignation of Mr. Cyrus Vance. The change there has not helped in the search for a reinforced European solution, or at least a European initiative, which I have put forward and which has been put forward by a number of European leaders, not least President Giscard d'Estaing of France and my own Foreign Minister. It is for the Americans to make up their minds how they think their essential interests are best protected. I cannot abrogate the essential interests of the people in my own country and throughout Western Europe that I represent in this Assembly.

There are those who ask me what good I think a European initiative would achieve. I do not know. I wish that I could look into the crystal ball. But I know that Camp David has done nothing to achieve a solution or a lessening of the tensions, except in the context of Egypt – and even there the most recent developments have not been helpful. We cannot sit back and wait for the result of the American elections before launching an initiative to try to lessen the tensions that are

building up in that part of the world. If it achieved nothing else, we could buy a certain amount of time for reason to prevail and for there to be a change of attitude in Israel through changes within the government. There have been two resignations of prominent Israelis, great patriots, in the persons of General Dayan and, more recently, Mr. Weizman. It is not only this Assembly that is gravely anxious about developments and about developing attitudes.

With an initiative, we should give heart to those forces of moderation within the Arab world whose positions are becoming increasingly precarious when they see no developments that will assuage the desires of the Palestinians, now spread throughout Arabia. If we could at least show the Palestinians and the moderate Arab leaders that we were prepared to try to play our part in reaching a compromise solution that recognised the undoubted integrity of Israel and the undoubted and equal right of the Palestinians to a homeland of their own, I believe that this Assembly would have served a useful purpose. But if we were to reject the idea of a European initiative I am as confident as I have ever been on any political issue in my life that we should live to rue the day when we encouraged the extremists in that part of the world, who would then be able to tell those all too ready to listen "We have tried the ways of peace and diplomacy. We have tried political contacts. They have all failed. Even Europe will do nothing to try to help." The consequences of those extremist forces gaining strength in that part of the world would be a source of delight in only one place – in Moscow. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Frederic.

I now open the debate.

I have twenty-four names on the list of speakers and I begin by calling Mr. Vecchietti.

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation).– Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it seems to me that Sir Frederic Bennett's report and the draft recommendation to the Council on the impact of the situation in the Near and Middle East on European security do not correspond with the aims of this Assembly which cannot contemplate European security by concentrating on armaments policy instead of peace policy. Both documents reflect the concept of détente advanced by President Carter in his recent Philadelphia speech, rather than the present average view of the countries of Western Europe.

May I elaborate? President Carter's declaration that détente must be based on deterrence, on military superiority and on recogni-

Mr. Vecchiotti (continued)

tion of the United States' global interests has produced the obvious riposte from the Soviet Union to the effect that if this American policy were put into effect it could only lead to a general arms race and to increased international tension. This is precisely what Europe is seeking to avoid or at least this is the line taken by most Western European governments.

Indeed, France and the Federal Republic of Germany are claiming the right to make independent European peace overtures precisely because the United States is paralysed by the prospect of the forthcoming election and by the present policy of President Carter who is determined to negotiate with the Soviet Union from a position of strength only.

Now, Sir Frederic Bennett's report and the draft recommendation tabled for discussion aim at establishing positions of strength in Europe also and then negotiating worldwide for a return to the policy of peaceful coexistence. The Rapporteur argues that European security is gravely threatened by Soviet expansionism in two directions – towards Western Europe and the Middle East – in a drive to gain control of the oil routes. He maintains that this imminent danger can only be averted by strengthening Western Europe's armaments also and by the active participation of the European countries in the defence of the Near and Middle East.

If I have understood correctly, all this is to be achieved by strengthening NATO in Europe and by extending the military commitments of the NATO countries in the Near and Middle East. It would appear to me that the documents now before us are based on the conviction that European security and world peace can only be saved by the massive rearmament of the West. In my view, however, security must be sought through persistent efforts to establish a military balance at the lowest level of armaments, towards which we in fact seemed to be moving before Afghanistan and the Iranian crisis. Consequently, the aim now should not be an arms race but the solution of the Afghan and Iranian issues, by the restoration of respect for international law, the independence of Afghanistan and security in the Middle East.

I shall not go into the merits of Soviet policy here or argue whether it is dictated by expansionist aims or by the conviction that a policy of encirclement of the USSR is gaining the upper hand in the West, as the Russians claim, pointing in particular to the newly-established relations between the United States and China. We Italian communists have condemned the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan

primarily on grounds of principle but also because of the damage it was bound to cause to world peace and détente. And we did so regardless of any view we might have as to whether the USSR had acted in this way for expansionist or defensive reasons. But is it possible to maintain seriously, as do the documents now before us, that the world is now faced by the threat of the absorption, directly or indirectly, of the whole Near and Middle East into the Soviet Union's political and military orbit and by the threat of Soviet expansion directed against Western Europe? Above all, this view is not seriously shared by most European governments, and certainly not in the axiomatic form contained in the report.

At this moment, various moves and suggestions are being put together for a political solution of at least the most acute crises, caused by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the taking of American hostages in Iran. Soundings and proposals have come not only from France and Germany but also from Algeria, India and now the Islamic countries themselves. Messages to Washington and Europe are coming out of Moscow and Warsaw. It is not our duty to assume that only the worst can happen. On the contrary, we should support these moves, emphasise how important they can be for the maintenance of peace and call on the governments of Europe to test the real intentions behind the messages coming from Moscow.

One final comment. On the Palestinian question and the subject of peace in that vital area of the Middle East, the proposals tabled quite rightly recognise the existence of the PLO, the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and the essential condition that peace in the Middle East must guarantee the security and territorial integrity of all countries, including the state of Israel. But, in my view, no European peace moves in the Middle East can have any reasonable prospect of success by way of a conference designed to impose a line of conduct on the United Nations from outside, as proposed in the documents. The Geneva Conference was still-born because it made a Soviet-American agreement the main condition for a Middle East agreement and this was precisely what was lacking. The Camp David agreements have reached a dead end because they were based on the mistaken assumption that Israeli-Egyptian agreement, under the leadership of the United States, would create a *de facto* situation which would sooner or later be accepted by the other Arab countries and would therefore be grudgingly swallowed by the Palestinians themselves.

The proposal now before us is for an approach lacking the universal character required to reconcile the divergent views and



*Mr. Vecchiatti (continued)*

interests which, in the Middle East, separate the United States from the Soviet Union, the United States from the countries of Western Europe, Israel from the PLO and the Arab countries, and the Arab countries from each other. Israel at present rejects any just and stable settlement in the Middle East and will only be able to accept if its traditional allies, headed by the United States, use the necessary means to bring it about. In its present domestic situation, the United States will only be able to influence Israel to accept a fair settlement if it really wants to do so and if it can overcome its own internal opposition and Israel's hostility to the authority of the United Nations.

Finally, it seems to me that the United Nations is the most appropriate place and offers the best means of resolving the long-standing problem of the recognition of Israel by the PLO and of the recognition by Israel of the Palestinian's right to self-determination.

Many steps towards a just and peaceful solution of the Middle East question have been taken by major Arab countries and by the PLO itself. The succession of crises triggered off within his own government by Begin's intransigence, and the resumption by the Israeli Labour Party of positions of undoubted interest show that in Israel there are now not merely heart-searchings but also signs of significant political changes. In my view, we should be encouraging these new tendencies emerging from both sides by the most suitable means and wherever is most appropriate.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – I support the recommendation that is before us. I should also like to congratulate the Rapporteur on the report, in which he has drawn on his thorough study and great experience of the region to produce a masterly analysis of its political problems and their most complex international ramifications.

I particularly agree with paragraph 3 of the recommendation. No western country should contemplate acceptance of the *fait accompli* of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Indeed, the West should not accept anything less than a return to the situation which existed prior to Soviet intervention and should talk only in terms of such a return. The Soviet Union may brush aside, or seek to weaken, such demands today. That does not mean, if we do not allow this demand to be weakened, that they will brush it aside indefinitely.

The title of the report is "Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East

on Western European security". Nothing demonstrates better this characteristic of the situation to evolve than the threat by President Carter on Sunday to use the United States veto if European countries seek to introduce a resolution in the United Nations designed to supplement Resolution 242. This prompts two questions. How should European governments react to this warning, and how should we react to it in our resolution?

So far as we are concerned, I think that it would be wrong to expect us to alter a recommendation which it has taken our Committee several months to compose in order to take account of remarks made only forty-eight hours earlier by one of the major parties. We do not have that degree of flexibility. We are not ourselves conducting diplomacy. Therefore, I suggest that we should keep that part of the recommendation which calls for a new European initiative and urges a review or a supplement to Resolution 242 by the Security Council. In any case, we set no time limit. Our recommendation does not exclude the possibility of the postponement of the consideration of this question by the Security Council until next year, if the governments concerned so decide.

As for the European governments, they will have to consider the matter carefully. It may be that they could state their own collective view that Resolution 242 needs to be supplemented to take account of the political rights of the Palestinians and that they could develop further their policy of recognising the need for the PLO to be brought into the peace process without forcing the issue, at this stage, in the United Nations. If they adopt this course, as they do so they could bear in mind that the Palestinian leadership and its moderate supporters are just as aware as anybody else of the restraints which the presidential election imposes this year on United States policy. This may incline moderate Palestinians and moderate Arab states to be self-restrained until that election is over. Of course, if there is no activity for the rest of this year, it will certainly build up a serious pressure of expectation on the next United States presidency. But it may be wiser for Europe to spend the rest of this year in preparing the ground for an initiative to be taken next year either by European governments or by the United States itself rather than forcing the issue in the United Nations at this time.

In Committee, anxiety was expressed that our recommendation might induce in Israel a sense of desperation. To that I would say that if our policies envisaged for one moment the possibility of Israel's destruction, such a fear would be justified. But at present it is not

*Lord Reay (continued)*

Israel but the Palestinians who have a right to feel desperate at the march, or perhaps I should say the marking time, of history. Resolution 242 provided for the restoration of occupied Arab territory which, thirteen years later, remains in Israeli hands. By its policy of settling those lands, the Israeli Government gives the impression to some that it never intends to return them. With Jerusalem it has behaved in the same way with the law which has recently passed through the Knesset. On the West Bank, to stifle unrest, the Israeli Government finds itself forced into repression.

Under these provocations, it seems to me that it is the Palestinians who are being driven to desperation. Let us all hope that their patience will last a little longer. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – I thank Lord Reay.

I call Mr. Mattick.

Mr. MATTICK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – When, on a day like this, we cast our minds back and ask ourselves: “What has happened?” we find time and again that in politics there are many individuals and many groups who, in the light of their own standard of living, believe that time is a great healer, and who think that if they take their time much will gradually be forgotten. I should like to refute this idea, because the argument that in politics time will or can heal everything is wrong. Even steel begins to rust, and wounds begin to fester. And then there comes a point when action is too late, no matter what one tries. I am thinking in this connection of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. We talked about these countries here years ago. I am also thinking of Israel and Palestine..

Please forgive me if I now say something further on this subject. I am thinking of 1914. The Kaiser called and everyone, yes, everyone came. I remember a scene I witnessed when I was six years old. In that July of 1914, families were receiving call-up papers. Fathers – those of the younger generation too – went gladly off to the front, ready to save the Reich for the Kaiser, believing that “it would all be over by Christmas”. But when Christmas 1918 came it really was all over. It was the worst catastrophe ever experienced by my generation.

After 1918, we, the younger generation, entered the political struggle with the slogan: “No more war!” We did not understand what had happened in our own country. Until in 1933 the internal peace of the German Reich of the day was shattered.

Then, Ladies and Gentlemen, came the next development, and I should like to remind

you of that too. In 1936, as a young man in Berlin together with a few friends, I stood with clenched teeth near the Brandenburger Tor when those taking part in the Olympic Games came to Berlin and marched past in front of Hitler. On that occasion it could be said: Hitler called and everyone, yes, everyone came. Anyone who experienced this knows how it is possible to play politics even with the Olympic Games. When the Olympic Games were being held in 1936, Hitler had long been pressing on with rearmament at top speed. I still remember how the Labour Party said at that time in the House of Commons “We are disarming, even if Hitler rearms”. We saw many mistakes made at that time.

A writer, Emil Ludwig, who after 1918 concerned himself a great deal with the war, wrote a book called “1914”. In it he says that it would not have required the skill of a Bismarck to avoid the most stupid of all wars meaning the world war of 1914-18. The second world war was not avoided either.

When we look at what happened then, it seems to me that we must, during our discussions here today, yesterday and tomorrow, really ask ourselves what they are achieving, and what we are doing not only to make others aware of what we realise here but also to make political action possible.

I have the impression that, while the events in Afghanistan did in fact cause feeling to run very high, many people here in Europe still have the idea, deep down, that it is after all rather a long way away.

The question the world is asking today is not: “What is Europe’s position?” but – if there is talk of Europe and it is recognised that Europe means something today – people ask: “What is Europe doing?”.

I can see in this room a number of colleagues who were also in Brussels three weeks ago. The conference on security and co-operation in Europe was meeting there. At that meeting, after Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc were pretty much under fire. But they came, and we argued with them. We managed to adopt unanimously resolutions which were accepted even by the communists of all nations. But we are making nothing of it. I have hardly found one line in the press about the actual significance of this CSCE meeting after Afghanistan. This conference, held three weeks ago in Brussels, made it somewhat clearer that movements have in fact developed within the eastern bloc which wish to avoid a break or hostile clashes, and that the governments and political authorities of the individual eastern bloc countries are endeavouring to ease the pressure, trying to develop

*Mr. Mattick (continued)*

other forms. This development – as we saw three weeks ago in Brussels – has led to the adoption of resolutions. If parliamentarians will take advantage of these decisions in their efforts to deal with communists and reactionaries in their own countries, then more was achieved in Brussels than most people realise, if they care about it at all.

I ask, “What is Europe doing?” meaning by this that we cannot behave here as if we are taking care of Europe but merely mourning for the world. We must know what we can do for the world.

Let me give an example. We are in a difficult position when we look at the relationship between Turkey and Greece and at the Cyprus problem. If we do not offer Turkey every possible assistance, that country will, given its internal situation, drop out of the Alliance. We are acting this way while knowing that Turkey has not in fact behaved properly in Cyprus. It is time the problems connected with Cyprus were tackled. The breakdown of the coalition between Kyprianou and the communists has now reached a stage where it is creating grave dangers as regards developments in Cyprus.

I have already overstepped my time – please excuse me. I would just like to add one final remark.

We must turn the question “What is Europe doing?” into a great discussion, a great debate. We must appeal to the powers involved in the places where a conflagration can occur at any moment and we must say to them: “It is time for the opposing sides to meet each other part way”. Wherever it may be – in Ankara, Athens, Cyprus, Israel or Egypt – it is time to come together in the realisation that time does not heal wounds, but that time can be squandered. And if it is thought that things will sort themselves out, that can lead to disaster. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Mattick.

I call Mr. Jung.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would first like to congratulate the Rapporteur on his very lucid and objective analysis of the situation in that area and tell him how fully I agree with the section describing the grip which Russian imperialism has taken on one part of the world.

I also share his conviction that the Middle East problem can be solved only by an agreement between Israel and the Arab countries.

But I must also say that I cannot concur with our Rapporteur’s proposal in paragraph 7 of his recommendation.

Mr. Rapporteur, you who are a statesman, try for a few minutes to put yourself in the shoes of the Prime Minister of Israel. Would you have any hope of finding a solution, with the PLO as your partner, as long as the basic issue of the destruction of Israel has not been settled? Do you see any possibility of accepting, in any form whatever, a group which still allows the murder of children, which regards placing bombs in a market or on planes as an heroic action? Do you think that is the way to find a preliminary basis for talks and peaceful settlements?

It is precisely the mission of our Assembly to try to find such a basis and to show the Palestinian people, for whom I personally have great sympathy, that that is the way to find solutions.

I also think, Mr. Rapporteur, that we are adopting rather dangerous positions here concerning Resolution 242 of the Security Council. We have very little time, since the deadline is 26th May, but I would point out that even in Europe some negotiations lasted ten or twelve years. Take for example the entry of your country, Mr. Rapporteur, into the Common Market, which took nearly ten years and was even then perhaps premature.

I am convinced that the avenues mapped out at Camp David must be left open if a solution is to be found. For in the final analysis the Camp David agreements recognised the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, giving them autonomy for a five-year transitional period. So let us not throw the whole of this process out of gear.

Ladies and Gentlemen, keenly aware as I am of world developments and the dangers facing Europe, I ask myself whether we are not in the process of creating a very odd situation, because I cannot forget that, despite everything, the PLO will take its orders from Moscow. Do you not think we will be creating a situation which will allow USSR troops to establish themselves on the other border of the oil-fields? And that oil is vital for Europe.

I am quite sure, Mr. Rapporteur, that you do not wish at any point to confirm Mr. Brezhnev’s statement in Prague in 1973 to the effect that he hoped by 1985 to have achieved all his objectives so that Western Europe would be under his thumb.

We must be fully aware of all these considerations before taking the decision proposed in this report. I share your hope of finding a solution, but I also share your view that a President of the United States should not be

*Mr. Jung (continued)*

able to present an ultimatum to the countries of Europe.

We must move very cautiously and in full awareness of our responsibilities, we Europeans in particular, who are always talking of human rights and how to combat terrorism. (*Applause*)

(*Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Jung. I must draw the attention of the Assembly to the fact that the list of speakers in this debate has already reached twenty-five, and practically every speaker so far has had ten minutes. It is a matter of arithmetic to see that we shall be in grave difficulty in keeping to our agenda. I must ask, first, that speakers keep within their time-limit and, if at all possible, reduce their ten minutes to, say, six or seven minutes. Secondly, the list for this debate will be closed in another fifteen minutes, at 11.15. I do not think we can go on as yesterday with people coming in right up to the last minute adding their name to a list which is already twenty-five speakers long.

The next speaker is Mr. Beith.

Mr. BEITH (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, may I first say what a pleasure it is to see you restored to full health and occupying the President's chair in this Assembly for what I hope will be a fruitful period of presidency. (*Applause*)

I support in general terms both this report and Mr. Vohrer's report, which is now to be debated separately. I am too young to have any detailed memory of the Berlin airlift and anything more than a fleeting memory of the building of the Berlin wall. The Soviet repression in Hungary and Czechoslovakia fall well within my remembered consciousness, but a generation is growing up which does not remember any of those things.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has reminded that generation and shown them what Soviet imperialism is like in practice. The Soviet Union may not realise what damage they have done to their interests in the free world by the action they have taken. The damage that they may have done should not blind us to the advantages they have gained by the use of military force. I share many of the reservations and fears which the Rapporteur has expressed about what their next adventure will be and about their desire to neutralise – or, to use that rather unfortunate word, "Finlandise" – as many countries in the free world as possible. One can sense in some of the reactions of India to the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan a dangerous move in the direction of that emasculation of all serious views on foreign policy which is a Soviet objective for the free world.

They are dangers of fermenting insurrection which make relations between Western Europe and the Moslem world so important. Those relations that we so much want to improve between the western world and the Moslem states are made very difficult by two things at the moment. The first is what is happening in Iran, and particularly the continued holding of diplomatic hostages, which needs to be recognised more widely, not least by Moslem states, as a denial of the freedom on which we all depend and from the removal of which we would all suffer; the continued holding of the hostages under the control of students whose attention to their studies must now have been seriously neglected and who are in reality very much the creatures of extremism with external influences upon it. The continued holding of hostages under the control of these so-called students makes the Iranian régime look totally unable to exert any authority at all and makes it appear dangerously subject to influences which have nothing whatever to do with the Islamic revolution. If the Iranian régime wants to establish some credibility in the world, it must bring an end to this intolerable situation.

The other key and much longer-term factor which is inhibiting western relations with the Moslem world is the Arab-Israeli conflict. The longer it remains unresolved, the more we will encourage vicarious Soviet activity in the Middle East and the more we make the Palestinian leadership beholden to the Soviet Union – and Finlandisation is something that has already clearly happened to the PLO. It is obvious in the PLO's attitude to Soviet activity elsewhere, such as Afghanistan, that their foreign policy is very much influenced by their increasing feeling of dependence upon the Soviet Union.

I am worried by the implied acceptance in the preamble to the recommendation of the principle that the Palestine Liberation Organisation might be the sole representative of the Palestinian people by reference to the fact that Arab states took that view some time ago. Their involvement is crucial. They are a significant element in the power struggle of the Middle East, but I will never accept that they should be regarded as the sole representatives of the Palestinian people, and many Palestinians would not accept it either.

Another point on which I disagree with the Rapporteur's emphasis both in this report and previously is over the Camp David agreement. It is wrong for us in any way to denigrate the progress, limited though it is, which

*Mr. Beith (continued)*

the Camp David agreement represents, not least because President Sadat and the Egyptian people deserve our support for the stand they have taken. What Israel and the United States must recognise is that Camp David itself cannot be left half-finished and that progress must be made on the Palestinian issue.

Under present leadership, Israel is the despair of her friends with her settlement policies, harassment of legitimate Palestinian leaders, her attitude to the territories which Israel occupies and her refusal to continue the Camp David process. Israel really delivers weapons to all of her enemies. Those of us who stand firm by Israel's right to a secure future find our task of advocacy made ever more difficult by the policies of the present Israeli Government.

Moreover, the United States and President Carter himself ask too much of their allies if they expect Western Europe not to develop policies on this issue. We in Europe may judge that a European initiative could be better timed in order to assure that a Washington administration might be a little freer to support it when political uncertainties press less heavily on the American President. But we cannot wait indefinitely in Europe, because we see this Middle East situation at much closer quarters. We cannot allow our security indefinitely to be threatened by the absence of peace and stability in the Middle East. The development of European policies to deal with these matters is essential, and the Americans and Israelis will have to recognise that that, too, is a factor in the fight to secure stability in that part of the world. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – I now call Mr. Deschamps.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Near and Middle East are the scene of major tensions for which a political solution must be found, for the sake of the peoples involved and of world peace.

The only possible way of putting an end to these tensions is by respecting the peoples' right to self-determination.

Far from being guided in its actions by the teachings of history, American imperialism is on the contrary endeavouring to destabilise the democratic régimes in this part of the world and to oppose the peoples' legitimate and unquenchable desire for independence.

The deplorable and dangerous American military operation against Iran, whose people are taking action to establish their sovereignty, is an illustration of this, as is also the admission

made a few days ago by a senior official of the State Department, the Assistant Secretary of State Muskie, who said in connection with Afghanistan: "We are still trying to help them ..." – he meant the rebels operating in Afghanistan – "... by every means at our disposal."

The terrible bloodbath in South Korea, the support given to repression and political murders in Turkey, the only European country where the communist party is still banned, the build-up of American forces in the Indian Ocean and in particular of the giant base at Diego Garcia, together with the support given to Israel in its expansionist policy, all bear witness, to quote examples from this region alone, to the aggressiveness of imperialism in a world situation marked by the advance of the peoples and the growth of the forces of peace, which are now capable of preventing the outbreak of another world war.

But, as Sir Frederic Bennett's report and the draft recommendation single them out for mention, allow me to dwell for a moment on two sets of problems: those concerning Afghanistan and those raised by the failure of the Camp David agreements.

With regard to Afghanistan, we have already had occasion to state that the peoples' right to self-determination naturally includes that of calling upon their allies if they consider it necessary. This is what Afghanistan did by calling for the help of the Soviet Union against threats and attacks instigated and encouraged from outside.

Today a political solution is possible, but account must be taken of the proposals made by the Afghan Government. For, on 14th May that government issued a declaration which reflects a genuine determination to eliminate, by negotiation, the sources of friction, especially with Pakistan.

The Kabul Government proposed to Tehran and Islamabad that bilateral agreements should be worked out on the basis "of good neighbourliness and non-interference in internal affairs" and "concrete commitments prohibiting armed activities and all hostile acts" against each other.

The Afghan Government calls upon all its nationals who are temporarily, for one reason or another, on the territory of Pakistan or in other neighbouring countries, to return to their homeland, where they will come under the terms of the amnesty declared on 1st January 1980.

Lastly, the statement calls for political guarantees, to be given in particular by the Soviet Union and the United States.

*Mr. Deschamps (continued)*

The Afghan Government states: "The question of the withdrawal of the limited Soviet military contingent from the territory of Afghanistan must be resolved within the context of the political settlement. The guaranteed cessation and non-renewal of armed aggression and all other forms of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan will eliminate the causes which led Afghanistan to ask for the sending of this contingent."

Those who genuinely want a peaceful political settlement of these problems cannot disregard – or pretend to be unaware of – these proposals. As my friend Georges Marchais said on 29th May: "With such a political settlement it would be possible to envisage the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and to establish lasting peace in this part of the world."

With regard to what the draft recommendation calls the Arab-Israeli dispute, the issue is in fact the need to recognise the Palestinian people's right to independence, including the right to form an independent state, which was incidentally acknowledged by the United Nations as far back as 1947.

Instead, the Camp David agreement, which was a separate United States-Egyptian-Israeli attempt at reaching a settlement, far from paving the way for a settlement on that basis, merely encouraged the expansionism of Mr. Begin's Government.

The Israeli-occupied West Bank of the Jordan is offering increasingly determined resistance to this occupation, a legitimate resistance, as a sacred duty, by a people whose sovereignty is being flouted.

Far from changing its attitude, the Government of Israel is stepping up repression on an unprecedented scale. Mayors and religious leaders are being expelled. Palestinians are being imprisoned, tortured and killed, and this morning's press tells us that the extremist Israeli organisations' professional killers struck again three times on Monday morning. Bombs were placed in the cars of the mayors of the West Bank towns of Nablus and Ramallah. They exploded as these men were getting into their cars. The mayor of Nablus, Mr. Bassam Shaka, was taken to hospital and had to have both legs amputated. The mayor of Ramallah, Mr. Karim Khalaf, was also very seriously injured.

We condemn these outrages and the policy which permitted and encouraged them and we bow our heads in tribute to the victims of these crimes. We reaffirm our solidarity with the population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in their struggle against occupation,

colonisation and repression, and with the PLO, the only rightful representative of the Palestinian people.

We demand that those responsible for these outrages be punished and that the arbitrary measures adopted against the population, especially the expulsions, be discontinued.

Camp David is a failure. For there can be no solution other than recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to a state of its own and recognition of the PLO as the only rightful and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

These are, in brief, the main lines, as we see them, of the policy which ought to be pursued in the Near and Middle East in order to relieve the tensions, and we note with interest that other voices – some in this Assembly – are being raised in favour of moderation and peace. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is adjourned.

#### **6. Application of the Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council**

*(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 836)*

The PRESIDENT. – We now proceed to the vote which had to be postponed yesterday on the draft recommendation in Document 836, as amended.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we can save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

We shall take a vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Sènès.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows <sup>1</sup> :

Number of votes cast ...	63
Ayes .....	55
Noes .....	6
Abstentions .....	2

*The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted* <sup>2</sup>.

1. See page 30.

2. See page 31.

*The President (continued)*

However, I must stress again that there were some difficulties in taking the roll-call because a number of substitutes had not signed the list to indicate that they were taking the place of absent representatives. It is impossible to work the system unless, at the beginning of each sitting, representatives and substitutes sign the list, preferably printing their names clearly on the list so that they can be read by the clerks.

**7. Address by Mr. Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom**

The PRESIDENT. – Although it is a little earlier than envisaged, we are delighted to welcome Mr. Douglas Hurd, the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, to address us. We had word that Mr. Hurd's aircraft was late, but he has managed to be here at the appointed time. We very much look forward to his address. He has also indicated that he will answer questions at the conclusion of his address.

I invite the Minister to come to the rostrum.

Mr. HURD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I thank you, Mr. President, for that invitation and take this opportunity to say to all the parliamentarians assembled here what a pleasure it is to have been invited to address this session this morning.

First, I congratulate you, Mr. President, most warmly on your election, which has given us great pleasure. We wish you a highly successful term of office.

I am glad to have the opportunity to salute the work that Western European Union has done in the past and to welcome the work that it continues to do at present. It seems that the part played by WEU in the reconciliation and the construction of Europe was absolutely crucial, as historians certainly will recognise. It was through WEU in 1954 that the British Government first took the formidable step of committing themselves to the stationing of forces on the European mainland – formidable in terms of British history up to that point.

It is not too much to say that it was through WEU and the Council of Europe in the 1940s and 1950s that Britain became irrevocably part of Europe and started on the path which led subsequently to our membership of the European Community. I hope that representatives

will forgive me for adding that I am certain that after the last few days the British commitment to Europe has received fresh strength as a result of the heroic efforts of those concerned in the provisional agreement on the budgetary question. If, as I hope, that agreement is sustained by all member governments of the Community this week, there can be some confidence that this will be the beginning of a new, more reasonable and happier chapter in the history of European co-operation.

But there is another reason why it is refreshing and interesting to me to be here in this Assembly. We are all members of national parliaments, and the fact is that national parliaments are the bedrock of Europe. It is the fact that we are all parliamentary democracies which provides the means of shared inheritance which enables us to co-operate. The parliament of the European Community is now directly elected. It no longer provides an opportunity for a meeting place for members of national parliaments. Therefore, it is all the more important that here in this Assembly – and in the Assembly of the Council of Europe, but particularly here – such a meeting place exists. The whole enterprise of European co-operation would be the poorer and would begin to lack substance unless there were some meeting place or forum in which the members of national parliaments could meet in a European context. My British colleagues in the Assembly are very conscious of the responsibility which is placed upon them. I think that increasingly this may be an important and dominant aspect of the work of WEU.

I wish to turn to the international scene, as I was invited originally to do by the former President of this Assembly, Mr. von Hassel, to whom I wish to pay my respects and thank him for all he has done.

I was slightly embarrassed to be handed in the car on the way here from Charles de Gaulle airport a copy of the excellent speech made to this Assembly by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. Although the phrases I use will be different, I must emphasise that many of the sentiments will echo many of the things said by the Dutch Foreign Minister and are, perhaps, none the worse for that.

I must begin, because this is the starting point for most of our British thinking on foreign affairs, by adding a few words to the millions of words which have already been spoken and written about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. I make no apology for taking that course because I am certain that our response to that aggression continues to be the best measure available of the alertness and energy of the Alliance to which we all belong. So long as Soviet forces continue to bomb and to kill in

*Mr. Hurd (continued)*

Afghanistan, so long is it unsafe for us to forget Afghanistan.

If we were, as we are sometimes urged to do, to gloss over what is happening, we would not simply be condoning a breach of the most essential principle of international order. We should also be forgetting the needs of our own security here in Europe. It is not for the reason that we in Europe had any special interests in Afghanistan itself, nor is it because we wish to dictate the future of Afghanistan. But if we have learnt anything from history in this continent, it is surely that once the principle of aggression is accepted, we can be sure that aggression will be repeated. In that case none of us is safe, whether we are big or small, however peaceful our language, however unprovocative our policies.

Since the invasion of Afghanistan, there has been a massive series of consultations between the governments of the countries represented here. Often the cry goes up for yet more consultation, for more meetings, for more diplomatic machinery. I think that perhaps – and this is a personal view – there is a danger here, because there is no magic in meetings for their own sake. Indeed, they can sometimes build up expectations which it is difficult to match. I sometimes feel that we expect our leaders to spend too much of their time in aeroplanes and at airports. On the desk of Mr. Harold Macmillan, when he was Prime Minister of my country, was a notice – quoted, I think, from a Gilbert and Sullivan opera, but I have not been able to confirm this – saying “Quiet deliberation disentangles every knot”. Perhaps we need a little more emphasis on quiet deliberation so that we can achieve the discipline of working together in accordance with a shared analysis.

The British Government is very glad that within Europe of the Nine there has been a steady growth of the work of political co-operation under the stimulus of recent events. We must be honest and say that there is still a long way to go before the Nine can be satisfied that they are exerting to the full the weight of the European Community in the world. But in the last few months there has been real progress, and on this we mean to build.

I have the pleasure, if that is the right description, of wrestling on behalf of the British Government with some of the problems of the Middle East. Among all the perplexities of that region, there is one thing that has impressed me perhaps more than any other in the last year, and that is the extent to which governments and peoples of the Middle East

now, when they look at us, think in terms of Europe rather than of individual nation states and ask themselves “What will Europe do on our behalf, and when?”

Of course, in an alliance of free states there will often be differences of emphasis and sometimes differences of interest, although one hopes that the differences of interest will in the end be only marginal. In societies where the media are free, obviously these differences will prove more exciting and more interesting to press and television than will our agreements. It is perhaps necessary to stress the extent of our agreement within the Alliance, particularly on the question of the Soviet threat.

We are all agreed, I think, that Soviet military force has now for the first time since the war been used directly to extend the Soviet sphere of influence rather than to maintain it. This is a dangerous leap forward. The Brezhnev doctrine, devoted to maintaining the sphere of influence, was already unacceptable; now it has been enlarged. All the countries represented here have in their different ways emphasised the danger of that change. We are all agreed that this calls into question not the principle of détente but the way in which détente has been operating. None of us can accept an interpretation of détente by which the Russians secure for themselves all sorts of benefits in terms of trade, credits and access to western technology while reserving the right to expand their power outside Europe by any means available to them. There is no such thing as a kind of Euro-détente confined to an area north of the 40th Parallel.

I think that our agreement – the shared ground between us – goes beyond analysis. As to Afghanistan, we are agreed that the proposal first put forward by Lord Carrington for a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan could provide a way for that country to recover its sovereignty and independence. The Russians have claimed – not convincingly – that their own security and that of Afghanistan were threatened by the situation in Afghanistan in early December. Actually, what was happening was that the people of Afghanistan were reacting against an unpopular and brutal Marxist régime. But, if we accept that the Russians were genuinely concerned about security, our proposal about neutrality could remove their concern, because it would involve guarantees of non-intervention by all the states concerned. It would give the Soviet Union the opportunity to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan while avoiding any risks to Soviet or Afghan security.

We are not particularly optimistic – I do not think that any objective observer can be parti-



*Mr. Hurd (continued)*

cularly optimistic – about the Soviet Union deciding to withdraw in the near future. So far, it seems intent on continuing to use force. But it is also true that the Russians evidently underestimated the extent of international opposition to their move and also the extent of internal resistance in Afghanistan. Already they feel bound to pay lip service to the concept of a political solution.

We have the impression that the concept of a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan is gathering support in other parts of the world. It has been supported by the ASEAN countries in South-East Asia and by some of the Islamic countries. We can all note with great interest the result of the latest Islamic conference in Islamabad in this respect. We have no particular pride of parentage in this proposal. It does not matter to us under whose auspices it goes forward. It does not matter to us what label is attached to it or by what precise route the goal is achieved. What is important is the maximum agreement on the proposition that the Russians must withdraw from Afghanistan, so leaving the Afghans free to determine their own future internally and internationally.

We also all agree in principle that these events cannot leave untouched our policies towards the Soviet Union. The British Government have supported all the efforts which have been made in the West to show a vigorous reaction. We have cancelled certain visits and events, we have ended what we regarded as excessively friendly credit arrangements for trade between Britain and the Soviet Union, and we think it is right to tighten the arrangements which govern the export of higher technology to the Soviet Union. Work on that, as everyone here knows, is continuing. We have urged British sportsmen not to take part in the Olympic Games, so far – as will have been observed – with only partial success; but we shall continue.

We believe that it is necessary to react in this way not in order to punish the Soviet Union – because the concept of punishment in these international matters is not very real – but in order to show the Soviet leaders and Soviet people, as far as we can reach their ears, that aggression will bring penalties and that a repetition could cause – indeed, would cause – a major crisis. We believe that if the West had reacted more vigorously on earlier occasions, in the case of Angola or in the case of the Cuban military move into Ethiopia with Soviet backing, and if there had been a stauncher response on those occasions, the Soviet Union might have thought more carefully before moving into Afghanistan.

We have also turned our attention to the countries which lie along what Mr. Brzezinski and others call the arc of crisis. I think that a side effect of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is that we are all more alert, more energetic and, I hope, more imaginative in thinking about tackling some of the problems of the area, the Middle East and South-West Asia, which have been with us for a long time but have tended to continue without perhaps the attention which their importance deserves.

The Middle East and South-West Asia are dangerously full of unsolved problems. There is the problem of the American hostages in Iran. We and our partners in the Community have thought it right to respond to the United States' request for economic sanctions – a request made only after five months of patient but unsuccessful diplomacy. Our sanctions on new trade are now in effect. We hope that they will be taken by the Iranians first as a signal that, while we have no quarrel with the people of Iran or their aspirations and the way they want to run their country, nevertheless they cannot expect to enjoy full economic co-operation with the West so long as they defy a basic principle of international law.

There are serious economic problems in several countries of the area, notably Turkey. We pay tribute to the work of the German Government in taking the lead in this area and we believe it right that we should all join in an effort to make this Turkish problem and other similar problems more bearable.

There is the long-standing and desperately difficult Arab/Israel dispute, which I know this Assembly has been discussing. The heads of government of the Nine will be considering next month at Venice whether a way can be found for Europe to help towards a just and lasting settlement.

If it is in order, Mr. President, I should like to take this opportunity to refer with thanks and appreciation to the report submitted to the Assembly by Sir Frederic Bennett. He was kind enough to send me a copy of it on behalf of the General Affairs Committee and I have discussed it with him. The way in which he, in his broad sweep of analysis of the international situation, concentrated upon and returned from time to time to the need to find an answer to the Arab/Israel problem was extremely helpful, because it tended to show that this was not a separate problem. It is an ancient problem but it is not separate from the other problems which confront us. Unless it is tackled in the context of those other problems, those other problems will be much more difficult.

This, I think, is the particular lesson that I have drawn from recent events. We have all

*Mr. Hurd (continued)*

these problems. Some of them are familiar. Some of them make us weary even when we think of them. In the past we have tended to treat these problems in separate compartments. We now need – I hope that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been persuasive in this respect – a new form of mental discipline which obliges us to consider each of these problems in a wider framework. We must not act on any of these problems in a way which contradicts our other aims.

In particular, we should take every possible step to show the peoples of the area that we understand their aspirations and hope that they succeed. Their culture is different from ours and we have no wish to impose our culture on them. Our only interest – this is true of Britain and, I think, of all the countries represented here – is in a peaceful and stable Middle East, Gulf and South-West Asia.

The main threat to that stability comes from the Soviet Union. It is not we who seek to invade, subvert or overthrow. We should tackle the unsolved problems with greater imagination and energy so that all in the area, whether they call themselves aligned or non-aligned, can see that our motives are honourable and our friendship sincere.

We believe, Mr. President, in *détente* provided it is real *détente*; we think it is right to keep the lines of communication open, to go on talking to the Russians about the issues of war and peace which concern us all. There have been several contacts of substance and importance between the western allies and the Soviet Union and its friends in recent weeks, based, I think, on this analysis. They include the discussion which Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary of my government, had with Mr. Gromyko in Vienna last month.

In addition, we believe that the SALT II agreement should be ratified when that becomes possible. We believe that it is probably right to proceed with the Madrid conference on European security, which follows the original Helsinki agreement. But, of course, the situation has changed, and we shall have to see exactly how we conduct that conference in Madrid this autumn.

It is essential that we should have a thorough examination of the performance by all the parties of their obligations in all three baskets. We could argue that by invading Afghanistan the Soviet Union has broken all the principles in basket 1. It would thus be unrealistic to look for decisions on new actions, new developments, in the Helsinki context until we have had a thorough examination of the

past performance by the various parties to the final act. But we hope that it may be possible, having had this examination of past performance, which is inescapable and right, to move on to achieve at least agreement on some future steps so as to keep the Helsinki process going. For instance, it may well be worth seeing how far new confidence-building measures could contribute to greater security. Very much work has been done in this field, and it is certainly our wish that at Madrid that work could begin to show fruit.

Just over two weeks ago the Warsaw Pact produced what they have described as a major initiative, for a world summit to eliminate what they called hotbeds of tension. This proposal was backed up by fifty-four pages of prose containing a whole series of well-worn proposals. I have to say that this is not the way forward. Why should the Soviet Union want to propose a grandiose conference to eliminate world tension when the most recent and dramatic increase in that tension stems directly from their own actions? It is time for the Soviet Union to realise that one cannot bring peace and progress to the world with guns and bombs. One has only to compare what is happening in Afghanistan now with the hard-won peace which our efforts have opened up in Zimbabwe to see the contrast between our wares on display at the moment and theirs.

Let us say to the Soviet leaders: Yes, let us by all means talk, let us keep the channels of communication open, but let us talk about ending the fighting in Afghanistan and about letting the people of that country determine their own future without outside interference from anyone, including the Soviet Union. In that way, maybe we can develop *détente*, develop a system of living with the Soviet Union, which will really be worthy of the name.

To sum up, Mr. President, our own commitment to progress in arms control and keeping the lines of communication open is not in doubt. The achievement of genuine, balanced and verifiable measures is an integral part of our efforts to safeguard peace and security. But we have to be realistic. Arms control is not a one-way option. We cannot defend ourselves and our interests around the world with an unreciprocated commitment to arms control. We cannot, in our view, shirk our share of responsibility for the common defence of Europe or, if need be, for expanded effort elsewhere.

Britain will use the resources provided by carrying through the 3% increase in defence spending to give all the support it can. We have long-standing links with South-West Asia and in the Gulf. We continue to make a

*Mr. Hurd (continued)*

modest but, I believe, significant contribution to stability in that area, and we do this both militarily and politically.

In thirty years the West has adapted itself to succeeding changes in the military threat and in the political climate. It is not always easy for us – representatives of parliamentary democracy – to lead, guide, or persuade our fellow citizens to recognise early enough a changed threat, a new development. It is not for us to give orders. Governments cannot give orders to parliaments in our countries; members of parliament cannot give orders to their constituents, to the free society and the components of the free society in which we live. It tends to be a slow process because we have to work time after time with the instruments of persuasion and not of dictation. Therefore, we have always to be alert for new changes so that we can begin this process of persuading and of change in free societies. The strength of this system – the danger is its occasional slowness – is that once one has achieved action through persuasion, that action is much more likely to be successful and sustained than if it is achieved simply by the orders of a dictator.

It is a task not just for governments or chiefs of staff but for all of us as parliamentarians, for all those who have the duty of forming public opinion. We have this task of showing to our people the change in the nature of the world and the continuing, though subtly changing, threat to which our free societies are exposed. We have to show that we can adapt ourselves to a new phase, which over the years may perhaps be even more demanding than when the threat was a direct and clearly perceived military threat in Europe. Today, the threat is not in Europe alone but to the international community as a whole. We have to rally not simply those who are aligned, those who are members of our Alliance, but those outside who are non-aligned but nevertheless have a passionate interest in their own independence and well-being.

This was illustrated by the overwhelming vote at the United Nations on the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, which illustrated the devotion to independence and the will of the vast majority of the nations of the world for peace. This is the new phase into which we are moving and in which we will need all our resources – not just of determination, of willingness to stand on our defences, but also of subtlety and imagination in tackling these problems outside our own continent on which, nevertheless, the interests of our own continent so heavily depend.

We have the capacity and just enough shared unity of purpose, but we would all admit that there is more work to be done in building on that unity and making it more effective. This is the main task which the British Government wishes to put its hand to. We are reasonably confident, although there are so many problems still to be solved, that the materials and the will exist to bring that task to a successful conclusion. Thank you very much. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Minister, for your address, which has given us much to think about. I am sure members will have been greatly encouraged by your reference to the rôle and the work of the Assembly.

I now invite questions.

It is for your preference, Minister, whether you answer each question individually or take them in groups at the end, because I find that inevitably there is some duplication.

The first question is by Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). – Since I have the honour to speak first, may I say to the Minister that I found his address most interesting and that I agree with his analysis of events in many respects.

However, I would like him to develop in more detail his rather-briefly stated view of Middle Eastern affairs, and, in particular, I wish to ask the following question:

What is his assessment of the declarations by the President of the United States to the effect that he is opposed to any European move to modify Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Europe is divided on what action to take to persuade the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. Indeed, opposing decisions have been taken giving the impression that some allied countries want to keep in with the Soviet Union or are even tending to use the international situation to obtain advantages of various kinds. Does not the Minister think that all this jeopardises the success of the pressures now being exerted on the USSR to withdraw from Afghanistan and to abandon its expansionist policy?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Grant.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – As the best, most practical and immediate way of condemning the Soviet actions in Afghanistan would be a boycott of the debased Moscow games, I was very glad to hear the Minister say that he would continue attempts freely to persuade athletes, and no doubt administrators,

*Mr. Grant (continued)*

not to participate. Will he confirm that these efforts will continue vigorously right up to the time of the games, if they ever take place? Will he also endeavour to persuade other governments in similar positions that are allies of ours to take exactly the same line, to be robust in their condemnation of the Moscow games? Will he work in close concert with them to make certain that the games are treated with the derision that they deserve?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Jager.

Mr. JAGER (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. Minister, I have a very brief question.

As the Minister responsible for commonwealth affairs, what do you think of the secession of the island of Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides? What measures do you intend to take, in agreement with the French Government, to ensure that the New Hebrides gain their independence in an atmosphere of calm?

The PRESIDENT. – That is a rather fast one, as the matter is still under discussion, but no doubt the Minister will deal with the question.

I call Lord Reay.

Lord REAY (*United Kingdom*). – Would the Minister like to say something to assuage the disappointment and criticism expressed by some of Britain's European allies – in particular, the German Government – at the final failure of the British Government to backdate sanctions against Iran to 4th November?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – May I ask the Minister a question connected with Sir Frederic Bennett's report, which we are in the process of debating? The Minister referred to the report and in particular to the Israeli-Arab conflict. I should like to ask him about a slightly different point concerning the undoubted fact that Baluchistan now forms the only land mass to stop Soviet troops reaching the Indian Ocean. In view of the political situation in Baluchistan, where there is a certain amount of turmoil, does the Minister agree with the assessment of the report that efforts should be directed towards solving the problems between India and Pakistan with fence-mending action?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. Minister, you have called for European action on Afghanistan, but you also said that account must be taken of economic and trade interests.

One of my colleagues has already put this question, but I repeat it: How do you explain the United Kingdom's refusal to apply economic sanctions against Iran to which it had committed itself with its European partners?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Osborn.

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate the Minister on the way in which he succinctly put forward a European attitude and foreign policy. In this institution and in other institutions the tendency is to examine the work, whether it be the Council of Europe, Western European Union or the European Parliament. There is no doubt that in defence matters Western European Union, with NATO, is the vehicle for expressing a joint strategy in connection with the matters that the Minister has touched on. As an ex-member of the European Parliament, I for one hope that the European Parliament and the Community will not only deal with foreign affairs but will interest themselves in defence, even in defence procurement. To what extent has that progressed at ministerial as well as parliamentary level, bearing in mind the existence of Western European Union?

The PRESIDENT. – I think that you may wish to reply now, Mr. Minister.

Mr. HURD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – It is a rather long list of searching questions to answer, but I was warned that this was likely to happen.

Mr. Bozzi raised the important question of a European initiative on the Middle East and cited the comments made by the President of the United States. I must make one point of fact. Many of the distinguished representatives here have experience of the United Nations. It is not possible to amend a resolution. A resolution is part of history. All that one can do, if one wishes, is to introduce a new resolution. We have taken the view for several months now – Lord Carrington said it at the General Assembly – that there is a gap in the resolution of the Security Council on the Palestine question, because the political rights of the Palestinians are not fully recognised and to a considerable extent their position is equated with that of refugees. It might be sensible – I emphasise "might" – at the right time and in the right circumstances to fill that gap and so move the peace process forward.

I apologise for having dealt with the present position very briefly in my speech. It is that the heads of government of the Nine at Luxembourg requested the Foreign Ministers of the Nine to see whether Europe could make a contribution to helping the peace process forward, neither contradicting nor affirming

*Mr. Hurd (continued)*

Camp David – I am putting my own gloss upon it – but making its own contribution. With the help of their officials, the Foreign Ministers are now hard at work on that question. They will report to the next summit in Venice this month.

All that I would add to that necessarily rather cautious reply is that Europe has an entirely legitimate and genuine interest in this matter. If we believe, if the heads of government come to the conclusion, that Europe can make a contribution at this stage in the present situation, which is increasingly tense and violent, on the West Bank and the present situation as between Israel, Egypt and the United States, I believe that we have the right and possibly the duty to do so.

Mr. Cavaliere made a point with which I agree about the need for unity and for occasionally making a compromise on individual interests in order to achieve the major goal, which he described as being to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. We need discipline in working together, which will occasionally mean subordinating a particular interest.

Mr. Grant asked about the Olympics. Some federations of British sportsmen representing important sports – equestrians, sailors and two others – have decided not to go to Moscow. So in Britain we have a partial boycott, though not as widespread as we should like. We shall continue to make our views known forcefully to our competitors. We are gladdened by the decisions made by athletes in some other countries, notably the German athletes. They have shown great courage and sacrifice in a difficult situation. We are in close touch with other governments in the same position as ourselves and we will remain so.

On the question of the New Hebrides, I must excuse my colleague, Mr. Peter Blaker, also Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who was in this city yesterday discussing the matter. I do not know whether our aircraft crossed, but I was in the House of Commons until 1 o'clock this morning and I have not had the opportunity of discussing with him the way in which he and his French colleague saw this matter. I have no doubt that a statement will be made in the House of Commons today or tomorrow which will explain the British Government's policy in this respect.

Lord Reay raised, quite rightly and in reasonable terms, the question of sanctions against Iran. Mr. Pignion indicated that we have refused to implement sanctions against

Iran. If that is a widespread view, I am glad to have the opportunity to contradict it. As from last week, British sanctions against Iran are in effect. They will be debated under our parliamentary procedures during the course of this week. I do not doubt that the necessary parliamentary orders will be approved by the House of Commons.

The difficulty arose not from the principle of sanctions but from the date of their taking effect. We are reluctant sanctioners, if there is such a word. We are not enthusiastic about sanctions and I do not think that any sensible people are. We have had recent experience in Rhodesia which has not increased our enthusiasm. Nevertheless, the House of Commons and the British Government, in common with the parliaments and governments of the Community, recognised that despite a certain reluctance it was right to respond to the appeal made to us by the President of the United States on 8th April and introduce sanctions. This was agreed at Naples and it has been done. Our difficulty related to the subordinated and subsidiary matter of the date of starting the sanctions.

The Naples agreement to implement sanctions from 4th November last year, the date on which the hostages were taken, received a violent reception in the House of Commons for two reasons. First, we had the Rhodesian experience, which we felt more bitterly than others, and secondly, in my party particularly, there is a deep-rooted and long-standing antagonism to the principle of retrospection – the principle that governments can, by law, make illegal a past act which was previously legal. We have fought many parliamentary battles on that issue and we regard retrospection as a first step towards authoritarianism and increasing the power of government which we believe is intolerable.

Therefore, the Naples proposal hit those two rocks, and the British Government decided – and events have proved us wise – to introduce sanctions but to change the date on which they became effective to new contracts made after the order rather than contracts dated before that.

Trade will be substantially affected. The press reports which indicate that these will be phantom sanctions are well wide of the mark. Our trade with Iran is increasing. New people are entering the market and others are coming back, having been excluded since the revolution. These people will not be able to undertake new business or sign new contracts. The effect on our trade with Iran will be noticeable and considerable, as will be the effect on trade with our partners. I am sorry to have dealt with that matter at some length, but it is

*Mr. Hurd (continued)*

important and there has been some obscurity about it.

To Mr. Osborn I simply say that I am not an expert on this matter, as he is. But I do not believe that any of us are satisfied with the progress that has been made on common defence procurement at ministerial level. We all feel that there is a great deal more to be done before we can be even reasonably satisfied.

I accept entirely what Mrs. Knight said when she raised several points from Sir Frederic Bennett's report. We believe that it is essential that there should be better understanding between India and Pakistan. There has been some progress in recent months. The position between those two countries is not as difficult as appeared possible after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Mrs. Gandhi's reaction to it. There is understanding on the part of both governments that their ancient quarrels should be relegated to the past and that a new way of living together should be found in this increasingly dangerous world. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you again, Mr. Hurd, for your full and comprehensive replies to those searching questions, in addition to your valuable address. We appreciate it all the more knowing that less than twelve hours ago you were on your feet in the House of Commons in London. We appreciate the trouble that you have taken to prepare your speech and to come here and answer our questions. Thank you very much. (*Applause*)

Mr. HURD (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President.

### **8. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security**

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 844 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – We now resume the debate on the report by Sir Frederic Bennett, Document 844 and Amendments.

The next speaker, Mr. Porthaine, is not here, and so I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I begin by thanking the Rapporteur, Sir Frederic Bennett, most warmly for the balanced report he has presented. I believe it broadly represents the common conviction of the members of this Assembly.

First of all let me say something about today's speech by Mr. Mattick, in which he said the present situation reminded him of 1914. I would not draw the same parallel, because it reminds me more of the run-up to 1939. In point of fact, there were decisive differences as regards the periods leading up to the two world wars and attitudes at those times. In 1914 there was an underlying readiness to run the risk of war, and the great powers – as the historians have put it – slid into the first world war. Before the second world war the situation was quite different. Then there was never any talk of war – always of détente and peace; and in that I see a certain parallel to the present day.

From 30th January 1933, that is from the day he became Chancellor, Adolf Hitler talked continuously of peace while preparing for war, and many people were taken in by it – I would say in the beginning almost all the major European political movements and statesmen. Today it seems hardly credible that on 17th May 1933 even a party like the German Social Democratic Party voted in favour of the Reichstag resolution on Adolf Hitler's peace declaration. Hearing that today, after the event, one feels it could not possibly have happened. But it did. In just the same way French and British statesmen repeatedly gave credence to the dictator's protestations of peaceful intentions right up to 1939, when their illusions were finally shattered. Thus, at that time, the more talk there was of peace and détente, the greater was the practical danger of a second world war. And then, once the German army had marched into Poland, there was no other option then and the terrible war began.

And that is what I am reminded of when I consider the present discussion. For this discussion too is based on the assumption that we have entered a period of peace and détente and that, when all is said and done, there can be no more risk of war if the great powers talk reasonably together.

In 1939 it was the Stalin-Hitler pact which prepared the way, in Eastern Europe at least, for a certain division of power, and it was to clinch this that sacrifices were accepted which it has not subsequently been possible to reverse – look at the fate of the three Baltic states, the present-day Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic and other areas. Comparing that with what has happened in Afghanistan, we can see that the reality of what has been described since about 1969-70 in current international discussions as "détente policy" is at least in some respects open to question. Of course one already knew that the dialectic of peaceful coexistence was a typical example of dialectical materialism, and that war, though outward-

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

ly rejected, was of course still covertly recognised in the guise of class struggle or internal disputes. Only Afghanistan, the Red Army invasion, and the massive deployment of regular troops in such a class conflict – if I may describe it as such – made clear the imperialist character of Soviet policy today. At the same time it became obvious that the word “détente”, on the other side at least, had remained a mere word.

I was therefore in no way surprised to hear our French communist colleague, who is unfortunately no longer here, defending Moscow’s policy today in exactly the same way as his comrades in the French Communist Party defended the Hitler-Stalin pact in 1939. They always align themselves on Moscow. There is not the slightest dissenting view here, at least as far as the French Communist Party is concerned.

It sounded like a bad joke when he said the women and children need only return from Pakistan or Iran, as an amnesty had been declared for them in Afghanistan. As if women and children needed to be amnestied because they fled across the borders to escape napalm bombs and the destruction of Afghan villages!

In this connection one cannot but wonder how far the peace we have been talking about in the framework of détente policy for the last ten years has become more secure. I use the phrase “more secure” deliberately, as one of the few members of the Christian Democrat Group in my country who voted in the Bundestag in 1972 not against but in favour of the treaties with the eastern bloc countries – treaties that were concluded at the time under the same slogan of making peace “more secure”.

I have strong doubts about this, if only when I read the sentence that appeared on 5th January this year in a leading article in UZ, the official organ of the German Communist Party, where the deputy editor-in-chief, writing about the Red Army’s invasion of Afghanistan, affirmed that it had made peace more secure. The same argument that served détente policy is thus now being used to justify aggression by an army that has invaded a neighbouring country. This – if I may say so – simply makes anyone who honestly believed in the Soviet Union’s readiness for détente look foolish.

Let me, while on this topic, make one more comment about the reaction to Afghanistan. In view of the time, I shall be quite brief. Whatever one may think of the American President and his call for a boycott, and

about whether it was very cleverly formulated – I leave the answer to the historians; I too have my doubts – the Europeans ought at least to have recognised that there was a moral duty to react to the Red Army invasion of Afghanistan, not out of solidarity with the Americans but out of solidarity with the men, women and children who have to suffer the effects of Soviet imperialism in Afghanistan.

And given that the International Olympic Committee had decided years ago at a meeting in Montevideo that the 1980 Olympics would be known as the “Games for Peace”, the moral consequence for the sportsmen and sports officials – not for the governments or politicians, but for all those who feel that they belong to the West, to a free society – should have been that as long as women and children are being murdered there can be no “Games for Peace” in Moscow, and one cannot participate in such “Games for Peace”.

It is significant – and I will end on this point – that almost all governments and leading politicians in the member states of this Assembly have been against participation by their sportsmen in the Olympic Games – the Dutch Parliament adopted a resolution to this effect, as did the House of Commons and the Bundestag – but that the influence of the political leadership in those countries was not strong enough to ensure that their sportsmen and sports officials would take due heed. I have the greatest respect for those sportsmen who, despite decisions by their national olympic committees to participate in the Moscow games, have said, as individuals, “No, I shall not take part”. They are true examples of the spirit of sportsmanship, examples who at this time deserve our respect and our esteem. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. – I thank Mr. Müller.

I call Mr. Hardy, to be followed by Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – The report that is before us deals with grave problems, and throughout that part of the world with which the report is concerned the problems are grave enough to threaten peace and security for us all, and certainly grave enough already to have markedly affected the international economy.

In regard to Afghanistan, the western response has been more apparent than real. Words have been tough but much of our action rests on a boycott of the Olympic Games, so that a great deal of the burden of western foreign policy has been placed on the shoulders of young athletes. But what the West’s posture will look like as soon as the Olympic Games are over, heaven only

*Mr. Hardy (continued)*

knows. Perhaps attention will be given then, as might have been more desirable earlier, to an economic response of a more marked character. It is certainly odd that many young athletes will not be going to Moscow but that American grain is cheaper in Moscow than it is in London and that there seems to be no lack of credit to facilitate its purchase.

Although I am hesitant about enthusing over recommendation 2, since I am reluctant to appear to endorse administrations which may provide future difficulty, I think that the words and the reactions have been firm, although I doubt whether the free world will be able to act swiftly to shift the present commitment and influence of the Iranian theocracy and revolution.

I have no quarrel with recommendations 3 and 4. As Sir Frederic will recall, I would have preferred to see not only our rightful condemnation but a clear statement making conditional upon the release of hostages our hope and willingness to co-operate in achieving cordial and close diplomatic, economic, political and cultural relationships with Iran. I believe that the olive branch should not lie further from our hand than do our armouries.

The report refers to western patience. There is no better alternative than the patience of diplomatic endeavour. It may not seem attractive to the media and it may offer no swift immediacy, but events have proved that this is the best instrument. On the other hand, it may be wrong for us to rely on the same degree of patience in our consideration of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. For that reason, I concur with the Rapporteur in that I do not believe that the peoples and governments of Western Europe should meekly respond to the wish of the United States in allowing the Israeli-Palestinian question to be held in both hazard and abeyance. There may be a very real need and a serious opportunity for Western and Western European governments to promote progress, and therefore I support recommendations 8 and 9. They should be seen together, for they are closely related. They deserve much attention, and the world interest is such as to suggest that delay is scarcely tolerable; for, given the nature of present Israeli policy, there is a possible danger.

Europe must pursue sensible courses. It should do so with cohesion. One hopes that the Council of the Nine, meeting very shortly in Venice, will commence the contribution to the pursuit of the initiative that is essential. A comprehensive settlement is necessary. This means that the Israeli policies in regard to the occupied territories must swiftly be changed.

It also means that the question of Jerusalem cannot be ignored much longer. There must be an attempt to ensure that a unified administration is established in that city. All this depends, as it must depend, upon an unequivocal, firm and clear acceptance by the Palestinians and Arabs of Israel's right to exist in sovereignty and security.

But I am also concerned about recommendation 5 with regard to Turkey, and I congratulate the Rapporteur on presenting to us a report which shows the severe difficulties and problems there. That is why I support recommendation 5, especially if it is amended in the way that I suggest. Turkey's geographical position is important. It stands exposed to the East-West Caucasian interface, and at the same time it faces enormous difficulties. It may be that these difficulties will become more severe during the 1980s in the context of the widened Europe.

Last autumn the Council of Europe's Committee on Agriculture presented a report which showed recognition of these likely difficulties. Turkey needs to increase its exports of Mediterranean products into European markets, and it seems to some of us that within a widened Europe those prospects will be more limited rather than broadened. If that occurs, the political consequences could be quite severe – possibly dreadful.

It is right that Turkey should be assisted. We should ensure that it is supported. But the context of the amendments suggests that we ought not to offer that which we cannot deliver. We should not put ourselves in a position of saying that we shall guarantee all the support that is necessary, because it could be so immense that we have little capacity to deliver.

I do not wish to burden the Assembly any longer. I believe that the report is a serious contribution to the debate and that it is right for us to stand by stability and to condemn both the invasion of Afghanistan and the chaos and dangerous nature of the events in Tehran. I believe, therefore, that the governments of our countries should pay particular attention to the report and seek to serve stability by ensuring that some diplomatic and political advance commences urgently. If that happened, we would be not merely ensuring a more stable world economy; we would be making a marked contribution to the achievement of world peace.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy. I thank you particularly for not taking the full ten minutes for which you asked – an example that I hope will be followed by subsequent speakers.



*The President (continued)*

The next speaker is Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Since in this Assembly the Dutch language is one of the official languages, Mr. President, I shall now speak in my own language.

*(The speaker continued in Dutch)*

(Translation). – Mr. President, I want to start by congratulating Sir Frederic Bennett on a valuable and most interesting report. I say this most emphatically; I very often find Sir Frederic's work very interesting, but disagree with quite a lot of what he writes and says. That is not the case this time.

Despite my agreement with the main lines of his argument, I have one or two comments to make, first of all about the situation of Afghanistan being occupied by Soviet troops. An occupation, by force and by military means, of another country or parts of another country deserves the strongest condemnation. And that applies to this occupation. So I agree that an expression – a collective expression – of this condemnation is called for.

I think it is dangerous, however, to say as the draft recommendation does that this should be done with every conceivable means. There must be no doubt left that this should be done solely by peaceful means.

It is obvious, Mr. President, that the tensions between East and West have been heightened by a number of events, such as the NATO decision to modernise its nuclear weaponry and the stationing of 577 medium-range nuclear missiles on European soil, and the occupation of Afghanistan. The essential process of détente and policy of détente have been threatened as a result. It would be wrong, therefore, to jeopardise détente further still through a fresh continuation, at a faster pace, of the arms race.

*(The speaker continued in English)*

Perhaps the Rapporteur can find the opportunity at least to listen to the speakers. I shall wait until he has the decency to listen.

I shall now continue in my own language. I hope that the Rapporteur had the opportunity to listen to my first remarks, and I hope that he will have the decency to answer especially my first remarks.

I shall now continue in my own language.

*(The speaker continued in Dutch)*

(Translation). – My second comment concerns the Middle East. As I did in April, during the debate on the Middle East in the

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, I would like again to make my basic position clear.

The first point from which I start is that Israel's existence and right to exist within secure and recognised borders must be guaranteed; that must be beyond any doubt. The second point is that the Palestinian people have a right to an independent Palestinian state of their own on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, perhaps federated with Jordan, perhaps not. The third point from which I start is that lasting peace in the Middle East, and the achievement of these various points, must be reached by peaceful means, that is to say, through negotiation. A lasting peace cannot be attained without negotiations with the PLO. Many people, not only in the Arab countries, look on the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. I offer no judgment on that. It is however a fact that at the present time the PLO is an extremely important representative of the Palestinian people, one that has to be taken account of and talked to. My fourth point has to do with the conditions under which these talks might start. It would of course be ideal if the PLO and Israel were to agree to conditions beforehand. It would be ideal if the PLO were from the outset to make a definite and solemn declaration that it acknowledges Israel's existence and right to exist, and that it renounces the use of force.

It would be ideal if Israel were to recognise the right of the Palestinian people to a Palestinian state of their own on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, with the PLO as sole representative of the Palestinian people, and were to renounce the use of force against the Palestinians. As I have said, this would be ideal; but I cannot see it happening. This is why talks have to be started off through the initiative of others, without these prior conditions. I am mentioning initiatives by others, and among these I mean in particular the initiative of the European Communities. From the very beginning of the Camp David agreements I have doubted whether they could lead to a lasting peace in the Middle East. It is now beginning to be more and more clear that this is not going to work, and that a European initiative, in the closest possible co-operation with the United States, might make sense.

I should add to this that I feel that it is above all essential that Israel should call a halt to, and reverse, its pernicious and provocative policy of settlement. Secondly, it is above all essential that the PLO should ensure that its supporters cease their frightful acts of violence, and that Israel should at once stop using force, as for instance in the bombing of Palestinian refugee

*Mr. Stoffelen (continued)*

camps. Israel should also put an end as speedily as possible to the banning of leaders of the Palestinian community.

The Palestinian people have been waiting so long in vain for a state of their own that it is right from all viewpoints that a real prospect of this state of their own should be offered them as soon as possible.

For all these reasons, I think that the draft recommendation could be improved on a number of points. Nevertheless, I can broadly agree with it, especially the passages dealing with the Middle East. It is a recommendation which, cautious though it may be, represents a further step towards lasting peace in the Middle East. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stoffelen.

The next speaker is Mr. van den Bergh.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I cannot agree with those who have said that the report from Sir Frederic Bennett is a good report. I feel that on a number of points it is imbued with a spirit of confrontation instead of reticence, the need for tact and caution. Let me offer one or two examples.

NATO must build up its military strength because the Russians have gone into Afghanistan. I do not know that this is true.

Then, Sir Frederic says that the Americans need speedily to set up a strike-force in and around the Persian Gulf. We all know that a force like this will not come about, because it cannot be afforded. Pakistan ought to be strengthened militarily – and that after the Pakistanis have turned down a modest offer of arms from the United States.

In my view, there have first of all to be political and economic solutions found to the problems that have arisen in Afghanistan and elsewhere. In spite of the very clear condemnation we must voice of the invasion of Afghanistan, the situation is not such that NATO has to react with an immediate military response. This is the path we have taken for years – that of more and more armaments. It is not a path that leads to a better situation in the world.

Where Afghanistan is concerned, we must in the first place try to start a political dialogue. In the second place, we must find a solution that involves not only Afghanistan, but also India, Pakistan and, most of all China. Without this political perspective it will be impossible in any near future to find an answer to the problem of Afghanistan.

Now I come to Iran. Everyone starts by saying that the hostages must be released, and that hostage-taking is a serious breach of international law. This is an attitude I agree with, and it is an attitude from which we should not budge by one inch. I do worry, however, about the lack of readiness in the western world to show greater understanding of what has happened in Iran, bearing in mind what has gone on there in the past.

I tell you very clearly and distinctly that we shall never manage to start up a political dialogue with Iran unless we admit that the past, when under the Shah there was oppression, massacres and so on and so forth, is the main reason for the present bad relations between Iran and the West. The Shah was always, because of the economic interests involved, massively supported by many countries of the West. This does not mean that we do not continue to condemn what is happening now in Iran. By admitting this we can achieve an understanding of what the fundamentalists in Iran have brought about, even though this does not stop one having one's doubts about it. This recognition that we are ourselves partly responsible for developments in recent years in Iran is the only basis for a political dialogue with that country. At the present time, a short-sighted view predominates in our dialogue with Iran. That is wrong. We shall not obtain the release of the hostages in that way. We shall have to put our political relations with Iran on a new footing before we can make any progress.

The same applies to our attitude towards the growth of Islam. I agree with those who feel there is cause for concern about what is happening in many countries of the Islamic world. This is a movement that is and will continue to be of major world significance. I do urge that we should not be short-sighted in our reactions to developments in Islam. We must try to understand what is going on, and accept the development of Islam as a valid development. And difficult as it may be, we must try to arrive at a real dialogue.

Then I want to make a couple of comments on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Things are not going well between Israel and the Arab countries. The Begin government's policy on the West Bank is disastrous. Yesterday in Damascus El Fatah stated that it is essential "fully to liberate all of Palestine and liquidate the entity at economic, political, military, educational and ideological level". That is an official statement from the most important organisation within the PLO.

More and more, political extremism is gaining the upper hand, and this must make us very worried. The question is to know how

*Mr. van den Bergh (continued)*

Western Europe can best contribute to a solution of the conflict. It is evident that we have to make a contribution, but I do not care for the proposals made by Sir Frederic Bennett. Our experience with conferences of the kind he suggests, a conference with a lot of countries taking part, has been very poor. Such conferences have failed in the past, because the political basis needed for a conference like this is lacking. The political climate is too bad for solutions like this.

Then I note that the Soviet Union would not be involved in such a conference. I call that being politically naïve. I am no friend of the Soviet Union, but it is as clear as day that it is naïve to suggest letting the Western European countries work on a solution to the Middle East conflict without the Soviet Union taking part in a conference on the subject. It is a very major power.

But as I have said I do not think a large-scale conference would be sensible. The draft recommendation says that Western European countries should contribute to the success of such a conference. I would ask the countries that share that view, for instance countries with oil interests, to stand up and tell us what ought to happen. Was it right, at the very moment when relations with the United States are poor on a number of points, for us to get from a confirmed proponent of the Atlantic Alliance like Sir Frederic, a proposal that has roused the American President's anger? The proposal suggests a vague European conference, without there being a European point of view. We are not told which European countries ought to attend, though I have an idea which countries Sir Frederic thinks ought to take part. I think this is a bad proposal. We should tackle the limited task of bringing about, in consultation with the United States, a change in the political attitudes in Israel and the Arab countries. Only a change in attitudes like this can provide the basis for a broad-based conference, in which the Soviet Union must naturally be involved. Such a conference, which I hope will take place very soon, would have solely to set the seal to what had been achieved in the meantime at political and diplomatic level. Without this approach, such a conference will be doomed to failure. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – We have time for one more speech before the lunch adjournment.

I call Mr. Mommersteeg.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we have before us today an interesting, comprehensive and important report from Sir Frederic Bennett, which sketches out the complex relationship of

elements and factors that can be brought together under the phrase “the present international crisis”. There are, understandably enough, one or two points I would want to question.

I would think that this is equally true for Sir Frederic, but I shall not go into those matters now. I shall concentrate my remarks on the draft recommendation, and in particular on what it says about the Palestinian problem proper.

In the first substantive paragraph of the recommendation, for example, the Council is recommended to intensify consultations and to agree on joint action on questions concerning balance and security outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. Leaving aside the fact that treaties limit the sphere of action, it strikes me – and I think this is wrong – that it says nothing about consultation with the United States. Yet in matters of security America is the major and indispensable member of the Alliance. Where balance outside the NATO area is concerned, the United States is the principal and decisive factor.

The third paragraph recommends that all available means be used to show that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is unacceptable. Yet nothing specific is said about these means. Are solely verbal means intended? The refusal to take part in the Olympic Games is one such means. Refusing to supply high technology products could have some meaning. Is this the sort of thing Sir Frederic has in mind?

In the fifth paragraph, it says that a just and lasting peace in Palestine is essential for stability in the region. I would agree with this, but we must be under no illusions. It is not, of course, saying that such a peace will guarantee security. The differences between the Arab countries – in their various political systems, for instance – are too great for that.

It is further recommended that there should be a European initiative aimed at amending Security Council Resolution 242. I admit that the content of that resolution is inadequate, because it treats the Palestinian people as refugees. On the other hand one has to remember that this resolution forms the basis for all the discussions and negotiations that have taken place to date. It strikes me, too, that a European initiative is being urged, and I do not feel that this is something that could come from the Council of WEU. We know that political consultation and political collaboration within Europe have shifted towards the Nine; that is where such an initiative ought to come from. I see that here too there is no hint of consultation with the United States, though

*Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)*

over recent years the United States has done a lot towards finding a solution.

I must make the point that the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt is an important political fact, which must be seen as wholly positive. Yet this is not acknowledged in any way in either the report or the recommendation. I admit that the treaty has also had its negative side, for instance in isolating Egypt from the Arab and Islamic world. The lack of any beginning to an answer to the Palestinian problem exacerbates these adverse consequences, and also affects domestic politics and the social and economic scene inside Egypt. For all that, the treaty is still an important factor.

The Palestinian problem is a major component of the international crisis, I grant Sir Frederic that. It has never, of course, been purely a question of refugees. A Palestinian people exists, or is in the making, separate from the other Arab nations. This people is looking for the opportunity to decide its own future. The question is, however, whether the Nine can launch an initiative that could come up against a United States veto. I think this would be an extremely ill-judged move. Mr. van den Bergh, too, mentioned this, and I support what he had to say. The United States has played an important part in the inception and fostering of the peace-making process. Where the Palestinian problem is concerned, progress in the Camp David process would seem to be blocked. The United States seems unable – at least in this election year – to bring Israel to show greater flexibility. This blocking of progress is not in the interests of the West, or of the United States. Further progress in the Camp David talks, making it possible via an interim period, to offer a prospect of a more permanent settlement, would be in the interests of the United States as well.

Any European initiatives that may be worked out need to be geared to this, and they need to be acceptable enough to the United States for them not to run up against an American veto. A veto would make European-American

relations even more difficult, and this would militate against the solution it is so essential to find. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Mommersteeg.

The debate is adjourned.

### **9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 844 and Amendments).
2. The international situation and European security (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 845).
3. Interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Document 843).
4. Co-operation between WEU member countries on video communication systems (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 839).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 1 p.m.)*

## FOURTH SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd June 1980

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 844 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Pavitt, Dr. Miller, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Jessel, Mr. McGuire, Mr. De Poi, Mr. Grant, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Vyzas (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Koutsogeorgas (*Observer from Greece*), Sir Frederic Bennett (*Rapporteur*).
4. Welcome of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium.  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Nothomb (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium*), the President.
5. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 844 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Vohrer (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Brown, Mr. Depietri, Mr. Vohrer (*Rapporteur*).
6. Interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure (*Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Doc. 843*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Grieve (*Chairman and Rapporteur*); (point of order): Sir Frederic Bennett.
7. The international situation and European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 845*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Vohrer (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Brown, Mr. Depietri, Mr. Vohrer (*Rapporteur*).
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Sitting is open.

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

#### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup>. See page 34.

#### 3. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 844 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Orders of the Day now provide for the resumed debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security and the vote on the draft recommendation, Document 844 and Amendments.

In the resumed debate I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I am not sure whether it is an advantage or a disadvantage to speak first after the luncheon adjournment. One has the advantage of getting it over with, but one has the feeling that one is talking to thin air until one actually sees one's remarks in print. Of course, those present make up in quality for what they lack in quantity.

I wish to congratulate most warmly my friend Sir Frederic Bennett on the report. It fulfils a

*Mr. Grieve (continued)*

useful function at present, and it is a continuation of a long series of services which Sir Frederic has given to this Assembly. The report follows three previous ones on similar subjects following up the situation in the Middle East and South-West Asia as it has evolved in recent years.

In my submission, the most important service that Sir Frederic's report renders to the Assembly is to show how the problems of the Middle East, and even the Far East, interlock. It is on that interlocking aspect of the immediate and critical situation that I wish to comment this afternoon.

Because the problems of world peace interlock so much, it is impossible for any statesman or any political assembly to consider one particular problem in a void. In November last year, when the staff of the American Embassy in Tehran were taken prisoner and made hostages, I was one of those who rose in this Assembly shortly afterwards and protested. What was done then in Iran and what is continuing there is an outrage which could not have been contemplated by civilised society thirty or forty years ago.

I make no apology for saying again now that the persons of diplomats are sacred in the cause of international negotiations. It is horrifying that today the persons of diplomats should be subject to the exigencies of what almost amounts to war and that they should be pawns in the hands of terrorists and others pursuing causes which, however just they are in themselves, put the lives and freedom of those diplomats in danger.

Therefore, I believe that we must have the greatest sympathy for the United States and we must show the utmost solidarity with that country. For the American people it is an appalling emotional strain to see their diplomats and emissaries to what was once a friendly state being held prisoner in this way in the capital of that state.

We must avoid seeing the problems of Iran and of the American hostages in a void – as a problem of itself. I believe that the problems of Afghanistan and Iran are interlocked so clearly and manifestly that they are the most striking example of the interlocking of the cause of peace in the modern world and the dangers to it. Because I felt it so necessary that we should show solidarity with the Americans, I supported the immediate demand for sanctions against Iran in my parliament. Indeed, I was prepared, much as I dislike sanctions, to go along with retrospective sanctions. I was prepared to do this despite the fact that the

whole experience of my lifetime has been that if any course of conduct is likely to bear little fruit in international affairs, it is that of sanctions. We have seen it recently in Rhodesia and before the war when Italy invaded Abyssinia. We have seen it again and again in the lifetime of many of us here today. But overriding the interrogation of the efficacy of sanctions was the necessity to show solidarity with our United States allies, on whom we are still dependent for the maintenance of peace, security and freedom. That was an overriding consideration.

Having said that, I wish to make this point. Grave as is the question of the American hostages in Iran, the danger to world peace and to the security of East and West in Afghanistan is of vital importance. We must not overlook that fact. In showing solidarity with our American allies, we must not forget that the prime problem in the East at present is that of Afghanistan. In that case, a relatively free country has, until recently, maintained its freedom for centuries against all comers, including my own country in the nineteenth century. It has now been invaded with colossal military forces and war is being waged even against children. When children stoned the Russian tanks in Kabul the other day, they were mercilessly treated. In this case an Asian people are holding fast to their freedom in their mountains and in their snows while they are being subjected to the most outrageous invasion that has taken place anywhere in the world since the war. I say that not forgetting Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In those countries there was at least the excuse of Yalta. We made many mistakes at Yalta, but on that occasion those countries were placed within the Russian sphere of influence.

There is no excuse at all in Afghanistan. The invasion of Afghanistan and the presence of Russian troops in that country has brought this great Russian empire – because, despite communism and Marxist ideas, it still is the heir of the empire of Peter the Great – within striking distance of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. It is a terrifying situation, and we are fighting it with our hands tied behind our backs because we still wish to preserve the peace of the world. But we must now stop at nothing else to show to the rulers of Russia that this is a situation which the free world finds intolerable.

I welcome the initiative taken by Lord Carrington and our allies at the February meeting in Naples. I very much hope that it may be possible in some way to neutralise Afghanistan and to see Russian troops withdrawn, although I am not very opti-

*Mr. Grieve (continued)*

mistic. It may be that for a long time the freedom of the people of Afghanistan will depend on their own desire for freedom and their determination to fight the invader.

We must use every other means in our power to express our disapproval. We have in our hands an elementary means of so doing – namely, by saying: “We will not go to the Olympic Games. We are free countries. We do not dictate to the people of our countries whether they leave our shores or when they leave them, or, indeed, for what purpose, provided that it is a legal purpose.”

I am horrified when I find athletes – much as I sympathise with their desire to excel and to win gold medals, for which they have trained and disciplined themselves for so long – putting their priorities in the way of the necessity of the free world to dissociate itself from Russian actions in Afghanistan. I repeat that we have the means at hand, and that is to tell Moscow that we will not go to its games.

I am happy that some at least of the British team, including our riders, have decided not to attend the games. I very much hope that as the day of the games approaches more and more people will withdraw from them. I lived through the 1936 Olympic Games, and, indeed, I had already come to manhood. I saw the situation for myself, and I witnessed the propaganda advantage drawn by Hitler by the very presence of the athletes of the whole world at Berlin in 1936. I hope that Russia will be able to draw no such propaganda advantage from the presence of the athletes of the free world in Moscow this year.

I return to the main point of my remarks. We must do all we can, by diplomacy, by helping the Americans and by showing solidarity with them, to procure the release of the hostages. The holding of the hostages is an outrage. However, we must also examine the larger problem and must not run the risk of pushing Iran into the hands of Soviet Russia by treating her as an outlaw. Therefore, we have a difficult course to pursue in diplomacy, negotiation and the actions we take.

I approve in every way what the report says about Turkey, which is a key nation in the maintenance of peace and security in the free world. Those of us who have been to Turkey in recent years know of the appalling poverty and bad economic conditions that prevail in that country. We must do all we can to support Turkey and to help that country to make its way out of the dangerous and difficult economic situation in which it finds itself. There will be no political stability in Turkey until it has achieved the economic stability

which is necessary to Turkey and to us as her allies in the free world.

Finally, I touch with trepidation on the problem of Palestine and Israel. I believe that we cannot achieve maximum understanding with the Arab powers, who are so necessary to the defence of the free world, without resolving the problem of Israel and of Palestine. It is no use pushing the Palestinians under the carpet, as it were, and saying that many of them are terrorists. The nation of Israel was founded by those who did not hesitate to use terrorism – for example, in the explosion at the King David Hotel – to achieve their ends. The Arabs must recognise the existence of Israel and promise to retain it. But Israel, too, must be tolerant and give to the Palestinian people their homeland to live in.

With those few observations – and there is little that is original in them – I commend Sir Frederic’s report to the Assembly. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – I wish to thank Mr. Grieve.

I call Mr. Pavitt.

Mr. PAVITT (*United Kingdom*). – I agree with my colleague, Mr. Grieve, in his remarks on the interrelationship of this excellent report and its recommendations. However, I shall not worry the Assembly with a number of the other points made by Mr. Grieve.

I yield to nobody in my respect for the value of the relationship with the United States and its place in the world scene. But, in the present circumstances of the presidential election, I believe that a sincere friend is one who is prepared not only to consult and to work alongside oneself in pursuing the objectives that we all have in mind but from time to time to be frank and free in discussing the courses of action we should take.

The report before us has the appearance of a chessboard. It has isolated a part of the world scene so that we have been able to focus our attention on a number of areas which give parliamentarians grave cause for concern. We should be aware not only that the pieces in play in the Middle East are important but that the great powers which have their existence outside that area are part and parcel of the consideration we must give to the settling of the very real problems which afflict the area and to the suggestions which are put forward in the report.

Three important areas of consideration have already been emphasised – namely, the United States, the Soviet Union and Europe. In the next ten years the Assembly will be wrong if it ignores the emergence of China as yet a further person sitting round a chessboard and prepared from time to time to intervene in the game.

*Mr. Pavitt (continued)*

The title of the report emphasises the word "evolving". In the hot climate of the Middle East, the growth rate of some of the problems dealt with in the report has been far more rapid than we have been able to grasp. It is a seed which has developed into a great problem in the hothouse of the Middle East, a problem which we must seek to control.

The wider perspective put forward by the United Kingdom Minister, Mr. Hurd, this morning is part of the considerations relating to my remarks in this debate. Parliamentarians as part of their task read a great deal of material. The tendency is to get the gist of it in the nine points on which we are asked to concentrate. I commend the explanatory memorandum because Sir Frederic Bennett has put within it a very wide historical background, without which the nine proposals would lack any solid base on which to make our decision.

I now turn to the recommendations and in particular to the part concerning Pakistan. We have to be aware that Pakistan is still not stable. We all know of the tragedy of Bhutto. We know of the problems faced by General Zia. We know that the country is under martial law and that in an evolving situation we have to be aware of the day-to-day changes taking place in Pakistan.

Sir Frederic drew attention to the Baluchistan problem. I have lived there and I have also been in Uzbekistan in the Soviet Union. Having been on either side of the border, one realises that it is not possible to understand the problems of the people of that area simply in terms of frontiers formed in the last century. The Baluchis, with their nomadic cattle, have many tribal problems, but we would be wrong to consider Pakistan in this perspective without considering the future developments in Baluchistan.

The United Nations has some responsibility concerning the mobility of the cattle which go from Afghanistan into the North-West Frontier Province and also into Baluchistan. The amount of feed on the ground is limited. With such large numbers of cattle, there is immediately an immigration problem – not of people but in terms of the use of cattle and keeping the cattle alive.

The Assembly ought to be pressing the United Nations and its other agencies to consider what can be done to alleviate the human problem and also to alleviate the problem that will be faced if the Baluchis, the Pathans and the other people involved feel that the feed for their cattle is being eaten by the Afghanistan cattle and that they are therefore being deprived.

I commend the point made this morning concerning the age-old problem of India and Kashmir. When Afghanistan was invaded, there was an initial response from Mrs. Gandhi, who had not then been in office very long. But her second thoughts were better than her first, and the visit by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary and the discussions which took place represent one of the most hopeful signs in that part of the world.

We have already been discussing Turkey, and I draw attention in that context to the Cyprus problem. If we are thinking of Turkey in terms of economic and military strength and its place within the Alliance, we cannot ignore the problem that arises when we have yet another barrier drawn between people, as we have on the island of Cyprus, with checkpoint Charlies and armed forces to keep the island in separate compartments.

As politicians we have been very lax. When we are able to solve a problem temporarily – as, for example, between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and in the Middle East in regard to the West Bank – we ought to go back a little further and remember the partition of Northern Ireland from Ireland after the first world war. When we leave a problem unsolved, it sometimes takes a good many years before it erupts. The best hope to give Turkey would be to find a solid solution to the Cyprus problem, so that Turkey can release its forces. That would also have beneficial economic effects. I believe that we can play a part in that respect.

Recommendation 9 expresses our hopes concerning self-determination for Palestine and real security for Israel. Although we may have the right words, I regret that there is not the strength to guarantee Israel's feelings about the need for security. In 1966 Israel had security because of the United Nations forces which stood between Israel and the Arab states, but those forces were withdrawn within twenty-four hours. This time we have to go much further. I accept recommendation 9 – as I think the Assembly will – but it places on us a responsibility to make it a reality in terms of self-determination and security.

The Palestinians would be well advised to think a little more about their economic future and about what is to be done, if they get the state into their own hands, in regard to self-sufficiency, trade and economic strength. If I lived in Israel, I would be looking at the pressures coming from all the Arab states. I would be thinking not of the provision of seeds, tractors or other agricultural machinery but primarily about defence matters.



*Mr. Pavitt (continued)*

I commend the postscript to the document. The General Affairs Committee had the very good fortune that our Rapporteur went to visit the various parts of the Middle East just before the report was finalised. The postscript therefore contains some extremely important material. We cannot hope to solve politically the problems of the area that we are discussing without accepting that the first and most important aspect is oil and the energy crisis and that the second and third most important aspects are also oil and the energy crisis. Unless that thought is at the forefront of our attempts to solve these problems, we shall be missing the prime motivating forces for action in the world today. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Pavitt.

Dr. Miller has the floor.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – In his report, Sir Frederic Bennett very wisely tells us at the beginning that it does not pretend to be an overall and detailed historical analysis of the position in the Middle East and South-West Asia as was Document 820, which was approved by the Assembly in December and which I bitterly opposed.

Since Sir Frederic has been forthcoming in indicating that his report was not an attempt to be a *tour d'horizon*, I cannot say that I have as many objections to this document as I had to the previous one.

I shall come to the recommendations which the document makes. First, in the introduction it asks this Assembly a little too much to blame Israel for everything that is happening in the Middle East today. Sir Frederic says that foremost remains the unresolved and worsening Israel-Arab dispute. The Arab countries, because of their continual territorial dispute with Israel, are experiencing internal disruptions. The report goes on to blame what is happening in the Lebanon on Israel, what happened in the Great Mosque in Mecca on Israel, and what happened when Colonel Kadhafi's commando forces attacked Gafsa, in Tunisia, on Israel.

But is it seriously suggested that the little country of Israel is at the root of all these problems? If Israel did not exist, the Arab states would have to invent her. I do not think that there are any two out of the twenty-one or twenty-two Arab states which have had friendly relations one with another. Certainly no one state has friendly relations with every one of the others. It looks to me as though there is developing in the minds of some people the idea of producing a scapegoat for all that is going on in the Middle East. We had a

scapegoat, or scapegoats, in the 1930s. Those were the Jews of Germany. We now have scapegoats in the 1980s which look to me as though they are the Jews of Israel. I do not think that we ought to be approaching the problem there from the point of view of even implying that one little country lies at the root of all these problems. That is nonsense and should not be said.

Lord Reay, in a speech which I have now come to associate with him, shows admirable concern for the Palestinian Arabs, but he forgets that these difficulties are largely of their own making. If they had accepted the situation which the United Nations outlined in 1947, these problems would not have arisen. Words have been bandied around and definitions are being put forward, but, whatever we say about them, they are refugees. If one wants to accord them another status, that is fine. I do not say that we should not do so, but legally they are refugees because they did not previously have a state of their own.

Some people were thrown out of their homes; that is true and is something that I deplore. That does not give them the status – unless they wish themselves to accord that status to their group of people – of a nation. In my opinion, we ought to accord them that status. I do not say that we should not do so, but it should not be argued that, *ipso facto*, they are a state, because they are not a state, even though they have set up in exile people who take upon themselves the rights of an elected government.

I warned the Council of Europe Assembly in April – if I dare use the word – that if we accord to one group of refugees or dissidents, or to any group of people who want to accord themselves that status, the title of a state, we may have to do it to the Basque separatists, the Serbo-Croats, the Montenegrans, the Kurds, the Corsican separatists, the Quebec separatists, the South Moluccans and a whole host of other people who may demand the same status.

I agree that Israel still occupies territories which it occupied for the first time in 1967. So did we after a war. So did the allies. There is nothing illegal in occupying territory after a war pending a peaceful settlement. It is a normal situation. I totally condemn Mr. Begin's policy of not only the extension of settlements into the West Bank but his whole policy – his whole economic policy as well. But I deplore Mrs. Thatcher's policy. I know that some of my conservative colleagues do not. But in deploring Mrs. Thatcher's policy I do not associate myself in any way with people who want to eliminate the British people. To my mind peace, so far as some of the Arabs are concerned, and, in fact,

*Dr. Miller (continued)*

so far as the PLO is concerned, means the elimination of Israel, and we cannot talk in these terms.

If we can satisfy the Israelis on the security problem, the whole series of difficulties in relation to the Palestinian Arabs could well be on the way to a settlement. Incidentally, if we could satisfy the Russians that we have no evil intentions towards them, however much they may be wrong in their belief that we have evil intentions, we could put an end to the arms race.

If European countries were less critical of Camp David, more inclined to encourage developments and less inclined to grovel in the face of oil problems, much greater progress would have been made. At very great risk to Israel, the Egyptians are now fast achieving all that they asked for, and there are many risks to Israel. Israel gave up a large part of land which she had occupied and which acted as a buffer in case there was another attack on her, as there had been in the past. The Israelis gave that up. They have had to build new defences at enormous cost. They gave up something else in addition to security and the risk to security. In addition to having to construct new defences somewhere else, Israel gave up oil which was supplying most of her needs; and now she has another problem adding to her balance of payments deficit, and that is the import of oil.

It is not far-fetched to believe that if we were behind the Camp David agreement, pushing it forward, satisfaction similar to that which has been achieved by the Egyptians could be achieved by the Palestinians and the Arabs. An independent Arab state on the West Bank and at Gaza is advocated by some people, but not by the report, which talks about self-determination. I commend that, because that is the way we should be proceeding. If one visualises the map of that part of the world, one can see that an independent Arab state on the West Bank and at Gaza would be an extremely serious threat to Israel. From the north there would be the Syrians, and from the east and from the Gaza Strip in the west there would be an attack on her.

When mentioning the possibility of a European initiative to try to solve this problem, a good point was made by Mr. van den Bergh when he said that a European initiative could include the Soviet Union. Why not? It is part of Europe. How would those who advocate a European initiative respond to that suggestion? We have every right as democrats, as people concerned about peace and about the

interests of our people, to try to resolve this situation. But we also must recognise, while we fall over backwards to recognise the problems of the Arabs, the problem that Israel has.

Israel looks upon Europe as an area, a continent, a group of countries, that will once again sell her down the river. Let us face it: we sold Czechoslovakia down the river in 1938. The Israelis are extremely concerned that that kind of thing might happen again.

We should be giving encouragement to the vast majority of the Israeli people who are democratic in outlook and who want to see a just resolution of the problem. I deplore and totally condemn the senseless retaliatory violence that has taken place – and took place yesterday – which is absolutely terrible. It is the Jewish people in Israel acting totally outside their normal behaviour.

What overlies every argument and every debate in this chamber, the Council of Europe and nearly all the legislative assemblies of Europe is the point that my colleague, Mr. Pavitt, made – our fear that our economies will be disrupted and our standards of living will fall if we do not appease the Arabs by making sure that we stand up against Israel and, therefore continue to get the Arab's oil.

I end with a quotation from a British historian of the Middle East, Mr. J.B. Kelly, in an article in *New Republic* only two weeks ago:

“ We have only to look around us today to see the degree of debasement that Arab oil money has caused in western society and politics over the past ten years. If such degradation can occur in so short a time, what on earth will be our conditions ten years hence ? ” (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Dr. Miller.

(*The President continued in French*)

(Translation).– I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation).– Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, there are facts, and facts are stubborn, and then there are explanations of facts. There is the Europe one talks about and the Europe that actually exists. It is on the basis of these two points that I wish to make a substantial contribution to this debate.

Afghanistan is a problem, and although we can hold forth at length about its origins, we can hardly plumb the hearts and minds of Brezhnev and others. The awakening of Islam is a fact. Where will it lead? Again, we have no crystal ball to tell the future. We cannot define the purpose of Soviet expansionism, but

*Mr. Pignion (continued)*

we can see its results, and the hypotheses considered by the Rapporteur are all credible; they are all in the realm of the possible. Whether one speaks of the Brezhnev doctrine or any other, may I simply say, and repeat, that those are the facts and that it would be futile not to see all these events as a direct threat to peace in the short or medium term.

I also find that most of these problems are rooted in the underlying economic situation. We are not going to do anything for the Afghans, but we will for Oman if things should go that far.

May I simply draw your attention to this point and join you in asking whether there is any way we can resolve these problems other than individually. I hope that, facing as it does the two blocs with their on-going policies, Europe may at last be able to present itself as a trusted and credible negotiating partner to whom one can turn with full confidence. And as regards the report submitted to us, I think we should not give way to pessimism or to a kind of neurotic belief in the inevitability of confrontation.

What I want to emphasise, speaking of Europe and corroborating what I said earlier, is that at present Europe is not credible. Our offers of mediation have not been accepted – in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict – and you will have seen from the results of the most recent Al Fatah congress last Sunday that the European countries' proposals could not be taken seriously because these countries seemed too weak to make their wishes respected. The congress also affirmed that the Americans were equally suspect since they had again declared through the voice of Jimmy Carter that they alone had been empowered so far to try to resolve this conflict but were not succeeding in doing so.

That is a lesson for the European countries which, acting separately, are not capable of inspiring confidence and for that reason are continuing to strengthen the process of bipolarisation.

All the verbal condemnation, the indignation expressed on many sides and the few economic sanctions against the USSR have been no more successful than the Nine's proposal to neutralise Afghanistan in swaying the Soviet Government in its determination to control that country.

So I think Europe's first priority should be to achieve credibility by helping the Afghan people. We must give them the assistance they need very quickly. Short of resorting to armed force, we can at least provide them with

prompt and effective aid. Practical humanitarian action of this kind is the only way to give the Afghan people confidence in Europe.

The same applies to Turkey. I remember the visit to Turkey by the members of the Council of Europe's Committee on Economic Affairs. We visited the country and listened to comments on its political organisation, its troubles and, in particular, the economic crisis it is passing through. And those who showed us the Soviet cargo vessels and warship passing by made it quite clear to us that Europe must help Turkey, since otherwise Turkey could easily swing to the other side. Will these words be heard and will these expectations be met? I do not think they will as long as we continue our separate approach to these problems and to hold futile discussions.

Europe must, I repeat, take concerted and rapid action to restore a climate of confidence. I have referred in this connection to the example of Turkey and the Afghan people.

As a French socialist and as one who has recently attended debates on the way we think these problems should be resolved, may I point out that the connecting thread running through our policy should be the resolve to consider system of blocs and replace this by a collective organisation for peace. That is to say, it seems to us that the East-West tensions cannot be reduced merely by creating a North-South axis putting an end to exploitation of the underdeveloped South by the industrialised North.

Given the risk of an aggravation of the tensions between the big powers, we must not succumb to the war mentality or allow ourselves to be caught up in the machinery of confrontation between the blocs. We think that France, which was and remains a member of the Atlantic Alliance, must not let the United States use the Alliance as an instrument of its policy. France must preserve its own means of defence and its independent power to take decisions. So it is now more urgent than ever to ensure Europe's political independence, as the British Minister pointed out this morning.

As for détente, whatever the chances are, we must begin by identifying the principles on which to base our action. For, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is because we lack clearly-enough defined principles that instead of avoiding the threats facing us we meet them head on. For lack of principles, embassies no longer have extra-territorial rights. How did we react? For lack of principles, we let the UNIFIL soldiers be murdered, as in the good old days, by a bullet in the neck. Who reacted? The United States reacted against the taking of hostages. We took our time. Once principles

*Mr. Pignion (continued)*

have been abandoned, we no longer have a firm policy and, above all, as one of our colleagues said earlier, our policy is no longer backed by the power to assert the validity of our principles.

Now, I think the life of nations is like the life of individuals. If we abandon these principles, we will lose the thread of any sound policy. Individuals, when they grow up, rise above their selfish desires and personal needs to think of others and in so doing become credible, reliable and worthy of respect. They become all the more so in that, physically almost, they come to stand for something.

I see no other solution in the life of nations and the dramas now being played out on the world stage than, firstly, firmness backed by the means to assert it and secondly, a deep attachment and continuous return to sound principles.

Surely we are not short of agencies to settle our problems? Surely we are not going to go on believing in the bilateral character of the negotiations? Are we going to let people believe, in the final analysis – and I conclude with this – that Europe does not exist?

Ladies and Gentlemen, we have spoken a great deal about Europe here. It must prove itself worthy of what the countries expect of it. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. – I now call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – I listened with great interest to the remarks of Mr. Pignion. He talked about the affirmation of sound and valid principles as part of our stand, but that cannot be enough. He said that we must not be pessimistic about the world situation, but I do not agree at all. It is right to be profoundly pessimistic about the world situation, which has become appalling. We have heard many representatives talk about Afghanistan and the ruthless aggression and wicked brutality of the Russians. Mr. Pavitt said that the world was like a chessboard. Afghanistan can be seen as the latest episode in a progression of conquests, subversions and takeovers by the Russians, who are determined to impose their system of communist dictatorship on the entire world. Nothing they have said or done gives one any reason to believe that they have abandoned their aims.

Our generation sees Afghanistan as the latest in a long line of events. We have seen the ruthless suppression of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. We have seen suppression in Cuba, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and the Yemen. This cannot be allowed to continue.

Of course, the Russians have their eyes on the oil in Iran and other places in the Middle East. The stocks of oil there are so vast that, even at the present rate of consumption, they will last another 120 to 150 years, unlike most other stocks in the world, which will last for much shorter periods.

It is essential that the West gives a firm response to the events in Afghanistan, otherwise the Russians may miscalculate by committing aggression in another country where the West must respond militarily, and thus the Russians may trigger off a third world war.

I hope that everyone accepts the need to prevent the Russians from gaining a propaganda advantage in their own country and in the third world from the Olympic Games, to which Mr. Grieve referred. We all understand how the athletes must feel. Many are very young and have striven for years to build up their athletic prowess. But, surely, the disappointment of a few thousand athletes must be absolutely trivial compared with the prevention of the third world war.

However, it goes beyond that. This matter must be seen as a moral question. No one in this Assembly would wish to eat or drink with thugs or murderers. Neither should anyone wish to play games in the country of thugs or murderers in a way which could result in favourable publicity. As the elected representatives of the European public, we must seek to give a lead in this matter.

I turn to the problems of the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli dispute, on which I spoke at length at our meeting six months ago. If the so-called West Bank, which is known by the Israelis as Samaria, fell into the hands of the Arabs, it would be like a thumb on the windpipe of the Israelis. This is only a narrow strip of land – there is about fifteen or twenty miles between the West Bank and the sea. It would be a strategic position for people who were hostile to Israel, and this would render the Israelis highly vulnerable.

We must consider the question of a European initiative in terms of political realism. Is such an initiative realistic? I do not believe that it is. The position of the Americans is far more realistic. It cannot be possible, realistically, to ask the Israelis to give up strategic positions from which they are highly vulnerable to attack by people who have sworn to destroy them. That cannot possibly be a realistic suggestion. Therefore, there can be no question of expecting the Israelis to hand over these territories until the persons to whom it is suggested that they hand over have absolutely renounced their foresworn threat to destroy them.

*Mr. Jessel (continued)*

I am sorry to be repetitive, but this point must be emphasised. This Assembly does not seem to understand that aspect. I agree with Mr. Grieve on many matters, but I do not agree with him when he suggests that the Israelis should be tolerant. How can anyone be tolerant towards people who are planning to destroy one? That makes an utter mockery of the word "tolerance". The threat to destroy them is not a new matter for the Israelis. Only thirty or forty years ago vast numbers of their relatives were destroyed in concentration camps. Therefore, they must look at this matter in the light of that experience.

I conclude with a brief reference to the Gaza Strip on the other side of Israel. The position here is somewhat different from that of the West Bank. I went on a trip to the Middle East as a member of the Council of Europe's Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography. As well as meeting Arabs and Israelis, we met some Arab leaders in the Gaza Strip. On that side there was a great deal of relief felt by some of them about the agreement between Egypt and Israel at Camp David. On the border between Egypt and Israel, war had continued on and off for nearly thirty years and the Arabs there were extremely thankful for Camp David. I hope that no one will belittle Camp David or attempt to play it down. I hope that this Assembly and the governments of all the countries of which we are the elected representatives will do their best to build on Camp David. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Jessel.

The next speaker is Mr. McGuire.

Mr. McGUIRE (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to begin by paying tribute, as I did on the last occasion, to the Rapporteur for his industry. In his introduction, the Rapporteur mentioned the wider scope of this report, Document 844, as compared with Document 820, with the same title, which he presented last December. This report deals with some of the problems facing India, Pakistan and Turkey and also with the situation in Afghanistan, Iran and the Arab-Israeli conflict. It succinctly illustrates the interrelationship of all these problems with our own security.

The Chinese have a saying "May your children live in exciting times". I am not sure whether that saying is meant as a curse or as a blessing. What may be exciting for the viewer or commentator may be absolute hell and misery for those who are involved, particularly, in this case, the poor people of Afghanistan. We are living in exciting times, but they are dangerous times. I believe that the response of the West must be certain and sure.

I wish briefly to touch on three points: Iran and the American hostages, Afghanistan and the Middle East. In regard to Iran, we must utterly condemn what has happened. My colleague Mr. Grieve has already said that the protection of diplomats was an ancient and civilised way of dealing with foreign nationals in one's own country, but that ancient custom has now been breached in every possible way. I regret even more the attitude of those who condemn what has happened as a violation of international relations but who temper their views with references to what the Shah did or did not do. I believe that democratic institutions such as this Assembly should say unequivocally that the hostages should be released. We say in the first place that they should not have been seized. It is a wicked act that those hostages should continue to be held against their will and to be threatened with trial. I should not like to contemplate the position of anybody who was put on trial in such circumstances. I have no truck with anybody who seeks to temper any criticism of the taking of those hostages.

In regard to Afghanistan, I as a socialist condemn the invasion of that nation. I am greatly annoyed that many of my socialist colleagues in many parts of the world temper their criticisms of this violation, this wicked act of aggression, by the Russians. I believe that it is the duty of all members of free democratic societies such as those to which we have the privilege to belong unequivocally to condemn such acts. We should say to the Russians that they should not have gone in in the first place and that the quicker they get out the better it will be for the world.

I turn to a delicate matter which has been recently discussed in the British House of Commons, namely, the question of how best can the West, short of going to war, show its abhorrence, detestation and condemnation of this act of aggression. I believe that the best means open to us to make our view felt in the strongest possible way is to boycott the Olympics. Sometimes we in the West tend to misunderstand the psychological make-up of the Russians. I think that we wrongly assume that they are totally western in their outlook. I hope that I offend nobody's sensitivities if I say that the Russian make-up is part oriental. Certainly loss of face is a powerful weapon and something about which the Russians feel deeply.

If we could have inflicted on the Russians the humiliation of a boycott – and I regret that the boycott has not been complete – this would have been the most powerful weapon in our hands to show the Russians how we view their invasion of Afghanistan. That would be the humiliation in the forthcoming Olympics,

*Mr. McGuire (continued)*

which would be turned into an Olympics of only the Russians and their satellite states.

However, the boycott has not happened. I can sympathise with young men and women who have spent many years training to such a pitch that they are able to represent their countries at the highest possible peak of fitness. I know that to athletes the thought of winning is absolute heaven. Although I sympathise deeply with those athletes, I believe that because we live in a free society, and because we cannot impose our will on athletes, the athletes themselves should have recognised the precious jewel of freedom. The athletes should have taken the view: "We agree that the invasion was a wicked act by the Russians, and we shall make the sacrifice of not attending the games". However, that was not to be because we live in a free society. We cannot impose our views.

I congratulate my German colleagues. I very much regret that the Germans now stand alone among the larger nations of Western Europe as the only people who have held out for a boycott. I regret that other nations have not followed. I am an unashamed boycotter. Since I voted for a boycott, nothing has happened to change my views. If I were given another chance, I would vote in the same way as I did a few months ago.

I was surprised at the phrase "intervene in" used by Sir Frederic Bennett in his report. No doubt he will accept Amendment 2, because I believe that we should not mince words. What happened in Afghanistan certainly was not an intervention but an invasion. I pay tribute to Sir Frederic's industry and the many jewels in his report, and I know that he will agree to accept the amendment that will put the situation right.

I now turn to the Middle East. I understand the commitment of some of my colleagues on the question of the security and prosperity of Israel. I wish to tell those colleagues who point to serious defects in the report that I should like to see a peaceful and prosperous Israel. But I believe that Israel will not be prosperous and will not live in peace with its neighbours, if it continues in its view that there is no such entity as a Palestinian people because they do not exist as a state. There are many states which have come into existence in the last fifty years about which the same argument could have been used.

I believe that a great injustice was done in Palestine to an innocent group of people, and I make no bones about saying this. Those who attempt to pour scorn on the PLO and to

belittle or diminish its contribution – and we remember the discussion on Document 820 with references to the PLO as murderers, thugs and all the rest of it and suggesting that we should have no truck with that body – must remember that history is littered with statements to the effect that one should never negotiate with this, that or the other body because of its background.

I urge the state of Israel and its leaders to recognise a burning injustice which has eaten into their souls and the souls of the people of Palestine. Surely a nation such as the Jews should recognise this. The sooner both sides can get round the table, the better. We shall not have the opportunity of hearing a PLO representative address this Assembly because this Assembly is not constituted to receive such people. But the sooner we can hear a representative of the PLO in our sister Assembly, the Council of Europe, the quicker we can challenge him about the intentions of that body and the happier I shall be. I would vote for that opportunity. I believe that that day will soon be with us.

I believe that the people of Palestine are now getting that message across. Their voice is now being heard and their claims are being heeded. The only two groups of people who can give voice to those feelings and put into effect what we all wish to see happen in that area, leading to a just and lasting peace, are the leaders of the PLO and the leaders of the state of Israel.

The report is a very valuable one. It will have served a most useful purpose if it spurs the free countries of the world – and above all Western European countries – to learn the lesson that if we do not hang together, most certainly we shall hang separately. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

I call Mr. De Poi.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, some weeks ago in the Council of Europe, we discussed and approved Mr. Baumel's report on the Middle East crisis; today we are discussing the Bennett report, which we regard as another serious and sincere attempt to point the way towards a solution. It unquestionably reflects a view generally held in the western world and in Europe in particular, regarding the non-aggressivity of its own rôle and its sincere efforts for the restoration of a peaceful balance.

Of course, if we set these facts and declarations, and the resolutions based on them, against the attitude which looks somehow for alibis and excuses in the communist world, or

*Mr. De Poi (continued)*

finds other alibis and excuses among western communists for what has happened, we realise that we want different kinds of peace. But, beyond these sincere anxieties and the effort now being made, some situations have not changed and the fear is that, unfortunately, the wound will turn gangrenous. Despite the protests of the western world, despite the boycotting of the Olympic Games by several delegations, Afghanistan remains occupied; despite the efforts to make something more of the Camp David agreements, the situation in the Palestinian world – taken to mean the area in general – remains unresolved; indeed the position is at present getting worse with a number of particularly dramatic events.

In Iran, the position of the hostages has certainly not improved and they are in fact scattered and further from us. I believe, therefore, that, over and above declarations of good will, which certainly indicate a non-aggressive attitude entirely different from that of other western countries, this situation must, in any case be handled with great care. The world of today is as it is; a powder keg which could be exploded by any sudden movement. Of course, the emotional reaction in the United States and Israel – both with their eyes on a general election – does not permit the calm approach which we should adopt in fact, rather than in words, to particular situations of extreme gravity.

In this highly nervous atmosphere, the game is easier for the Soviet Union which felt itself to be excluded from the Camp David agreements and is therefore trying to work its way back into the Middle East by creating instability in various ways. We must never forget this fact, Ladies and Gentlemen; the Soviet Union had the feeling of being kept out of this first peaceful settlement and is deeply concerned over its own energy supplies in five years' time. These facts will undoubtedly lead the Soviet Union to foment growing instability in the Middle East if solutions cannot be found involving all the countries seeking to establish a fresh balance and greater calm in that area in the restoration of peace.

Our view, therefore, is that the part which Europe can play is underestimated, perhaps at home, and certainly abroad, precisely because of the excessive anxieties expressed by the United States and Israel. But worry can sometimes be a poor counsellor. Over the last few years impeccably democratic political forces and European countries which are unquestionably peace-loving have offered frequent proof of their determination not merely to consolidate the western world but also to restore the strategic balance in order to be

better equipped to meet the Soviet threat more adequately. For this precise reason, I believe that more trust should be shown by countries like Israel and the United States, which are certainly not threatened but are offered help by the terms of a fresh proposal which offers a real possibility of mediation between the western countries.

But this is certainly not an attempt to impose ourselves or a declaration by Europe as a third force. This may be a temptation to us today and it may be that the mistake made by a number of countries is precisely that of having suggested moves without the prior agreement of the United States and Israel. I feel that this is a lesson which we must take to heart. We can make no proposals or start any move for peace which has not been previously approved by the United States and Israel, in order to reassure them completely concerning Europe's intentions. No individual action can be taken which in any way may give the impression of lack of consultation between the European partners as happened with the recent French move. But it is clear that we cannot, at the same time, pursue a co-ordinated peace strategy without recognising that different attitudes are required in each part of the world. And I believe that this applies to the situation in Palestine, to Iran and to Afghanistan.

We must of course be seriously concerned to strengthen NATO but our main concern must be to promote a specific western belief in democracy, development and peace. For a political movement like the Christian Democratic movement which supports NATO and for countries like Italy which are members of NATO, the concern for NATO itself is greater. In my view, this is a genuine objective, which takes precedence over the strengthening of NATO, which is useful and indispensable but not the primary objective; and I believe that we must try to understand the significance of the upsurge of Islam throughout the Middle East; we must understand its underlying reasons instead of leaving it to the mercy of the integrating tendencies and equivocal help of the Soviet Union, when some parts of the same Islamic movement have been crushed by the same Soviet Union.

To sum up, we must conclude regional agreements because the more the western countries succeed in co-ordinating their rôle the more the peace settlement will be in line with the historical, cultural and economic characteristics of the development of certain countries.

Thus, there are reasons why we should not confine ourselves to propaganda as a demonstration of our goodwill; goodwill is not enough to get the Russians out of the countries which

*Mr. De Poi (continued)*

they have invaded; goodwill is not enough to restore the hostages to their families or to reassure Israel and give a homeland to the Palestinians. Actions, hard facts and readiness and trust among the western allies are needed in order to achieve this objective which to us takes precedence over all else.

If we are to act and succeed we must have credibility with all the parties involved whatever the rôle they may have to play in a Palestine peace conference. We must negotiate seriously and sincerely for the release of the hostages in Iran; we must work out a stable, guaranteed settlement for Pakistan and Afghanistan, including a suggested cease-fire line in Afghanistan aimed at forcing the Soviet Union to respond to a serious proposal on which it will have to show its hand.

*(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. De Poi, you have exceeded your time. Perhaps you could bring your remarks to an end.

Mr. DE POI *(Italy)* (Translation). – Just a few more words, Mr. President. I believe that, quite apart from reasons which may salve our consciences, this is the line to be followed in order to arrive at a balance which is not unfavourable to the West. Progress requires both the unity of the European countries and the solidarity of the whole western world. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. De Poi. Because we are running so late, I must ask speakers to respect the times that they themselves gave for their speeches. If members go substantially beyond the time limits, it will make the position even more serious than it is.

Mr. Grant is the next speaker.

Mr. GRANT *(United Kingdom)*. – Thank you very much, Mr. President. In view of the time, I shall touch only briefly on two points in this excellent report, first to commend and support recommendation 5 concerning Turkey. It was only two years ago from that very rostrum when you were our Minister of Defence that I moved a report which called attention in particular to the important rôle that Turkey played in our defence in the Mediterranean area in NATO. Since then, although the United States arms embargo has been lifted, the economic position of Turkey has become infinitely worse. Therefore, we must welcome and sustain every effort to help them. I commend the European Communities and West Germany in particular for the initiative they have taken, because a glance at the map alone

will show the vital position that Turkey forms in the Western Alliance. If Turkey should succumb for economic or for any other reasons, not only Greece and Western Europe but the whole world would suffer.

The second point to which I wish to refer is recommendation 3 on the question of Afghanistan, which has occupied so much of our debate. We have spent many hours in this Assembly, both today and earlier, discussing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. What becomes increasingly clear is that talking is not enough. We have to do something about it. Of course, certain trade sanctions, the reduction in the supply of grain and the withdrawal of technical knowhow are all very well, but in an iron, political dictatorial state their impact on the people of Russia is long-term only.

The only immediately effective means of bringing home to the Russian people the brutal enormity of their government's conduct is to boycott the Olympic Games, the Olympic Games which were so foolishly and unwisely scheduled to take place in Moscow. That was the first mistake. It simply will not do to say, as one often hears, that politics must be kept out of sport. The Olympics have been infested with politics for most of this century, most notably in 1936 in Nazi Germany. We have only to remember what was the fate, only four years after the Berlin games, of some of the young athletes who participated there.

In case we have any doubt today whether politics are in sport, I quote merely from the Soviet "Handbook for Party Activists" of November last year, which states that the decision to give the right to hold the Olympic Games in Moscow was:

"convincing testimony to the general recognition of the historical importance and the correctness of the foreign political course of our country [and] of the enormous services of the Soviet Union in the struggle for peace."

If that is not bringing politics into sport, I do not know what is.

I feel deep regret, and, indeed, shame, that the British Olympics Committee has not followed the same honourable course as that of our colleagues in West Germany and other countries. But it is not too late. In a free society, everybody has the right peacefully and lawfully to persuade his fellow men and women to take a more sensible and wiser course. In my own country, nobody has taken a more honourable and vigorous part in this campaign than has our Rapporteur himself, Sir Frederic Bennett, who has very much led the field in this connection.



*Mr. Grant (continued)*

I appreciate, as we all appreciate – Mr. Jessel said this, and Mr. McGuire said it in an admirable speech – the way in which young athletes concentrate vigorously on their physical tasks. So they did in Berlin in 1936. But the very fact that they concentrate exclusively upon their athletic tasks means that they have not acquired the experience to enable them to see the bigger picture in the world. If one is spending all one's time running round the track and thinking about one's time, one cannot see – one does not have the time to understand and see – the bigger and broader picture.

Therefore, I hope that my country and every other Western European country – indeed, every free country – will keep on advocating the case for non-participation in what will be a mockery of every ideal that the Olympics have ever stood for. I hope that governments of all countries will keep all young athletes directly informed of the horrors that are occurring in Afghanistan. I hope that they will send them pictures of the ghastly injuries suffered by a young and beautiful woman, seen this week in, I believe, *Le Figaro*, as well as the murder of schoolgirls, the genocide and the hideous savagery against men, women and children.

I hope that governments will also let athletes know of the misery of the million people imprisoned behind the iron curtain in the country that the games are intended directly to boost. I hope that those splendid young athletes will think again and think deeply, and that they will spurn the chance to win medals which at the end of the day will be made only of putty. I hope that in the interests of the free world of which they are part and which gives them the right to choose, they will put honour before glory and stay away. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Grant.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we have all appreciated and, indeed, expressed our appreciation of the quality of Sir Frederic Bennett's report, which is particularly rich in ideas for all of us. This, moreover, is what has led me – in place of a colleague who was unable to be here – to table some amendments – a little late, I admit, and I must apologise – in the hope that the Assembly might after all be able to adopt some guidelines on fundamentals. As to the general line taken by Sir Frederic, we feel that it constitutes an entirely positive contribution to Europe's international action.

The report has two fundamental points in its favour: on the one hand, the attempt to achieve a balanced definition of the objectives on which

Europe's international action might be aimed in a region absolutely vital for its security and, on the other, the attempt at a definition based on an overall analysis of the problems of the Middle East that takes due account of Europe's own interests in the framework of western solidarity. A sometimes complicated process which, nevertheless, would enable us to make of the present political co-operation between the nine member states of the European Community something more than a series of isolated interventions in international organisations or resolutions adopted under the pressure of events without any real search for coherence or continuity.

Of the aims which Europe should be pursuing in the Middle East, Sir Frederic rightly puts the accent on stability and equilibrium – in a word, on peace.

Europe has a specific political interest, strengthened by its traditional links with the Mediterranean countries, in a solution to the Middle East conflicts, particularly the Israeli-Arab conflict. Any resolution of this conflict, as Sir Frederic objectively notes, will have to be political, comprehensive and based on mutual recognition of the elementary fact – despite the occasional difficulties of finding the right expression to cover it – of the existence of two peoples, Israeli and Palestinian.

These principles can of course be implemented in different ways which cannot be precisely determined at this stage because of the present distance between the positions of the parties concerned. Sir Frederic is right not to put forward any ready-made recipe for peace. However, he does propose certain procedures for a settlement which, I would stress, seem rather impractical from the outset. How in fact can one guarantee the success of comprehensive negotiations going beyond the limits of the Camp David agreement by convening a conference between Israel, all adjacent Arab countries, a delegation representative of the Palestinians, the United States and the countries of Western Europe? I put it to you, Ladies and Gentlemen: is it realistic to exclude the USSR? The concept of adjacent Arab countries is either too restrictive or too vague.

How, moreover, can one speak of granting a territory of their own to the Palestinians without any mention of the complex problems raised by the need to implement the two-fold process of withdrawal from the occupied territories and of working out precise, practical and binding guarantees for Israel's security?

Nevertheless, the basic tenor of Sir Frederic's proposals corresponds to the interests of Europe. They are particularly interesting at a time when there is in the offing an initiative by

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

the Nine to get peace talks going again in a wider framework than the inadequate one of the Camp David agreement.

At a time when there is a new increase of tension on the West Bank, and Israeli interventions in South Lebanon are adding still more to mutual distrust, it seems that only Europe can offer something new, even if, because of its limited influence, its proposals do no more than reflect the need for compromise, guarantees and equilibrium without which no settlement is possible.

As for paragraph 5 of the recommendation, concerning Turkey, with which I am in entire agreement, I would all the same have liked the explanatory memorandum to refer to the fact that although Turkey must be assisted and its rôle is indispensable to the defence of Western Europe, it should make some contribution of its own to the solution of its problems with Greece. We therefore hope in this respect that the future will to some extent give the lie to the past.

It would be serious and harmful to the interests of the Atlantic Alliance if the United States were to stand in the way of a European initiative along these lines, and it would be dangerous to peace if the United States were to reserve for itself a monopoly on conciliation.

While the Middle East conflict unfortunately constitutes an old source of serious difficulties for European security, the Afghanistan conflict is marked by two disturbing new features. For the first time since the second world war the Soviet Union is conducting a massive military intervention in a country which does not belong to its own alliance system. One cannot therefore but agree with the joint European view that the Soviet intervention has struck a blow at the basic relations and balances that guarantee peace in the world. It is also the first time that the Soviet Union has made its full military power felt in the major strategic zone of the Afghan crossroads, a zone of contact between China, the Indian sub-continent and the Middle East.

I am making no judgments; I am simply stating facts. As far as the rest is concerned, we share the same value judgments about the blow that has been struck in that country against the rights of peoples and human dignity.

The risks of a deterioration in the security of Europe's supply lines through the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf are therefore considerable. They are compounded by the recent new upsurge of activity by naval forces in this region and most particularly – it has perhaps not been stressed sufficiently – by the Soviet submarine fleet.

This has also put an end to any hopes raised by the Vienna talks on the disengagement of the great powers from the Indian Ocean.

Sir Frederic simply and correctly describes the attitude which one should expect from Europe to the events in Afghanistan as a collective refusal to accept a *fait accompli*.

It would seem that the positions taken by the Nine meet this requirement in form and appearance, but not always in reality.

Nevertheless, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has to be seen in its geographical context...

The PRESIDENT. – You have already reached the limit of the time for which you asked, Mr. Valleix. Will you please bring your remarks to a close?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Dialogue is necessary not only because it is vital to preserve the achievements of the recent years of détente. Dialogue may also make it easier for the Soviet Union to pull back in the face of insurmountable military, diplomatic and political difficulties.

The recommendations proposed to the Assembly are thus positive overall. They correspond to the obvious reality. However, defence in the way we are talking about it requires not only alliance with the United States, but also separate intervention by Europe itself.

I shall conclude, Mr. President. May these proposals provide encouragement and a solid basis for the long-awaited affirmation – too long awaited, in fact – of true solidarity between our countries for the benefit of peace in the world and – let us never forget it – the benefit of human dignity and freedom. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

Two observers from Greece have asked to participate in the debate. We are glad that each has agreed to limit his contribution to only three minutes.

I call Mr. Vyzas, a Deputy from the Greek Parliament.

Mr. VYZAS (*Observer from Greece*). – I shall be as brief as I can, Mr. President. I shall not exceed three minutes, because I know of your difficulties in curtailing the debate.

I have read with great attention the extensive report by Sir Frederic Bennett dealing especially with the problems in the Near and Middle East, closely linked with the security of Western Europe. I wish to concentrate on paragraph 111 of the report in an effort to clarify the point about the Greek Government's attitude to the financial assistance to Turkey.

*Mr. Vyzas (continued)*

I should like to point out that Greece has taken no exception to financial aid to Turkey, given the economic situation in that country and the uncertainty caused by recent developments in the area. However, it is in the interests of the south-eastern flank of the Alliance as a whole that the assistance to Turkey should not affect the existing military balance between that country and Greece. WEU itself should seek a balanced defence aid policy towards the two countries.

At this stage of the debate I should like to recall the words uttered by Mr. Grant, of the United Kingdom, as Rapporteur on Mediterranean security, who said two years ago in this Assembly:

“I can understand the anxieties of Greece, and we would expect Turkey to give assurances that the lifting of the United States arms embargo would be solely to enable the Turks to fulfil their commitments in NATO and for no other purpose.”

Following that observation, I wish to urge all members of the Assembly to approve the addition of a number of words to the end of paragraph 5 : “without affecting the existing military balance between that country and Greece.”

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Vyzas.

I shall now ask your colleague, Mr. Koutsogeorgas, who is also a Deputy from Greece, to speak. He also has agreed to be brief, for which we are grateful.

Mr. KOUTSOGEORGAS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I begin by saying that I am here as an observer and as a member of the largest opposition party in Greece.

I would like to draw Sir Frederic’s attention to the following : my impression is that his proposal to give vast economic, financial and military aid to Turkey conflicts with the following facts.

The Turkish Government has disregarded fourteen resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations on the immediate withdrawal of the armed forces occupying the island of Cyprus and the return of 200,000 refugees to their homes. Instead, Turkey is pursuing a policy of provocation both in Cyprus and in the question of the Aegean Sea which for Greece does not arise. Furthermore, we have recently learned of unacceptable incidents which further justify the Greek view of Turkey’s chauvinistic intention towards a country that is a member of the Atlantic Alliance and of the United Nations.

How is it possible to justify, within the framework of NATO and Western Europe, the fact that Turkey has stationed tens of thousands of its soldiers in Cyprus while claiming that its own eastern frontiers are at risk? What is the attitude of the western countries to this anomaly which, moreover, is in flagrant contradiction of the United Nations Charter, international agreements and the Helsinki resolutions which lay down a code of relations between European countries?

This is wholly in defiance of the principle of non-intervention and non-violation of frontiers. That is why we do not accept the loss of Cyprus or any reduction of Greek national territory. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Koutsogeorgas.

That concludes the debate on Sir Frederic Bennett’s report. I now ask him as Rapporteur to reply. I hope that we can then proceed to the necessary votes.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I think that the Chairman will follow me. I shall be as brief as possible in order to assist you with your heavy load, Mr. President. However, a number of points have been raised about areas all over the world.

I hope that our two Greek friends will not think me discourteous if I do not take up their points at this stage. The terms of reference of the task that I was given expressly precluded investigation of the dispute between the Greek Government and Turkey. To begin a new initiative on this matter would be an unfair imposition on myself and the Committee. That does not mean that I have any lack of sympathy for the matters that were raised.

I wish to group a number of the matters which have been dealt with in the debate. I hope that it will not be thought discourteous if I do not refer to all the contributors to the discussion.

To turn first to the subject of the Olympic Games, my colleague Mr. Grant knows my position on that subject. In common with others, I confess to a feeling of personal shame that the Germans, with a social democratic government, took the step they did and that my own country, despite the initiative by our Prime Minister and by people such as Mr. McGuire and others, did not follow their example.

Let me quote one aspect to show how deeply people feel on this topic. Out of the hundreds and thousands of letters I have received, including donations towards the holding of compensatory games to help young athletes who have been disappointed, there was one

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

from a pensioner aged 89, who sent me £1 towards helping to provide such alternative pursuits. Her son had gone to Berlin and returned flushed with glory, but he was dead four years later before the next Olympic Games were held.

A French communist representative suggested that there was a parallel to be drawn between South Korea and the Americans there and the invasion of Afghanistan. Incidentally, I accept the reproach that I should have used the words "invasion of" rather than "intervene in", as one of my colleagues pointed out. However, I claim credit for the fact that every word in the text of my report is a jewel, but the recommendations are the collective result of the Committee as a whole. I willingly accept in advance that "invasion" would have been a better word to use. To have the effrontery to talk of the Afghans having invited the Soviet Union to come to their aid when the Russians' first act was to murder their own host, the Prime Minister, is a strange sort of invitation. It will certainly make me cautious about issuing invitations in the future if I think that my guests, as their first action on arrival, will try to cut my throat. I hope that we hear no more nonsense of that sort.

I turn to the vexed question – the always vexed question – of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli dispute. I am surprised at the suggestion from some colleagues that my ideas do not meet the needs of the time from one side or the other or are not a perfect solution or are unlikely to succeed. If I, as Rapporteur, with my Chairman and Committee, were able to provide a specific, definitive solution to this Assembly, we should by now have been able to retire comfortably with a Nobel prize.

It is a fact that statesmen of the world with far greater qualities than mine have failed in this task, but the fact that so far our efforts have failed does not excuse us from doing our best. If in the long run our efforts do not succeed, it will not be the first time that parliamentary initiatives have failed. It may also not be the first time that parliamentary initiatives have succeeded. It is in that spirit that I have drafted the report.

I wish to take up three or four points, and then I shall close my remarks. We must be careful to differentiate when we talk about resort to terrorism and violence as applied to the acts of people within an occupied country as opposed to the carrying out of terrorist attacks abroad as part of political initiatives. Tribute was paid to the fact that other countries have resisted foreign occupation after they have been illegally occupied by a foreign

power. It has been said that we always refer to such people as resisters, freedom fighters and so on, whether in Africa, Europe or elsewhere.

I am always careful in coming to moral judgments when people find themselves unable to obtain their own freedom and rights within their own country. At what point do they stop becoming freedom fighters, and when do they become terrorists and resorters to violence? I shall not seek to sit in judgment on that thorny question. However, I wish only to say that the sooner that we reach a compromise settlement, the less incentive there will be for either the Israelis or the Arabs to resort to violence. That should be our aim – namely, to try to bring to an end the process that causes people to take to violence because they have no other opportunity of reaching their legitimate ends.

Let me say this to those who have talked about the question of negotiations about the West Bank. I am still waiting, and I have not yet received an assurance from any authoritative Israeli source that their sole motivation in wanting to remain on the West Bank and on the Gaza Strip is that of security. If that is so and I receive that assurance, if it is said by the Prime Minister of Israel that his only concern is security, he will find no better friend than myself. But that is not what he has said. It is said that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip belong traditionally to the state of Israel. It is in terms of acquisition of that territory and not just in terms of security that it is being done. But if Dr. Miller or anybody else can show me a letter which says "Provided that our security is guaranteed, we have no territorial acquisitions in mind on the West Bank", that would have a dramatic effect on my assessment of the situation. So far, that has not been forthcoming.

I want now to deal with the status of the Palestinians. It is not true to say that they are merely refugees because they do not have a state. Mr. McGuire referred to the fact that there are many states today which were not states some little time ago. But that is not even constitutionally true, because it was not Resolution 242 but a resolution passed in November 1947 which set up the state of Israel, which was the act of conception of the state of Israel, and on which it relies for its very existence. That resolution also set up an Arab state within Palestine within certain boundaries. If Israel claims legitimacy from 1947, so have the Arabs in regard to the rest of what was formerly Palestine the same right to rely on the same resolution on which they themselves rely for their own integrity. Therefore, it is not fair to refer to those people as refugees.

I turn to the question of the supplementation of Resolution 242. It is a fact that that reso-

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

lution as it stands does not accept, other than in terms of the word "refugees", the right of the Palestinians, as with every other people of the world – and the British Empire learnt enough on this subject – to self-determination but talks in terms of regional, administrative or local autonomy. I know that we have had a declaration from a British Minister on this matter, and we also know that the French feel the same on this topic. However, I am not aware of the same level of declaration by other countries, although the German Chancellor has spoken in terms of self-determination for the people of the West Bank. Therefore, in three assemblies, as it were, there is an acceptance of self-determination. This morning my British colleague, Mr. Hurd, said that in a fortnight's time one of the courses which the British Government will be considering is whether we should supplement Resolution 242 and, if so, at what time.

If these Ministers, who in the end derive their authority from this Assembly, consider supplementation of Resolution 242 as one of the ways forward, with a conference to be held afterwards, I see nothing extraordinary in the fact that we as parliamentarians should ask Ministers to include this item. They should surely take some responsibility in this area.

I have great sympathy with the United States, and I am a keen believer in the Alliance. I have every respect for President Carter's difficulties. But Europe has a special stake, and I cannot accept the answer that when our basic interests are at stake Europe has no right to try to look after its interests, particularly when those interests are based on morality and rectitude, as well as on enlightened self-interest in respect of all parties concerned.

I conclude my remarks on that note. I am afraid that there are many comments with which I have omitted to deal, but if I were to write the text of the report again I would not change one word of it.

After hours and hours of discussion on several days, the resolutions and recommendations represent a consensus of a kind that is rarely found within a committee in this building. It was not a matter of dividing by nine votes to seven. On a controversial subject, after a consensus was reached, there was a vote of seventeen to nil, with four abstentions.

I ask my colleagues not to seek to upset a balance which represents a compromise between a wide range of opinion within the Committee, in which members held strong views. I should hate to think that this

Assembly, which is always struggling for recognition by the governments of Europe, might find itself unable to express itself this evening on a matter which will be discussed in any event by Ministers within two weeks. As parliamentarians, at least let us do our job and let our Ministers know what we think. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Sir Frederic.

#### **4. Welcome of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium**

The PRESIDENT. – I think that all members would want me to welcome the new Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Mr. Charles Nothomb, who is participating in or at least listening to our debates. It is particularly noteworthy that he should have paid us this courtesy within his first two weeks in office. He is an old member of the Assembly, having been here from 1969 to 1974. He was very active in the Defence and Science Committees of the Assembly. Those who were present in Brussels last autumn at the symposium may remember that he was then President or Speaker of the House of Representatives and that, as well as participating in the symposium, he was generous enough to offer us a splendid reception, which we very greatly enjoyed.

I hope very much that other Ministers from time to time may exercise their rights, as Mr. Nothomb has done, and come to listen to our debates. The Minister has not exercised the right that he has under the charter to address us. If, in paying us this great courtesy of coming to the Assembly, he would care to give a *coup de chapeau*, we shall be very glad to hear from him.

Mr. NOTHOMB (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, a happy combination of circumstances has brought me to Paris today, since this is also the date of a meeting of OECD Ministers, a lunch with the Prime Minister of the French Republic and a session of the Assembly of Western European Union, which gives me the chance to be with you.

Although I have been Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium for such a short time, about a fortnight, I wanted to take this first opportunity to occupy, however briefly, the seat that is rightfully mine in the WEU Council in order to demonstrate how great an interest the Belgian Government takes in your work.

If I only became Minister recently, your President was elected even more recently. I therefore have the privilege of being one of the first to congratulate Mr. Mulley on his election which not only crowns a brilliant parliamentary

*Mr. Nothomb (continued)*

and ministerial career but above all gives you a leader who is a statesman experienced in those fields which, by the terms of the treaties, are your exclusive European parliamentary prerogative: defence and foreign affairs.

It is indeed a difficult task for Mr. Mulley to succeed a man of the stamp and quality of President von Hassel, who is an even closer and more long-standing friend. I am happy to join you in paying tribute to him.

My pleasure in being with you has its roots in the past. As the President said, I was a member of your Assembly for six years and, as a young parliamentarian, I was happy to be a regular member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, under the chairmanship of Mr. Edwards, from whose experience I learned a great deal. In my own country I have been Rapporteur on the foreign affairs budget. Moreover, as the President also pointed out, I took part as President of the Chamber of Representatives in the symposium you held in Brussels last October, for I regard it as most important to maintain good relations between national parliaments and European assemblies, such as yours.

My time with you here today will be short, as my speech has been, for other duties call me elsewhere. But I wanted to confirm at once, by my visit, Belgium's attachment to a treaty and an organisation that have recently celebrated their twenty-fifth anniversary.

I certainly hope to return here to join you for in-depth deliberations and debates as soon as circumstances so demand and permit. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – I think, Minister, that the warmth of your reception indicates how greatly we appreciate your courtesy and consideration, in a busy schedule in Paris, in finding time to participate in our affairs. We feel that we have another friend in the Council of Ministers, a distinguished parliamentarian and an "old boy" of our Assembly. We look forward to hearing you again in your ministerial capacity.

Thank you very much, Mr. Nothomb, for what you have said and for paying this brief visit to us today.

##### **5. Impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security**

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 844 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – I now ask the outgoing Chairman of the General Affairs Committee,

Mrs. von Bothmer, to conclude the debate on Sir Frederic Bennett's report.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to take the floor again, for the last time, as Chairman of the Committee. It is obvious that the problems in the Near and Middle East are interrelated. No problem exists in isolation. This point is brought out extremely well Sir Frederic's report. For the Arabs, however, the problem of the Israelis and the Palestinians is problem No. 1 – and this is true for all the Arab countries. These problems are so closely interrelated that common sense dictates that we should deal with problem No. 1 first. We must not think that we can put it on one side for a while and that the position will then improve. It will not. This has been painfully brought home to us recently.

We must rid ourselves of the idea that anyone who speaks in favour of the Arabs or the Palestinians is automatically an enemy of the Israelis. This is an entirely spurious alternative which is more a hindrance than a help. Those who cling to the idea that anyone who breathes a word of criticism is an enemy will learn from experience how unpolitical this is.

Nor does it really matter now who is friend or foe. What does matter is the mortally dangerous situation which exists in this region. On this point the so-called friends or enemies ought to be able to agree. It ought to be possible to get away from this narrow, false alternative.

The longer this region remains unstable, the more possible it also is for Soviet influence to be brought to bear on it, and in all sorts of ways. It is not that the Russians are inciting the Palestinians, as many people are inclined to say, but rather that this is the only quarter from which the Palestinians are receiving help. Unfortunately that is the case not only there, the position is similar in other parts of the world. Those who are unable to obtain justice accept help from anyone who offers it.

The fact that the Israeli Government is doing all it can to avoid any kind of reasonable negotiation or compromise does not make things any easier. This can be seen from the negotiations about autonomy, which have made no progress at all. As the Israeli Government is behaving in this way, Europe, which is very closely concerned, must consider what it can do, how it can achieve something.

It is very embarrassing that the American President has already virtually put his veto on such action. Nevertheless Europe, for whom this is a crucial issue, must consider what it can

*Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)*

do itself without alienating the Americans. I very much hope that even in America it will be possible to appreciate that we are closer to this source of crises than they are.

There is constant talk of the need for Israel to have secure frontiers. All well and good. But it must be clear where these frontiers are to be. At least a dozen maps have been produced during the last fifty years, and some of them only very recently, showing "Greater Israel". "Greater Israel" is how the Israelis see it and wish it to be. Some of these maps include Southern Lebanon, and others the Golan Heights as well, together with, of course, the West Bank and Gaza. All of which is most confusing. But as long as this is not clear it really is unreasonable to expect the Palestinians to recognise Israel. Which Israel? Within what borders? I feel that this is the first question to be clarified.

Several colleagues have again asserted today that the Palestinians as such, the PLO, cannot be recognised because they are a gang of murderers. Today we read in the papers that the mayors of Nablus and Ramallah have been seriously injured as a result of Israeli attacks. Ladies and Gentlemen, must we carry on setting one thing against the other? What we have here is a state of smouldering war. Dreadful things are happening there. But no one should get on his high horse and say that it is only the Palestinians.

We have been told here that still more time should be allowed for Camp David. I should like to know what has been achieved up to now in the negotiations about autonomy. I do not think anyone here can enlighten me. There is no point in allowing yet more time to pass and complying with our colleagues' request to wait until the climate improves. The climate is appalling, as we can see from the attempts to assassinate the mayors. But how can the climate improve if nobody does anything? There is not the slightest chance of that.

I have something further to say, which I actually say with great reluctance: there is a rumour about here – I am fairly sure that it is not just a rumour but a fact – that the Israeli embassies in some of our member countries have telephoned our colleagues in an attempt to induce them to vote against Sir Frederic's report. If this should be true, it would be a colossal, an appalling interference with the rights of members. In any case, I would ask the President to check whether this is only a rumour or whether it really is a fact. If it is, it would be a matter which we could not allow to pass without comment.

Sir Frederic's report, as has been said, is very comprehensive and finely balanced and the recommendation reflects this balance. As the Rapporteur himself has said, we worked hard and earnestly in an endeavour to make it as well balanced as possible. I, too, should like to ask the Assembly to refrain if possible from rekindling the discussion by amendments and thus jeopardising acceptance of this excellent report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. von Bothmer.

The debate is closed.

We must now proceed to the amendments which have been put down to the draft recommendation proposed by Sir Frederic Bennett. The draft recommendation is in Document 844 and the first amendment is No. 3, in the name of Mr. Valleix:

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "on the most appropriate basis".

I hope that members who have put forward amendments in their supporting general observations will not find it necessary to repeat again all the arguments that we have had put to us. If they wish to say something briefly in moving their amendments, that, of course, will be in order.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, thank you for not discouraging us completely from tabling amendments, else I wonder how much democracy would be left in our Assembly.

My Amendment 3 concerns paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation and calls for clarification, or rather for more precision, in the actual text of the draft recommendation.

The question is how to leave no room for doubts about the Committee's intentions as a result of vague wording. The draft recommendation includes the words "on the most appropriate basis". What does this mean? In fact Pakistan has an advanced and developed civil nuclear technology and a potential military nuclear capacity. I do not think the Committee ever envisaged that the term "appropriate" could be taken to mean that. So I think this phrase is likely to create confusion rather than to clarify matters.

That is the reason for my amendment, which I now leave to the Rapporteur for his explanations and to the wisdom of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

Does anyone else wish to speak before I call the Rapporteur, Sir Frederic?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*).— Mr. President, I appreciate the concern of Mr. Valleix. I can only say that it never entered the minds of any of us that we were thinking in terms of “on the most appropriate basis” being to extend what might be done. It was, in fact, a phrase put in to meet the wishes of the majority of the Committee, all of whom did not want to be bound to the same extent as others in regard to reinforcing Pakistan’s capacity, because some countries are prepared to do more and some less. Some are prepared to do something in the economic field, some in the political field, some in the charitable field of refugees, and some in the military field.

This was a compromise reached in a large and well-attended Committee to meet the point of view that not every country felt as inclined as others to do certain things to help Pakistan. Mr. Valleix has achieved a purpose as he has now got it on the record that it never entered the mind of any of us that we were extending the element of military assistance. We were, in fact, curtailing it to meet the wishes of the various countries.

I hope that with that assurance, which is now on the record, Mr. Valleix will not press the amendment, because the wording was reached as a matter of compromise after a long discussion on this paragraph in the Committee as a whole. Therefore, I cannot really ask now, without reference back to the Committee, that we should go back on something which was the result of a long period of compromise.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Sir Frederic.

Mr. Valleix, are you prepared to accept the assurance of the Rapporteur, or do you wish to pursue the amendment?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, we must conclude. This is a report of fundamental importance. In these circumstances I personally will rely on the Rapporteur’s explanations and, through you, Mr. President, who need but consult our Assembly, on his wisdom, given that the Rapporteur’s words will be recorded in the Official Report. In this way we will avoid reopening the discussions held in Committee, which would lead to useless debates this evening.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

Does the Assembly agree that the amendment can be withdrawn?...

That is agreed.

*Amendment 3 is withdrawn.*

The next amendment, No. 2, is in the names of Mr. Urwin and Mr. Hardy. Mr. Hardy will move it. It reads as follows:

2. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, line 1, after “every” insert “peaceful” and in line 2 leave out “intervention in” and insert “invasion of”.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*).— I shall be extremely brief. There is no point in having a long debate on this amendment. It has been covered in many contributions. For example, Mr. McGuire spoke forcefully about the need to use appropriate words, and he dealt admirably with the question of the use of the word “invasion” rather than “intervention”.

I am happy to move the amendment, although I understand that Sir Frederic, having considered it, may have an alternative suggestion which would make it clear that we should be precluding the use of military measures. I am prepared, as I am sure Mr. Urwin would be prepared, to accept Sir Frederic’s alternative proposal. If he cares to confirm his suggestion, I hope that it will be acceptable to the Assembly as a whole.

I can move the amendment without any desire to mar the report. I do not think that Sir Frederic’s suggestion will in any way detract from the report, which could, as he said, serve a very important purpose.

The PRESIDENT. — Does anyone else wish to speak on the amendment?...

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, may I first make it quite clear that, so far as we Italians are concerned, Israeli sources have not tried to influence our attitude to the Bennett report in any way.

I consider that the amendment should be supported and therefore approved by the Assembly: the insertion of the word “peaceful” before the word “means” will reassure all of us and European and world public opinion concerning our intentions.

It is further my view that the most appropriate term for what the Soviet Union has done in Afghanistan is not “military intervention” but “invasion”. I hope therefore that the proposer will maintain the amendment for which I am prepared to vote.

The PRESIDENT. — Perhaps we should ask the Rapporteur for the Committee’s view.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — I have spoken with my colleague, Mr. Hardy, about the amendment, and I fully accept its spirit, which I think meets what we were trying to say within the Committee and improves it.

I shall not at this stage comment about the phrases “invasion of” or “intervention in”. It would not be in order, and I have



*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

already accepted that change in advance. We can make it when we come to it – “the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan”.

I have been pressed to be specific. I should prefer words that I have already discussed with Mr. Hardy, which I think will meet the desires of the Italians. I do not like vague words such as “peaceful”. “Peace” is one of the most abused words that I know of, in various interpretations.

I have suggested a form of words that Mr. Hardy has accepted and that I think Mr. Urwin would have accepted if he had been here :

“Make use of all means at the disposal of member countries without resort to military measures to demonstrate collectively their non-acceptance of the fait accompli by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan;”.

That makes it clear that we are precluding military means, and I think that it is more specific and more definite. I hope that I can rely on Mr. Hardy saying that this is better than using a vague generalisation.

Provided that the wording is changed as I have suggested and as Mr. Hardy has already intimated he accepts, perhaps we can move on. I do not need to make a separate speech about the words “Soviet invasion of Afghanistan”, because I have already accepted that change.

The PRESIDENT. – Does Mr. Hardy accept Sir Frederic’s manuscript amendment?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Yes, Mr. President, and I draw attention to the fact that Sir Frederic is accepting Mr. Cavaliere’s point that we should replace the words “intervention in” by “invasion of”. I hope that the alternative form of words that Sir Frederic has just put forward is acceptable to the Assembly as a whole.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Assembly accept the manuscript amendment?

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The manuscript amendment is agreed to.*

Does the Assembly accept the amendment as amended?

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 2, as amended, is agreed to.*

The next amendment is Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Hardy and Mr. Stoffelen. It reads as follows:

1. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “the economic assistance necessary for” and insert “economic support to assist in”.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I referred to this matter in my speech, and other speeches have been relevant to it. While we need to support Turkey and make it clear that we support Turkey, we should also be absolutely realistic. We cannot guarantee to meet all the needs that Turkey may have, and we should not present a blank cheque at this stage.

I made the point that in the context of a wider Europe great difficulties that may not now be foreseen could emerge. If we cannot guarantee to deliver, we should not so easily promise as we appear to be doing here.

At the same time, we should stress that Turkey needs to be sustained, and this sustenance is called for in the amendment. That is in no way to threaten or embarrass Turkey but is to maintain a position of realism.

I hope that Sir Frederic is prepared to accept this qualifying amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone else wish to speak to the amendment?...

Does the Rapporteur wish to give the Committee’s view?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Assembly accept the amendment?...

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

We come now to Amendment 4 tabled by Mr. Valleix :

4. Leave out paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

“8. Propose that the United Nations Security Council guarantee respect for an overall settlement ensuring *inter alia* the security of Israel in a specific, concrete and binding manner;”.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – First I would like to remind the Rapporteur that we had to discuss a translation difficulty in paragraph 7 of the recommendation, which in the French text ends with the words “*territoire propre*”, whereas the English reads “home-land”. This should be rendered in French as “*patrie propre*”. I hope the Rapporteur can endorse this translation.

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

Amendment No. 4 is very simple but important. I fear my views may not be accepted, but we are here to debate such matters and the Assembly will decide as it sees fit. Ladies and Gentlemen, may I draw your full attention to what I said in my earlier statement, pointing out that the proposal to hold a conference is not necessarily a realistic one at the present time and that it seems unlikely that an international decision would carry much weight if the USSR did not take part. It may surprise you that I in particular should speak in this way. However that may be, I believe I must do so, and may I say that I wish in any case to maintain my amendment because it seems to me that this is very likely to be the solution that will ultimately have to be adopted; so I think that a text which seems more realistic than the present wording of paragraph 8 should be filed, so to speak, in our archives.

That is why I move this amendment, with prudence and leaving the decision to the Assembly's judgment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Valleix.

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I regret to say that I cannot accept Mr. Valleix's amendment. He speaks of realism, but I find that turning to the Security Council is not any more realistic, for all it does is to give formal expression to the present status quo, or at least accept it. I can understand a French member of parliament perhaps accepting it; but for myself, I cannot possibly agree to sanction a right of veto which some members of the Security Council have and abuse.

In the present political situation, since only this recommendation – and not the report as a whole – will perhaps be known to the public, we might lead people to think that our Assembly had bowed to Mr. Carter's recent threats which allowed the Europeans not the slightest scope for action in settling the Middle Eastern problem.

In this connection, I know that the text submitted by the Rapporteur, and which has my agreement, may look imprecise to some and unrealistic to others; but if we, as politicians, had not been to some extent unrealistic we could not have achieved the social and political progress we see today. That is why I support the Rapporteur's proposal and oppose Mr. Valleix's amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Valleix raised two points. The first was that he did not like the French translation of the word "homeland" and he wished me to correct it. A number of tributes have been paid to my intellectual qualities, but my ability to translate from English to French more efficiently than the officials here is not a quality that I claim.

The PRESIDENT. – That matter is not before us at the moment. That will be attended to by the officials.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – As far as I am concerned, "homeland" means what it says, and I am given to understand by Mr. Valleix that "patrie" is the right word in French. I am perfectly happy to accept that. The French translation was put before me, but I can only go by my own language and the word "homeland" was what the Committee agreed to. I am happy to leave the correct French interpretation to the powers-that-be.

The second point was the fundamental one about paragraph 8. We propose only the preparation of a conference between certain countries. I agree that to some extent we must be realistic as we are charting a difficult course. I have not excluded the Soviet Union because of my prejudices against communism.

However, we want to get the conference going and the idea that in the present climate of world opinion Israel would sit down at a conference about its future with the Soviet Union is totally unrealistic.

Therefore, I have suggested the sort of conference that I think Israel would attend. If the United States were present Israel might come, and I believe that the adjoining Arab countries might also come if certain sympathetic European countries were present. However, I make no claims to a Nobel prize. This proposal was the result of two or three votes in Committee and this was the form of wording finally agreed to.

Therefore, I urge the Assembly to reject something which would alter altogether the balance of a Committee decision reached after a series of votes and a long discussion. It represented a consensus, and I should be acting irresponsibly if I suggested at this late stage that we should change it.

The PRESIDENT. – I think that we should now proceed to a vote on the amendment.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 4 is negatived.*

*The President (continued)*

The next amendment is Amendment 5 tabled by Mr. Valleix :

5. In paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "before that conference" and insert "prior"; after "participants" insert "in this settlement".

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I think the first part of the amendment lapses automatically since the Assembly has endorsed paragraph 8 of the recommendation. So we need only decide on the second part of the amendment, inserting, after the word "participants", the words "in this settlement".

The Rapporteur has taken note of the difference of nuance, which is not a fundamental one but to which he can no doubt agree, for which I thank him in advance.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Valleix.

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – We accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – The Rapporteur is prepared to accept the amendment as modified by Mr. Valleix. Does the Assembly accept the amendment?...

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Part 1 of Amendment 5 is not moved.*

*Part 2 of Amendment 5 is agreed to.*

We must now proceed to a vote on the amended draft recommendation as a whole.

If the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation?...

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). – My friends and I are opposed to the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – We must therefore proceed to a roll-call vote.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Cavaliere.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – May I ask whether we are to be permitted to give an explanation of vote?

The PRESIDENT. – The vote has already been taken. Explanations normally take place before voting.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I enquired at the Sittings Office and was told that this could be done after the vote, otherwise I would have spoken at the time. I appeal to you, Mr. President, so that I may make such an explanation.

The PRESIDENT. – Such a course is contrary to normal practice. Representatives make their explanations and then they vote. You have already voted, Dr. Miller. However, if you want to make a short explanation of vote, if you have been misinformed by the Sittings Office, I will accept it now. I hope that it will not be taken as a precedent. Will you make your explanation short?

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – My explanation is as follows. The report contains one or two inaccuracies. I gather from the legal advice which I have received that there is no illegality, although a good deal of unwise wisdom, in the settlements on the West Bank.

The second point relates to recommendation 7. I am not in favour of a new Security Council change in Resolution 242. I am fortified in my view by the speeches made by the Rapporteur and by the Chairman of the Committee. The United Nations partition decision in 1947 was accepted by the Jews of Palestine but not by the Arabs. They invaded Palestine; they tried to eliminate Israel; they tried it again twice later. They cannot turn the clock back because there is a new ball game. I wish to say that Mrs. von Bothmer...

The PRESIDENT. – I hope that Dr. Miller will not abuse the position and make another long speech in explanation of his vote. He has already spoken once.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I am merely answering on this point. Mrs. von Bothmer made a silly complaint about attempts made by Israeli diplomats to influence members here. That is a ridiculous kind of complaint to make. In any case, I am not in favour of the report and I have given my reason for voting against it.

The PRESIDENT. – I hope that everybody who votes against the report will not find it necessary to give an explanation. People often vote against reports.

Does Mr. Reddemann also wish to give an explanation of vote? It is a most irregular feature after the votes have been cast.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it is not unusual in this Assembly for a representative to give an explanation of vote after a vote has taken place. I would simply like to say, on behalf of Mr. Wittmann and myself, that neither of us voted for the recommendation because we are afraid that it does not take sufficient account of Israel's right to exist as a state.

May I add that I deeply regret that the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee made a speech which, while it represented her own subjective opinion, did not represent the opinion of the Committee – and certainly not the opinion of the majority of the German Delegation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Reddemann.

I now declare the result of the vote<sup>1</sup>:

Number of votes cast .....	57
Ayes .....	39
Noes .....	5
Abstentions .....	13

*The amended draft recommendation is agreed to<sup>2</sup>.*

## 6. Interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure

*(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Doc. 843)*

The PRESIDENT. – Will the Assembly agree now to take the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges? It is unlikely, unless we go on to a late hour, that we shall complete either the Vohrer or the Valleix report. I understand that Mr. Grieve's report will take only a few minutes and should not be controversial.

Is that agreed?...

That is agreed.

I call Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I am grateful for the opportunity of moving my report now. It had the unanimous support of my Committee, and the Rules of Procedure are designed to be flexible and yet to discipline the Assembly. Unfortunately, it has only just been brought to my attention that the Italian Delegation, although represented in the Committee, foresees difficulties in the implementation of the new rule which I and my

Committee had thought would meet all the necessities of the Assembly.

In those circumstances, I myself, as Rapporteur and Chairman of the Committee, wish to move the reference back of the report to see whether we can meet the difficulties of the Italian Delegation. I trust that the Assembly will agree to that course.

The PRESIDENT. – I am grateful to you, Mr. Grieve. The rules of the Assembly provide that if the Chairman or the Rapporteur asks for a report to be referred back to the Committee, it shall be so referred. As you are making the recommendation in both capacities, Mr. Grieve, you can be doubly sure that the rules require that it be referred back to the Committee. I hope that your Committee will reach a satisfactory solution to the problem.

The report is accordingly referred back to the Committee.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I am very much obliged to you, Mr. President.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. This matter has nothing to do with the last report, nor is it an explanation of vote. In my new capacity as Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, I wish to point to the fact that Mr. Vohrer's report was to be discussed first of all yesterday and was then put back until today. Mr. Vohrer's report is in no way as controversial as mine was, and the list of speakers on his report is short. Mr. Vohrer is anxious that he should move his report now because he is unable to be with us tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT. – I have every intention of asking Mr. Vohrer to present his report, and I hope that we shall be able to conclude the debate. The list at present is long and the speeches will take possibly one and a half hours. My experience of the Assembly is that it is unlikely that we shall obtain a roll-call vote, if one is demanded, at 7.30 this evening. That is why I was doubtful about concluding the debate this evening. I shall call Mr. Vohrer to present his report.

## 7. The international situation and European security

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 845)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the international situation and European security, Document 845.

I call Mr. Vohrer, Rapporteur.

1. See page 35.

2. See page 36.

Mr. VOHRER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would be pleased if this report, which the Chairman of the Committee has already presented and which did not give rise to any controversy in the Committee, could after all be debated and adopted today.

The report which now bears the title “The international situation and European security” was originally to put the emphasis on European security, détente and disarmament, but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and what has occurred since 28th December were such that the emphasis could no longer be on détente and disarmament. In view of the shift in the security situation in Europe, we changed the title in the Committee.

The report does not mince words. It describes bluntly the Soviet Union’s breach of international law – not only the breach of the United Nations Charter but even more importantly, of the Helsinki final act. Above all, the invasion struck a blow at the spirit of Helsinki. Consequently, one of the questions raised in the report is what place, if any, détente can still have in our policy today.

We consider that détente in Europe is threatened in various ways – not only in geographical terms – when Soviet troops are in Afghanistan and thus very close to one of the main arteries of economic life, namely the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, the balance of military force has also changed, for we must recognise that the rapid deployment of the SS-20 medium-range missiles alters the balance of force at least in the nuclear field. The manufacture of the Backfire bomber is a further step towards a change in the military balance. It is because of this background that the report reflects serious anxiety, that we in this Assembly must draw the necessary conclusions, and that the countries of Europe – especially those united here in the WEU Assembly – are called upon to make greater efforts in future with regard to security and defence.

The report expressly states that we should aim at achieving an increase in defence expenditure of 3 % in real terms. I realise this will raise serious difficulties in most of our countries. We know the worries this causes to our own parliament. We too have been having to go through the economic recession with a high rate of public borrowing – a public sector borrowing requirement that puts us under great pressure. We too are trying to counter the recession by means of tax concessions.

Only a very short while ago we in the Federal Republic were saddled with additional expenditure as a result of the very costly compromise reached in the EEC.

As a contribution to peace in the wider sense I would also mention development policy, where we in Germany are making great efforts to reach the target of 0.7 % we have set ourselves.

When we consider the additional items of expenditure or drops in revenue we can see that each country, particularly my own, will have considerable difficulty in raising defence expenditure by 3 % in real terms. Nevertheless, that is what we have to do, given the new situation described in my report and again this morning by the British Minister, who gave us a very penetrating analysis. I very much want to make some comments on this issue early in this year’s summer half-session.

Mr. Dejardin hinted that for him the report was a plea for aggression and muscle-flexing. There can be no question of that. Our aim must be to avoid a new arms race and achieve a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. This is spelt out clearly in the recommendation and in the report itself. All international negotiations at the various levels – SALT, MBFR, and any European initiatives – should be directed towards achieving a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. Furthermore, all contacts and opportunities for communication afforded us in discussions between East and West should be used towards this end, and we should make proposals in the various international negotiations designed to achieve balance at a low level.

The report shows that co-ordination between the United States and Europe in the forward areas has not been satisfactory. Of course, there are also difficulties of co-ordination between the European states that should not be minimised. We have only to think of the Olympics boycott – which must of course be looked at only in the light of Afghanistan – for us Germans to be not exactly happy. Our sporting associations having decided in favour of the boycott, now we find that European loyalty is not nearly so great as we thought when we took the decision. I would be very pleased if there were greater clarity in our appreciation of the problems of co-ordination between the United States and Europe, but if within Europe too there were greater – if possible maximum – unity in drawing conclusions from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

It was a very welcome step when the EEC Foreign Ministers in Rome proposed a guarantee for a neutral, non-aligned Afghanistan, a guarantee which could and ought to make it possible for Soviet troops to withdraw from the country. The first reactions from the Soviet side show that the proposed non-aligned status of Afghanistan and the offer of a European guarantee are taken more seriously

*Mr. Vohrer (continued)*

than certain critics of the Rome decision were at first prepared to believe. I can imagine that this European initiative, this proposal, might play a part in the current discussions, and in the further talks which our Chancellor is due to have at the end of the month in Moscow, and that it might perhaps form a nucleus for détente in the region.

My report also touches on the major area of the human rights convention and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. I believe that, using this pluralistic approach, we can succeed in making it clear, both in Europe and to the other power blocs in the world, that our aim is to clear these difficulties out of the way and that our reaction is not to make the wrong move towards an arms race and a cold war. Our aims are quite clear. We wish to pursue our efforts towards détente and disarmament. At the same time we are not minimising the problems raised by the facts and are trying to tailor our reactions to the facts of the situation. But our objective is, and must remain, peace in Europe and the world. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Vohrer.

The debate is now open.

I call as the first speaker Mr. Atkinson.

Clearly, the list of speakers, which is considerable, should now be closed, because, if we can, we should like to finish this debate tonight.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, both this report and the previous report, by Sir Frederic Bennett, refer to European security in their titles. Both beg the question of where the West goes from here in containing further Soviet expansion. Recommendation 2 of this report calls for the members of the Atlantic Alliance to agree on effective measures to be taken to convince the Soviet Union of their unanimous condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan. The important question that I want to discuss is what those effective measures should be. It is a question the answer to which has so far eluded us in the Western Alliance.

Let us first recognise that to date the West's reaction to the Soviet annexation of Afghanistan has been feeble, half-hearted, disunited and ineffective. In my view, the nature and the application of the so-called retaliatory measures to date must have surprised and delighted the Kremlin. Grain which it cannot buy from North America it now buys from South America. The off, on, off sales of Community butter are now on again. Last

month West Germany agreed to develop Soviet oil and gas and to assist Russian industry. So much for ceasing to aid the communist war machine.

Thus, only an incomplete attendance at the Olympic Games will provide the sole visible sign of the free world's disapproval of Soviet expansionism. None of the measures being applied or contemplated by the West to date will, I believe, divert the Soviet Union from pursuing its mission to infiltrate, to undermine and ultimately to take over independent states, leading them to the inevitable "fraternal invitation" to the Red Army to protect their régime in the classic Leninist tradition, of which Afghanistan is only the latest example.

Mr. President, in your short address to us yesterday morning you said that the West did not anticipate the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and how right you were. How blind we have been to our continued failure since 1917 to recognise the seriousness of the Soviet threat to the rest of the world, and how unsuccessful we have been in containing it. We failed to support adequately the nationalist forces of Russia in those early uncertain years of Lenin's régime in 1920. Our wartime strategy allowed the Soviet seizure of Eastern Europe unnecessarily. We handed over to the communists for reprisal in 1945 more than a million of their opponents. Our weakness prevented us from aiding – even indirectly and without attribution – the Poles in 1952, the Hungarians in 1956 and the Czechs in 1968.

The Soviet Union had been threatening Afghanistan since 1971, and it was western indifference to the fall of the Daoud régime in 1978 which encouraged the Kremlin to take over at its own convenience. Now it is at work in Iran, no doubt in Yugoslavia – indeed, anywhere where it can encourage chaos and confusion in unstable and complex political situations to exploit to its own advantage.

There is one other theory to which Sir Frederic Bennett did not refer in his report, as to why the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan. It is that the dynamic of the entire Soviet system and its organisation both at home and abroad, as bequeathed by Lenin and Stalin, is geared to expansionism. Its bureaucracy, its party machine, the KGB and its embassy staff abroad must all report progress or be replaced. It is a motivation which is ruthless, and we should never forget that communism has taken a larger toll of human life than both world wars combined.

So how do we contain it? The truth is that the Soviet Union will stop its expansionism only when it meets a match for its own resolve

*Mr. Atkinson (continued)*

and experiences a taste of its own medicine. I believe that the western Alliance must accept this reality – and apply it – if freedom is not to be further eroded. We must now make it abundantly clear to the Soviet Union that, in the light of the Afghanistan invasion, we reserve the right to provide full support, short of manpower, to all freedom fighters involved in counter-subversion in Soviet-occupied lands.

We should exploit in every way the growing internal pressures within the Soviet Union itself which could lead to its own disintegration, be they consumer, religious, nationalistic or anti-Slav. We should embark upon a propaganda offensive aimed at every radio receiver in every communist country with information sensitive to the needs of the people. We must intensify our diplomacy to convince all non-aligned nations that neutrality is no guarantee against Soviet subversion and that inevitably they must make a choice before a choice is made for them.

Mr. Vohrer's report before us today recommends, quite rightly, that the Helsinki final act must be the "subject of strict and exhaustive scrutiny at the Madrid conference". Let us not forget that Helsinki has produced far more for the Soviet Union – with its acknowledgement of its conquests in Europe – than it has in upholding the principles of human rights and contacts for which the final act is more well known, and that the Belgrade review conference in 1977 failed utterly to redress that balance.

As it appears that the Soviet Union wants a disarmament conference to be agreed to at Madrid, let us resolve now that that is negotiable only after it has shown evidence that it is implementing its own pledges made in Helsinki on human rights and fundamental freedoms. We in the free world must fully appreciate that the third world war began before the second world war ended and that the Soviet Union is winning that war. This report from Mr. Vohrer impresses upon us that the West needs now to display a new resolve upon the Soviet Union that we will not tolerate any further imposition of communism upon an unwilling people. Only by an assertion of that resolve, similar to that displayed by President Kennedy in the Cuban missiles crisis of 1962, will Soviet expansionism be contained and the communist tide reversed in favour of freedom and democracy.

Mr. President, I beg to support the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. van den Bergh? Mr. van den Bergh is not here, so I

pass to Mr. Mommersteeg. He is not here. Mr. Baumel? Mr. Ellis?

Mr. ELLIS (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I want to do three things. The first is to congratulate my colleague Mr. Vohrer on the excellence of his report. He has summed up the situation admirably. He has encapsulated the trends, and I think that his conclusions are correct. One of his conclusions brings me to my second point. It is the conclusion contained in paragraph 99 (*iii*), where he says "that the West, and particularly its European element, should pay very strong attention to the military and particularly nuclear aspects of its security".

I should have thought that that statement was so much a statement of the obvious as to be platitudinous. But I regret that in fact it is not, because there are elements in the West – certainly in my country – with a considerable feeling that we are absolutely on the wrong lines: that far from seeing to our military defences in a military way, building them up and so on, what we ought to do is have a more moral posture through disarmament.

There are people in my country who are undergoing what Mr. Vohrer in a later paragraph calls "an agonising reappraisal". I disagree with them but one cannot ignore the fact that influential elements in my country, and, I suspect, in other countries in Europe, are having second thoughts – these agonising reappraisals.

Only last Saturday, a speech was made by a prominent politician in my country who spoke about the real strength in Britain being a moral strength that would accrue if we were unilaterally to disarm. The objection to the siting of the cruise missile is a typical example of that point of view.

Unfortunately, those who express that point of view in my country rather illogically refuse at the same time to grasp the symbolism – Mr. Vohrer speaks about the symbolic approach – of unilateral disarmament. The politician who made that speech also thought that it was not a very good symbol to try to stop our athletes going to the Olympic Games. Therefore, one finds it very difficult to follow the logic of that school of thought.

One of the merits of the report is that it clearly spells out the need for the West, for Europe, to adopt a much more hard-headed approach to the question of détente and relations between the West and the Soviet Union.

That brings me to my third and perhaps most important point – the whole question of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. NATO,

*Mr. Ellis (continued)*

which is the cornerstone of our security, has a built-in, inherent weakness in that it is not a balanced alliance. It is asymmetric. In his first speech from the presidential chair, our President warned us of the dangers of being simplistic in these very complicated matters.

I do not want to take a black-and-white view of what is a complex situation, but I think that it is possible, after due consideration, to draw up some simple, straightforward but none the less meaningful and valid propositions. One of those propositions is that the strength of any alliance is increased the more equally the members contribute. That seems to be self-evident. It follows that we in Europe should substantially increase our contributions in relation to those made by the United States. If we feel that we cannot do that, we must accept the consequences.

The first consequence is that if we want to live under the pax Americana we must, at least in principle, accept the American lead. Many representatives said in the previous debate that Europe had a legitimate interest in this or that area and should have her say. It is all very well for people to say that, but if we are content simply to have our security under the pax Americana we should accept the American lead. If we are not prepared to accept some of the more obvious advantages of that, we must make a much more substantial contribution to our defence.

It is in this area that we need to be much more hard-headed and clear in our thinking. There has been some very interesting correspondence in *The Times* of London, one of our more prestigious newspapers, by some very senior retired military people. It has been a fascinating contribution to the debate, which has concerned itself with Britain's possession of a nuclear deterrent.

I do not want to go into the arguments that were deployed in the correspondence. They were essentially geared to the question of the nuclear deterrent not of Europe or the West but of Britain. France sometimes appears almost to want to go it alone. We must be clear about what the consequences are. We have spoken a great deal today about Europe wanting to do this or that. In this morning's press, General Rodgers writes of Europe being able to make a greater maritime contribution if American warships are deployed away from the Mediterranean and into the Indian Ocean.

Europe is a nebulous quantity in this field. The immediate reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan was not that Europe spoke with one voice or even that the West spoke

with one voice. Some European states, almost as a Pavlovian reflex, went along with the American policy, while others went in other ways.

The pax Americana is demonstrably being eroded; it has been weakened over the past decade. I trust that in due course we in this Assembly will seriously consider in those circumstances how an increased European commitment to the NATO Alliance – as distinct from a French, Italian, German or British commitment – would affect all the complex issues. It is a very difficult question, one that is not being faced up to in the West. It is high time that we began to face up to it. This body is uniquely fitted to do it.

*(Mr. Talamona, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Brown has the floor.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I shall restrict myself at this late hour to discussing the report only so far as it deals with the Helsinki final act, particularly with regard to basket 3.

I am rather disappointed with the report, because it seems to me to accept a general proposition that the Soviets can be permitted to trade away freedom for a little of this and a little of that. Since when did basket 3 indicate that freedom came only in small amounts and that one gave it according to one's whim and fancy? Paragraph 33 of the report ends:

“Following the Helsinki final act, they proved far more willing to allow emigration.”

I ask: emigration for whom, and for how many? When did we trade freedom in this way?

The report has not grasped the significance of basket 3. For example, the Soviets are still abrogating international posts and telecommunications agreements. A constituent of mine tried to send a Christmas card to Ida Nudal, a Jewess, who is being treated in a most abominable way in Russia. The card, with a friendly greeting, was returned to the sender unopened because the Russians refused to pass it to Ida Nudal.

I raised the matter with my own government, who recognised it as an abrogation of the international law with regard to posts. They have referred it to the international body dealing with the international posts. That makes sure that nothing will be done for a long time.

While I recognise the argument put by the Rapporteur about boycotting the Olympic



*Mr. Brown (continued)*

Games in Moscow, I remind him – this does not come out in the report – that the grounds and arguments for not having the Moscow games existed a long time ago, long before Afghanistan. Those of us who were thinking about it and arguing about it at the time were few on the ground. We were arguing against holding the Olympic Games in Moscow not because of Afghanistan but because of the withdrawal of the freedoms and rights of the individual, not only in the Soviet Union but in other parts of the Soviet group.

I welcome the Rapporteur's conversion, albeit on the basis of Afghanistan, but I remind him that we have put many arguments for the freedoms and rights of the individual. As a socialist, I have argued for them for a long time. It is deplorable that the world has allowed the sort of thing that happens in Russia to go on.

Therefore, in my view, the report tends to talk about the principles of freedom being expendable. If the Soviet Union feels that way, Afghanistan has only compounded the felony and it can only be regarded as the straw that broke the camel's back.

I turn to the present argument about the Olympic Games. There is ample evidence that Jewish people and dissidents are being deported from Moscow to other parts of the country. One might well ask why the President of the International Olympic Committee did not satisfy himself on that point when he visited Moscow. People are being deported. Ida Nudal was deported to ensure that she would not be available in Moscow when the games took place. The President of the IOC made no attempt to see her at all. Therefore, my position on the Olympic Games is the same as it was in 1936. I think that it is a travesty of freedom to hold the games in Moscow. I regret the fact that sportsmen are so blind and so bereft of compassion that they will not see the obvious.

I thought that paragraph 27 of the report must have been written tongue in cheek. It is a masterly understatement to say "The Soviet Union was already experiencing considerable difficulty in respecting its Helsinki undertakings and was reluctant to enter into any more where its domestic régime was concerned".

I assume that the Rapporteur was talking about freedom. He is apparently saying that he is prepared to accept in this report that the Soviet Union had found it difficult to implement anything relating to freedom. Therefore, I believe that the report should

reflect the important fact that we must place our reliance on arguments against the abrogation of basket 3.

Finally, I draw attention to the conclusion in paragraph 97, where the Rapporteur refers to the fact that the invasion of Afghanistan is a first step by the Soviet Union towards the Indian Ocean. In this Assembly, years ago, I raised the point that the Soviet Union had moved to the island of Socotra, which is a major piece of military hardware in the neck of the Indian Ocean. It has been so for years, and I have tried many times to point out that that was the first step to the Indian Ocean. Therefore, Afghanistan is not the first step. Socotra was the first indication that the Soviets had their major communications base in the Indian Ocean. Afghanistan is the second step in that plan, and obviously the report should reflect that.

We must be determined to let the Soviet Union know that we do not accept this abrogation of basket 3 on the rights and freedoms of the individual. The Soviet bully-boy tactics are not acceptable to decent people, and certainly they are not acceptable to me as a socialist. If we back down and pursue a course of appeasement, history tells us that freedom will be lost for ever. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Depietri.

Mr. DEPIETRI (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, when the United States, France or some other capitalist country resorts to military intervention or provides support with armaments outside its own frontiers, people have the gall to declare, virtuously, that this was done at the request of the government of the country concerned to rescue the unhappy inhabitants from the chaos of Marxism or the barbarity of communism and to keep them in the free world and its civilisation which offers them so many benefits; in reality, however, the purpose of the military operations and of the support given to such governments, whether in Africa, the Middle East, Central or South America, is to maintain by force, at the price of thousands of dead, their semi-colonial oppression, in order to safeguard the interests of the multinationals that are plundering vast raw materials resources and thereby making vast profits. The purpose is also to maintain strategic bases, all of which are aimed against the USSR and the socialist countries. I need only mention Iran, El Salvador, South Korea, Chad, Zaire, and so forth.

You must admit that the military measures taken by the USSR in Afghanistan were taken only to pre-empt the measures the United States were preparing to take against Iran, part-

*Mr. Depietri (continued)*

ly using bases in Afghanistan. So the United States is only using Afghanistan as a pretext for demanding even more support from its European allies for Mr. Carter's adventures. You may notice that the report regrets the lack of enthusiasm displayed by some European countries.

The Rapporteur declares that the measures taken by the USSR are a serious threat to peace, but he forgets that it is the United States and not the USSR that has hundreds of military bases outside its frontiers, that the NATO countries are saturated with nuclear weapons directed against the USSR and the socialist countries, as they have been for years, and that the NATO countries have replied to the measures taken by the USSR to reduce its forces in the German Democratic Republic by 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks by deploying Pershing missiles and increasing their military budgets.

As regards the protection of human rights, you say a great deal about Sakharov, but, to quote only a few examples, you forget the recent massacres in South Korea and El Salvador, the massacre of the blacks in Miami and the murder of Mgr. Romero in El Salvador.

So in this Assembly, which is supposed to be working for peace but in which the communists have been the only members since they joined in 1973 to make proposals aimed at peace, why not start by calling for and taking measures to consolidate peace, in particular by entering into discussions with all countries, by accepting Mr. Brezhnev's proposal for a conference of all the statesmen in the world and drawing inspiration from the Pope's words when he begged you, at UNESCO in Paris yesterday, to prevent a nuclear cataclysm.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is now closed.

The Rapporteur, Mr. Vohrer has the floor.

Mr. VOHRER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I will gladly sum up the debate. I listened with great pleasure to the contributions made by Mr. Atkinson and Mr. Ellis, which in fact expressed a large measure of agreement with the report.

Our British colleague, Mr. Brown, takes a somewhat different view of the Olympic boycott from that which I hold myself and from that put forward in this report. I should like to make it clear that from my country's point of view the Olympic boycott is essentially linked with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and that we have also stated that we were prepared to recommend to our Olympic Committee that

we should take part in the games if the Soviet troops withdrew prior to the time-limit for accepting the invitation. This clearly brings out the link which exists for my country between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and non-participation in the games. As a result of the occupation of Afghanistan we no longer feel that there is any guarantee that the Olympic Games in Moscow will be Games for Peace.

We should have been delighted if, in accordance with the proposal made in Rome, the Soviet troops had been withdrawn from Afghanistan before the time-limit under an international agreement guaranteeing for Afghanistan the status of a neutral, non-aligned country. Had this withdrawal been possible, we should certainly have advised our national Olympic Committee to decide to go to the games. There is, then, an absolutely clear link between the Olympic Games boycott and the occupation of Afghanistan.

Had we gone as far as making participation in the Olympic Games conditional on fulfilment of CSCE basket 3, it would have been possible for countries to indicate much earlier that they were not interested in participating in them. But that was not the case with any of the countries. I think it is interesting, incidentally, that a more far-reaching proposal, which has the support of the politicians as well, was in fact made precisely in Great Britain, but it has unfortunately not been complied with by the athletes.

I am not surprised that Mr. Depietri has different views on a number of matters. That contributes to the diversity of opinions in Europe. I think it is right that we should discuss security questions here objectively with our communist colleagues.

However, the Committee unanimously shared the Rapporteur's opinion that the line taken in the report and in the recommendation is the opinion of the Assembly. I should be glad if this were to be confirmed in the voting. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — As the Chairman of the Committee is not present we can proceed at once to vote on the General Affairs Committee's draft recommendation in Document 845, to which no amendments have been tabled.

The vote must be taken by roll-call, unless members have no objections to the draft recommendation.

Are there any objections?...

As there are objections the vote will be deferred until tomorrow's sitting.

**8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday 4th June, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. Co-operation between WEU member countries on video communication systems (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 839).
2. The international situation and European security (Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 845).

3. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 838 and Amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 6.35 p.m.)*

**FIFTH SITTING**  
**Wednesday, 4th June 1980**

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
  2. Attendance Register.
  3. Change in the membership of a Committee.
  4. Co-operation between WEU member countries on video communication systems (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 839*).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Valleix (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Forma, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Valleix.
  5. The international situation and European security (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 845*).
- Speakers:* The President, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Hawkins (point of order).
6. Retirement of the Clerk of the Assembly.
  7. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 838 and Amendments*).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Banks (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Bernini, Mr. Hardy, Dr. Miller, Mr. Jager, Mr. Smith, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Grant, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Brown, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Banks (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Banks, Mr. Brown, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Miller, Mr. Banks, Mrs. Knight (point of order).
  8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. – The Sitting is open.

**1. Adoption of the Minutes**

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

**2. Attendance Register**

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

**3. Change in the membership of a Committee**

The PRESIDENT. – The Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany proposes the following change in the composition of the General Affairs Committee: Mr. Reddemann as an alternate member in place of Mr. Evers.

Are there any objections?...

Mr. Reddemann is appointed as an alternate member in place of Mr. Evers.

**4. Co-operation between WEU member countries on video communication systems**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 839)*

The PRESIDENT. – The first item on the Orders of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on co-operation between WEU member countries on video communication systems, Document 839. After the debate, it will be necessary to vote on the draft recommendation in the report.

I call Mr. Valleix, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee, to present the report.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, this modest recommendation was drafted by our friend Mr. Warren, the former Chairman of the Committee, who was with us up till the last session of the Assembly, and by your humble servant who submitted it to our Committee. The Committee thought it advisable to ask you to schedule the debate on this recommendation for this session and I thank the Presidential Committee for having agreed.

Mr. President, it is clear that for some months now, in fact for a year – and, as far as

<sup>1</sup> See page 40.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

public opinion is concerned, very frequently over the past six months – our language, which is evolving apace in all our countries, has been thrown into confusion and weighed down by neologisms such as “office electronics”, “telematics”, and even worse. Public opinion itself is sometimes bewildered by them.

The problem is really that of accepting entirely new means of communication based on data-processing and in particular micro-processing, on which, as you know, I had the honour of speaking at the Council of Europe.

Our Committee noted the great innovations achieved by some countries in these areas, matching an entirely new system of telecommunications to the need for communication. This matching of a need and a technology has led several European countries, especially the United Kingdom and France, to develop new telecommunications systems, the Prestel system in the United Kingdom and the Antiope system in France.

For the record, may I point out that the term “Antiope” is not taken from any mythological tale or famous poem but is simply made up of the initials of the words *acquisition numérique et télévisualisation d'images organisées en pages d'écritures* – digital acquisition and tele-display of pictures arranged in the form of written pages. I quote this definition because, in my view, it expresses both the simplicity of the concept – if I dare use that word – and the abstruse not to say abstract aspect of some modern terminology.

The special feature of these systems is that, in addition to providing firms with new means of communication and expression, which is precisely our aim, they can also be used as exchanges, especially for the transmission of military orders, and as you can see, Ladies and Gentlemen, this has major implications in our own field of European defence and security.

What we must do is not only take note of this new means of communication for large businesses and for our armies, but also think ahead to the revolution already being heralded in everyday life with, for example, the introduction of small television screens in airports and waiting-rooms and, tomorrow perhaps, televised newspapers relayed by videotex systems.

We must take charge of this approaching revolution and in the draft recommendation submitted on behalf of the Committee we have tried to emphasise that we consider it a duty for the governments to give full recognition to this new form of communication and, since it is so novel, to aim at its standardisation.

The stakes are very high, since, as I said, the process is a new one and it is therefore important to work out standard rules for its use by Europeans, of course – but also because in this case the United States, that constant source of new inventions, is in fact lagging behind in relation to the European countries I have mentioned and others elsewhere.

Now that the Europeans are taking steps to gain access to the American market for this system, it is important for us to try to harmonise our production standards, so that Europe can show itself to have a new vehicle of expression on a universal and therefore harmonised scale and present itself as a trading partner, promoting a very advanced process – in the United States as elsewhere, but in co-operation rather than competition, if possible. European emulation is acceptable and welcome; but unfettered and possibly lethal competition on a market as large as the American market now open to us would be absurd.

Those are the two guidelines underlying the draft recommendation inviting our governments to concert their efforts, through the European post and telecommunications conference, to establish common standards where possible and to ensure that the responsible leaders of industry and the administrative authorities support this new chance for European co-operation and, over and above this, exploit this opportunity, almost unique in our time, for Europe to emerge as conqueror – and why not, for it has the right and the duty to do so – on the international markets.

There is no point in going further, and in any case the modest scope of this report demands discretion on my part. Ladies and Gentlemen, I think we would be right to support the Committee, thereby expressing the hope that the Council and our governments will help our seven European countries, and if possible others which might follow our lead, to take concerted, vigorous action and, for our part, action to resolve the defence problems in which these new means of communication will soon be deeply involved. (Applause)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Valleix.

The debate is now open.

The first speaker is Mr. Forma.

Mr. FORMA (Italy) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think that the Rapporteur's conclusions are effectively stated by the reference, which he repeated at the beginning of his short but extremely clear exposition, to two practical developments: first, the British Prestel system, introduced by the British Post Office for use with the telephone network only; and, second,

*Mr. Forma (continued)*

the Antiope system, designed and developed by French Television for both telephone and video communication. The mention of these two notable – but still relatively modest – developments leads on logically to the need to up-date European knowledge of these advanced technological components and to speed up their introduction through new techniques, and, also, to create a European market for European products which is lacking at present.

We import from the United States about 90 % of the components and products which can clearly be used and Japan is already making great inroads into our markets. It seems to me therefore that the report now before us shows clearly what is needed as regards techniques and the means of co-ordinating such equipment and bringing it into use.

In this respect, Europe is not so far from practical success; it has a reasonable production capacity based on a by no means negligible know-how. It would not be difficult in this context to quote far more than two examples of developments in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy itself and the other countries we represent, mostly co-ordinated through bilateral agreements between neighbouring countries but in some cases through wider agreements for common defence.

Without going more deeply into the inviting prospects offered by the Valleix report, I feel that it may not be out of place to recall two other reports, which in fact will be discussed later, closely related to the same subject; I am referring to the reports on aerospace activities and on defence-related information technology. My reason for doing so is to focus attention on the subject of common defence which is our main and specific responsibility.

Indeed, it can hardly be maintained that up-to-date, standard equipment for both land and space applications can be developed without making full allowance for the conclusions of the report we are discussing, which are well in line with both the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development and to Recommendation 308 which really received too little attention and stressed the urgent need to improve means of crisis management within the Alliance,

If we fail to take part in this foreseeable race for progress, at what must be headlong speed, we shall not be true to our own faith in a Europe capable of working in unity and of setting aside selfish interests which, however, come to the surface at every step, as we have again seen recently. I should like to recall here

a point made by our minister Mr. Colombo who, when Chairman-in-Office of the Council of the Community, made a number of statements to the Political Committee of the parliament. He said that the present crisis should spur us on to greater awareness of the need to channel and co-ordinate the resolve to work out joint solutions for problems for which individual national responses are inadequate and completely insufficient.

In my view, therefore, our recommendation to the Council is more than opportune, calling as it does for the establishment of common standards and for a common approach ensuring that the West does not find itself unprepared for a civilisation which is changing from the one which we have known.

It is not for us, but perhaps for philosophers and moralists to wrangle over whether the fundamental change in relationships brought about by these discoveries is desirable, or whether, as a result of these discoveries, our world, after first being thrown into a state of bewilderment, can find itself again in a new dimension which will compensate for the admittedly important loss of old and secure values.

All we politicians can do, however, is note that there are no practical alternatives – as the Rapporteur himself said – to striking out in a new direction which must be explored if we are not to fail in our primary duty, on which our very existence and that of both the industrialised and non-industrialised world depends, and which wholly involves every one of us. It seems right therefore that our countries should be called on to make a joint effort in order not to waste all the strength which such union brings. This is not a matter of pride or wanting to dominate but of discovering painfully and anxiously the right way along the road, which is both attractive and difficult but which we must take. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Forma.

The next speaker is Mr. Lenzer.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, our WEU Assembly will be looking at this report by Mr. Valleix again this afternoon, in connection with the technology of new defence-related information systems. I would stress that this technology is of interest not only to scientists and engineers – it is also a political factor of the first order. Information technology – and Mr. Valleix's report deals with only a small section of the immense range it covers – will be one of the new interdisciplinary technologies, perhaps in the next few years the new interdisciplinary technology, which will dramatically influence our lives, and it will do so not

*Mr. Lenzer (continued)*

only in the economic and scientific spheres but in our homes as well.

I should like to take advantage of the discussion on this report to make a few fundamental points. Data-processing, communications technology and electronics are going to bring about radical changes in the production and services sectors of modern industrialised countries. With the lessening cost of electronic devices, automation of goods production is advancing rapidly at all stages of manufacture and it will increase the flexibility of industrial production. As demands with regard to production diminish, those relating to the development and preparation of production processes increase. For instance, storage and processing devices are turning typewriters into word processors. They can now refer back to central data banks and pass texts to each other. Telephones, which are by now to be found in almost every home, can have their functions extended by abbreviated-dialling and call-repetition systems or can be used as simple data input devices.

This development, and also the fall in the price of microprocessors, will in the long run make data-processing a part of every individual's job.

I should also perhaps say a word about another field, namely that of optical telecommunication, which will eventually, in conjunction with semiconductor technology, make it possible to establish new telecommunication networks which can be used flexibly for the transmission of texts, data, speech and even pictures – this, too, has reached the trial stage. View-data and cable television are the precursors of this development. One only needs, I think, to consider the debate about the new media going on in our various countries to realise what opportunities for abuse they will offer in the future.

We have long since moved on from the technical plane and reached the stage of policy decisions. Technical change in the transmission and processing of information leads to complete systems which allow of a wide variety of applications. Today we can no longer deal with the individual technologies, such as data-processing, communications technology or microelectronics and their many possible applications, in isolation. This is why, taking the French technical expression *télématique* as a model, we have coined the term information technology.

These new information and communication technologies affect the number, character and content of jobs in industry and the service

sector. On the one hand jobs will disappear or undergo a change of character in the manufacturing and services sectors, and even more in clerical and administrative work. I want to stress what consequences this is going to have for the future of the individual worker, and what demands this trend is going to make on his skills and his occupational mobility. In future the individual worker will no longer be able to count on staying in the same job for ten, fifteen or twenty years or perhaps even for the whole of his working life. On the contrary, he will have to accept continued training if he is to overcome the obstacles raised by the need to cope with these new technologies. At the same time they will require new capital investment for both production and applications and will give rise to new functions and services, so that jobs and even completely new occupations will be created.

In this connection – I have already spoken briefly of the possibilities of manipulation offered by this technology – the problems of data protection must not be overlooked. The new technologies naturally permit – owing to the high degree of linkage and the speed of access – much more complete and rapid gathering of personal data on the individual citizen.

And now a word about telematics, or communications technology. It facilitates the execution of data-intensive operations in private business and public administration. The proportion of persons engaged mainly in data-intensive and communication-intensive activities is growing particularly fast in the modern industrialised countries. Indeed, it may even be a characteristic of modern industrial society that the traditional growth industries – heavy industry, for example – are losing ground more and more, while the tertiary sector, the services sector, which will not be able to manage in future without modern information technology, is growing. There will therefore be a decline in the number of people directly engaged in production of goods. Consequently – and this is an important point – competitiveness will increasingly depend on the extent to which rational use is made of new forms of technological communication in the public and private sectors.

In technological communications, for instance, precision engineering is being replaced by electronics, while in the field of office machines, in communications switching equipment and in certain aspects of printing all these problems have already been encountered.

The report touches on a sore point: the insufficiency and at times complete absence of standardisation between the various systems. When use is made in Europe of two different

*Mr. Lenzer (continued)*

video communication systems, namely Prestel and Antiope, which are not compatible, one cannot but wonder whether this was necessary, whether these cases of "doing one's own thing" are not perhaps a further symptom of that typically European sickness, parochialism. I believe, as the Rapporteur and Chairman of our Committee, Mr. Valleix, and our Italian colleague, Mr. Forma, have already very rightly said, that we can meet the challenge of competition from the United States, a country with, we must remember, an enormous domestic market which is not as dependent as we are on the export of "intelligent" products, and above all from the immense dynamism of Japanese industry in this field, only if we all combine our efforts.

As a warning example of a case where Europe lost ground and had an extremely hard time until it caught up a bit again, I would quote the optical industry, and especially the fate of the single-lens reflex camera, the market for which is now almost completely dominated by Japanese products. I would remind you of the pocket calculator and, finally, of the whole field of entertainment electronics.

We are now at a point where we really must take a decision if we want to create new growth industries in Europe with the aid of information technology, which, whether we like it or not, will find its way not only into trade and industry, offices and jobs, but also into our homes. To ensure our chances of success we must take advantage of every possibility of joint action, every possibility of co-operation. Mr. President, I thank you for your attention. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. – That concludes the debate.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think I can be very brief, especially as I merely wish to reply by placing on record my great satisfaction at the last two contributions; I should also like to draw attention to the three-sided character of our debate this morning, with Germany, Italy and France taking part.

As you will have appreciated, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Forma's and Mr. Lenzer's remarks have contributed much more than your Rapporteur's statement, from two angles which are to a great extent complementary.

I agree with Mr. Forma that Europe must participate – on an equal footing if possible – in the worldwide competition in electronic components. This is quite obvious, particu-

larly at a time when, as you know, the micro-processor, the little silicon chip, is an essential instrument for any kind of progress and for any success in the development of these modern communication technologies.

A big effort is needed. I will merely recall the Council of Europe's proposal for an agreement on this subject, which seeks to improve co-operation between European manufacturers in these matters but, unfortunately, has so far remained virtually without practical effect.

I would add that the subject we are dealing with is of direct relevance to aerospace activities, military activities in general and satellite communications.

Lastly, I think Mr. Forma has put the matter in the right light by quoting Mr. Colombo. It is true that, when discussing this problem – of which I gave a modest account, now substantially expanded by the contributions of our two colleagues – you must realise that tomorrow these telecommunications technologies will radically change – perhaps, unfortunately, for the worse – not only the potential of the means of making war – and it is our job to safeguard ourselves against these – but also everyday life, right into the homes and inmost private lives of our fellow citizens. That is why this new dimension does indeed call for the rethinking which was mentioned just now. I would add that Mr. Lenzer is absolutely right in talking about an interdisciplinary technology, since micro-informatics, and especially the modern technologies with which we are dealing, are finding their way not only into the whole range of means of human communication – tomorrow our lives will be different from what they are today – but also into production in every sector – very soon the primary sector – why not? – but already the secondary sector and – to what an extent! – the tertiary sector.

As regards practical applications, you will have noticed in the brief report that the Paris Stock Exchange already has an Antiope facility and also that the Prestel remote display system is now in operation and that a number of subscribers in the London area are making use of this new technique.

Lastly, here, very close to Paris, Vélizy will become a centre next September, and the system now being installed will in fact become a trial system for the introduction of Antiope for the use of individual subscribers.

All this leads me to the following conclusion, with the additional item of information that, for optical communications, Biarritz has been chosen by France as the experimental area for the establishment of the first telecommunications network using glass-fibre cables. Biarritz will thus be the first place in Europe to see the



*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

application of a method which is still very new even in the United States.

We have thus already entered a revolutionary phase. We must act accordingly as regards employment, and the Council of Europe is dealing with this. On the technological plane it is our job too. Lastly, it is of course our duty to respond to this revolution on the military plane. But you have seen that for Europe to have a chance of winning through in this matter it must certainly establish as many common standards as possible and thus put itself in a position, at world level, to conquer the big international markets, including, we would remind you, that of the United States.

That is why our Assembly should express its opinion on this recommendation and make our governments even more aware of the need to shoulder their responsibilities not only as regards control but also as regards giving an impetus and lastly as regards taking this revolution into account so that we are better able to achieve the joint defence which is our aim. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Valleix. The way in which your report has been received by the Assembly reflects our appreciation of the work that has gone into it.

We now proceed to the vote on the draft recommendation in Document 839.

I understand that there are no amendments.

Are there any objections to this recommendation?...

Mr. DEPIETRI (*France*). – Yes.

The PRESIDENT. – If there is an objection, we must take a roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Ahrens.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows<sup>1</sup>:

Number of votes cast .....	45
Ayes .....	44
Noes .....	1
Abstentions .....	0

1. See page 41.

There is thus an exact quorum.

*The draft recommendation is therefore adopted*<sup>1</sup>.

We now proceed to the next business.

### 5. *The international situation and European security*

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 845)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next Order of the Day is the vote on the draft recommendation in Document 845 dealing with the international situation and European security presented yesterday by Mr. Vohrer. The debate was concluded. I have only to ask the Chairman whether he wishes to make any comments before we proceed to the vote.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – No, Mr. President. I am perfectly happy to proceed to the vote. The report received overwhelming support yesterday. It would be superfluous to add anything now.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Chairman.

We therefore now proceed to the vote on the draft recommendation on the international situation and European security. We could avoid a roll-call if there were no opposition.

Are there any objections?...

Again there is opposition, so under our rules I have no alternative but to ask for a roll-call.

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I wish only to ask that the bells be rung. They were still ringing well after the last roll-call had begun and some people did not know about it. May I ask that the bells be rung now?

The PRESIDENT. – I understand that they have been rung three times, but I am most grateful for the timely reminder. The bells will be rung again.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Ahrens.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows<sup>2</sup>:

1. See page 43.

2. See page 42.

*The President (continued)*

Number of votes cast .....	47
Ayes .....	44
Noes .....	3
Abstentions .....	0

*The draft recommendation is therefore adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

### **6. Retirement of the Clerk of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT. – Before we proceed to the next Order of the Day, there is an important announcement that as President I wish to make to the Assembly.

Mr. Humblet, the Clerk of the Assembly, has asked me to inform you of his wish to resign his office at the end of this year. We can only note with regret his intention to depart, because we recall the tremendous work that he has done and the fact that he has been Clerk of the Assembly since its creation.

In accordance with the Rules of the Assembly, the Bureau will now consider the position and take the necessary measures to prepare for the election of a new Clerk as soon as that becomes possible.

I thought that the Assembly should be aware of Mr. Humblet's intention to resign after the next part-session in December.

### **7. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 838 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT. – We now proceed to the next Order of the Day which is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on nuclear, biological and chemical protection, Document 838. After this, there will be a vote on the draft recommendation in the report.

I call Mr. Banks, Rapporteur of the Committee, to present the report.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). – I have the honour to present to you, Mr. President, and the members of the Assembly the report on nuclear, biological and chemical protection, on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I have been privileged to prepare this report, and the work undertaken has involved meeting some fifty-three officials in the countries that I have visited. I am

indebted to everyone for the enthusiastic help and willingness to provide the information I have sought.

I am also immensely grateful for the help of the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Stuart Whyte, in particular and of his small staff for all the work they have put into the final report which is before you. This is the third text, after alterations and minor corrections. It has placed a considerable burden of work on the typing staff, who have worked meticulously, and I should like to record my thanks to them.

The chapters dealing with both military NBC protection and civil protection have been referred back to the officials of the countries concerned and any amendments to the factual evidence collated have been written in. I submit, therefore, a report which is a collection of facts on the situation, both military and civil, which we have today and the conclusions and recommendations that are drawn from that evidence.

I have no hesitation in stating my firm belief that there is no single subject more important in the realms of defence thinking and strategy today than that of survival in nuclear or chemical war. It is more than fifteen years since this Assembly considered the protection of civil populations. It was twenty years ago that a report dealt with the effects of nuclear weapons, and it was under your rapporteurship, Mr. President, that this Assembly was informed. This long lapse of time characterises in the main the attitude of governments through the past two decades towards protecting civil populations and, to a lesser extent until the mid-1970s, the protection of military personnel from nuclear fallout.

I earnestly trust that this report will draw attention not only to a subject too accustomed to slumber and to be left at the bottom of priorities but to the now urgent action that the Committee believes is essential. Time after time, I came across instances of governments cutting civil defence expenditure and slowing down the introduction of military protective equipment whenever there was a need to reduce expenditure. This whole area has been classified in the soft perimeter of public spending or the tail end of defence expenditure, so that it inevitably took the first trim of a cut.

This, then, is only part of the background. The determination and commitment of the Soviet Union vastly to increase her military forces and to set the correspondingly high level of gross national product devoted to the production of increasingly sophisticated armaments and a great force of men now presents, therefore, a recognisable challenge to us in the West. It becomes increasingly more likely that

<sup>1</sup>. See page 44.

*Mr. Banks (continued)*

any period of conventional war will be of shorter duration than has been considered hitherto, and that the trip-wire strategy of the use of battlefield nuclear weapons will be more likely to be activated because of the West's inferior position, at least in numbers of conventional weapons, compared with the Warsaw Pact.

In view of this and the variable and more sophisticated nuclear weapon launchers now in evidence in the Soviet Union and the quantities of nuclear weapons available, I believe that a limited nuclear war is now more likely than less likely. The effects of the various sizes and types of nuclear detonations are explained fully in the report. Let me make it quite clear that even in a total and unthinkable nuclear war there would be survivors; there would be many millions of people killed; there would be many millions of casualties who, if unprotected, would die in a painful period of time. Given some protection, many millions of people would be amongst the survivors. Radiation does decay, and quite rapidly, and this factor and the belief that survival is possible are not widely understood by the public at large.

In the case of the protection of military personnel, the report concludes that there must be a new impetus to the training of members of the armed forces and to the essential supply of the necessary equipment for surviving and fighting in a contaminated environment.

Individual dosimeters for the detection of both gamma and neutron radiation should be made more widely available.

Effective NBC protective clothing is still not issued to all personnel in all forces, nor are sufficient spare suits held. The vital protection of aircrews and the effective decontamination of aircraft for servicing and repair have still to be satisfactorily dealt with. Respirators must be interoperable. The United States version on issue is seriously out of date in that it takes more than twenty minutes to change the filters, and they do not conform to the new NATO Stanag for interoperability. Ample spare canisters must also be available.

Vehicles should be fitted with individual piped air supplies. The inadequacy of the majority of vehicles in service underlies, I think, the lack of attention paid to the chemical and nuclear aspect of warfare. Research is urgently needed into the range of antidotes for chemical weapons that may be used, and equipment for the quick detection of chemical attacks must be more widely issued and improved. An overriding essential is that all communications and radar equipment must be protected against the effects of electromagnetic

pulse from high altitude nuclear explosions. This is particularly earmarked for attention in recommendation 1(a).

To conclude this section of my speech, I can only express my deep concern about the very many deficiencies that exist in military protection measures, and many others, particularly in the area of decontamination, are referred to in the report.

I should like now to turn to the question of chemical protection. Until recently this subject was considered taboo and chemical warfare unthinkable, but over the years the Soviet Union has built up a chemical corps of an estimated 100,000 men compared with about 4,000 men in the United States chemical corps. These are men specially trained in the field to protect themselves and to conduct offensive and defensive tactical operations in a chemically contaminated environment. Statements in the United States clearly underwrite that the Soviets have developed a variety of modern agents, multiple delivery systems and the tactical doctrine for large-scale employment. It has been reported that the Soviet Union's stocks of chemical weapons greatly exceed the combined stocks of the free world in Europe and are quite sufficient for three or four major offensives on a wide front. They probably comprise some 15% of the total of the Russian military munitions.

These munitions, which are believed to have chemical projectiles, include their 122 mm and 152 mm artillery and their 122 mm multi-barrelled rocket, as well as the Frog 7 and Scud-A tactical missiles and aircraft munitions. It must be assumed that the Soviet Union possesses a considerable offensive chemical warfare capability both in terms of the range and quantities of chemicals and their means of delivery, and of the ability of their troops to move through heavily contaminated areas. It would, therefore, be a distinct possibility for the whole of the central front to be paralysed by the blanket effect of the use there of chemical weapons and the securing of territory leading to the Channel ports by a thrust of trained and protected Soviet troops through unprepared rearguard positions. Without an adequate chemical retaliatory capability, the question has to be answered as to the circumstances for a nuclear response from NATO forces in the event of a chemical attack.

Since July 1969, the United States has manufactured no chemical weapons. The expected storage life of chemical warfare agents is probably fifteen to twenty years. Therefore, whilst old United States stocks certainly exist, it is essential now to reappraise the situation. In particular, the availability of chemically-armed modern missiles and the position of stocks in

*Mr. Banks (continued)*

Europe must be brought up to today's requirements.

A report from the United States Under-Secretary of Defence for Research and Development and Acquisition for the fiscal year 1980 states that the United States retaliatory stockpile of chemical weapons has deteriorated to less than prudent level and that there is a serious lack of modern air-deliverable munitions. Half of the current stockpile consists of mustard agent, which is less effective than newer agents. However, research and development into the new binary chemical munitions is continuing, but no decision has been taken to construct a pilot plant and this is not included in the fiscal year 1981 budget. Binary weapons, I should explain, comprise two harmless chemical agents which are mixed in the warhead during the weapon's delivery, when they become toxic.

For some five years, bilateral talks have been taking place between the Soviet Union and the United States to produce a treaty banning the manufacture, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons. In short, whilst some progress has been made towards an agreement, it has not yet been resolved as to how to specify stocks and facilities, how to verify any controls and when any agreement should enter into force.

Therefore, any ban, if it can be agreed – and I hope that it can – remains some years away, and after any agreement destruction of existing stocks would be phased over ten years. The military threat will therefore remain for this decade.

During the last war, the non-use of chemical weapons was ensured by the equal capability of the two sides. I believe, therefore, that it is now vital for a full review of existing stocks in NATO to be undertaken and that a retaliatory capability be established amongst NATO partners equal to the estimated offensive capability of the Warsaw Pact. I regard this as an essential feature both towards achieving a satisfactory agreement in Geneva and to ensuring that the balance of forces held on both sides precludes their use. To this aim also I endorse the suggestion in the report's recommendation that multilateral negotiations are encouraged, and an international conference on this subject should, I believe, be sponsored.

I should now like to turn to biological weapons. These are weapons which cause incapacitation through the spread of disease like, for instance, yellow fever, typhus and anthrax. The 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Warfare has been signed by all Warsaw Pact and NATO coun-

tries except France and came into force in 1975. It has yet to be ratified by the Governments of Western Germany and the Netherlands. The use of such weapons could prove as lethal to the population of the country employing them, because no check on the spread of these diseases is possible, and, coupled with the agreement to ban their use, makes it unlikely that bacteriological warfare is a serious threat. Nevertheless, the reports of an unusual outbreak of anthrax in the Russian town of Sverdlovsk call for the verification procedures to be undertaken to clarify any doubt about the origin of the outbreak. I understand that the United States has initiated discussions with the Soviet Union under the terms of the 1972 convention.

Finally, I should like to turn to the section of the report describing existing civil defence arrangements in our member countries and Norway. Let me say straight away that, in my view, protection of the civilian population is not only part of national defence but is an essential responsibility of governments to protect the lives of their people. In Central Europe it is of vital and supreme military importance. Any activity in either of the southern or northern flanks causing concern will inevitably be reflected in tension on the central front. In those circumstances, it is essential that military movements are carried out quickly and effectively.

The natural instinct of men, women and children is for their own survival. In the absence of adequate prepared arrangements, it is inevitable that people will seek to move to safer areas or to those countries providing shelter accommodation. I ask you, therefore, to picture the sort of chaos on the roads that such a refugee exodus would be like. Imagine that, together with the effort to bring up military reinforcements, and the open exposure of those people on the roads to the effects of all types of weapons, and you have a recipe for disaster.

The task of providing shelter protection is a long and expensive one. Norway, with shelter places for 70 % of its population, and Switzerland, which aims to shelter its entire population by the 1990s, are good examples of countries adopting long-term and consistent civil defence programmes. Some countries, such as Holland, are making progress. Broadly speaking, however, existing arrangements are seriously inadequate, out of date and dangerously neglected. Monitoring communications are desperately vulnerable, and NATO at present would not be directly involved in the communication of fallout data and prediction. Information available to the public is almost universally low key or non-existent.

*Mr. Banks (continued)*

Amongst officials I detected a note of despair that funds are kept so low that even national information policies at least to make the public aware both of the threat and consequences of nuclear and chemical contamination and of the measures that can individually be taken to improve their own chances of survival are curtailed. NATO officials pointed out that even in a total nuclear exchange something over half of the population of the industrialised countries could be expected to survive the initial exchange. Casualties will be considerably reduced by civil defence measures, and yet few countries have taken any steps to identify existing structures suitable for easy adaptation to fallout shelters. Notably Holland has taken action both in this direction and in using legislation to ensure that new buildings provide basement shelter areas.

A great deal needs to be done, and urgently and on a co-ordinated basis, and in the recommendations much of this is set out. I would mention in particular the use of volunteers, co-ordinated with other organisations and the sale of self-help equipment, which the public at large should be able to purchase easily. What is surprising is that protection against the effects of conventional war does not now seem to count. It is almost as though that was out of date. Perhaps therein explains a subconscious realisation in this fourth quarter of the twentieth century that we must face up to the reality of the existence and possible use of nuclear and chemical weapons.

Some people may argue that a programme for civil defence weakens confidence in the possession of nuclear weapons for their deterrent value. That presupposes that we in NATO use them first and have superior missiles and that retaliation does not occur. It is, in my reckoning, a safer insurance to base our protection against an exchange of those nuclear weapons.

I commend the report to the Assembly in the sincere hope that the wise counsels of the world will surmount all misconceptions, injustices and foolish actions. Let our protection be in peaceful coexistence amongst differing philosophies and an understanding amongst all nations that excludes the option of war and is dedicated to the safety and improvement of mankind. Until that time can be brought about, let us take prudent action for survival and the maintenance of the priceless peace that we treasure. *(Applause)*

*(Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Rapporteur.

The debate is open.

*(The President continued in French)*

(Translation). – I call Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI *(Italy)* (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to congratulate Mr. Banks on his report which gives detailed information on nuclear, bacteriological and chemical warfare and on the value of protection from its consequences and its lethal effects on military personnel and civilians.

A valuable feature is the assessment of existing international treaties and agreements, covering the various treaties on nuclear and chemical weapons and the vast number of agreements banning the biological weapons listed in the modified Brussels Treaty and including the powers of the WEU Agency for the Control of Armaments.

The report also contains information on current negotiations for the conclusion of treaties banning all use of radiation and chemical weapons, together with data and comments on the protective measures so far taken by different countries and the conclusions which they suggest for WEU and member governments. To this end, as the recommendation stresses, it is certainly important to promote closer co-ordination between the allies in working out co-ordinated joint programmes and in improving the interoperability and efficiency of both military and civilian protection. In our view, however, it would be wrong to ignore individual national circumstances and the specific military and geographical location of the weapons held by the various national armed forces, which call for measures geared to the situation in each allied country.

The general points made in the report on the various forms of military and civilian protection are largely common ground. Unquestionably, such protection against the effects of any NBC war is an important aspect of balanced defence, provided, of course, the relevant measures are understood as forming part of a policy aimed not merely at maintaining the present military balance but also at furthering agreements to reduce the present level of nuclear and conventional weapons, and ultimately at a complete ban on the production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, leading finally to disarmament.

It is, however, difficult to accept all the arguments advanced in the report or the whole of the line taken in the recommendation, and particularly the conclusion reached at the end of the third paragraph.

*Mr. Bernini (continued)*

The report and parts of the recommendation set out a number of facts which cannot be disputed. First of all, the fact that even the widest possible military and civilian protection can only help to limit destruction and the number of victims, which would still be incalculable. Therefore, in addition to the enormous cost of such measures – which would be completely beyond the means of some countries – there is the practical difficulty – and virtual impossibility – of organising adequate and effective protection for the armed forces and even more for the civilian population.

Information on protection and, therefore, any measures taken should in no way lead to our underestimating the mortal perils of modern warfare, which hang over the whole of mankind.

Again, in the case of chemical weapons there are no reliable data or estimates of the present international balance, as indeed the report itself recognises in saying that standard reference sources give only little or no information on quantities of chemical weapons stockpiled. The figures are all partly unverifiable and therefore open to dispute in some cases and must therefore be used with caution for a more realistic assessment of the situation.

Lastly, there is the position as regards existing agreements on nuclear and biological weapons, the 1925 protocol on chemical weapons and the Brussels Treaty, with their limits and also the obligations which they impose, and the progress of current negotiations, in particular between the United States and the Soviet Union for a complete ban on chemical weapons, the positive results of which were – as recalled in the report – submitted to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva in May 1979 as a basis for a possible international convention to be concluded by 1980.

There are therefore obstacles to be overcome – about which we should be concerned – but there are also possibilities for positive developments which must not be overlooked or underestimated.

Despite these factual aspects of the situation what line does the recommendation take? No reference is made to the perils of nuclear weapons and to the need to reduce their number – and in particular to proceed quickly to the ratification of SALT II and then start the SALT III negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe – but in the case of chemical weapons the recommendation, despite the negotiations now taking place, calls for an increase of stocks in the various countries, thus introducing fresh tensions into the already grave world situation, further complicating the present negotiations, adding the potential destruc-

tive capacity of chemical weapons to the already enormous potential of nuclear weapons and taking for granted that world war will also mean chemical warfare, which we should, on the contrary, continue to oppose with all our strength.

It is true that there are still obstacles to an agreement on chemical weapons, particularly regarding the date when control measures should come into force, but we should not add to these difficulties and should work for a speedy conclusion of the negotiations; it is wrong to use difficulties as an argument to press for the production of new chemical weapons. But this would appear to be the spirit of the recommendation, confirming the disturbing line – which indeed we have observed in other documents submitted to this Assembly – which adds to the existing international suspicions and disagreements and gives further impetus to the drive for rearmament.

On the contrary, the immense destruction which would be caused by an NBC war, the deterioration of world relations – especially between the great powers, the risks and dangers which this entails for the whole of mankind, demand that we do not add to the sources of conflict but rather should take every opportunity of helping to reopen the dialogue, of promoting agreements for alleviating the serious problems raised and debated by this Assembly, of steadily lowering nuclear and conventional military potential and of introducing effective controls on chemical weapons.

This is the direction in which WEU and the member countries should move, within the Alliance of course, but also through independent moves aimed at breaking the logic of the use of force and at reopening the way to détente in the interests of Europe and its security.

Consequently, quite apart from the interpretation of certain paragraphs, the basic line of the recommendation should be amended. It should be referred back to the Committee for that purpose. If on the other hand the present form of words is maintained, we shall be obliged to vote against it, Mr. President. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Bernini.

*(The President continued in English)*

I call Mr. Hardy, and the next speaker will be Dr. Miller.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – This is an interesting report, and Mr. Banks has made an important contribution to the study of and interest in these matters. However, the horrific implications of the report strengthen my view that our priority should be greatly to increase

*Mr. Hardy (continued)*

the vigour of our pursuit of international agreement in achieving disarmament and in reducing and limiting existing and potential weaponry.

I go along with the first recommendation. It is essential that any potential aggressor should recognise that our troops, particularly on the central front, can withstand aggression, even after a chemical or nuclear onslaught. I certainly go along with recommendation 2, particularly if Mr. Banks accepts one of the amendments that we shall discuss later. I strongly support recommendation 3.

However, it is recommendation 4 which gives me most concern, and I have given long and serious thought to this matter. My principal argument against a massive extension of civil defence arrangements and expenditure is based, first, on the cost. The cost of the scale of defence against a serious nuclear attack would be such as substantially to reduce our capacity to defend our people against want, squalor and ignorance. If we were to devote resources to this purpose, we would be at risk of increasing the needs of our society and reducing the quality of our life and services. That may be part of a potential aggressor's plans.

It may suit the Warsaw Pact for us to spend less on housing, education and social services, and we must be vigilant in order to ensure that we do not divert resources away from such purposes merely to improve our capacity to resist aggression. I believe firmly in the line pursued by recommendation 1 – that we must be prepared, and that we must have a military capacity – but I also believe that we must maintain the living standards of the population, otherwise our people will ask whether they have anything worth defending.

Also, we must look at the fact that at a time when Mr. Banks' own government – and I am sorry to inject a partisan note into this speech – are seeking drastically to cut expenditure by local authorities, it is astonishing that the fundamental rôle of local authorities in terms of civil defence would be incapacitated. Recommendation 4 brings in the police, the fire brigades, military reservists, the Red Cross and other voluntary organisations.

At this point I join with Mr. Banks in paying tribute to the work of the volunteer organisations. They do a superb job and are often first-class people and deserve our admiration. But in any civil defence arrangement the local authority has a great rôle to play. Yet local authorities, regardless of political allegiances in the United Kingdom, resent the enormous cuts which the Conservative Government are inflicting upon them, since cuts would

greatly reduce their capacity to respond in the event of a nuclear war.

My second reason for opposing recommendation 4 is more serious. Some experts offer the prospect in the United Kingdom, for example, that if there were a serious nuclear war, ten million or fifteen million people might survive. We have no knowledge in modern history of that kind of casualty rate. We would have to go back in terms of Western Europe to the middle of the fourteenth century, to the plague that swept Europe at that time and reached Britain in 1351. If Mr. Banks looks back to that period, he will find the enormous economic and political consequences of that mortality rate. That was perhaps less serious than the same mortality rate might be in a modern and civilised society.

In an agrarian community, a death rate of more than half might be tolerable. It might seem more tolerable to those of us who live in a modern, urban society than those who lived in the past primitively agrarian one. In a modern, civilised society, involving an interdependence on which we all depend, the mortality rates envisaged by the experts would mean that if anybody survived in a fallout shelter the life that he or she would enter would perhaps not be worth living. We must consider whether we are prepared to see that level of expenditure incurred to give people the prospect of entering a life which they would find intolerable.

We are told, for example, that in the Warsaw Pact countries civil defence arrangements are being dramatically increased; there is to be protection for workers in key industries. I suppose that at great cost we could offer the same protection to workers in key industries in our countries. I have examined the matter from the angle of constituency representation. It may be that workers in some of the special steel factories or large profitable collieries, power station workers and people of that kind could be told that they will be given protection while at work. In other words, they would be protected for 40 hours out of the 168 hours of the week. But what will they say to their workmates who are not on the same shift, and, what is more, what will they say to their mothers, fathers, wives and children? Are they to go to work knowing that they will have the chance to survive but that the chances of survival for their kinfolk will be much less?

I do not believe that that is a practicable proposition. It may be tenable in the Warsaw Pact countries, but the position in our democracies is very different. I am not prepared to tell my constituents that they have to accept a situation in which, because of the nature of their employment, they will be protected but

*Mr. Hardy (continued)*

that if they are not at work and are with their families at home they will have no protection.

In any case, this idea is based on a fundamental misconception. In the nature of our modern society, we are so interdependent that no worker is more important than another. The man working in a pit or steelworks is no more important than the sewerage worker, the man who provides us with a water supply, the surgeon in hospital or the transport driver. I do not believe that we should pursue that rôle. The Warsaw Pact with its political differences – differences that we find intolerable – may be able to get away with it, but it is not feasible in our democracy.

I have never poured scorn on open government, but, although it may be right to provide people with information and a full understanding of the horrors of potential war, I do not believe that at this stage we should embark on costly arrangements, even though it may be profitable to do so in certain areas.

I believe that our efforts should be at all times aimed at securing and promoting peace. We should not give people false hopes. The argument must be that if a man invests several thousands of pounds in a fallout shelter he may be generating within himself and his family a false hope. I do not believe that at this stage false hopes would be helpful. We need to inject into the political leaders of all our countries a determination to prevent these horrors happening rather than to pay for an insurance policy which may even encourage them.

The PRESIDENT. – I thank Mr. Hardy.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to pay tribute to the Rapporteur, Mr. Banks, who must have put in many man-hours and travelled many miles to produce this comprehensive report. I know he will not take it amiss if I say that I do not agree with certain aspects of the report, but this is a matter of opinion. It is a matter on which people have different points of view. Nevertheless, he has produced a valuable and, indeed, amazing piece of work in terms of the information within it.

I liked Mr. Hardy's speech. Speaking as a doctor, I must say to him that with a plague one has a chance. But I do not think there would be any chance at all in a nuclear holocaust or in chemical or biological warfare. If one sneezes, a friend may say "Bless you" and one will not catch the plague. That would at least give some kind of protection. That seems to be the kind of protection that is envisaged in

the report. It looks as though fallout-proof shelters would roast alive their inhabitants. I do not see how such shelters could be accommodated in multi-storey blocks of flats or used by the vast majority of the population.

Were this not such a serious subject, recommendation 4, which I also oppose, would be almost laughable in its concept. However, it is too serious a matter to be laughed off or to be considered in any way other than as a most grave concern.

The report deals with the most terrifying problem of our times. I am much concerned about the climate which such a report engenders in itself and, indeed, fosters in people's minds.

The climate of arms trading and of the arms race is a terrifying one. Defence, advice on defence and the whole problem associated with it has become in itself a huge industry. I am not talking now about the sale of arms; I am talking of the thousands – perhaps millions – of people who derive very comfortable incomes out of the whole atmosphere which has been engendered in recent years in the realm of defence and arms.

For the first time in his existence – I think that it is right to say it now – man has the power completely to destroy himself. The immediate effects of a nuclear explosion or nuclear holocaust, plus the later effects, show quite clearly that we could obliterate the human race. I have in mind the views of some of the great anthropologists and biologists. David Attenborough has had an excellent series of programmes on British television. He has talked about mankind being a threatened species, and one of the threats that he is envisaging is the threat that we make to ourselves by pursuing what I consider to be the mad race for more nuclear weapons and for biological and chemical weapons.

We have to pose this question really seriously to ourselves: is there really protection and is there really defence? The tenor of the report is that there is defence and that there is protection. I do not think that there is. But the report goes even further. It does not postulate the possibility of protection. It is actually saying or implying to people "You can be saved, you can survive".

I expect that we have all seen religious posters about being saved by a saviour or messiah. We may well be getting towards the situation in which such posters will be replaced by others suggesting that we can be saved by the use of fallout shelters that we are supposed to be building for ourselves or instructing our governments to build for us or to make available for purchase.



*Dr. Miller (continued)*

In my opinion, the report is pulling the wool over people's eyes. I do not say that it does so deliberately or wittingly, but it does so by implication. It is deceiving the public into not only thinking but believing that there is the possibility of survival in certain circumstances. Yes, there could be survival at the periphery, and that claim has been made by supporters of the report and supporters of so-called protection against nuclear fallout.

The trouble is that any enemy who is to attack us with nuclear weapons will not give us the two pieces of vital information which are necessary to determine where the periphery will be. He will not tell us the size of the weapon that he proposes to explode and he will not tell us the exact point over which he is to explode it.

Our only hope, in a terrifying and devastating situation, rather than gulling the public into believing that they can be saved, is to tell the truth and impress upon people the horror of biological, chemical and nuclear warfare to such an extent that the public will make the demand upon us as politicians and parliamentarians to go out and strive ceaselessly for peace instead of drifting towards the dangers of war.

It used to be said that old men should not start wars which they expected young men to fight. Nuclear, biological and chemical warfare would render that rather simple view completely out of date, because that kind of warfare would kill us all without even the chance of a fight.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Dr. Miller.

I call Mr. Jager.

Mr. JAGER (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to take the opportunity afforded by Mr. Banks' excellent report to inform the house that the problem of civil defence has become a topical issue in France. Two of my colleagues who are in the Senate, Mr. Bonnefous and Mr. Marcellin, have just published a background report in which many of the suggestions put forward in the Banks report also appear.

In our view, civil defence has to become a "burning duty". For indeed, the doctrine of deterrence does not in itself provide an absolute guarantee for the protection of the public and the safeguard of territorial integrity, seeing that, firstly, the potential enemy does not rule out the actual use of nuclear, or indeed biological and chemical weapons, and is prepared to accept the risk of a strike against his territory, and that, secondly, the numerous forms of modern conflict – psychological, economic,

subversive, via an intermediary aggressor, etc. – call for a variety of responses involving the general public.

We therefore think that civil defence – including economic measures – should be a "burning duty". The benefits of putting it into effect would be twofold. Internally, it would strengthen the bond between the nation and its freely-elected leaders and thus contribute to national unity in the face of an external threat. Externally, it would strengthen defence strategy by increasing its credibility.

Nevertheless, Mr. Banks, I do not think it enough to recommend a programme of technical measures. In my view, it should be borne in mind that an effective civil defence policy requires three conditions to be fulfilled: the necessary change in attitudes has to be brought about; the reactivation of civil defence has to be the result of a political decision at the highest level; finally, the administrative structures have to be set up and sufficient funds mobilised.

Once these three conditions have been met, the next move is to the stage of technical measures. The report before us contains many very interesting suggestions concerning warning systems, aid to the general public, and shelters. But I do think, Mr. Banks, that there should also be a policy for laying down stocks of food and of certain mineral raw materials.

The Marcellin-Bonnefous report which I have already mentioned also contains some extremely relevant estimates of the cost of a minimum civil defence programme. The cost of such a policy would in no event exceed 0.6% of the defence budget. It would therefore be quite bearable.

In conclusion, Ladies and Gentlemen, I fully support paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation. A civil defence policy is indispensable since it would save many human lives. Given the present state of international relations, the rapid implementation of a co-ordinated joint programme of civil defence is a matter of vital national urgency for each of our countries. In voting for the Banks report, Ladies and Gentlemen, our Assembly will therefore be meeting the challenge of history.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Jager.

I now call Mr. Smith. The next speaker after him will be Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I want to speak briefly about the chemical warfare aspect, which I believe that the report brings out effectively and rather starkly. I feel, and have felt for a long time, that the most serious aspect of the war threat now is the one dealing with the chemical capabilities of the potential aggressors of the East. Indeed, the

*Mr. Smith (continued)*

stark fact is – it is underlined by the report, and so far I have heard nobody deny it – that the Soviet Union possesses a massive capability for offensive chemical warfare. We are dealing with a situation where we cannot trust the Soviet Union.

Only on Monday in this Assembly, the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands stated: "Moscow has violated the rules of the game." We all realise that we cannot trust the Soviet Union after what happened in Afghanistan and after a number of other treaties have been blatantly ignored. Of course, we should all work towards the abolition of nuclear weapons and the abolition of chemical capability, but we must be on our guard because, as I say, I do not believe that we can trust the Soviet Union.

We know now that the Soviet Union has both the weapons for chemical warfare capability and the delivery systems. We in the West, certainly in the countries of Europe, have only our defensive measures. We do not have a nuclear offensive capability in NATO, and the United States, as the report stresses, has only a limited capability and seems to be very slowly gathering pace in trying to decide whether or not to expand its chemical capability.

There are many people, and I am one of them, who believe almost exclusively that we have enjoyed peace in the world over the last thirty-five years on a general level because of the balance of the nuclear deterrent and that this has been the reason why there has been no aggressor country on an international scale. I believe that that balance is now seriously undermined by the massive chemical capability of the Soviet Union. I believe – and the report brings it out if we read it carefully – that we are now very vulnerable. I believe that we should, as a group of nations who believe in the preservation of freedom, take serious note indeed of what Mr. Banks and his Committee tell us.

I wish to make three specific points about the chemical capability. Because of the imbalance which has now been created, a chemical attack is now much more likely than a nuclear attack in the event of the outbreak of war. It will be appreciated by a potential aggressor that the use of nerve gases and the like will, at least, save environmental devastation while achieving the diabolical objective of wiping out masses of people, thousands and millions of their enemies.

Secondly, if the chemical warfare capabilities are sophisticated and successfully controlled, as indeed they are, this will give the aggressor an overwhelming superiority. We all know just how sophisticated these weapons are in compa-

ison with years gone by. The report of Mr. Banks brings out the fact, of which I was not aware and I doubt whether many other members even of middle age are aware, that in the first world war more than 100,000 were killed and more than 1 million were injured by the use of gas.

We know that for various reasons, which I shall not explore now, chemical agents were not used during the second world war. But we have come a long way in the last thirty-five years, and I believe that the use of chemical warfare now could be of such a sophistication as to be totally effective without damaging and ruining the attacking aggressor country, whereas biological warfare still presents some problems and I tend to discount that more than other things.

The third point I want to make, which is really in the form of a question, is whether, if the Soviet Union used its offensive chemical capability, we would respond with a nuclear riposte. Would we in fact do this? I suppose that it would depend on the scale of the aggression by the aggressor where chemical warfare was concerned. But it would put us in an enormous dilemma as to whether we retaliated by using our nuclear capability. This dilemma is an inescapable fact because, as we know and as the report tells us, we do not have an offensive chemical capability.

I cannot understand the protesters about chemical warfare. I accept that all of us look with abhorrence on nuclear warfare, chemical warfare or biological warfare. It is unacceptable. It is unthinkable. But it is there and it is waiting for use in certain circumstances, and we should be constantly on our guard. I am told by one of the local branches of the United Nations Association in my constituency that I should come out strongly against chemical warfare. I come out strongly against chemical warfare, but I also come out strongly in suggesting that we should have a chemical capability in the West which can match that of the Soviet Union and which will give us the balance of deterrence which is so necessary.

Perhaps I may end by using a little known quotation by Winston Churchill. He said on one occasion: "It is not enough to do your best. Sometimes it is essential to do what is necessary." I submit to this Assembly that it is vitally necessary for the West to have a chemical capability of offensive proportions in order to preserve the balance of power and to make sure that in this uneasy world we have a good many more years ahead of us without the outbreak of international war.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Smith.

*The President (continued)*

I call Mr. Dejardin, and after him I shall call Mr. Grant.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the day before yesterday our esteemed colleague, Charles Hanin, pronounced a sentence, to the applause of the majority of those present, which I took the liberty of noting down. Europe, he said, “must be capable of taking initiatives in order to break through the vicious circle of permanent rearmament”.

In the same debate I referred to the concept some people have of peace, particularly in the guise of *pax romana*, and it is perhaps symbolic that the first paragraph of Mr. Banks’ report is an illustration of the celebrated Latin dictum *si vis pacem para bellum* which is moreover reaffirmed in modern terms in paragraph 1.8 of the report.

I must say that I deplore the scaremongering going on once again in this Assembly. It sometimes helps to explain many attitudes and initiatives, but the allegation I note at the beginning of the report, in paragraph 1.5, that “there is no longer a NATO capability for a prolonged conventional war”, is a very serious one.

Well, Mr. President, I ask in all simplicity: what is the use of all these millions we are spending on conventional arms, particularly troop transporters, if, from the outset, an eminent military expert like Mr. Banks tells us that NATO is no longer capable of conducting a prolonged conventional war?

Mr. Banks will therefore forgive me if I find his report less than excellent, not out of any desire to be different but because I consider – as is my right – that he has abused his position as Rapporteur. He was asked to draw up a report on nuclear, biological and chemical protection – that is the title – it being understood that the meaning was protection of the civilian population.

Now, the emphasis in this report is not on civil defence. That is mentioned, of course, but the basic thrust is that governments ought to acquire and stockpile chemical weapons, the cost of which, according to the experts, is horrifying and far exceeds all the sacrifices made by the people of our countries, the taxpayers, for the sake of defence expenditure. This frightful cost, however, is not without profit for those who manufacture such weapons; and there, in my view, is the crux of the matter.

The recommendation, particularly paragraph 4 (e), also aims to promote the sale of gadgetry.

May I remind you, for your amusement, of what happened not so long ago in the United States where the public were sold paper hats at two dollars each as safety helmets to be worn as protection against the bits and pieces of the Soyuz space station that was about to break up in the atmosphere. This is the same sort of exploitative trade in gadgets that serve no very clear purpose but have an effect in terms of crowd psychology.

Need I also remind you, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, of the contents of the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council to the Assembly, particularly the statement about chemical weapons in Chapter III.E, which is nothing less than a reiteration of the refusal of the member states of WEU to encourage or allow the manufacture or stockpiling of chemical weapons.

Reference has also been made to the constant United Nations resolutions against the use of chemical weapons. Well, such weapons could not be used if they were not manufactured or stockpiled.

Mr. President, you know better than I the effects of chemical weapons. You are not as young as I am, and there are doubtless still to be found in your country, Britain – in any case there are many of them in Belgium – ex-soldiers gassed in the Yser valley who survived and suffer to this day in their very flesh, and are there to remind us of the horrors of chemical weapons.

You will forgive my frankness, but I must say the Rapporteur’s arguments are specious – at the least they are open to dispute – and a case of what I would call “doom-mongering”.

Of course, Ladies and Gentlemen, we all have our own military experts, but all those I have ever consulted have told me that chemical weapons have no deterrent effect.

I read in paragraph 2.39 of the report: “The fact that gas was used by neither side in World War II probably resulted not so much from the existence of the Geneva Convention as from a military assessment that no clear military advantage could be obtained when the adversary had a retaliatory capacity and when both sides possessed protective equipment”.

Well, perhaps. But other military experts consider that the fact that gas and chemical weapons were not used during the last world war was because there were no longer any trenches and it was war of movement rather than a war of position.

I could give other examples: the massive use of chemical weapons by the American troops in Vietnam in a war of position and, as seems now to be confirmed, the use of chemical weapons

*Mr. Dejardin (continued)*

by the Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan against a population it cannot otherwise subjugate.

Now, a war in Europe would clearly not be a war of position. It would be essentially a war of movement, and in that case chemical weapons, unlike nuclear weapons, would not be employable.

With a great deal of objectivity the Rapporteur reminds us of the statement by a former British Minister, Mr. Healey, that it is almost inconceivable that enemy forces would use chemical weapons against NATO forces.

Of course, Mr. Banks, who is a conservative, finds a supporter in his colleague and political friend, Mr. Pym, who is of a different opinion, but that is to be expected simply because some people are more sensitive to the idea of peace than others.

In conclusion: yes, I think it essential that we should co-operate in drawing up the coherent plans we do not have at the present time — plans for protecting the civilian population, essentially, against a possible attack with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Yes to the search for effective protection plans. But no to the horrifying escalation of chemical weapons that we are being asked to stockpile, an escalation which would basically benefit the private shareholders of the chemical industry. This Assembly does not say enough about who benefits financially from the arms deals and the stockpiling of weapons, chemical weapons included.

Nor do I think it desirable, for the dignity of our Assembly, that it should be used as an advertising medium for certain unscrupulous industrialists or profiteering businessmen. At the risk of appearing discourteous, dare I mention Mr. Banks' statement in Committee about one of his industrialist friends who manufactures individual shelters? You will also have heard of the Belgian paper *La Libre Belgique*, which is beginning to publish regular small ads offering would-be buyers individual shelters without any technical control or scientific guarantee. This is an open door for charlatans and, of course, for certain dealers of the less scrupulous, less respectable kind.

I repeat: yes to the protection of our peoples, to the protection of men and women and our common heritage; no to the attempt to promote a chemical arms race. I shall therefore vote in favour of the five amendments tabled by the Socialist Group.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

*(The President continued in English)*

I call Mr. Grant. The next speaker after him will be Sir Frederic Bennett.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). — I should like first to deal with the argument of my colleague, Peter Hardy, an argument that he advanced with great sincerity but total fallacy. Of course, we can agree with him that spending on social and welfare matters is essential for the people of free societies and that the collapse of, or political or economic unrest in, free countries in the West would be a major object of enemies in the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. But all the argument countering the need to spend on civil defence, as advocated by the report, presupposes that the dangers of nuclear, biological or chemical warfare are receding or, at least, not growing.

I submit, for the same reasons as those advanced by our Rapporteur, that all the evidence is entirely to the contrary. If we are right, I fear that all the spending that Mr. Hardy and his colleagues want on welfare, social advance and similar matters would be worthless in the event of a major attack of that nature. If the adoption of the recommendations in the report saved a single human life, believing, as I do, in the sanctity of the individual, I believe that it would have been worthwhile and that any money involved would have been well spent.

Two or three years ago we had a debate here about confidence-building measures. I made a speech in which I raised the subject of civil defence and its contribution to confidence-building in this dangerous world. The subject was not particularly fashionable at the time and very little attention was paid to my speech. Now, however, my colleague, Mr. Banks, has devoted his remarkable intellect and energy to producing this equally remarkable report. Fear and confusion arise through ignorance, and confidence can come only from knowledge of the dangers that exist. The report makes a unique contribution to knowledge on this vital and horrific subject.

A study of history in the fourteenth century, when so many people succumbed to the plague, demonstrates that if some of the most simple precautions that were available at the time had been taken, many thousands, if not millions, more people would have survived. That is the theme underlying the similar danger that exists in the twentieth century.

The report highlights the lamentable lack of preparation that has taken place on this matter in the western world. In the United Kingdom particularly, this is certainly true. All too many authorities in England are living in what I call "the rusty bucket of water and stirrup pump" era of the last war, and this pathetic lack of preparation, co-ordination and informa-

*Mr. Grant (continued)*

tion also exists in many other western countries as well. I believe that NATO should take the lead in this respect in order to push forward the policies advocated by Mr. Banks. It is no good believing that we can continue to live under the United States umbrella. That simply will not do. It is a contemptible and unrealistic outlook. Therefore, I urge that NATO itself should play a far greater part in this area.

There is a dangerous mood of fatalism prevailing. I have noticed it in many of the speeches that we have heard today. There is a feeling that mankind is about to enter an apocalypse and that we shall all disappear in a great cloud of nuclear fallout or be destroyed by chemical or biological germs or diseases. This mood of fatalism contrasts unfavourably with the massive and realistic preparations that are taking place in the Soviet Union, where enormous resources are devoted to the survival of the civilian population. A top four-star general is in command of the whole exercise and the country has a capability which would enable millions of people to survive a nuclear attack and continue to work.

We must have a much more positive approach. Mankind can and will survive nuclear, chemical or biological war, provided that the will to do so exists. The report is a remarkable example of realism. I hope that it will put determination into ministers and governments in order to give our people the opportunity to continue to live. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Grant.

I now call Sir Frederic Bennett, and the next speaker will be Mr. Brown.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, the last speaker finished on the note on which I propose to introduce my short remarks. Possibly the best tribute that one can pay to this paper is that it is realistic. No one yet has been able in any way to undermine the realism that runs through the central thread in the report and recommendations.

Long ago in the West, with the support of all governments of all political shades in NATO, it was realised that our security depended on the maintenance of a deterrent capacity in conventional and nuclear weapons. Indeed, it is plain everywhere that had this deterrent capacity not existed during the last thirty years we would already have been at war. I have never been able to understand why, when it has been accepted by governments and parties of all colours that there should be a deterrent capacity against the Soviet Union in both nuclear and conventional weapons, the same attitudes do not exist when we talk about a deterrent

capacity in chemical weapons. Chemical warfare is one of the other arms in which there is virtually no deterrent capacity at all.

I do not know how many people saw the Figaro magazine last week in which there were pictures and full details of a truly horrific nature of the suffering of the Afghans in tribal areas. I visited these areas recently and I know that what is being done to these people is enough to make anyone think hard. If anyone believes that the chemical weapons which have been used against the Afghan people in the last few weeks and which are still being used now would have been used had the Afghans had any form of deterrent capacity in their hands, he should think again. There are those who say that although the Soviet Union has these weapons, that does not mean that they will ever use them. To those people I say “Look at Figaro last week”. They could then come to a conclusion about the reluctance or otherwise of the Soviet forces to use those weapons when they are quite certain that there is no capacity for either retaliation or deterrence.

I turn to the question of civil defence, and particularly to the speech of Mr. De Jardin. Apparently he takes exception to civil defence measures on the basis that these will provide an opportunity to those whom he described as “unscrupulous industrialists”. If governments wish to take over this rôle and provide a large-scale capacity for civil defence, I am perfectly happy to go along with that. If that is what Mr. De Jardin is saying, I am delighted. If he is saying that he agrees that it is absolutely essential to have large-scale civil defence in the West but that he wants it to be in public hands and voted out of the public purse, he carries me with him all the way. But I do not think that that is what he is saying.

At present it is significant that the countries that have devoted the greatest resources to civil defence and to protection against both conventional and nuclear warfare are the Chinese – I have been to see their defences in Peking – and the Russians themselves. Perhaps Mr. De Jardin will tell us whether “unscrupulous revisionist industrialists” are building protective shelters in Peking and Moscow. Certainly much money is being provided. I find it rather sinister to hear that in this Assembly there are those who are perfectly willing to countenance the massive erection of civil defence anti-nuclear shelters in Moscow but wish to deny them to our own people. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Frederic.

I now call Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I believe that Sir Frederic Bennett’s final remarks are very wide of the mark. The fact that one does

*Mr. Brown (continued)*

not accept what is in the report does not mean that one has no interest in it. I shall show Sir Frederic that I am concerned about the facts in the report itself.

Mr. Banks said that the defence of the civilian population was of paramount importance. I accept that. But that importance means that it must be based on fact, and I submit that the proposals in the report do nothing to show any proven facts but are simply "kidology". The report is a military man's response to the need for having an adequate solution to an inconvenient element in the playing of a war game.

Those who have ever played war games will know only too well that the military mind focuses on military solutions and tends to eliminate the political and civilian components of the scenario. Often one must draw attention to what one regards as a simple proposition. Mr. Banks calls for this simple type of proposition at the beginning of his paper, which talks of a stay-at-home policy. Mr. Banks has only to read any history book of the second world war to know that it is impossible to keep people at home. People even break curfews although threatened with shooting if they do so. Therefore, it is nonsense to suggest a stay-at-home policy.

Basically, the ethos of the report relies on receiving early warning of any attack. I believe that an aggressor is most unlikely to provide advance knowledge of his attack programme and the kind of weapon he intends to deliver, whether nuclear, biological or chemical. That is a Maginot-line type of thinking which is being applied to the use of these sophisticated and horrifying weapons.

Mr. Banks needs only to reflect on the experiences of the second world war, when the United Kingdom had to cope with the V-1 and V-2 rockets. The V-1 allowed time for a follow-through because it was a slow delivery, but no evidence was available of where it would finally fall. No warning was able to be given to the people underneath the rocket when it fell. The V-2 gave no warning time at all. It simply came and went, and it was assumed that the people where it fell were expendable. If Mr. Banks will reflect on that, he will see how absurd are some of his recommendations on civil defence. There is no evidence in the facts which he has produced to show that in the event of NBC weapons being used any more information would be available to the country at which the delivery systems were aimed about the type of weapon and where it would fall.

It is no good Mr. Banks pretending that there is any way within his knowledge at present for

such information being available from a potential aggressor. Let us examine paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation. This is the paragraph to which I object most strongly because it is based on "kidology". Paragraph 4 (a) calls for "objective information to the public on survival". Objective information by whom? By the military men? I have long ceased to have much faith in their subjective judgment. Therefore, who will provide the information? Does not Mr. Banks envisage the arguments, meetings, discussions and objections that will be raised when that "objective information" is put forward?

Does he not realise the objections by his friends as well as by others as to the form of such information? Therefore, there would be no sense of confidence in such a suggestion.

Paragraph 4(b) talks of "an organisation with protected and up-dated communications". That sounds all very well, but what does it mean? What organisation in the United Kingdom has Mr. Banks in mind? How will it be protected in the way he suggests? Who will run it? Where will it obtain its information? How will it be monitored when such weapons fall and there is chaos all round? Who does he suggest will send the feedback from the front, while standing there being rained upon by nuclear fallout, germs or chemicals? Can he imagine such a person sending over the information "It is not too good here. It is a little hot"? To what central organisation will that information be fed? How would that in any way help the civilian population?

Let us take paragraph 4 (c), which envisages "plans for the co-ordinated use of military reservists... Red Cross... similar organisations", having in mind no doubt the boy scouts, the police, the girl guides and any other group that may be around. The mind boggles. The best thing I can say about that paragraph is to suggest that it may be Mr. Banks' party's way of overcoming unemployment - namely, that the army of unemployed could be used in the preparation for nuclear war. That is the most charitable view I can take of the paragraph.

I mentioned paragraph 4 (d) to Mr. Banks when we sat in Committee, when he spoke so glibly about providing fallout shelters in public buildings and in the home. In Mr. Banks' home that may be possible, but it is not so easy in many homes in my constituency which rise to twenty-one storeys in the air. My area of London was an expendable area in 1939-45 when tens of thousands of my constituents died. I take it that Mr. Banks is suggesting that they would be expendable this time, too. Therefore, he is not thinking of the constituents in my area, because he has already decided that there is no survival for them because he can

*Mr. Brown (continued)*

find no way of preventing those twenty-storey blocks of flats being blown down in a holocaust.

I suggest that this part of the report is nothing more than a big confidence trick. I do not know why it was ever started. If we are stupid enough to accept paragraph 4, we shall open the field to the spiv, the wide boy and the Harry Limes of the 1980s. What would be produced would be of no value at all.

I propose the deletion of paragraph 4 because it is nonsense – and, what is more, dangerous nonsense. I suggest to Mr. Banks and to his supporters that it is far better to spend our time putting fear into the hearts of men by pointing out that there is no survival. They must understand that one's chances in a nuclear war are hopeless. I do not know where Mr. Grant gets the idea that he would be able to survive such a holocaust, or, indeed, would want to survive it. We must show to man that such a course is suicidal. It is a course on which any civilised society should not embark. That is the message that must go out.

As Mr. Banks rightly said, people have a natural instinct to survive. Therefore, if they can be brought to understand the hopelessness of such a course of action, I think that they will rebel. They will certainly rebel in our countries, but even more they will rebel in any other nation, whether it be the Soviet Union or anywhere else. They will rise up against such a ridiculous state of affairs.

When I read the report I thought that it had been written by Dr. Strangelove. Indeed, its title should be "The plan by Dr. Strangelove". Of course, I accept the enormous amount of work contained in the preparation of the report, certainly as to its factual content, but the proposals in paragraph 4 are not realistic and, indeed, are totally unrealistic. What is more, it has as its basis a confidence trick, which I cannot support. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Brown.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, the report Mr. Banks is presenting on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments certainly responds to long-standing expectations. In the light of current strategic developments, these expectations will no doubt be expressed with increasing vigour in the WEU member countries.

It is noted that the Soviet Union has deployed anti-force missiles, backed by a very active policy of building shelters and organising

the dispersal of the population. These facts which, as Mr. Jager pointed out, were highlighted in a recent report submitted to the French Senate by Mr. Marcellin and Mr. Bonnefous, seem to bring the idea of actual nuclear attack and counter-attack within the bounds of possibility.

Moreover, and this is perhaps even more plausible, surely the danger of subversive action is even greater in such highly organised and industrialised societies as our own, which the complexity of modern economic life renders very vulnerable? These threats are aggravated by the danger of nuclear proliferation which might make atomic arms available to states governed by irresponsible men or create a risk of nuclear blackmail by terrorist organisations.

So Mr. Banks' report is highly topical. The civil defence measures he invites WEU governments to take are not on the same scale as the dangers, especially in France where very little has been accomplished to date.

In 1980 France set aside an appropriation of only 1.5 million francs for protection against biological and chemical dangers. At present – regrettably no doubt – there is no question in France of arranging for the evacuation of large urban centres, or of undertaking a huge-scale programme of shelter-building, even when new flats and public buildings are to be constructed. The administration has not even looked into the possibility of providing shelters. So in coming years it will not be possible to protect the population effectively on site.

The Banks report has the merit of laying special stress on the very sensitive problem of the inadequacy of the measures taken in Europe. Some of the recommendations, however, which go beyond the framework of civilian defence, seem less useful.

Why, Mr. Rapporteur, do you make a veiled demand for an increase in the existing chemical arms stock when negotiations are under way to ban such arms? Here I agree with Mr. Dejaradin's comments.

Deterrence is the prime object of strategic nuclear weapons; their credibility is reinforced by maintaining a minimum conventional and tactical nuclear protection. Chemical arms cannot really be fitted into this picture.

True, the United States and the United Kingdom are engaged on research in the chemical field. But at present these are national activities that need not be followed at European or Atlantic level as things now stand.

Lastly, the measures advocated by Mr. Banks to protect the electronic equipment and communications networks, desirable as they may be in themselves, must not in my view be

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

interpreted as an encouragement for the systematic integration of those systems. Although it must be possible for networks and data banks to be interconnected and to have harmonised interfaces, every state must retain control of its own means of detection, information and decision-making, as no one disputes.

Mr. President, I hope my brief statement has not taken up too much of the Assembly's time. It is true that some of these remarks are reservations.

To conclude, in my view the general tenor of the report is sufficiently useful for me to hope the Assembly will vote in favour of Mr. Banks' recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

*(The President continued in English)*

Would Mr. Banks, the Rapporteur, care to wind up?

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). – We have had a very interesting debate. It has been controversial. Mr. Bernini started by stressing the importance of arms control negotiation, and I agree with him. He also made a point about referring back recommendations, with which I heartily disagree.

Mr. Hardy reiterated some of what I would term the old socialist arguments against defence spending. Under the Labour Government, our country suffered considerable cuts in its defence expenditure fund. The price for those cuts is now being paid in terms of the inadequacies particularly of the numbers of pilots for our fighter aircraft and the fewer numbers of aircraft which are available.

*(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

Mr. Hardy also referred to cuts in local authority expenditure as making it more difficult for local authorities to respond to civil defence arrangements. At the same time, he was dismissing the suggestion that we should make adequate civil defence arrangements, so I found some conflict in his argument, which did not really add up. He also took us back to the fourteenth century. History can teach us lessons. Perhaps the best lesson is that of the first world war, when chemical warfare was used, with horrifying results. The aim of the report is to prevent that sort of warfare being used again.

Dr. Miller referred in particular to the problem of sheltering people who live in flats. I agree that this is one of the great problems that we have to face, with the advent of high-rise

blocks of flats. But many of them have basements as part of their foundation structure, and those basement areas should be converted to provide shelter accommodation. I do not believe that we shall be able to keep people in their flats when there is a war alert or the threat of a nuclear strike.

I am grateful to Dr. Miller for his kind thanks to me about the report. He also referred to pulling the wool over people's eyes about the possibility of survival. I refer him to the statements I made in my speech, when I suggested that for many people there would be survival. With some protection, at least people would be spared a long and painful death. That is an element that people too readily overlook. Death could be a long, tedious, difficult and painful process without the provision of proper protection. The use of nuclear weapons would not mean that everybody could opt for instant death. That would not be an option.

Mr. Jager referred to civil defence in France, and he was right to say that my report is limited. There are, indeed, areas which I should have liked to explore, but time did not permit. He referred to administrative arrangements and to the stockpiling of food and supplies. These are two very important areas. Perhaps I could add a third area – that of medical training in the treatment of people suffering from nuclear and chemical contamination. There is also the question of the stockpiling of medical supplies for those treatments.

Mr. Dudley Smith made a valuable contribution on the importance of balancing the deterrence in the chemical warfare capability of NATO as opposed to the Warsaw Pact. He pointed to the key argument that has to be answered – the dilemma over the response of NATO to a chemical attack. What is that response to be? Does it mean the employment of limited battlefield nuclear weapons by way of retaliation, or what does it mean? That is a very important key question and I am delighted that it was raised.

Mr. Dejardin made an impassioned speech. I heartily disagreed with every syllable that he uttered. He referred to the profits of manufacturers. As Sir Frederic Bennett pointed out, the fact that governments have not developed shelter systems, which could be on offer to the public or provided under some government arrangements, has meant that the number of manufacturers has grown in the United Kingdom from one or two to literally dozens of firms which are responding to public demand and providing shelters. What worries me – I hope that it worries Mr. Dejardin – is that the standard of those shelters must be properly monitored by governments in order to ensure



*Mr. Banks (continued)*

that the public have the chance of purchasing shelters which are adequate for the purpose for which they are sold.

I should like to say that the insinuation of a friendship that Mr. Dejardin says I have with a manufacturer is scurrilous and factless, and I would ask him to withdraw his insinuation.

Mr. Grant talked about fear and confusion arising out of ignorance, and how right that is. I thank him very much for his compliments on the report. It is the ignorance of people, particularly on the question of survival and on the question of what action people themselves can take, that I think is beginning to worry a large number of people in our respective countries.

I thank Sir Frederic Bennett for his remarks. He did us a service by referring to the lack of governments' position over the question of providing shelters. The other remarks that he made were a valuable contribution to this debate.

Mr. Brown and I are on opposite sides of the spectrum. I have the Norwegian Government, the Dutch people and the French Government, and certainly the Russian Government and the Chinese Government, on my side when I say that I believe that civil defence is a vital necessity for our countries. Therefore I think that Mr. Brown's speech would fall rather flat on the ears of those who have the comfort of knowing that their governments are looking after them and also are providing as much protection as possible for their own survival.

The whole question of survival is a subject that has been dealt with thoroughly and factually. I have tried in the report, and the Committee has given me its support, to set out the real facts of the case and to indicate that survival is indeed possible. Mr. Brown also referred to early warning. This, of course, is vitally important. What he overlooks is that radioactive cloud moves according to the wind direction, and in the headquarters in the countries that I visited I noticed maps on the walls showing the possible movement of radioactive fallout. To enable a warning signal to be given to the people in the path of that cloud, so that they can take proper protection, is of prime importance, and that is something that governments have really got to do.

Mr. Valleix asked specifically why I thought it was necessary to increase stocks of chemical weapons when the banning of the manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons is under negotiation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Those talks have been going on now for nearly five years, which is a

devil of a long time, and the problem arises over verification. As I said in my speech, there are other areas where agreement after all this time has still not been reached.

We have to reflect that during the course of this period of five years the stockpile of United States chemicals and munitions has been deteriorating. Chemicals have a life of between fifteen and twenty years. What is necessary, to answer the question, is that we raise our retaliatory capability as an aid to bringing the talks in Geneva to a fruitful conclusion so that all these weapons and their use can be banned and their stockpiles disseminated. That is important. But it is also important to ensure that if war ever did break out at least both sides would know that they had the weapons at their disposal, and that would be a feature which would prevent their use from ever being undertaken.

Mr. President, I am grateful for this second opportunity to speak on the report. I am grateful to those who have indicated that they will be giving it support in the vote.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you very much, Mr. Banks.

We now proceed to consider the amendments to the draft recommendation in Document 838.

The first amendment is tabled by Mr. Ahrens and Mr. Büchner:

1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, line 2, leave out "use" and insert "production".

Do you wish to move the amendment, Mr. Ahrens?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have proposed an amendment to paragraph (iii) of the preamble. Mr. Banks' draft speaks of the "use" of chemical weapons. I believe this is wrong. The use of chemical weapons has been banned since 1925 under the Geneva Protocol. So that cannot be the issue here. Nor is it the issue in the negotiations with the Soviet Union on the conclusion of a further agreement.

It seems to me, therefore, that here we have to go further and instead of the ban on the "use" of chemical weapons we should call for a ban on their "production". Otherwise the text would simply not say what is meant. I therefore ask for my amendment to be agreed to.

The PRESIDENT. — The amendment has been proposed.

Does anyone wish to speak to the amendment?...

*The President (continued)*

Does the Rapporteur wish to comment on the amendment?

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). – The Committee has met and discussed the set of amendments that Mr. Ahrens and Mr. Büchner have tabled. The word “use” was taken out of the terms of reference for the negotiations which are going on in Geneva. I would resist the change from “use” to “production” but, with the Committee’s support, I should be happy to include the full text from the terms of reference. This would read:

In paragraph (iii) of the preamble, before “use” insert “manufacture, stockpiling or” – that is, we would say: “manufacture, stockpiling or use”.

Those are the terms of reference for the negotiations. This would not in any way weaken the Geneva agreement signed in 1935. That agreement also prohibited and banned the use of bacteriological weapons; and that itself was superseded in 1972 with a new convention also referring to the word “use”. I very much hope that Mr. Ahrens will agree to the new alterations I have just proposed.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Ahrens?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would agree to that. We need then only make the corresponding addition to the French text.

The PRESIDENT. – The proposer has accepted the Rapporteur’s suggestion that the addition of the words “manufacture, stockpiling, or” should precede the word “use”, and, of course, there will be a corresponding amendment to the French text.

Does the Assembly accept that amendment?...

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The manuscript amendment is agreed to.*

We shall now vote on Amendment 1, as amended.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 1, as amended, is agreed to.*

I call Mr. Ahrens to move Amendment 2:

2. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “an equality of retaliatory and defensive capability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact” and insert “maintaining a complete deterrent and defensive capability as required by MC 14/3”.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this amendment concerns paragraph (iv) of the preamble. The text of the draft recommendation appears to rest upon a false concept of flexible response. One gets the impression that the author of the text is proceeding on the assumption that in each case deterrence should be achieved with arms of the same kind as those employed by the attacker and that in the case of a tank attack, for example, the riposte is to be made with tanks only. However, such a concept of “deterrence by component” is no part of flexible response as defined in document MC 14/3, which lays down the principles on which flexible response rests. In my view, therefore, the text has to be reworded so as to conform with the principles of flexible response.

“Deterrence by component” makes it easy for an attacker to calculate the risk. If anyone attacking with tanks can count on the fact that only tanks will be used in riposte, he is running a lesser risk than if he had to expect that other weapons too might be used from the area concerned. I therefore think it would be better to draft the text so that it corresponds to the currently-accepted concept of flexible response. I therefore ask that the amendment be agreed.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak to the amendment?...

I ask the Rapporteur to give us the Committee’s view.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). – The Committee’s view is that the amendment should be resisted. It refers to “MC 14/3”. I do not know what it is, except that it is a secret document in NATO, and I do not think that it would be appropriate to add a reference to a secret NATO document to the report. In any event, nobody could obtain information about what that document spelt out. Therefore, I must resist the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Do you wish to comment, Mr. Ahrens?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if the only difficulty – and the only reason for rejection – is the mention of this document, MC 14/3, which is in fact secret, then the amendment could be reworded to read: “as required by the principles of flexible response”. These principles, I would repeat, are set out in detail in document MC 14/3.

The PRESIDENT. – Would that revised version be acceptable to the Committee?

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). – No, Mr. President. The Committee has deliberated on

*Mr. Banks (continued)*

this matter and I think that it would be better to oppose the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Ahrens, do you wish your proposal to be put in your new formulation or as it is tabled? Do you want me to put it with your final words about “principles of flexible defence” in place of “MC 14/3”?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as there are obviously reasons that go beyond the question of the wording, I would like to keep to the original text.

The PRESIDENT. – The proposal, therefore, is the original Amendment 2 as tabled and circulated.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 2 is negatived.*

We proceed to Amendment 3:

3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“2. To investigate within NATO the requirement for a deterrent and retaliatory capability consisting of chemical weapons and the legal limitations with respect to their use;”.

I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – This amendment concerns paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation. I think this paragraph should be changed, for the reasons I have already mentioned. What is, after all, the “estimated” offensive capability of the Warsaw Pact in chemical weapons? Here again we have a clear reference to equivalence of defence components which does not correspond to the current concept of flexible response. That is the reason for the amendment. As far as I can see, there is no difference between the English and French texts in this case.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for that short introduction, Mr. Ahrens.

Does anyone else wish to speak to the amendment?...

Does the Rapporteur wish to speak?

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). – The Committee has deliberated on this amendment, and the decision was that we should resist it.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 3 is negatived.*

We now come to Amendment 4:

4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “use” and insert “transfer”.

I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this amendment concerns paragraph 3 of the recommendation. Here again the text speaks of the “use” of chemical weapons. I would refer to what I said about my first amendment. In this instance, if we are to say something new, what we should do is not to forbid “use”, but to replace the word “use” by the word “transfer”.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone else wish to speak to the amendment?...

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). – The Committee has deliberated on this amendment also. Its decision was that we should incorporate the word “transfer”, which I think is a valuable addition to the paragraph, retaining “use”, so that the wording will be “stockpiling, transfer and use”.

The PRESIDENT. – I note that Mr. Ahrens accepts the Rapporteur’s suggestion.

Does the Assembly accept that amendment?

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The manuscript amendment is agreed to.*

We shall now vote on the amendment, as amended.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 4, as amended, is agreed to.*

Finally, we come to Amendment 5:

5. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I shall not rehearse the arguments that I put forward in my speech, but I was not very satisfied with the answer. Paragraph 4 asks for the urgent implementation of a “stay-at-home” civil defence policy. There is no evidence that a stay-at-home policy is the right policy. Evacuation to other areas might well be the answer for certain categories of people. Therefore, the terminology can be challenged.

Paragraph 4 (e), with which I did not deal in my speech, is a recommendation that only those who can afford to buy respirators and

*Mr. Brown (continued)*

other equipment should be allowed to be saved from such actions as it is presupposed can occur.

I find this most offensive. Old people, the infirm and children will be bombarded with the urgency for self-protection and the need to take care of themselves or else they will die. Then a price tag will be put on the protection which they will not be able to afford. Those people will be in terrible fear. I believe that the whole of paragraph 4 is nonsense, but (e) is the worst part of all because it is a deliberate attempt to create a situation in which poor people will be told that if they cannot buy shelters from the spivs, the hyper-spivs and the Harry Limes of the 1980s they will probably die. I hope that the Assembly will throw out that recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Brown.

Does anyone else wish to speak to the amendment?...

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – May I simply ask Mr. Brown what he means by the “Harry Limes of the 1980s”? I do not quite understand.

The PRESIDENT. – I think that Mr. Brown made his observations quite clearly. I got the impression that he was opposed to paragraph 4, and (e) in particular. I think he made that quite clear.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I ask Mr. Banks to think very carefully before he replies to this amendment. There is much detail in the report and we have already paid tribute to Mr. Banks for the information that is contained in it. I mention in passing that it does not contain information about the fact that the Conservative Government’s defence cuts of November 1973 were appallingly savage and were largely ignored by the media in Britain. However, the report is useful from the point of view of information.

I accept the wisdom of the first part of the report, dealing with the need to ensure that our troops on the central front are able to survive the kind of onslaught that is envisaged, but if the recommendation contains paragraph 4 as it stands many of us will have to vote against it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I appeal to the Rapporteur. I would vote for the report if paragraph 4 of the recommendation were omitted. There is a much better chance that

governments would take heed of the report if this paragraph were left out. I do not think that our governments would consider this suggestion to be realistic, and, therefore, I appeal to Mr. Banks to remove it.

The PRESIDENT. – Are there any other speakers?...

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). – The Committee has not deliberated on the amendment because it was received only this morning. I am bound to say that I must resist it. There is no surety of any safe areas. If there were, those would be the places to put people. At present, the only reliable philosophy is to ensure that people stay at home and make the best of where they are rather than take to the roads and move to other areas which, in any event, could be contaminated to the same degree. That is why countries such as Norway have developed a shelter programme.

On the question of the selling of equipment, I am not setting a standard for people to rush out and start up companies selling equipment and bombarding the public with their goods. There is, however, a demand for information, and people want to know where they can get masks and respirators and other equipment. I do not see why people should not be given the opportunity, if the government provide the encouragement, to buy the odd sandbag or whatever they want. Nobody knows whether they can do these things unless the information is there. The public have a right to be allowed to make their own purchases if they wish to do so. Those who cannot will be covered by government policy on civil defence. Of course, I do not want to see spivs in that sort of industry. It is important that the government should set the standards and put a seal of approval on all the items which are made available to the public. I would fully support that.

The PRESIDENT. – An amendment has been moved to leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation.

We shall now vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The amendment is negatived.*

I must now put the amended draft recommendation as a whole to the vote.

I imagine that it is unlikely to be unanimous, which is the only way in which we could ensure not having a roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

I note that there are and, therefore, we must take a vote by roll-call.

*The President (continued)*

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Ahrens.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

I am sorry to inform the Assembly that we do not have a quorum. Therefore, the vote will have to be taken again this afternoon, probably after Mr. Ahrens' report has been begun.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. May we have guidance from the Chair as to the time at which you intend to take the vote on the earlier report?

The PRESIDENT. – I hope to do so after Mr. Ahrens has presented his report. The vote will be taken at about half-past three or four o'clock. I cannot be more precise than that.

#### **8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 837 and Amendment).
2. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection (Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Document 838).
3. Defence-related information technology (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 840).
4. State of European aerospace activities – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 841).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.)*

## SIXTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th June 1980

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Changes in the membership of Committees.
4. The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 837 and Amendment*).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Ahrens (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Ahrens (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Ahrens.
5. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 838*).
6. Changes in the membership of Committees.
7. Defence-related information technology (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 840*).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Brasseur (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Osborn, Mr. Brasseur (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lenzer (*Vice-Chairman of the Committee*).
8. State of European aerospace activities – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 841*).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Scheffler (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Konings, Mr. Osborn, Mr. Scheffler (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Lenzer (*Vice-Chairman of the Committee*).
9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT.– The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

I stress again the importance of all members signing the attendance list, and in particular the importance of Substitutes signing their names clearly to assist us in taking roll-calls.

1. See page 47.

### 3. Changes in the membership of Committees

The PRESIDENT. – The Belgian Delegation proposes the following change in the membership of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments: Mr. Peeters as an alternate member in place of Mrs. Staels-Dompas; and in the membership of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions: Mrs. Staels-Dompas as an alternate member in place of Mr. Peeters.

Is there any opposition to these changes?...

They are agreed to.

### 4. The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 837 and Amendment)*

The PRESIDENT. – The Orders of the Day now call for the presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on the northern flank and the Atlantic- and Channel commands, followed by debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 837 and Amendment.

*The President (continued)*

In a moment I shall call Mr. Ahrens, the Rapporteur of the Committee, to present the report. However, I have had notice of a previous question in the name of Mr. Boucheny and others. This has been distributed as Document 847. Since the previous question seeks to put aside the business before the Assembly, it must be taken before any debate on the Order of the Day itself.

In order to have the report and the draft recommendation formally before the Assembly, I shall first call Mr. Ahrens to present the report. I shall then call Mr. Boucheny to move his previous question. The Assembly will then have to decide upon Mr. Boucheny's previous question and we shall proceed from there.

I call Mr. Ahrens to present his report.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the security of the North Atlantic Alliance is being more and more influenced by supra-regional maritime developments. If the strategy of deterrence is to be credible, this requires that the North Atlantic Alliance shall be able to employ its entire defence potential. This defence potential, however, includes not only an operational combination of conventional forces, theatre nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear systems, but also the security of raw materials supplies and the safe transport from the United States, Canada and Great Britain of reinforcements and reserves held ready for the defence of Europe. The movement of these resources presupposes secure ocean lines of communication. These sea lanes, vital to the defence of Western Europe, run across the North Atlantic and end on the coasts and in the harbours of Western Europe. In this context, the flanks of the European continent occupy an outstandingly important but also outstandingly sensitive position.

The Assembly of Western European Union has concerned itself with these problems time and again. The last report submitted in this Assembly is dated 25th April 1972, and was presented by our former Italian colleague Mr. Vedovato.

The northern flank embraces an area consisting of northern Europe with the adjacent sea areas, the Norwegian Sea, the North Sea, the English Channel and the Baltic with approaches to it. It is an area of marked maritime character, in which NATO holds key strategic positions. This area is essential to the defence of Western Europe. Its occupation by Warsaw Pact forces

would cut the Atlantic lines of communication with Europe, destroy the cohesion of defence in central and northern Europe and thus, by attack from the sea, disrupt the forward defence of Europe. This northern sector of NATO can be defended only if NATO retains control of its Atlantic lines of communication, including control of the air. Only then, too, can reinforcements from overseas be brought to the central sector.

The threat to the northern flank of the Alliance has fundamentally changed now that the Soviet Union has expanded its navy into an instrument of sea power capable of action anywhere in the world. The expansion of its navy represents one of the most outstanding changes in the position of the Alliance, since it enables the Soviet Union not only to promote its political, ideological and economic ambitions all over the world by military means as well, but also to exert pressure on the Atlantic lines of communication to Europe.

The Soviet Union has taken account, in the deployment of its forces, of the special importance of the sea lanes for the Alliance and for the strategic situation of northern Europe. Its Northern Fleet, stationed in the area of the Kola Peninsula, represents the greatest concentration of Soviet naval strength and naval air forces in the world. This fleet is structured and equipped for a battle on the high seas, a battle for the Atlantic. A large part of the Soviet Second Fleet, the Baltic Fleet, is also suitable for fighting on the high seas. Furthermore, as the ships are interchangeable, concentrations can also be quickly built up by bringing in reinforcements from other Soviet fleet areas. This would enable the Soviet Union to outflank the European theatre and cut it off from the Atlantic.

It is therefore vitally important to safeguard the Alliance's key positions on the northern flank and to regard the North Sea and the Baltic, together with the approaches to them, as one strategic unit.

A prerequisite of effective defence is to analyse the adversary's strengths and weaknesses, and to organise one's own defence efforts accordingly. By the logical manner in which it is being expanded and by its combat potential, the Soviet naval armament is impressive. But it is still handicapped by the difficult situation of the Soviet Union when seen from the point of view of naval strategy. None of the four Soviet fleets has an access to open sea which is entirely under its own control. The Black Sea Fleet, like the Baltic Fleet, are in a peripheral sea, while the Pacific Fleet, based mainly in Vladivo-

*Mr. Ahrens (continued)*

stok, reflects the dispute with Japan about the return of the southern Kuriles.

In this situation it must be the Soviet Union's aim to strengthen its position in the European North Sea and keep open its Northern Fleet's access to the Atlantic. This is the purpose of its efforts to strengthen its positions on Spitzbergen and also to exert political pressure, for instance against Norway, especially through a press campaign directed against Norway's policy of alliances. It is also the purpose of the Soviet naval manœuvres in the North Sea, especially in the vicinity of Norway.

The Soviet Union's efforts to gain unimpeded access to the open sea for its Northern Fleet are not solely, and perhaps not even primarily, directed against Western Europe, but in fact serve the Soviet Union's interests as a superpower.

In seeking operational freedom for its Northern Fleet the Soviet Union wants to increase its political freedom of action in all spheres. In the event of an armed clash, however, the expansion of the Northern Fleet is designed to end NATO's domination of the North Sea, to disrupt and cut the lines of communication with the North American continent, to threaten Norway from the sea and to destroy the cohesion of the defence of Western Europe. Successful operations by a strong Soviet Northern Fleet would provide effective support for the attainment of the operational aims in the main theatre of war, the continent of Europe.

There can be no effective defence against such a threat without co-ordination of defence plans. Up to now such plans have existed only for the area covered by BALTAP, that is, only for the Baltic Sea and its approaches. In the North Sea area none of the three NATO commanders-in-chief has planning responsibility for the whole area. The area is divided among the three commanders – and has in fact been so for many years, since the time when the Federal Republic did not have a fleet. To this day the division of the command areas gives rise to occasional differences in appreciation and planning which, although locally co-ordinated, are still not entirely seamless. The aim must therefore be – and this should be one of our demands – to achieve, for crises, tense situations and especially in the case of defensive action, greater economy in the employment of our forces, improved ability to react quickly and to concentrate our strength, and generally to reduce the

need for co-ordination. Here the primary aim in my opinion is not to change the boundaries of the several NATO command areas – which would, anyway, be difficult to do – but to ensure by joint planning that these boundaries are not watertight.

The overall position as regards naval strategy demands that this joint planning of the defence effort be done at the earliest possible stage. This means, strictly speaking, that there must be harmonisation of our naval forces themselves, and that the problem posed by co-ordination of weapons and ships and the problems of logistics must be solved in peacetime, while the manœuvres of the naval and fleet air arm forces within the Alliance will have to be more frequent, more intensive and more unified than they have been so far.

The report, which I now ask you to approve, also serves this purpose of strengthening the Alliance's overall defence potential, and of strengthening it at a point which, on closer examination, is found to be particularly vulnerable. Thank you very much. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Ahrens.

As I have received notice from Mr. Boucheny that he wishes, under Rule 32, to move the previous question, I should remind the Assembly that the rule allows only one speaker – the proposer – for the previous question, one speaker against, and then the Rapporteur or Chairman of the Committee concerned. In each case the maximum speaking time is five minutes.

Mr. Boucheny, do you wish to move your previous question?

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the previous question tabled by the French communists under Rule 32 of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure is designed to establish in advance that the conclusions presented by Mr. Ahrens on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments are legally void.

Were they adopted, these conclusions could still only be regarded as null and void by anyone genuinely devoted to independence and peace.

The Brussels Treaty commits the states which signed it and the institutions which implement it to respect the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The first of these principles is the sovereignty and independence of every state. So how is it possible to accept a text proposed by a member of our Assembly who



*Mr. Boucheny (continued)*

publicly and unashamedly refuses to take any account of the sovereign decision taken by France some fifteen years ago to withdraw its forces from NATO commands and to re-establish full control over its means of command and defence?

Mr. Ahrens asks in so many words for the French naval forces to be assigned to the NATO Atlantic command "on the same basis as the naval forces of the other WEU countries". He is calling on the other European states to exert pressure on France in the WEU Council to persuade it to join in a large-scale war-mongering programme under the aegis of NATO.

To expand NATO naval operations without geographical limits, that is to say, to drag the Europeans into any gunboat adventure in the Indian Ocean or the Pacific; to speed up the building of warships; to record systematically, one by one, the position of even the smallest merchant vessel that has the misfortune to fly the flag of a socialist country; to exert pressure on Denmark and Norway, the inhabitants of which are contemptuously referred to in passing as "indigenous" in order to persuade them to authorise the deployment of nuclear weapons on their territory: these are the objectives of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, that is the line of action it is trying to impose on France.

The report was not drafted on the spur of the moment, but is part of a general design, as can be seen from Mr. Tanghe's proposals to do away with all limits on the expansion of the West German navy.

It should also be noted that, raising the alleged spectre of the Soviet threat, German imperialism is once again seeking to strengthen its military power - through its navy today, so why not by possession of an atomic weapon tomorrow?

This report has been submitted for approval to a sympathetic Assembly at a difficult moment in time when we are threatened with a new cold war. After the NATO Council's decision to deploy 108 Pershing 2 missiles and 464 cruise missiles on European soil, with the growth of a war psychosis after the events in Afghanistan - and one may note in passing that the mass media are showing signs of hysteria and panic after yesterday's proposals on the withdrawal of Soviet forces which, significantly, no one has mentioned yet here - and after the recent NATO decisions to speed up still further the major armament programme christened "long-term defence

plan", Mr. Ahrens' proposals represent yet another step towards excessive armament, worsening the tension, towards the erosion of sovereign rights and contempt of the peoples.

We refuse to accept this road, which leads no one knows where. So we refuse to debate the dangerous and shocking text before us.

The PRESIDENT. - Does anyone wish to speak?...

There can be only one speech against the previous question.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, I would like to oppose Mr. Boucheny's previous question. What Mr. Boucheny has said was, it is true, the exact position of the Soviet Union, but it was and is in no way the position of the democratic forces of the member states of Western European Union.

The Federal Republic of Germany has undertaken not to produce any nuclear weapons and it has never had any intention of going back on that undertaking. On those grounds alone the arguments used by Mr. Boucheny in no way correspond to the facts.

I therefore ask you, Mr. President, to let us proceed to the vote, so that the Assembly shall have a chance to adopt Mr. Ahrens' report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Reddemann.

Does the Rapporteur or the Chairman of the Committee wish to speak?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). - Mr. President, the Chairman of the Committee is not here. I agree with Mr. Reddemann. Perhaps I might simply add that what Mr. Boucheny is complaining about - the fact that we are dealing here with defence problems of Norway and Denmark - has been the practice of this Assembly for twenty years.

The PRESIDENT. - Under the rule, I must now put the question. Rule 32(3) states that in debate on these matters the only speakers shall be the proposer, one speaker against, and the Rapporteur or Chairman of the Committee concerned. Therefore, I put the previous question, which has been circulated, "that there are no grounds for debating the draft recommendation on the northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands" to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The President (continued)*

*The previous question is negatived.*

We therefore continue with the debate on the report.

The first speaker is Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I shall not make a long speech. I particularly wish to speak in order to congratulate Mr. Ahrens and the Committee on their excellent document. I gather that Mr. Boucheny does not like it, but I do.

I should also like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to John Roper, who worked closely with Mr. Ahrens as Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. Representatives will recall the enormous contribution that John Roper made. I am sure that everyone in the Assembly will wish him a speedy recovery to full health.

I am no longer a member of the Committee, but I took part in some of the visits and I should like to comment briefly on one visit that we made to northern Norway, where every member of the Committee was greatly impressed by the extreme skill that was revealed and the good equipment possessed by the United Kingdom and Dutch marines training there. It was interesting to see the close co-operation of that force at command level – a Dutch company with the Royal Marine commando.

I am keen to see further developments in co-operation of that kind, although it seems to me that the task of securing cordial relationships among the junior ranks requires more attention than it may have received. It is not sufficient for the commanders to be on good terms with each other. That relationship needs to be seen throughout the whole range of the units involved.

The main reason for my speech is my interest in energy matters. The North Sea oil and gas installations and facilities of the United Kingdom and Norway particularly are vital to us and extremely vulnerable. They are particularly vulnerable given the forces of the Warsaw Pact, which are growing in size and are powerful.

Such vulnerability seems to me to be made greater by the enormous mine-laying capacity of the Warsaw Pact forces. I was astonished, as I think other members of the Committee were, when we attended one meeting and were given an estimate of the number of mines at the disposal of the Soviet Union. Given the importance of the North Sea oil and gas to Norway and the United Kingdom

in particular – but they are important also to the rest of Western Europe – we need to be sure that those responsible for planning our naval arsenals properly reflect that vulnerability.

I have one anxiety. I do not speak to many naval officers, but those to whom I speak give me the impression that the high point of their naval careers is the period spent in sea-going command. Unfortunately, if ships become smaller the rank of the captain of the ship tends to be rather lower. It may be a good thing, as one of my colleagues said, but we have to keep people in the Royal Navy until they reach advanced middle age. I shall not digress to talk about the effect on military recruitment of a declining birth rate, but the point is serious. If naval officers believe that the pinnacle of their career is the period they spend in sea-going command, that may make them rather reluctant to give the priority that mine countermeasures and minesweeping require, and there may be too much weight in favour of building somewhat bigger ships.

I say that advisedly, because we had some interesting comments from some American naval officers when we visited American naval bases in March. I think that you, Mr. President, were with us when we visited two of the largest ships on the Atlantic seaboard of the United States. I do not believe that ships of that size will be particularly relevant in Western Europe and I do not think that they will be particularly helpful in protecting us or the vulnerability of our offshore installations.

I hope that career satisfaction will not be given such a high priority in military and naval planning. I believe that at present we lack the capacity to counter the enormous Soviet mine-laying threat. Following the comments of my colleague Mr. Grieve, I digress in passing to say that perhaps because of the decline in the birth-rate, which affects all member states in this Assembly, we may have to consider seriously the adequacy of recruitment in the second half of this decade. Whether we can recruit more ladies to serve in the northern flank remains to be seen, but certainly there are serious implications.

I have no great reservations about the report and I have a great deal of support for it. I have tabled one amendment which I hope the Assembly will dispense with formally in due course because it is only a matter of correcting the record. But, given the remarks of Mr. Boucheny, I think it is appropriate to refer to the fact that in any civilised society one sacrifices a little of one's

*Mr. Hardy (continued)*

freedom in order to live within the rule of law. In each of the countries within NATO, we sacrifice a little sovereignty in order to contribute to the Alliance. I do not think that it was too much to ask our colleagues from France to make some contribution in the way that the Rapporteur suggests so that France can contribute to the security of the Alliance, to which that country is so much attached, if only indirectly. If the cause of freedom and the existence of the Alliance are to be properly maintained, if the reason for this Assembly's existence is to continue to receive protection, we are entitled to expect France to respond to the point that Mr. Ahrens quite properly makes.

The PRESIDENT. - Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

I think that the Assembly was moved by your reference to the former Chairman of our Defence Committee. I think that that reference was the first that some of us knew about his illness, and I believe that it would be the wish of the Assembly if, as President, I were to write to him and wish him a speedy recovery. (*Applause*)

The next speaker is Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). - Mr. President, I, too, wish to pay a warm tribute to Mr. Ahrens' excellent report. The fact that it has provoked such an intemperate outburst from Mr. Boucheny shows what a sensitive nerve Mr. Ahrens touched. In strategic terms, it is probably the most important report that we shall debate at this Assembly. Mr. Boucheny had the gall, only six months after the invasion of Afghanistan, to refer to "a war psychology" and a new cold war. Coming so soon after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, his remarks were particularly galling.

I should also like to support everything that Mr. Reddemann said. There is no question of our good friends in the Federal Republic of Germany entering into the production of or the stationing of nuclear weapons on their soil. Also, the sentiments expressed by my colleague, Mr. Hardy, about the importance of Alliance collaboration should be emphasised.

I wish to say one thing that may modify my criticism of Mr. Boucheny. Of course, in an ideal world it would be better if French naval forces were directly under the command of SACLANT, but our French friends have their own political priorities and we understand them. The French play an important part in the global protection of western interests

through their naval presence, not least in the Indian Ocean, and this is something that the Alliance as a whole has come to value. We all know that the French, as lovers of liberty, freedom and democracy, will always, in the last analysis, fight alongside their friends in the Alliance. That is why General Hackett, when he writes of the dread events of the third world war, says that it is the French forces alongside those of NATO which tip the balance in favour of the countries of the West.

This report takes our preoccupation a little away from the central front and the North German plain and coming, as it does, from a German Rapporteur, I think that this is particularly welcome.

Without reinforcement across the Atlantic of equipment and reserves, the defence of Europe would be very difficult to sustain, and that reinforcement would be quite impossible without the preservation of control of the sea lanes across the North Atlantic. There would be nothing more crucial to the outcome of the battle of the North Atlantic, were deterrence to fail, than the outcome of the struggle to ensure that the key outlets for the Soviet northern and Baltic fleets of Northern Norway and Denmark remain firmly in NATO hands. The Rapporteur has brought this out particularly well.

The battle for the Norwegian Sea would be the most decisive if ever war were to break out. The power that controls the Greenland, Iceland, Faroes and Shetlands gaps will control the North Atlantic. That is why the thirteen strike carriers of the United States are so crucial, because they are the factor that tips the balance at present in favour of NATO. If, by pre-emptive attack or sudden assault, subversion or whatever, our potential adversaries were able to take possession of "Finmark" or even, worse still, the whole of the Norwegian coast, by controlling also the port facilities and the airfields of Norway, they would be able to interdict reinforcements by NATO across the North Atlantic. In this regard we must take account of the fact that a great deal of reinforcement will come not just by sea, as was the case in the second world war, but largely, because in these days the time scales are even more critical, by air. We know that the Alliance has plans to assign civil air fleets for such reinforcement, and long-range Backfire bombers equipped with air-to-air guided missiles could wreak havoc among the civil air transports that would be reinforcing northern Europe.

Therefore, I believe that the report is both timely and worthwhile.

*Mr. Wilkinson (continued)*

I wish to bring even more attention to bear on one part of Mr. Ahrens' report. I refer to his suggestion that we should re-examine the Brussels Treaty in two respects: first, that we should allow West Germany to construct larger naval vessels than is allowed at present under the treaty; and, secondly, that we should perhaps reconsider Britain's commitment to the stationing of four divisions and a tactical air force in Germany. I am not suggesting that the United Kingdom should diminish its total commitment to the defence of continental Europe, but Mr. Ahrens has highlighted the fact that in this age, when the threat to western interests is global, sea and air forces should have the flexibility to react promptly and rapidly to whatever the threat may be.

If, regardless of the circumstances in respect of energy resources in the Arabian Gulf and the sea lanes across the Atlantic, we always keep a rigid and inflexible interpretation of the Brussels Treaty at the centre point of our strategy, we may not be able to respond to the situation as it properly deserves. I greatly welcome the initiative in the report which seeks to bring these matters to our attention.

I am sure, as Mr. Ahrens suggests, the Federal German Republic could play a more important part in NATO naval operations under SACLANT. I also feel that the United Kingdom should devote more of its budget to air and naval forces if we are to get what the Germans call a proper *Arbeitsteilung* – in other words, a proper division of responsibility within the Alliance.

The report is admirable and sensible. The one factor in strategic terms which has changed the whole balance of security in the last eighteen years since the Cuban episode in 1962 has been the emergence of the Soviet Union as a naval power able to project its political influence to almost every corner of the globe. Admiral Gorshkov has proved as historic an architect of naval power as was Grand Admiral Tirpitz before the first world war. What Admiral Gorshkov has done is no less significant. The fact that the Soviet Union is building one nuclear submarine every six weeks and is now developing naval air power with its three Kiev-class carriers in commission, with a fourth one being built and a new strike carrier also under construction, has to be taken into account and we must react appropriately. The kind of measures suggested by Mr. Ahrens are responsible and timely and should be whole-heartedly supported by the Assembly. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson.

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, for my part, I will not try to play soldiers, or rather sailors; I am not competent to do so. I shall try to speak as a politician rather than a military expert.

I am sorry it was not possible for anyone to speak against the previous question tabled by Mr. Boucheny, for I would have liked to tell him that what is excessive is also superfluous, useless. What he said, and the rather curious terms in which he put his previous question, oblige me to say that the French communists, on whose behalf he spoke, have once again done a disservice to the left. Why?

There is no need to be a military expert: it is enough to read the papers to realise that even if the French navy is not integrated into NATO, it is, seen objectively, part of it, that all French politicians affirm that France will never be neutral and that, whatever happens, the French navy will – fortunately – come to the aid of its allies in case of need. How else should one interpret the French Government's recent call for combined manœuvres of five navies, at the invitation, incidentally, of the French navy?

Mr. Ahrens is my witness. Speaking before the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, I asked how statements could be made concerning Norway and Denmark, two countries which are not members of WEU, and I must say that the replies were as I had hoped. In any case, if Danish and Norwegian members of parliament happened to be in this Assembly as observers, it would be up to them to take or not take account of the proposals put forward.

As for the European military bloc being directed against the Soviet Union, that is not a laughing matter: it is already a fact today, for France, Norway and Denmark. NATO – and I shall not expatiate on the reasons for its existence – is a military bloc directed against the Soviet Union. And against whom is the Soviet military bloc directed? Perhaps that is a question one might ask.

I also took part in the visit to northern Norway and I am grateful to Mr. Ahrens for having described so concisely the impressions and the conclusions of the participants. I thank him and congratulate him for this.

Mr. President, you had omitted to call me in the general debate, no doubt because I entered my name rather late. But I was most surprised to find how few speakers were entered for the debate on a report which, like Mr. Wilkinson, I

*Mr. Dejardin (continued)*

consider to be the one most directly concerned with our responsibilities as an assembly.

The comments encouraged by this report and the thoughts it inspires concern the very future of the defence of Europe and I am truly sorry that so few members of our Assembly wanted to discuss its content during this major debate.

Be that as it may, I will approve Mr. Ahrens' report, as I did in Committee. However, I have a specific reservation – Mr. Ahrens knows what it is – about paragraph (v) of the preamble: “Noting that the reference to the Tropic of Cancer in Article 6...”. On re-reading the report I actually found in paragraph 5.6 a phrase more or less repeating the author's conclusions on this matter. Please excuse my innocence, Mr. President, but I had understood that this report, drafted in co-operation with the delegation to northern Norway of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, concerned the defence and protection of the northern flank of the Alliance. So I do not quite understand where the question of Soviet or other submarines, hostile or not, manœuvring south of the Tropic of Cancer, enters into it.

The same goes for this sentence as for other sentences in most of our reports, which may look harmless and at times even self-evident but which, on reflection, bear little relation to the basic issue under consideration.

In fact, I wonder whether this is not a feeler, like the one I protested at this morning during the debate on Mr. Banks' report, put out by certain, perhaps military, authorities seeking to obtain through our Assembly a kind of parliamentary sanction to exert pressure on those governments which refuse to modify the limits imposed by the North Atlantic Treaty.

So what I say is: watch out! For when people try to assert that these limits are not binding, I wonder whether it is really because they want to organise naval manœuvres or operations in the Atlantic or whether in fact this is a pretext to justify NATO operations in other parts of the world, in particular the Indian Ocean or the Persian Gulf.

Mr. President, please excuse me for questioning intentions, but the wording is so vague and this phrase seems so remote from the basic issue, that I must express formal reservations. I hope the Rapporteur will provide some minimal information and details or at least allay my anxiety.

Nevertheless, I shall vote in favour of the draft recommendation proposed in the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin. I apologise that I had not noticed Mr. Dejardin's intention to speak, otherwise I would have called him at once.

That concludes the debate.

I ask the Rapporteur whether he would like to reply.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, let me begin with what Mr. Dejardin objects to in the report. It is something that gave rise to a very detailed discussion in Committee as well. Having discussed the matter, the Committee decided, by a majority, to retain the wording now before us.

What is the issue here? Paragraph (v) of the preamble was quite certainly not conceived by me as a feeler. No less certainly, it was not an attempt to extend NATO's defence area. It is definitely not my view that troops, whether German or those of other NATO allies, should be used in the Persian Gulf. I may state categorically that this would certainly not be the view of the Federal German Government either.

Paragraph (v) is designed solely to indicate the legal position laid down in the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty defines the concept of armed attack on a member state. Article 6, on which I have based myself here, stipulates the Tropic of Cancer as a territories limitation “for the purpose of Article 5”, that is, for the purpose of the definition of “armed attack”.

The Committee had discussions in the United States with American naval commanders, and asked whether this stipulation of the NATO Treaty allowed for consideration to be given to global developments and for adaptation to events that might occur south of the Tropic of Cancer.

Let me clarify this with an example. It is not hard to imagine a situation in which the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope could be vital for NATO. I believe that there must be NATO plans for this eventuality too, that the commanders already working out plans for this eventuality must do so on behalf of NATO as well and not only as American supreme commanders acting in the interests of the United States. We are therefore not talking about intervening south of the Tropic of Cancer, but simply of placing the joint planning under the aegis of NATO.

Now to the other comments on this report, for which, as in the case of Mr. Dejardin's comments, I am most grateful.

*Mr. Ahrens (continued)*

I share Mr. Hardy's view that it is necessary in the Alliance not only for the staffs and the senior generals and admirals to work together, but also for there to be co-operation between officers, and indeed between soldiers of all ranks, for us to know and be on good terms with each other for us to understand each other's strengths and weaknesses, to be able to adapt to each other and put co-operation to the test.

I also agree with Mr. Hardy that we must pay the greatest attention to the threat of mines. I should point out that the special demand made in paragraph 1 (b) was adopted at his suggestion. In this connection, paragraph 1 (d) – the call for the monitoring of Warsaw Pact merchant ships in our ports – is also of importance, chiefly because we have to reckon with the fact that mines are laid not only by purpose-built warships but also by merchant vessels, we must know which ships are in our own waters.

The reason he advances for why the bigger ships are built – so as to create posts for older, higher-ranking officers – I found extremely interesting. I had not seen the matter in that light before. However, the fate of a naval officer is indeed such that the more successful he is in his career, the sooner he lands behind a desk and has nothing more to do with ships.

In judging the ships we saw in the United States, we must however bear in mind – as we both know – that they were built not for deployment in the North Sea or European coastal waters, but as a part of the Blue Water Navy, the United States' ocean-going forces. I believe they have their justification as such.

I also agree with Mr. Hardy that any participation in an alliance involves the sacrifice of a little freedom, a little bit of sovereignty. This is true for all of us. But what is also true for all of us is that here we no longer are superpowers, that if we want to continue to exist, we have to choose the path of alliance, and that only unity gives strength.

I agree with Mr. Wilkinson that we must of course take heed of French political priorities. There is not the slightest doubt about that in my mind. But on the basis of my own observation I would point out that, although the French navy is not part of NATO, there is very good co-operation between the French navy and the naval forces of the NATO countries.

I share his assessment of the special importance of the Baltic approaches. I refer to the importance of this area several times in my report, and draw certain conclusions which

should make it possible to improve the defence of this very sensitive area.

I also agree with Mr. Wilkinson that what might be decisive might be what happened not on land but at sea, namely in the North Sea, which looks so wide on the map or the globe, but which in reality is extraordinarily narrow, especially in view of present-day monitoring facilities, has narrow passages and is therefore, as I have shown, of the greatest strategic importance to the Soviet Union. It is the only area through which the Soviet Union could succeed in getting a fleet out into the open sea.

I of course also agree with him that a division of labour is needed in the Alliance. This also applies to the Federal German navy too, a navy which is not an end in itself and which none of my colleagues sees as an instrument of national policy, but simply as part of the Alliance. As such it was designed, as such it was built, as such it is commanded – and as such it will stay. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Ahrens.

We have one amendment to the report, tabled by Mr. Hardy.

I understand, Mr. Hardy, that you wish to move it formally.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I move the amendment formally, Mr. President:

1. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "North Atlantic Council" and insert "appropriate military authorities of NATO".

The PRESIDENT. – I understand that you accept the amendment, Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Yes.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on the amendment.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The amendment is agreed to.*

We now have to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

There is opposition to the report. Therefore, we must proceed by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Dr. Miller.

*The President (continued)*

I ask Representatives to remain in their places, because if this roll-call has the sufficient number I shall then want to proceed to the roll-call that we deferred this morning.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

I fear that we do not have a quorum. The vote will have to be deferred until tomorrow. Under the rules it must be taken at the next sitting.

### **5. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection**

*(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 838)*

The PRESIDENT. – Similarly, in the absence of a quorum, the vote on the recommendation in the report by Mr. Banks must now be taken at the next sitting. We shall try to take it tomorrow morning at about 10.45 or 11 o'clock.

### **6. Changes in the membership of Committees**

The PRESIDENT. – I have been asked by the Italian Delegation to propose the following changes in the membership of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments: Mr. Spitella as an alternate member in place of Mr. Foschi; and in the membership of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges: Mr. Foschi as an alternate member in place of Mr. Spitella.

Is there any opposition to these changes?...

They are agreed to.

### **7. Defence-related information technology**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 840)*

The PRESIDENT. – We now turn to the report from the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, the report of Mr. Brasseur, Document 840, on defence-related information technology.

I call Mr. Brasseur.

Mr. BRASSEUR (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, our

society is evolving rapidly and becoming more complex every day. That is why communications play an increasingly important rôle in it. Information technology is taking giant steps forward in a society which cannot survive in an organised manner without the simultaneous use of the available energy and information. Information technology, which backs up the processing of information, is now supplemented by telematics which disseminates and transmits that information.

The military sector is also involved in these developments and has understood that it cannot remain outside. That is why your Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions decided to present a report on defence-related information technology. Information has always played a major rôle in military organisations, but we also know that these organisations, born of a long historical tradition, are highly complex, very disparate and often differ from one state to another. So the computerisation of armies and, in particular, ensuring the compatibility of the information systems used by European states are very difficult problems.

Europe has great scientific and technological potential; it has the necessary capacities. Yet Europe imports more than 80% of the integrated circuits it needs and only covers 16% of the world market in informatics. If we want to create a genuine European informatics and telematics industry in the future, with all its benefits for industrial activity, research and employment, we must ensure that this market comes into being and is established.

In this respect, the military sector could provide at least a partial answer. By co-ordinating their military requirements, insisting on interoperable equipment and formulating a European military hardware policy in the informatics sector, the member states could generate a genuine European telematics industry. That is true in the field of technology and here I am thinking of micro-electronics which is developing rapidly. It applies to the construction of computer peripherals, that is to say, systems giving access to these computers. It also applies to software, that is to say, the backup system which enables these computers to function. All this, Ladies and Gentlemen, will of course involve the training of more young people in this sector, since it offers a great many outlets.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, information technology has many different military uses. They include of course the management sectors, such as personnel management or stock management, with which we are familiar on the civilian side. Then there

*Mr. Brasseur (continued)*

are the applications which I would describe as purely technological, such as the devices now often on fighter planes, or in other areas such as artillery, and which are very widely used by our European armed forces.

It can also be used to organise the collection and processing of information from enemy sources, in particular, as a backup for military decision-making – this is certainly the area with the most complex systems but also an area in which there are different schools of thought about the organisation of such systems.

The question of interoperability in the military field is particularly important, especially in the countries which work together within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

If we want to prevent American and Japanese technology from obtaining a stranglehold on NATO, we Europeans must show ourselves capable of taking up the challenge of the future and of asserting our presence. It is rather in this spirit that I am presenting our Committee's report.

It is divided into several sections which I shall not go over here since you have no doubt had a chance to peruse it; but I would like to emphasise the first part which is the most general and perhaps rather less military part, because I regard it as fundamental to an understanding of the future of informatics in the civil sector, of course, but also in the military field.

I would like to point to a number of trends in the development of microelectronic technology. Very rapid advances have been made in this area. As a result, prices of these systems have fallen at an annual rate of about 40 %, quite apart from their improved performance and the accompanying increase in calculating facilities.

In a world where energy is becoming scarce, computerisation and the development of telematics are bound to speed up, since communications systems allow information to be transmitted with only a minimum use of energy. A telephone call costs much less than the delivery of a letter, whether by an individual or via the postal services. This is true in both the civil and the military sectors.

So it may be useful to mention a few technologies which are now ripe for development and demand the attention of political leaders and also, more generally, the civil and military authorities. For example, optical fibre cables will become widespread in a few years' time, enabling great masses of information to be transmitted by pass-band. Telecommuni-

cations satellites will bring Europe within reach of every part of the world and will unquestionably have an important effect on our culture, our way of thinking and our daily lives. I am also thinking of several systems which will become very widespread among the general public. There is a chance that in a few years' time, everyone will have a home computer terminal, or a device for transmitting written texts without having to use a postal system. Video systems will be developed further. This increasing range of technology will also be developed for its military applications.

Parallel with this technological progress, however, the coming years will see major advances in software, improving the performances of the information systems familiar to us today.

New attitudes will therefore emerge, and many institutions will see changes; this we must realise. This is true of both the civil and the military sector; it will apply to the armed forces: land forces, navy and air forces.

Mr. President, military equipment is obviously rather different from civil equipment in that it must be more reliable and more robust. It must also be less vulnerable which is why, with the development of microelectronics, the information and strategic networks of the armed forces are becoming less and less centralised, more and more widely dispersed, although the various systems are of course linked to each other. A vast number of networks, national networks but also networks within NATO, are in fact, now being set up in the armed forces.

In conclusion I shall read the last paragraph of my written report because I consider it important for the Europeans. It reflects the desire, expressed in these few ideas I have put forward, for the creation in Europe of a truly European market and a genuine telecommunications industry, by way of military applications, in particular:

"If the Europeans unite they still have a chance to keep abreast with the Japanese and Americans in this field. Moreover, Europe should not channel its capital to dying industries rather than to new growing industries. Until now the industries which have stopped growing, like steel, textiles, shoes and automobiles, have special financial advantages accorded them by governments. The development of new industries such as that of telecommunications should be stimulated instead in order to gain a dominant position in semi-conductors, microelectronic components and audio and video components. In civil market terms Europe represents one-third of the world market for telecommunications equipment, i.e. \$ 33 bil-



*Mr. Brasseur (continued)*

lion, with a growth rate of some 7 % per year.”

Ladies and Gentlemen, which is the sector with such a rapid and clear-cut rate of growth?

“It also represents 26 % of the world market in informatics, i.e. nearly \$ 70 billion, with a growth rate of 17 % per year. In integrated circuits it represents 19 % of the world market, i.e. \$ 7.5 billion, with a growth rate of 25 % per year. The question is whether this European market will be supplied by European firms or is it more likely to be supplied by American and Japanese firms?”

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, if we choose the first alternative, if we have the will to create a genuine European informatics industry, we must create a genuine European market for it.

The armed forces, in which information technology is being and will continue to be developed, and which no longer regard their activities today as taking place within anything less than a European framework, can, I would even say must, contribute to the creation of European telematics. (*Applause*)

(*Mr. Mart, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank the Rapporteur.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Osborn.

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I intervene towards the end of this Assembly as an old member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, and as an old member of the WEU Assembly, to congratulate this organisation on the way in which it has settled down to its rôle in the 1970s. Some members may be aware from my speeches that thirty-five years ago I was an instructor in wireless theory and practice. What I knew then has no relevance to what I am about to say now. I attended the first colloquy on European aeronautical policy in 1973. I was aware of what was achieved in 1976, but any comment on Mr. Brasseur's report on defence-related information and technology must underwrite the lessons of the symposium in October last year, Document 823, Mr. Valleix's recommendation, Document 839, and the debate this morning on video and communications systems.

As a member of the British Parliament and the Select Committee on Science, Education

and the Arts of that parliament, I find that it has been instructive to bring myself up to date on the work of WEU. But it is important to find formulae to ensure that those in specialist committees of national parliaments know what is being looked at in this area by WEU. That could be the concern of the report on relations with parliaments tomorrow.

I turn to this report on defence-related information technology. I wish to congratulate the Committee on undertaking an inquiry into these matters. The nature of the work undertaken seems to be much more specific and relevant now than it was when I was a member of the Committee more than five years ago.

I have been most impressed by the information in Mr. Brasseur's report. He quite rightly points out the difference between military and civil communications equipment and the changes that will take place in transmission techniques; optical fibres and the use of satellites were mentioned. The Rapporteur has whetted my appetite, on which I congratulate him, but at the end of the day I find his conclusions and recommendations far from specific.

What should national governments, and in particular defence departments of WEU member states, do individually and particularly collectively to take advantage of the opportunities for technological advancement that are now available in the defence field? The Rapporteur has spoken, quite rightly, about NATO systems, the need for interoperability between NATO and national systems, and the fact that each nation has its own communications systems. He has also rightly referred to standards. That has been true for twenty-five years. This is, and has been, the greatest essential of technological and international co-operation and arms procurement policy and must also be true of telematics and informatics in both the civil and military fields. This report rightly emphasises the French system and refers to a report by Mr. Watkinson. It gives a good insight into naval, army and air force communications.

I am not certain whether this would have been better achieved through NATO. I accept that this poses a specific problem for France, but it also poses the old problem for European technology: to what extent do exchanges with the United States and Japan, even on standards, lead to an assertion of technological superiority in those countries which tends to make European technology appear too expensive and uncompetitive?

My impression is that the complexity of issues which the work of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Ques-

*Mr. Osborn (continued)*

tions has revealed in this field is so great that it has been impossible for Mr. Brasseur to be more precise and specific in his conclusions. I congratulate him and I do not wish to appear too critical, because the report has provided an opportunity for an outsider, such as myself, to gain an insight into the vast strides and changes that will be available in defence-related information technology.

I intervene because of an interest in areas that are not unrelated to this. Over many years in the British Parliament, in industry, in the Council of Europe and, more recently, in the European Parliament, I have taken an interest in these matters. At present, members of the European Parliament and the appropriate committees will be looking at and reporting on the Commission's draft directives and reports on the importance of telematics and informatics mainly with a view to offering support for new industries.

I know that Western European Union is concerned with defence, and rightly so, but I believe that the report stresses the need to be aware that European industrial interests are probably better examined by the European Economic Community. When I was a member of the European Parliament I tried to persuade its committees not to work in isolation from those in national parliaments or from similar bodies in WEU and the Council of Europe.

I hope that Mr. Brasseur will forgive me for suggesting that the appropriate committees of the European Parliament should now be made aware of the work which is being undertaken in WEU. Perhaps this has already happened. If so, I hope that the Rapporteur will reassure me. But surely WEU, and in particular its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, should note the Davignon initiative in the sphere of microchip technology, informatics and telematics. I had hoped to see more reference to this technology in the report.

I turn to the subject of the communication of information and knowledge in military terms. Such communication is more dynamic than that which is required in the civil, administrative, educational and industrial spheres. Five years ago I was involved in the work of the Council of Europe on co-operation between government departments and the libraries of parliaments in the first instance and, in consequence, national libraries. This followed the work of the British Parliamentary and Scientific Committee on information storage, retrieval and abstraction, and in particular the setting up of centres of reference, and international communication in respect of abstracts and cata-

logues. The last decade has seen huge strides in the area of information abstraction.

Next week, as a member of the British Select Committee on Education, Science and the Arts, I shall be in Washington. Britain has had to take a decision to determine whether new technology justifies expenditure on a national library, based on the British Library, to bring together different sections on the Bloomsbury site at a cost of at least £200 million and perhaps much more. The committee must determine whether this expenditure is because of, or in spite of, the new technologies, many of which have been referred to by Mr. Brasseur in his report. That committee has recommended that the first phase should go forward.

This morning in the debate on video communication there was reference to Prestel, Oracle and Ceefax, as well as to the French system Antiope. In fact, there is a lack of compatibility. In the report there is reference to typesetting, new typewriters, video techniques for correction and new office techniques. In recent years there has been what I call the memory explosion from the disc to the honeycomb and the bubble. In the sphere of European communications there has been the recent opening of Diane-Euronet, which provides immense opportunities for European industry.

I refer to this subject because I have in mind the last recommendation in the report which refers to offering new opportunities to new industries in Europe. It should be remembered that in modern technology defence contracts accelerate change and provide opportunities for industry, and, above all, for European industry.

Allow me, Mr. President, to wonder whether the reports of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, and in particular this report by Mr. Brasseur, have really thought out the ultimate impact of changes in "information technology" in the defence sphere and the ultimate impact on their civil and industrial counterparts.

This is a sphere in which civil and military effort must go forward together. The Rapporteur has emphasised the defence aspects and the new pace of defence communications. But if we are to march forward correctly it could be of immense advantage to our industries. I welcome the report, and I hope that the Assembly will forgive an outsider for commenting on it. (*Applause*).

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone else wish to speak?..

The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. BRASSEUR (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I thank Mr. Osborn for his comments on the report. I notice two of his observations in particular.

He first agreed that the proposals and the analysis were perhaps a little too general. I would answer that it is difficult to know all the manufacturing secrets behind the development of information technology for military uses because, unfortunately, in this particular area, some of them cannot be discussed publicly.

As regards future prospects, it is difficult to forecast the development of information technology. This is equally true in the civil area, and in the report we quoted an example which clearly illustrates this fact. When the gramophone record was invented it was developed for two main reasons: firstly, to preserve voices for posterity and, secondly, or so it was thought at the time, to replace letters, for it was believed that people would send records rather than letters. Looking at what has happened to the gramophone, we see that the record-player has been mainly used for other purposes and that other systems, unknown at the time, have perhaps enabled voices to be preserved; the postal service, however, still exists.

As regards the second point raised by Mr. Osborn, relations between our Assembly and the other European assemblies, in particular between WEU, the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, I share his views. For I agree that we must not build three or four different Europes but a single Europe and that all the international organisations still serving different purposes must work towards the same goal.

We were certainly mindful of this when we drafted the report, which was to a large extent based on a document prepared by the European Commission on the development of informatics in Europe.

For some time now the European Commission has been trying to define an informatics policy in Europe in more general terms than ours, taking in the cultural and social implications. We took substantial account of this work and introduced some of the Commission's ideas into our report. Naturally we will inform any other committees competent in this area of our ideas and our recommendations. That is what I wanted to say in reply to the speaker.

In conclusion, may I thank the Assembly for considering these ideas. I think this subject is far from closed and that in months and years to come we will have occasion to look into the problems of informatics and communications again in this Assembly or other European

assemblies because they are becoming fundamental to the development of our modern industrial society.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Vice-Chairman of the Committee would also like to have the floor – Mr. Lenzer.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, without taking up too much of your time, I should like at the end of this discussion to make a few brief observations on behalf of our Chairman, Mr. Valleix.

First, on behalf of the whole Committee, I should like to thank the Rapporteur, Mr. Brasseur, once again for the work he has done in presenting this report. He did so – and it is what we have come to expect of him – in the precise manner characteristic of his work in the Committee, bringing together, through his wide knowledge, a wealth of facts.

On behalf of the Committee I should also like to thank our old member of many years' standing, who is now a new member again, John Osborn, of the British Delegation, who made a contribution here. To take up a point which he made and which, I think, worries us in our work here, we suffer, I think, not so much from there being too few facts, too few reports, too few meetings of the multiplicity of bodies, but from the fact that the question of follow-up is too seldom asked – and this question ought to be asked: What happens to the many facts which are assembled in the various parliaments, in WEU, in the Council of Europe, in the European Parliament and in the national parliaments? Do we seize the opportunity of translating these facts into political action? This is a question we must constantly be asking ourselves. The Davignon report on microelectronics is undoubtedly, among the many reports, a particularly important document because it provides in this connection basic material of decisive value.

We have already had the opportunity this morning of drawing attention, during the debate, to the importance of electronic data-processing, microelectronics, and information technology. I do not want to go over this again now; I merely wish to emphasise once more that the civil and military uses of this technology are inseparable.

There were two possible ways – so the national governments thought, and perhaps still do – of promoting this technology. We have been shown one way by the United States, which has promoted technology mainly by means of major programmes in the defence field. Think, for instance, of the Pentagon's contracts or the major programmes of the space agency NASA.

*Mr. Lenzer (continued)*

In Europe the other way has been taken. Here an attempt has been made to promote technology directly by means of government grants. There was once an attempt – which unfortunately failed in 1975 – to combine the European data-processing industry under the aegis of Unidata, as it was then called. Since then – this may be regretted or perhaps welcomed – the national industries have again been trying to go their own ways.

So we come finally to the description of the present situation, which was also mentioned by Mr. Brasseur in his draft recommendation. Europe has to import 80 % of its integrated circuits. The European data-processing industry's share of the world market is only 16 %. There is no common strategy for changing this state of affairs. If by approving the report and adopting the recommendation – as I would ask you to do – the Assembly were to make a small contribution to progress in this direction, we should be very grateful.

*(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation in the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 840.

No amendments have been tabled.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

The Assembly is unanimous.

*The draft recommendation is agreed to unanimously<sup>1</sup>.*

### **8. State of European aerospace activities – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 841)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Orders of the Day call for the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the state of European aerospace activities – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council, Document 841.

I call Mr. Scheffler, Rapporteur.

1. See page 48.

Mr. SCHEFFLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in beginning my report – which deals with energy, the European aircraft industry and space questions – I must first of all express my warmest thanks to two bodies. First, I must acknowledge that the flow of information from the Council, and the extent of its support, have greatly helped my work and that of the Committee.

As I shall not be a member of the new, ninth Bundestag, this report is the last I shall make to this Assembly. I am therefore all the more anxious to thank the Committee's secretariat most warmly for collecting and collating the information, for the preparation of the report and for the quality of its work in all respects. I would particularly mention the Committee's secretary, Mr. Huigens, who has given me unflagging support.

The report contains a short section on energy matters, which are for the most part linked with the general questions dealt with in the report. I have again deliberately emphasised the fact that the energy problem is indeed one of the primary concerns of the western industrial nations but that it is also, to a far greater degree, a question fundamental to the very existence of the developing countries. It is depressing to have to note that, despite joint declarations expressing the will of this Assembly and of the Council, no practical achievements are yet in sight.

According to a European Communities' report of 8th April 1980, oil consumption rose again in 1979 by 2.7 % to a total of 525 million tonnes. That is 25 million tonnes more than envisaged in the joint decision of the governments of the member states. Although dependence on oil fell nominally from 54.5 % of total energy consumption in 1978 to 53.3 % in 1979, the fact that some 38 % of the gas used in the European Communities is supplied by the Soviet Union makes the possible consequences of the Afghanistan crisis and the general unsatisfactory situation more clearly visible than ever. It is therefore only logical and indeed imperative that the period of joint studies and decisions should give way to practical measures that would lessen Europe's dependence on energy imports. I therefore welcome the Committee's intention to maintain its concern with the security of energy supplies actively in the future.

Turning now to the section on the European aircraft industry, I would point out that this industry has an exceptionally wide range of products and has to face tough international competition.

The report states that the development of the Airbus family had been planned from the start.

*Mr. Scheffler (continued)*

This does, however, need qualification, since it was in fact not till 1978 that more or less concrete plans for the expansion of production were actually worked out. The decisive factors behind this development were the A-300's increasingly evident commercial success, its low environmental impact and its reliability. However, let us have no illusions. The development costs for other types of aircraft in this series will continue to run into thousands of millions, both in francs and in D-marks. I hope it will be possible to improve co-operation with Rolls-Royce and Fokker so as to keep duplication of development and intra-European competition to a minimum.

I would like to say that I am very glad that Mr. Osborn will be back in the Committee. He will certainly help to ensure that what he himself has just been calling for in this sector can in fact be managed from Europe's own resources.

A word about the ECA, the European combat aircraft. The opinion expressed in this report to the effect that new weapons systems could be introduced by the eighties needs to be qualified by the fact that the research and development costs for new systems vastly exceed the financial resources of any one country. For this reason implementation of most of the plans will have to wait until the nineties.

However, in one respect there is a particularly close connection between the further development of new aircraft systems and space engineering. Without further development of fundamental research into materials produced in conditions of weightlessness, the design of ultra-modern aircraft, missiles and weapons systems will be subject to severe limitations. Only the know-how gained in space, and the practical development of new alloys, metals and carbon compounds, will open wider perspectives.

Use will also have to be made of what Mr. Brasseur has just been describing. Experience in telematics, too, will provide opportunities for reductions in space, volume and weight, which are the *sine qua non* of any further aircraft development.

Experts in the aircraft industry believe that there are unlikely to be any great advances in aircraft design for some time. The progression from piston engine through turbo-prop to turbine propulsion seems to have come to a halt for the time being – this from somebody who in forty years has personally witnessed the leap from non-powered to powered flight and developments to the present day.

Surprisingly, however, it appears that in aerodynamics not all the possibilities have yet been fully exhausted, for research recently begun on the "supercritical wing" is not yet finished. In addition, extraordinary progress has already been made in regard to low-speed and fuel-saving flight. Further developments – as for example an increase in range – can be achieved only via a reduction in fuselage weight and in this respect the European aircraft industry is extremely well placed.

To conclude this section, I must say quite frankly that I am not very hopeful that the European combat aircraft programme can be implemented at all quickly. At the International Aircraft Exhibition in Hanover the German Defence Minister, Mr. Apel, speaking with reference to the tactical combat aircraft, known as the TKF, pointed to the financial difficulties which his defence budget could not cope with alone. The obvious conclusion is that other contributors will have to be found to finance further research on this aircraft.

Given this situation, the process of structural consolidation of aircraft and space undertakings in Europe must be pursued. This consolidation is already well advanced in Britain and France, and it is to be hoped that the merger of MBB and VFW will bring about the same situation in the Federal Republic.

Thirdly, I should like to turn to space questions. I can be very brief here as the subject has been dealt with in great detail in the report.

The report was written after the first successful Ariane launch. We were all rather proud of this. And in my personal opinion we have still reason to be optimistic even after the launching that has just failed. ESA tells me that the causes of the failure are still being analysed so that in future faults will be reduced to a minimum and if possible completely eliminated. The next launch is likely to take place this year, probably in November. And despite the varying locations of the manufacturers, technological developments in Europe have been such that it is possible to speak of an extremely high level of perfection. Meanwhile, the delays in the space shuttle project have meant that users' interest in the Ariane launcher has not only been maintained but has even increased further.

The experimental phase in the development of Ariane will come to an end in 1980. A large number of satellites, particularly telecommunication satellites, will be going into service in the near future and will provide communications systems that not only function more precisely but are also more economical to operate than, say, cable systems. Of the two hun-

*Mr. Scheffler (continued)*

dred or so civilian satellites that will be put into orbit in the next decade, about fifty should be launched by Ariane; launch orders have already been placed for eleven satellites. This offers the European space industry an opportunity which – with its high degree of technical know-how – it is well placed to seize.

The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions approved my report unanimously, and I would be grateful if the Assembly could follow the Committee's lead.

May I be permitted a personal remark in conclusion. It is natural that after many years in politics one is tempted to ask: how far the technical matters considered here have anything at all to do with politics. I believe that every contribution made to the debates in this Assembly has shown how closely technical progress is today connected with Europe's political, social and economic position, and that we must today make great leaps forward in these sectors if we are simply to maintain our position.

I wish the Committee and the Assembly every success in the coming stage of their deliberations. Thank you for your attention. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Scheffler.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I should like to congratulate Mr. Scheffler on his wide-ranging and useful report. I wish briefly to address my remarks to three subjects: first, to space; secondly, to helicopters; and thirdly to the new European combat aircraft which we all hope will be jointly developed.

First, on the subject of space, may I support the three recommendations in Mr. Scheffler's report. I shall address myself further to recommendation 3 when I introduce Document 842 in my name tomorrow on a European earth resources detection satellite programme. Recommendations 1 and 2 deserve the full support of this Assembly as well. Secondly, on the subject of helicopters, Mr. Scheffler, in paragraph 31 of his report, made brief remarks on this subject, but it is a most important one both militarily and industrially.

It is in helicopters that European industrial collaboration has made almost the greatest progress. In the 1950s and 1960s European helicopter manufacturers used to be engaged to

a large degree in the licensed manufacture of American designs, principally by Sikorsky and Bell. But since those days, largely through the medium of co-operation, the European helicopter manufacturers have been able to forge for themselves a significant indigenous development and manufacturing capability. Now we are moving to yet another stage when the principal European constructors and users are seeking to define and develop the helicopter programmes for the 1990s and into the next century. These programmes can be summarised as follows.

First, there is the new Anglo-Italian anti-submarine helicopter, the EH-101, which is to be developed jointly by Agusta and Westland. Secondly, there is the new anti-tank helicopter, to be developed jointly by MBB and Aérospatiale. Thirdly, Aérospatiale and Westland are seeking to make possible collaboration potentially in two areas – a medium-transport helicopter, the Super-Puma, to succeed the Puma, which is in service with the French army and with the Royal Air Force, and also perhaps a new anti-submarine helicopter to succeed the Sea King.

If that range, that spectrum, of helicopters goes ahead successfully, we in Europe shall have created a capability that will have a dramatic impact in world markets. That is borne out by an article in today's edition of the *International Herald Tribune* by Mr. Paul Lewis, written after a visit to Westland at Yeovil. The headline reads: "4 European Copter Makers Challenge US – Joint Projects Illustrate Trend."

Already Aérospatiale has been able to sell ninety helicopters to the United States Coast-guard. It is my hope that if these new helicopter programmes go ahead jointly in Europe we shall indeed be able to sell further helicopters into the United States under the aegis of what we all desire – a genuine two-way street.

It is because I believe that that will be possible only if we produce these helicopters collaboratively that I am requesting, if the Presidential Committee agrees, that our Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions should produce a new report on international industrial consortia and collaborative arrangements for the production of high-technology military equipment. Joint production will be the key to Europe's having the capability to produce equipment that will be cost-effective enough to compete with American equipment and to have a chance of selling into the United States market and providing equipment for the NATO Alliance as a whole.

*Mr. Wilkinson (continued)*

In no area other than helicopters is the potential for collaboration greater than in that of the new European combat aircraft, to which Mr. Scheffler rightly drew so much attention in his report. I made my maiden speech on this subject on 3rd December last year in the debate on Document 823, when I said – I do not apologise for repeating myself – that I believed that there was no question more important for the future of the European armaments industry than the creation of a new European combat aircraft.

We know, as an answer to a question that I put in the British House of Commons has confirmed, that MBB, Dornier, Avions Marcel Dassault and British Aerospace have broadly agreed that they can jointly develop such an aircraft. The difficulty remains in harmonising the operational requirements of the Royal Air Force, the Luftwaffe and the Armée de l'Air and the time scales for the introduction of new combat aircraft into their inventories. It is a paramount example of a case in which a clear political directive must be issued to the respective air staffs to try to concert their operational requirements.

We have in the case of Tornado not simply industrially but operationally an example of how a multi-rôle aircraft can be evolved to meet differing operational requirements. This is the key. The RAF is looking, in Air Staff Target 403, for a new offensive support aeroplane to succeed the Jaguar. The Armée de l'Air, in 124 Avion Combat Tactique for 1992 – ACT 1992 is also looking for a new offensive support aeroplane to succeed the Jaguar. In that there is commonality and no distinction or difference.

The Luftwaffe, on the other hand, in seeking its F-4F Phantom replacement, is looking primarily for an interceptor, an air combat aeroplane. But, with the Tornado, the RAF had a requirement not simply for an interdict or strike aircraft but for an air defence variant. Both of these, as well as the Luftwaffe and Italian air force and German navy aeroplanes, were able to be developed within the same overall framework. We should be able, using that Panavia experience, to produce a new European combat aircraft that will be an offensive support aeroplane, but there could also be a variant optimised for air combat to suit the German air forces.

I also believe the RAF – I cannot speak for the French air force – will be glad in the 1990s to have an aeroplane for offensive support with a good air combat secondary capability. The Jaguar is a good aeroplane. The trouble with it is that it is not ideally suited for air combat,

although it has a significant capability in that regard.

I trust that the new European combat aircraft, which I hope will be jointly developed by the companies that I have named, will have built into it as many as is reasonably possible of the new technologies, such as active controls, perhaps variable geometry, vectored thrust engines or actively configured aerofoils. It must be a modern aeroplane to see us into the next century.

However, that will be exceedingly expensive, which is why Mr. Scheffler was so right to emphasise as strongly as he did the importance of the collaborative nature of a project of this kind. It must be an aeroplane capable of operating from small, semi-prepared strips. A defensive alliance is always in danger of a pre-emptive strike. Therefore, having the Harrier experience behind us, I hope that the European air forces would wish to have an aircraft that can be readily dispersed.

Mr. Scheffler said that the new engine that he expects to be in the new aeroplane will cost about \$2,000 million to develop. That may be so. The difficulty with the Jaguar and the Tornado was that in developing these new aeroplanes both Sepecat and Panavia were having a new engine, the Adour and the Turbo Union 199, to install at the same time. If we are to seek to develop a new airframe, with modern radar and avionics and a totally new engine as well, that will be very costly. It might be better to try to develop further, say, the 199 for the purpose rather than try to develop a new engine at the same time.

That said, this is a timely and helpful report. I lend all the support I can to it. I particularly emphasise that there is no armaments decision more important than that the European countries – and principally the French, the Germans and British – jointly develop the new combat aircraft that they will require for their common defence in the 1990. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Konings.

Mr. KONINGS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – This is a sound report, Mr President, of the kind we are used to getting from Mr. Scheffler; which is why I am sorry that it is his last report. He has announced that after the next Bundestag elections he will no longer be with us. I think back with very real esteem to the years when I worked with him in the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions:

In his reports Mr. Scheffler has on a number of occasions made the point that where colla-

*Mr. Konings (continued)*

boration between the European countries and firms in the field of science and research is concerned, things are not all that good. Things tend to happen by chance, rather than in any structured way. I think he is quite right in saying this.

An important section of his report deals with energy. This is a subject that offers a perfect example of the divergent policies followed in the various West European countries. In France, for instance, substantial use is made of nuclear energy, whereas in the Netherlands there is to be no further expansion of it for the time being. There is also the development of alternative sources of energy, such as the gasification of coal, above or below ground, and the conversion of coal into a fluid energy medium. In this area, too, there is not much in the way of co-operation; the approach to the problem is fragmentary. It is enormously important that in Europe, in industry and training, all our efforts should be pooled to serve the needs of science and technology. At least, I take it that we do want to continue to count in the world. At the moment a lot of duplicated effort is going on in the various countries in this sphere. People are constantly re-inventing the wheel, and often one will be unaware of what another is doing. Overcoming this problem is important for the defence sector as well. There is, for instance, the question of standardisation, which could bring sizeable savings. A lot is talked about this in the various countries. Collaboration and standardisation are possible, without adversely affecting certain aspects that are important for our defence.

I believe the governments ought to provide a stimulus in this field. I believe, too, that it is precisely the new technologies, and innovation, that form the strength of Western Europe. A number of things that up to now we have dealt with will have to be handed over to the third world, and we shall have to look for our strength to the highly-developed technologies, and to innovation. If we do not want to miss the boat, we shall need a competitive policy towards the United States and Japan.

The third paragraph of the recommendation is about the European Space Agency, ESA. We know that this co-operative project involves many aspects of new technology. There is, indeed, collaboration within the framework of ESA, though there have – regrettably – been a number of other *ad hoc* space developments outside the ESA set-up. It is important, however, for the present collaboration in ESA to be expanded further. It is with this in mind that I would endorse the plea by Mr. Scheffler for ratification of the ESA convention

by France. I think, too, that in the ESA context a look will have to be taken at how the work might be redistributed. Perhaps the participation of the various partners might be reassessed.

Mr. Scheffler's report has a lot to say about collaboration between, and association of, certain companies. This difficult subject is a major problem area: on the one hand there is research, which is becoming almost unaffordable for private companies and national authorities, the cost levels involved making it virtually impossible to carry on. And on the other a number of national interests are at stake, including the matter of job opportunities – something to which every country has to pay close attention nowadays. And for the firms concerned there is also the question of competition with each other.

Often, there has been a great deal of financial and intellectual investment in these industries, both by the companies themselves and by the governments. This important fact has to be kept in mind when we talk about association.

On paragraph 6 of the recommendation, I would mention that only yesterday Fokker published their annual report for 1979. The company is doing very well indeed; in the first five months of 1980 there have been more F-27s and F-28s sold than during the whole of 1979. Where the F-27 is concerned this is understandable, as this aircraft is very economical on fuel. Even more interesting is what the report has to say about the F-29. It is stated that in 1981 some 150 million guilders will have to be invested, two-thirds of which will come from the Dutch Government and the other third from the company itself. This surely shows that Mr. Scheffler is right in saying that the development costs will creep up to reach a thousand million guilders. Gradually, therefore, the financial burden has become more than the company and the Dutch Government can cope with.

This has led to Fokker starting up talks with Airbus. The idea is that Fokker should become the smallest branch of the Airbus family. It would be a very good thing if the F-29 could be integrated in this way. Fokker is however also involved in discussions with American and Japanese firms about a joint project. Fokker wants to keep hold of overall control of the project, and this is proving to be a very difficult point. Yet Fokker's wanting to hold on to the final responsibility is something that I would endorse.

Let there be no doubt – I believe that Fokker should incorporate the F-29 project into the Airbus system. Obviously, however, a lot of money has already been poured into the project; it is, when all is said and done, a Dutch



*Mr. Konings (continued)*

project, and it should provide jobs in the Netherlands. This is why Fokker's insistence on having final responsibility is reasonable. If this condition is met, we will support incorporating the F-29 into Airbus. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Konings.

I call Mr. Osborn.

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I hesitate to intervene again, Mr. President, but I wish to congratulate Mr. Scheffler on his report. I intervene not because I am a member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, but because I am glad to be back here in this Assembly. I am a member of the Procedure Committee and, having spent a lifetime in science and industry, I confess that I feel more competent in this field than I do in procedure, bearing in mind that I tried to vote twice this morning. I shall learn my way about in this Assembly.

The report has concentrated on a number of important issues and, because I am intervening for a second time, I shall be brief. First, it has dealt with aircraft – the Airbus 300/310 and the new developments. It has referred to the success of the Boeing 747 and 757 and to competition from the United States, particularly in the area of new aircraft. I find it fascinating to talk to airline personnel, who are still forecasting a rise in tourist traffic over the next ten years and perhaps even the next twenty years. As a back-bench member of parliament, I hope, bearing in mind the rising cost of propulsion for aircraft, that these assumptions are as correct now as they were last year and the year before.

The aircraft industry is dependent to a certain extent on civil demand, and I accept that when it comes to civil aircraft this may be the concern of national governments, national aircraft construction companies and perhaps – and I say this tentatively – the Commission of the European Communities.

My colleague John Wilkinson has underlined the fact that the military demand for aircraft and our basic industries are oriented, whether in regard to helicopters or in other sectors, towards meeting our own demands in the sphere of defence. That is rightly the concern of WEU.

Mr. Scheffler referred to Ariane, and we must remember not only the successful launching last December but the future proposals for Ariane 1, 2, 3 and 4. He also mentioned the work of the European Space Agency, which one can observe from the European Parliament and the

Council of Europe as well as from this Assembly.

I note that there will be an alternative to NASA for the launching of satellites, and it must be said that NASA has long had a monopoly. I welcome the launching from Kourou, which I visited about ten years ago, when that base was first established as a competitor to Cape Kennedy and Cape Canaveral. The one aspect which WEU, and above all the European institutions, must bear in mind is that there is a new technological development which various committees have had under scrutiny – namely, the shuttle programme. I know that it has had its setbacks. I was there last December with NASA. I believe that the shuttle could be a modern competitor and could make conventional launching devices and retrieval devices very costly. This is primarily the concern of the European Space Agency, and rightly so.

Thirdly, the report refers to energy. WEU is concerned, as, indeed, is the EEC, with the security of the supply of food and materials. We are, of course, concerned with the security of the supplies of energy in order to drive our tanks, military aircraft and other equipment. We are well aware, whether we are in NATO or in WEU, of the extent to which European defence depends upon external supply.

The report contains some interesting figures. It refers to the fact that in 1979 the consumption of oil rose from 500 million metric tonnes to 525 million metric tonnes, a 2.7 % increase. What is relevant is that the expanded Community, instead of demanding about 55 % of its energy in imported oil, may require up to 75 to 80 % according to the latest statistics which I have before me. What is relevant from the report is that the Community is importing 38 % of its natural gas from the Soviet Union.

As Chairman of the Conservative Party Committee on Energy in the Parliament of the United Kingdom, I find it difficult to argue the case of economic reality as against the security of energy supplies. Let me give one example. I am told by industrial competitors in the Community – by competitors in Germany and France – that, although Britain may have more natural gas than any other country, many companies in Great Britain have to pay more for their natural gas than do their opposite numbers in Germany, France and Italy. The British Government are now waiting for British industry's case to be proved to them. As an industrial member of parliament, I find myself in the middle of this argument. Surely it is a matter for concern on the subject of defence that there shall be security of energy supplies –

*Mr. Osborn (continued)*

in other words, economic security rather than military security. These matters are all-important.

I welcome the fact that this issue has been examined by Mr. Scheffler. I am sure that the Committee is well aware of my problem as a conservative backbencher in the British Parliament in seeking to balance economy of supply against security of supply. If imported coal is a factor in our consideration, whether from the United States of America, South Africa, Australia or, indeed, Poland, and if it produces a cheap supply of electricity in Denmark, for example, we must realise that this will have its impact on the electricity supply industry of Britain. Therefore, the Assembly should perhaps look more closely at the need for the security of supply when balancing that consideration with the economy of supply. I feel that this Assembly is perhaps the most apt body to examine this aspect of the problem. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Osborn.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Scheffler.

Mr. SCHEFFLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, after the contributions that have been made here the Rapporteur would be lacking in respect if he did not wish to add a few further observations.

At a time when I was no longer allowed to fly big aircraft, Mr. Wilkinson was able to fly the most up-to-date aeroplanes. When we compare the equipment which a JU-52 used to have and what a small aircraft has nowadays, we must say that it is safer today to get into a little Cessna to fly across the Atlantic and bring the aircraft to Europe than it used to be to fly a JU-52 over the Mediterranean, even though that, too, was relatively safe. That is how times have changed. This much by way of introduction.

It shows clearly what an enormous amount of technical progress has been made in this field, as in others. Today we have radar. Above all, owing to the results of research work done under the Apollo programme, we now have at our disposal far lighter and more independent systems which almost make one feel, in a small aircraft, like the captain of a Boeing 747. That is how safe it is to fly with these systems.

Mr. Wilkinson spoke in particular about the Phantom-Jaguar-Tornado designs. I am not able to judge in detail what line should be taken. That would be beyond my capabilities. But the difficulty of assessing the situation lies simply in the fact that in every

case we have all expected too much of a single system. That was the case, for instance, when we ordered the Starfighter for Europe. An aircraft which had been built for fine weather was now to be packed full of all kinds of electronics to enable it to operate under minimum weather conditions and in mountainous country – conditions for which it was never intended. People who know the machine well still claim that it was one of the best aircraft in the world but that it was just not the right design for Europe. We must surely believe what these people say, that a good aircraft was given the wrong job to do, and lost part of its value. Mr. von Hassel, who was partly responsible for the whole development, will doubtless agree with me on this point.

I have a general remark to make on the so-called state of competition among the European countries and between Europe and the United States. It cannot be my job or our job here to conjure up antagonisms where none really exist. The United States and we are partners in NATO. All we want is to be able to develop our technology as best we can. That this inevitably leads to competitive situations in business, when the United States is faced with a reduction in its share of the market for big aircraft from 97 % in 1976 to 62 % in 1979, is of course obvious. But business is business, and every country is entitled to develop its own technology so as to be able to hold its own internationally.

The second problem is that of competition between the countries of Europe. It was touched upon by Mr. Konings. In view of the enormous cost of developing a system nowadays it is absolutely absurd to try to impose this burden on a single nation. No government can now be expected to accept it. This fact forces us all to tackle these problems jointly, or they will not be solved. Anyone who is not prepared to recognise this must give up, and say that we can no longer develop the new systems we urgently need.

Let me come back to another point. It is only fair that those who are nowadays making contributions in the aerospace industry should be entitled to entertain the legitimate expectation of obtaining something in return. Everywhere there are people looking for jobs, everywhere there are skilled workers wanting to keep their jobs. It would be an absolutely frivolous waste of high-level technical know-how if we let these workers remain idle and made no use of them. The problem arises again and again. When programmes such as the Symphonie programme are temporarily discontinued, there is a drop in employment which makes such specialists wonder whether they should remain faithful to their calling or

*Mr. Scheffler (continued)*

whether they will have to seek some other occupation.

I thank all three Rapporteurs for the kind words they have addressed to me personally and for the critical observations, which I hope will be regarded basically not as a criticism but simply as an extension of the report presented here and as pointers for the future work of this Committee. I am particularly grateful for their comments.

In connection with the European Space Agency, Mr. Konings said that the ESA agreement had been ratified by France. This is unfortunately not yet the case, as far as I know. The report is therefore still very much in the air on this point, and the hope has still not been fulfilled.

There was talk of Japan and the United States and of their lead in electronics. Anyone who has seen how things are in Japan cannot but agree unreservedly. That country has gained an enormous lead in the production of electronic sub-assemblies, and it will take the western world quite a time to catch up. That should give us all food for thought.

Mr. Osborn has spoken about Boeing and competition with the Airbus. I am quite sure that the question will be solved when one of the competitors succeeds in attaining the objective more quickly and more cheaply.

This tallies exactly with the point made by Mr. Osborn: one cannot but wonder whether aircraft development will continue as at present. The question at the moment is not just one of corroborating the prediction that things will continue as at present, which could be questionable given the general energy situation. It must also be realised that whole families of aircraft now have to be replaced. One need only think, for instance, of an aircraft like the Boeing 707, which has been flying very safely for over twenty years but whose replacement by another system is now overdue. It is perfectly justifiable to ask whether a new aircraft which costs much less and can fly much more economically, and also do much less damage to the environment, is not a good market proposition, and one with which it will be possible to hold our own. That is definitely so at the moment with the Airbus and the two or perhaps three next versions of it.

A further comment, on the energy problem and on the price of natural gas in Great Britain. I am not myself in a position to judge what has been said on this subject, but I feel obliged to say that there is no such thing as differential prices. We find that everywhere.

The demand for energy inevitably pushes up all energy prices. In petrochemicals there are now no longer cheap and expensive forms of energy. The contracts, which are tied to the prices of labour and of delivery, inevitably lead to an increase in prices for natural gas. Some natural gas prices have risen by 50 %. That is just a fact, and there can be no argument about it. Whether, in view of defence policy considerations, changes can be made at national level is another matter, but as things are I do not see any possibility of this happening.

This discussion has shown we are still far from obtaining any result, that we must go on working with a keen critical sense, and that we must not take our task lightly. Basically, it is make-or-break for Europe. That is why I regard this task as so extraordinarily important that it must always be mentioned along with the other major political tasks which this Assembly has to perform. I hope the Assembly will continue to have good luck in this work. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Scheffler.

I call Mr. Lenzer.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, all that remains for me to do at the end of the debate is to thank the Rapporteur, Mr. Scheffler, most warmly for his efforts. I do so knowing that I speak on behalf of all the members of the Committee, and I would like to add a personal comment. For years now I have worked together with Mr. Scheffler not only in the Bundestag, but also in the corresponding committee of the Bundestag and here in the Assembly of Western European Union. I believe that there is no need for me to stress how greatly I regret the fact that he will no longer be a member of the new Bundestag. May I sum up my feelings by saying that he will be sorely missed.

I should also like to thank those who have spoken in the debate: Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Konings and Mr. Osborn.

The two sets of problems dealt with in the report will no doubt be the subject of frequent discussion in this Assembly in the near future as in the past. In the energy field we have to note that very little has changed since the last debate. Our dependence, with all the attendant political risk, remains the same. We are still more than 50 % dependent on oil. This varies from country to country – sometimes the degree of dependence is even more serious.

Given the fact that natural gas, too, must be looked on as a relatively risky form of imported energy, I believe we all are bound to conclude

*Mr. Lenzer (continued)*

that we shall in future probably be less worried about the prices of these energy imports than about whether it will even be possible to obtain the quantities we need.

We have to consider the question of whether economies – whose potential must surely not be underestimated – really can make a decisive contribution to reducing our energy bill. While making savings involves an interdisciplinary approach, which calls for adequate investment and the application of modern technologies, the fact remains that you can only save what you already have. Nobody has ever heard of a starving man suddenly being better nourished as a result of strict fasting.

Another question would be to see whether the renewable energy sources available to us, in which a relatively large amount of research and development is being invested, can make a decisive contribution. Although this is often disputed publicly, I believe that here too all the international experts are in fact agreed that these energy sources will at best be able to supply no more than about 5 % of our needs in the year 2000.

And so, finally, each of us in his national parliament, or indeed in the international organisations such as this Assembly, must answer for himself the question of what attitude he takes towards raw materials in his own country. In my country, the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, coal and lignite play a particularly important part. In this connection I consider coal to be not only a fuel, but a raw material which it is a pity to burn under the boiler of a power station. Coal ought rather to be used as a raw material for the production of SNG – substitute natural gas – so that it can lessen the demand for oil on the heating market or be used direct to make motor fuel. The necessary technology has been available since the thirties. What is needed now is to pick up the large-scale production technique which has meanwhile been lost.

A further political question: each representative must ask himself whether, against this background, he is prepared to renounce the peaceful use of nuclear power. Whoever says yes to the peaceful use of nuclear power must justify his answer to the general public. But those who say no must also justify their negative answer and say how they would secure supplies of energy.

Turning now to the aerospace industry, a field in which Mr. Scheffler has been working in the last few years with great commitment in the Committee for which I am speaking, there are of course stresses and strains in some areas,

for example in regard to assessing the proper relationship between national and international programmes. We shall have to decide whether it is right that national industries should become increasingly responsible for commercially oriented programmes or whether this can still be the task of an international organisation. In future the rôle of ESA will have to be discussed in close contact with the Agency itself. I am happy to say that in this Committee there has always been very close contact with the senior people in ESA, and I hope that this will remain the case with the new Director General.

I would however ask your understanding for the fact that individual governments, in view of the considerable contribution they make to this organisation, are again having doubts about its future tasks. I say this in view of the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, despite a slight reduction in the 1980 financial year, is making a contribution of 405 million D-marks to the European Space Agency.

In regard to Ariane, Mr. Scheffler made some comments about the successful launching and the failures. One thing is certain: we have to pay for the lessons we are learning. But we must not throw in the towel right away. For one thing is clear to all of us, or ought to be – and I shall repeat it: without a launcher we will not be able to sell a single application satellite. This connection must be kept in view at all costs.

One rather critical remark about the Airbus, too. Each of us ought to ask himself, now that he is celebrating the commercial success of the Airbus with some enthusiasm and publicly applauding it, whether he saw the whole thing in the same light from the beginning. I think what we had to do was a certain amount of talking ourselves into it, as it were, until we got over the hump. Many who today stand on the rostrum and laud the success of the Airbus would at one time rather have called the whole thing off. For the sale and profit situation was not from the outset what we are now, thank goodness, in a position to appreciate.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you and ask you to adopt the recommendation. (*Applause*)

Mr. President, on behalf of our Chairman and colleague, Mr. Valleix, who has meanwhile joined us again, I would like to convey his personal good wishes to the Rapporteur and his thanks to Mr. Scheffler for his excellent collaboration.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

No amendments have been tabled.

*The President (continued)*

We will vote on the draft recommendation in Mr. Scheffler's report tomorrow morning, as scheduled in the Order of Business of this part of the session.

**9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday 5th June, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. A European earth resources detection satellite programme (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 842).

2. State of European aerospace activities – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 841).
3. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection; The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands (Votes on the amended draft Recommendations, Documents 838 and 837).
4. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 835).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 5.50 p.m.)*

# SEVENTH SITTING

Thursday, 5th June 1980

## SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. A European earth resources detection satellite programme (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 842*).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Valleix (*Chairman of the Committee*).
4. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 835*).
5. State of European aerospace activities – reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 841*).
6. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection; The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands (*Votes on the amended draft Recommendations, Docs. 838 and 837*).  
*Speakers:* The President, Sir Frederic Bennett (point of order).
7. Adjournment of the Session.

*The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT. – The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 3. A European earth resources detection satellite programme

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 842)*

The PRESIDENT. – The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on a European earth resources detection satellite programme,

1. See page 51.

Document 842. After that there will be a vote on the draft recommendation in the report.

I call Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – It is a great honour to be able to present the report, Document 842, in my name on a European earth resources detection satellite programme, submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

First, I should like to thank the Clerk to the Committee, Mr. Huigens, for all his generous assistance, together with that of Doris Turner, his secretary. When I embarked on the report, it was a new field of activity for me. Although I had worked professionally in the aerospace industry for a number of years, I had been involved only peripherally in space matters. Mr. Huigens's guidance on briefing material and his advice on study visits and on our programme of work, together with his compilation of meticulous minutes on our fact-finding meetings, were invaluable to me.

This Assembly has, in view of the strategic significance of the exploitation of space, taken an active interest in space questions for a considerable time. In the earliest days space technology was very much the monopoly of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. More recently, as befitted its growing economic and political power in world affairs, and not least its intellectual resources and technical inventiveness, Europe developed for itself a distinct and significant range of capabilities in space over a wide range of space programmes.

*Mr. Wilkinson* (continued)

Very soon European policy-makers and governments realised that a concerted joint space programme in Europe would achieve more than the sum of individual national space efforts. On grounds not simply of spreading the financial cost of space developments but of making the best use of the limited resources of industrial, technical and intellectual expertise, European collaboration in space was a logical and economic imperative.

The European Space Agency, with its ten European member states and three European associated nations, plus Canada, has, for all the frustrations and difficulties of its work since its inception in 1973, proved on the whole an effective vehicle for the development of space projects. Yet its host nation, France, whose contribution to the success of European space ventures has been in technical and economic terms so outstanding, has still not ratified the European Space Agency Convention. Indeed, the ESA Council has, apart from an important meeting in 1977, operated without the personal participation of Ministers.

As Europe has soon to face important political decisions about the future development of remote-sensing satellite systems, it is important that there be more active political involvement in the work of the ESA and in the evolution of space policies in Europe to co-ordinate national and European involvement in remote-sensing satellite programmes.

For this purpose, we recommend, after due preparation, the convocation of the European Space Agency Ministerial Council for the appropriate decisions to be taken.

There is no doubt that remote-sensing space programmes offer substantial economic and strategic benefits. Meteorology, climatology, cartography, agronomy, geography, geology, oceanography, hydrology – virtually every science to do with this planet's surface and its atmosphere – have benefited considerably from the data received from remote-sensing satellite systems. Not simply science, however, but specific programmes in commercially exploitable fields, such as agriculture, crop monitoring, mineral exploration and the plotting of ocean currents and icebergs, have been possible from remote-sensing satellite systems.

In the military sphere, remote-sensing satellites have transformed the scientific gathering of intelligence. Furthermore, the processes of reconnaissance from space and military surveillance techniques from space have not merely transformed our ideas of crisis management and arms control; there have also been other applications of remote-sensing satellite data which

have enhanced deterrence and reduced the risk of war.

In 1972 the United States launched the first Landsat spacecraft. The experiment was successful, and large areas of the world now have pictorial coverage obtained by the satellite and its successors, Landsat 2 and Landsat 3. The European Space Agency Earthnet programme has provided the European ground infrastructure for the acquisition and dissemination of Landsat, Nimbus and – for a short period – Seasat data.

ESA itself entered the field of earth observation with the Meteosat programme. The first of two identical experimental remote-sensing satellites was launched in 1977, and the second will be launched at the end of this year. Although they are experimental, these satellites have a potentially operational configuration. The first satellite provided invaluable meteorological data until it went unserviceable last November.

The Meteosat programme was started by the French space and meteorological institutions. In 1972 the programme was Europeanised through legal arrangements between eight of the ESA member nations. The Agency controls Meteosat and is responsible for the processing of the data through the ESA centre at Darmstadt. In my view, the programme could continue most usefully into the 1990s.

European participation in the United States Spacelab programme will prove a most important element in the development of an indigenous European remote-sensing space capability. It is proposed to fly two experiments provided by West Germany for the European Space Agency as part of the first Spacelab payload to be launched by the NASA space shuttle in 1982. These payloads concern high-resolution space photography and all-weather microwave sensing by means of a synthetic aperture radar, a two-frequency scatterometer and one passive microwave radiometer.

Further remote-sensing payloads are planned in later Spacelab missions to develop further the synthetic aperture radar which will be so crucial to future European automatic remote-sensing satellites.

The European Space Agency has been involved since 1976 in remote-sensing studies. ESA considers that the mission requirements to cover both European regional needs and development aid programmes can best be met by two satellite systems: first, a coastal ocean monitoring satellite system – COMSS for short – and, secondly, a land application satellite system – LASS for short. A third protection system for global ocean monitoring could be incor-

*Mr. Wilkinson (continued)*

porated into COMSS. The first phase of studies of COMSS and LASS was assigned in September 1978 to the British Aerospace Corporation and Dornier respectively. The preparatory programme as a whole began in March 1979 and should last until next spring. The first launch, given the appropriate political go-ahead, should be in the mid-1980s – 1985 or 1986 – with a coastal ocean monitoring system, and the second should be in 1987-88 with LASS.

The launch vehicle for these launches would be the Ariane, and the systems would have a common platform. These satellite systems would be optimised for all-weather sensing.

In addition, France has been engaged since February 1978 in the development of the *Système Probatoire d'Observation de la Terre – SPOT* – under the aegis of ESA and its national space agency, *Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales* (CNES). Again, the launch vehicle will be Ariane, but the sensing for this remote-sensing system will be concentrated on the optical mode. Sweden and Belgium have agreed to participate in the programme industrially. The first launch is due in 1984, the second could be in 1986, the third in 1989 and the fourth in 1991, if it is decided to produce an operational system. There are also military possibilities inherent in the French programme, and that should be taken into account.

In these circumstances, as recommendation 3 points out, I believe that we should build on existing national programmes, such as the French SPOT system, either by a renewed effort at their Europeanisation or by integrating such programmes within an approved ESA schedule of compatible resources satellite launchers.

Furthermore, as recommendation 4 points out, I believe that in view of the development of remote-sensing satellites by other countries such as India and Japan, Europe should devote adequate funding for worthwhile resources satellite programmes. I am not convinced that we have yet evolved the most appropriate mechanisms for that development. ESA is, on balance, probably the most appropriate mechanism for the development phase, but the commercial exploitation of such systems deserves further study.

If Europe is to have a truly independent capability and not be dependent on data from American systems, we must seriously look at the military requirements for remote-sensing satellite systems in a concerted way. I believe that the Independent European Programme Group is the right mechanism for this.

Lastly, we should bear in mind the potential for development aid that is inherent in the data that can be acquired from remote-sensing systems. Both the EEC and the Council of Europe could be appropriate vehicles for this.

I pay tribute to the help that I have received from the ESA, the CNES, BAC, the British Department of Industry, the Royal Aircraft Establishment and the EEC. I must draw the attention of the Assembly to the words of the former Director-General of the ESA, Mr. Roy Gibson, who said in his report of 1979:

“ESA's 1979 is not an easy year to summarise: apart from the gratifying success of Ariane in the last days, it is difficult to point to any spectacular achievements.”

He advises the Council that the ball remains clearly in the court of the delegations and emphasises that if they put to good use material that has been made available to them, a worthwhile European space follow-on programme is assured. If not, there is a real danger that ESA will share the fate of at least one other European organisation whose communal objectives were never reconciled with national ambitions.

Space, par excellence, is a field of human endeavour which should not merely be inspiring, intellectually and spiritually, but should, in a practical, industrial and commercial way, be made to transcend the national boundaries in Europe that have divided our countries for so long. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Wilkinson.

No representatives have indicated a desire to participate in the debate.

Is there anyone who wishes to speak?...

If not, I shall ask the Chairman of the Committee to reply.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would have preferred the debate to have come from the chamber rather than the Committee bench. Nevertheless, I hope Mr. Wilkinson will allow me to say how much I admire the quality of the report and the talent of the Rapporteur. I am sure you all agree with me.

Mr. Wilkinson has discussed the subject matter of his report on several occasions before the Committee, and this morning you have had a chance to appreciate its solid character and the interesting nature of guidelines suggested for the Committee's future activities. I shall return to this later.

On behalf of us all, I therefore thank the Rapporteur for this clear and closely-argued



*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

contribution which, Mr. President, will lead to further developments if the Presidential Committee so decides.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like briefly to draw your attention to certain points which the Rapporteur discussed but which I think need further clarification. For example, you will have seen that remote earth-sensing is now and will increasingly become a prime area of European co-operation. The United States is of course well advanced in this sector as in many others, but you will have realised, Ladies and Gentlemen, from Mr. Wilkinson's statement and in particular from his report, that Europe is in a strong and healthy position too.

We may regret – and I, as a Frenchman, am the first to admit it – a certain imbalance in the commitment of our European countries to developing the detection of earth resources by satellite. What strikes me, however, is that all the European partner countries are now aware that the subject is important. And if France is ahead here, others must turn this to account – if I may use that expression – and I am happy to see that some of our European partners have gone a long way on the road towards such co-operation with France, just as I am happy to see that the European Space Agency has firmly assumed responsibility for other areas, so that the Europeans can now cover the whole vast network of remote earth-sensing.

There are, therefore, the beginnings of co-operation in this vast area; and our European countries have almost unanimously realised its importance. What we must do now – and that is the rôle of our Assembly – and the main and primary aim of this report – is to promote the development of this technical co-operation, along two lines, for peaceful as well as military purposes.

This technical co-operation would be an outstanding development for Europe, and I must emphasise this, firstly on the basis of what Europe has already achieved and secondly – following the Rapporteur who rightly identified the lines of force in the area of remote-sensing – in terms of its peaceful applications; oceanography, where Europe has already achieved results rivalling those of the United States; the vast and inexhaustible area of meteorology; and then cartography, exploration in general and – a very important sector highlighted by the Rapporteur – land use, a sector of agronomy with considerable development potential thanks to the data provided by remote earth-sensing, which offers much scope for co-operation, in this case with all the developing countries, especially the poorer countries, as is clearly noted in the draft recommendation.

After these peaceful uses, I now come to defence purposes. One paragraph of the draft recommendation is concerned with coastal ocean monitoring, which certainly has a very direct bearing on defence questions.

In this connection, and without wishing to force the hand of the next Presidential Committee, may I say that the Committee on Scientific Questions will probably propose for consideration by our Assembly in the near future a report on the law of the sea and security. It is to be hoped that the Conference on the Law of the Sea will complete its work next summer and our Committee has already attempted to pre-empt, so to speak, the conclusions of that conference, in order to evaluate the important new information it may offer our European countries from the scientific, technological and defence standpoints. The possibility of coastal monitoring by means of remote earth-sensing has of course already introduced us to this subject.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I do not wish to prolong our Assembly's debates this morning since, once again, Mr. Wilkinson's oral and written presentation of his report has given us all the necessary details. Yet I would like to make three observations.

The first is the dynamic progress of European activity in remote earth-sensing. I am extremely glad, as a Frenchman, that Italy, Switzerland and France – and we owe thanks to these three countries – have found it possible to co-operate very closely in the SPOT project. In my view an even more interesting point – and the Rapporteur is right – is that the European Space Agency will become the prime instrument and means of directing all European activities in this area.

Once again, that is the aim of the report. The recommendation is most explicit on the subject and, following the Rapporteur who consulted those responsible at all levels in nearly all our countries, I can bear witness that France lays no claim to a separate position here simply because it may be more advanced in certain fields than in others; on the contrary France hopes that European co-operation will crystallise, become organised and develop further thanks to the European Space Agency.

Ladies and Gentlemen, may I point out in passing that the Agency believes that this field offers considerable scope for fresh activities. Some people may have thought that having completed its work on Ariane successfully – and we believe in Ariane more than ever – the Agency had come to the end of its activities. This was not so! In fact the European Space Agency's programme is becoming even heavier as a result of our ambitions regarding the subject dealt with by Mr. Wilkinson.

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

My second observation is as follows: like the Rapporteur, I hope our activities will convince our countries of the importance we attach to a meeting of the Ministerial Council of the European Space Agency in the coming months. There has been no meeting at ministerial level since 1977. Because of the issues at stake, and the need to plan new, additional objectives for the future, as regards both the launcher and detection for other purposes, the Ministerial Council must meet, very soon, within the next few months. I think it is up to WEU to point this out and make it known to our governments.

I repeat, Ladies and Gentlemen, that although it is true that the Istres Centre is operating, cost what it may – which is very little compared to the European Space Agency – and although I know the Ministers are consulting on the subject of this centre, I see no signs of them meeting for collective discussions about the European Space Agency. This is something on which we must insist.

Lastly, and this is my perhaps rather ambitious conclusion, Mr. President, but we must be ambitious, I hope that just as WEU certainly played a part, and its very own part, in European co-operation in the last ten years or so, largely as a result of the success of our colloquies in Toulouse, Paris and elsewhere – Mr. Huigens, the administrator, and some of my other colleagues can bear witness to this – and of the activities of Mr. de Montesquiou and our colleague Mr. Warren, we too have made a real contribution to the crystallisation of a European will to co-operate and to the achievement of the full potential of European aeronautics.

The results are most tangible in civil achievements, which we are the first to welcome. For example, the Airbus is the whole Airbus industry, for the purpose here was not only to produce a good aircraft but also to create a technical and commercial infrastructure making it possible to exploit this aeronautical achievement.

It is very likely that we will do further work on this subject and the high quality of the report presented to you is a guarantee of this. I believe we will have to come back to the subject, go into it in more depth, and who can tell this morning, Mr. Wilkinson, whether in seven or ten years we will not have to reassess this report; I hope the findings would be positive, that we would find that European remote-sensing had contributed to enriching the poorer countries, to the development of the less-developed countries and also to opening up a field of future action for the benefit of the whole of Europe.

That must be our ambition and I do not think I am exaggerating with this conclusion, in the hope that our work this morning will gain the recognition it deserves. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Valleix. I am sure that members will endorse your commendation of the excellence of the work of the Rapporteur and your remarks on the importance of the report that your Committee has put before us.

We now have to vote on the draft recommendation in Document 842.

There are no amendments.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

*The draft recommendation is agreed to unanimously<sup>1</sup>.*

It was said yesterday that the votes on outstanding matters would be taken at about 10.45 a.m. I therefore propose now to proceed to the next item of business, in order not to waste any time.

#### 4. Relations with Parliaments

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 835)*

The PRESIDENT. – The next Order of the Day is the presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Schlingemann on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 835.

I understand that the Rapporteur, Mr. Schlingemann, is not able to be present but that Mr. Mommersteeg has kindly undertaken to present the report on behalf of the Committee.

I therefore call Mr. Mommersteeg.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, my friend Mr. Schlingemann, Rapporteur for our Committee, cannot present his report because he is at a meeting with the President of the French Republic.

Mr. President, I hope I may continue in my mother tongue which is spoken by some twenty million Europeans.

*(The speaker continued in Dutch)*

1. See page 52.

*Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)*

Since the Committee's Rapporteur, Mr. Schlingemann, is not present, it falls to me to give you a survey of what the Rapporteur and the Committee are putting before you. In view of the fact that members of the European Parliament have since June 1979 been directly elected, and are thus increasingly less at the same time members of their national parliaments, the Committee feels it is important to let you see how contact between our two assemblies is still possible.

The amount of documentation that flows constantly from Paris to Luxembourg and from Luxembourg to Paris is, so far as we can see, bewilderingly large. I can only hope that the secretary of our Committee does not become buried under the tons of paper he receives and has to read. The Committee hopes that it will be possible, via our General Affairs Committee, to establish contacts at political level – relations between chairmen, between bureaux, clerks and officials with eventually, as an outcome of all these contacts, co-operation at parliamentary level.

The report goes on to describe what the Committee is and what it is trying to do, either directly or through the national delegations. The members of parliament of the seven member countries have a major part to play here; the WEU Assembly is, after all, so far the only assembly at European level where defence matters can, may and ought to be debated. We have a wide field with vast opportunities open to us. Are we really making use of these opportunities? Do we, when we get back home, talk about WEU? I will take advantage of the absence of our Rapporteur, who as the "official spokesman" of the Committee is not able to put things quite so bluntly, to say to all of you, to all of us, that only too often we tend to leave the Committee out in the cold; as soon as we hear the doors of this building close behind us, we may think about what presents we are taking back for our wives and children but we certainly give no further thought to the very important issues we have – sometimes quite vehemently – been discussing here. How often do we ask a parliamentary question about WEU? How often, in a debate, do we mention what has been said here, often on the same subject? How often do we call attention to our reports, which are sometimes very important and politically relevant?

We are very ready to say here that the WEU Council of Ministers does not do much. But why should it do much, if the members of parliament do not do much either? Can we blame other people for something we are guilty of ourselves?

When you all read the report of this speech back at home – I am sad to see that only a few have stayed here to the end – you might give five minutes to thinking about what you can do. Try asking our very keen Committee secretary to let you have a question to ask on a particular subject, to let you have a speech for one or other of your debates. You would of course have to rework the text to match your own political views.

The Committee has tried to establish many contacts with the public, with the press and with other parliamentarians. The European centre for study and documentation at parliamentary level, which has members from thirty-five national parliaments, has one member from this Assembly – the secretary of your Committee for Relations with Parliaments. Since our staff are trying to build bridges between the numerous parliaments of Western Europe I, as a mere stand-in for your Rapporteur, believe that here parliamentarians can and must do something, even if only by giving our secretary our full backing in his work.

Finally, I would tell you that after the Committee's very fruitful visit to the French Jura, a visit is now being organised to Aquitaine, the south-west part of France. Contacts with the public, the press, the university world and so on are not only useful but most necessary for the continued existence of WEU.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

After these two visits to France we plan to go to Belgium, where we have not been for several years, and to the United Kingdom.

The Committee for Relations with Parliaments must take up the necessary contacts both in the capital cities and in the provinces or regions.

*(The speaker continued in English)*

Your Committee, Mr. President, believes that its task is to have contacts not only with national parliaments but with the population of our member countries, and that our task is to put forward the interests and work of WEU to all 250 million inhabitants of its member states. This can be done only with the help of all of you. So, Mr. President, permit me to beseech the distinguished representatives to listen to what I would like to call this *cri de cœur* – that we do the necessary. Thank you, Mr. President. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Mommersteeg. I am sure that your words are extremely timely. I am only sorry that your audience was so small, because I am sure that you are right in saying that the importance and influence of this Assembly depends

*The President (continued)*

heavily on the activities of its members between the sittings here in Paris and, in particular, their activities within their own national parliaments on questions that are discussed here.

I do not think that anyone has put his name down as wishing to take part in the debate.

Does anyone wish to take part in the debate on the report ?...

Mr. Osborn.

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I hesitate to rise at the end of this part-session, but I thought that I was going to hear some other speakers follow up this excellent report on relations between parliaments and this Assembly, the Council of Europe, NATO, and, above all, the European Parliament. May I congratulate you on finishing your first term as President. The member for Sheffield, Hallam, extends his congratulations to the member for Sheffield, Park, on his rôle in the Chair. That is the pleasant part of my contribution.

The other is perhaps a challenge to you, Mr. President, to help the work of the Committee. It is communication between assemblies, between national parliaments, this Assembly, the Council of Europe, and certainly now the European Parliament, as Mr. Douglas Hurd, the Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, pointed out, where to an increasing extent the members of the European Parliament will not be members of our national parliaments.

I was delighted to find in the report reference in paragraph 32 to the European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation and a reference in paragraph 34 to the symposium in Brussels on 15th, 16th and 17th October where representatives from the different assemblies come together. I want to endorse the value of the work of the Committee. I have not given you prior notice of my intention to seek to intervene to wish it luck in the coming year and to suggest, Mr. President, that you might find it worth your while as President to keep us in touch with the other assemblies and our national parliaments whose co-ordination and communication is all-important.

I spoke yesterday on information technology. This is important in the civil and military fields. What is achieved internationally must be of importance to our national governments and to our national parliaments. I found, coming here after a gap of five years, that the work has been constructive. Perhaps the problem, when one looks at a problem in the national parliaments or in this Assembly, is in having brought to one's attention the work going on in other areas.

In this field I brought up the question of telematics and informatics and the initiative that has been taken by the Commission of the European Communities and Commissioner Davignon. Perhaps I was unaware, through the criticism that I make at the present time, of what had been done in the European Parliament in this field. Therefore, the work of the Rapporteur and the Committee in ensuring that we know what others are doing is all-important. I apologise for intervening at this time, but I have taken the opportunity of a space in our proceedings to do so.

The PRESIDENT. – There is certainly no need to apologise, Mr. Osborn. I am grateful to you for supporting Mr. Mommersteeg in his presentation of the report.

I thank you, Mr. Osborn, for your kind personal reference to me. It is all the more agreeable as it arises from neighbourliness – although our political parties are different – in the great city of Sheffield.

Does anyone else wish to take part in the debate on this report ?...

Mr. Mommersteeg, do you wish to reply ?

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*). – No, thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – In that case, I am sure that it is the wish of the Assembly to thank Mr. Mommersteeg and the Committee. (*Applause*)

I hope we can take to heart the message that Mr. Mommersteeg left with us and that the Committee will have a more optimistic and successful report of activity in national parliaments when we meet next time.

**5. State of European aerospace activities  
– reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the  
Council**

(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 841)

The PRESIDENT. – We must now deal with the recommendations on which votes have been deferred from yesterday.

With the permission of the Assembly, I should like to put first the recommendation contained in Document 841, the state of European aerospace activities, which was concluded at the end of yesterday afternoon's sitting and which has not yet been put to the Assembly for decision. I think that this is less controversial than the other matters, and I wonder whether there are any objections to the recommendation in Document 841.

Are there any objections ?...

*The President (continued)*

Are there any abstentions ?...

*The draft recommendation is agreed to<sup>1</sup>.*

**6. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection**  
***The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands***

*(Votes on the amended draft Recommendations, Docs. 838 and 837)*

The PRESIDENT. – We turn now to the recommendations of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments that have been deferred from yesterday. The first one is in Document 838 on nuclear, biological and chemical protection. We must certainly have a roll-call to see whether we have a quorum today.

We have not a quorum in the hemicycle, but we should see whether other members come in. What is the view of the Assembly ?

We shall proceed with a roll-call.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, on a point of order. I did not hear, and certainly some other members did not, whether there was any demand for a roll-call and anyone against.

The PRESIDENT. – Since objection has already been taken within the Assembly, it would be wrong, under our rules, not to have a roll-call vote. On looking around, I think that there will certainly be objections.

Are there objections to the recommendation in Document 838 ?...

Yes, objections are taken. I think that this will be so in the case of all the votes which

have been postponed. It would be wrong under our rules, the chair having received objections, for us to proceed without a roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Pawelczyk.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

I regret to have to say that again we do not have a quorum, so it would be equally unuseful to proceed with the remaining vote on the recommendation in Document 837 on the northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands.

**7. Adjournment of the Session**

The PRESIDENT. – That concludes the work of this part-session:

I thank all representatives again for the great honour they did me at the beginning of our session by electing me as President. I hope that, despite the difficulties outside, representatives will have easy and pleasant journeys home to their respective countries. I look forward to seeing everyone again at our next part-session in December.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

I declare the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union adjourned.

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 10.55 a.m.)*

1. See page 53.



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