

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1986

I

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

M. 2. 178/7

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I

Assembly Documents

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PARIS

The proceedings of the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I: Assembly documents.

Volume II: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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	DE DECKER Armand	PRL
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	BEREGOVOY Pierre	Socialist
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	President of the Assembly	
	de CHAMBRUN Charles	National Front
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Mr.	Donald COLEMAN	Labour
Sir	Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
Mr.	Edward GARRETT	Labour
Sir	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr.	Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr.	James HILL	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
Mr.	Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Earl	of KINNOULL	Conservative
Lady	Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Dr.	Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir	John OSBORN	Conservative
Sir	John PAGE	Conservative
Mr.	Stephen ROSS	Liberal
Sir	Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr.	John WILKINSON	Conservative

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	Stefan TERLEZKI	Conservative
	John WARD	Conservative
	Alec WOODALL	Labour

Parliaments, public opinion and defence

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations ²
by Mr. Eysink, Rapporteur*

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on parliaments, public opinion and defence

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submitted by Mr. Eysink, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Dame Jill Knight (Chairman); MM. Frasca, Enders (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Bonnel (Alternate: Dejardin), Cavaliere, Goerens, Hackel (Alternate: Antretter), Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Mr. Mercier, Dr. Miller, MM. Noerens, Sènès, Stoffelen (Alternate: Eysink), Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Resolution***on parliaments, public opinion and defence***

The Assembly,

- (i) Having studied the report of its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on parliaments, public opinion and defence;
- (ii) Convinced that the necessary improvement in public awareness of western security and defence questions and particularly of the functions and activities of the Assembly of Western European Union in this respect calls for new efforts at both national and international level,

CALLS ON NATIONAL DELEGATIONS

1. To intensify their efforts to follow up the activities of the WEU Assembly in national parliaments, political groups, committees and vis-à-vis the public;
2. To invite governments to take specific steps to provide the public with substantial information about WEU in general and the Council's activities in particular;
3. To keep a continuing watch over the relevant governmental activities.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Eysink, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. This is the first report to be presented by this committee to the Assembly of Western European Union since 23rd May 1985 when the Assembly adopted Resolution 70 on the amendment of Rule 42 *bis* extending the responsibilities of the committee whose title was changed to "Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations". A new task was attributed to the committee in that a new paragraph was added to Rule 42 *bis* stipulating that the committee shall:

“(c) make all necessary proposals with a view to bringing the work of the Assembly to the attention of the public and the press in member countries”.

2. The new scope of the committee cannot be without consequences for its future activities, but effective action is extremely difficult in view of the strict limitations imposed by the Assembly's difficult budgetary situation.

3. At this stage already a fundamental question arises which concerns both governments and parliaments: Is the pursuit of an effective public relations policy really possible within the limits of the rigorous principle of zero growth?

4. This problem does not concern Western European Union alone. It was *Lord Carrington*, the Secretary-General of NATO, who, at the opening session of the thirty-first annual assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Oporto, Portugal, made the following remarks:

“I sometimes think that our paymasters have a rather exaggerated view of the virtues of the shoe-string in the information business. A business which the western democracies cannot afford to neglect, because it is the essence of our system that policies – and especially policies for the longer haul – will only succeed if they are understood and seen to make sense.”

5. Probably an effective information policy cannot be pursued without financial support. But this is of course only one aspect. There is also the question of the rôle parliamentarians should play vis-à-vis the public in security and defence matters at national and international level. All activities in this new field need very careful consideration before making concrete proposals or reaching conclusions. The purpose of this report is therefore merely to collect data likely to highlight interrelations between parliaments, public opinion and defence questions in order to establish a basis for working out a public relations policy for the Assembly.

6. This analysis will not therefore be theoretical but will seek to spell out the duties of WEU parliamentarians towards the public and public opinion and to provide guidelines for fulfilling these duties. In a further report firm proposals for the Assembly's public relations policy should be elaborated.

II. The different interrelations

(i) Parliaments and defence

7. The rôle of parliaments in defence matters has many facets, most of which have already been examined by different committees of the Assembly of Western European Union. In May 1977 the Assembly took note of an information report entitled "Members of parliament and defence" presented by *Mr. Delorme* on behalf of the then Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

8. His study covered the rôle of members in national parliaments and was based on a questionnaire sent to the parliaments of all member countries. A major part of the report dealt with the relationship between parliaments and governments in defence matters.

9. One of the Rapporteur's conclusions was that "in spite of differences between countries, parliaments have important *legislative* and *supervisory* powers" in defence matters. But on the other hand he stated that apart from some exceptions, "it would appear that the planning of defence policy is the prerogative of the executive and even of the government assisted by committees of experts".

10. Referring to the Netherlands, where a defence council attached to the government includes representatives of both chambers, the Rapporteur concluded that this example was worthy of consideration in order to allow the legislature to be associated with defence planning from the outset. Otherwise the fundamental question had to be raised as to whether the nature of modern warfare did not make parliamentary powers illusory.

11. It is worth repeating these considerations because they also have repercussions on the question of whether governments and parliaments have a joint or separate function vis-à-vis public opinion.

12. Turning to the European level, the Assembly of Western European Union has only limited supervisory powers vis-à-vis the Council. For

that very reason, the Assembly has always been concerned that national governments and the Council should keep parliamentarians informed about security and defence planning.

13. In this context, the Assembly adopted specific recommendations such as:

- Recommendation 197 on military security and parliamentary information adopted on 12th May 1970; and
- Recommendation 333 on parliaments and defence procurement adopted on 22nd May 1979 on reports from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

14. In their Rome declaration ministers supported the idea of more contact between the Council and the Assembly and in the Council's reply to Recommendation 411 on deterrence and the will of the people, communicated to the Assembly on 20th May 1985, it was affirmed that "the enhanced dialogue between the Assembly and the Council should enable public opinion to be even better informed of the basis of the defence policy of WEU member states".

15. But for the moment these intentions are still waiting to be carried into effect and the position of WEU parliamentarians, caught between the Council and the public, remains difficult.

(ii) Public opinion and defence

16. In the abovementioned report by *Mr. Delorme*, one result of the questionnaire was summarised as follows:

"All the answers show the interest of the population in defence matters. Parliamentarians are frequently questioned on the subject and the political parties have to give them prominence in their electoral undertakings."

17. But such a result does not say anything about the main preoccupation of the public in security and defence, nor does it give any idea of the level of knowledge among the population. "Interest in defence matters" may also mean: conscientious objection, noise from military flights, damage caused by manoeuvres, equipment supply problems, stationing of troops, military installations, pollution control, etc.

18. One major and at the same time particular aspect was handled in a very comprehensive way in the report *Mr. Lagorce* presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee on deterrence and the will of the people on which Recommendation 411 was adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1984.

19. It is worth quoting the following assessment from the explanatory memorandum as an example:

"Your Rapporteur considers it important, and it corroborates the various poll results that he has been able to consult, that international peace, defence, nuclear weapons and the balance of forces, although real and serious, are not the main preoccupation of the majority of Europeans... The inadequacy of the West's means of defence, a fact stressed by all governments, does not seem very serious to a large majority of Europeans."

20. As a consequence, the Assembly in Recommendation 411 recommended that the Council "continue to keep European public opinion informed of the dangers to which the world is exposed, of the measures available to the European members of the Atlantic Alliance for countering them and of the type and level of weapons deployed in Europe".

21. The Council in its reply "shares the Assembly's concern to ensure that European opinion is informed as completely as possible about the threats to our continent and about the security and defence policy adopted by the member countries of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance to counter these threats... this is essentially the responsibility of each member state which provides regular information using the methods that it considers the most appropriate". There is therefore agreement between the Assembly and the Council on the general need for an improved information policy.

22. All parliamentarians should use this reply in asking their respective governments about how they are really implementing this information effort towards the public. But the breakdown of tasks between parliamentarians and ministerial organs in this respect needs further clarification.

23. It is interesting that the Council further referred to the document "WEU and public awareness" which had been prepared by the Permanent Council and had been approved at the meeting at ministerial level in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985. The document was annexed to the reply and contains some ideas concerning the Assembly's rôle in public relations which will be examined below.

24. In fact it cannot be denied that parliamentarians too have an important responsibility towards the public and public opinion in security and defence matters.

(iii) Parliaments and public opinion

25. The responsibility of parliamentarians towards the public is mainly based on the fact that they are elected by the population and represent the interests of the people. WEU parliamentarians have a twofold responsibility

towards their national electorate and at European level.

26. The population has the right to be kept regularly informed by its representatives about their activities. Conversely, parliamentarians should listen to their electors in order to take account of their views on all relevant questions. Consequently, as already stated in the report by Mr. Delorme, parliamentarians have mainly an information rôle towards the public.

27. This information rôle is a duty which should not be limited to parliamentary activities but should include opinions on political decisions and action taken by governments. Parliamentarians should seize every opportunity of improving public knowledge and awareness of defence and security matters where they are better informed than the average citizen. In providing their assessments of the situation and of governmental activities, parliamentarians must also to some extent provide information on government actions.

28. As a first result, it may be said that parliamentarians are something of a link between governments and the people. It is important to realise that parliaments and parliamentarians are responsible towards the people and not towards government. But governments are responsible both towards parliaments and towards the people. Parliaments have to represent and interpret the will of the people vis-à-vis the governments. The question is whether they have also to interpret governmental action vis-à-vis the people. This question will be examined in the following section with particular regard to the responsibilities of WEU parliamentarians.

III. The responsibilities of WEU parliamentarians in security and defence questions vis-à-vis the public

29. When the Assembly decided to enlarge the competence of this committee in order to improve public awareness of its work, it became the committee's duty to examine the improvement of technical means for reaching the wider public within the given financial limits and also the substance of the message to be conveyed to the public.

30. To determine the substance of the Assembly's activities, the point of departure is the fact that the Assembly of Western European Union is the only international parliamentary institution with responsibility in defence and security matters backed by an international treaty.

31. The former Chairman-in-Office of the Council, *Mr. Genscher*, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany,

therefore raised a crucial point, when he stated in his speech to the WEU Assembly in Paris on 22nd May 1985:

“ The Assembly bears great responsibility with regard to the *democratic legitimization* of our endeavours. It represents at an international level *democracy* in practice on matters of security policy. ”

32. It is interesting to note that in addressing the North Atlantic Assembly in Stuttgart on 20th May 1985, the Federal Chancellor, Mr. Kohl, underlined, with regard to that assembly too, that it was of importance in representing the democratic element of the Atlantic Alliance. But on the same occasion the President of the Bundesrat deplored that the North Atlantic Treaty did not, in fact, make provision for true participation at parliamentary level and stated that it had been overlooked that the legislative organs too were able to take most important decisions for the alliance.

33. Bearing in mind the stronger position of WEU parliamentarians, who have the backing of the modified Brussels Treaty and the Assembly's Charter, and reiterating the Ministers' wish expressed in the Rome declaration “ to see the Assembly playing an increasing rôle ” also with regard to public opinion, it seems urgent for the Assembly to define its responsibilities and position in this respect on the basis of its legal and political independence.

34. A central aspect of the Assembly's public relations policy should therefore be to strengthen public awareness of the fact that the existence and activities of the WEU Assembly mean first and foremost that European defence and security policy is *democratically supervised* at both European and national level.

35. This democratic structure of WEU based on an international treaty is unique in the whole world and should be brought more often to the attention of the public by comparing it, for instance, with the totally different situation in the Warsaw Pact organisation which was created as a reaction to the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Brussels Treaty and to the Atlantic Alliance, but does not provide any specific parliamentary supervision.

36. In the Assembly's public relations policy, parliamentarians could always advocate an improvement of the democratic structure of WEU, bearing in mind that the powers of parliamentarians are still incomplete at European level. On the other hand, there are good reasons for explaining in public the advantages of having parliamentary supervision in WEU both at international and national level.

37. In working out a public relations policy, in substance it should be borne in mind, of course,

that the Council and its subsidiary bodies form, together with the Assembly, one and the same organisation, Western European Union. There are certainly matters of common interest which concern the organisation as a whole, for instance to make WEU better known to public opinion. The publication of an information booklet such as "Western European Union" prepared on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was undoubtedly in the interest of the whole organisation.

38. But is it possible to join the Assembly and the ministerial organs in common action for public relations as advocated in the document entitled "WEU and public awareness" prepared by the Permanent Council and endorsed by the Ministers on 23rd April 1985?

39. First of all, it is gratifying that the Council recognises the importance of an improved public relations policy and that steps are being taken to carry this policy into practice. In the above-mentioned document, the rôle of the Assembly is described as follows:

"III. (ii) The Rome declaration and document on institutional reform indicate the importance Ministers attach to the Assembly in the revitalisation of WEU and to the rôle it might play in striving 'to consolidate the consensus among public opinion' on the security and defence needs of the member states. In this context, Ministers at Rome express the hope that the Assembly might play a part in achieving greater public understanding of the defence and security options open to the Council which expresses the political will of the individual governments in its policy statements. To help in this, the Rome institution document calls *inter alia* for the development of informal contacts between government representatives and representatives of the Assembly, and for better means of keeping the Assembly informed of the work of the Council so that the two bodies can operate together in an even more complementary fashion."

40. In her address to the Assembly on 21st May 1985, *Baroness Young*, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, explained the rôle the Assembly should play in this context, as follows:

"... the Assembly has a significant function, together with member governments, in the process of improving public information and generating what has been called 'reassurance' about our defence policies... As representatives of the public, and with obligations towards them, parliamentarians have a most important part to play in this process. The

main aim of debate in the Assembly is to develop ideas and proposals in defence and security and to keep governments up to the mark. In so far as is possible, however, we in the United Kingdom believe that it should also be to create and expand a consensus within our countries, cutting across party political boundaries, about the need for the alliance and the defensive nature of its purpose and strategies as well as those of its member states. We in the Council are indebted to the Assembly for its work in developing the thrust behind the renewal process and for the critical exchange of views which has such importance in our daily work as we governments account for ourselves in responding to Assembly recommendations and questions. But let us also become indebted for the development of public understanding of the defence and security option open to us as Council members."

41. The Assembly of course is always prepared to explain to the public its own views on the whole spectrum of security and defence problems facing Europe. On the other hand, there were some good reasons for the Assembly to clarify its position in Recommendation 420 "welcoming the fact that the Council for its part has decided to inform the public about its activities but recalling that the Assembly alone is responsible for information about its own work" and recommending that the Council "inform the public and press about its own activities".

42. There are mainly two reasons why the Assembly and its members are not in a position to carry out the task of explaining to the public the defence and security options open to the Council and/or member governments.

43. The first reason is a practical one. Parliamentarians are never informed well enough about all aspects of Council and government concepts and planning in security and defence policy. The improvement of contacts between the Council and the Assembly is still to be implemented and effective parliamentary participation in decisions will remain difficult.

44. The second reason is a political one. The Assembly has an albeit limited control and supervisory function vis-à-vis the Council. Its position will therefore always be a critical one even in the case of an enhanced dialogue between the two main WEU institutions which are the Assembly and the Council.

45. Consequently, the options open to the Council have to be interpreted and explained in public by the Council itself and its member governments. On the other hand, it is the task of all WEU parliamentarians to explain the Assembly's positions on the Council's activities and decisions.

46. The better the information conveyed to the public by the Council at European level and by the governments at national level, the more rewarding will be the public dialogue on these issues.

47. It emerges from the foregoing considerations that the Assembly has to elaborate its own public relations policy. One aspect of this policy has been mentioned already in paragraphs 34 and 35. On the other hand, an exchange of information between the Council and the Assembly about efforts to improve public awareness of WEU matters will be useful. It was therefore most useful that the Council transmitted the document on WEU and public awareness to the Assembly. Undoubtedly it contains useful suggestions which should be assessed for the Assembly's public relations work. In addition, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations is very grateful that the new Secretary-General of WEU, Mr. Cahen, has agreed to address the committee on the subject of improving WEU's public relations activities and every opportunity of discussing each other's intentions should be seized.

48. For elaborating the substance of a public relations policy for the Assembly, the themes listed in the WEU and public awareness document might provide a useful collection of the main problems now facing Europeans.

49. The Assembly's positions on actual problems of western security and defence are set out mainly in recommendations addressed to the Council and according to Rule 42 *bis*, paragraph 3 (a), it is particularly the duty of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to "select from texts adopted by the Assembly those which, in its opinion, should be debated in national parliaments".

50. It will be one of the new duties of the committee to propose a procedure for bringing Assembly recommendations to the attention of the public and to examine to what extent criteria for selecting texts for parliaments are valid for the public too.

51. The committee should also examine whether the Assembly should draw up more general documents for use in public in which the Assembly's function and position would be described in a political context. Such considerations should be co-ordinated with the General Affairs Committee and the Presidential Committee.

52. After the necessary review of the general function of the WEU Assembly with regard to the public and after collecting some first elements of a future public relations policy in substance, it will be necessary to examine the practical means available to parliamentarians for

reaching the public in security and defence matters.

IV. The means of reaching public opinion in security and defence matters

(i) Governmental action

53. Referring to the document on WEU and public awareness according to which "the most effective way of authoritatively reaching a wide audience is through the public statements of politicians and ministers in the national governments of member states", it might be added that successful joint political action by the governments and/or by the Council would be an even more effective public relations policy than political speeches and joint declarations.

54. The Assembly for its part will continue to urge the Council and the governments to take such political action.

(ii) Parliamentary action

55. The intensification of parliamentary action at European and national level also attracts more public attention.

56. In this connection WEU parliamentarians could and should do far more than heretofore. The arrangements for follow-up action in national parliaments on the activities of the WEU Assembly still seem to be insufficient. Parliamentarians who are not members of the WEU Assembly still know very little about what goes on in WEU.

57. It therefore goes without saying that the initiative taken by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations for making the consequences of the reactivation of WEU better known in the parliaments of member countries (information-action) has to be continued.

58. Nevertheless there are other aspects where your Rapporteur believes an improvement could be made in attracting the public's attention to WEU matters. They are listed hereafter.

59. On 27th October 1975, ten years ago, in Document 681 this committee suggested to the Assembly and its Presidential Committee that every two years a session be held away from the permanent seat of the Assembly. This suggestion is still valid, but additional financial means will be necessary if it is to be implemented.

60. The chairmen of national delegations should play a greater part in co-ordinating follow-up action in national parliaments. It could be suggested therefore that the committee invite to its meetings once or twice a year, the chairmen of national delegations.

61. Procedure for transmitting texts selected for debate in national parliaments and follow-up action should be re-examined. At the moment, these texts are transmitted by the President of the Assembly to the presidents of member parliaments under cover of an official letter expressing the wish that these texts be used as material for speeches or questions to ministers.

62. It would be useful to send copies of these letters also to the chairmen of delegations and the rapporteurs for the selected recommendations in order to encourage them to promote follow-up action in the national parliaments.

63. At present, the Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations sends a letter with suggested questions on the texts selected to committee members. It would also be useful for the chairmen of delegations to be sent copies of these letters and also the rapporteurs for the recommendations in question. If possible, the rapporteurs should advise the committee on how to proceed with follow-up action in the parliaments.

64. A member should be appointed from each parliament to report to the committee once or twice a year on the follow-up action in his parliament. For this, he should ask for the assistance of the secretariat of the relevant national delegation. He should also remain in permanent contact with the chairman of the delegation and use his connections with committees concerned and the political groups.

65. Some delegations meet briefly prior to each Assembly session in order to co-ordinate procedures during the session. Why not meet after the session too in order to co-ordinate follow-up action? Such meetings could be held in the different member parliaments.

66. Apart from putting questions to the government, it would be very useful if every member made an effort to mention Western European Union in general, WEU Assembly recommendations or other activities of the organisation in speeches made at plenary sessions of the national parliaments.

67. It was requested in the previous report that every national government be asked to report regularly to parliament on its activities in WEU matters. Such reports should contain not only facts but also political assessments and decisions and should be debated both in committee and in plenary session.

68. Reverting to the activities of the Assembly, all committees should endeavour to make the recommendations the Assembly transmits to the Council as concise and specific as possible in order to strengthen their effectiveness. This will improve the Assembly's position in requesting a comprehensive reply without undue delay.

(iii) *Action vis-à-vis the public and public opinion*

69. For the means of reaching the public directly, the problems are even more delicate.

70. From the very outset the notions "public" and "public opinion" have to be defined clearly. The public is not identical with the press and media although the latter play a prominent rôle in shaping public opinion. The public also includes the different private and public institutions such as clubs, schools, universities, churches, pressure groups, political parties, trade unions, etc.

71. But first, the public is composed of an enormous number of *individuals* who are subjected to a wide variety of impressions and influences.

72. Because of the complexity of the subject, this report can outline only some aspects of the problem of reaching public opinion on security and defence matters.

73. In a further report this subject should be examined in detail. At present only the main questions to be solved can be listed without claiming to be exhaustive.

74. Among the great number of individuals, are there groups whose attitude in security and defence matters should be considered as crucial?

75. What is the rôle and attitude of young people? In the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, every third citizen is less than twenty years old. The German Bundeswehr has so-called "youth officers" whose duty is to seek contacts with young people in order to inform them about questions related to defence and military service.

76. Who has the greatest influence on individuals and particularly on young people? Families, schools, universities, churches, trade unions and other pressure groups, all sorts of associations and clubs, political parties, or the mass media such as television, radio and press?

77. Is the number of publications and the wealth of information so enormous that many people are saturated by all kinds of published opinion?

78. What are the effects of the so-called "genius of the period" (*Zeitgeist*) which is often marked by reflections of important contemporary philosophers?

79. If an improvement is to be made in public awareness and understanding of security and defence matters, two different means might be mentioned, i.e. approaching the population directly, or approaching opinion leaders.

(a) Approaching the population directly

80. There are various possibilities. A good example was the participation of the President of the Assembly, *Mr. Caro*, in several political discussions organised by different organisations such as the Europa Union in Hamburg in June 1985. Every member should seize the opportunity of taking part in such conferences and discussions where a large audience may be found.

81. Provided the financial question can be settled, groups of young people could be invited periodically to come to Paris in order to discuss security questions with members of the Assembly. Apparently, the Council of Europe and national parliaments already receive many more visiting groups than the Assembly of WEU.

82. A special problem is the question of creating a regular WEU publication. The financial implications are evident. Nevertheless it should be worth studying the activities of similar organisations in this respect.

83. The Eurogroup for instance recently made an effort by publishing an illustrated booklet entitled "Western defence, the European rôle in NATO". Several other publications are issued by NATO, such as the NATO Review, now published six times a year in several languages. Every two months the North Atlantic Assembly publishes a document entitled "News" with a summary of its activities and a calendar of events.

84. These are only a few examples. Is it not worth studying the possibility of creating an attractive information review dealing with WEU questions? It could also provide a forum where members and other prominent politicians would have an opportunity of addressing the public. Apart from the budgetary question it is obvious that it should first be established whether such a publication should be created under the aegis of the Council or of the Assembly.

85. Would it be possible to find a film producer to produce a film on the activities of the Assembly and Western European Union as a whole? Eurogroup was able to produce such a film for public showing.

86. These are only first considerations which have to be examined very carefully.

(b) Approaching opinion leaders

87. The possibility of establishing contacts with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) dealing with questions of defence and security, research institutes, universities, etc., might be studied. (It should be recalled that the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations of the Council of Europe has even created a sub-

committee for relations with non-governmental organisations.) The purpose of such contacts might be to ensure that these organisations take due account of WEU and its Assembly in their own work and particularly in their publications which sometimes have an important influence in forming the opinions of politicians.

88. The problem might be illustrated by one example: every two weeks the German society for foreign policy (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik*) publishes a periodical entitled *Europa Archiv*. In its documental part, this review always takes account of important events and documents relating to WEU. But this does not seem to have a visible effect on authors of articles which are published in the same periodical. In a recent copy of *Europa Archiv* dated 25th August 1985, there was an article on burden-sharing in the Atlantic Alliance – the future of the American military presence in Europe.

89. In a footnote, the author gave bibliographical data about the general problem of burden-sharing. No mention was made of Mr. Wilkinson's report adopted by the Assembly of Western European Union on 29th November 1983 on European security and burden-sharing in the alliance which was the basis of the Assembly's Recommendation 396. Nor was there any substantial examination of the contents of Mr. Wilkinson's report in the text of the article.

90. There are many reviews, newspapers and periodicals at national and European level interested in publishing articles on European security questions. It would be a good opportunity for the President of the Assembly, the chairmen of the committees, rapporteurs or other members to use these channels for making the Assembly's positions known to the public.

91. Turning to relations with the press and journalists, it is first the Press Counsellor who should advise the committee on how to present the activities of the Assembly in a more effective way in the different countries.

92. But it is worth repeating that this committee has already examined the problems of relations with the press twice in recent years. Indeed, *Dame Jill Knight* herself presented two information reports on this matter: on 3rd December 1980, Document 865 on relations with parliaments with preliminary observations on relations between parliaments and the press, and, on 28th April 1981, Document 873 on relations between parliaments and the press – the WEU Assembly and the press. At that time, stress was laid on three main concerns: (i) the WEU Assembly was not of sufficient interest for the members themselves; (ii) an extremely small sum was available in the Assembly's information budget compared with that of the European

Parliament and the Council of Europe; (iii) the Council was inactive and failed to provide the Assembly with adequate information.

93. WEU's new prospects following the reactivation agreed by ministers in the Rome declaration should provide an opportunity to improve the interest of the press in the Assembly's work too. Before considering new technical proposals which, of course, have to be prepared, it seems crucial to stimulate the interest of members themselves in WEU matters.

V. Activities of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

94. The committee met in Paris on 22nd May, in Rome on 11th June and in London on 5th November 1985. In accordance with Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, it selected from texts adopted by the Assembly at the first part of its thirty-first ordinary session the following recommendations to be debated in the parliaments, i.e.:

- 417 on East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act;
- 420 on the new outlook for WEU - reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council;
- 421 on the application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council;
- 423 on the state of European security - the central region.

95. These texts were transmitted with a letter from the President of the Assembly to the presidents of member parliaments expressing the hope that they would be of interest and provide subject matter for speeches or questions to ministers.

96. In a letter addressed to committee members on 9th September 1985, the Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations enclosed draft questions relating to the subjects covered in the relevant recommendations and invited members to inform the Office of the Clerk of the questions they actually put.

97. Reactions so far have been practically nil. Only *Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges* put a question on Recommendation 420 in the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies on 11th July 1985.

98. It was also *Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges* who asked her government about the future rôle of WEU following the Rome declaration (4th June 1985) referring to Order 58 adopted by the Assembly. On 2nd July 1985, she put a question on Recommendation 413 on the military

use of space and on Luxembourg's contribution to the budget of Western European Union.

99. It emerges from this result that there are active members but very few of them keep the secretariat informed about their follow-up activities. Your Rapporteur therefore believes the procedure should be improved as quickly as possible. He made the relevant proposals in paragraphs 60 to 66.

100. The committee has continued to organise information meetings in member parliaments. On 11th June 1985 an information meeting was held with members of the two chambers of the Italian Parliament and the press at the Italian Senate. The relevant summary record is appended. There was a large attendance on the Italian side, and the local press reported the event. Briefings were given by members of the committee as follows:

- the duties of the new WEU (by *Mr. Giust*);
- the Assembly of WEU (by *Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges*);
- relations between WEU, NATO and other Western European organisations and countries (by *Mr. Eysink*).

101. It is planned to hold the next information meeting in the German Bundestag in February 1986. On 5th November 1985, the committee had the pleasure of being addressed in London by *Mr. Cahen*, the new Secretary-General of Western European Union, on the subject of improving WEU's public relations activities.

VI. Conclusions

102. (i) Both the Council and the Assembly agree that efforts have to be made to improve public awareness of defence matters in general and of WEU matters in particular.

103. (ii) As for the Council and its member governments, the best public relations policy would be successful political action.

104. (iii) Member governments should be asked to report regularly to parliament on their activities in WEU matters.

105. (iv) Parliamentarians in each member country should urge their respective governments to implement the Council's reply to Recommendation 411, according to which the effort of informing European opinion is essentially the responsibility of each member state.

106. (v) Parliamentary action, and particularly follow-up action in national parliaments on the Assembly's recommendations, has to be inten-

sified with greater participation by the chairmen of national delegations and rapporteurs.

107. *(vi)* A member should be appointed from each parliament to report to the committee once or twice a year on the follow-up action in that member's parliament.

108. *(vii)* In connection with actions vis-à-vis the public and public opinion, the Assembly has to work out its own public relations policy taking into account that new ways of informing the public about its activities must not involve new expenditure.

109. *(viii)* In substance, a central point in the Assembly's public relations should be to explain the significance of WEU's democratic structure and the fact that Western European security and defence policy is democratically verified and supervised at both national and European level. On this basis, the Assembly should explain its specific activities in public, using, in the first place, the recommendations it adopts.

110. *(ix)* All reasonable means of approaching opinion leaders and the population directly will be helpful to stimulate public interest in WEU.

APPENDIX I
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ³
to Recommendation 411

1. The Council has noted with great interest Recommendation 411 on deterrence and the will of the people. It shares the Assembly's concern to ensure that European opinion is informed as completely as possible about the threats to our continent and about the security and defence policy adopted by the member countries of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance to counter these threats.
2. This effort is essentially the responsibility of each member state which provides regular information using the methods that it considers the most appropriate.
3. Parallel to this effort, in the context of joint reflection on this matter, the Council, which met at ministerial level in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April, approved a document entitled "WEU and public awareness". This document is annexed to the present reply.
4. As the Assembly is the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to discuss security and defence questions, the Council attaches particular importance to the reflections on the preoccupations of European public opinion which the Assembly can convey to the Council. The enhanced dialogue between the Assembly and the Council should enable public opinion to be even better informed of the basis of the defence policy of WEU member states. Whilst assuring the security interests of the member states and maintaining closer co-operation between them, this policy makes it possible to preserve peace and to seek genuine dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe. This position has been approved by all the member states of the alliance and frequently reaffirmed, in particular in the Washington declaration of 31st May 1984 which demonstrates the full agreement and unity of the WEU member states with their allies on the principles underlying their security.
5. Inspired directly by these principles, the members of the integrated military structure adopted the dual-track decision of December 1979. It aimed at restoring a balance in Europe which had been distorted by the deployment of Soviet SS-20 missiles.

At the same time the dual-track decision again demonstrated the alliance's readiness for dialogue with the countries of the East. This decision advocated negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States aimed at achieving balance at the lowest possible level of forces and stressed that western deployment could be reversed, halted or modified if the talks succeeded.

Hence the allies regretted the breaking-off of talks by the Soviet Union in November 1983 and the WEU Council can but welcome the opening of a new round of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva on 12th March 1985.
6. The member states maintain regular in-depth consultations - multilaterally in the appropriate fora, but also bilaterally - on all the problems relating to the various arms control questions. In this connection, the member states of the integrated military structure hold regular consultations with the United States on the negotiations in Geneva. Furthermore, the United States regularly inform the NATO Council about these negotiations.
7. At its meeting in Bonn, the Council of Ministers requested the Permanent Council to implement rapidly their decisions on restructuring the Paris agencies and to submit to the next meeting of the Council of Ministers a report on the progress achieved by then and on the new tasks attributed to these agencies, which include, inter alia, studies in the field of disarmament and arms control. The Council takes the view that these studies should provide a useful contribution to its reflections in this field.
8. The continuation of the North-South dialogue clearly goes beyond the competence of WEU. The Council wishes to point out, however, that the seven member states have already made substantial efforts to expand their co-operation with the developing countries at both bilateral and multilateral level and specifically at European level within the framework of the Lomé Convention, recently renewed for a second time.

3. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th May 1985.

WEU and public awareness

Introduction

I. (i) WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers at Rome agreed that a study should be made of WEU public relations activities and a report submitted by the Permanent Council for the next ministerial meeting. The Chairman-in-Office of WEU referred to this in his speech to the WEU Assembly on 29th October :

“ The Ministers commissioned the Permanent Council to prepare reports that are to be deliberated at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers. The Permanent Council will submit proposals... on ways of improving WEU public relations activities. ”

I. (ii) In considering how best to develop WEU public relations activities, thought should be given to the *themes* WEU wishes to address in presenting its activities, and to the *means* by which this presentation is to be made. This paper aims to address these points.

Themes

II. (i) Ministers at Rome stressed the importance of the modified Brussels Treaty and their attachment to its goals of maintaining peace and security, of promoting unity, and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation both among its member states and with other European organisations. They emphasised :

- the indivisibility of security within the North Atlantic Treaty area ;
- the vital and substantial contribution of all the European allies ;
- their conviction that a better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity among its members.

II. (ii) Ministers therefore decided to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe. They agreed on six main areas for discussion, as indicated in paragraph 8 of the Rome declaration.

II. (iii) Drawing on this mandate, the themes which the WEU might address in its public relations, with the aim of informing public opinion on security and defence policies, became clearer. The following could fulfil the expectations set at Rome :

- (a) to explain the need to maintain adequate defences, that security has to be won, and that it should never be taken for granted ;
- (b) to explain that the need for security and defence measures is greater than hitherto in view of force imbalances and the present threat ;
- (c) to reiterate that the members of WEU are determined to ensure their defence and solidarity whilst seeking more stable relationships with the countries of the East through constructive dialogue and co-operation ;
- (d) to demonstrate the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty as the foundation of our security, while underlining the defensive nature of its policies ; and to highlight the importance of the European contribution to the alliance and to western security ;
- (e) to draw attention to the proposals of western countries, including the Europeans, to seek balanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements at the lowest possible level of forces, explaining that allied unity increases the chances for progress ;
- (f) to draw attention to the importance of developing European co-operation in the field of armaments ;
- (g) to draw attention to the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world ;
- (h) in general, to encourage a better-informed public debate about defence and security policy.

II. (iv) In view of the continuing quantitative and qualitative development of Soviet military forces, European governments should focus the attention of their publics on the central importance of deterrence in maintaining peace and security. The WEU must also aim to

develop public understanding of the transatlantic relationship as fundamental to the alliance, and of the irreplaceable nature of the United States commitment to Europe and the American nuclear guarantee.

II. (v) It will be especially important for WEU to demonstrate the well-established commitment of the alliance (cf. Harmel report) to work for constructive and stable East-West relations and a productive dialogue. In the coming months, it may also be important to explain the complexities of arms control negotiations in order to help increase public understanding of why early results cannot always be achieved.

Means

III. (i) There are three avenues through which WEU public relations activity could be channelled :

- WEU Assembly ;
- WEU Council/Secretary-General/Agencies ;
- WEU member governments.

Assembly

III. (ii) The Rome declaration and document on institutional reform indicate the importance Ministers attach to the Assembly in the revitalisation of WEU and to the rôle it might play in striving "to consolidate the consensus among public opinion" on the security and defence needs of the member states. In this context, Ministers at Rome express the hope that the Assembly might play a part in achieving greater public understanding of the defence and security options open to the Council which expresses the political will of the individual governments in its policy statements. To help in this, the Rome institution document calls *inter alia* for the development of informal contacts between government representatives and representatives of the Assembly, and for better means of keeping the Assembly informed of the work of the Council so that the two bodies can operate together in an even more complementary fashion.

III. (iii) The Assembly is the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to discuss defence and security issues. It attracts considerable public attention during its biennial sessions.

III. (iv) Individual Assembly sessions are addressed by Ministers from various member states on subjects of topical interest. This provides an opportunity to put across to a wider audience the commonly agreed themes. Other speeches which provide a platform for the discussion of defence and security issues (see paragraph III. (x) below) might also incorporate these ideas.

III. (v) It will be important to give maximum publicity to such speeches. This will to a large extent be a national task; but WEU institutions can also play a rôle by helping to spread information from Assembly sessions and disseminating the texts or extracts of speeches by Ministers of member states. Consideration should be given to the arrangement of press briefings, the production of broadsheets, information on Assembly debates, and the distribution of reports suitable for use by the press. It would be helpful in this respect if in future Ministers making speeches at WEU Assembly sessions could include a press conference in their itinerary. Between Assembly sessions, the press section should try to arrange greater contact between members of parliament of member states and the media.

Council/Secretary-General/Agencies

III. (vi) Ministerial sessions provide an opportunity to further develop good and comprehensive relations with the press. This task is primarily the responsibility of the presidency and national governments. Delegations should include officials responsible solely for this function. They should aim also to assist in promoting the image of a revitalised WEU.

III. (vii) There may also be scope for using the office of the Secretary-General to promote WEU, to explain its purpose and functions within the framework of European security, and to press themes agreed by the Council. The Council could also charge the Secretary-General to relay information to the press through independent briefings to journalists or, if appropriate, speeches.

III. (viii) There is probably a rôle for a public relations and information unit within the Secretariat-General. This could take responsibility for developing contacts with the press and disseminating information about WEU. It could arrange briefing sessions for the press before the major sessions of the Council and Assembly and as necessary in between them. It would be for the Permanent Council to decide on the substance and nature of any material distributed by the unit.

Agencies

III. (ix) The Council may commission the Paris agencies of WEU to contribute to information activity in the following ways :

- (i) preparing material specifically for public relations use ; such material could be distributed as directed by the Permanent Council through the secretariat unit in London. If budgetary resources permitted, the Council might request preparation of small publications about the work of WEU in pamphlet or brochure form for distribution ;
- (ii) preparing material of topical interest for publication and dissemination to the press. A list of press contacts should be drawn up and kept with the new unit in the Secretariat-General in London.

National governments

III. (x) As previously indicated, the most effective way of authoritatively reaching a wide audience is through the public statements of politicians and Ministers in the national governments of member states. Considerable attention is regularly given to them by the media. Use should be made of the major ministerial speeches, parliamentary debates, and media appearances of WEU Ministers to put across the agreed themes.

III. (xi) Government Ministers and officials in all WEU member countries regularly discuss defence and security issues with members of parliament, journalists, church leaders, non-governmental organisations, research institutes, academic bodies, and others. These contacts should be used to explain the agreed themes and the rôle of WEU in the context of European security.

III. (xii) Other national information channels should also be used more effectively to generate greater public awareness of policies which the alliance and WEU members follow. The Permanent Council will be instructed to look at this problem periodically during its regular sessions. When the Permanent Council considers it appropriate, such national information activities could be co-ordinated in order to enhance their effect. The overall aim of this work by the Permanent Council will be to improve the image of the WEU member countries in the field of defence and security questions.

Conclusion

IV. (i) Success in achieving the objectives of the Rome declaration will depend on many factors, a major one of which will be the stimulation of public interest in WEU and the generation of greater public awareness of policies which WEU members follow. Maintenance of the higher political profile of WEU will enable the organisation to play a part in helping the cause of European security and transatlantic unity.

APPENDIX II

*Summary record
of the information meeting with members of the two chambers
of the Italian Parliament and the press at the Italian Senate,
Rome, on Tuesday, 11th June 1985, at 4.30 p.m.*

The meeting was organised at the invitation of the Italian Delegation and in the context of the special action of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations in the WEU member parliaments.

The following Italian parliamentarians attended the meeting:

Mr. Bianco, Chairman of the Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly ;

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the WEU Assembly ;

Mr. Vecchietti, Vice-Chairman of the Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly.

Senate :

The following members were present :

MM. Accili, Frasca, Gianotti, Marchio, Mezzapesa, Milani, Mitterdorfer, Palumbo, Spitella (all members of the Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly).

Foreign Affairs Committee

Mr. Taviani, Chairman of the committee ;
MM. Bernassola, Malagodi, Pierrelli, Rumor.

Defence Committee

Mr. Ferrara, Vice-Chairman of the committee ;
MM. Butini, Falluchi, Saporito.

Chamber of Deputies :

The following members were present :

MM. Foschi, Martino, Sinesio (all members of the Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly).

Defence Committee

Mr. Ruffini, Chairman of the committee
Mr. Stegagnini, Vice-Chairman of the committee ;
MM. Di Re, Zanini.

At the beginning of the meeting briefings were given by members of the committee as follows :

- the duties of the new WEU (by Mr. Giust) ;

- the Assembly of WEU (by Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges) ;
- relations between WEU, NATO and other Western European organisations and countries (by Mr. Eysink).

The following discussion was launched by questions put by members of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to their Italian colleagues.

Mr. Goerens asked whether Italian parliamentarians felt they were sufficiently informed about WEU matters and if they wished to suggest improvements.

Mr. Eysink asked what was the attitude in Italy towards the SDI and Eureka programmes.

On the SDI, *Mr. Bianco*, Chairman of the Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly, said there was a need of a specific European forum to discuss these problems. There were still too many bilateral talks and relations between different European countries and the United States. The general feeling in Italy was that WEU should play an important rôle in harmonising the position of Western European countries in this matter.

This position was endorsed by *Mr. Milani* who raised the question of the rôle the Assembly could play within WEU.

Mr. Taviani, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, said this was perhaps the eve of a strategic revolution. In this connection, WEU could have a new function in voicing Europe's view. He was convinced Italy wished to address these matters, but the main question was whether the British, French and Germans had the same intention. Another question was the enlargement of the organisation with the accession of Portugal and Spain. In his view these countries could not be kept outside. If European positions were not harmonised, decisions would be taken elsewhere without Europe.

Mr. Ruffini, Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, said as a matter of fact there was little interest for WEU in his committee. The problem was whether we had the ability to define a joint European defence policy. Unfortunately there was no united Europe. The type of relationship between the United States and Europe was not clear. Membership of NATO was fundamental

for Italy. A difficulty was that there was no identity between NATO and WEU, so it was impossible to reach a special European position on security matters. WEU had the advantage of including France.

Another difficulty came from the United States which failed to understand European needs. There was a danger of drifting away from each other and this could damage the relationship. If the United States had contacted its European allies on the problem of the neutron bomb prior to reaching decisions many difficulties would have been avoided.

In the SDI, it should be carefully considered whether it might not lead to new unbalances.

He agreed with Mr. Taviani, recalling the European Defence Community which had been extremely important for Italy. It was important for the creation of Europe which should not be merely a Europe for trade. In the European Community there were too many conflicts. Had the defence community succeeded, the history of Europe would have been quite different.

WEU could have a future but it should work for Europe's unity.

Mr. Martino thought further meetings were needed to be able to reach a decision in the Assembly on the SDI.

Mr. Malagodi asked whether the *relationship between Eurogroup and WEU* was taken carefully into consideration. As for the United States, it had to be noted that what the Americans considered to be consultations meant

only information after decisions had been reached. If there had been real consultations a problem such as that of the *neutron bomb* would never have happened.

As for the SDI, he believed the Soviets would double the number of their missiles.

There was adequate co-operation in NATO between chiefs-of-staff, but there was a need for a political forum. Security was not just a question of money. He was very pleased that this meeting was being held to discuss these questions.

Mr. Stegagnini mentioned that the Italian Chamber of Deputies had tried to put forward a *bill on the export of armaments*. A question was whether that bill corresponded to legislation in other parliaments. *There should be a united European position* in this matter. Furthermore, WEU should work for better *co-ordination of standardisation*. There was still too much competition within Europe.

Sir John Page asked what Italian parliamentarians expected from the new Italian presidency of the WEU Council.

Mr. Vecchiatti said future developments depended mainly on three countries: *France, Britain and Germany*. If the three were in agreement, the others would follow. Italy wanted WEU to be extended *to all other Western European countries*.

Mrs. Knight thanked all parliamentarians for their contributions and closed the meeting at 6.30 p.m.

*Revision and interpretation of the
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges ²
by MM. Eysink, Spies von Büllenheim and Unland, Rapporteurs*

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on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter

DRAFT RESOLUTION

on the revision of the Rules of Procedure

(Each rule referred to in the draft resolution is followed by the initial of the Rapporteur concerned.)

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by MM. Eysink, Spies von Büllenheim and Unland, Rapporteurs

APPENDIX

Comparison of present text and proposed amended text

1. Adopted in committee by 11 votes to 0 with 5 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Schulte (Chairman); MM. Eysink, Woodall (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Antoni (Alternate: Gianotti), Antretter, Coleman (Alternate: Jessel), Corrie, Delehedde (Alternate: Sénès), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Gorla, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges (Alternate: Konen), MM. Koehl, Lapenta, Marchio, Michel, Pécriaux, Spies von Büllenheim, Unland, Vial-Massat, van der Werff, Wilquin (Alternate: Beix).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Resolution

on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter

The Assembly,

DECIDES

1. To amend Article III of the Charter as follows:
Leave out the whole of paragraph (a) and insert:
“ Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordinary session which may be divided into several parts.
The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee and immediately brought to the attention of representatives. ”;
2. To amend Article IV of the Charter as follows:
In paragraph (b), leave out “ Bureau ” and insert “ Presidential Committee ”.
3. To amend Article XI of the Charter as follows:
Leave out Article XI and insert:
“ (a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau for a period of five years.
(b) In the performance of his duties, the Clerk shall be responsible to the President. He shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.
(c) The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretariat-General of Western European Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.”
4. To amend the English text of Article XII of the Charter as follows:
In paragraph (a), leave out “ Proposals ” and insert “ Motions ”.

Draft Resolution
on the revision of the Rules of Procedure

The Assembly,

DECIDES

To amend the Rules of Procedure as follows:

1. *Rule 2 S*

Leave out paragraphs 1 and 2 and insert:

“ 1. Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordinary session which may be divided into several parts.”

Renumber the other paragraphs accordingly.

2. *Rule 3 S*

At the end of the paragraph, leave out “ or substitutes ”.

3. *Rule 4 S*

In paragraph 2, leave out “ Bureau ” and insert “ Presidential Committee ”.

4. *Rule 5 S*

Leave out paragraphs 1 and 2 and insert:

“ 1. At the beginning of each ordinary session, the oldest representative present shall take the Chair until the election of the President has been announced.

2. No discussion may take place while the Provisional President is in the Chair unless it is concerned with the examination of credentials or the election of the President of the Assembly.”

5. *Rule 6 S*

Leave out paragraph 3 and insert:

“ 3. A committee of five representatives chosen by lot may be instructed to examine these credentials and report to the Assembly without delay.”

6. *Rule 7 S*

Leave out the title and insert:

“ Representatives and substitutes, titular members and alternates ”.

Leave out paragraph 1.

Leave out paragraph 2 and insert:

“ 1. Unless otherwise provided by the rules, the powers of a representative may be exercised by a substitute. Substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.”

Renumber the other paragraphs accordingly.

7. *Rule 8 E*

Leave out paragraph 3.

8. *Rule 11 E*

At the beginning of paragraph 2, add: “ When in the Chair ”.

At the end of paragraph 2, add:

“ If the President speaks in a debate on a specific subject, he may not resume the Chair until the debate on that subject is over.”

9. *Rule 15 E*

In paragraph 1 of the English text, leave out “ for any reason ” and insert “ without having been invited by the President of the Assembly ”.

Add a paragraph 4:

“ 4. Duly accredited representatives of the media may be admitted to the Chamber for the purpose of photographic and/or sound recording only under guidelines approved by the Presidential Committee. ”

10. *Rule 22 S*

At the end of paragraph 1, add:

“ Speakers may submit corrections to the reports of their speeches not later than the day after that on which the reports were communicated to them. ”

Leave out paragraph 2 and insert:

“ 2. A full transcription of speeches made in Dutch, German and Italian shall be made available without delay to speakers on request. They may submit corrections to the transcription of their speeches not later than the day after the speech was made. ”

11. *Rule 24 S*

Leave out “ in accordance with Rule 7 ”.

Add a paragraph 2:

“ 2. Unless otherwise provided by the rules, the powers of a representative who is prevented from attending a sitting may be exercised by a substitute who has duly signed the register. ”

12. *Rule 27 S*

In paragraph 4, leave out “ may ” and insert “ shall be invited to ”.

English text only: after “ debate ”, insert “ may ”.

13. *Rule 28 U*

In paragraph 2, redraft the end of the first sentence to read: “ and take the form of a recommendation, opinion, resolution, order or decision ”.

At the end of paragraph 2, add:

“ (a) Recommendations or opinions shall be addressed to the Council.

(b) Resolutions shall be addressed to international organisations, governments or national parliaments.

(c) Orders shall be addressed to the President of the Assembly or to a committee.

(d) Decisions concern the working of the Assembly and the status of its members. ”

Rule 30 is therefore deleted.

14. *Rule 29 S*

Leave out paragraph 2 and insert:

“ 2. Amendments tabled in writing and signed by their author shall be distributed without delay. Unless otherwise decided by the President, no amendment shall be proposed and put to the vote in the Assembly if it has not been tabled at the latest before the end of the sitting preceding that at which it is considered. In the case of the first sitting, this time-limit shall end with the opening of the sitting. ”

Leave out paragraphs 8 and 9 and renumber paragraph 10 accordingly.

15. *Rule 31 S*

Leave out paragraph 2 and insert:

“ 2. Except for the chairman of the committee and the rapporteur, representatives wishing to speak in a general debate shall enter their names in a register provided for the purpose at the

latest before the close of the sitting preceding the debate. In the case of the first sitting, their request to speak shall be made in writing before the opening of the part-session. Unless the President decides otherwise, no other representative shall be called upon to speak.”

Leave out paragraph 6 and insert:

“ 6. The President shall decide when a representative may respond to a statement challenging him on a personal basis. No debate may take place on this response. ”

In paragraph 7, after “ determining of ”, insert “ the order of business of the Assembly ”.

16. *Rule 32 S*

At the end of paragraph 4, add:

“ The time-limit for points of order shall be one minute. If the right to raise points of order is misused, the President may forbid the offending representative to speak for the remainder of the debate. ”

17. *Rule 34 E*

At the end of paragraph 1, add:

“ Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast. ”

At the end of paragraph 2(c), add: “ or if the President so decides ”.

In paragraph 4, after the first sentence, insert:

“ Two tellers chosen by lot shall count the votes cast. ”

At the end of paragraph 4, add:

“ The President shall announce the result. ”

18. *Rule 35 E*

At the end of paragraph 1(b), add: “ (see Rule 34, paragraph 1) ”.

At the end of paragraph 1(c), add:

“ In the event of a tie, the candidate senior in age shall be declared elected. If only one candidature is proposed to the Assembly and there is no opposition to it, the single candidate shall be declared elected (see Rule 34, paragraph 4). ”

Leave out paragraph 2.

19. *Rule 39 E*

At the end of paragraph 2, add former paragraph 3 of Rule 8:

“ The Presidential Committee may, during the periods between sessions or part-sessions, provisionally fill the seats which have fallen vacant in committees with representatives or substitutes. These appointments must be ratified at the first session of the Assembly. ”

In paragraph 5, leave out “ resolution ” and insert “ decision ”.

In paragraph 6, leave out “ Rule 8, paragraph 3 ”, and insert “ paragraph 2 above ”.

20. *Rule 40 E*

In paragraph 5, leave out “ Bureau of the Assembly ” and insert “ Presidential Committee ”.

21. *Rule 41 E*

At the beginning of paragraph 2, insert: “ In application of Rule 40, paragraph 5, ”.

In paragraph 4, leave out “ and methods of voting (Rule 34) ” and insert “ methods of voting (Rule 34) and majorities required (Rule 35 (b) and (c)) ”.

Leave out paragraph 4(b).

In paragraph 4(c), after “ but ” insert “ elections or ”.

Add a paragraph 4(d):

“ (d) Substitutes may be elected members of the bureau of a committee. ”

22. *Rule 42 E*

Leave out paragraph 3 and insert:

“ 3. Only the substantive text is voted upon by the Assembly. It must be presented in the form of a draft recommendation, opinion, resolution, order or decision as defined in Rule 28. ”

Add a paragraph 4:

“ 4. All reports on the agenda of a part-session shall be adopted by committees at least three weeks before the opening of the relevant part-session. A report not adopted in time shall be withdrawn from the agenda. However, the Assembly may decide, at the request of the committee, to place the report on its agenda unless twenty representatives are opposed. Such a decision shall be taken before the order of business is adopted (Rule 18). After adopting within the prescribed time-limit a report placed before it, the committee may, after that time-limit, prepare a supplementary report to take account of current events. ”

23. *Rule 47 U*

Leave out paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 and insert:

“ 1. The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau. His term of office shall expire at the end of the fifth year following his appointment and may be renewed. If there has not been an appointment or reappointment before 30th June of the year in which his term of office expires, his term of office shall be extended by one year.

2. Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a solemn declaration before the Assembly that he will perform his duties in complete independence and uninfluenced by national considerations, that he will neither seek nor receive indications concerning the performance of his duties from any government or authority other than the Assembly, and will refrain from any action incompatible with his position as a European civil servant.

3. In the exercise of his duties, the Clerk shall be responsible to the President. He shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.

4. The Presidential Committee shall, on the proposal of the Clerk, appoint members of the Office of the Clerk who are recruited for a period of more than one year. It may delegate to the Clerk the right to appoint permanent or temporary officials of a given level.

5. The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretary-General of Western European Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments. ”

24. *Rule 50 U*

In paragraph 2, leave out “ resolution ” and insert “ decision ”.

25. *Rule 51 U*

In paragraph 1 of the French text, leave out “ résolution ” and insert “ décision ”.

26. *Reference to substitutes S*

Leave out reference to substitutes in the following rules: 2, 5, 13, 26, 27 (first sentence of paragraph 6), 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36 (paragraph 2, line 4), 39, 41 (except in paragraph 7), 43 (except in paragraph 6), 45 and 51.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by MM. Eysink, Spies von Büllenheim and Unland, Rapporteurs)

Rule 2

There is a contradiction in the concept of an ordinary session in paragraphs 1 and 2. The wording proposed makes a clear distinction between the ordinary session which is annual and part-sessions.

There is a contradiction between Rules 2 and 3. Since, according to Rule 2, paragraph 1, "The Assembly shall meet in ordinary session as often as the fulfilment of its functions may require", Rule 3 on convening extraordinary sessions seems pointless. The ordinary session is all the part-sessions the Assembly holds during the year since it meets "not less than once in the course of any calendar year".

The wording of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the Council of Europe is better and should be taken as a model. The following amendment is proposed:

Leave out paragraph 1 of Rule 2 and insert:

"Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordinary session which may be divided into several parts."

Leave out paragraph 2 of Rule 2 and renumber paragraphs 3 and 4 accordingly.

Rule 3

These provisions should be brought into line with those of Article III of the Charter and the words "or substitutes" left out.

Rule 4

The following amendment is proposed:

Leave out "the Bureau of the Assembly" and insert "the Presidential Committee of the Assembly".

This amendment takes into account the Presidential Committee's responsibilities under Rule 2, paragraph 3, and Rule 14.

Rule 5

The following drafting amendment is proposed to the French text only:

Leave out "jusqu'à la proclamation du Président élu" and insert "jusqu'à la proclamation de l'élection du Président".

Rule 6

In paragraph 3, leave out "may examine these credentials and report at once to the

Assembly" and insert "may be instructed to examine these credentials and report to the Assembly without delay".

In fact this committee has not been convened for a very long time and it is responsible only for examining the validity of the documents attesting credentials which have been received from the appropriate authorities.

Rule 7

The committee considered it useful to set out the general principle that unless otherwise stipulated in the Rules of Procedure the powers of a representative may be exercised by a substitute. It is therefore possible to leave out the reference to substitutes in many of the rules (see paragraph 20 of the draft resolution). It is evident that in all cases where they have the same powers as representatives, substitutes have the same obligations.

Rule 11

The provisions of this rule give the President wide enough powers to allow him to solve any procedural problem and to settle any incident, if necessary in consultation with the Assembly.

It should be noted in particular that repeated points of order delay the Assembly's work and that the President, responsible under Rule 11 for maintaining order, may stop them to allow the Assembly to continue with the debates on its agenda.

Comments in the present report on the tabling of amendments (Rule 29) and the right to speak (Rules 31 and 33) emphasise the extent of the President's powers when in the Chair. It is proposed, however, to stress that these powers are linked with the fact that he is effectively in the Chair. If he takes part in a debate, the committee considers he should not resume the Chair until the debate is over. It is therefore proposed to add, at the beginning of paragraph 2, "When in the Chair" and, at the end of paragraph 2, "When the President speaks in a debate on a specific subject, he may not resume the Chair until the debate on that subject is over."

These provisions are applicable to a Vice-President replacing the President in accordance with Rule 12.

*Rule 15**Paragraph 1*

After "Chamber", add "without having been invited by the President of the Assembly..."

The purpose is to allow access to the Chamber for persons who are not members of governments of member countries but who have been invited by the Presidential Committee to attend and often to speak (representatives of non-member governments, non-governmental speakers, parliamentary observers, etc.).

Rule 22

Whereas the official report distributed after each sitting gives the full text only of speeches delivered in French and English, the proceedings issued after each session give the full text in French and English of all speeches, irrespective of the official language in which they were delivered.

Among the arrangements made for this purpose, mention should be made of the possibility for speakers to ask the verbatim reporters to give them the transcription of their speeches a few minutes after they have been delivered. A copy of this transcription may also be given to a delegation secretary at his request.

It might be useful for this to be set out in the Rules of Procedure. It is therefore proposed to add a new paragraph 2 to Rule 22 as follows:

"2. A full transcription of speeches made in Dutch, German and Italian shall be made available without delay to speakers on request. They may submit corrections to the transcription of their speeches not later than the day after the speech was made."

The present paragraph 2, as amended, would be added to paragraph 1 since it relates solely to the summary report in English and French (the word "sténographie" in the French text being left out and "compte rendu" inserted).

Rule 24

The revised Rule 7 now covers all the rights of substitutes independently of their attendance at a given sitting in replacement of representatives.

By making the links between the powers of substitutes and signature of the attendance register more flexible, the amendment to Rule 7 therefore clearly gives substitutes rights such as that of convening an extraordinary session, fulfilling the duties of Provisional President or standing for election to a committee bureau.

Conversely, the rights and duties of substitutes in the context of a given sitting must be specified. For this purpose, Rule 24 should be revised by deleting the reference to Rule 7, which is now pointless, and by inserting a new paragraph as follows:

"Unless otherwise provided by the rules, the powers of a representative who is prevented from attending a sitting may be exercised by a substitute who has duly signed the register."

It is proposed to retain the reference to substitutes in rules indicating the *area of application* of a general rule and to delete it in rules defining the powers and obligations incumbent upon members of the Assembly, the powers and obligations of substitutes being, in accordance with the principle laid down in Rule 7 revised, identical to those of representatives.

*Rule 26: Interpretation**Paragraph 2*

The present rule authorising explanations of vote only after the vote on the text as a whole conforms to practice in the Council of Europe. The purpose of this is to avoid another general debate being started before the vote on the text as a whole, since certain speakers might be tempted to influence the decision of their colleagues at the last minute. It thus allows the Assembly to vote on the text as a whole immediately after the debate on the amendments.

Only those who wish to explain the meaning of their votes speak. They are necessarily limited in number, which is a considerable advantage in view of the brevity of sessions.

Rule 27

Draft the beginning of paragraph 4 as follows:

"The Chairman of the Council shall be invited to present the report orally to the Assembly..."

The purpose of this amendment is to bring the drafting of the rule into line with the corresponding paragraph of the Charter and to make the English and French texts concord.

Rules 28 and 30

Rule 30 concerns motions for orders. In the Assembly's vocabulary, a text emanating from a committee is a draft and a text emanating from members of the Assembly is a motion.

After noting the difference between draft orders in reports and motions for orders as referred to in Rule 30, it is therefore necessary to stipulate to what extent the provisions appli-

cable to motions for recommendations, opinions or resolutions, covered by Rule 28, also concern motions for orders.

The following differences should be noted:

- (i) motions under Rule 28 must be submitted in writing and signed by at least ten representatives, whereas a single representative may lay a motion for an order on the table of the Assembly;
- (ii) motions under Rule 28 are submitted to the Assembly for inclusion in the register of the Assembly, whereas motions for orders may be put to the vote without prior reference to committee and may in this case be adopted directly;
- (iii) where the debate is concerned, Rule 28 lays down that when the question of including such a motion in the register is put to the Assembly the following only may be heard: one speaker for the motion, one speaker against and the chairman of any committee concerned. Rule 30 says nothing in this respect but it is customary to treat a motion for an order in the same way as a motion within the meaning of Rule 28;
- (iv) finally, the notion of an order is not defined but it is generally considered that its purpose is to give a mandate to the President or to an Assembly committee.

In view of the facility with which a motion for an order may be tabled and adopted, the Assembly is liable to find itself bound by a text adopted without debate by a chance majority.

To allow the Assembly to keep control of its proceedings, three methods may be considered:

The first, to which the Assembly of the Council of Europe seems to be turning, is to introduce into the Rules of Procedure a precise definition of the notion of an order laying down in particular that an order may not relate to a new subject but must relate to a question already included in the register of the Assembly and keep to matters of form, transmission, execution or procedure, without tackling the substance of the question.

The second is to delete completely the notion of an order which is possible since in fact members of the Assembly generally resort to points of order to raise matters which would be the subject of a motion for an order if the motion for an order were thus defined. Draft orders submitted by committees for the purpose

of instructing an Assembly body to carry out a specific task may also be termed draft resolutions.

The third method has the advantage of being clear and simple and should be given preference. It is to define an order as a mandate given to an Assembly body and to deal with motions for orders under Rule 28 like motions for recommendations, opinions or resolutions. Thus completed, Rule 28 would be the same as paragraph 3 of Rule 42 which sets out the form of the substantive text of reports and also mentions draft orders.

The latter solution would imply redrafting the end of the first sentence of paragraph 2 of Rule 28 to read: "and take the form of a recommendation, opinion, resolution, order or decision".

Finally, a definition should be made of motions tabled in the Assembly by ten of its members and drafts included in committee reports. It would be desirable to take this opportunity of dispelling the ambiguity arising from the plurality of meanings attributed to the word "resolution". It may in fact designate an Assembly text addressed by its President to international organisations, governments or national parliaments or an Assembly decision relating to its operation or the status of its members: amendments to the Charter (Article XII) or the Rules of Procedure (Rule 51), the appointment of a committee of investigation (Rule 39, paragraph 5), request for the waiver of immunity (Rule 50, paragraph 2).

Rule 28 might consequently set out the following definitions:

- "(a) Recommendations or opinions shall be addressed to the Council.
- (b) Resolutions shall be addressed to international organisations, governments or national parliaments.
- (c) Orders shall be addressed to the President of the Assembly or to a committee.
- (d) Decisions concern the working of the Assembly and the status of its members.

The adoption of this amendment would imply deletion of Rule 30.

Rule 29: Interpretation

The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that the Assembly has time to see amendments before they are debated, while leaving the President the possibility of relaxing this rule if necessary.

Rule 31: Interpretation

This amendment is intended to allow the President to ascertain the number of speakers early enough before a debate to be able to foresee the length of the debate and, if necessary, make the appropriate arrangements to organise it. This provision would moreover facilitate the President's task as set out in Rule 31, paragraph 2: "As far as possible he shall endeavour to call alternately upon speakers for and against the matter under discussion." Equally it allows him to avoid a succession of speakers of the same political group or the same nationality.

Paragraph 6

The committee considered the unduly vague notion of a personal statement should be defined. On the other hand, it wished to leave the President greater freedom to choose when a member of the Assembly may reply to a personal affront.

Paragraph 7

After "determining of" add "the order of business of the Assembly".

Speaking time should be limited for speeches on the adoption of the draft order of business in the same way as for determining the orders of the day of sittings and procedural matters.

Rule 33: Interpretation

The President may have included in the draft order of business a proposal to hold a debate on one or more reports. He may also make such a proposal during the session should this seem necessary.

In regard to speaking time for various categories of speaker, proposals were made in the memorandum by the President (Document 1016). This is a question of practice and not one for the Rules of Procedure. In this connection, the Assembly must be able to adapt the provisions it agrees upon according to circumstances.

Paragraph 1

Just as the President regularly limits the speaking time in general debates under Rule 33, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Procedure, there should be no problem if he at the same time limits speaking time on amendments.

*Rule 34**Paragraph 1*

Add at the end of the paragraph: "Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast."

The purpose of this amendment is to specify that the rule applicable to roll-call votes is also applicable to votes by sitting and standing.

Paragraph 2

This amendment allows the President to resort to roll-call votes when, for instance, he considers it to be the only way to allow the Assembly to vote clearly.

Paragraph 4

It is proposed to amend this paragraph by adding the provisions in italics:

"4. Voting on nominations shall take place by secret ballot. *Two tellers chosen by lot shall count the votes cast. Only those ballot papers bearing the names of persons who have been duly entered as candidates shall be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the number of votes cast. The President shall announce the result.*"

Inclusion of the provisions in italics recalls the provisions of Rule 10 for nominations other than those of members of the Bureau of the Assembly.

*Rule 35**Paragraph 1(b)*

Add: "(See Rule 34, paragraph 1)".

Paragraph 1(c)

Add at the end of this paragraph:

"...In the event of a tie, the candidate senior in age shall be declared elected. If only one candidature is proposed to the Assembly and there is no opposition to it, the single candidate shall be declared elected. (See Rule 34, paragraph 4)."

These provisions, applicable to the election of members of the Bureau of the Assembly under Rule 10, may be extended to cover all elections.

Paragraph 2

Leave out this paragraph whose provisions are included in Rule 34, paragraph 1.

Rule 36

The present rule that the quorum is calculated in accordance with the number of signatures on the register of attendance and not the number of representatives effectively present in the Chamber has so far proved satisfactory. It avoids a minority being able to prevent the Assembly from voting by leaving the Chamber. It no doubt prevents a parliamentarian from

insisting on the postponement of a vote by invoking the insufficient number of representatives present, but the President may always, at the request of a member of the Assembly, and with the agreement of the latter, postpone a vote or suspend the sitting. Moreover, it is his task, in the exercise of his responsibilities under Rule 11, to avoid a surprise vote. Conversely, calculating the quorum on the basis of the number of representatives present would result in the Assembly and its President again becoming powerless in face of certain manoeuvres aimed at preventing the majority from being able to express its political wishes.

Rule 39

Paragraph 2

See the proposed amendment to Rule 8.

Paragraph 6

The reference should no longer be to Rule 8, paragraph 3, but to Rule 39, paragraph 2.

Rule 40

Paragraph 5

Leave out "Bureau" and insert "Presidential Committee".

This is an overall responsibility of the Presidential Committee rather than the Bureau.

Rule 41

Paragraph 2

According to Rule 40, authorisation is necessary for appointing one or more members of a committee to carry out an information or study visit. A fortiori, the authorisation of the Presidential Committee would be necessary for appointing a sub-committee in view of the financial implications of such a decision.

The following amendment is therefore proposed:

Add at the beginning of Rule 41, paragraph 2, "In application of Rule 40, paragraph 5."

Paragraph 4(b)

This paragraph is not clear. It would be better to leave out this paragraph and amend paragraph 4 as follows to include a reference to Rule 35 on majorities, which is clearer.

In the first paragraph of paragraph 4, after "(Rule 32)" read "methods of voting (Rule 34) and majorities required (Rule 35 (b) and (c)) shall apply...".

Paragraph 4(c)

An election is not simple deliberation but a major decision. It should therefore be made

quite clear that the same quorum rules apply for electing the bureau of a committee or its rapporteurs as for the vote on a report as a whole.

The following amendment is therefore proposed:

"A committee may deliberate when one-third of its members is present, but *elections or the vote on a report as a whole...*"

Paragraph 4(d): "Substitutes may be elected members of the bureau of a committee."

The addition of this new paragraph is to avoid the ambiguity that might stem from the fact that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly. It might be considered that this rule was applicable to the bureau of a committee. Rule 7, paragraph 3, makes it clear that substitutes may be elected to the bureau of a committee. Affirmation of this in Rule 41 adds to the clarity and coherence of the rules.

Rule 42

The purpose of this amendment is to allow the Assembly time to examine reports, account being taken of the time required for preparing texts, translating the last corrections, printing and mailing.

It shall nevertheless still be possible for the Assembly, in certain strict conditions, to debate a report adopted after the required time-limit.

Rule 47

At the meeting of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on 4th December 1984, the Chairman read out a letter from Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, communicating the following resolution by the Bureau dated 12th November 1984:

"The Bureau of the Assembly,

Anxious to guarantee the Assembly's right to exercise in full its supervision of all matters within its purview;

Noting that in exercising this right the Assembly is limited in respect of the mandate it confers upon the Clerk and any Clerk Assistant as long as the duration of these mandates is not fixed;

Considering this shortcoming should be overcome by the adoption of new provisions guaranteeing that the Assembly can exercise its right in this respect;

Feels it desirable to fix a five-year time-limit on the mandate of the Clerk and any Clerk Assistant, this mandate being renewable by decision of the Assembly,

Asks the President to proceed to transmit the present resolution to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges so that the latter may report to the Assembly on this matter, if possible at the December 1984 session. ”

Since lack of time did not allow a report to be presented at the December 1984 session, the President of the Assembly asked the committee to report on this matter at the May 1985 session.

The Rapporteur first submitted an oral report at the meeting of the committee in Palermo on 22nd February 1985.

The matter was discussed at length and general agreement on the principle of an amendment was reached without a vote. Consequently, the Rapporteur drafted the proposed amended text of Rule 47 and presented it orally to the Presidential Committee at its meeting on 15th April 1985. In this presentation he underlined the following points:

- the political basis and starting point for the work of the committee was exclusively the resolution of the Bureau dated 12th November 1984;
- the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges is a purely technical

organ. In this specific instance, its tasks were merely to work out the technical and legal means of implementing a political decision by the Bureau;

- as for the legal aspects, the present Clerk was elected in December 1980 for an unlimited period. An amendment of Rule 47 could not have retroactive effect. It could be applicable only in future provided the post of Clerk became vacant.

The Presidential Committee fully endorsed these considerations and authorised the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to pursue its work on this basis.

An amendment to Article XI of the Charter will be necessary. According to Article XII of the Charter, proposals to amend the Charter are to be tabled in writing by at least ten representatives.

Your Rapporteur proposes therefore to submit to the Assembly the attached draft resolution. The text corresponds to that of the proposed amendment to Rule 47 but is shorter since in the Charter only the basic principles should be set out.

APPENDIX

*Comparison of present text and proposed amended text
of the Charter and Rules of Procedure**Charter**Present text**III. Sessions of the Assembly*

(a) The Assembly shall meet in ordinary session as often as the fulfilment of its functions may require, and not less than once in the course of any calendar year.

The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee and immediately brought to the attention of representatives and substitutes.

(b) The Assembly may be convened in extraordinary session by the President, either on his own initiative or following a request by the Council or by not less than a quarter of the representatives.

IV. Seat of the Assembly

(a) The seat of the Assembly is at Paris.

(b) Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at the seat of the Assembly unless the Bureau of the Assembly decides otherwise.

XI. Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

(a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly on the proposal of the Bureau. He shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.

Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a solemn declaration before the Assembly that he will perform his duties in complete independence and uninfluenced by national considerations; that he will neither seek nor receive indications concerning the performance of his duties from any government or authority other than the Assembly, and will refrain from any action incompatible with his position as a European civil servant.

(b) The Clerk shall, in consultation with the Bureau, appoint officials on a permanent or temporary basis as members of the Office of the Clerk.

(c) The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretary-General of Western European Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

*Proposed amended text**III. Sessions of the Assembly*

(a) Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordinary session which may be divided into several parts.

The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee and immediately brought to the attention of representatives.

(b) The Assembly may be convened in extraordinary session by the President, either on his own initiative or following a request by the Council or by not less than a quarter of the representatives.

IV. Seat of the Assembly

(a) The seat of the Assembly is at Paris.

(b) Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at the seat of the Assembly unless the Presidential Committee of the Assembly decides otherwise.

XI. Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

(a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau for a period of five years.

(b) In the performance of his duties, the Clerk shall be responsible to the President. He shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.

(c) The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretary-General of Western European Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

XII. Amendment of the Charter and adoption and amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

(a) Proposals to amend the Charter of the Assembly shall be tabled in writing by at least ten representatives. After consideration of the report thereon by the competent committee or committees, such amendments require the approval of a majority of the representatives of the Assembly.

(b) The adoption of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, and of any subsequent amendments thereto, shall require an absolute majority of the votes cast.

XII. Amendment of the Charter and adoption and amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

(a) Motions to amend the Charter of the Assembly shall be tabled in writing by at least ten representatives. After consideration of the report thereon by the competent committee or committees, such amendments require the approval of a majority of the representatives of the Assembly.

(b) The adoption of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, and of any subsequent amendments thereto, shall require an absolute majority of the votes cast.

*Rules of Procedure**Present text*

RULE 2

Date and duration of sessions

1. The Assembly shall meet in ordinary session as often as the fulfilment of its functions may require, and not less than once in the course of any calendar year.
2. An ordinary session may be divided into two or more parts.
3. The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee and immediately brought to the attention of representatives and substitutes.
4. The Presidential Committee shall inform representatives and substitutes of the dates of the opening or resumption of an ordinary session not less than six weeks beforehand.

RULE 3

Extraordinary sessions

The Assembly may be convened in extraordinary session by the President, either on his own initiative or following a request by the Council or by not less than a quarter of the representatives or substitutes.

RULE 4

Seat of the Assembly

1. The seat of the Assembly is at Paris.
2. Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at the seat of the Assembly unless the Bureau of the Assembly decides otherwise.

RULE 5

Provisional President

1. At the beginning of each ordinary session the oldest representative or substitute present shall discharge the duties of President until the election of the President has been announced.
2. No discussion may take place while the oldest representative or substitute is in the Chair unless it is concerned with the election of the President, or with the election or the report of the Credentials Committee.

Proposed amended text

RULE 2

Date and duration of sessions

1. Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordinary session which may be divided into several parts.
2. The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee and immediately brought to the attention of representatives.
3. The Presidential Committee shall inform representatives of the dates of the opening or resumption of an ordinary session not less than six weeks beforehand.

RULE 3

Extraordinary sessions

The Assembly may be convened in extraordinary session by the President, either on his own initiative or following a request by the Council or by not less than a quarter of the representatives.

RULE 4

Seat of the Assembly

1. The seat of the Assembly is at Paris.
2. Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at the seat of the Assembly unless the Presidential Committee of the Assembly decides otherwise.

RULE 5

Provisional President

1. At the beginning of each ordinary session the oldest representative present shall take the Chair until the election of the President has been announced.
2. No discussion may take place while the Provisional President is in the Chair unless it is concerned with the examination of credentials or the election of the President of the Assembly.

RULE 6

Ratification of credentials

1. The credentials of representatives and substitutes shall be attested by the statement of the ratification of credentials formally communicated to the President of the Assembly by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
2. If the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has been unable to ratify the credentials, the WEU Assembly shall ratify them on the basis of the official documents supplied either by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or by the parliaments or governments of member states subject to conformity with the subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
3. A committee of five representatives or substitutes chosen by lot may examine these credentials and report at once to the Assembly.
4. Any representative or substitute whose credentials are contested may take his seat provisionally with the same rights as other representatives and substitutes until the Assembly has made a decision on his case.

RULE 7

Substitutes and alternates

1. Any representative prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly may be replaced by a substitute.
2. Substitutes duly registered in accordance with Rule 24 have the same rights as representatives in the Assembly.
Substitutes may not, however, be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.
3. A substitute who is a committee chairman or rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if he is not sitting in place of a representative. In the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled to vote.
4. Representatives and substitutes may sit on committees either as titular members or as alternates.

Any titular member who is prevented from attending a meeting may appoint an alternate from among the alternate members of the committee of the same nationality as himself. With the consent of the chairman of the committee, he may also be replaced by any other representative or substitute of the same nationality as himself.

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Ratification of credentials

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2. If the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has been unable to ratify the credentials, the WEU Assembly shall ratify them on the basis of the official documents supplied either by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or by the parliaments or governments of member states subject to conformity with the subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
3. A committee of five representatives chosen by lot may be instructed to examine these credentials and report to the Assembly without delay.
4. Any representative or substitute whose credentials are contested may take his seat provisionally with the same rights as other representatives and substitutes until the Assembly has made a decision on his case.

RULE 7

Representatives and substitutes, titular members and alternates

1. Unless otherwise provided by the rules, the powers of a representative may be exercised by a substitute. Substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.
2. A substitute who is a committee chairman or rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if he is not sitting in place of a representative. In the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled to vote.
3. Representatives and substitutes may sit on committees either as titular members or as alternates.
4. Any titular member who is prevented from attending a meeting may appoint an alternate from among the alternate members of the committee of the same nationality as himself. With the consent of the chairman of the committee, he may also be replaced by any other representative or substitute of the same nationality as himself.
5. The alternate so appointed shall have the same rights as the titular member. Alternates may not however be elected to the bureau of a committee.

The alternate so appointed shall have the same rights as the titular member. Alternates may not however be elected to the bureau of a committee.

RULE 8

Duration of term of office of representatives and substitutes

1. The term of office of representatives and substitutes shall take effect from the date of the communication of the statement of the ratification of the credentials by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, or from the date of their appointment by member states if the session of the Assembly precedes that of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and subject to the ratification of the credentials by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
2. The term of office shall end in accordance with the rules of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe whether a seat is vacated through parliamentary elections or through death or resignation or through invalidation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
3. The Presidential Committee may, during the periods between sessions or part-sessions, provisionally fill the seats which have fallen vacant in committees with representatives and substitutes. These appointments must be ratified at the first session of the Assembly.

RULE 11

President

1. The duties of the President shall be: to open, suspend and close sittings, to propose at the end of each sitting the date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting, to guide the debates of the Assembly, to ensure the observance of the rules, to maintain order, to call on speakers, to close debates, to put questions to the vote and announce the result of votes, and to refer communications to the appropriate committees.
2. The President shall neither speak in debate nor vote, his substitute may sit, speak and vote in his place.
3. When so directed by the Assembly, the President shall transmit resolutions to international organisations, governments and national parliaments.

RULE 8

Duration of term of office of representatives and substitutes

1. The term of office of representatives and substitutes shall take effect from the date of the communication of the statement of the ratification of the credentials by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, or from the date of their appointment by member states if the session of the Assembly precedes that of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and subject to the ratification of the credentials by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
2. The term of office shall end in accordance with the rules of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe whether a seat is vacated through parliamentary elections or through death or resignation or through invalidation by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

RULE 11

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1. The duties of the President shall be: to open, suspend and close sittings, to propose at the end of each sitting the date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting, to guide the debates of the Assembly, to ensure the observance of the rules, to maintain order, to call on speakers, to close debates, to put questions to the vote and announce the result of votes, and to refer communications to the appropriate committees.
2. When in the Chair the President shall neither speak in debate nor vote; his substitute may sit, speak and vote in his place. If the President speaks in a debate on a specific subject, he may not resume the Chair until the debate on that subject is over.
3. When so directed by the Assembly, the President shall transmit resolutions to international organisations, governments and national parliaments.

RULE 13

Maintenance of order

1. The President shall call to order any representative or substitute who departs from it.
2. If the offence is repeated, the President shall again call the representative or substitute to order and cause the fact to be recorded in the minutes of proceedings.
3. In the event of a further offence (other than an offence to which Rule 31 (4) applies) the President may exclude the offender from the chamber for the remainder of the sitting.
4. In serious cases the President may propose that the representative or substitute who committed the offence be censured and excluded from the chamber for a period not exceeding four days. The representative or substitute upon whom a vote of censure is proposed shall always have the right to be heard.
5. After the representative or substitute concerned has been heard, if he has exercised his right, the vote of censure shall be taken without debate.
6. It shall be forbidden to make use of words or expressions which are contrary to the good conduct of debates. Without prejudice to his other rights for the maintenance of order, the President may cause such words to be deleted from the official report of debates. He shall have similar power as regards any intervention by a representative or substitute who has not obtained prior permission to speak or who exceeds the time that may have been allotted to speakers.

RULE 15

Public order in the chamber and galleries

1. No person shall enter the chamber for any reason except representatives and substitutes, ministers who are members of the Council of Western European Union, other ministers of member states and officials whose duties require their presence there.
2. Only persons provided with a card granting right of access duly issued by the Clerk may be admitted to the galleries.
3. Members of the public admitted to the galleries shall remain seated and in silence. Any person expressing approval or disapproval shall be ejected at once by the ushers.

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1. The President shall call to order any representative who departs from it.
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3. In the event of a further offence (other than an offence to which Rule 31 (4) applies) the President may exclude the offender from the chamber for the remainder of the sitting.
4. In serious cases the President may propose that the representative who committed the offence be censured and excluded from the chamber for a period not exceeding four days. The representative upon whom a vote of censure is proposed shall always have the right to be heard.
5. After the representative concerned has been heard, if he has exercised his right, the vote of censure shall be taken without debate.
6. It shall be forbidden to make use of words or expressions which are contrary to the good conduct of debates. Without prejudice to his other rights for the maintenance of order, the President may cause such words to be deleted from the official report of debates. He shall have similar power as regards any intervention by a representative who has not obtained prior permission to speak or who exceeds the time that may have been allotted to speakers.

RULE 15

Public order in the chamber and galleries

1. No person shall enter the chamber without having been invited by the President of the Assembly except representatives, ministers who are members of the Council of Western European Union, other ministers of member states and officials whose duties require their presence there.
2. Only persons provided with a card granting right of access duly issued by the Clerk may be admitted to the galleries.
3. Members of the public admitted to the galleries shall remain seated and in silence. Any person expressing approval or disapproval shall be ejected at once by the ushers.
4. Duly accredited representatives of the media may be admitted to the chamber for the purpose of photographic and/or sound recording only under guidelines approved by the Presidential Committee.

RULE 22

Reports of debates

1. A report of debates at each sitting shall be compiled in French and English and distributed within as short a period as possible. A speech delivered in French or English shall be reproduced verbatim in the report compiled in the language in which the speech was delivered; a summary report of the simultaneous interpretation of the speech shall be incorporated in the report compiled in the other language. When a speech is delivered in an official language of a member state other than French or English, a summary report of its simultaneous interpretation shall be incorporated in the reports compiled in French and English.
2. Speakers are required to return the reports of their speeches to the Office of the Clerk not later than the day after that on which the reports were communicated to them.
3. After each session or part-session the reports of debates shall be published in full in French and English.

RULE 24

Register of attendance

At each morning and afternoon sitting, each representative or his substitute shall sign the register of attendance in accordance with Rule 7 before taking his place.

RULE 26

Order of debates

1. A general debate and the examination of a text shall take place on the report of the committee to which the matter has been referred and not sooner than twenty-four hours after the distribution of the report unless the Assembly decides to apply the provisions of Rule 43 below.
2. When examination of and voting on a text as a whole have been concluded and the results announced, representatives or substitutes may present explanations of votes.

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1. A report of debates at each sitting shall be compiled in French and English and distributed within as short a period as possible. A speech delivered in French or English shall be reproduced verbatim in the report compiled in the language in which the speech was delivered; a summary report of the simultaneous interpretation of the speech shall be incorporated in the report compiled in the other language. When a speech is delivered in an official language of a member state other than French or English, a summary report of its simultaneous interpretation shall be incorporated in the reports compiled in French and English. Speakers may submit corrections to the reports of their speeches not later than the day after that on which the reports were communicated to them.
2. A full transcription of speeches made in Dutch, German and Italian shall be made available without delay to speakers on request. They may submit corrections to the transcription of their speeches not later than the day after the speech was made.
3. After each session or part-session the reports of debates shall be published in full in French and English.

RULE 24

Register of attendance

1. At each morning and afternoon sitting, each representative or his substitute shall sign the register of attendance before taking his place.
2. Unless otherwise provided by the rules, the powers of a representative who is prevented from attending a sitting may be exercised by a substitute who has duly signed the register.

RULE 26

Order of debates

1. A general debate and the examination of a text shall take place on the report of the committee to which the matter has been referred and not sooner than twenty-four hours after the distribution of the report unless the Assembly decides to apply the provisions of Rule 43 below.
2. When examination of and voting on a text as a whole have been concluded and the results announced, representatives may present explanations of votes.

RULE 27

Debate on the annual report

1. The Clerk shall send a copy of the annual report of the Council of Western European Union to each representative and substitute, together with related documents.
2. The Presidential Committee shall refer to the competent committees the relevant chapters of the annual report of the Council of Western European Union.
3. Meetings of the appropriate committees shall be held before the opening or resumption of the session.

These committees may formulate questions, which shall be transmitted by the President of the Assembly to the Council. The text of the questions put to the Council and of the replies thereto shall be included in reports of the committees to the Assembly.

If a reply is postponed or omitted for reasons of European public interest, the question shall be published, with a statement of the reasons given by the Council which deferred or prevented the publication of a reply.

4. The Chairman of the Council may present the report orally to the Assembly, and a general debate take place on the annual report and on the message of the Chairman of the Council.
5. An examination in detail of the texts submitted by the committees shall begin not earlier than twenty-four hours after the distribution of their reports.
6. A motion to disagree to the content of the annual report, or any part of the report, must be signed by at least ten representatives or substitutes. The adoption of such a motion, which shall not be put to the vote until at least twenty-four hours after it has been tabled, shall require support from a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of the representatives to the Assembly.

RULE 28

Motions

1. Motions may be tabled by representatives or substitutes on any matter within the aim and scope of the Assembly as defined in Article I of the Charter.
2. Motions must embody a concise summary of the subject raised and take the form of a recommendation, opinion or resolution. They shall be submitted in writing and be signed by at least ten representatives or substitutes.
3. The President shall decide whether such motions are in order. He may, if he thinks fit,

RULE 27

Debate on the annual report

1. The Clerk shall send a copy of the annual report of the Council of Western European Union to each representative and substitute, together with related documents.

2. The Presidential Committee shall refer to the competent committees the relevant chapters of the annual report of the Council of Western European Union.

3. Meetings of the appropriate committees shall be held before the opening or resumption of the session. These committees may formulate questions, which shall be transmitted by the President of the Assembly to the Council. The text of the questions put to the Council and of the replies thereto shall be included in reports of the committees to the Assembly. If a reply is postponed or omitted for reasons of European public interest, the question shall be published, with a statement of the reasons given by the Council which deferred or prevented the publication of a reply.

4. The Chairman of the Council shall be invited to present the report orally to the Assembly, and a general debate may take place on the annual report and on the message of the Chairman of the Council.

5. An examination in detail of the texts submitted by the committees shall begin not earlier than twenty-four hours after the distribution of their reports.

6. A motion to disagree to the content of the annual report, or any part of the report, must be signed by at least ten representatives. The adoption of such a motion, which shall not be put to the vote until at least twenty-four hours after it has been tabled, shall require support from a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of the representatives to the Assembly.

RULE 28

Motions

1. Motions may be tabled by representatives on any matter within the aim and scope of the Assembly as defined in Article I of the Charter.

2. Motions must embody a concise summary of the subject raised and take the form of a recommendation, opinion, resolution, order or decision. They shall be submitted in writing and be signed by at least ten representatives.

- (a) Recommendations or opinions shall be addressed to the Council.

refer the matter to the Assembly or to the Presidential Committee.

Motions which are in order shall be printed and distributed immediately.

4. When the question of including such a motion in the register is put to the Assembly, the following only may be heard: one speaker for the motion, one speaker against and the chairman of any committee concerned.

RULE 29

Amendments

1. Any representative or substitute may propose and speak to amendments. The President shall decide whether they are in order.

2. Amendments must be signed by their author. Amendments shall, if time permits, be printed and distributed before their consideration by the Assembly. The President shall have the power not to select amendments for consideration if, in his opinion, there has not been adequate time for members of the Assembly to study such amendments.

3. Amendments shall relate directly to the text which it is sought to alter. Unless otherwise decided by the President of the Assembly, they shall relate to only one paragraph at a time.

4. Amendments shall be put to the vote before the text to which they relate.

5. If two or more amendments relate to the same paragraph, the amendment which differs most from the original text shall be put to the vote first.

6. When several contradictory amendments are tabled, the President may rule that they be debated together, their authors speaking in turn before the amendments are put to the vote one by one.

7. Amendments to amendments are in order only if they do not contradict the amendment; they may not be amended. They shall be debated after and put to the vote before the amendment to which they relate.

(b) Resolutions shall be addressed to international organisations, governments or national parliaments.

(c) Orders shall be addressed to the President of the Assembly or to a committee.

(d) Decisions concern the working of the Assembly and the status of its members.

3. The President shall decide whether such motions are in order. He may, if he thinks fit, refer the matter to the Assembly or to the Presidential Committee. Motions which are in order shall be printed and distributed immediately.

4. When the question of including such a motion in the register is put to the Assembly, the following only may be heard: one speaker for the motion, one speaker against and the chairman of any committee concerned.

RULE 29

Amendments

1. Any representative may propose and speak to amendments. The President shall decide whether they are in order.

2. Amendments tabled in writing and signed by their author shall be distributed without delay. Unless otherwise decided by the President, no amendment shall be proposed and put to the vote in the Assembly if it has not been tabled at the latest before the end of the sitting preceding that at which it is considered. In the case of the first sitting, this time-limit shall end with the opening of the sitting.

3. Amendments shall relate directly to the text which it is sought to alter. Unless otherwise decided by the President of the Assembly, they shall relate to only one paragraph at a time.

4. Amendments shall be put to the vote before the text to which they relate.

5. If two or more amendments relate to the same paragraph, the amendment which differs most from the original text shall be put to the vote first.

6. When several contradictory amendments are tabled, the President may rule that they be debated together, their authors speaking in turn before the amendments are put to the vote one by one.

7. Amendments to amendments are in order only if they do not contradict the amendment; they may not be amended. They shall be debated after and put to the vote before the amendment to which they relate.

8. The reference back of an amendment to committee may always be requested and shall be obligatory if requested by the chairman or rapporteur of the committee.

9. The reference back of an amendment to committee shall not necessarily interrupt the debate. The Assembly may fix a time-limit within which the committee shall report its conclusions on the amendments which have been referred to it.

10. When amendments are being considered, unless the President of the Assembly decides otherwise, the only members who may speak shall be the mover of the amendment, or another member speaking in its favour, one member opposed to the amendment and the rapporteur or the committee chairman.

RULE 30

Orders of the Assembly

1. Any representative or substitute may lay on the table of the Assembly a motion for an order of the Assembly. The President shall decide whether such motions are in order.

2. Such a motion may be put to the vote without being referred to committee.

RULE 31

Right to speak

1. No representative or substitute may speak unless called upon to do so by the President. Representatives or substitutes shall speak from their place and shall address the Chair; the President may invite them to come to the rostrum.

2. Representatives or substitutes wishing to speak shall either enter their names before the opening of the sitting in a register provided for the purpose or ask for the right to speak in the course of the sitting. The President may, in the interests of the debate, depart from the order in which representatives or substitutes have entered their names or have asked to speak. As far as possible he shall endeavour to call alternately upon speakers for and against the matter under discussion. Once begun, a speech may not be interrupted and resumed at the following sitting.

3. A speaker may not be interrupted except on a point of order. He may, however, with the permission of the President, give way during his speech to allow another representative or substitute to put to him a question on a particular point in his speech.

4. If a speaker is irrelevant, the President shall call him to order. If a speaker has already

8. When amendments are being considered, unless the President of the Assembly decides otherwise, the only members who may speak shall be the mover of the amendment, or another member speaking in its favour, one member opposed to the amendment and the rapporteur or the committee chairman.

RULE 30

Orders of the Assembly

Deleted.

RULE 31

Right to speak

1. No representative may speak unless called upon to do so by the President. Representatives shall speak from their place and shall address the Chair; the President may invite them to come to the rostrum.

2. Except for the chairman of the committee and the rapporteur, representatives wishing to speak in a general debate shall enter their names in a register provided for the purpose at the latest before the close of the sitting preceding the debate. In the case of the first sitting, their request to speak shall be made in writing before the opening of the part-session. Unless the President decides otherwise, no other representative shall be called upon to speak.

3. A speaker may not be interrupted except on a point of order. He may, however, with the permission of the President, give way during his speech to allow another representative to put to him a question on a particular point in his speech.

4. If a speaker is irrelevant, the President shall call him to order. If a speaker has already been called to order twice in the same debate, the President may, on the third occasion, forbid

been called to order twice in the same debate, the President may, on the third occasion, forbid him to speak during the remainder of the debate on the same subject.

5. Members of the Council and rapporteurs on a question under discussion shall be allowed to speak whenever they wish.

6. A representative or substitute who wishes to make a personal statement shall be heard, but only at the end of a sitting.

7. No representative or substitute may speak for more than five minutes on any of the following: explanations of vote, personal statements, comments on the adoption of the minutes of proceedings of the preceding sitting, determining of the orders of the day of a sitting and all questions of procedure.

RULE 32

Procedural motions

1. A representative or substitute shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave:

- (a) to move the previous question which, if adopted, results in the subject of the debate being removed from the agenda and from the register of the Assembly;
- (b) to move the suspension of the sitting or the adjournment of the debate;
- (c) to move the closure of the debate;
- (d) to move reference back to committee.

Previous questions shall be notified to the President before the opening of the sitting and put to the vote immediately after the presentation of the relevant committee report.

None of these procedural motions may be moved more than once during the course of a debate.

2. The above matters shall take precedence over the main question, the debate on which shall be suspended while they are being considered.

3. In debate on the above matters, the following only shall be heard: the proposer of the motion, one speaker against the motion, and the rapporteur or the chairman of any committee concerned.

4. In addition, a representative or substitute shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave to raise a point of order. A point of order must be confined to raising questions of procedure for a ruling from the Chair.

him to speak during the remainder of the debate on the same subject.

5. Members of the Council and rapporteurs on a question under discussion shall be allowed to speak whenever they wish.

6. The President shall decide when a representative may respond to a statement challenging him on a personal basis. No debate may take place on this response.

7. No representative may speak for more than five minutes on any of the following: explanations of vote, personal statements, comments on the adoption of the minutes of proceedings of the preceding sitting, determining of the order of business of the Assembly, the orders of the day of a sitting and all questions of procedure.

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1. A representative shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave :

- (a) to move the previous question which, if adopted, results in the subject of the debate being removed from the agenda and from the register of the Assembly;
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- (c) to move the closure of the debate;
- (d) to move reference back to committee.

Previous questions shall be notified to the President before the opening of the sitting and put to the vote immediately after the presentation of the relevant committee report. None of these procedural motions may be moved more than once during the course of a debate.

2. The above matters shall take precedence over the main question, the debate on which shall be suspended while they are being considered.

3. In debate on the above matters, the following only shall be heard: the proposer of the motion, one speaker against the motion, and the rapporteur or the chairman of any committee concerned.

4. In addition, a representative shall have a prior right to speak if he asks leave to raise a point of order. A point of order must be confined to raising questions of procedure for a ruling from the Chair. The time-limit for points of order shall be one minute. If the right to raise points of order is misused, the President may forbid the offending representative to speak for the remainder of the debate.

RULE 34

Methods of voting

1. The Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing except in cases where a roll-call vote or secret ballot is required.
2. The Assembly shall vote by roll-call:
 - (a) when an absolute majority is required, in accordance with Rule 35, 1 (a), of the Rules of Procedure;
 - (b) on the draft reply to the annual report and on a draft recommendation or opinion considered as a whole, whenever five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire;
 - (c) in other cases, whenever ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire.
3. The roll shall be called in alphabetical order, beginning with the name of a representative drawn by lot. Voting shall be by word of mouth and shall be expressed by "Yes", "No", or "I abstain". Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast. The President shall be responsible for the counting of votes and shall announce the result. The votes shall be recorded in the minutes of the proceedings of the sitting in the alphabetical order of representatives' names.
4. Voting on nominations shall take place by secret ballot. Only those ballot papers bearing the names of persons who have been duly entered as candidates shall be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the number of votes cast.

RULE 35

Majorities

1. The majorities required are the following:
 - (a) for the adoption of amendments to the Charter, for the adoption of a motion to disagree to the annual report or to any part of the report or for the adoption of a request for urgent procedure without prior reference to committee: a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the Assembly;
 - (b) for any other decision: a majority of the votes cast;

RULE 34

Methods of voting

1. The Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing except in cases where a roll-call vote or secret ballot is required. Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast.
2. The Assembly shall vote by roll-call:
 - (a) when an absolute majority is required, in accordance with Rule 35 (a) of the Rules of Procedure;
 - (b) on the draft reply to the annual report and on a draft recommendation or opinion considered as a whole, whenever five or more representatives present in the chamber so desire;
 - (c) in other cases, whenever ten or more representatives present in the chamber so desire or if the President so decides.
3. The roll shall be called in alphabetical order, beginning with the name of a representative drawn by lot. Voting shall be by word of mouth and shall be expressed by "Yes", "No", or "I abstain". Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast. The President shall be responsible for the counting of votes and shall announce the result. The votes shall be recorded in the minutes of the proceedings of the sitting in the alphabetical order of representatives' names.
4. Voting on nominations shall take place by secret ballot. Two tellers chosen by lot shall count the votes cast. Only those ballot papers bearing the names of persons who have been duly entered as candidates shall be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the number of votes cast. The President shall announce the result.

RULE 35

Majorities

- The majorities required are the following:
- (a) for the adoption of amendments to the Charter, for the adoption of a motion to disagree to the annual report or to any part of the report or for the adoption of a request for urgent procedure without prior reference to committee: a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the Assembly;
 - (b) for any other decision: a majority of the votes cast (see Rule 34, paragraph 1);

(c) for appointments other than those provided for in Rule 10 above: an absolute majority of votes cast at the first ballot and a relative majority at the second ballot.

2. Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast.

RULE 36

Quorum

1. The Assembly shall not take any decision by roll-call unless more than half of the representatives to the Assembly or their substitutes have signed the register of attendance provided for in Rule 24 above.

2. All votes other than votes by roll-call shall be valid, whatever the number of representatives or substitutes present, unless, at the request of a representative or substitute before the voting has begun, the President has ascertained that the number of representatives or substitutes who have signed the register of attendance is less than a quorum.

3. In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall be postponed. It may be taken at any time once there is a quorum. Any matter on which it has not been possible to vote before the end of the part-session in the absence of a quorum shall be referred to the Presidential Committee, which shall decide whether the text should be put to the vote at the next part-session of the Assembly or referred back to committee.

RULE 39

Appointment of committees

1. At the beginning of each ordinary session the Assembly shall set up the following permanent committees:

- (i) Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments;
- (ii) General Affairs Committee;
- (iii) Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions;
- (iv) Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration;
- (v) Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

2. The first and second of the permanent committees shall be composed of twenty-seven members divided as follows: Belgium 3; France

(c) for appointments other than those provided for in Rule 10 above: an absolute majority of votes cast at the first ballot and a relative majority at the second ballot. In the event of a tie, the candidate senior in age shall be declared elected. If only one candidature is proposed to the Assembly and there is no opposition to it, the single candidate shall be declared elected (see Rule 34, paragraph 4).

RULE 36

Quorum

1. The Assembly shall not take any decision by roll-call unless more than half of the representatives to the Assembly or their substitutes have signed the register of attendance provided for in Rule 24 above.

2. All votes other than votes by roll-call shall be valid, whatever the number of representatives or substitutes present, unless, at the request of a representative before the voting has begun, the President has ascertained that the number of representatives or substitutes who have signed the register of attendance is less than a quorum.

3. In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall be postponed. It may be taken at any time once there is a quorum. Any matter on which it has not been possible to vote before the end of the part-session in the absence of a quorum shall be referred to the Presidential Committee, which shall decide whether the text should be put to the vote at the next part-session of the Assembly or referred back to committee.

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Appointment of committees

1. At the beginning of each ordinary session the Assembly shall set up the following permanent committees:

- (i) Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments;
- (ii) General Affairs Committee;
- (iii) Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions;
- (iv) Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration;
- (v) Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

2. The first and second of the permanent committees shall be composed of twenty-seven members divided as follows: Belgium 3, France

5; the Federal Republic of Germany 5; Italy 5; Luxembourg 1; the Netherlands 3; the United Kingdom 5.

The third, fourth and fifth permanent committees shall be composed of twenty-one members divided as follows: Belgium 2; France 4; the Federal Republic of Germany 4; Italy 4; Luxembourg 1; the Netherlands 2; the United Kingdom 4.

3. The Assembly may set up special committees during the session, which may be reappointed at the beginning of subsequent sessions. The Assembly shall fix the total number of seats in such committees and the number of seats to be allotted to each member state.

4. When setting up committees in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Assembly shall have regard to the activities of other European organisations.

5. With the approval of the Council, the Assembly may appoint committees of investigation as provided for in Article VII (*f*) of the Charter, the composition, terms of reference and duration of which shall be defined in a resolution.

6. Candidatures for membership of committees shall be addressed to the Bureau which shall submit to the Assembly, or in the cases provided for in Rule 8, paragraph 3, to the Presidential Committee, proposals for their composition taking into account the representation of political tendencies. The President of the Assembly may invite the chairmen of political groups to attend the appropriate meetings of the Bureau. The Assembly, or the Presidential Committee, shall decide by secret vote disputed nominations for one or more seats in a committee.

7. The bureau of each committee shall be composed of a chairman and two vice-chairmen. Representatives or substitutes who are members of governments shall not be members of the bureau of a committee.

RULE 40

Powers of committees

1. Committees shall examine questions and documents which are referred to them by the Assembly or by the Presidential Committee.

2. Committees shall also examine the action taken on recommendations and resolutions adopted by the Assembly on their reports.

3. Should a committee declare itself not competent to consider a question, or should a

5, the Federal Republic of Germany 5, Italy 5, Luxembourg 1, the Netherlands 3, the United Kingdom 5. The third, fourth and fifth permanent committees shall be composed of twenty-one members divided as follows: Belgium 2, France 4, the Federal Republic of Germany 4, Italy 4, Luxembourg 1, the Netherlands 2, the United Kingdom 4. The Presidential Committee may, during the periods between sessions or part-sessions, provisionally fill the seats which have fallen vacant in committees with representatives or substitutes. These appointments must be ratified at the first session of the Assembly.

3. The Assembly may set up special committees during the session, which may be reappointed at the beginning of subsequent sessions. The Assembly shall fix the total number of seats in such committees and the number of seats to be allotted to each member state.

4. When setting up committees in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Assembly shall have regard to the activities of other European organisations.

5. With the approval of the Council, the Assembly may appoint committees of investigation as provided for in Article VII (*f*) of the Charter, the composition, terms of reference and duration of which shall be defined in a decision.

6. Candidatures for membership of committees shall be addressed to the Bureau which shall submit to the Assembly, or in the cases provided for in paragraph 2 above, to the Presidential Committee, proposals for their composition taking into account the representation of political tendencies. The President of the Assembly may invite the chairmen of political groups to attend the appropriate meetings of the Bureau. The Assembly, or the Presidential Committee, shall decide by secret vote disputed nominations for one or more seats in a committee.

7. The bureau of each committee shall be composed of a chairman and two vice-chairmen. Representatives who are members of governments shall not be members of the bureau of a committee.

RULE 40

Powers of committees

1. Committees shall examine questions and documents which are referred to them by the Assembly or by the Presidential Committee.

2. Committees shall also examine the action taken on recommendations and resolutions adopted by the Assembly on their reports.

3. Should a committee declare itself not competent to consider a question, or should a

conflict arise over the competence of two or more committees, the question of competence shall be submitted to the Presidential Committee or the Assembly.

4. Committees of the Assembly may request the Council to communicate documents or information necessary for their enquiries.

5. A committee may, with the approval of the Bureau of the Assembly, appoint one or several of its members to undertake a mission for purposes of information or study.

RULE 41

Procedure in committees

1. A committee shall meet when convened by its chairman or at the request of the President of the Assembly, either during or between sessions.

2. A committee may, in the interest of its work, appoint one or more subcommittees, of which it shall at the same time determine the composition and competence. However, the number of members of a subcommittee may not exceed a third of the membership of the full committee.

3. Any two or more committees or subcommittees may hold a joint meeting for the examination of subjects coming within their competence, but may not reach a joint decision.

4. The rules adopted for the Assembly concerning the election of the President and Vice-Presidents (Rules 5 and 10), the minutes of proceedings (Rule 21), amendments (Rule 29), the right to speak (Rule 31), procedural motions (Rule 32), and methods of voting (Rule 34), shall apply to the proceedings of committees, subject to the following provisions :

- (a) A committee shall vote by show of hands, unless any representative or substitute requests a vote by roll-call. The vote on any text which is to be tabled in the Assembly shall be taken by roll-call. The roll shall be called alphabetically beginning with the letter "A". Election shall take place by secret ballot. The formal proposal of candidates is optional.
- (b) Voting in committee shall be by absolute majority of the votes cast, provided that election shall be by relative majority at the second ballot, if necessary. In the event of a tie, the candidate senior in age shall be declared elected.
- (c) A committee may deliberate when one-third of its members are present,

conflict arise over the competence of two or more committees, the question of competence shall be submitted to the Presidential Committee or the Assembly.

4. Committees of the Assembly may request the Council to communicate documents or information necessary for their enquiries.

5. A committee may, with the approval of the Presidential Committee, appoint one or several of its members to undertake a mission for purposes of information or study.

RULE 41

Procedure in committees

1. A committee shall meet when convened by its chairman or at the request of the President of the Assembly, either during or between sessions.

2. In application of Rule 40, paragraph 5, a committee may, in the interest of its work, appoint one or more subcommittees, of which it shall at the same time determine the composition and competence. However, the number of members of a subcommittee may not exceed a third of the membership of the full committee.

3. Any two or more committees or subcommittees may hold a joint meeting for the examination of subjects coming within their competence, but may not reach a joint decision.

4. The rules adopted for the Assembly concerning the election of the President and Vice-Presidents (Rules 5 and 10), the minutes of proceedings (Rule 21), amendments (Rule 29), the right to speak (Rule 31), procedural motions (Rule 32), methods of voting (Rule 34) and majorities required (Rule 35 (b) and (c)), shall apply to the proceedings of committees, subject to the following provisions:

- (a) A committee shall vote by show of hands, unless any representative requests a vote by roll-call. The vote on any text which is to be tabled in the Assembly shall be taken by roll-call. The roll shall be called alphabetically beginning with the letter "A". Election shall take place by secret ballot. The formal proposal of candidates is optional.
- (b) A committee may deliberate when one-third of its members are present, but elections or the vote on a report as a whole shall not be valid unless the majority of the members of the committee are present.
- (c) Substitutes may be elected members of the bureau of a committee.

but the vote on a report as a whole shall not be valid unless the majority of the members of the committee are present.

5. The chairman of the committee may take part in discussions and may vote, but without having a casting vote.

6. Committee meetings shall be held in private. Unless a committee decides otherwise, representatives and substitutes may attend meetings of that committee even though they are not members, but they may not take part in its discussions.

A representative or substitute who has moved a motion which has been referred to a committee may, however, be invited by that committee to take part in its discussions in an advisory capacity.

7. The conditions in which any person who is not a representative or substitute may be heard by a committee shall be decided by that committee. If the committee agrees, such a person may take part in the discussions at the discretion of the chairman.

8. The conditions in which the officials of Western European Union and experts are heard by a committee shall be determined in each case after agreement with the Council.

9. Minutes of proceedings shall be drawn up for each committee meeting.

10. Unless a committee decides otherwise, and subject to the confidential character of information communicated by the Council, the only texts which shall be made public shall be the reports that have been agreed to, or statements issued on the responsibility of the chairman.

RULE 42

Reports of committees

1. The committees shall appoint a rapporteur for each subject, who shall be responsible for the preparation of the report of the committee and for introducing it to the Assembly. The final report of a committee shall comprise an explanatory memorandum and a substantive text.

2. The explanatory memorandum shall, in particular, state the result of the vote taken in committee on the report as a whole and, if the committee's opinion is not unanimous, it must also state the opinion of the minority.

3. Only the substantive text is voted upon by the Assembly. It must be presented in the form of a draft recommendation or opinion addressed to the Council, a draft resolution or a draft order.

5. The chairman of the committee may take part in discussions and may vote, but without having a casting vote.

6. Committee meetings shall be held in private. Unless a committee decides otherwise, representatives may attend meetings of that committee even though they are not members, but they may not take part in its discussions. A representative who has moved a motion which has been referred to a committee may, however, be invited by that committee to take part in its discussions in an advisory capacity.

7. The conditions in which any person who is not a representative or substitute may be heard by a committee shall be decided by that committee. If the committee agrees, such a person may take part in the discussions at the discretion of the chairman.

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2. The explanatory memorandum shall, in particular, state the result of the vote taken in committee on the report as a whole and, if the committee's opinion is not unanimous, it must also state the opinion of the minority.

3. Only the substantive text is voted upon by the Assembly. It must be presented in the form of a draft recommendation, opinion, resolution, order or decision as defined in Rule 28.

RULE 43

Urgent procedure

1. At the request of the Council, of the committee concerned, or of ten or more representatives or substitutes, a debate may be held on an item which has not been placed on the agenda.
2. As soon as a request for urgent procedure is received, the President shall communicate it orally to the Assembly. The request shall then be posted up and the relevant text circulated. The Assembly shall decide on the request for urgent procedure at the earliest after the first vote included in the orders of the day of the sitting at which the request for urgent procedure was communicated to the Assembly and at the latest at the beginning of the next sitting.
3. The debate on a request for urgent procedure shall not enter into the substance of the question other than to justify the request or to reject the urgent procedure. In connection with a request for urgent procedure, the following only may be heard: one speaker for the request, one speaker against, the chairman of the committee concerned and one representative of the Bureau speaking in its name.
4. If the Assembly decides against urgent procedure, another request concerning the same question may not be placed before it during the same part-session.
5. If urgent procedure is adopted, the Assembly may, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 26, decide that the debate on the substance of the text shall be held on an oral report of the appropriate committee, either at the beginning of the orders of the day of the next sitting or at a later date during the current part-session.
6. Any request for urgent procedure without prior reference to committee shall be put to the vote by roll-call. Its adoption shall require a favourable vote by a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the Assembly.

4. All reports on the agenda of a part-session shall be adopted by committees at least three weeks before the opening of the relevant part-session. A report not adopted in time shall be withdrawn from the agenda. However, if that report has been adopted unanimously, the Assembly may decide at the request of the committee to keep it on its agenda, unless twenty representatives are opposed. Such a decision shall be taken before the order of business is adopted (Rule 18). After adopting within the prescribed time-limit a report placed before it, the committee may, after that time-limit, prepare a supplementary report to take account of current events.

RULE 43

Urgent procedure

1. At the request of the Council, of the committee concerned, or of ten or more representatives, a debate may be held on an item which has not been placed on the agenda.
2. As soon as a request for urgent procedure is received, the President shall communicate it orally to the Assembly. The request shall then be posted up and the relevant text circulated. The Assembly shall decide on the request for urgent procedure at the earliest after the first vote included in the orders of the day of the sitting at which the request for urgent procedure was communicated to the Assembly and at the latest at the beginning of the next sitting.
3. The debate on a request for urgent procedure shall not enter into the substance of the question other than to justify the request or to reject the urgent procedure. In connection with a request for urgent procedure, the following only may be heard: one speaker for the request, one speaker against, the chairman of the committee concerned and one representative of the Bureau speaking in its name.
4. If the Assembly decides against urgent procedure, another request concerning the same question may not be placed before it during the same part-session.
5. If urgent procedure is adopted, the Assembly may, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 26, decide that the debate on the substance of the text shall be held on an oral report of the appropriate committee, either at the beginning of the orders of the day of the next sitting or at a later date during the current part-session.
6. Any request for urgent procedure without prior reference to committee shall be put to the vote by roll-call. Its adoption shall require a favourable vote by a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the Assembly.

RULE 45

Written questions

1. Any representative or substitute may put written questions to the Council in accordance with Article V (i) of the Charter. The text of such questions shall be transmitted by the President to the Chairman of the Council. Questions and answers shall be published by the Clerk of the Assembly.
2. All questions governed by this rule to which an answer has not been given within a period of one month shall be published, together with a statement that no reply has been received.

RULE 47

Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

1. The Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly, on the proposal of the Bureau. He shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.

Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a solemn declaration before the Assembly that he will perform his duties in complete independence and uninfluenced by national considerations, that he will neither seek nor receive indications concerning the performance of his duties from any government or authority other than the Assembly, and will refrain from any action incompatible with his position as a European civil servant.

2. The Clerk shall, in consultation with the Bureau, appoint officials on a permanent or temporary basis as members of the Office of the Clerk.
3. The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretary-General of Western European Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

RULE 45

Written questions

1. Any representative may put written questions to the Council in accordance with Article V (i) of the Charter. The text of such questions shall be transmitted by the President to the Chairman of the Council. Questions and answers shall be published by the Clerk of the Assembly.
2. All questions governed by this rule to which an answer has not been given within a period of one month shall be published, together with a statement that no reply has been received.

RULE 47

Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

1. The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau. His term of office shall expire at the end of the fifth year following his appointment and may be renewed. If there has not been an appointment or reappointment before 30th June of the year in which his term of office expires, his term of office shall be extended by one year.

2. Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a solemn declaration before the Assembly that he will perform his duties in complete independence and uninfluenced by national considerations, that he will neither seek nor receive indications concerning the performance of his duties from any government or authority other than the Assembly, and will refrain from any action incompatible with his position as a European civil servant.

3. In the exercise of his duties, the Clerk shall be responsible to the President. He shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.

4. The Presidential Committee shall, on the proposal of the Clerk, appoint members of the Office of the Clerk who are recruited for a period of more than one year. It may delegate to the Clerk the right to appoint permanent or temporary officials of a given level.

5. The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretary-General of Western European Union, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

RULE 50

Waiver of the immunity of representatives and substitutes

1. Any request addressed to the President by the competent authority of a member state for the waiver of the immunity of a representative or substitute shall be transmitted to the Assembly and then referred without prior discussion to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
2. The committee shall immediately consider the request, but shall not make any examination of the merits of the case in question. The representative or substitute concerned may, if he so wishes, be heard by the committee. The report of the committee shall conclude with a draft resolution for the retention or the waiver of the immunity.
3. The report of the committee shall automatically be included as the first item of the orders of the day for the first day on which the Assembly sits after the report has been laid upon the table of the Assembly.
4. The debate on the report shall be confined to arguments for or against the waiver of the immunity.
5. The President shall immediately inform the authority which submitted the request of the decision of the Assembly.

RULE 51

Revision of the Rules of Procedure

1. Motions to amend the Rules of Procedure must be supported by ten or more representatives or substitutes. They shall be referred without debate to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, which shall report on them, as provided by Rule 42 above.
2. The examination of the report of the committee shall be included in the orders of the day in accordance with the provisions of Rule 17 above.
3. The debate shall be concerned only with the relevant texts.

RULE 50

Waiver of the immunity of representatives and substitutes

1. Any request addressed to the President by the competent authority of a member state for the waiver of the immunity of a representative or substitute shall be transmitted to the Assembly and then referred without prior discussion to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
2. The committee shall immediately consider the request, but shall not make any examination of the merits of the case in question. The representative or substitute concerned may, if he so wishes, be heard by the committee. The report of the committee shall conclude with a draft decision for the retention or the waiver of the immunity.
3. The report of the committee shall automatically be included as the first item of the orders of the day for the first day on which the Assembly sits after the report has been laid upon the table of the Assembly.
4. The debate on the report shall be confined to arguments for or against the waiver of the immunity.
5. The President shall immediately inform the authority which submitted the request of the decision of the Assembly.

RULE 51

Revision of the Rules of Procedure

1. Motions to amend the Rules of Procedure must be supported by ten or more representatives. They shall be referred without debate to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, which shall report on them, as provided by Rule 42 above.
2. The examination of the report of the committee shall be included in the orders of the day in accordance with the provisions of Rule 17 above.
3. The debate shall be concerned only with the relevant texts.

*Revision and interpretation of the
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure*

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2¹

tabled by Mr. Bianco and others

1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter.
2. Leave out paragraph 23 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure (Rule 47).

Signed: Bianco, Amadei, Antoni, Mezzapesa, Foschi, Rauti, Masciadri, Giust, Sinesio, Martino, Sarti, Mitterdorfer, Francese

1. See 4th sitting, 3rd June 1986 (amendment 1 withdrawn; amendment 2 fell).

*Revision and interpretation of the
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure*

AMENDMENTS 3 to 9¹

tabled by Lord Hughes and others

3. In paragraph 3 of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter, leave out “ (a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau for a period of five years. ” and insert “ (a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly on the proposal of the Presidential Committee for a period of five years. ”.
4. After paragraph 8 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, insert the following new paragraph:
“ 9. *Rule 14*
In paragraph 1, line 5, leave out ‘and’.
In paragraph 1, line 6, after ‘committees’ insert ‘and one member appointed by each political group’.
In paragraph 1, line 10, leave out ‘The President may invite the Chairmen of the political groups to attend meetings of the Presidential Committee’.”
5. In paragraph 14, last line, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out “ Leave out paragraphs 8 and 9 and renumber paragraph 10 accordingly. ”.
6. In paragraph 18, line 4, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out “ and there is no opposition to it ”.
7. In paragraph 21, line 4, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out “ Leave out paragraph 4(b). ”.
8. In paragraph 23, line 2, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out “ Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau ” and insert “ Assembly on the proposal of the Presidential Committee ”.
9. In paragraph 23 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the proposed new paragraph 4, line 1, leave out “ shall ” and insert “ may ”.

Signed: Hughes, Tummers, Hardy, Büchner, Stoffelen, Blaauw, van Tets, Jung, Cifarelli, Staels-Dompas

1. See 2nd and 4th sittings, 2nd and 3rd June 1986 (amendments 3, 4, 6 and 8 agreed to; amendments 5, 7 and 9 withdrawn).

*Revision and interpretation of the
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure*

AMENDMENT 10¹

tabled by Mr. Schulte and others

10. In paragraph 3, line 9, of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter, in the proposed new paragraph (c), leave out “, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.” and insert “and the three agencies for security questions.”

Signed: Schulte, Eysink, Spies von Büllesheim, Unland, Lenzer, Berger, Enders, Ahrens, Stoffelen, Schmidt, Gansel, Staels-Dompas

1. See 4th sitting, 3rd June 1986 (amendment agreed to).

*Revision and interpretation of the
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure*

AMENDMENT 11 ¹

tabled by Mr. Schulte and others

11. In paragraph 23, line 17, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the proposed new paragraph 5, leave out “, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments. ” and insert “ and the three agencies for security questions. ”.

Signed: Schulte, Eysink, Spies von Büllenheim, Unland

1. See 4th sitting, 3rd June 1986 (amendment agreed to).

*Revision and interpretation of the
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure*

AMENDMENTS 12 AND 13 ¹

tabled by Mr. Schulte

12. At the end of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ 5. That these amendments shall come into force on 1st October 1986. ”

13. At the beginning of the operative text of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, after “ To amend the Rules of Procedure as follows ” insert “ and that these amendments shall come into force on 1st October 1986 ”.

Signed: Schulte

1. See 2nd and 4th sittings, 2nd and 3rd June 1986 (amendments agreed to).

*Revision and interpretation of the
Charter and of the Rules of Procedure*

AMENDMENTS 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19¹

tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg

14. In paragraph 8 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out the proposal to add at the end of paragraph 2 "If the President speaks in a debate on a specific subject, he may not resume the chair until the debate on that subject is over".

15. In paragraph 13 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, insert at the end of the penultimate line:

" 4. (a) Orders addressed to a committee under sub-paragraph 3(c) of this rule shall be put to the vote without reference to committee.

(b) When the question of including in the Assembly's register any other text referred to in paragraph 3 of this rule is put to the Assembly, the following only may be heard: one speaker for the motion, one speaker against, and the chairman of any committee concerned."

16. In paragraph 14 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the second line of the proposed new paragraph 2, leave out "Unless otherwise decided by the President".

17. In paragraph 15 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, omit the proposal to leave out paragraph 6 of Rule 31.

18. In paragraph 22 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the proposed new paragraph 4 of Rule 42, leave out "However, the Assembly may decide, at the request of the committee, to place the report on the agenda unless twenty representatives are opposed. Such a decision shall be taken before the order of business is adopted (Rule 18)."

19. After paragraph 8 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, insert the following new paragraph:

" *Rule 12*

After paragraph 1 insert:

2. A Vice-President who replaces the President may not speak in the particular debate over which he has presided."

Renumber existing paragraph 2 accordingly.

Signed: Finsberg

1. See 2nd sitting, 2nd June 1986 (amendments 14 and 19 negatived; amendments 15, 17 and 18 withdrawn; amendment 16 agreed to).

AGENDA

**of the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session
Paris, 2nd-5th June 1986**

I. Report of the Council

Thirty-first annual report of the Council to the Assembly

II. Political Questions

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Bianco on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 2. Security and terrorism – the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world | <i>Report tabled by Mr. van der Werff on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |

III. Defence Questions

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Amadei on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 2. European security and the Mediterranean | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Kittelmann on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 3. Emerging technology and military strategy | <i>Report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |

IV. Technical and Scientific Questions

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Fourré on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
| 2. Canadian-European co-operation in high technology | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |

V. Budgetary and Administrative Questions

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Draft opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986 | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Sinesio on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
|--|--|

VI. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure	<i>Report tabled by MM. Eysink, Spies von Büllesheim and Unland on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges</i>
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VII. Parliamentary and Public Relations

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Parliaments, public opinion and defence | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Eysink on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations</i> |
| 2. Promotion of parliamentary and public interest in WEU matters | <i>Report tabled by Mrs. Fischer on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations</i> |

ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session
Paris, 2nd-5th June 1986

MONDAY, 2nd JUNE

Morning

Meetings of political groups.

12 noon

1. Opening of the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session by the Provisional President.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session.

Afternoon 2.30 p.m.

1. Action by the Presidential Committee:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Dudley Smith on behalf of the Presidential Committee.
Debate.
2. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
3. Parliaments, public opinion and defence:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Eysink on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
4. Promotion of parliamentary and public interest in WEU matters:
presentation of the report tabled by Mrs. Fischer on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Votes on the draft resolutions.
5. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure:
presentation of the report tabled by MM. Eysink, Spies von Büllenheim and Unland on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.
Debate.
Votes on the draft resolutions.

TUESDAY, 3rd JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

1. Reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Bianco on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.
Debate.

2. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Amadei on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
Debate.
3. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Fourré on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.
4. Draft opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Sinesio on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
Debate.

Afternoon 2.30 p.m.

1. Thirty-first annual report of the Council:
presentation by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
2. Address by Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations of Belgium.
3. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
4. Reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe;
Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council;
Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence;
Draft opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986:
Votes on the draft recommendations.

WEDNESDAY, 4th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

1. European security and the Mediterranean:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Kittelmann on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
2. Address by Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
3. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.
4. European security and the Mediterranean:
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

- Canadian-European co-operation in high technology:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Hill on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.

THURSDAY, 5th JUNE

Morning 10 a.m.

Security and terrorism – the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van der Werff on behalf of the General Affairs Committee;

presentation of the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

Emerging technology and military strategy:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE THIRTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION

Armaments sector of industry in the member countries

ECONOMIC STUDY

prepared by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee

This study has been circulated separately.

Emerging technology and military strategy

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur*

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on emerging technology and military strategy

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alberini, Amadei, Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: Lord Newall), MM. van den Bergh, Bourges, Brown, De Decker (Alternate: Close), Dejardin, Edwards, Ertl, Galley, Gerstl, Giust, Huyghues des Etages, Konen (Alternate: Hengel), de Kwaadsteniet (Alternate: Aarts), Lemmrich (Alternate: Berger), Natiez, Pecchioli, Sarti, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Steverlynck, Stokes.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

APPENDICES

- I. Comparative table of defence effort 1981-1985
 - A. Financial effort
 - B. Manpower effort
- II. Table I: Expenditure on defence research and development (as % of total defence expenditure)
 - Table II: Expenditure on defence research and development (ECU million at 1975 prices and exchange rates)
 - Table III: Defence research and development indicators
- III. 1. Air-land battle and FOFA target arrays
 - 2. An interim conventional interdiction system capability will be in place by the late 1980s

Introductory Note

In preparing this report and another on the strategic defence initiative, *the Rapporteur* had interviews as follows :

10th January 1985 – Ministry of Defence, The Hague

General G.L.J. Huijser, Chief of Defence Staff ;
 Lt. General G.W. Boerman, National Armaments Director ;
 Major General Ir. C.M. van den Bergh, Director of Matériel, Army ;
 Commodore Ir. W.J.A. van Raay, Deputy Director Matériel, Navy ;
 Major General Ir. H. Boekenoogen, Director of Matériel, Air Force ;
 Brigadier General Ir. E.B. van Erp Taalmankip, Matériel Department, Air Force ;
 Dr. Bert Kraamers, Policy Planning Staff ;
 Colonel H.A. Konzy, Chief, Planning Division, Army Staff ;
 Colonel de Jong, Information Department, Air Force ;
 Lt. Colonel Vollema.

25th January 1985 – Ministry of Defence, Bonn

Major General Hüttel, Assistant Chief of Staff, Politico-Military Affairs ;
 Colonel Wiesmann, Politico-Military Affairs ;
 Colonel Rode, NATO Affairs ;
 Colonel Dingler, Armaments Co-operation ;
 Colonel Bromeis, Operations ;
 Lt. Colonel Dr. Schilling, Military-Strategic Affairs ;
 Lt. Colonel Lehr, Defence Planning ;
 Lt. Colonel Wenger, Defence Intelligence ;
 Dr. Schloenbach, Armaments ;
 Mr. Wenthe, Armaments Research.

8th February 1985 – London

Chatham House RIIA

Mr. John Roper, Research Fellow, former Chairman of the committee.

Ministry of Defence

Mr. Nigel Nicholls, Assistant Under-Secretary, Defence Staff ;
 Mr. John Roberts, Assistant Under-Secretary, International Procurement ;
 Mr. Nigel Hughes, Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser ;
 Mr. Brian Hawtin, Head of NATO/UK Policy Division ;
 Mr. T.M. Bossom, Head Resources and Programmes Division ;
 Wing Commander R. MacKendrick, Defence Policy Staff ;
 Dr. Waters, Scientific Staff ;
 Colonel G.J. Barnett, Defence Concepts Staff ;
 Miss Hilary Thompson, NATO Policy Division.

Plessey Electronics

Mr. Peter Bates, Deputy Chairman, United Kingdom Representative to NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG).

14th February 1985 – NATO Headquarters, Brussels

Mr. Robin Beard, Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Support ;
Mr. M. Weiss, Director of Armaments and Defence Research ;
Mr. N. Spridgen, Armaments and Defence Research ;
Mr. J.M. Stewart, Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Planning and Policy.

25th February-1st March 1985 – Washington

25th February – Department of Defence

Mr. George Bader, Principal Director, European and NATO Policy, ISP ;
Dr. Harlan Straus, Director, Northern Europe Region, ISP ;
Mr. Louis Michael, Assistant Under-Secretary, Plans and Development, DRE ;
Dr. James Tegnelia, Assistant Under-Secretary, Conventional Initiatives, DRE ;
Ms. Mary Ann Gillece, Deputy Under-Secretary, Acquisition Management ;
Mr. Walter Henderson, Senior Negotiator, International Acquisition ;
Mr. Frank Cevasco, Director, NATO and European Affairs, DRE.

26th February – Department of Defence

Mr. Ronald S. Lauder, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Policy, ISP ;
Dr. Steven D. Bryen, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Trade and Security Policy (East-West Trade) ;
Mr. Randy Bell and Mr. Robert Fiss, Office of Regional Policy Issues, ISP ;
Mr. Talbot Lindstrom, Deputy Under-Secretary, International Programmes and Technology, DRE.

State Department

Mr. John Hawes, Deputy Director, Politico-Military Bureau.

Consultant

Dr. Steven Canby.

27th February – State Department

Mr. James Huff, Director, Benelux Department ;
Mr. Martin Wenick, Director, Northern European Affairs ;
Mr. James Dobbins, Deputy Assistant Secretary, European Affairs.

Department of Defence

Major General Klein, Vice-Director, J5, Plans and Policy, JCS ; Colonel Robbins ; Major Emerson ; Major Dials ;
Lt. Colonel Sandrock ;
Commander Sheffield.

House of Representatives

Mr. Warren Nelson, Staff Member, House Armed Services Committee.

28th February 1985 – *The Raytheon Corporation, Boston, Mass.*

1st March 1985 – *National Security Industrial Association, Washington*

Mr. George Newsome, Chairman of the International Committee and representative of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather and Geraldson ;

Colonel Bruce E. Green, USA (Ret), International Committee Executive.

Representatives of United States Industry

Mr. M. Edward Carlson, Director, International Programmes Honeywell, Inc. ;

Mr. Harley A. Cloud, Director of Technology, Federal Systems Division IBM Corporation ;

Mr. Walter R. Edgington, Vice-President Marketing, GTE Business Systems Corporation ;

Mr. Harold V. Larson, Manager International Representation, Rockwell International Overseas Corp. ;

Mr. George H. Perlman, Vice-President International Martin Marietta Corporation ;

Mr. Arthur J. Stanziano, Vice-President Government Affairs, Hazeltine Corporation ;

Mr. John C. Stockett Jr., Consultant, Sanders Associates, Inc. ;

Mr. H.C. Witthaus, Industry-Government Relations, General Motors Corporation ;

Mr. Richard G. Woodbury, Vice-President, Contraves Goerz Corporation.

Representatives of Department of Defence

Mr. Frank Cevasco ;

Dr. Harlan Straus.

8th March 1985 – *Paris – Ministry of Defence*

Mr. Henri Conze, Deputy Director, International Relations, Délégation Générale pour l'Armement ;

Mr. Mazens, DGA ;

Général Juin, Deputy Director, GPES ;

Colonel Baer, Defence Staff, IBEG ;

Colonel Brunet, Defence Staff – Plans and Policy ;

Colonel de Linage, Defence Staff – General Studies ;

Professor J. Lestel, Research and Study Directorate, DGA.

The committee as a whole met at the Palais d'Egmont, Brussels, on 15th February 1985, when Lt. General Huitfeldt, Director of the NATO International Military Staff, addressed it on emerging technology and military strategy. It then held a joint meeting with the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly.

The committee then met in Strasbourg on 12th March 1985 where it was briefed by General Charles de Llamby, Commander First French Army, and members of his staff, and at Headquarters French Forces in Germany Baden-Oos, where it was briefed by Lt. General Houdet, Commander-in-Chief, and Commander 2nd French Army Corps, and his staff.

The committee met at the seat of the Assembly the following day and was received by Mr. Charles Hernu, Minister of Defence, and then visited the French Defence Staff command post where it was briefed by Vice-Admiral Louzeau, Major General of the Joint Defence Staff, and by General Guichard, Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Operations.

The committee met subsequently at the seat of the Assembly on 16th April, 7th May and 20th May when it discussed earlier drafts of a combined report on emerging technology and military strategy, which also dealt with SDI.

At a further meeting in Geneva on 24th July 1985, the committee was addressed by representatives to the Conference on Disarmament. At that meeting, the committee asked the Rapporteur to

separate the parts of his draft report which dealt with the strategic defence initiative, and with emerging technology and military strategy.

Following its meeting in Turkey and Greece from 23rd to 30th October when the committee took evidence for a forthcoming report on European security and the Mediterranean, the committee then met at the seat of WEU in London on 4th November 1985 when it discussed and adopted that part of its report dealing with the strategic defence initiative (Document 1033). The present report was adopted by the committee at its meeting in Paris on 19th February 1986.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the ministers, members of parliament, officials, senior officers and experts who met the committee and replied to questions.

In particular, the Rapporteur thanks the international secretariat of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee, which was authorised by the Council to assist in the preparation of the report, for its invaluable help. Material problems which made it impossible to make full use of that assistance were raised in the committee's report replying to the annual report of the Council (Document 1019).

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation
on emerging technology and military strategy

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of a number of projects in the NATO and IEPG frameworks involving the application of the most recent technology to weapons and defence equipment, arising in particular from the United States emerging technology proposal, and SACEUR's follow-on forces attack concept ;
- (ii) Considering that in many cases NATO countries could advantageously introduce modern technology more rapidly into conventional weapons systems to help offset Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in tanks, guns, and aircraft ;
- (iii) Believing that the European allies must examine all such proposals carefully, and that the introduction of modern technology into defence equipment must satisfy the criteria of this recommendation ;
- (iv) Calling for the possible arms control implications of the introduction of emerging technology into conventional weapons systems to be more closely studied,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that current proposals for the introduction of emerging technology into conventional weapons systems or for the follow-on forces attack concept meet the following criteria :
 - (a) they should fit the conceptual framework being developed by the NATO Military Committee, and take account of North Atlantic Council recommendations bearing in mind the need for deterrence to maintain peace and security both in Europe and in the world ;
 - (b) they should be cost-effective and affordable within the limits of national defence budgets ;
 - (c) they should emphasise again the need for standardisation and co-operation at European level which is also a precondition of co-operation between the European allies and the United States ;
 - (d) they should lead to a balanced and just transatlantic sharing and transfer of technology, research and production, and improve interoperability ;
 - (e) they should be capable of being taken into account in current and future arms control negotiations ;
2. Report annually to the Assembly on the progress being made on the list of priority projects selected by the IEPG ;
3. Instruct the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions to report annually to the Assembly on the arms control implications of the foregoing proposals.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. Two parallel but distinct initiatives during the last few years have focused attention both on the obvious advantages for western defence of introducing more modern technology into defence equipment, but also on the possible disadvantages of doing so.

1.2. Mr. Weinberger, the United States Secretary of Defence, first proposed in June 1982 that NATO should examine emerging technologies and their application to weapons systems, with the objective, he claimed, of improving conventional defence, reducing reliance on (but not the need for) nuclear weapons, and of sharing new technology with the European defence industry.

1.3. A doctrinal debate in the United States armed forces some years earlier led in 1982 to the introduction of the United States army field manual FM 100-5, incorporating the ideas of the air-land battle. Some features of that concept are to be found in SACEUR's separate follow-on forces attack (FOFA) proposals aimed in part at providing land forces with conventional weapons capable of striking point targets at ranges previously reached only by aircraft or nuclear missiles.

II. Definition and understanding of emerging technology

A. General

2.1. Although the term emerging technologies is already used in the media and in public discussion, according to General Huitfeldt, Director of the NATO International Military Staff, who addressed the committee on 15th February 1985, the term has not been formally defined in NATO. Rather a common understanding was established as NATO examined the United States emerging technology initiative.

2.2. In the Netherlands and other NATO countries a distinction has been made between "emerged" and "emerging", implying that the emerged technologies, which have been available recently, can be applied to improve existing weapon systems. On the other hand, emerging technologies, when available, will be incorporated in future weapon systems more than a decade away. A German interpretation refers to technologies and developments which would make an essential improvement in the perfor-

mance of reconnaissance, command and control, conventional weapon effects and/or setting the scene for novel systems.

2.3. All countries have always given high priority to the introduction of new technologies and there is nothing fundamentally new in the present trends. The development of technology, whether for civil or military applications, is usually evolutionary. However, cumulative changes in different technologies may occasionally lead to weapon systems with revolutionary capabilities compared with earlier models. These weapons could be called revolutionary because they change the nature of war instead of introducing a new technical principle. Ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads are an obvious example.

2.4. Emerging technology in this report is used chiefly in the context of the Weinberger initiative of 1982, described in section III.A below.

B. Emerging technologies

2.5. McGraw-Hill's Encyclopaedia of Science and Technology defines technology thus :

"Technology is closely related to science and to engineering. Science deals with man's understanding of the real world about him - the inherent properties of space, matter, energy and their interactions. Engineering is the application of objective knowledge to the creation of plans, design and means for achieving desired objectives. Technology deals with tools and techniques for carrying out the plans."

2.6. A chief objective of the proposals discussed in this report is to improve significantly NATO's conventional stand-off capability, i.e. the ability to engage targets at greater range and without, in the case of aircraft, the need to overfly the target itself. This requires:

- real time surveillance;
- increased target acquisition capability ;
- greater weapon system accuracy and lethality;
- highly-automated, jamming-resistant command, control, communications and intelligence systems.

2.7. These four objectives are inter-related and are technically attainable thanks to technical evolution in several key areas described below.

(i) Microelectronics

2.8. The United States Defence Department's VHSIC¹ technology programme, started in 1980, is beginning to yield VHSIC-like chips specially designed for aerospace and defence applications. The programme has been divided into three phases lasting to the 1990s.

2.9. The six phase I contractors are Honeywell, IBM, Texas-Instruments, Hughes Aircraft, TRW and Westinghouse. Although in a limited sense competitors, they share their progress in periodic joint review meetings and they have co-operated to solve mutual problems. The VHSIC technology provides some devices which could be used in different combinations to create a wide variety of signal processor types for radar, image processing, electronic warfare and communications, spread-spectrum and frequency agility, navigation and identification subsystems.

2.10. A start has been asked for with research and development of computer technology even more advanced than VHSIC. This supercomputer, still to be developed, would offer computational speeds 1,000 times greater than those used in military systems today, possibly through the use of gallium arsenide as a semiconductor, which is being developed at laboratory level in France, in place of silicon technology.

(ii) Computer software

2.11. Closely related in its applications is the software used for computer operations; new generation computers will operate programmes of far greater length and complexity, and use new algorithms for the range of computer applications. Europe possesses expertise in this area.

(iii) Material technology

2.12. New materials, based on ceramics, carbon-carbon (composite material) or quartz phenolic three (or more) dimensional structures (fibre optics), will offer the possibility of quite new engines, missiles or armour. Beyond the obvious benefits of fibre optics of reducing weight (and cost) and increasing the communications bandwidth with a minimum of signal loss as compared with conventional wire guidance weapon systems, fibre optics offer the potential of creating new weapons that would not otherwise be possible.

(iv) Biotechnology

2.13. There are developments in this field as well, e.g.:

- artificial blood plasma to be used for transfusions given to the wounded;

- artificial skin to be used on the wounded;
- "safe" drugs to reduce fatigue and combat stress without inhibiting performance;
- foams and disintegrators for the rapid disposal of dead.

*C. Applications**(i) Sensors*

2.14. Improved sensors will make possible not only general tactical reconnaissance of distant areas, without the need for aircraft to overfly them, but also the location (acquisition) of targets at ranges in excess of 50 km. Airborne radar can be refined, and remotely-piloted vehicles can use the infrared spectrum. Sensors can also use acoustic and seismic signals. They can be emplaced behind enemy lines and transmit data by radio.

2.15. Hitherto interdiction targets have usually been fixed targets such as airfields and infrastructure installations - bridges, railway marshalling yards and the like - but new sensors will make it possible to detect moving tactical targets such as a column of tanks or vehicles.

2.16. The United States is currently developing the bi-service JSTARS - the joint surveillance target attack radar system - which will be a sideways looking airborne radar, comparable in some ways to the existing AWACS used for identifying aircraft, but directed instead to locating targets on the ground. Flying at distances of tens of kilometres behind the forward line of troops, with a range of 200 km, it will be capable of identifying targets 150 km beyond allied forward positions.

2.17. Simultaneously the United States is developing the precision location strike system (PLSS) - a passive airborne system which will identify and locate sources of radio and radar emission, and transmit the information to a PLSS ground station for transmission to weapon systems which can be used to attack the source of emission. By locating enemy air defence radars this system will greatly enhance the capability for air defence suppression.

(ii) Command, control and communications

2.18. Improved communications, including immediate communications with the foregoing sensor systems, will give commanders real time information about hostile targets at ranges over which hitherto information from aerial reconnaissance would become available only after one or several hours, following the return of the reconnaissance aircraft and the development of photographic films.

1. VHSIC: very high speed integrated circuit; see Aviation Week & Space Technology, 30th July and 26th November 1984.

2.19. Computer-assisted processing of the greatly increased mass of data which the new sensor systems will provide will be necessary to sort out target priorities, to assist decision-making and the allocation of weapon systems to the most urgent targets.

2.20. The United States has developed JTIDS (joint tactical information distribution systems) used inter alia for communication with AWACS aircraft. The United States further envisages in the longer term linking the various sensor systems referred to above in the joint tactical fusion programme for the 1990s.

(iii) *Computers*

2.21. The introduction of computers 1,000 times faster than present models will play a central rôle in defence in the 1990s, using VHSIC technology, if the key investment for development is made now.

2.22. The supercomputers may one day simulate and predict the outcome of various courses of military action for field commanders. This will allow the commander and his staff to focus their attention on the larger strategic issues rather than having to manage the enormous flow of information that will characterise the battles of the future.

(iv) *Other developments*

2.23. Attacks on major air bases with conventional munitions have so far been carried out by aircraft alone. But the problem of using manned aircraft behind the FEBA² results in a bigger loss of very expensive fighter aircraft. Attack by both aircraft and missiles is envisaged in the future. New efficient runway penetrators, as well as dispensers fitted to aircraft and containing a great number of submunitions, will reduce the number of aircraft sorties considerably. Ballistic and cruise missiles have the advantage of being unmanned and being able to carry submunitions.

III. Official proposals involving emerging technology

A. The Weinberger proposals in NATO

3.1. The first public reference in NATO documents to the application of emerging technology to defence equipment appeared in the declaration of the heads of state and government participating in the summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bonn on 10th June 1982, to which all sixteen NATO countries subscribed – Spain was attending for the first

time: “We will seek to achieve greater effectiveness in the application of national resources to defence, giving due attention to possibilities for developing areas of practical co-operation. In this respect the allies concerned will urgently explore ways to take full advantage both technically and economically of emerging technologies. At the same time steps will be taken in the appropriate fora to restrict Warsaw Pact access to western militarily relevant technology.” The attached document on integrated NATO defence, to which only “the representatives of the North Atlantic Alliance taking part in its integrated defence structure...” subscribed, reiterated the theme, again linking it to another initiative of the United States administration which was to prevent the transfer of technology to the Warsaw Pact: “...We will... explore ways to take full advantage both technically and economically of emerging technologies especially to improve conventional defence, and take steps necessary to restrict the transfer of militarily relevant technology to the Warsaw Pact.” Mr. Weinberger’s initiative attracted little public attention at the time because the summit had been largely devoted to issues of arms control and disarmament. Further papers were submitted by the United States – in December 1982 a paper on the central region which in many ways forms the core of the ET initiative as currently being discussed within NATO circles. It was elaborated on in other papers in 1983 seeking applications for the concept in the other regions and to naval forces.

3.2. The United States proposals for making more use of emerging technology for defence systems on the central front, as submitted to defence ministers in December 1982, is reported to have listed four particular topics:

- defence against Warsaw Pact first echelon forces;
- improving allied counter-air capability;
- interdicting follow-on forces of the Warsaw Pact;
- command, control, communications and intelligence.

3.3. There is of course nothing new in the idea of using new technology in defence equipment, and the United States proposals certainly aroused some scepticism in other allied capitals, being suspected in part as a means of selling yet more United States sophisticated defence equipment to Europeans. After two years of discussion in the alliance and study by the member countries it is generally agreed that conventional equipment can be improved but the debate continues about the particular weapon systems and particular capabilities of weapon systems that stand in most need of improvement. In particular the cost-effectiveness of some of the

2. FEBA: forward edge of the battle area.

more elaborate systems suggested remains to be established in the eyes of many European countries. Although NATO is worried by the long-term implications of modernisation of Warsaw Pact forces if the present trend continues, it is still believed that most NATO equipment is technologically superior to that of Warsaw Pact forces:

“...while both sides also carried out extensive modernisation, the rate and extent of this modernisation, as far as it is measurable and comparable, has been greater for the Warsaw Pact. It has deployed greater numbers of modern systems, many of which incorporate technological advances leading to capabilities *increasingly comparable to those of NATO*. It is the weight and momentum of Warsaw Pact modernisation and the introduction of large numbers of improved systems that is the specific cause for concern.”³

3.4. A particular cause of concern among the allies was the fact that the Weinberger initiative at the time it was made did not respond to any particular military requirement then identified by the NATO military authorities. Mr. Wörner, the German Minister of Defence, proposed that the alliance should first elaborate a conceptual framework against which specific proposals for more sophisticated weapons systems and defence equipment could be examined.

3.5. Conceptual military frameworks in fact became generally fashionable in 1983. When SACEUR was developing his follow-on forces attack proposals referred to in section C below, the NATO Military Committee had instructed him to produce a conceptual framework which would show how his FOFA proposals would fit in with NATO's long-term planning guidelines. Ministers at the meeting of the NATO Defence Planning Committee on 7th December 1983 instructed the NATO military authorities to “develop a conceptual military framework as a basis for establishing priorities for the selection and application of emerging technologies in meeting military requirements”⁴. In 1984 the Military Committee agreed to produce a broadly based conceptual military framework on which all NATO defence planning could be based.

3. Conventional defence improvements. Where is the alliance going?, James Moray Stewart, NATO's Assistant Secretary-General for Defence Planning and Policy, in NATO Review, April 1985. Emphasis added.

4. The conceptual military framework, article by Major-General Michael Reynolds, Assistant Director, Plans and Policy Division, International Military Staff, NATO, in NATO's sixteen nations, December 1985. The quotation is not apparently taken from the DPC communiqué of 7th December 1983.

3.6. The communiqué of the ministerial meeting of the NATO Defence Planning Committee on 4th and 5th December 1984 records that:

“...we invited the Secretary-General and the Defence Planning Committee in permanent session to come forward with proposals for a coherent effort to improve NATO conventional defences. This should, inter alia, include an early conclusion to ongoing work on a conceptual military framework, establishment of priorities for conventional defence improvements...”

3.7. In response, the Military Committee decided to produce both a general NATO-wide military conceptual framework and to instruct the three major NATO commanders to produce more detailed frameworks of their own. The Military Committee's general conceptual military framework was approved by the Military Committee on 8th May 1985, designated MC-299, and the communiqué of the subsequent meeting on 22nd May 1985 records that:

“3. ...we endorsed a report from the Secretary-General and the Defence Planning Committee in permanent session on conventional defence improvements, in response to our mandate last December, which provides a coherent and balanced approach to achieving improvements to our conventional forces. The report identifies key deficiencies on a regional and a functional basis which could, if uncorrected, threaten NATO's ability to implement its strategy. It also highlights those areas where special attention will provide the greatest return, both in the medium and long term...”

.....

5. We had an initial discussion of the work on a conceptual military framework submitted by NATO's military authorities. This important work is continuing.”

3.8. An authoritative article⁵ has described the main provisions of the Military Committee's general conceptual military framework MC-299:

“...the document starts by referring to the current allied strategy laid down in MC-14/3. Naturally it recognises, as it must, that the two nuclear legs of the triad, together with the conventional one, are interdependent and mutually supporting.

...For the first time in a NATO document MC-299 contains a definition of the mission of the alliance's conventional

5. General Reynolds op. cit. Emphasis added.

forces. It then goes on to specify the key components of that mission (known as KMCs – the key mission components) which are essential if it is to be accomplished. These involve the defeat of the forces in the vanguard of a WP attack and the neutralisation of the reinforcing formations behind them together with their supporting assets and installations. The success of NATO's mission will, of course, require a favourable environment in the air while on the ground the accomplishment of the military functions in the rear area (that is all areas which are not within the sphere of responsibility of the corps level of command) will be essential. Furthermore a successful allied defence will be largely dependent on maritime support. At sea the alliance's navies must control the seas so that vital areas of the oceans are not denied to us...

...While the failure to achieve one KMC will lead to a failure to achieve the overall mission, the interdependence and importance of each KMC may, nevertheless, be assessed differently in the various commands and nations of the alliance. And so while at alliance level it is neither correct nor logical to attempt any prioritisation of the KMCs, major NATO commanders (MNCs) may set priorities for their commands and it will remain the responsibility of each nation to determine its contribution to allied defence – and that includes any priority which a nation may wish to establish for the provision of its assets to the MNCs...

...MC-299 gives an agreed assessment of the threat which may face the alliance in 2005... there is no suggestion that there will be dramatic developments in the conventional threat during the next 15 years. But the assessment does suggest that, if left unchecked, WP capabilities will increase greatly as a result of identifiable evolutionary trends. Second, NATO can counter such a development by sustaining a step-by-step approach of moderate but effective measures.

...the CMF assesses the alliance's current capabilities so that some idea of the full span of improvements which are needed for the long term can be obtained...

Because of its importance in the events which led to the formulation of the CMF, *MC-299 devotes special attention to the rôle which technology, whether emerging or emergent, should play in the future. But, this is a large and complex subject to which we were not able to do as much justice as we wished in the timeframe*

available to us. New and in-depth studies are required and are taking place. Nevertheless, the document does suggest a general notion of how technology should be applied to the improvement of conventional defence. It underscores the contribution which modern technology can make to the enhancement of the quality of NATO's equipment; it emphasises the necessity of establishing a balance between quantity and quality and identifies some areas which give promise of technological opportunity...

...The need for a balanced and broad-based effort leads naturally to a list which is somewhat all-embracing. But... a few selected measures would not be enough to upgrade allied defence vis-à-vis the expected threat."

3.9. As for the more detailed conceptual frameworks being produced by the major NATO commanders it is understood that a first draft of SACEUR's proposal has been discussed by nations and is now being revised while a maritime CMF to be produced by the three major NATO commanders (SACEUR, SAC-LANT and CINCHAN) is to be produced early in 1986. It is understood that the Military Committee recommended that its own CMF be formally endorsed by the ministerial meeting of the NATO DPC on 3rd December 1985, and the communiqué of that meeting notes "the work under way includes: ...endorsement of a conceptual military framework developed by NATO's military authorities which provides nations with broad, longer-term guidance on the military requirements of NATO strategy...".

3.10. The DPC communiqué of 22nd May 1985 contains an important document on resource guidance:

"Resource guidance

Resource guidance must always be viewed as one amongst several instruments to guide the defence efforts within the alliance. No formula can provide more than planning guidance; the ultimate yardstick is the overall ability to perform the tasks required to support NATO's overall deterrence and defence objectives.

- (a) There is a political and military need to improve NATO's conventional defence capabilities in relation to those of the Warsaw Pact in order to narrow the gap and reduce dependence on the early recourse to nuclear weapons.
- (b) To achieve this every effort must be made to obtain optimal value from scarce resources.

- (c) To this end vigorous efforts must be made to improve co-operation and co-ordination within the alliance, and as part of these efforts a study should be undertaken whether specific improvements could best be brought about by common funding.
- (d) Notwithstanding the above efforts to improve the output from existing expenditures it will be necessary to increase the allocation of resources to defence in real terms with most nations achieving rates of real increase higher than those in the past.
- (e) Determined efforts should be made as a matter of urgency to devise an agreed and accepted methodology for measuring output performance with a view toward developing a variety of key performance indicators allowing supplementary resource guidance to be set in those terms.
- (f) The 3% formula is confirmed as a general guide. Those nations which have not met it in the past should make every effort to do so in the future. In applying this general guide, account should be taken of the considerations above as well as the specific considerations applying to individual countries based on analysis of all factors relevant to the respective national defence efforts. These considerations should take as their starting point the quantity and quality of each nation's past and present defence effort, the identification of the most critical deficiencies in each nation's force contribution and the necessary improvement measures, in short, performance. Nations should achieve, to the extent possible and as soon as possible, necessary force improvements even if they are additional to those contemplated at the resource level called for by the formula."

3.11. General Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has recently drawn attention to the resource allocation problem for conventional defence in connection with the SDI:

"...I support continuing the research phase of the United States strategic defence initiative (SDI) to find out if there may be something of use to improve the defence of NATO; for example, the research might provide us the means to develop a theatre nuclear defence system. Those of us who share the responsibility for the security of NATO share some

legitimate concerns about the SDI programme... Our defence resources are limited and the price tag for SDI will probably be high. We must ensure that if SDI proves feasible in the future, and it is deployed, that it does not drain away money needed to modernise and improve our conventional forces".⁶

3.12. During discussion of the proposals in the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors an attempt has been made to distinguish between emerged technology, which could be applied in the short term to weapon systems about to enter service, and truly emerging technology which could be incorporated in weapon systems due to enter service say in the last decade of the century. In April 1984 CNAD drew up a list of twelve projects which might rank for inclusion in an ET programme, designed for entry into service within the next ten years.

3.13. According to the technical press these initial ET application programmes, are:

- (a) NATO identification, friend or foe system (IFF) (NIS);
- (b) multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) equipped with a terminally-guided weapon;
- (c) low-cost powered dispenser (LOC-POD) for use against fixed targets;
- (d) autonomous precision-guided munitions for 155 mm tube artillery;
- (e) short-range anti-radiation missile (SRAM);
- (f) stand-off radar surveillance and target acquisition system (this could be United States JSTAR);
- (g) electronic support system, a ground-based system that can process data acquired by various sensors;
- (h) artillery locating system;
- (i) a medium-range RPV for battlefield surveillance and target acquisition;
- (j) electronic jamming systems for tactical aircraft;
- (k) electronic warfare systems for army helicopters.⁷

3.14. The ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 13th December 1985 issued a special press statement on armaments co-operation which noted inter alia that:

6. Interview with the Westfaelische Nachrichten, 25th June 1985, text distributed by SHAPE in ACE output, September 1985.

7. Armed forces Journal International, December 1984.

“ ministers have agreed:

- that efforts to increase co-operation in research and technology, in particular to exploit emerging technologies, should be stepped up in order to achieve a more cost-effective use of resources of the countries of the alliance and facilitate the establishment of co-operative projects. A wider exchange of information is a key factor in these endeavours... ”,

and the Defence Planning Committee communiqué of 3rd December 1985 similarly noted that:

“ the work under way includes:

- continued exploitation of emerging technologies;
- progress towards a NATO identification system (NIS);
- endorsement of a conceptual military framework developed by NATO's military authorities which provides nations with broad, longer-term guidance on the military requirements of NATO strategy; ... ”

3.15. Of these the most urgent project as the committee has frequently reported is the NATO identification system which will permit all NATO air defence systems to positively identify any aircraft as friend or foe. There is no single standardised system in operation in NATO at the present time. Short-range air defence systems in particular do not have electronic means for identifying aircraft. The January 1985 report to Congress on the standardisation of equipment within NATO submitted by the Secretary of Defence has this to say:

“ The fact that NATO has to resort to an indirect identification process results in cumbersome non-responsive procedures and weapon identification zones, and restrictions on beyond-visual range (BVR) capabilities that diminish a major advantage potentially held over Warsaw Pact air forces. This situation is compounded by the establishment of a hostile ECM environment. The critical link to the entire air defence structure is the NATO identification system (NIS) which would allow friendly aircraft greater freedom to operate over the battlefield, but which has not been obtainable because of disagreements with other NATO nations over cost and frequency. The Mark XV identification friend or foe (IFF) is the only affordable system acceptable to the United States given the large number of units needed. ”

3.16. The committee understands that the D-band frequency on which the United States

Mark XV system operates was acceptable to a majority of European countries although one preferred the E and F bands which would have been more expensive. The recent agreement between the Ministers of Defence of Germany and the United States on the frequencies to be used for the question and answer component have now enabled the NATO countries to proceed with a definition of a common system, and it is hoped that a full development programme will get under way shortly, to be followed by full-scale production.

3.17. The system will not be fully effective until fitted universally to all platforms, and because of the high cost this will take some time. In the meantime, NATO has a second approach to the problem involving an indirect component to collect all the identification data available on the battlefield and combine it to produce high-confidence identification. This system is progressing through the validation phase, and will help to fill the gap until the NIS question and answer system is operational.

3.18. The committee welcomes these overdue signs of progress on the NIS. The equipment will eventually be manufactured in several countries; the important thing was to agree on the single specification to make all NIS equipment interoperable and interchangeable. The committee recommends that NATO continue to give the highest priority to bringing the equipment into full-scale production.

B. The European response to the ET initiative

3.19. In April 1984 the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) made a joint response to the Weinberger ET initiative accepting the thesis that the West's advantage in technology might well be better exploited to offset the Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority in the central region. It provided a conceptual basis for priorities in selecting ET projects which the committee understands laid emphasis on the need to counter Warsaw Pact first echelon forces; the need to improve NATO's counter-air capabilities and battlefield interdiction to slow the rate at which follow-on forces could join the battle. It was not felt that the ability to strike at follow-on forces in greater depth should have the same priority.

3.20. The IEPG report listed two conditions to be met if the initiative were to succeed:

- (i) priorities for projects which would clearly increase the defence capabilities and keep costs at a reasonable level;
- (ii) political and managerial arrangements to ensure that available and future technologies will be available to all

allies, i.e. European and transatlantic co-operation, especially the transatlantic two-way street.

3.21. The IEPG reply listed areas of technology deemed to be important for weapon systems; the list includes those technologies enumerated in section II.B and C above. The response then listed some 200 European defence equipment projects incorporating high technology which were offered to the United States for co-operation, and about 100 United States projects said to be of interest to European countries. This is obviously only a preliminary response from the IEPG and your Rapporteur found in the United States – and in some European countries – considerable scepticism about the list of 200 European projects, many of which are not at a stage where European countries sponsoring them are ready in the immediate future to sign co-production agreements with the United States. To provide a credible European response to the United States initiative – several features of which would be attractive to European countries interested in transatlantic co-operation – the IEPG will have to come up with a short list, only one-tenth of the size, of projects on which European countries are ready to do business at once.

C. Follow-on forces attack (FOFA)

3.22. General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has described the proposals for follow-on forces attack associated with his command⁸. According to General Rogers, SHAPE has established three priorities for improving conventional forces: (i) bring existing forces up to the standards of his command for manning, equipping, training, sustaining and reinforcing; (ii) modernise weapon systems and improve the ability to reduce the rate at which Warsaw Pact forces would arrive at the allied defensive position; (iii) increase conventional forces through mobilisable trained reserves.

3.23. While SHAPE staff late in 1979 were working on (ii) above they noticed that in Warsaw Pact exercises ZAPAD '81 operational manoeuvre groups were used, recalling the mobile groups which were part of the Soviet Union's world war two concept. It was in this context that SHAPE staff began to refer to Warsaw Pact forces behind troops actually in contact as follow-on forces and this study developed into the follow-on forces attack concept.

3.24. General Rogers describes the objectives so far in the following words:

“After the lead Warsaw Pact divisions are committed to battle, subsequent divisions, armies and army groups follow. Our

FOFA subconcept is designed to attack with conventional weapons those enemy forces which stretch from just behind the troops in contact to as far into the enemy's rear as our target acquisition and conventional weapon systems will permit.

Allied Command Europe can prevent the attacker from maintaining the momentum of his assault by targeting these follow-on forces (which include the operational manoeuvre groups) before they hit our general defensive position. NATO military commanders have always sought to target these follow-on forces but the fact is we have lacked adequate target acquisition resources and conventional weapon systems – other than manned aircraft – with sufficient range and accuracy. In recent years, some promising improvements in acquiring targets and in the lethality, range and accuracy of conventional weapons have made FOFA a much more realistic subconcept.”

3.25. General Rogers is at pains to point out in his article that FOFA is not a new strategy, but is fully compatible with forward defence and flexible response: “Interdiction of the enemy's rear area with long-range weapons (manned aircraft) has always been part of NATO's general defence plans and doctrines. FOFA merely seeks ways and means to do it better with other systems as well as aircraft.” He points out that FOFA is not an adaptation of the United States forces' air-land battle concept to NATO, nor is the FOFA concept in itself an offensive strategy.

3.26. As General Huitfeldt, Director of the NATO International Military Staff, pointed out when addressing the committee in February: “FOFA is not a spin-off of the emerging technologies issue, it is a conceptual modernisation of one of the classical military tasks; interdiction of the enemy's rear area. The only means to carry it out to date have been manned aircraft, scarce in numbers, with inappropriate weapons, and highly vulnerable over heavily defended areas.”

3.27. SACEUR's long-term planning guideline for FOFA was approved by the NATO Defence Planning Committee on 9th November 1984 and has now been referred to the NATO Military Committee.

D. United States forces' doctrines

3.28. The following three descriptions of United States forces' doctrines have been adapted from articles in *International Defence Review*, August and November 1983, pages 1035-1554.

(i) *FM 100-5*

3.29. The United States army has undergone a rather rapid evolution in its doctrine in terms of how the ground conflict, particularly that in

8. NATO Review No. 6, December 1984.

Central Europe, will be waged. This evolving doctrine has been set forth in two significant field manuals (FM): FM 100-1, The Army, and FM 100-5, Operations.

3.30. To a significant degree, the 1982 version of FM 100-5 has its roots in the earlier 1976 version of the same manual. However, it is difficult to perceive any direct link between the active defence, as embodied in the earlier manual, and the deep attack philosophy of the later version.

3.31. One aspect of the concealed link lies in the fact that the manuals are accurate reflections of the army at that specific time. Additional threads of continuity or links exist in the overwhelming focus of the manuals on the acknowledgment that the potential adversary is numerically superior to the United States forces, on the rôle of forward defence and on the fact that the first battle is still significant.

3.32. The 1976 version also tacitly acknowledges the political realities of NATO or, more specifically, that of the Federal Republic of Germany: space will not be traded for time. Unfortunately, during the same period that the doctrine was being formulated, other factors were assuming larger and larger rôles.

3.33. The "trip-wire" response – the exchange of strategic weapons between the United States and the USSR should the USSR invade Western Europe – had been replaced by the flexible response, and the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons designed to enhance that flexibility had been accomplished.

3.34. The FM 100-5 manual combined the various concepts of operations currently in vogue – the extended battlefield, the integrated battlefield and battlefield air interdiction – into one operational concept. This concept is best expressed as the air-land battle in which the ground commander sees deep and attacks deep with all available resources, using the operational capabilities of both the land and air forces.

3.35. In the case of defending NATO, the major Soviet vulnerabilities, or areas of weakness, were depicted as the predictable division of forces and the rigid command and control system.

(ii) *Air-Land Battle 2000* (now called Army 21)

3.36. Air-Land Battle 2000 is intended to be a logical outcome of the FM 100-5.

3.37. The nature of the future battlefield and the overwhelming force potential of the enemy, say the authors of ALB 2000, argue for avoidance of all-out attrition warfare. In order to avoid high combat losses, therefore, victory must be sought through manoeuvre, advantageous positioning of forces, use of deception,

psychological efforts to wear down the enemy's will and minimum exposure of friendly forces to the effects of destructive weapons.

3.38. The ALB 2000 study covers strategic, operational and tactical doctrines, with the emphasis on the last two, for which it says new organisations are required. The study gives as an example a theatre command (strategic) with two air-land forces (ALF), a United States Marine Corps amphibious brigade, plus USAF and United States navy assets at the operational level.

3.39. A series of detailed annexes to the Air-Land Battle 2000 study discusses the types of new equipment that are necessary for its successful implementation.

(iii) *Air Force 2000* (now called Air Force 21)

3.40. Like the United States army, the United States air force has looked into the next century and concluded, in a study called Air Force 2000: Air power entering the 21st century, that the air force must be ready to fight "across the spectrum of conflict" from bush wars to nuclear exchanges. But, because of limited funding for weaponry, the USAF will have to increase its reliance on technology and tactical surprise for survival.

3.41. The USAF study, designed to provide general guidance to planners as they address specific force development issues in the near term, was ordered by former USAF Chief-of-Staff, General Lew Allen, in October 1981 and was completed in the summer of 1982.

3.42. The study took a broad-brush view, tackling economic, demographic, environmental and technological matters to provide a comprehensive picture of the operational environment in which the air force of the future will carry out its missions.

3.43. Use will be made of rapid advances in computer technology, micro-electronics, communications, composite materials and directed energy technologies.

3.44. The USAF study concluded that "success in air warfare in the year 2000" will depend largely on the operation of integrated command, control, communications and intelligence systems. Such an integrated system will collect, process and transmit massive amounts of information to commanders. Improved secure communications are also needed, as there are new-generation computers to help process the huge volume of data.

IV. The relationship with military strategy

4.1. While the Weinberger ET proposals can be of general application to all three armed services, and do not in themselves imply any conse-

quences for military strategy or doctrine, the most interesting specific proposals concern weapon systems which would have their chief application in the central region in Europe, and would in part be the instrument of SACEUR's new FOFA doctrine which has been adopted as a long-term planning guideline. There has been some public discussion of FOFA in the context of military strategy.

4.2. Some commentators have argued that the introduction of operational manoeuvre groups (OMG) by the Warsaw Pact, identified in the ZAPAD '81 exercises, implies a totally new Warsaw Pact strategy relying on highly-mobile heavily-armoured formations which would penetrate rapidly to the rear of NATO forces, and that as a consequence the classical Soviet concept of second and third echelons which would be committed to the attack in successive waves as the attack of the first echelon faltered has been abandoned. According to this argument there would no longer be any second and third echelon forces in the Warsaw Pact rear, and therefore nothing for new NATO deep-attack conventional weapons to strike. The committee is satisfied that this is a quite unrealistic interpretation of the OMGs. Your Rapporteur understands from his discussions that while Warsaw Pact commanders may in future urge more initiative for commanders of particularly mobile formations to penetrate deeply into NATO defensive positions, this shift of emphasis represents more an exploitation of the greatly improved mobility of all Soviet forces than a radical departure from the organisation of forces in several echelons. Useful military targets will undoubtedly continue to exist at ranges of 100 and more kilometres behind the battle area. The debate over the introduction of conventional missile systems capable of attacking forces at this range – and this applies both to surface missiles as well as air-launch missiles designed to give existing interdiction aircraft a stand-off capability in the face of the improved Soviet air defences – is a debate over opportunity costs and military priorities, it is not a debate over whether targets will exist at these ranges.

4.3. The key to the interdiction debate is the rate of build-up of military force in the battle area. Weapon systems which will slow the arrival of Warsaw Pact forces in the battle area may be cost-effective when ranges of several tens of kilometres, or classical interdiction of fixed installations, are considered. At the same time improvement in the speed with which existing NATO forces can reach their battle positions can also improve the force ratio in the battle area, and can do so at less cost than some of the more sophisticated weapon systems under consideration for ranges of a 100 km or more.

4.4. A third and most important aspect of strategy and doctrine and its relationship to

emerging technologies is the question of nuclear weapons. All authorities with whom your Rapporteur has discussed the subject of his report have stressed the fact that the introduction of new technologies into NATO weapon systems is not intended in itself to replace nuclear weapons which, it is contended, will continue to be needed both to deter the use of nuclear weapons by the adversary, and as a weapon of last resort should it not prove possible for NATO conventional forces to prevent a breakthrough of Warsaw Pact forces. But the introduction of improved means of interdiction, and more sophisticated weapons with higher kill probability in the battle area, will considerably enhance the ability of NATO forces to withstand by conventional means only the Warsaw Pact forces, which in the central region continue to be greatly superior in terms of numbers of tanks, artillery and aircraft. As a result, any Warsaw Pact attack on NATO would have to commit a far greater proportion of its conventional forces to battle before NATO would need to resort to nuclear weapons. From this standpoint the nuclear threshold would be raised by the introduction of new technologies.

4.5. This is one aspect of the greater emphasis which has been placed on conventional forces ever since the doctrine of flexible response was adopted in the 1960s. The committee recalls in this context that on taking the dual decision in 1979 involving the deployment of INF forces, NATO unilaterally withdrew 1,000 warheads for tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. It has further undertaken to withdraw one nuclear warhead for every warhead introduced on the INF systems, cruise and Pershing II missiles now being deployed. Lastly at the Montebello meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in 1983 it was decided to remove a further 1,400 tactical nuclear warheads from Europe, and at the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in Luxembourg on 27th March 1985 SACEUR submitted his proposals for implementing that decision which, it is understood, would cover rather more than 1,400 nuclear warheads for obsolescent systems, including atomic demolition munition and Nike Hercules surface-to-air missile warheads.

V. Economic aspects of emerging technology

A. Volume and trend of defence research and development expenditure

5.1. A recent OECD study⁹ has published science and technology indicators which show the widely different range of expenditure on defence research and development by different countries, whether as a percentage of the defence budget or as a percentage of total publicly

9. Science and technology indicators – Resources devoted to research and development, OECD 1984.

financed research and development. Thus, in 1980, the United Kingdom devoted the greater part of publicly financed research and development to defence (nearly 60%); France devoted 40% and Germany the same year about 15%. The trend from 1970 shows a reduction in this proportion in the United Kingdom (from 72% in 1970) and Germany (from about 30% in 1970), while in France the share of defence research and development as a percentage of total publicly financed research and development has tended to increase from only one-third in 1975. The other main manufacturing sectors accounting for publicly financed research and development expenditure are energy (in 1980, 21% in Germany, 8% in France, 7% in the United Kingdom), space (about 7% in Germany and France, 2% in the United Kingdom), civil aeronautics (between 2% and 3% in the three countries).

5.2. The United States in 1980 devoted about half of publicly financed research and development to defence. At the beginning of the 1970s the percentage was higher. During the period studied in the OECD report space research and development accounted for from 15% to 20% of publicly financed research and development, energy, which accounted for less than 4% in 1971, increased to more than 11% in 1980, while civil aeronautics fell in that country from 3.6% in 1971 to 1.9% in 1982.

5.3. Table I at Appendix II shows the trend of defence research and development expenditure as a percentage of total defence expenditure. Big differences emerge. The highest proportions are those of France and the United Kingdom (from 13% to 14% in recent years). Germany follows some way behind, hardly reaching 4%. For the other WEU countries the proportion is still smaller – 2% for Italy, 1% for the Netherlands and less than 1% for Belgium. In the United States some 10% of the defence budget is devoted to research and development according to annual reports of the Research and Engineering Department of the Pentagon.

5.4. Table II shows expenditure on military research derived from national defence budgets expressed in ECUs at 1975 prices and exchange rates. This table shows a fairly regular trend in defence research and development. In 1983, for the whole of WEU, it passed the 1975 level of about 40%. In Belgium and Germany this expenditure is on the decrease. France showed the highest growth rate among the WEU countries apart from Italy where defence research and development expenditure was originally very small.

B. Costs of emerging technology project

5.5. As will be seen from the previous sections, the Weinberger ET initiative is a general concept, and no cost estimate can be attached to

the concept as such. Discussion in NATO has led to the definition of thirteen possible specific projects with differing timescales; the IEPG response produced an initial list of 200 European projects in very different stages of readiness or development. Cost estimates have been advanced for a few of these specific projects that are in a sufficiently advanced stage of study, costs have also been mentioned in the context of SACEUR's follow-on forces attack proposals and budgetary requests to Congress are also known in respect of President Reagan's strategic defence initiative.

5.6. A 1983 study has provided cost estimates for specific weapon systems associated with counter-air, battlefield interdiction and corps support weapon systems.¹⁰

(i) Counter air

5.7. A conventional development of the Pershing II missile fitted with a terminally guided container carrying some 30 conventional high explosive connected energy penetrators could be used to destroy airfield runways over ranges of a few hundred kilometres. The cost for 900 missiles – 600 to close 30 main airfields for three days, while a further 300 could be used in an interdiction rôle against about 100 choke points – is estimated at \$1.8 billion with further costs of \$0.22 billion for shelters and \$0.25 billion manning costs for ten years making a total of \$2.3 billion.

(ii) Corps support weapons

5.8. A proposed Skeet terminally guided weapon capable of homing in on vehicle engines could be carried by the multiple-launch rocket system being developed by five NATO countries, carrying about 48 Skeets per rocket. With longer-range missile boosters this weapon system again could be used against individual mobile targets such as tanks or soft vehicles, at distances in excess of 100 km. On the basis of 360 missiles per corps, the study estimates a cost of \$0.22 billion per corps, with additional costs of \$0.01 billion for vehicles and \$0.1 billion for manning over ten years, making a total of \$0.33 billion per corps or \$2.64 billion to equip eight corps in the central region. To that would be added a further \$1.2 billion to cover surveillance and targeting systems for the whole central region, that would be necessary to employ this Skeet system.

(iii) Stand-off weapon for aircraft

5.9. Cost estimates in the study for 2,000 conventional stand-off weapons – sufficient to

10. Strengthening conventional defence in Europe, report of the European Security Study (ESECS), published by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1983.

equip 30 aircraft per corps at two sorties per day – amount to \$1.2 billion for the weapons with a further \$0.3 billion for manning, bringing the total bill, including other equipment, to \$1.51 billion for the whole central region, with another estimated \$0.5 for surveillance and targeting systems.

(iv) *Central region total estimates*

5.10. The whole of the weapon systems discussed above are estimated by the study to cost \$8.35 billion for the whole central region, with a further \$1.05 billion for completing research and development costs prior to deployment. These estimates were contributed to the study by Donald Cotter, president of a consultancy firm in the Washington area. The ESECS Steering Group doubled the figure suggesting “\$20 billion (with a possible variation of 50% higher or lower)”.

5.11. The Pentagon study of interdiction and deep attack systems based on the sensors, battle management and weapons systems described in paragraphs 2.14 to 2.13, for the two United States corps in the central region, has estimated the total programme cost over the period to 1990 to be \$21.4 billion made up as follows:

		<i>\$ billion</i>
<i>Sensors:</i>	TRS (PLSS/ASARS)	2.7
	JSTARS	3.3
<i>Battle management:</i>	JTFP	1.6
	GACC	0.7
<i>Weapons:</i>	Anti-armour	5.0
	Interdiction	3.0
	Airfield attack	<u>5.0</u>
		21.4

5.12. The cost for so equipping all corps in the central region would be \$30 to \$40 billion. Diagrams showing assumed target density, and the timescale for the introduction of these systems are at Appendix III.

FOFA costs

5.13. General Rogers has suggested that the cost of his FOFA proposals could be met if the 1980 NATO objective of a 3% real increase in defence expenditure each year were to be raised to an annual 4%. The extra 1% would imply annual expenditure of \$3.5 billion on the total NATO-country defence budgets of \$350 billion (1984 estimates). As NATO countries are not committed even to the 3% increase beyond the current year, there is obviously no prospect of SACEUR obtaining this sort of money. Moreover the opportunity costs of some of the more exotic ET projects would be high; they could be financed only at the expense of other NATO force improvement programmes, including the particularly important sustainability programme

aimed at increasing stocks of ammunition for existing conventional weapons.

C. Cost-effectiveness

5.14. Some experts have criticised the cost/kill estimates put forward for some of the conventional deep-strike weapon systems which have been described above. Canby¹¹ has concluded:

“Deep attack of follow-on forces therefore falters on *all* counts:

- the underlying premise is false: NATO is outgunned but neither outmanned nor outspent. NATO’s problem is organisational and doctrinal; marginal technological advances cannot overcome these self-inflicted wounds;
- technology is being wrongly focused on difficult deep attacks rather than on easier and more rewarding targets close to the FEBA;
- while the individual technologies may work, the many diverse components and distinct tasks have yet to be combined and demonstrated in a benign, much less a hostile environment;
- unless protective measures are devised, any deployed system, because of the emissions of its VISTA infrastructure will have large signatures. Components will be vulnerable to attack and so the system will be inherently vulnerable; cost will inhibit redundancy;
- NATO requires 4% more annually just to modernise current forces. The proposed technologies are additions. Costs using its proponents own claims of effectiveness are an order of magnitude greater than asserted.”

In particular Canby argues Cotter’s estimates for terminally guided deep-strike Skeet missiles mentioned above grossly overestimate the probability of damaging Soviet armed forces over the ranges considered:

“More than an order of magnitude increase in missiles, firing battalions, and funding would be required to make a difference. Even so it is an open question whether much effect will be obtained. With the inclusion of countermeasures against the assault-breaker submunitions, hit probabilities drop sharply to not much

11. Dr. Steven L. Canby in an as yet unpublished paper on new conventional force technology and the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance submitted to the IISS annual conference, September 1984.

more than random probability while 'destroy' probabilities against armoured vehicles *effectively approach zero.*"

5.15. This criticism of course is directed only at the *deep-strike* aspect of the FOFA proposals, i.e. the ability to strike individual moving targets at ranges measured in hundreds of kilometres. All European authorities consulted by your Rapporteur have expressed scepticism about the cost-effectiveness in the present situation of such weapon systems. These criticisms do not however apply to counter-air and interdiction systems used against fixed installations (airfields, choke points) over comparable ranges, nor of course do they apply to improved measures for striking at first echelon forces over distances measured in a few tens of kilometres.

D. European share

5.16. European interest in the Weinberger ET proposals and in SACEUR's FOFA concept, which for the moment remains a long-term planning guidance, will depend on the extent to which the European defence industry can share in production and development of selected projects, and in the new technologies involved. These new projects would not be attractive to European governments if their adoption were to lead to a worsening of the current balance and defence equipment in the two-way street between the United States and Europe. As is shown by the 200 projects attached to the IEPG study referred to above, European countries also possess technological expertise in areas that can be offered to the United States; reciprocity will be essential in the adoption of projects.

5.17. At the same time, however, European countries must understand the United States sense of frustration at the fragmented European response to many American initiatives. Most of the 200 European projects listed by the IEPG are not in fact serious contenders for early production agreements; they are there so that as many of the IEPG countries as possible can be included as potential originators of weapon projects. Competition between defence contractors in different European countries, all of whom are operating on too small a scale to be viable in the face of the United States, is one of the chief obstacles to a balanced transatlantic two-way street in defence equipment. It is no answer for European NATO countries to buy the product of another single European country rather than United States equipment when selection of the latter will provide generous offset agreements ensuring local production of significant parts of the United States system in the European country acquiring it. For the four countries that procured the United States F-16 aircraft the choice in practice was much more European for

them, because they are now themselves producing part of that aircraft, than would have been a decision to procure the alternative French Mirage aircraft which, because of the no doubt shorter production runs involved, could not offer the same proportion of local production in the other European countries.

5.18. For the production of the most sophisticated type of weapon systems where the research and development costs are a large proportion of the whole project costs – typically guided missiles and aircraft – the only solution for Europe is to create more international consortia so that new weapons projects will be genuinely European from the outset and not the product of a single European country.

5.19. As far as the economics are concerned the committee concludes that overall the proportion of defence resources devoted by the WEU countries to defence research and development is adequate¹². In the case of the two largest arms producers – France and the United Kingdom – it compares favourably with the United States. The figures are for publicly financed defence research and development, that undertaken by private enterprise on its own account may affect those figures in all the countries considered, but such research and development is difficult to define, let alone identify, when governments in any case tend to be the sole customers of defence equipment manufacturers. The defence research and development effort of the WEU countries may appear to be unfairly shared among them, but it would not necessarily be cost-effective to change this situation – countries with little or no tradition of defence research and development might do better to improve their conventional defence effort, than to embark from scratch on research programmes which would only be of small scale.

5.20. The technological level of European defence research is also abreast or ahead of the United States in some sectors, but Europe tends to lag particularly in the development stage that precedes production. A more co-ordinated defence research and development effort in Europe, eliminating duplication between European countries, would put Europe in a better position to compete with the United States, to redress the unsatisfactory balance of defence equipment in the two-way street, and to become far more self-reliant for defence equipment, and thus far less affected by the vagaries of initiatives from Washington. The result would be to put Europe in a better position to participate in the transatlantic dialogue – as pointed out above, the United States is frustrated by the absence of

12. See defence research and development indicators at Appendix II, tables I, II and III.

a properly organised European partner to respond to its initiatives.

5.21. Work is under way in the IEPG to improve this situation, as shown in the decisions by ministers at the 23rd November 1984 meeting:

“ Research and technology

6. Ministers regard the enhancement of the European defence technological base as being of fundamental importance. To this end, it is their intention that co-operative technology projects (CTPs) should be identified in accordance with the agreed procedures and within the agreed time schedule, so that they are available to support developments in key areas of defence. They instruct their staffs to proceed accordingly. In order to promote such an effort in the best possible conditions, European industry, with the assistance of the European Defence Industrial Group, should be actively involved. As soon as CTPs have been identified, the question how to involve as many nations as possible into these projects must be dealt with, taking into account the encouragement of a freer flow of technology and research information among IEPG countries...

Balanced European defence industry

.....

8. Ministers agreed to seek an improvement in the efficient use of resources in the European defence industrial base through a combination of:

- (a) greater discipline in not launching a national development project where one already exists elsewhere, nationally or collaboratively, in Europe;”

and in the communiqué of the London IEPG ministerial meeting on 17th and 18th June 1985:

“ Research and technology

Ministers re-emphasised the importance of enhancing collaboration in defence technology research. In this regard, they expressed satisfaction with the progress made towards identifying co-operative technology projects (CTPs). Some 30 technological areas have been identified as fields for possible co-operation.

Ministers decided to launch concrete co-operation in research and technology based on several initial CTPs which the participants will finance on a case-by-case basis; these relate to military aspects of the following areas:

- microelectronics (gallium arsenide);
- high-strength lightweight materials;
- compound materials;
- image processing;
- conventional warhead design.

They noted that this is the first time that multinational defence research co-operation has been approached in such a thorough fashion...”

VI. Emerging technology and arms control

6.1. The committee recognises that there will be many advantages both by way of improved conventional defence and improved stability if some cost-effective new technology can be introduced to provide for example better surveillance and monitoring systems which would identify troop movements at a distance. These might be radar and infrared systems mounted in aircraft or remote sensors which can be delivered behind enemy lines. Certainly aircraft identification systems need to be improved, and better intelligence and data-handling systems will be required to handle the larger flow of data that can be expected from improved surveillance and sensors. Conventional weapons themselves for defence against first echelon forces can have improved lethality, more sophisticated anti-tank mines can enhance NATO's ability to resist attack by the numerically superior Warsaw Pact tanks.

6.2. Two important consequences can flow from such technological improvements - NATO can gain valuable warning time if there were to be signs of Warsaw Pact forces concentrating for a possible attack. At the same time peacetime stability will be improved when such surveillance systems can reveal the absence of preparations for surprise attack. Improvements in conventional weapon systems themselves serve to raise the nuclear threshold, i.e. to enable allied forces to withstand attack by numerically superior forces, without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons.

6.3. At the same time the committee is disturbed to note that little attention appears to have been devoted to the possible implications for arms control of the introduction of the sort of new technology that is now being envisaged. There are all too few properly verifiable arms control agreements at present in force, and those that have been concluded have tended to limit weapons to existing levels; there have been no true disarmament agreements since the war which have led to actual reductions in any weapon systems. Doubts have been expressed as to whether negotiations on arms control

would be able to keep pace with the growing rate of technical improvement of weapons. A number of questions arise: will new technology change the character of conventional warfare at the operational level? Will the strategic defence initiative change the nature of strategic warfare? Will the new military options which may be provided by new technology make it more difficult to estimate the number of weapon systems on each side? In particular the suggestion that certain tactical missiles which at present are equipped only with nuclear warheads might in the future be used as a means of delivery for sophisticated conventional warheads of various sorts will greatly complicate the existing dual capable problem which already arises with most tactical aircraft – are they to be counted as nuclear weapon systems or as conventional weapon systems in estimating the force balance? Most of them are capable of delivering either.

6.4. If continued research permitted one day the detection of strategic ballistic missile-firing submarines on patrol, the basis of the invulnerable second strike, on which the present stable system of deterrence is based, would be jeopardised. The Rapporteur wonders whether such research should not be restricted through arms control agreements.

6.5. The committee recognises the arms control dilemma which faces the alliance because of the new technologies. On the one hand, NATO has always relied on the superior quality of its weapon systems to offset in part the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact but, on the other, the introduction of yet more sophisticated technology may trigger off a new arms race in the field of conventional weapons. Professor von Baudissin¹³ has proposed preventive arms control:

“Until now, weapon systems already in operation or ready for deployment have for the most part been the subject of negotiation... I think that a much more promising approach would be to negotiate systems *before* production has begun, an approach I call preventive arms control... Each side would have less of a vested interest in the retention or deployment of planned programmes. Both sides would therefore be more willing to mutually abandon certain technologically advanced systems... I would even venture to say that this negotiating procedure would have the positive influence of limiting research and development. If this were indeed to occur, the destabilising tendency to modernise would be restricted.”

13. Professor Wolf Graf von Baudissin, New technology, stability and the arms control deadlock, paper submitted to the IISS conference, September 1984.

6.6. The committee notes in this connection a sentence in the declaration of the Warsaw Treaty member states adopted at their meeting in Sofia on 22nd and 23rd October 1985:

“The participants in the meeting suggest that the USSR and the USA pledge not to develop and manufacture new types of conventional weapons, comparable in their destructive capacity to the mass destruction weapons.”

6.7. If NATO were prepared to forego the technological advantages of new weapon systems in exchange for an assurance that the Warsaw Pact would not subsequently develop similar systems, such arms control negotiations might be envisaged if the imbalance in present conventional forces could be simultaneously redressed through agreement in the MBFR talks in Vienna. But the fundamental obstacle would be verification. Already however the IAEA in Vienna applies international safeguards to civilian nuclear power reactors to ensure that fissile material is not diverted to military purposes. Significantly the Soviet Union has recently accepted the application of IAEA safeguards to some of its own civilian nuclear reactors. The United Kingdom has recently suggested the application of some similar safeguard systems to the civilian chemical industry, in connection with the treaty banning chemical weapons now being negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The committee suggests that a study be made of the possibility of using the IAEA type of system as a model for a safeguards system that could be adapted to national research and development facilities in general, as a contribution to verification procedures for arms control agreements which might ban the introduction of specified technology into weapons systems.

VII. Conclusions

7.1. The committee concludes that there is both good and bad in the current emerging technology proposals. In the first place they are beneficial in focusing attention on the need to speed up the application of new technology to the requirements of allied defence. Market-driven civilian technology succeeds in putting the latest microchips into pocket calculators in the shop window within five years of development; defence equipment in the field today embodies the technology of the 1960s. The much smaller scale of the defence equipment market compared with the mass civilian market for small electronic devices is a factor in explaining the ten- to fifteen-year lead time for defence equipment compared with five years for civilian projects. Where new technology is cheap, cost-effective in military terms, and

where a real military requirement can be found for it (whether or not the requirement existed already), then the Weinberger initiative would have served a useful purpose if it generates political pressure to deploy such technology rapidly. NATO's technological advantage over the Warsaw Pact can undoubtedly be exploited to offset Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in tanks, guns and aircraft.

7.2. United States and European projects which are candidates for procurement in the framework of the ET initiative should be considered selectively to see which can be usefully employed in the light of existing NATO strategy of forward defence and flexible response, and whether they fit a conceptual framework which is now being developed by the NATO Military Committee. For the central region in Europe to which most attention is devoted in the ET proposals, appropriate projects should be selected giving priority:

- to countering Warsaw Pact first echelon forces;
- to counter-air to blunt the Warsaw Pact air offensive;
- to interdicting an early arrival on the battlefield of the first Warsaw Pact follow-on forces.

An effective and credible threat to Warsaw Pact forces in greater depth should be maintained, but forces which do not affect the force ratio in the combat zone are targets of lower priority.

7.3. The conceptual framework that emerges is:

- (i) that allied ground forces in place in Europe should have sufficient capability to compel the Warsaw Pact to make large-scale (and hence visible) preparations for any attack, and to be able to withstand the first Warsaw Pact forces while NATO reserves are deployed;
- (ii) that sustainability should be improved through increased stocks of ammunition and reserve equipment;
- (iii) that secure disembarkation facilities and sea lanes must be maintained for the arrival of United States reinforcements, and that the arrival of Warsaw Pact second echelon fronts in the battle area must be delayed for several days;

- (iv) that the ability of NATO air forces to engage an adversary's air forces should be improved.

7.4. The committee remains deeply sceptical about the value of terminally guided munitions for use against individual mobile targets at ranges of 100 km or more. In many cases improving the velocity of NATO force build-up will be a more reliable and cheaper means of producing the same effect.

7.5. As far as SACEUR's follow-on forces attack proposals are concerned they are acceptable within the foregoing framework, and as long as they serve to raise the nuclear threshold.

7.6. The committee calls for more attention to be paid to the possible arms control implications of new technology in conventional weapon systems, but recognises that the subject is complex. On the one hand, it would be highly undesirable to trigger a new and even more expensive arms race in conventional weapons to parallel that in nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the western allies have a real incentive to use technology to offset Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in tanks, guns and aircraft, and any agreement limiting qualitative improvements in conventional weapon systems would be very difficult to verify. The committee therefore makes no substantive proposals on arms control in the draft recommendation but proposes that the new WEU agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions should study urgently the arms control impact of the introduction of ET into conventional weapons, including the likely nature and timescale of Warsaw Pact reaction to it, and the possibility of designing some system of safeguards (based on the IAEA safeguards on nuclear reactors - see paragraph 6.7 above) which could be applied to research and development in general, to detect any diversion to military applications, in the framework of possible arms control agreements that might ban the introduction of specified technology into weapons systems.

7.7. Lastly, the committee calls for the Council to report annually to the Assembly on progress being made on the IEPG list of priority emerging technology projects, and for the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions to report annually to the Assembly on the conclusions of its study proposed in the previous paragraph.

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1981-1985

A. FINANCIAL EFFORT

Country	National currency unit	Defence expenditure (national currency, current prices) <i>d</i>					Defence expenditure (current prices - US \$ million) <i>a</i>					GDP in purchasers' values (current prices - US \$ million) <i>a</i>					Population (thousand)					Defence expenditure as % of GDP in purchasers' values					Defence expenditure per head (current prices - US \$) <i>a</i>					Defence expenditure as % of total WEU				
		1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>
(0)	(1)	(- 5)	(- 4)	(- 3)	(- 2)	(- 1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
Belgium	Million B. Frs.	125,689	132,127	136,853	141,676	155,668	3,385	2,892	2,676	2,452	2,241	95,730	84,251	80,087	76,046	73,586	9,852	9,856	9,856	9,852	9,852	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.3	344	293	272	249	248	3.84	3.38	3.17	3.11	3.25
France (c)	Million F. Frs.	129,708	148,021	165,029	176,638	186,242	23,867	22,523	21,654	20,212	19,233	572,371	542,746	516,317	489,428	472,025	54,182	54,480	54,729	54,947	55,222	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.1	4.1	440	413	396	368	348	27.05	26.31	25.65	25.66	25.57
Germany	Million DM	52,193	54,234	56,496	57,274	59,737	23,094	22,350	22,127	20,125	18,835	683,239	659,849	653,883	613,159	576,699	59,790	59,761	59,562	59,336	59,217	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.3	386	374	371	339	318	26.18	26.11	26.21	25.55	25.04
Italy	Milliard Lire	9,868	12,294	14,400	16,433	18,059	8,681	9,090	9,481	9,353	9,048	353,254	347,862	354,884	348,385	336,357	56,502	56,639	56,825	56,983	57,154	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	154	160	167	164	158	9.84	10.62	11.23	11.87	12.03
Luxembourg	Million L. Frs.	1,715	1,893	2,104	2,234	2,317	46	41	41	39	36	3,818	3,437	3,374	3,235	3,123	366	366	366	366	366	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	126	113	112	106	99	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Netherlands	Million Guilders	11,296	11,921	12,149	12,765	12,885	4,527	4,464	4,257	3,978	3,595	141,412	138,139	132,595	123,059	115,138	14,247	14,310	14,362	14,420	14,492	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.1	318	312	296	276	248	5.13	5.22	5.04	5.05	4.78
United Kingdom	Million £ Sterling	12,144	13,849	15,952	16,923	18,572	24,627	24,242	24,198	22,614	22,034	513,978	483,864	455,443	424,679	409,567	56,379	56,335	56,377	56,488	56,544	4.8	5.0	5.3	5.3	5.4	437	430	429	400	390	27.91	28.32	28.66	28.71	29.29
TOTAL WEU							88,228	85,602	84,434	78,773	75,222	2,363,802	2,260,149	2,196,584	2,077,991	1,986,494	251,318	251,747	252,077	252,392	252,847	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	351	340	335	312	298	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Canada	Million C. \$	6,289	7,655	8,086	9,320	10,263	5,245	6,205	6,561	7,196	7,539	291,539	299,061	324,003	332,492	338,035	24,366	24,657	24,904	25,150	25,427	1.8	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.2	215	252	263	286	297	5.95	7.25	7.77	9.14	10.02
Denmark	Million D. Kr.	10,301	11,669	12,574	13,045	13,750	1,446	1,400	1,375	1,260	1,210	57,247	56,003	56,321	54,635	53,343	5,122	5,119	5,114	5,111	5,104	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	282	274	269	246	237	1.64	1.64	1.63	1.60	1.61
Greece	Million Drachmas	142,865	176,270	193,340	271,922	321,722	2,578	2,639	2,195	2,412	2,379	36,941	38,140	34,813	33,466	33,509	9,730	9,790	9,848	9,910	9,989	7.0	6.9	6.3	7.2	7.1	265	270	223	243	238	2.92	3.08	2.60	3.06	3.16
Norway	Million N. Kr.	9,468	10,956	12,395	12,688	15,431	1,650	1,698	1,699	1,555	1,690	57,091	56,277	55,064	54,736	52,772	4,100	4,116	4,130	4,141	4,153	2.9	3.0	3.1	2.8	3.2	402	412	411	375	407	1.87	1.98	2.01	1.97	2.25
Portugal	Million Escudos	51,917	63,817	76,765	92,009	111,522	844	803	693	629	635	23,928	23,365	20,668	19,310	19,624	9,970	10,030	10,099	10,170	10,231	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.2	85	80	69	62	62	0.96	0.94	0.82	0.80	0.84
Turkey	Millions L.	313,067	447,790	556,738	803,044	1,198,125	2,815	2,755	2,469	2,190	2,422	57,666	53,032	51,147	49,858	55,144	45,757	46,780	47,804	48,720	49,792	4.9	5.2	4.8	4.4	4.4	62	59	52	45	49	3.19	3.22	2.92	2.78	3.22
United States	Million US \$	169,888	196,390	217,198	277,052	266,642	169,888	196,390	217,198	237,052	266,642	2,934,911	3,045,279	3,275,728	3,634,522	3,870,830	230,043	232,345	234,538	236,681	239,048	5.8	6.4	6.6	6.5	6.9	739	845	926	1,002	1,115	192.56	229.42	257.24	300.93	354.47
TOTAL NON-WEU							184,466	211,889	232,190	252,293	282,518	3,459,322	3,571,157	3,817,743	4,179,079	4,423,257	329,088	332,837	336,437	339,883	343,744	5.3	5.9	6.1	6.0	6.4	561	637	690	742	822	209.08	247.53	275.00	320.28	375.58
TOTAL NATO (d), , , ,							272,694	297,491	316,625	331,066	357,740	5,823,124	5,831,306	6,014,327	6,257,070	6,409,751	580,406	584,584	588,514	592,275	596,591	4.7	5.1	5.3	5.3	5.6	470	509	538	559	600	309.08	347.53	375.00	420.28	475.58

Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States \$ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion.

For the period 1981-1985, the following rates of exchange have been applied:

Units per US \$

Country	National currency unit	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>b</i>
(0)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Belgium	Million B. Frs.	37.12900	45.69100	51.13200	57.78400	63.76700
France	Million F. Frs.	5.43460	6.57210	7.62130	8.73910	9.68360
Germany	Million DM	2.26000	2.42660	2.55330	2.84590	3.17150
Italy	Milliard Lire	1.13680	1.35250	1.51880	1.75700	1.99590
Luxembourg	Million L. Frs.	37.12900	45.69100	51.13200	57.78400	63.76700
Netherlands	Million Guilders	2.49520	2.67020	2.85410	3.20870	3.58440
United Kingdom	Million Pound Sterling	0.49312	0.57127	0.65920	0.74833	0.84289
Canada	Million C. \$	1.19890	1.23370	1.23240	1.29510	1.36130
Denmark	Million D. Kr.	7.12340	8.33240	9.14500	10.35660	11.36200
Greece	Million Drachmas	55.40800	66.80300	88.06400	112.72000	135.23000
Norway	Million N. Kr.	5.73950	6.45400	7.29640	8.16150	9.13020
Portugal	Million Escudos	61.54600	79.47300	110.78000	146.39000	175.62000
Turkey	Million Turkish Lira	111.22000	162.55000	225.46000	366.68000	494.64000
United States	Million US \$	1.00000	1.00000	1.00000	1.00000	1.00000

Note b: 6 months' average.

Note c: France is a member of the alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures for defence expenditures are indicative only.

Note d: The corresponding statistical data for Spain are not available.

e - Preliminary estimate.

f - Forecast.

* - WEU Office of the Clerk estimates.

Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(85)25.

B. MANPOWER EFFORT - 1985

	Period of compulsory ¹ military service (months)			Total in armed forces ² military personnel (thousands) (e)	Total armed forces ² (military and civilian) as percentage of active population (e)
	Army	Navy	Air force		
Belgium	10 ³	10 ³	10 ³	108	2.7
France	12	12	12	563	2.9
Germany	15 ⁴	15 ⁴	15 ⁴	495	2.4
Italy	12	18	12	531	2.5
Luxembourg		voluntary		1	0.9
Netherlands	14-16	14-17	14-17	103	2.1
United Kingdom		voluntary		335	2.0
TOTAL WEU				2,136	2.5
Canada		voluntary		83	1.0
Denmark	9 ⁵	9 ⁵	9 ⁵	29	1.4
Greece	22	26	24	206	6.2
Norway	12	15	15	41	2.5
Portugal	16	24	21-24	101	2.6
Turkey	18	18	18	825	4.6
United States		voluntary		2,289	2.9
TOTAL NON-WEU				3,574	3.1
TOTAL NATO				5,710	2.8

Sources:

1. IISS, Military Balance, 1985-86.
2. NATO press release M-DPC-2 (85) 25 of 3rd December 1985.
3. Eight months if served in Germany.
4. To be eighteen months from 1989.
5. To be twelve months in combat arms.

e = estimate.

APPENDIX II

TABLE I

Expenditure on defence research and development
(as % of total defence expenditure)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Belgium	0.0	-	-	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
France	11.3	12.1	11.5	10.7	10.4	10.2	10.6	11.4	12.0	15.0	14.5	13.5
Germany	5.4	5.1	4.7	4.6	5.0	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.2	3.9	3.7	3.9
Italy	0.8	1.3	1.4	0.8	2.6	1.7	1.4	1.1	1.3	1.9	1.5	1.8
Netherlands	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.0
United Kingdom	10.7	12.0	11.0	10.9	10.2	12.8	12.4	13.2	13.8	14.0	13.3	12.5
United States ¹	12.0	12.1	11.5	11.4	11.8	12.5	12.9					
United States ²							10.5	10.4	9.5	9.4	10.1	9.6

Source: WEU countries estimated by WEU secretariat.

1. Science and technology indicators, OECD, 1984.

2. Annual reports of DRE, United States Department of Defence.

TABLE II

Expenditure on defence research and development
(ECU million at 1975 prices and exchange rates)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Belgium	0.24	-	-	1	1	2	1	3	1	1	1	1
France	633	780	792	926	929	934	1,052	1,175	1,275	1,621	1,589	1,514
Germany	364	418	455	475	509	486	503	513	450	395	412	438
Italy	24	42	44	26	82	54	43	39	47	71	61	77
Netherlands	12	14	18	21	23	22	24	22	21	20	20	24
United Kingdom	735	832	898	989	1,086	1,123	1,070	1,234	1,324	1,343	1,372	1,350
United States							7,715	7,900	7,788	8,296	9,800	10,705

Source: WEU countries - WEU secretariat.

Annual reports of DRE, United States Department of Defence.

TABLE III

Defence research and development indicators


	(1) 1979 Total R & D civil and defence as % of GDP	(2) 1980 Defence R & D as % of total public financed R & D (in brackets defence and aerospace research as a total of all public financed R & D)	(3) 1980 Defence R & D as % of total defence expenditure
Belgium	1.40	0.3	0.0
France	1.81	40.1 (49.3)	12.0
Germany	2.40	15.3 (24.4)	4.2
Italy	0.84	2.7	1.3
Netherlands	1.99	3.1	0.9
United Kingdom	2.20	59.4 (64.8)	13.8
United States	2.38	47.3 (63.7)	9.5
Japan	2.10	4.9 (16.8)	

Source: (1), (2) Science and technology indicators, OECD, 1984.

(3) Estimates of WEU secretariat (United States figures from annual DRE reports, Department of Defence).

APPENDIX III¹


1. Air-land battle and FOFA target arrays



	<i>First echelon targets</i>	<i>Second echelon targets</i>	<i>FOFA targets</i>
Army targets:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Combat vehicles Artillery Command and control 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Combat vehicles Surface-to-surface missiles Command and control Choke points 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Airfields Air defence EW GCI Choke points Manoeuvre units
Air force targets:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Air defence Close air support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Air defence EW GCI Choke points 	

1. Reference to Chapter V, paragraph 5.12.
 Source: United States Department of Defence.

2. An interim conventional interdiction system capability will be in place by the late 1980s



96

Source: United States Department of Defence.

Canadian-European co-operation in high technology

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur*

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on Canadian-European co-operation in high technology

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Lenzer (Chairman); MM. Wilkinson, Bassinet (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: Tummers), Adriaensens, Böhm, Colajanni, Fiandrotti, Fourré, Garrett (Alternate: Parry), Sir Paul Hawkins, MM. Hengel, McGuire, Mezzapesa, Schmidt, Sinesio (Alternate: Cavaliere), Souvet, Spiess von Büllesheim, Mrs. Staels-Dompas (Alternate: De Bondt), MM. Valleix, Worrell.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

(c) The House of Commons of the Federal Canadian Parliament

(d) The Legislative Assembly of Ontario

(e) The Legislative Assembly of Alberta

(f) The British Columbia Research Council

(g) Expo 86

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Canada in space

Draft Recommendation
on Canadian-European co-operation in high technology

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming Canada's participation in NATO, OECD, ESA and other international organisations and conferences together with WEU member countries;
- (ii) Considering Canada's achievements in the scientific, technological and aerospace sectors such as V-STOL aircraft, the Canadarm, the Candu nuclear reactor, energy from conventional and non-conventional sources, polar ocean research and communication techniques;
- (iii) Considering that Canada is an associate member of ESA and that a new agreement will have to be signed in 1988;
- (iv) Considering Canada's wish to develop further its high technology industries and also its close industrial and political relations with several Western European countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member states:

1. To study the possibilities of Canada participating in projects of the Independent European Programme Group and other high technology European ventures provided there is reciprocity and that Canada likewise adopts a most-favoured attitude to European research, development and production;
2. To promote closer collaboration with Canada in the European Space Agency by:
 - (a) extending its associate membership from five to ten years;
 - (b) widening the range of programmes in which Canada should participate to include new application programmes such as ERS-II and TDRSS and also scientific programmes;
 - (c) asking the Canadian authorities to use European hardware such as Ariane in joint ventures;
 - (d) inviting the Canadian space authorities to participate in European manned space programmes such as Hermes and Hotol;
3. Also to promote Canadian collaboration in Eureka projects;
4. To approach the Canadian authorities for the promotion of European hardware in the international organisations in which they participate.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. For budgetary reasons, the committee's visit to Canada planned for July 1985 was not agreed to by the Presidential Committee when it was requested in the spring of 1985. However, at a later stage, after a letter of protest from the Chairman of the committee, it was finally agreed on condition that no special funds were required for interpretation purposes. The visit had to be postponed from July to October and eventually took place from 22nd October to 1st November 1985.
2. Once the Presidential Committee had agreed to the visit, a draft programme was drawn up through the good offices of the Canadian Embassy in Paris. The Department of External Affairs finalised the programme on 18th October 1985.
3. Your Rapporteur wishes to express his and the committee's gratitude to the Canadian officials from the Department of External Affairs, the Embassy in Paris, the secretariat for parliamentary relations of the houses of parliament and the ministries, both federal and provincial, and private industries involved in the organisation of the visit.
4. During the visit, the emphasis was on the science and technology policies of the provincial governments rather than of the federal government. The committee obtained a good impression of what could be done at provincial level to promote science and technology in order to advance the economies of the provinces and research activities at industrial and university level.
5. In Ottawa, the committee was received on 29th October 1985 by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of State for Science and Technology, Mr. Bernard Valcourt, and Mr. Tackart, Vice-President of the European-Canadian Parliamentary Group. The reception was followed by a lunch at which Mr. Valcourt underlined that Canada's future was dependent on science and technology. Canada needed for the 1990s some 20,000 young scientists but would probably obtain only some 8,000. The government would do everything in its power to increase this number.
6. Another matter of concern for the Canadian Government was the huge budget deficit in 1985. Here again the government would have to give high priority to lowering this deficit.
7. As far as the American strategic defence initiative - SDI - was concerned, Canada had a general agreement with the United States for the execution of military contracts in Canadian industries. Canada did not therefore need a special memorandum of understanding for its industry to take part in research and development connected with the strategic defence initiative. The government as such however would not participate as it did not consider this to be in the interest of Canada. On the other hand, the government considered the SDI a good initiative for the United States.
8. Finally, Mr. Valcourt pointed to the healthy relationship between Canada and the European Space Agency. Taking into account Canadian budgetary problems, this relationship should nevertheless continue as it allowed Canada to remain competitive on the world market of telecommunications and satellites.
9. The co-ordination of Canadian research and development at federal level is organised by the National Research Council which has many laboratories dealing with all types of sciences; the committee saw several of these laboratories during its visit. It noticed the interaction of the federal and provincial research bodies and of those with the universities and the private sector. The most important body for research and development is the National Research Council which was created over a century ago. Its laboratories are located all over Canada. The committee visited a number of them. Other science-based departments and agencies have also a number of research facilities across the country such as the departments of agriculture, fisheries and oceans.
10. The committee had an interesting general discussion with the Chairman of the Science Council of Canada, Dr. Stuart L. Smith, on 29th October 1985. The Science Council is a non-government body whose rôle is to give policy advice on science and development to government policy makers. He indicated that the Canadians had come to realise that science and technology had a crucial rôle to play in restoring the competitiveness of Canada's traditional industries and in developing new high-technology, knowledge-intensive industries. They realised that more research and development was needed at all levels to secure Canada's place in international markets and that science and technology must therefore have greater prominence in the full cycle of the educational system.
11. There was general awareness that it was simply not enough to achieve economic growth or to increase exports but that special govern-

mental policies would be needed to ensure that wealth creation in knowledge-intensive industries should be balanced by job creation in labour-intensive fields.

12. The strategic options had to be thoroughly discussed by all segments of society to reach broad agreement on how best to manage the change from a resource-based to a knowledge-based economy.

13. However, the new government had decided to cut in half the Can.\$5 million budget of the Science Council with the result that a number of topics could no longer be discussed by the Science Council and some of its staff would have to be dismissed.

14. The Council's approach in giving advice to the government was directed towards achieving concrete results. For that reason the Council organised follow-up meetings to ensure a full and wide-ranging discussion of the issues which were raised in its reports in order to stimulate implementation of its recommendations.

15. With this in mind, the Council was convinced that Canada should spend a large part of its research and development funds first and foremost on agriculture where Canadian achievements in science and development have always been extremely successful.

16. The second area was biotechnology which may provide a key for improving the international competitiveness of Canada's natural resource industry while creating a range of spin-off, knowledge-intensive companies. Applications included pharmaceuticals, agriculture, forestry, mineral extraction and waste management.

17. The third area was energy resources. Canada has very important resources in oil, gas, coal, etc.

18. In general, the future was in high value-added technology products. The people were not yet convinced that knowledge and know-how were needed to establish innovative enterprises.

19. The Council believed that more must be done to enhance Canadian industrial competitiveness and encourage change. There were four areas of weakness on which the Council made recommendations designed to enhance entrepreneurship, improve Canada's technological capacity for future development, encourage industry to look outward to international markets and promote co-operation among the various interest groups in the Canadian industrial structure.

20. The rôle of government should be to promote this knowledge and know-how if Canada was to stand on its own in the

next century. Government strategy must also include policies and programmes that will create a market for and accelerate the diffusion of new and existing technologies. Although technology transfer had received considerable impetus from federal and provincial initiatives in creating research programmes and institutes, governments could do more to encourage the use of new technology in industry. For example, a government-supported leasing company for state-of-the-art machinery or equipment, run along the lines of the Japan Robot Leasing Company, would speed the diffusion of domestic technology. Government purchasing was an important part of this strategy.

21. Dr. Smith also pointed to the greenhouse effect which might take place in the next century and which would mean that the North American climate would get warmer and that the United States would become drier. Canada, with its abundance of water resources, would then become the major agricultural producer.

II. Oceanography

22. The first subject the committee came into contact with in Canada was oceanography which is not very astonishing as its first stop was at St. John's, the capital city of the province of Newfoundland and Labrador. This most easterly and oldest city in North America was settled in the early 1500s. Its seaport is a naturally sheltered harbour and centre for inshore and offshore fishing, fish processing and offshore oil and gas drilling.

23. Its university, Memorial University - thus named in memory of Newfoundlanders who lost their lives in active service during the first world war when Newfoundland was still a British dominion separate from Canada - focuses its research on oceanography and ocean engineering in view of its proximity to the oil-rich Grand Banks.

24. Navigation in Canadian waters is dominated by ice for much of the year, storms bringing severe winds and wave conditions. Icebergs frequently move southwards between Canada and Greenland.

25. The risk of collision between ocean-going vessels and icebergs, according to Mrs. Deborah Diemand of the Centre for Cold Ocean Resources Engineering, was a very real threat and impediment to the safe development of the natural resources of Canada's eastern shelf zone. Damage from icebergs may occur either as a direct collision with a vessel or offshore structure or by the crushing and ploughing of seabed installations such as wellheads, mooring systems, pipelines and telecommunications cables, by grounding and scouring icebergs.

26. The damage resulting from such a collision could range from moderate property loss to major loss of life or environmental damage. In order to remove or mitigate the danger posed by icebergs a far greater understanding of the problem was needed. A credible risk analysis must include not only statistics on the number of icebergs, which were at present available from various sources, but also information on the physical properties of the ice itself, the behaviour of small ice masses in heavy seas and of the large icebergs during a grounding event as well as the frequency of such groundings. Most of these factors would vary with latitude and time of year. Very little information was available on any of these aspects.

27. Having quantified the problem through a risk and hazard analysis including these properties of icebergs in general and icebergs individually, it then remained to reduce the danger.

28. Work in the institutes and universities had concentrated on the development of collision avoidance techniques and on improving techniques for the remote identification of approaching icebergs. This was of little use to an endangered immobile structure such as a wellhead unless it could be buried deeply enough to escape the damaging effects of a large, scouring iceberg. Work had been undertaken to develop a method to split such an iceberg in order to reduce its draft. It was felt that this could be achieved through the introduction of heat into the cold core of the iceberg and consequent massive thermal shock.

29. The overall objectives of oceanographic research were to build a collision probability model for iceberg risk analysis, and to develop a means of mitigating the danger of a catastrophic oil spill by preventing iceberg damage to seabed structures. This would contribute to the development of a sound and economical basis for marine management of the Canadian North Atlantic coast.

30. During its stay at St. John's on 23rd and 24th October 1985, the committee visited Nordco Ltd., the engineering and applied sciences division of the Memorial University of Newfoundland, the Institute for Marine Dynamics - a newly created laboratory of the Federal National Research Council, the Centre for Cold Ocean Resources Engineering and finally the provincial parliamentary Assembly of Newfoundland and Labrador.

(a) Nordco Ltd.

31. According to Mr. John Foster, director, activities in the oil and gas and the fishery sectors of the east coast of Canada needed companies able to offer a general approach to research and development in all aspects of ocean

resources development such as studies of icebergs, shipbuilding, weather forecasting, electronic instrumentation design and maintenance.

32. The company was set up with federal government funds and had to become self-sufficient within five years. In the end the federal government would hold 10% to 20% of the shares and the employees the other 80%. Its main activities (70%) were related to offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation, some 20% to fishery and 10% to other activities. Nordco used advanced technology in many fields including satellite tracking systems and computer modelling techniques. It was involved in the detection, measurement and prediction of icebergs, in continuing studies of marine transportation through pack-ice, and it provided valuable information on hull forces encountered during ice-breaking operations. All these data were directly applicable to the problems of year-round use of ports in Arctic and sub-Arctic areas. Radar development was also of great importance, especially over-the-horizon radar for ships and aircraft. As often in these waters, visual observation was not possible. The Canadian radar satellite, Radarsat, for instance, would be used for offshore mapping, and would be in general use in poor visibility conditions.

33. Nordco provided geophysical project management logistics and data interpretation capabilities for applications ranging from marine structure design and pipeline routing studies to mineral and hydrocarbon location and extraction programmes.

34. Nordco had two subsidiary companies, CANAM Offshore Systems Ltd. which provided services to determine the ability of vessels to operate under specific environmental conditions. It used special operational guidance monitoring and communication systems.

35. The other subsidiary company was Geonautics Ltd. which provided its clients with geophysical services and offshore engineering projects. It provided detailed mapping of the seabed and located drilling hazards beneath the seabed. Special surveys were made for laying pipeline and cable and this required accurate knowledge of the geology of the seabed.

(b) The engineering and applied sciences division of the Memorial University of Newfoundland

36. The committee was received by the Dean of the university, Dr. G.R. Peters, who explained that at the university there were some 11,000 students, 600 of whom were in the faculty of engineering. Each year some 80 students would finish their studies in civil or hydrological engineering. Of these, about 30 would specialise in ocean engineering; naval architecture was an important discipline and this university was

the only one in Canada where it could be studied. Every year some 50 students would obtain a PhD. The Memorial University is one of the rare universities having a co-operative programme which provides for students to spend roughly half of their time in university and the other part in industry; so that, coming out, a number of them are able to create their own companies.

37. Dr. D.B. Muggeridge, Chairman of the ocean engineering faculty, explained that the ocean engineering research group was formed of some 35 professors doing research in ocean-related problems.

38. The faculty had several research facilities and laboratories for undergraduate teaching and graduate research. There were laboratories for electrical engineering, remote sensing, heavy structures, materials, etc. Facilities were available for interpreting aerial photographs, plotting and image analysis. The faculty also had several computer facilities for the exclusive use of students.

(c) The Institute for Marine Dynamics

39. As Canada had a long coastline and vast inland waterways, research into the design of ships and offshore structures destined for frozen Arctic seas was of great importance. Navigation was dominated by ice for much of the year; storms brought severe wind and wave conditions. Future exploitation and transportation of natural resources in the Arctic and off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts depended on the development of ships and of exploration and production platforms which could operate in severe conditions.

40. Research into marine dynamics and the performance of high-capability vessels required a major investment in facilities such as ice tanks, sea-keeping and manoeuvring tanks and towing tanks and several associated workshops for manufacturing models and instrumentation.

41. Research projects included evaluation of the ice-breaking capability of different designs for ice-breakers and ice-transiting vessels, and also the effects of ice on offshore platforms. Research into the performance of propellers or other propulsion devices made it necessary to study basic physics of cavitation which might be the cause of propeller damage, noise or ship vibration. The committee toured the institute.

(d) The Centre for Cold Ocean Resources Engineering

42. The location of the Institute for Marine Dynamics at St. John's placed it at the centre of a vital marine-oriented research group, such as the Memorial University and the Centre for

Cold Ocean Resources Engineering. This centre had been established in 1975 and was part of the faculty of sciences of the Memorial University.

43. The main subjects were geotechnology, acoustics, communication and telemetry, hydrodynamics, ice and icebergs, ocean characteristics and engineering and economic impact studies.

44. The impact of offshore oil and gas on the Newfoundland construction industry was important. The repercussions of North Sea oil in Norway and Scotland were being examined as representative cases. Special attention was paid to education and training, technology development and spin-off development for small local businesses; government structures, administration and social structure and organisation were additional subjects. The committee visited the centre.

(e) The provincial parliamentary Assembly of Newfoundland and Labrador

45. The committee was received in the chamber of the parliamentary assembly and witnessed a question and answer period.

III. The Industrial Materials Research Institute

46. On Friday, 25th October 1985, the committee visited the Industrial Materials Research Institute of the National Research Council of Canada at its new permanent facilities at Boucherville in the vicinity of Montreal. The committee was received by Mr. Georges Bata, the director of the institute. He explained that materials engineering was particularly important for Canada because of the extensive development of its primary and secondary industrial sector which could benefit considerably from the introduction of data-processing methods and improve materials.

47. The establishment of an industrial materials research institute in the province of Quebec, which would co-operate with existing research institutes, would have a significant effect on the economic health of Quebec manufacturing industries and should benefit the Canadian industrial sector as a whole.

48. The federal government had put in some Can.\$500 million which should generate economics of Can.\$1 billion. The institute was wholly funded by the federal government.

49. Another federal government priority was the provision of better opportunities for French-speaking scientists, engineers and technicians to participate more directly in the research activities of the National Research Council and broaden their contact with industrial research.

The institute used French as a working language in order to integrate better the industrial and research communities of Quebec. The institute had a staff of 139 of whom 39 were research workers and trainees.

50. The institute's activities were divided into four sections: the first section was concerned with the optimisation of manufacturing processes with special regard to metals and polymers. A future subject would be ceramics; the second section was involved in the development and characterisation of new materials; the third section was concerned with studies which tried to represent the working environment of new materials, their lifespan and conditions of utilisation; the fourth section was involved mainly in the development of sensors in order to measure the chemical and physical properties of materials.

51. In each section there was great emphasis on strong collaboration with industrial partners who would come in as early as possible in any new research project. They were invited to make their own research effort in order to take out a licence which, when the research stage was finished, would be handed to the industrial partner.

52. Examples given were the improvement of welding productivity - the institute was developing systems to be used in computer-aided manufacturing welding systems - and plastics, as most plastic processors in Canada were too small to have a research staff. The institute was basically concerned with developing background knowledge on which improvements in the characteristics of plastics would be based.

53. Half of the advisory board of the institute was composed of industrialists and the other half of government-nominated members and university professors. It gave advice on how to run the institute and how to introduce in private industry the new technologies developed in the institute. The purpose was to make Canadian industry more competitive with foreign, mainly American, industry.

54. Each programme had its own manager who was responsible for ensuring that the programme was completed and that the spin-off reached the industry concerned.

55. The National Research Council had contacts with several European countries and followed in detail what was being done in countries such as France and Germany.

56. The institute might be expanded to employ some 250 or 300 employees and was keenly interested in defence-related research.

57. The institute had an important library which was organised by the Canadian Institute for Scientific and Technical Information based

in Ottawa at the headquarters of the National Research Council and was responsible for disseminating scientific and technical information on materials science and engineering.

IV. The Armand-Frappier Institute

58. Also on 25th October 1985, the committee visited the Armand-Frappier Institute in Laval, near Montreal, which was a teaching and research institute for microbiology. Its goal was twofold: the promotion of human and animal health and the development of the bio-industry. It is also run as a private company. The committee was received by Dr. Aurèle Beaulnes, director, and Dr. Claude Vézina, assistant director.

59. After the committee had been welcomed by the director, Dr. Vézina compared the institute to the Institut Pasteur in France.

60. The institute was a non-profit-making organisation, governed by a board of fifteen directors representing various sectors of society.

61. The research activities were organised around six centres: bacteriology, epidemiology and preventive medicine, immunology, comparative medicine (veterinary medicine included), applied food sciences and virology.

62. The institute had a staff of 600, including 75 scientists, and was the largest centre for bio-industrial research and development in Canada.

63. It was pointed out that biotechnology might change our lives in a number of ways. It was one of the advanced technologies which was expected to produce quantum jumps in productivity in various fields of economic activities. Like microelectronics, it was a pervasive technique in the sense that it might find its application in many fields of activity. It could be defined as the integrated application of biochemistry, microbiology and process technology aimed at economic use of micro-organisms.

64. Modern biotechnology was now being tested and applied in many fields such as pharmaceuticals (old and new drugs), forestry (propagating forest trees by cloning), agriculture (plant and animal breeding), the chemical industry (pesticides and new plastics), the energy sector (the conversion of biomass into gasohol), mining (enhanced oil recovery - concentrate metals), waste treatment and many other fields, even in regard to human beings.

65. In the East-West relationship the impact of biotechnology might make itself particularly felt in agriculture. In the Soviet Union, biotechnology would play a more and more important rôle in its production. This might

lead to fewer exports from Canada to the Soviet Union, especially in animal feed products.

66. On the other hand, the increased use of biotechnology might particularly increase the demand for various kinds of industrial equipment and know-how, also in microelectronics and computer technology which would play an important rôle in large-scale fermentation processes. For these technologies the Eastern European countries were still largely dependent on the West.

67. Increased use of biotechnology processes could lead to a substantial reduction in western energy demand and therefore Soviet oil exports to Western Europe might be reduced significantly.

68. The institute was also responsible for teaching at scientific and professional level and its public health services related to hospitals and universities, production of vaccines, biochemical and diagnostic products.

69. About 55% of the cost of the institute was covered by its earnings from the production of goods and services. Apart from vaccines for human beings and livestock, the institute now also had an AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome) screening laboratory and a large research programme which was especially for the use of the medical community in greater Montreal.

70. After this introduction, the committee visited the department of vaccine production, the biomass laboratory, and the department of biochemical products.

V. Energy research

71. During its visit, the committee paid special attention to energy research in Canada. The projections of energy supply and demand in Canada as elsewhere had changed frequently and substantially in recent years. Moreover energy policy in Canada was a matter for the provinces which had quite different policies and energy markets and which had of course strongly influenced the major changes at a federal level.

72. The committee visited Hydro-Quebec International, Hydro-Ontario, the oil sands research department of the Alberta Research Council and the federal laboratory of mines and resources.

(a) Hydro-Quebec International

73. On 25th October 1985, the committee visited the Hydro-Quebec International headquarters in Montreal, where it was received by Mrs. Caroline Reed and Mr. Jean-Paul Fontaine. After a general introduction given by Mrs. Reed,

Mr. Fontaine explained the plans and programme of the James Bay hydroelectric project. The project covered some 176,000 sq.km in the heart of the province of Quebec where about 18,000 workers were transforming a vast system of lakes and rivers into one of the largest hydroelectric projects in the world. In ten years Hydro-Quebec had doubled its power output. The total cost of the project was about Can.\$14.6 billion of which Can.\$10 billion had been used to carry out the project and the remainder allocated to the construction of energy transmission lines.

74. Harnessing the northern Quebec rivers had made it possible to increase the share of electricity in the energy supply of the province – some 25,000 megawatts – and triggered explosive growth in experience and expertise in many Quebec firms.

75. The James Bay project had started in 1971 and since then five airports and 1,500 km of permanent roads had been built. Two commercial airlines provided daily service between the James Bay villages and the major cities of Quebec.

76. Hydro-Quebec now had 95% of its energy supply from hydro power stations. It was selling all its excess output to the state of New York and the New England states at a profit. At the same time it also imported hydroelectric power generated by the Churchill Falls in Labrador. The Churchill Falls could generate 5.4 million kilowatts.

77. Hydro-Quebec was exporting its energy and also its know-how of hydroelectric works. In developing the hydroelectric potential of the James Bay region, the James Bay energy society had taken great care not to disrupt the balance of the fragile environment when it transformed the vast network of lakes, rivers and forests into hydroelectric power plants. Its environmental protection policy called for environmental factors to receive the same attention as technical and economic factors at every stage of the execution of the project.

78. The project would be completed in the early 1990s. The first phase was completed in 1985.

(b) Hydro-Ontario

79. On 30th October 1985, the committee visited the Pickering nuclear power station near Toronto where it was received by Mr. Fred Kee, who briefed the committee about the workings of this power station.

80. Although Canada had large oil and gas reserves and much hydroelectric power, the electricity generating stations in Ontario and in some other provinces were nuclear. The reason

was that Hydro-Ontario believed that nuclear reactors were a more economical and safe source of energy. Moreover, there were large deposits of low-cost uranium in Canada, which provided an economic alternative to fossil fuels.

81. Canada had developed its own Candu system using heavy water as the moderator, which was material to slow down the neutrons produced in the fission reactor. Its major advantage was that natural uranium could be used as fuel and enriched uranium was not required as in light water reactors.

82. The Pickering generating station in Toronto was the first nuclear power station in Canada, Hydro-Ontario now operated four nuclear power stations with a total of ten reactors and an additional twelve reactors were under construction.

83. When all these reactors were operating in the early 1990s, Hydro-Ontario would be self-sufficient in energy and would produce a lot of cheap electricity from its nuclear power plants.

84. The figures given in Canadian dollars per kilowatt hour were: hydroelectric power 6 cents, oil 6 cents, coal 3.4 cents and nuclear power 1.80 cents. This would make the Ontario electricity rates one quarter those of New York.

85. In the early 1990s, 68% of Ontario's electrical energy would be from nuclear sources, 22% from hydro and 10% from coal and other sources. At the end of the century, nuclear power would therefore be the main energy source for this province.

(c) Oil sands

86. On 31st October 1985, the committee was received at the energy resources division of the Alberta Research Council in the oil sands research department where the committee was briefed by Dr. Daniel R. Prowse, manager of the engineering research section.

87. The Alberta Research Council was a crown corporation of more than 500 employees promoting responsible economic development of the province of Alberta through a broad range of research in science and technology – oil sands, coal, industrial and engineering research, natural resources and frontier sciences.

88. Ever since it was founded in 1921, the Alberta Research Council had been engaged in oil sands research. Dr. Karl Clark had obtained a patent in 1929 for a hot water process for extracting bitumen from oil sands by open-cast mining. However, 90% of Alberta's oil sands deposits could not yet be economically processed by deep underground mining methods. Research therefore was now focused on the in situ recovery of bitumen from deep layers of oil

sands and on ways to make these techniques more economical and more productive.

89. Researchers were developing a detailed understanding of the chemical characteristics of the relationship between water and bitumen and water/mineral interfaces.

90. The Alberta oil sands deposits were among the largest hydrocarbon deposits in the world and would certainly play a major rôle in Canada's future energy production.

91. Although the technology for the surface mining technique was now well developed, there were still many technological processes to invent and develop for the separation of bitumen from sands and other materials some 50 to 800 m underground.

92. Bitumen was so viscous that it acted more like a solid than a liquid and therefore had to be heated or mixed with solvents to reduce its viscosity to allow it to flow through the porous spaces between the sand grains. Hot fluids such as steam were injected into deposits to provide the necessary heat and pressure to drive the bitumen into production wells. The successful development of the in situ recovery process required a detailed understanding of the geological features of the deposits.

93. Moreover, although there were very large deposits of crude bitumen in Alberta, each presented its own specific challenge when it had to be extracted; two large open pits were being exploited using the hot water separation process and the bitumen was then upgraded by a refinery process to a synthetic crude oil.

94. The main difficulty with available deep-mining technology was that it was too expensive and therefore not competitive with conventional crude oil.

95. The major economic factors that would determine the rate of oil sands development were oil prices, fiscal conditions and the financing capabilities of the industry and markets.

96. Government policy at both federal and provincial levels could have a major impact on these factors. Consequently, there was a large degree of uncertainty in any forecast of future oil sands production. Depending upon economic factors, in situ bitumen production could be as low as 15,000 cu.m per day or as high as 50,000 cu.m per day in the year 2005.

97. The Alberta Research Council had an oil sands analytical laboratory which provided special advisory service to industry and commercial laboratories through research into the physical and chemical properties of bitumen and oil sands, and the measurement and analysis of bitumen, water and solids in oil sands. It determined the content of each of these mate-

rials on the basis of small and large samples of oil sands, tailings, sludge and emulsions.

98. After the briefing, the committee toured the laboratory.

(d) Coal

99. In the afternoon of 31st October 1985, the committee was received by Mr. T. David Brown, director of the federal coal research laboratory, and Mr. R. Gary Martin, head of the coal research department of the Alberta Research Council.

100. Mr. Brown explained that Canada was a major producer of coal, most of it by open-cast mining in Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia. In the eastern provinces, in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, mines were underground.

101. In Alberta, the mining of coal was the cheapest of all. It had most of Canada's coal reserves; it had some 39 mines - 240 in all of Canada - but 10 mines in Alberta produced 91% of all coal.

102. They exported some 23 million tons representing Can.\$1.8 billion. The mining industry had some 15,000 employees and in Alberta coal cost Can.\$6 a ton compared with Can.\$25 a ton in Eastern Canada and some Can.\$60 a ton in Europe.

103. The extent, quality and availability of coal reserves underneath the Alberta plains made coal a major potential source of liquid fuel to meet the energy demands of future years. Coal could be converted to many products such as fuel, gas and synthetic gas for hydrogen and ammonia production, but liquid fuels remained the most attractive because they could be transported cheaply over long distances.

104. The Alberta Research Council was investigating methods of making coal economically competitive as a future source of synthetic fluids. As coals were different in physical and chemical structure, the Alberta Research Council had developed coal conversion technology suited to local coal characteristics and production capabilities.

105. The Alberta Research Council and the Federal Canadian Centre for Mineral and Energy Technology had set up a coal research centre and laboratory which were developing new and more efficient methods of preparing "washed" coal for the market. One other major programme concerned the technology of liquefying coal. Yet another research field was the processing of coal with bitumen and heavy oil to provide a synthetic fuel which could easily be transported. Some 154 scientists were working in this laboratory.

106. The laboratory operated a permanent pilot plant unique in Canada and rare in the world.

VI. Communications

107. The committee visited the David Florida Laboratory of the Federal Department of Communications in Ottawa. It was briefed on Canadian space developments and experience with communications satellites and visited the Microtel Pacific Research Centre at Vancouver.

(a) The David Florida Laboratory

108. The committee was received by Dr. Rolf Mamen, director of the laboratory, in Ottawa on 29th October 1985. According to Dr. Mamen, the laboratory was Canada's main spacecraft assembly, integration and testing centre maintained and operated by the Federal Department of Communications. On a cost recovery basis, the laboratory supplied government and industry with the specialised rooms, equipment and support personnel necessary for assembling and checking spaceworthiness of complete spacecraft, their subsystems or major functional parts and their components.

109. The laboratory had been built in the early 1970s to support the development of the Hermes communications technology satellite. It was named after the late Mr. David Florida, who was director of the Canadian National Space Telecommunications laboratory and manager of the ISIS (international satellites for ionospheric studies) programme, a Canadian-United States project to study part of the earth's atmosphere.

110. Many countries and agencies had used the laboratory since 1972 as follows:

Canada: Anik C-2 telecommunications satellite, partially integrated and tested; Anik D-1 and Anik D-2 telecommunications satellites, built, assembled and tested; the National Research Council, Canadian space science projects; Canadian aerospace companies, testing antenna, microwave and ground equipment¹.

United States: Sarsat subsystems tested, for the international Cospas/Sarsat satellite-aided search-and-rescue project credited with saving 305 lives in just over two years of operation; American satellite subsystems, tested by the Canadian manufacturer, ComDev Ltd.; Canadarm subsystems, tested for Spar Aerospace Ltd., the Canadian company that designed and built the remote manipulator system for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) space shuttles.

1. See Appendix.

Brazil: The Brasilsat telecommunications satellites, built, assembled and tested.

Sweden: Viking scientific research satellite payload tested for Canadian Astronautics Ltd.

European Space Agency: Olympus 1 testing.

111. Canadarm and Olympus were two highlights of the laboratory's testing career. The Canadarm developed for the United States space shuttles by Spar Aerospace had proved itself indispensable to space development, playing a major rôle in the deployment and retrieval of satellites. The testing of the remote manipulator system was the intriguing challenge of how to test, in full gravity, delicate equipment designed to operate only in conditions of zero gravity. A special pneumatic support system had been developed to allow the arm to function, in one plane at a time, as it would in space.

112. Because it provided all the necessary world-class equipment and expert aerospace personnel in one location, the David Florida Laboratory had been chosen by the European Space Agency for the major work of testing three models of Olympus 1, the first in a new generation of large, multipurpose "bus" satellites that would carry more equipment and provide more power than Canadian satellites of the Anik series or the European ESA/Marecs spacecraft. The testing of the thermal and structural models of Olympus 1 had begun in 1985 and the proto-flight model that would actually be launched into space in 1987 was soon expected to arrive at the laboratory.

113. After the briefing, the committee visited several facilities such as the spacecraft assembly area, the radio frequency testing facility, the vacuum chambers and support equipment such as computers, etc.

(b) Dr. J.G. Chambers and Dr. D.J. Mabey briefed the committee on *Canadian space developments*.

(i) *Space communications*

114. Space communications were and would be in the future of great importance to Canada. Canadians relied more and more on satellites for telephone, data and broadcasting services as well as for special applications such as distant education, search and rescue and emergency communications.

115. The objectives of the Canadian space programme were (a) to ensure that the potential of space technology for practical applications to meet Canadian needs was fully developed, (b) to encourage the development of competitive space industries and (c) to ensure that Canada

maintained a position of excellence in the worldwide scientific exploration of space.

116. Together with NASA, Canadian industry had been working to extend space services even further through the so-called mobile satellite programme MSAT. This programme would involve a communication satellite powerful enough to send and receive voice and data signals from small mobile terminals anywhere in Canada. These mobile terminals could be installed in cars, trucks, trains, ships or even aeroplanes. The system was a new communications system, to bring a two-way mobile service to many businesses, industries and government agencies which depended on mobile communications for their work. It would facilitate the economic development of rural and remote parts of Canada and improve the safety of the public. The mobile satellite, MSAT would be launched in 1989 and would cover virtually the entire nation. The system would be operated by Telesat, Canada, which was the national satellite communications carrier. The system could be operational in 1990. The United States would adopt the same system based on a separate MSAT.

(ii) *Space station*

117. Canada would take part in the American space station but only on a small scale. The station might be used to test satellites which might be brought down for servicing either by man or by robots. Of great importance would be the Canadarm, the remote manipulator currently used in the United States space programme. It was developed by the National Research Council and Spar Aerospace Ltd. of Toronto. The Canadarm had been in use since 1981.

(iii) *Radar research and Radarsat*

118. Canada's main effort in radar research and development was centred in the radar and military communications laboratory of the Communications Research Centre. CRC is presently assisting the Federal Department of Energy, Mines and Resources in developing Radarsat, a surveillance satellite which will use microwave and optical sensors to monitor the Canadian environment and to support resource development. Radarsat is scheduled for launch in 1990.

119. The radar research group was closely involved in the SHARP project, the proposed use of pilotless aircraft as relay stations. Its responsibility here was to develop ground transmitters to send microwave radiation to the aircraft to serve as a power source. This project was of great importance for northern Canada which was often completely covered by clouds.

The development of the system had so far cost some Can.\$20 million.

(iv) Sarsat

120. Planning for a satellite-aided search and rescue system had begun early in the 1970s, when experience had shown that a satellite, equipped to receive emergency transmissions from aircraft or ships, could locate distress sites within minutes and to an accuracy of some 10 km. Canada's vast and sparsely-populated territory, its varied geography and inhospitable climate made it extremely difficult and costly to locate missing aircraft and ships. Canada therefore played an important rôle in developing this type of satellite.

121. Canada, the United States and France were now testing Sarsat in co-operation with the Soviet Union's Cospas system. With three satellites in operation, an emergency signal would be detected in less than four hours. The Department of National Defence managed Sarsat and was responsible, in co-operation with the Canadian coastguards, for search and rescue activities. Although still in a development phase, the system had already worked in several cases since 1982. Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom had joined the system. The Department of National Defence was contributing Can.\$12.7 million and the Department of Communications nearly Can.\$1 million.

(v) L-Sat

122. Another major high technology project with important international implications was the large telecommunications satellite (L-Sat programme) of the European Space Agency. Canada had been involved since 1980. The satellite was now called Olympus and was in the construction and testing stages. The launch was planned for 1987.

123. Canada was contributing some Can.\$80 million which amounted to 11% of the total cost of the ESA programme.

124. Canada's prime interest in Olympus was in gaining experience with a large spacecraft in preparation for future domestic and export programmes. There was a limit to the number of communications satellites which could operate in geostationary orbit above the equator. The trend was therefore towards larger satellites. Olympus was twice the weight and would provide close to four times the power of the largest Canadian satellite now in orbit.

125. Spar Aerospace would design and manufacture the solar arrays and parts of the communications equipment.

(vi) Canada and the European Space Agency

126. Canada had concluded an agreement of co-operation with ESA in 1979, which had been renewed in 1984 for a further five years. Canada contributed to ESA's general budget and participated in two optional programmes - Olympus and the remote-sensing satellite programme ERS-I. The latter would be the prototype of a European remote-sensing satellite which would become operational in the 1990s.

127. It would be placed in a quasi-polar circular orbit at an altitude of 780 km. Its objectives were both economic and scientific: to establish, develop and exploit the coastal ocean and ice applications of remote-sensing data with a view to improving knowledge of ocean parameters and sea state conditions. These applications were particularly important with regard to offshore and coastal activities in the 200 nautical mile zone. It would produce images of land surfaces in all weather conditions thanks to the synthetic aperture radar and, finally, it would increase the scientific understanding of coastal zones and global ocean processes in general world weather conditions.

128. In three years' time the Canadian Government would have to consider whether it would continue to collaborate with ESA. No decision has been taken by the new federal cabinet on the Canadian space programme for the next five years.

129. Canada had a great need for application satellites, but there were many budgetary restrictions. It had also to reckon with its geographic position: 75% of its total trade was with the United States and it was also involved with the United States in the continental defence effort.

(vii) Microtel

130. On 1st November 1985, the committee visited Microtel, Vancouver, where it was received by the director, Mr. Larry Rhodes, who briefed the committee on Microtel Pacific Research Ltd., western Canada's largest telecommunications research and development facility.

131. The telecommunications industry in Canada had strong domestic manufacturing and research capabilities. Bell Canada enterprises included Northern Telecom Ltd., one of the world's leading telecommunications equipment manufacturers, and Bell Northern Research, Canada's largest private industrial research and development organisation. Bell Canada Telephone was affiliated with Microtel Ltd. and Microtel Pacific Research. Microtel Ltd., the parent company of Microtel Pacific Research, was also associated with GTE of the United States.

132. Microtel Pacific Research was a private manufacturing company for telephone equipment, microwave and automatic transmission facilities. It had some 2,500 employees and a Can.\$200 million turnover.

133. Canada had two national telecommunications systems, Telecom Canada and CNCP telecommunications (Canadian Pacific). The telephone systems of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba were owned by the provincial governments; all other telephone companies were privately owned.

134. Microtel Pacific Research offered the market the most sophisticated telecommunications systems, transmission systems, switchboards, etc., all of which products had to be competitive in order to find a market in Canada and in the rest of the world. 25% of its products were for export; no products were exported to the United States where GTE serviced the market. Although Canada had several private and public telecommunications companies, the systems were nevertheless interconnected on a national and international level.

VII. Miscellaneous

135. Your Rapporteur does not wish to conclude his report without mentioning several most interesting discussions and visits at university and political level.

(a) Laval University

136. In Quebec the committee visited the Laval University on 28th October 1985. This was the first French-speaking university in North America; it had some 1,400 full-time professors and nearly 30,000 students.

137. Charters for the university had been granted in 1852 by the Pope and Queen Victoria, although the university had existed since 1663.

138. In 1971 a new charter was established; the government now paid 85% of its budget and 15% had to be collected from private sources. It was mainly a regional university. Compared with the English-speaking universities, the Laval University had only one-third of PhDs per 1,000 students; it was therefore the policy of the university to increase its number of PhDs in ten years' time to the same level as the English-speaking universities.

(b) The National Assembly of Quebec

139. The committee was received at the National Assembly of Quebec by the Clerk, Mr. Pierre Duchesne. As the Assembly was not in session, the committee was able to visit the building and hold a committee meeting. Lunch was then given by the Clerk.

140. During lunch, the committee was addressed by Mr. Camille Limoges, Minister of State in the Ministry for Higher Education, Science and Technology of the Government of Quebec. He underlined that his ministry tried to establish a close relationship between industry, small enterprises and the universities of the province. For this purpose it had established a large number of specialised centres where university professors could explain their teaching activities and how they related to the life of private industries and other enterprises. The ministry also encouraged professors to work from three months to one year in a private industry or in a small business to get used to the industrial and entrepreneurial climate. These secondments were highly appreciated on both sides.

(c) The House of Commons of the Federal Canadian Parliament

141. On 29th October 1985, the committee was received at the House of Commons of the Federal Parliament of Canada. It attended a question and answer period. Its presence was acknowledged by the Speaker and the full assembly.

(d) The Legislative Assembly of Ontario

142. On 30th October 1985, the committee was received at the Legislative Assembly of the province of Ontario, in Toronto. It was addressed by the Speaker, Mr. Hugh Edighouffer, who explained the workings of the assembly and the political situation of the province.

(e) The Legislative Assembly of Alberta

143. On 31st October 1985, the committee visited the Legislative Assembly of Alberta in Edmonton. There it was received for lunch by the Speaker, Mr. Gerard Amerongen, who explained the political situation in Alberta and underlined the many agricultural problems which Canada and especially Alberta had to solve. As more and more countries in the world such as China, India, Indonesia and others became self-sufficient in food production, it became increasingly difficult for Canada to export its agricultural products. The problem was the more acute as agricultural science and technology led to increasing productivity and production. If it were not for the Soviet Union, Canadian agricultural products would no longer have an outlet. As in the United States, farmers in Alberta were becoming more and more indebted to the banks without much chance of repaying their debts. If no solution was found, this might lead to a catastrophic situation for both the banks and the farmers.

(f) The British Columbia Research Council

144. On 1st November 1985, the committee was received at the office of the British Columbia Research Council, where it was briefed by Dr. T.E. Howard, executive director.

145. The British Columbia Research Council conducted research, development and other technical work under contract for sponsors in industry and government. Its divisions were chemical, physical and fisheries technology, the environment, health, operations management, extractive metallurgy, biotechnology and business assistance. 78% of its income came from local, national and international contracts with industry and government.

146. Forest production accounted for 50% of British Columbia's resources. The export of wood products went mainly to Japan and Europe. The home market of British Columbia was very small since there were only 2,500,000 inhabitants.

147. Important sources of income were mining and tourism, the latter especially from Japan. Electronics and fishery products were of major importance for the province.

148. British Columbia had a famous university with some 25,000 students. However, it was becoming increasingly difficult for graduates to find work in the province.

(g) EXPO 86

149. On 2nd November 1985, the committee visited the 1986 world exposition site at Vancouver. It was received by Mr. Leslie Millin, director, who informed the committee that the main themes of the exposition would be transportation and communications. He expected that some 15 million visitors would come to this world exposition and expressed the hope that many would come from Europe.

150. Major issues of the three symposia to be organised in 1986 were:

- major regional, national and international transportation and communications systems;
- maintaining the transportation infrastructures in the industrialised countries and the creation of systems in developing countries;
- technological development in transportation systems and its capital costs;
- the social benefits of transportation and communications systems.

After the introduction, the committee toured the grounds.

VIII. Canadian defence policy

151. For a better understanding of Canadian defence policy, your Rapporteur learnt that it should be considered in the light of Canadian defence policies in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the nineteenth century, the main threat to Canada was from the south, from the United States. In the early twentieth century, this feeling remained in part to give way subsequently to a strong political relationship between the United Kingdom and Canada.

152. During the first and second world wars the main war effort was directed towards helping the mother country, Great Britain. Canadians who were not of British descent were not of course over-enthusiastic and during the first world war especially there were several major conscription crises.

153. After the second world war, Canada became increasingly aware that what happened in Europe was of major importance to Canadian security. In the early 1950s the Soviet threat – through aircraft and missiles – became reality, particularly since Canada's continental shelf was contiguous with the Soviet continental shelf.

154. The Canadian Government was then keenly aware that if North America was a target in any air or missile war Canada would be involved automatically.

155. The second major risk for Canada was a conflict in Europe where major Canadian forces were stationed. One consequence was that Canada had to keep the sea lanes open for supplying its troops stationed in Europe.

156. Since the 1950s a fairly high degree of consensus had developed on the perception of the threat. The Canadian Government of the day had an active foreign policy, not only on the American continent but also in the United Nations.

157. In the defence review for 1984, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Eric Nielsen, Minister of National Defence, stated that the government's two main policy objectives were the preservation of peace and freedom and the prevention of nuclear confrontation.

158. Although Canada was less exposed to attack by conventional military means than most other countries, mainly because of its geographical position, which made a conventional attack over the Arctic area hardly possible, it could not be sheltered from the effects of a nuclear exchange between the superpowers.

159. Canada's defence policy required sovereign control over its vast territory and maritime areas. Canada recognised its inability to prevent war on its own. As a result, its defence policy reflected the need to join with all like-

mindful nations in peacetime to deter aggression. Its defence effort was aimed above all at the prevention of war and deterrence through collective defence.

160. The defence systems of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation were vital for Canada. It should make every effort to meet its agreed commitments and carry its share of the burden in upholding the principle of collective defence.

161. Nevertheless, Canada had a regular force of only 83,630 men and women to defend a territory larger than the United States. The budget was only 2% of its gross national product which was less than that of any ally, apart from Iceland and Luxembourg.

162. The government which had taken office in September 1984, under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, had announced in March 1985 that 1,200 more men would be sent to reinforce the NATO contingent in the Federal Republic of Germany.

163. A major priority would remain the modernisation of the obsolescent North American air defence system in co-operation with the United States. Canada had to supply two squadrons of F-18 interceptors and 24 long-range radar stations.

164. The northern air defence system was now being modernised; this process would take five or six years and involve new aircraft, new radar systems and radar satellites.

165. The Canadian Government was convinced that in future defence systems would require greater reliance on all types of satellites, communications, early warning, detection and land and ocean surveillance. Whether Canada would aim to build its own military satellite system would depend mainly on the Soviet Union's plans in this field; much would depend on the nature of the threat.

166. Because of Canada's cold climate, troops were trained in winter warfare more than any other army. A force of 3,200 men had the task of repelling any invasion of Canadian territory.

167. One battalion of 850 men was committed to defend northern Norway. Other troops concentrated in Europe were 4 Canadian mechanised brigade groups and 1 Canadian air group. These formations were stationed near the Black Forest in Western Germany. The total military strength was approximately 5,900 men.

168. The maritime forces were most in need of re-equipment of surface ships and submarines. The fleet was divided between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, but most of the Canadian destroyers were based in the Atlantic - 13 compared with 8 in the Pacific.

169. The development of the Canadian navy runs parallel with the development of modern navies in other NATO countries. The admiralty wants the most up-to-date ships which are therefore very expensive. Consequently, fewer ships can be procured.

170. A highly-sensitive political issue is the north-west passage to the Sea of Beaufort. This passage is considered Canadian national territory. To patrol this passage, Canada has ordered a polar icebreaker for Can.\$500 million.

171. Canada also has a coastguard of 6,561 men and women, 25 icebreakers and some 16 patrol vessels, helicopters and other rescue craft.

172. In order to back up the regular units, the armed forces rely on 23,800 reserve forces called the militia.

173. The biggest impediment to increasing the armed forces was lack of money; only 9% of the federal budget was earmarked for defence.

174. During the last three years, the Canadian defence budget has been increased regularly by 3% in real terms pursuant to the NATO decision on this issue. However, the Canadian deficit is one of the largest in the world and savings will have to be made to reduce this deficit. An effort is already being made in the social budget and military reductions will have to follow.

175. Of political importance is the contribution of peace-keeping forces to the United Nations force in Cyprus where Canada has 515 men.

176. In the Middle East, in the United Nations truce supervisory organisation and the United Nations disengagement observer force, Canada has some 254 military personnel. Finally, it has observers in the United Nations military observer group in India-Pakistan.

177. Most important was the unification of Canada's military forces which was effected about ten years ago. Much was expected of unification in economic terms since the three services would have common administrative regulations and could combine intendant and supply units. Rivalry between the three services could be greatly reduced. On the other hand regimental identification and esprit de corps was lost. The new government has decided that the services would revert to different types of uniforms. However, the military personnel is not now very keen to receive them, being quite satisfied with the situation as it has developed. The veterans of the armed forces did not share this opinion however.

SDI

178. As explained earlier, the Canadian Government has decided not to participate in

the SDI programme as such. Nevertheless it considers the American attitude prudent as research in this field is certainly most important and necessary. The Canadian Government is fully aware that the Soviet Union is conducting its own research in this area and that its utterances are more ritualistic than threatening. The government has a general agreement with the United States Government for the production of military hardware and this agreement could be applied to any sharing of defence production. The question of spin-off and industrial secrecy would need an agreement along the same lines as the one the United Kingdom Government has concluded with the United States Government.

179. As long as there is no general discussion in NATO about the strategic consequences of SDI and armaments production, there is no need for the Canadian Government to change its present policy.

IX. Conclusions

180. Your Rapporteur has given as faithful an account as possible of the committee's visit to Canada. From this account it may clearly be seen how much authority is invested in provincial governments and their research and development councils. It is interesting to note that with highly-developed provincial autonomy research and development in the provinces is geared mainly to provincial requirements. It is therefore logical that oceanographic studies and studies of the physical properties and behaviour of icebergs is conducted in the maritime provinces. A similar example is Alberta where the research council has directed its activities to research on oil sands and coal.

181. Another interesting development is that in Quebec where a close relationship has been established between the universities of the province, industries and small firms, many specialised centres have been established where university professors explain their teaching activities and how they are linked to the life of private industry and small firms. The provincial Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology also encourages professors to work

from three months to a year in a private industry or a small business to acquaint themselves with the industrial and entrepreneurial atmosphere.

182. Canadian space developments are under federal government authority. Canada's wide experience in communications satellites - the geographical situation of the country, its sparse population in the north and frontiers with the United States in the south and the Arctic in the north - were subjects of special interest for the committee. However, Canadian relations with the European Space Agency may not be altogether satisfactory.

183. Canadian interest lies in practical applications rather than scientific space studies. Your Rapporteur believes this should be rectified by increased Canadian participation in ESA's scientific programme. For Europe and Canada, a continuous association would be fruitful for both sides but, to succeed, associate membership should be extended from five to ten years. Five years seems too short in terms of space activities which all require long-term research and development. Second, the range of programmes should be widened. Your Rapporteur has already mentioned the scientific programme but new application programmes should also be included.

184. However, association means loyalty on both sides and the Canadian-American relationship might in some ways detract from a Canadian-European relationship if Canada wished to rely on the United States for advanced technology. Europe on the other hand wishes to remain autonomous vis-à-vis American space technology.

185. The same conditions of reciprocity and loyalty for co-operation in space developments are also relevant for other sectors. It might be useful for the European countries if Canada participated in programmes of the Independent European Programme Group and other high-technology European ventures. This would strengthen the Atlantic Alliance and European security.

186. Your Rapporteur has included these ideas in the draft recommendation which he thinks is self-explanatory.

APPENDIX

*Canada in space*¹

After the Soviet Union and the United States, Canada was the first country to venture into space. With its vast distances and its widely spread population, Canada quickly recognised how space technology could improve domestic communications.

Canada's first satellite, Alouette 1, was launched on 29th September 1962 from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Like all other Canadian satellites that followed, it continued to function much longer than expected. For ten years Alouette 1 sent back useful data on the ionosphere. In 1965 it was followed into orbit by Alouette 2, which extended the programme of measurements from the top side of the ionosphere.

Then came two more research satellites – international satellites for ionospheric studies, or ISIS. ISIS 1 was launched in 1969 and ISIS 2 in 1971, and both are still sending back valuable information. Since Canada completed its ISIS programme in March 1984, Japan has continued to receive and analyse data from these satellites, by special agreement with the Department of Communications. Anik A-1, launched in 1972 by Telesat Canada, was the world's first domestic communications satellite in geostationary orbit. This orbit allowed it to remain in the same position over the earth to bring Canadians continuous reliable telecommunications services.

Anik A-1 was followed in 1973 by Anik A-2, which served initially as an orbiting spare or back-up satellite. Then Anik A-3, launched in 1975, provided additional capacity. Together the Aniks brought network radio, television and improved telephone service to northern Canada and other remote areas.

Hermes, the communications technology satellite launched in 1976, was the world's most powerful communications satellite – the product of combined Canadian and United States expertise. Over the next four years both countries successfully tested it for direct broadcasting to remote areas, for use in tele-medicine, tele-education and other applications.

Anik B, in orbit since 1978, continues to assist this work, while serving many other

experimental and commercial purposes. Through a number of Anik B pilot projects, government, business and special interest groups have explored new applications of space technology.

Anik D-1, launched in 1982, was the first Canadian-made communications satellite, built by Spar Aerospace Limited. Anik D-2, the second in this series, was placed in storage orbit in November 1984, ready for future use. Anik C-3 and Anik C-2 were launched in 1982 and 1983 respectively, and Anik C-1 was expected to join them in spring 1985.

Scheduled for launch in 1989 is MSAT (mobile satellite), being developed by Canadian and United States industry in co-operation with the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). MSATs over both countries will provide reliable communications for vehicles outside large metropolitan areas, as well as for ships, boats and aircraft. The owner and operator of the MSAT system will be Telesat Canada, a company owned jointly by the Canadian Government and Canada's long-distance telephone companies.

Radarsat, to be launched in 1990, will keep track of Arctic ice conditions for northern shipping and the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources. From a height of 1,000 km, it will also serve a number of other government departments. Unaffected by the weather, it will send back data on sea conditions, oil spills, crops, forests, mineral deposits and other resources, in Canada and around the world.

Radarsat will circle the earth in polar orbit – an orbit that passes over both poles. It will cover every part of the globe in 16 days, while completing a northern hemisphere ice survey every three days.

A proposed direct broadcast satellite (DBS) could beam radio and television broadcasts directly into the homes of people living in remote areas. This could be launched as early as the end of the decade, but no firm plans have yet been made. Meanwhile, the Anik C satellites already have the potential to provide medium power direct-to-home television service.

1. Extract from *Reaching for tomorrow*, Canadian Government Department of Communications, 1985.

Canadian-European co-operation in high technology

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Mr. Hill and Mr. Spies von Büllesheim

1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the operative text of the draft recommendation and insert:
“ To consider favourably connections of Canadian firms and research institutions with Eureka projects; ”

Signed: Hill, Spies von Büllesheim

1. See 6th sitting, 4th June 1986 (amendment agreed to).

**OPINION ON THE BUDGETS OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEARS 1985 (REVISED) AND
1986¹**

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. Sinesio, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman); MM. Haase (Alternate: Gansel), Beix (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Bey-sen (Alternate: Steverlynck), Bohl, Declercq, Enders, Ferrari Aggradi, Freeson, Jeambrun, Linster, Morris, Oehler, Mrs. Pack, MM. Pollidoro (Alternate: Accili), Rauti (Alternate: Giust), Sinesio, Stokes, van Tets, de Vries, Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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Draft Recommendation

***on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial years 1985 (revised) and 1986***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1985 (revised) and 1986, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Considering that:
 - (a) the budgets for 1985 (revised) and 1986 take account of the new structure of the ministerial organs of WEU achieved in conformity with the directives set out in the Rome declaration;
 - (b) each of these budgets is the subject of an initial three-part document (recapitulation, explanatory memorandum and pensions) for the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee and of a document revised on the basis of the recommendations adopted by that committee and transmitted to the Council;
 - (c) examination of the budgets consequently requires knowledge of the abovementioned documents and of the others produced during the year but which are not sent to the Assembly on a regular basis;
 - (d) the way WEU budgets are now presented draws no distinction between ordinary and extraordinary expenditure although the latter may have a considerable effect on statistics on the evolution of budgets and consequently detract from the objective application of the zero growth criterion or of any other criterion for budgetary trends agreed by the governments;
 - (e) the 1985 budget allowed considerable excess resources to be built up which were used for the sole purpose of restructuring the ministerial organs, no account being taken in this context of the requirements of the Assembly although the ministers expressed their wish in Rome in October 1984 to have the Assembly "play a growing rôle";
 - (f) the new breakdown of duties shown in the recent establishment tables of the ministerial organs increases the need to review procedure for approving Assembly budgets in order to provide a better guarantee of its autonomy and independence;
 - (g) the task of managing pensions in WEU has grown to such an extent that an independent body should be given responsibility for this task;
- (iii) Regretting that:
 - (a) two Grade B posts are shown as vacant in the budget of the Paris agencies whereas the Assembly's proposal to create two new Grade B posts in the Office of the Clerk has been rejected;
 - (b) the programme for the modernisation of equipment makes no provision for purchasing a telex, the lack of which is keenly felt by all the services of WEU as well as by parliamentarians;
- (iv) Welcoming the fact that the Council, in attributing grades to the various types of duty, has adopted the dual-grading criterion which the Assembly has often recommended in the past,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine the possibility of:
 - (a) combining in a single budgetary document all the information now given in many different documents;
 - (b) showing in the two parts of the budget (operating budget and pensions budget) two categories of expenditure: ordinary and extraordinary expenditure, to make it easier to follow the evolution of these budgets;
2. Transmit to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly all budgetary documents relating to its budgetary decisions;

3. In consultation with the appropriate Assembly bodies, review procedure for approving Assembly budgets so that it corresponds better to the principle of its autonomy and independence;
4. Give favourable consideration to the proposals to create two new Grade B3 posts which are given top priority in the Assembly's draft budget for 1986;
5. Further to Assembly Recommendation 357, promote the creation of an independent body for the administration of pensions and, to this end, organise consultations with the other co-ordinated organisations;
6. Study the problem of dual-grading at every level of the hierarchy and lay down a general rule on the subject applicable to all WEU staff;
7. Authorise the installation of a telex in the London and Paris offices, it being understood that the telex installed in Paris would be available to all WEU organs in accordance with methods of use and cost-sharing to be agreed among them;
8. Promote harmonisation of the technical equipment of the organs of WEU to achieve future cost-saving and engage a management consultant from a member government or private industry to investigate this matter and make recommendations.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Sinesio, Rapporteur)

I. Preliminary considerations

1. According to Article VIII (c) of the Charter of the Assembly, "the Assembly shall express its views in the form of an opinion or recommendation on the annual budget of Western European Union as soon as it has been communicated".

2. For this purpose, a member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration is instructed to submit a report which has to be mainly of a technical nature since the committee is responsible only for budgetary and administrative matters.

3. In fact, there can be no question of the committee dealing with matters relating to the activities of the Council and of the various ministerial organs since these are referred by the Presidential Committee to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

4. In the specific context in which it has to give its opinion, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration therefore wishes to study the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU from the standpoint of the restructuring of these organs which took place as from 1985 and which, on the basis of a supplementary budget for 1985 and a 1986 budget, led to a new presentation of the latter.

II. Aspects of the 1985 budget (revised) and the 1986 budget

5. After the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Rome in October 1984, the Budget and Organisation Committee and the Secretary-General had agreed that the 1985 budget should follow traditional lines and be based on the existing administrative structure. When the Council had approved measures for reform that would have budgetary consequences, the necessary funds would be sought in a revised budget. Your Rapporteur will return in the next chapter to the budgetary implications of this decision which laid down precise guidelines for preparing the revised budget for 1985 and the 1986 budget. A few remarks may first be made however about the structure of these budgets.

6. As is customary, the budgets for 1985 (revised) and for 1986, after consideration by the Budget and Organisation Committee, were set out in documents C-B (85) 15 of 29th October 1985 (cf. Appendix I) and C-B (85) 17 of 17th

January 1986 (cf. Appendix II) respectively, which incorporated the changes recommended by that committee. But as these documents contained only one set of tables showing amounts under the various heads and sub-heads of the two budgets, it was necessary to refer to the basic documents submitted to the Budget and Organisation Committee under references B (85) 14 and B (85) 17. It was in these documents that your Rapporteur was able to find the information necessary for preparing his report.

7. As usual, the revised budget for 1985 – set out in document B (85) 14 – was presented in three sections: Section A for the budget of the Secretariat-General, Section B for the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and Section C for the Agency for the Control of Armaments. Conversely, because of the reorganisation of the ministerial organs, in the 1986 budget in document B (85) 17 the former Sections B and C have been replaced by a new Section B grouping the reorganised Agency for the Control of Armaments and the three new agencies for security questions.

8. As in the past, the two budgets are presented in three parts: the first giving overall tables, the second the explanatory memorandum and the third the pensions budget.

9. In regard to the explanatory memorandum in particular, it should be noted that on some important points the latter refers to other documents which have to be consulted in order to understand the reasons for certain Council decisions with budgetary implications. These documents are produced during the year and are the result of the permanent contacts which the Secretariat-General maintains with the Budget and Organisation Committee and with the Council in order to keep them informed of the requirements of the ministerial organs.

10. Thus, when examining the explanatory memorandum, account must be taken of the following documents which were not appended to the budget but which your Rapporteur consulted:

- C (86) 10 of 13th January 1986 on the organisation of the Secretariat-General and the agencies for security questions¹;

¹ Since these documents are classified "Restricted", they have not been appended to the present report.

- B (85) 11 of 13th August 1985 on office modernisation at the Secretariat-General (cf. Appendix IV);
- C-B (85) 13 of 22nd July 1985 reviewing in general terms the present overall situation¹;
- B (84) 10 of 15th August 1984 on the long-term maintenance and modernisation programme of the London office (cf. Appendix VI).

11. On the other hand, your Rapporteur was unable to consult the records of Council meetings at which budgetary decisions were taken since these records, or extracts from them, have not been transmitted to the Office of the Clerk due to their confidential nature.

12. In view of the above considerations, your Rapporteur, while respecting the prerogatives and responsibilities of the ministerial organs in this connection, wonders whether it would be possible for a single budgetary document to show and justify the evolution of requirements in relation to the aims to be attained and the tasks assigned to these organs by the Council. It would also seem possible to simplify the explanatory memorandum by deleting the detailed breakdown of expenditure (travelling expenses, daily allowances, water, gas, electricity, etc.) which, apart from a few additional explanations, is a mere repetition of the details of expenditure set out in the first part. The presentation of the budget would gain in simplicity and clarity.

13. The third part showing pensions expenditure and receipts fully meets the need to separate the operating budget from the pensions budget. It conforms to a general principle of budgetary methods and allows the zero growth rate criterion to be applied to the operating budget only as advocated in Recommendations 409 and 426 already communicated to the Council in the Assembly's opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs for 1983, 1984 and 1985.

14. In regard to pensions and in view of the growing burden of managing them in WEU² and the other co-ordinated organisations, your Rapporteur considers it necessary to return to the proposal the Assembly made to the Council in Recommendation 357, adopted on 2nd December 1980 (cf. Appendix XIII), and, in consultation with the other co-ordinated organisations, study the desirability of setting up an independent body for the administration of pensions as a natural extension of the joint pensions administrative section. In its reply to this recommendation, the Council said it considered "that the setting-up of an independent interna-

tional body for the administration of pensions for the co-ordinated organisations could be desirable in the long term". Time now having passed, this body seems no longer desirable but necessary.

III. Budgetary implications of the restructuration of the ministerial organs

15. As mentioned in paragraph 5 above, the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee and the Secretariat-General agreed to base the budget estimates of the ministerial organs for 1985 on the existing administrative structure. The implications of such a decision should be considered since many posts already vacant in Paris continued to be taken into account in the budget estimates. The 1985 budget allowed considerable excess resources to be built up which could subsequently be used for restructuration purposes.

16. In fact, the savings in the first half of the year have been greater than were expected. Some of those savings were used to employ temporary staff and some to purchase new office machinery – both made necessary by the increasing volume of activity surrounding the reactivation process. This means that the excess mentioned in paragraph 15 was used solely to strengthen the Secretariat-General.

17. Your Rapporteur ventures to note that the effects of these decisions went beyond the framework of the ministerial organs with very negative repercussions on the Assembly. Justification is to be found in the interpretation of paragraph III.3(f) of the Rome declaration in which the Council of Ministers said it was necessary to "ensure that the various arrangements proposed remain within the present limits in terms of staff and the organisation's budget, without weakening WEU's ability to play its rôle". Indeed, the Permanent Council interpreted this decision as meaning that, on the one hand, some of these arrangements applied only to the ministerial organs, which could therefore use all the resources released by the restructuration, and, on the other hand, "the limits in terms of staff and the organisation's budget" applied also to the Assembly, which was thus forced to remain within the limits of its previous budget because of the application of the zero growth criterion.

18. To say the least, your Rapporteur believes this interpretation is arbitrary and partial: arbitrary insofar as the aim was to devote all the resources which became available to the strengthening of the Secretariat-General and to apply the constraints only to the Assembly; partial because it took no account of other sections of the Rome declaration in which the ministers expressed their wish for the Assembly to "play a growing rôle" and "supported the idea of

1. Since these documents are classified "Restricted", they have not been appended to the present report.

2. The evolution of expenditure on pensions paid by WEU since 1982 is shown at Appendix XVI.

greater contact between the Council and the Assembly". The contradiction is clear.

19. The consequences of this interpretation for the Assembly are well known. Its draft budgets for 1985 and 1986, showing its real requirements in the context of reactivation, were severely and unilaterally reduced, although it was made quite clear that the reactivation of WEU necessarily implied a change in its structure and means. Consequently, as Mr. Ferrari Aggradi said in the report he submitted at the Assembly's June session, "the Assembly's action is hindered by the inadequacy of its secretariat for the tasks incumbent upon it and by the reduction in real terms of its operating budget"³.

20. The budgetary implications of the restructuration of the ministerial organs carried out following the Rome declaration are set out in the tables at Appendices VII and VIII. As a whole, and compared with its initial 1985 budget, the Secretariat-General was granted an increase of £130,450 (revised 1985 budget) and then a further increase of £175,573 (1986 budget). Conversely, the initial 1985 budget of the Paris agencies was reduced by F 750,000 whereas their 1986 budget was increased by F 547,570 over the revised 1985 budget.

21. Some comment is necessary on the figures in Appendices VII and VIII. In regard to the overall reduction of F 750,000 included in the revised budget of the Paris agencies, it should be noted that this is far lower than the savings made. In fact, by decision of the Council, some of the savings allowed additional expenditure for security-related work and additional unforeseen expenditure (F 800,000 approximately) to be included in the revised budget.

22. Thus, these extraordinary factors distort any analysis of the budgetary trend insofar as they hinder a comparison between the budgets. This is the case for instance for expenditure on pensions which was estimated at F 6,737,200 in the revised budget for 1985 but reduced to F 5,787,500 in 1986. The difference, which was due to the non-recurring nature of leaving allowances payable in 1985, is so large that it has a considerable effect on statistical data relating to the budgets concerned. Thus, the pensions budget of the Paris agencies, instead of being reduced by 16.99% compared with the previous year, should show an increase, which would be logical.

23. It therefore seems evident that if all this extraordinary expenditure were left out of the statistical comparison between the budgets, the general rate of increase in the budgets of the ministerial organs for 1986 compared with the previ-

ous budget would prove to be far higher than the 5.9% indicated by the Council.

24. Your Rapporteur therefore considers that henceforth WEU budgets should be presented in two parts: operating budget and pensions budget, and that each part should be in two sections: ordinary expenditure and extraordinary expenditure. This breakdown would make it easier to follow the trend of the budget from a statistical point of view and at the same time allow the agreed growth criterion to be applied more objectively, be it zero growth or any other criterion agreed by the governments.

25. In conclusion, the trend in the budgets of the ministerial organs for 1985 (revised) and for 1986 covering the restructuration of the ministerial organs may be summed up as follows, not taking into account the remarks made in paragraph 21 above:

	<i>Secretariat-General</i>	<i>Paris agencies</i>
1985	100	100
1985 (revised)	111.74	97.50
1986	127.54	99.32

26. In the explanatory memorandum to the 1986 budget, it is specified that the increases "reflect the consequences of the reorganisation taking place especially the need now to fill all posts and modify the establishment by the addition of some posts. The estimates, in some cases, must be tentative until a new pattern of activity emerges more clearly and long-term needs, in the new framework, can be more accurately assessed. The Secretary-General has emphasised the need for flexibility especially in a transitional period expected to last until the end of 1987; "the Council recognises that need". It will therefore be possible to take up this matter again at the end of this transitional period.

IV. The new organisation of the Secretariat-General and of the agencies for security questions

27. The Secretary-General has communicated the latest version of the establishment tables of the Secretariat-General and of the Paris agencies. These establishment tables were approved after the budgets of the organs concerned had been prepared; it is also to be assumed that the budget estimates for 1986 were based on planned staff levels.

28. Consideration of the establishment tables in question shows a new factor, i.e. that there is not always, as was the case in the past, a specific grade for each type of duty. Certain duties are in fact assigned two or three different grades

3. Cf. Document 1017, May 1985, Volume I, page 153.

(A3/4, A2/3 and B2/3/4). This allows some degree of flexibility in recruitment and also makes it possible to promote officials in the course of their careers. Your Rapporteur can but welcome this decision which brings the dual-grading criterion to the forefront again; this has been discussed for many years and, inter alia, was the subject of Assembly Recommendations 240, 250 and 340 (cf. Appendix XII). It therefore seems desirable for the matter to be studied fully and in detail and for the Council to lay down a general rule applying to all WEU staff, including the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly.

29. Moreover, the attribution of a range of grades to certain duties prevents an accurate idea being obtained, grade by grade, of variations in staff compared with previous establishment tables. These variations are therefore given in the table at Appendix IX solely according to categories of staff.

30. This table shows that the number of Grade A, L and B staff in the Secretariat-General has increased by five. This increase is partly offset by the loss of one HG post, transferred to Paris, and one Grade C post.

31. The staff in Paris has been reduced by eight Grade A and L officials and increased by one HG post transferred from London. In reality, your Rapporteur understands that two Grade B posts in the establishment table will remain vacant until further investigation and experience during 1986 show whether and in what part of the establishment list a reduction in the number of B-grade staff may be effected.

32. The various aspects of the establishment table of the Secretariat-General thus strengthened seem balanced and well-adapted to the duties of each service. Conversely, the same is not true of the establishment table of the Paris agencies: the latter's tasks have still not been clearly defined, with the result that the establishment table is not definite. A possible reason is the Council's concern about retaining all existing staff. This is also how the Council's guidelines referred to in paragraph 31 above can be interpreted.

33. However, the decision to keep two Grade B3 posts vacant, which will not be filled without prior consultation with the Council, is open to criticism if the general situation of WEU, including the Assembly, is examined. In the context of the reactivation of WEU and on the occasion of the presentation of its 1986 budget, the Assembly referred to the serious shortcomings in its present structure and gave top priority to two additional Grade B3 posts needed to bring its staff up to strength. As this proposal was not accepted, it has to be noted that the refusal came just when the Council authorised a reserve of posts in the

Paris agencies which can certainly not be used in the immediate future.

34. The establishment table of the Paris agencies calls for another remark relating to the attribution to the Head of the Administration and Legal Affairs Division of the duties of Chairman of the Budget and Organisation Committee hitherto the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary-General in London. This committee, consisting of financial experts from the governments of member states, verifies that the budgets of the ministerial organs and of the Assembly remain within the limits of the overall amount earmarked by the governments for WEU as a whole. If it is considered that the budgets of these separate parts are in competition with each other, your Rapporteur can but wonder to what extent it is possible to be objective in the exercise of these important duties in view of the fact that the official exercising them – whose loyalty is not questioned – is responsible for and defender of the budgets of the Paris agencies.

35. Your Rapporteur therefore wishes the procedure for approving Assembly budgets to be revised and the Assembly to be given greater independence in budgetary matters. This is not a new problem and it is interesting to recall how it developed.

36. At the second part of the fifth session of the Assembly, Dame Florence Horsbrugh and others tabled a motion for a recommendation on the "reform of present methods of approving the Assembly's budget" (cf. Appendix X) recommending that the Council transfer to the Presidential Committee the exercise of its annual examination of the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly. This text was referred by the Assembly to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs.

37. Following the joint meeting between the Council and the Bureau of the Assembly on 30th October 1959, new procedure was considered. This procedure was approved by the Presidential Committee on 18th March 1960 and is still in force (cf. Appendix XI).

38. However, with time and in recent years in particular, it has proved inadequate for settling the fundamental differences between the Council and the Assembly, and especially:

- the adoption by the Council of the zero growth criterion and the consequences of its strict application for the total budget, including pensions;
- the fact that this criterion makes no distinction between the various categories of expenditure (which are in reality subject to different inflation rates);

- the meticulous discussion of all items in the budget and the drastic cuts made by the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee – a consultative body of the Council – after a report on the budget had been drawn up by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and by the Presidential Committee;
- the determination of the Council and its Budget Committee not to give the Assembly all the means it requested in order to take part in the reactivation of WEU, as explained in Chapter III above.

All this has again brought to the fore the question of the Assembly's budgetary independence. Moreover, at the second part of its thirty-first session, the latter recommended that the Council "guarantee the Assembly full independence in all areas, in particular by allowing it to divide its overall budget between the various heads while respecting the regulations governing the staff of the co-ordinated organisations" (Recommendation 429 at Appendix XV). At the time this report was being drafted, the Council's reply to the recommendation had not been received.

39. A last remark about the establishment tables of the Secretariat-General and of the Paris agencies relates to the number of staff assigned to supporting services such as administration, general services, security, etc. In this connection, your Rapporteur can but refer to the various Assembly recommendations on the reunification of the two seats⁴. While leaving it to the political committees to work out the conditions and political constraints of such an operation, he considers it would enable the supporting services to be merged, thus improving their efficiency and simplifying their organisation.

V. Office modernisation programme

40. The study of the restructuration of the services of the Secretariat-General was accompanied by a programme for modernising office equipment, submitted to the Budget and Organisation Committee for approval (cf. Document B (85) 11 at Appendix V). The major equipment which sums earmarked for this purpose allowed the Secretariat-General to purchase included:

- a personal computer for financial management;
- an electronic typewriter with word-processing functions;
- two tempered word processors.

4. Cf. Recommendations 406, 409 and 426.

Your Rapporteur understands that the two word processors are incompatible with the equipment which has been in use in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly since 1984. This is regrettable in that it precludes any exchange in disc form of important documents between the Secretariat-General and the Assembly. Such documents include committee reports and the annual report of the Council which has to be completely retyped for printing.

41. The modernisation programme of the ministerial organs still makes no provision for purchasing a telex. It should be recalled that some time ago the Budget and Organisation Committee rejected such a proposal by the Secretariat-General and that when the Assembly's 1986 budget was discussed negative opinions were again expressed in response to a similar request by the Assembly.

42. It should however be stressed that it is necessary for all the WEU organs to be able to use a means of communication universally employed. Whether it should be telex or teletex – which seems to be the new-generation equipment – is a problem to be considered in the light of running costs and the size of the network using each system. What matters and must be emphasised is that it is inconceivable that there should be any discussion about the usefulness of such equipment in this day and age. Your Rapporteur believes a single system would suffice for all the WEU organs in Paris. The Office of the Clerk of the Assembly and the agencies would have to agree on methods of use and cost-sharing.

VI. Action taken on Assembly Recommendation 426

43. The reply of the Council to Recommendation 426 is provisional since it envisages no solution to the problems raised by the Assembly.

44. Regarding the application of the zero growth criterion to the net total of the budget, including pensions, the Council says that it "will continue to monitor how far these costs have an adverse effect on operating expenditure". Yet the budget of the ministerial organs as well as that of the Assembly show that adverse effects are already being felt and will become increasingly grave and insupportable since in 1986 and the next two years many officials who have been serving in the organisation for a long time will be reaching the age of retirement.

45. As a member of the Budget Committee of the Chamber of Deputies of his country, your Rapporteur cannot endorse the Council's affirmation that "the strict application of the zero

growth criterion is the objective of member states for both their national budgets and those international budgets to which they contribute". No comparison is possible as long as the characteristics and aims of these two types of budgets are inherently different. It is certain that in national budgets expenditure on pensions is not a constraint for operating expenditure. The absurdity of the criterion which means that an increase in expenditure on pensions in WEU has to be compensated by a proportional reduction in the operating budget is becoming more flagrant every year. This problem can be solved satisfactorily only by creating an independent body for managing pensions, as explained in paragraph 14 of the present report.

46. Regarding the application of the zero growth criterion to the overall budget, which does not take account of the fact that some categories of expenditure may show higher increases, the Council also affirms that it is "necessary to exercise restraint in other areas of

expenditure". One may wonder whether, by adding this restraint to the pension restraints mentioned above, the organs of WEU will not one day have to reduce or terminate their retirement benefits.

47. The continuing study for improving the status of staff mentioned by the Council has now been under way for a very long time. In view of the present impossibility of the co-ordinated organisations reaching a common solution, the principle of twin grades adopted by the Council for the restructuration of the ministerial organs (cf. paragraph 28 above) could possibly offer an immediate response to the legitimate expectations of the WEU staff.

48. The question of establishing a single seat is extremely complex and will inevitably have to be examined in the light of its advantages and disadvantages as the Council says. Here your Rapporteur merely refers to the considerations expressed in paragraph 39 of the present report.

APPENDIX I

*Revised WEU budget for 1985*¹

1. The Secretary-General circulates herewith a revised WEU budget for 1985. This budget was originally circulated under reference B (85) 14 (and corrigendum) and was examined at the Budget and Organisation Committee's meeting in London on 24th and 25th October 1985 (BR (85) 2, V, to be circulated).
2. In their examination and discussion of the budget, delegations noted:
 - (a) that the increases in Section A largely followed those described earlier in document C-B (85) 13;
 - (b) that the estimates in Section A would be modified to take account of transfers agreed under the silent procedure (cf. B (85) 4 and 10), which had the effect of reducing Chapter A.I., item 1, by £6,800 and of increasing Chapter A.IV, item 2, by a corresponding sum;
 - (c) that the estimates for Sections B and C were reduced to the level suggested when the 1985 budget was approved subject to the freezing of a sum of F 750,000 (see cover note to C-B (84) 7, page 2);
 - (d) that in fact the Paris offices had achieved savings greater than F 750,000 which had enabled them to meet unforeseen expenditure, e.g. pensions and security measures, without any increase being sought;
 - (e) that increased Paris expenditure arising from the installation of car telephones for the ungraded officials and language courses for staff should have been submitted for approval *before* commitments were entered into.
3. Subject to the foregoing, the committee could recommend the Council to approve the WEU revised budget for 1985.

1. Document C-B (85) 15 of 29th October 1985.

WEU revised budget for 1985**Summary**

	Section A	Section B	Section C	Total B + C
	£	F	F	F
Salaries and allowances	- 6,236	- 516,600	- 1,915,200	- 2,431,800
Travel	8,210	-	-	-
Other operating costs	55,730	16,700	-	16,700
Purchase of furniture, etc.	7,000	-	-	-
Buildings	-	126,500	228,000	354,500
Total expenditure	64,704	- 373,400	- 1,687,200	- 2,060,600
WEU tax	- 25,360	- 124,300	- 727,100	- 851,400
Other receipts	- 7,975	- 2,000	- 12,300	- 14,300
Total income	- 33,335	- 126,300	- 739,400	- 865,700
Net expenditure	98,039	- 247,100	- 947,800	- 1,194,900
Net pensions	32,420	311,600	133,300	444,900
NET TOTAL	130,459	64,500	- 814,500	- 750,000
1985 budgets	1,111,210	9,314,690	20,739,440	30,054,130
REVISED TOTALS	1,241,669	9,379,190	19,924,940	29,304,130

A - Secretariat-General.

B - International secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.

WEU revised budget for 1985**Section A**

	Budget 1985	Amendments proposed	Revised estimates
	£	£	£
Salaries and allowances	1,296,910	- 6,236	1,290,674
Travel	39,750	+ 8,210	47,960
Other operating costs	212,600	+ 55,730	268,330
Purchase of furniture, etc.	2,720	+ 7,000	9,720
Buildings	-	-	-
Total expenditure	1,551,980	+ 64,704	1,616,684
WEU tax	486,840	- 25,360	461,480
Other receipts	43,620	- 7,975	35,645
Total income	530,460	- 33,335	497,125
Net expenditure	1,021,520	+ 98,039	1,119,559
Net pensions	89,690	+ 32,420	122,110
NET TOTAL	1,111,210	+ 130,459	1,241,669

Contributions

	600ths	£
Belgium	59	8,403,47
France	120	17,091,80
Germany	120	17,091,80
Italy	120	17,091,80
Luxembourg	2	284,86
Netherlands	59	8,403,47
United Kingdom	120	17,091,80
	600	85,459,00*

* Budget increase	130,459
Less £45,000 for security work already funded	<u>45,000</u>
Net sum required	85,459

Sections B and C

	Budget 1985	Amendments proposed	Revised estimates
	F	F	F
Salaries and allowances	34,936,550	- 2,431,800	32,504,750
Travel	724,900	-	724,900
Other operating costs	1,875,880	+ 16,700	1,892,580
Purchase of furniture, etc.	96,400	-	96,400
Buildings	70,000	+ 354,500	424,500
Total expenditure	37,703,730	- 2,060,600	35,643,130
WEU tax	12,164,200	- 851,400	11,312,800
Other receipts	763,400	- 14,300	749,100
Total income	12,927,600	- 865,700	12,061,900
Net expenditure	24,776,130	- 1,194,900	23,581,230
Net pensions	5,278,000	+ 444,900	5,722,900
NET TOTAL	30,054,130	- 750,000	29,304,130

*Secretariat-General**Summary*

	Credits approved for 1985	Amendments proposed	Revised estimates
	£	£	£
<i>Current expenditure</i>			
A.I. Salaries, wages and other remunerations to personnel, provident fund, social and supplementary insurances	1,296,910	- 6,236	1,290,674
A.II. Travel	39,750	+ 8,210	47,960
A.III. Other operating costs	212,600	+ 55,730	268,330
	1,549,260	+ 57,704	1,606,964
<i>Capital expenditure</i>			
A.IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment	2,720	+ 7,000	9,720
A.V. Buildings	-	-	-
Total expenditure	1,551,980	+ 64,704	1,616,684
<i>Income</i>			
A.VI. WEU tax	486,840	- 25,360	461,480
A.VII. Other receipts	43,620	- 7,975	35,645
Total income	530,460	- 33,335	497,125
NET TOTAL	1,021,520	+ 98,039	1,119,559

Details by item

	Credits approved for 1985	Amendments proposed	Revised estimates
	£	£	£
<i>Current expenditure</i>			
A.I. Salaries, wages and other remunerations to personnel, social and supplementary insurances			
1. Basic salary	1,118,140	- 52,875	1,065,265
2. Expatriation allowance	58,846	- 4,126	54,720
3. Household allowance	25,505	+ 280	25,785
4. Children's and dependants' allowance	22,640	- 2,720	19,920
5. Language allowance	452	-	452
6. Representation allowance	3,857	-	3,857
Total	1,229,440	- 59,441	1,169,999
7. Installation allowance	1,500	+ 12,325	13,825
8. Rent allowance	15,000	+ 3,500	18,500
9. Overtime	1,800	-	1,800
10. Payment for unexpended leave	-	+ 425	425
11. Home leave	1,800	-	1,800
12. Contribution of WEU to provident fund 14% of basic salary	21,150	- 6,620	14,530
13. Allowance on termination of contract	-	+ 1,985	1,985
14. Temporary staff	1,400	+ 43,200	44,600
15. Social insurance (employer's part)	-	-	-
16. Supplementary insurance - premium paid by WEU	22,400	- 1,610	20,790
17. Education allowance	2,420	-	2,420
TOTAL CHAPTER A.I.	1,296,910	- 6,236	1,290,674

	Credits approved for 1985	Amendments proposed	Revised estimates
	£	£	£
A.II. Travel			
1. Travel on official business			
(a) Travelling expenses	19,520	- 3,500	16,020
(b) Subsistence allowance	14,560	+ 3,500	18,060
2. Travel on initial recruitment, transfer or departure	400	+ 1,350	1,750
3. Removal of household effects	1,000	+ 7,860	8,860
4. Travel under Article 60 (b) of the Staff Rules			
(a) Travelling expenses	2,325	- 500	1,825
(b) Subsistence allowance	1,945	- 500	1,445
TOTAL CHAPTER A.II.	39,750	+ 8,210	47,960

	Credits approved for 1985	Amendments proposed	Revised estimates
	£	£	£
A.III. Other operating costs			
1. Premises			
(a) Rent and rates	20,555	- 900	19,655
(b) Maintenance and repairs	94,000	+ 45,000	139,000
(c) Gas, electricity and water	12,385	-	12,385
(d) Cleaning (contract)	8,340	-	8,340
2. Furniture/equipment			
(a) Rental	2,100	-	2,100
(b) Maintenance, repair	2,320	+ 1,055	3,375
3. Office supplies	8,740	+ 2,160	10,900
4. Communications			
(a) Telephone/telegraph charges	10,800	-	10,800
(b) Postage	950	-	950
5. Other expenses			
(a) Audit	3,680	- 400	3,280
(b) Bank charges	380	+ 150	530
(c) Hospitality	6,385	-	6,385
(d) Motor vehicles	3,150	- 150	3,000
(e) Information, documentation, periodicals	3,845	+ 1,000	4,845
(f) Uniforms	1,035	-	1,035
(g) Linguists' fees and other profes- sional charges	4,645	+ 7,415	12,060
(h) Medical examinations	870	-	870
(i) Insurances	3,585	-	3,585
(j) Printing	1,500	-	1,500
(k) Appeals board	p.m.	-	-
(l) Miscellaneous	500	+ 400	900
(m) Inter-organisational charges	22,335	- 500	21,835
6. Allowance for contingencies	500	+ 500	1,000
TOTAL CHAPTER A.III.	212,600	+ 55,730	268,330

	Credits approved for 1985	Amendments proposed	Revised estimates
	£	£	£
<i>Capital expenditure</i>			
A.IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment			
1. Furniture for 8-9 Grosvenor Place	2,045	-	2,045
2. Office machines and equipment	150	+ 6,800	6,950
3. Library	525	+ 200	725
4. Motor vehicles	-	-	-
TOTAL CHAPTER A.IV.	2,720	+ 7,000	9,720
A.V. Buildings	-	-	-
TOTAL CHAPTER A.V.	-	-	-

	Credits approved for 1985	Amendments proposed	Revised estimates
	£	£	£
<i>Income</i>			
A.VI. WEU tax			
1. Tax levied according to Article 2 of the WEU Taxation Regulations	477,791	- 22,446	455,345
2. Tax levied according to Article 8 (1) of the WEU Taxation Regulations	9,049	- 2,914	6,135
TOTAL CHAPTER A.VI.	486,840	- 25,360	461,480
A.VII. Other receipts			
1. Bank interest	20,000	- 4,000	16,000
2. Reimbursement of VAT	13,500	-	13,500
3. Social insurance benefits and family allowance	1,420	- 700	720
4. Miscellaneous	-	+ 150	150
5. Temporary levy - A/L	8,700	- 3,425	5,275
TOTAL CHAPTER A.VII.	43,620	- 7,975	35,645

*International secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee**Summary*

	Credits approved for 1985	Amendments proposed	Revised estimates
	F	F	F
<i>Current expenditure</i>			
B.I. Salaries, wages and other remuneration to personnel, provident fund, social and supplementary insurances	11,206,900	- 516,600	10,690,300
B.II. Travel	174,400	-	174,400
B.III. Other operating costs	760,790	+ 16,700	777,490
	12,142,090	- 499,900	11,642,190
<i>Capital expenditure</i>			
B.IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment	22,500	-	22,500
B.V. Buildings	25,000	+ 126,500	151,500
Total expenditure	12,189,590	- 373,400	11,816,190
<i>Income</i>			
B.VI. WEU tax	3,922,500	- 124,300	3,798,200
B.VII. Other receipts	234,500	- 2,000	232,500
Total income	4,157,000	- 126,300	4,030,700
NET TOTAL	8,032,590	- 247,100	7,785,490

	Credits approved for 1985	Amendments proposed	Revised estimates
	F	F	F
<i>Current expenditure</i>			
B.I. Salaries, wages and other remunerations to personnel, provident fund, social and supplementary insurances			
1. Basic salary	9,040,500	- 240,000	8,800,500
2. Expatriation allowance	397,000	- 54,000	343,000
3. Household allowance	238,000	- 28,000	210,000
4. Children's allowance	306,000	- 51,000	255,000
5. Language allowance	-	-	-
6. Representation allowance	-	-	-
Total	9,981,500	- 373,000	9,608,500
7. Installation allowance	41,900	- 41,900	-
8. Rent allowance	8,800	+ 6,000	14,800
9. Overtime	29,500	-	29,500
10. Payment for unexpended leave	-	-	-
11. Home leave	37,700	- 29,900	7,800
12. Contribution of WEU to provident fund 14 % of basic salary	112,500	+ 1,200	113,700
13. Allowance on termination of contract	-	-	-
14. Temporary staff	-	-	-
15. Social insurance (employer's contribution)	720,000	- 20,000	700,000
16. Supplementary insurance (premium payable by WEU)	195,000	- 19,000	176,000
17. Education allowance	80,000	- 40,000	40,000
TOTAL CHAPTER B.I.	11,206,900	- 516,600	10,690,300

	Credits approved for 1985	Amendments proposed	Revised estimates
	F	F	F
B.III. Other operating costs			
1. Premises			
(a) Rent and rates	10,950	- 2,500	8,450
(b) Maintenance and repairs	100,200	-	100,200
(c) Water, gas, electricity, heating	121,500	-	121,500
(d) Cleaning (by contract)	86,750	- 7,500	79,250
2. Furniture and equipment			
(a) Rental	33,950	+ 1,000	34,950
(b) Maintenance and repair	16,200	+ 1,000	17,200
3. Office supplies	90,000	+ 5,000	95,000
4. Communications			
(a) Telephone/telegraph charges	110,000	+ 13,000	123,000
(b) Postage	13,400	-	13,400
5. Other expenses			
(a) Audit and accountancy charges	-	-	-
(b) Bank charges	50	-	50
(c) Hospitality	39,000	-	39,000
(d) Motor vehicles	15,540	-	15,540
(e) Information, documentation, periodicals	30,550	-	30,550
(f) Uniforms	7,800	-	7,800
(g) Linguists' fees and other profes- sional charges	25,000	+ 12,500	37,500
(h) Medical exams	9,100	- 1,800	7,300
(i) Insurances	22,700	- 4,000	18,700
(j) Miscellaneous	17,900	-	17,900
(k) Non-recoverable tax payments	9,350	-	9,350
(l) Translation fees	-	-	-
6. Allowance for contingencies	850	-	850
TOTAL CHAPTER B.III.	760,790	+ 16,700	777,490

	Credits approved for 1985	Amendments proposed	Revised estimates
	F	F	F
<i>Capital expenditure</i>			
B.IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment			
1. Furniture and equipment	15,000	–	15,000
2. Office machines	7,500	–	7,500
3. Library	–	–	–
4. Motor vehicles	–	–	–
TOTAL CHAPTER B.IV.	22,500	–	22,500
B.V. Building	25,000	+ 126,500	151,500
TOTAL CHAPTER B.V.	25,000	+ 126,500	151,500

	Credits approved for 1985	Proposed amendments	Revised estimates
	F	F	F
<i>Income</i>			
B.VI. WEU tax			
1. Tax levied according to Article 2 of the WEU Taxation Regulations	3,875,000	– 124,300	3,750,700
2. Tax levied according to Article 8 (1) of the WEU Taxation Regulations	47,500	–	47,500
TOTAL CHAPTER B.VI.	3,922,500	– 124,300	3,798,200
B.VII. Other receipts			
1. Bank interest	114,500	–	114,500
2. Reimbursement of purchase tax	–	–	–
3. Social insurance benefits and family allowances	10,700	–	10,700
4. Miscellaneous	8,000	–	8,000
5. Exceptional levy on the basic salaries of A and L personnel	101,300	– 2,000	99,300
TOTAL CHAPTER B.VII.	234,500	– 2,000	232,500

*Agency for the Control of Armaments**Summary*

	Credits approved for 1985	Proposed amendments	Revised estimates
	F	F	F
<i>Current expenditure</i>			
C.I. Salaries, wages and other remunerations to personnel, provident fund, social and supplementary insurances	23,729,650	- 1,915,200	21,814,450
C.II. Travel	550,500	-	550,500
C.III. Other operating costs	1,115,090	-	1,115,090
	25,395,240	- 1,915,200	23,480,040
<i>Capital expenditure</i>			
C.IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment	73,900	-	73,900
C.V. Building	45,000	+ 228,000	273,000
Total expenditure	25,514,140	- 1,687,200	23,826,940
<i>Income</i>			
C.VI. WEU tax	8,241,700	- 727,100	7,514,600
C.VII. Other receipts	528,900	- 12,300	516,600
Total income	8,770,600	- 739,400	8,031,200
NET TOTAL	16,743,540	- 947,800	15,795,740

	Credits approved for 1985	Proposed amendments	Revised estimates
	F	F	F
C.I. Salaries, wages and other remunerations to personnel, provident fund, social and supplementary insurances			
1. Basic salary	19,100,000	- 1,566,200	17,533,800
2. Expatriation allowance	1,380,000	- 232,000	1,148,000
3. Household allowance	560,000	- 50,000	510,000
4. Children's allowance	401,700	-	401,700
5. Language allowance	6,500	-	6,500
6. Representation allowance	-	-	-
Total	21,448,200	- 1,848,200	19,600,000
7. Installation allowance	149,000	- 149,000	-
8. Rent allowance	49,000	-	49,000
9. Overtime	28,250	-	28,250
10. Payment for unexpended leave	-	-	-
11. Home leave	90,900	-	90,900
12. Contribution of WEU to provident fund	36,300	+ 2,000	38,300
13. Allowance on termination of contract	-	-	-
14. Temporary staff	-	-	-
15. Social insurance (employer's contribution)	1,432,000	-	1,432,000
16. Supplementary insurance (premium payable by WEU)	402,000	-	402,000
17. Education allowance	94,000	+ 80,000	174,000
TOTAL CHAPTER C.I.	23,729,650	- 1,915,200	21,814,450

	Credits approved for 1985	Proposed amendments	Revised estimates
	F	F	F
<i>Capital expenditure</i>			
C.IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment			
1. Furniture and equipment	25,000	–	25,000
2. Office machines	36,000	–	36,000
3. Library	12,900	–	12,900
4. Motor vehicles	–	–	–
TOTAL CHAPTER C.IV.	73,900	–	73,900
C.V. Buildings	45,000	+ 228,000	273,000
TOTAL CHAPTER C.V.	45,000	+ 228,000	273,000

	Credits approved for 1985	Proposed amendments	Revised estimates
	F	F	F
<i>Income</i>			
C.VI. WEU tax			
1. Tax levied according to Article 2 of the WEU Taxation Regulations	8,226,500	– 727,100	7,499,400
2. Tax levied according to Article 8 (1) of the WEU Taxation Regulations	15,200	–	15,200
TOTAL CHAPTER C.VI.	8,241,700	– 727,100	7,514,600
C.VII. Other receipts			
1. Bank interest	230,000	–	230,000
2. Reimbursement of purchase tax	–	–	–
3. Social insurance benefits and family allowances	21,400	–	21,400
4. Miscellaneous	14,500	–	14,500
5. Exceptional levy on the basic salaries of A and L personnel	263,000	– 12,300	250,700
TOTAL CHAPTER C.VII.	528,900	– 12,300	516,600

Revised pensions budget**Summary**

	Section A	Section B	Section C	Total B + C
	£	F	F	F
<i>Expenditure</i>				
I.A. Pensions				
1. Pensions				
(a) Retirement pensions	4,550	—	—	—
(b) Invalidity pensions	530	—	—	—
(c) Survivors' pensions	9,700	1,800	—	1,800
(d) Orphans' pensions	1,650	—	1,000	1,000
2. Allowances				
(a) Household allowance	325	6,400	—	6,400
(b) Dependants' allowance	1,785	31,400	—	31,400
(c) Education allowance	—	—	—	—
(d) Hardship allowance	—	—	—	—
3. Leaving allowance	13,345	263,000	75,000	338,000
4. Supplementary insurance (premium payable by WEU)	285	—	—	—
TOTAL CHAPTER A.I.	32,170	302,600	76,000	378,600
<i>Income</i>				
VIII. Pension receipts				
1. Contributions (7%)	— 250	— 9,000	— 57,300	— 66,300
2. Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals	—	—	—	—
3. Other receipts	—	—	—	—
TOTAL CHAPTER VIII.	— 250	— 9,000	— 57,300	— 66,300
NET TOTAL	32,420	311,600	133,300	444,900
Approved for 1985	89,690	1,282,100	3,995,900	5,278,000
REVISED TOTAL	122,110	1,593,700	4,129,200	5,722,900

Secretariat-General

	Credits approved for 1985	Proposed amendments	Revised estimates
	£	£	£
<i>Expenditure</i>			
A.I.A. Pensions			
1. Pensions			
(a) Retirement pensions	92,480	+ 4,550	97,030
(b) Invalidity pensions	10,930	+ 530	11,460
(c) Survivors' pensions	21,075	+ 9,700	30,775
(d) Orphans' pensions	5,225	+ 1,650	6,875
2. Allowances			
(a) Household allowance	4,450	+ 325	4,775
(b) Dependants' allowance	1,915	+ 1,785	3,700
(c) Education allowance	—	—	—
(d) Hardship allowance	—	—	—
3. Leaving allowance	p.m.	13,345	13,345
4. Supplementary insurance (premium payable by WEU)	1,815	+ 285	2,100
5. Bank charges	—	—	—
TOTAL CHAPTER A.I.A.	137,890	+ 32,170	170,060
<i>Income</i>			
A.VIII. Pension receipts			
1. Contributions (7%)	39,110	— 250	38,860
2. Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals	3,780	—	3,780
3. Other receipts	5,310	—	5,310
TOTAL CHAPTER A.VIII.	48,200	— 250	47,950
NET TOTAL	89,690	+ 32,420	122,110

International secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee

	Credits approved for 1985	Proposed amendments	Revised estimates
	F	F	F
<i>Expenditure</i>			
B.I.A. Pensions			
1. Pensions			
(a) Retirement pension	1,109,000	-	1,109,000
(b) Invalidity pension	-	-	-
(c) Survivors' pension	405,000	+ 1,800	406,800
(d) Orphans' pension	-	-	-
2. Allowances			
(a) Household allowance	54,400	+ 6,400	60,800
(b) Dependants' allowance	11,100	+ 31,400	42,500
(c) Education allowance	-	-	-
(d) Hardship allowance	-	-	-
3. Leaving allowance	-	263,000	263,000
4. Supplementary insurance (premium payable by WEU)	31,600	-	31,600
TOTAL CHAPTER B.I.A.	1,611,100	+ 302,600	1,913,700
<i>Income</i>			
B.VIII. Receipts relating to pensions			
1. Contributions (7%)	329,000	- 9,000	320,000
2. Reimbursement of loans and withdrawals	-	-	-
3. Other receipts	-	-	-
TOTAL CHAPTER B.VIII.	329,000	- 9,000	320,000
NET TOTAL	1,282,100	+ 311,600	1,593,700

Agency for the Control of Armaments

	Credits approved for 1985	Proposed amendments	Revised estimates
	F	F	F
<i>Expenditure</i>			
C.I.A. Pensions			
1. Pensions			
(a) Retirement pension	2,290,000	-	2,290,000
(b) Invalidity pension	-	-	-
(c) Survivors' pension	817,300	-	817,300
(d) Orphans' pension	51,000	+ 1,000	52,000
2. Allowances			
(a) Household allowance	167,700	-	167,700
(b) Dependants' allowance	81,200	-	81,200
(c) Education allowance	-	-	-
(d) Hardship allowance	-	-	-
3. Leaving allowance	1,272,000	+ 75,000	1,347,000
4. Supplementary insurance (premium payable by WEU)	68,300	-	68,300
TOTAL CHAPTER C.I.A.	4,747,500	+ 76,000	4,823,500
<i>Income</i>			
C.VIII. Receipts relating to pensions			
1. Contributions (7%)	751,600	- 57,300	694,300
2. Reimbursement of loans and withdrawals	-	-	-
3. Other receipts	-	-	-
TOTAL CHAPTER C.VIII.	751,600	- 57,300	694,300
NET TOTAL	3,995,900	+ 133,300	4,129,200

APPENDIX II

*WEU budget for 1986*¹

1. The draft budget was examined by the Budget and Organisation Committee at its meeting on 24th-25th October 1985 (B (85) 17; BR (85) 2, VI) and the estimates were subsequently modified in accordance with the committee's recommendations.

2. The budget was approved by the Council on 15th January 1986 (C-B (85) 17; CR (86) 1, VII, 1), subject to the proviso outlined in document C (86) 10.

1. Document C-B (85) 17 of 17th January 1986.

*WEU budget estimates for 1986**Proposed expenditure and income*

	Section A - London	Section B - Paris
	£	F
<i>Expenditure</i>		
Salaries and allowances	1,549,357	34,723,600
Travel	54,620	690,000
Other operating costs	251,890	2,160,700
Purchase of furniture and equipment	5,215	65,000
Building	-	70,000
Total	1,861,082	37,709,300
<i>Income</i>		
WEU tax	573,330	12,130,000
Other receipts	39,155	478,100
	612,485	12,608,100
NET TOTAL	1,248,597	25,101,200
Net pensions	168,645	4,750,500
Contributions required*	1,417,242	29,851,700
Budget surplus 1984	569	921,391
Net contributions 1986**	1,416,673	28,930,309
	14.14%	1.87%

* Difference 1986/1985.
(Total + 5,89 %)

*Contributions***

	600ths	£	F
Belgium	59	139,306.18	2,844,813.72
France	120	283,334.60	5,786,061.80
Germany	120	283,334.60	5,786,061.80
Italy	120	283,334.60	5,786,061.80
Luxembourg	2	4,722.24	96,434.36
Netherlands	59	139,306.18	2,844,813.72
United Kingdom	120	283,334.60	5,786,061.80
	600	1,416,673.00	28,930,309.00

*Secretariat-General**Summary of estimated expenditure and income for 1986*

	Credits		Difference between 1986 and 1985	Expenditure and income in 1984
	Proposed for 1986	Revised for 1985		
	£	£	£	£
<i>Current expenditure</i>				
A.I. Salaries, wages and other remunerations to personnel, provident fund, social and supplementary insurances	1,549,357	1 290,674	258,683	1,215,930
A.II. Travel	54,620	47,960	6,660	36,035
A.III. Other operating costs	251,890	268,330	- 16,440	194,571
	1,855,867	1,606,964	248,903	1,446,536
<i>Capital expenditure</i>				
A.IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment	5,215	9,720	- 4,505	14,630
A.V. Buildings	-	-	-	-
Total expenditure 1986/1985 + 15.12%	1,861,082	1,616,684	244,398	1,461,166
<i>Income</i>				
A.VI. WEU tax	573,330	461,480	111,850	453,783
A.VII. Other receipts	39,155	35,645	3,510	44,763
Total income 1986/1985 - 23.21%	612,485	497,125	115,360	498,546
NET TOTAL 1986/1985 + 11.53%	1,248,597	1,119,559	129,038	962,620

Details by item

	Credits		Difference between 1986 and 1985	Expenditure and income in 1984
	Proposed for 1986	Revised for 1985		
	£	£		
<i>Current expenditure</i>				
A.I. Salaries, wages and other remunerations to personnel, social and supplementary insurances				
1. Basic salary	1,331,545	1,065,265	266,280	1,042,197
2. Expatriation allowance	75,160	54,720	20,440	52,228
3. Household allowance	29,030	25,785	3,245	24,308
4. Children's and dependants' allowance	25,360	19,920	5,440	20,980
5. Language allowance	1,015	452	563	371
6. Representation allowance	3,857	3,857	-	3,857
Total	1,465,967	1,169,999	295,968	1,143,941
7. Installation allowance	8,570	13,825	- 5,255	-
8. Rent allowance	26,545	18,500	8,045	13,856
9. Overtime	2,500	1,800	700	1,625
10. Payment for unexpended leave	-	425	- 425	-
11. Home leave	2,500	1,800	700	2,036
12. Contribution of WEU to provident fund - 14% of basic salary	10,335	14,530	- 4,195	20,899
13. Allowance on termination of contract	-	1,985	- 1,985	-
14. Temporary staff	3,200	44,600	- 41,400	10,625
15. Social insurance (employer's part)	-	-	-	-
16. Supplementary insurance premium paid by WEU	25,820	20,790	5,030	20,962
17. Education allowance	3,920	2,420	1,500	1,986
TOTAL CHAPTER A.I. 1986/1985 + 20.04%	1,549,357	1,290,674	258,683	1,215,930

	Credits		Difference between 1986 and 1985	Expenditure and income in 1984
	Proposed for 1986	Revised for 1985		
	£	£	£	£
A.II. Travel				
1. Travel on official business				
(a) Travelling expenses	21,925	16,020	5,905	17,508
(b) Subsistence allowance	18,065	18,060	5	16,360
2. Travel on initial recruitment, transfer or departure	1,500	1,750	- 250	149
3. Removal of household effects	8,860	8,860	-	-
4. Travel under Article 60 (b) of the Staff Rules				
(a) Travelling expenses	2,325	1,825	500	909
(b) Subsistence allowance	1,945	1,445	500	1,109
TOTAL CHAPTER A.II. 1986/1985 + 13.89%	54,620	47,960	6,660	36,035

	Credits		Difference between 1986 and 1985	Expenditure and income in 1984
	Proposed for 1986	Revised for 1985		
	£	£	£	£
A.III. Other operating costs				
1. Premises				
(a) Rent and rates	20,210	19,655	555	19,273
(b) Maintenance and repairs	100,000	139,000	- 39,000	83,718
(c) Gas, electricity and water	13,230	12,385	845	10,235
(d) Cleaning (contract)	8,200	8,340	- 140	7,810
2. Furniture/equipment				
(a) Rental	13,150	2,100	11,050	697
(b) Maintenance, repair	5,680	3,375	2,305	2,874
3. Office supplies	11,550	10,900	650	10,387
4. Communications				
(a) Telephone/telegraph charges	11,220	10,800	420	9,194
(b) Postage	975	950	25	780
5. Other expenses				
(a) Audit	5,195	3,280	1,915	3,671
(b) Bank charges	200	530	- 330	350
(c) Hospitality	6,895	6,385	510	5,789
(d) Motor vehicles	3,350	3,000	350	2,613
(e) Information, documenta- tion, periodicals	5,135	4,845	290	3,812
(f) Uniforms	1,095	1,035	60	438
(g) Linguists' fees and other professional charges	11,700	12,060	- 360	7,745
(h) Medical examinations	1,060	870	190	773
(i) Insurances	3,450	3,585	- 135	2,787
(j) Printing	3,000	1,500	1,500	460
(k) Appeals board	p.m.	p.m.	-	-
(l) Miscellaneous	900	900	-	899
(m) Inter-organisational charges	24,695	21,835	2,860	20,053
6. Allowance for contingencies	1,000	1,000	-	231
TOTAL CHAPTER A.III. 1986/1985 - 6.13%	251,890	268,330	- 16,440	194,571

	Credits		Difference between 1986 and 1985	Expenditure and income in 1984
	Proposed for 1986	Revised for 1985		
	£	£	£	£
<i>Capital expenditure</i>				
A.IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment				
1. Furniture for 8-9 Grosvenor Place	2,110	2,045	65	2,958
2. Office machines and equipment	2,380	6,950	- 4,750	4,678
3. Library	725	725	-	356
4. Motor vehicles	-	-	-	6,638
TOTAL CHAPTER A.IV. 1986/1985 - 46.35%	5,215	9,720	- 4,505	14,630
A.V. Buildings	-	-	-	-
TOTAL CHAPTER A.V. 1986/1985	-	-	-	-

	Credits		Difference between 1986 and 1985	Expenditure and income in 1984
	Proposed for 1986	Revised for 1985		
	£	£	£	£
<i>Income</i>				
A.VI. WEU tax				
1. Tax levied according to Article 2 of the WEU Taxation Regulations	569,010	455,345	113,665	444,870
2. Tax levied according to Article 8 (1) of the WEU Taxation Regulations	4,320	6,135	- 1,815	8,913
TOTAL CHAPTER A.VI. 1986/1985 + 24.24%	573,330	461,480	111,850	453,783
A.VII. Other receipts				
1. Bank interest	15,000	16,000	- 1,000	18,322
2. Reimbursement of VAT	20,160	13,500	6,660	19,024
3. Social insurance benefits and family allowance	650	720	- 70	1,219
4. Miscellaneous	-	150	- 150	500
5. Temporary levy - A/L	3,345	5,275	- 1,930	5,698
TOTAL CHAPTER A.VII. 1986/1985 + 9.85%	39,155	35,645	3,510	44,763

*Agencies for security questions**Summary of estimated expenditure and income for 1986*

	Credits		Difference between 1986 and 1985	Expenditure and income in 1984
	Proposed for 1986	Revised for 1985 ¹		
	F	F	F	
<i>Current expenditure</i>				
B.I. Salaries, wages and other remunerations to personnel, provident fund, social and supplementary insurances	34,723,600	32,504,750	2,218,850	31,737,027.62
B.II. Travel	690,000	724,900	- 34,900	762,911.15
B.III. Other operating costs	2,160,700	1,892,580	268,120	1,625,701.41
	37,574,300	35,122,230	2,452,070	34,125,640.18
<i>Capital expenditure</i>				
B.IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment	65,000	96,400	- 31,400	85,176.60
B.V. Buildings	70,000	424,500	- 354,500	70,000.00
Total expenditure 1986/1985 + 5.80%	37,709,300	35,643,130	2,066,170	34,280,816.78
<i>Income</i>				
B.VI. WEU tax	12,130,000	11,312,800	817,200	11,090,708.14
B.VII. Other receipts	478,100	749,100	- 271,000	745,579.19
Total income 1986/1985 + 4.53%	12,608,100	12,061,900	546,200	11,836,287.33
NET TOTAL 1986/1985 + 6.45%	25,101,200	23,581,230	1,519,970	22,444,529.45

1. Total credits of sections B and C.

Details by item

	Credits		Difference between 1986 and 1985	Expenditure and income in 1984
	Proposed for 1986	Revised for 1985 ¹		
	F	F	F	F
<i>Current expenditure</i>				
B.I. Salaries, wages and other remunerations to personnel, social and supplementary insurances				
1. Basic salary	27,963,800	26,334,300	1,629,500	25,704,550.33
2. Expatriation allowance	1,582,100	1,491,000	91,100	1,582,463.98
3. Household allowance	770,800	720,000	50,800	719,129.09
4. Children's and dependants' allowance	764,500	656,700	107,800	639,966.83
5. Language allowance	7,000	6,500	500	6,134.16
6. Representation allowance	—	—	—	—
Total	31,088,200	29,208,500	1,879,700	28,652,244.39
7. Installation allowance	190,000	—	190,000	47,996.17
8. Rent allowance	62,000	63,800	— 1,800	53,665.89
9. Overtime	61,800	57,750	4,050	50,342.34
10. Payment for unexpended leave	—	—	—	—
11. Home leave	136,300	98,700	37,600	57,753.44
12. Contribution of WEU to provident fund — 14% of basic salary	159,000	152,000	7,000	148,139.72
13. Allowance on termination of contract	—	—	—	—
14. Temporary staff	—	—	—	20,000.00
15. Social insurance (employer's part)	2,214,000	2,132,000	82,000	1,963,567.02
16. Supplementary insurance premium paid by WEU	576,800	578,000	1,200	526,720.03
17. Education allowance	235,500	214,000	21,500	216,598.62
TOTAL CHAPTER B.I. 1986/1985 + 6.83%	34,723,600	32,504,750	2,218,850	31,737,027.62

1. Total credits of sections B and C.

	Credits		Difference between 1986 and 1985	Expenditure and income in 1984
	Proposed for 1986	Revised for 1985 ¹		
	F	F	F	F
B.II. Travel				
1. Travel on official business				
(a) Travelling expenses	190,000	202,600	- 12,600	291,089.74
(b) Subsistence allowance	290,000	268,700	21,300	332,423.22
2. Travel on initial recruitment, transfer or departure	20,000	33,600	- 13,600	15,640.64
3. Removal of household effects	190,000	220,000	- 30,000	123,757.55
TOTAL CHAPTER B.II. 1986/1985 - 4.81%	690,000	724,900	- 34,900	762,911.15

1. Total credits of sections B and C.

	Credits		Difference between 1986 and 1985	Expenditure and income in 1984
	Proposed for 1986	Revised for 1985 ¹		
	F	F	F	F
B.III. Other operating costs				
1. Premises				
(a) Rent and rates	33,700	28,160	5,540	21,154.37
(b) Maintenance and repairs	307,700	280,500	27,200	253,894.77
(c) Gas, electricity and water	373,200	340,200	33,000	262,287.81
(d) Cleaning (contract)	265,500	235,400	30,100	196,708.62
2. Furniture/equipment				
(a) Rental	127,900	69,990	57,910	69,872.70
(b) Maintenance, repairs	37,700	35,350	2,350	28,555.01
3. Office supplies	190,000	174,060	15,940	151,082.17
4. Communications				
(a) Telephone/telegraph charges	317,150	317,150	—	291,909.14
(b) Postage	23,500	22,400	1,100	16,427.30
5. Other expenses				
(a) Audit	—	—	—	—
(b) Bank charges	100	100	—	112.50
(c) Hospitality	118,500	79,000	39,500	75,618.82
(d) Motor vehicles	40,000	32,340	7,660	25,105.76
(e) Information/documenta- tion/periodicals	80,000	66,650	13,350	69,188.23
(f) Uniforms	26,600	19,800	6,800	21,633.79
(g) Linguists' fees and other pro- fessional charges	44,500	44,500	—	19,414.69
(h) Medical examinations	27,600	24,000	3,600	15,765.46
(i) Insurances	54,700	43,500	11,200	38,134.86
(j) Miscellaneous	47,550	44,800	2,750	36,214.57
(k) Non-recoverable tax pay- ments	32,500	23,150	9,350	22,422.25
(l) Translation fees	10,500	9,830	670	9,215.40
6. Allowance for contingencies	1,800	1,700	100	983.19
TOTAL CHAPTER B.III. 1986/1985 + 14.17%	2,160,700	1,892,580	268,120	1,625,701.41

1. Total credits of sections B and C.

	Credits		Difference between 1986 and 1985	Expenditure and income in 1984
	Proposed for 1986	Revised for 1985 ¹		
	F	F	F	F
<i>Capital expenditure</i>				
B.IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment				
1. Furniture and equipment	45,000	40,000	5,000	57,676.78
2. Office machines	–	43,500	– 43,500	22,152.29
3. Library	20,000	12,900	7,100	5,347.53
4. Motor vehicles	–	–	–	–
TOTAL CHAPTER B.IV. 1986/1985 – 32.57%	65,000	96,400	– 31,400	85,176.60
B.V. Buildings	70,000	424,500	(–) 354,500	70,000.00
TOTAL CHAPTER B.V. 1986/1985 – 83.51%	70,000	424,500	(–) 354,500	70,000.00

1. Total credits for sections B and C.

	Credits		Difference between 1986 and 1985	Expenditure and income in 1984
	Proposed for 1986	Revised for 1985 ¹		
	F	F	F	F
<i>Income</i>				
B.VI. WEU tax				
1. Tax levied according to Article 2 of the WEU Taxation Regula- tions	12,062,000	11,250,100	811,900	11,028,286.52
2. Tax levied according to Article 8 (1) of the WEU Taxation Regu- lations	68,000	62,700	5,300	62,421.62
TOTAL CHAPTER B.VI. 1986/1985 + 7.22%	12,130,000	11,312,800	817,200	11,090,708.14
B.VII. Other receipts				
1. Bank interest	300,000	344,500	– 44,500	529,268.26
2. Reimbursement of VAT	–	–	–	–
3. Social insurance benefits and family allowance	32,100	32,100	–	53,138.60
4. Miscellaneous	10,000	22,500	– 12,500	33,080.13
5. Temporary levy – A/L	136,000	350,000	– 214,000	130,092.20
TOTAL CHAPTER B.VII. 1986/1985 – 36.18%	478,100	749,100	– 271,000	745,579.19

1. Total credits for sections B and C.

ANNEX
WEU pension budget for 1986
Proposed expenditure and income

	Section A London	Section B Paris
	£	F
<i>Expenditure</i>		
<i>Pensions</i>		
Retirement	145,730	3,625,800
Invalidity	12,065	-
Survivors'	33,140	1,280,200
Orphans'	7,065	53,800
<i>Allowances</i>		
Household	7,350	241,500
Dependants'	4,780	108,000
Education	-	-
Hardship	-	-
Leaving	12,700	372,000
Supplementary insurance	2,775	106,200
Bank charges	325	-
Total expenditure	225,930	5,787,500
<i>Income</i>		
Contributions (7%)	50,365	1,037,000
Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals	1,570	-
Other receipts	5,350	-
Total income	57,285	1,037,000
NET TOTAL 1986	168,645	4,750,500
NET TOTAL 1985	122,110	5,722,900
Difference	+ 46,535	- 972,400
	+ 38.11%	- 16.99%

Section A - Secretariat-General

	Credits		Difference between 1986 and 1985	Expenditure and income in 1984
	Proposed for 1986	Revised for 1985		
	£	£	£	£
<i>Pensions budget</i>				
<i>Expenditure</i>				
A.I.A. Pensions				
1. Pensions				
(a) Retirement pensions	145,730	97,030	48,700	87,056
(b) Invalidity pensions	12,065	11,460	605	10,871
(c) Survivors' pensions	33,140	30,775	2,365	20,675
(d) Orphans' pensions	7,065	6,875	190	3,455
2. Allowances				
(a) Household allowance	7,350	4,775	2,575	4,019
(b) Dependants' allowance	4,780	3,700	1,080	1,881
(c) Education allowance	—	—	—	—
(d) Hardship allowance	—	—	—	—
3. Leaving allowance	12,700	13,345	- 645	20,710
4. Supplementary insurance premium paid by WEU	2,775	2,100	675	1,753
5. Bank charges	325	—	325	—
TOTAL CHAPTER A.I.A. 1986/1985 + 32.85%	225,930	170,060	55,870	150,420
<i>Income</i>				
A.VIII. Pension receipts				
1. Contribution 7%	50,365	38,860	11,505	35,813
2. Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals	1,570	3,780	- 2,210	3,783
3. Other receipts	5,350	5,310	40	4,823
TOTAL CHAPTER A.VIII. 1986/1985 + 19.47%	57,285	47,950	9,335	44,419
NET TOTAL 1986/1985 + 38.11%	168,645	122,110	46,535	106,001

Section B – Agencies for security questions


	Credits		Difference between 1986 and 1985	Expenditure and income in 1984
	Proposed for 1986	Revised for 1985 ¹		
	F	F	F	F
<i>Pensions budget</i>				
<i>Expenditure</i>				
B.I.A. Pensions				
1. Pensions				
(a) Retirement pensions	3,625,800	3,399,000	226,800	3,087,995
(b) Invalidity pensions	–	–	–	–
(c) Survivors' pensions	1,280,200	1,224,100	56,100	1,236,975
(d) Orphans' pensions	53,800	52,000	1,800	47,861
2. Allowances				
(a) Household allowance	241,500	228,500	13,000	200,837
(b) Dependants' allowance	108,000	123,700	– 15,700	82,375
(c) Education allowance	–	–	–	–
(d) Hardship allowance	–	–	–	–
3. Leaving allowance	372,000	1,610,000	– 1,238,000	865,821
4. Supplementary insurance premium paid by WEU	106,200	99,900	6,300	89,441
TOTAL CHAPTER B.I.A. 1986/1985 – 14.10%	5,787,500	6,737,200	– 949,700	5,611,305
<i>Income</i>				
B.VIII. Pension receipts				
1. Contributions 7%	1,037,000	1,014,300	22,700	984,805
2. Reimbursement of loans and withdrawals	–	–	–	–
3. Other receipts	–	–	–	26,889
TOTAL CHAPTER B.VIII. 1986/1985 + 2.24%	1,037,000	1,014,300	22,700	1,011,694
NET TOTAL 1986/1985 – 16.99%	4,750,500	5,722,900	– 972,400	4,599,611


1. Total credits of sections B and C.

Organisation of the Secretariat-General

APPENDIX III

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Organisation of the agencies for security questions

APPENDIX IV

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- * Double function : Director of Agency I and Director of A.C.A.
- ** Double function : Staff member of Agency I and Deputy Director of A.C.A.

APPENDIX V

*Office modernisation at the Secretariat-General*¹

1. Document B (83) 8 contains a number of observations concerning the introduction of "tempested" word-processing equipment. No provisions were made for this equipment in the 1984 budget. The subject was discussed at the Budget and Organisation Committee meeting on 20th June 1983 (BR (83) 1, VI), and it was then agreed to keep the matter under review.

2. In B (84) 10 it was observed that, under the long-term renewal programme for typewriters, due to recommence in 1988, electronic typewriters might be introduced; the more sophisticated machines include word-processing functions.

3. The discussions on the reactivation of WEU, which started in 1984, were further advanced following the meeting of the Council of Ministers in October 1984. New work programmes are already being followed which call for extra meetings of working groups. In addition there is a much-increased production of documents, as well as regular Council meetings with extended agendas and a need for more rapid follow-up action, greater secretarial assistance and increasing demands on the translation services.

A forewarning of the effect on the (London) budget was given in B (84) 15, part II, paragraph 1, and B (84) 10, page 7.

4. Some temporary measures to improve secretarial services have been taken, and transfers requested to take advantage of savings obtained by maintaining vacancies temporarily to the extent possible.

(i) With B (84) 20 one electronic typewriter was supplemented by a VDU and a micro processor to become a true word processor. This is a non-tempested word processor, to be used in the office of administration for non-classified documents only. This equipment is also very valuable in providing practical experience with word processors.

(ii) Approval of B (85) 4 made it possible to purchase a personal computer, to be used for the modernisation and computerisation of the financial administration.

(iii) With B (85) 10 funds were made available by transfer to permit the purchase of two electronic typewriters, with attachments for floppy-disc memories so as to permit the storing of classified information, to be used by the General Affairs Division.

5. The required quality, quantity and speed of secretarial assistance and production of classified documents now calls for the introduction of tempested word-processing equipment. Bearing in mind the requirement that all documents need to be produced in the two official languages simultaneously, it would be a great advantage to have two stand-alone, complete word processors so as to enable the English and the French sections to work in parallel.

(i) As an alternative to outright purchase, leasing could cover three years or five years. In effect, it means that over those periods the purchase sum plus approximately 10% annual interest would be paid.

(ii) A typical cost comparison is given in annex.

(iii) Delivery time of a tempested word processor is three months.

6. It is difficult at this stage to judge exactly how the introduction of two word processors for the general typing and secretarial functions would affect the staffing situation. This would be a matter for subsequent review in the light of experience.

7. The approval of the Budget Committee will be sought at its next meeting on 24th-25th October 1985, for either the purchase of one word processor in 1986 and one in 1987, or the lease of two word processors for a period of 3 or 5 years.

1. Document B (85) 11 of 13th August 1985.

ANNEX

Budgetary cost calculations for tempested word processor

A. <i>Purchase</i>	£
(i) 1 standard word processor	10,830
additional software for French language	200
automatic paper feeder for printer	560
acoustic hood for printer	550
ancillaries (110/220 V. convertor, floppy discs, etc.)	<u>1,000</u>
	13,140
+ 15 % VAT	£15,111
(ii) training one operator free, second operator	200
(iii) maintenance contract	£96 p/month £1,152 p/annum

B. *Lease*

Amount of lease based on purchase value £13,100 (excl. VAT) £15,100 (incl. VAT) and at completion of lease period equipment may be purchased for a token amount, or returned to seller.

(i) 5-year lease at £26 per thousand per month;	£
(excl. VAT) per month	341
per annum	4,087
(incl. VAT) per month	392
per annum	4,711
(ii) 3-year lease at £37 per thousand per month;	
(excl. VAT) per month	485
per annum	5,816
(incl. VAT) per month	559
per annum	6,704
(iii) maintenance as for A. Purchase	
(iv) training as for A. Purchase	

C. *Budget comparison (for 2 word processors) excl. VAT*

Budget year	Purchase	3-year lease	5-year lease
1986	£	£	£
	13,140 1,152 200	11,632 2,304 400	8,174 2,304 400
	14,492	14,336	10,878
1987	13,140 2,304 200	11,632 2,304	8,174 2,304
	15,644	13,936	10,478
1988	2,304	13,936	10,478
1989	2,304	2,304	10,478
1990	2,304	2,304	10,478
Totals	37,048	46,816	52,790

APPENDIX VI

*Long-term maintenance and modernisation programme – London office*¹

1. On 11th May 1983, the Secretary-General circulated document B (83) 8 setting out an updated programme of future maintenance and modernisation plans.

2. The programme has again been updated and is attached.

3. This document will be on the agenda of the next meeting of the Budget and Organisation Committee.

A. Maintenance of the building

1. Delegations are reminded that the building is leased, on behalf of WEU, by the British Government. The lease has a duration of 42 years and expires in 1998. The annual rental was fixed for the whole term at £10,500 per annum. That is equivalent to £0.74 per square foot per annum. Similar properties in the same area today command at least £15 per square foot per annum and leases nowadays provide for periodic rent reviews.

As is customary in the United Kingdom, the lease makes the tenant responsible for all maintenance. That work is carried out by the British Government's Department of the Environment which is reimbursed by WEU.

2. The lease calls for the periodic redecoration of the building, both inside (about seven years) and outside (every three years), with the full internal cleaning of walls and paintwork within the seven year interval. Outside brick and stonework has also to be cleaned and renovated according to the landlord's requirements but not more than once every ten years. Other work is carried out as and when necessary, as determined by the surveyors and engineers of the Department of the Environment.

3. In response to a request for details of work to be carried out in the 1985 financial year, the Department of the Environment has submitted the following estimate:

(a) Stone cleaning front façade from 1st floor to roof	£34,500
This is a lease commitment and must be done.	

(b) Major roof repairs (new felt, battens and slates)	£55,200
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This is in a very poor state of repair.

(c) Gents toilet in basement (eradicate damp)	£25,000
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Toilet is in a very poor state of repair and will soon be unfit to be used.

(d) Repairs to parapet and pointing to brickwork on rear elevation – including scaffolding	£34,500
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Parapet will soon be in a dangerous state.

(e) Day-to-day maintenance	£34,500
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(f) For work to be carried out to meet the fire officer's recommendations	£31,000
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TOTAL	£214,700
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The comments accompanying the above estimates are those of the Department of the Environment's official responsible for this building.

4. Actual maintenance expenditure over recent years has been as follows:

1981 –	£41,017
1982 –	£93,375
1983 –	£64,834
1984 –	£87,000 (estimate)

5. Aware that member governments would not wish to see, in 1985, an increase of almost 150% for this expenditure, the Department of the Environment was asked to examine the possibility of reducing its estimate. In reply it was suggested that items (b), (c) and (d) could now be postponed until 1986 but that the amount under (e) be increased by £10,000 to cover interim remedial work that may be required as a result of the postponement. This proposal would not be wholly satisfactory in terms of reaching an even spread of the costs and, for that reason, the Secretary-General suggests the following allocations:

1. Document B (84) 10, 15th August 1984.

1985 budget

(a) Stone cleaning	£34,500
(c) Gents toilet in basement	£15,000
(for the most urgent work)	
(e) Day-to-day maintenance with extra provision for remedial work (parapet)	£44,500
(f) One-third of the cost of the fire precautions work (to be spread over three years)	£10,350
TOTAL	£104,350 (+ 20 %)

1986 budget

(b) Roof repairs	£55,200
(c) Gents toilet – balance of work if required ..	£10,000
(d) Repairs to parapet/brickwork	£34,500
(e) Day-to-day maintenance	£34,500
(f) One-third of fire precautions work	£10,350
TOTAL	£144,550

These figures for 1986 will, obviously, be subject to confirmation during 1985.

6. Finally, it is noted that the fire precautions work mentioned above was originally foreseen in the period 1980 to 1982. It was not then carried out because of objections raised by the owners of the building. Their approval is still outstanding but the Department of the Environment now seems reasonably confident that it will be given.

*Note:**Routine maintenance*

This involves regular inspections and servicing by technical staff of:

- (i) central-heating boiler/hot water system;
- (ii) lift installation;
- (iii) electrical system including replacement of lamps;
- (iv) plumbing installations.

Annual estimates

The approved estimate for routine maintenance in 1984 amounted to £27,500. It is not possible to break down this estimate to establish the cost of the various types of maintenance because the Department of the Environment is unable to provide such details (see B (80) 6, page 2, paragraph A.2).

*B. Office furniture and equipment**Suggested programme for renewals (at estimated 1985 prices)**Carpets, furniture, etc.*

- (a) All worn carpets will continue to be renewed in annual allotments. Lino will also be renewed as required.
- (b) As was stated in B (80) 6, all furniture would be repaired or, where essential, replaced in annual allotments until completion in 1983. Thereafter only incidental maintenance would be required.
- (c) The replacement of net curtains has begun three years later than was foreseen in 1980 and will span the years 1984-1986.
- (d) Heavy curtains: rear side of building full curtains to be replaced by side curtains, where necessary.

£ sterling

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Furniture	645	725	725	725	725	725	725	725	725
Carpets/lino	1,525	1,320	1,320	1,320	1,320	1,320	1,320	1,320	1,320
Net curtains	645	725	725	–	–	–	–	–	–
Heavy curtains	–	1,320	1,320	1,320	–	–	–	–	–
Total	2,815	4,090	4,090	3,365	2,045	2,045	2,045	2,045	2,045

Office machines

Office machines are expected to have a working life of ten years. Earlier replacement may, however, be necessary occasionally. When

the typewriter renewal programme recommences in 1988, it will be preceded by a study of the new generation of electronic machines now being introduced. The more sophisticated of these include word-processing functions.

£ sterling

	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Typewriters	-	-	-	-	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200
Reproduction equipment	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tape recorders	-	-	-	600	600	600	600	-	-
Microphone system	1,900	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Desk top calculators	-	-	-	180	180	-	-	-	-
Dictating machine	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	350
Word processors	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Totals	1,900	-	-	780	1,980	1,800	1,800	1,200	1,550

Notes:

- Prices for 1985 and beyond are based on those anticipated in 1985 and will, of course, be subject to adjustment at the appropriate time.
- The typewriter replacement programme refers to the machines used by secretaries and typists (18 including 3 for special work and one reserve).
- The typewriter modernisation programme was completed in 1983 and all oper-

ational typewriters are now electric typewriters.

- In 1983 an off-set printing machine was purchased and put into operation. Back-up equipment, either another similar machine or more sophisticated photocopying equipment, may be required if the volume of work continues at the level experienced in the first half of 1984. In any event, it will be necessary to make temporary arrangements in this respect for the second half of 1984 and the beginning of 1985.

APPENDIX VII

Trend of budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU between 1985 and 1986

	Secretariat-General (£)			Paris agencies (French francs)		
	1985	1985 revised	1986	1985	1985 revised	1986
A. Operating budget						
I. Staff	1,296,910	1,290,674	1,549,357	34,936,550	32,504,750	34,723,600
II. Travel	39,750	47,960	54,620	724,900	724,900	690,000
III. Other operating costs	212,600	268,330	251,890	1,875,880	1,892,580	2,160,700
IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment	2,720	9,720	5,215	96,400	96,400	65,000
V. Buildings	—	—	—	70,000	424,500	70,000
Total expenditure	1,551,980	1,616,684	1,861,082	37,703,730	35,643,130	37,709,300
Receipts	530,460	497,125	612,485	12,927,600	12,061,900	12,608,100
Net total	1,021,520	1,119,559	1,248,597	24,776,130	23,581,230	25,101,200
B. Pensions budget						
Pensions and allowances	137,890	170,060	225,930	6,358,600	6,737,200	5,787,500
Pension receipts	48,200	47,950	57,285	1,080,600	1,014,300	1,037,000
Net total	89,690	122,110	168,645	5,278,000	5,722,900	4,750,500
NET GRAND TOTAL (A + B)	1,111,210	1,241,669	1,417,242	30,054,130	29,304,130	29,851,700

APPENDIX VIII

*Variations in the budgets of the ministerial organs
for 1985 (revised) and 1986 compared with previous budgets*

	Secretariat-General (£)					Paris agencies (French francs)				
	1985	1985 revised (+ or -)	%	1986 (+ or -)	%	1985	1985 revised (+ or -)	%	1986 (+ or -)	%
A. Operating budget										
I. Staff	1,296,910	- 6,236		+ 258,683		34,936,550	- 2,431,800		+ 2,218,850	
II. Travel	39,750	+ 8,210		+ 6,660		724,900	-		- 34,900	
III. Other operating costs	212,600	+ 55,730		- 16,440		1,875,880	+ 16,700		+ 268,120	
IV. Purchase of furniture and equipment	2,720	+ 7,000		- 4,505		96,400	-		- 31,000	
V. Buildings	-	-		-		70,000	+ 354,500		- 354,500	
Total expenditure	1,551,980	+ 64,704	4.17	+ 244,398	15.11	37,703,730	+ 2,060,600	- 5.46	+ 2,066,170	5.80
Receipts	530,460	- 33,335		+ 115,360		12,927,600	- 865,700		+ 546,200	
Net total	1,021,520	+ 98,039	9.59	+ 129,038	11.52	24,776,130	- 1,194,900	- 0.48	+ 1,519,970	6.44
B. Pensions budget										
Pensions and allowances	137,890	+ 32,170	23.33	+ 55,870	32.85	6,358,600	+ 378,600	5.95	- 949,700	- 14.10
Pensions receipts	48,200	- 250		+ 9,335		1,080,600	- 66,300		+ 22,700	
Net total	89,690	+ 32,420	36.14	+ 46,535	38.10	5,278,000	444,900	8.43	- 972,400	- 16.99
NET GRAND TOTAL (A + B)	1,111,210	+ 130,459	11.74	+ 175,573	14.14	30,054,130	- 750,000	- 2.49	+ 547,570	1.87
Differences 1986/1985		27.54%					- 0.67%			

APPENDIX IX

*Comparison between the staff of the ministerial organs of WEU
in 1985 and 1986*

Grades	Secretariat-General			Paris agencies		
	1985	1986	Variation	1985	1986	Variation
H.G.	3	2	- 1	2	3	+ 1
A	8	11	+ 3	26	20	- 6
L	4	5	+ 1	6	4	- 2
B	22	23	+ 1	29	29	-
C	11	10	- 1	17	17	-
	48	51	+ 3	80	73	- 7

APPENDIX X

Reform of present methods of approving the Assembly's budget*¹*MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION*****tabled by Dame Florence Horsbrugh
and several of her colleagues***

The Assembly,

Anxious to respect both the ultimate financial responsibility vested in the Council, and the dignity of a parliamentary Assembly,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

1. That it transfer the exercise of its annual examination of the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly to the Presidential Committee of the Assembly, for a trial period of two years, on the condition that the total expenditure does not exceed the budget for the financial year 1960.
2. That, in the event of circumstances necessitating an increase in this expenditure, the prior permission of the Council be sought at a joint meeting.

Signed: Dame Florence Horsbrugh, MM. Altmaier, Russell, Duynstee, Lucifero, Mme Rehling, MM. Linden, de la Vallée Poussin, Cadorna, Pisani, Taylor

1. Document 155, 30th November 1959.

APPENDIX XI

*Procedure for approving Assembly budgets
adopted by the Council on 24th February 1960
and approved by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly
on 18th March 1960*

- (i) The Assembly's Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration produces a draft budget ¹;
- (ii) this draft, accompanied by an explanatory memorandum, is sent to the Council for an opinion ²;
- (iii) the Council gives its opinion, indicating either preparedness to accept the draft or proposing amendments;
- (iv) in the latter case, if the Council's amendments are not acceptable and the matter cannot be settled by correspondence, they are discussed at a joint meeting;
- (v) the draft budget, as eventually agreed, then continues through the Assembly's normal procedure;
- (vi) the budget, as then approved by the Assembly (during the second part of the annual session), goes back to the Council and, if it has not been further amended by the Assembly, the Council can formally approve it without further discussion.

1. In accordance with Article VIII of the Charter of the Assembly, the draft budget is prepared by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration "in consultation" with the Presidential Committee. Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly and Article 2 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly provide that this draft budget is prepared by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration "in collaboration" with the Presidential Committee.

2. The draft budget is considered first by the Budget and Organisation Committee at a meeting with the representative of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly. The Council then gives its opinion on the basis of recommendations made by that committee.

APPENDIX XII

*Extracts from Assembly Recommendations 240, 250 and 340
and replies of the Council*I. *Extract from Recommendation 240 adopted by the Assembly on 20th November 1973*

The Assembly,

.....

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

.....

2. (b) the provision of dual grades at every level of employment.

Extract from the reply of the Council to Recommendation 240, communicated to the Assembly on 29th April 1974

.....

2. (b) Discussions between co-ordinated organisations have shown that implementation of the Assembly's recommendation for the provision of dual grades, at every level of employment, would create very serious difficulties for the organisations. It is recognised, however, that WEU has a special problem in this respect because promotion prospects are more limited for reasons of structure and numbers.

The Secretary-General has put a numbers of proposals to the Council concerning B-grade staff.

II. *Extract from Recommendation 250 adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1974*

The Assembly,

.....

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

.....

II. In the framework of WEU:

5. Give urgent consideration to dual grades at every level in order to offset promotion difficulties.

Extract from the reply of the Council to Recommendation 250, communicated to the Assembly on 28th October 1974

.....

5. While recognising that the position of WEU staff gives rise to certain special problems as regards promotion prospects, the Council feel unable to act upon the Assembly's recommendation for the introduction of a general system of dual grading at every level. They consider that individual special measures should be sufficient to resolve the difficulties arising in this connection.

III. *Extract from Recommendation 340 adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1979*

The Assembly,

.....

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

.....

3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy and in particular:

.....

- to study the possibility of introducing a dual grading system at every level of the hierarchy;

.....

Extract from the reply of the Council to Recommendation 340, communicated to the Assembly on 14th May 1980

.....

3. (a) With regard to the grading system and the introduction of a dual grading system the problems are still under consideration at the administrative level.

APPENDIX XIII

***Recommendation 357 on improving the status of WEU staff
and reply of the Council*****RECOMMENDATION 357¹*****on improving the status of WEU staff²***

The Assembly,

Conscious of the fact that despite the many years' existence of the majority of the co-ordinated organisations problems affecting the careers of officials in these organisations still remain unresolved;

Regretting the necessity to revert to its Recommendation 340;

Regretting also the element of stagnation manifest in the Council's reply to this recommendation and previous recommendations submitted on identical matters,

REQUESTS THAT THE COUNCIL

- I. 1. Appoint an expert, within the framework of the co-ordinated organisations, to study the desirability of setting up an independent body for the administration of pensions as a natural follow-on from the joint pensions administrative section and to make proposals;
 2. Continue to review the possibility of creating a single appeals board for pensions in the light of experience in view of the possibly divergent views taken by appeals boards of the various co-ordinated organisations and the inherent risk of prejudice for officials in these organisations;
 3. Transmit any conclusions which the various co-ordinating agencies may have come to on the problems outlined in paragraph 3 of Recommendation 340 and request these agencies to continue their studies and to report without avoidable delay;
 4. Provide information concerning the number of meetings held by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts in 1980, the duration of these meetings, the subjects discussed and the positive decisions which resulted;
- II. Invites the Secretary-General to ensure that notice of all staff vacancies of A, L, B and C grades arising in the co-ordinated organisations be circulated to the staff of the others.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (10th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 862).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 357***

I.1. The Council recognise that the setting-up of an independent international body for the administration of pensions for the co-ordinated organisations could be desirable in the long term.

However, the joint pensions administrative section, set up and organised as a result of the 149th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts, is a purely consultative body which only started its operational work on 1st January 1980. In accordance with the aim which led to its establishment, namely uniformity in the implementation of the pension scheme, valuable experience is being gained, the scope of its work expanded and new fields of co-operation and exchange explored under the initiative, guidance and supervision of the co-ordinated organisations.

The Council consider it preferable that during this formative phase, the existing organisational structure should be maintained. However, they are following developments closely so as to be able to judge, together with the other co-ordinated organisations, if and when they should study arrangements for modifying the existing structure of the joint pensions administrative section.

2. As already explained in the reply to Recommendation 340, the creation of a single appeals board to deal with matters concerning pensions depends on the developments referred to in paragraph 1 above. But as things stand at present, namely decisions on the implementation of the pension scheme being taken by the Secretary-General of each co-ordinated organisation, the appeals board of each organisation should retain its full responsibility, particularly in the matter of pensions.

This being so, and in keeping with the concern expressed by the Assembly, every effort has been made to avoid divergent decisions being taken by appeals boards with respect to similar cases. Accordingly, the CAPOC* is generally consulted before the confirmation of any decision that might give rise to an appeal and the boards inform each other of their decisions, always providing reasons in full.

3. The Council will keep the Assembly informed of tangible progress made with the matters raised under point 3 of Recommendation 340, which are still under discussion between the various co-ordinated organisations.

4. Details of the meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts held in 1980 are provided in Chapter VI of the twenty-sixth annual report.

II. Notices about staff vacancies are being exchanged with other organisations whenever vacancies cannot be filled by promotion from within the organisation concerned.

* The Administrative Committee on Pensions of the Co-ordinated Organisations (CAPOC) was set up by the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General on 11th September 1974 in implementation of Article 52 of the pension scheme rules. The CAPOC is assisted in its work by the staff of the joint pensions administrative section.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th May 1981.

APPENDIX XIV

***Recommendation 426 on the budget of the ministerial organs
of WEU for the financial years 1984 and 1985
and reply of the Council***

RECOMMENDATION 426 ¹

***on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU
for the financial years 1984 and 1985*** ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Having taken note of the contents;
- (iii) Considering that:
 - (a) the new structure of the ministerial organs of Western European Union depends essentially on the tasks devolving upon them in the framework of the institutional reform announced in the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984;
 - (b) the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for 1984 and 1985 are merely a renewal of the budget for 1983;
 - (c) it would consequently be pointless to examine these budgets on a cost-effectiveness basis;
 - (d) in preparing the budgets for the financial years 1984 and 1985 the criterion of zero growth was applied;
 - (e) since 1984 progress has been made in consultation and conciliation within the co-ordinated organisations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Re-examine the problem of applying the zero growth criterion with a view to specifying that this criterion is to be applied only to operating budgets and not pension budgets;
2. In order to apply this criterion correctly, establish a rate of increase for each category of expenditure instead of fixing a single rate of increase for the net total of the budget;
3. Pursue efforts to improve the status of staff in the framework of consultation and inform the Assembly of the conclusions of studies on this subject;
4. In the framework of present reorganisational studies, re-examine the possibility of a single seat for the ministerial organs of WEU in order to improve liaison between these bodies which at present have offices in London and in Paris, thus reducing costs by integrating supporting staff, and reach a decision on this matter.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (10th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van Tets on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 1031).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 426***

1. The strict application of the zero growth criterion is the objective of member states for both their national budgets and those international budgets to which they contribute. In principle, this objective applies to the overall total of the budget. As far as pension costs are concerned, it is recognised that these will continue to increase until the pension scheme has been in operation long enough for the levelling-off stage to be reached. It is also recognised that, by the very nature of the scheme and its impact on the relatively small budget of WEU, erratic variations in expenditure from year to year will result. The Council will continue to monitor how far these costs have an adverse effect on operating expenditure.
2. While the zero growth target is applied to a total budget, it is, of course, appreciated that some expenditure items may attract increases that exceed that target. In such circumstances, it is customary and necessary to exercise restraint in other areas of expenditure so that the overall objective may be attained. These principles have long been recognised and applied in the case of the budgets of Western European Union.
3. Improvements in the status of staff remain the subject of a continuing study in the framework of co-ordination. Difficulties requiring reappraisal and causing delays can and do arise. This and other matters of concern to staff remain an important preoccupation of the Co-ordinating Committee.
4. The Council has taken note of point 4 of the Assembly's recommendation. The question of establishing a single seat should in any case be examined in the light of the advantages and disadvantages of such an option.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th March 1986.

APPENDIX XV

***Recommendation 429 on WEU and the strategic defence initiative –
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance*****RECOMMENDATION 429¹*****on WEU and the strategic defence initiative
The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance²***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that Europe's security requires the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to make their views carry greater weight on matters relating to the strategy of the alliance, disarmament and allied countries' policies outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;
- (ii) Considering that close, continuing co-ordination of their views is essential to achieve this end;
- (iii) Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty at present provides an ideal framework to achieve this end;
- (iv) Welcoming the intentions asserted by the Council in its Rome declaration, Bonn communiqué and reply to Recommendation 420 with a view to giving new life to WEU, but regretting the slowness with which these intentions are transformed into decisions;
- (v) Considering that it is urgent to adapt the WEU agencies to the Council's new vocation;
- (vi) Considering that keeping public opinion informed about the activities of the Council and of the Assembly is an essential part of a policy of deterrence whose real basis is the will of the people ;
- (vii) Noting the very marked improvement in the information the Council gives the Assembly, but hoping that, in accordance with the intentions expressed in the Bonn communiqué, the Council will increasingly inform the press of its activities;
- (viii) Referring to the fact that the report on the possibilities, conditions and consequences of a closer institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU, which is asked for in Order 63, will be prepared separately,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that the Ministers of Defence participate fully in its work and in its dialogue with the Assembly;
2. Have the appropriate agency conduct a continuing study of the strategic consequences of the development of new weapons, whatever the results of its efforts to co-ordinate the answers of member countries to the American proposal that they take part in the strategic defence initiative;
3. Proceed to organise the new agencies, namely the agency for the study of defence questions and the agency for co-operation in the field of armaments, by giving them, insofar as possible, all the necessary means to be able to co-operate in carrying out their respective tasks;
4. Specify without delay the new aims of its discussions and the scope of its action regarding disarmament and the nature of the tasks given to the agency concerned;
5. Play an active part in informing Europeans about matters relating to their security:
 - (a) by keeping the press systematically and officially informed of its own activities by all appropriate means;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (11th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Berrier on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1034).

- (b) by instructing the new agency handling defence questions to promote the organisation of training courses in the defence institutes of each of the member countries for nationals of the seven countries with responsibility in defence matters or likely to have an influence on public opinion so as to allow them to have a better understanding of the European dimension of security problems;
6. Guarantee the Assembly full independence in all areas, in particular by allowing it to divide its overall budget between the various heads while respecting the regulations governing the staff of the co-ordinated organisations;
7. Pursue its efforts to keep the Assembly better informed of its work by ensuring in particular the continuation of joint meetings between the Council at ministerial level and the permanent committees of the Assembly;
8. Expedite positively the examination of applications for membership from European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance with the aim of one day associating all the member countries of the European Community in a joint security policy.

APPENDIX XVI

Evolution of expenditure on pensions paid by WEU since 1982

(a) Appropriations for pensions for the various organs of WEU (1982-1986)

	1982			1983			1984			1985			1986		
	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)
	£	£		£	£		£	£		£	£		£	£	
Secretariat-General	1,113,957	104,880	9.41	1,028,515	67,830	6.59	1,069,190	65,265	6.10	1,111,210	89,960	8.07	1,417,242	168,645	11.90
Standing Armaments Committee	F	F		F	F		F	F		F	F		F	F	
Agency for the Control of Armaments	7,969,630	1,199,500	15.58	7,313,890	1,131,450	15.47	8,839,380	1,206,130	13.65	9,314,690	1,282,100	13.76	29,851,700	4,750,500	15.91
Office of the Clerk	16,461,940	2,803,100	17.02	14,910,050	2,004,500	13.44	19,126,150	3,106,300	16.24	20,739,440	3,995,900	19.27			
	12,282,000	126,000	1.03	13,893,000	240,000	1.73	14,762,200	677,000	4.58	15,470,900	683,500	4.42	16,809,900	928,000	5.52

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(b) Number of pensions paid out by WEU (1982-1986)

Pensions	1982					1983					1984					1985					1986			
	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ASQ	O of C	Total
Retirement	7	18	13	2	40	7	20	14	3	44	7	23	13	2	45	9	23	13	2	47	11	38	4	53
Survivors'	1	9	3	1	14	1	9	3	1	14	2	9	4	1	16	3	9	4	1	17	4	13	1	18
Orphans'	-	1 ¹	-	1	2	-	1	-	1	2	3	1	-	-	4	3	1	-	-	4	4	1	-	5
Invalidity	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	2	1	-	-	1	2	1	-	1	2
Totals	9	28	16	4	57	9	30	17	5	61	13	33	17	4	67	16	33	17	4	70	20	52	6	78
Total establishment ²	45	51	27	26	149	45	51	27	27	150	45	51	27	26	149	45	51	27	26	149	49	70	26	145

SG = Secretariat General.

ACA = Agency for the Control of Armaments.

SAC = Standing Armaments Committee.

ASQ = Agencies for Security Questions.

O of C = Office of the Clerk.

1. Paid in conjunction with a survivor's pension.

2. Excluding hors cadre officials.

*Scientific, technological and aerospace questions
and Western European defence*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions ²
by Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur*

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APPENDIX

Eureka projects endorsed in Hanover

1. Adopted in committee by 12 votes to 1 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. *Lenzer* (Chairman); MM. *Wilkinson*, *Bassinot* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Aarts*, *Adriaensens* (Alternate: *De Bondt*), *Böhm*, *Colajanni*, *Fiandrotti*, *Fourré*, *Garrett* (Alternate: *Parry*), *Sir Paul Hawkins*, MM. *Hengel* (Alternate: *Konen*), *McGuire*, *Mezapesa* (Alternate: *Cavaliere*), *Schmidt*, *Sinesio*, *Souvet*, *Spies von Büllenheim*, *Mrs. Staels-Dompas*, MM. *Valleix*, *Worrell* (Alternate: *Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on scientific, technological and aerospace questions
and Western European defence*

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that by the 1990s information technology might become the largest manufacturing activity in the West;
- (ii) Considering that Western Europe's industrial success in this technology will probably depend on the promotion of a European civil and military computer market;
- (iii) Aware of the report on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries prepared by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee and the Council's answer on 20th March 1986 to Written Question 262 put by Mr. Lenzer on the activities of that committee complementary to those of the Independent European Programme Group;
- (iv) Disappointed by the Council's answer on the lack of practical steps to be taken to enhance the competitiveness of the European defence industry in general and of information technology in particular;
- (v) Considering Europe's important rôle in space and its activities in space transportation, satellites and scientific matters such as the Giotto programme;
- (vi) Considering that the importance of this rôle demands a strong European effort as well as effective co-operation with the United States;
- (vii) Considering the need for co-operation between NASA and Ariespace on worldwide launch price policies;
- (viii) Considering that the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments should play a well-defined intermediary rôle in co-operation on weapons development projects such as the European fighter aircraft;
- (ix) Deploring the Council's lack of political will in not preparing its thirty-first annual report on its activities which cannot now be taken into account in preparing the present report,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Instruct Agency III, i.e. the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments, to initiate studies on:
 - (a) the establishment of an integrated Western European civil and military computer market;
 - (b) the possibilities of creating networks of supercomputers in Europe for civil as well as military purposes;
2. Define, in co-operative weapons development projects such as the European fighter aircraft, a useful co-ordinating rôle for the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments, with particular regard to European military industrial matters, taking into account the activities of the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors and the Independent European Programme Group;
3. Provide the Assembly with full details of this rôle in the thirty-second annual report.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. More than ever, your Rapporteur is convinced of the need to reverse Western Europe's economic decline and that high technology industrial developments are a must for survival in the twenty-first century. It is most important for Western European high technology industries to prepare themselves here and now in order to gain a worldwide technological lead. Europe's shrinking share of the global population – probably 5% by the year 2010 – and the competition and industrial growth of developing countries, especially in South-East Asia, will force Europe to seize every opportunity to remain a leading economic and political force in the world.
2. In its reply to Recommendation 419 appended to your Rapporteur's first report on the military use of computers, the Council stated that European computer technology had reached a high level and that it realised that the military use of computers was but one aspect of the wide-ranging application of advanced computer technology. Your Rapporteur agrees that examination of the military use of computers cannot therefore be separated from the civilian applications.
3. However, Europe's annual trade deficit on large mainframe computers alone is \$10 billion and by 1990 the present balance in the telecommunications trade is expected to sink to a \$16 billion deficit. Europe's share of the world market in these products tells the same story even more convincingly. Europe's industry for instance now has 6% of the world market for telecommunications equipment compared with Japan's 12% and America's 39%.
4. In semiconductors, European producers have recently tried to make a comeback but their present share of the world market is only 8.5% which is two-thirds of the 1979 figure.
5. In its abovementioned reply, the Council mentions efforts to make the computer systems of Western European countries interoperable, in certain conditions, in line with military requirements. As in many other areas, the prerequisite for this is the early harmonisation of national operational requirements by the authorities concerned.
6. Your Rapporteur doubts whether this will be sufficient. The protectionism inherent in government procurement systems of the various European countries has fragmented European industry at a time when market logic should have been pushing it into cross-frontier partnerships. Only European groupings will be able to afford the scale of investment that the technological revolution is demanding.
7. If there is to be European co-operation, governments must promote cross-frontier links. The EEC Commission is now promoting an information technology research effort called Esprit and Siemens and Philips, for instance, will spend some \$1.5 billion to produce microchips jointly in an attempt to capture part of the world market.
8. In March 1986, the European Investment Bank (EIB) loaned Philips (Netherlands) the equivalent of 470 million francs to finance a vast investment programme aimed at mastering submicronic technology, i.e. the technology that will be used to produce the next generation of integrated circuits (megachip programme). The first type of product of this generation will be a static memory with semiconductors with a storage capacity of 1 megabit (1 million bits) per chip. The megachip programme is the fruit of combined efforts by Philips and Siemens.
9. One of the main aims of the European Investment Bank is to encourage the development of modern technology in order to improve Europe's competitiveness. The megachip programme is of crucial importance in this connection. By developing the mega-memory chip, Philips and Siemens intend to enhance their position on the international chip market. Europe's share of the world semiconductor industry fell from 13.9% in 1979 to 8.5% in 1984. Philips will present prototypes of the 1 megabit static memory in 1988 and start large-scale production in 1989 at the latest. Philips and Siemens are each investing 30,000 million francs in the megachip programme.
10. If a common market for high technology hardware is not established soon, costs in Europe's protected national markets will rise sharply. For instance, per capita spending on telecommunications in Europe is now one-third of the level in the United States. In this market protectionism is costing Europe's PTTs \$20 billion in lost revenues.
11. If the technology gap with Japan and America is ever closed, the battle will have been won by Europe's highly-developed research institutes and university laboratories, but if the battle is lost, responsibility will rest with Europe's short-sighted policy makers.
12. The forecasts are that by 1990 information technology will have become the largest manufacturing activity of all. In the EEC, a recent forecast presented Europe's existing 4 million high technology-related jobs as being the key to 60 million jobs in the long term. This might come about if Europe makes up for lost time in manufacturing its own computers and telecommunications equipment and promotes the use of

microelectronics regardless of the country of origin.

13. Here the ministries of defence could play a very important rôle by promoting a single European market for military computers and particularly supercomputers which would give impetus to the civil market as well. Interoperability alone would not be sufficient to attain this goal.

II. European co-operative efforts in high technology

14. The balkanisation of Europe's computer industry has caused an appalling waste of resources and many parliamentarians in national parliaments, in the EEC and in the Council of Europe have pressed for a new, more active and more united technological policy. This could certainly be established as Europe has the necessary resources, brains and basic structures.

15. In his first report, your Rapporteur mentioned the European strategic programme for research and development in information technology (Esprit) which covers most areas of information technology such as microelectronics, software engineering, computer integrated manufacturing and communication logistics.

16. The first phase of the programme was to examine whether it was possible to overcome earlier lack of confidence and see whether former competitors could work together. During a five-year period a total of 1.5 billion ECUs will be spent by industry and the Community together to achieve a competitive position on the world market. Twelve important European electronics industries will try to collaborate and overcome nationalistic ambitions. Intercompany agreements have been concluded on standards for the use of UNIX 5 as a compatible operating system for their products. Siemens, Bull and ICL have established joint research and development facilities in Munich.

17. It is yet too early to indicate whether Esprit will be a success. However, after the first enthusiasm, difficulties have emerged mainly because of political trading of a budgetary nature in the EEC.

18. European industries should realise that the leading United States computer companies – not IBM – have also begun a major effort to develop standards that will allow computers made by different manufacturers to share information. If this succeeds it will have major ramifications for the computer industry and its users. The lack of standards has frustrated computer users for many years and General Motors, for instance, has developed its own standards for connecting computers, machine tools, robots and other electronic gear in their factories.

19. Following the start of Esprit in February 1984, the EEC Council adopted, in July 1985, a programme for research and development in advanced communications technologies for

Europe (Race). Its main aim was to promote competition in the European telecommunications industry and to make available new telecommunications services. The programme will be implemented in the same way as Esprit.

20. Although these community programmes are important, the amount of money involved is relatively small and the unanimity rule for budgetary matters remains a major obstacle.

21. In the introduction to the first part of his report, your Rapporteur already mentioned the Eureka project, although he was not able to say much about it since it was first proposed only in April 1985. For the moment the Eureka programme has secured mainly political support from some eighteen European governments. Your Rapporteur believes that the governments committed to participating in Eureka should act more quickly and establish European-wide standards for new technologies, provide financing for Eureka projects and establish an authority to define these projects accurately. On the other hand, private industry should participate in the financing of such projects.

22. At the Hanover conference on 5th and 6th November 1985, ten research projects were established in fourteen countries costing the equivalent of some \$312 million.

23. For the list of Eureka projects endorsed in Hanover, your Rapporteur refers to the appendix. Dozens of companies and research institutes are involved in such questions as microcomputers, lasers, water filtration, optoelectronics, robots, etc., but in spite of this Eureka still remains vague pending far stronger commitments than have been entered into so far. A point of political disagreement between the participating countries is whether the Commission of the EEC should play a modest or a leading rôle in directing the Eureka programme.

24. Whatever the outcome of this conflict, the most important effort to be made should be in stimulating a European comeback in electronics and information technology. This implies European projects in microelectronics, optoelectronics, artificial intelligence, computer integration and manufacturing high performance supercomputers. Computer manufacturing and artificial intelligence especially will be the key technologies for the years to come.

25. So far, the Americans and Japanese have used intensively the results of European university research, but Europe itself seems unable to apply this research and development for mass-produced products and conquer large markets, nor has it been able to stem the brain drain.

26. It is all very well to put great emphasis on a strong technological base, but one cannot disregard the need for a completely free internal European market. Your Rapporteur agrees that it is extremely difficult to sweep away national bureaucratic hindrances and override more than

300 rules and regulations which now block parts of the European internal market.

27. As your Rapporteur wrote in paragraph 13 of his first report, it should be realised that an open and unified market will cause a considerable upheaval among certain European electronics companies. But this does not mean that only large concerns will be able to succeed in the computer business. Many small enterprises in Europe as well as in the United States have proved to be both dynamic and capable in turning to new technology.

28. The construction of supercomputers which forms a fast and growing market should also be stimulated in the coming years and a network of this type of computer set up in Europe.

29. Your Rapporteur mentions these European developments as they are also important for the development of military computers. Nevertheless, he would stress that Esprit, Race and Eureka are for civil purposes. The Eureka charter as adopted in Hanover on 5th November 1985 states as one of its objectives that Eureka projects will serve civilian purposes only and will be directed to the private and public sector markets.

30. Although enough public money is available for the Eureka project as it now exists, more ambitious projects will need substantial additional financing.

31. A question which arises in this connection is whether the participation of European companies, universities and individual scientists in the development of SDI will have a strong, a moderate or little influence on Eureka. To answer this question, one has to know how individual countries will react to the American President's SDI proposal.

32. The United Kingdom has signed a memorandum of understanding and discussions between the German and the United States Governments led to agreement in April 1986. Italy will make a preliminary approach similar to the one the Federal Republic of Germany negotiated in Washington.

33. In the last six months, the argument in most European governments has centred not on whether to encourage their companies to take part in this research programme but rather on how best to do so. Countries like the Netherlands, Canada and France already allow their national companies to take part in the programme but have refused official participation and government-to-government agreements.

34. The strategic defence initiative is extremely important to the subject under discussion, namely military computers, because computers more than space segments will be relevant for the success or failure of the SDI.

35. At the end of January, the Eureka Council of the eighteen participating countries met again

in London and agreed to fourteen new projects for a total sum of \$500 million. These fourteen new projects will be added to the twenty-four Eureka projects adopted at the Hanover meeting.

36. The latest projects include research into the use of laser techniques searching for faults in end-products.

37. Other projects are concerned with electronic circuits, computers with artificial intelligence, production of new types of chips and mobile robots. Environmental and medical research and development are also covered.

III. Space aspects

38. 1986 will be one of the most crucial years for European space activities as the long-term space programmes approved at the ministerial meeting held in Rome in January 1985 have to be acted upon this year.

39. The main decisions to be taken concern the configuration of the Ariane 5 launcher, European participation in NASA's international space station, particularly definition of the Columbus module specifications, and last but not least the immediate impact of the loss of the Challenger shuttle on European space programmes.

40. At its meeting on 27th February 1986, the committee was addressed on Ariane developments by Arianespace's deputy manager. Your Rapporteur does not want to go into great detail but would point out that in the years to come Arianespace will be able to offer its civil customers a family of launchers fully adapted to their satellites. The three different types of Ariane launchers now being used are all derived from Ariane 1 with the addition of a number of boosters in accordance with the size of the satellites and the number of satellites to be launched.

41. According to the European Space Agency programme adopted in 1981, Ariane 4 is now under development. ESA's objective is to have Ariane 4 operational in 1986. Six variants of the Ariane 4 version are available for single or dual payload configuration launching of satellites with a weight of between 1,900 and 4,200 kg.

42. A key element of Europe's future space planning is the Ariane 5 heavy-lift launcher which will provide a payload lift capability equal to that of the American space shuttle. Ariane 5 is designed mainly for launching commercial satellites but it will also be capable of orbiting the proposed Hermes spacecraft.

43. The Hermes manned space plane has been promoted by France as part of the long-term European space package deal, in addition to Ariane 5 and Europe's participation in the NASA space station. Ariane 5 can therefore launch unmanned satellite payloads and also the Hermes manned space vehicle.

44. Ariane officials are of the opinion that for the orbiting of telecommunications, observation and scientific payloads a manned launcher is not needed. However, to serve the space station, manned missions might be essential.

45. The next generation space vehicle might be the Hotol (horizontal take-off and landing) vehicle which the British Government and industry (British Aerospace and Rolls-Royce) are planning to produce for the early years of the next century. The concept evaluation will last two years, starting in the second half of 1986. The Hermes and Hotol vehicles are considered to be complementary although they might compete for the same funding within the framework of the European Space Agency.

46. Europe's rôle in the space station will also be defined in 1986. The module known as Columbus proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy will have to be defined. This module would be attached to the station but be so designed as to be capable of free-flying missions of short duration. Since Spacelab and its imbrication in the bay of the shuttle, the European Space Agency felt that the module should not be dependent exclusively on the NASA space station programme but should be used independently too.

47. The loss of the shuttle Challenger on 28th January 1986 has brought to the fore the question of whether expendable launchers such as the Thor-Delta or the Atlas-Centaur should be built again for commercial, military and scientific uses.

48. NASA's space transportation system has to be kept moving and, if the shuttle is to be grounded for up to a year or more, production lines of expendable launchers will have to be reopened.

49. Some Thor-Delta and Atlas-Centaur launchers are available for military communications and other satellites. Once these have been used, by April 1987 new production lines will have to be built which may well take up to two years according to General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas spokesmen.

50. If shuttle launches are started again in a few months' time, ESA and NASA will have to come to an agreement on price policies for launching satellites, especially since the dollar has lost much of its value.

51. In a letter to the NASA Administrator, the Director General of ESA, Dr. Lüst, has already expressed his concern at the low rate of NASA charges for commercial satellite payload customers.

52. Pricing policy discussions have to take place at a high level as the risk of repercussions for American-European co-operation in space should be avoided.

IV. Co-operative weapons development projects

53. Further to the report by Mr. Wilkinson (Document 1037) on the European fighter aircraft for the nineties, your Rapporteur wishes to inform the Assembly that the fighter aircraft project is not progressing as expected.

54. During a meeting in Rome on 13th and 14th March 1986, representatives of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany failed to agree on design leadership, financing and production. The main source of disagreement is again the weight of the aircraft. The United Kingdom wants a plane with a greater air-to-ground capability and a longer range which would require more equipment, thus adding to the weight. The Federal Republic wishes to remain within the 9.75 ton range, whereas the United Kingdom is prepared to accept up to 12.5 tons.

55. Apart from the disagreement over weight, other problems are France's request to join in this project nevertheless and also to discuss transport planes, trainers and weapon systems. Discussions between defence officials will be continued at a meeting of defence ministers in Madrid at the end of April 1986.

56. Also at issue is a proposal by the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger, for transatlantic co-operation in building the new American fighter aircraft. This aircraft would largely fulfil the same rôle as the European fighter aircraft for the nineties.

57. A lighter combat aircraft might be developed in parallel with the European fighter aircraft by France and the four European nations that operate the General Dynamics F-16 - Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. The French Dassault-Bréguet Rafale demonstrator aircraft could be used as a baseline for the five-nation light combat aircraft project.

58. The new aircraft would be a more sophisticated follow-up to the F-16. It would also meet the requirements of the French air force and navy and would be adapted for ground attack and air superiority rôles.

59. Here again, the representatives of the countries concerned hope that the new aircraft will have as much component commonality as possible with the larger aircraft. Commonality would reduce development costs and increase interoperability.

60. The American Department of Defence and NASA have taken steps to develop an aerospace plane, a potential successor to the space shuttle. This plane is destined to fly at supersonic speeds; for instance, it is expected to be able to link New York and Tokyo in two hours. It would be able to fly above the atmosphere in low earth orbit.

61. The first contracts awarded by the Department of Defence and NASA are worth some

\$300 to \$400 million. This will cover accelerated research into propulsion systems, high performance materials and other technology required for the aerospace plane.

62. Feasibility studies will take some three or four years. It will have scramjet (supersonic combustion ramjet) engines which have been undergoing tests in the NASA research centres for many years. They will use hydrogen not hydrocarbon fuel. Nuclear energy might also be used for propulsion in space.

63. The aerospace planes will be part of the space station programme which aims to establish human settlements on the moon by 2017 and on Mars by 2027. Other vehicles to be developed are advanced rocket vehicles. The main decisions for the total programme will have to be taken by 1992.

64. Other co-operative programmes cover the development of helicopters. France and Germany are co-operating to build a new attack helicopter and Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are working on a medium-sized military transport helicopter. Here again the different partners are trying to increase the commonality of the various versions of the helicopter as the lack of commonality causes excessive development costs.

65. The United Kingdom and the United States are starting joint research and development on a follow-up plane for the Harrier which is a short take-off and landing aircraft used by the British and American navies.

66. Another fighter aircraft study is being considered by Northrop of the United States and Dornier of Germany as well as by McDonnell Douglas and MBB. These two studies might lead to tactical fighter aircraft for the German and American air forces.

67. One of the difficulties of collaboration with the United States is its concern about technology transfer. The United States believes that the Soviet Union has made and is making a large-scale effort to obtain military technology developed in the West and providing American technology to European allies might increase the possibility of the Soviets gaining access to it.

68. The main disagreement among the allies is over dual-use technology. The Europeans

would like to be able to use some of this technology for civilian purposes to produce items for the open market. The United States prefers not to put such technology to civilian uses. The European countries however rely heavily on international commerce and communication to keep pace with progress and there is a strong feeling that censorship could severely hamper their scientific and industrial development and therefore weaken the alliance.

69. One of the main reasons for American preponderance in technology transfer is the United States spending on research and development. The United States Government spends about \$40 billion on military research and development, whereas the main European countries, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, which account for more than 90% of all research and development in Europe, spend only about \$8 billion yearly.

70. The Europeans should increase their military research and development budget and reduce useless duplication of effort.

71. Europeans are in a serious political dilemma; on the one hand they want to strengthen the alliance and the European contribution to it, which means that intra-European defence co-operation should be promoted, and on the other hand not to co-operate with the United States might be harmful.

72. Apart from aerospace collaborative projects, your Rapporteur wishes to mention the next generation of air defence systems which would include new airborne radar installations, guided munition programmes, friend-or-foe identification equipment, communications systems, new computer language and the next generation of air defence missiles, with particular regard to command and control systems, which will require co-operative efforts at component level if not for the whole of the programmes.

73. Mention should also be made of the development of new types of destroyers and frigates and of new tanks.

74. Finally, your Rapporteur recalls that our thinking must take account of the proposal by the German Defence Minister, Mr. Manfred Wörner, which might lead to a European strategic defence initiative.

APPENDIX

Eureka projects endorsed in Hanover

1. Creating a European standard for personal and educational microcomputers: United Kingdom, France and Italy are partners to this project. Turkey seems interested.
2. Compact vector computers for high-speed calculations: partners are France and Norway. Italy is interested.
3. Manufacture of amorphous silicon for solar powered cells: partners are France and Federal Republic of Germany.
4. Robotic lasers for fabric cutting: partners are France and Portugal. Spain and Turkey seem interested.
5. Membrane microfilters: France and Denmark are partners. The Netherlands is interested.
6. High-powered lasers: partners: Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom. Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands are interested.
7. EUROTRAC (Study of the transport and transformation of pollutants in the troposphere): partners: Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, the European Communities. Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland and Turkey are interested.
8. European Research Network: partners: Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, the European Communities, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland. Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Belgium, Greece, Spain and Turkey are interested.
9. Diagnostic kit for sexually transmissible diseases: partners: Spain and the United Kingdom.
10. Flexible manufacturing based on seeing-robots system: partners: France and Italy. Switzerland seems interested.

*Scientific, technological and aerospace questions
and Western European defence*

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 ¹

tabled by Mr. Fourré

1. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
“ Considering that the importance of this rôle demands an independent European effort within the framework of certain activities such as those relating to the space station but also requires effective co-operation with the United States; ”.
2. Leave out paragraph 1(a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
“ the establishment of a European civil and military computer market ”.

Signed: Fourré

1. See 7th sitting, 5th June 1986 (amendments agreed to).

*Scientific, technological and aerospace questions
and Western European defence*

AMENDMENTS 3 and 4¹

tabled by Mr. Gansel

3. After paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Noting with concern differences in policies of member countries with regard to armament exports to non-member countries, especially those in conflict areas and even those which support international terrorism, which may seriously obstruct progress towards improved defence co-operation;”

4. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Elaborate joint criteria for armament export policies of member countries, with preference in the field of defence co-operation, ensuring that no weapons or defence equipment be exported to non-member countries when this would be against the security interests of the alliance;”

Signed: Gansel

1. See 7th sitting, 5th June 1986 (amendment 3 agreed to; amendment 4 withdrawn).

*Promotion of parliamentary
and public interest in WEU matters*

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations²
by Mrs. Fischer, Rapporteur*

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submitted by Mrs. Fischer, Rapporteur

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- I. Questions and answers in national parliaments
- II. Information meeting held in the German Bundestag, Bonn – Thursday, 20th February 1986

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Dame Jill Knight (Chairman); MM. Frasca (Alternate: Mrs. Francese), Enders (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Cavaliere, De Bondt (Alternate: Mrs. Staels-Dompas), Mrs. Fischer, Mr. Goerens (Alternate: Linster), Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Mr. Mercier, Dr. Miller (Alternate: Terlezki), MM. Noerens, Sènès, Stoffelen, Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra (Alternate: Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers).*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Resolution
*on the promotion of parliamentary and
public interest in WEU matters*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the increasing urgency of giving tangible shape to efforts to improve parliamentary and public awareness of the Assembly's rôle and contribution to the creation of a European security dimension;
- (ii) Convinced that, in addition to relations with parliaments and the press, contacts with non-governmental organisations, research institutes, academic bodies and other institutions with political influence on public opinion are important for promoting public interest in WEU matters;
- (iii) Welcoming the public information activities already conducted by the President of the Assembly, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and individual representatives of the Assembly as well as by the Secretary-General of WEU;
- (iv) Regretting, however, that the Assembly is still lacking the minimum technical requirements for public information which exist in most member parliaments such as telexes or computer-controlled documentation systems;
- (v) Convinced that no great success can be expected in improving public relations if the Assembly has to continue working under present financial and technical conditions,

INVITES member parliaments to impress upon the governments of the WEU states the urgency of allocating to the Assembly the financial resources needed for the effective pursuit of its public relations activities;

ENCOURAGES its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to pursue its action for bringing the work of the Assembly to the attention of parliaments, the public and the press in member countries including the organisation of special hearings in member parliaments.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mrs. Fischer, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. Since its responsibilities were extended, the committee has to report on its activities and action taken in parliaments and also on its efforts to elaborate proposals for improving public awareness of the work of the Assembly. The report will therefore be divided into two main sections: the first dealing with the situation in parliaments, the second with problems regarding public opinion.

2. The subject of the present report was originally chosen in conjunction with the previous report on parliaments, public opinion and defence which covered more general aspects of the duties of WEU parliamentarians vis-à-vis the public. The purpose of the present report was initially to elaborate concrete proposals for the Assembly's public relations policy, but in view of the Assembly's critical financial situation, particularly where public relations are concerned, many necessary proposals and suggestions will remain somewhat theoretical.

3. The WEU Council is responsible for informing the public about its own activities. The Assembly should keep a continuing watch over its activities in this regard, particularly because such information is very important and cannot be communicated by the Assembly. After the interesting briefing of the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations by the Secretary-General in London on 5th November 1985, the committee wishes to be kept informed of the future public relations activities of the Secretariat-General and the ministerial organs. Consequently, a section of this report will be devoted to putting questions on these matters.

II. The general situation in member parliaments

(i) Mention of WEU in parliamentary speeches

4. In the previous report it was suggested *inter alia* that, apart from putting questions to their governments, every member should make an effort to mention Western European Union in speeches at plenary sessions of national parliaments. It seems that this suggestion has been followed up in several member parliaments during the last half year.

5. In Luxembourg, a general debate on foreign policy was held in the Chamber of Deputies on 5th and 6th March 1986 in which Mr. Hengel

underlined the firm determination to reactivate WEU, but its structures and financial means had to be revised. In the same debate, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges advocated new initiatives under the Luxembourg presidency of the WEU Council. She said that the reactivation of WEU should not lead to a weakening of NATO.

6. In a debate in the Belgian Senate on 10th December 1985, Mr. Péciaux made a long speech in which he strongly advocated using Western European Union as a real European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. With reference to the December session of the Assembly, he asked what attitude would the government adopt towards Belgium's participation in the SDI research, what stage had been reached in harmonising the views of member states in WEU, what was the position vis-à-vis the Eureka project, the enlargement of WEU with the accession of Portugal and Spain and what progress had been made with the European fighter aircraft programme. In a debate in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives on 11th December 1985 on the results of the European Council meeting on 2nd and 3rd December, the relationship between European political co-operation and WEU and NATO was discussed in speeches by Mr. Van Wambeke and Mr. Tindemans, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

7. In the Netherlands, Western European Union was prominent in debates in the Second Chamber on 9th and 18th December 1985 and 22nd January 1986. On 9th December, Mr. van der Spek discussed problems of co-ordination between the new agencies of WEU and the IEPG. On 18th December, Mr. Engwirda referred to critical comments by Mr. Caro, President of the WEU Assembly, during the session last December with regard to the activities of the Council and asked if the government would comment on the fact that revitalisation of WEU in practice did not mean very much. This provided an opportunity for Mr. de Ruiters, Minister of Defence, to make a longer statement on several aspects of WEU's activities and on the Netherlands rôle in its reactivation.

8. Still in the Netherlands, in a debate on 22nd January 1986, MM. Frinking, Blaauw and Schutte asked questions about co-ordination problems between the different WEU and NATO institutions and European political co-operation and the rôle of French nuclear power, which were answered by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. de Ruiters, Minister of Defence. On the problem of avoiding duplication of work between WEU and the IEPG, Mr.

de Ruiter said that WEU should concentrate its attention and its work on studies and general political stimulation with a view to achieving effective co-operation, whereas the IEPG is more directly concerned with practical co-operation and the implementation of programmes. On the working group created last year in the IEPG composed of independent experts, he said that this working group was to submit proposals for improving the competitiveness of the European armaments industry. Mr. de Ruiter said that IEPG had insisted explicitly on independent experts, whereas in WEU deliberations were being pursued only at the level of governmental representatives. The use of independent experts had the advantage of minimising direct national influences. Progress might thus be easier. Arrangements had been made for avoiding duplication of work between the IEPG and the WEU agency whose activities should be complementary.

9. In the French National Assembly, at a meeting on 22nd October 1985 of the Defence and Armed Forces Committee on the 1986 defence budget, Mr. Pignion put a question on the absence of appropriations for Western European Union in the defence budget, in spite of the recent reactivation of that organisation, an operation which had not been carried fully into effect. Mr. Quilès, Minister of Defence, said *inter alia* that WEU, whose importance should not be underestimated, "cannot be the start of a European defence community". On 6th November 1985, in the debate on the budget for 1986, Mr. Koehl in a lengthy speech on the problems of European defence paid tribute to the increasing rôle of WEU in armaments co-operation. In a further debate in the National Assembly on 8th November 1985, Mr. Lagorce underlined the importance of WEU for giving political impetus to European security and paid special tribute to the rôle of its Assembly. In the same debate, Mr. Pignion emphasised the need for WEU to be granted sufficient funds for its activities, which was not the case at present; he also stressed the importance of the WEU Assembly and reported on the visits of its Defence Committee to the French forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and to the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. He also asked how co-ordination was ensured between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence in WEU matters and requested more information about the recent activities of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG).

10. In the United Kingdom House of Lords, a debate on the address concerning foreign affairs, overseas aid and defence was held on 7th November 1985. Lord Mayhew made a statement in which, without mentioning WEU explicitly, he strongly supported the idea of basing the alliance on two pillars, which called for greater

unity in Europe. In the view of the alliance parties, it was time for Western European countries to assert themselves and to take their proper place as equal partners with the United States in the Atlantic Alliance. In reply, Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence Support, said *inter alia* that there were three main forums for European co-operation – the Eurogroup, IEPG and WEU. "All have a rôle to play but we shall ensure that there is no unnecessary duplication..."

11. An analysis of the debates in the German Bundestag is of special interest because the committee held its last information meeting there on 20th February 1986. A summary of the meeting will be given below. During the discussion with German colleagues, Mr. Gansel said speeches and debates on WEU matters were not held very often in plenary sessions of the Bundestag. It is not possible to establish true comparisons and statistics between member parliaments because the Rapporteur does not have complete documentation. But the fact is that, in Germany, parliamentary activity is particularly intensive on security and defence problems.

12. In a major debate on 3rd October 1985, the Bundestag discussed seven different draft motions for resolutions on problems of disarmament, control of armaments and chemical weapons with speeches by nine parliamentarians and statements by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Unfortunately, not a single speaker mentioned Western European Union.

13. In the general debate on the Federal budget for 1986 on 26th November 1985, a comprehensive discussion of the portfolios of the Federal Chancellery, the Foreign Office and the Minister of Defence was held in which thirty speakers took part, covering the most topical areas of foreign, defence and European policy. WEU was mentioned only by Mr. Wörner, Minister of Defence, in a sentence in which he emphasised that the Federal Government had undertaken new efforts to reactivate Western European Union. In the same debate, Mr. Stercken mentioned the Assembly of WEU when he recalled the contribution of Bundestag representatives to the activities of international and European assemblies.

14. In a debate on the results of the last European Council meeting on 5th December 1985, important aspects of European and Atlantic security policy were discussed, but WEU was mentioned only by Mrs. Kelly who put questions about the pact obligations of the modified Brussels Treaty. In a wide-ranging debate on the problems of German participation in SDI and questions of European security on 13th December 1985 (shortly after the SDI session of the WEU Assembly), Mr. Gansel was the only representative to ask what Western Europe should do

to ensure its security and whether WEU would be the appropriate organisational framework for this. In that debate, Mr. Müllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, emphasised that questions of strategy had to be discussed by the alliance as a whole. Modifications of the political and strategic security concept could be decided only by the whole alliance. It was important to harmonise specific European aspects previously in WEU. This was also true for the relevant aspects of the SDI programme.

15. From Italy the Rapporteur has no specific information regarding action or speeches related to WEU matters in plenary sessions of parliament during the last half year.

(ii) Governmental reports to parliament on WEU

16. Another suggestion made in the previous report was that member governments should be requested to report regularly to parliament on WEU matters and their activities there. On 26th February 1986, Mr. Murphy put two written questions in the House of Commons, one on a government report to parliament on WEU Assembly sessions and one on a government statement to parliament on the work of WEU. The answer to the first question was negative, but it is worth quoting the second question because the answer was partly positive:

“ Mr. Murphy asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will arrange for a government statement on the work of Western European Union to be presented to parliament annually. ”

Mr. Eggar, Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, answered:

“ The annual reports of the Council of Western European Union to the Assembly (on the Council's activities for the period 1st January to 31st December of each year) are published. Copies are placed in the library of the House. However, I would be happy to adopt the suggestion of my hon. friend and would propose to make such a statement after the autumn ministerial meeting of Western European Union. ”

17. The initiative taken by Mr. Murphy is most welcome and it is recommended that members in Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands put similar pressure on their respective governments. (In Germany, the Federal Government issues a written half-yearly report to parliament on WEU matters.)

III. Activities of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

(i) Action taken on recommendations adopted by the Assembly of WEU

18. The Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations continued its traditional duties, selecting from the texts adopted by the Assembly those which, in its opinion, should be debated in the parliaments. From recommendations adopted during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session in December 1985 the committee selected:

- 425 on disarmament;
- 428 on WEU and the strategic defence initiative (defence aspects);
- 429 on WEU and the strategic defence initiative - the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance;
- 430 on WEU and the strategic defence initiative - guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe (proposals).

19. These texts were transmitted as usual with a letter from the President of the Assembly dated 5th December 1985 to the presidents of member parliaments expressing the hope that they would be of interest and provide subject matter for speeches or questions to ministers.

20. The Office of the Clerk has so far no specific information on whether these texts have been used for questions or speeches in parliament. However, on 9th December 1985, when Mr. Heseltine, then Secretary of State for Defence, made a statement in the House of Commons on British participation in the United States strategic defence initiative research programme and announced that agreement had been reached with the United States in the form of a confidential memorandum of understanding on an information exchange programme, Sir John Osborn took the opportunity to ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he was aware that this was a major subject of debate in Western European Union and that before then it was a concern of the WEU Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions as well as industrialists throughout Europe. He asked inter alia whether the government was able to share with America the application of any results, if positive, and to what extent will that fall within the orbit of Western European Union or even NATO. In his answer, Mr. Heseltine, Secretary of State for Defence, said that this was a bilateral agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom. Therefore it did not fall within WEU or the NATO alliance arrangements.

21. Since all the subjects treated in the abovementioned recommendations remain topical (disarmament and SDI), it is strongly recommended that all members use these reports for parliamentary action and questions in their home countries. The Rapporteur is pleased to note that several questions have been put in parliaments on Recommendations 416, 417, 419, 420, 421 and 423.

22. In the Italian Senate, Mr. Masciadri put several questions on various recommendations. In January 1985, he put a question on Recommendation 414 on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology and on Recommendation 416 on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance. Both questions were answered by Mr. Fioret, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on 27th June 1985, but the texts of the replies reached the Office of the Clerk only in February 1986. On 22nd October 1985, Mr. Masciadri put questions on Recommendations 417 on East-West relations ten years after the Helsinki final act, 419 on the military use of computers – reply to the thirtieth annual report of the Council, and 423 on the state of European security – the central region. So far, only the answer of the Minister of Defence to the last question has been communicated. On 16th January 1986, Mr. Masciadri put a question on Recommendation 426 on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial years 1984 and 1985. The answer of the Italian Government is not yet known. The full texts of the documents mentioned in this paragraph are reproduced at Appendix I.

23. On 15th October 1985, several Italian senators joined in tabling two motions on WEU, one concerning the study by WEU countries of the possibility of setting up military intervention units under integrated command and of establishing a European agency responsible for industrial policy in defence matters and one concerning the location of the three new WEU agencies for security questions in Italy.

24. On 13th December 1985, Mr. Enders put two questions in the Bundestag on Recommendations 420 and 421 which were answered by Mr. Möllemann, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. On 5th November 1985, Mr. Hengel put a question on Recommendation 421 in the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies which was answered by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs. The full texts are reproduced at Appendix I.

25. Special action was taken by Mr. Coleman in the House of Commons on 6th February 1986 when he put eight questions on Western European Union to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. These questions concerned:

- the United Kingdom position on Portugal's application for membership and the enlargement of WEU (Recommendations 420 and 429);
- possible Spanish membership of WEU (Recommendation 429);
- the WEU Public Administration Committee;
- the measures taken by the government to improve public information about the Western European Union Council and about the other organs of WEU, and what measures are currently being taken by WEU in this direction (Recommendation 429);
- the budgetary implications of the measures which have been taken, and of those which are being taken, to reinvigorate Western European Union (Recommendation 426);
- the new agencies established by WEU (Recommendation 429); and
- the new posts created within the Secretariat-General and other organs of Western European Union.

26. From the different answers given by Mr. Eggar, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, texts of which are given at Appendix I, the answer on public information is of special interest. Mr. Eggar said:

“The government maintain contact with representatives of the media, academic life, and members of parliament to inform them about the activities of the WEU and its Council. Ministers regularly address the six-monthly sessions of the WEU Assembly in Paris. As part of the process of reorganising WEU institutions, a new post has been created in the WEU secretariat in London with responsibility for public relations and information. The government support this initiative and other publicity activities of the WEU.”

It appears from his answer on 7th March 1986 that the new A.4 post for public relations created in the Secretariat-General was still vacant.

27. One can only congratulate Mr. Coleman for his initiative which covered some of the most topical problems of WEU's reinvigoration and reorganisation. This example is worth following in other parliaments. The Rapporteur will revert to some of the subjects treated in Mr. Coleman's questions in the chapter on public relations.

28. Sometimes questions are useful in order to allow governments to clarify the areas of respon-

sibility of different European organisations. Asked by Mr. Taittinger on 16th May 1985 whether the European Economic Community is considering a joint response to the American SDI initiative, Mr. Dumas, Minister for External Relations, answered on 6th February 1986:

“The European Economic Community has no responsibility for security and defence matters. It is consequently not the appropriate framework for the possible co-ordination of national policies in this area. Conversely, the seven member states of Western European Union decided, at the ministerial meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985, to consider together matters raised by the American invitation to take part in the SDI programme. This brought out common elements of analysis which, at their last meeting in Rome on 14th November 1985, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs asked to be examined in greater detail.”

(ii) Information meetings in member parliaments

29. After holding such meetings in the French Senate (17th April 1985) and in the Italian Senate (11th June 1985), the committee organised an information meeting in the German Bundestag in Bonn on 20th February 1986. The committee wishes to repeat its gratitude to the President of the Bundestag and the German Delegation for inviting the committee, and particularly Mr. Enders, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, for organising the programme on 19th February in the representations of the Länder Nordrhein-Westfalen and Hessen.

30. The information meeting began as usual with short briefings by committee members in order to guide the discussion. First, Mr. Murphy spoke about the duties of the renewed Western European Union and its importance for the parliamentary and public debate on security and defence issues. Second, Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra gave information about the Assembly of Western European Union and, finally, Mr. Goerens spoke about relations between WEU, NATO and other Western European organisations and countries. The texts of the speeches are given at Appendix II.

31. After these briefings an interesting discussion was held on the basis of prepared questions. Answering a question put by Mr. Goerens on how best to co-ordinate and share tasks between the European and Atlantic bodies in security matters, Mr. Abelein, Vice-President of the North Atlantic Assembly and member of the WEU Assembly, stressed that the European position played an increased rôle in the discussions of the North Atlantic Assembly. After the reactivation of WEU, it was important to estab-

lish close relations between the two assemblies. The activities should be co-ordinated and the secretariats should co-operate. Mr. Abelein also advocated establishing close contacts between members of the North Atlantic and WEU Assemblies.

32. Answering a question put by Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra on the rôle of the Bundestag Committee on European Affairs, Mrs. Hellwig, Chairman of that committee, believed it would be advisable to create similar parliamentary institutions in each national parliament of Western Europe. The committee had consultative status but did not have the competence of regular parliamentary committees. Its motions were to be presented to the competent committees which would transform them into recommendations. At present, the Committee on European Affairs did not debate security questions but Mrs. Hellwig did not exclude this for the future.

33. Referring to questions put by Dame Jill Knight, Chairman of the committee, and Dr. Miller, Mr. Gansel said that the written reports about the sessions of the North Atlantic Assembly and of the WEU Assembly were issued rather late. Requests had therefore been made for these reports to be sent out earlier. Very few Germans were aware of the historical and political background of the presence of allied troops in Germany and of Germany's membership of WEU and NATO. Sometimes there were difficulties with allied troops who had their own regulations. There was close co-operation with the French forces stationed in Germany, but the non-integration of these forces in NATO posed a major problem. Reactivation of WEU should not lead to Franco-German domination.

34. Referring to a question put by Dame Jill Knight, Chairman of the committee, Mr. Borcier pointed out that for 1986 the amount available to the Assembly for public information was F 300,000 in comparison with some F 7,000,000 in the information budget of the Council of Europe.

35. Mr. von Kageneck, a German journalist, was interested in information on the Assembly's activities in disarmament matters. Dame Jill Knight, Chairman of the committee, explained that the Assembly regularly examined the problems of arms control and disarmament which was one of the main preoccupations of its Defence Committee. On the basis of that committee's reports, the Assembly regularly adopted important recommendations on these matters and they were transmitted to the Council in London. She particularly referred to Recommendation 425 on disarmament adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1985.

36. In an address during the luncheon she gave in honour of the committee at the end of

the visit to Bonn, Mrs. Renger, Vice-President of the German Bundestag, paid tribute to the committee's efforts in visiting the member parliaments in order to enhance the knowledge and interest of parliamentarians with regard to the importance of WEU's reactivation. Recognising the difficulties of achieving this aim for various reasons, particularly because of the many domestic preoccupations of parliamentarians, she encouraged the committee to continue its work. Dame Jill Knight, Chairman of the committee, expressed the committee's warm gratitude to the German Bundestag for this invitation. She was satisfied that the information meeting was a very interesting event with a useful and instructive exchange of views. In the early afternoon, the committee followed the plenary session of the Bundestag from the diplomatic tribune. Its presence there was officially announced by the presidency.

37. The Rapporteur will refer again to the results of the three information meetings held so far in the conclusions of this report. But it can be recorded already that these meetings have been very instructive experiences and most useful for the committee's future public relations activities.

IV. The situation regarding relations with the public and public opinion

38. According to amended Rule 42 *bis*, paragraph 3(c) of the Rules of Procedure, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations "shall make all necessary proposals with a view to bringing the work of the Assembly to the attention of the public and the press in member countries". On the other hand, in his address to the committee on 5th November 1985 in London, the Secretary-General of WEU stated that in regard to means of stimulating public interest the situation was not very easy. Money was needed and it was not the right time for budgetary generosity.

39. Consequently, at present only proposals or suggestions which may be implemented without major additional expenditure should be taken into consideration. In the previous report, for instance, it was suggested that members should seize every opportunity of taking part in public conferences and discussions on security questions where large audiences may be found. For financial reasons members should concentrate on local events. It would be most important to explain the rôle of the WEU Assembly on these occasions. The Office of the Clerk will always be ready to provide the representatives concerned with necessary documentation.

40. Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, continues to set a good example in this respect. For

instance, on 18th November 1985 he took part in a debate on WEU and the political aspects of European defence organised by the Cercle Mars et Mercure which was reported by the local press. On 9th January 1986, he made the introductory speech at an international colloquy on new technologies and defence in Europe organised in the French Senate in Paris by the Centre d'étude des problèmes stratégiques (CEPS).

41. In May 1985, the European Institute of Public Administration in Maastricht, Netherlands, organised a round table on the reactivation of Western European Union – the effects on the European Community and its institutions. The main contributions were published in working papers of that institute. The preface was written by the Secretary-General of WEU and Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly of WEU, contributed an article on WEU and European security. It is worth noting that the institute regularly organises conferences and round tables on different subjects related to European co-operation and publishes a bulletin every two months.

42. In the absence of a regular WEU information review all forums should be used for publishing articles on WEU matters which are likely to be widely propagated. During the 1985 winter session, a British journalist was seconded to the United Kingdom Delegation of the Assembly of WEU in order to examine ways of improving the interest of newspapers in reporting WEU matters. This journalist should be invited to the next information meeting in London to give the committee the benefit of his advice.

43. In Belgium, by private initiative, a quarterly information review was started at the beginning of 1986 to examine European defence with special attention to WEU matters. In the first number of this publication dated 15th February 1986, both Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, and the Secretary-General of WEU contributed articles on the reactivation of WEU.

44. The suggestion has been made to receive and inform more groups of visitors at the seat of the Assembly, but the limited financial means allow this to be done only occasionally. On 12th March 1986, a group from the Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders was received at the seat of the Assembly in Paris where it was briefed on topical problems in the evolution of WEU. In most cases, these groups are briefed by officials from the Office of the Clerk. It would be useful if representatives of the Assembly could participate or handle these briefings themselves. This is difficult however outside periods of plenary sessions or committee meetings. It is therefore suggested that such groups be received either during plenary sessions or on days when one of the political committees

meets in Paris. The chairman of a committee, a rapporteur or another suitable representative could then brief the group of visitors.

45. The information report on parliamentary coverage of defence matters – keeping national parliaments informed about WEU – submitted on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments on 17th November 1981 by Mr. Berchem, Rapporteur (Document 896), contained a list of regular Assembly publications designed to keep members of the Assembly informed about the activities of WEU. It is important that not only members of parliament but also the wider public be kept informed about WEU and particularly its Assembly. In this respect, it might be useful to draw up a list of those who regularly receive or request Assembly documents. This list would not cover the great number of journalists or international

organisations, such as NATO, EEC, ESA, or national or European parliaments which all receive these documents regularly, but it would be interesting to know to what extent such information is used by other people who have close contacts with the public.

46. Among the WEU member countries, it has been ascertained that France is the country where Assembly documents are distributed in the greatest numbers. WEU Assembly publications are regularly sent to some 45 institutes in France, 16 in the United Kingdom, 15 in Germany, 15 in Belgium, 13 in the Netherlands, 8 in Italy and 4 in Luxembourg. It is worth studying this in greater detail so as to be able to make a more accurate assessment. The following table shows the wide range of recipients in member countries.

Regular receivers of WEU Assembly publications

	Belgium	France	Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Research institutes	6	7	7	5		6	6
Universities, post-graduate training institutes, libraries	5	16	4	2	2	6	8
Industry	4	10					
Political parties		3	3		1		1
Government public relation services		2	1				
Others		7		1	1	1	1
Total	15	45	15	8	4	13	16

47. It is gratifying that many international and national research institutes dealing with foreign and defence questions are kept regularly informed about the Assembly's activities. This might help to intensify contacts with such institutes which may have a considerable influence on politicians and the more educated public. Without claiming to be exhaustive, some important institutes in Europe should be kept in mind:

(a) International institutes

- International Institute for Strategic Studies in London;
- Institut Atlantique in Paris;
- SIPRI in Stockholm;
- NATO Defence College in Rome;
- European Institute of Public Administration in Maastricht;

- Centre International de Formation Européenne;
- Collège d'Europe in Bruges.

(b) National institutes

Belgium:

- Institut Royal des Relations Internationales in Brussels;
- Institut Royal Supérieur de Défense.

France:

- Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI) in Paris;
- Institut des Hautes Etudes Européennes in Strasbourg;
- Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Défense Nationale;
- Centre d'étude des problèmes stratégiques (CEPS) in Paris.

Federal Republic of Germany:

- Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik in Bonn;
- Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen;
- Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in Hamburg;
- Stiftung Europakolleg in Hamburg.

Italy:

- Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome;
- Centro Studi Militari in Rome;
- Bertrand Russell research and training centre for international relations.

Netherlands:

- Netherlands institute for international relations "Clingendael";
- European research centre in The Hague.

United Kingdom:

- Royal Institute for International Affairs (Chatham House) in London;
- Royal United Services Institutes for Defence Studies (RUSI) in London;
- Royal College of Defence Studies in London.

48. Of these institutes, only the European Institute of Public Administration in Maastricht, Chatham House, RUSI and the Clingendael do not regularly receive Assembly documents. It would be useful to encourage these institutes to ask for these documents. The Assembly should intensify relations with research institutes. It is important to know their yearly programme of work and representatives should be informed of dates and places of important conferences and colloquies. In recent years the Assembly itself has organised several very successful colloquies on armaments co-operation and aerospace questions. Another possibility might be to organise a wide-ranging political colloquy under the chairmanship of the General Affairs Committee bringing together members of parliament, governments, political research institutes and journalists.

49. To improve the organisation of further information meetings under the aegis of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, the directors or other competent experts from the abovementioned institutes in member countries should be invited to attend and provide information about their activities with particular reference to WEU matters.

50. It should not be forgotten that there are also important scientific institutes which should take a more regular interest in the Assembly's

activities in scientific and technological questions. There are for instance institutes such as the International Institute for Aerial Survey and Earth Sciences in Enschede and the Deutsche Forschungs- und Versuchsanstalt für Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. in Cologne which have already participated in Assembly colloquies. So far they have not received Assembly information documents on a regular basis.

51. The importance of post-graduate study institutes and training institutes dealing with political matters also should not be underestimated. At present, for instance, the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA) in Paris regularly receives Assembly documents but this is not so for the German Verwaltungshochschule in Speyer.

52. As for universities and libraries, the number of institutes requesting WEU documentation varies considerably from country to country. The best figure is to be noted in France with sixteen institutions. In the other member countries the number is below ten for each country. In view of the many universities and libraries throughout Western Europe, these figures are not very impressive.

53. It is interesting to note that in only two member countries, i.e. in Belgium and France, some major industries and commercial companies are regularly requesting Assembly documents. In France, they include Aérospatiale, Bréguet Aviation, Société nationale d'étude et de construction de moteurs d'aviation (SNECMA), CEA Marcel Dassault, Air France, Service Technique des Programmes Aéronautiques, Département Hélicoptères (STPA), Antenne constructions aéronautiques (CEDOCAR), direction commerciale Thomson and Lockheed Corporation International. In Belgium there are Belgospace, Chief Marketing MBLE, Texaco Europe and United Technologies (Europe) Inc.

54. Considering the importance of industrial co-operation in armaments and high technology – the subject of many Assembly recommendations and colloquies – it would be certainly an advantage if similar interest could be encouraged in the other five member countries too. There is no doubt about the interest of many more industries and technical research institutions considering the large number of companies that took part in colloquies organised by the Committees on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and on Defence Questions and Armaments. Rapporteurs are often briefed by their representatives in preparing Assembly reports.

55. The interest of political parties in receiving Assembly documents directly from Paris seems moderate. Some party offices in four countries (France, Germany, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom) receive them directly. Of

course all political parties always have the possibility of obtaining information through the delegation secretariat. Nevertheless, it might be worth considering, in the political groups of the Assembly, whether the supply of documentation is satisfactory for all political parties in all member countries.

56. Although it is ensured that Assembly documents are available in all the appropriate ministries of member governments, it is surprising that at present governmental information and public relations services in only two member countries (France and Germany) receive them directly from Paris, i.e. the German Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, the Service de l'information et des relations publiques (French Ministry of the Interior) and the Service d'information et de relations publiques des armées. It has been an oft-repeated request that governments should do more about informing the public of WEU matters. It is therefore essential for their information services to be provided with the necessary documentation including Assembly publications.

57. With reference to information about Assembly activities in NATO member countries which are not members of WEU it is to be noted that in the United States some thirteen institutions regularly receive Assembly documents, i.e. seven universities, three libraries and three research institutes. In Canada, Assembly documents are available in the parliamentary library of Ottawa. Among European NATO countries, Assembly documents are sent to the parliamentary libraries of Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Spain (they are also available in the Oviedo University), but there are no recipients in Iceland, Norway or Turkey.

58. In Ireland, Assembly documents are available in the Direachtas Library in Dublin. Of the countries of the Council of Europe, only Cyprus, Liechtenstein and Malta do not regularly receive Assembly publications. Conversely, it is worth noting that the following countries show a regular interest in such documentation: Austria, India, Israel, New Zealand, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. In recent years, requests have been transmitted by institutes in the GDR and the USSR.

59. To complete the picture, it might be noted that the publications department of the Assembly currently has contracts with sales agents in four countries. The sales agents are responsible for the distribution of all Assembly publications for sale in a given country. At present there is a contract with an agent in New York for sales in the United States and Canada. This agent has a selling capacity of about 75 volumes of the Assembly proceedings per year. In Europe, there are sales contracts with agents in France (1 or 2 volumes), Germany (13 volumes) and Italy

(2 volumes). Former contracts with agents in Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom have not been renewed. If possible, contracts should be established in all WEU member countries at least.

V. Activities of the ministerial organs in improving public information

60. In his address to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on 5th November 1985 and in his speech to the Assembly on 2nd December 1985, the Secretary-General of WEU stressed the importance of public information on WEU matters. It is to be welcomed that he is personally extremely active in this respect. Again, the relevant efforts of the Council, its ministerial organs and, last but not least, of the national governments cannot be without interest for the Assembly.

61. This committee is not authorised to draw up recommendations for transmission to the Council, but it can ask questions and make suggestions concerning the public relations activities of the ministerial organs since all proposals for bringing the work of the Assembly to the attention of the public and the press in member countries might be affected by the corresponding activities of the Council and its ministerial organs. If the Council does nothing, the substance of such proposals will be quite different from what might be appropriate if the Council shows some degree of activity.

62. It is therefore crucial for the Assembly to be regularly informed about the public relations activities of the Council and its ministerial organs. In a letter to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, the President of the Assembly has already said that the Assembly has not been informed of how the Council keeps the public informed of its work. The Assembly should ask for the annual report of the Council to contain a section on its public information activities.

63. In his address to the Assembly, the Secretary-General announced that the Secretariat-General would henceforth have an information and public relations unit. Thanks to the question put in the House of Commons by Mr. Coleman concerning new posts created within the Secretariat-General, we know through the United Kingdom Government's answer on 7th March 1986 that the A.4 post created for public relations in the Secretariat-General was still vacant. It would be interesting to know when this information unit will be ready to operate.

64. In the Council's document entitled WEU and public awareness, approved in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985, it was affirmed that "Ministerial sessions provide an opportunity to further develop good and comprehensive rela-

tions with the press". After the Bonn meeting, a joint communiqué was issued, but after the Rome meeting on 14th November 1985 only a press conference was given by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

65. With reference to the new agencies for security questions, it should be recalled that the document on the institutional reform of WEU attached to the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984 underlined that the restructuring of the agencies was guided by the intention "to have available a common basis of analysis which could form a useful point of reference for the work of both the Council and the Assembly and also for *informing public opinion*". In the abovementioned document on WEU and public awareness, the Council stressed, *inter alia*: "The Council may commission the Paris agencies of WEU to contribute to information activity in the following ways: ...preparing material specifically for public relation use; ...preparing material specifically for publication and dissemination to the press..." What has been done so far in this respect?

66. Still with reference to the same document, what has been done by national governments in order to put across subjects related to the rôle of WEU in the context of European security? It was said that "other national information channels should also be used more effectively to generate greater public awareness of policies which the alliance and WEU members follow. The Permanent Council will be instructed to look at this problem periodically during its regular sessions. When the Permanent Council considers it appropriate, such national information activities could be co-ordinated in order to enhance their effect. The overall aim of this work by the Permanent Council will be to improve the image of the WEU member countries in the field of defence and security questions." What activities has the Permanent Council developed so far and what was the result of its consultations in this respect?

VI. Conclusions

67. It is encouraging to note that during the last six months representatives in several member parliaments have made some effort to speak about the rôle of Western European Union in plenary session. In Belgium and the Netherlands, speakers have even made specific reference to the Assembly's December 1985 session. Important speeches in favour of the Assembly's activities were also made in parliamentary debates in France and Luxembourg. Taking into account the large number of plenary debates on foreign and security policy in every national parliament, it is recommended to intensify efforts in other member parliaments too, emphasizing the importance of WEU in the European and Atlantic security framework.

68. Regarding the results of action taken in parliaments on recommendations adopted by the Assembly, it remains difficult to obtain a complete picture since only very few representatives inform the Office of the Clerk though their delegation secretariat about their interventions or the questions they actually put to their governments. So far the Rapporteur has obtained information about parliamentary questions only from Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom. In order to settle the old problem of co-ordination, the proposals for improving procedure so far submitted in Mr. Eysink's earlier report on parliaments, public opinion and defence should be implemented as quickly as possible. All recommendations selected by the committee on 5th December 1985, i.e. 425 on disarmament and 428 to 430 on the SDI, are still topical. It is therefore strongly recommended to continue using these texts including the explanatory memoranda for parliamentary interventions and questions. The Italian Senate still gives the only example where several members join in tabling motions for resolutions on WEU matters. Is similar action not possible in other member parliaments?

69. With reference to the information meetings organised by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations in member parliaments, it is possible to conclude after three such meetings held in France, Germany and Italy that these efforts are useful and necessary. But the committee's true rôle can be fulfilled only if it is provided with the wherewithal to maintain an intensive and continuing contact with member parliaments and with the public in member countries. Regular visits to member parliaments are essential for the fulfilment of its duty. The Rules of Procedure request the committee to "*make all necessary arrangements*". If, for financial reasons, this action is to remain sporadic, the results of efforts to promote parliamentary and public interest in WEU matters will remain sporadic too.

70. For organising future information meetings, the following improvements might be proposed:

- directors or experts from international or national research institutes dealing with foreign and security policy located in the host country should be invited to attend and to give briefings on their institutes' activities;
- the rapporteur of a topical Assembly recommendation or the chairman of one of the three political committees should be present;
- the British journalist seconded to the United Kingdom Delegation during the winter 1985 session of the Assembly in order to examine how to

improve the interest of British newspapers in reporting on WEU matters should be invited to the next information meeting in London in order to give his advice to the committee.

71. For the necessary improvements in informing the public about the Assembly's work, it is not realistic to make proposals which, for financial reasons, have no chance of being implemented. As long as the financial situation of the Assembly remains unchanged with a public information budget of some F 300,000 per year, there is no chance of achieving visible success in public relations activities. Without even a telex, the most interesting and topical press releases are useless to the larger international information agencies if they have to be transmitted by post.

72. Thus, existing means of "showing the flag" remain very modest. Every representative may participate in public colloquies, conferences and political discussions organised by the various institutions in every country where a large audience can be found and where he has a possibility of explaining the rôle of WEU for European security. All opportunities should be seized to write articles on WEU matters which are likely to reach a wide public. The Office of the Clerk can always be asked to provide the necessary documentation. Groups of visitors to the seat of the Assembly should be received and briefed – if possible – by Assembly representatives instead of just officials of the Office of the Clerk.

73. Relations with important political and scientific research institutes should be intensified. The existing interest of industries and technological research institutions in the work of the Assembly in some member countries could be encouraged throughout all WEU member countries. The publications department of the Assembly should make an effort to draw up new sales contracts for Assembly publications with agencies in all member countries at least.

74. Turning to the activities of governments, it is to be regretted that – with few exceptions – major statements on Western European Union by ministers in parliaments have been very rare. When ministers occasionally mentioned WEU this was not always done in a very encouraging manner. After Mr. Murphy's initiative in the House of Commons requesting that a regular governmental report on the work of WEU be presented to parliament annually, it is recommended that similar pressure be brought to bear on the governments of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (in Germany the government presents a written half-yearly report on the activities of WEU to the Bundestag).

75. With the exception of the United Kingdom Government's answer to a question put by Mr. Coleman on the public relations activities of governments and the Council, the Assembly has no concrete information so far. The Council should therefore be requested to report regularly on its activities in this area and particularly to devote a section of the annual report to this question.

APPENDIX I

*Questions and answers in national parliaments**Italy**Senate**23rd January 1985**Question put by Mr. Masciadri on Recommendation 414*

To ask the Prime Minister to give the government's opinion on Recommendation 414 on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology adopted by the WEU Assembly on 4th December 1984 and to ask what steps it intends to take to follow it up.

In this recommendation, the governments of member states are invited to submit a plan to the United States Government on how to collaborate in military programmes such as fighter aircraft, helicopters, other weapon system platforms and under-water weapon systems. The WEU Assembly also advocates exchanging information with the United States on future nuclear energy plants.

In particular, it invites member governments to promote a common European policy on the first space station programme in the framework of which European and American companies should co-operate on an equal footing in the operation of the space station, with the participation of European crews.

Finally, it invites the United States to reconsider its attitude towards the draft convention on the law of the sea.

*27th June 1985**Answer by Mr. Fioret, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to the question put by Mr. Masciadri on Recommendation 414*

Armaments research in co-operation with the United States is at present being conducted by the Italian Government in NATO in the framework of the Conference of National Armaments Directors.

Regarding the exchange of nuclear information with the United States, periodical bilateral consultations have already been held frequently at all levels. The discussions cover multilateral and bilateral co-operation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Regarding space co-operation, at the ESA conference in Rome on 30th and 31st January 1985, the European countries members of the Agency adopted two important resolutions on:

- the launching of a ten-year programme centred on two fundamental elements: (a) the development of the Ariane 5 launcher (total cost about 3,600 billion lire); (b) the development of a small orbital station of Italo-German concept, Columbus (total cost about 3,600 billion lire). Other programmes were agreed to covering meteorological, remote sensing, telecommunications, microgravity and basic research;
- the decision to accept President Reagan's proposal to take part in building a manned orbital station, it being specified that Columbus should be the main element of the European contribution and co-operation should be established on an equal footing.

The conference thus defined an independent European strategy in space transport and manned flights, encouraging important steps towards international co-operation such as those now being taken with the United States.

Italy's partners were unanimously grateful to it for having proposed and prepared a conference which was decisive for the future of ESA. The importance of Italy's commitments in the Columbus and Ariane 5 programmes lays the foundations for an extension of our influence and ability to act in a strategic technological sector.

*23rd January 1985**Question put by Mr. Masciadri on Recommendation 416*

To ask the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence to give their opinion on Recommendation 416 on WEU, European union and the Atlantic Alliance adopted by the WEU Assembly on 5th December 1984 and to say what action they intend to take to follow it up.

In this recommendation, the Assembly asks the Council of Ministers to increase the powers of the Permanent Council (in this connection, it asks member countries to appoint a permanent representation to the Council and to give the Secretary-General powers of initiative allowing him to assume responsibility for applying Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty); to ensure the existence, operation and strengthening of the WEU technical bodies (Agency for the Control of Armaments and Standing Armaments Committee), giving these bodies new tasks relating to the security of

Europe and events occurring outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, problems relating to disarmament and the control of armaments, European armaments co-operation and an active policy for improving relations between East and West; to prepare joint measures to allow Europe to play an active part in international negotiations on disarmament and to develop co-operation between WEU and the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly in the joint production of armaments, bearing in mind that the aim is their accession to WEU.

27th June 1985

Answer by Mr. Fioret, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to the question put by Mr. Masciadri on Recommendation 416

Recommendation 416 adopted by the WEU Assembly on 5th December 1984 seems to correspond perfectly with the government's intentions as expressed when it adopted the Rome declaration on 27th October 1984, which was also agreed to by the six other members of WEU. The principles it formulates are being examined closely by the Permanent Council and the working group which has been set up specifically to define appropriate solutions for the accomplishment of the new tasks attributed to the organisation and consequently to indicate possible changes.

In this respect, the government's intention is to foster the process of revitalising WEU so as to ensure the achievement of the aims it was set, which extend from the strengthening of peace and security to the progressive integration of Europe, including, for instance, closer co-operation with the member countries and other European organisations.

In view of the indivisible nature of security, this process should naturally take account also of the joint defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance which remains a basis of European security.

Federal Republic of Germany

Bundestag

13th December 1985

Question put by Mr. Enders on WEU and the strategic defence initiative (Recommendation 420)

Does the Federal Government consider it useful to try in the framework of WEU to harmonise the positions of the member states of that organisation towards the strategic defence initiative and, if so, what steps has it taken itself in this sense?

Answer by Mr. Müllemann, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

In adopting a position on the SDI on 27th March 1985, the Federal Government stated that it was pursuing its efforts in regard to the SDI for Europeans to reach a joint position in the course of consultations.

At their meeting in Bonn on 22nd-23rd April, the WEU Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence "agreed to continue their collective consideration in order to achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their governments to the invitation of the United States to participate in the research programme and instructed the Permanent Council accordingly".

The Permanent Council formed a special working group which, during a series of meetings, drew up an interim report which was endorsed by the WEU ministers at their meeting in Rome on 14th November 1985. The ministers stated unanimously that they would not prevent their industries from taking part in the research programme. They considered that since armaments co-operation with the United States had so far been governed by different contracts according to different procedure in the various member countries their positions could but differ on the question of whether and to what extent the participation of firms in the SDI research programme required the agreement of the government.

The ministers also agreed on the importance of the politico-strategic repercussions of the SDI on European security. However, all ministers agreed that it was yet too soon to give final views on this matter. They decided to continue their joint reflection on the SDI in the framework of WEU.

Question put by Mr. Enders on the joint production of observation satellites by members of WEU (Recommendation 421)

What is the position of the Federal Government on the joint production of observation satellites by the WEU member countries in order to have an independent means of surveillance in the control of armaments and security?

Answer by Mr. Müllemann, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

The Federal Government has not yet had an opportunity of examining the joint production of observation satellites by WEU member countries.

It considered a plan of this type with France. At the last Franco-German summit meeting we informed France that because of the high cost of such a system we could not envisage implementing this plan for the time being.

Luxembourg

Chamber of Deputies

5th November 1985

Question put by Mr. Hengel on the joint production of observation satellites, the control of armaments and disarmament (Recommendation 421)

What is the government's position towards observation satellites being produced jointly by Western European countries so as to have an independent source of information on armaments control and security matters?

What is the position in this connection?

What new initiatives are being taken by the government to ensure that the WEU countries regularly examine all matters relating to the control of armaments and disarmament and adopt a joint position in the Atlantic Alliance, in particular on:

- preventing an arms race in outer space;
- banning chemical weapons; and
- totally banning nuclear tests?

Answer by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs

On the possibility of observation satellites being produced jointly by Western European Union countries so as to have an independent source of information on armaments control and security matters, I wish to inform the honourable member that no definite plan exists. On the other hand, there is France's well-known proposal for setting up an international agency for supervision by satellite whose aim is the same. This proposal, discussed at the Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe and the bilateral talks between the President of the Republic and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, meets the same concern as expressed by the honourable member, although placed in a wider multilateral context. Such a satellite would provide an objective source of information for all states taking part in the CSCE process.

The WEU countries are harmonising their reactions to the American strategic defence initiative, as agreed at the last WEU ministerial meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985.

The Luxembourg Government has often expressed its wish to prevent an arms race in outer space and this was moreover one of the aims of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva, as set out in the joint communiqué issued by Mr. Shultz and Mr. Gromyko on 8th January 1985. Luxembourg continues to sup-

port this aim in appropriate forums and in its bilateral contacts with the two countries concerned.

On banning chemical weapons, I wish to recall the recent answer to a question put by Mrs. Flesch in parliament, when the government recalled that it advocated the adoption of a convention banning the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons.

Finally, on totally banning nuclear tests, at the third conference of parties responsible for studying the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, held in Geneva from 27th August to 21st September 1985, the Luxembourg Government again said it was in favour of concluding a treaty totally banning nuclear tests, accompanied by true control and verification measures.

Italy

Senate

22nd October 1985

Question put by Mr. Masciadri on Recommendation 423

To ask the Minister of Defence what action has been taken on Recommendation 423, adopted by the WEU Assembly on 22nd May 1985, and in particular on the fundamental aim for Europe's defence which is the establishment of a European defence industry for improving standardisation and interoperability of weapons.

Answer by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence, to the question put by Mr. Masciadri on Recommendation 423

In the sector mentioned by the author of the question, the action of the Defence Ministry is indirect and intended mainly to help the qualitative improvement and degree of integration of industry in this sector both at national level and in the wider framework of Europe, NATO and at the international level.

To this end, the main means of action is research, definition and, in appropriate cases, the launching of European armaments programmes in co-operation with the other allied countries in the appropriate institutional bodies and in particular in the framework of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), which has existed since 1976. In this framework, the achievement of programmes which have been harmonised between the three European countries concerned is entrusted to consortia of European firms similar to those formed for developing and producing weapons systems such as Tornado and the FH-70 howitzer.

Furthermore, the co-operation of European defence industries is being pursued by promoting the creation of informal and official institutions such as the European Defence Industrial Group (EDIG). In addition to these steps which contribute more directly to improving the European defence base and the standardisation of armaments, the Defence Ministry is also encouraging research on this matter.

16th January 1986

Question put by Mr. Masciadri to the Minister for Foreign Affairs

Considering that:

The Assembly of Western European Union adopted, at its sitting on 2nd December 1985, Recommendation 426 on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial years 1984 and 1985;

This recommendation recommends that the Council:

- “ 1. Re-examine the problem of applying the zero growth criterion with a view to specifying that this criterion is to be applied only to operating budgets and not pension budgets;
2. In order to apply this criterion correctly, establish a rate of increase for each category of expenditure instead of fixing a single rate of increase for the net total of the budget;
3. Pursue efforts to improve the status of staff in the framework of consultation and inform the Assembly of the conclusions of studies on this subject;
4. In the framework of present reorganisational studies, re-examine the possibility of a single seat for the ministerial organs of WEU in order to improve liaison between these bodies which at present have offices in London and in Paris, thus reducing costs by integrating supporting staff, and reach a decision on this matter. ”

What steps has the government taken or does it intend to take to follow up the text adopted by the WEU Assembly?

United Kingdom

House of Commons

6th February 1986

Written questions by Mr. Coleman on United Kingdom Government policy toward WEU and its future and replies by Mr. Eggar, Parliamen-

tary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr. COLEMAN asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs: (1) what is the policy of Her Majesty's Government towards Portugal's application for membership of Western European Union; and if he will make a statement; (2) why a decision has not been taken by the Western European Union on Portugal's application for membership; when a decision is expected to be taken; and if he will make a statement; (3) what is the policy of Her Majesty's Government towards enlargement of the Western European Union; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. EGGAR. – The question of the possible enlargement of the WEU is currently under consideration. Ministers agreed at Bonn on 22nd-23rd April 1985 that, once the process of reactivating and reorganising the WEU had been completed, the Council should consider the principles which should govern possible WEU enlargement. The Council would then, on the basis of these general principles, consider individual cases, particularly that of Portugal which applied for membership in October 1984.

Mr. COLEMAN asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what approaches have been received by the Western European Union from Spain about possible Spanish membership of the organisation; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. EGGAR. – Spain has not applied to join the WEU.

Mr. COLEMAN asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs who is the representative of the United Kingdom on the Western European Union Public Administration Committee.

Mr. EGGAR. – The United Kingdom is represented on the Western European Union Public Administration Committee by a Home Civil Service principal grade officer in the Cabinet Office (Management and Personnel Office).

Mr. COLEMAN asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what discussions he has held with the Spanish Government covering possible Spanish membership of the Western European Union.

Mr. EGGAR. – None.

Mr. COLEMAN asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what specific measures the government are promoting to seek to improve public information about the Western European Union Council and about the other organs of the Western European Union; and what measures are currently being taken by the Western European Union in this direction.

Mr. EGGAR. — The government maintain contact with representatives of the media, academic life, and members of parliament to inform them about the activities of the WEU and its Council. Ministers regularly address the six-monthly sessions of the WEU Assembly in Paris. As part of the process of reorganising WEU institutions a new post has been created in the WEU secretariat in London with responsibility for public relations and information. The government support this initiative, and other publicity activities of the WEU.

Mr. COLEMAN asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what are the budgetary implications of the measures which have been taken, and of those which are being taken, to reinvigorate the Western European Union; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. EGGAR. — The measures agreed by the Council of the Western European Union to reinvigorate the organisation have been undertaken with respect for existing budgetary limits. It is the government's policy, and the policy of many of our allies, to maintain zero real growth in the administrative budgets of international organisations, inclusive of pensions.

Mr. COLEMAN asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what new agencies have been established by the Western European Union since the Rome declaration of October 1984; what relationship is envisaged between these agencies and the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments; and what relationship is envisaged between the new agencies and the Assembly of the Western European Union, and between the new agencies and the Council.

Mr. EGGAR. — WEU ministers decided at Bonn in April 1985 that three new agencies of the Western European Union should be established. They were: (i) the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions; (ii) the agency for the study of security and defence questions; (iii) the agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments.

These agencies were established with effect from 1st January 1986.

The Director of Agency I has a dual capacity as Director for the Agency for the Control of Armaments; his deputy in that capacity is a member of the staff of Agency I.

The rôle of WEU in armaments co-operation is to help provide the necessary political impetus for, and practical contribution to, the various efforts undertaken in this field, including those carried out by the Independent European Programme Group, the main forum for European equipment co-operation, and the Conference of National Armaments Directors. The Standing Armaments Committee will help ensure that the work of Agency III is fully co-ordinated with the activities of these other organisations.

The new agencies will be responsible to the WEU Secretary-General in London and, through him, to the WEU Council. The Council will maintain overall control of the agencies' work programmes. The Council considers that the agencies should provide technical assistance to the Assembly on a case-by-case basis and in conformity with criteria to be agreed in the light of individual requests.

Mr. COLEMAN asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what new posts have been created within the Secretariat-General of the Western European Union and within other organs of the Western European Union since the Rome declaration of October 1984; what responsibilities and salaries these posts carry; which of them have been filled and by whom; by what means new staff are being recruited; and what steps are being taken to keep (a) parliament and (b) the Assembly of Western European Union, informed of such developments occurring in the course of the Western European Union reinvigoration process.

Mr. EGGAR. — I am arranging for the detailed information requested on posts to be assembled and to be published in the Official Report as soon as possible. Information about developments arising from WEU reactivation is reported regularly by the Council and Secretary-General to the WEU Assembly, British members of which are drawn from parliament.

7th March 1986

Reply by Mr. Eggar, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr. EGGAR (*pursuant to his reply, 6th February 1986*). — We are now able to supply the following information:

<i>Places and name of WEU organisation</i>	<i>New posts (A-Grade)</i>	<i>Responsibilities</i>	<i>Starting salaries (net monthly) £</i>	<i>Post filled or vacant</i>
<i>London :</i>				
Secretariat-General	A6	Head Political Affairs Division	2,369	Filled (Italy)
	A3/4	Head General Policy and Research Section	1,533 to 1,763	Filled (United Kingdom)
	A2/3 A4	General Policy and Research Public Relations	1,242 to 1,533 1,763	Vacant Vacant
<i>Paris :</i>				
Agency I	1 Hors Grade	Director	3,145	Filled (Italy)
	5 Officials (A2 to A6)	Research/Study	1,242 to 2,369	All filled*
Agency II	1 Hors Grade	Director	3,145	Filled (United Kingdom)
	4 Officials (A2 to A6)	Research/Study	1,242 to 3,369	3 Filled* ; 1 Vacancy
Agency III	1 Hors Grade	Director	3,145	Filled (France)
	4 Officials (A2 to A6)	Research/Study	1,242 to 2,369	Filled*
Joint Administration Offices	7 Officials (A2 to A6)	Administration, Security, Documentation, Translation, Interpretation and General Services	1,242 to 2,369	All Filled*

* Nineteen out of 20 A-grade positions in Paris have been filled. They have been allocated as follows:

Belgium: 3
 Federal Republic of Germany: 4
 Luxembourg: 1
 United Kingdom: 2
 France: 4
 Italy: 3
 Netherlands: 2.

The overall effect of recent changes on personnel in London is a reduction of one hors-grade (assistant secretary-general) post and one former A-grade post balanced by the creation of the four new A-grade posts.

The overall effect on WEU personnel of recent changes in Paris is the creation of one new director and a reduction of six A-grade officials.

Vacancy notices are issued to the national representatives in the Permanent Council for onward transmission to their capitals; they are also sent where appropriate to other international organisations. Contracts for employment will in principle be of short-term duration in the first instance in view of the transitional period which extends to the end of December 1987.

APPENDIX II

*Information meeting held in the German Bundestag, Bonn**20th February 1986**Participants**Parliamentarians*

Mrs. Renger, Vice-President of the German Bundestag
Mrs. Hellwig, Chairman of the Bundestag Committee on European Affairs
Mr. Abelein, Vice-President of the North Atlantic Assembly
Mrs. Pack
MM. Vogelsang
 Büchner
 Wulff
 Gansel
 Spies von Büllenheim

German Foreign Office

Mr. Brecht (WEU Department)

Journalists

Mrs. Marthe (AFP)
MM. Merkow (APN)
 Renken (Das Parlament)
 von Kageneck (Die Welt)
 Kurilin (Soviet Television and Broadcasting)

Committee members

Dame Jill Knight, Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations
Mrs. Fischer
Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
Dr. Miller
MM. Enders
 Goerens
 Noerens
 Jung
 Murphy

Secretaries of delegations

Mrs. Dossier-Carzou (France)
Mr. Moreau (France)
Mr. de Gou (Netherlands)
Mr. Möller (Federal Republic of Germany)
Mr. Cairncross (United Kingdom)
Mr. Dillenbourg (Luxembourg)

*Texts of briefings**The duties of the renewed
Western European Union
and its importance for the parliamentary
and public debate on security
and defence issues**Briefing by Mr. Murphy*

Since it is one of the main duties of our committee to establish relations with parliaments and the public of the member countries of Western European Union we of course follow with interest political discussions and debates in these countries – especially those on security and defence matters.

Having the pleasure today to be invited to the Bundestag, and provided you do not consider it out of place to exchange compliments between parliamentarians, we will not hesitate to congratulate the German Parliament for the high quality of its political work. Here, parliamentary life in a divided country at the point of contact between East and West is particularly intensive and interesting, especially with regard to problems of our joint security.

Of course we are not here to tell you that Western European Union is the philosophers' stone for all our problems, and tomorrow other groups from other international organisations will convince you that there are other philosophers' stones.

Our concern has a more general aspect. We think that the debates in parliaments and among the public with regard to the various problems of our security should be conducted more and more in a context of creating a common European security dimension.

The first reason for doing so is the situation with regard to the Atlantic Alliance. There is broad agreement on both sides of the Atlantic that NATO has preserved peace in Europe for more than thirty-five years and that the alliance remains the foundation of western security. On the other hand, the international situation today is quite different in comparison with 1949 when NATO was founded. The need to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance is an oft-repeated request asking the European partners to increase their contribution to transatlantic security.

But the situation among the European partners in NATO has become more difficult since a few of its members adopt separate political positions on security and defence policy. On the other hand there are complaints that Europe's influence within the alliance does not correspond to the importance of its contribu-

tion to joint defence efforts. But naturally the weight of Western Europe can increase only if member countries manage to co-ordinate and harmonise their security policies so as to speak with one voice. Of course, this is a difficult objective to achieve and we are far from it.

These considerations lead to a second aspect regarding the future evolution of the construction of Europe. The construction will be incomplete if Europe fails to acquire a security dimension parallel with the economic dimension now achieved through the European Communities and a foreign policy dimension through European political co-operation.

But living in the present we have to realise that more than thirty years after the failure to create a European defence community efforts to harmonise security policies in other frameworks, such as, for instance, the European Community, have not so far been really successful despite the various efforts and projects discussed during recent European summit conferences. It would be going too far to enumerate all the reasons for the difficulties, but as a matter of fact they have finally led to initiatives to revitalise a small but useful institution called Western European Union.

When ministers in their Rome declaration of 27th October 1984 underlined their determination to make better use of the WEU framework in order to harmonise security policy and decided some important institutional reforms with regard to its ministerial bodies, these were important but only first steps. They may lead to the creation of an appropriate and efficient motor for a European security dimension and at the same time to a strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance. But it has still to be proved that political will and determination will overcome scepticism. The renewed Western European Union must justify its qualifications for its new rôle by actions and deeds related to actual political issues in security matters. This is particularly difficult because of the magnitude of the problems.

But we think that after being freed from most of its former control functions Western European Union is perfectly fit to play its new rôle to the full because this small but homogeneous body has all the necessary administrative and democratic structures including a parliamentary assembly which is still the only one at international level authorised by treaty to deal with security and defence matters. But we need a strong and permanent determination to seek co-operation in its framework.

This is not a matter to be left entirely to governments. We believe that parliamentary participation in security and defence matters at European level is absolutely imperative. There must be steady and relentless pressure from the Assembly vis-à-vis the Council but also from national parliaments and the public vis-à-vis member governments in order to strengthen this determination. We particularly need strong parliamentary solidarity and continuing support for our Assembly activities in all national parliaments. Why is this so important?

According to the treaties, our Assembly has only very imperfect means of supervising or following up the activities of the Council. The latter is merely obliged to report once a year to the Assembly about its activities. Of course, the Assembly continues to bring pressure to bear on the Council, sending recommendations, asking questions and seeking all possible means to enhance its dialogue with the various ministerial organs, but true governmental responsibility vis-à-vis parliamentarians exists only at national level. We therefore think we should take advantage of the fact that all members of the Assembly are at the same time members of national parliaments. Our activities in Paris can be successful only if we continue this work at home. We think that not only members of the Assembly but all parliamentarians interested in defence and security matters should participate in this work.

What is the practical significance of this? A larger number of parliamentarians should know more about our actual concerns and preoccupations in the Assembly of Western European Union in order to take up these matters in their contacts with their government. I admit that in the Bundestag you are already in a fairly privileged position compared with other parliaments of WEU member countries since the Federal Government is so far the only member government to communicate to the parliament written half-yearly reports on the evolution of WEU. Since reports are also regularly drawn up by the delegation after each part-session of the Assembly, there are several opportunities for engaging a debate with the government. But in the area of security policy we have so many and such urgent problems that we think WEU issues should become an important part of the *permanent* parliamentary dialogue with the government.

I would recall that in implementation of a decision taken by the Council of Ministers at their Rome meeting in October 1984 three new agencies are being established in the place of the previous two institutions, i.e. the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee:

- at the December 1985 session, the Assembly of Western European Union

was informed by the Secretary-General that *Agency I for the study of arms control and disarmament* is to monitor the progress of current negotiations on the control, limitation and reduction of armaments, analysing their possible implications for European security and attending to the essential problem of verification;

- tasks of *Agency II for the study of security and defence questions* include threat assessment and the contribution of WEU states to the response to that threat; and
- *Agency III for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments* is to help to perform WEU's rôle of providing political impetus in arms co-operation and, in close co-operation with the IEPG and CNAD, to keep under review a changing world market and the situation of our industries in that respect including the study of emerging technologies.

In connection with these new organs, various questions could be put to governments, especially with regard to their missions, the breakdown of their work in relation to other institutions such as IEPG and CNAD and their co-operation with other international and national research institutes, or the possibility for parliamentarians to be informed of the results of their work.

Last but not least, there is the question of the enlargement of WEU. If, through every member parliament, governments were pressed to accelerate the consultation procedure with regard to the decision to be taken on Portugal's application for membership, it would be most helpful for the relevant activities of our Assembly.

In quoting these examples, I in no way wish to suggest that national parliaments should do the work of the WEU Assembly. But I repeat that we really need a support at national level and my intention was to promote your interest in raising WEU questions in your parliament by pointing out the various possibilities and subjects covered by WEU.

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***The Assembly
of Western European Union***

Briefing by Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra

What I shall try in the next few minutes is to deepen your understanding and to win your sympathy for a parliamentary assembly at the

European level which has to work under fairly difficult and even contradictory conditions.

The Assembly of Western European Union has one privilege. It is the only international parliament with responsibilities in defence and security matters. But this is its only privilege. In terms of constitutional working conditions it must be admitted that although WEU has a democratic structure its true powers are very limited.

It is true that the modified Brussels Treaty mentions the WEU Assembly only in the context of the annual report which the Council has to submit to the Assembly on its activities. The Assembly's status is a purely consultative one. It can take no real sanctions against the Council and does not even decide upon its own budget.

This last aspect must be most surprising for parliamentarians who are accustomed to national practice whereby parliaments decide on their own budget and also on that of their governments. In WEU, the situation is just the opposite. The Assembly's budget has to be approved by the member governments which form the Council. I should like to revert to this particularity in a few moments.

According to the treaties, the Assembly is composed of the representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. In other words, parliamentarians have a dual mandate in these two assemblies, although their vocations are quite different. As you know, this makes it difficult to form national delegations. Furthermore, many representatives are overburdened with their triple mission in one national and two international assemblies.

On the other hand it should be recalled that defence and security policy still remains wholly under the sovereignty of national governments. From this point of view it is an advantage that the idea of electing the Assembly by direct universal suffrage, as for the European Parliament, has so far not been envisaged. But we have the impression that sometimes members of national parliaments interested in European defence policy are not sufficiently motivated or are not asked to become members of their country's parliamentary delegation to the WEU Assembly. It would be interesting to learn something about your experience in the Bundestag so far and what conclusions might be drawn.

Within the Assembly, consideration is being given to certain suggestions, for instance: the presidents of national parliaments might be informed and asked to urge political groups in their parliaments to attach greater importance to the participation of parliamentarians interested

in WEU matters when appointing members of their country's parliamentary delegation. To this end, the interest of chairmen of defence and foreign affairs committees should be aroused. Again consideration might be given, when forming national delegations to the Assembly of the Council of Europe, to appointing a relatively large number of parliamentarians who would be required to give priority to meetings of the WEU Assembly.

Turning to the specific activities of the Assembly, they seem to be fairly limited compared with the means and possibilities of other international parliaments. Normally, the Assembly meets only twice a year in plenary session, for four days each time, generally in Paris where its seat and secretariat are located.

Even so, this Assembly is doing very comprehensive and useful work. Everybody who has had the opportunity of taking part in its work, namely within its three main political committees, i.e. the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, knows the quality of its reports and recommendations on various topical political issues. The extent to which the Assembly is able to influence decisions and positions adopted by governments represented in the WEU Council cannot be described accurately, but it is a fact, and in no way denied by governments, that efforts to revive Western European Union have been made largely because of Assembly initiatives and pressure.

Nevertheless, we are still far away from true parliamentary participation in reflection and decision-making regarding defence and security matters at European level. Considering that these questions concern our very existence, it is worth giving serious thought to all means of strengthening the powers and influence of our Assembly. I will consider our meeting successful if I can make an effective contribution to encouraging you to continue and intensify your reflections in this respect. This process of reflection has to be channelled through the national parliaments since any change in the status quo has to be decided by member governments. As there is at present practically no chance of convincing governments to alter the treaties to increase the Assembly's responsibilities and powers, there is no choice but to improve its working conditions within the existing framework. In our view help could be afforded by national parliaments and the public in at least two respects:

First and foremost is the most difficult financial situation of our Assembly. There is a fundamental contradiction between the duties we are required to fulfil and the financial means at our disposal.

In the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984, the Council of Ministers recalled the importance of the WEU Assembly which – and I quote from this declaration – “as the only parliamentary body mandated by a treaty to discuss defence matters, is called to play a growing rôle”. In the same declaration, ministers instructed the Permanent Council to ensure that the various arrangements proposed with regard to the institutional reform “remain within the present limits... of the organisation’s budget”. In other words, the principle of strict zero growth has to be applied; but the Council applies this principle to the Assembly as well. The situation has deteriorated even further because, taking the inflation rate into account, the financial means accorded to the Assembly during the last years fell even below zero growth. Attempts to offset these losses have been rejected by the Council. As a consequence, the problem is now becoming critical.

If you wish to help us, it would be extremely useful if you could stress these contradictions, either in plenary session, for instance during budget discussions, or on other occasions in the budget committee or in direct contact with the government. We do not deny that every government in every member country has to make economies. But we should avoid trying to save money in the wrong places.

The second possibility of improving our working conditions and the effectiveness of our activities would be to intensify the follow-up action to be taken in parliaments with regard to initiatives and recommendations adopted by the Assembly. A fundamental condition is of course that our work is made sufficiently known in national parliaments. And perhaps we should improve the procedures we have followed so far. If members of the German Delegation could make comments or suggestions in this respect, we would certainly be grateful, for these problems are among the main concerns of our Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

At the end of every part-session, our committee selects from the texts adopted by the Assembly those which, in its opinion, should be debated in national parliaments. These texts are transmitted by the President of the Assembly to the presidents of member parliaments under cover of an official letter expressing the wish that these texts be used as material for speeches or questions to ministers. May I ask if the texts transmitted at the end of the last plenary session from 2nd to 5th December 1985 have reached anyone present in this room and has anyone had the time and opportunity to study them? I am convinced that these selected texts can be very useful in national debates. The agenda of the session last December was largely dominated by the question of SDI and disarmament. The dif-

ferent aspects of SDI were examined on the basis of reports presented by the three political committees according to their defence, political and technological aspects, also taking into account guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the space challenge for Europe organised in Munich from 18th to 20th September 1985 by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. The three relevant recommendations were transmitted to national parliaments for discussion together with a recommendation on disarmament. We know that it is difficult to obtain translated texts in time, but you will agree that the earlier you make use of these texts for interventions with your government the more you can influence its position in the WEU Council where the replies to the different recommendations are worked out.

Apart from putting written or oral questions to the government, would it not be worth considering incorporating recommendations or other initiatives of the WEU Assembly in wider motions for resolutions, interpellations or “major questions” (Grosse Anfragen) so often debated in committees and in plenary session of the Bundestag?

At the very end, I would like to take up the question of the activities of the three new WEU agencies already mentioned by our colleague, Mr. Murphy.

It is in fact important to know what these agencies are doing.

I therefore draw your attention to Recommendation 425 on disarmament, adopted last December, which recommends that the Council instruct the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions (Agency I) to study the verification and observer régime which should be agreed in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, and to co-ordinate the activities of observers from WEU countries invited to Warsaw Pact manoeuvres.

I would also refer you to Recommendation 428 on WEU and the strategic defence initiative which recommends that the Council instruct the same agency to report annually on the arms control impact of SDI.

Finally I would mention Recommendation 429 which recommends that the Council have the appropriate agency conduct a continuing study of the strategic consequences of the development of new weapons. Furthermore, that the Council play an active part in informing Europeans about matters relating to their security by instructing the new agency handling defence questions to promote the organisation of training courses for nationals of the seven countries so as to allow them to have a better understanding of the European dimension of security problems.

By mentioning these few examples of the Assembly's activities and initiatives, I wanted to encourage you to continue and intensify your efforts to use our work in your national activities, because, to achieve a European security dimension, we need strong parliamentary and public participation in all member states.

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***Relations between Western European Union,
NATO and other Western European
organisations and countries***

Briefing by Mr. Goerens

For some time now, there has again been talk of Europe.

There is an impression that the initiative taken to reactivate WEU may have influenced and even speeded up deliberations in other European forums and also in the Atlantic Alliance. A spirit of competition is perhaps sometimes necessary and useful in order to give fresh impetus elsewhere.

At its meeting in Luxembourg on 2nd and 3rd December 1985, the European Council reached an agreement of principle on reforming the Community institutions. The parties considered that closer co-operation in European security matters was likely to make an essential contribution to the development of a European identity in external policy matters and were prepared to co-ordinate their positions on the *political and economic aspects of security* more fully. They also expressed their determination to safeguard the technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security.

Subject to the consequences of the refusal of the Danish Parliament to associate itself with this agreement, it may be noted that the proposal aims at bringing about important elements of a European security dimension. However, these are still only elements and are not sufficient to reach a true common defence and security policy.

The agreement consequently specified that the provisions of the treaty were not an obstacle to the existence of closer co-operation in security matters between certain high contracting parties in the framework of Western European Union and of the Atlantic Alliance.

There is an important fact which should be borne in mind: the seven WEU member states – Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – are all represented in the European Community, European political co-operation and the Council of Europe. They are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and, with the exception of France, of Eurogroup, the unofficial association of Euro-

pean partners of the alliance. Conversely, France takes part with the other WEU member states in the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) set up by Eurogroup to strengthen European co-operation in the field of armaments and defence equipment.

WEU is therefore not only one of the major elements of the European edifice but also has special responsibility to assume as a forum for reflection and consultation on security matters with a view to giving political impetus to this aspect of European integration.

This implies:

- full application of the vast responsibilities conferred on the WEU Council by the modified Brussels Treaty which, in its preamble, affirms the resolution of the parties “to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe” and also provides for the closest possible co-operation with the Atlantic Alliance;
- close co-ordination and co-operation with the other elements of the European edifice and with the organs of the alliance, while avoiding duplication. A concern constantly expressed by the Assembly is that the WEU Council must abandon none of its responsibilities, even when its sometimes over-scrupulous desire to avoid duplication of work encourages it to reduce the scope of its activities in favour of NATO or other European organisations.

In the first place, all this comes within the intergovernmental context since it is the governments that conclude treaties and in practice apply them. But what is our rôle as parliamentarians in this connection?

Our task of control and supervision requires that we be kept permanently and thoroughly informed about the present state of European security co-operation and the activities of the executive bodies. This is why we put questions and encourage all our parliamentary colleagues and also the public to put questions or make proposals. In view of the fact that external security matters are highly controversial, a public debate on the basis of sound information is essential to prevent ignorance and/or disinformation forming an ever-larger obstacle to understanding of the difficult conditions of our security.

One of the fundamental questions put to governments is therefore whether they are prepared to make a substantial improvement in the information they give parliaments and the public about European defence and security matters

and about European and transatlantic co-operation in this area.

Like us, you have to put questions to know how the WEU Council effectively shows its determination to co-ordinate its activities with NATO and with European political co-operation. On several occasions, the Assembly has asked the Council to hold consultations in WEU prior to meetings of the North Atlantic Council in order to give greater weight to purely European concerns in regard to defence and disarmament.

The creation of new agencies raises the problem of how to co-ordinate their work with that of the corresponding bodies of the alliance. How is this done?

How does the WEU Council give tangible form to its determination to give new political impetus to the efforts of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD)?

What new impetus can WEU give to the progress of the joint production of armaments and in particular of standardisation and interoperability? How does it intend to co-ordinate the technological and industrial aspects of security with the European Community?

In what framework should Europeans co-ordinate their views on matters relating to disarmament and the control of armaments?

But as parliamentarians we also have to think about possible ways of improving the co-ordination of our own activities in interparliamentary forums. On the one hand, relations with national parliaments must be developed and, on the other, there must be co-ordination at international level. Where Portugal is concerned, our Presidential Committee has just decided that members of the Portuguese Parliament may be invited to attend all meetings of Assembly committees as observers.

Our Assembly has also always endeavoured to co-ordinate its work with that of the other European parliamentary assemblies and it has adopted several recommendations and resolutions in this sense and on the unification of European activities. Documents and observers are at present exchanged between an Assembly committee and the Security and Disarmament Subcommittee of the European Parliament.

Our Assembly has always constantly followed the work of the North Atlantic

Assembly. Admittedly, it has no links or official relationship with that assembly but since there are a few cases of dual mandates and many of the subjects dealt with by the two assemblies are almost identical there would be good reasons to improve co-ordination of their work. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of our Assembly already holds occasional meetings with the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly.

Although, because of the composition of the two organisations, it is relatively easy to share tasks between the WEU Assembly and the Assembly of the Council of Europe, some care has to be shown when choosing the dates and places of meetings.

In their Rome declaration, the WEU ministers stressed "the value, in their eyes, of developing a dialogue between the Assembly and other parliaments or parliamentary institutions".

The ministers' view is useful because it allows the governments concerned to be reminded that the development of a true interparliamentary dialogue does not depend solely on good will but also on the granting of fair financial resources. In view of the Assembly's present budgetary position, the promotion of interparliamentary relations is practically impossible. This is a particularly regrettable situation since the Assembly does not consider itself to be an exclusive club. We are not wrapped up in our own activities. We want a dialogue. As you will have noticed, I have made ample reference to the activities of other European and Atlantic institutions. The Assembly has in fact always reported on the activities of others. Moreover, there is sometimes an impression that it is customary in certain other international organisations to gloss over all activities emanating from our Assembly in total silence. But was it by sheer chance that, during the last plenary session of the North Atlantic Assembly, which inter alia tackled problems relating to the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance, not one speaker mentioned the activities of WEU?

We are convinced that, if our work is to be successful, we should rather endeavour to ascertain areas in which we could achieve some degree of unification of interparliamentary action. If this is not possible in present circumstances, we must at least take note of each other's work and seek to make more of each other's results.

*Security and terrorism –
the implications for Europe of crises
in other parts of the world*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur*

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For a European group to co-ordinate the fight against terrorism – Memorandum from Jean-Marie Caro, President of the WEU Assembly, to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, 17th April 1986

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Michel (Alternate: *De Bondt*) (Chairman); MM. *Hardy, van der Werff* (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. *Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts* (Alternate: *Péciaux*), *Burger, Close, Sir Anthony Grant, Mr. Hill* (Alternate: *Murphy*), Mrs. *Kelly* (Alternate: Mrs. *Fischer*), MM. *Koehl* (Alternate: *Dreyfus-Schmidt*), *Lagorce, Lord Mackie* (Alternate: *Dame Jill Knight*), MM. *Martino* (Alternate: *Cavaliere*), *Masciadri, Müller, Prouvost, Reddemann, Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spitella, Vecchietti, de Vries*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

*on security and terrorism –
the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty is an essential basis for European co-operation in external policy matters;
- (ii) Considering that in certain areas no western organisation is able to replace the WEU Council for the application of this article of the treaty;
- (iii) Deploring the fact that the seven governments have not yet made use of the WEU Council to examine matters which constitute a threat to international peace and stability;
- (iv) Recalling that the Rome declaration confirmed the WEU Council's vocation to play an active part in the application of Article VIII;
- (v) Recalling that relations between certain member countries and countries outside Europe call for continuous exchanges of views between the WEU countries;
- (vi) Considering that the pursuit of the war between Iran and Iraq is a serious threat to international peace and security;
- (vii) Considering that the recrudescence of international terrorism is also a serious threat to international peace and security and may seriously unsettle western society if effective countermeasures are not taken;
- (viii) Welcoming the fact that international society has started to take up the challenge of terrorism, but regretting the absence of any significant agreement about the means to be used to this end and deploring the consequences of this division, considering how essential it is to agree on the measures to be taken;
- (ix) Regretting that no effective co-ordinated measures, whether preventive or repressive, have been taken against terrorist actions before the United States action against Libya, recalls that the members of the Assembly give preference to political and diplomatic channels for solving the problem of international terrorism, while not precluding any other appropriate measures if it proves impossible to succeed by negotiation;
- (x) Welcoming as a modest step forward the intentions announced by the Twelve on 27th January and 14th and 22nd April 1986;
- (xi) Considering that only the co-ordination of measures taken by the states in question can meet the situation created by international terrorism;
- (xii) Recalling that this co-ordination is all the more necessary after the launching by Libya of two missiles towards the island of Lampedusa, which constituted a true act of war against a member country of WEU,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- I.1. Effectively apply Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty as it planned when adopting paragraph 8 of the Rome declaration in October 1984 and, in particular, meet each time crises outside the North Atlantic Treaty area require it to do so and whenever consultations among the Twelve seem unlikely to meet the situation;
2. Follow attentively developments in the war between Iraq and Iran and:
 - (a) promote the return to a fair, lasting peace;
 - (b) strongly denounce any violation of the laws of war by either side;
 - (c) concert action by member countries to prevent any extension of the war and to ensure the safety of navigation in the Gulf;
3. Confirm that the development of international terrorism brings into play the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and, in this context:

- (a) promote and participate effectively in international consultations to counter terrorist action;
- (b) apply systematically the decisions set out in the twelve-power declarations of 27th January and 14th and 22nd April 1986;
- (c) draw up a charter specifying the principles which its signatories would undertake to follow in the event of terrorist action;
- (d) co-ordinate the preventive and repressive measures which member countries are obliged to take because of the development of terrorist operations;
- (e) concert the action taken by member countries so as to deter effectively any country from affording assistance or encouragement to organisations practising terrorism.

II. For these purposes, the Assembly endorses the call for action its President addressed to the Council and recommends that the Council instruct the appropriate WEU agencies to report without delay on the various aspects of the threat international terrorism constitutes for the western defence system, individuals and public freedoms and define the measures which member countries should take to counter terrorism effectively.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In October 1985, the General Affairs Committee decided to ask for a report on WEU and member countries' commitments outside the North Atlantic Treaty area to be included in the agenda of the June 1986 session. Its intention was then to explore the prospects offered by paragraph 8 of the Rome declaration which, in application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, whose paragraph 3 specifies that:

“ At the request of any of the high contracting parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability ”,

indicates for its part that the ministers “ may also consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world ”.

2. Since then, the Presidential Committee has referred to the committee two motions for recommendations. One, dated 21st May 1985, was tabled by Mr. Hardy and others and was published as Document 1022. It concerned the war between Iraq and Iran and reads as follows:

“ The Assembly,

Aware of the continued crisis arising from the Iran-Iraq conflict which presents a threat not only to regional stability, but to global security;

Concerned at the aggressive character of the Khomeini régime, which has already cost enormous numbers of lives;

Noting the apparently increasing concern of many Iranian people that a cease-fire should be arranged and that negotiations for peace should commence;

URGES member states to express further their desire for peace and to use their diplomatic, political and economic influence to secure this end. ”

3. The other was tabled by Mr. Bianco and others on 3rd December 1985 and was published as Document 1047. It reads as follows:

“ The Assembly,

Considering the serious human and financial losses caused by the war between Iran and Iraq;

Considering the present régime's insistence on continuing the war between Iran and Iraq, which is a serious threat to peace and tranquillity in the area and throughout the world;

Considering the will of the Iranian people to bring the war to a peaceful conclusion, which finds a positive point of reference in the peace plan of the National Resistance Council;

Considering further the resolutions submitted to and adopted by the Council of Europe,

CONDEMNS the policy of the Iranian régime, which continues to be based on recourse to war and the violation of human rights, as dramatically demonstrated by the list of 12,028 victims in the Mujaheddin publication. ”

4. Finally, at its meeting on 20th January 1986, the Presidential Committee decided to ask the General Affairs Committee to examine the question of international terrorism. Anxious not to increase the number of reports on the agenda of the next session but to tackle matters while they were still topical, the Presidential Committee decided to change the title of the report proposed by the General Affairs Committee and to include in the agenda of the June 1986 session a report on security and terrorism – the implications for Europe of crisis situations in other parts of the world.

5. These are obviously three separate subjects but all relate to the application of Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty and paragraph 8 of the Rome declaration. Your Rapporteur therefore proposes to deal with them in three chapters leading up to a single draft recommendation.

6. A working paper prepared by your Rapporteur was given a first reading by the General Affairs Committee on 17th March. This brought out no major disagreement among members of the committee, but it allowed your Rapporteur to make broad changes in his text in order to take many useful suggestions into account. He has also been able to obtain further information, most of which is included in the present document, the text of which was concluded on 15th April. In view of the events then occurring, your Rapporteur well realises that certain aspects of this report will soon be out of date. He feels nevertheless that the expected

course of events should not undermine the fundamental principles he has endeavoured to set out here.

II. Application of Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty and paragraph 8 of the Rome declaration

7. Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, which specifies the area in which the Atlantic Alliance is to operate, the modified Brussels Treaty, while defining an area in which the *casus foederis* is to be automatically applied – the territory of member states in Europe – gives the WEU Council responsibility for tackling matters relating to the rest of the world. However, it does not give the Council the task of examining such matters in all circumstances but links this commitment to the initiative of one of its members. Consequently, the application of Article VIII is not without ambiguity since, whereas the convocation of the Council by one of its members is a right, the treaty specifies in paragraph 4 of that article that “the Council shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has been or may be agreed”, which obviously covers any application of paragraph 3. Thus, it would appear that the decision to include in the agenda of a Council meeting a matter governed by Article VIII may be taken at the request of a single member country, but any subsequent decision is subject to the unanimity rule, which may make the decision to convene the Council quite pointless.

8. Moreover, the convening of meetings of ambassadors in London is probably not the best means available to the governments for consulting each other in the event of crisis since the ambassadors are not able to commit their governments in matters for which they have no responsibility. Meetings of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, of ambassadors in the country or countries in which the crisis arises and of permanent representatives to the United Nations might be meaningful and up to 1971 meetings of the Seven ambassadors to the United Nations were effectively held. Since then, they have been held in the framework of the Nine, then the Ten and now the Twelve. Conversely, as far as your Rapporteur knows, the ambassadors of the Seven in London have never met at the initiative of one of them to tackle a crisis. Nor have the ministers ever met in the framework of the Seven in such circumstances.

9. Yet it has often seemed that crises arising outside Europe might be most detrimental to relations between WEU member countries and neither consultations between representatives of governments in NATO nor those sometimes held in the context of European political co-operation were fully able to take the place of

those which could have been held in WEU. The first in fact were mainly consultations between the United States and its allies and could not achieve a truly European consensus when that might be necessary. The second practically excluded from the consultations the steps to be taken to implement any joint decisions taken if they implied recourse to force.

10. It is true that the commitments stemming from the modified Brussels Treaty imply no military action outside Europe. The WEU member countries have moreover adopted extremely different positions of principle in regard to the possibility of using their armed forces outside Europe. For instance, its basic law forbids the Federal Republic to take any action of this kind, whereas the United Kingdom and France have forces permanently stationed overseas, have concluded defensive alliances with certain third countries and have intervened on several occasions since the end of the second world war in various areas of the world. Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium, without totally banning them, have limited such actions as far as possible in recent years but have taken part in certain operations under the aegis of the United Nations or, in the case of Italy, of the multinational buffer force in Beirut.

11. The question inevitably arises therefore as to what extent countries bound by an alliance involving extremely strict commitments in Europe can launch themselves unilaterally into operations outside Europe which may lead to unforeseeable situations which may bring them into opposition with each other or have repercussions on peace in Europe itself. In any event, any redeployment or major losses among the forces of one or other of its members will reflect on the deployment of alliance forces as a whole and thereby weaken them.

12. Among recent affairs, the Falklands crisis in 1982 involved several of these drawbacks since the British expeditionary force included parts of units withdrawn from the Rhine Army and, above all, warships normally assigned to the defence of the North Sea. The latter suffered losses which the Royal Navy has not yet been able to replace in full. Finally, some of these losses were caused by missiles manufactured in France and sold by France to Argentina. Furthermore, the procurement of such missiles by Peru at the very time the British and Argentinian forces came to grips seems to have made it possible for Peru to pass these arms on to Argentina, further adding to the losses of the Royal Navy.

13. Less serious for the cohesion of WEU was the deployment of British, French and Italian forces with the multinational buffer force in Beirut in 1984, where they were at the side of American forces. However, the conditions in

which these units were deployed and their subsequent withdrawal following attacks on the American and French contingents precluded the co-ordination which would have been essential for the force to achieve maximum efficiency. Although there was almost a consensus in Europe in favour of their deployment, this action was never expressed as a joint step by the countries of the Atlantic Alliance or of WEU.

14. The third matter in which a WEU member country has been involved recently is that of Chad, where France, in application of its treaty of alliance with Chad, sent a force in 1983 to support the army of the Chad Government, threatened by Chad insurgents backed by Libya. It was learned that the French intervention was encouraged and assisted by the United States, but the latter was dissatisfied that France merely pushed the rebel forces back to the north of the country and did not try to prevent Libyan forces establishing themselves permanently in that area. Early in 1986, a further attempt by forces opposed to the Chad Government, with the active support of Libya, induced France to redeploy troops and equipment in that country, again with American support. The French air force led the bombing of an aerodrome occupied by the Libyan air force. As soon as the situation of Chad Government forces had recovered, the French forces deployed on Chad territory stopped playing an active rôle but they are still there and ready to intervene.

15. These three operations and their repercussions for Europe have been considered carefully by the WEU Assembly, where they have been the subject of major debates on reports by Mr. Cavaliere for the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Documents 907 and 935) on the Falklands affair, by Lord Reay for the General Affairs Committee (Documents 965 and 978) on Lebanon and by Mr. Müller for the General Affairs Committee (Document 957) on Chad. These reports and the accompanying debates showed, not unanimous agreement, but the Assembly's broad understanding for countries which had taken the initiative of armed intervention. They showed that it was possible to reach a very wide consensus in these areas between the elected representatives of the peoples of the seven member countries.

16. It may therefore be wondered why the governments for their part have not applied Article VIII of the treaty and above all why those who have taken up arms have done nothing to inform their allies of their intentions or possibly to ask them for their moral and diplomatic support. This would probably have avoided misunderstandings which were regrettable for European cohesion and, in most cases at least, ensured an expression of European solidarity which would have enhanced their position in the battle area and throughout the world. Although

it is very easy to understand why a government intending to take armed action wishes to move with the utmost discretion and secrecy right up to zero hour, there can be no explanation for that government not reaching agreement with its permanent allies at the appropriate time.

17. According to information received by the Assembly, the only consultations held by the Council on these matters related to its answers to Assembly recommendations. In other words, it tackled questions a long time after they had been settled and probably only in order to find a wording which was sufficiently vague and ambiguous to allow it to obtain the necessary unanimous vote. It is clear that even if there is some interest in resorting to such methods, this has little to do with the consultations provided for in Article VIII of the treaty.

18. Moreover, the Council regularly justifies its lack of action by invoking consultations held or which could have been held in NATO. Thus, in its answer to Recommendation 391 on the Falklands crisis it said:

“ ... The detailed consequences for NATO of the deployment of British forces to the South Atlantic will be discussed within the alliance as part of the normal planning process...

.....

As regards the implications for members of the alliance of events beyond the NATO area which threaten vital allied interests, and in particular the consequences for NATO of deployment outside the area to meet such threats, the Council note that these are already under study in the alliance. The Council emphasise that the question of consultation within the alliance on threats outside the NATO area to the purely national interests of allies is a matter for ad hoc decision at the time.

Insofar as the accurate assessment of information permitting the early identification of attack is concerned, the Council wish to stress that this activity represents a continuing concern of the alliance.

.....

The Council note the Assembly's interest in the field of policy concerning the export of defence equipment to non-allied countries, and stress in this regard that policy on the export of arms is a matter for individual countries, although consultation on the subject takes place within the alliance when appropriate.”

19. As for the economic aspects of the crisis, i.e. the answers to be given to Latin American countries whose trade with Western Europe was

seriously affected at that time, the same answer shows that these matters were examined in the EEC. The answers to Recommendations 403 and 412 on the Middle East refer to examination of the situation in the area only in the context of European political consultations. Only the answer to Recommendation 402 mentions exchanges of views among the Seven without specifying, however, what they were about or in what framework they were held. It says that:

“ ... The member countries of WEU cannot remain indifferent to the crises which develop in Africa, especially when outside interference or intervention are involved. They have on various occasions exchanged views on this subject... ”

20. The Assembly has never criticised the governments' view that the commitment to hold consultations under Article VIII of the treaty should be exercised in the widest possible context, provided the Council does not relinquish its responsibilities and testifies to this by keeping the Assembly duly informed of such consultations. However, it would appear that in many cases the choice of wider frameworks than WEU has not allowed exchanges of views among the Seven to lead to measures satisfactory for their security, either because the framework chosen did not allow consideration of military action or because such action depended too much on the American allies. Making consultations a normal, habitual activity is not just a matter which concerns Europe's security, it also enhances the cohesion of Europe, which is essential for the establishment of a future European union.

21. It was therefore normal that, insofar as it was intended to make WEU a European pillar of the alliance, the Rome declaration should have asked the Council effectively to apply Article VIII. But, as far as your Rapporteur knows, this has hardly been followed up.

22. However, it should be recalled that, from the days of their colonial empires, a number of member countries have commitments which they cannot easily relinquish but which do not directly concern the other member countries. First, certain territories, always small, often islands, have remained dependent on their former parent state with various statutes and generally with the consent of the population or at least a majority of that population. However, many of them are experiencing disturbances from within, as in the case of French New Caledonia, or from without as in the case of the British Falklands or of Mayotte, which was separated from the Comoro Islands when that archipelago became independent. Generally speaking, the principle of maintaining a link between the parent state and

its former colonies is criticised by many countries which themselves are former colonies.

23. The modified Brussels Treaty extends the guarantee of its Article V only to the territories of member countries located in Europe, which includes Gibraltar, but excludes the other dependent territories of European countries. It is therefore for each country to deal with any problems stemming from its dependencies due to external threats or internal difficulties. The Falklands problem was a matter for British sovereignty and France, without any attempt to consult its allies, and without interference from them, is handling the problems raised by the status of New Caledonia.

24. Nevertheless, even in cases of this kind, the existence of a defensive alliance as formed by the modified Brussels Treaty implies, in your Rapporteur's opinion, a number of commitments for each and every signatory.

25. (a) Member countries with overseas territories must take account, in their attitude, of the sensibilities of public opinion among their partners. For instance, to introduce ethnic discrimination in any territory dependent on a WEU country would be completely unacceptable to the others and would jeopardise solidarity. In other words, it is an obligation for WEU countries facing such situations to seek democratic solutions and humane ways of handling local problems. Moreover, it cannot be said that any member country is at present infringing this principle systematically, even if there may have been occasional regrettable incidents.

26. (b) If member countries with difficulties in their overseas territories took the trouble to inform and consult the other members of WEU, it might lead to mutual declarations of solidarity of principle, moral support and even, where appropriate, joint measures such as temporary economic assistance or decisions not to supply arms in general, or at least certain categories of arms, to powers with which they were directly or indirectly in conflict. Without such demonstrations of solidarity, the very content of the treaty, with its Articles V and VIII, would lose credibility because of the tension which would inevitably emerge between the signatory countries to the detriment of the deterrent aspect. The positions adopted by the Assembly on such matters as the Falklands war showed that its members were fully aware of this twofold obligation.

27. (c) This means constantly exchanging information on the problems which may arise in these territories, on the threats which may affect them, on the parent states' intentions and on the probable reactions of other countries to developments in those territories. This is precisely what should be done in the WEU Council but never has been done.

28. A second case concerns the various treaties of alliance and agreements associating one or more WEU member countries with third countries. These are governed by Article VII of the modified Brussels Treaty, which specifies that:

“The high contracting parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any other of the high contracting parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of the present treaty.

None of the high contracting parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the high contracting parties.”

29. This is an important provision of the treaty since it implies certain limits on member countries' right to enter into commitments vis-à-vis other powers. It is normal insofar as such commitments may lead to one of them becoming involved in conflicts which may have repercussions in Europe itself.

30. The most important case is that of France which, when it granted independence to a number of African countries, concluded treaties of alliance with several of them. These alliances form part of France's overall policy which has economic, cultural and financial as well as military aspects. They have led the French Government to ask for and obtain support from the entire European Community for a policy of development assistance which now concerns very many states, not all of which are African, far from it. They have also resulted in France having to maintain several military bases on the territory of some of its allies to allow it, if necessary, to intervene on behalf of any of them which may be attacked, as in Chad. This French military guarantee is of real importance because it allows many West African countries to keep their military budgets very low and to remain among those spending the smallest percentage of their GNP on defence, thus avoiding the plague which military expenditure constitutes for many developing countries.

31. However, this French policy in fact indirectly commits France's allies. In an affair such as that of Chad, the whole of Western Europe is liable to share the drawbacks which a conflict with Kadhafi's Libya may have for France.

32. Here, too, your Rapporteur foresees no radical change in the situation, but he wishes to recall that the conditions to which action by the Seven is subject where their respective overseas territories are concerned should also govern the policy of all of them outside the North Atlantic Treaty area. Reciprocal information, support and consultations are as necessary in this second case as in the first. But it has to be noted that

this is not done and that France did not use the WEU Council to consult its partners over Chad any more than the United Kingdom did in the case of the Falklands. Similarly, neither France, Italy, Belgium or the Netherlands bothered to inform its WEU partners of commitments they had entered into under the aegis of the United Nations.

33. A third question is raised by arms supplies to third countries. This is obviously not a merely commercial question since, in view of the sophistication of modern weapons, the systems procured are complex and require training for those who have to use them. Sales of arms therefore imply co-operation between buyer and seller over a period of several years which may involve sellers in conflicts outside Europe much earlier than they wish. Certain countries may be tempted to promote their sales of arms for purely economic reasons, in spite of possible major military and political repercussions. Moreover, the necessary development of European armaments co-operation no longer allows each participant in co-production to ignore its partners when concluding agreements involving the supply of arms.

34. This is a most delicate area since governments and firms are often intent on being as discreet as possible about their arms trade and wish to keep a free hand in the matter; the WEU member countries respect different principles and their political options are not the same. Your Rapporteur will examine later these aspects of the problem in regard to the Near and Middle East where differences are the greatest.

35. It therefore seems very unrealistic to try to make member countries' arms trade subject to any form of control by the WEU Council. However, it may be hoped that the studies conducted by the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee on the conditions for European co-operation in this field will lead to harmonisation of the legal conditions governing the arms trade in WEU member countries. But it is clear that, first and foremost, a rapprochement of the policies pursued in sensitive areas may induce governments to take account of their partners' positions. As matters now stand, there is far more chance of action taken in application of Article VIII of the treaty preventing the WEU countries from playing an undesirable or dangerous rôle in conflicts outside the North Atlantic Treaty area than action based on a wish to restrict the supply of arms.

36. Your Rapporteur therefore considers that so far the application, to say the least restrictive, of Article VIII does not correspond to the vocation of WEU and that the decision to revive the organisation will remain a dead letter if the Council fails to give greater content than hereto-

fore to the section of the Rome declaration relating to problems outside the North Atlantic Treaty area in view of the fact that there is no WEU area and that the modified Brussels Treaty concerns all threats to Europe's security wherever they may arise in the world.

III. *The Gulf war*

37. Problems arising from the Gulf war cannot be separated from developments in the international situation throughout southern Asia. The continued presence of the Soviet army in Afghanistan and the pursuit of the war in that country mean that everything that occurs in the Gulf area may very quickly affect the vital interests of a great power and consequently internationalise a war which has already lasted too long in an extremely sensitive area.

38. In December 1984, the Assembly adopted Recommendation 412 on the consequences of the Gulf war submitted by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. The Assembly strongly endorsed this report and the Council's reply showed that, even if it had not been very active in this matter, the policies pursued by the seven member countries were not fundamentally different from the one advocated by the Assembly.

39. It is remarkable that the military operations have since led to no major changes in the situation in the area and in 1985 the Assembly was able to reiterate all the elements of the recommendation adopted in 1984. However, it would appear that certain facts might change this situation drastically in 1986.

40. (a) The importance of the Gulf for Europe's oil supplies has diminished considerably and the trends dominating the international oil market changed radically in 1985. On the one hand, the exchange rate for the United States dollar fell by more than 25% in one year compared with most European currencies. This led to a corresponding drop in the price of oil imported from the Middle East for European buyers since oil prices are expressed in dollars. Moreover, prices themselves have fallen very considerably since, on 1st April 1986, they were around \$10 a barrel compared with more than \$30 at the end of 1984. Overall, the cost of oil calculated in most European currencies has fallen by more than 75% in just over a year, which has profoundly disturbed the market.

41. There are many reasons for this disturbance. First, there has been a major increase in oil-producing capacity throughout the world. The large increase in prices as from October 1973 encouraged prospection and production and supplies now considerably exceed

demand. Furthermore, demand itself has fallen, particularly in Europe, because economic growth has slowed down or is marking time and new sources of energy, especially nuclear, have been developed. More than 50% of electricity now produced in Western Europe is supplied by nuclear power stations.

42. In the Middle East itself, while certain producer countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, have made a considerable effort to bolster prices by reducing production, they have not been followed by all their OPEC partners or, a fortiori, by the new producers, many of which have not joined that organisation. Iraq for its part needed to push its sales back up to a high level so as to meet the cost of the war which is continuing and it has built a pipeline allowing crude oil from the Mosul basin to be delivered in a Turkish port, Dörtyol. Another pipeline, towards Saudi Arabia, was opened in September 1985 and a third is under construction towards Aqaba in Jordan to provide a direct outlet in the Red Sea for oil from southern Iraq. Thus, Iraqi production, which was 3.2 million barrels per day before the war, fell to 700,000 barrels in 1982 after the destruction of the Fao terminal and Syria's closure of the Kirkuk-Banyas pipeline. Iraq can now export 1.5 million barrels per day and its oil revenue rose from \$9,000 million in 1982 to \$11,500 million in 1985. However, its position is again threatened by the fall in oil prices, while its debts amount to \$40,000 million of which \$25,000 million to the Gulf Arab countries, although the latter may not be too demanding as long as the war lasts. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are in fact already contributing to Iraq's war effort by giving it the proceeds of the sale of 310,000 barrels of oil per day. However, Iraq has had to reduce its imports considerably to a figure of no more than \$12 million in 1985 compared with \$20 million before the war. In view of the considerable increase in defence procurement, the repercussions of this reduction on civil investment and consumption are easy to imagine.

43. Conversely, Iraqi bombing of the Kharg oil terminal, whose capacity fell from 1.5 million barrels per day before the war to 600,000 barrels in February 1986, after the bombing of Abadan, has considerably reduced Iran's export capacity. But the latter's threats to oil shipping along the southern coast of the Gulf led to reactions from the coastal Arab states which, for a time, deterred Iran, whose air force is still relatively weak, from seriously following up these threats. However, at the end of March 1986 there was a further outbreak of Iranian air raids on tankers serving the southern coast of the Gulf. Iran is apparently trying to make the Arab countries in the area bring pressure to bear on Iraq to stop its operations against Iranian tankers and in particular those which run a shut-

tle service between the Kharg terminal and the floating terminal at Sinni in the south of the Gulf and out of range of Iraqi aircraft. This shuttle service, designed to allow oil from Kharg to be taken away in international tankers, is believed to have been seriously damaged in the early months of 1986. In any event, attacks on the high seas against ships of non-belligerent countries already constitute an extension of the war with a strong risk of it spreading even further.

44. The present fall in oil prices is liable to have far-reaching effects on the market. Production costs in Saudi Arabia are low enough for it to be able, by increasing output, to compete fiercely with countries in which costs are far higher, particularly the United Kingdom and Norway, and to make European oil and natural gas exporters lose much of their profits, natural gas prices being linked with those of oil. Another consequence might be to end oil company investments in new sites, as the Norwegian authorities told the committee when it visited Oslo, which would perhaps lead to higher prices in the long term. In any event, prices may remain low for several years and the Middle East countries will find it difficult to recover their former share of world production.

45. Two consequences of this new situation are worthy of note: first, the scarcity of oil is no longer making Europe press for the restoration of peace in the Gulf, although for political and humanitarian reasons it must do its utmost to help to bring the war to an end. Second, Iran and Iraq are finding it increasingly difficult to pay for an expensive war and the latter country's debts have increased dangerously in spite of the assistance it receives from several of its Arab neighbours.

46. (b) After a long period during which large-scale military operations were rare and air raids limited, on 9th February 1986 Iran launched a major offensive in southern Iraq and occupied the port of Fao which on the one hand considerably limits Iraq's access to the Gulf and on the other brings Iranian forces closer to the frontier of Kuwait. Iraq has counter-attacked in the area but seems to be advancing very slowly. There are considerable losses on both sides.

47. This new operation led to a re-emergence of the violations of the laws of war noted in Mr. Blaauw's report and in particular there seems no doubt that Iraq is using chemical weapons. For the first time since the war started, the United Nations Security Council firmly condemned Iraq, on 21st March 1986, for using chemical weapons following an inquiry conducted in Iran by a group of international experts. According to Iran, more than 12,000 Iranian soldiers were victims of these weapons during the fighting in February 1986. This is a fact to which the inter-

national community cannot remain indifferent or passive. The United States Government, not known for its sympathy towards Iran, has expressed its disapproval and Europe should do likewise. There are also reports of large-scale badly-armed fanatical forces of the Iranian army being launched into offensives where they have suffered very heavy losses, but to the best of your Rapporteur's knowledge, there has as yet been no sign of adolescents being used in the 1986 offensive.

48. (c) Iranian opponents of the régime set up by Ayatollah Khomeini have revealed a number of atrocities committed by the Iranian Government against persons suspected, rightly or wrongly, of being against the régime. Lists issued by the Iranian opponents seem to prove that there have been 12,000 victims of repression. They have also revealed the existence of a widespread, active resistance movement in certain parts of Iran, particularly Kurdistan. It has also been reported that since summer 1985 the Iranian Government has been using intensive propaganda to recruit "volunteers" who are sent to the front in spite of only cursory training and with inadequate weapons and equipment, among whom there are said to be heavy losses.

49. But there are also reports of disturbances and repression among the Kurd population in Iraq. However, information available to international public opinion is too rare and unreliable to justify making a protest. The least might be to call upon these two countries to agree to the free circulation of persons and, by this means, of the more or less objective information which can be given by the international press covering events on their territory. Iraq for its part continues to receive correspondents from foreign newspapers in the theatre of operations, while Iran does its utmost to prevent the presence of such witnesses in the midst of its armed forces.

50. Your Rapporteur considers that the information now available to him, however respectable some of his sources may be – others seem more questionable, particularly in view of the divisions between opposition movements in Iran and the influence which Iraq may have on some of them – is not complete enough for him to be able to propose that the Assembly specifically condemn the policy pursued by one or other of the belligerents within its frontiers. There seems to be no doubt that there is an active opposition, particularly in Iran, but too little is known about the scale of rejection of the present régime and of repression for him to try to make a valid assessment.

51. (d) The continuation of the war and even more the Iranian offensive in February 1986 have drawn the neighbouring Arab countries in

the Gulf increasingly closer both to give indirect support, mainly through large-scale financial assistance, to Iraq's cause and to protect themselves against possible Iranian moves.

52. For this purpose, some of these countries have started to build up their defence capability very considerably and, in December 1984, the countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council announced the creation of an integrated joint force of 12,000 men under Saudi command. In spring 1985, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait drew up plans for mobilising their entire populations. In January, Saudi Arabia concluded a particularly important contract with France for the procurement of an anti-aircraft defence system costing some \$4,500 million and it has taken part in joint air force manoeuvres with Qatar, Bahrein and Kuwait. The deterrent effect of these measures was not sufficient since in May two Kuwaiti oil tankers and one Saudi tanker were attacked by the Iranian air force. On 5th June, for the first time, the Saudi air force intervened directly and shot down two Iranian aircraft over Saudi territory, while the United States Government proposed to sell Saudi Arabia 1,200 Stinger surface-to-air missiles and 200 launchers.

53. However, opposition in Congress prevented the United States supplying Kuwait with surface-to-air missiles and in July 1985 the latter therefore turned to the Soviet Union to buy military equipment. It had to respond to concern over the hijacking of a Kuwaiti civil aircraft to Teheran, the spread of Iranian air raids on shipping along the southern coast of the Gulf and the steady deterioration in relations between these countries and Iran.

54. Generally speaking, the pursuit of the Gulf war played an important part in grouping the Arab countries in two blocs in 1985, which was not without consequences for the Palestinian and Lebanese conflict: while Libya and Syria supported the Iranian cause, provoked a serious schism in the PLO and afforded more or less open support for a number of terrorist operations against Israel and many western countries, Jordan, Egypt and all the Gulf countries, which were allies, at least until January 1986, of the official PLO, provided Iraq with economic and financial support and strengthened their means of defence against Iran and certain Islamic fundamentalist elements which afforded Iran active support.

55. (e) Although there now seems to be a serious threat of the war spreading to certain countries round the Gulf, it must be noted that the two great powers have so far avoided anything which might involve them in the hostilities. Both seem to fear Iranian expansion which would destabilise the region and, while the Soviet Union is still the principal supplier of arms to Iraq, the United States Government, frustrated in its intentions to deliver sophisti-

cated weapons to moderate Arab countries because of Congress's hostility to such plans, has helped to give them the economic means they need, in particular by promoting the construction of the pipeline from Iraq to the Red Sea. It has also supplied Iraq with fifty helicopters.

56. It is as if both, feeling powerless to bring the war to an end, above all fear an expansion of the Iranian revolution and are trying to stop it spreading until such time as Iran is prepared to negotiate a return to peace in conditions acceptable to Iraq. Naturally, there may be new developments in the war, but there seems to be nothing in the international situation against the opening of peace negotiations, which Iraq continues to request, and which Iran continues to make subject to the departure of President Saddam Hussein, an attitude which is moreover implicitly condemned in the Security Council resolution of 21st March 1986.

57. (f) Europe is not in a position to play an active rôle in the Gulf war. It can therefore take no spectacular steps to promote a return to peace which would be in its interests for mainly political, not economic, reasons. It has excellent grounds for wanting the end of hostilities, not only because it disapproves of this murderous and seemingly endless war but also because it wants to find stable, peaceful partners in the Middle East and has every reason to fear that an event connected with the war may induce one of the two great powers to become more deeply involved and raise the Gulf war to the dimension of an international war.

58. In such circumstances, your Rapporteur fears that over-active steps, even if solely aimed at a return to peace or even in favour of the opposition in one or other belligerent country, might have effects contrary to what Europe wants. However much respect one may have for the cause of the Iranian resisters to Khomeini's dictatorship, it cannot make one forget that Iraq, which started the war, has acted against the laws of war. Neither the fact that the Iranian régime is being challenged from within, nor the debatable methods it uses to recruit and fanaticise its troops, nor its recourse to terrorist action abroad nor, finally, the concern to maintain some degree of balance which alone can guarantee the survival and integrity of the Gulf countries should make Europe take measures which might internationalise the war and force the great powers to depart from the reserve which they have so far shown.

59. This obviously does not imply that Europe must refrain from taking part in attempts by the United Nations, and by its Security Council in particular, where in February 1986 there was a unanimous vote in favour of a resolution calling on the good offices of the Secretary-General to obtain a cease-fire, the withdrawal of forces of

both sides behind their frontiers and mediation on every aspect of the war. Iran rejected this text, which was accepted by Iraq. It was very similar to the one adopted at the beginning of the same month by the League of Arab States, in spite of opposition by Syria and Libya.

60. (g) From quite another standpoint, the fact that the superiority of the Iraqi army due to the standard of command and its ability to use sophisticated conventional weapons has not allowed it to beat the more numerous but less well-armed and less well-trained army deployed by Iran, is probably worthy of analysis and perhaps might undermine the dominant western concepts which attribute great importance to the ability to use very sophisticated weapons. Your Rapporteur is certainly not in a position to draw military conclusions from developments in the war, about which he lacks information, but he wishes European experts in the use of arms to conduct a critical study so as to draw the necessary conclusions for the security of Europe.

IV. International terrorism

61. In the last twenty years, there has been a remarkable rise in terrorist activities in many parts of the world, and particularly Western Europe, in the form of assassinations of well-known people or individuals considered to represent a social group, the taking of hostages, the hijacking of aircraft and bomb attacks. This was obviously not a new phenomenon for there have always been actions of this type and there have been several periods of crisis in history, an instance being the international anarchist movement at the end of the nineteenth century. But the present recrudescence is evident, even if it does not seem possible to reduce the causes to a simple factor. This was what led the Presidential Committee to ask the General Affairs Committee to consider the matter in the present report, particularly because of the many serious actions carried out at the end of 1985. The terrorists seem to enjoy the complicity or support of certain states, sometimes because their activities may be of benefit to the specific interests of one of them, but also because others seem to wish to take advantage of international disorder in order to destabilise western society.

62. Consequently, and also because available information about the instigators of terrorist action is often vague and questionable, it is difficult to draw up an inventory of motives or acts. Much of the discontent or internal conflict in certain countries results in terrorist actions by a kind of contagion spread by the press, radio and television: violent action, when presented daily to the public, seems to be a "natural" way of appealing to public opinion for certain causes, even in countries where there are legal ways of

presenting and defending them. Your Rapporteur does not intend to consider that motivation can serve as an excuse for actions which are to be condemned from every point of view and which should be a disservice to the causes they claim to support. He considers nevertheless that examination of these motives can help to grasp the phenomena and find ways to counter them.

63. (a) Many attacks in Europe are attributable, at least so their perpetrators claim, to internal state matters or to the harshness of relations between two states: be they Irish, Corsican, Basque, Moluccan or Mafiosi, it is for the countries concerned alone to tackle the problems which those who use terrorist methods claim to be raising.

64. On several occasions, however, it has been clear that some of them had been trained in specialised centres, particularly in Libya and Lebanon or even Iran since Khomeini's régime came to power and, perhaps, in Syria. The Americans also sometimes quote Latin American countries such as Cuba and Nicaragua. These countries seem to have encouraged a number of terrorist operations, which at first sight had nothing to do with their national interests, by providing the perpetrators of attacks with false identity papers or even arms and closing their eyes to the way these documents were used and to the fact that the arms left their territory. The same countries have often been accused of taking in hijackers of civil aircraft and thus encouraging the spread of this type of action.

65. Apart from the latter case, the responsibility of these countries is generally very difficult to prove. But insofar as it can be proved, the necessary arrangements should obviously be made to deter them from complicity in terrorism. Even if the terrorists' motives do not concern international society and the repression of their acts is solely a matter for the police and justice of the countries which are their victims and for the extradition agreements they may have concluded with countries where terrorists take refuge, the participation, even indirect, of external countries in the arming, training, flight and hiding of perpetrators of attacks raises a more general problem for international society as a whole and in particular for all the countries of Western Europe since no unilateral gesture is enough to deter them from pursuing their work of destabilising the West.

66. Terrorism stemming from internal state matters or relations between two states is probably not to be feared the most because only a small number of countries feel responsible for the situation. It is possible for them to tackle the political problem raised and, while repressing terrorist action, to try to remove the causes. In

this connection, the conclusion of an agreement between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland on 15th November 1985 should be welcomed. This relates to the status of Northern Ireland and the establishment of an intergovernmental conference to examine matters at issue between the two countries, develop co-operation and take the necessary preventive and repressive measures to terminate terrorism.

67. (b) Another type of terrorist action emanates from groups which are generally small but whose desire to use every means to destroy the order on which western society is based seems to have been exacerbated in the last twenty years. The fact that some of them subscribe to fascist ideology and others claim to be to the extreme left and close to anarchism makes little difference but even if these groups act under different names from one country to another (Rote Armee Fraktion in Germany, Action directe in France, Prima Linea and Red Brigades in Italy, Cellules communistes combattantes in Belgium, unknown groups in Luxembourg, etc.), there is quite obviously active international complicity, at least within each of the two ideological families. It allows the exchange of hiding places, weapons, explosives or even persons between the groups and helps them to evade national police forces.

68. In this case, it is not so much a state and its policy towards a specific point that are challenged as the general direction of western society, liberal capitalism and the system of defence which ensures Europe's security, particularly NATO, which are the targets. For instance, it is no secret that a booby-trapped car parked at the seat of WEU in Paris in August 1984 would have caused considerable damage and inevitably victims if the firing device had worked. Other attacks on national or international civil and military installations have taken place in several member countries of the Atlantic Alliance which are also members of WEU. Political, economic and military leaders have been assassinated.

69. It is not easy to determine who manipulates these terrorist groups, guides their actions, trains them, arms them and chooses the victims. It would appear that in many cases Near or Middle East countries, including Libya and Lebanon, have taken in members of these groups and trained them on their territory. However, the reasons why countries in that area should protect and encourage such terrorism are not very clear, apart from a vague, general intention to destabilise the West.

70. According to certain press reports, an international conference of the international centre for the fight against imperialism, racism, zionism, reaction and fascism was held in a barracks in the suburbs of Tripoli from 14th to 18th

March 1986. It is believed to have been attended by official representatives from countries such as Cuba and Syria and of political parties in power such as the Algerian FLN and the Bulgarian Communist Party and leaders of certain opposition parties and various autonomist, separatist and revolutionary movements. Addressing the conference on 15th March, President Kadhafi is reported to have called for the creation of an international revolutionary army to wage war on imperialism, particularly American and French, the creation of a Nuremberg tribunal against zionism and the revolt of the 400,000 negroes in the American army. Among the statements by the President of Libya, the one to the Chad GUNT has been quoted, in which he said a united socialist fighting front had just been achieved, directed by the Soviet Union, a worldwide front consisting of small groups and states, revolutionary movements and political organisations and progressive régimes and revolutionary guerrilla movements.

71. This conference and the statements made probably explain the uncompromising attitude adopted by the United States at the end of March on the occasion of the American Sixth Fleet's manoeuvres in the Gulf of Sirte. The Libyan Government is known to claim rights to the whole of this gulf while the international community does not accept the unilateral extension of a state's territorial waters beyond twelve nautical miles from its coasts. This did not prevent Libya from launching surface-to-air missiles against American aircraft in the area it is attempting to appropriate, after which the United States took action against Libyan warships and missile sites. At least one Libyan naval launch was sunk. These American reactions were considered excessive by those who saw them merely as a response to what were after all moderate demonstrations by Libya to uphold its position with regard to the Gulf of Sirte. But there is every reason to think that this sharp reaction was also a response to the Tripoli conference.

72. The different ways the United States' various allies reacted to this affair indicate that the former had probably not kept its partners well-enough informed of its intentions. They also show that the United States' European partners had not had a satisfactory exchange of views on the situation Libya had created with the Tripoli conference, its claims to use arms to defend its unilateral positions in the Gulf of Sirte and also the new offensive launched by the GUNT in Chad with its support.

73. In any event, several of the terrorist attacks perpetrated at the end of March and beginning of April 1986, for instance on a TWA aircraft between Rome and Athens and in a

discotheque frequented by American soldiers in West Berlin, and the destruction of a Mexican Boeing 727 causing 176 deaths in Mexico on 31st March 1986, have been claimed by various terrorist organisations as retaliation against the American reaction in the Gulf of Sirte. The American authorities have decoded a message of congratulations from President Kadhafi to the authors of the Berlin attack. This seems to confirm the close link between Libyan policy and the practice of terrorist action directed mainly against civilian populations and activities.

74. There is every indication that the United States, which has said it will tackle the question of international terrorism and possible counter-measures at the summit meeting of industrialised countries to be held in Tokyo at the beginning of May 1986, will try to press the West to pursue a strict policy towards Libya. It would be desirable for the European countries being represented at the summit meeting to consult their partners beforehand, in WEU for instance, on how to address the links between Libya and international terrorism and the measures which should be taken to make that country give up actions which are unreasonable, morally unacceptable and dangerous for international peace.

75. Some observers have revealed that objectives designated by Soviet propaganda have often been the subject of attacks. This was so for the attempt against the seat of WEU following attacks by the Tass Agency against the reactivation of the organisation. However this may be, direct links between terrorist groups and Soviet concerns have not been clearly proved, even if they were referred to in Colonel Kadhafi's address on 15th March 1986. Moreover, the Soviet Union has apparently also had attacks of this type in the last decade, but information about them is inadequate due to that country's systematic policy of blanketing everything relating to internal contestation. Only the attack on the Pope resulted in Bulgarian services being implicated, and they would obviously not have acted without Soviet encouragement, but at the trial in March 1986 the Italian jury considered the proof against these services was insufficient to warrant a conviction.

76. At whatever level the decisions are taken, it is at least apparent that they seek to weaken the West's political, economic and military cohesion and therefore play into the hands of its enemies. These attacks concern the defence of Europe and are a direct responsibility of WEU, even if the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence are not those who are generally called upon to fight terrorism. Faced with action at international level, consultation and co-ordination of information, methods and steps taken to fight terrorism are essential and should

not be limited to occasional co-operation between police forces or the application of existing extradition treaties. The threat must be assessed, areas of activity studied and counter-measures co-ordinated; this is a political matter directly affecting the security of Western Europe.

77. (c) Another aspect of contemporary terrorism is connected with Near or Middle East affairs and first of all the dispersion of Palestinian refugees throughout the area. More recently, the Iranian revolution has given new impetus to this aspect.

78. The fact that a large part of the Arab population of Palestine fled or was chased off the territory it occupied following successive wars between the Jewish and Arab communities prior to 1949 and then between the state of Israel and its neighbours induced this population, deprived of national territory, to pursue the fight by other means, terrorist operations being the most important. Attacks, first aimed at Jews and Israelis, subsequently spread to Arab countries which did not seem to be firm enough towards Israel or came to terms with it and later to western countries accused of providing Israel with political, military or simply moral assistance.

79. In the last ten years, the extension of the conflict to Lebanon, the pursuit of a long civil war in that country and then the Iranian revolution have made terrorist activities so widespread that it is now difficult to determine who are behind the attacks, the taking of hostages, assassinations or hijackings, what their real aims are and what cause they are defending. Nevertheless, many of the most bloody and blind attacks seem to have originated in the East. Most hijackings have also been the work of individuals or groups from that area.

80. Western society has been forced to react with defence measures affecting public freedom in all our countries in varying degrees: searches in airports, guards on public places, controls on roads and in public transport and greater flexibility in police practices such as telephone tapping have become necessities. However, they lead to psychological tension whose effects are difficult to assess but which are among the reasons for the anti-democratic reactions within our societies. Even if the insecurity created directly by attacks is still limited, their destabilising effect and hence the propaganda due to the fact that they are aimed at the West's liberal civilisation are far from negligible.

81. In this case as in the previous one, any measures which can be taken by the national police forces, like the legal decisions taken, are quite inadequate because at best they reach only the field operators. Conversely, retaliatory

action is of doubtful effect against blurred targets and persons whose responsibility has not been proved. Thus, the bombing of a PLO headquarters at Cartagena in the suburbs of Tunis by the Israeli air force harmed many Tunisian civilians who had no responsibility in the 29th September 1985 attack at Larnaca to which the bombing was supposed to be a reprisal. It is therefore extremely difficult to practise an effective policy of defence against the dangers which threaten western society as a whole, and such a policy can be carried out only through a constant exchange of information and close co-operation between the countries concerned by the fight against terrorism.

82. The many serious attacks which took place on 27th December 1985 at Vienna and Rome airports, the hijacking of several aircraft in the Mediterranean part of Europe, particularly the one on 24th November 1985 at Valetta which resulted in fifty-seven people being killed, and the hijacking of the Italian liner Achille Lauro brought out vast differences of views between the members of the Atlantic Alliance regarding the nature and aim of measures that should be taken to counter this fresh outbreak of terrorism. While the United States accused Libya of bearing most of the responsibility for several of these operations, some European countries considered there was insufficient proof of responsibility to allow action against that country. Moreover, the United States used force to oppose the implementation of commitments entered into by Italy to allow the Achille Lauro affair to be settled by forcing the aircraft repatriating the perpetrators of the hijacking which resulted in the murder of an American citizen to land in Sicily. Although it would have been essential for the West to stand united in the face of terrorism and the countries backing it, serious differences have emerged between countries which had nevertheless agreed on the principle of resisting the taking of hostages and blackmail.

83. The matter was tackled in the context of European political consultations since on 27th January the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the twelve countries of the European Community adopted a declaration on international terrorism condemning the governments which supported terrorist acts. Two countries – Greece and Spain – are believed to have bitterly opposed any explicit reference to Libya. The document comprised two general commitments:

- a decision not to export arms or other military equipment to countries which “are clearly implicated in supporting terrorism”. The Twelve will examine in common the possibility of national measures in order to avoid a situation whereby such exports are hijacked for terrorist purposes;

- efforts to ensure that the citizens and industries of the Twelve do not “seek any commercial advantage from measures in reaction to terrorist attacks and other terrorist activities”, a clear reference to the non-replacement of Americans who were to leave Libya as a result of retaliatory measures decided upon unilaterally by the United States.

The Twelve have also decided to intensify their combined efforts concerning:

- security at airports, ports and railway stations;
- control by member states of people leaving or entering the Community and travelling within it;
- policy on issuing visas with regard to the problem of terrorism;
- abuse of diplomatic immunity.

A permanent working group is to be given the task of monitoring the implementation of this common action. Italy has proposed that the group study the proposal to obtain a firm commitment from all Twelve to refuse to refuel hijacked aircraft. Finally, the declaration condemns not only “the perpetrators, accomplices and instigators” but also the governments which support them and expresses the readiness of the Twelve to co-operate with all countries, including those of the Mediterranean, in order to deprive all terrorists of support, shelter or refuge and affirms that “states that favour or protect terrorists cannot expect indulgence nor can they expect to have normal relations with the Twelve”.

84. The WEU Assembly welcomes the fact that the Twelve, which include the seven WEU countries, have managed to adopt such a joint declaration. It has reason to regret, however, that the latter did not adopt a position on the United States accusations against Libya. If the latter are considered to be well-founded, it is obvious that measures to deter Libya from continuing to support terrorist acts should be taken, inter alia by the European members of the Atlantic Alliance adopting the economic boycott measures decided upon by the United States. If it is true that Spain and Greece, for reasons connected with their own policy towards Arab countries, prevented the Twelve from openly condemning Libya or Syria insofar as there was no doubt about the responsibility of one of these countries, then it may be wondered whether the context of the Twelve was the best one for tackling a question which is after all a security question. The WEU Council, which is smaller and where countries with a more homogeneous attitude are represented, would probably have

been able to show greater firmness in this connection.

85. It is equally clear that even the occasional use by a WEU member state of methods close to terrorism, for whatever reasons, cannot facilitate the co-operation to which they must all contribute. The committee laid strong emphasis on this at its meeting on 17th March 1986.

86. On the other hand, it is clear that when a country is placed in a crisis situation its government often has to face up to very heavy responsibilities in view of the human lives at stake. In such conditions, even if generally speaking firmness towards terrorists and takers of hostages is the policy which should be adopted, its allies cannot expect to impose their own assessment of the situation and the line of conduct to be adopted. Even less should they oppose the implementation of measures decided upon and commitments entered into by a country which remains sovereign in the way it handles such problems. Thus, Italian protests at the United States air force intervention to prevent the implementation of measures which Italy had agreed upon in full knowledge of the facts at the time of the Achille Lauro affair seem fully justified.

87. But the problem of terrorism stemming from conflicts in the Near and Middle East is not only a matter of decisions taken in time of crisis. Generally speaking, it is a matter of Europe's policy towards the area and European solidarity in this connection. Hence there is a clear link between Europe's attitude towards the Gulf war or the Palestinian war and its policy towards terrorism. It will be possible for Europeans to be firmer and more interdependent in the second case if they are more objective and disinterested in the first and make a greater effort to promote the restoration of peace.

88. Your Rapporteur does not believe WEU should define a European policy towards the East if it is possible to do so in a wider framework. But if it appears, as seems to have been the case on 27th January, that the positions of the Twelve have been weakened or are even condemned to be more complacent towards countries which encourage terrorism, it is for the Seven to react in the forum at their disposal in WEU to work out measures corresponding to Europe's true interests, and this is well within the responsibilities of the organisation.

89. (d) In addition to these cases, mention might be made of the kidnapping of persons, inter alia from economic circles, in order to force governments or firms, particularly multinational companies, to issue statements, to extort money from them or, by blackmail about the lives of the kidnapped persons, to pursue or allow to be pursued certain action. To counter this form of ter-

rorism, the solidarity of democratic countries, the co-ordination of efforts by national police forces and firmness by courts of justice are an even more obvious necessity than in other cases, but the very nature of these crimes probably allows them to be tackled in a wider framework than WEU, as they are a matter of common law.

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90. Hence it can be seen that the problems which terrorism raises for Western Europe are infinitely complex and their classification, which your Rapporteur has just tried to define, should not lead to an erosion of the principles on which their reactions should be based, to a weakening of the necessary countermeasures or to a division of Europe. But nor should the obligation to face up to crises veil the need to handle the more deep-rooted problems behind the recent development of terrorism in the West.

91. The American magazine *US News and World Report* of 8th July 1985 quoted an inquiry by a specialised institute assessing the number of terrorist acts in recent years. There are believed to have been 293 in 1970, 2,585 in 1979 and 3,525 in 1984. *Le Monde Diplomatique* of February 1986 also quotes an inquiry by the United States Department of State according to which between 1973 and 1983 5,175 terrorist acts killed 3,689 people and wounded 7,791. In 1983, 40% of these attacks are believed to have been on Americans, causing 271 deaths and wounding 116. But Western Europe is believed to come at the top of the list of regions of the world where attacks have been committed, with 37.2% as compared with 25.6% in Latin America, 22.8% in the Middle East and North Africa, etc., but only 0.8% in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

92. If these figures are considered only from the point of view of the number of victims, it must be admitted that the figure is still low. But the recent increase in terrorism, the countermeasures which have to be taken as a result and the impact on the population thanks to the media are a serious challenge to western civilisation and Europe cannot take this lightly. If it wishes to prove its existence, it must face up to such problems. It is more important to do this than to wonder about institutional problems: WEU does not have to try to impose itself but at the present juncture it can be a useful forum in which consultations between Europeans can lead to decisions and real action.

V. Conclusions

93. Separate conclusions have been drawn in each chapter of this report and any general conclusions that may be drawn on three such dis-

tinct matters as the application of Article VIII of the treaty, the Gulf war and international terrorism will amount to very little.

94. It should first be underlined, however, that, as WEU is the smallest of the European or western organisations, it is preferable for matters which concern the whole of Western Europe at least, or even the whole of the western world, to be examined in a wider framework. Although certain countries have not agreed to the question of international terrorism being included in the agenda of the summit meeting of major industrialised nations to be held in Tokyo at the beginning of May, it is nevertheless clear that the matter will be tackled by participants outside the official meetings.

95. It must however be noted on the one hand that a number of countries, particularly the smaller ones, are excluded from such meetings. This does not therefore prevent the prior consideration of matters to be discussed there by organisations to which these countries have access. The usefulness of restricted meetings for solving certain problems is understandable, but those attending them cannot be expected to represent others if the matters they are to tackle have not been the subject of prior exchanges of views, particularly between the

European members of the Atlantic Alliance. The WEU Council is fully competent to play such a preparatory rôle if the governments so wish.

96. Furthermore, there is still the question of how far it is desirable to examine in the narrower context of WEU matters which may be of interest to all members of the European Community, the Atlantic Alliance or the Council of Europe. It is now clear however that differences between members of these organisations over matters relating to the Middle East and measures to be taken to counter international terrorism make it difficult to use them, whereas WEU is a useful forum for tackling such matters because its members have shown that they have relatively convergent approaches to them.

97. It is not a question of having WEU replace other organisations, but merely of taking advantage of its smaller membership and the existence of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty in order to use it in cases where larger organisations cannot hold effective consultations. The WEU Council must still, however, show that seven-power Europe is capable of achieving results that cannot be obtained by the Twelve, the members of NATO or those of the Council of Europe. It has not yet done so.

APPENDIX

For a European group to co-ordinate the fight against terrorism

MEMORANDUM

*from Jean-Marie Caro, President of the WEU Assembly, to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council**17th April 1986*

For a few countries, terrorism has become a continuation of policy by other means, as war was for Clausewitz. The risk of war can no longer be taken in the nuclear age, hence the recourse to terrorist action. This requires few means and allows responsibilities to be evaded. *Blind in choosing its targets, the aims of terrorism are not: it strikes at the free world, its security, its unity and its ability to take external action.* We are already feeling the effects: the shiver running through society in many European countries because the Americans, here to participate in Europe's security, have become the target of frequent attacks. Governments' hesitation to be associated in any way with the measures taken by the United States to remind Libya of its responsibilities, the feebleness of repression, the only too frequent refusal to extradite the guilty, and even the help they are afforded in their flight, give the impression that expressions of determination to counter all aggression fade away in face of the elusive and insidious threat of terrorism.

As long as terrorists are dealing with isolated countries, obsessed by their immediate interests and incapable of taking effective anti-terrorist action, they will continue without great risk to reap the rewards of their crimes and there is every reason to expect that *their action will continue to grow until they have attained their aim and brought about the dismemberment of the western world.* Let there be no mistake about this. However horrible it may be, each attack has limited repercussions. But the multiplication of these crimes creates a feeling of mistrust and of suspicion between allies which is a serious threat to the West and to Europe in particular. The every-man-for-himself attitude of the Twelve at the mere thought of United States action against Kadhafi showed this.

Yet Western Europe cannot evade its own responsibilities in face of this threat. Seven of its members signed the 1954 Paris Agreements modifying the 1948 Brussels Treaty, by which they undertook (in Article V) to "afford all the military and other aid and assistance in their power" to any party which "should be the

object of an armed attack in Europe" and (in Article VIII) "to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise". *Who can deny that terrorism is an armed attack in Europe and a threat to peace?* In such conditions, consultations with a view to joint action by the Seven (Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) are a contractual obligation for these countries which they cannot evade. Naturally, if the Twelve had managed to define a true European policy at their meeting in The Hague on 14th April, they would have fulfilled the obligations committing the Seven. But the weakness some of them showed towards the country whose active complicity in terrorist operations is nevertheless in no doubt at all makes one question the possibilities of twelve-power action. However this may be, *the ministers for foreign affairs and defence of the Seven who form the Council of Western European Union are to meet in Venice on 29th and 30th April and it would be unthinkable for them not to tackle together a matter which is so much their responsibility.*

What can they do? First, of course, respond to the United States' appeal to support the action which it seems determined to take to make Libya understand that *the West will no longer tolerate it protecting, arming and encouraging terrorists. To give in to Colonel Kadhafi's blackmail of the towns of southern Europe would be extremely serious,* since it would give terrorism the political victory it is seeking and open the way for other series of attacks. There must be no mistake: one way or another, terrorism will strike at Western Europe after the American action against Tripoli. Its weakness will not protect it.

Furthermore, even if Libya bears very heavy responsibility, weakening that country is not enough to put an end to terrorism. Criminal organisations exist and will find elsewhere the rear bases they now have in Libya. *The fight against terrorism must be pursued every instant within each country, along its frontiers, on its*

airports and also through information obtained abroad. This is a huge task, for which each country inevitably has only limited means.

Europe has no solution other than to organise and co-ordinate each one's efforts. In a Europe claiming to be united, it should no longer be possible for a group having carried out an attack in one country to be able to take refuge, almost without risk, in a neighbouring country, for each national police force to have to work out and manage its own card indexes, for information obtained to be shared parsimoniously, for co-operation between police forces to be constantly slowed down by the need to resort to extremely cumbersome procedure and for extradition between countries offering protection for the guilty to raise sometimes insoluble problems. Yet that is what is happening every day in spite of the modest but not unsuccessful efforts made in recent months.

As President of the WEU Assembly, it is in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the modified Brussels Treaty that I have therefore announced my decision to ask the member governments of this organisation to set up a *European group to co-ordinate the fight against terrorism* (GECLAT)¹.

This group should first centralise information obtained by the relevant services of all member countries: police, military security, counter-espionage, intelligence services, foreign affairs, in order to determine who the terrorists are, where they are and what plans they have. In brief, the purpose is to ascertain and assess the threat.

1. Groupe européen pour la coordination de la lutte antiterroriste.

Its second rôle would be to plan, prepare and co-ordinate measures taken or to be taken in each country in the fight against terrorism, so as to prevent the national organisation of police forces and justice allowing terrorists to take advantage of the frontiers dividing Europe to evade measures of control, prevention and repression.

Finally, the formation of an operational unit recruited from all the WEU countries should allow the co-ordination of the relevant services, police forces and, as a last resort, the armed forces for rapid intervention against any terrorist threat, wheresoever it may arise.

A product of the political will of member states and having its operational unit, the co-ordinating group should obviously, if it is to be effective, maintain close relations with the services of member countries concerned by the fight against terrorism and have fast and powerful means of communication whose secrecy would have to be protected. It should include officials seconded from each of the national services so as to achieve the necessary co-ordination in the most efficient manner.

Only insofar as Europe has means of information, reflection and action of this type will it be able to avoid the alternative which is now its stumbling-block. *To leave it to the Americans to pursue the fight against terrorism at international level, even if this means complaining in vain a posteriori about the action taken, or to continue individually at national level a fight which is bound to be hopeless since terrorism itself is conducted in the framework of a world war are not solutions for Europe.* Hence my proposal.

*Security and terrorism – the implications for Europe
of crises in other parts of the world*

AMENDMENT 1¹

tabled by Lady Jill Knight

1. At the end of paragraph I.3 of the draft recommendation proper, add:
“ (f) Seek an agreement between member countries that their courts will not refuse extradition applications for convicted terrorists on the grounds that the act (or acts) of terrorism was carried out from political motives. ”

Signed: Knight

1. See 7th sitting, 5th June 1986 (amendment agreed to).

*Reactivation of WEU –
its tasks, structure and place in Europe*

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee
by Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Michel (Alternate: *De Bondt*); MM. *Hardy, van der Werff* (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Ahrens, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. *Berrier, Bianco, Bogaerts* (Alternate: *Pécriaux, Burger, Close, Sir Anthony Grant*, Mr. Hill (Alternate: *Murphy*), Mrs. Kelly, MM. *Koehl* (Alternate: *Dreyfus-Schmidt*), *Lagorce*, Lord Mackie (Alternate: *Dame Jill Knight*), MM. *Martino, Masciadri, Müller, Prouvost, Reddemann* (Alternate: *Mrs. Fischer*), *Ruet, Rumpf, van der Sanden, Spotella, Vecchietti, de Vries*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
*on the reactivation of WEU –
 its tasks, structure and place in Europe*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the interest in the reactivation of WEU shown by several European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (ii) Stressing that the interest in the activities of WEU shown by many European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance is closely linked with the effectiveness of the Council's political activities;
- (iii) Considering that abolition of the lists of armaments subject to control and the new direction given to WEU following the Rome declaration will allow consideration to be given to enlarging WEU once it has been given definite terms of reference;
- (iv) Recalling Portugal's application for membership of WEU and welcoming the results of the referendum held in Spain on 12th March 1986;
- (v) Considering that the delay in transmitting the thirty-first annual report of the Council to the Assembly makes it impossible to adopt an answer to that report in time for the first part of the thirty-second session of the Assembly;
- (vi) Welcoming the efforts made by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the Secretary-General to develop a dialogue with the Assembly;
- (vii) Recalling that information which cannot be given officially to all members of the Assembly cannot be counted as part of this dialogue;
- (viii) Noting that many texts which the Council promised the Assembly have not been sent and that the Assembly is therefore not kept properly informed of the activities of the Permanent Council, the working groups and the agencies;
- (ix) Regretting that the permanent tasks assigned to the agencies are inadequate and vague;
- (x) Considering that in these circumstances the Assembly's tasks of supervision, criticism and censure of the Council remain fundamental, which means that the Assembly must remain completely independent of the Council,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Keep the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance informed of and associated with its activities insofar as the modified Brussels Treaty allows this, particularly in regard to co-operation in armaments matters, in the hope that it will be possible to achieve greater rationalisation and overall harmonisation in this area;
2. Study the consequences of the possible accession of Spain and Portugal to WEU so as to take favourable action without delay on Portugal's application and to propose that Spain accede to the modified Brussels Treaty;
3. Ensure that the Assembly is kept regularly informed of all the Council's activities at a frequency and in time to allow a fruitful dialogue between the two organs of WEU;
4. Present the information which it itself, its Chairman-in-Office or the Secretary-General give the Assembly in such a way that it may be transmitted to all members of the Assembly;
5. Within reasonable time-limits, allow the Assembly to benefit from the studies conducted by the agencies and working groups after expurgating those parts which are classified secret;
6. Ensure that, in addition to the conjunctural studies requested by the Council, the agencies have permanent tasks with due independence of action for implementing them;
7. Inter alia, instruct Agency II to organise a European institute for advanced defence studies, whose tasks will have been defined by the Council, in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Recommendation 429.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. In November 1985, the General Affairs Committee decided to include in its programme of work a report on WEU's place in Europe. Its principal aim was to consider the prospects of a possible enlargement of WEU after its visit to Portugal in 1985 to study that country's application for membership. It agreed not to conduct a similar inquiry in Spain, then a candidate for membership of the EEC on the same basis as Portugal, as long as the question of Spain remaining in NATO had not been settled by the March 1986 referendum. But in November 1985 it gave consideration to following up talks held between Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, and representatives of the Danish Government by visiting Copenhagen. It also decided to ask the Norwegian authorities to receive it. All the elements needed to study WEU's place in Europe would therefore have been available. Special circumstances linked with the Folketing's rejection of the agreement between the Twelve reached in Luxembourg on 3rd December 1985 made the Danish authorities ask the General Affairs Committee to postpone its visit until after the referendum on 27th February 1986.

2. So as not to overburden the agenda of the June 1986 session, it was logical for the committee to link this study with its statutory reply to the Council's report on its activities in 1985. In view of the importance of the measures taken in the context of the reactivation of WEU, it was difficult to foresee the content of a report which would quite obviously have to break with the routine presentation of the Council's annual reports since the start of WEU and also raise the question of WEU's place in Europe. However, the annual report had not reached the Office of the Clerk on 10th April, making it impossible for your Rapporteur to study it in time for the committee to be able to discuss the matter at its meeting on 29th April at which the present report is to be adopted.

3. Finally, at its meeting in Paris on 20th January 1986, the Presidential Committee of the Assembly decided to refer to the General Affairs Committee the question of action to be taken on a paragraph in the preamble to Recommendation 429 inserted by amendment in December 1985. This paragraph asked that the General Affairs Committee set out its conclusions in a separate report. Anxious to avoid including too many reports in the agenda for the June 1986 session, the Presidential Committee preferred to

associate this more detailed study with the General Affairs Committee's report on WEU in reply to the annual report of the Council, it being understood that it was for the General Affairs Committee to handle relations between the Assembly and the Council in that report.

4. As a result of these various decisions, your Rapporteur was given terms of reference which ultimately covered related matters: the reactivation, enlargement and structure of WEU. In order to take account of the prerogatives of other committees, the wishes of those who tabled the amendment and the obligation to prepare a reply to the annual report of the Council for 1985, your Rapporteur has taken each of these three questions separately in three distinct chapters of the present report. Your Rapporteur is well aware that those who tabled the amendment to Recommendation 429 would have liked the questions they raised in 1984 to be the subject of an entirely separate report. He wished to point out that it was neither he nor the General Affairs Committee but the Presidential Committee that decided to join the three questions, albeit closely linked, in a single report. The General Affairs Committee could but take note of this decision.

5. In the end, this decision has led your Rapporteur to tackle the important matter of the reactivation of WEU from three different standpoints: the problems of enlargement, the Council's activities and the structure of WEU are at present the three aspects of this reactivation, so they cannot be dealt with as purely technical matters. The idea each of us has of the nature of the Western European countries' participation in the defence of Europe can alone guide us in this respect and we cannot overlook the questions which WEU will have to answer in future years.

6. The development of the strategic defence initiative launched by President Reagan, whatever the degree of participation of the European members of the Atlantic Alliance, plus the deployment of new conventional weapons and the continuing Soviet-American disarmament negotiations are likely to change Euro-American relations very considerably. There is admittedly nothing to indicate that NATO is being called in question. United States superiority in defence-related technology will probably mean more than ever that Europe's security will be based on the integration of American forces in the military system which ensures its defence.

7. Hence it is within an Atlantic system that Europe will have to define its own interests better than it has managed to do so far, and the purpose of the reactivation of WEU is not to set up a European deployment alongside NATO deployment but to allow Europe to express and give weight to its views on its security requirements. In other words, the reactivation of WEU is more political than military.

8. It remains to be seen which Europe is prepared to express its views on security matters: the European members of the Atlantic Alliance? The twelve members of the Community? The seven members of WEU? It still seems difficult to answer this question, even for those who consider that the future European union should group all the European members of the Atlantic Alliance within a community framework. Solutions have to be found for the next few years, rather than speculate on a more remote future.

9. Similarly, reconsideration of the structure of WEU should not anticipate the future but aim at setting up, at parliamentary level and at the level of the governmental organs, something acceptable to the seven governments and to applicants for possible membership of WEU. It is from this standpoint that your Rapporteur wishes to tackle all the problems which have now arisen.

II. WEU in Europe

10. It should be recalled that Western European Union came into being in 1954 following the adoption by the French National Assembly on 30th August 1954 of a prior question leaving out of its debates the treaty setting up a European Defence Community between the six countries which had just set up the European Coal and Steel Community. This vote meant that France was not prepared to discuss defence matters with its European partners on a community basis. The latter thought they could not or should not develop this community without France and without the United Kingdom, which had not signed the treaty setting up the EDC and, together with France, sought a framework for consultation on European defence on other bases.

11. For this purpose, the Seven modified the text of the Brussels Treaty which, since 1948, had associated the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries in a defensive alliance, to adapt it to the new circumstances in Europe. They extended the initial treaty to Germany and Italy, gave up the integrated European headquarters which had been set up in 1948 in favour of SHAPE, which had in fact already replaced the Western Union headquarters, worked out a system of declaration and control of armaments on

the mainland of Europe, led the United Kingdom to undertake to maintain large numbers of land and air forces in the Federal Republic and set up a parliamentary assembly and a committee to promote the joint production of armaments.

12. Strangely, the modified Brussels Treaty, which refers in its preamble to a joint will to build Europe, corresponded to none of the geographical contours or ideological aims round which Europe was then in the process of taking shape.

13. While the EDC grouped the six member countries of the very recent ECSC, had community principles and aimed at establishing a supranational Europe, WEU had seven members and was an alliance of sovereign states. The only element of federal-type integration was the great novelty of including in a treaty of alliance the Council's right to vote by majority in a number of well-defined cases.

14. The modified Brussels Treaty explicitly referred to the Europe of the Council of Europe in Article IX which set up our Assembly with the delegations of the member countries of the Consultative Assembly. But the explicit links it created with NATO practically excluded the accession of neutral countries or non-members of the Atlantic Alliance, not to speak of countries belonging to another alliance system, whereas the Council of Europe has always shown an interest in relations between the countries both west and east of our continent and includes a number of neutral and non-aligned countries, thus precluding any co-operation with NATO.

15. In any event, the presence of arms controls among WEU's activities effectively prevented enlargement. The balance of advantages and commitments granted to or imposed upon the various parties by the modified Brussels Treaty or its complementary texts was subtle and fragile and hardly allowed other countries to intrude upon defence Europe. WEU was therefore not to be confused with the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance.

16. These peculiarities of seven-power Europe have not always been sufficiently emphasised and it might have been thought that the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities would lead to WEU being integrated in the Community system. This has not been so because the accession of the United Kingdom was achieved at the same time as that of Denmark and Ireland, which did not intend to take part in WEU and, further, several members of WEU wished to avoid at all costs entrusting the command of their armed forces to a seven-, nine- or twelve-power Europe either because they did not want any integration beyond what they had accepted in NATO or, in the case of

France, because it accepted no integration of its forces at all. There is nothing to show any great change in this situation. However, apart from arms controls, seven-power Europe has no very specific political programme and its members have relied on other wider organisations to exercise WEU's responsibilities in defence matters (NATO), cultural and social affairs (Council of Europe), economic matters (EEC) and political consultation.

17. The agreement which the Twelve reached in Luxembourg on 3rd December 1985 includes a draft treaty on European co-operation in the sphere of foreign policy. Article 6 of this treaty specifies that the high contracting parties are "ready to co-ordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security" and are also "determined to maintain the technological and industrial conditions necessary for their security". But the same article specifies that: "Nothing in this treaty shall impede closer co-operation in the field of security between certain of the high contracting parties within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance". This wording, worked out after the ministerial meeting of the WEU Council in Rome, shows as clearly as possible the link between what the governments intend to do in the context of twelve-power consultations and what they wish to keep for WEU. It also shows that the governments are well aware of the limits to co-operation among the Twelve in defence matters and that WEU is to retain its rôle alongside twelve-power Europe.

18. Changes in WEU in 1984 and 1985 under the general heading of the reactivation of WEU nevertheless altered some of the facts of the problem. In fact, while the almost total disappearance of arms controls weakened WEU's grip on its members, it no longer prevented enlargement. The question is how far and in what direction it can be enlarged.

19. The Council was keenly aware of this new situation since it envisaged possible enlargement in the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984. It took note of Portugal's application for membership on the same date but has so far given no answer. It also asked the Assembly to increase its contacts with the parliaments of the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, which the Assembly has done. But the Assembly realised that such contacts could not continue indefinitely nor continue further until the governments had taken the basic decision about whether they were prepared to enlarge WEU and to which countries. So far, they have talked about the need to reorganise WEU itself before enlarging it, a purely dilatory approach, since there was nothing to prevent new members of WEU taking part in the study of the structural reforms needed for this reorganisation. If there

is to be enlargement, further changes will indeed have to be made in WEU and it would have been possible to avoid a further period of adaptation by taking account at once of the possible accession of other countries. There indeed seems to be certain differences among the Seven about possible enlargement.

20. Thus, in June 1984 Mr. Cheyssou, then French Minister for External Relations and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, expressed his firm hostility towards any enlargement of WEU. He considered the Seven to be a sort of hard core of defence Europe which could but be softened by a territorial extension of WEU. This argument would have been perfectly valid if WEU had had military commands and, a fortiori, armed forces of its own. But from the moment some European countries take part in the NATO integrated military system, which is not even the case for all the members of WEU, it is even harder to see why they should be kept out as four of them are now also members of the European Community and play a regular part in twelve-power European political co-operation.

21. While on the other hand the abolition of controls of conventional weapons facilitates application of Article XI of the treaty providing for a possible enlargement of WEU, the Rome declaration does not affect Protocol No. II providing for controls on the levels of forces of member countries. This protocol is obviously of great importance since conventional arms controls played an essential rôle in verifying the declarations and controls regarding forces. As we know, SACEUR is responsible for applying this protocol where the forces assigned to him are concerned, which means no non-member country of the Atlantic Alliance can join WEU since there can be no question of SACEUR reporting to countries which are not members of the alliance on the levels of troops assigned to him. Conversely, the accession of member countries of the alliance to Protocol No. II should not raise any fundamental difficulties.

22. In fact, there is only one valid reason for being opposed to countries which take part in the same military deployment as the Seven and in the same effort to co-ordinate foreign policies joining a European defence organisation involving no integration or obligation to conform to decisions which are binding only on those who have acceded to them, and that is the possible difficulty of applying Article V of the treaty to these countries. Your Rapporteur will discuss this problem in respect of Greece, Turkey and Norway.

23. There is no indication that the doctrine voiced by Mr. Cheyssou in 1984 is or will remain that of the French Government, which would not be very well placed to be over-punctilious

about WEU countries belonging to NATO. However, recent reactions by certain European members of NATO to foreign and defence policy matters, particularly Greece and Denmark, indicate that some caution is still necessary in the event of enlargement if WEU is to remain free of the kind of blockage which the vote in the Danish Parliament in January 1986 might have imposed on the nevertheless most modest decisions contained in the Luxembourg agreement of 3rd December 1985 on European political co-operation. There is no indication moreover that these countries would effectively be prepared to join WEU, and the attitude adopted by the Danish Folketing towards the decisions taken in Luxembourg, although not confirmed by the referendum on 27th February 1986, makes it most improbable that it would seek to take concerted action in WEU which it found so difficult to accept among the Twelve.

24. When considering inviting observers to its sessions, the Assembly for its part hesitated for some time between two quite different concepts of the Europe it wished to help by its initiatives. Some wanted invitations to be sent mainly to member countries of the European Community, although they knew that at least one of them, Ireland, was not prepared to take part in a military alliance or even to tighten its links with WEU. They wished to confirm that the only future they saw for European union lay in the extension of the Rome Treaty to areas which it did not yet cover and in application of the Community system. Since then the apparent success of the Anglo-Irish agreement of 15th November 1985 offers hope that the obstacles which had hitherto stood in the way of Ireland co-operating with its European partners in security matters will be removed progressively.

25. Others, on the contrary, were prepared to invite parliamentary observers from all European countries members of the Atlantic Alliance to emphasise that if WEU wished to assert itself as the European pillar of the alliance it would have to group the largest possible number of countries. In the end, this was the position adopted by the Presidential Committee on 20th January 1986 when it decided to issue a standing invitation to its sessions to two parliamentary observers from all European countries members of the Atlantic Alliance. Only Portugal, which has applied for membership of WEU, was invited to send a delegation corresponding to its delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Finally, the Presidential Committee left committees free to invite observers to their meetings in the light of their agendas, but did not wish to make such invitations a political gesture.

26. The Presidential Committee's decision is quite logical and perfectly coherent. However, it does not claim to anticipate decisions which

are the responsibility of the Council and while it shows a certain line of thought this in no way implies that the Assembly has advocated the immediate accession to WEU of all European countries members of the alliance or that it has rejected the idea that in defence matters WEU foreshadows a European union whose responsibilities would no longer be limited to those which the treaties in force assigned to the European Community. It can at most be interpreted as an expression of the hope that one day the Community will group all the European members of the Atlantic Alliance and naturally also as a demonstration of support for Portugal's candidature which the Assembly endorsed in June 1985 (Recommendation 420).

27. The idea of the immediate accession of all the European members of the alliance would disregard certain facts, in particular the extremely binding nature of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. Thus, no Western European country would be anxious to have Greece or Turkey join an alliance which included a so-called automatic assistance clause as long as those two countries had not found a lasting solution to the problems which divide them.

28. It has also been wondered whether the accession of Norway to such a treaty would be reasonable insofar as, if that country had to meet a limited aggression from the north or against the Barents Sea islands, its security would be ensured mainly by the presence of United States naval and air forces, whereas the Seven do not really have the means of participating effectively in the defence of those areas. In the circumstances, a moot point was could they hope for close political co-operation with Norway?

29. When it visited Norway on 18th and 19th February 1986, the General Affairs Committee was able to obtain an answer in part to this question. First, it could see that the Norwegian authorities, with a very large majority of the Storting, viewed their relations with WEU mainly from the standpoint of their ties with Western Europe. These were strained by the 1972 referendum in which the Norwegian people rejected accession to the European Community. Since then, the close relationship between Denmark and Norway has to some extent overcome the drawbacks of this decision by avoiding Norway being isolated.

30. The logical way to do this would obviously be to go back on the 1972 decisions, but this would require another referendum. In the meantime, WEU can help to satisfy the Norwegian authorities, who say they welcome the regular participation of Norwegian parliamentary observers in Assembly sessions. Again, Norway seems to be considering examining its relations with WEU once the question of relations between Spain and WEU has been raised in spe-

cific terms, particularly if the reactivation of the organisation is confirmed and it does not appear to be a divisive factor for the Atlantic Alliance. On all these points, the views of the Norwegian Government seem extremely close to those constantly expressed by the Assembly.

31. In any event there are obviously no reasons for leaving Greece, Turkey and Norway out of all WEU's activities in which they are interested, particularly those which do not relate directly to defence but rather to armaments. In this connection, the regular presence of observers at Assembly sessions and visits by Assembly committees to the countries concerned should offer a better idea of each one's special position and help to establish links between them and WEU which conform to what is possible and desirable.

32. The two countries whose relations with WEU are now a problem are Portugal and Spain. The first applied for membership in October 1984 and has not yet received an answer from the WEU Council. This is particularly unacceptable since there seem to be hardly any obstacles to its accession, but it is obviously humiliating for a country to have such a serious commitment to WEU ignored in this way.

33. The case of Spain is more delicate since the country has not applied for membership, but, on 21st January 1986, for instance, when its Prime Minister, Mr. Gonzalez, visited the Italian Prime Minister, Mr. Craxi, it showed its interest in WEU. However, the Spanish Government was determined not to tackle the possibility of applying for membership before the 12th March 1986 referendum on whether Spain should remain in the Atlantic Alliance.

34. Answering questions put by a journalist on the occasion of this meeting, the two ministers made the following remarks:

Question: I should like to ask the two Presidents about WEU. To President Craxi I should like to ask about Italy's support to Spain's accession to WEU and to President Gonzalez if, in the course of the debate on foreign policy on 4th February, the WEU question will be raised, since it is on the agenda.

President Craxi: We believe it is an excellent thing for Spain to join WEU. As much as we deem it important that Spain continues to play her rôle in the Atlantic Alliance.

President Gonzalez: I believe that Spain, who has not yet officially presented her candidature to WEU, has not done so because, before taking such a decision, she waits for the debate among the member states of WEU to come to a head; therefore

she will take part in this debate and naturally, during such a debate, will reiterate what we have already said to Italy and to the other members of WEU. We are establishing contacts and before the end of the month we shall meet the Secretary-General in order to clarify and define this issue, so as to be able to add it to the process of implementation of what is known as the decalogue of Spain's policy for peace and security. As you know, it is a policy of harmonisation of ten points, in that one does not opt for one point to the detriment of another. They are coherent points related to one another. Spain must belong to WEU and such a process will certainly come to fruition in the next few months."

35. The Spanish Council of Ministers considered the matter on 24th January and the government spokesman, Mr. Solana, said at the close of the meeting that the Spanish Government was preparing its integration in WEU, which was envisaged after the referendum on NATO. The Spanish Prime Minister, Mr. Gonzalez, was to hold talks with Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, on 29th January, during the latter's visit to Spain when they would discuss the present position of the organisation.

36. The Spanish Government spokesman recalled that the European countries were reactivating WEU and that the Spanish Government intended Spain to join in accordance with the intentions expressed by Mr. Gonzalez in his "defence decalogue" on 23rd October 1984. Item 6 of this peace and security programme put forward by the Spanish Prime Minister specifies that:

"Spain does not belong to the Western European Union for defence matters, although it is the only organisation with responsibility in this area. I consider Spain's participation would be desirable, although I think that beforehand we must consider the results of the process of our integration into Europe."

37. The spokesman recalled the words of the Prime Minister following the Italo-Spanish conference in Taormina on 21st January, when he said that:

"Spain has not yet applied formally for membership of WEU because it is waiting for the reactivation proposed by its member countries to reach maturity. We shall receive the Secretary-General of WEU in order to clarify obscure points in the context of the 'defence decalogue' whose main aspects are continued membership of NATO without military integration, a

reduction of the American military presence in Spain, non-nuclearisation of Spanish territory and integration in WEU.”

He also said:

“We are not aiming to be a member of one (referring to WEU) while abandoning the other (referring to NATO).”

Furthermore, the WEU Secretary-General's visit to Madrid on 28th and 29th January was the subject of a letter to the President of the Assembly which has been circulated to members of the Assembly with the authorisation of the Secretary-General.

38. Furthermore, it seems clear that the Spanish Government sees the prospect of joining WEU as being in line with joining the European Communities. Even if Spain has in mind procedure in conformity with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty for its accession to WEU, i.e. if it is waiting for a formal invitation from the Seven, the result of the referendum on the Atlantic Alliance should allow contacts to be made very quickly. It would be very disturbing for the future of Europe if the Seven did not take early steps, in a case where this is possible, to make WEU's frontiers coincide with those of Community Europe.

39. At its meeting in Venice on 29th and 30th April, the WEU Council must decide on the action to be taken on Portugal's explicit and Spain's implicit candidatures. It will probably be unable to issue immediately the invitation provided for in Article XI of the treaty but will rather decide to examine the practical consequences of the possible accession of these two countries for themselves, for WEU and its structures and for the application of the modified Brussels Treaty.

40. Your Rapporteur wishes to make the following remarks based on what he has noted above:

41. (i) Accession to WEU can concern only countries which want it and are prepared to take account of all the consequences of all the commitments imposed by the modified Brussels Treaty and to move towards the establishment of a European union including close co-operation in defence matters.

42. (ii) There can be no question of countries which are not members of the Atlantic Alliance being admitted to WEU and WEU cannot be considered as a substitute for NATO.

43. (iii) The enlargement of WEU must in no event lead to Article V of the treaty being extended to countries whose relations with their neighbours are liable to degenerate into armed conflict, without this jeopardising the security of Western Europe as a whole. This does not neces-

sarily prevent countries in such a situation taking part in some of WEU's activities, particularly the production of armaments, since, in any case, these countries are already, in NATO, Eurogroup or the IEPG, co-operating with their European partners in armaments matters.

44. (iv) The decisions taken by the Assembly about inviting parliamentary observers to sessions do not mean that the Assembly has adopted a position in favour of the early accession to WEU of the countries concerned but are merely a demonstration of the Assembly's concern that close contacts should be maintained with the European members of the alliance, which seems to correspond to the Council's view on the subject. Moreover, the Assembly has declared its support for Portugal's application for membership and the special treatment it has decided to grant to a delegation of Portuguese observers shows that this support is continuing and is unique.

III. The political activities of the Council in 1985

45. The thirty-first annual report of the Council had not yet reached the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly when this chapter was drafted. The delay makes it most unlikely that it will be possible to circulate the report to members of the Assembly in time for them to read it before the meeting on 29th April at which the General Affairs Committee is to adopt the present report so that it may be printed and circulated within the prescribed time-limits before the Assembly's session. Your Rapporteur therefore proposes to examine the political activities of the Council on the basis of documents effectively received in time and suggests postponing until the December 1986 session the adoption of a reply to the annual report of the Council for 1985. He wishes to stress that this delay shows that the statutory exchanges between the Council and the Assembly have slowed down and this is wholly contrary to the wishes expressed by the Assembly in 1985 when it expressed its intention to activate its exchanges with the Council, proposing inter alia that the Council present half-yearly reports to the Assembly. This is most regrettable since 1985 will have been the decisive year for the reactivation of WEU during which most of the decisions affecting its future will have been taken.

46. Indeed, the principles set out in the Rome declaration had to be applied in regard to the Council and its secretariat and to the WEU technical bodies. The Assembly, on the other hand, had no need to take any major immediate decisions, but it had to try to follow closely what happened in the Council so as to adapt its agenda and overall work to what the modified Brussels Treaty had made it responsible for supervising, i.e. the activities of the Council.

47. Thus, more than ever in 1985 the Assembly should have been kept seriously and regularly informed of the state of the activities of the Council and its dependent bodies. Your Rapporteur ventures to underline that this has not been the case at all but that in spite of the delay in the adoption of the thirty-first annual report, the Assembly has received more substantial information from several sources in the first months of 1986, thanks mainly to fortunate initiatives taken by the Secretary-General.

48. Yet the Assembly had taken a number of steps to facilitate and improve its dialogue with the Council. For instance, in spring 1985, it set up a Committee for Relations with the Council with the main task of informing the Council, before it took any decisions concerning WEU, of the Assembly's point of view on matters on the agenda of its meetings. Furthermore, the Presidential Committee was able to meet the Council at the close of both its 1985 ministerial meetings to obtain all the information which the latter was prepared to give. It had also asked to meet the Permanent Council in London in June 1985, but this meeting had to be cancelled because the Council did not wish to guarantee that simultaneous interpretation would be made available for parliamentarians as required by the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, the seriousness of its work and the full participation of all its members. Finally, the difference between the Permanent Council and the Assembly was solved during the Assembly's session in December 1985 when the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, consented to convene a joint meeting between the Presidential Committee and the Permanent Council to arrange for the organisation of regular meetings between these two bodies. The first of these meetings was held in Paris on 21st January 1986.

49. This meeting allowed the Presidential Committee of the Assembly to put a number of questions to the Council, most of which were summed up in a letter from the President of the Assembly to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, to whom he wrote *inter alia*:

"Apart from budgetary matters, which have been the subject of a separate communication to the Council, I consider that the principal points raised at the meeting were as follows:

1. Relations between the Council and the Assembly

The Assembly continues to be deprived of any serious information about the Council's activities, apart from ministerial meetings.

(a) In spite of the undertaking given by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council

in December, the 1985 report of the working group on the SDI has not been communicated to the Assembly.

(b) The new agencies were set up on 1st January 1986, but the Assembly has not been informed of:

(i) their organogram and the staff available to them¹;

(ii) the tasks assigned to them and the time-limits set for accomplishing these tasks²;

(iii) how the Ministers of Defence and their staff will take part in the work of the Council, the working groups and the agencies;

(iv) action taken on the proposal to set up a European defence institute;

(v) keeping the public informed of the Council's work³;

(vi) the progress of seven-power consultations on disarmament;

(vii) the SAC's study on Japanese armaments and action to be taken on this study.

(c) For future meetings between the Council and the Assembly:

(i) Are the Council or its Chairman-in-Office prepared to hold a meeting with the Assembly committee responsible for relations with the Council before the ministerial meeting in Venice so that the Council may be informed of the Assembly's view in due time⁴?

(ii) Is the Council prepared to receive, at the close of the ministerial meeting in Venice, the two committees (Committee on Defence

1. Since the President of the Assembly wrote this letter to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly has received a note from the Secretary-General giving two organograms.

2. A letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly dated 17th March 1986, circulated to members of the Assembly, answers this question.

3. On 20th May 1985, the Council sent the Assembly a document on "WEU and public awareness", appended to the reply to Recommendation 411. This sets out the Council's intentions in regard to informing public opinion but the Assembly has received no word of the possible implementation of its intentions.

4. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council gave the President of the Assembly a favourable answer to this question on 8th February 1986. A meeting was held between the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, assisted by representatives of most member countries, and the Committee for Relations with the Council in Rome on 8th April.

Questions and Armaments and General Affairs Committee) which have requested a joint meeting on that occasion, as well as the Presidential Committee of the Assembly? If the Council considers it desirable, these meetings might be combined in a single meeting.⁴

- (iii) Is the Permanent Council prepared to organise twice-yearly meetings with the Presidential Committee of the Assembly in order to inform it of the state of matters dealt with in WEU?
- (d) The Presidential Committee of the Assembly has not been very satisfied with the way ministers have taken part in Assembly sessions.
- (i) It has expressed the wish that their interventions be grouped on the day set aside for consideration of the Council's work. At the next session, this would be in the afternoon of Tuesday, 3rd June.⁵
- (ii) The Presidential Committee has also expressed the wish that the Council be represented throughout the Assembly's debates by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council or by a minister or secretary of state representing him and empowered to speak during debates on matters on the agenda, either to answer questions or to give the Council's views on the matters being debated.

2. SDI

(a) The probable cuts to be made by the United States Congress in amounts earmarked by the United States for its defence are perhaps liable to alter the offers of co-operation made by the United States to its partners. It is to be feared that if Europe does not give an early answer to the offers made to it the United States may give priority in this field to the countries which were the first to give their answers, and particularly Japan. The Assembly has been informed of divergent answers given by certain member countries to the United States offers. How-

4. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council gave the President of the Assembly a favourable answer to this question on 8th February 1986. A meeting was held between the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, assisted by representatives of most member countries, and the Committee for Relations with the Council in Rome on 8th April.

5. An at least partial answer was given to this question on 8th February 1986.

ever, it has not been informed of the text of the agreements concluded between certain member countries and the United States in this connection.

In view of the importance of the reports considered during the debate on the SDI, which was the central point of the Assembly's last session, does the Council intend to take account of them in pursuing its work on the harmonisation of European answers to the SDI? Does it intend to pursue a dialogue with the Assembly on this matter?⁶

(b) The development of Eureka requires that Europeans know what benefits they will derive from the SDI so as to direct their own programme and to foresee the budgetary commitments needed for Eureka.

Does the Council intend to tackle the question of the relationship between the SDI and Eureka and is it prepared to inform the Assembly about the development of Eureka since the programme was adopted in Hanover on 6th November 1985?

3. WEU agencies

Information received by the Assembly suggests that the new WEU agencies will have very small staffs which will not allow them to conduct research on their own. It will be possible to make them responsible only for work of synthesis whose value will depend on the sources of information available to them and the means they have of processing this information.

This implies agreement between WEU on the one hand and NATO, the IEPG and national administrations on the other for the provision of the necessary information. Secondly, it requires a computerised documentation centre being made available to the agencies. Can the Council specify what steps have been taken to provide the agencies with the information they need?⁷

The question arises whether the Assembly will be able to have access to this information and to the agencies' computer and in what conditions.

6. The Council said the answer to this question will be given in the answer to Written Question 263, but this answer had not reached the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly on 10th April 1986.

7. The answer to Written Question 262, dated 20th March 1986, answers this question.

4. Problems outside the NATO area

The Assembly has heard nothing about how the Council has followed up the intentions expressed in the Rome declaration in this connection.

- (a) Does the Council intend to examine the consequences for Europe of the emergence of new arms producing and exporting powers such as Japan and Brazil?
- (b) Does the Council intend to tackle the question raised by certain countries' support for international terrorism and measures to be taken to prevent the growth of such terrorism?
- (c) Does the Council intend to seek to harmonise member countries' policies so as to help to restore peace where it is the most seriously threatened, particularly in the Near and Middle East, Africa or possibly Latin America, as it is urged to do in the modified Brussels Treaty?

I am quite aware that this represents a very considerable number of questions and wishes and that the Council will probably not be able to answer them all immediately. It seems to me, nevertheless, that serious consideration of these proposals and the adoption of a positive attitude towards them by the Council would be a major step towards improving relations between the Council and the Assembly, which is our common aim."

50. Probably the annual report will provide answers to some of the questions put by the President and the Assembly's opinion on the report and the Council's action in 1985 will depend on the value of these answers. It must be borne in mind, on the one hand, that no answers have yet been given to questions not marked with a footnote and, on the other hand, that many of the answers mentioned are incomplete, provisional or vague and the Assembly cannot therefore consider them satisfactory.

51. It is nevertheless possible to make a number of remarks here and now. First, the fact that the Council's report is an annual one does not allow the Assembly to obtain a valid idea of the Council's initiatives and in good time. It is essential that, by appropriate procedure, the Council should keep the Assembly informed more frequently about what it undertakes and what it achieves if it wishes to establish or maintain a true dialogue with the parliamentarians for, if there is a lapse of time of more than a few months between something happening and it being reported to the Assembly, any reactions which may be expressed are no longer of interest,

nor can the Council adjust its approach to take account of the parliamentarians' views. In the long run, it is of little importance whether the latter approve or disapprove of what the Council does; all that counts is that they should be able to exert an influence on it.

52. As shown by your Rapporteur's footnotes to a number of the questions put by the President of the Assembly to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, some answers, preliminary answers or incomplete answers have been given during the early months of 1986. It is gratifying that the Council, its Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary-General did not feel they had to wait for the publication of the annual report in order to give the Assembly this information and thus provide material for a dialogue between the two WEU bodies. It is for the Assembly to pursue these exchanges and your Rapporteur therefore proposes to examine the Council's activities in 1985 without waiting for the Council to send the thirty-first annual report.

53. He nevertheless feels that the Council's scattered communications to the Assembly make it difficult for parliamentarians, in view of their activities and the voluminous documentation they receive, to absorb this information correctly and in the long run it is detrimental to valid exchanges between the Council and the Assembly. The nature of some of the documents the Council has sent means that they cannot be circulated outside the Assembly. Your Rapporteur has tried to overcome this drawback by having an information document prepared for the General Affairs Committee containing the texts suitable for such a presentation, but others could not be included because of their personal nature. Your Rapporteur wishes to emphasise that the very principles of parliamentarism mean that a communication to a parliamentary assembly cannot be counted if it cannot be circulated to all the members of that assembly. A dialogue between the two sides of WEU cannot be conducted by means of private letters and informal meetings at which no minutes are taken. Such letters and meetings may be useful for establishing a dialogue but do not, in themselves, constitute a dialogue. Practically speaking, your Rapporteur suggests that the Council make a clear distinction between communications to the Assembly and their accompanying letters and give a reference number to the former so that they may be grouped for working purposes. Failing this, misunderstandings would probably soon arise over the nature of the Council's communications about which the Council would be the first to protest.

54. Your Rapporteur also asks the Council to ensure that the declassification of documents produced by the agencies or working groups prior to their communication to the Assembly be effected as quickly as possible so that the Assem-

bly may receive information which is not out of date before it arrives. This was already the case for the text on the SDI and documents prepared by the international secretariat of the SAC on Japanese armaments industries, for instance. Henceforth it may also be true for texts produced by the three agencies.

55. Procedure for consultation has been introduced since the Council started to reactivate WEU and this has allowed the Assembly to be not altogether alien to the activities of the Council, particularly when it meets at ministerial level, but it is far from producing adequate results since all the decisions relating to WEU's own activities are prepared at the level of the Permanent Council and its working groups and, inevitably, it tends to take the place of earlier procedure which is becoming obsolescent.

56. Thus, meetings between the Presidential Committee and the Council were held after each of the two ministerial meetings in 1985, but there was no joint meeting between the Council and Assembly committees in 1985. Similarly, the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee was not received by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council at the close of these ministerial meetings: it would have been pointless since the Chairman-in-Office gave the Presidential Committee as a whole the information which had hitherto been reserved for the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

57. Conversely, the rarity of joint meetings with committees reduced considerably the number of parliamentarians able to take part in the dialogue with the Council. Even when the chairmen of political groups are convened to its meetings, the Presidential Committee is not a political body with political weighting and it does not have to prepare the replies to the annual report of the Council whose adoption is one of the Assembly's statutory duties. Having taken note of the fact that joint meetings with committees, from which the Council intentionally removed all that was compulsory for it when it gave up applying the official procedure which it had itself worked out, are to be held at the close of the ministerial meeting in Venice on 30th April, your Rapporteur wishes to emphasise that it is essential to hold such meetings if the dialogue with the Council is really to involve the Assembly.

58. The President of the Assembly met the two successive Chairmen-in-Office of the Council several times in 1985. Your Rapporteur can but welcome such meetings, but he must stress that they are of interest only if the remarks of the Chairman-in-Office truly commit the Council. As no record is taken of such meetings, it is difficult to ensure that participants draw identical conclusions, and the differences between the Council and the Assembly which

came to light during the December 1985 session indicate that these meetings did not produce all the results one was entitled to expect.

59. Moreover, the Assembly set up a Committee for Relations with the Council whose main duty is to inform the Council, before its decisions are taken, of the Assembly's views. It could have played an important rôle at the time measures were taken to reactivate WEU. However, it was not possible to arrange a meeting with the Council prior to the ministerial meeting in Rome in November 1985 when a number of important decisions had to be taken in this sense. Your Rapporteur is gratified that it was possible to hold such a meeting in Rome on 8th April 1986.

60. Finally, at the meeting between the Presidential Committee and the Permanent Council on 21st January 1986, no answers were given to the many questions set out in the letter from the President of the Assembly. Clearly the members of the Permanent Council are not empowered to answer on behalf of their governments when questions relate to matters on which they have had no special instructions. It might have been hoped, however, that for matters relating directly to WEU, as for almost all the questions put, it would have been possible for them to give their views. This does not seem to have been the case.

61. At such meetings, we are therefore faced with the problem which has always paralysed relations between the Assembly and the Council and there is no reason for the Assembly to depart from the position it has always adopted, i.e. to insist either on formal meetings for which the parliamentarians' questions are transmitted in advance and the Council's answers, adopted in accordance with the rules governing the organisation, express the unanimous opinion of the seven governments, or on informal meetings allowing a real dialogue but implying that the government representatives speak freely. If the Permanent Council continues to insist on informal meetings without paying the price and allowing its members to speak freely, there is every reason to fear that these meetings have little future. This is so for instance when the Council acts as it did over the Assembly's budget for 1986, i.e. holding its meeting with the parliamentarians only after it had previously adopted its positions unanimously. A dialogue between the Council and the Assembly is not and cannot be the mere presentation to the Assembly of decisions already taken.

62. All these remarks give your Rapporteur the impression that the problems raised are not just procedural but concern the way the Council believes its rôle should be played. There can be no improvement in relations between the two WEU bodies if the Council continues - as was

the case for understandable reasons before the reactivation of WEU abolished most armaments controls – to shelter behind procedure to conceal its refusal of all initiatives implied by Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and the Rome declaration. No procedure will allow a true dialogue to be initiated between the Council and the Assembly, nor will the Council's expressed desire to launch a policy of keeping the press informed have the slightest chance of success as long as the Council has no real existence.

63. Similarly, the Council cannot expect the Assembly to play effectively the rôle among public opinion assigned to it by the Rome declaration if it persists in using procedure which in fact deprives the Assembly of credibility. The Council's persistent refusal to grant the Assembly the budget it needs to meet the growing requests for documentation, information, attendance at various colloquies, and relations with other parliamentary assemblies, which it has been receiving since the Council itself raised the idea of reactivating WEU, the total absence of independence in the management of the budget which it forces upon the Assembly, the shortage of information it provides and the meagreness of the dialogue it allows significantly limit the Assembly's audience. It is not for your Rapporteur to tackle the budgetary aspects of the matter here, but he wishes to recall that they also have a political aspect which should not be neglected.

64. Until such time as the thirty-first annual report of the Council reaches the Assembly, it will be difficult to review the Council's political activities in 1985. Possibly new practices, including the presence of senior ministry officials and experts at meetings of the Permanent Council, may have changed the standard of the Council's work considerably, but the Assembly has nothing on which to form an opinion. Your Rapporteur wishes to underline that during a first reading of the working paper which he submitted to the General Affairs Committee on 17th March, many of his colleagues voiced grave doubts about the Council's true intentions and its will to apply the Rome declaration effectively. The documents sent by the Council to the Assembly in the first months of 1986 are certainly not likely to make them change their minds, particularly where the activities of the new agencies are concerned.

65. Until 31st December 1985, the ACA and the international secretariat of the SAC had their own activities, defined on a permanent basis, and their dependence on the Council was limited. This is no longer the case, at least for most of the activities of the three new agencies. One may wonder, however, why an intergovernmental body needs agencies to provide it with information which, inevitably, will

come mainly from the governments represented on the Council. As long as these agencies have no permanent, clearly-defined and compulsory tasks, and are responsible mainly for certain topical studies, the need for which is not always obvious and they are not given the means to do their job thoroughly, it may be wondered to what extent the governments really wish to reactivate WEU.

66. This is one of the reasons why the proposal made by Mr. Genscher, then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, in December 1984, taken up and developed by the successive rapporteurs of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Masciadri (Document 990), Mr. van der Sanden (Document 1012) and Mr. Berrier (Document 1034), to set up an institute to study defence questions, apart from the interest of setting up such an institute, would, if the institute were set up in WEU, have the further advantage of providing a permanent programme of work and responsibilities, at least for the agency for the study of security and defence problems (Agency II). Your Rapporteur believes this matter is on the agenda of the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Venice and he hopes the governments will take a decision on it. He has noted with very special interest the specific proposals in the article by Mr. Pierre Schwed and General Henri Bagnouls "Ebauche d'un institut européen des hautes études de défense" published in the French magazine *Défense nationale* of March 1986, which he considers makes a particularly interesting proposal for incorporating such an institute in WEU. He regrets that so far the Council has given only evasive and laconic answers to the proposals made by the General Affairs Committee in this connection.

67. He also regrets that the Council has given no indication of what it expects of the work of Agency I on disarmament and the control of armaments, i.e. its own intentions in this respect. In May 1985, Mr. van der Sanden's report said that there had been American opposition to the pursuit of the Council's work on this matter and, while the Council has never given the Assembly any information about this, the General Affairs Committee received confirmation during its visit to the State Department in Washington in June 1985. This was perhaps not the most appropriate place for the Assembly to obtain important information about the Council's activities.

68. Finally, the answer to Written Question 262 is far from providing the assurances that might have been expected after the Rome declaration about the permanent activities of Agency III and the areas of its responsibilities compared with those of the IEPG.

69. Your Rapporteur has to conclude this chapter by stressing that many details are still lacking about the activities of the Council and its

dependent organs both in the recent past and regarding the governments' intentions for the future. He is very much afraid that these gaps in the information given to the Assembly and the delay in adopting the thirty-first annual report of the Council may conceal considerable hesitancy in the intentions of the Seven about effectively applying the decisions, the principle of which was agreed upon in Rome eighteen months ago.

IV. The Assembly's prospects

70. A brief debate led to the adoption of the amendment to include a new paragraph in the preamble to the draft recommendation submitted by Mr. Berrier on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, as follows:

“Referring to the fact that the report on the possibilities, conditions and consequences of a closer institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU, which is asked for in Order 63, will be prepared separately.”

71. Although there was not time for speakers to express their views in full, this debate indicated that members of the Assembly have two apparently very different concepts if not about the nature and vocation of WEU, at least about what it is possible and desirable to do in the immediate future.

72. Mr. Berrier's report included a chapter answering Order 63 which had been referred back to the General Affairs Committee for consideration. This chapter was based on a very sound analysis of the right established by the modified Brussels Treaty and noted that the Assembly's main duty was to supervise the Council's activities on the basis of the annual report which the latter has to submit to the Assembly. It concluded that the priority given to its supervisory activities meant that the Assembly had to be completely independent of the Council and hence the Office of the Clerk had to be independent vis-à-vis the Secretariat-General. This led the Rapporteur to reject most of the ideas which had visibly guided the authors of Order 63.

73. As opposed to this right, speeches by several of the signatories of the order during the debate on Mr. Berrier's report referred to the changing position of WEU due to its reactivation. They considered that this situation called for greater unity between the Council and the Assembly so as to form a bloc in order to promote the European union they wanted, considering the priority hitherto given to the Assembly's independence to be out of date. This at least is the way your Rapporteur interprets Mr. Spies von Büllenheim's speech in favour of the amendment.

74. An attempt should therefore be made to get to the heart of the problem and to examine the elements of this order only in the light of more general views on the present and future of WEU.

75. In point of fact, this is not a new debate since it emerged at the very start of WEU and has constantly brought those who considered that the organisation was a balanced whole, acceptable in itself because it brought together the necessary conditions for the application of Article V of the treaty, into conflict with those who considered that the failure of the EDC had permanently compromised the future of a defence Europe. Of those who considered that the solution offered by the modified Brussels Treaty was the best one possible, particularly among the French and British, many were in favour of a confederal-type Europe, at least for defence matters which they considered should not escape state sovereignty.

76. Others, without stopping at a global view of the future of Europe, noted that the failure of the EDC had shown that Europe could go no further in this area in the near future. One needs only to recall the hesitation shown by several members in 1954 about allowing German military units to be formed, the aversion of the British to commit themselves for several decades to maintaining a large force on the mainland of Europe, the Federal Republic's hesitation about mortgaging aspects of its economic, military and political future by renouncing the production of certain weapons and France's refusal to take part in a European defence organisation in which the United Kingdom would not occupy a place to realise the delicate, subtle balance of commitments which the modified Brussels Treaty had to meet: it was probably the maximum that it was possible to achieve in 1954. But in their view this in no way precluded the subsequent development of WEU, giving it a place in a European union whose boundaries and above all political orientations were to be worked out without a prior condition being the solution of structural matters.

77. Finally, a few people considered that by setting up a seven-power confederal-type Europe the signatories of the Paris Agreements were delaying and making more difficult the progress of a community-type Europe which at the time could only have been a six-power Europe and hence they constantly endeavoured to promote, outside WEU, the extension of Community Europe to the field of defence. This tendency has often been evident in the European Parliament but has so far produced no results in the governments.

78. It is now clear that, however one looks at it, the choice made after the failure of the EDC was the only one possible. It did not hinder the

enlargement of Community Europe and if the latter has not advanced towards greater European unity it is certainly not due to the influence exerted by WEU. However this may be, the question raised indirectly by Order 63 is to what extent the situation in 1986 is sufficiently different from that of 1954 to allow the structure of WEU to evolve away from the treaty which set up the institution and made the Assembly a supervisory body implying that the Assembly should be completely independent of the Council, as recalled in Mr. Berrier's report.

79. A first argument in favour of an evolution in the WEU structure stems from the abolition of most of the controls exercised by the Agency for the Control of Armaments. This has been done progressively following, on the one hand, reductions in the list of conventional weapons which the Federal Republic undertook not to manufacture and, on the other hand, the French decision not to submit its nuclear weapons to control. The decision taken by the Council in 1984 to delete the lists in Annex III to Protocol No. III and subsequently to abolish all controls of conventional weapons completed this evolution. The argument which was apparently at the back of the minds of the authors of Order 63 was that once these controls were abolished the Assembly's principal task vis-à-vis the Council would no longer be significant.

80. However, this argument is based only on Council practice in the last ten years (i.e. since the United Kingdom joined the European Communities) and not on the intentions of the signatories of the treaty. The latter considered that Article V was the basis of WEU, not arms controls. All the rest became significant only in relation to the *casus foederis*, which meant that the Assembly's rôle covered all the Council's activities and application of the modified Brussels Treaty and not specifically arms controls. Once these have disappeared, or almost, the Assembly's obligations remain the same: to supervise the application of the modified Brussels Treaty. The Council clearly recognised this when it acknowledged that it was answerable to the Assembly for all matters relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even if the seven-power consultations provided for in Article VIII were held in frameworks other than WEU. A reduction in arms controls therefore does not affect the application of Article IX of the treaty.

81. A second argument in favour of a change in institutional relations between the Council and the Assembly might be based on the fact that in practice the Assembly has played a rôle which has been far more important in terms of proposals than of control. In December 1984, Mr. Masciadri prepared a brief showing the Assembly's important contribution to the reactivation of WEU which the Council

recognised in the Rome declaration. It is evident that this rôle of making proposals and suggestions can often be developed more effectively in informal exchanges of views than through the transmission of official documents although, as shown by the brief published in 1984, it is mainly through texts adopted and transmitted to the Council that the Assembly has acted, while informal exchanges of views have often been very disappointing. But one may wonder whether they would have been less disappointing if there had been closer institutional links between the Council and the Assembly or whether, on the contrary, such links would not have led to the Assembly's ability to make proposals and suggestions being restricted by allowing the governments to take steps to ensure that parliamentarians did not adopt any proposals which displeased them.

82. In this connection, the example of the Council of Europe provides ambiguous pointers, on the one hand because most of the matters handled in that forum relate to areas which governments find less sensitive than those covered by the modified Brussels Treaty and, on the other hand, because the more or less discreet nature of government statements prevents an analysis of their nature and effects and, finally, because the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has no supervisory duties but has a consultative rôle which does not require the same strict separation of powers.

83. The idea that WEU should one day draw closer to the European Community and that it would therefore be in its interest to bring the statute of its Assembly more into line with that of the European Parliament is not likely to encourage a tightening of links between the Council and the Assembly since the European Parliament for its part is totally independent of both the Council and the Commission. On the other hand, all the attempts it has made so far to handle matters relating to Western European security have remained without response from the governments.

84. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to recall that an assembly without legislative or budgetary powers can act only by arousing the interest of the press and public opinion and an essential condition for ensuring such interest is to be independent of the executive.

85. In these conditions, your Rapporteur feels that the reactivation of WEU as it is taking shape allows the Council and the Assembly to draw closer together in certain useful areas but it is not such as to call in question either the modified Brussels Treaty or the independence of the Assembly stemming from it.

86. (a) A useful step would obviously be to bring the Council and the Assembly geographi-

cally closer together as this would allow savings to be made in the budget and facilitate exchanges of information between the two WEU bodies. However, this should not be to the detriment of the Assembly which needs suitable premises in a city where the press, and particularly those interested in defence questions, is adequately represented, where it is easy to obtain information about matters it handles and where there is adequate hotel accommodation.

87. (b) The new direction to be taken by the three agencies set up on 1st January will lead them to combine and add considerably to their documentation on matters of direct interest to the Assembly. The latter should ensure that its members and secretariat are authorised to have access to this information insofar as its classification allows. The fact that the agencies' documentation is to be combined in a common service should facilitate the establishment of an agreement between the Assembly and the Council allowing such access in accordance with the Rome declaration which provides for "the possibility that the Assembly might make use of contributions from the technical institutions of WEU". The declaration even specifies that the work of the agencies on arms control, disarmament and security and defence problems "could form a useful point of reference for the work" of the Assembly.

88. A number of statements by the Secretary-General have explained the Council's views about possible co-operation between the WEU technical organs and the Assembly in application of the general obligation laid down in the Rome declaration. Inter alia, he has stated that any request for the co-operation of an agency in preparing an Assembly report requires a specific decision by the Council and, furthermore, any expenditure incurred by the agencies on behalf of the Assembly must be met from the Assembly budget. While the Assembly is therefore allowed privileged use of the agencies, the Council has placed strict limits on this use and ensured that there will be no confusion of authority between it and the Assembly in regard to these bodies.

89. (c) While it is true that the change in the Secretary-General's responsibilities towards the Assembly proposed in Order 63 must in no case call in question the Assembly's independence of the executive, conversely the initiative taken by the Secretary-General, obviously with the authorisation of the Council, in addressing the Assembly at the December session on behalf of the Council to which he is responsible is obviously a major new development: it is a matter of organising relations between the two WEU bodies on a clear basis in accordance with the vocation of both sides and making the Secretary-General a privileged instrument of the Council's

participation in this dialogue is a very positive factor.

90. (d) Greater independence for the Assembly in the management of its operating budget within limits necessarily laid down in agreement with the Council would greatly facilitate relations between the Council and the Assembly by cutting out a number of minor details. In this connection, the idea of "one single budget" referred to in Order 63 is particularly unclear since the Assembly is at the same time requesting greater budgetary independence. The Council has to reply to Recommendation 429 before the next session. This recommendation set out the Assembly's request for budgetary independence. The answer should throw light on the possibility of the Assembly negotiating new procedure with the Council for adopting Assembly budgets. Under present procedure, which gives the Assembly the right only to express an opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs, the only possibility of drawing up a single budget would be for the Assembly to relinquish its right to adopt its own budget after a last reading, which would run counter to the claim for greater budgetary independence which has always been the Assembly's position.

91. Such are the possibilities which your Rapporteur considers desirable for tightening links between the Assembly and the other WEU organs within the context of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and the reactivation of WEU. Any attempt to tighten them further would mean revising the treaty, which the governments wished to avoid when they adopted the Rome declaration (the procedure used to abolish arms controls is proof of this). A revision may be necessary when there is a possibility of merging WEU and Community institutions. This is not so at present. Conversely, it might still call in question most of what was gained in 1954, i.e. the basing of European defence on a defensive alliance with particularly binding provisions.

V. Conclusions

92. At its meeting on 17th March 1986, the General Affairs Committee was divided between those who considered that in the immediate future WEU should not be enlarged as this might lead to a weakening of the political will of the governments to follow up the Rome declaration and those who thought any European countries so wishing should be admitted if they were members of the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance, in certain cases, or of one of them, in others. There are indications that the seven governments are experiencing the same difficulties. Your Rapporteur is not at all convinced that this is a true alternative. While Portugal's application for membership in 1984

seems to have been almost unconditional, Spain has indicated that its interest in WEU is linked with the development of the organisation's activities and the members of the General Affairs Committee who visited Norway in February 1986 heard similar remarks, apart from the fact that the Norwegian Government, which might be interested in WEU later, is not considering joining in the near future.

93. Furthermore, nothing in the information the Assembly has received from the Council implies that the Seven have a political will which might be jeopardised by the accession of the countries which are now candidates. It is difficult to see how the presence of Spain or Portugal might weaken cohesion of which there is very little sign. Quite the contrary, it may be hoped that the arrival of new members would force the governments to be rather more specific than before about what they intend to do with WEU, and above all in WEU.

94. It is certain that since October 1984 successive Chairmen-in-Office and the Secretary-General have done what they could to meet the Assembly's wishes by increasing contacts and providing it with any information possible. They have certainly done much to give the Assembly confidence in their good intentions. Yet a start should at least be made on these intentions and this does not seem to be the case at all judging by the Council's communica-

tions to the Assembly. The Assembly merely wishes the Council to implement the Rome decisions. Eighteen months later, it cannot be claimed that any real start has been made and the improvement in relations between the Council and the Assembly is therefore little more than a matter of appearances and an exchange of courtesies. Members of the General Affairs Committee who attended the meeting with the Council in Bonn in April 1985 felt there was a complete absence of dialogue because the Council, having practically nothing to say about its activities, could not dialogue with the Assembly. The failure to adopt the thirty-first annual report of the Council within the normal time makes one wonder why it is so difficult for the seven governments to reach agreement on a text which, after all, has to reveal only the past activities of the WEU Council, unless it is because these activities are a long way from corresponding to the intentions agreed to unanimously in Rome.

95. Your Rapporteur therefore considers it highly risky to rely sufficiently on the Council's intentions to do nothing that might jeopardise the Assembly's independence. As long as the Council fails to show stronger political determination, the rôle of the Assembly will continue to be mainly one of criticism and censure, which means that the Assembly itself and all its attendant organs must steadfastly maintain their independence.

*Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council*REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur*

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APPENDIX

Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly –
17th March 1986

1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 0 with 7 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. *Blaauw, Kittelmann* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Alberini* (Alternate: *Milani*) *Amadei* (Alternate: *Cifarelli*), Sir *Frederic Bennett* (Alternate: *Wilkinson*), MM. *van den Bergh*, *Bourges* (Alternate: *Matraja*), *Brown*, *De Decker*, *Dejardin* (Alternate: *Close*), *Edwards*, *Ertl*, *Galley* (Alternate: *Valleix*), *Gerstl*, *Giust*, *Konen*, *de Kwaadsteniet*, *Lemmrich* (Alternate: *Berger*), *Natiez*, *Pecchioli* (Alternate: *Antoni*), *Sarti*, *Scheer*, *Sir Dudley Smith*, MM. *Steverlynck* (Alternate: *Declercq*), *Stokes*, N... (vacant seat).

N.B.: *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation***on disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Deeply regretting that the Council has so far submitted to the Assembly only part of the report on its activities provided for in Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (ii) Considering that the absence of a joint position on certain matters should not prevent the Council from presenting its report;
- (iii) Welcoming the fact that the Council, both in the Rome declaration and in the tasks which it assigned to Agency I, maintains its decision to discuss and harmonise the views of the Seven on disarmament and the control of armaments;
- (iv) Concerned at the lack of progress achieved in the various international conferences now dealing with these matters in spite of the promising results of the summit meeting in November 1985;
- (v) Considering that it is more than ever essential for the Seven to maintain their own bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and to seek a common position on the control of armaments and disarmament;
- (vi) Noting with satisfaction on the one hand that, when inviting the Soviet Union to be represented by experts in the assessment of a new system for measuring and detecting underground nuclear tests, the United States declared itself prepared to promote ratification of the treaties limiting tests to 150 kt and on peaceful nuclear explosions if the new system proves satisfactory, and on the other hand that on 20th February 1986 the Soviet Union agreed to the principle of on-site inspections in the context of an agreement banning all nuclear tests;
- (vii) Noting reports that most nuclear tests down to the very smallest can be adequately monitored;
- (viii) Considering the new proposals concerning a convention to ban chemical weapons submitted by the Soviet Union on 22nd April 1986 to be a constructive basis for further negotiations;
- (ix) Reiterating the proposals contained in its Recommendation 425 adopted on 2nd December 1985 which are still fully valid,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that in future the whole of the annual report on its activities reaches the Assembly before the end of February of the following year;
2. Take into consideration both the strategic and political aspects when discussing the enlargement of WEU;
3. Urge the Seven, in their consultations on negotiations on strategic and space weapons, to insist on the treaties already signed being respected, in particular SALT I, SALT II and the ABM treaty;
4. Urge those of the seven governments participating in the MBFR negotiations to insist:
 - (a) on the right of automatic inspections; and
 - (b) on the obligation for all troops entering or leaving the reductions zone to pass at all times through recognised entry-exit points with permanent observers;
5. Urge the Soviet Union to accept the United States' invitation to observe a nuclear test carried out by it in order to draw up reliable data on verification, and ask the Seven to instruct their representatives at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to proceed without delay to the negotiation of a treaty banning all nuclear tests;
6. (a) Agree instructions calling for negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to be accelerated, taking full account of the most recent proposals of the United States and the Soviet Union;
 - (b) Pending a review of the entire situation next year, not approve as a NATO force goal the deployment of further chemical weapons in Europe.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. In accordance with the terms of reference given to the Rapporteur for his report, the committee noted that "as the internal WEU conventional arms control functions are terminated at the end of 1985, while three new agencies are created, including the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions, the report replying to the annual report of the Council can conveniently be combined with a follow-up report on disarmament which, in view of the impulse given by the Reagan-Gorbachev summit, will follow negotiations on the most topical or urgent disarmament problems, without however covering all the topics dealt with in the information report of 4th November (Document 1040) or the report of 22nd November (Document 1043)". But at the time of writing the Rapporteur has in his possession only Chapters III and IV of the annual report of the Council dealing with the last activities of the former international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments up to 31st December 1985. As far as its own activities are concerned, the Council apparently has not been able to reach agreement on the text of a simple account of them in 1985.

1.2. As for the Council's three new Agencies I, II and III, which replace the Agency and the international secretariat in Paris, a letter from the Secretary-General dated 17th March nevertheless throws light on their future composition and initial activities with a view to preparing the ministerial meeting of the Council in Venice on 29th and 30th April¹.

1.3. It is not surprising that the Council was unable to reach agreement on two specific points on which the positions of the seven governments still seem to differ. These are Portugal's application for membership of WEU made in October 1984 and the attempt to co-ordinate the reactions of WEU countries to the United States invitation to take part in research for strategic defence purposes.

1.4. In regard to the accession of new states to the Brussels Treaty, Article XI of the treaty provides that "the high contracting parties may, by agreement, invite any other state to accede to the present treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the state so invited". The Seven seem to have been unprepared for Portugal's application in 1984 which in a way

anticipated their invitation. In this connection, another letter from the WEU Secretary-General on 26th February 1986 informing the President of the Assembly of his visit to Spain on 28th and 29th January reports in regard to Spain that:

"On relations between Spain and Western European Union, those to whom I spoke confirmed Spain's interest in acceding to WEU. How do they view such accession? They are aware that accession to WEU is at the invitation of the WEU Council. They will therefore await this invitation in due course, i.e. after the major debate on the problem of security raised by the referendum on 12th March has come to a conclusion."

The Secretary-General concluded:

"Still in my personal capacity, I concluded that it was politically desirable, if a state wished to join WEU, for it:

- to be a member of the Communities and of political co-operation;
- to be a member of the Atlantic Alliance; and
- to have a real desire to promote a European security dimension."

While it is certain that the accession of Portugal and Spain would be very warmly welcomed from a purely political standpoint, certain WEU countries consider that at the same time it is essential not to isolate the European allied countries on the two flanks which are of vital strategic importance for European security. Should not a simultaneous invitation therefore also be made to all the allied European countries members of NATO to join WEU?

1.5. In regard to the American invitation to take part in research for strategic defence purposes, the bilateral negotiations held by the United States with each of the European allied countries are making slow progress. Memoranda of understanding have been signed by the United Kingdom and Germany but, exceptionally for this type of document, their content has not been published, which is arousing concern about the extent of the American technical know-how to which European industries taking part in the research would have access.

1.6. Apart from these two delicate matters, it is nevertheless surprising, and unacceptable for a parliamentary assembly, not to have at its spring session a simple account of the activities of

1. See text of letter from Secretary-General at Appendix.

the Council for the previous year. Where the Council's activities are concerned, the present report by the committee will therefore deal only with Chapters III and IV of the annual report. As for the future activities of the three new Council agencies, the letter from the Secretary-General reports that:

“ Agency I is to study Soviet tactics vis-à-vis the countries of Western Europe in regard to questions of the control of armaments and disarmament. In the future it will also have to take an interest in the control of conventional armaments and the essential problem of verification. ”

1.7. The second part of this report consists of an updating of the committee's previous report on disarmament and the control of armaments.

II. Agency for the Control of Armaments

(a) Conventional weapons

2.1. In its 1984 report², the committee examined the history of the rather incomplete application of controls of member countries' weapons provided for in the Brussels Treaty as modified in 1954. There is no need to return to controls of conventional weapons – and the gaps in their application – since the Council, in accordance with several Assembly recommendations, decided to abolish them completely as from 1st January 1986. In 1985, in accordance with the decision of principle taken by the Council in Rome in October 1984, supplemented by its resolution of 23rd January 1985, controls were applied to only about half the conventional weapons subject to control under the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols Nos. III and IV. By pursuing documentary controls – which represented most of the Agency's work in the past – in 1985 and carrying out thirty-four field control measures in the same year, the Agency for the Control of Armaments duly carried out its duties until the last day of its existence with a full staff. The table hereafter gives a breakdown of field control measures.

2.2. The Council's decision to control only half the number of conventional weapons formerly controlled in 1985 pending the complete abolition of such controls as from 1st January 1986 seems curious, not to say aberrant.

(b) ABC weapons

2.3. The situation is different in regard to atomic, biological and chemical weapons. The Rome declaration adopted by the Council on 27th October 1984 asserted that “ the commit-

ments and controls concerning ABC weapons would be maintained at the existing level and in accordance with the procedures agreed up to the present time ”. But, as in previous years, the annual report of the Council for 1985 states that “ since the situation has remained the same as in previous years, the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of atomic weapons ” and the list of biological weapons subject to control accepted by the Council in 1981 having been renewed by the latter for 1985 “ as in previous years ... the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of biological weapons ”.

2.4. There remain chemical weapons. As for atomic and biological weapons, there are two aspects to controls of chemical weapons provided for in the Brussels Treaty:

- (i) control of any production in countries not having renounced the right to produce chemical weapons;
- (ii) verification of undertakings made by the country which renounced the right to produce such weapons.

2.5. As in past years, in 1985 the Council first renewed the list of chemical weapons subject to control which it had previously approved. Then, according to the annual report, the questionnaire which the Agency sends the six countries which have not renounced the right to produce such chemical weapons asked:

“ ... whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage. As in the past, all these states replied in the negative.

In addition, the Agency asked all the member states to declare any chemical weapons that they might hold. Since all the member states replied in the negative, the Agency carried out no quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 1985. ”

2.6. In the case of the seventh country, which has renounced the right to produce chemical weapons on its territory, the annual report specifies that:

“ The competent authorities of the country concerned provided the Agency with a detailed, precise and complete reply to the request for information – aimed at facilitating the control of non-production of chemical weapons – which was sent to them by the Agency in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Council in 1959 and with the directive received from the Council in 1960. In addition, the procedure applied with these authorities since 1973 was again used. ”

2.7. In regard to field control measures, the Agency each year conducts agreed verification of

2. Thirty years of the modified Brussels Treaty – reply to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, Document 973, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker.

Numbers and types of inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments - 1961-85

	Quantitative control measures				Non-production control measures		Total control measures (all categories)	
	at depots	at units under national command	at production plants	Sub-total	at production plants	(of which non-production of chemical weapons)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	
1961	29	15	12	66	7	(2)	63	
2	26	20	11	57	7	(2)	65	
3	35	13	13	61	10	(4)	74	
4	39	19	13	71	9	(4)	80	
5	26	16	11	53	7	n.a.	60	
6	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	78	
7	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	70	
8	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	79	
9	*	*	*	*	*	(3)	77	
1970	<i>a</i> *	<i>b</i> *	<i>a</i> *	<i>b</i> *	<i>a</i> *	<i>b</i> *	<i>a</i> 82	<i>b</i> 72
1	*	*	*	*	*	*	82	72
2	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	66
3	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	66
4	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	71
5	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	72
6	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	-	71
7	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	-	70
8	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	-	68
9	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	-	70
1980	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	-	70
1	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	-	70
2	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	-	69
3	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	-	72
4	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	-	66
5	*	*	*	*	*	n.a.	-	34

Notes *a*, *b*: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thenceforth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in numbers of inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets of figures (old and new style - *a* and *b*) for the years 1970 and 1971.

n.a.: Information not available.

Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of the Council. With regard to the variable categories of controls (columns 1 to 6), figures for 1961-65 are also derived from the published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the committee. Those for 1970 to 1985 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to Recommendation 213, but permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit and are without significance.

* Confidential information available to the committee deleted from the published report.

non-production in plants. But reports of the Council prior to 1983 contained the following reservation:

“As the convention for the due process of law³ has not yet entered into force, the

3. Convention concerning measures to be taken by member states of Western European Union in order to enable the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its control effectively and making provision for due process of law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels Treaty, as modified by the protocols signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 but so far ratified by only six countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).

control measures carried out by the Agency at private concerns had, in 1982, as in previous years, to take the form of agreed control measures.

One consequence of this situation is that, in order to obtain the agreement of the firms concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' notice. Since this agreement has never been withheld, the 1982 programme of control measures at privately-owned plants was therefore drawn up with full confidence that it could be implemented as in previous years.”

2.8. In future, therefore, WEU's activities in regard to the internal control of armaments will be limited in fact to this procedure for controlling chemical weapons. The Agency for the Control of Armaments has not been disbanded altogether, but its staff has been reduced to one person, an expert in chemical weapons.

III. International negotiations on the control of armaments

(a) General

3.1. The committee welcomed the fact that the Council decided in the Rome declaration of October 1984:

“... to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe, in particular:

.....

– arms control and disarmament.”

While the committee can but regret that the Council was unable to transmit its annual report in time, since this would have thrown light on the way in which it fulfilled this undertaking in 1985, the task assigned to the new Agency I in preparing the ministerial meeting in Venice in April 1986 shows that the question is still on the Council's agenda.

3.2. The committee, for its part, studied in detail last year the progress of negotiations on the control of armaments in four international forums: the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space weapons, the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations in Vienna; the conference on disarmament in Europe in Stockholm and the Geneva disarmament conference⁴.

3.3. At the close of the summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva from 19th to 21st November 1985, the committee was able inter alia to welcome “the positive fresh start to bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet Union ... and the constructive references to most arms control issues in the agreed statement including the principle of a 50% reduction in nuclear arms, the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons, and the idea of an interim INF agreement, while noting the absence of specific agreements”. The very positive impetus given to the negotiations was enhanced shortly afterwards by the long statement on disarmament made by General Secretary

4. Disarmament, information report, Document 1040, 4th November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw; Disarmament, Document 1043, 22nd November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.

Gorbachev in Moscow on 15th January 1986 which contained six proposals, including a five-year programme leading in three stages to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world before the end of the century and a three-month prolongation of the moratorium on nuclear tests initially declared by the Soviet Union as from 6th August 1985 immediately after it had carried out a programme of nuclear test explosions.

3.4. However, in spite of these two auspicious events, it appears that meaningful progress in the various negotiations has been slight or nil. While Mr. Gorbachev's public statements seem promising, the actual proposals made by his delegates in the privacy of negotiations have apparently not come up to expectations. At the same time, certain western reactions to the Soviet proposals seem to have taken a step backwards compared with some earlier positions. Developments since the adoption of the committee's last report on 22nd November 1985 are analysed under the following headings: bilateral negotiations (INF, START, space weapons); MBFR; Geneva disarmament conference (complete suspension of nuclear tests, chemical weapons, space weapons); Stockholm conference.

(b) Bilateral negotiations

(i) Intermediate nuclear forces

3.5. In the bilateral negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear weapons, intermediate-range nuclear forces and space weapons, particular attention was paid to intermediate-range weapons because of the new proposals put forward by Mr. Gorbachev in his statement of 15th January and the terms of the West's answer. Details of the proposals made by each side's negotiators in Geneva are obviously not known. But since the Soviet Union in particular has developed the habit of negotiating more publicly than in the past, the public is most probably aware of the major elements of the proposals exchanged.

3.6. The rather spectacular language used by Mr. Gorbachev in his address was certainly intended to impress world public opinion:

“The Soviet Union is proposing a step-by-step and consistent process of ridding the earth of nuclear weapons, to be implemented and completed within the next fifteen years, before the end of this century.”

Nevertheless, for intermediate-range weapons, this address contains at least the outline of certain tangible proposals. The first stage would last from five to eight years:

“The first stage will include the adoption and implementation of the decision on the

complete elimination of intermediate-range missiles of the USSR and the United States in the European zone, both ballistic and cruise missiles, as a first step towards ridding the European continent of nuclear weapons.

At the same time the United States should undertake not to transfer its strategic and medium-range missiles to other countries, while Britain and France should pledge not to build up their respective nuclear arms. ”

During the second stage, starting in 1990 and spread over a period of five to seven years:

... the other nuclear powers will begin to engage in nuclear disarmament. To begin with, they would pledge to freeze all their nuclear arms and not to have them in the territories of other countries.

In this period the USSR and the United States will go on with the reductions agreed upon during the first stage and also carry out further measures designed to eliminate their medium-range nuclear weapons and freeze their tactical nuclear systems. ”

Further details were given on 12th February during an interview granted to West German television by General Nikolai Chervov, Soviet spokesman on disarmament. He defined the “European zone” as being the area extending as far as longitude 80° east, i.e. a line some 1,300 km to the east of the Urals, beyond which SS-20 missiles are out of range of Europe. SS-20 missiles west of that line would be destroyed:

“ We do not propose to move these SS-20 missiles somewhere else. They will be destroyed under painstaking and reliable national and international control, including inspections on site and on the spot. ”

3.7. The detailed Soviet proposals tabled at the Geneva negotiations on 16th January were completed by letters to the British and French Governments, not represented at the negotiations.

3.8. There are two new and positive elements in these Soviet proposals. British and French nuclear forces would no longer be taken into account in the negotiations but merely frozen at their present level. Secondly, the Soviet Union no longer seeks a link with space weapons, a ban on which was previously to have formed part of any agreement on other weapons systems. This point was confirmed publicly by Mr. Gorbachev in an interview which he granted to United States Senator Edward Kennedy in Moscow on 6th February when Mr. Gorbachev said that his proposal to withdraw SS-20s from Europe if the Americans did the same with their Pershing IIs depended solely on the United Kingdom and France refraining from increasing their corre-

sponding nuclear weapons and the United States not supplying such weapons to other countries.

3.9. While the United States was holding consultations with its allies, particularly during Mr. Paul Nitze's visit to Europe in February, the press on 8th February reported an American counter-proposal approved by Mr. Reagan subject to consultations with the allies. It is believed this plan accepted the elimination of all intermediate-range American and Soviet missiles stationed in Europe but also insisted on a 50% reduction in Soviet SS-20 missiles in Asia. However, no ceiling was said to be placed on British or French forces, nor were there to be limitations on the supply of American missiles to the allies.

3.10. This time it was the European allies that had reservations about the first American proposals, considering that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe would leave western forces at the mercy of the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces, particularly in Central Europe. The American answer finally communicated to the Soviet Union on 23rd February returned rather to the “global zero-zero” position already defined in 1981. The United States therefore proposed as a target the elimination of SS-20 and cruise missiles in both Europe and Asia, but as a first stage the reduction to 140 of the SS-20 launching ramps in Europe, with a proportional reduction in Asia; only in the second and third stages would the United States agree to a reduction of its own missiles parallel with Soviet reductions; short-range missiles were also to be taken into account. Proposals relating to British and French forces were rejected since the Geneva negotiations are purely bilateral. French and British answers to Mr. Gorbachev also rejected his proposal, France recalling its well-known position that it is in favour of all reductions in nuclear weapons but the arsenals of the super-powers must be reduced significantly before reductions in the relatively small French forces can be considered; in any event, priority was to be given to reducing conventional weapons.

3.11. In previous reports, the committee recalled that the existence of British and French forces had in fact been taken into account already in the SALT I and SALT II bilateral agreements. In the first case, the Soviet unilateral declaration accompanying the agreement stated that the Soviet Union could increase the number of its strategic missile launching submarines in the event of the United States allies doing likewise. In the case of SALT II, it has been known for a long time that the concession which allowed the Soviet Union to retain 308 heavy ICBMs (SS-9s and SS-18s) was made in compensation for British and French nuclear forces and the deployment of American nuclear systems in Europe.

3.12. While the committee has always rejected any proposal to reduce British and French nuclear forces at a time when the superpowers have thousands of nuclear warheads, it has nevertheless drawn attention to the problems which would arise for the negotiations on the control of armaments if European forces were equipped with multiple-warhead missiles. The Trident missile, intended to come into service with the British force in the nineties, is designed to carry up to eight warheads. The possibility of a British force eight times its present size obviously raises a problem for the Soviet Union in the current negotiations.

(ii) *Strategic nuclear weapons*

3.13. Referring to strategic weapons in his major statement on the elimination of nuclear weapons before the end of the century, Mr. Gorbachev said:

“ Stage one. Within the next five to eight years the USSR and the United States will reduce by one half the nuclear arms that can reach each other’s territory. On the remaining delivery vehicles of this kind each side will retain no more than 6,000 warheads.

It stands to reason that such a reduction is possible only if the USSR and the United States mutually renounce the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons.”

In stage two, as from 1990 and for a period of five to seven years, the United States and the Soviet Union will have completed the 50% reduction in their strategic weapons; at the same stage, the prohibition of space strike weapons would have to become multilateral, with the participation of major industrial powers. There would be a ban on the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, with a destructive power close to that of nuclear arms for other weapons of mass destruction. Finally, in stage three as from 1995 the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons will be completed. Mr. Gorbachev then made a few comments about verification:

“ We have in mind that special procedures will be worked out for the destruction of nuclear weapons as well as the dismantling, re-equipment or destruction of delivery vehicles. In the process, agreement will be reached on the numbers of weapons to be destroyed at each stage, the sites of their destruction and so on.

Verification with regard to the weapons that are destroyed or limited would be carried out both by national technical means

and through on-site inspections. The USSR is ready to reach agreement on any other additional verification measures.”

3.14. In his answer communicated to the Soviet Union on 23rd February, President Reagan reconfirmed the American proposal to reduce strategic nuclear weapons by half. In an address on 24th February on the eve of the opening of the twenty-seventh congress of the Soviet Communist Party, President Reagan expressed reservations about the rather publicity-seeking aspects of Mr. Gorbachev’s proposals:

“ On the other hand, many of the specific details proposed in the subsequent phases of the Soviet ‘plan’ are clearly not appropriate for consideration at this time. In our view, the total elimination of nuclear weapons will require, at the same time, the correction of the conventional and other force imbalances, full compliance with existing and future treaty obligations, peaceful resolution of regional conflicts... Unfortunately, the details of the Soviet ‘plan’ do not address these equally vital requirements.”

3.15. As the United States has still not accepted the principle of a link with the ban on space weapons, it seems unlikely that it will be possible to make much progress with strategic weapons in the immediate future.

3.16. Towards 20th May, the United States will have to face the problem of respecting the SALT II treaty when the strategic submarine Nevada undergoes sea-trials with a load of 24 missiles. To respect the treaty limits, the United States will then have to dismantle two old Poseidon submarines (with 16 launchers each) or reduce the number of its Minuteman ICBMs. On 14th April, 52 of the 100 senators wrote to President Reagan asking him to take the necessary steps to respect the treaty. The committee for its part stresses the importance of respecting all existing treaties relating to the control of armaments.

3.17. In the week of 21st April Mr. Paul Nitze, the President’s Special Adviser on Arms Control, was touring European capitals, reportedly with the message that President Reagan had tentatively decided to dismantle the two Poseidon submarines in question, but was simultaneously considering “ proportionate responses ” to certain actions of the Soviet Union which the United States had claimed to be violations of the SALT and ABM treaties. As the committee has previously pointed out the only such violation specifically endorsed by the NATO countries was the introduction of SS-X24 and SS-25 missiles by the Soviet Union⁵. These United States’

5. See Document 1040, Disarmament, information report, 4th November 1985, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw – paragraphs 4.25. to 4.27.

responses might include the conversion of more than the agreed limit of 120 B-52 bombers to carry cruise missiles; acceleration of the Midgetman research and development programme (the introduction of this missile in addition to the already planned MX would be a similar violation of SALT II which allows only one "new" missile to each side). Other measures would include a request to Congress for an additional 50 MX missiles beyond those already planned⁶.

(iii) Space weapons

3.18. In his references to space weapons in his address on 15th January, Mr. Gorbachev maintained his total opposition: "We are against weapons in space." But for the first time he seemed to consider the possibility of space research not leading to the deployment of offensive weapons in space:

"Space must remain peaceful, strike weapons should not be deployed there. Neither should they be developed. And let there also be a most rigorous control, including opening the relevant laboratories for inspection."

3.19. If there has been a specific answer from the United States to this request to open laboratories engaged in space research for inspection, it has not been made public. In his 24th February address, President Reagan merely welcomed the Soviet Union's acceptance of the principle of verification:

"We intend to pursue in specific terms at the negotiating table General Secretary Gorbachev's public offer to resolve any necessary verification issues."

(c) Mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe

(i) The western initiative of 5th December 1985

3.20. On 5th December 1985, western participants in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna put forward new proposals which they said were intended to allow a first, albeit modest, agreement to be reached quickly. To this end, they accepted the general framework and main provisions of the Warsaw Pact proposal of 14th February 1985, but proposed making only half the initial reductions set out in that proposal. On 30th January 1986, the western proposals were supplemented by an outline text accompanied by a table of associated measures.

3.21. The western initiative provided for an initial cutback of 5,000 American and 11,500 Soviet troops in the reduction zone. It provided for a no-increase commitment relating to NATO, the

Warsaw Pact and American and Soviet troops stationed in that zone which was to come into force immediately after the reductions. The agreement and its various provisions were to be valid for a period of three years following the completion of the initial reductions. This period was to be used to pursue negotiations and prepare for further reductions.

3.22. Since the new proposals no longer insisted on prior agreement on levels of troops now present in the reduction zone (the data problem), they were intended, in the mind of the West, to allow speedy progress to be made. It was also believed that acceptance, during the period of the agreement, of the first stage of transitional force ceilings relating, on the one hand, to each alliance and, on the other hand, to the United States and the Soviet Union separately was also a favourable factor for advancing the negotiations.

3.23. Nevertheless, NATO maintained and to a certain extent strengthened the verification system hitherto envisaged.

3.24. The associated measures included:

- setting up permanent entry and exit points with observers through which all personnel of land and air forces of participating countries would leave or enter the reduction zone;
- notification and observation of withdrawals;
- notification of out-of-garrison activities;
- exchange of observers on the occasion of such activities;
- notification of ground force movements in the reduction zone;
- the right for each side to conduct thirty inspections each year to verify the no-increase undertaking;
- exchange of information up to battalion level;
- the free use of national technical means.

3.25. The only position adopted in the western proposal on what was to happen to the weapons of units withdrawn was to say that it was for each side to decide on the destination of the equipment concerned. However, the proposal increased from 18 to 30, as compared with previous proposals, the number of annual inspections required and had the provisions relating to activities outside garrisons apply even on the western part of Soviet territory outside the reduction zone.

6. The Guardian, 23rd April 1986.

(ii) Immediate Warsaw Pact reactions and its written answer of 20th February 1986

3.26. The first Warsaw Pact reactions were rather encouraging. At a press conference in Moscow on 17th December 1986, Mr. Mikhailov, Soviet Ambassador to the MBFR talks, said that the western proposals were in line with the spirit of Geneva but were still very divergent. He criticised however the associated measures, which he considered to be deliberately excessive, and also the fact that the reduction figures proposed by NATO were not significant and the 5th December proposal did not include the equipment of troops withdrawn.

3.27. Even Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 15th January gave an encouraging impression; he said he was prepared for "reasonable verification" of troop reductions, including the establishment of permanent verification posts at the points of passage of troops withdrawn.

3.28. The Warsaw Pact counter-proposal of 20th February 1986 entitled "draft agreement on the initial reduction by the Soviet Union and the United States of ground forces and armaments and on the subsequent no-increase of forces and armaments of the sides and associated measures in Central Europe" could not therefore fail to be very disappointing to the western partners.

3.29. Although it accepts the principle of permanent verification posts at points where troops enter or leave the reduction zone, this proposal is negative in several respects:

- while the reductions proposed by NATO were not militarily significant, the Pact would nevertheless agree to similar figures, i.e. 6,500 American and 11,500 Soviet troops, which, for the West, did not correspond to the disparity between American and Soviet troops stationed in the reduction zone;
- the verification measures proposed were termed excessive and a kind of legalised spying. It was unacceptable to extend the area of verification to cover part of Soviet territory as NATO had requested for out-of-garrison activities.

3.30. Furthermore, the question of the destination of the weapons of troops withdrawn remained at the heart of the East-West controversy.

3.31. In greater detail, the seventeen articles in the document, which the Warsaw Pact describes as intended to guide the negotiations towards a favourable outcome, may be summarised as follows:

- in the course of one year, the USSR and the United States will withdraw behind

their national boundaries 11,500 and 6,500 men respectively from their ground forces stationed in Central Europe, together with their *armaments* and combat equipment;

- information on the military units reduced will be exchanged prior to the beginning of the withdrawals;
- the eleven direct participants in the negotiations will undertake not to increase the levels of their ground and air forces in the reduction zone for a period of three years after the completion of the Soviet-American reductions;
- as from the same date, updated figures on forces remaining in the reduction zone will be exchanged each year;
- when the agreement comes into force, three or four observation posts will be established on each side;
- units and subunits of the ground forces of all signatories of the agreement must enter or leave the reduction zone via these posts;
- observation posts will be manned by representatives of both sides;
- military activities (movements, exercises, call-up of reservists) involving more than 20,000 men must be notified beforehand;
- in addition to the obligation not to interfere with implementation of national technical means, requests for on-site verification may be made if well-founded. As a rule, such requests should be granted. A refusal must be accompanied by a sufficiently convincing explanation;
- a consultative commission will be established to settle disputes which may arise when the agreement is implemented.

Finally, on the basis of these proposals, the East offered to join in the drafting of a joint agreement, in the course of which the utmost should be done to overcome remaining difficulties.

(iii) Present situation

3.32. Since the Warsaw Pact proposals of 14th February 1985 and the western answer of 5th December 1985, the negotiations seem to have made little progress in spite of the concessions made by both sides.

3.33. The East has mainly kept to its earlier proposals, i.e. withdrawal in combat or combat support units, establishment of permanent entry and

exit points, immediate freeze of troop levels in the reduction zone on a collective basis and without national sub-ceilings for a period of three years after the completion of initial withdrawals under the control of observers from both sides. The NATO countries for their part have agreed to abandon their data requirements and, as a whole, have linked their proposals with the plan proposed by the Warsaw Pact. There are still major points of disagreement, however, and these explain the disappointment felt on both sides.

3.34. Differences between East and West have crystallised around verification. While the Pact has now agreed to the permanent presence of observers at entry and exit posts, during and after the reductions, it has not accepted western requirements concerning larger-scale inspections in the reduction zone, which, for the Pact, can take place only after a well-founded and justified request and with the prior consent of the country concerned. The NATO partners are calling for thirty inspections each year for both sides, at short prior notice.

3.35. The other point at issue is the destination of equipment of units withdrawn. The West wishes to have a free hand in stockpiling such equipment as the country concerned sees fit, but the East on the contrary insists on it being destroyed or returned to the country of origin. The geographical dissymmetry between the parties to the negotiations prevents NATO from accepting this position.

3.36. Still to be settled is the fate of rotations of individuals relieving troops in the reduction zone which the Soviet Union refuses to have pass through the official entry and exit points. As for the strengths to be notified before their withdrawal, the West is calling for them to be reported down to battalion level whereas the East does not wish to go lower than divisional level. Finally, the delicate problem of notification of exercises and possible inspections in the two western districts of the Soviet Union, measures which the West considers essential for the security of the countries on the alliance's flanks, has not been solved.

(iv) The future

3.37. The foregoing explains why the thirty-eighth session of the MBFR talks came to an end without any progress having been made and in an atmosphere of disappointment which was particularly bitter since both sides had cherished hopes of success.

3.38. The Warsaw Pact criticises the West for the intransigence of the "legalised spying" verification system.

3.39. NATO for its part considers that the eastern countries' proposal of 20th February 1986 merely reiterates the Warsaw Pact's requests of February 1985, fails to take seriously the question of verification and tries to deny the reality and importance of geography.

3.40. Nevertheless, by proposing far smaller reductions than before (half), at the same time increasing from eighteen to thirty the number of annual inspections called for, NATO has gone against the conventional Soviet position that any verification must be commensurate with the magnitude of the reductions involved. At the close of this very disappointing session, both parties nevertheless plan to return to the negotiating table in May with new positions which might finally lead to an agreement.

3.41. Some confusion arises over Mr. Gorbachev's speech in East Berlin on 18th April where he said:

"The USSR proposes substantial reduction of all components of land forces and tactical aircraft based in Europe, including the relevant parts of American and Canadian forces deployed there.

The military units should be dissolved and their armaments either destroyed or put into storage on their national territories. The scope of the reductions must obviously cover the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals."⁷

It is not clear whether the Soviet Union is about to make new compromise proposals in Vienna, or is proposing a completely new initiative relating to the much wider area "from the Atlantic to the Urals" which at present is the basis of the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

3.42. In its previous report, the committee pointed out with regard to the unresolved problem of equipment that:

"NATO could however accept the withdrawal, to a depot in some rear area in Europe to be designated, of the equipment of American units to be withdrawn from the zone."

(d) Total nuclear test ban

3.43. At the fortieth session of the United Nations Assembly which ended in December 1985, very particular attention was once again paid to a ban on all nuclear tests. Three separate resolutions⁸ were devoted to the matter, the

7. International Herald Tribune, 22nd April 1986.

8. 40/80A; 40/81; 40/88.

first of which urged the three depositary powers of the partial test ban treaty to promote, at the Geneva disarmament conference, the creation of a special committee to negotiate a treaty on a complete halt to nuclear test explosions.

3.44. In his speech on 15th January, Mr. Gorbachev prolonged by three months, until 31st March 1986, the unilateral moratorium declared by the Soviet Union in August 1985. The United States maintained the position held by the Reagan administration for the past two years according to which nuclear tests had become necessary to guarantee the effectiveness of nuclear weapons in storage. For the first time since the Soviet moratorium was declared, the United States carried out a test on 22nd March. At Easter Mr. Gorbachev proposed an emergency meeting in a European city to discuss a moratorium on nuclear tests but the United States having conducted a second test on 10th April, Marshal Akhromeyev, Chief-of-Staff of the Soviet armed forces, stated at a press conference in Moscow on 14th April that the Soviet moratorium had been terminated as from 11th April and that Soviet tests would be resumed.

3.45. In the meantime, a United States spokesman had announced on 14th March that Mr. Reagan had proposed in a direct communication to Mr. Gorbachev that an assessment be made of a new seismic technique which he called Cortex designed to measure the yield of nuclear tests. For this purpose, the Soviet Union was invited to send scientists to the American test site in Nevada in the third week of April to test this new system when a nuclear explosion was planned. President Reagan thus renewed earlier American proposals and asked the Soviet Union to hold negotiations on improving verification measures provided for in the treaties on nuclear tests for peaceful purposes and on nuclear tests below a threshold of 150 kilotonnes signed by both countries but not ratified by the United States.

3.46. At the Geneva disarmament conference it has still not been possible to set up a special committee to negotiate a treaty on banning nuclear tests as called for in United Nations General Assembly resolutions and proposed in Geneva by the non-aligned and Warsaw Pact countries. As in previous years, the western powers have maintained their opposition to terms of reference which would allow a treaty to be negotiated, considering that the terms of reference of a special committee should be limited to examining problems.

3.47. In a letter addressed to the conference on 20th February, General Secretary Gorbachev said:

“The Soviet Union, for its part, has been doing all it can to help achieve this goal. In particular, it is agreeable to the

strictest control over a ban on nuclear-weapon tests, including on-site inspections and the use of all the latest developments in seismology.”

The Soviet Union had also announced that it would agree to the establishment of regional seismological networks on its territory to verify that a treaty banning nuclear tests was respected.

3.48. Finally, at the disarmament conference the ad hoc group of experts on seismic measuring systems submitted a report on its technical tests in 1984 in the framework of international co-operation for recording and analysing seismic phenomena with a view to verifying an agreement banning nuclear tests.

3.49. The western countries' position, which is well known, has not changed. The United States has asserted several times that it intended to pursue a nuclear test programme intended above all to ensure the reliability of American nuclear weapons. It is known that the present test programme also covers research on a possible X-ray laser for strategic defence systems and on new nuclear warheads for the Midgetman missile. The press has now quoted scientists at the United States Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratories as saying that new generations of nuclear weapons under development, understood to be part of the SDI programme, would require at least 100 test explosions per weapon compared with six for earlier weapons⁹. The United Kingdom for its part continues to assert that it is prepared to accede to a treaty banning tests if the verification problem is solved. On this latter point, the United Kingdom and the United States seem to be the only countries to consider that existing seismic networks, particularly if supplemented by regional systems on the territory of nuclear weapon countries, are not enough to verify such a treaty. France's policy in the matter is apparently not to become involved in the public debate.

3.50. The Prime Minister of China, Mr. Zhao, in his address of 20th March marking international peace year, announced that China was henceforth renouncing tests in the atmosphere; it had not conducted any since 1980. At the Geneva disarmament conference, China has declared that it is prepared to play an active part in negotiations to draft a total test ban treaty.

3.51. The other European allied countries at the moment are supporting United States opposition to the creation of a special committee in Geneva to draft a test ban treaty. However, in their public statements and in their affirmative votes on United Nations resolutions on the suspension of nuclear tests, they have shown they were in favour of a test ban treaty. For instance, the

9. The Times, 19th April 1986.

communiqué issued by the Federal German Ministry for Foreign Affairs on 2nd April at the close of Mr. Papandreou's visit to Bonn indicated that there was a chance of starting negotiations intended first to limit and then to stop nuclear tests.

3.52. The committee referred in its previous report to scientific evidence that underground nuclear explosions could be adequately monitored down to the smallest yields. As in its last report, the committee asks that priority be given to negotiating a complete nuclear test ban treaty and that the Soviet Union be urged most strongly to accept the United States' invitation to follow the testing of the new verification system at the United States test site.

(e) Chemical weapons

3.53. The emphasis on the need for an agreement banning chemical weapons in the summit communiqué of 21st November 1985 led to the belief that progress was possible in the negotiations being held on this subject at the Geneva disarmament conference. The communiqué also announced the start of a bilateral dialogue on measures to be taken to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons as follows:

“ We are prepared for a timely declaration of the location of enterprises producing chemical weapons and for the cessation of their production, and are ready to start developing procedures for destroying the relevant industrial base and to proceed, soon after the convention enters into force, to eliminating the stockpiles of chemical weapons. All these measures would be carried out under strict control including international on-site inspections. ”

Referring to certain interim measures, it said:

“ For example, agreement could be achieved on a multilateral basis not to transfer chemical weapons to anyone and not to deploy them in the territories of other states. ”

3.54. At the Geneva disarmament conference on 11th February, the United States representative, Mr. Lowitz, while his country gave priority to a comprehensive treaty eliminating chemical weapons, said:

“ However, the United States is opposed to a formal treaty – as some have suggested – such as one that would mirror the nuclear non-proliferation treaty for nuclear weapons. ”

At the session of the conference this spring, the United States also made it clear that in the

American draft treaty banning chemical weapons tabled in 1984 the inspections called for would apply to all establishments capable of manufacturing chemical products, and not solely to state enterprises, as the wording of the draft had initially indicated.

3.55. The special ad hoc committee, under United Kingdom chairmanship this year, and its three subgroups are continuing their work but little progress had been made until 22nd April when the representative of the Soviet Union introduced some significant new proposals which in particular moved further towards the western position on some aspects of destruction of chemical weapon facilities and verification:

- destruction of chemical weapon stocks would begin within six months and be completed within 10 years of entry into force of a convention;
- within 30 days of entry into force the number, capability and precise location of all plants capable of producing chemical weapons would be declared;
- destruction or dismantling of such production facilities would begin within one year of entry into force;
- all production activities would cease immediately on entry into force and measures to ensure their close-down, including disconnection from any non-military chemical production facilities the operation of which would be authorised under a convention, would be completed within three months;
- fairly detailed provisions were described for destruction of production equipment, or the dismantling of equipment which could be used for authorised civilian chemical production;
- verification measures were provided for: “ including systematic on-site inspections, such as the verification of the accuracy of declarations, the sealing by inspectors of the facility to be closed, the periodic checking of preservation of seals up to the moment the seals are removed and the destruction or the dismantling of the facility is initiated... the final international verification would be carried out upon the full termination of the process of the elimination or the dismantling of the entire facility ”.

3.56. The detailed nature of the Soviet proposals, which are obviously based on the design of existing chemical production plants where no doubt legitimate civilian chemical processes are also carried out, makes these proposals a convincing attempt at progress. The proposals do not however go into detail about subsequent ver-

ification measures after destruction of existing and declared chemical weapon production plants has been completed, merely asserting that "the convention should envisage measures ensuring its strict observance... first of all the prevention of the use of the commercial chemical industry for the development and production of chemical weapons". Nevertheless they seem to offer a solid basis for active negotiation of a treaty leading to a complete and verified ban on chemical weapons.

3.57. Once again there is reason to deplore the use of chemical weapons by Iraq against Iran in February 1986. For the first time, the United Nations group of experts investigating the incident mentioned Iraq by name: "The agent used has mainly been mustard gas although on some occasions nerve gas was also employed. ...On many occasions, Iraqi forces have used chemical weapons against Iranian forces."

3.58. In the meantime, on 18th February the NATO Supreme Commander, General Rogers, made an important statement to the French Institute for International Relations in Paris about stocks of chemical weapons. For the first time since 1969, he was expecting NATO to approve American plans concerning the production of chemical weapons. He outlined a plan providing for the transfer of chemical weapons to Europe in the event of crisis and after consultation with the European allies. He considered the stockpiling of chemical weapons should be approved as a force goal by the Defence Planning Committee at ministerial level. When voting funds in 1985 for the production of chemical weapons for the first time since 1969, the United States Congress had made production subject to the prior acceptance by the European allies of plans providing for the stockpiling of chemical weapons in Europe.

3.59. The committee repeats the conclusions it reached in its last report, considering that chemical weapons now stockpiled in Germany were sufficiently effective to deter an enemy from using such weapons. It consequently recommends that the United States be urged not to resume the production of chemical weapons at the present time and to make all necessary efforts to ensure real progress in 1986 in the negotiation of a treaty banning such weapons. While underlining the importance of realistic verification measures, the committee asks that the situation be re-examined at the end of 1986. In the meantime, it considers there is no need to approve the deployment of further chemical weapons in Europe as a NATO force goal.

(f) Space weapons

3.60. At the Geneva disarmament conference, the ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space has only just been

reconstituted. The Soviet Union proposed to the conference that an international agreement be prepared guaranteeing the immunity of artificial earth satellites, banning the creation, testing and deployment of new anti-satellite systems and making it compulsory to destroy old ones. It proposed that partial measures be taken urgently to enhance confidence between states in space activities pending a solution to the problem of preventing an arms race in space with all that implies.

(g) The conference on disarmament in Europe

3.61. The spring session of the conference on disarmament in Europe being held in Stockholm was adjourned on 14th March. The heads of the United States and Soviet Delegations stressed that it had been possible to start work on drafting the final document, but that the agreement so far concerned only matters of secondary importance.

3.62. While there is no progress to note since the committee's last report, participants in the conference remain relatively optimistic about the possibility of reaching an agreement on a realistic document within the seventeen negotiating weeks remaining to the conference before the opening of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe in Vienna on 4th November 1986.

IV. The Standing Armaments Committee

4.1. In the chapter of the annual report on the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee in 1985, it is stated that the committee:

"having noted the ministerial decisions taken in regard to it and in regard to the establishment of the 'agencies for security questions', addressed the problem of co-operation in the field of armaments and research, and that of its own future."

Delegates' opinions appear to have been divided as to the expediency of convening the committee in the future. The new Agency III which is replacing the former international secretariat of the SAC is now working directly for the Council and, according to the letter of the Secretary-General of 17th March 1986:

"will study certain aspects of competitiveness in the armaments industry in Europe and the implications of the evolution of the world arms market, together with the problems of technological transfers between European allies."

V. Conclusions

5.1. The committee's conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation, the substantive paragraphs of which relate to this explanatory memorandum as follows:

<i>Recommendation</i>	<i>Explanatory memorandum</i>
Paragraphs 1	Paragraphs 1.1 to 1.6
2	1.4
3	3.13 to 3.19
4	3.20 to 3.42
5	3.43 to 3.52
6 (a) and (b)	3.53 to 3.59

APPENDIX

*Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Assembly**17th March 1986**(Extract)*

.....

The Council has instructed me to give you the following information concerning the staff and activities of the new agencies responsible for security questions.

Since 1st January, each of these agencies has a director: General E. Rambaldi directs the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions (Agency I) and the restructured ACA. The former head of the international secretariat of the SAC, Mr. E. Hintermann, is responsible for the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments (Agency III). Appointed by the ministers at their meeting in Rome on 14th November 1985, a senior United Kingdom official, Mr. I. Dawson, has taken charge of the agency for the study of security and defence problems (Agency II).

A full table of establishment will be sent to you as soon as all the posts have been filled.

As indicated in the Bonn communiqué, the rôle of these new agencies is to carry out the studies requested by the Council.

Certain studies have already been planned, all or part of which will be the subject of interim reports which might be presented to the ministers at their meeting in Venice.

Agency I is to study Soviet tactics vis-à-vis the countries of Western Europe in regard to questions of the control of armaments and disarmament. In the future it will also have to take an interest in the control of conventional armaments and the essential problem of verification.

In connection and close co-ordination with the tasks of Agency I, Agency II will have to study the assessment of the threat, and the contribution of the WEU countries to the response to this threat, and the question of management resources.

Agency III will study certain aspects of competitiveness in the armaments industry in Europe and the implications of the evolution of the world arms market, together with the problems of technological transfers between European allies.

All these studies constitute internal working papers for the Council intended to contribute to its process of reflection on the subjects dealt with.

In order to guarantee the availability of the information necessary for them, the agencies shall establish links with the appropriate international bodies and with national administrations. In this respect it must be noted that the latter must be assured that the classified information they transmit to the ministerial organs of WEU is handled in accordance with their security regulations and limited to the exclusive use of these organs.

The suggestion to place at the disposal of the ministerial organs a computerised documentation centre will have to be assessed in the light of budgetary priorities and will have to be examined subsequently by the Council.

(signed) A. CAHEN

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3¹

tabled by Mr. Millan and others

1. In paragraph 6(b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ Pending a review of the entire situation next year, ”.
2. After paragraph 6(b) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
“ Urge the United States not to resume the production of chemical weapons at the present time. ”
3. After paragraph 6(b) of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
“ Support regional measures such as the creation of zones free of chemical weapons and subject to effective verification procedures. ”

Signed: Millan, Gansel, Bérégovoy

1. See 7th sitting, 5th June 1986 (report referred back to committee).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

AMENDMENTS 4, 5 and 6¹

tabled by Mr. Antoni and others

4. After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Concerned at the negative effects of a further arms race stemming from the decision announced by President Reagan to denounce SALT I and not to respect the SALT II limits voluntarily accepted by the United States and the Soviet Union; ”

5. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“ 3. Invite the Seven to insist in the appropriate bodies on the United States and the Soviet Union respecting the limits imposed by SALT I, SALT II and the ABM treaty; ”

6. In paragraph 6(b) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ further ”.

Signed: Antoni, Vecchietti, Gianotti, Rubbi, Francese

1. See 7th sitting, 5th June 1986 (report referred back to committee).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

AMENDMENT 7¹

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

7. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “more than ever”.

Signed: Cavaliere

1. See 7th sitting, 5th June 1986 (report referred back to committee).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

AMENDMENTS 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 ¹

tabled by Mr. Milani

8. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
“ Noting with satisfaction that the Soviet Union has so far respected the unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and concerned that the United States and France have not yet welcomed the proposal for a concerted moratorium pending an international treaty permanently banning nuclear tests for military purposes;

Noting the readiness shown by the United States and the Soviet Union to allow independent monitoring of their respective territories and aware that modern monitoring technology allows this to be respected closely in the framework of international agreements; ”
9. After paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:
“ Disapproving the decision of the NATO Defence Planning Committee on the introduction of binary chemical weapons among its force goals; ”
10. Leave out paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:
“ Believing that the United States Government’s decision to consider SALT II obsolete is most serious since this relaunches the arms race; ”
11. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
“ Invite the United States and the other nuclear weapons countries to welcome the proposal for a concerted moratorium on military nuclear tests and at the same time call upon the Soviet Union and the United States to agree to independent supervision on their own territory and considering in this connection the agreement signed between the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the United States Natural Reserve Defence Council for the establishment of stations to monitor the effects of underground nuclear tests to be encouraging; ”
12. Leave out paragraph 6(b) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
“ Calling upon the governments of WEU countries, members of NATO, to adopt a position with a view to cancelling the decision to include the production of binary chemical weapons among NATO’s force goals. ”

Signed: Milani

1. See 7th sitting, 5th June 1986 (report referred back to committee).

Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council

AMENDMENT 13¹

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

13. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
“Ensure that in future the annual report on its activities, in two half-yearly parts, reaches the Assembly at least two months before the opening of its ordinary sessions;”

Signed: Cavaliere

1. See 7th sitting, 5th June 1986 (report referred back to committee).

European security and the Mediterranean

REPORT¹
*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*²
by Mr. Kittelmann, Rapporteur

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1. Adopted in committee by 16 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Pignion (Chairman); MM. Blaauw, Kittelmann (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alberini (Alternate: Milani), Amadei (Alternate: Cifarelli), Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. van den Bergh, Bourges (Alternate: Matraja), Brown (Alternate: Dr. Miller), De Decker (Alternate: Close), Dejardin, Edwards, Ertl, Galley (Alternate: Valleix), Gerstl, Giust, Konen, de Kwaadste-niet, Lemmrich (Alternate: Berger), Natiez, Pecchioli (Alternate: Antoni), Sarti, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Steverlynck, Stokes, N... (vacant seat).*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

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Introductory Note

In preparing this report, *the Rapporteur* had interviews as follows:

3rd March-6th March 1986 – Cyprus

3rd March

British Sovereign Base, Episkopi

Mr. David Reynolds, Chief Officer;
Brigadier Andrew Myrtle, Deputy Commander, British Forces;
Air Vice-Marshal K.W. Hayr, Commander, British Forces.

UNFICYP Headquarters, Nicosia

Major-General Günther G. Greindl, Commander, United Nations Force in Cyprus;
Major Roderick MacArthur, Military Public Information Officer.

4th March

H.E. Mr. W.J.A. Wilberforce, CMG, British High Commissioner;
Mr. George Iacovou, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
President Rauf Denktash;
Dr. V. Lyssarides, President of the House of Representatives.

5th March

Mr. Spyros Kyprianou, President of the Republic of Cyprus;
Mr. Elias Eliades, Minister of Defence;
Mr. George Anastadiades, Director-General of the Ministry of Defence;
Mr. James Holger, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations;
Mr. Gustave Feissel, Director of the Office of the Under-Secretaries-General;
Mr. Glafcos Clerides, Member of the House of Representatives.

6th March

H.E. Mr. Richard Boem, United States Ambassador;
Mr. Richard Hoover, United States Embassy;
Mr. Thomas Carolan, United States Embassy;
H.E. Dr. Thilo Rötger, German Ambassador.

21st March 1986 – Rome

Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Carmelo Liotta, Head Middle East and North Africa Desk, Ministry for Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Fernando Lay, WEU Affairs;
Mr. Vittorio Olcese, Secretary of State for Defence.

20th March 1986 – Naples

Information was gathered on behalf of the Rapporteur in interviews at Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe with:

Admiral S. Morean, United States Navy, CINCSOUTH;
Lt. General Thomas F. Healy, United States Army, Chief-of-Staff;
Mr. Donald A. Kruse, Special Assistant for International Affairs;
Brigadier General Carlo Parodi Dandini, Italian Army, Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Operations;

Brigadier General Dimitrios Avgouropoulos, Hellenic Army, Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Personnel and Administration;

Commodore Keith Estlin, Royal Navy, Assistant Chief-of-Staff, Communications and Information Systems;

Admiral André Deloinde, French Navy, Head of French Military Mission, and Staff Officers.

The committee as a whole met in Paris on 19th February 1986 when it discussed Mr. Kittelmann's draft outline report.

The committee met again in Venice on 29th April 1986 when it discussed and adopted the present report.

The Rapporteur expresses his thanks to all those persons who discussed the subject of the report with him or provided information for it.

The views expressed in the report, unless otherwise attributed, are those of the committee.

Draft Recommendation
on European security and the Mediterranean

The Assembly,

- (i) Convinced that the long-term political objective of the Soviet Union towards the Middle East region and the Mediterranean area has not changed;
- (ii) Believing however that the military threat from Warsaw Pact forces in the Mediterranean area has not increased since the committee's last report;
- (iii) Condemning the continued Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the perpetration of atrocities against the Afghan resistance forces and population;
- (iv) Concerned at the latest dangers arising from conflicts and crises particularly in the eastern and southern parts of the Mediterranean area which exert direct or indirect influence upon the interests and positions of allied countries;
- (v) Drawing particular attention to the political and military instability in the Middle East region caused by the unsolved Arab-Israeli dispute, Arab disunity, Libyan involvement in world terrorism and, last but not least, by Islamic belligerent fundamentalism in some countries of the region;
- (vi) Welcoming Spain's decision to remain a member of NATO;
- (vii) Believing that European security and security in the Mediterranean area depend also on appropriate diplomatic efforts to reach agreed and verifiable arms control measures,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Establish common adequate and convincing policies, which it should implement and publicise, when and where appropriate, and which should be defined and intended:

1. To demonstrate more publicly the collective responsibility of the western alliances for defence in the Mediterranean area:
 - (i) by supporting joint NATO forces and their exercises in the region and co-ordinating maritime surveillance under COMMARAIMED;
 - (ii) by recommending that peacetime actions of forces of NATO countries in the areas covered by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty should be oriented towards NATO policies;
 - (iii) by making all efforts to secure and maintain the operational freedom of forces of NATO countries in the Mediterranean area, in full accordance with international law and the principle of the freedom of the seas;
 - (iv) by emphasising the need for the continued presence of United States forces in the area thus helping to improve European defence capability in this particular part of the continent;
2. To stress the absolute need to maintain proper military stability in the region, particularly by providing military aid for the modernisation of the equipment of the Portuguese, Greek and Turkish armed forces;
3. To persuade Spain to co-operate to the fullest possible extent with ACE mobile force, the naval on-call force Mediterranean, Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean, and by contributing a mobile force for reinforcement of allied contingents in the Mediterranean, as well as by reporting defence data to NATO as customary with all other NATO members;
4. To pay proper attention and give due consideration to Turkey's key political and strategic position on the Middle East land bridge and to its important defence assignments in NATO's south-eastern flank;
5. To persuade Greece and Turkey to resume bilateral negotiations to solve their Aegean issues, inter alia with a view to permitting normal co-operation of Greek forces with NATO plans and to completing the NATO command structure in the area;
6. To persuade all relevant parties in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and especially in the disturbing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to find a final and lasting solution, thereby removing the inspiration and causes of terrorism, and reducing one peripheral threat to the region;

7. To continue to support the United Nations peace-keeping forces in Lebanon and Cyprus;
8. To encourage the two communities in Cyprus to resume direct contacts to discuss all issues which will assist in finding an agreed solution to the political problem through the good offices of the United Nations Secretary-General;
9. To recall Egypt's commitment to pursue the search for a peace settlement between the Arab world and Israel and, by political support, economic assistance and due consideration for its security problems, to encourage that country to continue relevant efforts in that direction;
10. To encourage appropriate measures to improve the economic and social situation of the peoples of the less-developed countries in order to create more stability in the region.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Kittelmann, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. The committee has regularly reported on the security situation in the Mediterranean, the three most recent reports to be devoted exclusively to the region being those by Mr. Bozzi in May 1981¹, Mr. Grant in May 1978², and Mr. Buck in May and June 1976³. Most recently, however, Sir Dudley Smith's report of May 1984⁴ paid particular attention to the western Mediterranean and the position of Spain within NATO, drawing in particular on information gathered during the committee's visit to that country in October 1983, and the Rapporteur's subsequent visit to Gibraltar.

1.2. On this occasion, therefore, the committee in the terms of reference asked the Rapporteur to deal with "the defence situation throughout the Mediterranean, in particular the eastern part". In this connection, the committee visited Greece and Turkey in October 1985 and the Rapporteur visited Cyprus and Rome in March this year.

1.3. Nevertheless, the successful outcome of the referendum in Spain on continued membership of NATO held on 12th March makes it appropriate to review the situation in that country also in the present report.

1.4. As the General Affairs Committee is preparing a report on terrorism and on security outside the area of the alliance⁵, this report does not deal in detail with security problems arising from conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf except to the extent that the levels of armaments and armed forces of the immediate neighbours of Turkey, or the risk of "...armed attack...on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the parties, when in or over...the Mediterranean Sea..."⁶, make the security problem an "in-area" one for NATO.

1. European security and the Mediterranean, Document 876.

2. Security in the Mediterranean, Document 776.

3. Security in the Mediterranean, Documents 708 and 712.

4. State of European security, Document 971.

5. Security and terrorism – the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world, Rapporteur: Mr. van der Werff.

6. Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty – full text of Articles 5 and 6 at Appendix I.

II. The Mediterranean and European security

(a) General

2.1. The welcome confirmation of continued Spanish membership of NATO consolidates, in theory at least, the stabilising influence of NATO in the Mediterranean basin, where all countries on the northern shore are members, with the sole exception of Yugoslavia and Albania. Despite the long-standing and still unresolved disputes between Greece and Turkey which seriously weaken the eastern flank, the countries of the alliance, through the frequent ministerial meetings and lower level working groups of NATO, as well as of the European Community to which all except Turkey now belong, are much better placed to co-ordinate their policies to their mutual benefit than the countries on the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean despite the fact, that with the exception of Israel, the latter are all members of the Arab League.

2.2. Within both main groups there are wide variations in standards of living with GDP per capita in the NATO Mediterranean countries ranging from little more than \$1,100 (Turkey) to over \$8,500 (France). Even wider variations among the Arab League countries are accounted for mostly by petroleum or natural gas resources of Libya and Algeria with per capita incomes of \$8,400 and \$2,200 respectively compared with Morocco and Egypt with per capita incomes of \$600 and \$700 respectively. Israel, and to a lesser extent the islands of Cyprus and Malta, stand out as countries with essentially European standards of living. Another common feature of many countries in the southern and eastern Mediterranean areas is the extreme youth of the population – in Libya more than half the population is under fifteen.

2.3. The Mediterranean Sea itself is of vital economic importance to all countries in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea. At any one time some 2,000 merchant vessels, including 250 to 300 belonging to the Soviet Union, are under way in the Mediterranean. Between 300 and 400 of these are tankers carrying up to 30 million barrels of petroleum or petroleum products. All imports of petroleum into Italy and Greece pass through the Mediterranean as do 50% of those of France, Spain and Germany.

2.4. There is thus a strong mutual interest for countries of both alliances, and all other Mediterranean countries, to ensure that the freedom of the sea is maintained.

2.5. There are considerable forces belonging to NATO countries permanently stationed in the Mediterranean area. In addition to those of Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey, the United States maintains powerful naval and air forces and some army units under bilateral basing agreements with Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey. Portugal has earmarked certain units as reinforcements for northern Italy in the event of hostilities. Forces from other NATO countries take part in NATO exercises in the Mediterranean area on a sporadic basis. Belgian, German and United Kingdom contingents form the land component of ACE mobile force when deployed in the Mediterranean, and Belgium, Germany and Italy contribute squadrons to the air component. In addition, the United Kingdom and the United States contribute a ship to the naval on-call force Mediterranean when activated.

2.6. In contrast the permanent military presence of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, described in Chapter III, is modest, comprising the Mediterranean squadron of the Soviet fleet and an occasional reconnaissance aircraft.

(b) Threats to security

2.7. The largest *potential* threat to NATO countries in the Mediterranean region comes from the very large land and air forces of the Soviet Union and its allies in three main areas. Eastern Turkey has a common frontier with the Soviet Union, but access to the Mediterranean from this remote and mountainous region with poor road communications would be difficult. Greece and Turkish Thrace have a common frontier with Bulgaria, but there are no Soviet forces stationed in Bulgaria. In addition, however, there is a significant, but not large, Soviet amphibious capability which could threaten the Turkish Straits. There are at present only four Soviet divisions in Hungary, the nearest Warsaw Pact territory to north-eastern Italy, but separated from it by non-aligned Yugoslavia which would provide some warning time of any approach to the Mediterranean in this area. This potential threat is described in the next chapter.

2.8. Access to the Mediterranean itself for the Soviet navy involves passage either through the Turkish Straits or Gibraltar, both of which are controlled by NATO countries. Access for military aircraft to the Mediterranean, without overflying NATO territory, involves overflight of Yugoslavia – which appears to be granted – and a circuitous flight path down the Adriatic. Since Soviet military base rights in Egypt were revoked by that country in 1972, Soviet naval forces have had relatively little access to port facilities in the Mediterranean, and Soviet air

forces have not been based in the Mediterranean area at all.

2.9. The more immediate, but smaller-scale, threat to the security of allied countries in the Mediterranean area arises from existing or potential local conflicts among certain non-aligned countries, with an inherent risk of involvement of the superpowers, or from the anarchic behaviour of a country such as Libya. The political stability of certain countries in the eastern Mediterranean and along the North African coast is uncertain. Any abrupt change of régime may lead to a change in political alignment favouring the Soviet Union and posing the direct threat of Soviet naval and air bases once again on the shores of the Mediterranean – although since its unfortunate experience in Egypt in 1972 the Soviet Union does not appear to have sought very actively to reinstall its forces on Mediterranean shores.

2.10. Security in the Mediterranean itself therefore depends very much on the maintenance of good relations with all the non-aligned countries of the area and the pursuit of a negotiated settlement to all actual or potential conflicts. Success in these aims will depend very much more on diplomatic and economic relations than on traditional military power. Permanent and lasting solutions to some of the local disputes or conflicts in the area may not always be in reach. Deficiencies can be found in the military readiness of the NATO forces available for use in the Mediterranean area. But the cohesion of the alliance and the pursuit of co-ordinated policies by the NATO and European Community countries are more important for the preservation of peaceful and stable conditions in an inherently unpredictable future than any purely military measures.

III. Soviet Union and the Mediterranean

(a) Possible strategic and political objectives of the Soviet Union

3.1. Historically Russia for 300 years had fought a series of wars with Turkey but the aim of gaining direct access to the Mediterranean through the possession of Constantinople and control of the Turkish Straits was never fulfilled. Relations between the two countries were normalised in 1925 with the signature of a treaty of friendship between Lenin and Kemal Atatürk, at least until the signature of the non-aggression treaty between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich in August 1939. Relations were again strained during World War II when Turkey, a non-belligerent, as it was entitled to do under the terms of the 1936 Montreux Convention, closed the Turkish Black Sea Straits to the

passage of warships of any belligerent – which included the Soviet Union and the western allies.

3.2. Although Turkey finally declared war on 23rd February 1945, the Soviet Union on 20th March that year denounced the 1925 treaty of friendship with Turkey which was not due to expire until December, demanded a revision of the Montreux Convention, and renewed certain historical territorial claims concerning eastern Turkey. In a subsequent note the Soviet Union demanded revision of the Montreux Convention as far as the passage of warships was concerned so as to permit the free transit of warships of Black Sea powers; to prohibit the transit of warships of non-Black Sea powers except in certain cases; the right for Black Sea powers to share jointly with Turkey responsibility for applying the transit régime; and the right for the Soviet Union to participate jointly with Turkey in the defence of the straits. Turkey at the time indicated a willingness to consider the first three proposals but refused to consider Soviet participation in defence of the straits. Turkey insisted that the Montreux Convention could be revised only by agreement among the signatories.

3.3. Soviet territorial claims against eastern Turkey were renounced only on 30th May 1953, some eighteen months after Turkey had acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty. In a note recalling also its earlier demands for revision of the Montreux Convention, the Soviet Union stated that it had reconsidered its position and considered that mutually agreeable conditions could be found to ensure its security. Turkey reasserted its position that it stood by the 1936 Montreux Convention.

3.4. After 1953 the Soviet Union, having failed to secure a modification of the Montreux Convention, sought naval and air bases elsewhere in the Mediterranean. A squadron of submarines was based in Albania until the withdrawal of that country from the Warsaw Pact in 1962 when the Soviet submarines were removed with the exception of two which were reported to have been seized by Albania at the time. After the 1956 Suez fiasco the Soviet Union was able to develop close relations with President Nasser of Egypt which enabled the Soviet Union to develop an important naval base in Alexandria, and to establish military air bases in Egypt. In 1972 however the new President Sadat expelled Soviet military personnel acting as advisers to the Egyptian armed forces, and following abrogation of the bilateral treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in March 1976, the naval and air bases were closed to the Soviet Union, a move which particularly hampered the operation of Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean.

3.5. Since 1976 the Soviet Union has not been successful in securing the use of additional major

naval or air facilities on the shores of the Mediterranean. It appears likely, in fact, that in the light of its experience with Egypt, it has not actively sought to invest major military resources in another Mediterranean country, fearing the possible loss of substantial investments in the long term through unpredictable changes in political leaderships and policies of alignment in the countries of the area.

(b) Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean

3.6. In an earlier report⁷ the committee examined in some detail the trend of Soviet naval deployment in the Mediterranean from the end of the second world war onwards. Very small in the 1950s the Soviet Union began to maintain a permanent presence of naval vessels reaching an average daily strength of about 20 inclusive of auxiliary vessels by 1964 or 1965 rising to an average of about 40 by 1969 – a level which has remained roughly constant since then, except for the big build-up to a total of 100 ships, including 73 combatants, for a brief period at the peak of the 1973 Yom Kippur war. Even in that year the average daily strength only reached 56. A typical presence on any day in the last 12 months might have been:

Surface combatants	6
Submarines	6
Intelligence collectors	2
Naval auxiliaries	25
Miscellaneous (minesweepers/research, etc.)	5
<u>Total</u>	<u>44</u>

Of these not more than one or two are modern ships with long-range anti-ship surface-to-surface missile capability. The remainder of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron tends to be older on average than ships of the other Soviet fleets.

3.7. The Soviet Mediterranean squadron is maintained for the most part by rotation of surface ships from the Black Sea fleet, with submarines transiting from the Northern and Baltic fleets because the Montreux Convention prohibits the transit of submarines from the Black Sea except for major repair (or on first delivery of a new submarine constructed outside the Black Sea). In the absence of major naval bases within the Mediterranean, the Soviet Mediterranean squadron leads a relatively uncomfortable existence at anchorages in a few sheltered spots

7. Security in the Mediterranean, Document 776, 31st May 1978, Rapporteur: Mr. Grant.

in the open sea off the coasts of various countries, but beyond the limits of the territorial sea. The main anchorages include the Gulf of Hammamet off the Tunisian coast; the Gulf of Sollum off Libya; an area to the east of Crete; and another off Lemnos Island in the North Aegean. Anchorages off Kithera, southern Greece and south of Cape Passero, off Sicily, are also used during exercises. Surface combatants spend three-quarters of their time in the open sea at these anchorages. A quarter of their time is spent under way on exercises or surveillance operations. On the other hand Soviet submarines when in the Mediterranean spend 90% of their time at sea.

3.8. For repair and maintenance purposes the Soviet Union has obtained the permission of the Syrian Government to use the port of Latakia, and Tartus where both submarines and surface ships rotate for maintenance periods usually of about 30 days. There are usually 6 to 8 repair ships in that port. The Soviet navy uses repair facilities at a number of other points in the Mediterranean. One submarine is always undergoing overhaul in Tivat, Yugoslavia, for 6 months at a time with a Soviet repair ship always present. Commercial repair facilities are also used in Bizerta in Tunisia and minor auxiliaries are usually to be found in the Greek shipyard on the island of Syros. Soviet naval visits to the Libyan ports of Tripoli and Tobruk have increased somewhat over the last 3 years; earlier in 1986 a command ship was to be found in Tripoli. Annaba in Algeria has been used for repair work.

3.9. It is of course open to the Soviet Union to make normal commercial arrangements for supplies in the Mediterranean. Soviet supply ships regularly visit the Italian ports of Palermo, Naples and Genoa to take on fresh foodstuffs, and also to purchase various items of tools and hardware that are available on the open market. On 26th January 1981 an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and the Maltese Government allowing the Soviet Union to use half of the Has Saptain underground oil storage facilities in Malta which had been built as part of the NATO infrastructure programme in the 1950s. Its total capacity was then reported to be 50,000 tonnes of diesel oil, 90,000 tonnes of other fuel oil and 40,000 tonnes of jet fuel. Soviet surface auxiliary vessels spend 95% of their time in the anchorages and ports mentioned above as being normally used by the Soviet Mediterranean squadron.

3.10. The historical level of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean is illustrated in the following table for the period 1964 to 1977, since when it can be regarded as substantially unchanged:

*Historical trend of
Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean
1964-77*

Year	Annual ship days	Average daily strength
1964	1,500	5
1965	2,800	8
1966	4,400	12
1967	8,100	22
1968	11,000	30
1969	15,000	41
1970	16,500	45
1971	19,000	52
1972	18,000	49
1973	20,600	56
1974	20,200	55
1975	20,000	55
1976	18,600	50
1977	17,747	48

The Soviet presence was negligible before 1964 and had remained constant at 46-48 since 1977.

3.11. Under the terms of the Montreux Convention Turkey reports each year to the parties to that convention on transits of all naval vessels through the Turkish Straits. The following table shows the pattern of Soviet naval transits through the Turkish Straits since 1964:

*Soviet naval transits of the Turkish Straits
1964-85*

Year	Auxiliary transits	Surface combatant transits	Total
1964	56	39	95
1965	80	49	129
1966	71	82	153
1967	149	93	242
1968	113	117	230
1969	142	121	263
1970	149	122	271
1971	154	123	277
1972	140	114	254
1973	159	126	285
1974	145	93	238
1975	146	79	225
1976	63	69	132
1977	103	82	185
1978	121	107	228
1979	129	94	223
1980	124	111	235
1982	134	94	228
1983	132	113	245
1984	137	86	223

3.12. Thus, compared with the naval forces maintained by other NATO countries in the Mediterranean, the Soviet presence is modest.

Naval vessels in the Mediterranean

	Soviet Union	United States	Other NATO ⁹	France	Spain ⁸	NATO
Carriers	—	2 ¹⁰	2	2	—	6
Cruisers	3	1	6	1	—	8
Frigates and destroyers	8	14	60	13	7	94
Sub-total – Major surface combatants	11	17	68	16	7	108
Submarines	8	5	37	11	8	61
Amphibious vessels	2	6	24	—	—	30
Auxiliaries	27	11	70	19	17	117
Total	48	39 ¹⁰	199	46	32	316

The Soviet squadron can of course be substantially increased by reinforcement from the Black Sea fleet described in the next section, but given the formalities of passage through the Turkish Straits this would take a certain time, and thus provide warning. Naval experts feel it unlikely that in the event of hostilities the Soviet Union would in fact expose major surface naval forces to the risks of operations in the Mediterranean which would inevitably be controlled by NATO countries. The Black Sea fleet would be more likely to be used in defence of the Warsaw Pact southern flank. There are also important Soviet naval shipbuilding yards in the Black Sea, and it forms the main base for Soviet naval units operating in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.

3.13. Major Soviet naval vessels including the Kiev-class VTOL aircraft carriers and the helicopter carriers Moskva and Leningrad are reported to transit the Turkish Straits from time to time on their way to deployment in other ocean areas after transiting the Mediterranean. They do not appear to be deployed operationally within the Mediterranean. It is expected that the full-sized aircraft carrier now under construction in Sebastopol will not be operational until the early 1990s. It is however anticipated that it will then leave the Black Sea, declared to Turkey as a cruiser because the Montreux Convention prohibits the transit of aircraft carriers, and will then be deployed with the Northern or Pacific fleet for use in more distant oceans.

*(c) Warsaw Pact forces
in proximity to NATO countries*

(i) The Black Sea fleet

3.14. As least as important as the Black Sea fleet itself are the naval shipbuilding yards at Nikolaiev where at the present time the first proper

8. Spain also has 1 aircraft carrier (2 in 1986) and escorts at Rota, west of the Straits of Gibraltar.

9. Total of Greece, Italy and Turkey.

10. When only 1 carrier present in Mediterranean the United States total of 39 falls to 33.

Soviet aircraft carrier is under construction. Reported to be nuclear-propelled, between 65,000 and 75,000 tonnes, some 300 m overall and to be equipped with steam catapults, this carrier when operational will for the first time permit the Soviet Union to operate fixed-wing aircraft at sea. First announced publicly by Admiral Gorshkov in 1979 the carrier has been under construction since 1983 but is not expected to undergo sea trials before 1988. Given the time it has taken other navies to acquire the necessary skills, the carrier is not expected to be fully operational in the oceans of the world until the early 1990s. It is not yet clear what aircraft will operate from it; there are reports that a new naval aircraft is being specially developed for the vessel.

3.15. When operational it is expected that the aircraft carrier will operate with the Soviet Northern or Pacific fleet, rather than in the Mediterranean itself.

3.16. The operational Black Sea fleet comprises first some 28 submarines (not nuclear-propelled – construction of nuclear-propelled submarines does not appear to be carried out at the Nikolaiev Black Sea shipyards). One of the Kiev-class aircraft carriers is normally based with the Black Sea fleet but operates usually beyond the Mediterranean. Of 37,000 tonnes displacement, 270 m length overall, this class operates vertical take-off aircraft and helicopters. The smaller helicopter carriers Moskva and Leningrad are also assigned to the Black Sea fleet. The total of 48 main surface combatants is completed with 9 cruisers, 21 destroyers and 15 frigates. There are in addition 25 lighter corvette-class vessels.

3.17. The amphibious capabilities of the Black Sea fleet is represented by 21 amphibious ships, including 5 landing ship tanks, and 5 battalions of naval infantry totalling 3,000 men.

3.18. Since the committee last reported five years ago, the Soviet Black Sea fleet naval aviation has been strengthened and now includes 100 bombers including the Tu-22M Backfire bomber as well as the older Tu-16 Badger.

(ii) Land forces

3.19. If NATO countries on the southern flank sometimes feel themselves the poor relations, with older equipment than that on the central front, the same is true of the Warsaw Pact's southern tier, Bulgaria and Hungary and Romania, if the latter country can still be considered as participating militarily in the pact. Both tanks and aircraft in these countries' forces tend to be older models than in the centre.

3.20. There are three widely separated areas of NATO territory to which the threat of Warsaw Pact land forces has to be considered. North-eastern Italy is possibly the most remote threat, being separated from the nearest Warsaw Pact forces in Hungary by the neutral territory of Yugoslavia and Austria. These Warsaw Pact forces comprise a total of 4 Soviet divisions and 6 Hungarian divisions, the latter at a lower state of readiness than those of the Soviet Union. A further 7 Soviet divisions at a lower state of readiness in the Kiev military district, the other side of the Carpathians, represent a reinforcement capability against north-eastern Italy. The Warsaw Pact forces stationed in Hungary are equipped with 2,340 tanks and 1,560 artillery pieces. Against this Italy has 8 divisional equivalents with 1,250 tanks and 1,400 artillery and mortar pieces. Portugal provides a reinforcement brigade for deployment in northern Italy.

3.21. Against Greek and Turkish Thrace there is an immediate threat from the Bulgarian army comprising some 7 divisional equivalents at category 1 and 2 and a further 3 cadre divisions. Romania further away provides 2 tank divisions and 4 motorised rifle divisions and one mountain division equivalent together with a further 4 cadre divisions. No Soviet forces are stationed in Bulgaria or Romania in peacetime, and Romania has not normally permitted the passage of Soviet forces for exercise purposes. In the Odessa military district in the Soviet Union there are a further 8 motorised rifle divisions and 1 airborne division. Of a total of 34 divisions the Italian 1985 white paper on defence estimates that just over 22 are at a high state of readiness with 3,680 tanks and 2,940 artillery and mortar pieces. Against these there are a total of 22 Greek and Turkish divisions available in the area, but account has also to be taken of the amphibious forces of the Soviet Black Sea fleet listed above.

3.22. In the area of eastern Turkey along its common border with the Soviet Union there are 12 Soviet divisions deployed forward with 2,400 tanks and 1,700 artillery pieces. A further 8 divisions with proportional numbers of tanks and artillery are available as reinforcements in the southern Soviet military districts. The Turkish army has some 8 divisions in north-eastern Turkey and a further 4 in south-eastern Turkey

protecting its other borders which could be used as reinforcements in the event of an attack in the north.

(iii) Air forces

3.23. The extreme mobility of air forces makes it misleading to count numbers of aircraft based in particular countries in peacetime. The Italian white paper on defence quoted above shows, in the whole of the southern region, some 695 Warsaw Pact fighter bomber/ground attack aircraft, 1,560 interceptors and 195 reconnaissance. Corresponding numbers for NATO are 615, 295, and 90. The situation on the NATO side has somewhat improved since the committee last reported with a modernisation programme under way in the three NATO countries concerned with three squadrons of Tornado aircraft being phased in in Italy and plans for Greece and Turkey to acquire F-16 aircraft.

(iv) General

3.24. Official NATO briefings speak in general terms of unfavourable force ratios in the southern region of 3 to 1 in north-eastern Italy, 2 to 1 in Thrace, and 3 to 1 in eastern Turkey. There are however considerable United States air forces available for rapid reinforcement from their normal bases in Spain and from the United States, and there are defensive advantages of both terrain and warning time in north-eastern Italy and of terrain in eastern Turkey.

IV. The NATO countries in the Mediterranean*(a) Defence policy and armed forces**(i) Portugal*

4.1. Although Portugal is not strictly a Mediterranean country it is mentioned in this report in part because of its commitment to a reinforcement rôle in north-eastern Italy. The committee reported in some detail on the Portuguese defence effort as a whole following its visit to that country in October 1982¹¹.

4.2. Portugal's main contribution to collective NATO defence is to the Atlantic command, Portugal forming part of SACLANT's area of responsibility. The important IBERLANT subordinate command is assigned to a Portuguese admiral and is responsible for the sea area comprising the western Atlantic south of the Portuguese/Spanish frontier as far east as the approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar.

4.3. The Portuguese army has undergone considerable reorganisation over the last ten years having been reduced in size from 190,000 to 45,740 today, organised into the equivalent of some 7 or 8 brigades.

11. State of European security, Document 936, 8th November 1982, Rapporteur: Mr. Blaauw.

4.4. One mobile armoured brigade is earmarked for deployment in north-eastern Italy and has practised this deployment during NATO exercises. On one occasion Portugal has contributed an artillery battery to ACE mobile force referred to below.

4.5. With the second lowest per capita income among the NATO countries, Portugal's chief problem is with modernisation of equipment. As far as the army is concerned, this is reflected in its armour which still consists of some outdated M-48 tanks and light armoured cars. As in the case of Greece and Turkey, NATO commanders lay stress on the need for Portugal to receive defence assistance from other countries of the alliance. For the time being the United States, Germany and the Netherlands provide military aid to Portugal. The Assembly has noted and welcomed, in the context of a number of other committee reports, Portugal's application to accede to the Brussels Treaty which has been under consideration by the WEU Council since October 1984.

(ii) *Spain*

4.6. The committee last visited Spain in October 1983 and reported on that visit in the framework of its report the following year¹².

4.7. Spain became a full party to the North Atlantic Treaty on 30th May 1982, but the socialist party then in opposition had pledged that it would hold a referendum on Spanish membership of NATO if it came to power, as it did in November 1982.

4.8. The promised referendum was held only on 12th March 1986, in political conditions rather different from those during the debate on Spanish accession to NATO. The socialist government, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Gonzalez, in person, campaigned vigorously for a "yes" vote on the carefully drafted question put to the electorate with three pre-conditions in the following terms:

"The government regards it in the national interest that Spain remain within the Atlantic Alliance and considers that permanency of membership should be established according to the following terms:

1. Spain's participation in the Atlantic Alliance does not include its incorporation in the integrated military structure.
2. The prohibition concerning the installing, stocking or introducing of nuclear weapons on Spanish territory, will be upheld.
3. Gradual steps will be taken towards a progressive reduction of the United States military presence in Spain.

12. State of European security, Document 971, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith.

Are you in favour of Spain being part of the Atlantic Alliance within the framework set out by the government?"

4.9. The centre and right-wing opposition led by Mr. Fraga, which has supported membership of NATO, opposed the holding of the referendum on principle, and called on voters to abstain. The communist party called for a "no" vote.

4.10. The results of the referendum on 12th March were considered an outstanding victory for the government:

Yes	8,987,525	52.54%
No	6,815,173	39.83%
Blank votes	1,119,202	6.54%
Spoiled papers	187,219	1.09%

Turn-out was put at: 17,109,118 (59.71%); abstentions: 11,542,410 (40.29%)¹³.

4.11. The result was welcomed in particular by the Secretary-General of NATO, Lord Carrington, at a press conference on 13th March when he noted that it would be simpler if all NATO member countries enjoyed the same status in the organisation. He recognised however that NATO had lived for many years with the particular problems of the 16 sovereign independent countries who were members and "we accommodate with this".

4.12. In a previous report¹⁴ the committee pointed out the anomalies of present Spanish membership of NATO. Following ratification of Spain's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty in May 1982 negotiations had begun on the integration of Spain into the NATO military structure. The progress of the talks has not been made public but they were known to have run into difficulties over the allocation of command responsibilities in the Iberian area, because of differences of opinion between Spain and Portugal which has exercised an important command responsibility in the Atlantic for many years. These negotiations were frozen with the change in government in Spain in November 1984. Spain from the outset of its membership of the organisation has however participated fully in all NATO committees including in particular the Defence Planning Committee, the Military Committee, and, as an observer, the Nuclear Planning Group. At the last meeting of the NPG on 21st March 1986, the Spanish Ambassador announced that Spain henceforth would participate as a full member; the communiqué of the meeting no longer carried the customary reservation, "Spain attended as an observer", of previous communiqués. Spain also attends meetings of Eurogroup. France, in contrast, since

13. Atlantic News, 14th March 1986.

14. Document 971, op. cit.

withdrawing from the integrated military structure in 1966, has not been represented on any of those bodies. France, on the other hand, since withdrawing its officers from the integrated staffs of the various NATO military headquarters has maintained military missions at these headquarters and also continues to report the various statistics concerning its defence effort which NATO publishes each year¹⁵. Spanish statistics are not yet included in the NATO figures. In confirming its membership of NATO, Spain continues its policy of not allowing nuclear weapons to be stationed on its territory – a policy it has maintained since the accident with the United States aircraft in the 1960s when a nuclear bomb, which did not explode, burst open on contact with the ground causing radioactive contamination. The same policy with respect to nuclear weapons has always been pursued by Denmark and Norway. The consequences for the stationing of United States forces in Spain and the bilateral defence treaty are discussed in section 4.68 et seq. below.

4.13. It appears to be generally recognised in NATO circles that in view of the terms of the referendum question, and while the present government remains in power, there will be no further discussion on the integration of Spanish forces into NATO. In the view of the committee however it would be undesirable for there to be any reduction in the present level of Spanish participation in NATO committees – which is mutually beneficial – and Spain should be urged to appoint military missions to the various NATO headquarters concerned which must include SHAPE, SACLANT and CINCHAN as well as subordinate headquarters including EASTLANT (co-located at Channel Command), IBERLANT as well as AFSOUTH and its subordinate headquarters AIRSOUTH and NAVSOUTH.

4.14. Since acceding to the North Atlantic Treaty, elements of the Spanish Mediterranean fleet (shown in the table in paragraph 3.12 above) have been participating on a bilateral basis in naval exercises in the Mediterranean with various other NATO countries. Spanish submarines in the past have acted as hypothetical “hostile” forces in anti-submarine exercises, and recently Spanish surface units have participated in such exercises for the first time. Without prejudging the question of permanent integration into the NATO military structure, it is felt that Spanish forces could make a useful military contribution to NATO’s various multi-lateral collective defence arrangements described in a later chapter. These could include:

- periodical exercises with naval on-call force Mediterranean;

- provision of reinforcement units for deployment in the Mediterranean area, and practising such deployments on exercises;
- participation of maritime patrol aircraft in co-ordinated surveillance activities in the Mediterranean through bilateral arrangement with COMMARAIRMED in Naples (as France already does).

4.15. The committee notes with satisfaction that Mr. Alfred Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, visited Spain for talks with ministers at the invitation of the Spanish Government in January 1986, and that at that time the government spokesman announced that Spain would apply for membership of the Brussels Treaty. It was understood that an application would be made once the results of the referendum were known.

(iii) Gibraltar

4.16. The British colony of Gibraltar houses a small naval and air headquarters which when activated during exercises or emergencies become a NATO naval command subordinate to NAVSOUTH in Naples – Commander Gibraltar Mediterranean, subordinate to Commander Naval Forces Mediterranean in Naples, and Commander Maritime Air Forces Gibraltar, subordinate to Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe in Naples.

4.17. Rapporteurs of the committee have visited Gibraltar from time to time, most recently in March 1984, and the committee at that time reported in some detail on the situation on the rock¹⁶.

4.18. British forces permanently stationed in Gibraltar are small. They amount to one battalion and some artillery the historical rôle of which is to defend the territory against any threat from Spain – a surely anomalous rôle now that Spain has become a democracy and is a member of NATO and of the European Community. There are normally 2 Jaguar fighter aircraft on rotation from the United Kingdom which can perform a useful reconnaissance function in obtaining close-up photographs of Soviet naval units transiting the straits. British Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft operate out of Gibraltar from time to time. Britain does not now station naval vessels in Gibraltar permanently but a guard ship – usually a frigate – based in the United Kingdom is available at short notice.

4.19. Other NATO countries including Canada, the Netherlands and the United States operate ships and aircraft out of Gibraltar during NATO

15. See Appendix II, derived from NATO statistics.

16. State of European security, Document 971, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith – explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.98 et seq.

exercises. In the event of hostilities naval vessels from the United Kingdom, the United States and Italy would operate under the Gibraltar NATO command. If Spain does not join the integrated military structure of NATO, Gibraltar will obviously continue to provide a useful base for a NATO naval headquarters from where control of the Gibraltar Straits can be exercised.

4.20. As far as the political situation in Gibraltar is concerned Spain recognises British sovereignty over "the town and castle of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications and forts" in accordance with the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht; successive Spanish governments have campaigned to "re-establish the territorial integrity of Spain" through the return of Gibraltar to Spanish sovereignty. After imposing a series of restrictions on Gibraltar the Spanish authorities closed the frontier in 1969. An Anglo-Spanish agreement was reached in Brussels on 27th November 1984 as a result of which the frontier was reopened in February 1985 while reciprocity of rights for Spaniards in Gibraltar and Gibraltarians in Spain was agreed, together with the establishment of "a negotiating process aimed at overcoming all the differences between them over Gibraltar... both sides accept that the issues of sovereignty will be discussed in that process. The British Government will fully maintain its commitment to honour the wishes of the people of Gibraltar as set out in the preamble of the 1969 constitution". The British commitment remains to respect the wishes of Gibraltarians who in a 1967 referendum voted by 12,138 to 44 in favour of retaining the link with Britain.

4.21. Following the passage of the Spanish aircraft carrier, *Dedalo*, within 1 mile of the Gibraltar dockyard and the launching of 2 helicopters from its flight deck in the vicinity of Gibraltar airport on the night of 20th/21st September 1985, Britain lodged an official protest which was rejected by the Spanish Government. A Spanish Foreign Ministry official was quoted as saying: "Spain only ceded the waters within the actual port of Gibraltar to Great Britain...consequently the remaining waters adjacent to the rock come under Spanish sovereignty"¹⁷. Britain claims territorial waters up to 3 miles or the median line around Gibraltar whereas Spain claims territorial waters up to 6 miles from its coast – or up to the median line with Morocco in the case of the Straits of Gibraltar. For some time Spain has maintained a prohibited area for aircraft stretching some 30 miles in the vicinity of the Straits of Gibraltar. Airspace up to 3 nautical miles around Gibraltar is however excluded from this prohibited area, permitting aircraft to operate in and out of the Gibraltar airfield. The question of the territorial sea is discussed in paragraph 4.74 below.

17. *The Guardian*, 3rd April 1986.

(iv) *France*

4.22. France has not been part of the integrated military structure of NATO since 1966 but maintains substantial naval and other forces in the Mediterranean; NATO commanders express confidence that these forces would be available to NATO in the event of hostilities.

4.23. France maintains a permanent military mission at the headquarters of CINCSOUTH in Naples, which includes 2 liaison officers from the French Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean in Toulon who are attached to the subordinate NATO Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe, also in Naples, who in turn maintains two NATO liaison officers at the French naval headquarters in Toulon. Arrangements for the co-operation of French naval forces with NATO forces in the event of hostilities are covered in detailed agreements negotiated between the NATO and French commanders-in-chief concerned in 1972 and 1976.

4.24. French naval forces in the Mediterranean are listed in the table in paragraph 3.12. They normally include 2 aircraft carriers carrying Super-Etendard nuclear capable strike aircraft equipped with the AN-52 nuclear bomb. Two of the 11 submarines are nuclear-propelled – the *Rubis* and *Saphir*. Part of the 27 Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft are based in the Mediterranean.

4.25. French naval vessels participate in NATO naval exercises occasionally, and more frequently in joint exercises with allied navies on a bilateral basis. French maritime patrol aircraft on request from the NATO Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean in Naples will participate in surveillance of Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean. The Atlantique, of somewhat shorter range than the Orion reconnaissance aircraft of some other navies, can on these occasions land at NATO airfields in Italy for refuelling before returning to its French base.

4.26. In May and early June 1985 the French Mediterranean fleet with some 14 vessels including the 2 aircraft carriers carried out a major cruise in the eastern and central Mediterranean, with port calls in Egypt and Greece, participating on the way in a series of allied and national naval exercises. The French Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, Vice-Admiral Claude Gagliardi, was quoted at the time as saying of the French fleet: "It is the military tool of an autonomous French policy in the Mediterranean, which was for a long time an American 'lake'. France is trying to catch up in this area vital for it, by demonstrating its military capability in the event of a crisis"¹⁸. At the conclusion of that exercise,

18. *Le Monde*, 6th May 1985.

one of the aircraft carriers, the *Clemenceau*, went into refit for 18 months which will include the fitting of *Crotale* missiles in an anti-missile rôle.

4.27. It is suggested that, in line with the committee's proposals concerning Spain, it would be useful if a French vessel were to be made available in the future for service with the naval on-call force Mediterranean during its periodic activations.

(v) *Italy*

4.28. Italy is the major NATO participant in the Mediterranean area, the whole of its armed forces being based on its own territory bounded only by the Mediterranean and the Alps in the north. In recent years the Italian Parliament has led in a process of opening up discussion of defence policy in Italy to parliamentary and public debate. This led to the publication on 16th November 1984 (in English as well as in Italian) of the Defence White Paper 1985 presented by the Minister of Defence, Mr. Spadolini. Later than most NATO countries, Italy is also in the process of establishing a central defence secretariat with the Chief of Defence Staff controlling overall defence policy and operations. The traditional three services in Italy had been too autonomous in the past. Mr. Spadolini's introduction to the white paper reflects both of these processes:

“The time is ripe for an exchange of opinions between the civilian and the military society in order to arrive at a common assessment of problems that cannot in any way be considered in an exclusive or separate way or covered by an impenetrable technicism. This is proved by the heated debates which are going on in parliament and all over the country. Italy's defence policy cannot be defined in the abstract but it must be agreed upon by a large majority of the population. Therefore this white paper on defence is at midway in a complex process of analysis and reorganisation started by parliament and based on a constant dialogue...”

The choice made by this white paper...consists in a defence structure based on mission needs with interrelations between the armed forces...

The problem is to reach a greater integration of the forces as regards operations, weapons and budget without in any way damaging the historical heritage of experiences and traditions of the individual services...

The administrative, industrial and military structures should be better co-ordinated with a consequent strengthening of the tasks of the Chief of Defence Staff in the military field and of those of the Secretary-

General for Defence, and a national armaments director, in the administrative sector.”

4.29. The Italian Ministry of Defence is seeking also to modernise the structure of the army by reducing the number of conscripts to provide a more efficient and more professional army and reducing the inefficient administrative burden of the territorial recruiting structure which has not been reorganised since the 19th century.

4.30. The potential military threat to north-eastern Italy from Warsaw Pact forces has been the basis of Italian defence planning for a long time, but in recent years more attention is paid to possible threats to the rest of the territory arising from the inherently unstable conditions in many Mediterranean countries. The white paper refers obliquely to these problems:

“In particular some conceptual and operational certainties that had been a major factor in the functioning of the international system (deterrence/parity/superiority) for more than ten years, have been undermined and the proportion and weights of power among regional and subregional areas have changed (Mediterranean/Persian Gulf/Africa). The increased tension between the United States and the Soviet Union and the ever-changing complexity of the southern area have entailed a parallel increase both in the threat, diversified as to forms and instruments, and in the tasks which Italy will have to fulfil for her security...”

Any part of national territory can be exposed to air and naval bombings and to attacks (small-scale seaborne and air landings) aimed at either damaging the lines of communication between the northern and southern areas of the peninsula or seizing areas of limited size but – particularly on the islands – of politico-strategic importance. Most of these actions would be characterised by short warning times and would rely on the element of surprise.”

4.31. The Italian forces available to meet the threat in the north-east include 20 brigades organised in 3 army corps based in Milan, Bolzano, and Vittorio Veneto. The total tank inventory includes 500 obsolete M-47, 300 M-60 approaching the end of their useful life and 970 Leopard 1 tanks. Support weapons include 6 Lance tactical missile launchers for which the United States retains the nuclear warheads. Air forces assigned to the north-eastern region comprise 4 fighter bomber squadrons, 2 reconnaissance squadrons and 3 squadrons of light fighter bombers. 3 of these squadrons are now beginning to be equipped with the new Tornado aircraft, the

remainder with older F-104s and G-91s, but a new fighter is being developed to replace them.

4.32. Air forces available for defence of the southern part of the country, based there in peacetime, amount to a total of 7 squadrons of fighter bombers, interceptors, and light fighter bombers. There are 2 squadrons of Atlantic maritime reconnaissance aircraft.

4.33. The maritime reconnaissance squadrons are operated by the air force, but the defence white paper envisages the creation of a naval air arm. There is a political debate in Italy about equipping the through-deck cruiser, *Garibaldi*, which entered service in 1985, with vertical take-off aircraft to provide an aircraft carrier of the type in service with the United Kingdom navy. The *Garibaldi* was designed and built with that possibility in mind. The Italian navy would be responsible for patrolling the central Mediterranean area in the event of overall hostilities co-ordinated by NATO. In addition to the *Garibaldi*, the Italian fleet comprises the helicopter carrier, *Vittorio Veneto*, 2 cruisers/helicopter carriers, 4 destroyers, 16 frigates, 8 corvettes and 10 submarines.

(vi) *Greece*

4.34. In preparing the present report the committee visited Greece in October 1985 where it was briefed by ministers and senior staff in the Ministries for Foreign Affairs and of Defence.

4.35. The Greek defence effort is substantial when compared with the size and wealth of the country. To NATO definition the defence expenditure is 7.1% of the gross domestic product – the highest in NATO; it may be compared with 6.9% for the United States. The total armed forces of 206,000 represent 6.2% of the active population – again the highest for NATO, Turkey coming next at 4.6%. In the early 1970s defence expenditure was only 4.1% of GDP and the armed forces numbered only 160,000. Paradoxically therefore the Greek defence effort today under a parliamentary democracy is significantly higher than during the dictatorship of the colonels.

4.36. What Greece claims to perceive as a threat from Turkey, in particular following Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus in 1974, rather than any recent increase in the threat from Bulgaria or from Warsaw Pact forces in general, lies behind this increased emphasis on defence.

4.37. Greece and Turkey have been members of NATO since 1952. Thereafter two subordinate NATO headquarters were established in Izmir – LANDSOUTHEAST and Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force – which under United States commanders with Greek and Turkish deputies were designed to co-ordinate the land and air battle in the Greek-Turkish area in the event of hostilities. In the period from 1953 to 1974 Greek

officers were withdrawn from the Izmir headquarters on a number of occasions; their presence in Izmir could have served as a barometer to the state of Greek-Turkish relations. They departed finally following the events of 1974 when Greece claimed to have withdrawn from the integrated military structure of NATO. In practice, the withdrawal was less than complete – in particular Greek officers continued to serve both in the NATO international military staff in Brussels and in other NATO military headquarters outside Turkey. The Greek forces were nominally returned to the NATO military structure on 20th October 1980 under the “Rogers plan” negotiated largely by the Supreme Allied Commander, which was an agreement in principle, leaving many details to be settled by subsequent negotiations with Turkey and the various NATO authorities. The committee understands that resumed co-operation with NATO is effective in practice only in the case of the Greek navy. Although Greece has sought to “assign” to NATO more forces than hitherto, in more than one case NATO has not been able to accept because the proposed declaration included forces on Lemnos. Furthermore, the present deployment of the Greek army and air force units is not in accordance with NATO policy. On 8th January 1985 a Greek Government statement was issued according to which:

“The Foreign Affairs and Defence Council of the cabinet met today with the participation of the leadership of the armed forces and approved the policy of national defence. The basic objective of our national defence policy is the safeguarding of national independence and territorial integrity of the country.”

The announcement did not name Turkey, but in December 1984 the Greek Government had stated that its new defence policy would be the basis for deploying Greek armed forces towards Turkey rather than Bulgaria¹⁹. In January 1986, the Greek Deputy Defence Minister was reported as saying that Greece was to deploy a new defence system along its borders, in particular in the Aegean area, involving 600,000 men, as a “purely preventive” measure. The move was said to be supported by the opposition New Democracy Party²⁰.

4.38. The Greek forces, if fully co-operating with the co-ordinated NATO plans, would make an important contribution to defence in the southern region, but as in the case of Portugal and Turkey, the financial resources of the country alone do not permit sufficient modernisation of equipment. The 1,600 tanks in service include 320 obsolete M-47 and 380 elderly M-48, together with 106 more modern Leopard; support

19. International Herald Tribune, 9th January 1985.

20. Atlantic News, 8th January 1985.

weapons include 8 Honest John tactical missile launchers for which the United States retains the nuclear warheads. The air force is equipped with F-104 and A-7 fighter bombers as well as F-4 and F-5A interceptors. Greece has announced its intention of acquiring F-16s and Mirage 2000s. Modernisation of Greek forces is supported through defence aid from the United States and Germany.

4.39. The total Greek forces assigned to NATO amount to 13 divisions (including 1 armoured division, 1 mechanised division as well as 5 armoured brigades and 2 mechanised brigades) with 1,050 tanks, 27 warships (the total fleet includes 10 submarines, 14 destroyers, 7 frigates, 16 fast-attack craft, and an amphibious force of 13 landing ships and a number of landing craft) and 310 combat aircraft.

4.40. The problems of Greek-Turkish relations and United States assistance are discussed below.

(vii) Turkey

4.41. The committee visited Turkey in October 1985 for the first time since 1981 – a time when parliamentary government had been suspended. Mr. Turgut Ozal took office as Prime Minister in December 1983 following elections the previous month in which his Motherland Party had won a clear majority over the Nationalist Democracy Party which had been favoured by the military authorities. Only parties approved by the military authorities were allowed to contest the elections; 243 former deputies had been banned from political activity for 10 years. Martial law was ended in Ankara and 6 other provinces in July 1985. At present martial law remains in force in 5 provinces along the eastern frontier.

4.42. Mr. Ozal's government has pursued an active policy to strengthen its links with European countries and European institutions. Mr. Halefoglu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has recently referred to Turkey's "contractual right" under the terms of the 1963 agreement on associate membership of the European Community, to "apply for full membership in due time".

4.43. With a defence expenditure of 4.4% of the GDP, Turkey's is among the highest defence efforts in NATO, comparing favourably with the larger WEU countries; with 4.6% of the active population in the armed forces, Turkey is second only to Greece among the NATO countries. In a country where illiteracy is still 30%, affecting twice as many women as men, the 20 months' compulsory military service has an important educational as well as a defence function in Turkey. Great importance is attached to training; there is a deliberate policy of posting troops for service to areas of the country away from their home province.

4.44. While emphasising first and foremost its ties with NATO and the Western European institutions including the Council of Europe and the European Communities with a view to eventual full membership of the latter, Turkey maintains neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union and the Balkan countries, and would seek to improve economic relations with them – some electricity in the frontier regions is already supplied by the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Relations with Bulgaria are however strained at the present time because of the repression of the Turkish minority in that country. Amnesty International reported in the week of 31st March that 100 ethnic Turks had been killed in clashes with the Bulgarian police during the 1985 campaign to oblige the minority to change their names to Bulgarian ones, stop the use of Turkish, and close the mosques. Turkey seeks the support of its allies as well as Islamic countries and the Soviet Union to stop Bulgarian atrocities. Turkey sees itself enjoying a special relationship with Islamic countries, especially the Arab countries. Nevertheless, a Turkish view of security has to take account not only of the obvious Warsaw Pact threat in Thrace and eastern Turkey, but of the level of armaments, largely supplied by the Soviet Union, of neighbours in the south-east.

4.45. Iran and Iraq, neighbours of Turkey but not Mediterranean countries, at war with each other since September 1980, present a problem to Turkey which seeks normal relations with both and co-operation in dealing with the Kurdish minority in the frontier area of all three countries. From the military equipment standpoint they are rather different. Iran, with regular forces of 305,000, has relied on its young revolutionary guards, reportedly 250,000, to supplement its 250,000 army in its offensive against Iraq. It has received limited supplies of modern equipment from the Soviet Union since the fall of the Shah in early 1979. It is reputed to have 1,000 tanks of which only 150 are relatively modern Soviet T-62 and T-72, 300 obsolescent T-54, and 500 British and American Chieftain and M-60 left from the Shah's régime. The air force now of dubious quality and training under the Khomeini régime is reported to have possibly 80 serviceable American aircraft F-4s and F-14s; it has not been re-equipped by the Soviet Union.

4.46. Iraq on the other hand has an army of 475,000 in 20 divisions equipped with some 2,900 tanks which also include some modern T-62 and T-72 and a sizable air force equipped with modern Soviet aircraft such as the Tu-22, MiG-23 and Su-20.

4.47. Syria has 9 divisions with much more modern armour including 1,300 T-62 and 1,100 T-72 tanks. Its air force with 9 attack squadrons again has much modern equipment including 40 Su-20 and 50 MiG-23. Much of this

equipment of Turkey's immediate neighbours appears superior to the bulk of that in service in the Turkish armed forces. Turkey is simultaneously in the uncomfortable position of sharing common frontiers with the two present belligerents, Iran and Iraq.

4.48. The Turkish army of 540,000 men is organised in 12 infantry divisions, 1 armoured division and 2 mechanised divisions with a further 6 armoured, 4 mechanised, and 10 infantry brigades plus a parachute brigade and a commando brigade. The bulk of the 2,900 tanks are still the obsolescent M-48, but 200 more modern M-48A and 77 Leopard I have recently been acquired. Support weapons include 18 Honest John tactical nuclear missile launchers for which the United States holds nuclear warheads.

4.49. The Turkish land forces are organised first in 3 field armies. The Turkish first army with headquarters in Istanbul is responsible for the area of the Turkish Straits where NATO briefings in the past concerning the overall area of Greek and Turkish Thrace have suggested that manpower is about evenly balanced at some 350,000 men on each side, but with a 2 to 1 adverse ratio for NATO in tanks. The Turkish third army with headquarters at Erzinçan has 8 divisions responsible for the defence of the eastern frontier with the Soviet Union where NATO briefings have suggested a 2 to 1 adverse ratio in manpower with about 152,500 men on the Turkish side, and an adverse ratio of up to 7 to 1 in tanks of which Turkey deploys some 900 in a region that is not particularly favourable for armour. Turkish second army with headquarters in Malatya has 4 divisions responsible for the southern border with Syria and Iraq and is, according to Turkish estimates, not capable of coping with the threat in this particular area.

4.50. A fourth army, the Aegean army, in south-western Turkey with its headquarters in Izmir is described by Turkey as comprising training units. It has been described by Greek authorities as a threat to Greece; they have claimed that it contains 140,000 men. No other authorities have supported that claim. Independent observers in Turkey believe that there might be some 50,000 men, largely in training units, in the Aegean army.

4.51. Since the 1974 landings, Turkey has maintained troops in Cyprus which at present amount to 17,000 men organised in 2 infantry divisions with 150 M-47 and M-48 tanks.

4.52. The Turkish navy makes an important contribution to NATO both in the Black Sea and in the eastern Mediterranean. Its 130 ships comprise 15 destroyers, 2 escorts and 16 submarines as well as a number of fast patrol craft, but as in the case of much other Turkish equipment, many are obsolescent.

4.53. The Turkish air force of 19 fighter squadrons and 4 transport squadrons with 8 Nike Hercules air defence squadrons is organised into the 1st and 2nd tactical air forces with headquarters at Eskisehir and Diyarbakir, responsible for the defence of north-western and eastern Turkey respectively. The fighter squadrons are equipped with F-5s, F-100s and F-4s. 7 of the squadrons have been equipped with F-104Gs supplied as part of German and some Netherlands assistance.

4.54. The chronic problem facing the Turkish armed forces is always one of modernising their equipment which lags one generation behind that of most other NATO countries, and is now inferior even to some modern equipment in the Bulgarian army. United States and German defence aid is promised to Turkey to assist in modernisation.

(viii) Greek-Turkish relations

4.55. Since the events of 1974 the committee has reported on six occasions on the state of Greek-Turkish relations which continue to affect adversely collective defence arrangements in the area. It is not the purpose of the present report concerned with European security to examine these in any detail, far less to suggest a solution. The salient features are merely recalled for the record.

4.56. Apart from Cyprus, described separately below, Greek-Turkish differences concern to some extent ethnic minorities in each country, but for the most part the problem of the Aegean Sea where history has bequeathed to the two countries an extremely complex situation. Following the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the 1947 peace treaty with Italy, virtually all islands in the sea, with the exception of 2 at the entrance to the Dardanelles and a few minor islands within 3 nautical miles of the Turkish coast, are Greek territory and inhabited largely by a Greek population. Several are within 5 nautical miles or less of the Turkish coast.

4.57. With the 6 nautical mile territorial sea at present claimed by both countries about 49% of the Aegean remains high seas, with a few high seas passages between islands providing uninterrupted high seas passage in and out of the Aegean, used also, of course, by all shipping between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Normal shipping lanes pass nevertheless through the Greek territorial sea in many places. With a general trend in the world towards a maximum territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, enshrined in the United Nations 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Turkey has found it necessary to assert on many occasions that it could not accept such an extension of the territorial sea by Greece which would leave no high seas passages between the Greek islands, and reduce the high seas area within the Aegean to less than 20%. Greece has

not claimed a 12 nautical mile territorial sea; on occasion it appears to have reserved the right to do so however. An extension of Greek territorial waters to 12 nautical miles would also leave the Soviet Union cut off from free passage into the Mediterranean which adds an East-West dimension to the problem.

4.58. The problem of the high seas is reflected in the airspace. In the 1950s, ICAO drew the boundary between the Athens and Ankara flight information regions (FIRs) largely along the median line between the Greek islands and the Turkish coast, leaving the Aegean entirely within the Athens FIR. Until 1964 the NATO air operations boundary between Greek and Turkish air forces was more nearly a median line down the centre of the Aegean Sea. The NATO air command boundary was moved by consensus in 1964 to coincide with the FIR line. In 1974 the Aegean became closed to civilian air traffic with the issue of conflicting NOTAMs by Turkey and Greece concerning the reporting of aircraft locations to Turkish and Greek air traffic control; they were withdrawn only in 1980 to permit limited civil and military air traffic across the Aegean. Until 1981 Greece however had maintained an air corridor W14 between northern Greece and the Dodecanese which Turkey claimed obstructed Turkish access to international Aegean airspace.

4.59. Economic rights to the seabed of the Aegean remain one of the most difficult problems. Turkey has claimed an equitable share on the basis of the extension of the continental shelf of the Turkish land mass under the Aegean; Greece has claimed a division based in principle on a median line between the Greek islands and the Turkish mainland. In a resolution of 25th August 1976 the United Nations Security Council called on the two countries to negotiate a settlement. Negotiations between the two countries were duly held until the Greek elections in October 1981, but have not been resumed since Mr. Papandreou came to power in Greece. The Greek position has been to prefer to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice, although the court in 1976 recognised the existence of a dispute over the area and does not appear to have accepted jurisdiction.

4.60. The direct and indirect consequences of these differences for collective NATO arrangements in the area are considerable. After the partial withdrawal of Greek forces from the integrated military structure of NATO in 1974, the NATO military authorities had to negotiate new arrangements culminating in the Rogers plan accepted by the NATO Defence Planning Committee on 20th October 1980. This provided for the return of Greek forces to the integrated military structure of NATO but left details to be settled by subsequent negotiations. Before 1974 the integrated NATO military headquarters at Izmir

in Turkey contained the headquarters of Sixth ATAF and of land forces south-eastern Europe which, in the event of hostilities, would have controlled operations by Greek and Turkish forces and by external reinforcements, in particular United States air forces, that might be operating in the area. Under the Rogers plan Izmir became a purely Turkish-NATO headquarters from 1st July 1978 on the understanding that a separate Greek-NATO headquarters would be established at Larissa in Greece. The Larissa headquarters has not however been established because Greece and Turkey have not solved the problem of the control of military aircraft operating in the Aegean. Turkey reserves the right for its military aircraft to operate in international airspace over the Aegean without reporting to Greek air control. Greece demands that all aircraft operating within the Athens FIR report to Greek air control.

4.61. A further problem arises over the militarisation of certain Greek islands, in particular Lemnos. Under the Treaty of Lausanne, Lemnos was to be demilitarised, as were the Dodecanese under the Italian peace treaty. For some years Greece has stationed troops on Lemnos, claiming in part that there is a military threat from the Turkish mainland, and in part that the demilitarisation of the Lausanne Treaty was superseded by the Montreux Convention of 1936. Because of the disputed nature of Lemnos it has never been included in joint exercises arranged by NATO but in recent years Greece has attempted to declare its troops on Lemnos to NATO as part of its contributed forces and has refused to participate in exercises that do not include the island.

4.62. As a consequence of these disagreements the committee understands that reintegration of Greek forces can be said to be effective to some extent only in the case of the Greek navy, which participates in some NATO exercises. The full co-operation of Greek air and land forces in NATO defence plans, and the establishment of a new NATO headquarters in Larissa remain essential.

(ix) *United States*

4.63. As the only non-riparian NATO country with a major military presence in the Mediterranean today, the United States makes an important contribution to NATO defence in the area not only by the size of its forces – important though they are – but as a link between the local NATO countries in the area which are largely separated by sea as well as by history. As well as participating in the NATO collective defence arrangements to which all the local NATO countries subscribe, the United States has bilateral mutual defence agreements with all the Mediterranean NATO countries (except France) whereby the United States enjoys the use of various mili-

tary base and other facilities, while it provides military assistance to Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey. In addition, United States officers in senior positions of command – in particular Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) himself – have been better placed to generate co-operation between the military forces of the different NATO countries in the area than might officers from those countries because of certain historical rivalries.

4.64. At the same time, certain operations conducted by United States forces in the Mediterranean, which like forces of all NATO countries operate under national command in peacetime, have been the subject of some criticism by European NATO countries from time to time. Increasingly the host countries have insisted that the military installations they make available to United States forces shall be used for NATO purposes only – or for purposes approved by the host country. Periodical renewal of the bilateral agreements is the subject of negotiations, sometimes lengthy negotiations.

4.65. The United States sixth fleet in the Mediterranean will normally comprise up to 6 nuclear-propelled attack submarines, 1 or 2 (rarely 3) aircraft carriers, 12 other major surface combatants, 11 support ships and a marine unit of battalion size or larger embarked on 5 amphibious landing ships. Normally based in the area of Naples and Catania in Sicily, the sixth fleet also uses the important large anchorage at Suda Bay in Crete. The United States air force in the Mediterranean area is largely based in Spain where there are 3 squadrons with 72 F-16 which rotate to United States air bases further east in the Mediterranean in Italy, Greece and Turkey. The United States naval aviation operates P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft chiefly out of Sigonella in Sicily.

4.66. United States army units in the Mediterranean theatre are smaller but there are some 4,000 army personnel in Italy mostly comprising the Southern European Task Force responsible for providing logistical and nuclear fire support to Italian forces.

4.67. The United States basing agreement with Portugal originated in a bilateral executive agreement of September 1951, modified, extended and amplified in various formal and informal arrangements since then. The agreement provides for the use of 3 airfields and 5 naval facilities in the Azores as well as communication facilities, radio relays and navigational aids. Submarine surveillance facilities in the Azores are capable of tracking Soviet submarines as far away as the Straits of Gibraltar. In April 1975 the then Portuguese Government declared that the Azores air base could not be used by the United States for supplying Israel in the course of any new war in the Middle East.

4.68. As in the case of Portugal, United States defence agreements with Spain were first concluded with a dictatorship and extended on a five-yearly basis. Under a 1976 treaty which replaced earlier agreements, most tanker aircraft (used for refuelling transport aircraft en route to Israel) were withdrawn from Spain, and strategic submarines were removed from Rota from 1979. A new agreement was signed in July 1982, a month after Spain's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. For the first time this agreement provided that the overflight and use of Spanish airspace was subject to Spanish control; it maintained Spanish policy, since the accident in the 1960s which caused radioactive contamination, of excluding nuclear weapons from Spanish territory. The major bases available to the United States are the naval base at Rota near Cadiz and air bases at Torrejon near Madrid, Saragossa north-east of Madrid and Moron near Seville in the south. There is also a naval air base at Rota used chiefly for maritime surveillance. A United States petroleum pipeline stretches nearly 800 km from Cadiz to Saragossa providing aviation and other fuel to the United States air bases. There are 6 major communications centres at various points in Spain and on the Balearic islands and 2 LORAN stations. The government of Mr. Gonzalez took office on 1st December 1982, not long after the conclusion of the July agreement with the United States which the socialist party in opposition had criticised. The agreement was ratified in April 1983 with an additional protocol providing that Spain's membership of NATO did not imply participation in the integrated military structure. As already pointed out, one of the conditions put to the Spanish population in the referendum on membership of NATO held on 12th March 1986 was that "gradual steps will be taken towards the progressive reduction of United States military presence in Spain". The United States agreed in December 1985 to negotiate reductions in its forces when renewal of the 1982 agreement was discussed. At the time of the referendum there were press reports that the United States forces in Spain had been quietly reduced from 12,600 to 9,500, partly by replacement of United States by Spanish personnel. It was suggested that the lower figure would become the official ceiling when negotiations were completed.

4.69. The United States military presence in Italy dates in practice from World War II but was first formalised by an exchange of notes in January 1952 followed by an agreement signed in October 1954 with subsequent additions. The Italian Defence White Paper 1985 makes virtually no reference to the presence or rôle of United States forces in Italy. There is a total of some 58 various installations and bases available to the United States in Italy, some quite small such as radio relay stations, and some larger

bases. The United States army presence of 4,000 men in Italy is the largest in any of the Mediterranean countries, most of it concentrated in the Southern European Task Force with headquarters in Vicenza, with a logistic base in the port of Livorno which both provides logistical support as well as nuclear fire support for the Italian army. The United States air force has 5,800 men in Italy; the main base is at Aviano in north-eastern Italy from which tactical squadrons operate on rotation from the main bases in Spain. Naples airfield is also available to the United States air force and United States naval aviation operates maritime surveillance aircraft out of Sigonella airfield near the port of Catania in Sicily. The United States sixth fleet is based in part in Naples, with its headquarters-ship anchored off Gaeta to the north, and also uses the port of Catania in Sicily. The nuclear-propelled attack submarines in the Mediterranean are serviced at La Maddalena, an island off the north of Sardinia. There are 5,250 United States naval personnel in Italy. The United States operates some 15 radio communications stations located in various parts of Italy as well as the important intelligence-gathering centre at San Vito in the south-east near Brindisi.

4.70. Agreements on United States military facilities in Greece date from a first bilateral agreement of October 1953 authorising the construction of military and supporting facilities in Greece such as the two governments should agree to be necessary "for the implementation of, or in furtherance of, approved NATO plans". Following the events of 1974 there were long-drawn-out negotiations over a new agreement in which Greece sought guarantees that military assistance to Greece and Turkey would henceforth be in the ratio of 7 to 10 respectively, and in which Greece sought assurances concerning a military balance in the Aegean, and the use to which United States bases would be put. After Mr. Papandreou's government came to power in 1981, a new five-year base agreement was signed in 1983, providing specifically that the facilities provided could not be used against countries friendly to Greece, including Libya. Despite PASOK pre-election rhetoric calling for the removal of United States bases and nuclear weapons from Greek territory, the bases were reprieved. The most important from the United States point of view is probably the naval base in Suda Bay, Crete, an enclosed deepwater natural anchorage large enough to take the whole of the sixth fleet. The Suda Bay complex includes ammunitions storage sites and an airfield used by the United States air force for staging reconnaissance missions. There is a second air base at Hellenikon near Athens. There are in addition some eight major military communications facilities in various parts of Greece and a major intelligence-gathering centre at Iraklion in Crete. The present bilateral base

agreement expires in December 1988 and the United States has been anxious to secure assurances that it will be extended beyond that date. Apparently during Mr. Shultz's visit to Athens at the end of March the subject was not officially raised, but the Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreou, was reported as saying that Greece was satisfied with the agreement. The base agreement has always been closely linked to United States defence aid which in fiscal year 1986 is reported to be some \$500 million in the form of credits - the breakdown of United States defence aid to 52 countries worldwide, including 10 in the Mediterranean area, is shown at Appendix III. United States forces in Greece number 3,500, mostly air force.

4.71. United States basing arrangements in Turkey were first formalised in a number of secret agreements after Turkey's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1952, the most important being the military facilities agreement of June 1954. A defence co-operation agreement was signed in 1969 which apparently codified numerous earlier agreements. Although classified, apparently for political reasons at Turkey's request, the contents were publicised by Mr. Demirel, then Prime Minister, in February 1970 who pointed out that activities under joint defence co-operation were based on Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty and would never exceed the limits of NATO commitments. In July 1975, when the United States Congress suspended military assistance sales to Turkey, Turkey assumed full control of United States installations, leading inter alia to the suspension of intelligence-gathering activities at 4 sites. A new four-year agreement was signed in March 1976 which provided more specifically than the previous agreements that "the installations shall not be used for, nor shall the activities serve, purposes other than those authorised by the Government of the Republic of Turkey". Under the agreement the Turkish Government has the right to appoint 50% of the personnel engaged in technical operations and related maintenance services and activities in the authorised installations which "shall be carried out jointly". Difficulties with Congress prevented the arms embargo being lifted before 1978 and prevented the new agreement entering into force. A similar agreement was concluded in March 1980 which expired in December 1985, remaining tacitly in force while the Turkish Government of Mr. Ozal has notified the United States that it wishes to renegotiate its terms. The most important United States military facilities in Turkey are the strategic airfield at Incirlik in south-central Turkey from which United States squadrons can operate on rotation from Spain and Italy, and 4 important intelligence-gathering facilities located in eastern Turkey, 2 on the Black Sea coast and 1 in the Sea of Marmara. In addition, there are naval facilities at

Kargaburun in the Sea of Marmara and at Izmir, further airfields at Izmir and Ankara and some 16 major communications facilities in various parts of Turkey. During his visit to Turkey at the end of March the United States Secretary of State failed to renegotiate the base agreement, which is closely linked to the question of military assistance and, apparently, an attempt by Turkey to link agreement with its textile exports to the United States. General Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, is reported as estimating that \$1.4 billion a year is needed to upgrade Turkish military equipment²¹. Turkey is reported to have requested military assistance from the United States of \$1.2 billion a year whereas United States proposals for fiscal year 1986 amounted to \$714 million military assistance only – respecting the 7 to 10 ratio with Greece. As shown at Appendix III, assistance to Turkey would be about half in cheap loans and one-quarter in grants. United States forces in Turkey number 5,000 of which 3,800 are air force.

4.72. Operations by United States forces in the Mediterranean serve both national and NATO purposes. The maritime surveillance operation conducted largely by aircraft but also by reports from surface ships is a continuous activity throughout the year. Information on the locations and movements of Soviet naval vessels is in part a co-ordinated NATO activity run by Commander Maritime Air Forces, a United States admiral based in Naples. The United States sixth fleet conducts NATO exercises in co-ordination with vessels of other NATO navies from time to time. The very large electronic intelligence-gathering operation operated by the United States in the Mediterranean area, particularly in Turkey, is essentially a national defence function the fruits of which are certainly not circulated on a NATO-wide basis, although one or two allies have access to selected United States intelligence data through bilateral agreements. Nevertheless, the general picture of Soviet military capability and activities which is built up from many different sources of raw intelligence data is undoubtedly of value to the alliance as a whole.

4.73. However, certain military activities conducted by the United States in the Mediterranean area, which have not in any way been co-ordinated with NATO, have been the cause of concern to NATO allies. Two recent events are analysed separately here, because they raise different issues.

United States warships in the Black Sea

4.74. In the week of 10th March 2 United States warships cruising in the Black Sea sailed to within 6 miles of the Soviet coast in the Crimean

21. Time, 7th April 1986.

peninsula. The Soviet Union claims a 12 mile territorial sea and lodged an official protest with the United States over the incident. The United States claims that it was merely exercising the right of "innocent passage". Under the 1936 Treaty of Montreux, naval vessels of non-Black Sea powers are entitled to pass through the Turkish Straits and to cruise in the Black Sea under certain restrictions. Eight days' notice, preferably 15, of passage through the straits must be given to Turkey, there must not be more than an aggregate total of 45,000 tonnes of non-Black Sea power naval ships in the Black Sea at any one time, and not more than 30,000 tonnes belonging to any one non-Black Sea power. In practice, the United States navy exercises this right of non-Black Sea powers more than any other. An analysis of all passages by naval vessels through the Turkish Straits is given in the table hereafter. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 1982, now signed by 159 nations including all NATO countries except Germany, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, provides for the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea "so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state". Article 19 specifically precludes "any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal state". (The convention requires 60 ratifications to enter into force; so far only 25 mainly third world countries have ratified; the United States is seeking amendments chiefly to the economic provisions of the convention. So entry into force is not an immediate prospect.) The United Nations convention has largely codified previous usage in the matter of innocent passage. The spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Mr. Lomeiko, on 20th March asserted that: "what was involved here was not innocent passage, but a clearly provocative passage in clear violation of the state border of the Soviet Union and including an attempt to conduct espionage...". It had taken place "in the vicinity of the Soviet coast, where there are no traditional seaways"²². Press enquiries of the Department of Defence in Washington apparently elicited the information that the Soviet Union had exercised a similar right to sail warships near to American overseas territories, but not to the coast of the mainland²³.

United States warships in the Gulf of Sirte

4.75. The United States navy had exercised its right to sail in the Gulf of Sirte off the Libyan coast on 7 occasions since 1981²⁴. This is a

22. The Guardian, 21st March 1986.

23. Dangerous games at sea, International Herald Tribune, 25th March 1986.

24. Statement by the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr. Weinberger. Television interview on 23rd March 1986 quoted in Guardian, 24th March 1986.

Warships of non-Black Sea powers visiting the Black Sea

Country	1983			1984		
	Type of warship	No. of days in Black Sea	Total No. of ship-days 1983	Type of warship	No. of days in Black Sea	Total No. of ship-days 1984
United States	Destroyer	3	} 46	Cruiser	12	} 40
	Frigate	3		Frigate	12	
	Destroyer	8		Destroyer	8	
	Frigate	8		Destroyer	8	
	Destroyer	9				
	Frigate	9				
	Auxiliary	6				
Netherlands	Destroyer	6	} 12	-	-	-
	Frigate	6				
Greece	Training ship	13	13	Frigate	7	7
Italy	-	-	-	Training ship	8	8
Brazil	Training ship	6	6	-	-	-
Egypt	-	-	-	Destroyer	5	5
German DR	-	-	-	Training ship	9	} 18
	-	-	-	Auxiliary	9	
Libya	-	-	-	Landing ship	6	} 18
	-	-	-	Landing ship	6	
	-	-	-	Landing ship	6	
Poland	-	-	-	Training ship	10	10

Source : Rapport annuel sur le mouvement des navires à travers les détroits turcs, drawn up each year by the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in accordance with the 1936 Montreux Convention.

different issue which does not involve the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. Libya claims a territorial sea of 12 miles but in 1973 declared a base line across the Gulf of Sirte at 32°30' north latitude, claiming the waters to the landward as "internal waters". The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea permits such base lines to be drawn across bays only if the length of the straight line needed to enclose the bay does not exceed 24 nautical miles. The length of the Libyan base line across the Gulf of Sirte is some 270 nautical miles long, in parts more than 100 nautical miles distant from the coast. The Libyan claim has not been recognised by any country except Burkina. In December 1985 Colonel Kadhafi began referring to the Libyan base line as "the line of death".

4.76. In March 1986, with a third aircraft carrier being brought into the Mediterranean for the purpose and early-warning Hawkeye aircraft both from the carriers and apparently from bases in Egypt providing radar cover, the United States task force of 30 ships began to fly a number of aircraft sorties over the disputed area of the gulf, correctly informing Libyan air traffic control on 19th March that carrier flight operations were being carried out within its area of air control. Other press reports say that the Soviet Union was warned of United States intentions; Soviet

technicians were said to have been withdrawn from Libyan missile sites at the time, and a Soviet intelligence-gathering ship within the Gulf of Sirte took care to identify itself by keeping all its lights on. The United States claimed that on 24th March Libya fired 6 surface-to-air SAM-5 missiles from a base near to the town of Sirte, all of which missed their targets. In retaliation, United States aircraft destroyed the missile radars with two Harm missiles designed to home in on hostile radar emission. In the course of 24th and 25th March, United States aircraft launched a further attack on the missile site, sank 3 Libyan patrol boats, and left a fourth damaged. The United States had issued a warning that any Libyan forces more than 12 miles from the Libyan coast in the Gulf of Sirte would be considered hostile targets. The United States force then withdrew to Sicily.

4.77. Later press reports from Washington²⁵ said that planning for the operation began shortly after the terrorist attacks at Rome and Vienna airports on 27th December 1985, and was designed in part to offer opportunity for reprisal against Libya which the United States blamed for the airport attacks. The SAM-5 missile targets in Libya were ideal from the United States

25. International Herald Tribune, 26th March 1986.

point of view as the installation of those Soviet missiles in late 1985 had been denounced by United States spokesmen as exceeding any legitimate security requirement of Libya.

4.78. All NATO countries have of course joined in affirming the right of all countries to enjoy the freedom of the high seas, including the waters of the Gulf of Sirte, but the reactions of the Mediterranean NATO countries to the United States operations were reserved or critical. Typical was the comment by Mr. Craxi, the Italian Prime Minister, on 25th March, after an emergency cabinet meeting:

“ We do not want a war on our doorstep... war games in an area of such high tension do not appear to be the most appropriate to resolve a question of principle and of international law. ”²⁶

Italy told the United States that it hoped operations would not be conducted from bases in Italy.

4.79. General Secretary Gorbachev in a speech on 26th March, distributed by Tass, predictably condemned United States actions against Libya, but added:

“ If the United States, which is situated thousands of miles from the Mediterranean, pulled its fleet out of there, the Soviet Union would simultaneously do the same. ”

4.80. Article 6²⁷ of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that:

“ For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack...on the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of these parties when in or over...the Mediterranean Sea... ”

It was therefore open to the United States when its aircraft were attacked by Libya on 24th March to invoke Article 5 and call on all other NATO countries to assist by taking action “ including the use of armed force ”²⁸.

United States attack on targets in Libya

4.81. The United States attack on targets in Libya on 15th April and subsequent events are not dealt with in the present report. The committee intends to refer to them in a report expressing its opinion on the report of the General Affairs Committee on security and terrorism – the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world.

26. Daily Telegraph, 26th March 1986.

27. As modified on the accession of Greece and Turkey in 1952.

28. Text of Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty at Appendix I.

(b) Collective defence arrangements under NATO

4.82. Collective defence arrangements under NATO in the Mediterranean can be described under three main headings: command structure; joint forces; infrastructure.

(i) NATO command structure

4.83. In peacetime forces which are assigned to NATO or earmarked for assignment in the event of hostilities remain under purely national command except for certain air defence forces kept on permanent alert. NATO maintains a number of jointly staffed military headquarters which in peacetime have a planning function, including the right to inspect the readiness of forces assigned to NATO, and practise the control of forces during periodical NATO exercises.

4.84. The NATO Commander-in-Chief for the whole of the Mediterranean area, immediately subordinate to SACEUR, is Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe, a United States admiral with headquarters in Naples where a number of immediately subordinate headquarters are also housed. Details of the chain of command and subordinate NATO headquarters are shown at Appendix IV. Reference has been made to the COMGIBMED headquarters in paragraph 4.16, and the problems of the Izmir headquarters and the planned headquarters at Larissa in Greece have been referred to in paragraph 4.60 above.

4.85. Of particular importance in peacetime are the air defence headquarters which are permanently manned and which receive information from the NADGE (NATO air defence ground environment) radar chain which, in the Mediterranean area, comprises 9 radar stations in Italy, 4 in Greece and 14 in Turkey. NATO airborne early warning aircraft are now operational in the Mediterranean, operating already out of northern Italy and Turkey, and are scheduled to be operational out of airfields in Greece by 1987. This considerably improves early warning in the area, especially for low-flying aircraft.

4.86. Surveillance by maritime reconnaissance aircraft from all the NATO countries in the area, with good French co-operation, is co-ordinated by Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean also located in Naples.

(ii) Joint forces

4.87. While NATO forces remain under national command in peacetime, two joint international forces are activated periodically in the Mediterranean area which serve a politically valuable purpose in demonstrating the practical workings of NATO. The naval on-call force Mediterra-

nean (NAVOCFORMED) is normally assembled for a month twice a year for training when it makes a point of making port calls in various Mediterranean NATO countries. It is composed of one vessel contributed by each of Italy, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States; Spain has been invited to contribute a vessel. When in being the force is controlled by Commander Naval Forces Southern Europe from Naples. As with so many NATO arrangements in the Mediterranean the Greek-Turkey dispute has partly affected the operation of NAVOCFORMED.

4.88. ACE mobile force, comprising both a land and an air element, is a multinational force of brigade group size supported by 3 or 4 squadrons of aircraft which can deploy on demand to the NATO flanks. In the Mediterranean area it is regularly exercised in northern Italy, in Thrace, and in eastern Turkey. In any period of tension on one of the NATO flanks, ACE mobile force, once the governmental decisions are taken, can be rapidly moved to the area concerned providing not only small but militarily useful reinforcements but, politically more important, a demonstration of the solidarity of the alliance, demonstrating that any use of force by the Warsaw Pact would involve not only the flank country immediately threatened, but all other countries represented in the mobile force.

(iii) Infrastructure

4.89. NATO commonly-financed infrastructure has made an important contribution in improving the defence capabilities of the countries of the Mediterranean area. In the last 35 years it has funded the construction of airfields, now with hardened aircraft shelters, radar stations, fuel storage and communications systems. In the past priority has been given to the central region; the southern region lags badly behind as far as communications are concerned and the provision of aircraft shelters. NATO's latest six-year infrastructure programme was finally agreed by the Defence Planning Committee on 5th December 1984 after nearly a year of difficult negotiations. It provides a total of 3 billion international accounting units (\$7.85 billion) for the period 1985 to 1991 which will provide in particular for much of the outstanding facilities, including hardened aircraft shelters, necessary to receive United States air force reinforcements in Europe. As the United States provides 27% of infrastructure funds and the Federal Republic of Germany 26%, those two countries were primarily concerned in the negotiations, but the United States exerted considerable pressure in an attempt to secure a higher expenditure ceiling. The programme will provide several hundred hardened aircraft shelters, improved communications and improvements to existing oil depots and pipelines. For the first time the southern region has been allocated more than 33% of

expenditure, but existing deficiencies will not be remedied until towards the end of the programme in the early 1990s.

V. The non-aligned countries of the Mediterranean

(a) Yugoslavia

5.1. The pessimistic scenario occasionally put forward before the death of President Tito in 1980, according to which the Soviet Union might on such an occasion attempt to assert the Brezhnev doctrine of the "socialist commonwealth" elaborated at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, was not borne out. As the committee noted in its previous report there was an orderly transfer of power on President Tito's death to the rotating collective leadership representative of the 6 republics and 2 autonomous regions provided for in the 1974 constitution that had been specially drawn up to prepare the way for the post-Tito period. There has been no evidence of external pressure from the Soviet Union to attempt to impose any particular new leadership or to establish closer relations. At the same time, the very provisions of the 1974 constitution, designed to prevent domination of national politics by any one of the constituent parts of the country, have not made for strong central government. The present Prime Minister, Mr. Branko Mikulic, on taking office in January 1986, complained that the most able leaders were not being put forward by the provinces to serve in the Federal Government. Much real power remains in the hands of the separate republics.

5.2. Yugoslavia has severe economic problems at the present time, made worse by the great disparities in standards of living between the different constituent republics. There are severe public order problems in the province of Kosovo bordering Albania, where the majority Albanian-speaking muslim population is slowly succeeding in expelling the minority Serbian population from the province. It is claimed that most of the 2,000 political prisoners held in Yugoslavia are held in connection with disturbances in Kosovo.

5.3. President Tito broke away from Stalinist Russia as long ago as 1948 since when Yugoslavia has pursued an independent foreign policy, having played in the past an important rôle in the world non-aligned movement. Nevertheless, the country maintains correct relations with the Soviet Union and Soviet military aircraft on reconnaissance missions are able to overfly the country – the only access route to the Mediterranean that is normally open to Soviet military aircraft – and the provision of submarine repair facilities at Tivat has been noted above.

5.4. Italy maintains good relations with Yugoslavia. From the standpoint of European security it is certain that the neutral and non-aligned status of the country would provide very substantial warning time to NATO of any movement by Warsaw Pact forces towards north-eastern Italy. Italy believes that the European Community should play a leading rôle in helping Yugoslavia with its economic problems.

5.5. Yugoslavia is regarded as having effective armed forces of 241,000 with nearly 1,000 tanks, mostly T-54/55, but including 100 T-74, and over 400 combat aircraft which include MiG-21 and the Yugoslav ORAO produced jointly with Romania using British engines. Yugoslavia exported \$2 billion of armaments in 1985. Following a visit to Yugoslavia by a Rapporteur in 1978, the committee reported²⁹ on Yugoslav plans for "all-people's defence" which would involve most of the population in resistance if the country were invaded by any country.

(b) Albania

5.6. For decades a completely self-isolated country since its break with the Soviet Union in the 1950s Albania had received some economic and military assistance from China until the end of the Mao régime and had acted as an occasional spokesman for that country before it was admitted to the United Nations. After the admission of China, the isolation of Albania became complete.

5.7. With the death of Enver Hoxha in April 1985 there has naturally been speculation as to whether his successor, Mr. Ramiz Alia, would continue to follow Hoxha's rigid Stalinist and isolationist policy. There are a few tentative signs that this very backward underdeveloped country, where there are still no private cars, is taking a few tentative steps to establish some relations with European countries. It is understood that the Soviet Union has attempted to improve its relations with the country, but with no sign of the Soviet approaches being reciprocated. The Norwegian deputy Foreign Minister has recently paid a visit to the country, presumably at the invitation of Albania. Italy, which of the western countries naturally takes the lead in attempting to maintain friendly relations, has established a commercial airlink between Bari, Brindisi and Tirana. Italy, however, has a problem with a number of local families that have taken refuge in the Italian Embassy in Tirana against state repression and is endeavouring to secure safe passage for them. From the end of March 1986 there will be two weekly flights by Swissair from Zürich to Tirana - on the initiative of Albania. Some limited tourism for 40 visitors a week has been arranged with the Uni-

ted Kingdom from October, and a larger company, Cooks Tours, is reported to be arranging weekend visits from 1987.

5.8. Albanian armed forces total 40,000. The army of 30,000 has 100 mostly obsolete T-34, T-54 and T-59 tanks and an equally obsolete air force of 80 MiG-15, MiG-17 and MiG-19 combat aircraft.

(c) Cyprus

(i) General

5.9. Since 1974 the committee has frequently reported on the situation in Cyprus because it is an important factor in Greek-Turkish relations and consequently affects the cohesion of NATO and European security. For the first time the committee's Rapporteur was able to visit the island in March 1986, and to meet all the leading figures concerned. Previous reports of the committee have described the events from independence in 1960 up to the 1974 coup d'état by the Greek-officered national guard organised by the colonels' régime in Athens, which briefly replaced President Makarios by the former terrorist Nikos Sampson, and the subsequent military intervention by Turkey, which led to the present de facto division of the island with the United Nations force in Cyprus maintaining a buffer zone between the two communities. The past events are not described again in the present report, nor is it its purpose, much less the rôle of WEU, to seek to propose any solutions to a problem that must be settled between the two communities concerned, through the good offices of the United Nations Secretary-General, with as little interference from outside powers as possible. The purpose of the Rapporteur's visit was fact-finding; the committee's interest flows from its concern with European security.

(ii) Present situation

5.10. The events in 1974 transformed the situation in Cyprus in one significant way in that the two ethnic communities of Turkish-speaking Cypriots and Greek-speaking Cypriots are now physically separated by the cease-fire line. Previously, although a majority of the Turkish Cypriot population lived in the northern and eastern part of the island, the two communities had in practice been inextricably mixed with Turkish Cypriot agricultural communities in many villages throughout the island, and many Greek Cypriots in the north.

5.11. The Turkish Cypriot northern part of the island today comprises about one-third of the land area. Population figures in Cyprus are in dispute; there has been immigration to both parts of the island since 1974, and the situation is obscured to some extent by the large number of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots resident in the United Kingdom. Turkish Cypriots accounted

²⁹ Security in the Mediterranean, Document 776, 31st May 1978, Rapporteur: Mr. Grant.

for some 18% of the total population of 632,000 in 1973. Independent observers believe that about 30,000 agricultural workers from Turkish Anatolia were then settled in the north in 1975, some of whom have since returned. Some Turkish Cypriots have returned to Cyprus both from the United Kingdom and from Australia. Economically northern Cyprus is almost entirely dependent on Turkey for its trade and external relations, and communications with Turkey are being improved through the enlargement of the port of Kyrenia and the construction of a new airport at Lefkoniko to the north-east of Nicosia which was opened on 7th March. Mr. Rauf Denktash, the undisputed leader of the Turkish community, announced the formation of a "Turkish Cypriot federated state" in 1975 which was designed to form one part of a federal republic of Cyprus; he did not claim international recognition as an independent state, but the title was recognised only by Turkey. In 1983, however, Mr. Denktash went further in proclaiming a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", although reiterating his readiness to continue negotiations for the creation of a federal state in Cyprus. Only Turkey has accorded recognition to the proclaimed republic; so far neither Mr. Denktash nor Turkey has sought particularly actively to secure recognition for it. A draft constitution was approved by referendum on 5th May 1985; under it Mr. Denktash was elected President on 9th June that year by 70.5% of the votes against the Marxist CTP candidate, Mr. Ozgür, who obtained 18.4% of the votes and Mr. Durduran of the left wing communal liberation party (TKP) who obtained 9.2%. Legislative elections on 23rd June 1985 led to the following results:

*23rd June 1985 - elections
to the Northern Cyprus Assembly*

UBP (National Unity,
Mr. Denktash) 37% 24 seats

CTP (Marxist, Mr. Ozgür) 21% 12 seats
TKP (Left, Mr. Durduran) 16% 10 seats
New Dawn (centre-right) 9% 4 seats

5.12. The Greek Cypriot two-thirds of the island had an estimated 550,000 population but there is understood to have been some limited immigration from Greece and favourable economic conditions have attracted Cypriots from the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Unlike the north, the south has a strong economy with very little unemployment and has enjoyed an unprecedented building boom both of hotels and offices in large part because of the move of various commercial interests from the Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East. There are signs however that this growth is coming to a halt.

5.13. The present government of the Republic of Cyprus, internationally recognised as such, is still conducted under the independence constitution of 1960 although there has been no Turkish Cypriot participation in government since 1963. The de facto jurisdiction of the government is today limited to the Greek Cypriot part of the island.

5.14. At the end of December 1984, President Kyprianou terminated a co-operation agreement between his Democratic Party (DIKO) and the pro-communist AKEL. In early 1985, the opposition Democratic Rally (DISY) led by Mr. Glafcos Clerides called for President Kyprianou's resignation because of his obstruction of an intercommunal agreement, and were joined by the AKEL Party in their opposition. The socialist EDEK party has continued to support Mr. Kyprianou. The AKEL and DISY Parties lack the two-thirds majority in the chamber necessary to unseat President Kyprianou, but on 1st November 1985 the chamber agreed unanimously to hold premature elections on 8th December which led to the following results:

Republic of Cyprus elections - 8th December 1985

	%		Seats	
	1981	1985	1981	1985
AKEL (pro-Communist)	32.8	27.4	12	15
DISY (Democratic Rally, Clerides)	31.9	33.6	12	19
DIKO (Democratic Party, Kyprianou)	19.5	27.7	8	16
EDEK (Socialist)	8.2	11.1	3	6
Total Greek Cypriot (Reserved for Turkish Cypriots)			35 15	56 24
Total seats			50	80

5.15. Although the separation of the two communities is virtually complete - the United Nations estimate only 1,100 Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north and approximately

300 Turkish Cypriots in the south - the two zones are still interdependent for various services including water supplies, electricity and telephone although with the construction of new

water catchment facilities in the south, the dependence on water supplies from the north will decrease.

(iii) Greek, Turkish and Cypriot military forces in Cyprus

5.16. Independent observers estimate that today Turkey maintains 17,000 men in northern Cyprus organised in 2 divisions with some 150 battle tanks, artillery and armoured carriers. In addition, northern Cyprus has a militia of 4,500 men based on a 2-year period of conscription at age 18, but the militia has little equipment of its own.

5.17. In the south, Greece maintains one infantry battalion of 950 men and 1 commando of 350. In addition, 450 Greek officers and NCOs are serving with the Greek Cypriot national guard.

5.18. The national guard of 10,000 men is based on compulsory service of 26 months. It is organised in 1 armoured battalion and 2 reconnaissance/mechanised infantry battalions, some 20 ordinary infantry battalions and artillery support. It has a number of armoured carriers but lacks other armour.

(iv) United Nations force in Cyprus

5.19. The United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus was established by resolution of the Security Council on 4th March 1964 with a mandate to prevent the recurrence of intercommunal fighting that had broken out in the island. The mandate has since been extended by the Security Council for successive periods of 6 months, most recently in December 1985. Because of the intercommunal nature of the fighting in 1964 the force was originally deployed in towns and villages throughout the island. Following the outbreak of hostilities in 1974 and the eventual establishment of a cease-fire called for by the Security Council on 16th August 1974 the force was substantially redeployed to man observation posts and patrols along the buffer zone which was then created between the cease-fire lines of the opposing forces. The zone crosses the island from north-west to south-east, is 217 km long and varies in width from 7 km at its widest to 10 m at points within the old city of Nicosia which it traverses. The force has established 141 observation posts along the buffer zone, of which 60 are permanently manned 24 hours a day. In addition to patrolling the buffer zone and maintaining the military status quo as established at the time of the 1974 cease-fire, the force has humanitarian responsibilities to the small remaining minority populations living on the other side of the cease-fire line as well as sole administrative and police responsibility for the population living actually within the buffer zone where there are several villages, including Pyla, the only village with a mixed community remain-

ing on the island. UNFICYP also maintains a presence in Varosha, the former Greek-Cypriot suburb of Famagusta on the Turkish side of the cease-fire line, but now abandoned.

5.20. The force as constituted by the United Nations Security Council in 1964 is composed of military contingents from Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom together with civilian police detachments from Australia and Sweden. From a maximum size of 6,500 men, UNFICYP has now been reduced to 2,300 soldiers provided by the following contingents:

Denmark	341
United Kingdom	741
Canada	515
Sweden	376
Austria	301

These five contingents man the buffer zone in that order from west to east. The Finnish and Irish military contingents have now been reduced to a token 10 and 8 respectively, but battalions from these countries could be brought back at any time if necessary as the Security Council mandate remains valid. The force is supported by 35 international civilian staff of the United Nations of 21 different nationalities and 400 local employees. Most of the logistical support for the force including transport, communications and rations is supplied by the British contingent. The force is commanded by Major-General Günther G. Greindl, seconded from the Austrian army, who is directly responsible to the Secretary-General.

5.21. In 1984 the annual operating cost of the United Nations force was a little over US\$100 million a year. This is met first by the countries contributing contingents which, under United Nations regulations, are not reimbursed for troops' pay and allowances and normal material costs, and which have also agreed to meet certain of the extra costs involved in maintaining their troops in Cyprus. These contributions account for about two-thirds of the total cost. The remaining third is the direct cost to the United Nations which is financed through voluntary contributions from 71 countries including Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the United Kingdom from the WEU countries, but the voluntary Special Account had a cumulative deficit of \$127.7 million by the end of 1984, provisionally made up by the troop-contributing countries. None of the Warsaw Pact countries contributes. Details of financial contributions are shown at Appendix V.

(v) British sovereign base area

5.22. Cyprus was under the Ottoman Empire for 300 years from 1570 until 1878 when the Sultan in an agreement with Britain consented "to

assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England”³⁰. Britain used the island as a military base to provide assistance to the Ottoman Empire against Russia. With the outbreak of war in 1914 and Turkey an enemy, Britain annexed the island which became a British crown colony under the Treaty of Lausanne in 1924. After withdrawal of British forces from the Suez Canal zone in the early 1950s, Cyprus became the headquarters of British forces in the Middle East and Vulcan strategic bombers were based there in support of the CENTO commitment to Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

5.23. Under the Treaty of Establishment signed by the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus in July 1960, as part of the arrangements providing for the independence of Cyprus, the United Kingdom was provided with the present two sovereign base areas totalling 253 sq. km which do not form part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. The United Kingdom also retained the use of various other sites, installations and training areas including port areas in Limasol and Famagusta and an area in Nicosia airport (disused since 1974) with the right to use the runway.

5.24. British forces in Cyprus have never been assigned to NATO. Until 1976 it housed the headquarters British forces Near East, but since 1960 the numbers of forces have been considerably reduced and in 1976 the title of the headquarters was changed to “British forces Cyprus”. Today there are about 2,500 men organised in one and a half infantry battalions, one armoured reconnaissance battalion and some support units and a Wessex helicopter squadron. Phantom and Lightning tactical aircraft are based at the Akrotiri airfield.

5.25. Britain maintains an important communications and electronic intelligence-gathering facility in Cyprus which, together with a similar installation in Hong Kong, provides raw material to the communications intelligence centre in Cheltenham in the United Kingdom. Information derived from this source provides much of the basis for bilateral exchange of intelligence information with the United States. The sovereign base areas provide the United Kingdom with a useful forward air base which can be used by aircraft in transit to any points further east. It has been used in support of peace-keeping forces in the Lebanon and in the evacuation of residents from Yemen. With the knowledge of the Cyprus authorities, United States U-2 reconnaissance aircraft operate from the Akrotiri airfield carrying out observation duties over the demilitarised Sinai in a peace-keeping rôle.

5.26. Cyprus also provides British army and air force units with ideal training areas, with the advantage of a Mediterranean climate. The sovereign base areas have played an important rôle in peace-keeping arrangements in Cyprus, providing logistics support to the United Nations peace-keeping force referred to above.

5.27. Politically the presence of the sovereign base area is not an issue with the main political parties of either community in Cyprus. The Soviet Union on a number of occasions, most recently in 1985, in seeking to involve itself in the solution to the Cyprus problem has included proposals for the removal of all armed forces from the island.

(vi) The Cyprus problem

5.28. Since the events of 1974 there have been many years of abortive negotiations on a new constitution for Cyprus, in the course of which the Greek Cypriot side has come to concede the principle of a federal state while the Turkish Cypriot side as lately as November 1984 announced territorial concessions which would reduce the proportion of the island to be included in a Turkish Cypriot federated state to 29%. The most recent round of intercommunity negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General in New York from 17th to 21st January 1985 broke down through the refusal of President Kyrianiou to consider the Secretary-General's proposals as more than an agenda for negotiation whereas President Denktash considered them to be an outline agreement.

5.29. In March 1986 the Secretary-General completed a “draft framework agreement” which, while not being made public, is understood to embody simply a listing of most agreed issues, and an identification of areas of disagreement. The main unresolved points between the two communities appeared to be first the timetable for the withdrawal of Turkish forces, with the Greek Cypriot side insisting on withdrawal before any agreement enters into force, whereas the Turkish Cypriot side is unlikely to agree to complete withdrawal until such time as the Turkish Cypriot community has acquired confidence in the working of any new federal system. While the actual extent of territory to be included within each of the two future federated states is no longer a significant issue, the economic rights to be enjoyed by each community within the territory of the other remains to be settled. The Turkish Cypriot side is anxious to retain the homogeneity of its own community within the area of its own administration – a homogeneity that the 1974 events established for the first time. The Greek Cypriot side insists on the right of any Cypriots to engage in economic activities in any part of the island, which in practice, as the Greek Cypriots are the most entrepre-

30. The Cyprus Convention between Britain and the Ottoman Empire signed in Constantinople on 4th June 1878.

neurial-minded, amounts to the right for the Greek Cypriots to own property and conduct business in the area administered by the Turkish Cypriot community, although without any right to secure electoral representation outside their own area. The question of any guarantees by external powers also remains to be settled.

5.30. By the 21st April, the date on which the Secretary-General had asked for replies to his draft, the press was reporting that the draft had been accepted by the Turkish Cypriot side, but that a formal reply had not been sent by the Greek Cypriot side. Mr. George Iacovou, the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, is reported to have visited Moscow on 28th April to discuss the convening of an international conference to consider the four issues they considered had not been adequately dealt with in the Secretary-General's draft. This move was seen in allied circles as an attempt to force western allied countries to seek to persuade Turkey to persuade in turn Mr. Denktash to make more concessions to the Greek Cypriot position. The Soviet Union in January 1986 had renewed its proposals for an international conference on Cyprus which would seek to remove "all foreign forces" from the island – including by inference the British sovereign bases.

5.31. It is not the purpose of this report to make any specific proposals about internal Cyprus proposals. The committee nevertheless regrets the absence of direct contacts between the two Cyprus communities in the last 12 years. It will be difficult to resolve outstanding problems while intercommunity relations are limited to the present slender and indirect political contacts.

(d) Syria

5.32. Syria, with an army of 270,000 men and 4,200 tanks – 2,400 of them modern T-62 and T-72 – has the largest and most modern armoured force in the Middle East. Its air force of 500 combat aircraft includes modern Soviet MiG-25 and MiG-23 interceptors and 50 MiG-23 ground attack aircraft. It maintains some 3 armoured divisions with 800 battle tanks in Lebanon. Its navy is mainly based on 22 fast attack craft equipped with missiles. Israel claimed in February that the Soviet Union had supplied the first submarines.

5.33. Massively supplied with modern military equipment by the Soviet Union, Syria nevertheless cannot be counted as a Soviet ally. President Assad, re-elected in February 1985 for a third 7-year term since he took office in March 1971, and his Baath party have an overriding preoccupation with the restoration of the Palestinian state and the removal of Israel from other occupied territories. Deeply involved in Lebanon since it sent its forces in 1976, Syria supports

PLO factions opposed to Yasser Arafat, and some of the militia forces. While within the last 18 months President Assad has visited Moscow where he received assurances of continued military and economic support, western leaders have also visited Damascus including President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Papandreu, both in November 1984. Almost overlooked among the panoply of Soviet equipment in the Syrian armed forces are some Milan anti-tank missiles and 35 Gazelle helicopters supplied by France of which 15 destroyed in fighting have been replaced.

5.34. Observers attribute the naval facilities and port rights granted to the Soviet Union in the Syrian port of Tartus and Latakia more to Syrian dependence on the Soviet Union for its equipment, than on political alignment. The number of Soviet military technicians and advisers was reported in 1984 to have been reduced by about a third to some 3,000. While harbouring the Abu Nidal Palestinian faction, Syria has denied that it actively supports terrorism in third countries, and has assisted western countries in negotiations to free hostages taken by various armed factions in the Lebanon.

5.35. While Turkey is naturally preoccupied by the large and modern Syrian armoured divisions on its frontier, and has an outstanding dispute over territorial waters, relations between the two countries remain correct.

(e) Lebanon

5.36. The state of armed anarchy in Lebanon is not examined in the present report. Far from presenting any military threat of its own, Lebanon is a victim of Middle East conflicts not of its making. Its air force is virtually non-existent. Its army has some 50 tanks and a further 60 AMX-13 light tanks. Control of the country is largely exercised at present by the rival militias supported by Syria and Israel, and Syrian-backed PLO factions. Unidentified groups have seized hostages from several western countries, but there is no identifiable authority to which to turn to secure their release.

(f) Israel³¹

5.37. Relying heavily on the United States for military equipment (which in financial year 1986 is providing more military assistance to Israel than to any other country³²) and surrounded by potential adversaries, Israel has no alternative

31. The General Affairs Committee has regularly reported on the situation in Israel, most recently in the situation in the Middle East and European security, Document 978, 25th May 1984, Rapporteur: Lord Reay.

32. Appendix III.

foreign policies open to it. The primary interest of all western countries is to seek a solution to the particular Middle East conflict that involves Israel and the Palestinians, but the prospect of a solution is no nearer.

5.38. The highly efficient Israeli regular force of 142,000 men are backed by well-trained rapidly mobilisable reserves of 370,000. Well supplied by equipment, chiefly from the United States, Israel has its own important arms industry and is an exporter of equipment to countries which include South Africa. Israel's 3,600 tanks include 1,200 modern M-60 and its over 600 combat aircraft include F-15 and F-16.

(g) *Egypt*

5.39. Following the United States-sponsored Camp David agreement that sought to solve the Israeli-Egypt conflict in 1978, Egypt has become the largest single recipient after Israel of American military aid, entirely in the form of "forgiven credits"³³. The settlement has given Egypt and Israel a firm sense of security on their common frontier; the demilitarisation of Sinai is guaranteed by the United States which, with the other countries in the multilateral observer force, assists in peace-keeping surveillance of the area. The Egyptian leadership and any foreseeable alternative leadership from the middle classes accept the peace treaty with Israel as the only realistic policy for Egypt. The establishment in 1985 of close links between Libya and the new régime in the Sudan is particularly disturbing for Egypt.

5.40. Economically, disparity of the distribution of wealth among Egypt's large and growing population has become progressively worse. A large proportion of Egypt's relatively skilled labour force has been employed in the oil-producing Arab countries and remittances have provided an important addition to resources of the poorer section of the community. But that source is drying up with the falling price of oil, reduced production and the return home of Egyptian workers, in particular from Libya.

5.41. The riot in March by the central security forces is seen as a spontaneous demonstration by the lowest paid sector of the population against extremes of wealth flaunted in the luxury hotels in proximity to the barracks. Also muslim fundamentalism, building on deep-rooted opposition to the Israel peace treaty among the masses, which led to the assassination of President Sadat, remains a threat to the present régime.

5.42. In Egypt, as in much of the Middle East, a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute would do much to ensure the stability of the present Egyp-

tian Government and its present western-oriented policy.

5.43. In military terms, Egypt now provides the United States with a small but strategically important forward base, through which rapid deployment forces assigned to the new United States central command established in 1983 could be deployed for possible operations in the Persian Gulf. About 1,200 United States army personnel are stationed in Egypt.

5.44. One consequence of the change in alliances for Egypt is the impact on equipment. Some 1,500 Egyptian tanks are Soviet models which it will be increasingly difficult to maintain; 660 M-60s have so far been supplied by the United States. The air force of some 430 combat aircraft in service has been largely re-equipped with French and United States aircraft since its losses in the Yom Kippur conflict, but still retains 100 MiG interceptors.

(h) *Libya*

5.45. In its previous report the committee dealt at some length with Libya and the problems which its behaviour on the international scene poses not only to the western world but to its neighbours and nominal allies. Despite its conflict with Chad, the northern part of which is at present occupied by part of the Libyan army, Libya itself does not represent a serious military threat to the western world. Its armed forces are relatively small with an army of 58,000 providing perhaps the equivalent of two-and-a-half divisions. With its oil wealth, Libya has however purchased massive amounts of military equipment, mostly from the Soviet Union, but also from France, Italy and the United Kingdom. But of its 2,500 battle tanks and over 500 combat aircraft, much is reported to be in storage; the limited extent of skills among the Libyan population has obliged Colonel Kadhafi to rely on foreigners for technical support of sophisticated equipment while the air force reportedly relies on Soviet, Syrian, Pakistani, North Korean and Palestinian pilots.

5.46. Libya could of course provide the Soviet Union with important strategic bases in the Mediterranean as it has done in the past for western countries. Libya is reported to have constructed new airfields and to be constructing a new naval base beyond any possible national requirement, and vessels of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron have spent more time in Tripoli in the past year than hitherto. But there are no signs of the Soviet Union establishing any significant military base of its own in the country. Indeed, during Colonel Kadhafi's visit to Moscow in October 1985 relations with the Soviet Union were reported to have become strained. He failed to attend the Kremlin recep-

33. See Appendix III.

tion in his honour and the forecast treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union did not materialise although an economic agreement was extended. General Secretary Gorbachev was reported to have strongly criticised Libyan support for international terrorism including the seizing of the Achille Lauro liner by Palestinian guerrillas. Nevertheless, in December 1985 the Soviet Union supplied Libya with long-range SA-5 surface-to-air missiles which were described by a United States State Department spokesman as "clearly exceeding any legitimate security interests which the Libyans may have".

5.47. Libyan relationships with the rest of the Arab and muslim world vary from time to time. Colonel Kadhafi has been consistently hostile to his immediate neighbours, Tunisia and Egypt, as well as to Jordan. He has attempted to maintain good relations especially with Syria, and, surprisingly, in September 1984 signed a treaty of union with Morocco, but which does not appear to have had concrete results beyond indicating an end of Libyan support for the Polisario forces opposing Morocco in the western Sahara.

5.48. The problem of Libyan-sponsored terrorism abroad, the different interests and reactions of the European allies and the United States has been described in paragraphs 4.75 et seq. above.

5.49. Libya's unprecedented wealth giving it one of the highest per capita incomes on the southern shore of the Mediterranean has arisen for more than 90% from its petroleum exports. With the slump in the price of oil to one-third of the price of only a few years ago, Libya is facing an inevitable and severe economic crisis. It is interested in closer economic links with the European Community and the majority view among European countries is undoubtedly in favour of leaving the country through its excesses to isolate itself from the more moderate Arab world, while maintaining a dialogue through countries best placed to communicate with Libya and seeking to influence its policy by economic means. The consequence of military action against Libya may for some time increase support for the country in much of the Arab world.

(i) *Malta*

5.50. Malta had been an important British naval base from the beginning of the 19th century and a NATO naval headquarters for the Mediterranean was maintained there from 1952 until 1971. Malta became independent in September 1964 and in 1971 when the Malta Labour Party under Mr. Mintoff won the elections, it followed a policy of non-alignment which led to the removal of the NATO naval headquarters to Naples. The United Kingdom continued to

maintain naval and air forces on the island from 1972 to 1979 under a bilateral defence agreement which was not subsequently renewed, the last British forces being withdrawn in 1979. In 1980 Italy concluded a bilateral agreement with Malta providing for economic assistance and military guarantees for the neutrality and non-alignment of Malta. In return, Malta agreed to forbid the use of military bases in Malta to any country except Italy which would have the right to use them for defending Maltese neutrality.

5.51. In December 1984 Mr. Mintoff, seeking renewal of economic assistance, announced that the treaty with Italy had not been renewed, but Italy pointed out that the Maltese neutrality clauses of the agreement had not expired.

5.52. Mr. Mintoff's government had seen Malta as a link between Europe and the North African countries, in particular Libya. Colonel Kadhafi signed a five-year "economic and security co-operation agreement" during a visit to Malta in November 1984 which also provided for the non-establishment of military bases on Malta, but contained offers of Libyan assistance with military training and of Libyan military assistance if Malta were attacked. Malta had earlier signed an agreement with the Soviet Union in October 1981 whereby the latter recognised Maltese neutrality. Because of the conduct of internal policy under Mr. Mintoff which denied democratic rights to the opposition, relations with the Council of Europe and the European Community were strained, and the European Community in 1983 suspended aid because of human rights abuses.

5.53. With the resignation of Mr. Mintoff, his former deputy Dr. Mifsud Bonnici became Prime Minister on 22nd December 1984. Since then relations with European countries and the Community have improved. The opposition Nationalist Party is again represented in the Maltese Delegation to the Council of Europe.

5.54. While Malta can provide an important naval and air base strategically located in the centre of the Mediterranean, there are plenty of other naval bases available to NATO forces. The interests of European security are therefore not opposed to Malta's own declared policy of neutrality and non-alignment.

(j) *Rest of the Maghreb*

5.55. Despite anxiety at times in the past about possible Soviet access to important naval bases in the western part of the North African coast, especially Bizerta in Tunisia and Mers-el-Kebir in Algeria, there has been no increased presence since the committee last reported. The Soviet Union continues to use commercial repair facilities for naval vessels in Bizerta and Annaba in Algeria.

5.56. The political future of Tunisia is perhaps the most unpredictable at the present time with the danger of a pro-Libyan government assuming power when President Bourguiba, perhaps the last French-educated ruler, eventually leaves the scene.

5.57. Algeria is seen as a more stable régime with a not unhelpful attitude to western interests, but its economy unfavourably affected by the fall in the price of natural gas.

5.58. Morocco surprised western countries with the August 1984 declaration of union with Libya, but that appears in retrospect to have amounted to little more than an ending of Libyan support for the Polisaria guerrillas in the western Sahara in exchange for Moroccan non-intervention in Chad. Morocco appears to have stabilised the situation in the western Sahara by constructing a defensive ditch with electronic sensors. Morocco's long-standing claim to the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla were renewed in 1985 when Spain announced the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom about the future of Gibraltar.

VI. Summary and conclusions

6.1. The security of the Atlantic Alliance is based on the principle of political and strategic unity of the NATO area and the functional interdependence of the whole military apparatus. Therefore, the NATO southern flank should not be considered "peripheral". In practice, in the event of the flanks being lost, the central region itself could no longer be defended. The need to pay greater attention to this part of the NATO area is justified by:

- the danger for the alliance of possible encirclement, and local sources of conflict;
- defence requirements; military equipment of some of the countries in the area is still insufficient in some cases;
- the economic weakness of NATO partners in the area;
- the important contribution which the southern flank countries make to defence and détente.

The key position of NATO's southern flank is determined by the strategic importance of the Mediterranean which is crossed by heavily used merchant shipping lanes, which in particular provide the main routes for supplying Europe with petroleum from North Africa and the Near East. The central power which exercised hegemony in the Mediterranean area in the past has now disappeared and has not been replaced by a politico-strategic balance of force on which

future security could be based. The distribution of power and the ratio of forces in general remains unstable and changing.

6.2. The Soviet Union also considers itself a Mediterranean power and conducts a policy aimed at neutralising western influences, especially that of the United States, and at increasing its own influence. It endeavours in this way to exploit for its own benefit the political heterogeneity, the lack of geo-strategic unity and the regional instabilities characteristic of this region.

6.3. The stationing in the Mediterranean of the third squadron of the Soviet Black Sea fleet has weakened the domination of the United States Sixth fleet in the region. The mission of the Soviet squadron is both political and military. In political terms it seeks:

- to demonstrate the maritime presence of the Soviet Union as a power factor in this region and to provide a military guarantee for Soviet policy;
- to increase Soviet influence in the Arab states;
- to present the Soviet Union as a potential protecting power;
- to demonstrate that the Mediterranean should no longer be considered the exclusive domain of the West and that the Soviet Union should itself be regarded as a legitimate Mediterranean power.

In military terms it is designed:

- to conduct peacetime surveillance of the activities of the United States Sixth fleet, to reduce its freedom of manoeuvre to prevent it from intervening in time of crisis and to increase the risk of actions against countries friendly to the Soviet Union;
- in the event of a conflict to undertake a rapid offensive against units of the Sixth fleet.

Admittedly the Mediterranean has not become a "red sea" - Moscow has achieved only a few of its aims in the Mediterranean area, especially as concerns access to support points and base rights. Nevertheless it has imposed itself in the region as an important influence. However, it must be remembered that the Soviet Union fleet in the Mediterranean encounters some difficulties which limits its scope and the speed with which it could be reinforced (for example the restrictions concerning passage through the Turkish Straits resulting from the provisions of the Montreux Convention, and the absence of proper bases on the Mediterranean shore).

6.4. On the whole the politico-military situation in the Mediterranean area is characterised by contradictory tendencies in the western and eastern parts where international European influences are at play, as well as in the Near East and North African area which create an unstable and disturbing situation.

6.5. Apart from the area of interest to Europe in order to assess the regional situation in the Mediterranean area, account must also be taken of events in the Near and Middle East as well as in North Africa:

- the still unforeseeable consequences of Egyptian policy which is tending to rapprochement with the Arab world;
- the uncertain outcome of the war between Iran and Iraq and the relations maintained by Iran with the big powers;
- the Near East problem which remains unsolved and the tense situation still prevailing in the area;
- the problem still pending of the western Sahara;
- the radical policy conducted by Libya, based on revolutionary principles which constitute an unpredictable factor of instability;
- the economically oriented policy of neutrality conducted by Malta which in 1981 permitted Soviet merchant vessels access to its protected petroleum stores and which in 1984 signed an agreement with Libya, the consequences of which are still not entirely foreseeable.

6.6. The whole of the foregoing shows clearly that the Soviet Union poses more than a purely "conventional" threat to western security in the Mediterranean area and to the stability of the southern flank of NATO. Thus, the very mixed southern region of NATO, from a security stand-

point, is subject at any moment to changes which are difficult to foresee. The political unity of the alliance, especially on the southern flank, is not assured from the standpoint of security. The gravity of this situation is not reduced by attempts to co-ordinate military plans for the southern flank. To this, on the periphery of the southern flank, is to be added the risk of conflicts with different possible causes and consequences.

6.7. As far as East-West antagonisms are concerned, the southern flank offers the Warsaw Pact many more possibilities to test the political cohesion of the alliance and the danger always remains of a conflict in this important area for NATO.

6.8. It is therefore in the western interest to strengthen, through carefully judged political, economic and military aid, the cohesion of the southern NATO countries, and to provide political, economic and development aid with a view to stabilising the periphery of NATO's southern flank.

6.9. The committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation, the substantive paragraphs of which relate to the present explanatory memorandum as follows:

<i>Draft Recommendation</i>	<i>Explanatory Memorandum</i>
1(i)	4.82-4.89.
1(ii)	4.80.
1(iii), (iv)	4.74-4.89.
2	Chapters III and IV: paragraphs 4.5, 4.38, 4.54.
3	4.6-4.14.
4	4.41-4.54.
5	4.55-4.62.
6	5.37-5.44.
7	5.19-5.21.
8	5.9-5.21, 5.28-5.31.
9	5.39.
10	2.1-2.10.

APPENDIX I

*The North Atlantic Treaty**Washington DC, 4th April 1949**(Extracts)**Article 5*

The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- (i) on the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- (ii) on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the parties were stationed on the date when the treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1981-1985
A. FINANCIAL EFFORT

Country	National currency unit	Defence expenditure (national currency, current prices) <i>d</i>					Defence expenditure (current prices - US \$ million) <i>a</i>					GDP in purchasers' values (current prices - US \$ million) <i>a</i>					Population (thousand)					Defence expenditure as % of GDP in purchasers' values					Defence expenditure per head (current prices - US \$) <i>a</i>					Defence expenditure as % of total WEU				
		1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>f</i>
(0)	(1)	(-5)	(-4)	(-3)	(-2)	(-1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)	(26)	(27)	(28)	(29)	(30)
Belgium	Million B. Frs.	125,689	132,127	136,853	141,676	155,668	3,385	2,892	2,676	2,452	2,241	95,730	84,251	80,087	76,046	73,586	9,852	9,856	9,856	9,852	9,852	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.3	344	293	272	249	248	3.84	3.38	3.17	3.11	3.25
France (c)	Million F. Frs.	129,708	148,021	165,029	176,638	186,242	23,867	22,523	21,654	20,212	19,233	572,371	542,746	516,317	489,428	472,025	54,182	54,480	54,729	54,947	55,222	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.1	4.1	440	413	396	368	348	27.05	26.31	25.65	25.66	25.57
Germany	Million DM	52,193	54,234	56,496	57,274	59,737	23,094	22,350	22,127	20,125	18,835	683,239	659,849	653,883	613,159	576,699	59,790	59,761	59,562	59,336	59,217	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.3	386	374	371	339	318	26.18	26.11	26.21	25.55	25.04
Italy	Milliard Lire	9,868	12,294	14,400	16,433	18,059	8,681	9,090	9,481	9,353	9,048	353,254	347,862	354,884	348,385	336,357	56,502	56,639	56,825	56,983	57,154	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.7	154	160	167	164	158	9.84	10.62	11.23	11.87	12.03
Luxembourg	Million L. Frs.	1,715	1,893	2,104	2,234	2,317	46	41	41	39	36	3,818	3,437	3,374	3,235	3,123	366	366	366	366	366	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	126	113	112	106	99	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Netherlands	Million Guilders	11,296	11,921	12,149	12,765	12,885	4,527	4,464	4,257	3,978	3,595	141,412	138,139	132,595	123,059	115,138	14,247	14,310	14,362	14,420	14,492	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.1	318	312	296	276	248	5.13	5.22	5.04	5.05	4.78
United Kingdom	Million £ Sterling	12,144	13,849	15,952	16,923	18,572	24,627	24,242	24,198	22,614	22,034	513,978	483,864	455,443	424,679	409,567	56,379	56,335	56,377	56,488	56,544	4.8	5.0	5.3	5.3	5.4	437	430	429	400	390	27.91	28.32	28.66	28.71	29.29
TOTAL WEU							88,228	85,602	84,434	78,773	75,222	2,363,802	2,260,149	2,196,584	2,077,991	1,986,494	251,318	251,747	252,077	252,392	252,847	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	351	340	335	312	298	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Canada	Million C. \$	6,289	7,655	8,086	9,320	10,263	5,245	6,205	6,561	7,196	7,539	291,539	299,061	324,003	332,492	338,035	24,366	24,657	24,904	25,150	25,427	1.8	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.2	215	252	263	286	297	5.95	7.25	7.77	9.14	10.02
Denmark	Million D. Kr.	10,301	11,669	12,574	13,045	13,750	1,446	1,400	1,375	1,260	1,210	57,247	56,003	56,321	54,635	53,343	5,122	5,119	5,114	5,111	5,104	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	282	274	269	246	237	1.64	1.64	1.63	1.60	1.61
Greece	Million Drachmas	142,865	176,270	193,340	271,922	321,722	2,578	2,639	2,195	2,412	2,379	36,941	38,140	34,813	33,466	33,509	9,730	9,790	9,848	9,910	9,989	7.0	6.9	6.3	7.2	7.1	265	270	223	243	238	2.92	3.08	2.60	3.06	3.16
Norway	Million N. Kr.	9,468	10,956	12,395	12,688	15,431	1,650	1,698	1,699	1,555	1,690	57,091	56,277	55,064	54,736	52,772	4,100	4,116	4,130	4,141	4,153	2.9	3.0	3.1	2.8	3.2	402	412	411	375	407	1.87	1.98	2.01	1.97	2.25
Portugal	Million Escudos	51,917	63,817	76,765	92,009	111,522	844	803	693	629	635	23,928	23,365	20,668	19,310	19,624	9,970	10,030	10,099	10,170	10,231	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.2	85	80	69	62	62	0.96	0.94	0.82	0.80	0.84
Turkey	Millions L.	313,067	447,790	556,738	803,044	1,198,125	2,815	2,755	2,469	2,190	2,422	57,666	53,032	51,147	49,858	55,144	45,757	46,780	47,804	48,720	49,792	4.9	5.2	4.8	4.4	4.4	62	59	52	45	49	3.19	3.22	2.92	2.78	3.22
United States	Million US \$	169,888	196,390	217,198	277,052	266,642	169,888	196,390	217,198	237,052	266,642	2,934,911	3,045,279	3,275,728	3,634,522	3,870,830	230,043	232,345	234,538	236,681	239,048	5.8	6.4	6.6	6.5	6.9	739	845	926	1,002	1,115	192.56	229.42	257.24	300.93	354.47
TOTAL NON-WEU							184,466	211,889	232,190	252,293	282,518	3,459,322	3,571,157	3,817,743	4,179,079	4,423,257	329,088	332,837	336,437	339,883	343,744	5.3	5.9	6.1	6.0	6.4	561	637	690	742	822	209.08	247.53	275.00	320.28	375.58
TOTAL NATO (d), , , ,							272,694	297,491	316,625	331,066	357,740	5,823,124	5,831,306	6,014,327	6,257,070	6,409,751	580,406	584,584	588,514	592,275	596,591	4.7	5.1	5.3	5.3	5.6	470	509	538	559	600	309.08	347.53	375.00	420.28	475.58

Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States \$ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency conversion.

For the period 1981-1985, the following rates of exchange have been applied:

Country	National currency unit	Units per US \$				
		1981	1982	1983	1984	1985 <i>b</i>
(0)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Belgium	Million B. Frs.	37.12900	45.69100	51.13200	57.78400	63.76700
France	Million F. Frs.	5.43460	6.57210	7.62130	8.73910	9.68360
Germany	Million DM	2.26000	2.42660	2.55330	2.84590	3.17150
Italy	Milliard Lire	1.13680	1.35250	1.51880	1.75700	1.99590
Luxembourg	Million L. Frs.	37.12900	45.69100	51.13200	57.78400	63.76700
Netherlands	Million Guilders	2.49520	2.67020	2.85410	3.20870	3.58440
United Kingdom	Million Pound Sterling	0.49312	0.57127	0.65920	0.74833	0.84289
Canada	Million C. \$	1.19890	1.23370	1.23240	1.29510	1.36130
Denmark	Million D. Kr.	7.12340	8.33240	9.14500	10.35660	11.36200
Greece	Million Drachmas	55.40800	66.80300	88.06400	112.72000	135.23000
Norway	Million N. Kr.	5.73950	6.45400	7.29640	8.16150	9.13020
Portugal	Million Escudos	61.54600	79.47300	110.78000	146.39000	175.62000
Turkey	Million Turkish Lira	111.22000	162.55000	225.46000	366.68000	494.64000
United States	Million US \$	1.00000	1.00000	1.00000	1.00000	1.00000

Note b: 6 months' average.

Note c: France is a member of the alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures for defence expenditures are indicative only.

Note d: The corresponding statistical data for Spain are not available.

e - Preliminary estimate.

f - Forecast.

* - WEU Office of the Clerk estimates.

Source: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(85)25.

B. MANPOWER EFFORT - 1985

	Period of compulsory ¹ military service (months)			Total in armed forces ² military personnel (thousands) (e)	Total armed forces ² (military and civilian) as percentage of active population (e)
	Army	Navy	Air force		
Belgium	10 ³	10 ³	10 ³	108	2.7
France	12	12	12	563	2.9
Germany	15 ⁴	15 ⁴	15 ⁴	495	2.4
Italy	12	18	12	531	2.5
Luxembourg		voluntary		1	0.9
Netherlands	14-16	14-17	14-17	103	2.1
United Kingdom		voluntary		335	2.0
TOTAL WEU				2,136	2.5
Canada		voluntary		83	1.0
Denmark	9 ⁵	9 ⁵	9 ⁵	29	1.4
Greece	22	26	24	206	6.2
Norway	12	15	15	41	2.5
Portugal	16	24	21-24	101	2.6
Turkey	18	18	18	825	4.6
United States		voluntary		2,289	2.9
TOTAL NON-WEU				3,574	3.1
TOTAL NATO				5,710	2.8


Sources:

1. IISS, Military Balance, 1985-86.
2. NATO press release M-DPC-2 (85) 25 of 3rd December 1985.
3. Eight months if served in Germany.
4. To be eighteen months from 1989.
5. To be twelve months in combat arms.

e = estimate.

APPENDIX III


*United States military assistance
Department of Defence proposals FY 1986*



Source: United States Secretary of Defence annual report to Congress, fiscal year 1986, 4th February 1985.

APPENDIX IV

NATO military command structure - Elements in the Mediterranean and adjoining area



APPENDIX V

*United Nations force in Cyprus**Background information**Finances*

UNFICYP is the only current United Nations peace-keeping operation financed solely by voluntary contributions. Funding comes from two sources:

- about one-third of the costs are met by a special fund, the UNFICYP special account, to which 71 countries have contributed since 1964;
- approximately two-thirds of the costs are absorbed voluntarily by troop-contributing countries.

In order to provide contingents for UNFICYP, the troop-contributing governments divert from national duty troops and other resources at an ongoing cost to them estimated by them at present at \$36.2 million for each six-month period. This figure includes (a) the troops' regular pay and allowances and normal matériel expenses for which, under existing arrangements, the United Nations is not required by the troop-contributors to reimburse them: these therefore constitute costs of maintaining the force which are being financed directly by the troop-contributing governments; and (b) certain extra and extraordinary costs that they incur in respect of UNFICYP for which, under existing arrangements, the troop-contributors would be entitled to claim reimbursement from the United Nations, but which they have to finance at their own expense as a further contribution to the United Nations operation in Cyprus.

Including the above two elements of costs, the actual cost of financing the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the six-month period ending 15th December 1984 totals approximately \$50.4 million, estimated as follows:

	US\$ (in millions)
1. (a) Regular troops' pay and allowances and normal matériel costs	
(b) Certain extra and extraordinary costs of the troop-contributing governments that are financed directly by them	36.2

2. Direct costs to the United Nations which the organisation is required to meet (including the extra and extraordinary costs of governments providing contingents for which they seek to be reimbursed), financed through voluntary contributions	14.2
Total costs	50.4

Voluntary contributions from governments are required to finance the second of these cost elements through the medium of the special account.

The special account

The special account was established to "finance direct costs to the United Nations which the organisation is required to meet (including the extra and extraordinary costs of governments providing contingents for which they seek reimbursement)". In the six-month mandate to 15th December 1984 these costs were \$14.2 million.

In the period since the inception of UNFICYP on 27th March 1964 to 15th December 1984, costs under this item have been US\$470.5 million. However, to the latter date, voluntary contributions to the special account have only totalled US\$342.8 million. In December 1984, therefore, the account was in a deficit by \$127.7 million, a sum which has temporarily been absorbed by troop-contributing countries until sufficient funding becomes available through the special account. The Secretary-General regularly draws the attention of United Nations member nations to the deficit, which is currently growing by about \$5 to 6 million for each six-month mandate. The Government of the Republic of Cyprus is contributing the equivalent of more than US\$1 million a year in finances and services.

Costs absorbed by contingent-contributing countries

Since 1964 troop-contributing countries have voluntarily absorbed about two-thirds of the costs of UNFICYP. These costs consist of "regular troops' pay, allowances, normal

matériel costs, plus certain extra and extraordinary costs of the troop-contributing governments that are financed directly by them". In the six-month mandate to December 1984, these costs were \$36.2 million, made up as follows:

	US\$ (in millions)
Australia	0.5
Austria	1.9
Canada	10.7
Denmark	0.6
Sweden	3.5
United Kingdom	19.0

By extrapolation it is estimated that the sum absorbed voluntarily by troop-contributing nations since 1964 is in the order of US\$870 million. In addition, as described earlier, these nations are also temporarily shouldering the special account deficit which stood at US\$127.7 million in December 1984. Due to this deficit, the latest payment in respect of claims by troop-contributing nations (which in some cases represent only a fraction of the actual costs incurred by them in maintaining their contingents) was made in January 1984 and met those claims only up to December 1977.

Taking into consideration both the special account and the voluntarily absorbed amounts, UNFICYP has cost about US\$1,400 million up to the end of 1984. At the present time, UNFICYP costs about US\$100 million annually.

Voluntary contributions

To 15th December 1984, the voluntary contributors to the UNFICYP special account have been:

<i>Principal contributors</i>	<i>% of total</i>
United States	46.8
United Kingdom	21.4
Federal Republic of Germany	7.1
Greece	6.1
Norway	2.5
Sweden	2.4
Italy	2.3
Switzerland	1.9
Denmark	1.4
Japan	1.3
Belgium	1.3
Austria	1.2
Cyprus	1.0
Australia	0.9
Netherlands	0.8

Turkey	0.6
Finland	0.3
Others (see below)	0.7
	<u>100.00</u>

Other contributors

Bahamas
Barbados
Botswana
Democratic Cambodia
Ghana
Guyana
Iceland
India
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Kuwait
Lao People's Democratic Republic
Lebanon
Liberia
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Luxembourg
Malawi
Malaysia
Malta
Mauritania
Morocco
Nepal
New Zealand
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Philippines
Portugal
Qatar
Republic of Korea
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
United Arab Emirates
United Republic of Cameroon
United Republic of Tanzania
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe

European security and the Mediterranean

AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3¹

tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

1. In paragraph (v) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “ Libyan ” add “ and Syrian ”.
2. After paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:
“ Condemning Libya’s attack on the island of Lampedusa, which constitutes a real act of war against a WEU country, and complaining that there was not recourse to the procedure provided for in Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty; ”
3. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ the disturbing Israeli-Palestinian conflict ” and insert “ conflicts linked with the Palestinian problem ”.

Signed: Cavaliere

1. See 6th sitting, 4th June 1986 (report referred back to committee).

*Thirty-first annual report of the Council to the Assembly
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period
1st January to 31st December 1985*

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PART ONE

I. Activities of the Council

1. During 1985, the Council met at ministerial level on 22nd and 23rd April in Bonn under the chairmanship of Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, and on 14th November in Rome under the chairmanship of Mr. Andreotti, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

It held twenty-one meetings at permanent representative level in London.

The Council was assisted in its work by the working group made up of assistants to the permanent representatives, which met thirty times, by special working groups (thirteen meetings) composed of members of the embassies in London and experts from capitals – to prepare for the ministerial meetings of the Council – and by the Secretariat-General.

2. A key feature of 1985 has been the efforts made to reactivate WEU, a process announced in the Rome declaration (26th and 27th October 1984). On 22nd and 23rd April in Bonn, where the fourteen Foreign and Defence Ministers were meeting together for the first time in ordinary session, and on 14th November in Rome, where they met for the first time in informal session, the new structures of the organisation were put in place and decisions taken to enable WEU to fulfil the mission assigned to it by the Rome declaration.

3. During its meetings, the Council examined a number of political and defence questions relating to European security and the European posture to be adopted towards the various initiatives and negotiations in the field of defence and security.

4. It also ensured that the commitments entered into by the member states of WEU under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty and its protocols were observed.

5. The Council has noted with interest the reports drawn up by the Assembly committees and has closely followed the Assembly's discussions during both parts of its thirty-first ordinary session.

Several members of the Council and the Secretary-General took part in the colloquy organised by the Assembly in Munich in September 1985 on the theme the space challenge for Europe.

The Council has, on several occasions, turned its attention to the question of its relations with the Assembly, stressing both their importance and their value. A number of

contacts, in addition to the regular communication between the two bodies, were made during the sessions and informal meetings.

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Mr. Edouard Longestaey, Secretary-General of WEU since 1977, retired on 31st May. At its meeting in Bonn, the Council of Ministers appointed Mr. Alfred Cahen as his successor.

A. Political and defence questions concerning European security

The following exposition relates to the deliberations of the Council, meeting at both permanent representative and ministerial level, and to the positions adopted by the Council in its replies to Assembly recommendations.

1. East-West relations

On the questions of East-West relations, the Ministers, meeting in Bonn, welcomed the resumption of the United States-Soviet negotiations in Geneva – an important event for the security of the Atlantic Alliance in general and for that of Europe in particular. They reaffirmed their firm support for, and their confidence in, their American ally in its efforts to achieve a more stable strategic relationship at the lowest possible balanced level of forces and called on the Soviet Union to display a positive attitude.

The Ministers expressed the hope that the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union would make possible radical reductions in their strategic and medium-range nuclear armaments and agreements aimed at ending the arms race on earth and preventing an arms race in space. They underlined in this regard the importance they attached to respect for existing treaty obligations.

The Ministers reaffirmed their countries' determination to continue to work for better East-West relations on a realistic and long-term basis and for the full realisation of the CSCE commitments established at Helsinki and Madrid. They also recalled the multilateral negotiations in the field of confidence-building measures and conventional disarmament and underscored the significance of these negotiations for Europe. The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to continue contributing towards progress in the negotiations for a com-

prehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons being conducted at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

(a) *Multilateral negotiations*

Negotiations on arms control and disarmament were discussed by the Ministers and the members of the Permanent Council.

On this subject, the Council, replying to Recommendations 411 and 417, fully endorsed the emphasis placed by the Assembly on the need for the proper verification of arms control agreements in order to ensure compliance, the Council taking the view that verification was the most sensitive aspect of a global ban on chemical weapons.

With regard to the MBFR negotiations, the Council, in its reply to Recommendation 415, said that those WEU member governments and their Atlantic Alliance allies participating in the MBFR negotiations agreed that the basic provisions of an adequate verification régime for an MBFR agreement should include on-site inspection, permanent exit/entry points, detailed exchanges of information on force levels and non-interference with national technical means.

With reference to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the Council, in its reply to Recommendation 415, said that it favoured the achievement of either multilateral or bilateral constraints on the military use of outer space and believed that, in any agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union aimed at preventing an arms race in space, the existence of and adherence to the 1972 ABM treaty constituted an important element.

In its reply to Recommendation 417, the Council, having recalled the importance which the member states attached to the full implementation by all the participating states in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe (CSCE) of all the principles and provisions laid down in the final act, deplored the delays and breaches on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries in fulfilling the solemn intentions and commitments expressed in Helsinki in 1975.

As to the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe (CDE), the Council pointed out in its reply to Recommendation 417 that the measures drawn up by the member countries of WEU in co-operation with their allies in the Atlantic Alliance contained specific commitments relating in particular to the exchange of military information, the prior notification of military manoeuvres, the invitation to send observers and verification measures. The aim of western participants was to achieve greater mutual transparency as a means of building confidence bet-

ween the countries of East and West. The Council was very much in favour of this aim as stated in its reply to Recommendation 421.

(b) *Bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union*

With regard to START and INF, the Council hoped that all the constructive and mutually acceptable proposals would be taken into account in the negotiations; it therefore shared the view expressed by the Assembly in Recommendation 415. The Council thought, however, that a moratorium on the deployment of long- and short-range INF weapons would alter the context of the negotiations and would perpetuate the Soviet Union's superiority.

In his address to the Assembly on 22nd May, Mr. Genscher, then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, welcomed the resumption of the United States/Soviet talks in Geneva and recalled the WEU member countries' support for the American efforts to achieve a more stable strategic relationship at the lowest possible balanced level of forces. The Council of Ministers expressed the hope that the Geneva negotiations would lead to radical reductions of United States and Soviet intercontinental strategic and intermediate-range nuclear armaments and that agreements would be reached, aimed at ending the arms race on earth and preventing another in space.

On several occasions, the Council discussed the proposals made by Mr. Gorbachev on nuclear disarmament prior to his meeting with Mr. Reagan in Geneva. Mr. Andreotti, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, briefed the Assembly on 4th December about these discussions and welcomed the fact that the two leaders had agreed during their meeting to give a positive and constructive orientation to all the various disarmament negotiations.

On this specific matter, it had already been pointed out in the reply to Recommendation 411 that the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union aimed at achieving a balance at the lowest possible level of forces had been advocated by the alliance and had stressed that western deployment could be reversed, halted or modified if the talks succeeded. This was why the allies had regretted the breaking-off of talks by the Soviet Union in November 1983 and why the WEU Council welcomed the opening of a new round of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva on 12th March 1985.

The question of the Geneva negotiations was also raised in the Council's reply to Recommendation 417 which underscored the special attention paid by the Seven to an examination of this question.

(c) *Relations between Western Europe and the countries of Eastern Europe*

In his address to the Assembly on 22nd May, Mr. Genscher, then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, said that the Ministers had, at their meeting in Bonn, agreed that the East-West relationship must not be confined to matters of defence and arms control. Only a broad-based policy could bring about improved East-West relations. It included co-operation in political, economic, cultural and humanitarian issues. He said that the final communiqué made particular mention of the undertakings entered into in Helsinki and Madrid in the framework of the CSCE.

The replies to Recommendations 411 and 417 also allude to this willingness to seek a genuine dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe, the member countries of WEU acting bilaterally and in the appropriate fora to promote the development of trade between the countries of the East and of the West and also to promote co-operation in the field of environmental protection. Furthermore, the member countries of WEU had always demonstrated their concern to develop trade with the countries of the East in a way which did not jeopardise their own security.

2. WEU, the Atlantic Alliance and the European security dimension

In the communiqué published at the end of their meeting in Bonn, the Ministers reaffirmed their determination to strengthen their solidarity and that which linked them with their allies of the Atlantic Alliance, which remained the only body for implementing common defence and the expression of the fundamental bond between the security of Europe and that of North America.

During its meetings and in its replies to recommendations, the Council has frequently affirmed its commitment to the cohesion of the alliance and its desire to see WEU provide political impetus to bodies such as the IEPG and the CNAD.

(a) *Cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance*

During their discussions on matters relating to NATO, the Ministers of the WEU member countries frequently referred to the importance and necessity of real cohesion and complete mutual trust between members of the alliance.

Addressing the Assembly at its December session, Mr. Andreotti, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, welcomed the contribution made to the success of the Geneva talks by the input of ideas and the common attitude of the NATO countries, in particular the WEU member coun-

tries, adding that it was perhaps the first time since the fifties that a President of the United States had met his Soviet opposite number backed by such a high measure of cohesion within the Atlantic Alliance. The Chairman-in-Office also remarked that the need to preserve the alliance's political and strategic cohesion had constantly to be borne in mind. European security must not be separated from that of the United States and research on defensive systems must take account of all aspects of the threat at all levels, both nuclear and conventional, so as to prevent the creation of zones with different levels of security within the NATO area. In other words, the security of the alliance must remain indivisible.

At the same session, the Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen, stressed the need for close contacts and most effective co-ordinated relations between the two organisations.

(b) *WEU and the European security dimension*

The rôle of WEU and the European dimension of security have been on the agenda of several meetings of the Permanent Council; in a note addressed to the latter, the Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen, observed that the member countries of the European Community had succeeded in developing an economic dimension and, in the framework of political co-operation, a foreign policy dimension, but had not so far provided a true security dimension. It was against this background that the reactivated WEU appeared as one of the elements in the work of constructing Europe, in particular to promote closer co-operation in the security field. In this context, too, the Council has taken account of the proceedings of the Luxembourg intergovernmental conference on the reform of the Treaty of Rome.

(c) *The political impetus to be given by WEU*

Replying to Recommendations 416 and 423, the Council drew attention to the political impetus which WEU was called upon to provide by supporting all co-operative efforts within Europe, including those of the CNAD and IEPG and hoped that the WEU contribution to the work of the latter body would be intensified¹.

(d) *European co-operation in the field of technology and armaments*

As stated in the Bonn communiqué, the Ministers held a detailed exchange of views on questions relating to armaments co-operation and research and agreed that closer co-operation and the harmonisation of their efforts were fun-

1. See 2(d) (ii).

damental in maintaining in the longer term a competitive and advanced defence industrial base in Europe and in achieving a more cost-effective defence. The Ministers instructed the Permanent Council to present proposals to help provide the necessary political impetus for, and practical contributions to, the various efforts undertaken in this field, including those carried out by bodies such as the IEPG and the CNAD.

Noting the increasing importance of technology, the Ministers also affirmed the member states' determination to take the necessary measures within the European Communities to strengthen Europe's own technological capacity and thus achieve the creation of a technological community.

(i) On 22nd May, Mr. Genscher, then Chairman-in-Office of the Council, briefed the Assembly on the Ministers' discussions concerning the French proposal for close co-operation in the field of high technology, pointing out that the seven governments recognised the need for Europe to strengthen its own technological capabilities with a view to creating a technological community.

In its reply to Recommendation 419, the Council welcomed the European efforts which had already been made at various levels in the field of information technology, specifically mentioning Eureka and the Esprit programme.

(ii) Whereas European co-operation in the field of civilian technology could be dealt with by the European Community, it was the task of the IEPG and WEU, whose rôle it was to provide political impetus to the IEPG, to address armaments co-operation.

At their meeting in Bonn, the Ministers took the view that the harmonisation of national and sectoral interests within a common political framework could facilitate co-operation in the various armaments fields. They set up an agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments (Agency III) to contribute actively to the development of European armaments co-operation.

The replies to Recommendations 416 and 423 reflect the importance which the Council attached, within the framework of WEU's competence, to promoting European armaments co-operation.

(iii) The Council, in its replies to Recommendations 414 and 416, recognised the importance of co-operation between the United States and Europe in the field of advanced technologies, emphasising in particular that one of the main purposes of the discussions within the IEPG was to work towards the establishment of a balanced two-way street in arms procurement between the United States and Europe.

3. Space and related activities

(a) WEU and the strategic defence initiative

At their meeting in Bonn, the Ministers agreed to continue their collective consideration concerning the specific question of the United States invitation to participate in the research programme on the strategic defence initiative, in order to achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their governments, and instructed the Permanent Council accordingly.

The latter then charged a special working group consisting of assistants to the permanent representatives and experts from the capitals to consider the strategic and technological aspects involved in the United States invitation.

In execution of its mandate, the group drew up an interim report which was approved by the Ministers at their Council meeting on 14th November in Rome. The main points of this report were the following:

1. Need to contribute to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, whose rôle was fundamental in the discussion of this subject, as recalled by the Ministers of the member states in their Bonn communiqué.
2. Consequently, any conclusions concerning participation in research that may be reached, or decisions made on a national basis, should not prejudge the positions of the member states on the political and strategic implications arising from the SDI programme and its future evolution.
3. In this regard, a conclusive analysis of the political and strategic implications of the programme would be premature at this stage.
4. However, the need was recognised to bear in mind and take account of a number of wider considerations such as:
 - (i) deterrence and stability must not be undermined but enhanced;
 - (ii) nuclear deterrence remains the only way for effectively preventing war;
 - (iii) the strategic unity of the alliance must be preserved by avoiding any decoupling between the defence of the United States and that of their European allies;
 - (iv) in the light of the implications that SDI-related developments may have for the strategy of deterrence, European security and East/West relations, the consultative process within the alliance must be effectively used to preserve the cohesion of the allies;

(v) the priority goal of the Geneva negotiations remains, for the countries of WEU, the achievement of significant and balanced reductions of the offensive forces of the two parties;

(vi) research into defensive systems must be carried out by both parties in strict compliance with the ABM treaty.

5. Need for Europe to mobilise its resources in the field of advanced technology. Hence the member countries are aware that the decisions taken in an attempt to work out ways of co-ordinating a response to the United States invitation would not be incompatible with the decisions concerning the Eureka project taken by the European Council in Milan on 28th and 29th June 1985.

6. Possible participation in SDI research should be seen against the background of the broader issue of transatlantic technological co-operation, and perhaps could provide the opportunity for expanding that co-operation. It should also be seen within the context of the technological challenge facing Europe which calls for a response at national, European and transatlantic levels.

7. This being said, the objectives relevant to participation should include:

- (i) to ensure European companies wishing to participate in SDI projects have comparable rights and conditions of involvement as United States companies, taking into account the limits of existing international agreements;
- (ii) to determine the arrangements necessary to safeguard the rights of European industries regarding the results obtained from SDI research projects in which they have participated;
- (iii) to ensure adequate protection of research data;
- (iv) to ensure participant countries have sufficient access to the SDI programme so as to be able to judge the whole range of projects;
- (v) to consider whether SDI research projects can be undertaken in the framework of existing alliance co-operation procedures;
- (vi) to assess whether there exist within the SDI programme identifiable sectors of special interest to European countries;
- (vii) to ensure European participation in research projects opens up a genuine exchange of technology;

(viii) to avoid the risk of a European brain-drain to the United States.

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The activities of the special working group have already been described in the Council replies to Recommendations 417, 419, 420 and 421.

As regards the observation by both the Americans and the Soviets of their obligations under existing treaties, WEU governments noted with satisfaction the United States Government's commitment to keep any further defence research within the limits of a restrictive interpretation of the ABM treaty.

The Council also drew attention to this aspect in its reply to Recommendation 413, noting that the strategic defence initiative was no more than a scientific research programme and did not therefore contravene the provisions of the ABM treaty; on the other hand, relevant tests or deployments would, under the terms of the ABM treaty, have to be a matter for negotiation.

In his address to the Assembly on 4th December, Mr. Andreotti, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, having stressed the importance of co-ordination within WEU, made a point of summarising the many areas of convergence between the positions of the various governments as expressed in the interim report of the special working group and also, in his view, between these positions and the American position.

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At its meeting in Rome on 14th November the Council of Ministers instructed the Permanent Council to continue its consideration of SDI in the light notably of the results of the Geneva summit, and by making use of the work of its special working group.

(b) *European space programme*

The Council, like the Assembly, has shown a keen interest in this question, as shown by its replies to Recommendations 413 and 414. The countries of WEU have in fact played an important rôle in the ESA decision to respond positively to the United States offer to participate in the space station project.

It is noteworthy in this connection that the colloquy organised in Munich from 18th to 20th September 1985 by the Assembly's Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the theme the space challenge for Europe was attended by the German State Secre-

tary for Defence, Mr. Timmermann, and by the United Kingdom, French and Italian Ministers for Industry or Research.

4. WEU and public awareness

In their Bonn communiqué, the Ministers recalled the contribution that WEU can make in particular to achieve a wider consensus among public opinion on the efforts made by the European countries in the field of defence.

On several occasions, and notably in its reply to Recommendation 411, the Council also stressed the need to ensure that European opinion was informed as completely as possible about the threats to our continent and about the security and defence policy adopted by the member countries and the Atlantic Alliance to counter these threats.

Following its meeting in Bonn, the Council remitted to the members of the Committee for Relations with the Council, the report entitled "WEU and public awareness"², which had been drawn up in pursuance of the mandate given to the permanent representatives by the Ministers at their meeting in Rome on 26th and 27th October 1984.

5. Regional problems

(a) Regional conflicts

These questions were considered primarily in the Council replies to Assembly recommendations relating to a specific region, notably Recommendations 412, 418 and 422 on the Gulf war, Cyprus and European security and Lebanon respectively.

In each case, the Council shared the Assembly's concerns and drew attention to the initiatives taken within the appropriate international fora.

(b) Disaster in Mexico

Sharing the feelings expressed by the Assembly in Recommendation 424, the Council recalled the WEU member countries' participation in international solidarity through the sending-out of equipment, medical and first-aid teams and financial help.

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B. Dialogue between the Council and the Assembly in 1985

The WEU Council frequently gave consideration to the problem of its relations with the Assembly.

². See Annex.

It emerged from these reflections that the interaction between governments and parliamentary institutions within WEU was important for the organisation to focus on a European dimension of security.

The importance that the member states attach to strengthening their dialogue with the Assembly was displayed notably by the presence of many members of the governments at the two parts of the Assembly's session.

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The main feature of 1985 was an experimental new procedure for replying to recommendations which proved very satisfactory and meant that the Assembly received replies much sooner than in the past.

1. The following documents were transmitted to the Assembly:

- (i) the thirtieth annual report of the Council on its activities for the period 1st January to 31st December 1984, communicated in implementation of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (ii) the Council's replies to Recommendations 411 to 424 which the Assembly adopted during the second part of its thirtieth ordinary session and the first part of its thirty-first ordinary session;
- (iii) the Council replies to Written Questions 249 to 261, put by members of the Assembly;
- (iv) the document on WEU and public awareness²;
- (v) the document on the reorganisation of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Standing Armaments Committee².

These last two documents above were adopted by the Council of Ministers on 23rd April in Bonn and remitted to the Committee for Relations with the Council that day.

2. There were several contacts between the Council and the Assembly organs:

- (i) on 23rd April in Bonn when Mr. Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, presented the conclusions of the ministerial meeting to the Committee for Relations with the Council;

². See Annex.

- (ii) on 5th November in London when Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General, gave a speech on the new public relations activities of the Council to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations;
- (iii) on 14th November in Rome when Mr. Andreotti, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, presented the conclusions of the ministerial meeting to the Presidential Committee of the Assembly;
- (iv) on 4th December in Paris at a meeting (followed by a luncheon) between the Permanent Council, under the chairmanship of Mr. Andreotti, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Presidential Committee of the Assembly.
3. On 11th September, Mr. Andreotti, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, had talks in Rome with Mr. Caro and Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, President and Vice-President respectively of the Assembly.
4. Finally, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and other Ministers addressed the Assembly during its sessions.
- (i) During the first part of the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly in Paris (20th-23rd May 1985):
- on 22nd May, Mr. Genscher presented the thirtieth annual report of the Council to the Assembly in his capacity as Chairman-in-Office of the Council and also spoke as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany;
 - on 21st May, Baroness Young addressed the Assembly as the United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
- (ii) During the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session of the Assembly in Paris (2nd-5th December 1985) the following Ministers took the floor:
- on 4th December, Mr. Andreotti, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman-in-Office of the Council;
 - on 3rd December, Baroness Young, United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs;
 - on 4th December, Mr. Dumas, the French Minister for External Relations;
 - on 5th December, Mr. Spadolini, Italian Minister of Defence.

5. Mr. Cahen also addressed the Assembly on the occasion of the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session in Paris on 2nd December.

II. Implementation of Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty on forces of Western European Union

A. Level of forces of member states

During the year under review, the Council has carried out its customary tasks in implementation of Protocol No. II on forces and armaments control.

1. Forces under NATO command

The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member states of WEU place under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. Article III of the Protocol provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to enable these levels to be increased above the limits specified in Articles I and II.

So that it may satisfy itself that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the Council receives information every year concerning the levels in question, in accordance with Article IV of that Protocol. This information is obtained in the course of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by him to that end. The information, as at the end of 1984, was conveyed at the appropriate time.

The same procedure is under way for 1985.

Furthermore, the Council takes the necessary steps to implement the procedure laid down in its resolution of 15th September 1956, whereby the levels of forces under NATO command are examined in the light of the annual review.

For the year 1984, the permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom examined the level of forces of WEU member states and reported to the Council.

The Council noted that the level of forces of the member states of WEU, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II, as at present in force. It also took note of a declaration

on French forces made by the representative of France.

The same procedure is under way for the year 1985.

2. Forces under national command

The strength and armaments of forces of member states maintained on the mainland of Europe and remaining under national command – internal defence and police forces, forces for the defence of overseas territories, and common defence forces – are fixed each year in accordance with the procedure specified in the Agreement signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 in implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II.

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By means of the methods set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the Council has been able, in 1985, to carry out its obligations under Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty concerning levels of forces.

B. United Kingdom forces stationed on the mainland of Europe

The Government of the United Kingdom has informed the Council that the average number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1985, in accordance with the commitment in Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty, was 56,005. The continued need for the presence of troops in Northern Ireland made it necessary for units of the British Army of the Rhine to be deployed for short tours of duty there, and in 1985 there was an average of 814 men from the British Army of the Rhine in Northern Ireland. As has been previously stated, these units would be quickly returned to their normal duty station in an emergency affecting NATO.

Furthermore, the Government of the United Kingdom has informed the Council that the strength of the United Kingdom's contribution to the Second Allied Tactical Air Force in 1985 was:

<i>Rôle</i>	<i>Aircraft/Equipment</i>	<i>Squadrons</i>
Strike/Attack	Jaguar	1
	Tornado	4
Offensive support	Harrier	2
	Jaguar	1
Reconnaissance	Phantom	2
	Rapier surface-to-air missiles	4
Air defence	Puma	1
	Chinook	1
Air transport	RAF regiment	1
Ground defence		

III. Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments

In 1985, the Agency continued to carry out the tasks assigned to it under the terms of Article VII of Protocol No. IV. However, the extent and volume of the control activities was affected by the following Council decisions:

At their meeting in Rome on 26th and 27th October 1984, the Ministers decided, in accordance with Article V of Protocol No. III which allows the Council to vary the ACA's control activity, to abolish gradually the remaining quantitative controls on conventional weapons. The Ministers agreed that these controls should be substantially reduced by 1st January 1985 and entirely lifted by 1st January 1986. (Document on the institutional reform of WEU³, point III, 3(a).)

Pursuant to this decision, the Council adopted a resolution³ on 23rd January 1985 – effective from 1st January 1985 – indicating the types of armaments in respect of which controls had been lifted.

It was also stipulated that the factory inspections of conventional weapons subject to control in 1985 had been abolished.

A. Situation concerning the control of atomic, chemical and biological weapons

1. Atomic weapons

Since the situation has remained the same as in previous years, the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of atomic weapons

2. Biological weapons

All the member countries again gave their agreement, for 1985, on the renewal of the list of biological weapons subject to control as accepted by the Council in 1981. The Council noted the fact.

As in previous years, however, the Agency did not exercise any control in the field of biological weapons

3. Chemical weapons

The Agency asked member countries for their agreement to renew in 1985 the list of chemical weapons subject to control. This agree-

³ These texts were communicated to the Assembly at the time.

ment was given and the Council noted the fact. The Agency therefore continued to use this list for its control activities in 1985.

In implementation of Article III of Protocol No. III, which lays down conditions to enable the Council to fix levels of chemical weapons that may be held on the mainland of Europe by those countries which have not given up the right to produce them, and in accordance with the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked the countries concerned, in its questionnaire, whether production of chemical weapons on their mainland territory had passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage. As in the past, all these states replied in the negative.

In addition, the Agency asked all the member states to declare any chemical weapons that they might hold. Since all the member states replied in the negative, the Agency carried out no quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 1985.

The competent authorities of the country concerned provided the Agency with a detailed, precise and complete reply to the request for information – aimed at facilitating the control of non-production of chemical weapons – which was sent to them by the Agency in accordance with the resolution adopted by the Council in 1959 and with the directive received from the Council in 1960. In addition, the procedure applied with these authorities since 1973 was again used.

B. Controls from documentary sources

The main aim of the Agency's work in this field of its activity has been to compare, by studying the relevant documents, the quantities of armaments held by the member states with the levels fixed by the Council, in order to establish whether these constituted appropriate levels within the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty

1. Information processed by the Agency

Under the usual procedure, the Agency studied the member states' replies to its annual questionnaire, and the information given by the state concerned in reply to its annual request for information concerning the non-production of certain types of armaments. It compared this information with: the data supplied by NATO; the information communicated to the Council by the Governments of the United States and Canada (Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV); the conclusions of its budgetary studies; the information culled from open sources (specialised press) and the detailed statistics arising from its controls in previous years.

2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments

(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces placed under NATO command

After receiving and processing the member states' replies to the annual questionnaire and studying the statistical reports supplied by the authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Article VII, 2(a) of Protocol No. IV) and, in particular, by the NATO international secretariat, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the annual consultations with the NATO military authorities provided for by Article XIV of Protocol No. IV.

The consultations included a joint study session at Casteau on 21st October 1985 with an Agency expert and the appropriate officers from SHAPE headquarters; they concluded with a meeting in Paris on 26th November 1985 which was attended by representatives of the Agency, SHAPE, SACLANT and CINCHAN, and the international military staff of NATO. The meeting concluded that the quantities of armaments declared by the member states for their forces placed under NATO command and stationed on the mainland of Europe corresponded to the appropriate level for the control year 1985 within the terms of Articles XIV and XIX of Protocol No. IV, in respect of those armaments in respect of which the Agency is authorised to control stock levels.

(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces maintained under national command on the mainland of Europe

In accordance with the procedure in force for the implementation of the agreement of 14th December 1957, the Agency supplied the Council with the information relating to the armaments of this category of forces which had been supplied by the member states in response to the Agency's annual questionnaire. The Agency, having received from the Council the statements by the member states of force levels, analysed on the Council's behalf the data for armaments and forces, having regard to the rôles of their forces.

The Council subsequently accepted or approved for 1985 the maximum level of armaments of these forces and notified the Agency accordingly with the view to drawing up the final tables of the abovementioned forces.

C. Field control measures

The aim of this aspect of the Agency's activities was to verify the accuracy of the information obtained from documental controls.

For 1985, the preparation of the programme of field control measures was considera-

bly influenced by the decisions referred to in the introduction to this chapter

1. Programme definition

The formulation of the 1985 programme, even incorporating the substantial cutback on conventional weapons control measures which was tantamount to a 50% reduction compared with previous years, was a straightforward operation thanks to the well-defined criteria used in the past.

As 1985 was the final year of quantitative conventional armaments control, every effort was made to produce a balanced programme between the land, sea and air weapons of member states.

The system of joint Agency/SHAPE inspections at depots under NATO authority, introduced in 1957 and used each year since, was again authorised in 1985. Some depots were programmed for inspection by an Agency/SHAPE team.

On the basis of these considerations and of the information already available to it, the Agency was able to draw up a suitable programme for 1985 at the beginning of the year. In keeping with the usual procedure, this provisional programme was later modified following analyses and reviews of the member states' replies to the Agency's questionnaire, and some minor changes were made.

2. Type and extent of field control measures

The total number of field control measures was thirty-four.

These measures fall broadly into the following categories:

- (i) quantitative control measures at depots;
- (ii) quantitative control measures at units of forces under national command;
- (iii) agreed non-production control measures in factories.

Most of the quantitative control measures related to the land matériel, the others relating to air matériel and naval matériel; a significant number of these measures relating to missiles.

The agreed non-production control measures were carried out at chemical plants.

D. Other activities

1. Technical information visits (TIVs) and studies

The technical information visits (TIVs) and studies have in the past provided the means

of updating and improving armament control techniques in a changing technological world. They have also kept Agency experts up to date and interested. However, in view of the cessation of controls of conventional armaments at the end of 1985, it was considered inappropriate to incur expenditure on TIVs in this field during the year.

Nevertheless, because of its relevance to possible new tasks, some members of the Agency attended the WEU Assembly colloquy on the space challenge for Europe. Furthermore, at the invitation of the French authorities, Agency experts attended the Salon du Bourget and the French army exhibition at Satory.

2. In response to a request made in May by the Assembly's Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, the Council gave its agreement for Agency experts to assist the committee in the preparation of two of its reports.

3. The information gathered by the Agency in 1985 concerning the procurement and construction of armaments for the forces of WEU member countries stationed on the mainland of Europe is set out in an annex to this report.

E. General conclusions

In accordance with Articles VII and XIX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to report to the Council that, as a result of the control exercised in 1985, the figures obtained in accordance with Articles XIII of Protocol No. IV for the control year 1985:

- for armaments of forces under NATO command under the terms of Article XIV of Protocol No. IV, and
- for armaments of forces maintained under national command under the terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of Protocol No. IV and the agreement of 14th December 1957, concluded in implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II,

represented the appropriate levels of armaments subject to control for each of the member states.

As required by Article XX of Protocol No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the course of field control measures carried out at force units and military depots and during agreed non-production control measures, it did not detect for the categories of armaments which it controls:

- either the manufacture of a category of armaments that the governments of a member state concerned had undertaken not to manufacture (Annex II to Protocol No. III);

- or the existence, on the mainland of Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of Protocol No. IV) or not justified by export requirements (Article XXII of Protocol No. IV).

As in previous years, the help and co-operation given to the Agency by the national and NATO authorities, the directors and staff of the military establishments and private firms which the Agency visited played an important part in the accomplishment of its mission.

IV. Activities of the Standing Armaments Committee

In 1985, the Standing Armaments Committee met twice, on 3rd May and 25th October. The main items on the agenda of its meetings were: the follow-up to the Rome declaration and the Bonn communiqué regarding co-operation in the field of armaments and research and the future of the SAC in the reorganised WEU; the study of the armaments sector of industry in the member countries of WEU; information regarding the study on the development of the Japanese armaments industry and its possible repercussions in Europe; the updating of WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 on trials methods for wheeled vehicles; the activities of Working Group No. 8 on operational research.

A. Follow-up to the Rome declaration and the Bonn communiqué regarding co-operation in the field of armaments and research and the future of the SAC in the reorganised WEU

The Standing Armaments Committee, having noted the ministerial decisions taken in regard to it and in regard to the establishment of the agencies for security questions, addressed the problem of co-operation in the field of armaments and research, and that of its own future.

B. Study of the armament sector of industry in the member countries of WEU

The Standing Armaments Committee has, on the basis of data supplied by the member countries, drawn up the 1985 revision (covering the period 1976-83) of the first section of the economic part of the study on the armament sector of industry in the member countries of WEU. The Council has approved the transmission to the Assembly of a declassified version of this updating.

C. WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 on trials methods for wheeled vehicles

Work by the group of experts on the updating of WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 has progressed steadily. The group met twice at the WEU offices in Paris to discuss the texts drafted by the various delegations and in turn circulated in the two working languages by the international secretariat.

A representative of the relevant NATO committee attended the meetings.

The liaison between the group of experts and the NATO committee was provided by a committee secretary from the SAC.

D. Activities of the working groups

1. Working Group No. 8 on operational research

The remit of this working group, set up in 1968, is to exchange the findings of national operational research studies, to organise symposia on operational research methods and techniques and to arrange visits to national and international operational research centres.

In 1985, the group held two meetings, the second of which was combined with a seminar on methodology. The Standing Armaments Committee has given the go-ahead for the group to visit the ESTEC laboratory (European Space Technology Centre) in the Netherlands during 1986.

(a) Exchange of information

During the year, the delegations presented a number of information sheets concerning new studies and datings.

(b) Seminar on methodology

The theme of the seminar was "forecasting the life-cycle cost of weapon systems". Papers were presented by the German, Belgian, French, Italian and Netherlands Delegations and were followed by discussions.

(c) Lexicographical activity

The two meetings of the working group were devoted in part to the revisions of the five-language glossary.

2. Working Group No. 9 on possible hindrances to enemy action

This working group was not convened during the year under review.

*E. Activities of
the international secretariat*

1. The international secretariat has assisted the SAC, the group of experts on WEU Agreement 4.FT.6 and Working Group No. 8 in their work.

2. It has produced the study on the development of the Japanese armaments industry and its possible repercussions in Europe. This study has been completed following a study trip to Japan, in the course of which meetings were held with a number of high-ranking officials from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Japanese Defence Agency. Talks were also held at the Confederation of Japanese Industries (Keidanren), the Research Institute for Peace and Security and at the Technical Research and Development Institute. Finally, contacts were made with representatives of parliament, the press and the universities. Visits were also paid to the NASDA space centre in Tsukuba, to the launch site at Tanegashima, to the Mitsubishi H.I. shipyards at Nagasaki and the aeronautics and space factory at Komaki and, lastly, to the Fujitsu factory at Kamata.

The study was transmitted to the Council on 22nd October. A declassified version will be communicated to the Assembly.

3. The international secretariat has also contributed to the discussion on the follow-up to the Rome declaration regarding co-operation in the field of armaments and the new structures to be set up.

4. On 20th March 1985, the Assistant Secretary-General, head of the international secretariat, presented his oral annual report to the Permanent Council on the activities of the SAC. The Council noted the report's proposals regarding the future activities of the SAC in the context of the follow-up to the Rome declaration regarding co-operation in the field of armaments.

5. Relations between the SAC international secretariat and the FINABEL secretariat have continued in accordance with the provisions for co-operation laid down in 1973. A member of the international secretariat attended the annual meeting of the FINABEL Co-ordinating Committee.

6. As regards contacts with NATO, the international secretariat was represented at the April and September meetings of the Conference of National Armaments Directors, which took place at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

An observer from the international secretariat was present at the June and December meetings in Brussels of the NATO Naval Armaments Group.

7. In September, a member of the international secretariat took part in one-day meetings organised in Strasbourg by the French National Defence secretariat on the subject "defence and university research".

8. According to the ministerial instructions, the international secretariat has terminated its activities. Its tasks vis-à-vis the Standing Armaments Committee will be taken over by Agency III (agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments), which was established on 1st January 1986.

*V. Activities of the Public
Administration Committee*

A. Meetings of the committee

The Public Administration Committee, which meets once every six months, held its two meetings of 1985 in Haarlem, from 17th to 19th April, and in Celle, from 25th to 27th September.

As usual, these meetings were devoted to exchanges of information on significant administrative developments in the member countries during the preceding months and to the preparation of the multilateral seminar for government officials which takes place in the autumn of each year under the auspices of the committee, and which is organised by each of the member countries in turn.

The exchanges of view on administrative developments in the member countries represent a major part of the meetings. They provide delegates with an opportunity of describing the most notable reforms and innovations in their administrations, the problems raised and the obstacles (if any) encountered. Since, more often than not, the issues concern all the member countries (spread of new technologies throughout government departments, repercussions on the administration of a difficult economic climate), these exchanges of view provide a useful opportunity to compare the experiments being conducted in particular countries, the common aim of all of them being to adapt administrations and their staff more effectively to social and technological change and to the constraints of the current economic situation.

During the year under review, the exchanges of view focused on working conditions in the civil service, the characteristic features of which, in 1985, were austerity and modernisation.

Almost everywhere, the climate of austerity has led to a reduction in total wage and salary costs and a limit on recruitment, which is

tending to become more and more selective. Concurrently, the search for greater efficiency in the administration has led to more intense activity in the field of basic and advanced vocational training including at the senior level where attempts are being made – sometimes in co-operation with the private sector – to familiarise officials with modern management methods. The redeployment of manpower and increased staff mobility also contribute to the same end.

The modernisation of office systems is also designed to achieve greater productivity and at the same time to improve the working conditions of officials and the services provided to consumers. It is forecast that, by about 1995, data transmission systems may well replace documents in the public services. Here too, such objectives call for a major training effort: as modern systems continue to spread throughout the administration, a proper policy will be needed to educate the vast majority of officials at all levels about information technology.

B. Seminars for government officials

It was in the light of the above considerations that the topic for the 1985 seminar for government officials was chosen; it was held in Maastricht from 6th to 12th October and brought together twenty senior civil servants from the administrations of the member countries. The actual title of the seminar was "The management of change in the public administration" and focused specifically on the contribution which private sector management techniques could offer a public sector anxious to reform itself.

Prior to the seminar, and before any general discussion had been initiated on the main topic, each participant had been asked to prepare a case-study describing his/her experience of the management of change.

The seminar itself opened and closed with plenary sessions, further discussions taking place in two working groups, each comprising half of the participants. Four external speakers had also been invited to describe their own experiences. The principal guests at the closing dinner were the Netherlands Minister for Internal Affairs and the Governor of Limbourg.

The various case-studies gave the participants an insight into the diversity of national experiences on this topic of common interest.

Some of the case-studies dealt with the internal reorganisation of a public service aimed at modernising and simplifying management methods.

A second group of studies centred on schemes to achieve drastic cuts in public service facilities in order to obtain budgetary savings.

A third group focused more specifically on the attempts made to open up the administration to the outside and to adapt its services to the public's needs.

With few exceptions all the case-studies and, especially, the contributions made in the meetings were profoundly influenced by the general atmosphere of budgetary austerity and reappraisal vis-à-vis the public service sector, a sector thought to be consuming excessive funds to provide services deemed unsatisfactory both in terms of quantity and quality.

The comments received after the seminar clearly demonstrated that it had provided the opportunity for a valuable exchange of information for both the participants and the governments they represented.

C. Study visits

These visits, which are organised bilaterally on the responsibility of the members of the committee, enable an official to spend one or two weeks in the administration of another member country studying in his own specialist field.

Examples of visits organised during the year are: regulations to control major accident hazards, the response of industry and enforcement arrangements; the administration of air pollution control (subjects studied in the Federal Republic of Germany); information services, with particular reference to programmes for overseas visitors (subject studied in Belgium); immigration control: policy, legislation and implementation (subject studied in France); safety of dams and reservoirs: legislation and implementation; long-term imprisonment: the provisions made for adult prisoners serving long sentences (subject studied in the Netherlands).

VI. Budgetary and administrative questions

(a) With the economic situation still obliging member countries to exercise strict control over public expenditure, the 1985 WEU budget was again restricted to zero real growth, this objective being applied to total expenditure including pension costs.

The process of reactivation, which started in October 1984, continued during 1985, bringing with it a number of financial consequences for the ministerial organs.

The control activities of the ACA were gradually reduced in conformity with the Council's decision, taken in 1984, to lift entirely the control of conventional weapons on 1st January 1986. This resulted in savings on travel in the ACA, whilst, with a view to the pending reorganisation, staff vacancies resulting from retirement or other reasons were kept unfilled.

The workload of the Secretariat-General, however, was substantially increased; there were more Council meetings and meetings of working groups, and consequent increases in document production. As a result, vacancies which had not been budgeted for, or in part only, needed to be filled, mainly with temporary staff at the outset, but as the year progressed with permanent staff on short contracts.

On the political and public relations side, and to ensure rapid co-ordination between national delegations and with other organisations, senior officials had to undertake a considerable amount of unforeseen extra travel.

Furthermore, following terrorist threats, and at the instigation of the specialist authorities concerned, unexpected security work at the WEU premises in both London and Paris had to be undertaken. The Paris offices were able to finance this from their budget surplus, but the Secretariat-General required supplementary funds.

The budget for 1985 was drafted during the early stages of reactivation and could not be expected to take account of all the changed demands that would be made on personnel and material.

Due to the financial repercussions of these changed demands, a revised 1985 budget for the ministerial organs had to be drawn up.

(b) When drafting the budgets for 1986, the format of the Paris budget was adapted to the

organisational change effective from 1st January 1986, namely one single budget for the agencies for security questions. The budget of the ministerial organs for 1986 consists therefore of two sections: Section A for the Secretariat-General in London and Section B for the agencies for security questions in Paris. The combined budget for Sections A and B was increased by 5.89% over the revised 1985 ministerial organs' budget (including pensions).

(c) The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts held nine meetings. In addition, there were eleven meetings of the Heads of Administration, ten joint meetings of the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General with the Standing Committee of Staff Associations, as well as one meeting of the Secretaries-General.

The main subjects dealt with, some of which are still under review, were as follows:

- the improvement of staff participation in the framework of co-ordination;
- current problems associated with the temporary levy on the basic salaries of A and L grade staff;
- the report by international experts on international indices, economic parities and family budget surveys;
- the periodic adjustment of salaries and allowances;
- the report of a comparative study on the budgetary effect of the new education allowance;
- a study on the children's allowance;
- problems associated with special wage measures in some reference countries and their impact on salary comparisons.

PART TWO

The meetings of the WEU Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence in Rome on 26th and 27th October 1984, in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985 and, informally, in Rome on 14th November 1985 were decisive steps in the process of reactivating the organisation.

By the end of 1985 the new structures of the ministerial organs were outlined, most of them being already set up, with the rest to be completed in 1986.

I. Activation of the ministerial organs

As decided in Rome on 26th and 27th October 1984⁴, the Ministerial Council, comprising Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers, met twice in 1985:

- on 22nd and 23rd April in Bonn;
- in informal session on 14th November in Rome.

Points 11 and 12 of the Bonn communiqué (annexed hereto) fixed the guidelines for the reorganisation of the ministerial organs in Paris and for the strengthening of the Secretariat-General in London, as accepted in principle at the previous ministerial meeting in Rome.

A. WEU Council

In deciding at their meeting in Rome "to make full use of the institutions of WEU and, accordingly, to bring the existing institutions into line with the changed tasks of the organisation", the Ministers meeting in Bonn stated their intention to intensify the work of the Permanent Council in line with the increased activities of the Council of Ministers.

B. Reorganisation of the ministerial organs in Paris

In the communiqué issued after the Bonn meeting, the Ministers decided to reorganise comprehensively the ACA, the SAC and its international secretariat. They agreed to establish the following new structures under the collective title, agencies for security questions:

- an agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions;

- an agency for the study of security and defence questions;
- an agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments.

The ACA will, for the time being, be placed under co-direction with the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions. It will continue to undertake its commitments remaining after the abolition of quantitative controls on conventional weapons.⁵

The SAC was also to be maintained and would meet at the appropriate level. The international secretariat of the SAC would be abolished. The agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments would also serve as a secretariat for the SAC.

The Permanent Council, asked by the Ministers to implement rapidly their decisions and to submit to the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 14th November in Rome a report on the progress achieved by then and on the new tasks attributed to these agencies, agreed on the following measures.

The larger part of the tasks of the agencies will consist of ad hoc studies requested by the Council.

Monitoring studies and periodic reports could also be undertaken by the agencies but should not, however, prevent the agencies from completing the ad hoc studies within the timetable set by the Council. After examining the first monitoring studies and periodic reports, the Council may, if necessary, reorient the agencies' work.

The new agencies will operate under these arrangements for a transitional period ending 31st December 1987 when the Council will re-examine the problems of organisation and staff.

C. Strengthening of the Secretariat-General in London

In order to adapt the Secretariat-General to the increased activities of the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council, and to implement the governments' and Assembly's desire to see the political dimension of the work of WEU clearly reinforced, a strengthened political affairs division has been set up. Alongside the Council secretariat section, it will include a

4. See thirtieth annual report of the Council to the Assembly, Annex V (Document 1006).

5. Document on the institutional reform of WEU, point III.3(a).

new section entitled, "General policy and research".

In addition, as had been recommended in the document WEU and public awareness⁶, a small information and public relations unit will be set up within the secretariat during 1986.

II. Relations between the Assembly and the Council

As already stated, the improvement of relations between the Assembly and the Council has been one of the latter's constant concerns.

A. Improvement of the procedure for replying to the Assembly

On 13th December 1984 the Permanent Council had instructed its Working Group to look at the question of improving the procedure for replying to the Assembly.

A number of proposals have been put forward and are being evaluated.

⁶ Document transmitted to the Assembly after the meeting in Bonn on 23rd April.

B. Improvement in the exchange of information between the Council and the Assembly

(i) The subject has often been discussed at meetings between the Assembly and the Council (cf. Chapter I, B, 2) and in particular at the meeting after the Assembly session on 4th December in Paris between the Permanent Council, chaired by Mr. Andreotti, Italian Foreign Minister, and the Presidential Committee of the Assembly.

Several ideas were put forward which will be examined later by each of the parties and should lead to valuable results as from 1986.

(ii) It should also be noted that the Presidential Committee of the Assembly set up on 19th February 1985 a Committee for Relations with the Council. The committee met the Council for the first time on 23rd April in Bonn where the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Genscher, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, informed it of the conclusions of the ministerial meeting and where the Council's reports on WEU and public awareness and the reorganisation of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Standing Armaments Committee were handed over.

ANNEX I

*Communiqué issued at the close of the ministerial meeting
of the Council of Western European Union**Bonn, 22nd-23rd April 1985*

1. Foreign and Defence Ministers of the Western European Union met in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985.

2. The Ministers recalled the importance of the decisions taken at their extraordinary meeting in Rome in October 1984 to permit better use to be made of the framework and institutions of WEU and harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe. They reaffirmed their determination to strengthen their solidarity and that which links them with their allies of the Atlantic Alliance, which remains the only body for implementing common defence and the expression of the fundamental bond between the security of Europe and that of North America.

3. Reviewing questions relating to security in Europe, the Ministers noted that their countries are confronted with a continuing quantitative and qualitative development of Soviet military forces which cannot be justified solely by security interests. They emphasised the indispensable nature of deterrence based on credible nuclear and conventional forces. The Ministers reaffirmed the determination of each of their countries to pursue the efforts necessary, whether nationally or within the integrated military structure of the Atlantic Alliance, to strengthen their joint security.

4. In this context, the Ministers underlined the substantial defence effort of the European countries of the alliance. Their contribution in this respect, whatever form it may take, is fundamental to the strength of the alliance as a whole, and to the defence of European interests. They recalled the contribution that WEU can make in particular to achieve wider consensus among public opinion on these questions.

5. On the question of East-West relations, the Ministers welcomed the resumption of the United States-Soviet negotiations in Geneva – an important event for the security of the Atlantic Alliance in general and for that of Europe in particular. They reaffirmed their firm support for, and their confidence in, their American ally in its efforts to achieve a more stable strategic relationship at the lowest possible balanced level of forces and called on the Soviet Union to display a positive attitude.

6. The Ministers expressed the hope that the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union will make possible radical reduc-

tions in their strategic and medium-range nuclear armaments and agreements aimed at ending the arms race on earth and preventing an arms race in space. They underlined in this regard the importance which they attach to respect for existing treaty obligations.

7. The Ministers also examined questions associated with research efforts concerning strategic defence. They agreed to continue their collective consideration in order to achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their governments to the invitation of the United States to participate in the research programme and instructed the permanent Council accordingly. In this context they underlined the importance of the continuing bilateral consultations with their partners in the Atlantic Alliance as an essential element of allied cohesion.

8. The Ministers reaffirmed their countries' determination to continue to work for better East-West relations on a realistic and long-term basis, and for the full realisation of the CSCE commitments established at Helsinki and Madrid. They also recalled the multilateral negotiations in the field of confidence-building measures and conventional disarmament and underscored the significance of these negotiations for Europe. The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to continue contributing towards progress in the negotiations on a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons being conducted at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

9. The Ministers also held a detailed exchange of views on questions relating to armaments co-operation and research and agreed that closer co-operation and the harmonisation of their efforts are fundamental in maintaining in the longer term a competitive and advanced defence industrial base in Europe and in achieving a more cost-effective defence. The Ministers instructed the Permanent Council to present proposals in time for the next meeting to help provide the necessary political impetus for, and practical contributions to, the various efforts undertaken in this field, including those carried out by bodies such as the IEPG and the CNAD.

10. Noting the increasing importance of technology, the Ministers also affirmed the member states' determination to take the necessary measures within the European Communities to

strengthen Europe's own technological capacity and thus achieve the creation of a technological community.

11. As regards the reorganisation of WEU institutions, the principle of which was agreed at the Ministerial Council in Rome, the Ministers decided that the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee, and the Standing Armaments Committee would be comprehensively reorganised. They agreed to establish the following new structures under the collective title "Agencies for Security Questions":

- an agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions ;
- an agency for the study of security and defence questions ; and
- an agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments.

The Ministers endorsed the recommendations of the Permanent Council on this subject. They requested the Permanent Council to implement

rapidly their decisions and to submit to the next meeting of the Council of Ministers a report on the progress achieved by then and on the new tasks attributed to these agencies.

12. The Ministers also considered suggestions made by the Secretary-General on the strengthening of the WEU Secretariat-General in London. They also discussed ways and means of improving WEU's public relations activities. The Ministers underlined the important rôle of the WEU Assembly and paid tribute to its active contribution to the revitalisation of WEU.

13. The Ministers recalled the importance which they attach to their non-member allies being informed as fully as possible of their work. In this context, they considered that the special interest expressed by certain states is an appreciable encouragement to the efforts which they have undertaken within WEU.

14. The Ministers decided to appoint Mr. Alfred Cahen as the new Secretary-General of WEU. They expressed their warm appreciation for the services rendered by the retiring Secretary-General, Mr. Edouard Longestaey.

ANNEX II

*WEU and public awareness**Introduction*

I. (i) WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers at Rome agreed that a study should be made of WEU public relations activities and a report submitted by the Permanent Council for the next ministerial meeting. The Chairman-in-Office of WEU referred to this in his speech to the WEU Assembly on 29th October :

“ The Ministers commissioned the Permanent Council to prepare reports that are to be deliberated at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers. The Permanent Council will submit proposals... on ways of improving WEU public relations activities. ”

I. (ii) In considering how best to develop WEU public relations activities, thought should be given to the *themes* WEU wishes to address in presenting its activities, and to the *means* by which this presentation is to be made. This paper aims to address these points.

Themes

II. (i) Ministers at Rome stressed the importance of the modified Brussels Treaty and their attachment to its goals of maintaining peace and security, of promoting unity, and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation both among its member states and with other European organisations. They emphasised :

- the indivisibility of security within the North Atlantic Treaty area ;
- the vital and substantial contribution of all the European allies ;
- their conviction that a better utilisation of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and to greater solidarity among its members.

II. (ii) Ministers therefore decided to hold comprehensive discussions and to seek to harmonise their views on the specific conditions of security in Europe. They agreed on six main areas for discussion, as indicated in paragraph 8 of the Rome declaration.

II. (iii) Drawing on this mandate, the themes which the WEU might address in its public relations, with the aim of informing public opinion on security and defence policies, became clearer. The following could fulfil the expectations set at Rome :

- (a) to explain the need to maintain adequate defences, that security has to be won, and that it should never be taken for granted ;
- (b) to explain that the need for security and defence measures is greater than hitherto in view of force imbalances and the present threat ;
- (c) to reiterate that the members of WEU are determined to ensure their defence and solidarity whilst seeking more stable relationships with the countries of the East through constructive dialogue and co-operation ;
- (d) to demonstrate the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty as the foundation of our security, while underlining the defensive nature of its policies ; and to highlight the importance of the European contribution to the alliance and to western security ;
- (e) to draw attention to the proposals of western countries, including the Europeans, to seek balanced and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements at the lowest possible level of forces, explaining that allied unity increases the chances for progress ;
- (f) to draw attention to the importance of developing European co-operation in the field of armaments ;
- (g) to draw attention to the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world ;
- (h) in general, to encourage a better-informed public debate about defence and security policy.

II. (iv) In view of the continuing quantitative and qualitative development of Soviet military forces, European governments should focus the attention of their publics on the central importance of deterrence in maintaining peace and security. The WEU must also aim to

develop public understanding of the transatlantic relationship as fundamental to the alliance, and of the irreplaceable nature of the United States commitment to Europe and the American nuclear guarantee.

II. (v) It will be especially important for WEU to demonstrate the well-established commitment of the alliance (cf. Harmel report) to work for constructive and stable East-West relations and a productive dialogue. In the coming months, it may also be important to explain the complexities of arms control negotiations in order to help increase public understanding of why early results cannot always be achieved.

Means

III. (i) There are three avenues through which WEU public relations activity could be channelled :

- WEU Assembly ;
- WEU Council/Secretary-General/Agencies ;
- WEU member governments.

Assembly

III. (ii) The Rome declaration and document on institutional reform indicate the importance Ministers attach to the Assembly in the revitalisation of WEU and to the rôle it might play in striving "to consolidate the consensus among public opinion" on the security and defence needs of the member states. In this context, Ministers at Rome express the hope that the Assembly might play a part in achieving greater public understanding of the defence and security options open to the Council which expresses the political will of the individual governments in its policy statements. To help in this, the Rome institution document calls *inter alia* for the development of informal contacts between government representatives and representatives of the Assembly, and for better means of keeping the Assembly informed of the work of the Council so that the two bodies can operate together in an even more complementary fashion.

III. (iii) The Assembly is the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to discuss defence and security issues. It attracts considerable public attention during its biennial sessions.

III. (iv) Individual Assembly sessions are addressed by Ministers from various member states on subjects of topical interest. This provides an opportunity to put across to a wider audience the commonly agreed themes. Other speeches which provide a platform for the discussion of defence and security issues (see paragraph III. (x) below) might also incorporate these ideas.

III. (v) It will be important to give maximum publicity to such speeches. This will to a large extent be a national task ; but WEU institutions can also play a rôle by helping to spread information from Assembly sessions and disseminating the texts or extracts of speeches by Ministers of member states. Consideration should be given to the arrangement of press briefings, the production of broadsheets, information on Assembly debates, and the distribution of reports suitable for use by the press. It would be helpful in this respect if in future Ministers making speeches at WEU Assembly sessions could include a press conference in their itinerary. Between Assembly sessions, the press section should try to arrange greater contact between members of parliament of member states and the media.

Council/Secretary-General/Agencies

III. (vi) Ministerial sessions provide an opportunity to further develop good and comprehensive relations with the press. This task is primarily the responsibility of the presidency and national governments. Delegations should include officials responsible solely for this function. They should aim also to assist in promoting the image of a revitalised WEU.

III. (vii) There may also be scope for using the office of the Secretary-General to promote WEU, to explain its purpose and functions within the framework of European security, and to press themes agreed by the Council. The Council could also charge the Secretary-General to relay information to the press through independent briefings to journalists or, if appropriate, speeches.

III. (viii) There is probably a rôle for a public relations and information unit within the Secretariat-General. This could take responsibility for developing contacts with the press and disseminating information about WEU. It could arrange briefing sessions for the press before the major sessions of the Council and Assembly and as necessary in between them. It would be for the Permanent Council to decide on the substance and nature of any material distributed by the unit.

Agencies

III. (ix) The Council may commission the Paris agencies of WEU to contribute to information activity in the following ways :

- (i) preparing material specifically for public relations use ; such material could be distributed as directed by the Permanent Council through the secretariat unit in London. If budgetary resources permitted, the Council might request preparation of small publications about the work of WEU in pamphlet or brochure form for distribution ;
- (ii) preparing material of topical interest for publication and dissemination to the press. A list of press contacts should be drawn up and kept with the new unit in the Secretariat-General in London.

National governments

III. (x) As previously indicated, the most effective way of authoritatively reaching a wide audience is through the public statements of politicians and Ministers in the national governments of member states. Considerable attention is regularly given to them by the media. Use should be made of the major ministerial speeches, parliamentary debates, and media appearances of WEU Ministers to put across the agreed themes.

III. (xi) Government Ministers and officials in all WEU member countries regularly discuss defence and security issues with members of parliament, journalists, church leaders, non-governmental organisations, research institutes, academic bodies, and others. These contacts should be used to explain the agreed themes and the rôle of WEU in the context of European security.

III. (xii) Other national information channels should also be used more effectively to generate greater public awareness of policies which the alliance and WEU members follow. The Permanent Council will be instructed to look at this problem periodically during its regular sessions. When the Permanent Council considers it appropriate, such national information activities could be co-ordinated in order to enhance their effect. The overall aim of this work by the Permanent Council will be to improve the image of the WEU member countries in the field of defence and security questions.

Conclusion

IV. (i) Success in achieving the objectives of the Rome declaration will depend on many factors, a major one of which will be the stimulation of public interest in WEU and the generation of greater public awareness of policies which WEU members follow. Maintenance of the higher political profile of WEU will enable the organisation to play a part in helping the cause of European security and transatlantic unity.

ANNEX III

***Reorganisation of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and
the Standing Armaments Committee, including
the international secretariat
of the Standing Armaments Committee***

With the aim of better adapting the institutions of WEU to present and future requirements, without amending the modified Brussels Treaty, the Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU, at the ministerial meeting in Rome on 26th-27th October 1984, instructed the Permanent Council to define the modalities of an overall reorganisation affecting both the ACA, the international secretariat of the SAC and the SAC.

1. The mandate

The mandate given to the Permanent Council reads as follows (document on the institutional reform of WEU, III.3):

“ With the aim of better adapting the institutions of WEU to present and future requirements, the ministers reached the following decisions:

(a) Noting that the control functions originally assigned to the ACA have now become, for the most part, superfluous, the ministers decided, in accordance with Article V of Protocol No. III which allows the Council to make changes to the ACA's control activity, to abolish gradually the remaining quantitative controls on conventional weapons. The ministers agreed that these controls should be substantially reduced by 1st January 1985 and entirely lifted by 1st January 1986. The commitments and controls concerning ABC weapons would be maintained at the existing level and in accordance with the procedures agreed up to the present time.

(b) The ministers have instructed the Permanent Council to define, in consultation with the directors of the ACA and the SAC, the precise modalities of an overall reorganisation affecting both the ACA, the international secretariat of the SAC and the SAC which would be structured in such a way as to fulfil a threefold task:

- to study questions relating to arms control and disarmament whilst carrying out the remaining control functions;
- undertake the function of studying security and defence problems;
- to contribute actively to the development of European armaments co-operation.

(c) As regards the first two functions indicated above, the intention would be to have available a common basis of analysis which could form a useful point of reference for the work of both the Council and the Assembly and also for informing public opinion.

This reorganisation will have to be carried out taking into account, on the one hand, changes in duties resulting first from the reduction and then from the abolition of the control tasks and, on the other hand, the need to have the appropriate experts available.

(d) As regards armaments co-operation, WEU should be in a position to play an active rôle in providing political impetus:

- by supporting all co-operative efforts including those of the IEPG and the CNAD;
- by encouraging in particular the activity of the IEPG as a forum whose main objective is to promote European co-operation and also to contribute to the development of balanced co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance;
- by developing continuing concertation with the various existing bodies.

(e) In this general context, the Permanent Council will also take into account the existence of the FINABEL framework.

(f) In carrying out this overall reorganisation, the Permanent Council will have to:

- propose a precise organisation table which will make it possible to define and give a breakdown of the posts required for carrying out the three functions referred to above;
- ensure that the various arrangements proposed remain within the present limits in terms of staff and the organisation's budget, without weakening WEU's ability to play its rôle.

The ministers asked the Permanent Council to complete its work before their next session. They expressed the wish, however, that in the meantime a start should be made on all or part of the new tasks as soon as possible.”

2. Present situation

(a) Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA)

The ACA has a contractual foundation (see Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty in connection with Protocol No. I, Article IV as well as Protocol No. IV).

The Council is not prevented by the treaty from adjusting the size of the ACA staff to the reduction in its responsibilities permitted by the treaty and currently being effected. This means that the ACA can be reduced to the absolutely essential number of posts. The vacated posts can be reallocated.

In the ACA, there is one director hors grade and there are twenty-one administrative-grade posts. The ACA consists entirely of international civil servants.

By a resolution (C (85) 27), the Council, in implementation of the decision contained in paragraph 3(a) of Section III of the document on the institutional reform of WEU adopted in Rome on 27th October 1984, and having regard to the relevant provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty of 23rd October 1954,

Article 1

HAS DECIDED that, with effect from 1st January 1985, the controls shall be lifted on the following types of armaments in the list contained in Annex IV to Protocol No. III, signed in Paris on 23rd October 1954: the elevating mass referred to in paragraph 2 of the abovementioned list and the items mentioned in paragraphs 5, 6(a), 6(b), 7, 8(c), 9, 10, 11(b) and 11(c).

Article 2

HAS DECIDED that, with effect from 1st January 1986, paragraphs 2 to 11 inclusive of the abovementioned list shall be cancelled.

It is not possible to transfer new spheres of responsibility to the ACA, since this would not be consistent with the contractually established functions of the ACA (Article VII et seq. of Protocol No. IV).

(b) Standing Armaments Committee (SAC)

The SAC, including the international secretariat of the SAC, was not set up by the modified Brussels Treaty or its protocols, but by a Council decision taken in 1955.

The SAC consists of the Committee itself (composed of national representatives) and an international secretariat; only the latter has a staff of international civil servants.

The international secretariat has one director hors grade and five administrative-grade posts.

3. The objectives

Since the new agencies will have to play a special rôle within WEU, a definition of their tasks and their link to the Council and the Secretary-General would be appropriate.

(a) The Council

The Council (Council of Ministers and Permanent Council) is central to the efforts to make better use of WEU.

Pursuant to Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, the Council, assisted by the Secretariat-General, organises its activities as necessary and may consult or set up subsidiary bodies.

(b) The Secretary-General and the Secretariat-General

The Secretary-General, who chairs the meetings of the Permanent Council, has a major rôle to play in co-ordinating and stimulating the work of the organisation. He heads the Secretariat-General which is to be adapted in line with the increased activities of the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council. The Secretariat-General is the executive body of the Council and directly serves it. It liaises between the Council and the Assembly, between the Council and the agencies in Paris and between the Council and other subsidiary bodies. It also prepares reports requested by the Council.

(c) The new agencies

The new agencies in Paris are to support the Council and work at its request. They will have a functional link with the Secretary-General: they receive the Council's instructions through the Secretary-General and submit their studies via the Secretary-General to the Council. The agencies' studies – whether on a regular or ad hoc basis – should provide a substantial analytical contribution to the work of the Council.

4. Draft operational decision for the Council of Ministers

The following is the operational proposal by the Permanent Council for the Council of Ministers for:

*“ The reorganisation
of the WEU subsidiary bodies
and establishment of the new agencies for
security questions in Paris*

1. Under the collective title agencies for security questions, three new structures will be established in Paris, each of equal status:

- an agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions;

- an agency for the study of security and defence questions;
- an agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments.

Each agency will be headed by a director with a fixed term of office.

The three directors will be individually and collectively under the authority of the Council, having a functional link with the Secretary-General, whose rôle will be to ensure proper co-ordination with the Council and the implementation of its decisions.

The three directors will form a Committee of Directors having responsibility for co-ordinating their work. The Secretary-General or his representative can be present on the committee.

The total administrative-grade posts of the new agencies will in principle be shared in a balanced manner.

The agencies for security questions will share joint services (administration, security, documentation, translation and interpretation). Each director will be responsible in turn, on an annual basis, for supervising the work of the joint services and for reporting to the Committee of Directors.

2. Having regard to the present staffing situation, the following transitional measures will be adopted:

- (a) the present Director of the ACA, who holds an HG post, will remain head of the ACA and will set up and head the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions;
- (b) an HG post will be transferred from the Secretariat-General in London to Paris. The incumbent will set up and head the agency for the study of security and defence questions. This transfer should be made without prejudice to the strengthening of the Secretariat-General at another level;
- (c) the present head of the international secretariat of the SAC, who holds an HG post, will set up and head the agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments;
- (d) the setting-up of the agencies will be carried out under the supervision of the Council through the intermediary

of the Secretary-General represented at the Committee of Directors.

3. At the end of 1987, the Council will again consider the problems of organisation and staffing.

In the meantime, the Council will take the measures necessary so that the terms of office of the three directors responsible for setting up the new agencies will end simultaneously, at the end of 1987.

4. These measures will be taken without prejudice to those of a definitive character which will be adopted at the end of this transitional period. The latter will be taken in the light of the experience gained and should, in any event, meet the concern for a rational use of resources.

5. The ACA is to be maintained. The Permanent Council re-emphasises that the commitments and controls concerning ABC weapons (defined by Articles II and IV as well as Annex I to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty) will be maintained at the existing level and in accordance with the procedures agreed up to the present time. After 1st January 1986 the remaining functions will have to be dealt with by a very reduced A-grade staff (a director and a deputy director).

The ACA, as a separate agency, will remain, for the time being, under co-direction with the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions.

6. The SAC will be maintained and meet at the appropriate level, in particular to assist the Council of Ministers in giving the necessary political impetus in the field of armaments co-operation. The international secretariat of the SAC will be abolished. The agency for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments will also serve as a secretariat for the SAC.

7. The Permanent Council emphasises that:

- this reform will be carried out in strict adherence to the limits agreed in terms of budget and staff;
- it will not give rise to the creation of any posts;
- it will constitute an effort to rationalise the structures, notably by the setting-up of joint services for the technical bodies."

ANNEX IV

***Production and procurement
of armaments for the
forces of WEU member countries stationed on
the mainland of Europe***

1. Armaments for land forces

(a) Belgium has increased its holdings of M-109 105 mm howitzers. Considerable quantities of Milan anti-tank missiles were also delivered.

(b) France is in the process of scrapping some of its obsolete armoured fighting vehicles and battle tanks. A substantial number of modern light tanks and battle tanks have entered into service; anti-tank missiles, most of them of the obsolescent Entac type, have been fired for practice purposes or have been scrapped.

(c) The Federal Republic of Germany has withdrawn from service a number of Jagd Panzer Jaguar I tank destroyers fitted with 90 mm guns for conversion to armoured anti-tank missile-launcher vehicles or observation vehicles. The delivery of Leopard II tanks, tracked armoured vehicles equipped with Hot launchers and Milan and Hot anti-tank missiles was expected.

(d) Italy has continued to modernise its anti-tank forces by procuring a substantial number of Tow missiles. Some obsolete battle tanks and anti-tank recoilless rifles were withdrawn from service.

(e) Luxembourg has reported an increase in its holdings of Tow missiles.

(f) The Netherlands have continued to modernise their tank and anti-tank potential by procuring Leopard II battle tanks and Dragon missile-launchers.

(g) The United Kingdom has continued to replace obsolescent Chieftain battle tanks with tanks of the Challenger type. An increase in the anti-tank capability has been achieved through the delivery to BAOR of Milan anti-tank launchers and Milan and Swingfire missiles. The anti-aircraft capability has been enhanced by the acquisition of Rapier anti-aircraft missiles.

2. Naval armaments

(a) Belgium has acquired Sea Sparrow (sea-to-air) missiles.

(b) In France, one nuclear missile-carrying submarine was commissioned. Two older destroyers, two conventional submarines and one tank-landing ship were withdrawn from service. A number of Super Etendard carrier-

borne aircraft joined the fleet (the delivery planned for 1984 having been postponed until 1985).

A number of MM-40 (up-graded anti-ship Exocet) and Crotale Navale (sea-to-air) missiles were acquired whereas some medium-range Tartar/Standard sea-to-air missiles were scrapped. The obsolescent SS-11 and SS-12 air-to-ground wire-guided missiles were also scrapped.

(c) In the Federal Republic of Germany, there has been no change in the naval vessel situation. Some new Tornado attack aircraft were delivered, thus completing the fitting-out of one naval air wing. A number of older F-104 attack aircraft were disposed of. In addition, the navy has acquired Sea Sparrow air-to-air missiles and Sidewinder AIM 9L missiles for its Tornado aircraft.

(d) In Italy, the through deck cruiser (light aircraft-carrier) Garibaldi joined the fleet. Some older fast attack craft (torpedo-armed) were withdrawn from service. A number of Otomat sea-to-sea missiles were acquired, but some Terrier sea-to-air missiles were scrapped.

(e) In the Netherlands, a new air defence frigate, the Jacob van Heemskerck, joined the fleet. One older submarine was taken out of service. A number of Sea Sparrow missiles were bought whereas some older Sea Cat sea-to-air missiles were scrapped.

3. Air force armaments

(a) Belgium planned to expend a few Nike Hercules missiles during the year for training purposes.

(b) France was due to reduce slightly its Jaguar A holdings and to take delivery of Mirage 2000-C aircraft. A further delivery of Mirage F-1C aircraft was also planned. Holdings of Crotale R-440 and Matra Super 530 missiles were also set to increase.

(c) The Federal Republic of Germany was due to reduce its holdings of F-104G aircraft, this being offset by the planned delivery of Tornado MRCA aircraft. For training purposes, Nike Hercules, improved Hawk and Sidewinder AIM 9B missiles were to be used. A significant quantity of Sidewinder 9L missiles and Maverick AGM-65B missiles were also due for delivery.

(d) Italy has reported no significant changes for 1985, apart from the fact that a small number of missiles will be expended for training purposes.

(e) The Netherlands planned to take delivery of a number of F-16 aircraft and to expend some sea-to-air missiles in practice firings.

(f) The United Kingdom has withdrawn from its air force a number of Jaguar aircraft assigned to the Second ATAF, but has made a corresponding increase in its complement of Tornado aircraft. The number of Rapier launcher and tracking installations has been increased as have the holdings of Sidewinder AIM 9L missiles.

ANNEX V

Summary of revised WEU budget for 1985

	A*	B*	C*	Total B + C
	£	F.frs	F.frs	F.frs
Salaries and allowances	1,296,910	11,206,900	23,729,650	34,936,550
Pensions	137,390	1,611,100	4,747,500	6,358,600
Travel	39,750	174,400	550,500	724,900
Other operating costs	212,600	760,790	1,115,090	1,875,880
Purchase of furniture	2,720	22,500	73,900	96,400
Buildings	—	25,000	45,000	70,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	1,689,870	13,800,690	30,261,640	44,062,330
WEU tax	486,840	3,922,500	8,241,700	12,164,200
Other receipts	43,620	234,500	528,900	763,400
Pension receipts	48,200	329,000	751,600	1,080,600
TOTAL INCOME	578,660	4,486,000	9,522,200	14,008,200
NET TOTAL	1,111,210	9,314,690	20,739,440	30,054,130

National contributions called for under the revised WEU budget for 1985

	600ths	£	F.frs
Belgium	59	109,268.98	2,881,572.78
France	120	222,242.00	5,860,826.00
Germany	120	222,242.00	5,860,826.00
Italy	120	222,242.00	5,860,826.00
Luxembourg	2	3,704.04	97,680.44
Netherlands	59	109,268.98	2,881,572.78
United Kingdom	120	222,242.00	5,860,826.00
TOTAL	600	1,111,210.00	29,304,130.00**

*A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Agency for the Control of Armaments.

** Excludes Frs 750,000 frozen by Council.

Summary of revised WEU budget for 1985

	A*	B*	C*	Total B + C
	£	F.frs	F.frs	F.frs
Salaries and allowances	1,290,674	10,690,300	21,814,450	32,504,750
Pensions	170,060	1,913,700	4,823,500	6,737,200
Travel	47,960	174,400	550,500	724,900
Other operating costs	268,330	777,490	1,115,090	1,892,580
Purchase of furniture	9,720	22,500	73,900	94,400
Buildings	—	151,500	273,000	424,500
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	1,786,744	13,729,890	28,650,440	42,380,330
WEU tax	461,480	3,798,200	7,514,600	11,312,800
Other receipts	35,645	232,500	516,600	749,100
Pension receipts	47,950	320,000	694,300	1,014,300
TOTAL INCOME	545,075	4,350,700	8,725,500	13,076,200
NET TOTAL	1,241,669	9,379,190	19,924,940	29,304,130

National contributions called for under the revised WEU budget for 1985

	600ths	£	F.frs
Belgium	59	122,097.45	2,881,572.78
France	120	248,333.80	5,860,826.00
Germany	120	248,333.80	5,860,826.00
Italy	120	248,333.80	5,860,826.00
Luxembourg	2	4,138.90	97,680.44
Netherlands	59	122,097.45	2,881,572.78
United Kingdom	120	248,333.80	5,860,826.00
TOTAL	600	1,241,669.00	29,304,130.00

*A Secretariat-General.

B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.

C Agency for the Control of Armaments.

*Communiqué issued after the ministerial meeting
of the Council of Western European Union*

Venice, 29th-30th April 1986

1. Foreign and Defence Ministers of Western European Union met in Venice on 29th and 30th April 1986. They recalled the important rôle of WEU in the process of European construction. They reaffirmed their attachment to WEU as a forum in which the governments concerned can address specific European concerns in the security field within the framework of their membership of the Atlantic Alliance. These concerns relate both to the need for effective and appropriate defence capabilities and to the specific implications for security and stability in Europe of developments in the various arms control negotiations.

2. The Ministers stressed the importance of the contribution to common security made by the member states and expressed their appreciation of the contribution which the independent nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom make to deterrence. They recalled the indivisible nature of western security and their firm determination to strengthen the ties and the solidarity which bind them together and to the other members of the alliance.

3. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the improvement of East-West relations through the promotion of contact and dialogue. In this respect they recalled the importance of the CSCE process.

They emphasised that a climate of confidence is important for progress in the field of arms control and disarmament. They noted the need to find solutions in all negotiating fora that take full account of the security interests of their countries.

The Ministers recalled that the fundamental objective of arms control, both conventional and nuclear, must be to strengthen security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces.

4. The Ministers expressed their support for the efforts made by the United States in the talks with the Soviet Union about their nuclear weapons and space. They welcomed the various ongoing and close consultations among the allies and the American resolve to take European concerns fully into consideration.

The expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would give practical effect at the negotiating table to its stated intention to reach equitable and verifiable arms control agreements.

5. The Ministers stressed that the ongoing negotiations on United States and Soviet longer-

range intermediate nuclear forces are of particular interest to Europe. They recalled the importance they attach to the objective of progressive reductions leading to the global elimination of this category of weapons within the framework of effectively verifiable agreements. In this context the emergence of new areas of instability should be prevented by adequate measures.

6. The Ministers underlined that imbalances in the field of conventional forces throughout Europe equally constitute a factor of instability. Progress towards balanced and verifiable reductions of conventional forces would thus represent a very significant contribution to the strengthening of security and peace in Europe. The Ministers hope that, in this field, the Soviet Union will translate into deeds at the negotiating table its recent statements. They underlined their countries' continued efforts in the context of negotiations in multilateral fora such as those on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons in Geneva (CD) and on mutual and balanced force reductions in Vienna (MBFR). The Ministers considered it necessary to intensify the negotiations at the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe (CDE) taking place in Stockholm, in order that substantial results can be achieved before the third CSCE follow-up conference in the autumn of this year.

7. The Ministers recalled the increasingly complex problems caused by the cost of research, development and production of weapons systems, particularly those involving emerging technology. They underlined the importance of co-operative efforts designed to help strengthen their defence capabilities.

The Ministers welcomed the progress which had been made in the IEPG on harmonising military requirements and in launching co-operative research projects. They particularly welcomed the decision taken in Madrid on 28th April concerning co-operation in the military aeronautics sector.

The Ministers requested that studies be undertaken on the management of resources and the implications of rising defence costs.

8. The Ministers also considered an up-to-date report on issues relating to the SDI research programme provided by a working group of the Permanent Council. They decided that the work of WEU should continue to deal with questions related to participation in the SDI research programme and the politico-strategic implica-

tions for Europe of possible developments in the field of ballistic missile defence.

9. The Ministers exchanged views on security in the Mediterranean and the risks of destabilisation in this region. They stressed the rôle which Western European countries can continue to play in order to reduce tension in the area. They agreed to examine this point in greater depth.

10. They gave special attention to the threat to security posed by international terrorism and underlined the importance of early and effective action to implement the measures that the countries of Western Europe have agreed upon to combat this scourge.

11. The Ministers also reviewed the progress made since the October 1984 meeting in Rome in relaunching the organisation and exchanged views on its future prospects. In this spirit, they recognised the importance of good co-ordination among the various institutions capable of contributing to a Western European dimension of common security.

12. The Ministers mandated the Permanent Council to make proposals, at their next meeting, on ways of strengthening co-operation between existing European academic and research institutions in the field of security and defence, thus improving the quality of their research relevant to WEU.

*Action by the Presidential Committee***REPORT**

*submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee
by Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur*

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I. Introduction

1. Since the last session, the Presidential Committee has pursued two tasks simultaneously: one is its traditional task of maintaining and improving relations between the Assembly and the Council and the other is the implementation of a mandate given to it by the Assembly in connection with the budget. In Order 64, the latter instructed the Presidential Committee "to negotiate with the Council for the Assembly to be granted adequate financial means to allow it to play its rôle in a reactivated WEU" and "in application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, to take the necessary measures to finalise the Assembly's draft budget in acceptable conditions".

2. As the Assembly will be able to see from the exchange of correspondence appended to the present report, relations between the Council and the Assembly have developed in terms of methods and procedure and the only obstacle has been the difficulty the members of the Council have in agreeing to give the Assembly meaningful information. This difficulty reflected the fundamental problems encountered by the Council in reactivating WEU.

3. In regard to the budget, the Presidential Committee was unable to obtain the credits hoped for. In particular, the Council refused the appropriations which would have allowed the Office of the Clerk to be strengthened by recruiting officials and purchasing modern equipment.

4. Thus in both its relations with the Council and its budget, the Assembly is feeling the limits of reactivation.

II. The Assembly's relations with the Council

5. The Presidential Committee has shown the value it attaches to meetings with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council. It was therefore particularly grateful to Mr. Andreotti for having organised such a meeting during the session last December. This meeting allowed procedure to be worked out for the dialogue with the Council in future years. For instance, it was agreed to organise a further meeting between the Presidential Committee on the one hand and the Chairman-in-Office and the Permanent Council on the other and this was held at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 21st January 1986. Mr. Andreotti

being unable to attend because of other commitments, he asked Mr. Corti, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, to represent him.

6. At this meeting, the President of the Assembly stressed the Assembly's concern at the shortage of information transmitted to it on the activities of the Council outside ministerial meetings. In particular, he noted that in spite of the undertakings given by the Chairman-in-Office during the December session the Assembly had received no information on the results obtained by the working group on the SDI. Mr. Caro also regretted the absence of information on the restructuring of WEU following the establishment of the new agencies on 1st January 1986.

7. The Council was also asked to confirm its agreement to a timetable of meetings providing for:

- a meeting of the Committee for Relations with the Council before the spring ministerial meeting;
- a meeting between the Council and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee at the close of the spring ministerial meeting;
- a meeting between the Presidential Committee and the Ministers on the occasion of each ministerial meeting;
- a twice-yearly meeting between the Permanent Council and the Presidential Committee.

8. Finally, it was proposed that the participation of Ministers at sessions be organised, the main ministerial addresses being grouped on the same half-day, the Chairman-in-Office being represented as far as possible at the other sittings of the Assembly.

9. Mr. Corti responded favourably to these requests, while reserving the Council's final position, since the agreement of Italy's partners would have to be obtained to allow the suggestions to be implemented. Mr. Andreotti subsequently confirmed that in principle his attitude was favourable.

10. In regard to procedure, the meetings called for by the Presidential Committee were organised, with one exception. The Presidential Committee's wish to be heard by the Council at the ministerial meeting before the Ministers concluded their discussions was not accepted and a joint meeting between the Presidential Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee and the Council was held at the close of the Venice ministerial meeting. The Presidential Committee hopes that the meetings planned for the second half-year, i.e. the meeting of the Com-

mittee for Relations with the Council before the autumn ministerial meeting and the meetings between the Presidential Committee and the Ministers and Permanent Council will allow the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly to be pursued further.

11. Although from a formal point of view the contacts can be considered satisfactory, the substance of the information obtained is still open to criticism.

12. The Presidential Committee could but note the delay in communicating important parts of the annual report. It also found a number of topics on which it considered the Assembly, at the opening of its spring session, was insufficiently informed. These are the enlargement of WEU, disarmament and the control of armaments, international terrorism, the governments' will to use the potentialities of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty to implement consultations between Europeans on the various threats to peace which affect their security, the political impetus given to European armaments co-operation and the establishment of a European institute for advanced defence studies.

13. The meeting between the Presidential Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee and the Council held in Venice at the close of the ministerial meeting did not allow the standard of the dialogue with the Council on these various matters to be improved sufficiently, either because of the Council's concern not to divulge some of its work or because of the narrow area in which it had been possible to reach agreement.

14. Starting its spring session in this difficult context, the Assembly is necessarily concerned to protect its ability to fulfil its tasks. For this purpose, it must have adequate financial resources. But the amount of its budget was fixed without any dialogue with the Council.

III. Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1986

15. In Order 64, the Assembly gave the Presidential Committee the task of negotiating with the Council for the Assembly to be granted adequate financial means to allow it to play its rôle in a reactivated WEU. The President of the Assembly therefore wrote to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council asking that a joint ad hoc committee be set up at political level, as Mr. Andreotti himself had suggested at the end of his address to the Assembly last December. The purpose of this meeting was to find a means of solving a problem which was not so much financial, in view of the very small sums involved, as political since it was a matter of allowing the

Assembly, like the Secretariat-General, to be able to take part in the reactivation. In answer to this letter, the Council communicated its unilateral decision to increase the Assembly's budget by 8.6%. This decision was therefore taken without it being possible to hold the consultations planned by the presidency of the Council. Mr. Andreotti stressed that this figure was the result of a compromise and the maximum it was possible to obtain at the present juncture.

16. The Secretary-General for his part recalled the zero growth principle, which the Council had vigorously confirmed. Moreover, he underlined that the fact that the Council did not accept the principle of making up for losses incurred by the Assembly because the increases authorised in previous budgets were lower than the zero growth rate. The Assembly's budget for 1986, which represented a modest but real increase in relation to expected inflation in France, was therefore to be an exception, thus implying that any increase in real terms in the 1987 and subsequent financial years would be refused.

17. On behalf of the Presidential Committee, Mr. Caro expressed regret that it had not been possible to hold the planned negotiation. The agreement between the Council and the Presidential Committee on 4th December 1985 on the meeting of the joint ad hoc committee to study the Assembly's budget at political level not having been applied, he also emphasised that application of the zero growth criterion could be considered only when the Assembly's means had been adapted to its tasks, following the example of the ministerial organs, and in particular when the gaps in the table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk had been filled. Indeed, the dialogue between the Assembly and the Council could be fruitful only if the Assembly were granted the means of fulfilling, in correlation with the Council's activities, its twofold rôle of stimulation and supervision.

18. Finally, expenditure for the payment of pensions will rise very sharply because officials recruited when the Assembly and its secretariat were set up are reaching retiring age. The Council's refusal to examine the pensions budget separately will lead to a rapid and substantial reduction in the operating budget. The Assembly's means of carrying out its tasks may therefore be jeopardised in the very near future and this cannot be considered acceptable.

19. The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration could but make reductions in the budget to take account of the overall compression of the Assembly's budget for 1986. The budget thus reduced is given in document A/WEU/BA (86) 2 revised, approved by the

Council after a favourable opinion by the Budget and Organisation Committee which groups the Council's financial experts.

20. An answer should be given to a remark by the Budget and Organisation Committee quoted in the Secretary-General's note given in section 8 of Appendix II to the present report. The detailed information the Council wants was given in the Assembly's initial budget, which was the subject of the amendments set out in the document submitted to the Council.

21. The Presidential Committee notes with regret that it has been impossible to strengthen the structure of the Office of the Clerk by the recruitment of officials in spite of the urgency of the matter and previous reductions in the Assembly secretariat. The problem of the structure of the Office of the Clerk should therefore be raised again and will be materialised in a draft supplementary budget for the financial year 1986 and in the draft budget for the financial year 1987.

IV. Conclusions

22. While at political level the good will of the Council of Ministers and the Permanent Council, as well as of the Secretary-General seems undeniable, the basis of the agreement between the governments is too narrow to allow WEU to benefit fully from the determination expressed in Rome to make better use of the potentialities of the modified Brussels Treaty. It would be tantamount to despairing of the cause of Europe, however, to consider that the governments will be unable to overcome the remaining obstacles. The Assembly itself will continue to urge the governments strongly, as it has always done, to overcome their differences in order to give more life to the only European body capable at the present time of promoting European thinking and European consultations on the conditions of European security. The Presidential Committee, for its part, will continue, in the period between sessions, to encourage the Council to give favourable consideration to the recommendations adopted by the Assembly.

23. Finally, the problem of the balance between the means available to the Assembly and its tasks will be the subject of a further study by the Presidential Committee. It will be for the Assembly to show that its moderation does not exclude determination.

24. While this review of its action leaves the Presidential Committee some hope of improving the political and budgetary situation, it cannot be said that it is satisfied with the results obtained.

APPENDIX I

Relations between the Assembly and the Council

**1. Letter from Mr. Caro,
President of the Assembly,
to Mr. Andreotti,
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council**

(28th January 1986)

*(Remarks and suggestions made at the meeting
between the Presidential Committee and
Mr. Corti, Italian Minister of State
for Foreign Affairs,
and the Permanent Council of WEU
on 21st January 1986)*

.....

1. *Relations between the Council and the
Assembly*

The Assembly continues to be deprived of any serious information about the Council's activities, apart from ministerial meetings.

- (a) In spite of the undertaking given by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council in December, the 1985 report of the working group on the SDI has not been communicated to the Assembly.
- (b) The new agencies were set up on 1st January 1986, but the Assembly has not been informed of:
- (i) their organogram and the staff available to them;
 - (ii) the tasks assigned to them and the time-limits set for accomplishing these tasks;
 - (iii) how the Ministers of Defence and their staff will take part in the work of the Council, the working groups and the agencies;
 - (iv) action taken on the proposal to set up a European defence institute;
 - (v) keeping the public informed of the Council's work;
 - (vi) the progress of seven-power consultations on disarmament;
 - (vii) the SAC's study on Japanese armaments and action to be taken on this study.
- (c) For future meetings between the Council and the Assembly:

- (i) Are the Council or its Chairman-in-Office prepared to hold a meeting with the Assembly committee responsible for relations with the Council before the ministerial meeting in Venice so that the Council may be informed of the Assembly's views in due time?
- (ii) Is the Council prepared to receive, at the close of the ministerial meeting in Venice, the two committees (Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and General Affairs Committee) which have requested a joint meeting on that occasion, as well as the Presidential Committee of the Assembly? If the Council considers it desirable, these meetings might be combined in a single meeting.
- (iii) Is the Permanent Council prepared to organise twice-yearly meetings with the Presidential Committee of the Assembly in order to inform it of the state of matters dealt with in WEU?
- (d) The Presidential Committee of the Assembly has not been very satisfied with the way ministers have taken part in Assembly sessions.
 - (i) It has expressed the wish that their interventions be grouped on the day set aside for consideration of the Council's work. At the next session, this would be in the afternoon of Tuesday, 3rd June.
 - (ii) The Presidential Committee has also expressed the wish that the Council be represented throughout the Assembly's debates by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council or by a minister or secretary of state representing him and empowered to speak during debates on matters on the agenda, either to answer questions or to give the Council's views on the matters being debated.

2. *SDI*

- (a) The probable cuts to be made by the United States Congress in amounts earmarked by the United States for its defence are perhaps liable to

alter the offers of co-operation made by the United States to its partners. It is to be feared that if Europe does not give an early answer to the offers made to it the United States may give priority in this field to the countries which were the first to give their answers, and particularly Japan. The Assembly has been informed of divergent answers given by certain member countries to the United States offers. However, it has not been informed of the text of the agreements concluded between certain member countries and the United States in this connection.

In view of the importance of the reports considered during the debate on the SDI, which was the central point of the Assembly's last session, does the Council intend to take account of them in pursuing its work on the harmonisation of European answers to the SDI? Does it intend to pursue a dialogue with the Assembly on this matter?

(b) The development of Eureka requires that Europeans know what benefits they will derive from the SDI so as to direct their own programme and to foresee the budgetary commitments needed for Eureka.

Does the Council intend to tackle the question of the relationship between the SDI and Eureka and is it prepared to inform the Assembly about the development of Eureka since the programme was adopted in Hanover on 6th November 1985?

3. *WEU agencies*

Information received by the Assembly suggests that the new WEU agencies will have very small staffs which will not allow them to conduct research on their own. It will be possible to make them responsible only for work of synthesis whose value will depend on the sources of information available to them and the means they have of processing this information.

This implies agreement between WEU on the one hand and NATO, the IEPG and national administrations on the other for the provision of the necessary information. Secondly, it requires a computerised documentation centre being made available to the agencies. Can the Council specify what steps have been taken to provide the agencies with the information they need?

The question arises whether the Assembly will be able to have access to this information and to the agencies' computer and in what conditions.

4. *Problems outside the NATO area*

The Assembly has heard nothing about how the Council has followed up the intentions expressed in the Rome declaration in this connection.

(a) Does the Council intend to examine the consequences for Europe of the emergence of new arms producing and exporting powers such as Japan and Brazil?

(b) Does the Council intend to tackle the questions raised by certain countries' support for international terrorism and measures to be taken to prevent the growth of such terrorism?

(c) Does the Council intend to seek to harmonise member countries' policies so as to help to restore peace where it is the most seriously threatened, particularly in the Near and Middle East, Africa or possibly Latin America, as it is urged to do in the modified Brussels Treaty?

.....

**2. Letter from Mr. Andreotti,
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council,
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly**

(8th February 1986)

.....

Aware as I am that the relations between the Council and the Assembly, and a more active contribution to the work of WEU on the part of the latter, constitute an essential aspect of the relaunching of the organisation, as agreed with the other member states, I had asked the Minister of State, Mr. Corti, to attend the joint meeting of the Permanent Council and the Presidential Committee held in Paris on 21st January last.

I have learnt from the Minister of State that the meeting – which is the first of a new pattern of contacts I deem very useful – achieved satisfactory results and laid down the basis for the opening of a new chapter in the relations between the two bodies, to the success of which, as reported to me by Ambassador Bottai, all the members are committed.

In the mentioned Paris meeting the Italian Presidency suggested some concrete measures aimed at intensifying the flow of information from the Council to the Assembly. I refer in particular to the institutionalisation of the periodical meetings between the Presidential Committee and the Permanent Council, to written briefings on the activities of the Council, to the presentation of the general report every six months and, lastly, to the circulation, in the appropriate form, of some of the working papers of the Council.

I believe that, by implementing such measures, possibly together with others which may be identified later on, the Assembly should be

able to have a clear and updated picture of the trends prevailing within the Council with regard to the problems WEU is called to deal with.

Among these, I have registered the expectations of the Assembly on the strategic defence initiative. The matter, owing to its very nature, is in constant development and continues to be examined collectively in order to exchange information and evaluations, in the framework of the choices that each country has made or is about to make in this field. The answer to Written Question 263 will provide further elements on this point.

I have also taken note of the other topics mentioned in your letter of 28th January and have asked Ambassador Bottai to gather the other partners' views on them. As for the Presidency, I can assure you that the indications conveyed by you will be taken in due consideration.

I hope that a more intense dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, to which Italy is firmly committed, will in any case foster a convergence of the ends of these two bodies, which is in the interest of WEU.

I wish to reiterate my willingness to meet the Committee for Relations with the Council prior to the Venice meetings, the programme of which foresees also a working session with the Defence and General Affairs Committees.

I know that the proposals put forward by yourself on the organisation of the next session of the Assembly are being examined by the Council. I hope that the engagements of the various ministers will enable them to meet with your wish; on my part, I shall not fail, as in the past, to participate in the proceedings, possibly in the afternoon of 3rd June.

I shall ask the Secretary-General to inform you, in consultation with the Permanent Council, of the reactions to some specific proposals advanced by you in your letter and which require the agreement of all the partners

.....

**3. Letter from Mr. Caro,
President of the Assembly, to Mr. Andreotti,
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council**

(28th February 1986)

.....

In answer to your kind letter of 8th February 1986 concerning the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly, I have pleasure in confirming that the Committee for Relations with the Council would be very grateful if you

would receive it, about one month before the Venice meetings, for a meeting similar to those organised in Gymnich under German presidency.

I also have to inform you of the wish of the Presidential Committee that it be heard by the Council during the next ministerial meeting. In order to associate the Assembly more closely with the Council's deliberations, the Presidential Committee wishes its traditional meeting with the Council to be held before the Ministers complete their work. This meeting would be of a confidential nature so as to allow everyone to speak freely on both the Council and the parliamentary sides. It is clear that it would be even more fruitful if the Presidential Committee were better informed of the items on the Council's agenda.

Furthermore, as you know, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the General Affairs Committee have asked to hold a joint meeting with the Council at the close of the ministerial meeting in Venice. The procedure which I propose for the Presidential Committee would have the advantage of avoiding its meeting with the Council being a duplicate of the meeting between the Council and these two committees.

.....

**4. Letter from Mr. Andreotti,
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council,
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly**

(17th March 1986)

.....

I have received your letter of 28th February in which you refer to the forthcoming meeting with the Committee for Relations with the Council. I am pleased to confirm that this will be held on 8th April. You also suggest that the traditional meeting between the Council and the Presidential Committee be held during the period of the Council meeting and not, as is customary, at its close.

At present, we are in agreement with the principle of organising a meeting with the Presidential Committee on 30th April at 11 a.m., to be followed, before the traditional press conference, by the meeting with the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Although I found your proposal interesting, I must nevertheless point out, after having duly ascertained the opinions of the other partners, that the imminence of the Council meeting in Venice does not allow such an innovative

method to be studied in sufficient detail for it to be adopted.

.....

**5. Letter from Mr. Cahen,
Secretary-General of WEU,
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly**

(29th April 1986)

.....

As he indicated in his answer of 8th February to your letter of 28th January, the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Andreotti, has asked me to inform you of the Council's reactions to some of your proposals.

The Council first wishes to emphasise once again its conviction that excellent communications between our two organs are essential. It has held many discussions on the matter, being intent on quickly achieving a real improvement in procedure for dialogue and establishing regular, reciprocal and efficient exchanges of information.

1. In regard to meetings between the Assembly and the Permanent Council, the latter unanimously recognises the usefulness of informal meetings similar to the one held in Paris on 21st January and is prepared to hold further meetings of this kind, in particular on the eve of sessions of the Assembly.

(i) Referring to the next meeting of the Council of Ministers, the Presidency-in-Office of the Council consulted you and proposes to meet the Presidential Committee, the General Affairs Committee and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments at the end of its meeting.

(ii) Regarding future Assembly sessions, the Council noted with interest the Presidential Committee's wish that ministerial speeches at Assembly sessions be grouped on the day devoted to examination of the Council's work. The continuous presence of the Chairman-in-Office or his representative at political level during

Assembly debates may present a problem due to the ministers concerned having other commitments. However, it is the will of member governments that this should be ensured in the manner the Assembly finds most useful.

2. The annual report which the Council submits to the Assembly in the spring of each year is an important part of the Assembly's debates. The Council will endeavour to allow these debates to be based on up-to-date information. To this end, it will submit the report of the Council in two half-yearly parts and, as and when necessary, will transmit written information on certain activities. This will of course have to be done with due respect for the confidential nature of its work.

Reciprocally, the Council wishes to receive the Assembly's reports much earlier so that ministers' speeches in the relevant debates may be better prepared.

3. You also refer to Mr. Genscher's proposal for a European defence research institute for security matters. Having completed the reorganisation of the new agencies, the Council proposes to study means of improving co-operation between the national research institutes which study European security.

4. The Council recognises the need for a significant improvement in public awareness of WEU. To this end, it has set up a public relations and information unit in the secretariat. With the same aim in mind, the Secretary-General has agreed to give a number of lectures.

The purpose of this letter is not to answer in detail each of the matters you raise but to give you an idea of how the dialogue may be developed.

It is clear that the Council's replies to Assembly recommendations and written questions remain the normal means of communication between the two organs. It is also possible to use one of the abovementioned procedures or any other procedure if necessary.

.....

APPENDIX II

Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1986

*Exchange of letters between Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly,
Mr. Andreotti, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, and
Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU*

**1. Letter from Mr. Caro,
President of the Assembly, to Mr. Andreotti,
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council**

(20th December 1985)

.....

Before the close of the year, I wish to express my thanks to you for the efforts you have made for the cause of a Europe capable of making its voice heard in the debate on its own security.

The achievement of this goal, which also inspires my action, requires the WEU Council, in the present European context, to exercise the duties our Assembly has been urging it to assume for a long time. But our Assembly too must be able to pursue its activities. I know this is our joint concern. At our December session, during which you delivered a most outstanding speech, we agreed to set up an ad hoc group with equal representation at the political level in order to break the present budgetary deadlock. I therefore propose a meeting in the early days of next year, which I would attend accompanied by Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

I hope this meeting at political level will allow the way to be cleared for a solution to a problem which seems minimal in view of the sums in question but important when it is realised that it is a question of providing the parliamentary body of WEU with the means to fulfil its mission.

.....

**2. Letter from Mr. Andreotti,
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council,
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly**

(11th January 1986)

.....

Thank you for your kind letter of 20th December last in which you take up my proposal to form a group of an equal number of represen-

tatives from the Assembly and from the Council to find a satisfactory solution to the budgetary requirements which have been explained to me and suggest that we should meet.

In this respect I have the pleasure to inform you that for the current year the Council has decided – thanks in particular to the stimulating action pursued unremittingly by the Italian presidency – to increase the budget by about 8.6%.

I realise that this increase is less than the Assembly requested but, even if it is granted only as an exceptional measure, it nevertheless departs from the principle of zero growth to which as you know certain members of the organisation were initially most firmly attached.

In these conditions, the solution we have reached corresponds to the compromise we wanted and in my opinion constitutes, at this given time, the maximum it will be possible to obtain.

I regret that I shall be unable to exchange views with you in Paris on 21st January next during the first of the meetings planned between representatives of the Assembly and of the Permanent Council but I have already other commitments which prevent me from attending. However, since I attach symbolic value to the implementation of the new procedure for contacts which is not just for this occasion, I have the pleasure to inform you that the Minister of State, Mr. Corti, will represent me on that occasion.

.....

**3. Letter from Mr. Cahen,
Secretary-General of WEU,
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly**

(17th January 1986)

.....

The Council has studied in the greatest detail the budget of the Assembly and the difficulties experienced by governments in expressing an opinion on the Assembly's proposals for 1986. It believes this question should be settled as quickly as possible if there are to be good relations between the Council and the Assembly, as required at the present juncture.

At its meeting on 15th January, the Council instructed me to inform you of its present position with regard to the Assembly's future budgets and particularly its guidelines for 1986.

First and foremost, the Council wishes to call the Assembly's attention to the need, in view of the budgetary conditions prevailing in all the member states, to adhere to the zero growth principle.

Furthermore, the delegations emphasised the pressing importance of taking account of the insistence of WEU ministers themselves regarding the need, in examining reforms relating to the reactivation of WEU, to respect the requisite budgetary limits.

However, as an exceptional measure, the Council agrees that the budget of the Assembly for 1986 may be increased by a maximum of 8.6% over the budget adopted for 1985. This is a concession granted to the Assembly alone, and not to the ministerial organs of WEU whose budget, as now adopted, shows an increase of 5.9%.

To explain this decision, the Council has instructed me to set out the following considerations:

The global increase proposed seems justified in this period of reform in which the Assembly has an important additional rôle to play in regard to public opinion and external relations.

This increase must in no way be considered as compensation for the previous years during which authorised increases might have been below zero growth. This principle of compensation linked to the previous budget is not acceptable to the governments.

In the case of the budget of the ministerial organs, which has been agreed, the difference between the 1985 and 1986 budgets is the result of a deliberate policy of the Secretary-General and of the Council to reduce or to postpone expenditure during the past year pending specific decisions on future requirements.

Except for the special case of the Assembly in 1986, henceforth all WEU budgets must respect the principle of zero growth.

Taking account of the above and in view of the fact that the Assembly withdrew its first budgetary proposals in December 1985, the governments are prepared to examine a draft budget of the Assembly for 1986 as early as possible so that the Assembly might proceed forthwith to establish its programme for this year. A draft budget presented in February, for instance, might be adopted once and for all in March, but the Council would like to have the opinion of the Assembly on this point.

*
**

I also wish to inform you that the Council proposes to examine subsequently the question of the presentation of the budgets of the ministerial organs with an eye to simplification which might also affect the Assembly.

When the time comes, the Council will be happy to communicate to the Assembly its conclusions on this point which might constitute a step to the advantage of the Assembly as well as of the Council.

.....

**4. Letter from Mr. Caro,
President of the Assembly,
to Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU**

(27th January 1986)

.....

Following a statement by the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, the Assembly noted at the last session that it was not in a position to vote on the draft budget submitted to it since the Council had not made its opinion known.

It therefore instructed the Presidential Committee to negotiate with the Council for the Assembly to be granted adequate financial means and to take the necessary measures to finalise, in acceptable conditions, the Assembly's draft budget.

The Assembly regrets that it has not been possible to hold these negotiations since the agreement reached between the Council and the Presidential Committee on 4th December 1985 to hold a meeting of the ad hoc joint committee to examine the Assembly's budget from a political standpoint was not followed up. It was by unilateral decision that the Council fixed the rate of increase of the 1986 budget compared with the 1985 budget at 8.6% and asked for a new budget conforming with this requirement.

The Presidential Committee is compelled to take note of this decision but cannot approve it. The total amount of the budget having thus been decreed by the Council, the Assembly will take steps to reduce expenditure. I intend to inform you of these steps as soon as possible.

The Assembly considers that it is for the Council to take this opportunity of giving a favourable answer to Recommendation 429 and "guarantee the Assembly full independence in all areas, in particular by allowing it to divide its overall budget between the various heads while respecting the regulations governing the staff of the co-ordinated organisations".

Application of the zero growth criterion will be possible only when the Assembly's means

have been adapted to its tasks, as has been done for the ministerial organs, and, in particular, once a solution has been found to the recent reduction in the staff of the Assembly and to the shortcomings which henceforth jeopardise the smooth conduct of its work.

While, in this spirit, credits should certainly be allocated to the Assembly, as you indicate, to allow it to fulfil the additional rôle devolving upon it in regard to public opinion and external relations, this cannot be the only justification for increasing its budget. Implementation of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty requires a dialogue between the Council and the Assembly which can be fruitful only if the Assembly is allocated the means which will allow it to fulfil, in correlation with the development of the Council's activities, its twofold rôle of stimulation and supervision.

Expenditure on pensions will rise very considerably this year and will increase further in future because officials recruited when the Assembly formed its secretariat will be reaching retirement age. This compulsory expenditure is outside the control of the Assembly and must not lead to a reduction in its operating budget. The limitation of credits granted to the Assembly can therefore apply only to its operating budget.

Finally, since the true rate of inflation so far has always been higher than authorised budget increases, refusal of the principle of compensating losses in resources calculated in real terms implies a steady reduction in the Assembly's financial resources. The Assembly notes with regret that the Council has thus departed from the spirit of its Rome declaration.

.....

**5. Letter from Mr. Cahen,
Secretary-General of WEU,
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly**

(4th February 1986)

.....

Thank you for your letter of 27th January 1986 concerning the Assembly budget.

As you know, the Council's position is set out in my letter to you dated 17th January 1986.

The questions raised in your letter in connection with the Assembly's autonomy and pension costs will be considered by the Council in the framework of its replies to Recommendations 429 and 426.

The final approval of the budget is clearly an urgent problem and I shall be glad to know the outcome of the meeting of the Assembly's Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-

tration to be held on 5th February, so that a programme and dates for a meeting of the Council's Budget Committee may be arranged to discuss a draft Assembly budget, adapted accordingly.

I am sure that you will understand the requirements incumbent on the Council in this situation and that this understanding will be shared by the members of the Assembly whose essential rôle in the reactivation of WEU is fully appreciated by the Council and, as you know, by myself.

.....

**6. Letter from Mr. Caro,
President of the Assembly,
to Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU**

(24th February 1986)

.....

In answer to your letter of 4th February, I am pleased to send you the changes to the draft budget of the Assembly for 1986 as adopted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on 5th February and by the Presidential Committee of the Assembly on 24th February.

Like you, I think the final approval of the budget is an urgent matter and I shall be grateful for anything you can do to bring this affair to a speedy conclusion.

.....

**7. Letter from Mr. Cahen,
Secretary-General of WEU,
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly**

(27th February 1986)

.....

Thank you for your letter of 24th February and for document A/WEU/BA (86) 2 revised containing the amendments to the Assembly's budget for 1986 adopted by the Presidential Committee.

We are all aware of the serious budgetary difficulties facing our governments and I know the problems which this situation has created for you as President of the Assembly. I sincerely hope that following the next meeting of the Budget and Organisation Committee to be held on 10th and 11th April and the expression of a positive opinion by the Council we shall be able to settle this matter and pursue our common aim, the establishment of the best possible relationship between us for the greatest good of WEU.

.....

**8. Letter from Mr. Cahen,
Secretary-General of WEU,
to Mr. Moulias, Clerk of the Assembly**

(24th April 1986)

.....

I have the honour to inform you that at its meeting on 23rd April 1986 the Council expressed a favourable opinion on the budget of the WEU Assembly for 1986 as presented in document C-B (86) 5.

I enclose one copy of this document in French and one in English.

.....

14th April 1986

C-B (86) 5

Secretary-General's note

WEU Assembly budget (amended) for 1986

1. The Secretary-General refers to the amended budget of the Assembly for 1986, circulated under reference B (86) 8 (Assembly document A/WEU/BA (86) 2 revised), in which the estimates originally presented in B (85) 16 have been reduced to bring the net total down to a level compatible with the Council's decision that the increase over 1985 should be limited to 8.6% (CR (86) 1, IV, 1).

2. The amended budget was examined by the Budget and Organisation Committee at its meeting in London on 10th April 1986 (BR (86) 1, III) and the debate is summarised as follows:

Presentation

The committee acknowledged the efforts made by the Assembly to meet the wishes of the Council; one delegate regretted the lack of more

detailed information on how the substantial reductions had been achieved. Other delegations agreed. The representative of the Office of the Clerk pointed out that the Assembly had had to present the document in haste because of the timetable for various meetings. Normally, the Assembly's budget contained fully detailed explanations and would in the future do so. In applying the reductions to the 1986 budget, account had been taken of the observations made by delegations at the committee's October 1985 meeting. The committee accepted that the circumstances were exceptional in this instance.

Pensions

The Italian Delegate, with support from other members of the committee, urged that pensions be excluded from the 8.6% target. The Netherlands and United Kingdom could not agree however.

Estimates

The committee noted that the original estimates of F 20,021,300 had been reduced by F 3,211,400 to F 16,809,900 including pensions, which represented an increase of 8.65% over 1985. Without pensions, the increase was 7.39%. It was also noted that all staffing proposals in the original budget had been withdrawn.

Detailed questions on a number of specific items of expenditure were answered by the Assembly's representative.

3. Subject to the comments and observations reported above, the committee could unanimously recommend the Council to express a favourable opinion on the Assembly's budget for 1986 as amended in document B (86) 8.

4. The Council's formal approval of this budget will be sought at the meeting to be held on 23rd April 1986.

APPENDIX III

*WEU Secretariat-General**(a) Secretary-General's visit to Spain*

*Letter from Mr. Cahen,
Secretary-General of WEU,
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly*

(26th February 1986)

.....

As you know, I made an official visit to Spain on 28th and 29th January.

Through you I wish to inform the Assembly of the main points of this visit.

It was made at the invitation of the Spanish Government.

It allowed me to meet the Prime Minister, Mr. Felipe Gonzalez, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fernandez-Ordonez, the Minister of Defence, Mr. Serra, and their colleagues. It also gave me an opportunity of lecturing to the Diplomatic School on Western European Union as such and also as an element of the building of Europe and the beginning of a pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

Finally, it gave me an opportunity of meeting the Spanish press, usually with those whom I met, and in particular with Mr. Fernandez-Ordonez.

My activities during the two days I spent in the Spanish capital covered three topics:

- co-operation between the Independent European Programme Group and Western European Union in regard to European armaments co-operation, since Spain has had the presidency of the IEPG since 1st January;
- the Spanish Government's interest in Spain joining Western European Union;
- Spain's relations with the Atlantic Alliance, in particular in the context of the referendum to be held on 12th March.

On co-operation between the IEPG and WEU in regard to European armaments co-operation, my talks with Mr. Serra confirmed the conclusions I drew from my talks in The Hague in December with the outgoing Netherlands presidency in the person of the Minister of Defence, Mr. de Ruiters, and the Secretary of State for Armaments, Mr. van Houwelingen. Both the Spanish Minister of Defence and his Netherlands

colleague showed their interest in the driving rôle which Western European Union and its member countries can play in the Independent European Programme Group. The Spanish Minister agreed that it was important to maintain the necessary contacts in order to avoid duplication but on the other hand to promote worthwhile co-operation. In this spirit he said that, as the Netherlands presidency had already done, he would be happy for the Chairman of the IEPG and the Secretary-General of WEU to meet periodically and for the Director of WEU's Agency III for the development of co-operation in the field of armaments to hold regular meetings with the Chairman of the IEPG National Armaments Directors and the Chairmen of the IEPG panels, particularly Panel III, whose responsibilities would make such contacts especially useful. He welcomes the co-operation now being established between the IEPG group of wise men responsible for studying the competitiveness of European armaments industries and WEU's Agency III, designed to enable the latter to make its contribution to the work of the wise men.

On relations between Spain and Western European Union, those to whom I spoke confirmed Spain's interest in acceding to WEU.

How do they view such accession?

They are aware that accession to WEU is at the invitation of the WEU Council. They will therefore await this invitation in due course, i.e. after the major debate on the problem of security raised by the referendum on 12th March has come to a conclusion.

In this latter respect, the proximity of the referendum could not but give a certain amount of colour to my visit - which obviously did not take place in this specific context - not because the Spanish Government or I so wished but because of the force of circumstances.

It goes without saying that the Spanish press and the international press represented in Madrid were very interested in putting questions to me in this connection.

I did not wish to shirk this task but to answer as Secretary-General of a European organisation. In this connection, I recalled that where I personally was concerned I considered Western European Union destined to assert itself as:

- the European dimension of security, i.e. as an element of the edifice which is taking its place, if not at the same level

because we are seven and not twelve, at least at the side of the other elements of this European edifice, the Communities and political co-operation;


- the beginning of a European pillar of the alliance.

Still in my personal capacity, I concluded that it was politically desirable, if a state wished to join WEU, for it:

- to be a member of the Communities and of political co-operation;
- to be a member of the Atlantic Alliance; and
- to have a real desire to promote a European security dimension.

.....

(b) Organogram of the Secretariat-General



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APPENDIX IV

*Agencies responsible for security questions**(a) Duties of the agencies*

*Letter from Mr. Cahen,
Secretary-General of WEU,
to Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly*

(17th March 1986)

.....

The Council has instructed me to give you the following information concerning the staff and activities of the new agencies responsible for security questions.

Since 1st January, each of these agencies has a director: General E. Rambaldi directs the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions (Agency I) and the restructured ACA. The former head of the international secretariat of the SAC, Mr. E. Hintermann, is responsible for the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments (Agency III). Appointed by the ministers at their meeting in Rome on 14th November 1985, a senior United Kingdom official, Mr. I. Dawson, has taken charge of the agency for the study of security and defence problems (Agency II).

A full table of establishment will be sent to you as soon as all the posts have been filled.

As indicated in the Bonn communiqué, the rôle of these new agencies is to carry out the studies requested by the Council.

Certain studies have already been planned, all or part of which will be the subject of interim reports which might be presented to the ministers at their meeting in Venice.

Agency I is to study Soviet tactics vis-à-vis the countries of Western Europe in regard to questions of the control of armaments and disarmament. In the future it will also have to take

an interest in the control of conventional armaments and the essential problem of verification.

In connection and close co-ordination with the tasks of Agency I, Agency II will have to study the assessment of the threat, the contribution of the WEU countries to the response to this threat, and the question of management resources.

Agency III will study certain aspects of competitiveness in the armaments industry in Europe and the implications of the evolution of the world arms market, together with the problems of technological transfers between European allies.


Other tasks have been planned and will have to be undertaken during the transitional period up to the end of 1987.

All these studies constitute internal working papers for the Council intended to contribute to its process of reflection on the subjects dealt with.

In order to guarantee the availability of the information necessary for them, the agencies shall establish links with the appropriate international bodies and with national administrations. In this respect it must be noted that the latter must be assured that the classified information they transmit to the ministerial organs of WEU is handled in accordance with their security regulations and limited to the exclusive use of these organs.

The suggestion to place at the disposal of the ministerial organs a computerised documentation centre will have to be assessed in the light of budgetary priorities and will have to be examined subsequently by the Council.

.....



*Replies of the Council to Recommendations 425 to 431***RECOMMENDATION 425**¹*on disarmament*²

The Assembly,

(i) Welcoming the positive fresh start to bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet Union that has resulted from the summit meeting in Geneva from 19th to 21st November 1985, the agreement to hold further summit meetings as well as meetings of ministers and experts on various issues, and the constructive references to most arms control issues in the agreed statement including the principle of a 50% reduction in nuclear arms, the general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons, and the idea of an interim INF agreement, while noting the absence of specific agreements;

(ii) Considering the present status of negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Vienna, in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm, in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva;

(iii) Considering the conclusions of the third review conference on the non-proliferation treaty held in Geneva;

(iv) Stressing the importance of a concerted European position on all issues discussed in these forums in order to ensure that proper weight is attached to the requirements of European security,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that the machinery and practice of consultation in NATO attaches full weight to the views of the European allies on all disarmament and arms control issues;
2. Hold preliminary discussions itself on disarmament and arms control issues whenever a member government feels that proper weight is not being given to the European position in NATO or that European political co-operation has been unable to discuss an issue;
3. Request the United States to examine with the utmost attention the recent proposals of the Soviet Union in the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, and to seek an early interim agreement on INF systems providing for the lowest levels compatible with the interests of allied security of United States systems based in Europe and comparable Soviet systems;
4. Request countries participating in the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations to press for an early first phase agreement in which full verification of withdrawals could obviate the need for prior agreement on data, as outlined in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments;
- 5.(a) Pending agreement in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe on improved compulsory confidence-building measures, urge the Warsaw Pact to extend regular invitations to manœuvres to observers from NATO countries under the terms of the Helsinki final act;
- (b) Instruct the Agency for the Study of Arms Control and Disarmament Questions to study the verification and observer régime which should be agreed in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, and to co-ordinate the activities of observers from WEU countries invited to Warsaw Pact manœuvres;
- 6.(a) Urge member countries in the Conference on Disarmament to give priority to the urgent negotiation of treaties to ban chemical weapons and all nuclear tests;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (7th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 1043).

(b) Urge the Soviet Union to accept the United States invitation to observe United States nuclear test explosions with a view to establishing reliable seismic calibration data and urge the Soviet Union and the United States to ratify the threshold test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties;

7.(a) Request nuclear countries, and in the first place the two most powerful, to make arrangements as soon as possible to make significant and substantial reductions in their nuclear weapons as mentioned in the Reagan-Gorbachev summit statement, which would facilitate the desirable accession to the non-proliferation treaty of many countries which have not signed it;

(b) Urge all members of IAEA to further improve its safeguards and to establish arrangements for international plutonium storage and spent fuel management;

(c) Urge all parties to the London nuclear suppliers' group guidelines for nuclear transfers to continue co-operation and improve the application of the guidelines;

(d) Urge member governments to insist on the full application of IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material and installations in recipient countries before authorising the export of civilian nuclear material or facilities.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 425***

The Council is fully aware of the need to ensure that European views are taken into due account within the Atlantic Alliance consultative process, particularly when the issues discussed relate to, or have implications for, the European dimension of common security. It believes that the co-ordination of views which has taken place within WEU and the continuous process of consultation within the Atlantic Alliance have so far given WEU governments ample opportunities to present their views and make an effective contribution to the formulation of positions adopted by the western countries within the framework of various negotiations in progress. This also applies to the proposals which have been publicly presented by the Soviet Union and tabled at the bilateral negotiations in Geneva on space and nuclear arms. WEU member states have actively contributed to the identification of positive elements in those proposals and of potential areas of convergence, while rejecting those negative aspects which have unacceptable implications for the security of Europe.

The Council expressed its support for the efforts made by the United States in the talks with the Soviet Union about their nuclear weapons and space. In this connection, it recalls that the fundamental objective of arms control, both conventional and nuclear, must be to strengthen security and stability at the lowest possible level of forces.

With regard to the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, the Council draws the attention of the Assembly to the fact that new proposals were put forward on 5th December 1985 by the western countries participating in these negotiations, which seek to open a more fruitful dialogue in that negotiating forum and reflect the general views of the Assembly. WEU member countries regret, however, that the eastern response has so far been disappointing and hope that the Soviet Union will translate into deeds at the negotiating table its recent statements. The Council considers it necessary to intensify the negotiations at the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe (CDE) taking place in Stockholm, in order that results can be achieved before the third CSCE follow-up conference in the autumn of this year. These results must be concrete and substantial in the form of a set of CSBMs which are of military significance, politically binding, provided with adequate forms of verification and which cover the whole of Europe, as laid down in the mandate for this conference. They must represent a qualitative leap forward from those provisions agreed at Helsinki and this would justify a reaffirmation of the commitment to the principle of non-use of force. The conference adjourns on 19th September. If the conference is to produce a worthwhile agreement leading to greater openness about military activity of the sort that WEU member states require, the Soviet Union must show a greater willingness to negotiate on practical measures of information exchange, notification, observation and verification.

The Council is deeply aware of the urgent need to promote early progress in the negotiation of a global and verifiable ban on the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. WEU governments have been actively involved in the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and will pursue their efforts with a view to agreement on this important subject.

The Council is aware of the wish of the United States to discuss with the Soviet Union ways of improving the verification provisions of the United States-Soviet treaties on nuclear testing. It regrets the Soviet Union's rejection of the United States proposal for exchanges of test-site observers. This would, in fact, have represented a step towards progress in achieving the aforesaid treaties' aim of formally constraining nuclear testing.

The Council reiterates the importance attached by member governments to the universal application of the non-proliferation régime. WEU governments are satisfied that IAEA safeguards are effective in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They favour continued improvement in the implementation of the safeguards system and the wider acceptance of full-scope safeguards. They also favour the establishment of arrangements for international plutonium storage. They will continue to act accordingly.

WEU member states have all adhered to the nuclear suppliers' group guidelines and are all committed to ensuring their effective implementation.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th May 1986.

RECOMMENDATION 426 ¹

***on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU
for the financial years 1984 and 1985 ²***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Having taken note of the contents;
- (iii) Considering that:
 - (a) the new structure of the ministerial organs of Western European Union depends essentially on the tasks devolving upon them in the framework of the institutional reform announced in the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984;
 - (b) the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for 1984 and 1985 are merely a renewal of the budget for 1983;
 - (c) it would consequently be pointless to examine these budgets on a cost-effectiveness basis;
 - (d) in preparing the budgets for the financial years 1984 and 1985 the criterion of zero growth was applied;
 - (e) since 1984 progress has been made in consultation and conciliation within the co-ordinated organisations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Re-examine the problem of applying the zero growth criterion with a view to specifying that this criterion is to be applied only to operating budgets and not pension budgets;
2. In order to apply this criterion correctly, establish a rate of increase for each category of expenditure instead of fixing a single rate of increase for the net total of the budget;
3. Pursue efforts to improve the status of staff in the framework of consultation and inform the Assembly of the conclusions of studies on this subject;
4. In the framework of present reorganisational studies, re-examine the possibility of a single seat for the ministerial organs of WEU in order to improve liaison between these bodies which at present have offices in London and in Paris, thus reducing costs by integrating supporting staff, and reach a decision on this matter.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (10th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van Tets on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 1031).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 426***

1. The strict application of the zero growth criterion is the objective of member states for both their national budgets and those international budgets to which they contribute. In principle, this objective applies to the overall total of the budget. As far as pension costs are concerned, it is recognised that these will continue to increase until the pension scheme has been in operation long enough for the levelling-off stage to be reached. It is also recognised that, by the very nature of the scheme and its impact on the relatively small budget of WEU, erratic variations in expenditure from year to year will result. The Council will continue to monitor how far these costs have an adverse effect on operating expenditure.

2. While the zero growth target is applied to a total budget, it is, of course, appreciated that some expenditure items may attract increases that exceed that target. In such circumstances, it is customary and necessary to exercise restraint in other areas of expenditure so that the overall objective may be attained. These principles have long been recognised and applied in the case of the budgets of Western European Union.

3. Improvements in the status of staff remain the subject of a continuing study in the framework of co-ordination. Difficulties requiring reappraisal and causing delays can and do arise. This and other matters of concern to staff remain an important preoccupation of the Co-ordinating Committee.

4. The Council has taken note of point 4 of the Assembly's recommendation. The question of establishing a single seat should in any case be examined in the light of the advantages and disadvantages of such an option.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 17th March 1986.

RECOMMENDATION 427¹
*on developments in China and European security*²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the major part played by China in the world balance and the maintenance of peace and the even more important rôle it will have to play in the near future;
- (ii) Considering that the interests of China and of Western Europe converge in many areas and may develop independently of ideological and institutional differences;
- (iii) Considering that the major aim of the Chinese Government is the country's economic and social development;
- (iv) Considering that a condition of this development is the maintenance of peace in Asia and throughout the world and welcoming the fact that the Chinese Government clearly shares this conviction;
- (v) Welcoming the development of the Chinese economy and of trade of all kinds between China and Western Europe;
- (vi) Deploring developments in Cambodia and the loss of its independence;
- (vii) Concerned by the continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan where civilians are still being massacred,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Encourage all possible initiatives to ensure that current negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons also take the Far East into consideration so as to avoid weapons deployed in Europe being moved towards that region;
2. Study and assess the extent to which Cocom restrictions hinder the continued development of the People's Republic of China;
3. Urge member governments to develop their countries' political, technological and scientific relations with the People's Republic of China, in particular by:
 - (i) increasing trade between China and Western European countries;
 - (ii) developing knowledge of the Chinese language and culture in Western Europe;
 - (iii) facilitating cultural exchanges, particularly by establishing European cultural institutes in China.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (10th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by MM. Michel and van der Werff on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1035).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 427***

1. The Council has examined with interest the Assembly's report on the evolution of China and European security and the recommendation adopted on this subject.

The Council is fully aware of the importance of preventing disarmament measures in the European region from resulting in an increased threat to the Far East. This concern is reflected in positions adopted by WEU member countries with regard to the INF negotiations. The United States have always proposed the global reduction of LRINK missiles and have consistently maintained that Soviet reductions must include deployments in both Europe and Asia.

2. The Council recalls that, on the basis of considerations similar to those in the recommendation, Cocom initiated, in the spring of 1985, a review of the provisions governing exports to China.

3. All the member governments attach importance to the development of the political, technological, scientific, commercial and cultural relations that their countries maintain with the People's Republic of China. In 1984 and 1985, trade between China and WEU member states in particular was characterised by a significant increase, analogous to the growth which occurred generally in trade between China and other industrialised countries. The Council notes that Chinese imports have grown faster than Chinese exports, and recognises the desire of the Chinese authorities to achieve a balance of trade.

WEU countries account for approximately a third of total Chinese trade, whereas in proportionate terms China is still a relatively minor trading partner for WEU countries. This indicates the long-term potential for further growth in trade between China and WEU members.

The member states are following with interest the smooth and successful implementation of Chinese modernisation plans, based on outward-looking political and economic policies.

4. Finally, as far as cultural relations are concerned, the Council points out that, in recent years, opportunities for the study of Chinese language and culture have multiplied in WEU countries, in response to growing popular interest in this large country and in its ancient civilisation. Among the WEU countries, France has set up a cultural institute in Peking; the United Kingdom has already established a cultural representation there; Italy is preparing to open a cultural centre in Peking, destined to become a cultural institute; and the Federal Republic of Germany is about to start negotiations to set up an institute of culture there. The Netherlands has an extensive educational and scientific exchange programme based on a recently concluded treaty with the People's Republic of China. Belgium, for its part, concluded a cultural agreement in December 1980 covering, inter alia, the exchange of language assistants in higher educational institutes in the two countries.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th May 1986.

RECOMMENDATION 428 ¹

on WEU and the strategic defence initiative
The strategic defence initiative
(Defence aspects) ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the strategic defence initiative announced by President Reagan in March 1983 and the invitation from the United States Secretary of Defence of March 1985 for allied countries to explore possible co-operative efforts "on data and technology short of ABM component level";
- (ii) Considering that the development of space defence technology means that the European allies of the United States have to make every effort to master the new technologies which might one day take their place in an effective defence system;
- (iii) Believing that Europe collectively must give priority to developing independent space technology both for civilian applications and for defence applications which will enhance its security and assist in verification of arms control agreements and confidence-building measures;
- (iv) Welcoming any defence technology collaboration with the United States that will enhance security and stability and foster research on new defence systems without jeopardising existing arms control agreements or compromising the negotiation of future agreements;
- (v) Expressing the hope that the SDI programme will not cast doubt on the policy of nuclear deterrence which can only strengthen the defence of Europe;
- (vi) Welcoming the better prospect of progress in the bilateral negotiations on "space and nuclear arms both strategic and intermediate range", and welcoming the Council's attitude to SDI expressed in reply to Recommendation 413*, considering that the American authorities have not yet explained in sufficient detail the proposals for the United States' European allies to take part in the SDI programme,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Agree a common response to the United States' strategic defence initiative or, if that seems impossible, specify Europe's own interests in this area by harmonising as far as possible the answers of the seven WEU member countries which should:
 - (a) stress the importance of avoiding an arms race in space;
 - (b) accept research compatible with existing arms control agreements and of a nature and scale which will enhance stability and security;
 - (c) permit European industry to participate in all areas of SDI research on terms providing a genuine exchange of technology;
 - (d) ensure that the answers of members of WEU to the American invitation do not jeopardise the development of Europe's technological capability and encourage the development of this capability, in particular through the early implementation of the Eureka programme;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (11th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 1033).

* "3. The Council welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have begun global negotiations, i.e. dealing with strategic weapons, INF missiles and defence and space weapons. It hopes that these negotiations will achieve security at the lowest possible level of forces through substantial, balanced and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons. The Council notes that the strategic defence initiative (SDI) announced by the United States is no more than a scientific research programme and hence does not contravene the provisions of the 1972 ABM treaty. The Council also takes the view that laboratory research does not lend itself to arms control measures. On the other hand, relevant tests or deployment will have to be a matter for negotiation, under the terms of the ABM treaty. In view of the contribution of this treaty to stability, the Council stresses the importance of preventing its erosion."

2. Give priority and special emphasis to a joint European programme for defence and arms control purposes, including observation and communications satellites, and to promoting civil technological research of Eureka type within ESA and the European Communities;
3. Request all countries concerned to ensure that no obstacles will be placed in the way of balanced and verifiable agreements limiting strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons and encourage the pursuit and success of the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva on the limitation of armaments in the three areas covered;
4. Emphasise the need, when the results become available, for the United States and its European partners to discuss the political as well as the military and strategic implications of research on SDI;
5. Instruct the new agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions to report annually on the arms control impact of the SDI;
6. Ensure maintenance of the nuclear deterrent capability of the Atlantic Alliance as long as Europe's security is not effectively guaranteed by other means and consider the question of the case for adequacy in conventional defence capacity, both in the present situation and in regard to the development of the strategic defence initiative.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 428

The Council has taken note of the views expressed and the suggestions contained in Recommendation 428.

The Council reviewed, at its ministerial session in Rome on 14th November 1985, the results of the work conducted in the preceding months with the aim of co-ordinating, as far as possible, the national reactions of member governments to the United States invitation to participate in the SDI research programme. It noted with satisfaction that valuable work had been done in this regard and decided that the consultative process between member governments should continue. This decision was endorsed by the Ministers at their meeting in Venice on 29th and 30th April 1986 where they decided that the work of WEU should continue to deal with questions related to possible participation in the SDI research programme and the politico-strategic implications for Europe of possible developments in the field of ballistic missile defence. The Seven consider that it falls within the scope of the WEU consultative process to pursue the joint reflection already undertaken in order to identify common elements of analysis and to facilitate co-ordination of their points of view. This reflection may also serve as a useful contribution to consultations on this subject within the Atlantic Alliance. The Council is firmly convinced that the security of the alliance as a whole must continue to be based on the strategy of nuclear deterrence as long as no valid alternative has been proven feasible and agreed by the alliance as a whole.

The Council may ask the agencies for security questions to provide their specific technical contributions to its work to enable it, as the competent political organ of WEU, to make analyses and draw conclusions.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th May 1985.

RECOMMENDATION 429 ¹*on WEU and the strategic defence initiative –
The European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance* ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that Europe's security requires the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to make their views carry greater weight on matters relating to the strategy of the alliance, disarmament and allied countries' policies outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;
- (ii) Considering that close, continuing co-ordination of their views is essential to achieve this end;
- (iii) Noting that the modified Brussels Treaty at present provides an ideal framework to achieve this end;
- (iv) Welcoming the intentions asserted by the Council in its Rome declaration, Bonn communiqué and reply to Recommendation 420 with a view to giving new life to WEU, but regretting the slowness with which these intentions are transformed into decisions;
- (v) Considering that it is urgent to adapt the WEU agencies to the Council's new vocation;
- (vi) Considering that keeping public opinion informed about the activities of the Council and of the Assembly is an essential part of a policy of deterrence whose real basis is the will of the people;
- (vii) Noting the very marked improvement in the information the Council gives the Assembly, but hoping that, in accordance with the intentions expressed in the Bonn communiqué, the Council will increasingly inform the press of its activities;
- (viii) Referring to the fact that the report on the possibilities, conditions and consequences of a closer institutional connection of the Assembly with other organs of WEU, which is asked for in Order 63, will be prepared separately,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that the Ministers of Defence participate fully in its work and in its dialogue with the Assembly;
2. Have the appropriate agency conduct a continuing study of the strategic consequences of the development of new weapons, whatever the results of its efforts to co-ordinate the answers of member countries to the American proposal that they take part in the strategic defence initiative;
3. Proceed to organise the new agencies, namely the agency for the study of disarmament questions, the agency for the study of defence questions and the agency for co-operation in the field of armaments, by giving them, insofar as possible, all the necessary means to be able to co-operate in carrying out their respective tasks;
4. Specify without delay the new aims of its discussions and the scope of its action regarding disarmament and the nature of the tasks given to the agency concerned;
5. Play an active part in informing Europeans about matters relating to their security:
 - (a) by keeping the press systematically and officially informed of its own activities by all appropriate means;
 - (b) by instructing the new agency handling defence questions to promote the organisation of training courses in the defence institutes of each of the member countries for nationals of the seven countries with responsibility in defence matters or likely to have an influence on public opinion so as to allow them to have a better understanding of the European dimension of security problems;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (11th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Berrier on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1034).

6. Guarantee the Assembly full independence in all areas, in particular by allowing it to divide its overall budget between the various heads while respecting the regulations governing the staff of the co-ordinated organisations;
7. Pursue its effort to keep the Assembly better informed of its work by ensuring in particular the continuation of joint meetings between the Council at ministerial level and the permanent committees of the Assembly;
8. Expedite positively the examination of applications for membership from European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance with the aim of one day associating all the member countries of the European Community in a joint security policy.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 429***

1. Following the agreement reached at the extraordinary meeting held in Rome on 26th-27th October 1984 to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the modified Brussels Treaty, the Council's members decided to convene normally twice a year at ministerial level, with full participation of Foreign and Defence Ministers. This was the case for the ministerial meetings in Bonn in April 1985, in Rome in November 1985 and in Venice in April 1986.

2. The Council is fully aware of the importance of the development of new technologies in the field of armaments for the maintenance of security and peace in Europe. Experts of member countries discuss in the context of WEU the consequences of new technological developments from the point of view of the European dimension of common security.

The relevant WEU agency will be duly involved in this exercise.

3. Within the framework of the reactivation of WEU and in accordance with the tasks attributed to the three agencies, the Council has already agreed on the structure and distribution of personnel for these new agencies.

4. The agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions has been assigned general tasks and specific studies which reflect the Council's interest in this area.

5. Fully aware of the importance of informing European public opinion about matters relating to security, the Council's members are actively engaged in keeping their citizens informed. The Council takes note of the Assembly's suggestion to instruct the new agency concerned with defence questions to promote the organisation of training courses in the defence institutes of the member countries; it could study how the idea of organising these training courses could be developed and encouraged, particularly once the agency is adequately staffed and provided that the present budgetary limits are not exceeded. It shares the view that it is important that nationals of the seven countries with responsibility in defence matters or likely to have an influence on public opinion should acquire a better understanding of the European dimension of security problems.

6. The Council notes the Assembly's wish regarding its budget. However, it would be difficult to meet this wish because of different budget control procedures in member countries. Nevertheless, the Council has approved some simplifications – along the lines desired by the Assembly – in the way the ministerial organs' budget is presented which the Assembly might find appropriate for its own budget.

7. Following the joint meeting of the Presidential Committee of the Assembly and the Permanent Council, held on 21st January 1986 in the presence of the Italian Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Mr. Corti, and the assurances given by Foreign Minister Andreotti, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, the Council confirms its willingness to keep the Assembly informed of its activities, as specifically stated in the Secretary-General's letter of 29th April 1986 to the President of the Assembly.

8. The Council is aware of the Assembly's views on the interest of other states in joining WEU.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 13th May 1986.

RECOMMENDATION 430 ¹

*on WEU and the strategic defence initiative –
guidelines drawn from the colloquy on the
space challenge for Europe
(Proposals)* ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that it is now time to give new emphasis to a balanced, jointly-agreed European space policy and welcoming the decisions reached by the Ministerial Council of the European Space Agency in Rome on 30th and 31st January 1985;
- (ii) Aware of the need to develop markets, within Europe and worldwide, which will ensure economic returns from the large sums expended on space programmes;
- (iii) Noting that applications of space operations, for instance in telecommunications and meteorology, are hampered by over-nationalistic-minded governmental administrations and institutional monopolies;
- (iv) Considering the recognised benefits for mankind of the utilisation of space;
- (v) Considering the need to promote the manufacture in space of new products in the sectors of pharmacy, biotechnology, electronics and new materials;
- (vi) Considering that Arianespace is an example of successful marketing of space services;
- (vii) Considering also that European space industry is far more scattered and less rationalised than American industry, resulting in over-equipment and excess capacity, which will raise serious problems if the prospect of market stagnation is confirmed;
- (viii) Considering that Europe cannot remain in the van of space development if it fails to tackle the problems of a permanently-manned space station;
- (ix) Considering that the civil and military space budgets of the United States and the Soviet Union are almost seven times larger than the space budgets of the Western European countries;
- (x) Considering that Europe cannot therefore remain outside joint space defence programmes;
- (xi) Welcoming the establishment of the new space agency in Italy and the new space centre in the United Kingdom which are to promote joint European civil and military space activities,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To consider the adoption of a coherent space programme, composed of two main elements: participation in the American space station and further development of the European launcher system – Ariane-5 with the HM-60 engine – leading to an independent European manned transportation system;
2. To help the European aerospace industry to start a necessary period of reorganisation to ensure its independence and competitiveness in the international market;
3. To define the co-operative framework in which the defence aspects of European space activities can be discussed and determined;
4. To accept non-aggressive applications of military space technology such as communications, surveillance, navigation and the use of satellites for crisis management and treaty verification to strengthen strategic stability in relations between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries as indicated in the NATO statement of 8th January 1985;
5. To pursue jointly research on a European anti-missile system independently or as part of SDI.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (11th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 1036).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹***to Recommendation 430***

The Council shares the Assembly's view on the opportuneness of taking the necessary measures to ensure the adoption of a coherent and balanced European space programme. It should, on the one hand, give impetus to the pursuit of autonomous programmes and, on the other hand, expand the collaboration with American technological projects.

With the aim of maintaining the political momentum of a European space policy, the member states approved at the Conference of Ministers of the European Space Agency in Rome in January 1985 a long-term space programme. The main points of the programme are the development of a fifth-generation European launcher, Ariane 5, and the setting-up of a European orbital structure (Colombus), which is an important factor in view of the participation in the international space station project proposed by the United States President in March 1984.

The Council is aware of the importance, underlined in the Assembly's recommendation, of the European space industry's ability to compete in international markets. Such competitiveness can only be achieved by the rationalisation of the European industry and by its vigorous development.

The decisions adopted by ESA, including those of 30th and 31st January 1985, aim at ensuring the carrying out of common programmes and constitute the expression of its support for the independence and competitiveness of European industry.

These decisions stem from the belief that Europe must develop its rôle and be in the forefront of a sector which is of the greatest importance for technological progress, and linked to advancements in fields such as biotechnology, electronics and new materials.

The Council is fully aware of the importance of certain forms of utilisation of space which can contribute to strategic stability and to deterrence. The Council is therefore convinced that space technology in fields such as telecommunications and surveillance satellites can be usefully applied to the military sector for peaceful purposes.

The Council closely monitors every development in technological and scientific research likely to affect the security of member countries.

In this framework, it should be recalled that a process of in-depth reflection is being pursued within WEU on the questions related to possible participation in the SDI research programme and the politico-strategic implications for Europe of possible developments in the field of ballistic missile defence.

It is the view of the seven member countries that it appears premature to reach definitive conclusions, as these may well be affected by future developments, including developments in the research itself. These matters call for continuous review and the Seven believe that it is important to pursue the joint reflection already undertaken in order to identify common elements of analysis and to facilitate co-ordination of their points of view.

In this framework, it is particularly relevant to analyse the possible impact on European security interests of the application of research in the field of ballistic missile defence.

The enhancement of NATO's integrated air defence system remains an important issue independent of SDI.

As from now, it appears essential to the seven member governments that the research in the field of defensive systems be carried out by the Soviet Union and the United States in strict compliance with the ABM treaty; that the strategic unity of the Atlantic Alliance be maintained; that deterrence, stability and equilibrium be safeguarded and that the main aim of the Geneva negotiations remain substantive, balanced and verifiable reductions of the nuclear forces of the two parties.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th May 1986.

RECOMMENDATION 431 ¹
on the European fighter aircraft for the nineties ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the decision of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom to initiate the project definition of a common Eurofighter aircraft to meet the operational requirements of their air forces from the mid-1990s;
- (ii) Understanding the reasons which led the Government of France to seek to procure an aircraft based on the Rafale experimental aircraft for the French air force and navy in the 1990s;
- (iii) Mindful of the necessity for the members of the western alliance to utilise their resources for defence as effectively as possible;
- (iv) Conscious of the calls for improved interoperability and standardisation of equipment on the part of Western European Union member nations repeatedly made by this Assembly;
- (v) Recalling the political impetus given to increased rationalisation and collaboration by the European aerospace industry at the WEU colloquy on international aeronautical consortia in London in 1982;
- (vi) Aware that such aircraft currently in service as the Jaguar, Alpha-Jet, Atlantic, Transall, and Tornado have already demonstrated the industrial, logistic and military benefits of collaborative production and joint procurement albeit with differing modes of collaboration and project management in each case;
- (vii) Eager to reform governmental, and industrial structures so as to harmonise operational requirements, co-ordinate re-equipment timescales and choices and utilise industrial capacity on a collaborative basis within the WEU member countries;
- (viii) Convinced that such reforms are increasingly urgent in order to meet Western Europe's requirements for military aircraft at reasonable cost and to compete on more equal terms with United States manufacturers both within the NATO market and worldwide;
- (ix) Noting the French proposals made in Bonn to the four countries which have agreed to develop the European fighter aircraft that they take part in both fighter aircraft programmes and the proposal made to the Independent European Programme Group partners to start reflecting on the possibility of co-ordinating all military aircraft programmes;
- (x) Believing that WEU and this Assembly in particular have a vital rôle in helping to overcome national self-interests and the parochial political impediments which stand in the way of Western European integration of the procurement and production of high technology defence equipment,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the member states to:

1. Ensure that the Independent European Programme Group issues regular reports of its proceedings to the Assembly of WEU in order that members of the Assembly may monitor more closely the progress of Western European arms co-operation;
2. Accede to requests to join WEU which have been or may be made by such non-member countries as Portugal or Spain respectively so as to encourage political as well as industrial integration in the defence field in Western Europe;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th December 1985 during the second part of the thirty-first ordinary session (12th sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 1037).

3. Utilise to the full the experience gained in the management of previous international collaborative aerospace projects, and in particular of the Panavia Tornado, in deciding the governmental and industrial management structures to be adopted for the Eurofighter;
4. Invite the governments of France on the one hand and of the four Eurofighter consortium nations on the other to request the participation of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway in the production and procurement of their respective fighter aircraft to replace the F-16 in the late 1990s;
5. Take into consideration French proposals for France to have a 5 to 10% participation in the consortium responsible for developing the European fighter aircraft and for the four EFA partner nations to participate in the programme derived from the experimental Rafale aircraft;
6. Work vigorously towards the adoption of a similar collaborative approach towards the definition, development, production and procurement of other military aircraft for the air forces of Western Europe and in particular of a multirôle aeroplane for such missions as transport, maritime reconnaissance and in-flight refuelling;
7. Persuade the member nations of the Eurofighter consortium to standardise to the maximum extent possible weapon systems and equipment to be incorporated into the Eurofighter so as to enhance the aircraft's interoperability and facilitate its logistic support;
8. Initiate discussions both in the Independent European Programme Group and among the industrial interests concerned on making the Eurofighter consortium a durable industrial arrangement on the lines of Airbus Industrie which could produce a family of military aircraft.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL ¹

to Recommendation 431

The Council shares the view that a regular exchange of information between WEU and the IEPG regarding their respective activities would contribute to an increased awareness of the complex problems related to the growth of European armaments co-operation. The improvement of relations between WEU and the IEPG, already under way, may also permit the Assembly to be better informed about IEPG activities.

The Council has taken due notice of the Assembly's suggestion to make use of the experience acquired in the management of the Tornado aircraft to study the possibility of setting up other structures of management of a similar nature. In fact, such programmes entail the acquisition of technological, industrial, commercial and operational experiences in the medium and long terms, which can be utilised in an organic way, whilst avoiding heavy bureaucratic structures.

The Council agrees with the principle, underlying the Assembly's recommendation, of fostering the maximum possible rationalisation of the European market in the field of fighter aircraft.

The Council has noted all the Assembly's recommendations and is able to state that contacts are being made between the various countries or groups of countries concerned for the purpose of studying the various forms of co-operation that might be set up to foster the development and unity of the aircraft industry in Europe. However, the Council points out that the IEPG remains the relevant operational forum in this field. In this connection, the Defence Ministers of the member countries of the IEPG stated their position on this subject at their meeting in Madrid on 28th April last. They agreed that a systematic effort should now be made to promote the widest possible co-operation in key sectors of defence, looking ahead at the challenges facing Europe in the twenty-first century. Agreeing on the importance of co-operation in military aeronautics, and noting that important national and collaborative work was already under way, they decided to set in hand a study designed to highlight the possibilities for co-operation and co-ordination in the field of research, equipment and the manufacture of aeronautical hardware.

Within technically possible limits, those countries belonging to the EFA consortium are considering the French proposal for cross-participation in the EFA programme and the ACE programme.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th May 1986.

*Written Questions 262 to 269 and replies of the Council
to Written Questions 262, 263, 264 and 266*

QUESTION 262

*put by Mr. Lenzer
on 12th December 1985*

On 28th February 1978, the Council transmitted to the Assembly a note on the "Division of work between the Standing Armaments Committee and the Independent European Programme Group" which specified inter alia that it had authorised the SAC to prepare a study of the situation in the armaments sector of industry in the member countries, "with the reminder that governments were anxious to avoid any overlapping with the work of other bodies, particularly the IEPG".

According to the twenty-ninth annual report of the Council, the SAC was instructed "to provide a simplified annual updating" of the economic section of this report.

The Rome declaration of 27th October 1984 specified that the Council intended to "give political impetus" to joint production of armaments.

Finally, the communiqué issued at the close of the ministerial meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985 gave WEU the task of presenting "proposals in time for the next meeting to help provide the necessary political impetus for, and practical contributions to, the various efforts undertaken in this field, including those carried out by bodies such as the IEPG and the CNAD".

1. How can the Council reconcile these statements with the creation, in November 1985, of a study group to prepare a study for the IEPG on improving the competitiveness of the European defence industry, with a secretariat in Brussels?
2. Why has a new secretariat been set up when the WEU agency responsible for armaments co-operation is to continue to ensure the secretariat of the SAC?
3. Why has the IEPG turned to a group of independent experts for a study, the elements of which obviously have to be supplied by the authorities represented in the SAC?
4. In view of the fact that the decision of the WEU Council of 7th May 1985 left the work of the SAC open to NATO observers and specified that agreements or arrangements concluded in

the context of the SAC "would remain open to participation by other countries of NATO", does the creation of this study group and secretariat conform to the Council's will "to avoid any overlapping with the work of other bodies"?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 20th March 1986*

1. WEU has an important contribution to make to the enhancement of European armaments co-operation. The Standing Armaments Committee and Agency III are preparing concrete proposals in order to provide the necessary political impetus for, and practical contribution to, the various efforts undertaken in the field of armaments co-operation, including those carried out by the Independent European Programme Group. Therefore, both WEU and IEPG, in their own distinct way, contribute to European armaments co-operation. In November 1984, the IEPG Ministerial Council commissioned a study on enhancing the competitiveness of the European armaments industry. In June 1985, the Ministers decided to entrust the study to a group of independent experts from IEPG member countries. The creation of the study group by IEPG is in no way incompatible with the contribution by WEU to European armaments co-operation, it being understood that these activities must be concerted (see answer 4).
2. For practical reasons, a small temporary secretariat has been made available to the IEPG group of experts, which will be dissolved after the group's work has been completed. At the time the experts' group was created, WEU agencies were still in a stage of (re)organisation and definition of tasks. Moreover, the differences in membership of WEU and IEPG should be borne in mind.
3. Given the nature of the problem of industrial competitiveness, IEPG ministers felt the need for advice from a group of independent experts, not formally representing the governments of its members. The group must be in a position to put forward proposals not necessarily reflecting current government policies.

4. WEU, as well as IEPG, is aware of the risks of overlapping activities. The document of 1978 on division of work between the SAC and the IEPG specifically dealt with the exchange of information and co-ordination of activities between the SAC on the one hand and an IEPG working group on industrial co-operation and the rationalisation of the European defence industry on the other hand. Arrangements were made to ensure efficient liaison between WEU and IEPG. Exchange of information and, as appropriate, concertation of activities continue to be of utmost importance. On 23rd December 1985, an exploratory discussion was held between the Chairman of the IEPG, at that time the Dutch State Secretary, Mr. J. van Houwelingen, and Secretary-General Cahen, accompanied by Agency III Director Hintermann. Then on 29th January in Madrid, Mr. Cahen met the new Chairman of the IEPG, Mr. Serra, the Spanish Defence Minister. It was agreed that activities with respect to the enhancement of the competitiveness of European defence industry must be concerted to the greatest extent possible and should be complementary and mutually supportive.

QUESTION 263

*put by Mr. Caro
on 8th January 1986*

Will it be possible to pursue on a seven-power basis the activities of the working group on the SDI in view of the very different nature of the response by certain member countries of WEU to the United States proposal to European members of the Atlantic Alliance to take part in the research programme relating to the strategic defence initiative?

If so, will this working group examine only the political and strategic aspects of the SDI or will it seek to define a joint European position on national efforts to finance European participation in this programme and on the harmonisation of regulations governing technology transfer between the countries of the alliance?

Finally, will it study the consequences for a separate development programme for European technology resulting from the measures adopted by each member country for its participation in the SDI?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 22nd May 1986*

At their Bonn meeting on 22nd-23rd April 1985, the Ministers agreed to continue their collective consideration in order to achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their governments to the invitation of the United States to

participate in the research programme and instructed the Permanent Council accordingly. To this end the Permanent Council established a working group with the mandate of examining the strategic and technological aspects involved in the United States invitation.

The working group drew up an interim report covering these two aspects. The Ministers examined this interim report on 14th November in Rome and agreed that the working group should continue to pursue its work. At their meeting in Venice on 29th and 30th April 1986, the Ministers decided that the work of WEU should continue to deal with questions related to possible participation in the SDI research programme and the politico-strategic implications for Europe of possible developments in the field of ballistic missile defence. The working group met again on 12th May.

Whilst being fully aware of the variety of approaches chosen by member governments to their possible participation, the Council considers that the work carried out in WEU on these questions has been, and continues to be, useful for reflection by the governments. In addition, it has enabled the member states to have a better understanding of their respective positions on this very important question for their common interests.

The Permanent Council has taken note of the subjects suggested by the honourable President of the Assembly for future consideration by the group in regard to participation in SDI research. Although these suggestions are related to situations and possible developments in participation which cannot be anticipated at the present stage and are beyond the scope of current plans for participation as well as ongoing contacts with the United States Government, they nonetheless represent an interesting contribution to future reflections on the issue of participation and its implications.

On the other hand, the political and military aspects of the SDI programme are and should continue to be also a matter for review within the context of the inter-allied consultative process. The Permanent Council and the working group will obviously draw on the results of these consultations in the implementation of the mandate conferred upon them by Ministers.

QUESTION 264

*put by Mr. Fischer
on 26th February 1986*

According to the last part of paragraph 2 of Article XIII of Protocol No. IV to the Brussels Treaty, member states undertake to furnish to the Agency for the Control of Armaments the

statements listed in paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c) of stocks of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. III, including stocks held on the mainland of Europe for forces stationed overseas.

I ask the Council to answer the following questions:

1. Which of the three member countries (France, Netherlands, United Kingdom) still having overseas possessions hold arms on the mainland of Europe for their forces stationed overseas?
2. What types of arms are involved among those mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. III and what quantities are stockpiled?

For the second question, I ask the Council to give details for each individual country.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 25th April 1986*

All data relating to strengths and armaments communicated in accordance with the terms in force in the modified Brussels Treaty by the member countries to the Council, either directly, or indirectly through the Agency for the Control of Armaments, are classified as "Secret" in the member countries, in NATO and in WEU alike. Thus any information obtained in the exercise of arms control cannot be divulged.

For this reason the Council is unable to supply the information requested.

QUESTION 265

*put by Sir Frederic Bennett,
MM. De Decker, Ferrari Aggradi,
Kittelmann, Stoffelen and Vecchiotti
on 8th April 1986*

To ask the Council of Ministers what progress has been achieved in responding positively to paragraph 8 of Recommendation 429 in regard to enlargement of WEU and when can the Assembly hope to expect a definitive reaction with most immediate regard to the application of Portugal which has already been submitted as long ago as 19th October 1984.

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No reply has yet been received from the Council.

QUESTION 266

*put by Sir Frederic Bennett,
MM. Caro, Ferrari Aggradi, Sir Anthony Grant,
Lady Jill Knight, MM. Murphy, Schulte,
Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Stoffelen and van der Werff
on 30th April 1986*

In Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985, Ministers unanimously agreed that one of the priority tasks of the WEU Council on reactivation was to agree on a common approach and reaction to the United States' SDI development plans.

Since then, individual member states have pursued differing and different policies in this context.

Yet in Rome on 8th April 1986 it was admitted by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council to the Committee for Relations with the Council that efforts were still being pursued by a specialist committee of experts, presumably to try to attain a so far failed joint attitude of the Seven towards SDI.

When can the Assembly expect an indication either that the determination expressed in Bonn has been abandoned or, if not, when the Assembly will be informed of a positive answer?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 30th May 1986*

At their meeting in Bonn on 22nd and 23rd April 1985, the Ministers agreed to achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their governments to the invitation of the United States to participate in the research programme. The Seven did not commit themselves to the attainment of a joint attitude to SDI as there was a variety of approaches chosen by member governments to their possible participation.

WEU member countries followed up the ministerial decision in Bonn by setting up a working group which exchanged information on the contacts member governments and European industry have had with the United States regarding possible participation in the SDI research programme, and started a process of reflection on the strategic and technological aspects involved in the United States invitation. Moreover, they have discussed a number of initial points and aspects, as set out in the thirty-first annual report of the Council to the Assembly, in order to identify common elements of

analysis. In this field, consultation has already led to improved understanding of the issues involved on the part of each country.

At their meeting in Venice on 29th and 30th April, the Ministers decided that the work of WEU should continue to deal with questions related to possible participation in the SDI research programme and the political strategic implications for Europe of possible development in the field of ballistic missile defence. The SDI working group met again after this meeting and will continue to meet as appropriate.

QUESTION 267

*put by Sir Frederic Bennett,
MM. Caro, Ferrari Aggradi, Sir Anthony Grant,
Lady Jill Knight, MM. Murphy, Schulte,
Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Stoffelen and van der Werff
on 30th April 1986*

Has the Council under consideration on a continuing basis all aspects of present arms control and disarmament negotiations; and in particular has it agreed positions on:

- (a) the MBFR negotiations in Vienna;
- (b) the discussions in the conference on disarmament in Geneva on:
 - (i) a comprehensive, verifiable nuclear test ban;
 - (ii) a chemical weapons ban?

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* *

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

QUESTION 268

*put by Sir Frederic Bennett,
MM. Caro, Ferrari Aggradi, Sir Anthony Grant,
Lady Jill Knight, MM. Murphy, Schulte,
Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Stoffelen and van der Werff
on 30th April 1986*

Since the fundamental *raison d'être* of WEU's existence as expressed in the modified Brussels Treaty is to maintain the defence and security of Western Europe, what collaborative action can the Council of Ministers and other relevant organs of WEU institute and support to

take positive steps to establish joint machinery to combat government-sponsored and government-supported terrorism inside and outside Western Europe?

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No reply has yet been received from the Council.

QUESTION 269

*put by Mr. van der Werff
on 30th April 1986*

Like everyone, the General Affairs Committee has dealt extensively with terrorism, wondering whether it might be preferable, when necessary, to counter it in the framework of WEU rather than in that of the Twelve. Furthermore, such activity would improve WEU's position whose reactivation, since the Rome declaration, I feel has been marking time.

The new form of terrorism, clearly aimed at our societies, seems to be coming from Libya and also from Syria and even Algeria and it is impossible for the terrorists themselves not to have the full support of the governments of some at least of these countries, particularly Colonel Kadhafi.

Preventive and repressive measures must of course be taken without delay, but that is not all: we must above all see how to encourage forces against the practice of terrorism in the Arab countries. We should also ascertain how to deter the Soviet Union from affording large-scale assistance to the governments of these countries and perhaps also examine how it might be possible to oppose such support.

1. Does the Council intend to start such political activities? If WEU decides not to do so, will it really be done among the Twelve or in NATO?
2. Who will take the initiative?
3. Who will be responsible and how and when will the Assembly be informed of progress achieved, if any?
4. Does the WEU Council intend to examine the decisions taken in Tokyo to fight terrorism and ensure that they are applied in Europe?

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* *

No reply has yet been received from the Council.

*Security and terrorism – the implications for Europe
of crises in other parts of the world*

OPINION ¹

on the report of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1057)

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ²
by Mr. Kittelmann, Rapporteur*

Amendments

*to the draft recommendation on security and terrorism – the implications
for Europe of crises in other parts of the world
contained in the report of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1057)*

Amendment 1

After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“ Recalling however its Recommendation 396 concerning the alliance machinery for dealing with developments beyond the NATO area, and reiterating its belief ‘that in the case of such developments which the allies jointly recognise as directly threatening the vital interests of the alliance the ready assistance of all allies must be forthcoming within the area to facilitate United States deployments beyond the area’; ”.

Amendment 2

At the end of paragraph (x) of the preamble to the draft recommendation add “ and the firm diplomatic and juridical measures agreed at the Tokyo summit on 5th May 1986; ”.

1. Adopted in committee by 10 votes to 2 with 11 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman); Mr. Cifarelli (Alternate for Amadei), Dr. Miller (Alternate for Brown) (Vice-Chairmen); Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Bérégovoy, van den Bergh, Blaauw, Bourges (Alternate: Hunault), De Decker, Dejardin (Alternate: Michel), Edwards, Ertl (Alternate: Lenzer), Galley, Gerstl (Alternate: Soell), Giust, Konen (Alternate: Goerens), de Kwaadsteniet, Lemmrich (Alternate: Berger), Masciadri, Matraja, Pecchioli (Alternate: Milani), Sarti, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Steverlynck (Alternate: Declercq), Stokes, Wirth (Alternate: Jeambrun).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Kittelmann, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. The report of the General Affairs Committee on security and terrorism – the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world (Document 1057) was referred to the committee for an opinion by decision of the Presidential Committee.

1.2. The explanatory memorandum to that report deals, in three sections, with the case for consultation in the WEU Council with regard to threats to peace in whatever area they arise, the Gulf war and international terrorism. The report was adopted unanimously by the General Affairs Committee, so it will presumably command a wide measure of agreement in the Assembly. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments however would like to draw attention to two points, in part arising from more recent events.

1.3. While both the Brussels and North Atlantic treaties restrict their provisions for joint military action in the event of an attack to a specific geographical area – Europe in the case of the former, and the broader area of the national territories, North Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea in the case of the latter – neither imposes any geographical restriction on threats which may give rise to consultation. The Brussels Treaty in fact explicitly provides for such consultation “in whatever area this threat should arise”. While the geographical fringes of the treaties are thus clearly defined in cases which may give rise to joint military action, there appears in practice to be a vaguer political fringe concerning the nature of other threats, particularly threats outside the geographical area for joint military action, concerning which it is proper to consult in the framework of a mutual defence treaty.

II. Outside area

2.1. In the opinion of the committee there is an important point to be made in the report of the General Affairs Committee where it discusses the case for consultation in WEU on threats arising outside Europe. The tentative but important machinery for consultation in the North Atlantic Alliance should not be overlooked. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has reported on a number of occasions on the evolution of the process of consultation in NATO on events arising outside the geographical area of Article 6 of that treaty¹. The

¹ European security and burden sharing in the alliance, Document 959, 7th November 1983, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson. State of European security, Document 971, 15th May 1984, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith.

report by Mr. Harmel, then Foreign Minister of Belgium, commissioned by the North Atlantic Council in 1967 specifically recognised the need for consultation on out-of-area matters that might impair NATO security, and the usage concerning such consultation was clarified in the communiqué issued following the NATO summit meeting in Bonn on 10th June 1982:

“All of us have an interest in peace and security in other regions of the world. We will consult together as appropriate on events in these regions which may have implications for our security, taking into account our commonly-identified objectives. Those of us who are in a position to do so will endeavour to respond to requests for assistance from sovereign states whose security and independence is threatened.”

A document on integrated defence was issued at the same summit meeting by representatives of governments participating in the integrated defence structure. It contained the following statement:

“Noting that developments beyond the NATO area may threaten our vital interests, we reaffirm the need to consult with a view to sharing assessments and identifying common objectives, taking full account of the effect on NATO security and defence capability, as well as of the national interests of member countries. Recognising that the policies which nations adopt in this field are a matter for national decision, we agree to examine collectively in the appropriate NATO bodies the requirements which may arise for the defence of the NATO area as a result of deployments by individual member states outside that area. Steps which may be taken by individual allies in the light of such consultations to facilitate possible military deployments beyond the NATO area can represent an important contribution to western security.”

2.2. In Recommendation 396 adopted in November 1983 the Assembly expressed its belief that:

“...allied defence plans and commitments entered into in the Brussels Treaty must take account of the possible consequences of developments beyond the NATO area, and *that in the case of such developments which the allies jointly recognise as directly*

threatening the vital interests of the alliance the ready assistance of all allies must be forthcoming within the area to facilitate United States deployments beyond the area;" (emphasis added),

and recommended that the Council urge the WEU governments:

" 2. In the case of developments beyond the NATO area affecting their vital interests:

- (a) to facilitate by all necessary measures within the area the deployment of forces of any NATO country beyond the area;
- (b) in the case of those WEU member countries with appropriate military capability to participate in such deployments;"

The committee suggests that this recommendation might usefully be recalled in the draft recommendation submitted by the General Affairs Committee.

III. United States attack on military targets in Libya

3.1. Details of the United States air strike in Libya in the early morning of 15th April are too well known to need recalling.

3.2. The earlier incident in the Gulf of Sirte described in the committee's report on European security and the Mediterranean was followed shortly by two acts of international terrorism involving American targets. On 2nd April a bomb exploded on board a TWA airliner while over Greece, and on 5th April a bomb in a Berlin discotheque killed two persons including one United States serviceman and one young Turkishwoman, and injured 204, including 35 United States servicemen. The United States Government stated that it had direct evidence of Libyan involvement in the two incidents, but in urging military action against Libya it later concentrated on its evidence of Libyan involvement in the Berlin discotheque bombing based on intercepted communications.

3.3. The United States launched its air strike against Libya on 15th April from two carriers of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and by F-111 bombers flying from the United Kingdom. Inevitably, as in the case of any air strike in built-up areas, apart from the intended damage to military objectives, there were unfortunately some civilian casualties also.

3.4. The United States attack raises significantly different issues from the incident in the Gulf of Sirte on 24th March. The 15th April attack, carried out exclusively by the United

States, did not result from an attack on the forces of a NATO country within the area covered by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and could not in itself have led to that treaty being invoked.

3.5. The committee recalls that this incident revealed different reactions by most European allies about the unilateral use of force by the United States.

3.6. Since the United States attack allied unity has been restored in several forums where increasingly realistic measures have been agreed to combat international terrorism. The report of the General Affairs Committee notes the measures agreed by the Twelve in the European Community on 21st April 1986 which were a great advance on the earlier decisions on 27th January and 14th April. Since then the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe at its meeting in Strasbourg on 23rd and 24th April included the following statement in its communiqué:

" ...The Ministers expressed grave concern about the recent acts of terrorism which constitute a threat to peace and democracy. They reiterated their strong condemnation of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed and whatever its purpose. They reaffirmed the duty of all member states to take determined action against terrorism. They also reiterated their determination to put the like-minded approach of all members of the Council of Europe to greater advantage, amongst others by the co-ordination of the normative and juridical aspects of the combat against terrorism, taking account of the organisation's achievements and experience in this field. Recognising that the successful battle against terrorism will require the efforts of all states, they undertook to co-operate as appropriate with all other states who share their common concern about international terrorism.

On the basis of a report by an ad hoc multidisciplinary working party of senior officials, the Ministers agreed that a European Conference of Ministers responsible for combating terrorism should be held as soon as possible and in any case before the end of 1986. "

Then the WEU Council at its ministerial meeting in Venice on 29th and 30th April made a passing reference to terrorism in its communiqué:

" 10. The Ministers gave special attention to the threat to security posed by international terrorism and underlined the importance of early and effective action to implement the measures that the countries of Western Europe have agreed upon to combat this scourge. "

and the summit meeting of the seven industrialised states meeting in Tokyo on 5th May 1986 issued the firmest condemnation yet of international terrorism and agreed on the strongest measures to combat it:

“ 4. We specify the following as measures open to any government concerned to deny to international terrorists the opportunity and the means to carry out their aims, and to identify and deter those who perpetrate such terrorism. We have decided to apply these measures within the framework of international law and in our own jurisdictions in respect of any state which is clearly involved in sponsoring or supporting international terrorism, and in particular of Libya, until such time as the state concerned abandons its complicity in, or support for, such terrorism. These measures are:

- refusal to export arms to states which sponsor or support terrorism;
- strict limits on the size of the diplomatic and consular missions and other official bodies abroad of states which engage in such activities, control of travel of members of such missions and bodies, and, where appropriate, radical reductions in, or even the closure of, such missions and bodies;
- denial of entry to all persons, including diplomatic personnel, who have been expelled or excluded from one of our states on suspicion of involvement in international terrorism or who have been convicted of such a terrorist offence;
- improved extradition procedures within due process of domestic law for bringing to trial those who have perpetrated such acts of terrorism;
- stricter immigration and visa requirements and procedures in respect of nationals of states which sponsor or support terrorism;
- the closest possible bilateral and multi-lateral co-operation between police and security organisations and other relevant authorities in the fight against terrorism.

Each of us is committed to work in the appropriate international bodies to which

we belong to ensure that similar measures are accepted and acted upon by as many other governments as possible.”


The Tokyo summit points the way in which essentially criminal offences of terrorism can be dealt with firstly by police and court action, and by concerted diplomatic action against states which condone or actively engage in international terrorism. The committee suggests that an appropriate preambular reference to the Tokyo summit communiqué should be added to the draft recommendation in the report from the General Affairs Committee.

3.7. Other conclusions can be drawn from the Libyan affair:

- (a) An analysis of the events surrounding the American action against Libya leads to the conclusion that the United States felt obliged to resort to such measures because the Europeans, in the eyes of the United States, turned out not to be sufficiently reliable allies.
- (b) The basic attitudes of the western alliances – refusal to use military means for achieving political aims – should in no way be changed, in principle.
- (c) However, state terrorists such as those of Kadhafi, whose basic attitude is: “Whoever opposes world revolution shall be eliminated!” must be taken as a serious threat and must be combated.
- (d) The reality must be faced that state terrorism as an instrument of policy of fanatical governments is a threat of a different kind, constituting in practice a new form of warfare as the Tokyo declaration recognises. This new form of warfare must be combated by mental, political and economic means, and – when these measures do not suffice – by other adequate measures to restore order and security.

IV. Conclusions

4.1. The conclusions of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments are set forth in the two amendments which it proposes to the draft recommendation contained in the report from the General Affairs Committee.

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