

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-SECOND ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

**June 1986**

II

**Minutes**  
**Official Report of Debates**

WEU

PARIS

202.7 3



ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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**II**

**Minutes**  
**Official Report of Debates**

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The proceedings of the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I: Assembly documents.

Volume II: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.



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## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP
BOGAERTS August	SP
DECLERCQ Tijn	CVP
DEJARDIN Claude	PS
PECRIAUX Nestor	PS
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP

#### Substitutes

MM. BEYSEN Edward	PVV
CEREXHE Etienne	PSC
CLOSE Robert	PRL
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
MICHEL Josphe	PSC
NOERENS René	PVV

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BEREGOVY Pierre	Socialist
BERRIER Noël	Socialist
BOURGES Yvon	RPR
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
President of the Assembly de CHAMBRUN Charles	National Front
DELEBARRE Michel	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GREMETZ Maxime	Communist
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KOEHL Emile	UDF
MERMAZ Louis	Socialist
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
WIRTH Frédéric	UCDP

#### Substitutes

MM. ANDRE René	RPR
BICHET Jacques	UDF
BOHL André	UCDP
BORDU Gérard	Communist
CHARTRON Jacques	RPR
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.

MM. DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
DREYFUS-SCHMIDT Michel	Socialist
FOURRE Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAUT Xavier	UDF (App.)
MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
MONTASTRUC Pierre	UDF (App.)
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PRAT Henri	Socialist
SIRGUE Pierre	National Front
SOUVET Louis	RPR

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
BERGER Markus	CDU/CSU
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
HAASE Horst	SPD
Mrs. KELLY Petra	Die Grünen
MM. KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NEUMANN Volker	SPD
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
RUMPF Wolfgang	FDP
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
SCHWARZ Heinz	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU
ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU

#### Substitutes

MM. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
ERTL Josef	FPD
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. FISCHER Ulrich	Die Grünen
GANSEL Norbert	SPD
GERSTL Friedrich	SPD
GLOS Michael	CDU/CSU
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
JÄGER Claus	CDU/CSU
KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM. PFENNIG Gero	CDU/CSU
SCHAEER Hermann	SPD
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU

## ITALY

## Representatives

MM.	AMADEI Giuseppe	PSDI
	ANTONI Varese	Communist
	BIANCO Gerardo	Chr. Dem.
	CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
	CIFARELLI Michele	Republican
	FERRARI AGGRADI Mario	Chr. Dem.
	FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
	FRASCA Salvatore	Socialist
	GIANOTTI Lorenzo	Communist
	GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
	MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
	MILANI Eliseo	PDUP
	PECCHIOLO Ugo	Communist
	RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
	RUBBI Antonio	Communist
	SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
	SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
	VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

## Substitutes

MM.	ACCILI Achille	Chr. Dem.
	ALBERINI Guido	Socialist
	BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
	COLAJANNI Napoleone	Communist
	FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs.	FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM.	GORLA Massimo	Prol. Dem.
	LAPENTA Nicola	Chr. Dem.
	MARCHIO Michele	MSI-DN
	MARTINO Guido	Republican
	MASCIADRI Cornelio	Socialist
	MITTERDORFER Karl	SVP
	PALUMBO Vincenzo	Liberal
	POLLIDORO Carlo	Communist
	RIZZI Enrico	PSDI
	RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
	SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
	TEODORI Massimo	Radical

## LUXEMBOURG

## Representatives

MM.	BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
	GOERENS Charles	Dem.
	HENGEL René	Soc. Workers

## Substitutes

Mrs.	HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
MM.	KONEN René	Dem.
	LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

## NETHERLANDS

## Representatives

MM.	AARTS Harry	CDA
	van den BERGH Harry	Labour
	BLAAUW Jan Dirk	Liberal
	de KWAADSTENIET	
	Willem	CDA
	STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
Mrs.	van der WERF-TERPSTRA	
	Anne Maria	CDA
Mr.	van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal

## Substitutes

Mr.	EYSINK Rudolf	CDA
Mrs.	den OUDEN-DEKKERS	
	Greetje	Liberal
MM.	van der SANDEN Piet	CDA
	van TETS Govert	Liberal
	TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
	de VRIES Klaas	Labour
	WORRELL Joop	Labour

## UNITED KINGDOM

## Representatives

Sir	Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
Mr.	Donald COLEMAN	Labour
Sir	Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
Mr.	Edward GARRETT	Labour
Sir	Anthony GRANT	Conservative
Mr.	Peter HARDY	Labour
Sir	Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Mr.	James HILL	Conservative
Lord	HUGHES	Labour
Mr.	Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Earl	of KINNOULL	Conservative
Lady	Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Dr.	Maurice MILLER	Labour
Sir	John OSBORN	Conservative
Sir	John PAGE	Conservative
Mr.	Stephen ROSS	Liberal
Sir	Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr.	John WILKINSON	Conservative

## Substitutes

MM.	Robert BROWN	Labour
	John CORRIE	Conservative
	Thomas COX	Labour
	Robert EDWARDS	Labour
	Reginald FREESON	Labour
	Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Lord	MACKIE	Liberal
MM.	Bruce MILLAN	Labour
	Michael MORRIS	Conservative
	Christopher MURPHY	Conservative
Lord	NEWALL	Conservative
MM.	Robert PARRY	Labour
	Peter REES	Conservative
Lord	RODNEY	Conservative
MM.	John STOKES	Conservative
	Stefan TERLEZKI	Conservative
	John WARD	Conservative
	Alec WOODALL	Labour



**I**  
**MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS**

# FIRST SITTING

Monday, 2nd June 1986

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the thirty-second ordinary session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business of the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session (Doc. 1050).

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 12 noon with Mr. Edwards, Provisional President, in the Chair.*

### **1. Opening of the session**

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the thirty-second ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU.

### **2. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

### **3. Examination of credentials**

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 1 had been ratified by that Assembly, with the exception of the French Delegation.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure and subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of the above.

The Assembly took note of the following changes in the membership of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany: Mr. Soell as a representative in place of Mr. Gerstl; Mr. Gerstl as a substitute in place of Mr. Soell.

### **4. Election of the President of the Assembly**

Only one candidate was proposed for the post of President, namely Mr. Caro.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect its President by acclamation.

Mr. Caro was elected President by acclamation.

At the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. Caro took the Chair.

### **5. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The President addressed the Assembly.

### **6. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly**

Three candidates had been proposed for the posts of Vice-President, namely Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Goerens and Mr. Soell.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Goerens and Mr. Soell were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

### **7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session**

*(Doc. 1050)*

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session.

Mr. Blaauw requested that the Assembly agree to the addition to the order of business for the morning of Thursday, 5th June, of the presentation of the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments after the presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee.

The Assembly agreed to this change in the draft order of business.

The draft order of business for the first part of the session, as amended, was adopted.

### 8. *Nomination of members to committees*

In accordance with Rules 39 (6) and 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the membership of the six committees as follows:

#### 1. COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS (27 seats)

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. De Decker Dejardin Steverlynck	MM. Close Noerens Declercq
<i>France:</i>	MM. Bérégovoy Bourges Galley Matraja Wirth	MM. Delebarre Jung Baumel Bichet Jeambrun
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Ertl Gerstl Kittelmann Lemmrich Scheer	MM. Rumpf Klejdzinski Lenzer Berger Gansel
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Alberini Amadei Giust Pecchioli Sarti	MM. Milani Cifarelli Palumbo Antoni Rauti
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Konen	Mr. Goerens
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van den Bergh Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet	MM. de Vries van Tets Aarts
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Brown Edwards Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Stokes	Mr. Ross Dr. Miller Mr. Cox Lord Newall Mr. Wilkinson

#### 2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE (27 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Bogaerts Close Michel	MM. Adriaensens Pécriaux De Bondt
<i>France:</i>	MM. Baumel Berrier Koehl Mermaz Ruet	MM. André Delebarre Dreyfus-Schmidt Seitlinger Grussenmeyer

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	Mr. Ahrens Mrs. Kelly MM. Müller Reddemann Rumpf	MM. Haase Fischer Kittelmann Böhm Ertl
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Bianco Martino Masciadri Spitella Vecchietti	MM. Cavaliere Teodori Frasca Amadei Rubbi
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Burger	Mr. Konen
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van der Sanden de Vries van der Werff	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra MM. Tummers Blaauw
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Sir Frederic Bennett Sir Anthony Grant MM. Hardy Hill Lord Mackie	Lady Jill Knight Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Lord Hughes MM. Murphy Millan

### 3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	Mr. Adriaensens Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Beysen De Bondt
<i>France:</i>	MM. Bassinet Fourré Souvet Valleix	MM. Croze de Chambrun Galley Prat
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Böhm Lenzer Schmidt Spies von Büllenheim	MM. Müller Pfennig Klejdzinski Schwarz
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Colajanni Fiandrotti Mezzapesa Sinesio	MM. Gianotti Masciadri Cavaliere Sarti
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Hengel	Mr. Linster
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Aarts Worrell	Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers Mr. Tummers
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Mr. Garrett Sir Paul Hawkins MM. McGuire Wilkinson	Mr. Parry Lord Rodney Sir John Osborn Mr. Ward

*Members**Alternates*

## 4. COMMITTEES ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION (21 seats)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Beysen Declercq	MM. Bogaerts Steverlynck
<i>France:</i>	MM. Bohl Chartron Dhaille Oehler	MM. Hunault Jeambrun Sirgue Ruet
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Enders Haase Mrs. Pack Mr. Zierer	MM. Ahrens Büchner Glos Lemmerich
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Ferrari Aggradi Pollidoro Rauti Sinesio	MM. Accili Alberini Mitterdorfer Giust
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Linster	Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. van Tets de Vries	Mr. van den Bergh Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Freeson Morris Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Stokes	Mr. Woodall Lord Mackie Mr. Rees Sir Paul Hawkins

## 5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES (21 seats)

*Members**Alternates*

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Cerexhe Péciaux	MM. Michel De Decker
<i>France:</i>	MM. André Bordu Montastruc Sirgue	MM. Bohl Koehl Dreyfus-Schmidt Fourré
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	MM. Antretter Schulte Spies von Büllenheim Unland	MM. Büchner Schmidt Jäger Wulff
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Antoni Gorla Lapenta Marchio	MM. Fiandrotti Foschi Bonalumi Palumbo
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges	Mr. Burger
<i>Netherlands:</i>	MM. Eysink van der Werff	MM. van der Sanden Stoffelen

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Coleman Corrie Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. Woodall	MM. Cox Jessel Earl of Kinnoull Mr. Edwards

6. COMMITTEE FOR PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC RELATIONS (*14 seats*)

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. De Bondt Noerens	Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Dejardin
<i>France:</i>	MM. Mercier Seitlinger	MM. Gremetz de Chambrun
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>	Mr. Enders Mrs. Fischer	MM. Antretter Pfennig
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Cavaliere Frasca	Mr. Giust Mrs. Francese
<i>Luxembourg:</i>	Mr. Goerens Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges	MM. Hengel Linster
<i>Netherlands:</i>	Mr. Stoffelen Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra	Mr. Eysink Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	Lady Jill Knight Dr. Miller	MM. Terlezki Coleman

**9. Date, time and orders  
of the day of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 2.30 p.m.

*The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>MM. Kittelmann</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
<b>MM. Noerens (Bogaerts)</b>	Müller	<b>MM. Eysink (Aarts)</b>
Dejardin	<i>Gansel (Neumann)</i>	<i>Tummers</i>
Steverlynck	Reddemann	(van den Bergh)
	Schulte	Blaauw
	<i>Lemmrich (Schwarz)</i>	Stoffelen
	Soell	<b>Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers</b>
<b>France</b>	Spies von Büllenheim	(van der Werff)
<b>MM. Prat (Bassinot)</b>	Unland	
<i>André (Baumel)</i>	Zierer	
Bérégovoy		
Berrier	<b>Italy</b>	
Caro	<b>MM. Antoni</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Delebarre	Bianco	Sir Frederic Bennett
Gremetz	Cavaliere	Mr. Coleman
Jeambrun	<i>Martino (Cifarelli)</i>	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
Jung	Gianotti	Mr. Garrett
<i>Hunault (Koehl)</i>	Giust	Sir Anthony Grant
Mermaz	Mezzapesa	Mr. Parry (Hardy)
Seitlinger	Milani	Sir Paul Hawkins
Valleix	Rauti	Mr. Murphy (Hill)
	Sarti	Lord Hughes
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Sinesio	Mr. Terlezki (Jessel)
	Vecchietti	Earl of Kinnoull
<b>MM. Ahrens</b>		Lady Jill Knight
Antretter	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Dr. Miller
Berger	<b>MM. Burger</b>	Sir John Osborn
<b>Mrs. Pack (Böhm)</b>	Goerens	Mr. Morris (Sir John Page)
<b>MM. Enders</b>	Hengel	Sir Dudley Smith
<i>Holtz (Haase)</i>		Mr. Wilkinson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
<b>MM. Adriaensens</b>	<b>Mrs. Kelly</b>	<b>Mr. de Kwaadsteniet</b>
Declercq	<b>Mr. Rumpf</b>	<b>Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra</b>
Péciaux		
<b>Mrs. Staels-Dompas</b>		
	<b>Italy</b>	
<b>France</b>	<b>MM. Amadei</b>	
<b>MM. Bourges</b>	Ferrari Aggradi	
de Chambrun	Fiandrotti	
Galley	Frasca	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Ruet	Pecchioli	
Wirth	Rubbi	<b>Mr. Ross</b>

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## SECOND SITTING

Monday, 2nd June 1986

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1063*).
2. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
3. Parliaments, public opinion and defence; Promotion of parliamentary and public interest in WEU matters (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft resolutions, Docs. 1038 and 1056*).
4. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and votes on the draft resolutions, Doc. 1039 and amendments*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 2.40 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Tribute**

The President paid tribute to the memory of Mr. Longestaey, Honorary Ambassador of His Majesty the King of the Belgians and former Secretary-General of WEU.

#### **2. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly**

A candidate had been proposed for a post of Vice-President of the Assembly, namely Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-President by acclamation.

Mr. Ferrari Aggradi was elected a Vice-President by acclamation.

#### **4. Action by the Presidential Committee**

*(Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1063)*

The report of the Presidential Committee was presented by Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur.

The Assembly took note of the report of the Presidential Committee.

#### **5. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **6. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU**

Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Cahen answered questions put by MM. Wilkinson, Inan (*Observer from Turkey*) and Coleman.

#### **7. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly**

A candidate had been proposed for a post of Vice-President of the Assembly, namely Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-President by acclamation.

Sir Frederic Bennett was elected a Vice-President by acclamation.

### 8. Parliaments, public opinion and defence

#### *Promotion of parliamentary and public interest in WEU matters*

*(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft resolutions, Docs. 1038 and 1056)*

The reports of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations were presented by Mr. Eysink, Rapporteur.

*Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

The joint debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Tummers, Müller, Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers, MM. Murphy and Cavaliere.

The joint debate was closed.

Lady Jill Knight, Chairman of the committee, and Mr. Eysink, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution in Document 1038.

The draft resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This resolution will be published as No. 71)<sup>1</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft resolution in Document 1056.

The draft resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This resolution will be published as No. 72)<sup>2</sup>.

*Speaker (point of order):* Sir Paul Hawkins.

*The sitting was suspended at 4.40 p.m. and resumed at 4.50 p.m.*

*Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.*

### 9. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and votes on the draft resolutions, Doc. 1039 and amendments)*

*Speaker:* Mr. Schulte, Chairman of the committee.

The report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* Mr. Antoni, Lady Jill Knight and Mr. Bianco.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Schulte, Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

The President proposed, on a request from the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, to take first the amendments to the Rules of Procedure which did not bear on revision of the Charter.

*Speakers:* MM. Spies von Büllesheim, Bianco, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Lord Hughes.

The Assembly agreed to the President's proposal.

An amendment (No. 13) was tabled by Mr. Schulte:

13. At the beginning of the operative text of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, after "To amend the Rules of Procedure as follows" insert "and that these amendments shall come into force on 1st October 1986".

*Speakers:* MM. Schulte and Spies von Büllesheim.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 14) was tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg:

14. In paragraph 8 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out the proposal to add at the end of paragraph 2 "If the President speaks in a debate on a specific subject, he may not resume the chair until the debate on that subject is over".

*Speakers:* Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Unland (point of order), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Eysink.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 19) was tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg:

19. After paragraph 8 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, insert the following new paragraph:

"Rule 12

After paragraph 1 insert:

2. A Vice-President who replaces the President may not speak in the particular debate over which he has presided."

Renumber existing paragraph 2 accordingly.

*Speakers:* Sir Geoffrey Finsberg; (points of order): Mr. Jessel, Lord Hughes, MM. Eysink and Bianco.

Mr. Bianco proposed an adjournment of the sitting under Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure.

1. See page 23.

2. See page 24.

*Speakers:* Mr. Spies von Büllenheim and Dr. Miller.

The motion to adjourn the sitting was defeated.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Lord Hughes and others:

4. After paragraph 8 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, insert the following new paragraph:

“ 9. *Rule 14*

In paragraph 1, line 5, leave out ‘and’.

In paragraph 1, line 6, after ‘committees’ insert ‘and one member appointed by each political group’.

In paragraph 1, line 10, leave out ‘The President may invite the Chairmen of the political groups to attend meetings of the Presidential Committee’.

*Speakers:* Lord Hughes and Mr. Eysink.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 15) was tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg:

15. In paragraph 13 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, insert at the end of the penultimate line:

“ 4.(a) Orders addressed to a committee under sub-paragraph 3(c) of this rule shall be put to the vote without reference to committee.

(b) When the question of including in the Assembly’s register any other text referred to in paragraph 3 of this rule is put to the Assembly, the following only may be heard: one speaker for the motion, one speaker against, and the chairman of any committee concerned.”

*Speaker:* Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Lord Hughes and others:

5. In paragraph 14, last line, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out “Leave out paragraphs 8 and 9 and renumber paragraph 10 accordingly.”

*Speakers:* Lord Hughes, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim and Lord Hughes.

The amendment was withdrawn.

*Speaker (point of order):* Mr. Hardy.

An amendment (No. 16) was tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg:

16. In paragraph 14 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the second line of the proposed new paragraph 2, leave out “Unless otherwise decided by the President”.

*Speakers:* Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 17) was tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg:

17. In paragraph 15 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, omit the proposal to leave out paragraph 6 of Rule 31.

*Speaker:* Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Lord Hughes and others:

6. In paragraph 18, line 4, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out “and there is no opposition to it”.

*Speakers:* Lord Hughes and Mr. Eysink.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Lord Hughes and others:

7. In paragraph 21, line 4, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out “Leave out paragraph 4(b).”

*Speaker:* Lord Hughes.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 18) was tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg:

18. In paragraph 22 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the proposed new paragraph 4 of Rule 42, leave out “However, the Assembly may decide, at the request of the committee, to place the report on the agenda unless twenty representatives are opposed. Such a decision shall be taken before the order of business is adopted (Rule 18).”

*Speaker:* Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

The amendment was withdrawn.

*Speakers:* Mr. Valleix (point of order), Lord Hughes, MM. Unland, Bianco, Cox, Lord

Hughes, MM. Schulte, Bianco, Coleman and Antoni.

The President proposed that voting be resumed on Tuesday afternoon, 3rd June, after the address by Baroness Young.

*Speaker:* Mr. Reddemann.

The proposal by the President was agreed to.

***10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 3rd June, at 10 a.m.

*The sitting was closed at 6.55 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Müller <i>Gansel</i> (Neumann) Schulte <i>Lemmrich</i> (Schwarz) Soell Spies von Büllenheim Unland Zierer	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. <i>Close</i> (Adriaensens) <i>Noerens</i> (Bogaerts) Declercq Dejardin Pécriaux <i>De Decker</i> (Mrs. Staels-Dompas) Stevelyneck		MM. <i>Eysink</i> (Aarts) <i>Tummers</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw Stoffelen Mrs. <i>den Ouden-Dekkers</i> (van der Werff)
	<b>Italy</b>	
<b>France</b>	MM. Amadei Antoni Bianco Cavaliere <i>Martino</i> (Cifarelli) Ferrari Aggradi <i>Spitella</i> (Fiandrotti) <i>Masciadri</i> (Frasca) Gianotti Giust Mezzapesa Milani Sarti Sinesio	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Bassinet <i>André</i> (Baumel) Gremetz Jeambrun <i>Bohl</i> (Jung) <i>Prat</i> (Mermaz) Valleix		Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Coleman Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Garrett Hardy Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Hill) Lord Hughes MM. Jessel <i>Morris</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) Lady Jill Knight Dr. Miller MM. <i>Terlezki</i> (Sir John Osborn) <i>Rees</i> (Sir John Page) Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
MM. Ahrens Antretter Berger Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Böhm) MM. Enders Haase Kittelmann	MM. Burger Goerens Hengel	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>France</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	MM. Rubbi Vecchiatti
MM. Bérégovoy Berrier Bourges de Chambrun Delebarre Galley Koehl Ruet Seitlinger Wirth	Mrs. Kelly MM. Reddemann Rumpf	<b>Netherlands</b>
	<b>Italy</b>	Mr. de Kwaadsteniet Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
	MM. Pecchioli Rauti	<b>United Kingdom</b>
		Sir Anthony Grant Mr. Ross

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RESOLUTION 71*****on parliaments, public opinion and defence***

The Assembly,

- (i) Having studied the report of its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on parliaments, public opinion and defence;
- (ii) Convinced that the necessary improvement in public awareness of western security and defence questions and particularly of the functions and activities of the Assembly of Western European Union in this respect calls for new efforts at both national and international level,

**CALLS ON NATIONAL DELEGATIONS**

1. To intensify their efforts to follow up the activities of the WEU Assembly in national parliaments, political groups, committees and vis-à-vis the public;
2. To invite governments to take specific steps to provide the public with substantial information about WEU in general and the Council's activities in particular;
3. To keep a continuing watch over the relevant governmental activities.

**RESOLUTION 72*****on the promotion of parliamentary and  
public interest in WEU matters***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the increasing urgency of giving tangible shape to efforts to improve parliamentary and public awareness of the Assembly's rôle and contribution to the creation of a European security dimension;
- (ii) Convinced that, in addition to relations with parliaments and the press, contacts with non-governmental organisations, research institutes, academic bodies and other institutions with political influence on public opinion are important for promoting public interest in WEU matters;
- (iii) Welcoming the public information activities already conducted by the President of the Assembly, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and individual representatives of the Assembly as well as by the Secretary-General of WEU;
- (iv) Regretting, however, that the Assembly is still lacking the minimum technical requirements for public information which exist in most member parliaments such as telexes or computer-controlled documentation systems;
- (v) Convinced that no great success can be expected in improving public relations if the Assembly has to continue working under present financial and technical conditions,

INVITES member parliaments to impress upon the governments of the WEU states the urgency of allocating to the Assembly the financial resources needed for the effective pursuit of its public relations activities;

ENCOURAGES its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations to pursue its action for bringing the work of the Assembly to the attention of parliaments, the public and the press in member countries including the organisation of special hearings in member parliaments.

## THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd June 1986

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1058*).
2. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1059 and amendments*).
3. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1055 and amendments*).
4. Draft opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Doc. 1054*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

*Speaker:* Lord Hughes.

#### **2. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **3. Reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1058)*

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speaker:* Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

*Mr. Blaauw, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers:* Mr. Vecchietti, Sir Anthony Grant, MM. Cavaliere, Giust, Masciadri, Bassinet, Sarti, Hardy, Wilkinson, Rauti and Burger.

*Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers:* MM. Rees, Gansel, De Decker and Fiandrotti.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur, and Mr. Berrier, Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

#### **4. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1059 and amendments)*

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur.

*Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.*

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Milani, Berger and Antoni.

The debate was adjourned.

#### **5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 2.30 p.m.

*The sitting was closed at 1 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Böhm)	<b>Luxembourg</b>
MM. <i>Close</i> (Adriaensens)	MM. Enders	MM. Burger
<i>Noerens</i> (Bogaerts)	Kittelmann	Goerens
Declercq	Müller	<i>Linster</i> (Hengel)
<i>De Decker</i> (Dejardin)	Rumpf	
Péciaux	Schulte	<b>Netherlands</b>
Steverlynck	Soell	MM. <i>Eysink</i> (Aarts)
	Spies von Büllesheim	Blaauw
	Unland	Mrs. <i>den Ouden-Dekkers</i>
	Zierer	(van der Werff)
<b>France</b>		
MM. Bassinet	<b>Italy</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>
Baumel	MM. Amadei	Sir Frederic Bennett
<i>Prat</i> (Bérégovoy)	Antoni	Mr. Coleman
Berrier	Bianco	Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
Delebarre	Cavaliere	Mr. <i>Millan</i> (Garrett)
<i>Bordu</i> (Gremetz)	Cifarelli	Sir Anthony Grant
Jeambrun	Ferrari Aggradi	MM. Hardy
<i>Bohl</i> (Jung)	Fiandrotti	<i>Rees</i> (Sir Paul Hawkins)
<i>Hunault</i> (Koehl)	Frasca	<i>Morris</i> (Hill)
<i>Fourré</i> (Mermaz)	Gianotti	Lord Hughes
<i>Bichet</i> (Ruet)	Giust	Mr. Jessel
Seitlinger	Mezzapesa	Earl of Kinnoull
Valleix	Milani	Mr. <i>Murphy</i> (Lady Jill Knight)
	<i>Masciadri</i> (Pecchioli)	Dr. Miller
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	Rauti	Sir John Osborn
MM. <i>Gansel</i> (Ahrens)	Rubbi	Sir John Page
Antretter	Sarti	Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Ross)
Berger	Sinesio	Sir Dudley Smith
	Vecchiotti	Mr. Wilkinson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Mr. Haase	MM. van den Bergh
	Mrs. Kelly	de Kwaadsteniet
	MM. Neumann	Stoffelen
<b>France</b>	Reddemann	Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra
MM. Bourges	Schwarz	
de Chambrun		
Galley		
Wirth		

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## FOURTH SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd June 1986

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1061*).
2. Address by Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations of Belgium.
3. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
4. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure (*Resumed votes on the draft resolutions, Doc. 1039 and amendments*).
5. Reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1058*).
6. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1059 and amendments*).
7. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1055 and amendments*).
8. Draft opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1054*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 2.40 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **2. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

#### **3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly**

A candidate had been proposed for a post of Vice-President of the Assembly, namely Mr. Pécriaux.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-President by acclamation.

Mr. Pécriaux was elected a Vice-President by acclamation.

The President informed the Assembly that, according to age, the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents was as follows: Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Soell, Mr. Pécriaux, Mr. Blaauw and Mr. Goerens.

#### **4. Thirty-first annual report of the Council**

*(Presentation by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1061)*

The report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. Andreotti answered questions put by Sir John Page, MM. Antretter, Vecchiotti, Antoni, Sir John Osborn, MM. Ferrari Aggradi, Soell, Masciadri, Dr. Miller, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Burger, Bianco, Wilkinson, Milani, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Cifarelli, Terlezki and Fian-drotti.

#### **5. Address by Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations of Belgium**

Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations of Belgium, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Tindemans answered questions put by MM. De Decker, Gansel, Sir John Osborn, MM. Steverlynck, Declercq, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, MM. Jessel, Cavaliere, Antretter, Martino, Rumpf and Spies von Büllesheim.

*The sitting was suspended at 5.05 p.m. and resumed at 5.30 p.m.*

**6. Address by Baroness Young,  
Minister of State for Foreign  
and Commonwealth Affairs  
of the United Kingdom**

Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Baroness Young answered questions put by Sir Anthony Grant, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Soell, Antretter and the Earl of Kinnoull.

**7. Change in the order of business**

The President informed the Assembly that the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial years 1985 (revised) and 1986 would be presented by Mr. Sinesio at the end of the sitting the following morning, Wednesday, 4th June.

*Speaker:* Dr. Miller.

**8. Revision and interpretation of the Charter  
and of the Rules of Procedure**

*(Resumed votes on the draft resolutions,  
Doc. 1039 and amendments)*

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter.

*Speakers:* MM. Schulte and Bianco.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Bianco and others:

1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Lord Hughes and others:

3. In paragraph 3 of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter, leave out "(a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau for a period of five years." and insert "(a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly on the proposal of the Presidential Committee for a period of five years."

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 10) was tabled by Mr. Schulte and others:

10. In paragraph 3, line 9 of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of

the Charter, in the proposed new paragraph (c), leave out " , the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments." and insert "and the three agencies for security questions."

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 12) was tabled by Mr. Schulte:

12. At the end of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter, add a new paragraph as follows:

" 5. That these amendments shall come into force on 1st October 1986. "

The amendment was agreed to.

*Speakers:* Lord Hughes, MM. Bianco, Cavaliere, Lord Hughes (point of order), MM. Eysink and Bianco.

The President gave an undertaking that in the application of the revised Charter the Clerk would be responsible both to the President and to the Assembly.

The Assembly took note of the President's undertaking.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter.

The amended draft resolution was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 49 votes to 0 with 0 abstentions; 19 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote. (This resolution will be published as No. 73)<sup>1</sup>.

*Speaker* (point of order): Lord Hughes.

The Assembly resumed consideration of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure.

Amendment 2 fell.

An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Lord Hughes and others:

8. In paragraph 23, line 2, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out " Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau " and insert " Assembly on the proposal of the Presidential Committee ".

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 11) was tabled by Mr. Schulte and others:

11. In paragraph 23, line 17, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the proposed new paragraph 5, leave out " , the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Commit-

1. See page 32.

tee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.” and insert “and the three agencies for security questions.”.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Lord Hughes and others:

9. In paragraph 23 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the proposed new paragraph 4, line 1, leave out “shall” and insert “may”.

*Speaker:* Lord Hughes.

The amendment was withdrawn.

*Speaker:* Mr. Schulte.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure.

The draft resolution was agreed to. (This resolution will be published as No. 74)<sup>1</sup>.

**9. Reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe**

*(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1058)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 432)<sup>1</sup>.

**10. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council**

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1059 and amendments)*

The President noted that as there were no further speakers the debate was closed.

**11. Change in the membership of a committee**

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following change in the membership of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments proposed by the Italian Delegation: Mr. Masciadri as a titular member in place of Mr. Alberini.

**12. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 4th June, at 10 a.m.

*The sitting was closed at 7 p.m.*

1. See page 33.

1. See page 37.

## APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Spies von Büllesheim Unland Zierer	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. <i>Michel</i> (Bogaerts) Declercq Steverynck		MM. <i>Eysink</i> (Aarts) <i>Tummers</i> (van den Bergh) Blaauw Mrs. <i>den Ouden-Dekkers</i> (van der Werff)
	<b>Italy</b>	
<b>France</b>	MM. Amadei Antoni Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi Fiandrotti Frasca Gianotti Giust Mezzapesa Milani <i>Masciadri</i> (Pecchioli) Rauti Rubbi Sarti Sinesio Vecchietti	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. <i>Prat</i> (Bassinat) Baumel Berrier de Chambrun Ruet Seitlinger Valleix		Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Coleman Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. Millan Sir Anthony Grant MM. <i>Freeson</i> (Hardy) <i>Rees</i> (Sir Paul Hawkins) Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Mr. Jessel Earl of Kinnoull Mr. <i>Stokes</i> (Lady Jill Knight) Dr. Miller Sir John Osborn Sir John Page Lord Mackie MM. <i>Terlezki</i> (Sir Dudley Smith) Wilkinson
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>		
MM. <i>Gansel</i> (Ahrens) Antretter Berger Mrs. <i>Pack</i> (Böhm) MM. Kittelmann Müller <i>Holtz</i> (Neumann) <i>Pfennig</i> (Reddemann) Rumpf Schulte <i>Lenzer</i> (Schwarz) Soell	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
	MM. Burger Goerens <i>Linster</i> (Hengel)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>
MM. Adriaensens Dejardin Péciaux Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Bérégovoy Bourges Delebarre Galley Gremetz Jeambrun Jung Koehl Mermaz Wirth	MM. Enders Haase Mrs. Kelly
		<b>Netherlands</b>
		MM. de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the amended draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter (Doc. 1039) <sup>1</sup>:

Ayes .....	49
Noes .....	0
Abstentions .....	0

*Ayes:*

MM. <i>Eysink</i> (Aarts)	MM. <i>Millan</i> (Garrett)	Sir John Osborn
<i>Gansel</i> (Ahrens)	Giust	Sir John Page
Antretter	Sir Anthony Grant	MM. Rubbi
Sir Frederic Bennett	MM. <i>Freeson</i> (Hardy)	Rumpf
MM. Berger	<i>Rees</i> (Sir Paul Hawkins)	Sarti
<i>Tummers</i>	<i>Linster</i> (Hengel)	Schulte
(van den Bergh)	Hill	<i>Lenzer</i> (Schwarz)
Bianco	Lord Hughes	Seitlinger
Blaauw	Mr. Jessel	<i>Terlezki</i>
<i>Michel</i> (Bogaerts)	Earl of Kinnoull	(Sir Dudley Smith)
Mme <i>Pack</i> (Böhm)	MM. Kittelmann	Soell
MM. Burger	<i>Stokes</i>	Spies von Büllesheim
Cavaliere	(Lady Jill Knight)	Steverlynck
Cifarelli	Mezzapesa	Valleix
Coleman	Milani	Vecchietti
Declercq	Dr. Miller	Mrs. <i>den Ouden-Dekkers</i>
Ferrari Aggradi	MM. Müller	(van der Werff)
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg	<i>Holtz</i> (Neumann)	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## RESOLUTION 73

*on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter*

The Assembly,

DECIDES

1. To amend Article III of the Charter as follows:

Leave out the whole of paragraph (a) and insert:

“ Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordinary session which may be divided into several parts.

The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee and immediately brought to the attention of representatives. ”;

2. To amend Article IV of the Charter as follows:

In paragraph (b), leave out “ Bureau ” and insert “ Presidential Committee ”.

3. To amend Article XI of the Charter as follows:

Leave out Article XI and insert:

“ (a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly on the proposal of the Presidential Committee for a period of five years.

(b) In the performance of his duties, the Clerk shall be responsible both to the President and to the Assembly. He shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.

(c) The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretariat-General of Western European Union and the three agencies for security questions. ”

4. To amend the English text of Article XII of the Charter as follows:

In paragraph (a), leave out “ Proposals ” and insert “ Motions ”.

5. That these amendments shall come into force on 1st October 1986.

**RESOLUTION 74*****on the revision of the Rules of Procedure***

The Assembly,

DECIDES

To amend the Rules of Procedure as follows and that these amendments shall come into force on 1st October 1986:

1. *Rule 2*

Leave out paragraphs 1 and 2 and insert:

“ 1. Each year the Assembly shall hold an ordinary session which may be divided into several parts. ”

Renumber the other paragraphs accordingly.

2. *Rule 3*

At the end of the paragraph, leave out “ or substitutes ”.

3. *Rule 4*

In paragraph 2 leave out “ Bureau ” and insert “ Presidential Committee ”.

4. *Rule 5*

Leave out paragraphs 1 and 2 and insert:

“ 1. At the beginning of each ordinary session, the oldest representative present shall take the Chair until the election of the President has been announced.

2. No discussion may take place while the Provisional President is in the Chair unless it is concerned with the examination of credentials or the election of the President of the Assembly. ”

5. *Rule 6*

Leave out paragraph 3 and insert:

“ 3. A committee of five representatives chosen by lot may be instructed to examine these credentials and report to the Assembly without delay. ”

6. *Rule 7*

Leave out the title and insert:

“ Representatives and substitutes, titular members and alternates ”.

Leave out paragraph 1.

Leave out paragraph 2 and insert:

“ 1. Unless otherwise provided by the rules, the powers of a representative may be exercised by a substitute. Substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly. ”

Renumber the other paragraphs accordingly.

7. *Rule 8*

Leave out paragraph 3.

8. *Rule 11*

At the beginning of paragraph 2, add: “ When in the Chair ”.

At the end of paragraph 2, add:

“ If the President speaks in a debate on a specific subject, he may not resume the Chair until the debate on that subject is over. ”

9. *Rule 14*

In paragraph 1, line 5, leave out " and ".

In paragraph 1, line 6, after " committees " insert " and one member appointed by each political group ".

In paragraph 1, line 10, leave out " The President may invite the chairmen of the political groups to attend meetings of the Presidential Committee ".

10. *Rule 15*

In paragraph 1 of the English text, leave out " for any reason " and insert " without having been invited by the President of the Assembly ".

Add a paragraph 4:

" 4. Duly accredited representatives of the media may be admitted to the Chamber for the purpose of photographic and/or sound recording only under guidelines approved by the Presidential Committee. "

11. *Rule 22*

At the end of paragraph 1, add:

" Speakers may submit corrections to the reports of their speeches not later than the day after that on which the reports were communicated to them. "

Leave out paragraph 2 and insert:

" 2. A full transcription of speeches made in Dutch, German and Italian shall be made available without delay to speakers on request. They may submit corrections to the transcription of their speeches not later than the day after the speech was made. "

12. *Rule 24*

Leave out " in accordance with Rule 7 ".

Add a paragraph 2:

" 2. Unless otherwise provided by the rules, the powers of a representative who is prevented from attending a sitting may be exercised by a substitute who has duly signed the register. "

13. *Rule 27*

In paragraph 4, leave out " may " and insert " shall be invited to ".

English text only: after " debate ", insert " may ".

14. *Rule 28*

In paragraph 2, redraft the end of the first sentence to read: " and take the form of a recommendation, opinion, resolution, order or decision ".

At the end of paragraph 2, add:

" (a) Recommendations or opinions shall be addressed to the Council.

(b) Resolutions shall be addressed to international organisations, governments or national parliaments.

(c) Orders shall be addressed to the President of the Assembly or to a committee.

(d) Decisions concern the working of the Assembly and the status of its members. "

Rule 30 is therefore deleted.

15. *Rule 29*

Leave out paragraph 2 and insert:

" 2. Amendments tabled in writing and signed by their author shall be distributed without delay. No amendment shall be proposed and put to the vote in the Assembly if it has not been tabled at the latest before the end of the sitting preceding that at which it is considered. In the case of the first sitting, this time-limit shall end with the opening of the sitting. "

Leave out paragraphs 8 and 9 and renumber paragraph 10 accordingly.

16. *Rule 31*

Leave out paragraph 2 and insert:

“ 2. Except for the chairman of the committee and the rapporteur, representatives wishing to speak in a general debate shall enter their names in a register provided for the purpose at the latest before the close of the sitting preceding the debate. In the case of the first sitting, their request to speak shall be made in writing before the opening of the part-session. Unless the President decides otherwise, no other representative shall be called upon to speak. ”

Leave out paragraph 6 and insert:

“ 6. The President shall decide when a representative may respond to a statement challenging him on a personal basis. No debate may take place on this response. ”

In paragraph 7, after “ determining of ”, insert “ the order of business of the Assembly ”.

17. *Rule 32*

At the end of paragraph 4, add:

“ The time-limit for points of order shall be one minute. If the right to raise points of order is misused, the President may forbid the offending representative to speak for the remainder of the debate. ”

18. *Rule 34*

At the end of paragraph 1, add:

“ Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast. ”

At the end of paragraph 2(c), add: “ or if the President so decides ”.

In paragraph 4, after the first sentence, insert:

“ Two tellers chosen by lot shall count the votes cast. ”

At the end of paragraph 4, add:

“ The President shall announce the result. ”

19. *Rule 35*

At the end of paragraph 1(b), add: “ (see Rule 34, paragraph 1) ”.

At the end of paragraph 1(c), add:

“ In the event of a tie, the candidate senior in age shall be declared elected. If only one candidature is proposed to the Assembly the single candidate shall be declared elected (see Rule 34, paragraph 4). ”

Leave out paragraph 2.

20. *Rule 39*

At the end of paragraph 2, add former paragraph 3 of Rule 8:

“ The Presidential Committee may, during the periods between sessions or part-sessions, provisionally fill the seats which have fallen vacant in committees with representatives or substitutes. These appointments must be ratified at the first session of the Assembly. ”

In paragraph 5, leave out “ resolution ” and insert “ decision ”.

In paragraph 6, leave out “ Rule 8, paragraph 3 ”, and insert “ paragraph 2 above ”.

21. *Rule 40*

In paragraph 5, leave out “ Bureau of the Assembly ” and insert “ Presidential Committee ”.

22. *Rule 41*

At the beginning of paragraph 2, insert: “ In application of Rule 40, paragraph 5, ”.

In paragraph 4, leave out “ and methods of voting (Rule 34) ” and insert “ methods of voting (Rule 34) and majorities required (Rule 35 (b) and (c)) ”.

Leave out paragraph 4(b).

In paragraph 4(c), after “ but ” insert “ elections or ”.

Add a paragraph 4(d):

“ (d) Substitutes may be elected members of the bureau of a committee. ”

23. *Rule 42*

Leave out paragraph 3 and insert:

“ 3. Only the substantive text is voted upon by the Assembly. It must be presented in the form of a draft recommendation, opinion, resolution, order or decision as defined in Rule 28. ”

Add a paragraph 4:

“ 4. All reports on the agenda of a part-session shall be adopted by committees at least three weeks before the opening of the relevant part-session. A report not adopted in time shall be withdrawn from the agenda. However, the Assembly may decide, at the request of the committee, to place the report on its agenda unless twenty representatives are opposed. Such a decision shall be taken before the order of business is adopted (Rule 18). After adopting within the prescribed time-limit a report placed before it, the committee may, after that time-limit, prepare a supplementary report to take account of current events. ”

24. *Rule 47*

Leave out paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 and insert:

“ 1. The Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly on the proposal of the Presidential Committee. His term of office shall expire at the end of the fifth year following his appointment and may be renewed. If there has not been an appointment or reappointment before 30th June of the year in which his term of office expires, his term of office shall be extended by one year.

2. Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a solemn declaration before the Assembly that he will perform his duties in complete independence and uninfluenced by national considerations, that he will neither seek nor receive indications concerning the performance of his duties from any government or authority other than the Assembly, and will refrain from any action incompatible with his position as a European civil servant.

3. In the exercise of his duties, the Clerk shall be responsible both to the President and to the Assembly. He shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.

4. The Presidential Committee shall, on the proposal of the Clerk, appoint members of the Office of the Clerk who are recruited for a period of more than one year. It may delegate to the Clerk the right to appoint permanent or temporary officials of a given level.

5. The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with the Secretary-General of Western European Union and the three agencies for security questions. ”

25. *Rule 50*

In paragraph 2, leave out “ resolution ” and insert “ decision ”.

26. *Rule 51*

In paragraph 1 of the French text, leave out “ résolution ” and insert “ décision ”.

27. *Reference to substitutes*

Leave out reference to substitutes in the following rules: 2, 5, 13, 26, 27 (first sentence of paragraph 6), 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36 (paragraph 2, line 4), 39, 41 (except in paragraph 7), 43 (except in paragraph 6), 45 and 51.

**RECOMMENDATION 432*****on the reactivation of WEU –  
its tasks, structure and place in Europe***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the interest in the reactivation of WEU shown by several European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (ii) Stressing that the interest in the activities of WEU shown by many European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance is closely linked with the effectiveness of the Council's political activities;
- (iii) Considering that abolition of the lists of armaments subject to control and the new direction given to WEU following the Rome declaration will allow consideration to be given to enlarging WEU once it has been given definite terms of reference;
- (iv) Recalling Portugal's application for membership of WEU and welcoming the results of the referendum held in Spain on 12th March 1986;
- (v) Considering that the delay in transmitting the thirty-first annual report of the Council to the Assembly makes it impossible to adopt an answer to that report in time for the first part of the thirty-second session of the Assembly;
- (vi) Welcoming the efforts made by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the Secretary-General to develop a dialogue with the Assembly;
- (vii) Recalling that information which cannot be given officially to all members of the Assembly cannot be counted as part of this dialogue;
- (viii) Noting that many texts which the Council promised the Assembly have not been sent and that the Assembly is therefore not kept properly informed of the activities of the Permanent Council, the working groups and the agencies;
- (ix) Regretting that the permanent tasks assigned to the agencies are inadequate and vague;
- (x) Considering that in these circumstances the Assembly's tasks of supervision, criticism and censure of the Council remain fundamental, which means that the Assembly must remain completely independent of the Council,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Keep the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance informed of and associated with its activities insofar as the modified Brussels Treaty allows this, particularly in regard to co-operation in armaments matters, in the hope that it will be possible to achieve greater rationalisation and overall harmonisation in this area;
2. Study the consequences of the possible accession of Spain and Portugal to WEU so as to take favourable action without delay on Portugal's application and to propose that Spain accede to the modified Brussels Treaty;
3. Ensure that the Assembly is kept regularly informed of all the Council's activities at a frequency and in time to allow a fruitful dialogue between the two organs of WEU;
4. Present the information which it itself, its Chairman-in-Office or the Secretary-General give the Assembly in such a way that it may be transmitted to all members of the Assembly;
5. Within reasonable time-limits, allow the Assembly to benefit from the studies conducted by the agencies and working groups after expurgating those parts which are classified secret;
6. Ensure that, in addition to the conjunctural studies requested by the Council, the agencies have permanent tasks with due independence of action for implementing them;
7. Inter alia, instruct Agency II to organise a European institute for advanced defence studies, whose tasks will have been defined by the Council, in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Recommendation 429.

## FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th June 1986

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. European security and the Mediterranean (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1060 and amendments*).
2. Address by Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
3. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.
4. European security and the Mediterranean (*Debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1060 and amendments*).
5. Draft opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1054*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Adoption of the minutes**

The President informed the Assembly that the Charter and the Rules of Procedure would be amended to take account of the decision taken by the Assembly at the previous sitting to make the Clerk responsible both to the President and to the Assembly.

Following this clarification, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **2. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **3. European security and the Mediterranean**

*(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1060 and amendments)*

*Speaker* (point of order): Mr. Sinesio.

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur.

#### **4. Address by Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany**

Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Möllemann answered questions put by Mr. Antretter, Sir John Page, MM. Valleix, Jessel, Gianotti and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

#### **5. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy**

Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Spadolini answered questions put by MM. Cifarelli, Müller, Bianco, Cavaliere, Gianotti, Rubbi, Kittelmann and Inan (*Observer from Turkey*).

#### **6. European security and the Mediterranean**

*(Debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1060 and amendments)*

The debate was opened.

*Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

*Speakers:* MM. Rubbi, Müller, Matraja, Milani and Cavaliere.

The debate was adjourned.

#### **7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The sitting was closed at 1.15 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Müller <i>Scheer</i> (Neumann) Schulte Soell Zierer	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. <i>Close</i> (Adriaensens) Dejardin <i>Michel</i> (Mrs. Staels-Dompas)		MM. Aarts <i>Worrell</i> (van den Bergh) Stoffelen
	<b>Italy</b>	
<b>France</b>	MM. <i>Spitella</i> (Antoni) Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi <i>Masciadri</i> (Frasca) Gianotti Giust Mezzapesa Milani Rauti Rubbi Sarti Sinesio	<b>United Kingdom</b>
MM. Bassinet Baumel <i>Prat</i> (Bérégovoy) <i>Matraja</i> (Berrier) <i>Bordu</i> (Gremetz) Jeambrun Jung <i>Hunault</i> (Koehl) Valleix		Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. <i>Edwards</i> (Coleman) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Murphy</i> (Sir Anthony Grant) <i>Freeson</i> (Hardy) Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. Hill Lord Hughes Mr. Jessel Earl of Kinnoull Lady Jill Knight Dr. Miller Mr. <i>Rees</i> (Sir John Osborn) Sir John Page Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Ross) Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>		
MM. Antretter Berger <i>Lenzer</i> (Böhm) Enders <i>Schmidt</i> Haase) Kittelmann	<b>Luxembourg</b>	
	MM. Burger Goerens <i>Linster</i> (Hengel)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Mermaz Ruet Seitlinger Wirth	<b>Italy</b>
MM. Bogaerts Declercq Péciaux Steverlynck		MM. Amadei Fiandrotti Pecchioli Vecchiotti
	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>
<b>France</b>	Mr. Ahrens Mrs. Kelly MM. Reddemann Rumpf Schwarz Spies von Büllesheim Unland	MM. Blaauw de Kwaadsteniet Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra Mr. van der Werff
MM. Bourges de Chambrun Delebarre Galley Jung		<b>United Kingdom</b>
		Mr. Garrett

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## SIXTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th June 1986

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Draft opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1054*).
2. European security and the Mediterranean (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1060 and amendments*).
3. Canadian-European co-operation in high technology (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1053 and amendment*).
4. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1059 and amendments*).
5. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1055 and amendments*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### **2. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **3. Draft opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1054)*

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Sinesio, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Linster and Gianotti.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Sinesio, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 433)<sup>1</sup>.

#### **4. European security and the Mediterranean**

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1060 and amendments)*

The debate was resumed.

*Speakers:* MM. Rauti, Inan (*Observer from Turkey*), Freeson, Berger and Veryvakis (*Observer from Greece*).

The debate was closed.

*Speaker (point of order):* Sir Frederic Bennett.

In accordance with Rule 32 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, Mr. Cox proposed that the report be referred back to committee.

*Speakers:* MM. Cavaliere, Kittelmann, Cox and Kittelmann.

The motion for reference back was agreed to and the report was accordingly referred back to the committee.

<sup>1</sup>. See page 43.

*Speakers* (explanation of vote): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Wilkinson and Freeson.

### **5. Canadian-European co-operation in high technology**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1053 and amendment)*

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman of the committee.

The debate was opened.

*Speaker:* Sir John Osborn.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman of the committee, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by MM. Hill and Spies von Büllenheim:

1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the operative text of the draft recommendation and insert:

“ To consider favourably connections of Canadian firms and research institutions with Eureka projects; ”

*Speaker:* Mr. Wilkinson.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 434)<sup>1</sup>.

### **6. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council**

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1059 and amendments)*

The debate was resumed.

*Speaker:* Sir Frederic Bennett.

In accordance with Rule 36 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, Sir Frederic Bennett asked whether there was a quorum.

Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

The President announced that since there was not a quorum the votes on the draft recommendation and amendments would be deferred until the next sitting.

*Speakers* (points of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Milani and Cavaliere.

### **7. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1055 and amendments)*

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Fourné, Rapporteur.

*Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

The debate was opened.

*Speaker:* Sir John Osborn.

*Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.*

The debate was closed.

Mr. Fourné, Rapporteur, and Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman of the committee, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

In accordance with Rule 36 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, Mr. Cavaliere asked whether there was a quorum.

The President announced that since there was not a quorum the votes on the draft recommendation and amendments would be deferred until the next sitting.

### **8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 5th June, at 10 a.m.

*The sitting was closed at 5.50 p.m.*

1. See page 45.

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Ferrari Aggradi <i>Masciadri</i> (Frasca) Gianotti Giust Milani Rauti Rubbi Sinesio Vecchiatti	MM. Blaauw Stoffelen <i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) van der Werff
MM. <i>De Bondt</i> (Adriaensens) Dejardin		
<b>France</b>		
MM. <i>Fourré</i> (Bassiné) Ruet Valleix		
		<b>United Kingdom</b>
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	<b>Luxembourg</b>	Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. <i>Edwards</i> (Coleman) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Parry</i> (Garrett) <i>Millan</i> (Hardy) Sir Paul Hawkins MM. <i>Freeson</i> (Lord Hughes) Jessel Dr. Miller Sir John Osborn Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Ross) Mr. Wilkinson
MM. Enders Müller Soell Zierer	Mrs. <i>Hennicot-Schoepges</i> (Burger) MM. Goerens <i>Linster</i> (Hengel)	
<b>Italy</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	
MM. Bianco Cavaliere	MM. Aarts van den Bergh	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Mermaz Seitlinger Wirth	<b>Italy</b>
MM. Bogaerts Declercq Péciaux Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Steverlynck		MM. Amadei Antoni Cifarelli Fiandrotti Mezzapesa Pecchioli Sarti
	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	
<b>France</b>	MM. Ahrens Antretter Berger Böhm Haase Mrs. Kelly MM. Kittelmann Neumann Reddemann Rumpf Schulte Schwarz Spies von Bülesheim Unland	<b>Netherlands</b>
MM. Baumel Bérégovoy Berrier Bourges de Chambrun Delebarre Galley Gremetz Jeambrun Jung Koehl		Mr. de Kwaadsteniet
		<b>United Kingdom</b>
		Sir Anthony Grant Mr. Hill Earl of Kinnoull Lady Jill Knight Sir John Page Sir Dudley Smith

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## RECOMMENDATION 433

*on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union  
for the financial years 1985 (revised) and 1986*

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1985 (revised) and 1986, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Considering that:
- (a) the budgets for 1985 (revised) and 1986 take account of the new structure of the ministerial organs of WEU achieved in conformity with the directives set out in the Rome declaration;
  - (b) each of these budgets is the subject of an initial three-part document (recapitulation, explanatory memorandum and pensions) for the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee and of a document revised on the basis of the recommendations adopted by that committee and transmitted to the Council;
  - (c) examination of the budgets consequently requires knowledge of the abovementioned documents and of the others produced during the year but which are not sent to the Assembly on a regular basis;
  - (d) the way WEU budgets are now presented draws no distinction between ordinary and extraordinary expenditure although the latter may have a considerable effect on statistics on the evolution of budgets and consequently detract from the objective application of the zero growth criterion or of any other criterion for budgetary trends agreed by the governments;
  - (e) the 1985 budget allowed considerable excess resources to be built up which were used for the sole purpose of restructuring the ministerial organs, no account being taken in this context of the requirements of the Assembly although the ministers expressed their wish in Rome in October 1984 to have the Assembly "play a growing rôle";
  - (f) the new breakdown of duties shown in the recent establishment tables of the ministerial organs increases the need to review procedure for approving Assembly budgets in order to provide a better guarantee of its autonomy and independence;
  - (g) the task of managing pensions in WEU has grown to such an extent that an independent body should be given responsibility for this task;
- (iii) Regretting that:
- (a) two Grade B posts are shown as vacant in the budget of the Paris agencies whereas the Assembly's proposal to create two new Grade B posts in the Office of the Clerk has been rejected;
  - (b) the programme for the modernisation of equipment makes no provision for purchasing a telex, the lack of which is keenly felt by all the services of WEU as well as by parliamentarians;
- (iv) Welcoming the fact that the Council, in attributing grades to the various types of duty, has adopted the dual-grading criterion which the Assembly has often recommended in the past,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL:

1. Examine the possibility of:
  - (a) combining in a single budgetary document all the information now given in many different documents;
  - (b) showing in the two parts of the budget (operating budget and pensions budget) two categories of expenditure: ordinary and extraordinary expenditure, to make it easier to follow the evolution of these budgets;
2. Transmit to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly all budgetary documents relating to its budgetary decisions;

3. In consultation with the appropriate Assembly bodies, review procedure for approving Assembly budgets so that it corresponds better to the principle of its autonomy and independence;
4. Give favourable consideration to the proposals to create two new Grade B3 posts which are given top priority in the Assembly's draft budget for 1986;
5. Further to Assembly Recommendation 357, promote the creation of an independent body for the administration of pensions and, to this end, organise consultations with the other co-ordinated organisations;
6. Study the problem of dual-grading at every level of the hierarchy and lay down a general rule on the subject applicable to all WEU staff;
7. Authorise the installation of a telex in the London and Paris offices, it being understood that the telex installed in Paris would be available to all WEU organs in accordance with methods of use and cost-sharing to be agreed among them;
8. Promote harmonisation of the technical equipment of the organs of WEU to achieve future cost-saving and engage a management consultant from a member government or private industry to investigate this matter and make recommendations.

**RECOMMENDATION 434*****on Canadian-European co-operation in high technology***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming Canada's participation in NATO, OECD, ESA and other international organisations and conferences together with WEU member countries;
- (ii) Considering Canada's achievements in the scientific, technological and aerospace sectors such as V-STOL aircraft, the Canadarm, the Candu nuclear reactor, energy from conventional and non-conventional sources, polar ocean research and communication techniques;
- (iii) Considering that Canada is an associated member of ESA and that a new agreement will have to be signed in 1988;
- (iv) Considering Canada's wish to develop further its high technology industries and also its close industrial and political relations with several Western European countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member states:

1. To study the possibilities of Canada participating in projects of the Independent European Programme Group and other high technology European ventures provided there is reciprocity and that Canada likewise adopts a most-favoured attitude to European research, development and production;
2. To promote closer collaboration with Canada in the European Space Agency by:
  - (a) extending its associate membership from five to ten years;
  - (b) widening the range of programmes in which Canada should participate to include new application programmes such as ERS-II and TDRSS and also scientific programmes;
  - (c) asking the Canadian authorities to use European hardware such as Ariane in joint ventures;
  - (d) inviting the Canadian space authorities to participate in European manned space programmes such as Hermes and Hotel;
3. To consider favourably connections of Canadian firms and research institutions with Eureka projects;
4. To approach the Canadian authorities for the promotion of European hardware in the international organisations in which they participate.

## SEVENTH SITTING

Thursday, 5th June 1986

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Security and terrorism – the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world; Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (*Presentation of and debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Docs. 1057 and amendment and 1066*).
2. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1055 and amendments*).
3. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1059 and amendments*).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### **1. Adoption of the minutes**

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

*Speaker:* Mr. Milani.

#### **2. Attendance register**

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### **3. Change in the membership of a committee**

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments proposed by the Italian Delegation: Mr. Cifarelli as a titular member in place of Mr. Masciadri; Mr. Masciadri as an alternate member in place of Mr. Cifarelli.

#### **4. Security and terrorism – the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world**

##### ***Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments***

*(Presentation of and debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Docs. 1057 and amendment and 1066)*

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur.

The opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur.

*Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Berger, Stokes, Milani, Fresson, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Close, Jessel, Lady Jill Knight, Sir Paul Hawkins, MM. Antretter, Inan (*Observer from Turkey*) and Reddemann.

The debate was closed.

Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur, and Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

A first amendment was tabled by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments:

After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“ Recalling however its Recommendation 396 concerning the alliance machinery for dealing with developments beyond the NATO area, and reiterating its belief ‘that in the case of such developments which the allies jointly recognise as directly threatening the vital interests of the alliance the ready assistance of all allies must be forthcoming within the area to facilitate United States deployments beyond the area’; ”.

*Speakers:* MM. Kittelmann, Dejardin, van der Werff and Close.

*Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.*

The amendment was agreed to.

A second amendment was tabled by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments:

At the end of paragraph (x) of the preamble to the draft recommendation add "and the firm diplomatic and juridical measures agreed at the Tokyo summit on 5th May 1986;".

*Speaker:* Mr. van der Werff.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Lady Jill Knight:

1. At the end of paragraph I.3 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

"(f) seek an agreement between member countries that their courts will not refuse extradition applications for convicted terrorists on the grounds that the act (or acts) of terrorism was carried out from political motives."

*Speakers:* Lady Jill Knight, MM. Stoffelen, van der Werff, Lady Jill Knight and Mr. Close.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 435)<sup>1</sup>.

### **5. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence**

*(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1055 and amendments)*

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Fourré:

1. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"Considering that the importance of this rôle demands an independent European effort within the framework of certain activities such as those relating to the space station but also

requires effective co-operation with the United States;".

*Speaker:* Mr. Wilkinson.

*Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.*

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Gansel:

3. After paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Noting with concern differences in policies of member countries with regard to armament exports to non-member countries, especially those in conflict areas and even those which support international terrorism, which may seriously obstruct progress towards improved defence co-operation;"

*Speakers:* MM. Stoffelen, Fourré, Stoffelen and Wilkinson.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Fourré:

2. Leave out paragraph 1(a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"the establishment of a European civil and military computer market".

*Speakers:* MM. Fourré and Wilkinson.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Gansel:

4. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Elaborate joint criteria for armament export policies of member countries, with preference in the field of defence co-operation, ensuring that no weapons or defence equipment be exported to non-member countries when this would be against the security interests of the alliance;"

*Speakers:* Dr. Miller and Mr. Wilkinson.

The amendment was withdrawn.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 436)<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 50.

1. See page 52.

**6. Disarmament – reply to the  
thirty-first annual report of the Council**

*(Vote on the draft recommendation,  
Doc. 1059 and amendments)*

*Speakers* (points of order): Sir Dudley Smith,  
MM. Stoffelen, Wilkinson and Milani.

In accordance with Rule 32 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg proposed that the report be referred back to the committee.

*Speakers*: Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Freeson,  
Cox, Kittelmann and Dr. Miller.

The motion for reference back was agreed to and the report was accordingly referred back to the committee.

**7. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

**Belgium**

MM. *Close* (Adriaensens)  
*De Bondt* (Bogaerts)  
Dejardin  
Stevelyneck

**France**

MM. Bassinet  
Berrier  
*Fourré* (Delebarre)  
*Prat* (Mermaz)  
Valleix

**Federal Republic of Germany**

MM. Ahrens  
Antretter  
Berger  
Enders  
Kittelmann  
Reddemann  
Schulte  
Soell  
Unland

**Italy**

MM. *Spitella* (Bianco)  
*Masciadri* (Frasca)  
Mezzapesa  
Milani  
Rauti  
Sarti

**Luxembourg**

Mrs. *Hennicot-Schoepges*  
(Burger)  
Mr. Goerens

**Netherlands**

Mr. van den Bergh  
Mrs. *den Ouden-Dekkers*  
(Blaauw)  
MM. *Worrell*  
(de Kwaadsteniet)  
Stoffelen

MM. *Eysink* (Mrs. van der  
Werf-Terpstra)  
van der Werff

**United Kingdom**

Sir Frederic Bennett  
Mr. Coleman  
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg  
MM. *Woodall* (Garrett)  
*Murphy*  
(Sir Anthony Grant)  
*Freeson* (Hardy)  
Sir Paul Hawkins  
Mr. *Ward* (Hill)  
Lord Hughes  
MM. Jessel  
*Corrie* (Earl of  
Kinnoull)  
Lady Jill Knight  
Dr. Miller  
MM. *Terlezki* (Sir John  
Osborn)  
*Stokes* (Sir John Page)  
Lord *Mackie* (Ross)  
Sir Dudley Smith  
Mr. Wilkinson

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

**Belgium**

MM. Declercq  
Péciaux  
Mrs. Staels-Dompas

**France**

MM. Baumel  
Bérégovoy  
Bourges  
de Chambrun  
Galley  
Gremetz  
Jeambrun  
Jung  
Koehl  
Ruet  
Seitlinger  
Wirth

**Federal Republic of Germany**

MM. Böhm  
Haase  
Mrs. Kelly  
MM. Müller  
Neumann  
Rumpf  
Schwarz  
Spies von Büllesheim  
Zierer

**Italy**

MM. Amadei  
Antoni  
Cavaliere  
Cifarelli  
Ferrari Aggradi

MM. Fiandrotti  
Gianotti  
Giust  
Pecchioli  
Rubbi  
Sinesio  
Vecchietti

**Luxembourg**

Mr. Hengel

**Netherlands**

Mr. Aarts

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## RECOMMENDATION 435

*on security and terrorism –  
the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty is an essential basis for European co-operation in external policy matters;
- (ii) Considering that in certain areas no western organisation is able to replace the WEU Council for the application of this article of the treaty;
- (iii) Deploring the fact that the seven governments have not yet made use of the WEU Council to examine matters which constitute a threat to international peace and stability;
- (iv) Recalling however its Recommendation 396 concerning the alliance machinery for dealing with developments beyond the NATO area, and reiterating its belief " that in the case of such developments which the allies jointly recognise as directly threatening the vital interests of the alliance the ready assistance of all allies must be forthcoming within the area to facilitate United States deployments beyond the area ";
- (v) Recalling that the Rome declaration confirmed the WEU Council's vocation to play an active part in the application of Article VIII;
- (vi) Recalling that relations between certain member countries and countries outside Europe call for continuous exchanges of views between the WEU countries;
- (vii) Considering that the pursuit of the war between Iran and Iraq is a serious threat to international peace and security;
- (viii) Considering that the recrudescence of international terrorism is also a serious threat to international peace and security and may seriously unsettle western society if effective countermeasures are not taken;
- (ix) Welcoming the fact that international society has started to take up the challenge of terrorism, but regretting the absence of any significant agreement about the means to be used to this end and deploring the consequences of this division, considering how essential it is to agree on the measures to be taken;
- (x) Regretting that no effective co-ordinated measures, whether preventive or repressive, have been taken against terrorist actions before the United States action against Libya, but recalling that the members of the Assembly give preference to political and diplomatic channels for solving the problem of international terrorism, while not precluding any other appropriate measures if it proves impossible to succeed by negotiation;
- (xi) Welcoming as a modest step forward the intentions announced by the Twelve on 27th January, and 14th and 22nd April 1986 and the firm diplomatic and juridical measures agreed at the Tokyo summit on 5th May 1986;
- (xii) Considering that only the co-ordination of measures taken by the states in question can meet the situation created by international terrorism;
- (xiii) Recalling that this co-ordination is all the more necessary after the launching by Libya of two missiles towards the island of Lampedusa, which constituted a true act of war against a member country of WEU,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- 1.1. Effectively apply Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty as it planned when adopting paragraph 8 of the Rome declaration in October 1984 and, in particular, meet each time crises outside the North Atlantic Treaty area require it to do so and whenever consultations among the Twelve seem unlikely to meet the situation;
- 2. Follow attentively developments in the war between Iraq and Iran and:
  - (a) promote the return to a fair, lasting peace;

- (b)* strongly denounce any violation of the laws of war by either side;
  - (c)* concert action by member countries to prevent any extension of the war and to ensure the safety of navigation in the Gulf;
3. Confirm that the development of international terrorism brings into play the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and, in this context:
- (a)* promote and participate effectively in international consultations to counter terrorist action;
  - (b)* apply systematically the decisions set out in the twelve-power declaration of 27th January, and 14th and 22nd April 1986;
  - (c)* draw up a charter specifying the principles which its signatories would undertake to follow in the event of terrorist action;
  - (d)* co-ordinate the preventive and repressive measures which member countries are obliged to take because of the development of terrorist operations;
  - (e)* concert the action taken by member countries so as to deter effectively any country from affording assistance or encouragement to organisations practising terrorism;
  - (f)* seek an agreement between member countries that their courts will not refuse extradition applications for convicted terrorists on the grounds that the act (or acts) of terrorism was carried out from political motives.

II. For these purposes, the Assembly endorses the call for action its President addressed to the Council and recommends that the Council instruct the appropriate WEU agencies to report without delay on the various aspects of the threat international terrorism constitutes for the western defence system, individuals and public freedoms and define the measures which member countries should take to counter terrorism effectively.

**RECOMMENDATION 436*****on scientific, technological and aerospace questions and  
Western European defence***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that by the 1990s information technology might become the largest manufacturing activity in the West;
- (ii) Considering that Western Europe's industrial success in this technology will probably depend on the promotion of a European civil and military computer market;
- (iii) Aware of the report on the armaments sector of industry in the member countries prepared by the WEU Standing Armaments Committee and the Council's answer on 20th March 1986 to Written Question 262 put by Mr. Lenzer on the activities of that committee complementary to those of the Independent European Programme Group;
- (iv) Disappointed by the Council's answer on the lack of practical steps to be taken to enhance the competitiveness of the European defence industry in general and of information technology in particular;
- (v) Considering Europe's important rôle in space and its activities in space transportation, satellites and scientific matters such as the Giotto programme;
- (vi) Considering that the importance of this rôle demands an independent European effort within the framework of certain activities such as those relating to the space station but also requires effective co-operation with the United States;
- (vii) Considering the need for co-operation between NASA and Arianespace on worldwide launch price policies;
- (viii) Considering that the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments should play a well-defined intermediary rôle in co-operation on weapons development projects such as the European fighter aircraft;
- (ix) Noting with concern differences in policies of member countries with regard to armament exports to non-member countries, especially those in conflict areas and even those which support international terrorism, which may seriously obstruct progress towards improved defence co-operation;
- (x) Deploring the Council's lack of political will in not preparing its thirty-first annual report on its activities which cannot now be taken into account in preparing the present report,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Instruct Agency III, i.e. the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments, to initiate studies on:
  - (a) the establishment of a European civil and military computer market;
  - (b) the possibilities of creating networks of supercomputers in Europe for civil as well as military purposes;
2. Define, in co-operative weapons development projects such as the European fighter aircraft, a useful co-ordinating rôle for the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments, with particular regard to European military industrial matters, taking into account the activities of the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors and the Independent European Programme Group;
3. Provide the Assembly with full details of this rôle in the thirty-second annual report.

## EIGHTH SITTING

Thursday, 5th June 1986

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

Emerging technology and military strategy (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1052*).

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### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### *1. Adoption of the minutes*

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

#### *2. Attendance register*

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

#### *3. Emerging technology and military strategy*

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1052)*

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

*Speakers:* MM. Berger, Close, Baumel and Wilkinson.

The debate was closed.

Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur, and Dr. Miller, Vice-Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 437)<sup>1</sup>.

*Speakers (points of order):* Sir Paul Hawkins and Mr. Stoffelen.

#### *4. Adjournment of the session*

The President addressed the Assembly.

*Speaker:* Mr. Cox.

The President adjourned the thirty-second ordinary session of the Assembly.

*The sitting was closed at 4.25 p.m.*

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1. See page 55.

## APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance <sup>1</sup>:

<b>Belgium</b>	MM. Reddemann Schulte <i>Lemmrich</i> (Schwarz) Soell Unland	<b>United Kingdom</b> Sir Frederic Bennett Mr. Coleman MM. <i>Woodall</i> (Garrett) <i>Parry</i> (Hardy) Sir Paul Hawkins Mr. <i>Cox</i> (Lord Hughes) Dr. Miller Mr. <i>Terlezki</i> (Sir John Osborn) Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Ross) Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Wilkinson
MM. <i>De Bondt</i> (Adriaensens) <i>Close</i> (Pécriaux) Steverlynck		
<b>France</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	
MM. Bassinet Baumel Valleix	Mr. van den Bergh Mrs. <i>den Ouden-Dekkers</i> (Blaauw)	
<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	MM. Stoffelen <i>Eysink</i> (Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra) van der Werff	
MM. Ahrens Berger		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

<b>Belgium</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany</b>	MM. Pecchioli Rauti Rubbi Sarti Sinesio Vecchietti
MM. Bogaerts Declercq Dejardin Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Antretter Böhm Enders Haase Mrs. Kelly MM. Kittelmann Müller Neumann Rumpf Spies von Bülesheim Zierer	
<b>France</b>		<b>Luxembourg</b>
MM. Bérégovoy Berrier Bourges de Chambrun Delebarre Galley Gremetz Jeambrun Jung Koehl Mermaz Ruet Seitlinger Wirth	<b>Italy</b>	MM. Burger Goerens Hengel
	MM. Amadei Antoni Bianco Cavaliere Cifarelli Ferrari Aggradi Fiandrotti Frasca Gianotti Giust Mezzapesa Milani	<b>Netherlands</b>
		MM. Aarts de Kwaadsteniet
		<b>United Kingdom</b>
		Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Sir Anthony Grant MM. Hill Jessel Earl of Kinnoull Lady Jill Knight Sir John Page

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 437*****on emerging technology and military strategy***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware of a number of projects in the NATO and IEPG frameworks involving the application of the most recent technology to weapons and defence equipment, arising in particular from the United States emerging technology proposal, and SACEUR's follow-on forces attack concept;
- (ii) Considering that in many cases NATO countries could advantageously introduce modern technology more rapidly into conventional weapons systems to help offset Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in tanks, guns, and aircraft;
- (iii) Believing that the European allies must examine all such proposals carefully, and that the introduction of modern technology into defence equipment must satisfy the criteria of this recommendation;
- (iv) Calling for the possible arms control implications of the introduction of emerging technology into conventional weapons systems to be more closely studied,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Ensure that current proposals for the introduction of emerging technology into conventional weapons systems or for the follow-on forces attack concept meet the following criteria:
  - (a) they should fit the conceptual framework being developed by the NATO Military Committee, and take account of North Atlantic Council recommendations bearing in mind the need for deterrence to maintain peace and security both in Europe and in the world;
  - (b) they should be cost-effective and affordable within the limits of national defence budgets;
  - (c) they should emphasise again the need for standardisation and co-operation at European level which is also a precondition of co-operation between the European allies and the United States;
  - (d) they should lead to a balanced and just transatlantic sharing and transfer of technology, research and production, and improve interoperability;
  - (e) they should be capable of being taken into account in current and future arms control negotiations;
2. Report annually to the Assembly on the progress being made on the list of priority projects selected by the IEPG;
3. Instruct the agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions to report annually to the Assembly on the arms control implications of the foregoing proposals.



**II**  
**OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES**

# FIRST SITTING

Monday, 2nd June 1986

## SUMMARY

1. Opening of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Examination of credentials.
4. Election of the President of the Assembly.
5. Address by the President of the Assembly.
6. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session (Doc. 1050).  
*Speaker: Mr. Blaauw.*
8. Nomination of members to committees.
9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 12 noon with Mr. Edwards, Provisional President, in the Chair.*

### *1. Opening of the session*

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the thirty-second ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

### *2. Attendance register*

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### *3. Examination of credentials*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the examination of credentials.

The list of representatives and substitutes attending the thirty-second ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union has been published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, all these credentials were ratified by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and are attested by a statement of ratification which has been addressed to the President, with the exception of the members of the French Delegation.

1. See page 17.

It is now for the Assembly to ratify those credentials not already ratified, under Rule 6(2) of the Rules of Procedure.

The nominations are in proper form. No objection has been raised.

If the Assembly is unanimous, we may proceed to ratification without prior referral to a credentials committee.

Is there any opposition?...

The credentials are ratified by the Assembly, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Finally, I inform the Assembly that the Federal Republic of Germany proposes to alter the composition of its delegation as follows: Mr. Soell as representative in place of Mr. Gerstl and Mr. Gerstl as substitute in place of Mr. Soell.

May I take this opportunity, as the oldest member, of welcoming new colleagues and looking forward to their contributions to our work?

### *4. Election of the President of the Assembly*

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the election of the President of the Assembly.

Under Rules 7(2), 10(2) and 10(10), only a representative, who may not be a member of his national government, may stand as a candidate for the office of President, and his candidature must be sponsored by three or more representatives.

*The President (continued)*

At this point I note that I should make a speech, but I am not taking advantage of that opportunity, because it is so near to lunch time.

I have received only one nomination, that of Mr. Caro.

The nomination has been properly made and is in the form prescribed by the rules.

If there is no objection, I may declare Mr. Caro elected by acclamation in accordance with Rule 10(4).

Is there no objection?...

It is obvious that there is no opposition.

I proclaim Mr. Caro President of the Assembly of Western European Union. I congratulate him and invite him to take the Chair.

*(Mr. Caro then took the Chair)*

**5. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Members of the Permanent Council, Secretary-General, ladies and gentlemen, I sincerely thank you for your confidence and would like once more to express my respectful gratitude to Bob Edwards, our oldest member, who displayed his unflinching wisdom when he opened our discussions and lent me his hand up to the dais for the third time. I shall not forget that it was in your company, Bob, that I made my debut. Thank you once again.

I would also like to welcome the presence in this Assembly for the first time of the statutory number of observers from the Portuguese Parliament in implementation of the decision of the Presidential Committee to grant that government full representation with observer status in both the Assembly and committees.

My greetings also to the other observers from the member states of the alliance who, as I am pleased to note, regularly attend our meetings.

My first words will be to thank you for according me your confidence once again. This political act is of particular importance since, after our committee session in Venice, it gives the lie to claims that the steps I took to invite the Council to answer the challenge to Europe arising from the spread of terrorism had not been endorsed by the Assembly. You may be certain that during this third term of office I shall continue to respect and advance the views you have expressed and will express.

It is clear that a parliamentary assembly is a reflection of the opposing forces which exist in our countries and societies. But when it has

been possible for more than thirty years to see that an assembly has been almost unanimous in its votes in defence of certain values, this is significant and allows the President of this Assembly to express certain ideas with the certainty that he is being loyal to those who elected him.

This is so for our relations with the WEU Council which once again will take a prominent place in the debates during the session which has just started. The Council was moreover the first to recognise the continuity of the Assembly's action in this field when, in 1984, it started the reactivation of WEU which the Assembly had been requesting for a long time.

For that very reason it agreed that the dialogue between the Assembly and the Council should start off on a new foot. It wished meetings between the Council and Assembly bodies to be held frequently and in a wholly informal manner.

Yet for the first time in the existence of Western European Union we shall be unable, at the first part of our session, to consider the main chapters of the Council's annual report, which did not reach the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly until 20th May, making it impossible for them to be studied by the rapporteurs and then the committees for the debate which is to start tomorrow. Many of us were unable to read them until this morning.

For the humour of the situation, I would recall in passing that the Council complains about not receiving the documents adopted by our committees long enough before sessions. Perhaps it would prefer us to reply to its annual report before we receive it.

In any event, the Assembly will be able to give serious consideration to the report on the Council's activities in 1985, which is the task assigned to it by the modified Brussels Treaty, only at its December 1986 session. There is no point in emphasising the disadvantages of such a situation which means that almost two years will have elapsed before the Assembly can debate certain aspects of the Council's activities, including questions relating to the reactivation of WEU.

This detracts seriously from the dialogue between the Assembly and the Council, to which our governments say they are so attached, since this dialogue can be significant only if it relates to current policy and not to events which have become history.

Such a delay might, however, be considered as no more than an accident if it were duly explained. What makes it serious is what we may know about the reasons for it.

It is hardly believable that seven governments, which consider themselves to be the nucleus of the Europe of tomorrow and take pride in this to

*The President (continued)*

postpone any enlargement of WEU to countries which they consider are not yet ready to join their club, should have had so much difficulty in reaching agreement on a text which does not claim to be anything more than a report on past activities. Those of you who have been able to read the Council's annual report will, I think, agree with me that it contains nothing which might explain such a deadlock.

Yet delays and deadlocks are also encountered in the transmission of most of the documents the Council sends the Assembly. Replies to our recommendations reach us only after an incredible lapse of time and they seem so carefully filed down, smoothed off and polished that they are reminiscent of the style that Mr. de Norpois was so fond of but in fact in most cases they constitute a rejection of anything emanating from the Assembly. They are also ill-concealed refusals to keep the Assembly informed of the Council's true activities.

This for instance is so for all the documents transmitted by the Council in connection with the implementation of the Rome declaration in which, in October 1984, our seven governments defined the guidelines they intended to give to a renovated WEU. In other words, we cannot consider that, on matters which are essential for the organisation in which we are now meeting, relations between the Council and the Assembly are satisfactory.

Even so, having been elected as President of this Assembly just when the question arose of what form the reactivation of WEU would take, I was able to establish particularly friendly relations with the then Chairman-in-Office, Mr. Genscher of the Federal Republic, which allowed us to place co-operation between the Council and the Assembly on absolutely new bases. To continue this work, we set up a special Assembly committee and we must pay the Council the tribute of noting that nowhere else do relations between the parliamentary and ministerial bodies work as well as they do in WEU in terms of the number of meetings.

When Italy took over the presidency, Mr. Andreotti managed to maintain the frequency and cordiality of these contacts and even to extend them to the Permanent Council.

The Assembly could but welcome the development of these exchanges. It has made a considerable effort to adapt itself, as shown in the report by our colleague, Sir Dudley Smith, on the activities of the Presidential Committee. However, it is now forced to question the wisdom of the choice made by the Council, which the Assembly accepted, of unofficial channels for communications which should be official.

I shall certainly not betray the secret of our meetings with the Council, at which no minutes are taken, in saying that basically they have been most disappointing either because the Assembly's partners in the discussion tried to evade the questions put to them by the Assembly or because they expressed extremely restrictive, not to say negative, opinions on all requests, proposals and suggestions by the parliamentarians or because the Council did not feel it was very committed by remarks made on its behalf.

This disappointment is not confined to administrative and budgetary matters although in this connection the Assembly has much to complain about. The pittance granted to it for its 1986 budget covers neither the loss it suffered in previous years nor, and this is more serious, the most essential requirements of its normal activities. If the Council does not adopt a more flexible position on this specific point, it is clear that we shall soon have to take steps to restrict our activities, which will be just the opposite of what the governments claimed to expect of the Assembly when they proposed reactivating WEU.

But most serious of all is the mediocrity, not to say inexistence, of the dialogue between the two WEU bodies in political matters, in spite of the efforts made by our Secretary-General, Alfred Cahen, to promote it. This shortcoming is apparent in the official exchanges between the Council and the Assembly because statutory exchanges, which visibly the Council does not very much appreciate, reveal that in fact the governments are shirking their political obligations and are trying to conceal this by increasing the number of informal meetings, but the lateness and dearth of official information show the situation in its true light.

This forces us to wonder whether the Council is still determined to complete the reactivation decided upon by the governments in 1984 and to respect the modified Brussels Treaty itself.

The Assembly is not complaining about the organisation of its relations with the Council but about their content.

The Assembly for its part welcomed the prospect of the reactivation of WEU with an enthusiasm which left its mark on our reports and the record of our debates. This was not due mainly to the privileged rôle which the Council said the Assembly would play in this reorganisation but far more to the fact that the Council, after thirty years during which its activities consisted mainly of arms controls whose necessity was gradually diminishing, was at last proposing to accede to political existence. It set itself an action programme, most of which is set out in the Rome declaration. Since then, the doubts which the Council allows to prevail about its determination to carry out this programme have given rise to

*The President (continued)*

the uneasiness which is evident in relations between the two WEU bodies.

I wish to dwell on these circumstances for a moment to try to draw a few political lessons which I hope will help us to emerge from the reciprocal lack of understanding between the Council and the Assembly which is now paralysing WEU.

Decided upon at a time when the application of the NATO twofold decision of December 1979 and the ensuing pacifist demonstrations were front-page news, the reactivation of WEU met a need which all our governments then considered urgent.

But the problems which arose in 1985 with the opening of the Geneva negotiations, the need to answer the American proposal to Europe to take part in the SDI and to answer Soviet disarmament proposals, the urgency of a European reaction to the challenge of international terrorism and even the difficulties encountered in armaments co-operation clearly no longer achieved the unanimity of the seven governments in favour of a European solution. This is most certainly the true cause of the crisis, the effects of which we are now feeling.

Mr. Andreotti, who took over the presidency of the Council during that difficult year, probably did his utmost to make the Seven overcome their disagreement, but the meagre results of the Venice meeting show that he was unable to eliminate the differences which paralysed the Council in its approach to matters so vital for the future of Europe.

So, rather than admit the reality of this disagreement to the Assembly and to European public opinion, the Council preferred to spread as thick a smoke-screen as possible on the grounds that to reveal it would be tantamount to admitting that it had not correctly assessed the implications of the decisions it had itself taken in Rome in October 1984.

Traditional diplomacy has always taken the view that it was better to conceal differences behind empty words rather than display them in broad daylight, that compromises with words advantageously took the place of factual concessions and that a good misunderstanding was preferable to open opposition. This is probably still perfectly justified in a world in which the only true law is that of the strongest. It is therefore a matter of avoiding an armed conflict for which we must nevertheless always be prepared so as not to have to capitulate if faced with threats and blackmail.

But if such principles were to continue to prevail in Western Europe, one might wonder about

all that has been done in the last forty years to bring about a new type of inter-state relations on our continent.

When our governments decided in 1954 to place the implementation of their alliance under the supervision of a parliamentary assembly, they set relations between our countries on an entirely new course. This is the step forward that the Council has regularly questioned ever since. But in 1985 it seems to have given up hope of going any further. It shows this by resorting systematically to the subterfuge of diplomatic language to conceal the fact that it is shirking its duties.

The Assembly has never accepted this attitude of the Council and will never do so.

Admittedly, we cannot force our governments to adopt identical points of view in areas where we know very real problems still divide them. But we are entitled to expect them to give clear explanations. It is our duty to debate them openly and publicly and we are able to indicate where we consider the necessary compromises might be made in order to find a European policy which is not just a verbal compromise.

Those of us who heard the Chairman-in-Office of the Council answer our questions in such an ironic manner at the joint meeting between three of our committees and the Council in Venice on 30th April had an opportunity of assessing the damage that the diplomacy practised by the Council can do to Europe.

Indeed, not only the spirit but the very letter of the modified Brussels Treaty was called in question when Mr. Andreotti contested the fact that the consultations provided for in Article VIII of the treaty implied the search for joint decisions. To quote this article, the aims the signatories of the treaty set themselves were those of "strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between them and with other European organisations". Any claim that this means only exchanges of views without conclusion is a challenge to the substance of this article.

He also interpreted Article V of the treaty in a too restrictive manner by declaring that the firing of Libyan missiles at the island of Lampedusa was not an "armed attack" within the meaning of the treaty. Yet everyone knows that the aim of this article is not systematic recourse to force but the deterrent effect that can be exercised by the assertion of European solidarity in face of attack. Was this not an opportunity to give Libya a strong reminder of this?

The Council is constantly seeking to avoid applying Article IX by reducing its dialogue with the Assembly to the level of informal, courteous

*The President (continued)*

and vague talks and increasingly neglecting official procedures, the only ones that commit it.

But it is above all the spirit of the treaty, as defined in a preamble which vigorously asserts the will the governments had in 1954 to build Europe on new foundations, which is reduced to nought by the attitude adopted by the Council.

I wish to thank Mr. Andreotti for describing, in a clear manner to which our relations with the Council had not accustomed us, how, cornered by events, our ministers view the commitments imposed upon them by the treaty and respect the intentions they expressed in the Rome declaration.

But the Council must know full well that this is not the Assembly's view of its own duties and that it is not on such bases that a true dialogue can be hoped for between the two WEU organs.

We all know that many highly topical questions relating to the present and immediate future of European defence have effectively been put to the Council in recent months either by the Assembly or by others.

I will quote a few of them:

- the management of resources earmarked for defence purposes;
- the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons;
- various aspects of the United States strategic defence initiative;
- anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence in Europe;
- assessing the value of Soviet disarmament initiatives;
- a nuclear test ban;
- co-operation between WEU Agency III and the IEPG;
- extension of the work of FINABEL to naval and air forces;
- aspects of the threat in the Mediterranean and Africa south of the Sahara;
- the creation of a European institute for advanced defence studies; and, finally,
- the enlargement of WEU.

Is it true, as I have heard, that these questions were effectively put to the Council this spring?

Is it true that the Council has not yet seriously followed them up?

Why has the Council told the Assembly nothing about the reports submitted to it by the agencies just before its meeting in Venice?

Finally, is it true that the Council devoted most of its recent meetings to considering how to calm the Assembly down to avoid too serious a crisis?

If, as I have every reason to believe, all this is true, I venture to say that the Council is wasting its time and abandoning both the cause of Europe and respect for the modified Brussels Treaty by seeking to anaesthetise the Assembly by all the means offered by the most archaic form of diplomacy instead of doing what is its bounden duty, i.e. tell the truth it is trying to hide from us. This truth is its inability to rise above itself to assert a true European political will and hence to overcome differences which are exacerbated by the pressure of internal political interests.

We obviously cannot ask our seven governments to change their policies radically in order to reach a perfect agreement, nor have we any interest in making the relationship between the Council and the Assembly unduly controversial. What we want to do is profit from this tension, which after all is in the very nature of things, in order to draw what may be positive for WEU and profitable for Europe.

If this conflict is to be overcome, an absolute condition is for the Council to stop hedging and tackle frankly and clearly its examination of the problems dividing it and holding it up. As long as it remains tied to a way of thinking and acting - insofar as it is possible to speak of action on its part - which conforms to traditional diplomacy, the Assembly will continue to be a source of trouble and difficulties for the governments and the Council will continue to fight its influence with a mixture of kind words, vague texts and budgetary restrictions which stifle its activities.

If the present crisis could lead to the Council deciding to analyse the reasons for these deadlocks which we are criticising, I am convinced that a major step will have been taken to resolve them.

The Rome declaration, by sweeping away the very strict commitments imposed by the Paris Agreements, claimed to reactivate WEU on the basis of a new political will. Today, most of the specific commitments included in the treaty have disappeared to leave only requirements of a far more general nature. Consequently, while the Council conformed more or less to the former it is evading the latter altogether, particularly the commitment to report to the Assembly on its activities.

It would be more in conformity with the treaty to confess that all it can do is allow each government to have a free hand and renounce any joint action than to hide this truth behind vague, ambiguous or misleading remarks. Such a confession would at least force each government

*The President (continued)*

to express the reasons for its reticence and this would already be a step in the right direction. Not to do so would be tantamount to reducing WEU to zero, and keeping it in a state of hibernation just in case it could be used, as was almost the case in 1984. And this seems to be the option chosen by our seven governments.

The wish to pacify us is bringing five ministers or ministers of state to address us during the present session. It is for us to put questions to each of them on his government's intentions in regard to the questions put recently to the Council and insist that they give clear answers.

If the ministers show a sign of wishing to reach agreement on defining, circumscribing and, as far as possible, solving the differences which are holding up the Council, this will be strong encouragement for us to examine with them the means of overcoming these obstacles which, naturally, stand in the way of good relations between the Council and the Assembly, but even more in the way of WEU's existence. May I say that I sincerely hope we shall manage to do this.

If on the contrary the government representatives continue to be afraid of a dialogue and hide behind understatements and evasive remarks, we shall have to draw the full consequences which would probably not be in WEU's favour. In any event, they would be disastrous for a Europe which has no means of expression in security and defence matters other than that offered by WEU, outside of which it is impossible to imagine the establishment of a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

That is what I see as being at stake during this thirty-second session of the Assembly. In many respects, this session represents the last chance for Europe to exist in the vital fields for which we are responsible. If the governments do not make up their minds to apply the treaty, a whole wall of the European edifice, which already seems very unstable in many places, will collapse and damage us all.

Council and Assembly, together we have had to face up to a particularly difficult political year. Let us together learn to be frank in drawing lessons from this experience so that our generation will be remembered for having taken a step towards European unity. Reactivation implies action.

#### **6. Election of three Vice-Presidents of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 7(2) of the Rules of Procedure lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

In addition, Rule 10(2) and (10), of the Rules of Procedure states that no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of Vice-President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives and representatives who are members of governments may not be members of the Bureau.

Three nominations have been submitted in the prescribed form.

The candidates are, in alphabetical order, Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Goerens and Mr. Soell.

The other seats will be filled later.

If there are no objections, I propose that these three Vice-Presidents be elected by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare Mr. Blaauw, Mr. Goerens and Mr. Soell elected as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

#### **7. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session**

(Doc. 1050)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session, Document 1050.

Are there any objections to the draft order of business?...

I call Mr. Blaauw.

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – On behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments I should like to propose that in the order of business on Thursday, when we debate the report of the General Affairs Committee on security and terrorism, that we should also debate the opinion from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments which had a discussion on this subject at its last meeting. The opinion will be presented by Mr. Kittelmann.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Blaauw, the Chairman of the committee, Mr. Pignion has already put this question to me. I am told that whilst theoretically the Assembly is master of its own decisions, the committee's opinion, to be in line with the Assembly's usual practice, would need to be communicated to its members at least twenty-four hours before the vote on the recommendation of the General

*The President (continued)*

Affairs Committee to be taken on 4th June. If that can be done I do not see that there can be any objection to your proposal.

Is the Assembly in agreement?...

Mr. BLAAUW (*Netherlands*). – The committee will meet on Wednesday morning before the beginning of the sitting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Blaauw.

Are there any objections to this amended order of business?...

The draft order of business, as amended, is adopted.

**8. Nomination of members to committees**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the nomination of members to committees.

The candidates for the five permanent committees and the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations have been published in an Annex to Notice No. 1, which has been distributed.

In accordance with Rule 39(6) and Rule 42 *bis* these nominations are submitted to the Assembly.

Are there any objections?...

The nominations are agreed to.

**9. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 2.30 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Action by the Presidential Committee (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee, Document 1063).
2. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
3. Parliaments, public opinion and defence; Promotion of parliamentary and public interest in WEU matters (Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft resolutions, Documents 1038 and 1056).
4. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and votes on the draft resolutions, Document 1039 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 12.45 p.m.)*

## SECOND SITTING

Monday, 2nd June 1986

### SUMMARY

1. Tribute.
2. Attendance register.
3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
4. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1063*).  
*Speakers:* The President, Sir Dudley Smith (*Rapporteur*).
5. Adoption of the minutes.
6. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.  
*Replies by Mr. Cahen to questions put by:* Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Inan (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Coleman.
7. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
8. Parliaments, public opinion and defence; Promotion of parliamentary and public interest in WEU matters (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft resolutions, Docs. 1038 and 1056*).  
*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Eysink (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Tummers, Mr. Müller, Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Cavaliere, Lady Jill Knight (*Chairman of*

*the committee*), Mr. Eysink (*Rapporteur*), Sir Paul Hawkins (point of order).

9. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and votes on the draft resolutions, Doc. 1039 and amendments*).

*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Schulte (*Chairman of the committee*), Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Antoni, Lady Jill Knight, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Schulte (*Chairman of the committee*), the President, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mr. Bianco, the President, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Lord Hughes, the President, Mr. Schulte, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Unland (point of order), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Eysink, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg; (points of order): Mr. Jessel, Lord Hughes, Mr. Eysink, Mr. Bianco, the President, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Dr. Miller, Lord Hughes, Mr. Eysink, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Lord Hughes, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Lord Hughes, Mr. Hardy (point of order), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Lord Hughes, Mr. Eysink, Lord Hughes, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Valleix (point of order), Lord Hughes, Mr. Unland, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Cox, the President, Lord Hughes, Mr. Schulte, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Coleman, Mr. Antoni, the President, Mr. Reddemann.

10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 2.40 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

### 1. Tribute

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Edouard Longerstae, honorary Ambassador of His Majesty the King of the Belgians and Secretary-General of WEU from March 1977 to March 1985, died on the night of 27th/28th March last.

*(The members of the Assembly stood)*

There are many of us in the Assembly who had the privilege of knowing Edouard Longerstae and of working at his side at that historic time when together we made the preparations for the reactivation of WEU.

His death brought great sadness to all who believe in our organisation and who have worked outside it in the same spirit.

We extend our sympathy to his country, his family, his friends, his old colleagues, particularly those in the Secretariat-General, and of course the members of the Permanent Council with whom he was in continuous contact.

May I ask you to observe one minute's silence in his memory.

*(The members of the Assembly observed one minute's silence)*

Thank you.

### 2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 22.

### 3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (*Translation*). – This morning the Assembly elected three Vice-Presidents. I have since received a further valid nomination, that of Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

With the Assembly's agreement I propose that his election be by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare Mr. Ferrari Aggradi elected as a Vice-President of the Assembly.

The orders of the day for this part-session are particularly full and so I propose to the Assembly in accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure that speaking time for all the debates be limited to five minutes except in the case of rapporteurs and chairmen of committees.

Depending on the number of members asking to speak and the amount of time available for each debate I shall apply the Rules of Procedure with the strictness that the circumstances call for.

I would remind you that under the same rule the proposal has to be voted on by the Assembly without debate.

Is there any objection?...

It is so decided.

### 4. Action by the Presidential Committee

(*Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1063*)

The PRESIDENT (*Translation*). – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee on action by the Presidential Committee, Document 1063.

I call the Rapporteur, Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – On behalf of the Presidential Committee, I present the report which has been printed and circulated. It is a short report and I hope that all members will take the opportunity to read it.

This morning, Mr. President, you told us something of the trials and tribulations facing Western European Union. I noticed that at one stage there was spontaneous applause for what you said. That reflects the feelings of many parliamentarians of all parties who come here from their countries.

There is no doubt that WEU is in something of a dilemma – to use a cliché, it is at the crossroads again. Sometimes, I think that some foreign

ministers look on us as a tedious nuisance. I hope that that is not the case. I do not believe that we should be looked on in that way. Potentially, WEU is a very important organisation. The Assembly is, democratically, a useful sounding board on the whole question of defence in Europe.

I was interested to read an article early last month in the *Financial Times*, the headline of which stated: "Europe applies the brake on veteran defence vehicle". The article concerned an extensive interview with our Secretary-General. It implied that in the past few months there had been strong signs that enthusiasm for the enterprise of WEU was waning. That was confirmed at our Venice meeting a few weeks ago.

The Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen, was quoted as saying:

"Our organisation is like a good veteran car that hasn't been on the road for fifteen years. It ran some good rallies in its time and could again. But today, as you try to restart it, the battery is flat. When you push it, it moves – but not far enough"

To be fair to Mr. Cahen, in the same article he drew attention to the fact that he had just celebrated the first year of his appointment. He said: "But I hope to have it turning over nicely, ready to roar away, before my term is up." That will be in the next five-year period.

I think that we are all, and no one more than the parliamentary Assembly of WEU, conscious of the fact that there are difficulties, especially with budgets.

The report which I have prepared on behalf of the Presidential Committee is an honest attempt to be frank with the Council of Ministers and officials to let them know what we feel as representatives of our parliaments who are sent here to do a job. We are enthusiastically trying to do that job. If we were not, we would not be on our various delegations.

As a European assembly with defence responsibilities we shall debate in the spring session important matters such as the situation in the Mediterranean, disarmament, the rôle of WEU and, above all, terrorism. But most of us have only just been able to study the main parts of the annual report which the Council must, under statute, submit to the Assembly and the replies to the recommendations adopted by the Assembly early in December last year. It is difficult for the Assembly to believe that it is adequately informed by those communications which, I must say frankly, are not very explicit or helpful. In the opinion of many of us, they could be much better than they are.

*Sir Dudley Smith (continued)*

The Presidential Committee, one of whose tasks in the period between sessions is to prepare the Assembly's dialogue with the Council, cannot be altogether satisfied with the result of its work. In Mr. Andreotti, the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, we have a sincere friend and loyal ally, and we welcome his support. That is why I have stressed in the report that the main problem encountered in our relations with the Council is the difficulty that members of our governments have in speaking with a single voice, and consequently that limits the possibilities of dialogue with the Council rather than a lack of understanding.

In the political sphere, the meetings requested by the committee were granted. But it would be pointless to try to hide the fact that the satisfaction derived from the procedure for dialogue and the warmth of our welcome could not offset the disappointment in the substance of the information received and the ministerial response to remarks and suggestions by parliamentarians. Looking at the specific question, it behoves the Council of Ministers perhaps to examine that with a view to trying to bring about an improvement. It would be greatly welcomed by the parliamentarians and it could be done without breaching the rules of confidentiality or the slightly mystical atmosphere in which so many ministers operate when they meet their contemporaries from other countries.

Consideration of the Assembly's budgetary position in consultation with the Council was the only means by which the Presidential Committee could carry out its mandate. It was instructed last year, by order of the Assembly, to negotiate with the Council the inclusion in the Assembly's budget of amounts which would allow the parliamentary organ of WEU to play its rôle in the context of the reorganisation. Admittedly the Assembly was granted an increase which was slightly larger than the inflation rate, but not without a good deal of passion and tears behind the scenes. But the President of the Assembly was informed of that figure even before the procedure envisaged by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council at the last session for the holding of an ad hoc joint committee had been implemented.

However, this sum is still not enough to allow the officials of the Assembly their needs for additional recruitment and the purchase of modern equipment. The Assembly may even wonder whether the financial resources placed at its disposal to fulfil its task will not be further reduced by the Council's refusal to take account of the growing impact of pensions on the budget in view of the retirement of officials recruited immediately after the setting up of the

Assembly. We owe an obligation to these people, and they have to be paid. It is quite unfair that pensions to which we are committed should come out of the running budget. There is no way in which the obligation can be avoided or reduced; it has to be met. I hope that the Council, in its wisdom, will take it upon itself to examine this problem further and come up with the right conclusion.

I implied that the Presidential Committee had not been as successful as it had hoped in the tasks before it, for the reasons that I gave. However, the Presidential Committee now calls upon the Assembly to urge governments to overcome their differences and thus allow the Council to join the Assembly in a spirit of co-operation rather than confrontation in seeking to instil a greater determination to take action in the only European body able to promote union in security matters. That must be our first concern in a world in which the development of new military technology and the ever-increasing threats from various terrorist groups make the expression of European solidarity of vital importance.

That is what we are about. We are an organisation which can have the right kind of impact and which can get greater publicity for defence issues in Europe if we get the right encouragement and apply our policies correctly. If we do not, the Assembly of Western European Union will wither away. With the right encouragement, it will make progress. It will not necessarily be spectacular progress, but it has had far more press coverage since reactivation than it had before.

In our hearts, we as parliamentarians know that the defence issue is a crucial one and that, while it ebbs and flows in terms of coverage in our respective countries, there is a latent understanding of and belief in defence. Our countries are aware that the issue should be examined by parliamentarians – and what better forum than one from the various countries who support NATO and believe in the concept of defending freedom? We have a contribution to make. I hope that we shall be allowed to make it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Sir Dudley Smith for reporting on the work of the Presidential Committee so fully, succinctly and objectively.

Does anyone wish to speak on the report?...

No vote will be taken unless the Assembly so wishes.

The Assembly therefore takes note of the report in accordance with the procedure used at the last two sessions.

### 5. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have just been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

### 6. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day provide for the address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.

I am very pleased, Mr. Secretary-General, to invite you once again to take the rostrum. I thank you for your ready availability to the Assembly.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – Kindly allow me, Mr. President, before commencing my address, to thank you for the tribute you paid to my predecessor and friend. It touched me deeply.

Mr. President, members of the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union, this is the second time that I have had the great honour of an invitation from you to speak from your rostrum. May I say how great a privilege I feel this to be even though the conditions in which I am addressing you are not necessarily comfortable after the President's address and Sir Dudley Smith's excellent report. May I assure you that this does not worry me. It was important for the cards to be put on the table and Mr. Caro did so very firmly. It is now up to us, namely the ministerial organ of which I have the privilege to be one of the components, to pick up our hand and lay our cards on the table.

That is why I appreciate even more than last time the very great value of this opportunity to take part in the democratic dialogue which your Assembly, at European level, is alone empowered to carry out with our ministers and their Council.

Mr. Andreotti, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Baroness Young and Ministers Tindemans, Spadolini and Möllemann will conduct this dialogue at their particular level from tomorrow onwards looking at the wider prospects for our organisation's action.

As for me, I shall try to speak to you of its day-to-day, but not for that any less important, activities. This would seem fitting for me in my capacity as Secretary-General following, as I do from day to day, the progress of Western European Union, revitalised in accordance with the wishes of the governments of the member states

and as a result of your action during the years of comparative inactivity.

It is not that I wish to forget the essentially political inspiration on which this fresh start for Western European Union was conditional. But this is primarily a matter for personalities ordained, as it were, by universal suffrage as representatives of the people of Europe, namely the members of the governments and yourselves, ladies and gentlemen, who speak for public opinion.

However, it goes without saying that at my more modest level I am imbued with the same political inspiration in the daily work of the organisation which is my lot as Secretary-General. This task bears lightly on me because, having fought for the European cause for some forty years, I am particularly happy in my present work to be able to participate with our governments and with you in creating gradually a dimension that has been too long absent from the work of constructing Europe: its security dimension.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I followed what Mr. Caro said this morning and what Sir Dudley Smith has just said with the closest attention.

I have read with equal care your reports and the statements made by your President and other members in recent weeks. So it is clear that the growing misunderstanding developing between your Assembly and the ministerial organs has not escaped my notice; on the contrary it has caused me concern. Our Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers and those of his colleagues who are to address you from tomorrow on will certainly have an opportunity to speak to you about this issue at their own eminent level. But I think it is my particular duty to participate in this essential debate.

The questions, Mr. President, you put to us as the ministerial organ this morning were very precise and telling and I think they were useful in the sense that they call for replies. I shall therefore try to reply to you, not because there are answers which have to come from the politicians who are our ministers but because, on certain important points, our differences of view seem to me to be matters of misunderstanding rather than of substance.

To begin with, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to plead guilty. It is true that the information to which you are entitled has all too frequently over the past year not arrived on time. This is obviously true of the thirty-first annual report of the Council and also of replies to some of your questions and recommendations. It is also true that some of these replies have not been as clear and as factual as you would have liked.

*Mr. Cahen (continued)*

A little while ago you referred to the Marquis de Norpois, a canny diplomat in whose words there was sometimes no meaning to be found. The parallel is not always wide of the mark and I suppose that occasionally, when you read our answers, you have the same reaction as Bloch, the friend of the narrator, who, when listening to the Marquis de Norpois talking about the Dreyfus affair, said after one sentence: "He is pro-Dreyfus" and after another "No, he is anti-Dreyfus". Well, yes, on that score I plead guilty. However, you said, Mr. President, that such delays could be treated as simply accidental if you were given a proper explanation: in other words what made it serious was not being told the reasons for delay.

I shall try to give you a preliminary answer. The delay, or sometimes the relative obscurity of certain texts, is not due to a lack of interest on the part of our Council in the reactivated organisation, nor to any lack of interest in the Assembly. Paradoxically the reverse is true.

First of all, the reactivation of our organisation – fortunately moreover – has added to the Council's workload, which is still increasing and is now very considerable. The national administrations involved have had to adapt to this. They have not always been able to do it at once. In this respect, we have been, and to some extent still are, in a running-in period which, particularly from the point of view of informing the Assembly, is regrettable but which, in reality, reflects the new WEU's will to develop.

Secondly, in the context of this new WEU every attitude adopted in public is now important. Therefore, the governments of our member countries are anxious that documents submitted to the parliamentarians should reflect very precisely their options which have been harmonised with those of the others. Hence delays due to prolonged reflection and lengthy negotiations on the wording, leading in some cases to a certain obscurity of expression.

The ministerial organs are aware of this state of affairs and want to improve it. In some cases it would probably be preferable to give no answer to your questions and to explain that at that stage agreement was not complete among our countries on one or other point. This is normal in matters relating to major security or national defence problems. It is essential that we should remedy this state of affairs because, in my view, the fact that you are not informed officially, clearly and in good time is at the origin of what I believe are the misunderstandings that are developing between us. This is what gives you the impression that the revival of our organisation

which has for so long been your desire is not taking off as it ought. But it is taking off and Mr. Andreotti will confirm this to you tomorrow. For my part I shall try to convince you of it today, confining myself, of course, to the problems for which I have special responsibility either because they have an administrative aspect or because I have been more directly involved in them.

These problems are the budgetary problems you have referred to, our work on the SDI, the work of our Permanent Council on current issues such as the control, limitation and reduction of arms, the work of our organisation with regard to arms co-operation and the problem of the composition of our organisation.

This is what I wanted to talk to you about very briefly in an attempt to show that we have been working – and producing – but have not been informing you early enough or clearly enough.

First the budget problem. I would like to begin by telling Mr. Sinesio that his extremely exhaustive report had my full attention as did Sir Dudley Smith's statement on the matter. I am sure that it will be the same for our governments and that the Council will take pains to look into all the recommendations made in the report. I would add that some of the concerns are common to your Assembly and the ministerial organs, for example the pensions issue which arises in practically the same terms for us and which we shall need to approach in more or less the same way.

However, I should like to reassure Mr. Sinesio on three points. First of all, from the budget point of view the ministerial organs are treated neither better nor worse than the Assembly. In the context of the revival of WEU, the London and Paris establishments are now showing a tendency to merge in the service of the Council. They must therefore be considered together from all angles. From the budgetary standpoint it can be seen that what would seem to benefit one, in this case London, is at the expense of the other, Paris.

In this context, we are all in the same boat, if I may say so, and I would even add that it is clear from the budgetary debates which I have followed that our countries, being fully aware of the Assembly's important rôle, prefer, whenever the opportunity arises and within the tight limits imposed by their national budgets, to provide the Assembly, rather than the ministerial organs, with additional resources.

Mr. Sinesio is concerned that the Paris-based legal adviser for all the bodies, in both London and Paris, has been made chairman of the budget committee and is so to speak, both judge and jury. Let me reassure him on this point also. It will not be his duty to defend the budgets of the Paris

*Mr. Cahen (continued)*

agencies or the London budgets. This task will fall to the heads of the financial and administrative departments in Paris and London. The new Chairman of the budget committee – not to quote his name – will not, therefore, be both judge and jury.

Finally, Mr. Sinesio very rightly points out that in the Paris agencies two B-grade posts were frozen at the time when the establishment tables for these institutions were being approved. However, in the light of the agencies' needs, which became apparent as soon as they started to operate normally, one of these posts has been unfrozen.

To conclude this point I should respectfully like to draw the Assembly's attention to an important matter. The ministerial organs of Western European Union, from the start of the revival, have been operating within the context of a transitional phase and will continue to do so up to December 1987. At the end of next year their structures, functioning and tasks will be reviewed in depth by the member states and as a result may well undergo substantial changes. This will not of course apply to the Assembly nor to the Office of the Clerk. Therefore, when examining, particularly from the administrative and budgetary angles, the way the ministerial organs operate it is useful to take account of this situation and to remember that it is the governments' intention to profit from the experience of the two or three years of reactivation of WEU to introduce the necessary improvements both to its agencies and its Secretariat-General.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, one of the main foci – and perhaps the most significant – of the misunderstandings arising between you and your Council would seem to me to relate to the evaluation of the work on the strategic defence initiative.

The parliamentary Assembly feels and therefore voices disappointment at the progress so far made: the work seems to them to be deadlocked. I must say that this is a typical case of the effects of the failure to provide full and clear information to your Assembly for if there is one area where our revived organisation has functioned well, it is certainly this one. If I have chosen to testify this fact today, it is because I have had the privilege of chairing from the very beginning, that is roughly a year, the special working group responsible for following developments relating to SDI under the authority of the Council.

I may say, and this is important, that it is because of this group and also our Council, under whose authority it works, that Western European Union is, at the present time, the one

and only forum in our part of the world where this problem, of such importance for the Atlantic Alliance and for Europe, is being dealt with regularly and systematically. Furthermore, it is being discussed at the appropriate level which is that of the directors of the politico-military departments of our foreign ministries or their first assistants.

It is true that no public joint position of the Seven has emerged from this group. But we must remember that this was not its mandate. When this was defined by the Ministers in Bonn in April 1985 they spoke of "collective consideration in order to achieve as far as possible a co-ordinated reaction of their governments to the invitation of the United States to participate in the research programme". How could this have been otherwise when some of the countries which are members of our organisation had already publicly adopted a stance on this issue, expressing views that were not necessarily convergent?

Nevertheless, the group succeeded in producing, both as regards the technological and politico-military aspects of the problem, a series of considerations and concerns or principles common to all the member states and which were set out in its first report to the ministers last November. It has since continued its collective consideration and it can now be described as having reached its cruising speed.

It meets about once a month, which is the frequency of the Political Committee of the Twelve and their working groups and it is conducting its work within the framework of a clear-cut programme covering the technological aspects, the technico-military aspects and the politico-military aspects of the question. Answering one of your questions, Mr. President, it is also looking at the problem of the air defence of Europe which is an essential one for our part of the continent.

When I add that the working group, at each of its meetings, holds a detailed exchange of information on the data that each country is able to collect nationally in this sphere, I think you will agree with me that WEU has done a valuable job with regard to the strategic defence initiative. This work is now continuing on a long-term basis, which is inevitable, as we are all aware, because the SDI problem will be with us for many years to come.

While these results have proved to be more substantial than spectacular, it must be recalled that in such a delicate area discretion must pre-empt all discussions if the participants, representing their governments, are to speak with complete frankness and openness. I should like to add the important point that in their discussion all the members of the working group have

*Mr. Cahen (continued)*

been very much aware of Recommendations 428, 429 and 430, adopted by your Assembly.

But it has not only been in the SDI working group that the revived WEU has tackled the security question which the current situation raises for our states. The Permanent Council has been no less active in this respect and I am pleased to tell you that one of its meetings was attended either by the political directors of the various foreign ministers or by representatives of the Defence Ministry. If I may say so this was something of a "first" which enabled it among other things to consider in depth the various Soviet proposals regarding control, limitation and reduction of armaments.

Such "firsts" were so successful that those concerned decided to renew the experiment on a future occasion.

Nor, and here again I am answering one of your questions, Mr. President, has your organisation been totally inactive with regard to armaments co-operation. As you are well aware, it is not the aim of Western European Union to duplicate already existing institutions which, in another geographical context – often a wider one – have responsibilities which are similar or overlap, as is very often the case precisely in the sphere of armaments. On the contrary, it wishes to play a complementary rôle with respect to these institutions and, if possible, to provide an impetus. Contacts have been made in this respect with some of these bodies and in particular with the special working group. A kind of division of labour is being organised with the Independent European Programme Group which, to me, seems useful for both institutions and for Europe as well.

I am aware that the problem of the composition of our revived Western European Union – known generally as the "enlargement" question – is very much on your minds. It was at the forefront of the ministers' discussions a little while ago in Venice and on this question Mr. Andreotti will have an opportunity to speak with more authority than myself.

Nevertheless, with the approval of the Council and its Chairman, I was able to discuss this problem with the Portuguese authorities during my trip to Lisbon on 26th May in the framework of preliminary and informal contacts that our ministers consider valuable to clarify the various aspects of a complex problem. The people to whom I spoke were still just as interested in WEU but very much aware of the complexity of the issue and of the need, for them and for us, to explore all its facets.

I should not wish to give the impression from this obviously incomplete list of the activities of

the ministerial organs that all is well and running smoothly. It is only a start, but in my view promising because it proves that our organisation is establishing itself as what it ought to be: a centre for consultation between particularly closely allied countries from which should emerge a collective awareness about security both at governmental and parliamentary levels and at the level of public opinion.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the rôle of a parliament is, among many other things, to act as a catalyst for those who govern. No assembly knows this better than yours which struggled to fulfil this essential function even when, between 1973 and 1984, it had virtually no "government" with which to conduct the dialogue but continued, courageously, to make its voice heard in the hope that one day it would again find a partner to address.

Thanks to the reactivation of Western European Union, this partner in the dialogue is again present.

You transmit to this partner – and this is indeed your responsibility – your concerns and anxieties. You ask this partner – and this indeed is your right – to tell you what is being done. You exhort this partner – and this indeed is your duty – to press ahead.

From a careful reading of the reports of your committees I can see that that is what you do. I would like to be able to refer to each of them in detail. Tomorrow I shall have the honour of speaking to the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and I will then be able to deal with that committee's report in more detail.

In reality, it is a rule of the democratic system that those elected by the people should act as a spur to the ministers. It is the strength of our democracies that the latter take up this challenge. But to be really useful this democratic system must operate like a team sport where the executive and assembly are partners.

In reality, these two bodies act jointly and perform complementary rôles. Their aims are the same.

In his admirable book "Regards sur le monde actuel" Paul Valéry wrote as follows:

"The result of political battles is to disturb people's minds and to falsify their notion of the order of importance and the order of urgency of questions. What is vital is masked by what is simply a convenience; the future by the immediate; the really necessary by the apparent; what is deep and slow by what is sensational."

We are all very much aware of this risk both in the Assembly, Mr. President, and in the ministerial organs. We are agreed we must avoid fall-

*Mr. Cahen (continued)*

ing into this trap and must together strive for reactivation. In other words we have to go forward, pushing the vehicle that Sir Dudley Smith referred to a moment ago until it starts up, all of us pushing – of course – at roughly the same rate.

It is normal for the pace of an assembly to be faster than that of a government and for the limits to government action in various situations to compel it to drive slightly more slowly. What is important is that, in spite of everything, we match our pace. In a way this is the appeal I would like to make to you because we are all in the same boat.

I hope that the replies that are given during this very important part-session to the questions that you put this morning Mr. President and you, Sir Dudley Smith, this afternoon and to those put by the rapporteurs will satisfy the Assembly. There is no lack of substance. We need to pull together and in the same direction.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General, for addressing us at such a high level.

In you the Assembly has found a policy head appointed by the Council of Ministers with the presence, availability and willingness to co-operate which are absolutely essential for our organisation.

Thank you in particular for being prepared to take up the real debate and for not trying to deny that difficulties exist which in everyone's analysis are simply the reflection of a political situation seen in terms of our separate responsibilities.

The note that you struck with your address and your very direct style promise very favourably for the major debate we have begun today. As I said in my address this morning, out of the tension which is part of the normal order of things and right and proper in a democracy we will be able to derive what is best for the organisation. Everything depends on what we say to each other during these few days.

Thanks to your statement, Secretary-General, the Assembly now has what it needs to go ahead. We shall together draw our conclusions at the end of the part-session as we did last time. Once again, thank you.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to make just two points. Our organisation has been criticised on many occasions for not welcoming more fully those countries that wish to join WEU. The question of

enlargement is fundamental. If we are to be a live organisation with a future, we must be the type of body that welcomes new adherents. I should like the Secretary-General to comment on the response that has been made so far by the Council especially to Portugal.

It has often been suggested that our organisation would be strengthened if the Council and the Assembly were located in the same capital. I draw the Secretary-General's attention to the fact that in the old Greater London Council building – County Hall in London – there is an admirable hemicycle which is large enough for the present membership of WEU and for enlarged representation of additional countries. Might not that fine building be considered as a permanent home for the Assembly? That is a personal view.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. Wilkinson has raised two very important questions.

It is true that all the member states of our organisation are pleased at the interest shown in it by countries which are not yet members, proof as it is of the interest in reactivation and of the implementation of its first phase. After all, nobody would be interested in us if we were not interesting. Every one of our countries has considerable friendship for the states which have shown the most interest and that interest is being given careful study.

But at the moment there are two problems. First of all there is the fact that our ministerial organs are in a period of transition so that the countries displaying interest do so in an organisation that may have changed somewhat by the end of next year. We therefore need to have very close contact with those countries in order to consider the way they see, and in particular the way we see, the future.

Next there is the Brussels Treaty amended by the treaty of Paris and the Rome declaration and the way in which reactivation is taking shape. Are the countries showing interest in our organisation ready to accept everything contained in the Brussels Treaty and the Rome declaration and everything implied by the manner in which we are reviving the organisation or are there aspects they would wish to negotiate? This explains why it is important to have preliminary and informal contacts before embarking on negotiations which could prove disappointing. In a way, this is the question that, informally, with the authority of your Council and your President I went to Lisbon to ask.

*Mr. Cahen (continued)*

The bringing together of all our institutions in the same headquarters is clearly desirable from the viewpoints of administrative and budgetary logic. I would like to thank Mr. Wilkinson for his offer of a fine building, which is known to me, but should the institutions be brought together as a matter of policy and if so where? This is a major issue that calls for discussion in the context of our ministerial councils.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General. This is an extremely important subject but to some extent, having now provided concrete proof of our immense capacity for cohabitation, the problem of the place ought to be settled fairly easily.

I call Mr. Inan.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – As representative of Turkey, a country that is interested in the enlargement of the union, I do not know what to report to my government after hearing what the Secretary-General said. Was it encouragement or was it not? His words were not clear.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I leave it to the Secretary-General to reply.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – You are right to ask for clarity. That is what Mr. Caro also did this morning and what I tried to provide in my address.

You have asked me whether you should see what I said as an encouragement or otherwise to your country to seek membership of the organisation. I shall be very clear. Your country plays a very important rôle in Europe's security within the Atlantic Alliance and Turkey's pro-European attitude is an asset for Europe. That having been said, before adopting either an encouraging or a discouraging position which could not be my responsibility but that of our ministers – we need to see exactly how we picture the enlargement of Europe. Will it be within the framework of membership of the Communities, the alliance and the European dimension of security? Do we see it falling within only one of these contexts? All of this we have to define. Then we would have to see how Turkey sees its membership of our organisation. Would it accept every aspect of the Brussels Treaty, the Rome declaration and the path that we are now taking?

I am sorry not to be able to give you a clear yes or no in answer to your question but it all needs careful consideration. The matter is too important for that not to be done.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Secretary-General.

I call Mr. Coleman.

Mr. COLEMAN (*United Kingdom*). – I refer to paragraph 63 of Document 1056. I noticed that in his address the Secretary-General announced that the Secretariat-General would henceforth have an information and public relations unit. What has happened to that? Has he appointed a press and public information officer?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – Public relations are essential to our work, and that is why I am delighted to have been invited to appear tomorrow before Lady Jill Knight's committee, where I shall explain what I am trying to do to promote public relations. We have no public relations officer yet, but two candidates have been suggested by Great Britain, and others are coming. I want to see them all before making a choice. Obviously I should like someone who is a good writer of both speeches and articles, who has good connections with Fleet Street and who has international press contacts. I could have chosen such a person months ago, but I want to be sure that I pick a good one.

It is well known that we do not have limitless budgetary means, so there will be only one officer and a relatively small service. He must be the best available, and that is why I have not yet chosen him. I have asked the British Government to submit new candidates. Meanwhile, we have not been idle. The Secretariat-General is busy at public relations, and I have myself written a number of articles and made several speeches in member countries and in Spain and Portugal and I have invited journalists in various countries to write articles about WEU. We are working very hard and, if we do not yet have a press relations officer, it is because we want the best one available. If Mr. Coleman would care to see them, I can let him have the sight of all that has been published since I became Secretary-General and of all my speeches.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General for your contribution to our debate.

### **7. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day provide for the election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.

I have received a further valid nomination for a Vice-President of the Assembly, that of Sir Frederic Bennett.

*The President (continued)*

With the Assembly's agreement I propose that his election be by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare Sir Frederic Bennett elected as a Vice-President of the Assembly and congratulate him on his election.

### **8. Parliaments, public opinion and defence**

#### ***Promotion of parliamentary and public interest in WEU matters***

*(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and votes on the draft resolutions, Docs. 1038 and 1056)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day provide for the presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on parliaments, public opinion and defence and the promotion of parliamentary and public interest in WEU matters and votes on the draft resolutions, Documents 1038 and 1056.

After the presentation of the two reports by Mr. Eysink, taking Mrs. Fischer's place in the case of the second report, there can be a joint debate.

Is there any objection?...

It is so decided.

I call Mr. Eysink, Rapporteur of the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Mr. EYSINK (*Netherlands*). – Not having the qualifications to be a good public relations officer for WEU, this Rapporteur feels rather like a public relations officer in that he has written a good article though he has not a good name or money, and only a few responses.

Last December we tried, first, to get not the budget but sponsors both from our governments and from members of the Assembly. The purpose of the report is first and foremost to highlight the responsibilities of WEU parliamentarians in security and defence matters vis-à-vis the public. This kind of stocktaking is quite urgent since, according to the results of various polls consulted by previous rapporteurs of the Assembly, it appears that questions of international peace and security, although real and serious, are not the main preoccupation of the majority of Europeans.

As the Assembly of Western European Union is the only international parliamentary institu-

tion with defence and security responsibilities, it is important for every member to be aware of his own responsibility in terms of public relations.

I quote a few important factors of any public relations policy of the Assembly. There must be greater public awareness of the fact that the Assembly of WEU is a legally and politically independent European assembly responsible for security and defence matters established by international treaty. A central aspect should be to strengthen public awareness of the fact that the existence and activities of this Assembly mean first and foremost that European defence and security policy is democratically supervised at both European and national level. The public must be told that the democratic structure of WEU as an international defence organisation is unique in the whole world. Conversely, we parliamentarians should always advocate the improvement of this democratic structure which is still incomplete and ask public opinion in our countries to supply all efforts to strengthen the Assembly's power in supervising defence policy in Europe.

Turning to the substance of our public relations policy, it is the task of WEU parliamentarians to explain the Assembly's position in security and defence matters set out mainly in recommendations adopted by us and addressed to the Council. They are sometimes critical of the activities of the Council of Western European Union, and we should not make a secret of existing differences.

The Council for its part should inform the public and the press about its own activities. The better the information conveyed to the public by the Council, the more rewarding will be the public dialogue on these issues.

For the implementation of a successful public relations policy it is crucial to use all existing means of reaching public opinion at European and national level. One of the most important means is the intensification of parliamentary follow-up action in national parliaments on the activities of our Assembly. Unfortunately, parliamentarians who are not members of the WEU Assembly still know very little about what goes on in WEU, or what WEU means. Our committee, therefore, is continuing to organise information meetings in member parliaments to make the Assembly's activities better known there.

I repeat an old proposal put to the Assembly and its Presidential Committee in 1975 by the then Committee for Relations with Parliaments that every two years a plenary session be held away from the permanent seat of the Assembly. Of course, additional financial means will be necessary for that.

*Mr. Eysink (continued)*

The chairmen of national delegations and the rapporteurs should play a greater part in co-ordinating follow-up action in the national parliaments. Apart from putting questions to the governments it would be useful for every member to make an effort to mention WEU in general and to mention the activities of its Assembly in speeches made in plenary sittings of the national parliaments.

The purpose of the draft resolution is to call on all national delegations to intensify their own efforts regarding the follow-up activities in their own countries and to invite governments to provide the public with better information about the Council's goals and activities.

*(Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The joint debate is open.

I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President, it is really a pity that Mr. Eysink, who is certainly an eloquent speaker, did not speak in Dutch on this occasion. It would also have been good for public relations.

I have a few comments to make. I have made them before, and I make them again because there is something I wonder about. When I look at this report, I wonder whether it is a kind of alibi and intended for internal use, or whether it states clearly how we can enter into relations with the public. Surely our aim is not simply to let the public know what Western European Union is and what it has to offer, but also to hear what the public thinks about the various military efforts which are being made in Europe, one of which is quite definitely represented by Western European Union?

I think this report says too much about the way we want to involve the public in the work of WEU and too little about the way in which we can really achieve an active exchange of views with the public. We must realise that the public also believes that a great deal is being invested in the defence of peace and security and that, to this end, a great deal of money has been withdrawn from everyday life. There is no balance between investments in defence and the quality of life.

I know people think peace and security are an essential condition of the quality of life, but that is usually advanced as an automatic apology for the existence of the defence apparatus as opposed to other things that are badly needed in society. The public are not inclined to say: "All

right, go on and invest, take all the money from the cultural and social sectors, and then life will be marvellous". That is not the way things are.

Mr. President, why do I have so many doubts? A couple of years ago I said that at ten-year intervals two reports had appeared on the history of Western European Union. When the third decade had passed I proposed that a further report should appear, in two forms: one to tell the politicians and academics what has happened in the last ten years, the other a popular version, perhaps in the form of a paperback or textbook, to tell everyone what Western European Union is and explain the difference between WEU and the North Atlantic Pact, which are two completely different things.

I have tabled a motion that has been signed by many members, and I have corresponded with the President. I was told that money would be set aside in the budget for what has been proposed but nothing has been done. Can anyone be surprised that I do not believe genuine contact with the public is being encouraged by this organisation? When I think of the way in which this proposal was treated, I quickly lose any hope of its being actually implemented. I have referred to this point before and I want to emphasise it once again.

To revert to the question of the public relations officer possibly to be appointed in London, I heard the Secretary-General say that the man must be aware of and draw attention to anything to do with WEU that is of interest to the public. I did not hear him say that this man must be someone who is also very well informed about public opinion on peace and security and on defence. I feel this is one of the things he must definitely know something about. I hope he does not turn out to be a former army officer who has retired early and has no journalistic experience.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, yesterday I had a talk with one of the ambassadors at WEU. He told me he had addressed an important seminar for managers and had found that one of the managers attending this seminar had never heard of WEU. This goes to show how well informed the electors – because managers vote too – in our member countries are, if not even this group of people is aware of WEU's existence.

We can go a little further: if we are honest and ask our fellow parliamentarians in national parliaments, we shall find that many of them similarly have no idea what WEU is all about.

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

When I read press reports from the eastern bloc, from *Izvestia* or *Pravda* or from the official press agency *Tass*, I sometimes have the feeling that WEU is mentioned more often in the Soviet Union or in the eastern bloc as a whole than it is in our member countries. That is in fact quite gratifying.

And yet this alliance is of some importance to the member countries. I need cite no more than the automatic commitment to our allies, the arms control tasks, the question of the deployment of the army of the Rhine.

It is all the more surprising, then, that no one or only very few people in Europe are aware of WEU's importance or of the work done by the parliamentary Assembly. It is quite possible to do good work or to have a good institution, but if you do nothing to publicise it, it will remain largely unknown. This reminds me of a principle of public relations work in the United States, where they say: Do well, but above all, talk about it! But that is precisely what we have not done, and that applies equally to this Assembly. It must of course be said that our hands are tied in this respect. We have no budgetary rights. We do not have the necessary resources, as has already been said on several occasions, to do the work that needs to be done.

When I think how much good work ministers do and how much they talk about it, and of all the resources available for this purpose, I am surprised at the assessment of parliamentarians and parliamentary assemblies. One flight less across the Atlantic by private jet, at the taxpayers' expense, of course, would provide sufficient resources for a genuine public relations exercise.

If we are to have more solidarity in Europe – and we are politically agreed on this – on defence policy issues, if we intend to make Europe a genuine second pillar of the NATO alliance, we must make the only assembly that discusses defence matters, the WEU Assembly, far more widely known. There is absolutely no point in sporadic references to a reactivation of WEU. This may occasionally hit the headlines – in the national rather than the local press – but one day it will not be so easy to motivate the journalists, unless deeds follow the grand announcements.

I think the last conference in Venice made this particularly clear. I had the feeling that the German Foreign Minister saw Venice simply as a stop-over on his flight to Belgrade, for a meeting with the Syrian President Assad, which was far more important than the WEU conference in Venice that preceded it.

Perhaps we have settled into too much of a routine here, and are over-inclined to regard the Assembly meetings twice a year as business as usual. And perhaps we would be well advised to start a scandal here from time to time – I say this in quotation marks – so that the public realises this Assembly does indeed have something to say.

In addition to this, in taking up the many suggestions that have already been made, like the paperback Mr. Tummers was talking about just now, we should attach special importance to joint meetings between the various committees of this Assembly and the corresponding committees of the national parliaments. This is probably the best way of improving awareness of the solidarity in European defence policy and increasing the attention paid to it in the media in the various countries. If such meetings were held fairly often and at appropriate times, I believe this could help to make even the politicians in the national parliaments more aware of WEU's rôle and its Assembly.

We must do this because in my opinion developments in the last few months have made it clear that there is absolutely no chance of individual European countries acting in isolation on defence issues: the future lies in solidarity, in joint actions by the Europeans.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers.

Mrs. den OUDEN-DEKKERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am speaking on behalf of the Liberal Group. I will begin by thanking the Rapporteur for his report, in which he makes the very basic point that the Assembly as such is powerless to inform the public and maintain public relations. The resolution in fact makes an urgent appeal to the members of the national delegations to follow up WEU's activities, which ought really to be the Assembly's responsibility, in the national parliaments and the national media.

The public is interested in aspects of peace and security. Referring to a report by Mr. Lagorce, however, the Rapporteur points out that the Western European public at least tends to take peace and security in our part of the world for granted and completely ignores the fact peace and security each have their price, in financial as well as political terms.

Another point is that the public is made use of in the political dispute surrounding the question of peace and security. This puts a different complexion on the question of public relations for any organisation, including Western European Union. I think it is generally true to say of our part of the world, Western Europe, that it consists of open democracies in which citizens elect their representatives. These electors are

*Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers (continued)*

entitled to hear the justification for positions adopted, and that goes for peace and security too. But at the end of the twentieth century we have gone a step further than in the nineteenth. It is no longer simply a question of representation: it is also a matter of participation. This means that we are living in a society of emancipated citizens who join in the debate on the course that policy should follow, including policy on such subjects as peace and security.

Information, or public relations, is then very important, especially that provided by various social groupings, but also when it stems from governments and parliaments. Very basic to all this is the political question that must first be answered by the elected representatives and the government. The question is this: how will Western European Union develop in relation to NATO, and should there be more extensive political co-operation within the European Community? Only if this is clarified will the public also take an interest in the problem and want to participate in the discussion of the nature of the European organisation and its tasks and powers. In this respect the parliamentarians of Western European Union can play a pioneering rôle in their own countries.

An important factor in this context is the Assembly's relationship with the Council. Mr. Eysink refers to this in paragraph 44. The point about resources is, of course, extremely important. What money do we have available? This is discussed in paragraphs 82 and 59. I do not think the media will play a part until the last moment, when not only Western European Union but also the national parliaments realise that we are dealing with a serious organisation. Procedures in themselves do not produce anything, although the procedures Mr. Eysink proposes are certainly worth the trouble. The first question will be the substance of WEU's task and the attitude the Western European member countries take towards the development of Western European Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY (*United Kingdom*). – I welcome the report on the promotion of parliamentary and public interest in WEU matters and add my endorsement to its recommendations made in the draft resolution. At the same time I wish to comment on Mr. Eysink's report on the conclusions relating to the rôle of public relations.

The Rapporteur was kind enough in her explanatory memorandum to make reference to my initiative, via House of Commons questions, in which I sought to instigate, for the United

Kingdom Parliament, government reports on WEU Assembly sessions and government statements on the work of WEU. Although I have been only partly successful in achieving my objectives, at least one more opportunity for the affairs of WEU to be made known at Westminster has to some extent been gained.

The Rapporteur also draws attention to the need for the mention of WEU in parliamentary speeches. Perhaps I might be permitted to give a brief example, again in terms of the House of Commons. A recent debate was on the regrettably ever-topical subject of crime prevention. This gave an opportunity to raise the excellent proposals by the President of the Assembly in his memorandum of 17th April.

I quote briefly from Westminster's Hansard report of my speech on that occasion:

“With regard to terrorism a new initiative for international co-operation has been put forward by Western European Union for a European group to co-ordinate the fight against terrorism under the initials GECLAT. The blindness of the choice of targets masks the optical accuracy in the aims of the terrorists. It is fervently to be hoped that the government will play a leading rôle in the fight-back via this proposal. The group, involving the seven member countries, would centralise all information obtained by relevant security services so that threats can be ascertained and assessed. The group would plan, prepare and co-ordinate measures so that frontiers provide no barriers. The group would create an operational unit for rapid intervention against any terrorist threat wherever it might arise.”

It is right for us all as parliamentarians to encourage the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, under the expert chairmanship of Lady Jill Knight, in its valuable work. However, it is wrong for us as parliamentarians to leave this work simply to the committee's members. The obligation rests with each member of parliament to ensure not only the success of Western European Union in its defence rôle for Europeans, but the success of Western European Union in publicising its work on behalf of Europeans.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it was with some affection – if I may use the expression – that I listened to the Secretary-General's reply to a question put to him. He said that he was constantly trying to bring in the press and asking journalists to write about WEU and publicise its activities. He added that he himself had written many articles that had been published. All pre-

*Mr. Cavaliere (continued)*

vious speakers have stressed the need to make WEU better known. So I ask myself why does the press ignore WEU? I know that journalists are always looking for news which will interest the public and for newsworthy events and demonstrations. I know that both state and private television services are always looking for eminent persons and news. But when do they do it? When they think that the delegates present, the events and the work of assemblies may interest the public, when they think that delegates have something interesting to say and when the work done is likely to interest the public and be appreciated.

I have heard every minister who has spoken here say that WEU is the only Assembly entitled by international treaty to discuss defence and security problems. In practice however, what do we do of real interest to parliaments and our public? Let us not forget that when the reactivation of WEU was mooted and the wonderful meeting was held in Rome – wonderful not only for the important people who attended and discussed the problem, but also if I may say so, for the background provided by the Coliseum and St. Peter's and for Italy's magnificent hospitality, almost two years ago – the public was interested and both the press and television covered WEU not only in member countries but also in the Soviet Union which even protested at this attempt to reactivate a "war-mongering" organisation. Now, two years on, what has been done? What real steps forward have been taken? What interesting work do we do? And then we complain that the press and television pay no attention to us and that the public does not know what the organisation is and is not interested in what we do. No, we have no grounds for complaint.

So, either the Council decides to stop pulling our legs – if I may use the expression – and does something to strengthen the organisation and give it credibility, or everything will have been pointless.

Do you know what our electors often think? They think that we come here as tourists, for a rest, and that we do nothing constructive. We must all therefore decide to implement the modified Brussels Treaty and to make it work. If for example paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the treaty had been applied after the episode of the two missiles launched against Lampedusa, we would really have aroused public attention to WEU and would have shown it to be an organisation capable of creating situations which can and should give food for thought to ill-intentioned people. Instead nothing was done.

In these circumstances, ladies and gentlemen and members of the Council, we can discuss as much as we like, we can complain as much as we like but we can blame no one but ourselves.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Jill Knight.

Lady Jill KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – I ask you, Mr. President, to be good enough to convey the gratitude of my committee to the Presidential Committee for the place it has given us on the agenda. The reports by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations have often been presented at the tail end of sessions when 95% of the representatives have gone home. The committee has always been a cinderella – always considered in the dying embers of the session. At last, we can go to the ball. It is wonderful that this committee's report is being considered first.

Unless we obtain publicity for our activities in this place, we may as well do nothing. It is right that we should all discuss this matter. I am afraid that, unless we succeed in making our activities known to the public and parliaments, we shall not succeed. We spend much time and money in coming to this place. We could all be doing other things. But we try to help this body to do a good job. Unless we can get matters across to the public, it will all be to no avail.

I should like to apologise on behalf of Mrs. Fischer who had every intention of being here to present her report following Mr. Eysink, because the debate is on both reports. It is perhaps a little confusing that we have heard only from Mr. Eysink. No doubt we shall hear why Mrs. Fischer was not able to be here.

I have listened with great interest to what has been said. My committee is only too well aware of the lack of knowledge among the public, newspaper men and even ministers about WEU. Our stablemate – the Council of Europe – is cursed with the same total ignorance by the public. Most people think that the Council of Europe is a part of the European Parliament. All members here know the difficulties faced in publicising their rôles.

Part of the problem in the Assembly is that we do not do interesting things. To get the press to interest themselves in what we do we must have a good and interesting story to tell them. Mr. Müller and Mr. Cavaliere were right – we must find some way to catch the headlines with our activities. Of course, it is true that, if we prevailed upon the President to place a daisy in his mouth and dance the tango on the table tops in the Crazy Horse, we would get publicity in every paper in Europe. However, I would hesitate to urge the President to forget his natural dignity and take such a course, even if it were for the good of WEU. I doubt that that would be for

*Lady Jill Knight (continued)*

WEU's good. We want publicity, but the right sort.

We could be more successful in obtaining publicity even for what we are doing now. There could hardly be a more publicity-provoking subject at the moment than terrorism. We are debating it this week and I hope that we shall say or do something that will catch the headlines. Surely that is a matter in which the press are very interested. Disarmament is another matter on which we could gain publicity. I know that we would not get much publicity for the more technical side of our work because technicalities do not go over well in newspaper stories. I trust that our publicity officer, when we get one, will be aware of what interests the press.

The committee recognises its duties and responsibilities. It has many plans, but to some extent we have been told to build a house with no bricks. To carry the message of WEU to all member countries, the parliamentarians representing them and the public we have set up a series of meetings. Already we have had meetings in Rome, Bonn and Paris. We were to hold a meeting in London but we ran out of money and our committee was told that the information discussions for London should be conducted in Paris. I do not know how we could afford to carry everyone on aeroplanes from London to Paris to attend our meetings.

We do not want a lot of money. The committee has not travelled a great deal. However, we cannot do our job sufficiently well when money is being cut back so much that we cannot go to talks about our work.

There are many ideas and interesting points in the two reports. Mr. Eysink rightly reminded colleagues in paragraph 24 that all parliamentarians have responsibilities. We are sincere and determined about what we want to do. I very much hope that we shall have the backing of the whole Assembly in doing that.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you very much. I am in full agreement with you. This is a very important matter and we must take a decision.

I should first like to ask the Rapporteur to express his opinion. It may be useful to postpone the decision on the last point because we need a special presenter of votes.

I call Mr. Eysink.

Mr. EYSINK (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, to comply with Mr. Tummers' urgent request and demonstrate my great talents as a speaker, I shall reply in my own language, Dutch.

Mr. Tummers made a particular point of saying that a report like this one was in danger of appearing as a kind of alibi, consisting of words, words and more words, and in fact doing very little to explain to the public what WEU involves. For that you need a public relations officer, and Mr. Tummers says that he must also know something about public opinion on Western European defence and that, if he only recounts what we know about it, that is unlikely to be the answer to the question the public is asking us. One of the most important things in this connection — as Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers has pointed out — is that besides NATO, an organisation like WEU exists, and people need clarification of the relationship between the organisations: why is one part of WEU in Paris, when France is not a member of NATO, and another part of the WEU apparatus in London, Britain being, of course, in NATO? These are questions to which the public requires answers — meaningful ones. We must first have the answers ourselves. If we do not have them, we must formulate them.

Mr. Tummers also referred to his remarkable discovery concerning managers. They are not the only ones: there are all kinds of congresses attended by people who do not know what WEU is. If there is so little interest in our activities in Western Europe, or call it simply NATO's activities in Europe, whereas they do attract interest in Eastern Europe, we must do something about it. Mrs. den Ouden-Dekkers said that a great deal depends on the delegations and the members of this Assembly. This is the only genuine parliamentary assembly that is constituted democratically and discusses defence democratically, criticising and exercising control as necessary. This should surely be more widely known and also inspire more confidence, not only among the members themselves — I do not think there is a lack in that quarter — but, remarkably, in our governments, which are not only confronted with defence questions in their own parliaments but also with what we say about these questions in Paris. They say: is this really necessary? And I say it is, because in Europe we discuss these matters with one another. It is therefore a good thing that the ministers listen in from time to time. They should be paying heed to what we want, not just what we say.

Mr. President, it is hardly possible to support Mr. Cavaliere's words because he does so with such vigour himself. But we must listen closely to what he says. It is true that the democratic way in which we consider defence questions is unique in the world. Mr. Cavaliere stressed this, pointing out how important it is that our own people should know it. When the home front is asked what we do, it is said that this must be a very secret club, because you never read anything about it, you never see any reports in

*Mr. Eysink (continued)*

the press. So I have a good idea, Mr. President. I have several, in fact, but this is the one I want to disclose today. We rent Capri and seal it off hermetically. We then meet in the select company we now have here and all the journalists and TV commentators start swimming from Naples to Capri. If something is really exclusive and secret, they will come. As long as we discuss defence questions in public and our discussions are not reported in the media, we shall go on talking to each other. What the committee wants to achieve with its report is an improvement in this situation. I hope the recommendations it contains will be approved by this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the two draft resolutions and afterwards on the draft resolutions regarding the revision and interpretation of the Assembly's Charter and the Rules of Procedure which, to be adopted, need to be voted for by forty-five members. I would therefore ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to remain in the chamber because if the number of members is not sufficient when the time comes we shall have to postpone the votes.

We shall first proceed to vote on the draft resolution in Document 1038.

No one has asked for a vote by roll-call.

I shall therefore put the draft resolution to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The draft resolution is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft resolution in Document 1056.

No one has asked for a vote by roll-call.

I therefore put the draft resolution to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The draft resolution is adopted<sup>2</sup>.*

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. May I ask whether the bells for voting have been rung? I do not think that they have.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The bells had been rung.

I must suspend the sitting because of the absence of the Chairman of the committee.

The sitting is suspended.

*(The sitting was suspended at 4.40 p.m. and resumed at 4.50 p.m.)*

*(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

The sitting is resumed.

### **9. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and votes on the draft resolutions, Doc. 1039 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on the revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure and votes on the draft resolutions, Document 1039 and amendments.

May I remind you that at its sitting on 5th December 1985 the Assembly decided to refer the report back to committee.

I call Mr. Schulte, Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should first like to say how happy I am that we are in a position to discuss this subject. On the other hand, I must say that, when I look round, we probably do not have enough members present to achieve what we have set out to do.

Mr. President, as you know, what we are discussing here are amendments to the Charter and if these amendments are to be approved forty-five representatives must be present. That does not appear to be the case at the moment.

This is not the first time we have discussed our work, which – I should remind you – was, of course, initiated by the Bureau. But as there are probably other and perhaps new representatives here today, we should like to give a brief outline once again. This will be done by one of our three Rapporteurs, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim. I request you, Mr. President, to give Mr. Spies von Büllesheim the floor in his capacity as Rapporteur.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we three Rapporteurs – Mr. Unland, Mr. Eysink and myself – agree that there is little point in each of us presenting his amendments

1. See page 23.

2. See page 24.

*Mr. Spies von Büllenheim (continued)*

individually. This is a difficult matter and in most respects it can only be understood if the amendments are weighed up one against the other. I have taken it upon myself to give a short introduction for the three of us. This introduction can be particularly short because I do not intend to repeat the introduction given by Mr. Unland during the part-session in December of last year.

As our President has just said, we presented our proposals in December, but it was evident that not enough representatives would be in the chamber to amend the Charter.

I should first like to point out that the amendments to the Charter are no more than a follow-up to the amendments we have proposed to the Rules of Procedure. I think it would do no harm to complete the discussion of the Rules of Procedure, since all the amendments to the Charter have also been discussed in the context of the Rules of Procedure. If we do not sort out the Charter today, that might be done later. We can debate the substance of the matter during the debate on the Rules of Procedure. We are aware that the main points we have amended recur in some of the amendments, of which there are now nineteen. It is therefore probably right to examine the various views during the debate on the various amendments.

Afterwards it will probably be announced that Amendments 5 and 7, say, have been withdrawn. Some of the amendments have, moreover, been approved by the committee, so they are not a problem.

We have discussed all the Rules of Procedure at several meetings. As you can see from the paper, there is a large number of amendments. Many provisions are being amended only because we make it clear from the outset that substitutes for representatives have the same rights as the latter. This means that the words "or substitute" can be dropped from many provisions. The result is that quite a number of paragraphs have to be changed. But in many of them only the word "substitute" is omitted.

We have also introduced a number of definitions, where different words have crept in for the same parliamentary action, for instance "proposal" and "motion". We have tried to simplify and clarify this.

Of course there are amendments, which have, or might be regarded as having, a political quality. First and foremost, there is the position of the Clerk. It has been made clear that we are not referring to the present Clerk. The first step is to fix the Clerk's mandate at five years, about which there is unfortunately still

some uncertainty. We cannot eliminate this uncertainty now.

We consider it necessary for parliamentary assemblies to strengthen the position of their president. We have amended the Charter to read that the Clerk is directly responsible to the President in respect of his official duties. We also believe this example should be followed by other parliaments. Unlike the Council of Europe, for example, we do not happen to have a political figure, a secretary-general. We therefore believe that the Clerk, who is after all an official working under the President, does not need to be, and should not be, elected by the Assembly, as he is at present. His is simply not a political post. And we neither can nor would wish to change his post into a political one artificially.

We have not only strengthened the position of the Clerk but also that of the Presidential Committee. The importance of the Presidential Committee has been stressed from time to time on the grounds that it consists of the Vice-Presidents, the chairmen of the committees and the chairmen of the political groups. That is a relatively broad base.

Those who say, as one amendment does, that it would be better for the Clerk to be elected by the Assembly as he is now, should remember that applications and confidential information may be disclosed to the public. These are things that are better dealt with in a confidential body like the Presidential Committee.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have only been able to mention a few points. I have been brief because Mr. Unland discussed other points in December and also because we shall be reverting to various amendments which the committee has made when we come to discussing the amendments in a moment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges for the considerable amount of work it has done, for its task was extremely difficult. I hope members will be present in large numbers to pay honour to the report that the committee has presented.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I think I should open my brief remarks by repeating your tribute to the Chairman of the committee and all its members for their important work, which has required a great deal of time and much discussion. The rules of procedure of a democratic assembly are a very important matter and at once raise what I regard as the basic problem

*Mr. Antoni (continued)*

of combining the need for efficient parliamentary work with respect for democracy in that work and hence the right and duty of parliamentarians – whatever their views – and in particular respect for minorities and the efficient working of the Assembly.

In my view, I am happy to say, the work done has produced a positive and substantially productive result. I think that – possibly not this afternoon – continuation of the work should, if we can solve a few outstanding problems, enable us to improve on the present Rules of Procedure because the new version takes substantial account of the experience of the last few years and because I believe a balance has been achieved – which is not always easy with the basic problem which I mentioned of a proper balance between disciplined and effective work and respect for democracy. In my view this balance is generally achieved in all the basic elements of the proposal submitted to us, not only as regards the powers of the President which I do not see as being substantially increased except to improve the efficiency of the Assembly – again, with due respect for the Assembly and proper emphasis on the democratic rights of individual parliamentarians.

As the Rapporteur said, there may be disagreement on individual minor questions and these will be debated.

I confirm that I can on the whole support the text before us but differ on what is not a secondary question. This is why not only my group but also the whole Italian Delegation make the point and submit the amendments to their colleagues. The question raised, on which I disagree with the Rapporteur, is his statement confirming the contents of the present Rules of Procedure. This is the question of the Clerk of the Assembly, the official who according to the text should not be a political figure, which we wish him to be. My personal view is that it might be more productive to follow the example of other European institutions such as the Council of Europe because a political status and the duties of someone who would no longer be simply an official could give added weight to the Clerk's post, but this is not guaranteed by the text proposed and confirmed by the Rapporteur.

For this reason, we like some other members, have tabled amendments proposing that the Assembly be competent to set the rules for the appointment of the Clerk.

Mr. President, I do not wish to be discourteous to the Assembly by repeating what I have already said but equally I do not wish to be discourteous to the Rapporteur by not doing so. As I think that the first consideration is

more important I would ask the Rapporteur to excuse me and to look into the points raised by myself, the President and other members.

I would say finally that it would be better to give further thought to the question of the Clerk of the Assembly. At the end of his speech the Rapporteur said in so many words that the changes should be discussed further. I would ask what the Rapporteur meant. Did he mean that discussion would end when the amendments were taken and that the whole matter would be closed this afternoon or will there be the possibility of further discussion on this point of substance?

I ask this question, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, because some of us are concerned over the date for the entry into force of the new rules which has been set for October next. I think that there should be time for further discussion and that a decision should be taken during the present session but not necessarily this afternoon.

Finally, in addition to the points which I have raised we are particularly anxious that the change regarding the Clerk of the Assembly should be accepted so that we can prepare to take a vote on this major question now before the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Jill Knight.

Lady Jill KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – Rules exist to assist in the smooth and effective running of our business. Rules are the oil without which the machinery would seize up. However much we all love freedom, we all agree that we must have rules. I want to make one or two comments on changes that are before us today. I am somewhat concerned about the considerations affecting the behaviour of media representatives in this chamber. We are told that we are to have guidelines. I am sure we shall all be interested in those. What, for instance, will be the details concerning accreditation, or the numbers of technicians allowed to operate in the chamber at any one time? It can be extremely difficult working under television lights. I hope that there will be some ruling about that. There are questions about the restrictions to be placed upon these people. Where will they be able to go? Will they be in front of us, in the aisles or among the seats? It will be important for us to look carefully at what is suggested for these technicians.

I hope that I will be forgiven for commenting on the draft resolution which refers to the position that might arise if the President speaks in debate on a specific subject. It is said that he may not resume the chair until the debate on that subject is over. I hope that I shall be understood when I say that I very much hope that our President will not speak in a debate.

*Lady Jill Knight (continued)*

In the British Houses of Parliament we have Mr. Speaker and chairmen. If Mr. Speaker came down from his exalted position and merely became one of the rest of us taking part in a debate, somehow the coinage would be debased. I should not like to see you, Mr. President, descend from your exalted position. It is a wise and right rule that presidents should not speak in debates in the same way as the rest of us.

I should like to put forward a point that I have been longing to make for a long time. I believe that we would make far better use of our time if we paid more attention to the clock. All too often we begin ten minutes late. We have breaks in the middle and we do not know for how long they will continue. Our time is limited and the agendas are long.

I am horrified – I am sorry if this upsets anyone – to learn that no fewer than five ministers will address the Assembly in this session. One would have been enough. Those of us who have been members of WEU for some time know that ministers are often late. A year ago, we waited forty minutes for one minister. That is a discourtesy to the Assembly, and it is time someone said so. It is a great waste of our time. While we are waiting, we chat among ourselves and that is very pleasant. But we cannot possibly get through the items on the agenda if ministers often arrive late.

I am told that any minister of a member country is entitled to address us should he or she take it into his or her head to do so. Is it beyond the wit of man, the Presidential Committee and the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to devise a new method? Could we not say: "We should be delighted to hear you, Sir, but one – or perhaps two ministers at the outside – are already listed. We shall not get through our agenda if there are five ministers."? I may be alone in that opinion, but I believe that we spend far too much time departing from the agenda almost at the drop of a hat because a minister has come along to be heard. Of course, there are ministers whom we very much want to hear. Many say interesting things and I do not mean to belittle them. But there are too many and it wastes too much of the time of WEU.

I hope that the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges will consider how we can use our time in Paris better. Those are a few suggestions on how we might do so.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I shall confine myself to one point which I consider important

because it relates to the structure and work of the Assembly. I agree with much of what the previous speaker said and feel there is no need to dwell any further on his sound arguments. Together with other Italian representatives, I have tabled an amendment concerning the Clerk of the Assembly. The Rapporteur, commenting on methods, said that the Rules of Procedure for our Assembly should be looked at as a whole. As for some other types of machinery which should work properly, it is a matter of checking whether all the little wheels are in the right place. Precisely because this idea can be accepted I would point out that the proposal made by the Rapporteur concerning the Clerk of the Assembly in his report destroys the balance and harmony which we seek for the work of the Assembly.

Under the terms of Article XI (a) of the existing Charter the rôle and function of the Clerk of the Assembly are not simply those of a civil servant. I would remind the Assembly that the principle on which the Assembly's Charter was based requires that the Clerk make a solemn declaration before the Assembly that he will be answerable only to the Assembly in the performance of his duty, in complete independence of any links with his country of origin or with other countries. This is based on the very clear doctrine that the Clerk shall be answerable to the Assembly and its committees, as a personality with more than purely administrative duties but equally without a clearly political function. In practice, the person concerned tries to establish, as happens in other parliaments, a special relationship between the Assembly and the actual work of the Office of the Clerk. That is why I believe that the principle of direct appointment by the Assembly should be maintained precisely in order to restore that relationship. Nor do I see how the powers assigned to the Clerk can be left in the hands of a limited body such as the Bureau in which there are special balances, because not all member countries are represented, because for various historic reasons there are special links and solidarity between some countries and because that situation may ultimately lead to majorities not representative of the Assembly as a whole.

For these reasons I insist on the principle underlying our amendment which meets the general criterion of seeking the most efficient way of running the Assembly and establishing a relationship of trust between the Assembly itself and its Clerk.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone else wish to speak?...

The debate is closed.

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have just a few comments to make because the three Rapporteurs will be speaking to this matter in detail when the various amendments are discussed.

Firstly, Mr. President, I have a request to make to you. I would ask you to begin with the approval of the Rules of Procedure rather than the Charter and to take the amendments to the Charter afterwards. I do not think anything in the Rules of Procedure precludes our proceeding in this way.

Perhaps as Chairman of the committee I might be allowed to make just one more comment on the principal reform we have proposed. Mr. President, I must remind all the members of our Assembly that the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was instructed by the Bureau to examine and, if possible, restructure the position and situation of the Clerk.

The essential point in this provision – and I am now addressing primarily the Italian members who have expressed their views in amendments – is not the question of the electing body. The essential point is the limitation of this mandate, enabling the Assembly to hold a fresh election at regular, five-year intervals – we picked a five-year period in parallel with other institutions of this kind. I feel it is rather important to emphasise this.

Whether we have the Clerk elected by the Assembly or the Presidential Committee may in some respects be a very practical, pragmatic question, but it is nonetheless a question which, as we see the post of Clerk, needs to be answered. We do feel, however, that the function performed by the Clerk of the Assembly of Western European Union differs not inconsiderably from that of, say, the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. The Secretary-General of the Council of Europe undoubtedly has a political post, and it is seen as such. But ever since I first became a member of WEU – I should point out that what I am saying now does not concern the present incumbent and his ability, which I hold in high regard, but the function which he has to perform – I have regarded the Clerk only as the most senior official of this parliamentary Assembly, whose main task it is to assist the President and Bureau and to ensure that the staff carry out their duties as prescribed. I cannot remember an occasion on which the Clerk has been politically active in this Assembly. Nor, as we see it, should he ever be so. I therefore call on you all to consider this very carefully.

But a decision that the whole Assembly should elect the most senior official would, of course, be

a major indication that he is being allotted a political function. This was what prompted our decision to propose the Presidential Committee as the electing body. But if it is now said, pragmatically, that it is better for the whole Assembly to do this because political opinions and possibly national interests are more clearly reflected in an election by the whole Assembly, no one in the committee will in fact disagree. So this is something that should also be decided by the Assembly.

I would, however, ask the Italian members to appreciate that their amendment would result in there being no change in the Clerk's duties and no time-limit on his mandate, whereas a very large majority of the members of the committee felt that at least this time-limit should be introduced.

Let me say once again that this was not in any way an arbitrary act by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. We were not in any way presumptuous, or doing things we were not entitled to do. We examined the question very thoroughly because that is what we had been instructed to do by the Bureau and the President. This question is as topical today as it was two years ago.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges has raised a problem of a procedural nature with regard to our debate.

As you know a very large number of amendments have been tabled on a text that was adopted by the Committee on Rules of Procedure in 1985 but which we were unable to vote on at our last part-session in the absence of the quorum necessary for adopting amendments to the Charter. Naturally enough, further amendments have come in since raising the total number to seventeen, many of which incidentally have not been considered by the committee itself. All the amendments are valid: they were handed in to the President's office in the proper manner and are therefore eligible for debate.

The essential point for us is whether we shall have time to finish the debate today and here I repeat the appeal made by the committee to the whole house.

We have just had the bells rung in the building so that all members present can resume their seats in the chamber. Echoing Mr. Ferrari Aggradi who was kind enough to preside over the sitting a moment ago I would remind you that, to be adopted, any amendment to the Charter has to be voted for by at least forty-five members which means that at least forty-five must be present in the chamber. For the last half hour however, with my apologies to the observers whom I cannot count because they do not have the right

*The President (continued)*

to vote, there have been a maximum of twenty-five to twenty-eight present.

My second observation concerns the following: there is no explicit reference in the Rules of Procedure but in Article XII of the Charter, paragraph (a) of which deals with amendments to the Charter and paragraph (b) with the adoption of the Rules of Procedure, I read that amendments to the Rules of Procedure follow amendments to the Charter. In other words, the Charter prevails over the Rules of Procedure, not the reverse. We feel that this principle is fairly easy to apply.

However, in view of the possible absence of a quorum, which we will have to check when the time comes, the committee, which does not want its report to be postponed again, suggests that we first vote on the amendments to the Rules of Procedure and only when that has been done on those to the Charter. As President of the Assembly, subject to your agreement, I can see no objection in principle if we leave out the amendments which apply only to an amended Charter. After all, it is difficult for us to ask the Assembly to adopt an amendment which would not be in agreement with the Charter. If we went along with the committee's proposal we would therefore have to decide that paragraphs 1, 3 and 23 of the draft resolution tabled by the committee should not be voted upon. That would mean that Amendments 2, 8 and 9 could not be considered because the Charter would not have been amended beforehand. That is the procedural problem facing us.

I therefore ask the committee to tell the Assembly whether that interpretation corresponds to what it wants; in other words, does it agree that we should not consider those amendments? If the committee takes the opposite view, I shall again consult the Assembly on the procedure to follow.

I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, you have just referred to Article XII of the Charter. There is, of course, no denying that the Charter ranks higher. Hence the need for an absolute majority. But the Rules of Procedure add the detail to the framework that is the Charter. They stipulate what may be amended and how. The various provisions you have just read out also require amendments to the Charter.

The only sensible way I can envisage for dealing with this is to take the amendments to the Rules of Procedure first and vote on them, but with the proviso that the Charter is amended

accordingly afterwards. If we began by discussing the Charter, we should have to discuss all the details that will be referred to again when we come to the amendments to the Rules of Procedure. I consider that technically impossible.

I therefore propose that we begin by giving members the details by discussing and voting on Amendments 2 to 19 with the proviso that you have explicitly mentioned, that there should subsequently be a vote on the whole issue. We will then know how the land lies and agree on questions, and then at the end decide on the essential amendment, to the Charter, in connection with Article XII, and, if necessary, discuss the Rules of Procedure once again.

But to include all this in the discussion of the main issue would be a completely impossible procedure. There would be total confusion, which those of us who know something about the matter would like to spare our colleagues.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to maintain the amendments. In my view the problem is not one of procedure but of numbers. It seems to me that there is no quorum for taking a vote on the amendments. A decision has to be taken therefore because it does not seem right and proper to me to record that the statutory quorum for the approval of changes is not present.

I request the President to suspend the sitting if necessary and to return to the subject later.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I would like to intervene in this procedural debate to put a suggestion that I feel would make sense.

Even if I could, I would not wish to rule on the basis of a point accepted in principle. Speaking on behalf of the committee, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim has endorsed my view by stating that the law of the Charter takes precedence over the Rules of Procedure, which means that we cannot change the Rules of Procedure before the Charter has been changed. However, in view of the difficulties facing us the committee proposes that we should begin by considering the Rules of Procedure if we have the necessary quorum, which is not the case at the moment. My concern is not to prevent the Assembly from pursuing its work provided we adhere strictly to the rules both of the Charter and the Rules of Procedure.

Since Amendment 2 by Mr. Bianco, Amendments 8 and 9 by Lord Hughes and Amendment 11 by Mr. Schulte come at the end of the list of amendments to the Rules of Procedure that we have to consider, that would allow us, if the

*The President (continued)*

Assembly were in agreement, to begin by taking the amendments to the Rules of Procedure where there could be no conflict with the corresponding paragraphs in the Charter. We could therefore consider amendments 13 by Mr. Schulte, 14 by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, 19 by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, 4 by Lord Hughes, 15 by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, 16 by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, 5 by Lord Hughes, 17 by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, 6 by Lord Hughes, 7 by Lord Hughes and 18 by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg without any problem of rules arising in relation to the Charter.

After that we shall come to the four other amendments that will not need to be taken if there are no prior amendments made to the Charter. At that point we could decide, if we still have no quorum, to be strict and to adjourn the debate. If we have the quorum we could change both the Charter and the Rules of Procedure; I hope this will be possible between 5.30 p.m. and 6.30 p.m.

That is the most sensible method that I can propose to the Assembly, failing which I shall be forced to ask the Assembly to decide on the question of principle as to whether the Rules of Procedure should or should not be considered before the Charter.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I think that the silent majority has expressed its view.

The debate has shown clearly that we are making a mistake in proposing to change the rules at the end of the day's sitting. I am sure that the entire Assembly will support me in asking firmly the Presidential Committee to accept that rule changes should come at the beginning of the first day's sitting, not at the end.

We should not be in this mess if the Presidential Committee had accepted the advice of the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and proposed the changes at the beginning of the day.

We have learnt that, important though our debates are, the rules are the framework within which they take place. I hope that at future meetings we do not put ourselves into a mess of our own creation.

I support you, Mr. President, in the way in which you are trying to get us out of the mess, but I hope that the Clerk will note that rule changes should be examined under item one of day one of our sittings so that a quorum does not cause difficulty.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – I very much agree with what Sir Geoffrey has just said. I hope that I am not wrong in saying this, but apart from the amendments that would have to be postponed because they apply both to the Charter and to the rules affecting the position of the Clerk, most of the others will not be the subject of lengthy debate. For example, none of the seven amendments that I have tabled and the six tabled by Sir Geoffrey is in conflict with each other. Sir Geoffrey knows that I shall be supporting his amendments, and I know that he will be supporting mine. It may well be that that will reflect the Assembly's view of these amendments.

I would be content to leave out the amendments to the rules that are contingent on the Charter being altered, provided that you can accept Sir Geoffrey's advice that the vote on the Charter is held early in the proceedings, either tomorrow or on Wednesday. If the vote takes place on Tuesday or Wednesday afternoon, we shall be no further forward than we are now. I hope therefore that the business can be rearranged, because I do not think that the proceedings will be lengthy.

Basically, there are four amendments that are all on the same subject. Therefore, there need only be a limited number of speakers before the vote is taken. If either Mr. Bianco's amendment or my amendment is carried, two of the remaining ones will fall. If Mr. Bianco's amendments are carried, mine fall, and vice versa. All this need not take much time, but I emphasise what Sir Geoffrey has said about taking the vote on the other amendments early in the proceedings.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone else wish to speak?...

I would like to make something clear.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg asked me whether the Assembly would not agree to take such important items early in the sitting so that they could be properly discussed. It is true that the Committee on Rules of Procedure asked for the item to head the orders of the day for this sitting but we had also received the same request for the reports that were adopted earlier and had also been postponed to this session from the last.

I note Sir Geoffrey's statement and I shall do everything I can to ensure that if such matters come up again, they are put on the orders of the day at the beginning of the sitting in order to give everybody time to join in the debate.

Nevertheless, to repeat the view expressed by Sir Geoffrey, who said he concurred with my proposal, it is in the interests of the Assembly to find some suitable procedure to enable the

*The President (continued)*

debate that has begun to be concluded in the best possible conditions.

That is why I would like to maintain the proposal I made to you a moment ago to the effect that we should not for the moment be too inflexible on the issue of whether we should vote on the Charter prior to the Rules of Procedure or on the Rules of Procedure prior to the Charter in order to solve the problem of all the amendments to the Rules of Procedure which do not require prior revision of the Charter. This would dispose of two-thirds if not four-fifths of the amendments that have been tabled.

May I ask the chairmen of delegations, via their secretariats, to ask all members not present in the chamber to join us in the next few minutes because we could, if Lord Hughes is right, probably bring things to a conclusion fairly quickly.

I would therefore ask for the necessary steps to be taken by the Clerk of the Assembly so that all members are aware that their presence in the chamber is essential. Some are missing; everything must be done, successfully I hope, to bring them here.

Do you agree with the procedure I have proposed?...

It is so decided.

Mr. Schulte has tabled Amendment 13 which reads:

13. At the beginning of the operative text of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, after "To amend the Rules of Procedure as follows" insert "and that these amendments shall come into force on 1st October 1986".

I call Mr. Schulte.

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would ask you to call on the appropriate rapporteur – one of the three who have divided up this matter among themselves – to state his views.

We would do better to begin with our paper. Only a few modifications to our amendments have been proposed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – My intention was to take the amendments in view of the fact that the report has already been presented by the committee. If you wish to present it again I am at your service but since Amendment 13 is the first tabled by Mr. Schulte and others...

I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, Rapporteur.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I will briefly explain Amendment 13.

It seeks to have the amendments come into force on 1st October 1986. Why has this date been proposed? Because the new Rules of Procedure should, if possible, enter into force in good time before our next part-session in December and also because we need some time for technical matters before the amendments come into force. The new Rules of Procedure have to be printed and so on. The secretariat has proposed 1st October because that would leave enough time for everything to be printed and for arrangements to be made for the application of the new Rules of Procedure at the next part-session.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

The committee is in agreement with its Rapporteur, the Assembly having been informed.

I put the amendment to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 13 is agreed to.*

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has tabled Amendment 14 which reads:

14. In paragraph 8 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out the proposal to add at the end of paragraph 2 "If the President speaks in a debate on a specific subject, he may not resume the chair until the debate on that subject is over."

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to propose this amendment, as well as Amendment 19, later because it is related. I propose the deletion of the suggestion of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges because I do not believe that the President ought to participate in a debate. My colleague, Lady Jill Knight...

Mr. UNLAND (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, on a point of order.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, a valued member of our committee, has tabled a number of amendments, which we have not yet been able to discuss in committee. I should therefore like to ask Sir Geoffrey to consider the possibility of allowing the committee to examine these amendments at one of its forthcoming meetings. We have various other things to do in committee and could take this opportunity for a thorough discussion of his amendments, starting at Amendment 14. Not even we Rapporteurs have yet had the time to consider these amendments, because they were not tabled until this morning.

*Mr. Unland (continued)*

I believe it is particularly in the author's interests for us to consider these amendments carefully and then perhaps to vote on them at a future part-session.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Sir Geoffrey, the committee invites you to withdraw your amendment so that it may be studied by the committee. What is your opinion?...

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – The committee has not asked me to withdraw the amendment. One Rapporteur has asked me to do so. I am not prepared to withdraw the amendment, although I may be prepared to withdraw others later. I will not withdraw this amendment because the committee is making a suggestion about the President and, as a result, it would be wrong not to deal with this amendment. In almost no assembly does the presiding officer take part in the debate. All that I am trying to do is to make certain that the presiding officer takes no part in our debates. If we were to leave the matter as it is we would be saying "if the President speaks in the debate". I believe that we are correct in our original rules in preserving completely the neutrality of the President. That is all that I am trying to do.

I accept what the Rapporteur said a moment ago in his point of order. I will be delighted to ask for permission to withdraw other amendments and to take them back. However, this relates to something that we are discussing in Document 1039 and it seems perfectly right that it should be discussed and supported by colleagues.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly having been informed, the committee has already stated its view. I shall nevertheless call the committee again because it has the right to speak whenever it so wishes.

Mr. EYSINK (*Netherlands*). – As the Rapporteur dealing with this part of the rules I must object to the intervention of Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, not because he tabled the amendment too late but because our committee, with a big majority, dealt with the question of the presidents of many democratic assemblies taking the floor to speak on matters affecting them as members. That is why we have given the President this opportunity rather than setting out the rules in the normal, legal way of a national chamber. That is why I do not agree with the amendment and ask the Assembly to reject it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 14 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 14 is negatived.*

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has tabled Amendment 19 which reads:

19. After paragraph 8 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, insert the following new paragraph:

*" Rule 12*

*After paragraph 1 insert:*

2. A Vice-President who replaces the President may not speak in the particular debate over which he has presided."

Renumber existing paragraph 2 accordingly.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Could I ask you, Mr. President, when you put this matter to the vote to make it clear that the opposition does not come from the committee, which did not discuss the matter? You said that the opinion of the committee was against the amendment. The committee has never discussed it. The Rapporteur was against it, not the committee, which has not discussed it. This amendment is in the same position as the last one I moved. I hope that no one will object to it since it merely puts the Vice-President in the same position as we have now put the President by the rule change that the committee, by its large majority, has adopted. It does no more and no less.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. You have again said that it is the committee's opinion, instead of the Rapporteur's opinion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Jessel, I perfectly understood Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's comments. That is his opinion.

When a rapporteur or a chairman speaks from the committee bench, the President treats what he has said as the opinion of the committee. The rest is a debate in which the Assembly or the committee can engage but it is not a matter for me...

Kindly allow the President to require the committees to shoulder their responsibilities.

As to the second appeal I have just made, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg spoke to his amendment and, as is my duty, ladies and gentlemen, I asked the committee for its opinion. I have to do so. Were I not to do so I would be breaking the rules.

I therefore hold that the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, in the person of Mr.

*The President (continued)*

Eysink who stood to speak, has the right to intervene.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I agree that what you have done is perfectly correct. However, it is a normal practice, when a rapporteur is speaking on a matter that has not been considered by the committee, for him to begin by saying that the committee has not had the opportunity of discussing the matter. It then becomes clear that he is doing his best to interpret the wishes of the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eysink.

Mr. EYSINK (*Netherlands*). – I will not seek to interpret the wishes of the committee. The committee has had no opportunity to discuss this amendment. The only thing I can say, as the Rapporteur nominated by the Assembly to deal with this item, is that the position is the same as it was on the earlier amendment. The same applies to the Vice-President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I shall be happy to give the floor to everyone who wants to speak. The committee asked for the floor after Sir Geoffrey. In my view Mr. Bianco, who has also asked for the floor, wants to speak against the amendment.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I wish to speak on a point of order.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – We are in a regrettable situation, primarily because the text of many amendments is not even known. We would therefore be voting without any guidance.

The committee has not discussed the amendments and what we are hearing, therefore, are simply personal views. I would therefore request the President to suspend the sitting and to refer everything back to the committee so that we can meet and arrive at a collective view.

We cannot simply change the rules of the game; they are rules which govern the whole life of the Assembly and should therefore be given proper and careful thought. Instead, we are falling into confusion with the result that a group of parliamentarians would be forced to abstain as they had no knowledge of the text of the amendments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have a request to adjourn the sitting. This is the second, because Mr. Bianco proposed the same thing a few moments ago. I intend to follow up

this proposal. This debate is not an easy one and I would be grateful for all your help in presiding over it.

I would simply remind you, in relation to the first point made by the committee, that when Amendment 14 tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg was called, Mr. Unland stood up to point out that the committee had not considered it. This he did on behalf of the committee, requesting Sir Geoffrey Finsberg to withdraw his amendment. Sir Geoffrey replied that he would not and Mr. Eysink, on behalf of the committee – this is a committee responsibility – made a comment which gave rise to various appeals to the Rules of Procedure. At that point the committee explained that it had not considered Sir Geoffrey's amendment. The same thing then happened to the Assembly as happened to the committee. The Assembly was invited by the President to give its opinion on an amendment it has not considered. But the amendment had been tabled in a valid manner on the President's desk. It was his duty to seek the opinion of the committee concerned sitting on the committee bench. That is what I did. At that point Mr. Bianco, realising that the debate was difficult asked for the committee to reconsider the issue on the basis, among other things, of the amendments of which it had no knowledge.

This is not a matter for the President to decide but one for the Assembly since the committee did not ask for the sitting to be adjourned.

Lest there should be any misunderstanding between us, ladies and gentlemen, I am going by the Rules of Procedure and not departing from them.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I think it is true to say that the ordinary member of the Assembly may state his views on a proposal such as that made by Mr. Bianco for the adjournment of the sitting. I am now speaking as an ordinary member rather than as an official representative of the committee. I say this to prevent any misunderstanding, although I undoubtedly agree with the other members of the committee.

In December we also had a request – similarly from our Italian friends – that the amendment of the Rules of Procedure should not be discussed. The question of a quorum was raised right at the beginning, whereas it is otherwise raised immediately before the vote. And precisely the same thing has happened today: the question of a quorum was raised right at the beginning. This is an attempt to postpone the debate again.

*Mr. Spies von Büllesheim (continued)*

An attempt is now being made to adjourn the debate because amendments have been tabled that have not yet been discussed by the committee.

Mr. President, we have all witnessed numerous debates here in which amendments were tabled without being discussed by the committee. The Chairman of the committee has said: I cannot comment on the committee's behalf. We have all had that experience here on numerous occasions.

The Chairman of the committee has not requested an adjournment. It is in fact obvious that the committee would now like to see a decision taken after all the work it has done. I therefore oppose the request for an adjournment. I call for the continuation of the debate. I myself and many others see absolutely no reason for yet another delay.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Rapporteur has just repeated after me, forcefully and skilfully, that the committee wishes to go on with the debate.

The fact remains that I have the proposal before me and that I have to apply the Rules of Procedure. Rule 32 says that, on points of order and in particular requests to adjourn a sitting or a debate, the closure of a debate or referral back to committee, priority is given to those members making the request.

Mr. Bianco has repeated his request a second time.

In accordance with paragraph 3 of Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, I call a speaker who wishes to speak against the member's proposal.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I am delighted to oppose the suggestion that we adjourn. If an adjournment is proposed, we must say for how long we shall adjourn. It would be ridiculous to adjourn for a quarter of an hour and expect a contentious matter to be resolved within that short time. If we have an adjournment, it means adjourning the sitting and resuming another day. For that reason, I totally oppose an adjournment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall now consult the Assembly on Mr. Bianco's proposal to adjourn the debate and to refer the report back to the committee.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The motion is defeated.*

I now put Amendment 19, tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 19 is negatived.*

Lord Hughes and others have tabled Amendment 4 as follows:

4. After paragraph 8 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, insert the following new paragraph:

“9. Rule 14

In paragraph 1, line 5, leave out ‘and’.

In paragraph 1, line 6, after ‘committees’ insert ‘and one member appointed by each political group’.

In paragraph 1, line 10, leave out ‘The President may invite the Chairmen of the political groups to attend meetings of the Presidential Committee.’”

I call Lord Hughes to speak to the amendment.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – I beg to move Amendment 4.

The amendment looks exceedingly complicated, but only because it begins by proposing that we leave out “and”. The effect would be to add to the composition of the Presidential Committee “one member appointed by each political group”.

The Presidential Committee consists of the President, the Vice-Presidents and the chairmen of committees. The end of Rule 14 states:

“The President may invite the Chairmen of the political groups to attend meetings of the Presidential Committee.”

As the rule stands, there may be a political group that has no representative who fills the rôle of President, Vice-President or committee chairman. On that basis, it would not be represented on the Presidential Committee which carries out all the essential functions which were hitherto within the function of the Bureau. The Presidential Committee is an important organ. I hope that this simple amendment to guarantee that every political group will have at least one representative on the Presidential Committee will be acceptable to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 4 tabled by Lord Hughes?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. EYSINK (*Netherlands*). – The committee agreed to the amendment unanimously.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall now put Amendment 4 tabled by Lord Hughes to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has tabled Amendment 15 which reads:

15. In paragraph 13 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, insert at the end of the penultimate line:

“ 4. (a) Orders addressed to a committee under sub-paragraph 3 (c) of this rule shall be put to the vote without reference to committee.

(b) When the question of including in the Assembly's register any other text referred to in paragraph 3 of this rule is put to the Assembly, the following only may be heard: one speaker for the motion, one speaker against, and the chairman of any committee concerned.”

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – As I said earlier to Mr. Eysink, I am happy to ask for this amendment to go to the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The amendment is withdrawn and will therefore be tabled again in committee.

Lord Hughes and others have tabled Amendment 5 which reads:

5. In paragraph 14, last line, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out “Leave out paragraphs 8 and 9 and renumber paragraph 10 accordingly.”

I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – This is really a probing amendment. It amends Rule 29 and proposes to leave out paragraphs 8 and 9.

Paragraph 9 of Rule 29 reads:

“The reference back of an amendment to committee shall not necessarily interrupt the debate. The Assembly may fix a time within which the committee shall report its conclusions.”

Paragraph 8 reads:

“The reference back of an amendment to committee may always be requested and shall be obligatory if requested by the Chairman or Rapporteur of the committee.”

I can think of only one reason why those two paragraphs are omitted and that is that in the

amendment of the rules it is covered somewhere else. If that is the position, I shall beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

I have not withdrawn the amendment. I said that if the point was covered somewhere else in the rules, I should be happy to withdraw it, but I want to know why the committee is taking out the two paragraphs.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We will tidy up later.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's opinion?

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am afraid I do not know at the moment because we assumed that Amendments 5 and 7 had been withdrawn during the last part-session, because Lord Hughes said in December: “I shall not move Amendments 5 and 7. Of the remaining five amendments the committee is prepared...” and so on. And before that he said: “I could not understand why the committee proposed to leave out certain sections of the rules. This morning I met members of the committee and I am satisfied that leaving out those parts is correct.”

That was his opinion in December. So we assumed that these two amendments had been withdrawn. Lord Hughes, you were completely satisfied with the answer we gave you in December – I have the minutes here. That is why I am not in a position at the moment to answer your new question: I – or whichever of us is responsible – would again have to look through the papers to see what came before and after.

I should like to ask, Mr. President, whether Lord Hughes is not prepared to do what he did in December, that is, to say he is satisfied with the answer – even if he has now forgotten what it was – or whether the amendment was not in fact withdrawn in December and is therefore still under discussion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – I must plead my age in defence. If Mr. Edwards had not been here this morning, I should have been in the chair as the oldest member present.

I must admit that I cannot remember the explanation that the committee gave me in December. But apparently I am in the same boat as younger men since Mr. Spies von Büllesheim says that he cannot say what he told me in December because he has not had time to discover what he said on that occasion.

*Lord Hughes (continued)*

The committee is proposing to take out these two paragraphs. My recollection is that something happened in December which made the committee think that I might be right about a reference back. But if there is doubt in the committee's mind, I do not think that it is a matter on which we should divide because, if it turns out that the committee has made a mess of the rule by omitting these two paragraphs, it will have to put them back again.

If Mr. Spies von Büllesheim can discover what he said and remind me what I said in December, we can come back to it next time.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Amendment 5 is withdrawn.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I am in no way in conflict with my colleague Lord Hughes, who wishes to withdraw the amendment. However, there are a number of other members who are signatories to the amendment. Lord Hughes may have been given an explanation in December which he has forgotten and which Mr. Spies von Büllesheim has also forgotten. But those of us who are also signatories to the amendment never received any explanation. Therefore, I hope that before this sitting is over Lord Hughes, I and the other signatories to the amendment can have the explanation. That seems to be entirely reasonable.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – However that may be, Amendment 5 has been withdrawn.

I shall now take Amendment 16 tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg to whom I apologise for not having taken it in order.

The amendment reads as follows:

16. In paragraph 14 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the second line of the proposed new paragraph 2, leave out "Unless otherwise decided by the President".

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Amendment 16 has been tabled really to ask the Rapporteurs a question. If they can answer it, I shall not press the amendment.

Unless we amend the wording, it is ambiguous. Does the phrase which the amendment seeks to leave out give the President authority to waive the provision that amend-

ments must be in writing and the need to table them before the end of the preceding sitting, or only the second?

It is a simple question. A two-word answer will suffice. I shall be delighted to withdraw the amendment when I get the answer, but clearly I need an answer.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Would the committee please give its opinion and at the same time reply to Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's question. He will then decide whether to maintain his amendment or not in the light of that reply.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we must go back to Rule 29 in this connection. Rule 29 (2) has been reworded. It now reads: "... shall be distributed without delay. Unless otherwise decided by the President, no amendment shall be proposed and put to the vote in the Assembly if it has not been tabled at the latest before the end of the sitting...". We now have an amendment seeking the deletion of the words: "Unless otherwise decided by the President" if the amendment has not been previously distributed. In committee, however, we considered it right that the President should have some freedom. It may after all happen that an amendment, on which the political groups or committees perhaps agree, is suddenly tabled, and the President should then be permitted to declare this amendment admissible. I believe the exceptional nature of this possibility is already clear from the wording: "Unless otherwise decided by the President". The President will, we believe, be very wary of taking advantage of this right and do so only when there is no significant opposition.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Do you maintain your amendment, Sir Geoffrey?

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I am grateful for that answer but it does not answer my question. Mr. Spies von Büllesheim said that it would apply unless the President thinks that it is not very important. Does that mean in writing, the tabling of amendments, or both?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – So you maintain your Amendment 16. I shall now put it to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 16 is agreed to.*

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has tabled Amendment 17 which reads:

*The President (continued)*

17. In paragraph 15 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, omit the proposal to leave out paragraph 6 of Rule 31.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – As I said earlier to Mr. Eysink, I am happy to withdraw the amendment and refer it to the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Noted.

Lord Hughes and others have tabled Amendment 6 which reads:

6. In paragraph 18, line 4, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out “and there is no opposition to it”.

I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – At the beginning of today’s business we re-elected you, Mr. President. The rules are clear. If there is only one candidate for the office of President he is to be declared elected. However, in committee the procedure is different. If there is only one candidate in committee he is elected, unless there is opposition.

Normally in committee the rules for election follow the rules for the Assembly. I suggest that if only one candidate is proposed in committee and someone does not agree with that candidate he should do that which is required in the Assembly and put forward another candidate. If there is only one candidate he should be elected there and then. The procedure in committee would then be the same as it is in the Assembly. The amendment is simple.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee’s opinion?

Mr. EYSINK (*Netherlands*). – This amendment was taken to the committee where it was agreed. We propose to agree to it now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall now put Amendment 6 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 6 is agreed to.*

Lord Hughes and others have tabled Amendment 7 which reads:

7. In paragraph 21, line 4, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out “Leave out paragraph 4(b)”.

I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – This amendment was taken with Amendment 5 and I accepted it. I think that the amendment is not moved.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Amendment 7 therefore has no further purpose and is therefore withdrawn.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg has tabled Amendment 18 which reads:

18. In paragraph 22 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the proposed new paragraph 4 of Rule 42, leave out “However, the Assembly may decide, at the request of the committee, to place the report on the agenda unless twenty representatives are opposed. Such a decision shall be taken before the order of business is adopted (Rule 18)”.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I am happy to refer this to the committee, as I said earlier.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The amendment therefore falls.

We have now finished with the series of amendments that raised no problem in relation to the Charter. So far everything is clear and easy.

We now come to four amendments which have obvious connections with the Charter and would normally require a prior vote in relation to the Charter before they can be considered.

I shall therefore consult the Assembly on how we should proceed. For my part I would like the committee to be kind enough to give its point of view again on the procedure it would like the Assembly to follow. After that we shall then take the decision required by the Assembly’s reaction. The question I ask you is whether we should begin by examining the amendments to the Charter before Amendments 2, 8, 9 and 11 to the Rules of Procedure.

I call Mr. Valleix on a point of order.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – The fact is we have no choice. Constitutional law takes precedence over common law. In the same way the Charter prevails over the Rules of Procedure. You have stated the problem very clearly but it is your conclusion that I cannot follow.

It is clear that the Assembly could well waste its time were it to discuss amendments to the Rules of Procedure affecting the Charter without having first decided on changes to the Charter in accordance with its own specific rules.

That is why, ladies and gentlemen, I think we need to be clear-sighted in our discussions and

*Mr. Valleix (continued)*

should not initiate a procedure that cannot work properly. A moment ago the lawyer's blood curdled in my veins. To move forward in our debate we should perhaps conclude with the resolution amending the Rules of Procedure since so far it does not affect the Charter. We could then consider whether we are in a position to debate the Charter and, if not, decide to postpone the amendment of the Charter and the related rules. The Assembly is the supreme authority in these matters.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – I shall not attempt to disguise my remarks as a point of order, Mr. President. As the supporter of two of the amendments I think that it would be totally unfair to those members of the Assembly who are not here, but who will be expected to vote, if we were to discuss the amendments today and ask them to vote in ignorance of what is said. I want a decision on my amendments to be held over.

The four amendments cover two matters. One deals with alternative methods of adopting the Charter in relation to the Clerk and the other with two ways of changing the rules. Only one debate is required, but the vote is important and we should not talk about it today and ask members to vote in ignorance, tomorrow or the next day. I am anxious that there should be no further discussion today on the amendments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does the committee wish to speak again?

Mr. UNLAND (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I do not think we can proceed in any other way than Lord Hughes has just suggested. I cannot, however, conceal my deep concern about the way these things have been done in the last eighteen months. Mr. President, it was the Bureau that called on the committee to take up this matter. The committee has discussed these problems very carefully at numerous long meetings.

I cannot help thinking that there are forces in the Assembly that want to side-step the Bureau's opinion.

I really do not know whether there is much point in continuing this discussion. I feel it rather depends on the Bureau's self-respect. If the Bureau no longer intends to abide by its former position, it should withdraw its letter of December 1984. That would be an end to the matter. It would mean that we had been twiddling our fingers all this time. The alternative is this: if the Bureau keeps to its view, it should

also create a situation in this Assembly which enables the discussion of this subject to be concluded with as many representatives present as possible.

Anything else, it seems to me, would be incompatible with both the Bureau's and the committee's self-respect.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – We are discussing a problem which concerns the whole Assembly. I would like to make this point very strongly. The Assembly cannot regard itself as a kind of dependency of the Bureau. The Assembly is made up of parliamentarians who are all entitled to express their views in complete freedom and to formulate the legal text governing the activities of the body to which they belong in accordance with what they regard as the correct principles and ideas. That is the point. In this context we do not consider that the proposal put forward by the Bureau, but never discussed anywhere, can be regarded as binding. Furthermore, I do not think that we have been wasting time here. I do not believe that a committee called upon to discuss a problem in an objective manner should do so on the basis of instructions from the Bureau; on the contrary, it should do so bearing in mind that the work of the Assembly must be governed in the best possible manner. This is the principle which should prevail. Otherwise, the committee and the Rapporteur would simply have to carry out the Bureau's orders.

Finally, I would stress that I disagree completely with the previous speaker. We have not been prevaricating. We have done our work as parliamentarians with conviction and sincerity. That is what I would ask of this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cox but I would ask you not to abuse the opportunity of this debate on a point of order.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – Sadly, we are getting into utter confusion over our Rules of Procedure, which should be one of the major aspects of this Assembly. I am a member of this committee, and know that we have spent a great deal of time discussing these issues at the request of this Assembly. I strongly feel – I am sure that other members of the committee do so as well – that we are never given a fair hearing. Mr. Moulias attended the committee today and heard the comments that were expressed.

If we are now being told that the discussion will be adjourned, that will give no incentive whatever to the members of that committee to do the job that they were asked to do. We are

*Mr. Cox (continued)*

therefore entitled to some guidance from you, Mr. President, about when we shall have an opportunity to discuss these issues.

Mr. Bianco used the phrase "government in the best possible way", and no one would disagree. But the reports and amendments of this committee should also be listened to and discussed in the best possible way. I do not believe that that has happened either today or in relation to other debates that we have held on issues that have been considered by our committee.

If not today, then at the earliest time tomorrow you should give some indication, Mr. President, of how you envisage this committee's reports and recommendations being properly discussed and voted upon in the future. It is not a question of whether they are accepted or rejected. Rather, it is whether the committee feels that it is performing a function of this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Cox. In the arguments that it is my duty to put forward as President of the Assembly in the defence of conscientious work and in the respect of all the freedoms of committees, individual members and the organs speaking in the name of the Assembly, I can only endorse the sentiments he has expressed.

My concern, as I told Mr. Manfred Schulte, Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, was to do all I could to facilitate a debate that could be brought to a conclusion today. Unfortunately, the quorum problem is an obstacle about which we can clearly do nothing. Speaking for the Assembly, I keenly regret this fact.

In my opening address this morning, setting the subject in the political context, I took the liberty of voicing a number of sometimes severe criticisms regarding the things that impede the work of WEU and its potential for revival. I believe that the Assembly too, when its own affairs are in question, has a duty to take these criticisms to heart and I appeal to all my fellow members to speak about them in the right places.

Legally, we recognise that the Charter takes precedence. We cannot vote for changes to the rules which do not comply with it. We therefore have to amend the Charter before we can amend the Rules of Procedure. That being so I see no other possibility than to ask the Assembly to postpone its consideration of the amendments to the Rules of Procedure that are related to those tabled to the Charter and to postpone the vote on the four amendments particularly since we are not in a position, in the circumstances, to vote on the whole of the draft resolution tabled

by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Since we would like to give the Assembly every possible chance of taking a decision on these proposals I would like the Clerk of the Assembly to inform all members that an important vote on the Charter is to take place tomorrow. They would need to have this notice tomorrow morning either in their pigeonholes or via their delegations, whichever is felt best.

Immediately after the vote on Mr. Bianco's report, so as not to interrupt proceedings, the Assembly should vote on the amendments it was not possible to discuss today and I hope a quorum will be reached.

I would ask all my colleagues to keep their speeches or explanations short because tomorrow will be a very heavy day. The President will do everything he can for the debate to conclude as it should. Please make an effort to be there and please, therefore, accept my proposal.

Are there any objections?...

I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – Will you amplify that a little further, Mr. President? When do you expect that vote to take place? How long is Mr. Bianco likely to go on for? It is much better if we can tell our friends that we are likely to be discussing the Charter at such and such a time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Lord Hughes, I imagine the Clerk of the Assembly will be able to fix a time that will be communicated to all members.

But I would make one point. The number needed to vote on the report, forty-five, is less than half of an Assembly consisting of nearly one hundred members. If no more than half the parliamentarians cannot be present for Mr. Bianco's report things really will be desperate.

I am quite happy to simplify the work and facilitate the day's proceedings in the Assembly for members but the least they can do is to be present at debates on so important a subject as the reactivation of WEU.

We shall follow your very wise advice Lord Hughes. We shall set a speaking time but, after the vote on Mr. Bianco's report, we must go on immediately to the votes on the amendments.

I have just been told, quite rightly, that the debate is in the morning and the voting in the afternoon.

That is so. My apologies. We shall therefore be voting tomorrow afternoon. Perhaps

*The President (continued)*

that will help us to get the maximum number of members present in the chamber. I maintain my proposal.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – Let us deal with realities. It was originally suggested that this should be the first business tomorrow morning. We know perfectly well that we would not have a quorum then. People come in half an hour to an hour after the proceedings have started. If you put this issue off until the afternoon we will not have a quorum when we resume. The longer we go into the afternoon the more people will disappear, as has happened today. Ideally, this subject should be discussed at about 11 a.m. to 11.30 a.m.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Schulte.

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I am sorry, but I am extremely annoyed, Mr. President. I have been asking for the floor for over a quarter of an hour now, but obviously no one has seen me. I believe the Chairman of the committee which considered the matter in hand should even be given priority.

I am sorry, but I should like to point this out once again – I am also accountable to the members of the committee: if we are again allocated a time at which it is even now quite obvious that there will again be no quorum, which will undoubtedly be the case at 12 noon tomorrow because some members will already have left for lunch, I would suggest we should postpone this undertaking, because it is pointless.

I at least am not prepared to play any part in making this Assembly and specifically the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges look ridiculous. I am absolutely serious about this. I should point out that the committee was extremely annoyed about the treatment it receives. It is the only committee that needs a quorum to perform its work – work which we do, not because we derive any particular pleasure from amending the Rules of Procedure, but because we want to help this Assembly.

I believe we have made it quite clear that we were and are prepared to do this. We now expect those responsible to arrange things in such a way and at such a time as to enable us to reach decisions. Otherwise I shall be forced to resign as Chairman of this committee, a post I took on again today.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we want to work in a calm and orderly

fashion but unfortunately this has not been the case.

I think that the committee was fully entitled to ask that there should at some point be a full assembly. A specific time should therefore be set tomorrow morning – 11 a.m. – 11.30 a.m. – for the continuation of this debate. I would add that the committee might work out a compromise on the amendment – the only problem is not one of timetable but of voting on the question of the Clerk of the Assembly – and we could then make speedier progress.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Coleman.

Mr. COLEMAN (*United Kingdom*). – The Assembly has to make up its mind. It can work only if it has rules and procedures. All of the other reports that come to this Assembly are of no value unless we have an assembly. The Assembly is based on its rules and its functioning. This Assembly is making a fool of itself. It must formalise and settle these matters. Otherwise a discussion of other reports will be a waste of time. They will have no substance. We should get down to dealing with this matter at the earliest possible time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I did not wish to speak again but I have some questions concerning the criticisms that have been made concerning the way the Assembly works.

The committee is entitled to the fullest respect but we have a Charter which lays down a certain procedure for the appointment of the Clerk. What is the urgency of such a change to the Charter?

Our amendment stipulates that the question should remain a matter for the Assembly. Anyone concerned about the Assembly should therefore support our amendment. If there is no quorum, the question of numbers should come up again at the appropriate time.

As an amendment which fully respects the Charter has been submitted, I cannot see why the Assembly should complain; on the contrary this should be completely natural.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We have to take a decision.

Mr. Reddemann and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg still want to speak. With your permission, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to make a proposal following which you can speak if you wish.

We need to conclude the debate with the necessary quorum. I would like the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure to know

*The President (continued)*

that the President of the Assembly has done everything he possibly can. What is more you can see that I am trying my hardest to find a solution. If I fail it will clearly not be the fault of the President alone.

As to good will, I would like it to be displayed by everyone. Until now I have not once refused to allow the committee to speak. In fact when I introduced the procedure for consideration of the last four amendments which I had shelved, the first thing I did was to ask the committee for its opinion. At that time none of its members wished to speak and that is how the debate started. I recognise that the committee has the right to speak whenever it so wishes but the President is surely not at fault if he cannot every time heed every request that is put. You know, ladies and gentlemen, how concerned I am to defend the interests of the committee whose work has been particularly complicated. Let us drop the accusations of ill will and the displays of temperament which will get us nowhere.

With regard to the voting it is true that I complicated things somewhat by misreading a timetable and forgetting that we had decided there would be no voting tomorrow morning. It is true that all the votes have been grouped together at the end of the proceedings on Tuesday, 3rd June to facilitate reaching a quorum. I therefore propose that the vote be taken on the last amendments tomorrow irrespective of the importance of the reports presented.

In conclusion, to give the maximum guarantee and to respond to the truly anguished plea from the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure I propose to give priority, in the series of votes to take place after tomorrow's main political debate and the hearing of the ministers, to that concerning the draft resolution of the Committee on Rules of Procedure.

Would the Clerk of the Assembly kindly inform all members by having a note stressing the importance of their presence tomorrow afternoon placed in their pigeonholes and on their desks.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, if at the end of this debate we are still surprised that the Council of Ministers does not take us as seriously as we would like, we would do better to be surprised at ourselves.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for echoing one of the points I made. I am perfectly aware of its importance.

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask for your approval of the proposal that we should vote on the draft resolutions of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges at the beginning of the series of votes to be taken after the discussion with the ministers.

Are there any objections?...

It is so decided.

**10. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 3rd June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 1058).
2. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 1059 and amendments).
3. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 1055 and amendments).
4. Draft opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Document 1054).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(*The sitting was closed at 6.55 p.m.*)

## THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd June 1986

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.  
*Speaker:* Lord Hughes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1058*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Bianco (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mr. Vecchietti, Sir Anthony Grant, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Giust, Mr. Masciadri, Mr. Bassinet, Mr. Sarti, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Rauti, Mr. Burger,
- Mr. Rees, Mr. Gansel, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Fiandrotti, Mr. Bianco (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Berrier (*Chairman of the committee*).
4. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1059 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Amadei (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Milani, Mr. Berger, Mr. Antoni.
5. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

#### *1. Adoption of the minutes*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – I want to challenge the correctness of the minutes. I hope that your last remark, Mr. President, does not preclude me from doing so. I was on my feet when you stated that the minutes were adopted.

It is stated in the minutes that the vote on the Rules of Procedure will be taken this afternoon. I understood that the Assembly's wish was clearly established and that the vote would be taken immediately after the conclusion of Mr. Bianco's debate. It has been demonstrated to members of the Assembly that forty-five votes are needed in favour of an amendment to the Charter. Yesterday afternoon there were never more than thirty members sitting in the room despite the fact that sixty members of the Assembly had signed the register.

If one wished to prevent forty-five votes from being taken in favour, the best way to do so

would be to ensure that we discussed the matter this afternoon. The result would be exactly the same. I therefore suggest that the minutes would have been more correct if they had contained the wish of the Assembly that the decision be taken this morning. Whether that is done or not, I hope that the orders of the day will be altered to allow us to take that decision at the conclusion of Mr. Bianco's debate. If we wait until after Baroness Young has spoken, which I think will be this morning, or wait until this afternoon, we shall not have forty-five votes and I am certain that the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges will be justified in saying: "Let us abandon the whole operation. We are not prepared to be humiliated at that time."

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – It was in any case my intention to make a comment here before proceeding with the orders of the day. The minutes have been adopted and are perfectly correct. I first suggested yesterday that a vote should be taken after the presentation of Mr. Bianco's report, that is to say this morning, but after the fairly full debates which we had and seeing that all the day's political votes had been grouped together at the end of the sitting, it was decided at my suggestion that the vote on the draft resolutions of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges should take place after the addresses by ministers and before the other political votes this afternoon.

In order to ensure we have a quorum, I asked the Clerk of the Assembly to notify all Assembly members that this vote would take place at the beginning of the series of votes to be taken this Tuesday afternoon, 3rd June.

*The President (continued)*

Ladies and gentlemen, today's orders of the day have been adopted, and I ask you to trust the Chair, so that these important votes can take place as smoothly as possible. I shall use my best endeavours to this end but I appeal for strict observance of the time allowed to speakers, so that all the votes can be taken and the debate with the ministers can be properly conducted.

**2. Attendance register**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

**3. Reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1058)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe, Document 1058.

Before calling Mr. Bianco, I congratulate those delegates who have been elected, or re-elected, to the chairmanship of committees: Mr. Berrier has been elected Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Schulte has been re-elected Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Mr. Wilkinson has been elected Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, and Sir Dudley Smith has been re-elected Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

The other committees have not yet changed their officers.

I call Mr. Bianco, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report that I am presenting to the Assembly today is based on three points. Initially, it was to be a reply to the Council's thirty-first report, which I do not think, however, we shall be able to discuss here. Secondly, there was the problem of Portugal's application and Spain's wish to join WEU. The third point to be covered was the

follow-up to an amendment approved by the Assembly concerning Mr. Berrier's report. I think, however, that the reason for focusing the debate on the reactivation of WEU is first and foremost a hope encouraged by the meeting in Rome in October 1984, which was arranged specifically to promote the revival of WEU. At that time, there was a kind of revival of the European spirit which motivated the member countries of WEU to take large strides forward when the organisation first came into being.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we would not wish that this flame which seemed to be lit in Rome should be regarded as burnt out or drowned in the waters around Venice. It would be a serious matter and I think unfair to say that this has now happened. Admittedly, there are matters for legitimate concern at the moment. This concern was expressed in vigorous terms yesterday by our President, Mr. Caro, when, almost with a cry of grief, which revealed his political enthusiasm, he stressed the failures and disillusiones created by the policy followed over the last two years. I do not wish to be as pessimistic. I prefer to think that Venice represents only a pause for thought, although there are undoubtedly negative signs; and these are cumulative. It could well be said that numerous facts and actions seem to be geared to the single plan of depriving our organisation of all power.

I shall not dwell for example on the problems of the budget and of the structures of our Assembly. They will be discussed at another time. I shall simply stress here that there has been too little willingness to provide the Assembly with the proper resources it requires. I would say to the representatives of the Council that the Assembly is politically the most important part of WEU. I believe this to be undeniable. The Assembly focuses attention on security problems both here and in national parliaments. If the Assembly were deprived of power, the very purpose of WEU would in some way be destroyed and, as I must again stress, the idea of European security would be lost. In the past we have regarded WEU as a pillar of the Atlantic Alliance; this was the attempt to define a doctrine and to formulate ideas and principles; a doctrine which should unquestionably be developed and better defined.

This principle was, however, the basic concept around which it was possible to work. This concept which is unquestionably of central importance did not appear in the Venice communiqué and I ask what significance should be attached to its omission. Only an oversight or a change of perspectives?

Anyone who, two years after Rome, reflects on what has happened since will note not only a failure to build further but also, as is undoubt-

1. See page 26.

*Mr. Bianco (continued)*

edly becoming a matter of concern, the progressive disappearance of the only principle which seemed to have been generally adopted, namely the principle of WEU as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. We are starting all over again. In what direction? How? Where?

My feeling is that the Venice communiqué reflects in some measure both uncertainty and disagreement. In their communiqué, the governments conceal behind good intentions the lack of any definite strategy. But as the old saying has it: "The road to hell is paved with good intentions", and what is more a will is not built on good intentions. The will expressed by the Assembly on many occasions is different and one which we believe is to be found in the peoples of our countries; Europe should have a voice and thus must be capable of adopting co-ordinated policies in order to speak with a single voice saying the same things.

Is this merely a utopian hope? I do not think so because the great founders of Europe who first began to speak of Europe were utopians but also realists.

By unanimously approving the report I have presented, members of the Assembly have shown that a united view exists. As they said in Latin: "Unum idem sentire". There is a demand for the harmonisation of European security policies and an attempt to strengthen this organisation following the road which seemed to have opened up in Rome.

We fail therefore to understand the doubts which have emerged concerning for example the extension of WEU in reply to the application received a long time ago from Portugal.

The same can be said of another country, Spain, which is more cautious but open to the possibility of involving itself in the problems of WEU.

We know the arguments and objections which have been put forward against the extension of WEU; it is feared that its compact structure might in some measure be weakened. We take the opposing view that these countries would make a valuable contribution and that security policy would become more consistent, because of the clear wish expressed by the countries concerned to become involved.

I should like to add that I regard it as unacceptable that a country like Portugal which belongs to the EEC should be kept waiting on the mat without opening the door. This is becoming unpleasant and is spoiling the atmosphere of cordiality and co-operation which should exist between countries on the basis of mutual trust. The objections raised are therefore not

based on an objective assessment or a close political analysis.

We have also received other requests revealing the interest of a number of countries in our organisation; my report mentions the requests from Norway and Denmark. A number of appropriate decisions taken on the basis of fixed criteria set out in the report, which I hope members will read, offer guidelines for choosing the political action which we should take in the coming months.

This morning, the General Affairs Committee decided to travel to Denmark for further contacts in November next, in order to exchange ideas and define attitudes. There is an important point, however. Here and now in this Assembly there are other observers from friendly and allied countries. It is a matter of satisfaction that even through a thousand difficulties and the doubts which exist concerning the purpose and work of WEU, our organisation still arouses interest, still meets with approval and still acts as a magnet. It is to the common advantage of the seven countries to ensure that this interest does not diminish but is strengthened and becomes another focus of agreement capable of maintaining its power of attraction. From whatever point of view the international situation is considered I believe it true to say that there is a need for Europe and therefore for European unity. "Believe in Europe" was the headline in this morning's edition of a big French newspaper; Europe is needed in order to put an end to East-West tension and misunderstandings between America and the USSR, to focus attention on problems relating to disarmament in the European theatre and to achieve careful, measured and balanced progress on new problems, strategic concepts and the various approaches to technological development programmes in all fields and directions. No one here should have the illusion that this can be done alone.

Yesterday, I was looking at a book recently published in France on a subject of great importance for the future of our countries, namely, the so-called electronic chain. All the data and elements brought together in this journalistic study point to the conclusion that no country can act alone and on its own meet the great international challenge opposing Europe to Japan and the United States. Our co-operation is the key to our being listened to as an independent and significant entity. Without any aspiration to self-sufficiency and without any attempt to become a third force we must, in collaboration with our great ally, speak as Europe if we are to count and to have any independent significance. If we are unable to express common points of view we shall not even be able to define our perspectives clearly and the same therefore applies to strategic objectives.

*Mr. Bianco (continued)*

In all directions there are uncertainty and doubts on matters which should be jointly agreed and which are fundamental for Europe, such as the programmes which have been proposed by a number of countries. Take, for example, the outcome of the dialogue between Europe and the United States on SDI. More and more political analysts and experts on the subject are realising that the weakness lies in Europe's inability to state a common point of view. Despite the fact that the Assembly meeting here last December approved guidelines which might be useful for governments, we have continued to act separately each for ourselves. No country has been able to assess accurately the possible greater or lesser significance of purely industrial collaboration, involving agreement between the industries of the various countries and the SDI programme; and no country has succeeded in studying the positive return which might be achieved by greater involvement of our countries, in order to influence the course of events and have something to say on the next development stage in order to carry political weight.

In my view, this type of policy of separate action by each country leads to confusion and overlapping. The programmes, including those of most interest such as Esprit and Eureka, which should be more closely co-ordinated, are not getting off the ground.

There is, therefore, unbelievable confusion. The lack of European co-operation also involves a lack of strategic clarity. And when there is no clear view on strategies, there is less joint involvement and less mobilisation of economic and industrial energy and resources. Unfortunately, we are again witnessing in Europe the emergence of the shadow and illusion of nationalistic options. There is a move back towards the idea that each country can on its own handle the crises and serious developments building up on the horizon. In order to give Europe a rôle of the importance due to it – as the report says – we should define the relationship between our organisation and the other European institutions. There are too many meeting places, too many entities and too many sets of initials all mixed up together and the same subjects are discussed in different places sometimes by the same people; as a result nothing concrete is achieved, nothing is completed and no clear positions emerge. This rôle should, for example, be defined and it should be decided whether the problems ought to be dealt with in one place or another. We have a primary responsibility in the matter of armaments but some countries tend to discuss the subject in the IEPG.

Quoting this as one example only, I believe that some of this overlapping should be eliminated. I think that the modified Brussels

Treaty provides a particularly favourable basis for the co-ordination of European security policy. Some of its articles could provide major points of reference but their narrow interpretation, which unfortunately emerged at the Venice meeting also, does not help reactivation and clarification of the rôle of WEU. I consider that the treaty is a valuable instrument for concerted action. Article V for example and also Articles VIII and IX are of major political importance. If, as the Venice communiqué would appear to suggest, we reduce the treaty to an opportunity for the exchange of ideas and consultation, we shall be depriving Europe of the future of the only basis in international law – namely, the Brussels Treaty – for the construction of a common foreign and defence policy.

As an Italian I should like to mention an event which involved my country – the Libyan attack on Lampedusa. I believe that this was a classical case to which one of the salient provisions of the treaty applied. But this type of agreement, which certainly cannot on its own be definitive and which must properly be set in the context of the Atlantic Alliance, has its own rôle and significance, as I think the President said when he spoke yesterday; it has the capacity which should not be underestimated to deter aggression and risky adventures. It may even have a preventive capacity. But, ladies and gentlemen, the reactivation of WEU calls for a calm atmosphere and what we hope will be an ever-improving relationship between the Assembly and the Council. Consequently, there is one matter for regret. Yesterday, the Secretary-General spoke of mutual misunderstanding, but I believe that what is needed is a positive discussion; but for such a discussion to take place all misunderstandings must be eliminated. Everything must therefore be as clear as possible. In the words of the old saying: "Clear agreements make good friends". Any doubts which may exist must be removed. It is obvious that we have psychological difficulties because the Council's report was not presented until 20th May, so that any detailed examination was impossible. I do not think, however, that this cause for complaint should lead to tension. We must co-operate. May I say that the life of our organisation, if it has a rôle – which we think it has – should be close to the thoughts of both the Council and the Assembly.

Yesterday, I was pleased by the Secretary-General's remarks on the need to change the structure and forms of the relationship within WEU; such recognition is important and greatly appreciated by the Assembly. We cannot have a relationship based on old problems and differences; but there is something of interest, in line with what the Chairman of the Council anticipated. I am referring to the question of

*Mr. Bianco (continued)*

SDI. We therefore note with pleasure that the Secretary-General is prepared to change the structure of the report so as to provide genuinely significant points for discussion.

We shall have to decide on important issues in the coming months. In the last few days the question has arisen of the United States' intention to denounce the SALT II treaty, thus facing the European countries with major problems and the need to co-ordinate their position. The development of a European doctrine may find a first approach within WEU and therefore a first definition.

We would say to the members of the Council that we know they have a difficult task and that co-operation and collaboration in Europe have their ups and downs; doubts emerge, there are pauses for thought and the process slows down. But, if we look back at the last thirty-five years of Europe's history, we see that Europe has nevertheless gone forward and that we have succeeded in maintaining our collaboration and co-operation so much that the way forward is now irreversible.

Our intention is to collaborate ever more closely, to hold positive talks aimed at constructing a common security policy in which WEU has a part to play. We should work for the same objectives within the same organisations so that if we are weakened, you are weakened certainly to disadvantage and with less future possibility of achieving objectives and carrying out political programmes.

That is why a constructive approach is needed, taking into account problems relating to workloads and procedures. We here have committed ourselves on procedural questions and some seem to have attached less importance to them than I feel they should. In any case, both workloads and procedures should be backed by a strong political initiative.

In this context, the Council should look closely at what the Assembly has suggested and at the expression of the popular will emerging in our countries. Pressure is growing among politicians who, while maintaining the individuality, historic values and identities of each country, are moving increasingly towards wider integration.

It is against this background that we are seeking co-operation from the Council and asking it to look closely at our suggestions and understand the underlying reasons. For example, when the President opened yesterday's sitting he proposed an initiative against terrorism and made a proposal which may or may not be shared, may or may not be valid in terms of the Brussels Treaty or, may raise problems of integration but which deserves an effort to understand its reasoning

and significance. It cannot merely be rejected or, may I say, be received with a complaisant smile; instead an effort should be made to interpret the reasons behind the proposal.

Let us not forget that when the European idea first emerged, the great Europeans of the time, whose names you all know, believed that European integration would be achieved primarily through the European defence community. The reasons why this community did not come into being are well known; WEU was to some extent a replacement to allow collaboration at that level. Let us not water down its rôle until it becomes non-existent or marginal.

Ladies and gentlemen, the report I have presented was unanimously approved by the committee, where I heard expressions of a common determination to make a further contribution to the strengthening of our organisation.

A common affirmative answer was given to the questions and doubts voiced by some as to whether WEU had a rôle or a function within the European context. Our road forward is difficult but we have made progress. I have said that we must not permit ourselves easy optimism but nor should we fall into pessimism. All of us – parliament and Council – wish to work together through WEU for greater and closer European integration being convinced that if we work for security, for scientific collaboration and for integration we shall be defending to better effect our freedom and traditions and will ultimately be working for peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Bianco. Your reception by the Assembly bears witness to the interest of what you have had to say in opening the political debate on this important day.

The debate is now open.

I call the first speaker on the list, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Bianco is to be greatly thanked for his report and congratulated for having presented so interesting a paper on a subject that has, admittedly, long been topical but has become a momentous issue during the last years and particularly during the last few months.

The report needs to be read in association with our President's address to us yesterday. It was a critical speech, a fighting speech, but in its presentation of the facts it was also a saddening speech because in it the President pointed out that, in his view, co-operation with the Council was bad technically, financially and politically as well. It was technically bad because the infor-

*Mr. Spies von Büllesheim (continued)*

mation provided to us by the Council was insufficient, came via the wrong channels, lacked the necessary breadth and arrived too late, as we can see from the belated issue of the thirty-first annual report. Financially bad, because not only are we not given the necessary resources, we are also expected, to take one example, to finance the inevitably mounting cost of pensions from savings at a time when we do not even possess a telex machine. Finally, it is politically bad because implementation of the good intentions formulated in Rome in autumn 1984 has not even been started.

The President also said yesterday that he had the impression that the Council was moving, meanwhile, towards a limitative interpretation of the provisions of the Brussels Treaty to the effect that our Assembly could only be used for an exchange of views.

Co-operation with our Secretary-General has certainly improved. It is highly encouraging that we should have received a letter informing us about the reorganisation in London and that the three newly-created agencies and their remits have been reported to us. However, the remits are as yet very slim in content. The three agencies have been asked to produce expert opinions but as long as they have no independent mission they will continue – we can but fear – to be somewhat dormant. At least, however, the reorganisation has brought to an end the situation in which the organisations only had their old mandates to perform – tasks that in reality no longer existed. As you know, savings were made on the Assembly in the past and at the same time obsolete structures with the costs they involved were preserved in the form of the agencies which had ceased to have any real job to do. The reorganisation that has now become effective has certainly put an end to this unacceptable situation. But the new agencies are still without any concrete tasks in the pipeline and are waiting for the political responsibilities that we hope will be entrusted to WEU.

In his report, Mr. Bianco dealt in some considerable detail with the enlargement of WEU. With regard to other countries that might request or be considering accession, the question naturally arises as to what it is they want to join. Is it the modified Brussels Treaty, is it the old Brussels Treaty or is it a treaty that will be amended once again to embody new responsibilities? It is essential and urgent that with this Assembly's active involvement WEU's new responsibilities should be studied and defined in joint European discussions and in the framework of European co-operation.

Should there be further amendment of the modified Brussels Treaty arising out of this it

will certainly also be necessary to consider whether the present structure is the right one.

In his report, Mr. Bianco pointed out that the Assembly must at all costs remain independent in order to be able to monitor the Council. That is surely right but I am not wholly convinced, as Mr. Bianco's report seems to imply, that the organisation must remain as it now is whatever happens. To my mind we need to consider very carefully whether the post of a political secretary-general responsible for both Council and Assembly, as in the Council of Europe, would not be suitable for the structure of WEU as well. The solution of a political, elected secretary-general would at least offer the advantage of inevitable closer co-operation and less confrontation between the Council and this Assembly.

Mr. President, I can see your warning look and so I shall not take this idea any further.

To conclude I would like to point out two dangers that we should be alive to in the context of our reactivation efforts. The first is that we may perhaps injure WEU by making our discussion of reactivation too lengthy, too intensive and too controversial. The second is that we must always keep our relationship with America in mind. We must not allow reactivation of WEU to bring us into conflict with the United States. This is something that we could in no circumstances afford, in the light of our security interests and security requirements.

We hope that the proposals made by Mr. Bianco in his report will be a major step towards the reactivation of WEU and also, in the meantime, towards an improvement in relations with the Council.

*(Mr. Blaauw, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

THE PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim. However, I remind the Assembly that it was agreed yesterday that speaking time in all debates should be limited to three minutes, and you, Sir, had 40% more. The list contains more than a dozen speakers on this subject, and if we want to deal with Mr. Amadei's report before lunch, we will have to hurry.

I now call Mr. Vecchiatti.

MR. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, once again we are dealing with the political report answering the Council's annual report. Again, we have to say that the Assembly is dissatisfied at the state of relations between itself and the Council of Ministers and between itself and the Permanent Council, regarding the activities of WEU.

In my opinion the analysis and views expressed in Mr. Bianco's report are quite correct. Consequently, despite the decision

*Mr. Vecchiatti (continued)*

taken by the Council of Ministers in Rome two years ago to reactivate WEU, why do we yet again have to say we are not satisfied? There seem to be two main reasons. The first is that, despite reactivation, there has not been enough faith in WEU as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Such faith should mean first and foremost that, within the common security policy of the Atlantic Alliance countries, Europe should have a specific rôle, particularly of a political nature, but also covering certain military aspects in the search for security in order to guarantee peace.

There are objective reasons for Europe's having an independent rôle within NATO. For the United States, Europe's policy for peace and security is only one element, possibly the most important, but only one element in America's overall policy in relation to the USSR. For Europe, a specific peace and security rôle is the basis for the survival not only of our countries but also of their ability to pursue an active policy in the rest of the world.

The second reason is that, in order to be the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, the WEU countries should have a common policy, just as the other pillar, the United States, has its policy. At the moment there is little sign of such a common policy.

On all the major questions such as disarmament, the Middle East, the fight against terrorism and East-West relations every European country has its own policy and its own relations with the United States.

Even the Venice declaration of 1980 on the Middle East which looked for a political solution for the Palestinian problem has remained mere words which have run up against the unreserved support which the United States gives to Israel, without however repeating its intransigency. The recent visits by the Italian Foreign Minister, Mr. Andreotti, and the British Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, to Israel contributed nothing to solving the Palestinian question.

WEU was asked to work out a common basis in response to the United States strategic defence initiative. The outcome has been that Europe has split, with France saying no and the United Kingdom giving unconditional support and with the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy taking up intermediate positions.

Europe's divisions and weaknesses have created gaps as regards disarmament, security in the Mediterranean and East-West relations, which now seem to be increasingly filled by the independent initiative of President Reagan.

Before complaining about this state of affairs, we should first of all take a critical look at our-

selves as regards these political differences and, in some cases, as regards the violent expression of corporate interests, as has emerged clearly in the European Parliament. WEU can be a valid instrument if Western Europe is able to take a joint stance in the North Atlantic Council above all, but also in relations with the rest of the world and with countries which are not members of NATO. When there has been a single voice Europe has gained in prestige in the Middle East, in the Arab world and in the countries belonging to the Contadora pact in Latin America.

It seems to me that, not merely for the future of WEU, the Council of Ministers and the national parliaments behind the Council must adopt a common political line at least on the most important matters. Today, such a common line is becoming more and more necessary quite apart from what is happening in WEU itself, in order not to disappoint the hopes aroused by the Geneva meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev. With every day that passes there are more and more grounds for concern that instead of controlled balanced disarmament and world détente, extremist policies are prevailing with a return to the cold war, possibly in new forms and to a new nuclear armaments race with increasingly sophisticated weapons leading on to the militarisation of space.

The Chernobyl disaster, which is still far from over, should be a warning to us all concerning the risks of peace maintained only by a balance of terror based on bigger stocks of weapons, on more and more sophisticated nuclear weapons and even chemical weapons which it is more and more impossible to control.

These are the basic reasons why we should go further into the issues and instead of talking about crises recurring every year we should discuss the European pillar which was accepted and even promoted by the Council of Ministers which, as the speaker said, now ignores it completely.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Anthony Grant.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – We are all parliamentarians in our own countries and we all have plenty to do in our constituencies, but we participate in WEU because we believe that it is an essential political forum concerned with the defence of the West, that it is a political arm of NATO and the alliance and that it involves the important contribution of France, outside NATO.

No organisation remains static. It either grows or adapts itself to change, or it dies. I have been a member of WEU for nine years. I have observed a steady decline in its effectiveness during that time. Therefore, those of us who shared that view rejoiced in the move to reactivate WEU at the Rome meeting and

*Sir Anthony Grant (continued)*

declaration. We thought that WEU would play an enhanced rôle in the future and that other NATO nations should participate. We thought that the Council of Ministers would share our view. Alas, Venice proved that there was no intention to achieve that. Hopes have been dashed. Although the Secretary-General announced some initiatives, his speech did little to reassure me.

As so often happens in European countries, initiative and enthusiasm sink into the bureaucratic sand. The Assembly's views are treated by the Council of Ministers perfunctorily and with little more than contempt on some occasions. It suits the Council to have the Assembly as a cosmetic face but the Council seems determined to avoid anything being done, any change being made or any proposal being accepted that would result in ministers and their officials being shaken out of their cosy, comfortable nests. Mr. Bianco drew attention to that in much more courteous terms than I would use. Yesterday, our President expressed forcefully the frustration that we all feel.

I shall give two examples of ministerial inertia. The first concerns our President's recent initiative to get WEU to play a part in solving the dreadful problem of terrorism. As I said recently in Strasbourg, we pass resolutions, make speeches and utter condemnations, but nothing is done to eradicate this international disease. The same bucket of cold water was poured on Mr. Caro's plan by ministers.

My second example concerns enlargement. As I said, we grow, or we die. It is obvious that the inclusion of Spain and Portugal, and other countries if they wish, would enhance WEU's influence, but this is opposed by ministers on the astonishing ground that the political will of the Seven might be jeopardised by the accession of new candidates. What absolute nonsense. What great political will does WEU exercise that will be disturbed? I shall tell you what will be disturbed – the comfortable lethargy of the Council of Ministers.

At the risk of taxing the interpreters with a number of English adjectives, I would say that the Council's attitude has for too long been feeble, pusillanimous, vacillating and, in some respects, plain cowardly. I therefore support Mr. Bianco and our President. I hope that this debate will achieve two things. First, I hope that it will make the Council thoroughly ashamed of itself, although I rather doubt it because the Council is so thick-skinned and insulated. Secondly, I hope that it will make us determined to reactivate and enlarge WEU and encourage real deeds to follow our words.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Sir Anthony.

I give the floor to Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, if I pay tribute to Mr. Bianco for his excellent work it is for objective reasons and not because he is Italian and a colleague.

The reasons why France and Italy argued the need to reactivate WEU are numerous and known to everyone; they were considered sufficiently valid to persuade the Council and the Ministers of Defence to meet in Rome for the great project which was put into words in the Rome declaration.

In my view these reasons are still valid and some of the grounds for the plan to reactivate WEU have become even more significant and pressing. This being so, it is really amazing that even less faith is being expressed in WEU than over the years preceding the Rome meeting. This is due to the fact that some countries have decided that they cannot remain committed to the reasoning which led them to approve the Rome declaration. This is due to what I would call two states of mind, which sometimes emerge in the Assembly as well as the Council. First, there is a feeling of subordination to the European Economic Community and the European Parliament, based on the idea that we should delegate a large part of our functions to those institutions which supposedly carry greater weight, without taking into account the fact that our tasks are not the same as those of the European Parliament and the European Community. If we cannot free ourselves of this feeling of subordination and this willingness to delegate our tasks deriving from the modified Brussels Treaty to the European Parliament and the European Community there can be no question of reactivation.

Another concern which we should set aside is that we should hold ourselves at the same distance from the Soviet Union and from our ally, the United States. On the contrary, as events progress, the need for a closer relationship between the European countries of the Atlantic Alliance and the other countries, in particular the United States, is becoming less and less obvious. More and more criticisms are being heard and I do not believe that we shall achieve anything in that way. That is why we shall go no further with the enlargement of the organisation which should include all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and not only the EEC countries; and we shall go no further with constructive talks between the Assembly and the Council. I think on the other hand that once we have resolved these difficulties we shall really be able to make a genuine contribution to the construction of the European pillar of defence.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Giust.

Mr. GIUST (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I also wish to congratulate Mr. Bianco on his report which is undoubtedly a valuable point of reference for this session and also for the future activities of the Assembly. It comprises basically two main parts dealing respectively with the reactivation of Western European Union and the future of our Assembly. I shall not repeat the points made by the Rapporteur, by previous speakers and by the President in his opening speech yesterday in reply to the Council's thirty-first report, as they all reflected the Assembly's views on the question. I shall not repeat these ideas because the gist of Mr. Bianco's report is very clear and accepted by all of us. In other words, the reactivation of WEU requires a common political view and common action, which are unfortunately still lacking, and no member state can deceive itself into believing that it could on its own go ahead with a defence and security policy for its own people and therefore for Europe.

I shall not repeat these ideas because they are in all our minds. I shall rather consider briefly the second point concerning the future of our Assembly. Ladies and gentlemen, our institution is an international organisation composed of seven countries – may we hope that an eighth, Portugal, will be joining very soon – whose political decisions are centred on the national parliaments. They are seven countries whose politics, customs, values and decisions are given expression through the national parliaments. Moving from the national level into WEU we established a rôle which is in no way democratic. In my view, therefore, it is inevitable that until our Assembly becomes a fully democratic parliamentary body and can take supranational decisions, which are the implicit condition of its existence, and can go beyond the nationalist attitudes of the seven member countries, it will be nothing more than a worthy Assembly of worthy people but regrettably a sterile Assembly with functions limited to the approval of morally important but politically inadequate documents. That is, until such time as the Assembly occupies a central rôle in relation to the Council, to the secretariat-general and to the three WEU agencies, it is clear that it will have little hope of carrying political weight.

I agree with the Rapporteur's conclusion. WEU still presents a highly credible image, both psychologically and morally, in terms of our peoples' expectation of what I hope is an irreversible advance towards the construction of Europe including its defence. I think, however, that failing pressure by us in our national parliaments and with our governments with the aim of increasing the political efficacy of our Assembly, we shall have to resign ourselves to a rather unpromising future. I hope that Mr. Bianco's

conclusions, which I fully share, will find in the irreversible progress of Western European Union, the sure hope in fairly quick time – because we cannot let much time pass – of really establishing the militarily secure Europe for which we are all working.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Masciadri.

Mr. MASCIADRI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, my congratulations to Mr. Bianco on his report which, as always, is to the point, precise and scholarly. I would point out, however, that it was drafted and approved by the committee before the Council's annual report arrived. Otherwise my criticisms would have been much sharper than they will be in the five minutes I am allowed. The fact is that the annual report contains no evidence or even the slightest trace of political activity. Simple reasoning suggests two possibilities: either the Council does not inform the Assembly of its work which would be contrary to Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty or, alternatively, the Council does not engage in political activity which would be contrary to Article VIII of the same treaty. Furthermore, Article VIII clearly states that it shall pursue a policy of strengthening peace and security and of promoting and encouraging the progressive integration of Europe. Strictly none of this has happened. Furthermore, such objectives call for consultation and not merely an exchange of views. Consultation is the prior condition for decisions which have to be taken. An exchange of views on the other hand does not necessarily mean that a common decision has to be taken. We should, therefore, not allow "exchanges of views" in the Council to become a bad habit as a way of avoiding the major decisions which should be taken.

Are there perhaps no subjects for political discussion between the seven countries? I do not think so. What has been lacking has been joint action by the Council. There is the problem of the "space shield", there is the problem of the threats in such a sensitive area as the Mediterranean. And lastly, in order of time, there is the more serious and important problem of SALT II. There has been no response to any of these. No joint action by the Council, therefore. Again, there is the important problem of the three agencies. A report on the subject was presented in March 1986. I should like to know now what use the Council intends to make of it; does it simply intend to file it so that it ultimately becomes no more than a collection of dusty pages? Yet, the tasks to be given to the three agencies remain a basic problem which has not yet been discussed or, much less, resolved. It must be decided therefore whether we wish to be informed of the contents of the three reports which are certainly not unimportant. For example, the first, concern-

*Mr. Masciadri (continued)*

ing the disarmament agency, discussed the tactics of the Soviet Union in the disarmament negotiations while the second, concerning the security agency, examined the extent of the Soviet threat and the third, concerning the armaments agency, assessed the present armaments market. Without any doubt these are three basic problems which had to be brought to the Council's attention in order to provide the opportunity for profitable debate.

In conclusion, while I again compliment Mr. Bianco on his report which covers subjects fundamental to the reactivation of WEU, I am bound to say that I do not agree with the Council's report which to my mind does not help to strengthen the organisation which brings us together here.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Bassinet.

Mr. BASSINET (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the great political debate on the reactivation of WEU which we are holding today following the very interesting opening remarks by our Rapporteur, Mr. Bianco, has, in many respects, something unreal about it.

Is it really desirable that it should once again be the Assembly which is asking itself questions about the functions of our organisation, its possible enlargement, its structure and its position in relation to other European organisations and in European defence?

The concerted move started in 1984 to reactivate WEU no doubt met some of the needs felt at that time: the need to add a security dimension to the construction of Europe hitherto impossible in the framework of the Community institutions and also the need to respond to the growing concern making itself felt over security issues in Europe in recent years, as regards, for example, with the impact of Euromissiles, the Soviet policy of pressurising public opinion so as to isolate and divide Europe or even the idea of security itself. Indeed, if Europe continues for long to be incapable of assuming responsibility for its own defence and actually abandons the idea, that would suit Soviet objectives very well.

Although these needs continue to apply and notwithstanding the comforting remarks made yesterday by the Secretary-General, I fear the last two years have seen some distortion in the allocation of rôles between the various institutions of WEU. Truth again obliges us to admit that the political will for reactivation – solemnly affirmed in the Rome declaration – has not yielded adequate results.

What concrete results have there really been since the idea of reactivating WEU was launched? Some additions to the work of the

Permanent Council in London, two ministerial sessions each year instead of one, and the fact that WEU provided the framework for the launching of the Eureka project in Bonn in April 1985 and for the first multilateral debate on the SDI.

Ladies and gentlemen, that is modest indeed when measured against the hopes expressed at the time.

The structural reform with its creation of new agencies is doubtless a positive step, but the results will only be felt in the medium term, and such a reform cannot surely exhaust all the possibilities for reactivation. After the 1984 surge we now seem to be back in the situation characteristic of our organisation over its first thirty years, with the Assembly acting as an organ of political debate and the mouthpiece of national parliaments addressing a Council sunk happily in a state of lethargy. Must things really happen that way? Are we to believe that, for the Council, the "spirit of Rome" was no more than a way of clearing its name after thirty years of existence? Must we charge the Council with dereliction of duty? I think it would be a shame if we had to go to such extremes.

At the same time, the passivity of the Council, which now even seems to be having difficulty in fulfilling its statutory obligations, can only breed doubt and worry about the future of WEU.

For a long time it is, of course, possible to evade the one fundamental question worth asking. Do the governments of the member states, or do they not, see a need for the existence of a European organisation specifically entrusted with defence and security problems, which, for the reasons set out in Mr. Bianco's report, is neither a mere link between the European states of the Atlantic Alliance nor yet a security appendage to the European Communities?

It seemed that a clear reply to this question had been given in 1984, and here I may perhaps say a word of self-congratulation on the part played by the French Government in the course of reactivation from 1981 onwards.

But here we are in 1986, and times have changed. Is it really reasonable that, thirty-two years after its inception, an institution should still be questioning itself in this way? I think not.

And yet WEU exists. It even exerts a considerable pull – as is shown by the candidature of our Portuguese friends and the various approaches made by Spain and Norway. In the same way that the expansion of the EEC to include Spain and Portugal caused the Ten to put their economic house in order, so these voices from outside should galvanise WEU into making a fresh start. It is vital that our organisation

*Mr. Bassinet (continued)*

should finally respond to the fundamental problems of European defence and thereby fulfil a function which, I continue to believe, none is better qualified to perform. Our Assembly has long demonstrated its ability to provide political impetus, and it is now up to the Council to pick up the baton and stop acting the part of a hatchet committee in budgetary matters, to become the vital debating and decision-taking organ which Europe lacks.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Sarti.

Mr. SARTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as previous speakers have expressed appreciation of Mr. Bianco's report, I shall simply confirm their remarks not as an Italian parliamentarian but as a member of the Assembly. The report provides an excellent starting point but also a point of arrival after so many years of discussion in the Assembly.

Even this, Mr. President, is an expression of our shared disappointment; we are always starting again because Europe's defence and security are advancing only slowly and irregularly with the hopes of Rome followed by the disappointments of Venice.

Perhaps the most intelligent and provocative remark was made by our President yesterday when he alluded to the Marquis de Norpois. And those of us who love Proust grasped the meaning of the reference because Norpois is a diplomat capable of reducing every problem to the banal, to a matter of common sense and of common practice.

There is in fact little resemblance between the Marquis de Norpois and Mr. Bianco particularly because he detests commonplaces. But may I add that from personal knowledge I fortunately see little resemblance between the Marquis de Norpois and our diplomats who are men of ideas, intelligence and culture. The fault lies with the politicians and we should seek the reasons for this.

On the political level there must be an improvement of quality in these circumstances at least. First of all towards the enlargement of the union. If the territorial basis of WEU is not extended it is difficult to go beyond the historical reasons which led to the formation of WEU many years ago as a replacement for the European Defence Community, in an emergency the terms of which are now quite different.

I see the second qualitative change as being of a cultural and political nature but even more, may I say, of a philological and lexical nature. The impediment is within WEU because so long as we continue to regard ourselves as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alli-

ance, we shall continue to go round in circles and to wear ourselves out in tired rituals. I know that I shock some of my colleagues because I have never been offended at being called pro-American and at being considered, sometimes in Italy, as a conservative and a moderate, but the arguments for Atlanticism are heard in other political assemblies and the Atlantic treaty is part of the West's patrimony, whereas Western European Union can of itself add nothing of political significance. For WEU to be reactivated – and with it our Assembly and Europe in terms of defence and security – there must first be a Europe comprising the widest possible political and territorial elements with a full contribution from all European political forces including those of the left whose presence here should be regarded as an important and encouraging feature.

These forces must be harnessed for the construction of an entity to which it is our historic duty to contribute. It is the context in which the great political forces of Europe will have to be brought face to face. But in conclusion, Mr. President, it would be very sad to think that the Marquis de Norpois when asked to define the rôle of WEU should say that it is to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I have on several occasions gently and consistently suggested reservations about the actual prospect of reactivation. These remain relevant despite the eloquent presentation of the report by Mr. Bianco and the very powerful arguments that his report advances.

As I said, my reservations remain, and there are two. The first is wholly or largely concerned with a British interest. As I see it – and the record of the debates of this Assembly would seem to justify this anxiety – the probability is that the concern of a reactivated Western European Union would be overwhelmingly with the central area of NATO, and given the interests of our Italian colleagues, such concern as remained would probably be devoted to the Mediterranean area.

This Assembly should understand that alone among the members of this organisation, our concern is as much with the northern flank in strategic consideration as it is with the central area of NATO. Our boundary as a state does not end with the mainland shores of Scotland – and the north of Scotland is a long way away from the other member states – but extends to the distant islands to the north and west of Scotland and two hundred miles beyond them to our oil fields and the enormous investment that has gone into the extraction of that resource. Therefore, in my view, the United

*Mr. Hardy (continued)*

Kingdom cannot sensibly subscribe to a reactivated Western European Union unless it takes a larger perspective.

Obviously, the United Kingdom has a very full responsibility to the alliance, and in no way do I seek to diminish our rôle in providing a conventional capacity to prevent the holocaust that some people, perhaps in increasing numbers, fear.

The second reason may be of a more international character. It is perhaps one with which some of my British colleagues might strongly disagree. But I believe that reactivation will be of little worth unless it is seen as a meaningful development. If it is merely to provide a false security and reassurance, it could be most harmful. If it actually achieves nothing and pretends to achieve nothing, it will still be welcomed eagerly by the more militaristic Muscovian hawks and will therefore diminish the prospect of movement towards détente and disarmament. It could be harmful if it is cosmetic.

It could be beneficial if it provided an arrangement by which the European voice ranked more highly in the pecking order of the alliance. If it were a means of ensuring that Europe counted, had some rank, in the alliance, then it might be helpful. However, if it is an excuse which allows Europe pretentiously to appear powerful while it is not recognised as such in reality, it could be highly counter-productive. If it is designed merely to enliven the rôle of the pet poodle, it could be a very dangerous development indeed.

I shall not vote against Mr. Bianco's report, since it offers the prospect of an enhanced rôle of meaning which would give an adequate amount of influence to the European partnership within the western alliance. But, as I said, if it is to be merely cosmetic, it could be a pernicious development. It might be welcomed in the Pentagon or by the present President of the United States, but it is in the interests of Europe formally to increase its stature and its voice, to raise its position in the pecking order of power – but to do so in a way which would seem to serve the interests of common sense and to promote that approach to détente and disarmament which, regrettably, is lacking in Washington at present.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to add my voice to those who have congratulated Mr. Bianco on his report. It is thoughtful and precise in analysis, forceful and clear in prescription.

We would do well to remember the fundamental objective of our organisation, which is, quite simply, to strengthen our collective security. It would seem strange to an outside observer that we should allow an organisation such as ours to wither on the vine from neglect and disinterest. How would the Soviets view such a development? They could only be gladdened and encouraged by the failure of the Europeans to make full use of a collective security organisation such as this.

Of course, some people will say that we are fundamentally flawed in that, unlike NATO, we have no joint military organisation. But the failure of our alliance has not been so much a failure on the part of the military structure of NATO. The failure has lain in political quarters. We have seen an alliance divided; we have spoken with no clear voice on such fundamental issues as the deployment of enhanced radiation weapons, the strategic defence initiative, the response to disarmament, the deployment of binary chemical weapons, and perhaps even, in future, the United States administration's decision to exceed the limits of SALT II.

Surely the need, which has been clearly demonstrated, is for political organisations to provide a united, clear political voice on behalf of the Western European members of the alliance, so that we become a more unified and a stronger partner of the United States in security matters. If we do not, I believe that we shall see the gradual Balkanisation of our continent.

WEU of course has a smaller membership than the Eurogroup, but the fundamental deficiency of the latter is that France is not a member – and the defence of Europe without France is unthinkable. France provides a defence in depth; France provides an independent nuclear deterrent; France provides an out-of-area capability; above all, France has an incomparable political will. Thus, rather than thinking of ourselves as an exclusive small organisation that can simply be allowed quietly to decay, we should be bolder, and we should seek to extend our membership, essentially to that of the Eurogroup.

What obstacle can there be? It is alleged that there may be a reluctance to implement mutual defence obligations in the Brussels Treaty. I do not seriously believe that, if a European nation – such as Norway, let us say – were attacked, we would fail to go to Norway's defence. If we did, the result would be the true Finlandisation of Europe.

In arms collaboration, the great deficiency has been that the Independent European Programme Group has lacked a political constituency. I have long argued that the IEPG should report to the Assembly of WEU. The fact that it reports solely to national defence ministries is its greatest deficiency.

*Mr. Wilkinson (continued)*

In my own country, we have seen, over the Westland crisis, how the failure to construct a European helicopter strategy led to a full-blown governmental crisis. We have also seen the failure to construct a political constituency of support for European arms collaboration lead to a cabinet crisis.

In space matters as well, as the report of the Council makes clear, WEU has been supremely active. I only regret that, in the Council's report, our absolutely first-rate seminar in Munich rated only one paragraph in which it was suggested that only one German minister attended. In fact, four were present. The seminar was symptomatic of what could be done by WEU if only our Council had the will.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Rauti.

Mr. RAUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I too can endorse the spirit and form of Mr. Bianco's report and I should like to refer also to his speech and to go more deeply into the problems connected with the report.

Mr. Bianco said that the hoped for and promised reactivation of WEU marked a revival of the European spirit and that today it seemed impossible not to take the view that this had been partially drowned in the waters of Venice. The conclusion to the report is, however, not pessimistic and considers that what happened in Venice was only a pause. However, ladies and gentlemen, we should not be talking in terms of optimism or pessimism here. We must set the problems of WEU in the context of Europe's urgent needs.

I shall not, therefore, be referring purely and simply to the European spirit which earlier led to the creation of the various institutions designed to give form and substance to the unified governance of Europe.

From this standpoint, WEU represented and still represents the sole, specific instrument through which the defence and security of the main Western European powers could and should be unified.

The question to be asked is therefore have the reasons which led to the formation of WEU lost their force? Quite the contrary, they are now stronger because more than ever – and we shall be discussing this at this session with reference to the Mediterranean particularly – these reasons have assumed greater urgency and have become more vital in recent months.

During another debate here, I recalled that Paul Valéry had described Europe as a small appendix to Asia. In recent months, serious crises have arisen in the Mediterranean and not

merely threats of war but genuine acts of war. The consequences of an explosive amalgam of old and new problems are now being felt on Europe's southern flank, with Italy in the front line: these are the repercussions of the now chronic tragedy of the Palestinian people, the deepening of the crisis over most of the Middle East; the use of pitiless terrorism as an alternative weapon by states and régimes like that in Libya and the profound, far-reaching and persistent spread of Islamic fundamentalism.

When NATO was formed in 1949, the threat to be faced was conventional and very clear. At that time, however, NATO still included the French and British empires and possessions. Today, on Europe's southern flank it is not clear, particularly in the light of these challenges which are not unthinkingly described as new, where NATO begins and where it finishes as a common defence mechanism reacting to attack. This is not clear either legally or politically. There is a void within which only the United States is operating in the absence of Western Europe.

What we want, therefore, is that WEU should decide the timing, methods and levels of European defence in terms both of response to aggression and possibly of a fuller initiative from the old continent.

Briefly and in conclusion, these are the basic underlying reasons for now wanting WEU to be reactivated. On this point I disagree entirely with Mr. Sarti, whom I admire very greatly, and I would say to him that either WEU must go forward now or it will remain forever on paper, condemned to mere words. Either WEU responds now to the challenges of the times in which we live as they arise or it is not clear what more it can do. If Western Europe is not prepared to take up the burden of its own defence and security it will have to accept the consequences of decisions taken by others; it will become increasingly the object and less and less the controller of the vital decisions which concern it. Others will decide, will act, and will continue to fill the gap left by its withdrawal. And we shall also run all the risks because there is no escape from history or from reality.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to congratulate Mr. Bianco on his strenuous efforts on behalf of WEU during my two-year membership of this Assembly.

As far as the reactivation of WEU is concerned, no panacea or miracle solution exists. To some extent, there is a link between the reactivation of WEU and the revaluation of national parliaments under discussion in every country. It must be said that the press – or a certain section of the press – is inclined to stress

*Mr. Burger (continued)*

the negative aspects of the work done by the members of parliamentary assemblies. There is little mention of their problems, and most of that concerned with committee work, but the whole emphasis is laid on absenteeism. If absenteeism cannot be excused, it can at least be explained by the fact that most members have two or even three separate mandates and a choice therefore has to be made. As nobody can do two things at once, we should ask ourselves whether it is not time to look again at the timetables of the various national assemblies and international organisations so as to avoid conflicts of conscience wherever possible.

Ministers should also examine their consciences, as there is no doubt that their philosophy has been altered by the multiplicity of tasks imposed on them by other international organisations. We may question whether they have any great interest in the rôle of WEU apart from the promises and speeches they make in this forum. The President, the Secretary-General and we ourselves must keep badgering them in our national parliaments, especially about budget problems. When the state of the nation is debated in each of our parliaments, we should take the opportunity of raising foreign policy matters and defence problems.

I have already referred to the important part played by the media, whether in terms of the spoken, written or televised word. WEU policy should be "sold" more effectively at both national and international level. In our various assemblies we should claim the attention of our national press, either by press conferences or by repeated parliamentary interventions, as I must admit that during my fifteen years' membership of the Luxembourg assembly I never really got to know anything about the rôle of WEU or its aims. It is therefore only logical that we, as parliamentarians, should put our colleagues who are not members of WEU more into the picture about this organisation.

Our President and our Secretary-General ask for effective collaboration. Ladies and gentlemen, let that be our aim, and let us convince our ministers of the indispensability of WEU in the general political sphere and in defence matters at international level. This is perhaps the single vital issue for our organisation.

*(Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rees.

Mr. REES (*United Kingdom*). – I intervene with diffidence and, perhaps not inappropriately, as the last speaker on the published list. I say that because this is the first time I have attended

the Assembly of Western European Union. I hope that it is not inappropriate for me to congratulate Mr. Bianco and colleagues on his committee on their powerful analysis, especially their historical analysis. It was painful to be reminded of earlier missed opportunities, especially with respect to the European Defence Community and the formation of the European Community. I am as conscious as anyone here of the omissions in both respects of previous British governments.

Today we are invited to debate the reactivation of Western European Union. Therefore, I hope that it would not be inappropriate to go back to first principles. As a newcomer I believe that the rôle of WEU is to make a specifically European contribution to the defence of the West. It has not, of course, been conceived in any spirit of antipathy to or rivalry with the United States. A powerful body such as WEU should strengthen and improve the dialogue with our great ally.

Against that background, it is important to identify respects in which a specific and realistic European view is possible. Colleagues have referred to research and procurement. In recent instances in domestic British politics procurement has loomed large – I refer to the unhappy Westland incident and to the perhaps more successful case of the European fighter. There has been reference also to terrorism. I am well aware that that subject featured in the Rome declaration. I yield to no one in considering that that is a crucial subject and an international problem. I am not certain that a particular European view is possible. Not every security problem necessarily has a specific European dimension.

I turn to enlargement because it has featured in the contributions of many colleagues. My colleague, Sir Anthony Grant, said that we must enlarge or wither away. That is certainly true with respect to corporate activity, but we are not concerned with that here. Equally, it may be true with respect to the European Community or the Council of Europe, but I suggest that different considerations apply there. It is crucial to ascertain whether there is a fundamental identity of interest between candidates and existing members. My colleague, Mr. Hardy, touched on that.

There has been powerful criticism of the Council of Ministers. My lack of experience prevents me from adding to the robust epithets that have been flung around the chamber. I am not certain that I can form a conclusion on the contribution of the Council of Ministers. I await with interest the speeches that we shall hear from certain representatives this afternoon.

*Mr. Rees (continued)*

However, we must reflect on the rôle of the Assembly, and our reflections follow on logically and relevantly from yesterday's debate about attracting more publicity to the Assembly's activities. But we have to demonstrate that we are not just a debating society that meets in agreeable places. We have to formulate views on specific and relevant issues crucial to the defence of the West. If we do that, I believe that we shall attract the attention and interest of our voters at home and, if we attract their interest and attention, we shall in turn compel the attention of the Council. In that way we shall re-establish a real rôle for Western European Union and reactivate its activities. On that basis I support the main conclusions of Mr. Bianco and his colleagues.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, being probably the last speaker I shall refrain from broaching any new points of controversy. I would like to take the opportunity to thank Mr. Bianco for his careful and instructive report. As one of the spokesmen for the left in this house I have to tell you that even though we may not agree with every proposition of his judgments, we have great respect, in the interests of European unity and European security, for the European spirit expressed in them.

We have been discussing the reactivation of WEU for a long time. That reactivation will not simply develop from debate or from debate within the WEU bodies, but if we look at the events of the last three years – the stationing of medium-range rockets in Western Europe as a reaction to the deployment of the SS-20s by the Soviets, the discussion on SDI, the debate on the possible reduction of American troops in Western Europe, the argument over the production of new chemical weapons with the object of stationing them in Western Europe in emergencies, the debate on the problem as to what security risks for Western Europe might arise from out-of-area events and even the discussion in Western Europe of the Chernobyl disaster, which brought home the fact that East and West have either to ensure our security together or else perish together – when we discuss this chain of events it emerges clearly that Western Europe, the member states of Western European Union, must do more for their own security in relation to and with the potential adversary but also in relation to and with their actual allies.

I am convinced, and afraid, that it is external events that will accelerate the process of WEU's reactivation in the coming years. Until then it is important that we sustain WEU's function and

institutions and that we keep the treaty in the forefront of our minds.

As long as WEU bodies are talking about reactivating WEU, WEU is still alive. Where there is life there is not only fear – there is also hope.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I, too, wish to congratulate Mr. Bianco on his excellent report and its contribution to resolving the difficulties we are experiencing in the Assembly and the Council in the effort to reactivate this institution which we all hold in such high regard.

I would like to say briefly that I do not share the defeatism and scepticism of some fellow delegates with regard to the revival of WEU. The construction of Europe and the reactivation of an institution like ours is a question of will, not only on the part of the Council of Ministers but also on the part of the Assembly and ourselves.

Scepticism and defeatism are quite pointless. Let us act and get down to work, and things are bound to improve.

In my view, the present reactivation of WEU has yielded one obvious advantage, and that is that the foreign ministers and defence ministers now meet in Council twice a year after not having met together for the last thirty years. As the months and years go by, this will help build up European defence. It is important that ministers should meet to discuss European security in a European setting.

Unfortunately, in the very process of reactivation, our organisation has been called upon by current events to deal with some very important and difficult issues. Perhaps we were not quite ready to face up to the problem of the SDI or the question of terrorism – issues already under discussion in other forums like the Council of Ministers of the Twelve and other European institutions. This fact is also responsible for some of our present confusion.

I agree with the approach of our Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen, and with the points made by Mr. Wilkinson in his speech in believing that WEU should concentrate its activity and its attention on ensuring the adequacy of current European defence strategy. I think the main thrust of our work should be directed at this issue.

Here I would like to quote a sentence from a recently published book entitled *La Puissance de la Liberté* by General Copel, which was cited by our Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen, in an excellent article which appeared in yesterday's *Le Monde*: "We seek to defend ourselves with

*Mr. De Decker (continued)*

offensive structures, which is about as effective as trying to attack with defensive structures."

Ladies and gentlemen, if we ponder this sentence it will certainly provide stimulus for both thought and action.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fiandrotti.

Mr. FIANDROTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – When relations between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan improve, Europe's frame of mind improves and the converse is also true. This seems to me to have been Europe's defence policy. Mr. Wilkinson spoke of the Westland affair and the great difficulty experienced by the European countries in achieving political and military co-ordination for defence purposes or even simply for the sake of better co-ordination. Mr. Bassinet summarised the progress achieved since the formation of WEU and expressed positive faith in the union. Everyone who has spoken seems to have said that it is better to live than to die. There can be little argument that the recent efforts of WEU have convinced very few people. After the fanfares of 1984 and 1985 the Venice meeting has been the more disappointing and the fact that Mr. Caro's very limited proposal has not been accepted is a further indicator. It seems to me that WEU is struggling like the famous ship in the Sargasso Sea which cannot go forward and waits for help from outside. We can do nothing for ourselves and we know the reasons why; the states take opposing views and have difficulty in co-ordinating while there is no central authority and there is no specific will to co-ordinate and unify military and defence policies.

I think there are two possible solutions. The first might perhaps be to ask the European Community directly to take over the powers of WEU and that WEU should stand down completely because it is only where there is a central body with at least some powers, like the Commission, and an elected parliament, which has a will differing from that of the ministers, that any progress can be made. Or alternatively WEU should enlarge immediately and bring itself into exact parallel with the European Community. It is reasonable that the Council of Europe should continue in being because it is bigger than the European Community and deals with matters going beyond purely institutional activities, such as the protection of human rights. The position as regards WEU is quite different; its powers or rather its policies are military. It is absurd therefore that WEU should be inferior to the European Community, with fewer members. Indeed, this fact is of itself a source of weakness for the activities of the European Community

because there are two levels and two basic sets of powers not in harmony with each other.

With due regard for Mr. Bianco's honest, extremely clear and concise report, I believe that instead of repeating these hopeful declarations we should take a grasp of the situation and resolve the dilemma.

In conclusion, my view is that WEU should affirm in stronger terms a military policy for peace, in pursuit of world peace, rather than a European security and defence policy which puts it on the same footing as Atlantic policy and does not take it any further than the Atlantic Alliance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I wish to thank all the fifteen speakers who have commented on my report and who are in substantial agreement with the position it expresses. My thanks also go to the Secretary for his collaboration in compiling the report.

I do not think there is much to add and would only point out that we have to reach both a political and a psychological conclusion. Our political will must, of course, find expression by voting to promote the rôle and the ability of WEU to make a positive contribution on security problems. Psychologically, we must not become prey to pessimism, but must try to be realistic and practical in our determination to overcome every difficulty.

I also wish to thank Mr. Sarti for not having likened me to the Marquis de Norpois. I think it important that no parallel should be drawn between myself and that sceptical gentleman. Proust's characters were all in search of times past, and a quest for a lost Europe is the last thing we want. What we want is to build on our past work.

There are two quick points I should make: Mr. Spies von Büllenheim asked whether the enlargement of WEU required a revision of the modified Brussels Treaty. I believe that this problem is resolved by Article XI. The fact is that all prospective member countries which accept the treaty can be admitted according to the prescribed procedures and there is no problem of revision. The solution is, of course, a political one.

Turning to the remarks and reservations expressed by Mr. Hardy, I must point out that WEU has no land, military or naval forces. Not a single soldier could be drawn from any country. I should add that the enlargement of WEU raises no problem as regards the cover and guarantees to member countries. WEU does

*Mr. Bianco (continued)*

not exist for the Mediterranean, Central Europe or Northern Europe. What does exist is the Brussels Treaty, which confers on all seven countries equal rights and obligations as well as equal protection. From this point of view, the answer lies in political reactivation. We cannot merely provide a support for the policies of other countries such as the United States. If we want to react realistically and with some impact, we need to supply a point of reference in terms of European politics and security. This seems to me to be the line to follow.

I repeat my thanks to my fellow delegates for their contribution at a significant and stirring time for our Assembly. Each one has been motivated by a determination to advance the cause of Europe, and that is no small thing.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Berrier. Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. BERRIER (*France*) (Translation). – I have to remind you at this point that Mr. Bianco's report was unanimously adopted by the committee. It represents all that could be done prior to the committee's receiving the pertinent chapters of the annual report.

The Rapporteur has taken into account the information supplied by the Council outside the framework of the annual report and transmitted via the unofficial exchanges which have developed between the Council and the Assembly.

It should be pointed out that publication of the annual report has cast no shadow on Mr. Bianco's report, and all his recommendations remain fully valid.

You asked me the same question about the Council's activity in December when I was Rapporteur. Mr. Bianco's report represents the continuation of what the Assembly has always asked of the Council, subject of course to the necessary updating.

In response to our recommendation, the Council has indicated that it "could study" the organisation of a European institute of advanced defence studies as again proposed by Mr. Bianco. The real problem, and I say this loud and clear, does not lie in what the Assembly wants – that much is clear – but in the fact that it can no longer conduct a dialogue with the Council if the Council does not reply in a different way. If the Council wishes to reject a proposal, let it say as much without trying to dodge the issue!

The tension between the Council and the Assembly underlines how essential it is that the Assembly and its secretariat should be independent of the Council secretariat. The Assembly

would be unable to act if it failed to keep this independence fully intact.

In conclusion, I congratulate our Rapporteur on the clarity and conciseness – in a word, on the veracity – of his report. The General Affairs Committee has just reaffirmed the confidence it has in him by asking him to prepare for next December a reply to the Council's thirty-first annual report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Berrier.

I would remind you that the vote on this report will be taken this afternoon.

#### **4. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1059 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council, Document 1059 and amendments.

I call Mr. Amadei, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. AMADEI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The report which I am presenting today on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments brings together in a single document the committee's proposed reply to those chapters of the Council's annual report it was asked to consider as well as an analysis of the most recent events relating to arms control and disarmament. I take this opportunity of expressing my appreciation of the valuable help given by the staff, including especially Mr. Whyte and Colonel Hugo, who provided a major part of the information contained in the committee's report. The committee is, of course, solely responsible for the conclusions it has drawn from this information.

The draft recommendation before the Assembly begins by expressing regret that the Council's annual report failed to reach the Assembly in its entirety by the date on which the committee adopted its report – 29th April. Chapters I and II actually arrived in Paris on the day of the very last committee meeting on 22nd May, and the Rapporteur had no time to prepare a draft reply. That is why the committee has asked me to speak on these two chapters only; the other chapters of the annual report are discussed in the committee's report.

With regard to Chapters I and II, I am glad to note the important place given to the disarma-

*Mr. Amadei (continued)*

ment negotiations and the fact that the Council, at both permanent and ministerial level, has discussed these negotiations. Here I quote an important passage from Chapter I:

“ The Ministers expressed the hope that the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union would make possible radical reductions in their strategic and medium-range nuclear armaments and agreements aimed at ending the arms race on earth and preventing an arms race in space. They underlined in this regard the importance they attached to respect for existing treaty obligations. ”

This is a very important declaration, to which I shall return shortly.

I must draw the Assembly's attention to a curious omission from the Council's report. It contains no reference to the important meeting organised by the Council's then Chairman-in-Office of disarmament experts from the seven foreign ministries, which was held in Bonn on 11th February 1985 under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ruth. It is important that the WEU countries adopt a collective policy on major disarmament questions. Why, then, is no mention made of one of the most promising initiatives in this area?

Mr. President, I am sorry that the limited time at my disposal prevents my examining in greater detail the important first chapter of the Council's report, but I would like to make some brief comments on Chapter II concerning the forces of Western European Union. The important United Kingdom commitment to maintain 55,000 men and a tactical air force on the European mainland was duly honoured in 1985.

I now turn to the part of the committee's report dealing with disarmament questions, and I refer also to the Council's reply to the Assembly's previous recommendation on this subject, No. 415, which did not reach the Assembly until last week.

Paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation underlines the importance of “ ... the treaties already signed being respected, in particular SALT I, SALT II and the ABM treaty ”. This is in line with the Council's view, and I have just quoted the relevant extract from the annual report. This paragraph of the recommendation has now become a burning issue following President Reagan's declaration of 27th May concerning his intention to cease observing the SALT II treaty. I quote the key portion of his speech:

“ ... I have determined that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strate-

gic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet non-compliance, and especially in a flawed SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.

Since the United States will retire and dismantle two Poseidon submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II treaty until the United States equips its 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. However, given the decision that I have been forced to make, I intend at that time to continue deployment of US B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response without dismantling additional US systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II treaty. Of course, since we will remain in technical compliance with the terms of the expired SALT II treaty for some months, I continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, we will certainly take this into account. ”

We learn from the press that the European allies expressed their disagreement with President Reagan's decision at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Halifax at the end of last week. I will confine myself to quoting the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, who said that the United Kingdom would “ regret it very much ” if the United States were to implement its “ provisional decision ” to exceed the limits laid down in the SALT II agreement. Here I must make a passing reference to the question of the failure of the Soviet Union to observe the SALT II treaty. As this matter had been considered in detail in the committee's previous report – Document 1040, Rapporteur Mr. Blaauw, adopted in November 1985 – it was not discussed in the present report. The report presented by Mr. Blaauw on behalf of the committee mentions the communiqué of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group of 30th November 1985, which recognised that the deployment of SS-25 missiles by the Soviet Union constituted deployment of a second new system although only one new system is allowed under the SALT II treaty. However, the same communiqué is silent on the subject of the other treaty infringements listed by the United States – allegations which the other NATO countries did not consider to be well founded.

We should make the point, Mr. President, that the United States has not accused the USSR of violating the fundamental provisions of SALT II – the ceilings of 2,400 delivery vehicles, missiles

*Mr. Amadei (continued)*

plus strategic bombers, including 1,320 multiple-warhead missiles. According to the remarks made in Washington on 29th May by Mr. Paul Warnke, the American negotiator of the SALT II treaty, the Russians have respected the essential provisions of the treaty, that is the numerical limitations imposed on nuclear weapons. They have cheated only as regards its secondary provisions.

Similarly, a secondary infringement is at issue when the Soviet Union accuses the United States, which is now refusing to open negotiations on a total suspension of nuclear tests, of violating the 1963 partial test ban treaty whose signatories declared that they were seeking "... to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end...".

While the decision announced by Mr. Reagan on 27th May may not be final – the ceilings are expected to be exceeded "near the end of this year" – Mr. Weinberger has not failed to make it clear that he considers it to be so by stating on 28th May that the United States would certainly exceed the ceiling of 1,320 delivery vehicles because this was in its interest – even though, notwithstanding the present approximate parity with about 9,000 strategic warheads on both sides, the United States still has some 1,000 strategic warheads more than the USSR.

In the main, Mr. President, the other paragraphs of the draft recommendation contained in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments represent views already approved by the Assembly on many occasions in its earlier recommendations. As far as paragraph 4 dealing with the MBFR negotiations is concerned, we can note with satisfaction the new proposals formulated – in general terms for the time being – by the North Atlantic Council in its communiqué of 30th May.

I come now to paragraph 5 calling for the negotiation without delay of a treaty banning all nuclear tests. I regret that the Council, in its reply to the Assembly's previous recommendation, No. 425, which has only just been received, does not refer to this important recommendation by the Assembly, which has now been reiterated four times. We may note with satisfaction that, in his speech of 14th May about the Chernobyl catastrophe, Mr. Gorbachev announced the extension of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests until 6th August – the anniversary of the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

Mr. President, before I finish I must draw the Assembly's attention to paragraph 6(b) of the draft recommendation which demands, pending

a review of the entire situation next year, non-approval as a NATO force goal of the deployment of further chemical weapons in Europe. I note here that the communiqué of the NATO Defence Planning Committee dated 22nd May refers to "the 1987-1992 force goals which reflect the priorities we have identified for improving conventional defence" without making it clear that, for the United States, the force goals include production of the new generation of so-called "binary" chemical weapons. Three countries – Greece, Norway and Denmark – appended a reservation concerning the text of the communiqué. I believe this is the first time Norway has felt itself obliged to express public disagreement with a NATO communiqué.

At the same time the representatives of Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands made it known that they did not approve of the American decision. At all events, the ministerial meeting merely noted, without approving, a force goal affecting only the United States. Since then, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom have indicated that the new chemical weapons would not be deployed in Europe in peacetime, and that each country would have the right to veto their possible deployment on its territory in times of crisis. This possible deployment seems to have been discussed bilaterally with the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany has obtained a compensatory assurance that the stocks of American chemical weapons now stationed on its territory will be withdrawn by 1990.

While some recent decisions by the American administration have been criticised by the European allies, we must beware, ladies and gentlemen, of improper and unjustified anti-Americanism, which it is the Kremlin's chief aim to foster. The committee's report is objective and makes it clear that the chief obstacle to an agreement, especially as regards chemical weapons and MBFRs, continues to be the inadequacy of the verification measures so far accepted by the Soviet Union. If it accepted adequate measures, these two important agreements could be signed very quickly.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I apologise for having spoken for rather too long. The length of my address is explained by two factors: firstly, the delay in receiving the important chapters of the Council's annual report, and secondly the recent events since the adoption of the committee's report which lend added importance to its recommendations.

*(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The importance of what you have had to say, Mr. Amadei,

*The President (continued)*

fully justifies your care in explaining the problem to the Assembly.

In the debate I call Mr. Milani.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the draft recommendation on disarmament which we have before us is truly surprising. The recommendations to be submitted to the Council appear contradictory in the light of Mr. Amadei's report. This conclusion can be arrived at by considering two questions of the greatest urgency and sensitivity: the problem of a definite ban on nuclear tests and the question of new chemical weapons, although, following the United States' decision to consider the SALT II treaty inoperative, some very different points call for consideration. The Rapporteur himself has dealt with this topic at some length in commenting on his report.

Mr. Amadei's report reminds us clearly and objectively of the situation as regards the international debate on the banning of nuclear tests. It should be stressed however that the obligation to pursue negotiations to that end is the specific duty of the "nuclear powers" under the 1963 treaty, which included the banning of military nuclear tests in the atmosphere, and under the 1974 treaty which limited such explosions to a force of less than 150 kt.

We are aware of how things stand at present. First and foremost, there has recently been, and still is, an accommodating attitude, or at least a fairly accommodating attitude, on the part of the Soviet Union as expressed in its unilateral moratorium on tests and in the acceptance of monitoring stations on its own territory – reflected in the recent news of an agreement between the Soviet Academy of Sciences and a private American corporation for the installation of monitoring stations. There is no doubt that these are important innovations. In earlier years those in control in Moscow had never accepted independent verification in their own country. It would therefore have been both realistic and highly responsible to welcome these new developments, evaluate them and draw the most useful inferences lest we miss a valuable opportunity of finding a final solution to the problem.

Against this, we have witnessed negative reactions. Nuclear tests are continuing, to a clamorous accompaniment, despite the fact that even in the United States there is increasing opposition and doubt about tests which, apart from their general consequences for the arms race, are already giving rise to extremely serious environmental and ecological problems. The only counter-proposal which the United States has been able to make is its invitation to Soviet

scientists to attend tests in Nevada. But, in Mr. Amadei's words: "The United Kingdom and the United States seem to be the only countries to consider that existing seismic networks, particularly if supplemented by regional systems on the territory of nuclear weapon countries, are not enough to verify such a treaty (for a total nuclear test ban)". The negative response of the United States to the Soviet proposal for rapid progress towards an agreement is therefore untenable on technical grounds, as the great majority of experts and governments consider that effective verification is possible with the means already to hand – and even more so when account is taken of the present accommodating attitude displayed by the Soviet Union. It is also clear that the argument based on the obsolescence of nuclear arsenals lacks substance. This consideration applies to both sides, and no one has ever demonstrated that United States and western nuclear weapons are technologically behind those of the Soviet Union. The question therefore centres on a determination to go ahead, come what may, with the development of new strategic nuclear weapons, and, above all, to permit no slowing-down of the programmes associated with the strategic defence initiative.

If that is how matters stand – and Mr. Amadei's report is confirmation of this – how is it possible to accept a recommendation which refers only to the ridiculous United States proposal? How is it possible to make no comment on the Soviet moratorium which even the Rapporteur referred to in quite flattering terms when he introduced his report? How is it possible to close one's eyes to the reasons underlying the United States' rejection? Let us be clear that there is no question here of extolling the Soviet position. On the contrary, the point at issue is to seize an important opportunity born of Moscow's new attitude and one which it would be highly irresponsible to allow to pass unheeded.

With regard to the question of chemical weapons, you are all well aware of the grotesque situation in which we currently find ourselves.

The draft recommendation invites the Council not to approve as a NATO force goal the deployment of further chemical weapons. However, NATO's Defence Planning Committee has already given the green light to the United States, although we know that Congress has made its own approval of the binary chemical weapons programme conditional on adequate support from the European allies. Our debate is therefore behind the times and demonstrates once again the impotence and divisions which beset Europe. A number of European governments, the Italian Government included, have again chosen to give priority to their direct relationships with the United States rather than search for a common European position. It is all very

*Mr. Milani (continued)*

well in this Assembly to pass joint resolutions and express a desire for closer relations; the fact of the matter, when the issue arises, is that precedence is given to preferential agreement with the United States and there is no point here in returning to the matter of the SDI.

If it is to be credible, the draft recommendation must take account of all that has happened in NATO in recent weeks, and must take a stand on the issue. It must, in a word, express disagreement with the decisions reached and with the attitudes of those European governments which have failed to look for a common policy. It must call upon the Council to take action to see that these decisions are reopened for debate and that the manufacture of new chemical weapons is prevented. Failing this, the resolution will just look like another act of impotence providing an unwarranted alibi for those who, as the facts demonstrate, have already decided in favour of the production of chemical weapons.

Finally, it is my view that the draft recommendation cannot be accepted unless the Assembly agrees to some important amendments, especially as regards paragraphs (vi) of the preamble and 6 (a) of the recommendation proper dealing with a total nuclear test ban, and 6 (b) concerning chemical weapons. Amendments and additional observations are also needed with regard to the question of the SALT II treaty, which is today of such great and serious import. I do not believe it possible to omit from this document some clear and explicit reference to the attitude Europe should adopt on compliance or non-compliance with SALT II.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Milani, I was on the point of calling you to order, as it is unfortunately vital that speakers keep to the time allowed. I shall have something to say to the Assembly on this subject before the end of the sitting.

I call Mr. Berger.

Mr. BERGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to make one preliminary remark about the point and purpose of arms control. The essential condition for arms control and disarmament is the secure defence capability of the countries involved in this process. The purpose is security, increased security through strategic stability and fewer weapons. Anyone who really wants disarmament must never forget this. Arms control should therefore contribute to the limitation of the armament process, to the reduction of existing strike potentials through modernisation measures, to stabilising, i.e. defensive rather than offensive systems, and lastly to the avoidance of

misunderstandings and misinterpretations. The dividing line between this and confidence-building measures as an expression of one and the same policy of détente is therefore fluid. The point I want to make, to put things in a nutshell, is that treaties are the instruments of such a policy, not its essence.

Now it is obvious that there has been fresh movement in arms control policy during recent months. Changes that could be far-reaching are beginning to emerge. The Geneva summit, the proposals of the Soviet General Secretary and the West's response agreed in the alliance are all features of the movement I refer to. This is another result of western firmness in the alliance, which has neither accepted a Soviet monopoly of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe nor abandoned its efforts on behalf of disarmament and arms control for such weapons.

Since the Bundestag's decision on further armament of 22nd November 1983, the Soviet Union has reviewed its policy in important areas in order to get out of the impasse into which it had manoeuvred itself in its reliance on the so-called peace movement. The Soviet Union came back to the negotiating table without preconditions. In his disarmament proposal of 15th January 1986 Mr. Gorbachev gave his answer to western disarmament proposals already on the table. It has features which to my mind are constructive but also problematic for the security of the West. The western counter-proposal made in February this year picks up the constructive features and develops them logically in the direction of balanced and verifiable arms limitation and disarmament aimed at stable security.

As we know, the Soviet General Secretary offered his zero solution on medium-range missiles on 15th January, but he is only prepared to accept this for the European, not for the Asian medium-range system. Nor does he want to limit shorter-range missiles until a later stage in disarmament. In my view that is not acceptable for Western European security.

The western disarmament proposal, on the other hand, considers that the longer and shorter medium-range systems in both East and West have grown up in mutual interaction and should be seen as such by us and negotiated on together. The proposal is therefore that all longer-range missiles should be dismantled by the end of 1989 while at the same time shorter-range missiles are limited on a balanced and verifiable basis. The limitation of these shorter-range systems is essential because otherwise the Soviet superiority of almost 7:1 in this area would slip through the zero solution for the longer-range missiles and the Soviet threat, particularly to our country, would not be diminished – only different.

*Mr. Berger (continued)*

The inclusion of Asian longer-range systems is necessary because they are mobile and could therefore be quickly deployed against the West. Nor in my view can Europe expect Japan, its partner in the security field, and other Asian countries to become a region of reduced security.

With the little time available to me I cannot unfortunately say anything about all the other important aspects of disarmament. However, I shall close, Mr. President, with the point that whilst nuclear disarmament has been the central point in our discussions for many years now, conventional disarmament and the creation of a balance in conventional weapons must be pursued on behalf of the linked elements of more stability and security in Europe, because Europe is in the front line in terms of the threat from Soviet conventional superiority. We must not ignore this interrelationship.

Allow me one last sentence on an important conference and an important process that at the moment, to my mind, is being, as it were, stood on its head. I refer to the Stockholm disarmament conference. Last week we had the IPU conference in Bonn which had this item on its agenda too. As a member of the drafting committee there I gained the impression that the Soviet representatives were doing everything they could to bang the drum in their statements about the major disarmament themes but, in the wording of the communiqué, were always trying to revert to discussing the Madrid texts. In particular, they must be urged – by this Assembly as well – to recognise that the keystone for future success in disarmament now is success in Stockholm, i.e. reaching concrete agreement at least on the very modest confidence-building measures. If this is not achieved, or not achieved before the Vienna follow-up conference, then we should not be over-hopeful about any great success in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this is not the first time the question of disarmament has been on our agenda and, if the reply to the Council's annual report is the formal occasion, the real reason is to be found in very recent events, which are unfortunately not encouraging.

The international situation is again tense and the promising results of the summit of November 1985, which aroused so many hopes and expectations throughout the world, are now back in doubt. The prime need, therefore, is to discuss and work for the restoration of international confidence which cannot be separated from dis-

armament and is essential for the whole of Europe. For our institution, WEU, it means discharging a primary duty and the committee was therefore quite right to produce a document on the subject. I wish to pay tribute to the Rapporteur for his great efforts and to express appreciation of his research and his determination to keep up to date as the international situation develops and changes.

Despite this, I think that further additions are needed, particularly in the light of events and statements over the last few days. Indeed, a series of moves by the American Government raise doubts concerning the real intentions of the people in charge of United States policy, particularly as regards any real willingness to negotiate and reach agreement, although any statements and proposals by the Russians must not be accepted uncritically as a sign of concrete prospects for agreement between the two super-powers.

It is a fact, however, that the unilateral denunciation of the SALT I and ABM treaties and the refusal to continue observing SALT II voluntarily are not conducive to the resumption of negotiations. The problem of chemical weapons, with all the disagreements and contradictions we at present see in Europe, makes it difficult to move towards a positive solution which must be a common agreement to ban and destroy all such weapons.

It is true, however, that in this context the most recent attitudes adopted in Western Europe have created small openings for possible East-West détente and have thus further confirmed the need for Europe to have a renewed capacity for independent action.

The need for a major independent political initiative by Europe, to which repeated reference has been made during this session, emphasises the importance of WEU's rôle and function and points the way to overcome political divisions in Europe and reach an agreed position through the reactivation of WEU. What is needed is a European pillar which will help to establish a policy of controlled and balanced disarmament, détente and peace in the world.

The terms of the draft recommendation are certainly not opposed to these requirements. It is to be welcomed that both the recommendation and the report reject all extreme and radical positions and aim at objectivity. As already mentioned, however, despite updating there is still no more precise statement of view on recent developments in the international situation and on the danger of a return to rearmament.

Like some other representatives, our group has tried to correct this by submitting a number of amendments which we believe deserve the Assembly's attention and approval.

*Mr. Antoni (continued)*

The risks of tension and rearmament should be met by creating the political conditions for a single European position, pressing for removal of the disagreements between Europe and the United States within the Atlantic Alliance, and offering WEU real opportunities for reactivation so that it counts in Europe and Europe counts in the world.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as I said to begin with there has been much talk of the reactivation of WEU during this session, in particular during discussion of Mr. Bianco's report. There have been complaints concerning the inadequate – for some speakers, non-existent – consultation between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers and also concerning the fact that the WEU governments and countries are out of step with each other. It may be thought therefore – and this is my view – that a renewed and sincere commitment by our Assembly on disarmament is the best, most concrete and reasonable reply that Europe and WEU can give because reason always triumphs.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is adjourned.

***5. Date, time and orders of the day  
of the next sitting***

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 2.30 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Thirty-first annual report of the Council (Presentation by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Document 1061).

2. Address by Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations of Belgium.
3. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
4. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure (Resumed votes on the draft resolutions, Document 1039 and amendments).
5. Reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe (Vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1058).
6. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1059 and amendments).
7. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1055 and amendments).
8. Draft opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1054).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 1 p.m.)*

## FOURTH SITTING

Tuesday, 3rd June 1986

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
4. Thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1061*).  
*Replies by Mr. Andreotti to questions put by:* Sir John Page, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Vecchietti, Mr. Antoni, Sir John Osborn, Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Mr. Soell, Mr. Masciadri, Dr. Miller, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Burger, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Milani, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. Terlezki, Mr. Fiandrotti.
5. Address by Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations of Belgium.  
*Replies by Mr. Tindemans to questions put by:* Mr. De Decker, Mr. Gansel, Sir John Osborn, Mr. Steverlynck, Mr. Declercq, Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Martino, Mr. Rumpf, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.
6. Address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.  
*Replies by Baroness Young to questions put by:* Sir Anthony Grant, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Soell, Mr. Antretter, the Earl of Kinnoull.
7. Change in the order of business.  
*Speakers:* The President, Dr. Miller.
8. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure (*Resumed votes on the draft resolutions, Doc. 1039 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Schulte (*Chairman of the committee*), Mr. Bianco, Lord Hughes, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Cavaliere, Lord Hughes (point of order), Mr. Eysink, Mr. Bianco, Lord Hughes (point of order), Mr. Schulte.
9. Reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1058*).
10. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1059 and amendments*).
11. Change in the membership of a committee.
12. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 2.40 p.m., with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

#### **1. Adoption of the minutes**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### **2. Attendance register**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I would remind all members of the need to sign the register of attendance because it determines whether we have a quorum or not.

The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### **3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of a Vice-President of the Assembly. I received a further valid nomination for the office of Vice-President, namely, that of Mr. Péciaux.

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that his election be by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

<sup>1</sup> See page 30.

*The President (continued)*

I therefore declare Mr. Péciaux elected as a Vice-President of the Assembly.

The composition of the Bureau of the Assembly is therefore as follows: Mr. Caro, President; Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Soell, Mr. Péciaux, Mr. Blaauw and Mr. Goerens, Vice-Presidents.

The list is not in alphabetical order but in accordance with their age.

**4. Thirty-first annual report of the Council**

*(Presentation by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1061)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the thirty-first annual report of the Council by Mr. Andreotti, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Document 1061.

Mr. Andreotti, it is with great pleasure and cordial wishes that I welcome you today on behalf of the Assembly.

As you know, this very important part of the session is primarily concerned with the political dimension to be assumed by Western European Union with the fullest possible understanding between our parliamentary organ and the ministerial organ that you preside over and represent.

In my introductory address I had the advantage of being able to raise problems. I did so without mincing my words but knowing that we are all seeking ways of excelling ourselves whilst respecting our own responsibilities but placing the debate at our correct political level.

You have been Chairman-in-Office during a very difficult period at a time when Europe has been confronted with many problems of all kinds, among which those relating to security and defence have come increasingly to the fore.

Allow me on behalf of the whole Assembly to express my gratitude for everything you have done to facilitate contact between the Assembly and the Council and for the distinguished rôle you have played at the head of the Council.

I invite you, Mr. Chairman-in-Office, to come to the rostrum.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the review of the activities undertaken during the year by the Council of Western European Union marks the end of the Italian

chairmanship and documents the spirit which has motivated us in the work of consolidating the revival of the organisation.

In his address yesterday, President Caro, whom I thank for his kind words of introduction, was rather vehement – due no doubt to his passionate European commitment – in questioning the steadfastness of the member countries' will to continue working for reactivation.

To dispel this impression, which occurs frequently in your remarks as well as in some reports by parliamentary colleagues, I consider it particularly necessary to recall and define realistically the rôle which WEU can play in reinforcing European security, promoting the process of European integration and strengthening Atlantic solidarity.

Among the aims of the modified Brussels Treaty we emphasised in the Rome declaration that of "promoting the unity and encouraging the progressive integration of Europe", underlining in paragraph 3 of the declaration our "determination to make better use of the WEU framework in order to increase European co-operation in the field of security policy".

We are dealing here with momentous objectives, which for more than thirty years have been at the heart of the debate on the process of European construction. To achieve what progress is realistically possible towards the attainment of these goals has been the constant endeavour of the Italian chairmanship and of the entire Council with at the same time due regard for the indissoluble link between the interests of European security and the overall security of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance. This has lately been reaffirmed by the results of the recent Council meeting in Venice, where the ministers emphasised the indivisible nature of security and restated their determination to reinforce the bonds of solidarity binding them to each other and to the other members of the Atlantic Alliance.

Under the terms of the European act, the Twelve have committed themselves to closer co-operation on security and have defined the various political and economic issues involved. Objectively, this requires WEU to set about strengthening the European dimension of security without prior conditions. This is in line with the general requirements of the process of European construction, as well as with public expectations in the seven countries you represent here.

In the Atlantic context, the aim of strengthening allied security remains fully valid, and here WEU, as a joint forum for debating specifically European security concerns, can and must continue to make a fundamental contribution.

*Mr. Andreotti (continued)*

This is a dynamic process which is constantly enriched by constructive exchanges with the Assembly, for which the two essential points of reference are the existence of common defence organisations – NATO as a pillar of allied defence and the IEPG as a vehicle for effective co-operation between defence industries – and the commitment to the building of Europe.

At a time when the international scene is as complex and fraught with tension as it is today, the maintenance of western cohesion and, to this end, of a constructive dialogue between Europeans and Americans is increasingly appreciated to be a goal of the first importance. I think we may take satisfaction in the fact that the reactivation of WEU has made a useful contribution to the attainment of this goal.

Our organisation has already given convincing proof of its ability to deliberate on security questions and make a powerful contribution in terms of political impetus to European co-operation in this sphere. I am surprised, therefore, that the President complains, as he did yesterday, of a supposed lack of results from the Council meeting in Venice.

In actual fact, the foreign and defence ministers were pleased at the breadth of their discussions on questions vital to the East-West dialogue and the strategic stability of the world and covering such issues as the Soviet-American negotiations in Geneva and other important aspects of the disarmament process in every arms sector. On these questions Europe succeeded, as it wished, in expressing a united purpose. The Seven reasserted their profound collective desire for peace and the constructive pursuit of the dialogue with the East, while at the same time expressing their determination to safeguard and promote conditions of equilibrium and security, conducive to ensuring the progress of European society in peace and freedom.

The concerted approach adopted by our countries allowed us to achieve a degree of harmony which is significant not only for ourselves but for all those who look to Europe with interest, hope and expectation that it may be able to act dynamically and constructively on the international stage.

Again, our concerned approach has enabled us to transfer the European countries' experience in security matters more systematically and more efficiently to the broader framework of western consultation, so ensuring that such experience is taken into account in the formation of American positions.

European participation in the East-West dialogue through continuous and detailed consultation, either among the Seven or in the broader

framework of Atlantic collaboration, is indispensable as vital European security interests are involved.

As regards the priority question for Europe – the INF negotiations – the Seven reaffirmed a community of views and attitudes which cannot fail to prove highly significant. In particular, the Seven asserted the need for reductions leading to the total and comprehensive elimination of this entire category of weapons and avoiding the creation of new areas of instability.

The same can be said with regard to other decisive elements in the East-West relationship, relating to the aim of radical, equivalent reductions in the Soviet and United States nuclear arsenals and to the reinforcement of strategic stability.

As regards the problems of space and SDI research, while I must acknowledge the lack of a common position, I do believe that some significance may attach to the hope expressed by WEU countries for a co-operative approach with the USSR aimed at maintaining the stability of the offensive/defensive balance and at reinforcing confidence. On this last point, the "open laboratories" proposal seems to me to be especially promising.

The Seven are of course aware of the uncertainties and difficulties besetting the course of the East-West dialogue and the international situation in general. They believe, however, that there are still signs of a common interest in advancing the dialogue on disarmament and arms control. The Seven are therefore determined, all with the same intent, to see that the difficulties are played down and to promote the gradual establishment of more favourable prospects, thereby fulfilling Europe's proper rôle to the full.

In their consultations with the Americans and their other western allies and through their contacts with other countries, the Seven will do their utmost to further the Geneva negotiations on nuclear weapons and space in a way which translates into reality, as far as possible, the wishes of our peoples for a gradual and balanced process of general disarmament based on verification, security and increasing international confidence.

I also attribute great significance to the substantial agreement of the WEU countries about the need for a gradual reduction of offensive nuclear weapons to be accompanied by balanced and verifiable reductions of all types of arms, including in particular conventional weapons.

There is no doubt that the imbalances in conventional forces throughout the European theatre are a worrying cause of instability and need to be corrected by balanced and verifiable reductions. The WEU countries therefore share

*Mr. Andreotti (continued)*

the hope that the recent signs of tractability on the part of the USSR in this area and on the subject of chemical weapons may evoke an effective response at the negotiating table, thereby lending greater strength to the forces already at work in the existing negotiating forums.

Complete unity of purpose also exists with regard to the high priority attaching to the total elimination of chemical weapons, with suitable provision for verification and in a spirit of mutual trust, by the conclusion of an agreement at the Geneva disarmament conference.

Europe is naturally ready to examine any concrete disarmament proposal by constructive discussion round the negotiating table, taking fair account of the security requirements and suggestions of all the countries concerned.

In recent months the Seven have pursued their joint consideration of the questions – vitally important for the future – relating to the SDI research programme, to which I have already referred. Following the Bonn meeting in April 1985, the Western European countries felt an immediate need to co-ordinate, as far as realistically possible, their reaction to the American invitation and to deliberate together about the technological, political and strategic implications of the programme.

The criteria identified by consultation between the Seven have provided a point of reference for all our countries, even though dealings with the United States have been conducted without any really concerted WEU policy.

This is not the place to go into details, but a preliminary assessment of the political criteria established by the Seven and directed, among other things, to safeguarding balance and stability in East-West relations, securing strict observance of the ABM treaty, strengthening deterrence and promoting substantial, balanced reductions in the nuclear arsenals seems to me to demonstrate the importance of what has been accomplished.

The Seven are naturally well aware that a final judgment on the strategic implications of SDI is impossible for the time being, as the results of the research will be uncertain for a long time to come. Nevertheless, the importance of this question for the strategic balance of the future, and for European security, is such that the need for continuous consultation and deliberation within WEU immediately becomes apparent and this will be conducted on the basis of the decisions taken. The political and strategic impact of SDI on western security as a whole is, of course, an issue which will have to be considered collectively at the proper time within the Atlantic Alliance. However, WEU can and must per-

form an important rôle in examining the specific repercussions of SDI for the European dimension of our collective security.

Any weighing of the political and strategic implications also involves the continuous verification and evaluation of a number of other factors which are similarly of vital importance in a strategic equation which is changing all the time. These factors include the technical advances made in offensive weapons as well as the state of progress of the efforts the USSR is making in the same technological fields as the SDI programme. Furthermore, any evaluation by the WEU countries of the strategic implications for Europe of the American research programme presupposes the establishment of parameters reflecting the specific security requirements of European countries.

Clearly, then, the governments of the Seven are not avoiding the issue but are instead addressing themselves, carefully and opportunely, to those questions which will have to be answered in the effort to devise a course of action capable of safeguarding not only the technological and political rôle but also the security of Europe.

In the technological sphere, European countries will have to be able to respond – and they will make every effort to do so as is demonstrated by the Eureka initiative – to the formidable challenges of the near future. However, it is necessary above all to weigh the implications and consequences for Europe and its security of the foreseeable developments in the area of anti-ballistic missile defence. We have to deal here with the growing problem of the probable spread and improved efficiency of ballistic missiles of various ranges and with either a nuclear or a conventional capability. The European assessment of this aspect of defence can naturally be extended to other western countries in the wider alliance framework and is therefore clearly important and useful.

I therefore take the view that the expression in this Assembly of feelings of dissatisfaction and perhaps of impatience at the progress made in the reactivation of Western European Union is, from the standpoint of the Council and myself personally, not entirely justified. The serious and active part played by the foreign and defence ministers at ministerial councils, the presence in this Assembly of many government members, the meetings over the last twelve months between the two major organs of the union – the Council and the Assembly – my own contacts with President Caro, the increased activity of the Permanent Council, and the dynamic start to the work of the agencies are all evidence of effective reactivation within the timescale we set for the transition phase, which ends in December 1987.

*Mr. Andreotti (continued)*

While we are working earnestly to implement in full, by that date, the measures adopted under the Rome declaration of October 1984, we must remain fully mindful of the material difficulties involved as well as of the length of time required for a highly significant change in the united endeavours of Europe.

Perhaps I may be allowed to make a general observation at this point. It is true that a continuing effort must be made to ensure that the proper information and replies to the Assembly's recommendations are expeditiously conveyed to the Assembly, but it is also true that the Council is a collective body whose decisions have to be unanimous. Paradoxically enough, the longer time needed to arrive at a consensus is symptomatic of the growing political significance ascribed to the Assembly and of the greater impact it is able to exert on public opinion in our countries, as was pointed out in the Rome declaration. If the governments of the Seven are now subjecting the contents of documents for the Assembly to closer scrutiny, this is because they are aware that these are important pronouncements whose political formulation is liable to have a significant effect.

While this by no means excuses us from looking at quicker ways of doing things, it is nevertheless a factor which needs to be borne in mind. A number of steps have, however, already been taken, and your attention has been drawn to these by myself and by the Secretary-General.

To meet the reasonable demands of the Assembly, I take this opportunity of reaffirming the decision adopted by the Council to the effect that the reports on its activities will henceforth be issued at six-monthly and not yearly intervals.

Following the example of his German predecessor, the Italian Chairman has laid special emphasis on contacts with committees and with members of this Assembly. Looked at quite objectively, the accessible approach adopted and the number of meetings which have actually taken place are matters of fact. I will not bore you with a tiresome chronological list and will just point out that, as far as relations between the Council and the Assembly are concerned, a good deal has already been done, much has been started and, let us hope, more can be done in the future. Let us not forget that, in the absence of well-established models for determining the form of the consultative machinery involved, we have to adopt a pragmatic approach in identifying, defining and developing what is needed, as indeed has happened in the sphere of European political co-operation over a span of more than fifteen years – a practice which allows regular

and open exchanges of views at the highest possible level. This is the aim which has been pursued over the last twelve months with the Assembly's co-operation, and the Council will certainly continue to give this matter its full attention in the future.

Referring merely to the most recent of our encounters, I found the Venice meeting attended by the members of the Presidential Committee, of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, to be very useful. Such meetings, which must be held in a spirit of collaboration and unity, are to be encouraged and should, in my opinion, be turned to good account for the mobilisation of public opinion, as has already been pointed out.

I cannot finish my address without touching on the subject of the enlargement of WEU, which I know to be close to the heart of this Assembly.

What I have already said conveys the image of a changing organisation whose scope and structure are under constant scrutiny by the seven governments in anticipation of the end of the transition phase.

I have no hesitation in repeating that the Italian position – already made public – is in favour of starting concrete discussions with countries interested in joining WEU with a view to determining the conditions for their accession to membership.

Collectively, however, the Council takes the view that the organisation's rôle and structure need to be better defined before contemplating its enlargement, not only to safeguard WEU's present efficiency but also to provide potential members with a properly-established framework.

As I said in Venice, a consensus has already emerged in favour of entirely informal, exploratory contacts for the purpose, firstly, of making clear to the interested parties the provisions of the treaty as well as the objectives and aims of WEU, and, secondly, to establish the expectations and the level of commitment of the potential new partners.

In this context, the Secretary-General has already told you about the initial contacts made with Portugal.

There is general appreciation of the interest being shown by third countries, which is properly seen as a sign of the attention being paid to the reactivated WEU. I would like to conclude my address on this optimistic note.

Turning once more to what President Caro had to say and to some of the reports under discussion, I wish to reassert on behalf of the Coun-

*Mr. Andreotti (continued)*

cil its earnest commitment to continuing along the path of reactivation initiated by the Rome declaration.

At the same time, I believe that the Assembly, whose stimulating rôle must on no account be dissipated and whose views will be given all due weight by the Council, is capable of displaying the necessary measure of patience when appraising the progress we are making towards giving powerful expression to the voice of Europe. The Assembly can and must continue to contribute to the vital function of providing European political guidance, with parallel – and, in a sense, anticipatory – detailed debates on the subject in the national parliaments. To bear fruit, the progress achieved here must be linked with the overall drive towards the construction of Europe, the joint defence of the alliance and European technological co-operation. Italy has worked earnestly towards these goals, and now hands over the chairmanship to Luxembourg together with its heartfelt good wishes for future progress.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Minister, for your statement. As is our practice, a number of members of the Assembly would like to ask you questions.

I call Sir John Page.

Sir John PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – We are all most happy to have Mr. Andreotti, a good friend of ours, with us again today, and we are grateful for his carefully focused and thought-out remarks.

There is an expression in English which is sometimes used by a young man wanting a long-term love affair with a young lady. It is that she is blowing hot and cold; she is warm and loving one day and cool the next. As a warm-blooded Italian whose devotion to European and international co-operation is known throughout the world, will Mr. Andreotti pass on to his colleagues in the Council of Ministers that their warm approach to the reactivation of our union of a year ago seems to have cooled off a little? Will he try to warm it up again so that our love affair can be rekindled?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I would like to thank the speaker for his evocative image. At my age there is no time for lengthy love stories, but I will express my deeply held and long-standing conviction in favour of European construction and stimulation of awareness about collective European defence.

We must proceed with a high degree of caution, which is fully compatible with this conviction. Why caution? In stressing the idea of collective European defence, we must not encourage an undesirable American isolationism, which would not strengthen, but would weaken the Atlantic Alliance. I therefore believe that the appropriate platform is the reactivation, which we should see not as a mere rhetorical exercise but as a concrete political goal, even though its attainment may be only gradual. Using this platform, we will help bring about an authentic European forum. This path is sometimes beset with illusions.

This is something I experienced in acute form when moving from Milan to Luxembourg. The Milan platform for the Community was much broader than the content of the European act, as there is a bias towards generosity when making proposals while the bigger obstacles arise when it comes to making commitments. However, although no longer occupying the Chair and with full support for our Luxembourg colleague, I can assure you that we on our side will collaborate in ensuring the effective reactivation of WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I would warn you, Chairman-in-Office, that there are sixteen members of the Assembly wanting to ask you questions so your task will be considerable. I would remind members that we will then have an opportunity to hear Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations of Belgium, who is already with us, and Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

I would ask members to keep their questions short and not to use them as an opportunity for making speeches.

I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman-in-Office, over and above the information that you have given us I would like to ask you a question in connection with the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984.

At the time five important areas of co-operation were listed: defence questions, arms control and disarmament, effects of East-West relations on European security, Europe's contribution to the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance and WEU's political stimulus to European co-operation in the armaments area.

My question to the Chairman-in-Office is this: in which of the areas referred to in the Rome declaration has it so far been possible for the member states of WEU to reach common positions, and in which of them has WEU taken concrete political initiatives and given external stimuli?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The President's reference to the number of delegates wishing to ask questions and a proper regard for Baroness Young and Mr. Tindemans oblige me to be brief.

In these five areas we have perhaps been most effective in contributing to the East-West dialogue in the sense of examining means of ensuring that the difficulties encountered along the way do not interrupt the dialogue itself, and also as regards a common position – at least in principle – on SDI. The special working group is now studying the contents of this programme, the first phase having been devoted to the legal and political aspects affecting the relations of individual countries. Our attention has chiefly been focused on these two issues. Your question warrants more time than I have available and can certainly be taken up by my Luxembourg successor.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Vecchiatti.

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – In view of the brevity of the time available, I will read my question to Mr. Andreotti. How is the declaration on SALT I and SALT II made by the President of the United States to be reconciled with the position of the WEU governments, who have made any form of collaboration in research connected with defence in space contingent on observance of the above treaty and of the ABM treaty?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – While it is certain that we cannot dictate either the speeches or the attitudes of the United States President, I believe that the recent debate in the Atlantic Council at Halifax showed that all seven countries represented here possess the will to work in the interval between now and when the treaty limits start to be exceeded, as indicated by the President of the United States, towards the attainment of concrete results at the negotiating table, so that what we regard as a reasonable position can be maintained. The Soviet proposals of the last few days are very encouraging in this respect and lead one to believe that it may be possible to reach agreements, and that negotiations have by no means been broken off.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I, too, will be brief, but must first thank the Minister for the precision of his remarks.

With regard to chemical weapons, if I have understood him correctly, he noted the accommodating approach of the USSR in this field, and expressed the hope that this question could be resolved at the negotiating table. I now ask for his views about the obvious incompatibility between the declarations by a number of WEU governments, including that of Italy, to the effect that they are not prepared to produce, to stock, to use or to permit the use of chemical weapons on their territory and the green light given by NATO to the United States, at its request, to proceed with the manufacture of chemical and binary weapons for which Europe would be the main theatre. Does he not consider that the Council should be asked to reaffirm its commitment to the destruction of chemical weapons and, in that case, to encourage concrete action at an early date?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I believe the horror inspired by chemical weapons is shared by everybody. The problem can be stated in these terms: on the one hand we must guide the Geneva negotiations towards a favourable result while on the other recognising objectively that the basis of the United States' position is the claim that the Soviet Union possesses an overwhelmingly greater quantity of binary chemical weapons than the United States. Hence, the philosophy behind the proposal is that of re-establishing equilibrium. This is our interpretation of the situation, and it is an interpretation we have expressed publicly, while constantly stressing its importance in providing an impetus for the eventual resumption and conclusion of the Geneva talks. The technology is with us, and some tractability is called for on the part of both the Soviet Union and the United States. It is up to our countries to press for this.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate Mr. Andreotti on his very full review. He touched on the question of mutual and balanced force reductions, both nuclear and conventional, with the emphasis on verification. He also mentioned other European institutions including the EEC. The accident at the Soviet nuclear power station at Chernobyl has many lessons and has caused many debates in national and other institutions. Will Mr. Andreotti comment on the problems such as verification and living with

*Sir John Osborn (continued)*

radiation, whether from an accident of this type or the possible failure of SDI, which is perhaps of more concern to Europe than to North America? Have ministers discussed this issue in the context of Western European Union and in the context of meaningful disarmament? If not, will they do so?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – We were in Venice the day after the news broke about the Chernobyl disaster. Our first reaction was to declare that in this area there could be no division into watertight national compartments, and that there was a moral obligation to notify all countries at once irrespective of any treaty provisions, which should however be improved.

I believe that, following the Chernobyl incident, measures are in train in the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna as well as in Euratom, which is of particular interest to us as Europeans, to translate into concrete operating practices what the universal surge of public opinion demands. There is no room here for different attitudes. There is already too much confusion caused by technologists and semi-technologists in this basically unfamiliar area. Every day experts and would-be experts appear in print and on television only to compound our confusion. In defence of a source of energy which will remain a primary source pending the achievement of what we, as Europeans are working for, but which must be exploited under secure conditions, I believe it is imperative that we seek general co-ordination of the regulations governing both security and standardisation. This will clearly have a number of consequences for nuclear technology in general, including its military applications. We, as ministers, will not fail to keep abreast of these measures and we, together with the Assembly, which will also be involved in this question, will seek to help in finding solutions, the validity of which will be increased in proportion to the international participation involved.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ferrari Aggradi.

Mr. FERRARI AGGRADI (*Italy*) (Translation). – By way of a personal acknowledgment, I believe I may and should express to Mr. Andreotti a special word of thanks for his steadfastness and consistency in working for the benefit of our Assembly and for the establishment of constructive collaboration between the Assembly and the Council so that important problems can be brought into focus. From his

experience so far, I would like to ask Mr. Andreotti the following question: looking ahead, how does he see the future implementation of the spirit of the Rome declaration – what lines should such implementation follow, what methods should be used and on what fundamental points should future action be based?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I thank Mr. Ferrari Aggradi for his kind words. As to what method would be most conducive to ensuring effective implementation of the commitments contained in the Rome declaration, I would answer that the best method is to work from the bottom upwards. I mean by this that we should start from the level of individual national parliaments, where these problems are not, it must be said, always discussed in sufficient depth. It follows that the process should begin with public opinion in our individual countries, so as to create a solid foundation enabling this Assembly and others to debate from a position of greater confidence, knowing that they have behind them, not the assumption, but the certainty of national parliamentary support. In the Council, the ministers themselves would then feel encouraged, or even under a direct obligation, to take initiatives known to have the backing of public opinion in their respective countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, encouraged by your highly interesting and enlightening comments on the Council's commitment to the cause of arms control and disarmament, I would like to ask you to what extent the Council has formulated its own positions with regard to the Soviet disarmament proposals made in January of this year and to what extent those positions entered into the formulation of the western stance as a whole.

Is the Council prepared to discuss in detail and to formulate its own positions on proposals announced by the Soviet Union for the end of this month in relation to the reduction of conventional troops? After all, the member countries of Western European Union are particularly involved and interested in this question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – At meetings of the Council of Ministers we have established two points with regard to the proposals made by the Soviet

*Mr. Andreotti (continued)*

Union. The first is that all such proposals should always be subjected to close consideration and should not be dismissed out of hand or treated as propaganda. The second point – which we have formally urged on the United States as well – is that proposals should be laid on the negotiating table, not made in interviews or speeches. Of course, these means can be used to test the temperature: we are all politicians and very familiar with the situation, but it is often possible to observe some disparity between fine words and the actual proposals placed on the negotiating table. We have agreed on these two points and thereby, in my opinion, made some practical headway.

As to the merits of proposals, we consider that these should, wherever possible, be debated in restricted session between ministers, bearing in mind that negotiations are involved and that neither of the parties can make his final position public in advance. It is therefore my opinion that everything to be debated by the Assembly and the Council in continuation of their work hitherto should, to ensure its usefulness, be conveyed to the negotiators in the greatest possible confidence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Masciadri.

Mr. MASCIADRI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Andreotti, early last April three reports were submitted concerning the WEU agencies, dealing respectively with disarmament, security and arms integration. I believe that such reports should not be filed but should be used. I would therefore like to know if it is intended to utilise them, and how. I should specially like to know if they are to be made available to the Assembly, and how soon. We attach great importance to these reports and consider our complete ignorance of them to be a serious gap which needs filling.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I can assure you that, far from having been overlooked, these reports have been studied in Italy in preparing the work of the Atlantic Council and a series of scheduled bilateral meetings. I can also assure you that in the planned meetings with the Luxembourg Foreign Minister – and I would remind you that the President of this Assembly considers it possible to arrange a meeting with him similar to that held between myself and my predecessor, Mr. Genscher, when the Italians took over the chairmanship – we shall look into ways of introducing this material into the debates conducted in the

various forums, as well as into discussions with those who will subsequently sit down at the negotiating table.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – Why does the annual report of the Council omit to mention the meeting of the disarmament experts from the foreign ministries of the WEU countries which was held in Bonn on 11th February last year? Has the omission of any mention of that report anything to do with the possible displeasure of the United States of America at attempts by WEU countries to agree a common attitude to arms control?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The meeting referred to was in a sense considered informal, and that is why its outcome was not mentioned in the official report. That does not mean, however, that account was not taken of the matter discussed at that meeting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – During a most interesting address yesterday, the Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen, said that the increase in the Council's work was, inter alia, caused by the need to cope with the extra heavy workload generated by the development of relations with the Assembly. In those circumstances, does Mr. Andreotti think that the development of those relations has considerably increased the workload of the Assembly? Would he, therefore – I speak with feeling as the Chairman of the Budgetary Affairs Committee – propose a corresponding increase in the staff of the Clerk of the Assembly?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I believe there is an interchange between the work of the Council and the Assembly such that the one influences the other.

As far as the economic aspect is concerned, I have no authority to speak on behalf of the Council, and can only say that, if a proposal is made, the Italian representative will vote in favour.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I wish to ask the Minister the following question:

*Mr. Burger (continued)*

why has the Council taken no action on the proposal made by Mr. Genscher, in December 1984, to set up a European institute for defence questions when it indicated in its reply to Recommendation 429 that it might consider doing so?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The Venice communiqué confirmed the willingness to set up such an institute. There had been practical difficulties, but in Venice we wanted to look at the matter again to see if these difficulties could be overcome.

However, the fact that the matter was mentioned in the communiqué and that the commitment still stands reflects our belief that the difficulties can be surmounted. I consequently believe that a vigorous effort should be made to bring the preparatory work to a conclusion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, we note the restated determination to pursue vigorously the battle for WEU, as well as your commitment to clear up the doubts and uncertainties expressed in this Assembly.

I would like to ask you a question. The Secretary-General said yesterday that WEU needed a transitional period lasting until 1987. Will this transitional period involve the problems of agency activities and the enlargement of WEU to include the countries which have applied for membership, or the more trenchant question of the political activity of the Council itself?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – As Mr. Bianco is well aware, the 1987 terminal date is that set for the reactivation phase of WEU.

In answer to the triple question posed, I have to reply that, in my opinion, the time between now and the end of 1987 should be used to deal with all three points. We must see to it that the restructuration is completed, that contacts are developed with the countries wishing to join WEU – and in the case of Portugal these contacts have already been established – and that our national parliaments display the commitment I was talking about a short time ago.

While the period is not very long, it is sufficient to achieve practical solutions and within

the projected timetable, as well as to verify the implementation of the commitments contained in the Rome declaration, which I trust we shall honour.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Is Mr. Andreotti fully aware of the depth of feeling in the Assembly in favour of enlargement of WEU, most notably expressed recently in Mr. Bianco's admirable report? If a precondition is to be set for applicant nations, should it be based not on whether a country is a member of the EEC but on whether it is a member of NATO and is willing to accede to the Brussels Treaty in full?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – On this subject, I can only pass on the outcome of the Venice discussion. We stated that preliminary contacts should be established with the interested countries without regard to whether or not they belonged to the EEC.

Portugal applied for membership some time ago, while other countries are delaying their application until such time as negotiations are possible.

We have stated that such contacts should be made to familiarise these countries with WEU and make clear to them the commitments which applicants would be required to make. On the other hand, what we refer to as reactivation needs to be defined, so that these new members will know what sort of WEU they will be joining.

It is of little moment whether eight or nine instead of seven countries are involved, as long as the important problem of reactivation is still outstanding.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Milani.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, in reply to a fellow delegate a short time ago you said, with reference to the Chernobyl disaster, that these problems ought to be dealt with on the basis of interdependence and not by separate action.

Bearing in mind the alliance to which we belong, do you not consider that the SALT II decision was taken with some disregard for this interdependent relationship, and that our ally ought to have consulted its European partners?

Secondly, you mentioned that proposals should not be made in speeches, but should be presented at the negotiating table. I would like

*Mr. Milani (continued)*

to put it to you that our major ally has for some time acquired the habit of pressing harder, as in the case of SDI, chemical weapons, terrorism and the bombing of Libya, and now SALT II. Do you not consider that our ally should take account of European opinion so as to avoid creating problems for Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – To be precise, the President of the United States did consult heads of state and of governments, and I have no hesitation in saying that the Italian Prime Minister replied that the status quo should be maintained.

The subject has also been raised in the North Atlantic Council and it is hoped in many quarters, perhaps not without foundation, that the action of the United States President – which is not to take effect immediately – will get things moving and speed up the negotiations.

With regard to increasing or reducing pressure, I think we should look at the collective documents and particularly those of the alliance. Collective efforts along agreed lines – and the WEU countries can play a big part in ensuring that certain lines are adhered to – should ultimately produce an effect, as has happened in the past. Nobody should forget the significant part played by individual countries in NATO certainly, and perhaps also by the Warsaw Pact countries, in determining the attitudes of the two major powers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – We have two sayings in the United Kingdom, both of which mean the same thing. One is: “If you have an idea, you will the means.” The other, rather more colloquial, saying is: “Put your money where your mouth is.” They both mean that if one decides on a policy, one provides the resources.

Mr. Andreotti, your answer to my colleague Sir Dudley Smith confirms what many of us have thought – that busy ministers who come to the Council have a sheet of paper from their deputies saying: “The Assembly wants more money, but we do not think that you should agree” and ministers rubber-stamp it. Are you aware that the Assembly has proposed more than once not merely slight increases in the Clerk’s staff but replacement of typewriters which you as a minister and I as a former minister would not even allow on the scrap-heap in our ministries? Are you aware that you are not permitting the

Assembly to have even the increased cover needed because of the cost of pensions?

I suggest that ministers should take a little time to look at the enormous shortfall in resources available to the Assembly and decide whether they want us to do the job. Many of us are coming to the conclusion that, if we shall not have the resources needed to do the job that you ask us to do, it may not be worth our while coming to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Not trying to be kind, but speaking objectively and bearing in mind the increased tasks to be handled by WEU, I do think that the various budget allocations, including that for the Assembly, are not properly balanced.

We must try, in our respective parliaments, to convince our governments of this. Our own government is convinced, and I should be very glad if the delegate who put the question would use his influence with the British Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Questions to and answers from government representatives are always of considerable interest, Minister, and we thank you for your participation.

I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Andreotti, I also wish to thank you for the work accomplished and for your effective replies to the often very discontented voices raised in this Assembly.

When it was decided to reactivate WEU, and you as a long-standing European know that the connection at the back of everyone’s mind was the EEC, we hoped that problems associated with revitalising European defence would be given priority.

It seems to me, without wanting to be unkind, that we are currently paying too much attention to hanging on to the coat tails of the Americans or others, albeit in the worthy interests of peace.

Without asking you to prophesy, which would be foolish and presumptuous on my part, I would like to ask whether the rationalisation and construction of European defence have been completely overlooked. It seems to me that this is a question we have to answer. Europe cannot hold its own unless, subject to practical limitations and those imposed by its alliances, it looks to its own defence based on suitable agreements, the requisite sacrifices and the eradication of the many scandalous situations which have arisen among the Europeans in this area.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I thank Mr. Cifarelli for his kind words. As an old federalist, he knows full well that you should never abandon a just cause. I would not say it is a bad thing to hang on to the coat tails of somebody about to launch himself into an extremely vigorous initiative which may, however, like all violent activities, not always be best calculated to produce the real solution to a problem.

Mr. Cifarelli raises a very important point. While we must talk in what I would term a very flexible way about autonomous European defence, so as not to create confusion both here and on the other side of the Atlantic, some long-term preparation can be achieved by rationalisation and standardisation. These are problems of prime importance involving a whole range of interests. During my eight years as Defence Minister, I have listened to some marvellous speeches on standardisation, but in the event it was national, industrial and multinational interests which proved far more potent than the speeches.

I believe this is a subject we must take up, tiresome though it may be, since it is always pleasanter to make speeches about grand principles than about the need to use the same calibre for weapons of a particular type.

I believe Mr. Cifarelli is right in considering this to be a subject we must pursue indefatigably and with the exercise of all our technical ability.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Terlezki.

Mr. TERLEZKI (*United Kingdom*). – Is the intention of the United States Government to resume the manufacture of chemical weapons explained by the fact that the Soviet Union already has stockpiled three hundred thousand tonnes of such weapons?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – On this subject I have to read the newspapers. Unfortunately – because I hope it may one day be possible to have an inventory of armaments and completely reliable details of weapons transfers. This is not the present situation. There are specialist magazines, which give some clues and there are information services providing full information and contradictory intelligence, which make it even more difficult to know how things actually stand.

I could not say whether the Soviet Union really does possess these three hundred thousand tonnes of chemical weapons, although I can say that when the United States claimed that, failing an agreement, it would have to build up its chemical arsenal so as to balance the large Soviet stocks of all kinds of chemical and binary weapons, no disclaimer was, as far as I know, issued by the Soviet Union. I think therefore that the right policy is to press very energetically for the conclusion of an agreement, given the great difficulty, for me at least, of quantifying the stocks held on either side.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fiandrotti.

Mr. FIANDROTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The subject of my question holds less terror than chemical weapons. As you know, Italian style is much in vogue in Italy and Europe. When the Achille Lauro was hijacked, creating a very delicate situation in relation to our American allies, the Italian Craxi-Andreotti style asserted itself. Do you think this style would also suit WEU and bear the same mark of political attention?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. ANDREOTTI (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The first question was about love, and this is if anything even more delicate, as I would not want to see Mr. Fiandrotti's place taken by Versace and Valentino, although I hold these gentlemen in high regard, knowing how important Italian fashion is to our balance of trade.

I believe that Prime Minister Craxi and the government did what they had to in the circumstances. The upshot has been criticisms which have left us unimpressed. We would have been more impressed if, instead of one fatality, an extremely serious matter, we had put at risk the lives of the passengers and crew. To have brought matters to a conclusion in twenty-four hours, as far as the danger to the lives of those on board the Achille Lauro was concerned, was without doubt a major achievement. Whether it could be called a style I do not know. Some approved and some did not. For my part I must say, and I am pleased to have the opportunity of making this statement in this important forum, that Italy adopted a highly responsible attitude during those days. As soon as we received news of the hijacking there was a rumour that there would be a repetition of what happened in the case of the aircraft hijacking a few weeks previously, when its release was made conditional on asking the Israelis to release a number of Shi'ite militiamen. We immediately notified the Israelis that, even if we could negoti-

*Mr. Andreotti (continued)*

ate the release of the vessel by asking Israel to liberate persons held in detention by them, we would not accept such a course of action, as it would be wrong to pass over to Israel the responsibility for any possible tragedies. If Mr. Fiandrotti wishes to refer to this as a style, I have no objections. Throughout this affair the Italian Government certainly did nothing it should reproach itself for.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Andreotti.

Allow me on behalf of the Assembly to thank you for your readiness to answer questions and for having allowed us to go into a number of points of great concern to us. I am quite sure that by its applause, the Assembly wished to thank you and show its gratitude to the holder of the chairmanship of the Council for the past year. We hope to see you again in your capacity as Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and to have the benefit of your experience in that rôle.

##### **5. Address by Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations of Belgium**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Tindemans, Minister for External Relations of Belgium.

It is a pleasure for me, Minister, to welcome you on behalf of the Assembly not only in your capacity as Belgian Minister for External Relations but also as a committed European militant, familiar with the affairs of Western European Union, particularly since your country, through your agency, was one of the very first if not the very first to call for the reactivation of WEU. Everyone still remembers your statements and your articles in the press at the time which precisely enabled this Assembly and the Council to plan, within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, a future that would be more European and more in accordance with the spirit and political goals of the Rome Treaty and to maintain among the member states these bonds of an alliance designed for defence but at the same time for the peace of our peoples and to pursue our political objectives. The part you played was considerable and it is an honour for us to have you with us today.

I invite you, Minister, to come to the rostrum.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Minister for External Relations of Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, you have just heard the very enlightening words of my eminent colleague and friend, Giulio Andreotti, to whom I

take this opportunity of paying a warm tribute for the skill and dynamism with which he has presided over the work of the Council during these last twelve months.

My presence at this rostrum this afternoon is the result of a promise I made to your President when he made an official visit to Belgium last March, when we had some very fruitful exchanges of view on a number of questions of particular concern to your Assembly.

In receiving the President in Brussels, my country wished to pay its particular respects to this European Assembly which has the continuous and demanding task of monitoring the collective undertakings entered into under the modified Brussels Treaty. Your Assembly must more than ever remain a partner in the direct, constructive dialogue linking the two political organs of a revitalised WEU.

*(The speaker continued in Dutch)*

It is in that spirit that I would like to make my contribution to the discussion in this Assembly on the present and future activities of our organisation at a time when doubt, scepticism and criticism can all be heard about the political will of the members of the Council to go further along the road signposted by the Rome declaration.

In order to prevent your institution and public opinion in Europe, which it reflects, from falling under the spell of the Euro-pessimism that has caused so much damage in other institutions, I feel that we need to stand back and try to see where we have come from, where we want to go and where we stand today. This is the exercise that, with your permission, I would like to attempt. To that end, with your indulgence, let us go back two years and take a look at what was going on in the various institutions in which we are interested: the Atlantic Alliance, the European Community and WEU.

The Atlantic Alliance has been, is still and will continue to be the indispensable basis for the credible defence of Western Europe and the incarnation of the common political, economic and social values that we share with North America. But for years now, and even more so today, it has been subject to internal tensions, whose potential danger we must not underestimate. The causes of these tensions are many and varied and as always the responsibility for them is not one-sided. But there is one responsibility at least that we must shoulder. When the transatlantic dialogue becomes difficult it is often because the voice of Europe is not making itself heard. The European pillar of the alliance is weak and this weakness, as might be expected, represents a weakness in the alliance as a whole. That is the lesson we have to learn from the dissension-breeding and subversive

*Mr. Tindemans (continued)*

argument that went on in the various countries, including Belgium, in the eighties on the issue of the installation of cruise missiles. Passions have since cooled somewhat on that issue, but the fact remains that the consensus that used to exist in our countries on the major options of foreign policy and defence have broken down repeatedly. Our societies are weakened because of this, and it is our own fault, because I am convinced that a collective, undisputed and clearly formulated European stance would have won the votes of our peoples in this difficult and impassioned debate. This did not happen because there was no European voice to express a collective standpoint within the alliance. We went into the debate in open order, everyone for himself, with too little cohesion.

For its part, the European Community has built up in thirty years an economic solidarity and the feeling of belonging to the same entity which reflects the concept of a common destiny referred to in the first of the big European treaties: the Paris Treaty on the European Coal and Steel Community. Gradually economic solidarity is being supplemented by efforts towards co-operation on external policy, the gradual development of which is one of the successes of the construction of Europe during the last few years. But as soon as we look at security problems we see all the limits to political co-operation. Repeated efforts, and more specifically the proposals bearing the names of ministers such as Genscher and Colombo and more recently the European act, have produced very meagre results.

The obstacles that prevent the Ten and now the Twelve from tackling these problems directly are well known. Special situations, historical traditions, political options that are in themselves fully justified have had the upper hand in this area over the will to define a common standpoint and a common line of action. In a dangerous world with its overlapping and mounting tensions the countries of the Community were not in 1983 – and still are not today – capable of making a common approach to political and military problems deriving directly from a background of conflict. One can and should deplore this situation, but one cannot and must not be blind to it. Here too, cohesion appears to be inadequate.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, that leaves Western European Union which your Assembly has rightly and repeatedly said is the only European institution with competence in defence matters. We all know the lethargy into which WEU had fallen by 1983: a Council that had not met at ministerial level for over ten

years, a somewhat sleepy administrative structure, and your Assembly that was not striking in public opinion the echo merited by the importance of the problems which it discussed.

So that was the situation we had two years ago. There were obvious reasons for concern and it was that concern that led me to write, in an article that appeared in *Le Monde*, that we had to get European co-operation on the move and use Western European Union whose structures and potentialities were largely unused, in order to develop European co-operation on politico-military problems. That goal, shared by others and gradually accepted by all the members of our organisation, is at the origin of the reactivation of WEU. We now have to assess what progress has been made.

To do that we first have to remind ourselves of our objectives. As Mr. Bianco points out in the report he has presented to your Assembly, the reactivation of WEU is more political than military. We have never sought to put another European military entity in place of the Atlantic Alliance. On the contrary our aim is to strengthen the European pillar of that alliance in the interests of all. We have never said we wanted to replace Europe of the Ten or Twelve by Europe of the Seven. On the contrary our aim is to make up for the weaknesses of the former in the particular field of politico-military questions. We wanted it to be recognised that there could be an active WEU without harming either the interests of NATO or the interests of European construction.

It is my view that we have not done so badly in this short space of time although I understand the disappointment voiced yesterday by your President.

The fact is that we now have a form of co-operation among the Seven on politico-military questions. Ministers who had not seen each other in this forum for ten years now meet regularly, and most recently in Venice. They are analysing topical problems in depth and trying to harmonise their viewpoints. Political directors and experts meet regularly to make preparations for the ministerial meetings. The administrative structure inspired by an active and enterprising Secretary-General are working at a new pace. Your Assembly is organising debates, like today's, whose influence and scope are far from negligible. Admittedly this new co-operation is as yet far below the level many of us wanted and hoped for. I never believed that we could reach our target at the first attempt. I will revert to these inadequacies in a moment but first let us take stock of what we have been able to achieve.

Today, the seven member states of WEU discuss current politico-military issues in the framework of the Council. They have considered the

*Mr. Tindemans (continued)*

American strategic defence initiative, have agreed on a number of principles and have found that their approach was more similar in substance than the appearances might suggest.

They have looked into the essential facts of the high-level strategic negotiations between the USSR and the United States and we know that their common position, expressed within the organs of the alliance, has had its influence on the definition of the United States position, as for example, in the interpretation of the clauses of the ABM treaty. They regularly consider the proposals made publicly and at frequent intervals by Mr. Gorbachev. That their response was similar, if not identical as, for example, to the 15th January proposals, is there for all to see. Is not that what we wanted?

This first step in political co-operation, directed to problems which include some of the most difficult and the most delicate, has taken place as we wanted without collision with the institutions of either the Atlantic Alliance or the European Community. Some of our partners in the alliance look on these efforts at co-operation in WEU with scepticism, some with sympathy and others, perhaps, with envy. But I think we have been able to allay misgivings and I hope that our Secretary-General will continue his efforts to establish co-operative relations with the NATO Secretariat-General in an atmosphere of mutual confidence that is in everyone's interest.

The situation is similar as regards the European Community and I am glad that we were able to have an article inserted in the European act, now being ratified by the parliaments of the Community member states, which expressly confirms that collaboration within WEU is in no way in contradiction with the practices and aspirations of European political co-operation.

Thus, a new form of activity and co-operation is gradually taking shape, close on the one hand to the Atlantic Alliance and on the other to the European Community, thus forming the European pillar of the alliance and the security pillar of European construction. This hybrid structure of varying composition probably has nothing in common with an architect's drawing or cartesian logic, I would have preferred something more logical and more coherent but, in spite of these defects, I believe that what we have done meets a need we have all felt and that is what is important.

There is, moreover, one sign about which there can be no mistake. It is the fact that certain countries, not previously involved in our activities, are now seeking to join our organisation or are seriously thinking about doing so. This is a

difficult problem which Mr. Andreotti raised a moment ago. Several of us were concerned at the recent meeting in Venice about how to respond to proposals that are so attractive and comprehensible in themselves but which an organisation in the process of change finds difficult to accept. I shall not go into the substance of the problem but just say here that no one wants to join a moribund organisation or play a part in institutions which have no future. So let us not be more sceptical than those who observe us and let us agree that the progress we have made during recent months is not insignificant because it is attracting the interest and attention of our neighbours. Now, as your President suggested yesterday, we have to strive to make further progress in the direction we have taken and I would like to stress two particular objectives.

The first is to pursue and deepen our exchanges of views on current politico-military issues and, if possible, lead them gradually on to common conclusions. I am thinking, in particular, of the specifically European implications of installing a possible ballistic defence system. We should also continue our studies, with the aid of the agencies concerned, of Soviet tactics in relation to Europe, including, among other things, the flood of proposals of all kinds currently being put forward by Mr. Gorbachev. All this, in fact, is simply the continuation of what we have been doing for some months, and now with the encouragement of the Venice meeting.

Secondly, if there is a field where the identity of Europe would gain by doing more to assert itself it is certainly that of "extra-European" problems. I prefer that term to "out-of-area" or "out of Europe". WEU could make a useful contribution, with the direct backing of Article VIII of the treaty.

We are of course well aware of the difficulties of this task and the sensitivities and even resistance that it arouses.

The fact remains that the problem of Europe's security is not confined within Europe's frontiers nor even within the geographical boundaries of the alliance alone. The purely political aspects of the problem are being tackled in the framework of European political co-operation with undoubted success. When there are security aspects, however, these are not dealt with – or are dealt with indirectly – in the framework of the alliance, but only within the limits set by the Rome declaration of 10th June 1982.

The genuinely politico-military aspects of "outside Europe" are therefore hardly addressed at all. Each country relies on its own judgment and proceeds, where necessary, by way of bilateral contacts with, in most cases, the familiar indifferent results.

*Mr. Tindemans (continued)*

What Belgium proposes is certainly not to substitute WEU for political co-operation nor to use the organisation to define, more or less mandatorily, a common attitude to the "extra-European" problem as such. Such an exercise would be purely theoretical and very probably doomed to failure.

Our suggestion is that governments should agree to discuss in WEU the politico-military aspects bound up with specific situations which, when they occur, may have an impact on the security interests of Europe or certain of its member states. WEU would thus constitute a forum for consultation to which countries could appeal in case of need.

An exercise of that kind, conducted with the necessary swiftness and flexibility, would enable Europe's voice to be better heard, which of itself could only assist the dialogue at transatlantic level, and not directly within the alliance.

The two objectives I have just described are fully compatible with the Rome declaration. To me they seem realistic, but it is best to start by not minimising, as sometimes happens, the difficulties of this enterprise.

Defence and security, on which we would like to see regular collaboration between the members of WEU, are among the problems which touch most closely on such sensitive areas as the sovereignty of the member states, their historical traditions and the deeply-felt emotions of their peoples.

I have long been convinced that European countries must overcome their instinctive resistance to proposals for collaboration in so sensitive a field. I also know that the world does not stand still around us, that time presses and that in this area too, to use a metaphor of Michel Albert, the cost of "non-Europe" is high. But it has to be recognised that you cannot rush these matters without running serious risk of failure. The example of the EDC is there to prove it. Here, even more than elsewhere, though the slow pace is regrettable, a spectacular failure would be disastrous to the construction of Europe.

A second objective difficulty arises from the fact, to which I referred a moment ago, that the consensus there used to be in the post-war years among the main political powers on the major options of security policy is, at least in some of our countries, in jeopardy. This will inevitably introduce an internal policy factor into our work and will not make it any easier.

Lastly, a third difficulty, touching a particularly sensitive chord in this Assembly, is the fact that the problems we want to discuss are among

those which frequently demand discretion. In some cases we could probably get further by keeping quiet than by shouting from the rooftops. This is admittedly unsatisfactory for a parliamentary assembly and Mr. Bianco's report is very telling in that respect. We shall always have to seek a compromise between parliamentarians' democratic right to information and the necessarily confidential nature of certain aspects of security problems. This is surely just what we do in our national parliaments?

However that may be, there are many difficulties in store for us on the road to the effective and lasting reactivation of WEU and in this situation I feel that only pragmatism and patience will pay dividends.

Let us take our cue in this from European political co-operation which, beginning with flexible and non-mandatory procedures, has gradually extended its field of action and deepened its analyses. Today it is quite widely respected and unquestionably makes the voice of Europe heard in certain fields. I am sure that WEU will also achieve this in its own area, provided it continues to work with perseverance and discretion, which does not rule out the will to achieve higher objectives.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, for nearly thirty years I have been a combatant in the fight for Europe, which is both inspiring in its goals and unrewarding in the obstacles it constantly encounters. WEU has a significant contribution to make to this fight because its responsibilities cover the vital field of our security.

May I urge you to continue in your struggle for this ideal with the militancy demanded by the difficulty of the task, but also with the tenacity and patience we have to display in a process that will necessarily be very slow.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for the way you have taken part in this debate – the problem of reactivation remains one of our major concerns – and the proposals you have made during your address.

If you will be so kind, I would now ask you to answer the questions that some members of the Assembly want to put to you.

First of all, however, I extend a greeting to Baroness Young, who has kindly joined us. Without you, Madam, the Assembly would not be complete. We are always very pleased to welcome you and we shall listen with pleasure and interest to the address you will shortly be making on behalf of your government.

Before giving the floor to the first speaker I have something to tell you. You know that our orders of the day provide, at the close of the debate with Lady Young, for votes to be taken on the texts that have been discussed. I shall

*The President (continued)*

therefore certainly have to prolong this meeting, without overdoing it, because we cannot keep the staff on too long, for the budgetary reasons you are aware of. And since I do not want to ask too much of them – and of the interpreters in particular – I shall adjourn the sitting for about a quarter of an hour after the debate with Mr. Tindemans. After that we shall go as far as we can with the voting, up to about 7 p.m. or at latest 7.30 p.m.

I call Mr. De Decker, the first member down to speak.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I would like to thank you, Minister, for your important and interesting address and for the vital part you have played in the revitalisation of WEU.

You were right to stress the important and new rôle played by the Council of Ministers of the revitalised WEU and one can only be gratified at the Council's decision to study the setting-up of a ballistic defence system, an extremely important subject.

I also feel that if your wish to have WEU tackle the extra-European or out-of-area problem were acceded to, this would give WEU greater weight, influence and complementarity within the alliance.

I would like to ask you a question, Minister, on the very sensitive subject of chemical weapons, which we discussed a short while ago with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council. Like everyone else, I am in favour of WEU's making the complete elimination of chemical weapons in both East and West its objective. But I note, as President Mitterrand did with regard to Euromissiles, that in the East chemical weapons exist and in the West we are talking about eliminating them. Do you not think, Minister, that the Council of WEU and the governments of the member states should denounce with much more vigour than they do today the escalation of the USSR's chemical weapons production?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Minister for External Relations of Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would first like to thank Mr. De Decker for the courtesy with which, addressing himself to a Belgian minister, he phrased his question. The problem of chemical weapons is of great concern to all the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. There is clearly a lack of information available to both the public and governments and, by the way, we heard Mr. Andreotti say publicly here that he got his information from the newspapers.

What we want is to improve the flow of information and to organise a debate among the European countries, because this weapon could possibly be used on our continent. We should study the matter together, exchange the reliable information we have – or that certain countries are said to have – and form a judgment on the attitude that the members of the alliance should adopt.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gansel.

Mr. GANSEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – We know, Minister, of the services you have rendered in the organisational reactivation of WEU and we are grateful for them. But WEU will only attain political significance when the West Europeans – for once at least – are able to find a common formulation of their security interests.

You referred to the discord in Western Europe in connection with the NATO dual-track decision. We complained that, with SDI, the Americans had faced the Europeans with a fait accompli. On the production of new chemical weapons, the American Congress had made approval of funds dependent on a vote by the West European allies. Why was it not possible for Western Europe to give a common answer at least in this case? Was this not a specific challenge to WEU, because the issue involves the storage and use of such chemical weapons on the territory of its member states?

How, Minister, can one nail the rumour that has been going around to the effect that the European NATO partners of the United States agreed among themselves that those countries where no chemical weapons would be stored in an emergency should record their misgivings and those where such weapons would be stored should keep silent. This suspicion of a "tacitly" agreed position, avoiding a statement of Western Europe's real interests although the Americans asked us for one, seriously prejudices the cause of Western Europe.

I know that, as a Minister, you are not responsible for the whole of WEU, but I wanted to put this question to the European you are!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Minister for External Relations of Belgium*) (Translation). – I am sorry to say that I do not agree, and neither does my government. Europe on its own could never organise a credible defence at continental level. We need partners from overseas, as the second world war amply proved. We need to continue to ensure our continent's security in the framework of an Atlantic Alliance.

*Mr. Tindemans (continued)*

On the other hand I am wholly in agreement with those who are doing all they can to strengthen the European pillar within the alliance.

As regards SDI, I share your regret that Europe has been unable to agree on a common attitude, but I must nevertheless point out that the attempt was made and that at one time the principle of a co-ordinated response was adopted. This was under a German President, so that the expression used was *koordinierte Reaktion*, and we all accepted it. We agreed on a number of principles that you know about and which are now the basis of each member state's attitude. This is to be done in the context of the ABM treaty and if we want to get out of it we have to negotiate again. We do not want a new strategy and so on. I do not propose at this time to give you a talk on the principles accepted by all those present round the table when the problem was considered.

Later on, attitudes were not always the same. Some member states wanted to sign, or have signed, an agreement, while others are leaving their industries free to consider what might be done with their American counterparts.

Chemical weapons are a technical problem that has to be dealt with in the framework of the integrated military organisation. These are binary weapons and, here too, I note that Europe has never tried to adopt a unified approach.

There are no secret agreements on chemical weapons. Debates have been organised and we know what has been achieved in the parliamentary and governmental field in each member state. We can and must discuss the issue. Mr. Andreotti has told me that he has to leave us to attend a debate in the Italian parliament at 7 p.m. Tomorrow the Belgian Chamber of Representatives will be voting on this point. So the debate is open, there are no secret agreements.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – Those of us who were in the European Parliament some ten years ago, as I was, were aware of the active part that Mr. Tindemans played in the EEC. Indeed, he mentioned his thirty-year association with the Community. His contribution today heightened the respect of those who know what he has done in the EEC.

I ask Mr. Tindemans to expand on the borderline between civil and military science and technology in Europe. ESA, which was built out of ELDO and ESRO, has a rôle which is confined to peaceful purposes in space. Does Mr. Tindemans consider WEU a suitable organisation for

studying the military aspects of space and to take initiatives? Eureka is a peaceful creative initiative which has been of special interest to the Community. Of late, the Community has been concerned with the industrial capacity to manufacture arms, procurement and standards. What exactly is the Community's rôle vis-à-vis Western European Union?

As for military initiatives, does Mr. Tindemans consider that WEU is a good institution to sponsor military and technological development programmes equivalent to Eureka, and does he consider this possible and desirable?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Minister for External Relations of Belgium*) (Translation). – I am now in the Assembly of Western European Union. WEU is based on the Brussels Treaty and it is in that context that our activities must proceed. To my knowledge Eureka has nothing to do with that treaty, so I can only reply that it is outside the scope of this Assembly and this organisation.

That Europe should interest itself in technology is clearly desirable and necessary, but, once again, I can see no rôle as defined by Sir John Osborn, outside the legal basis of WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Steverlynck.

Mr. STEVERLYNCK (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would first and foremost like to thank the Minister and congratulate him on his analysis, his proposals and his appeal. The Minister calls Western European Union a politico-military institution – I stress "politico". Does he not think that public opinion in Europe is more interested in disarmament as a way of bringing about peace than with its own defence and the safeguarding of our freedoms? Our young people, after all, have never been through a war and their generosity is stirred by the underdeveloped state of the third world. Is there not an important task in store for the Council of Ministers and WEU, possibly in dialogue with the Assembly, namely to inform public opinion via debates like this one, more thoroughly and in a more structured way? This would effectively combat Euro-pessimism.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Minister for External Relations of Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I consider that the first duty of Western European Union is to come to the assistance of any member state in the event of aggression. On that score, as you know, the Brussels Treaty goes further than the Washington Treaty. Firstly, we have to consider how we, in the seven

*Mr. Tindemans (continued)*

European member states, look at our security problems. Secondly, the discussions in Stockholm and in Geneva on arms control and disarmament took place in two forums: the United Nations Committee on Disarmament and the talks between the Americans and the Soviets. Talks are also going on in Vienna. So the problems are being addressed in various places.

I fully support Mr. Steverlynck when he says he wants Western European Union and in particular the Council of Ministers to provide more in the way of information. May I add to that: and the Assembly of Western European Union? One of the reasons why Belgium has made efforts to put new life into Western European Union is that you have a democratic institution here which can also make its voice heard in the national parliaments and in that way represents a sounding-board and can play its own part in informing the public on Europe's security problems and the particular rôle that must be played here by the European countries. We are counting on it. I shall convey your question to the Council of Ministers in order to see what further steps we can take there. But I would ask the Assembly not to neglect this rôle either.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Declercq.

Mr. DECLERCQ (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to join those who have congratulated Mr. Tindemans on his dedication to European unification over the years. The address he made is a further proof of his commitment.

I was very struck by that part of Mr. Tindeman's address in which he referred to what I shall call the grey area of European security, the extra-European area. He put forward a proposal about which I would say this. It is extremely interesting but for me the boundaries are not all that clear. He spoke about a kind of European forum, namely, at the level of WEU, where these problems could be considered, though not on a binding basis. My question is therefore more concrete: should an initiative be taken to that end at the level of the Council of Ministers or does the Minister think that it would be more appropriate and that there might perhaps be more chance of success if this Assembly were to address a recommendation to this effect to the Council of Ministers?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Minister for External Relations of Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I do not recall using the words "grey area", but it says what needs to be said. May I tell Mr.

Declercq that it is sometimes very difficult to say what is European and what is extra-European. Let me give you an example. After the military raid on Libya there was the retaliatory strike on Lampedusa. Libya is not in the European area, if I may put it that way, but Lampedusa is. Suddenly it had become a European problem as well. So it is not so easy to say where the one ends and the other begins.

Secondly, dialogue and discussion must gradually develop in this area. To my mind it is self-evident that we in Western European Union should also analyse possible threats to us even when they come from outside Europe. Surely that is perfectly self-evident. If I remember rightly, a delegation from the Assembly has been to China. To my knowledge China is not yet part of the European Community or of the alliance. So there has to be a natural evolution if we are to take a greater interest in problems that could possibly affect European security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges.

Mrs. HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – You referred, Minister, to new forms of co-operation between WEU and the Europe of the Twelve. I would like to know what you mean by this in concrete terms. Often, the Europe of the Twelve has already taken a stand on major issues before the organs of WEU have had time to meet.

Also, how do you see effective co-operation between the two parliamentary assemblies? Do you not think we are trying to hide the obvious by keeping artificially alive, without much conviction on the part of the Council of Ministers, the moribund institutions you referred to?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Minister for External Relations of Belgium*) (Translation). – I would like to thank the speaker for the question, which English speakers would call provocative. The question is fundamental. I would say to the members of this Assembly that the Europe of the Twelve cannot give its views on certain questions which interest us and which interest you. One of the member states is neutral and another is a member of the alliance, but not of the integrated military organisation, whilst a third, up to the referendum, asked to be allowed special status. Some questions cannot therefore be considered at the level of the Twelve. In accordance with the Luxembourg decision last December it is proposed that political co-operation be included in the European act, but where security is referred to in the text this relates solely to the economic and political aspects of security, not its military aspects. Now, your organisation can deal with politico-military

*Mr. Tindemans (continued)*

aspects, as I said and as you have stressed. Even if the instrument we have is rather an odd shape – we have only seven members whereas the Community has twelve – we can do work that cannot be done in any other forum.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – On Thursday the Assembly is to debate security and terrorism, with which all European countries are deeply concerned. Is the Belgian Government aware of the increase in uncontrolled immigration into Europe via East and West Berlin from the Middle East, Sri Lanka and other parts of Asia? Is Mr. Tindemans aware that this traffic is positively encouraged by the Soviet and East German state airlines? In view of the European importance of this, does Mr. Tindemans think that it would be more appropriate for the European Community to make representations to both German Governments or for this to be done by national governments?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Minister for External Relations of Belgium*) (Translation). – The European Community has held meetings on the appalling problem of terrorism. I assume that the members of the Assembly are aware that the ministers for justice and internal affairs have met and decided to hold regular meetings from now on. The problem is therefore being dealt with at that level on an intergovernmental basis.

I would point out that according to my colleagues with responsibilities in this area, frontier controls have not proved to be the most effective way of stopping terrorists. The countries that have suffered from this scourge have found that such controls achieved practically nothing and that the exchange of information between the specialised services was more effective.

With regard to immigration policy, I would remind you that this has never been decided at Community level and is purely a matter for individual countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, the Assembly is asking for three small things which are currently at the root of its problems: more frequent, timely and close relations with the Council; an increase in the staff of WEU, which is at present notoriously small numerically, and more funds for the discharge of its duties. Do you not think that these three needs could largely be met by concentrating all the bodies of WEU in one place, as this Assem-

bly has been asking for some years past? Has this problem been raised in the Council? And what is your personal view on the matter?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Minister for External Relations of Belgium*) (Translation). – Please excuse me for not replying in Italian. I shall try to do so next time.

I listened with the greatest attention and, I do not mind telling you, with some pleasure to Mr. Andreotti's reply to the question whether the WEU budget should be increased. You are a member of your national parliament. The question ought firstly to be put to the national governments, because that is where budgetary decisions are taken.

With regard to location, I would like to know what you propose. If I have understood rightly, you were in favour of a single headquarters but I do not know whether all the members of this Assembly are in favour of that solution. Up to now, the Council has not considered this question – which I would almost call a “ diplomatic ” one – of balance and the distribution of the responsibilities and advantages inherent in the existence of an institution like WEU.

So I would like to hear a debate one day in this Assembly, to see whether unanimity emerges on the question of the organisation's headquarters. At our ministerial level, as I said, we have not yet discussed it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I do not want to interfere with the debate, but I would point out that the Assembly has voted in favour of texts tending in that direction.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Minister for External Relations of Belgium*) (Translation). – I beg your pardon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Not at all. This is not a debate but an exchange of questions and answers.

I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I have an undiplomatic question to ask you, Minister, but perhaps it will call for a diplomatic answer.

With great admiration for your successful European policy efforts, I would like to ask you whether you share the view that WEU – as stated in paragraph 1 of the Venice communiqué – is merely a forum in which the governments concerned can address specific European concerns in the security field, or whether your attitude is closer to that voiced by Mr. Genscher, German Minister for Foreign Affairs, in May 1985 in WEU when he said: “ ...the Council must face up

*Mr. Antretter (continued)*

courageously to all the security problems of our time, as it did successfully in Bonn. In future," he went on, "we must do more than simply co-ordinate our stances on security policy issues; we must work out common European positions."

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Minister for External Relations of Belgium*) (Translation). – I shall try, Mr. President, to give an answer that is diplomatically defensible but not typically diplomatic. I spoke of a process of development, as in all organisations. WEU, like any institution, must have the opportunity to develop its activities and influence, but if you ask me what my ideal would be I would go along with your last definition. I have one remark – not a reservation, a remark: we must not allow two blocs to form within the Atlantic Alliance. But in my opinion the Europeans should analyse the situation among themselves and formulate a European position. In this context of current issues to which you referred and with that knowledge of the problem facing us, they would then be in a position to defend their stand within the alliance in an open debate, whilst recognising the good points argued on both sides.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, what we have been saying over the past hours seems to me to have more bearing on defence than on security. In another forum, and in discussion with other political leaders, I have in the past called for the setting up of a specialist European emergency force. Such a force, more relevant to security than to defence, could be brought into action to cope with emergencies, natural catastrophes and peacekeeping, health and aid duties, broadly interpreted in conditions where civilian lives are placed at risk by acts of war. Would you pass on this request to the Council of Ministers?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Minister for External Relations of Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have no definitive answer. The matter is on the agenda and is being considered and in my view deserves serious examination in all its aspects, but we must not go too fast. Remember the failure of the European Defence Community. After all, the issue is that of setting up a European force which does not, up to now, exist. So let us tackle the subject cautiously and go on talking about it. That is the only answer I can give you today.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rumpf.

Mr. RUMPF (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. Tindemans, the Soviet Union recently offered Great Britain bilateral negotiations on the reduction of intermediate-range missiles. Sometime, presumably, a similar offer will be made to France. Do you consider such bilateral negotiations to be a help or a hindrance – for Western European Union that is – when the object in this matter must be to add more emphasis to the common voice of Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Minister for External Relations of Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I remind the questioner that the United States has not, so far, been authorised to speak on behalf of the United Kingdom and France in Geneva with regard to these two countries' strike forces. They said that this was essentially a national weapon which had no place in the negotiations between the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic Alliance.

Therefore, to give you an off-the-cuff answer to a very serious question, I personally see no objection to possible bilateral negotiations, if the arms in question are not part of the alliance's common resources.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Spies von Büllesheim.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – There are, Minister, to put it very simply, two opinions about the enlargement of WEU. Some say we must only invite other countries to join once we have put our own house in order, redefined our goals and have a proper mission and when we have perhaps modified our structure and the Brussels Treaty. The others say: No, invite now and admit anyone who wants to join, on the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty. These questions will be more easily solved that way. Which way would you lean? Presumably you will not be able to give a very precise answer.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. TINDEMANS (*Minister for External Relations of Belgium*) (Translation). – The Assembly is no doubt aware that at the last meeting in Venice it was decided to consider this question again and to make contact with any countries wishing to join.

As far as Belgium is concerned – I said this myself so I think I can repeat it here in public – in Venice my view was that the condition formulated by the Secretary-General then called the

*Mr. Tindemans (continued)*

"Cahen doctrine" was acceptable, namely that, to become a member of Western European Union a country had to be a member of the Atlantic Alliance and of the European Economic Community.

But I added that, in our view, the seven members had to answer without too great a delay because, and this is the sentence with which I concluded in my statement, whether it is yes or no we have to have the courage to say so. I do not like hurting people needlessly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Minister, we have come to the end of the list of representatives down to ask you questions. Thank you for answering so fully on the matters raised. You yourself observed that, with the technical politico-military questions, we have, thanks to you, embarked on the debate which we wanted and is the means whereby Western European Union, Council and Assembly, can serve the purposes of the Brussels Treaty and, of course, security. Thank you very much, Minister, for having been with us.

Ladies and gentlemen, as I told you, I am now adjourning the sitting for a few minutes.

The sitting is suspended.

*(The sitting was suspended at 5.05 p.m. and resumed at 5.30 p.m.)*

The sitting is resumed.

**6. Address by Baroness Young,  
Minister of State for Foreign  
and Commonwealth Affairs  
of the United Kingdom**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Baroness Young, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, whom our Assembly has already welcomed on several occasions.

Lady Young, thank you for being prepared to answer the questions that you will be asked after your address. I invite you to come to the rostrum.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Your Excellency, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to address the Assembly again. I am delighted to pay tribute once again to you, Mr. President, for all the work that you have done for the WEU Assembly. It is greatly appreciated by all the representatives here. I know from my British colleagues how much they value your work.

With respect, I am not here either to anaesthetise or to appease. I propose to speak on two subjects, both of which figure prominently in your deliberations this week. They are the prospect for arms control and the rôle, current and future, of WEU.

I begin with arms control.

When I last spoke at this Assembly six months ago, it was at what seemed to be an auspicious moment in East-West relations. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev had met at Geneva two weeks earlier, and there was a widespread feeling that prospects in 1986 for arms control agreements were better than for some while. There was a mood of optimism and confidence.

It would be good to report that this confidence had proved justified. But alas the picture is mixed. At the various disarmament fora in which they are involved – at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons, in MBFR in Vienna and at the conference on disarmament in Europe in Stockholm – western negotiators have put forward specific and detailed proposals. By contrast we have had from Mr. Gorbachev a number of speeches, some of them containing fine words, for example about verification; but somehow his words never seem to get reflected in the responses of Soviet negotiators in actual arms control discussions.

It may therefore be worth spelling out what we are seeking in terms of arms control and how we aim to achieve it. As Geoffrey Howe showed when he spoke at the NATO Council meeting in Halifax last week, our aims are both comprehensive and ambitious, covering the full range of nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons. We are looking for deep cuts in strategic nuclear forces, the elimination of a whole category of mobile intermediate nuclear weapons, the introduction of an international convention banning the deployment and production of chemical weapons, and lower levels of conventional armed forces in Europe, coupled with confidence-building measures providing openness and predictability about military activities throughout the continent – all this to be accompanied by effective verification measures, including on-site inspection, designed to ensure confidence that agreements are being complied with and to instil the trust necessary for further disarmament steps.

This is a challenging agenda. But we believe that it is practical and can be achieved: more so perhaps than vague references to the chimera of a nuclear-free world. In his speech of 15th January, Mr. Gorbachev claimed the prospect of such a world by the end of the century. But, on examination, his words contained much rhetoric and little prospect of meaningful negotiations.

*Baroness Young (continued)*

By contrast, the American proposals tabled in Geneva on 24th February picked up the one serious negotiating proposal in the Soviet scheme – INF. They provided a realistic basis for the global elimination of United States and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles, including the Soviet SS-20s in Asia, and they envisaged the constraints on the shorter-range systems such as the SS-22, which are necessary if an INF agreement is not to be circumvented. These proposals took full account of European views. They were the result of, and a tribute to, intense and successful consultations within the alliance.

The American proposals on INF, together with the previous proposals on START and in relation to space defence, were tabled as a serious set of negotiating possibilities. Sadly, we still await a serious Soviet response. We have welcomed Mr. Gorbachev's recognition of legitimate western concerns about verification, not only in his 15th January proposals but also in his report to the twenty-seventh Soviet Communist Party congress in February and in his speech in East Berlin in April. But we have yet to see any of the small print of these declarations, let alone their translation into concrete proposals at the negotiating table.

So in recent months, despite hopeful beginnings, progress at the Geneva nuclear and space talks between the United States of America and the Soviet Union has been limited. For Europeans, it is of paramount importance to go on pressing for more. This means first and foremost constructive Soviet responses in negotiable form.

In other areas, too, we await from the Soviet Union a serious and positive negotiating response. The significance of conventional armaments for Europe hardly needs emphasising. With modern weapons, conventional war would be an unmitigated disaster for Europe, far worse than the second world war. Any reductions in nuclear weaponry will serve to emphasise the rôle of conventional forces. The heavy imbalances in favour of Warsaw Pact countries in the critical central region are well known: their standing forces amount to some 975,000 soldiers, compared with a maximum of 780,000 deployed by NATO; 16,600 main battle tanks, compared with 7,800 for NATO; 8,800 pieces of artillery, against 3,000 NATO pieces; and 2,650 fixed-wing tactical aircraft, in comparison with 1,250 for NATO.

We must, therefore, find ways to reduce the massive conventional force levels in Europe, to bring those force levels into balance, and to bring an end to confrontation and insecurity. The West makes no bones about what it is prepared

to do on conventional arms control: we are prepared to be entirely open about the size and disposition of our military forces. We are ready for reductions to specified levels, and we are ready for adequate verification of those reductions, and of the levels of forces that remain. We are prepared to do all of these things. The reason why conventional arms control talks have failed is that the East is prepared to do none of them. At MBFR, the West made significant moves at the end of last year to break the twelve-year deadlock. The East's response was a rehash of eastern information and inspection proposals dating from 1983. At the Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe, there is a danger of the familiar pattern repeating itself. The fact is that the East has so far been unwilling to consider practical measures to open up, to reduce, or to verify. Mr. Gorbachev's few words on verification, and on his commitment to real measures of conventional disarmament, have yet to be put into practice at the negotiating table.

None the less, the speech of Mr. Gorbachev in East Berlin on 18th April, in which he expressed Soviet readiness to pursue force reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals, provides an opportunity which we must try to exploit. At their meeting in Halifax last week, NATO foreign ministers decided to set up a high-level task force on conventional arms control. The aim will be to find ways of establishing a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels, building on the western proposals at the CDE in Stockholm and at MBFR in Vienna.

In all these areas, verification is the key issue. Adequate verification is essential both to ensure that agreements, once entered into, are complied with, and to provide the confidence for more far-reaching measures. On-site inspection is a crucial part of a verification régime for nuclear, chemical and conventional forces. Without it, arguments about compliance are bound to arise. We saw last week, when President Reagan announced his decisions in relation to the SALT II agreement, how important the issue of compliance is. The British Government have frequently made clear their belief in the strict observance of arms control agreements by all parties. We have raised with Soviet leaders on a number of occasions our serious concern about their record on compliance. The Prime Minister did so again in a recent message to Mr. Gorbachev. We regard SALT II, like the ABM treaty, as a vital component in the arms control process which we must do everything possible to prevent unravelling. So we welcome President Reagan's decision to continue to respect for the time being the SALT II constraints by dismantling two Poseidon submarines – just as we welcomed last

*Baroness Young (continued)*

year his decision "to go the extra mile". There is now an opportunity for the Soviet Union to respond positively to the United States, an opportunity which they should take up. We accordingly hope that it will be possible for the United States itself to remain within the SALT II limits at the end of this year. In this way, the scope for real progress at Geneva would be enhanced, as envisaged by the two leaders at their summit last November.

There have, therefore, been reasons for disappointment since last November's United States-Soviet summit. But there are also reasons for hope. One test case here is the United States offer of dialogue at the Geneva talks on the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons. So long as the Russians stick fast to the unrealistic line that their research into strategic defence is legitimate, but that the United States SDI must stop, it is difficult not to doubt their seriousness. Meanwhile, common prudence dictates that the massive Soviet research programmes into strategic defences should be matched. The big cut in nuclear missiles which we want the superpowers to make could be brought closer by action to strengthen the effectiveness of the ABM treaty, and greater confidence over the nature of the relationship between offence and defence. As the Prime Minister agreed with President Reagan at Camp David in December 1984, the aim is security with reduced levels of offensive systems on both sides.

Europe of course has a legitimate and specific interest in the whole arms control process. But arms control must be seen in the context of an overall security policy. In the last four decades we have depended on the strategy of deterrence. This strategy has from the beginning successfully underpinned Europe's defensive alliance with the United States and Canada in NATO. Our security is based on collective defence, for which the United States commitment, symbolised by the presence in Europe of three hundred thousand American servicemen, is crucial. Our defensive military objectives are based on the principle that none of our weapons systems will ever be used except in response to an attack. And we complement this by the pursuit of political dialogue – indeed, a whole web of economic and human relationships – between East and West. This dual approach reflects a deeper reality, that security is just as much a political and diplomatic as a military problem.

Within this alliance framework, we Europeans must make a full and distinctive contribution. The statistics show that we have been doing this: we provide 90% of NATO manpower, 95% of its divisions, 85% of its tanks, 95% of its artillery, 80% of its combat aircraft, and, at sea in European waters and the Atlantic, 70% of

the fighting ships. This record speaks for itself. Europe has long recognised the importance of maintaining a strong European pillar in order to strengthen the alliance as a whole, and to maintain deterrence itself.

Politically, too, we play our part in securing the continued stability and prosperity of the post-war era. We have encouraged and developed a dialogue between East and West. We have opened up human contacts. We have made our voice heard in the process of consultation which is so essential to our solidarity and strength. When channels of communication have been closed, we have opened them. And when caution has been needed, we have counselled it. We have played our part in many fora; in the overall East-West context, perhaps most importantly in the CSCE. The follow-up meeting at Vienna in the autumn offers a chance to take stock of activities in the CSCE framework since Madrid, to redress the balance between its security, economic, and humanitarian aspects and to revitalise the process begun at Helsinki in 1975.

But we also play our part here in WEU. One reason why we reactivated WEU was to develop greater harmony in our views through discussion in this forum, to provide through political debate a stronger contribution to the alliance and to the work of other fora, such as the IEPG. We in Britain continue to hold to this principle. We want to see Europe make its full contribution to East-West security, to strengthen in that process its alliance with the United States, and ultimately to bring down the barriers which unnaturally separate us from our eastern neighbours. WEU can make a significant contribution towards the realisation of these aims.

We also see WEU as important in other ways. It offers a place where we as Europeans can discuss issues of security and defence in a more far-reaching way than in European political co-operation. Indeed, Article 30.6 of the new EEC treaty, which mentions the need for such discussions, cites WEU as an appropriate forum for them. The British Government, as you know, has for long pressed for more far-reaching consultations on security and defence issues within the framework of European political co-operation. We see WEU not only as a vehicle for developing a stronger joint identity with our European partners in the security and defence field. It is also a way of expressing our own enthusiasm for a more coherent and integrated Europe in all areas. As you know, we have put our shoulder to the task of European construction: through our contribution to the European Communities as a whole, and through our participation in the great variety of other European groupings, on a larger or smaller scale.

Of course, as a sovereign nation within the European network, the expression of our own

*Baroness Young (continued)*

interests will not always be identical to that of our partners. There will sometimes be differences between us on the issues of the day. But in the end these must be resolved by a process of debate and the development of understanding leading to a broader consensus. The important thing is that, whenever Britain acts, we act as Europeans and in the way that we think right for this continent's security.

The revived WEU has become one of the many symbols of our European commitment. And no one agrees more than we do with the emphasis the Assembly's recent reports placed on the need for European governments to improve their co-ordination. We strongly favour, for example, the close liaison in armaments co-operation among Europeans recommended by Mr. Bianco. We believe that WEU's rôle in support of the work of IEPG and NATO's Conference of National Armaments Directors should be developed. And we fully agree with the thrust of Mr. Fourré's report that co-operation in the civil field – for example, in Eureka or the European Space Agency – benefits us all.

On particular issues, we have noted the interest expressed among you about the work of the Council on the important question of SDI. I think that it has been made clear in a number of ways now, particularly in reply to some of your recommendations and questions, that we see a necessary job for WEU to do. As the communiqué of the Venice meeting of ministers made clear, further studies will be undertaken on this issue. We shall in particular look from a European perspective at certain aspects of European participation in the SDI research programme, and at the politico/strategic implications of SDI for Europe itself. Many of these questions, as Geoffrey Howe made clear in his speech in March 1985 to the Royal United Services Institute, are unanswerable, and will be so for a long time to come. And differences in perception and perspective between our member governments have already limited the possible extent of co-ordination or participation in the SDI research programme. But you will have seen from the report submitted on the activities of the Council last year that we did what we could on the topic in that period. We shall go on working on it in future. If we cannot provide immediate answers to some of your questions, it is not because we do not recognise their importance. It is because the answers will take time and study to find.

Another subject which I know has been of special concern to you has been that of the possible enlargement of WEU. Ministers discussed this in Venice. They concluded that the reorganised and renewed WEU needed time to settle down. The new structures, the agencies, are still

in their infancy. As you will be aware, a review of the reactivated WEU is in any case scheduled to be completed by the end of next year. In the meantime, we thought it wisest to allow WEU to pursue its work unhampered by the threat of further change. We shall, of course, be able to keep up our ordinary contacts with those countries who take an interest in our organisation. We in the United Kingdom are sure that this is the right approach to a sensitive political issue. Decisions cannot be rushed. We need time to think through all the various implications, but the Assembly can be certain that we shall be examining the issue as rapidly as possible, given its importance and complexity.

Ministers at Venice showed their sympathy with many of the other concerns of this Assembly. President Caro's initiative on terrorism was sympathetically received and fully understood. WEU governments, like parliamentarians, are entirely clear on the need to deal in short order with this growing scourge. We have taken action in other fora and now want to see it effectively implemented. The framework of the Twelve, which offers us the broadest possible consensus of European nations, is of key importance here. We shall keep up our efforts, encouraged by the support for our action that your enthusiasm has brought us.

This is, of course, the first opportunity that I have had of addressing the Assembly since the new organisational structure of WEU came into being on 1st January this year. The agencies have been in existence for just five months now, and have only recently had their staff brought up virtually to full strength. But, as you know, they have produced interim reports, to indicate to the Council the sort of work of which they could be capable in the future.

We in Britain have read the agency reports with interest and hope to see work expand on the basis of them. Sir Geoffrey Howe noted at the Venice ministerial meeting that even at this early stage the potential for WEU to contribute to the European debate on security and defence questions was already being realised. I can only echo his words and the welcome that he gave to this fact. Britain wants to see the agencies develop over time and to increase the contribution which WEU can make.

There is a further need to which we in WEU must respond. We must ensure that our publics in each country understand why we debate and decide on issues affecting our security in the way that we do, and that they understand it to be our own independent interest as Europeans that prompts us to do this. There are important issues to take forward here in WEU, and the Assembly has a leading part to play.

In the last few months I have followed closely the debate on improving relations between the

*Baroness Young (continued)*

Council and Assembly of WEU, about which both Mr. Andreotti and Mr. Cahen have spoken in detail. The issues have been brought out very clearly during this session. To my mind, this matter is central to the whole question of how best to use WEU as a forum for influencing our people's thinking and debate on security issues. A good relationship will bring the work of Assembly and Council to complement each other, developing the right kind of dialogue – a productive and constructive one – between parliaments and governments. I can assure you that my government fully support the measures that are being proposed to develop this relationship and of which Secretary-General Cahen and Mr. Andreotti have both spoken.

If we can develop it in the right kind of way along the fruitful and productive path that we all want, I am confident that it will make its own constructive contribution to the goals of our enterprise. I am also confident that it will be a growing contribution, that it will help WEU as a whole to take its place in the European enterprise as it moves forward, and that the security of Western Europe in its alliance with our North American friends and allies will be strengthened all the more because of this.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Madam, for addressing the Assembly and so enabling us to continue the debate we began today on relations between the Council and the Assembly and, above all, on the essential points that the representatives of the various governments feel they should raise concerning the rôle of WEU in the present context of our countries' security policy.

A number of members are anxious to ask you questions. Thank you for your willingness to answer them.

I call Sir Anthony Grant.

Sir Anthony GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – It is significant that when the Council of Ministers is somewhat under fire, it fields no less than three ministers in one afternoon and skilfully puts the most handsome and charming one in to bat last. Having paid Lady Young that well-deserved compliment, I want to ask her a question about the enlargement of WEU.

As I understand it, she told us that the Council of Ministers thought that it was wisest to allow WEU to pursue its work unhampered by the threat of further change. What precisely is this threat that will disturb the placid waters of WEU?

Secondly, we are told that the Council of Ministers cannot be rushed and that it needs time to think through all the various

implications. Very approximately, can she say when these great cogitations by the ministers might conceivably be concluded?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I recognise, Sir Anthony, both by the questions that you have asked and by the questions that have been put to me by other members of the British Delegation – as well as the questions that I have heard as I have listened to the debate this afternoon – that enlargement is undoubtedly one of the most significant questions confronting WEU. That was why I wanted to refer to it in my remarks. But this is a very big question. WEU has existed since 1948. There are a number of very important implications about altering it. There are very strong arguments for increasing it, and there are arguments against. As a government, we believe that it is very important to consider these matters carefully. As a result of Venice, we have felt it right to consider this matter to give reactivation a chance. As I also said, the newly formed agencies have been in existence for only five months. That in itself has been a change. The further issue of enlargement is a matter that we shall certainly consider, and I shall certainly take back and bear in mind the very real feeling of the Assembly and the points that have been raised this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Can I revert to Sir Anthony's question? Of all countries and of all governments, I would have thought that our own – of which Lady Young is a distinguished member – would have found it the least difficult to pursue defence links with Portugal instead of referring to it as a threat of change. It is only two or three weeks ago that we celebrated six hundred years of a military and defensive alliance with Portugal, which has brought us nothing but benefit in the past and to which tribute was paid about its value. Therefore, I should have thought that the British would be among the first to recognise that there is no great problem over defensive alliances with Portugal.

Lady Young referred to President Reagan's observations about SALT II. We have all read his remarks, in which he said specifically on behalf of his government and service spokesmen that continuing breaches of SALT II have occurred and are occurring. That is the reason that he has given. Can the Minister say – yes or no – whether we accept that the Soviet Union has committed breaches of SALT II?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – Sir Frederic has asked two very important questions. On the first, about the possible inclusion of Portugal in WEU, I absolutely take his comment about Portugal's importance. We were particularly pleased when Portugal joined the European Community. As someone who had the great honour and pleasure of being at Windsor Castle for the celebrations of our six hundred years of treaty association with Portugal, I am delighted to say again how much we value that treaty and Portugal as an ally.

It is not really a question of considering enlargement of WEU country by country but of what we might see as the shape of WEU and the future nature of its work. However, I take Sir Frederic's point and will certainly report very fully.

On the second question, in which Sir Frederic said that President Reagan had said that there was clear evidence that the Soviet Union had broken the SALT II treaty, I can only confirm what Geoffrey Howe has said – that the Soviet Union has a case to answer, but it is not for us to comment in detail on that case.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I would like to refer, Minister, to a point in your speech where you said something about the Soviet proposals of January 1986. I wanted to ask you whether the British Government has ever tried, through the diplomatic instruments available to it, to fathom what the Soviet Union means by the modernisation of British or French nuclear weapons. Does it mean quantitative expansion or a qualitative modernisation?

The second part of my question relates to whether the British Government is simply leaving this closer clarification of the question to the Geneva talks and not seeking enlightenment itself in direct talks – not negotiations – with the Soviet Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I thank Mr. Soell for that question about the Soviet proposals. The answer, I think, is that the Soviet Union knows very well our position on our strategic deterrent. If there were to be a major change following upon negotiations, I think that, between the United States and the Soviet Union, we have always said that we would reconsider our position about our own

independent nuclear deterrent. That remains our position on this matter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – You also spoke about the arms build-up, Minister, which has been very fully discussed here in this Assembly in the past. The majority was in favour. Some members on the left referred to the USSR offer to scrap all SS-20s, with verification, down to the number of intermediate-range missiles deployed in England and France.

The arguments we heard were that the Russians only understood the language of strength.

The weapons were deployed and are now all in the Federal Republic of Germany. The command centre for the Pershings is in my constituency, Schwäbisch-Gmünd. The result was not what those in favour had expected. No SS-20s were dismantled. On the contrary, SS-22s and SS-23s were added. I believe the USSR now has a more clear-cut superiority in the intermediate range than before. The imbalance to the disadvantage of the West has shifted.

I would like to ask you, Minister, whether against the background of these facts we should again be building up our arms, or whether we can imagine a time when the West might at last permit itself to take a step in the other direction – towards arms limitation?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I thank Mr. Antretter very much for that question, the central point of which, I think, was whether we should try to probe for a limitation on the intermediate-range nuclear weapon. The view that we have always taken on this matter is that there should be substantial reductions in INF on both sides. We have supported the American zero option on this and we hope very much that we will in any event achieve a substantial reduction of those nuclear weapons.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Kinnoull.

The Earl of KINNOULL (*United Kingdom*). – How does Lady Young estimate the value of the nuclear deterrent within the European defence policy over the last forty years, in view of the very heavy imbalance, which she described in her impressive speech, of conventional weapons?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Young.

Baroness YOUNG (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – The short answer is that we believe that the nuclear deterrent is one of the reasons why we have been fortunate enough to have forty years of peace in Europe. Of course, that is also due to NATO and to the political stability that has come with the European Community, but there is no doubt that the nuclear deterrent has made a major contribution to keeping peace in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Madam, on behalf of the Assembly for giving us your time and for taking part in today's debate. Our committees who prepare our work will take the fullest account of your replies which have involved very active participation along the lines you yourself defined at the opening of your address.

Allow me also to ask you to convey our friendly greetings to Sir Geoffrey Howe whom we were able to see only too briefly in Venice and who takes, with you, an active part in our work.

### 7. Change in the order of business

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, out of courtesy for Mr. Sinesio, who has to leave Paris without fail tomorrow afternoon, I propose to include consideration of his report on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration as the last item in the orders of the day for tomorrow morning's sitting which I think is possible without changing the timetable for this sitting.

Regarding consideration of reports by Mr. Amadei and Mr. Fourné, I propose that we continue as we decided this morning and conclude our debate on Mr. Amadei's report this afternoon. If that proves impossible we will take it at the end of the orders of the day for tomorrow afternoon.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President. I shall not take long. You said that, if possible, we shall continue the debate on Mr. Amadei's report. I should like you to be more specific and give us a time-limit. It is 6.10 p.m. and we should not be here longer than 7 p.m. I suggest that you make 7 p.m. the deadline and, if we do not reach Mr. Amadei's report by then, we should postpone that debate until tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I said at the beginning of this afternoon's sitting that we might be going on till 7.30 p.m. if necessary. However, like you, I am keen to finish as early as possible, possibly at 7 p.m. so I have the same concern in mind as you.

### 8. Revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure

(*Resumed votes on the draft resolutions, Doc. 1039 and amendments*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, in accordance with the decision we took yesterday, the next order of the day is the resumed votes on the draft resolutions on the revision and interpretation of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure, Document 1039 and amendments.

I would point out that these amendments do not require the qualified majority needed for the adoption of the resolution amending the Charter. We can therefore adopt them by normal relative majority.

I have four amendments.

Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Bianco and others reads as follows:

1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter.

Amendment 3 tabled by Lord Hughes and others reads as follows:

3. In paragraph 3 of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter, leave out “(a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau for a period of five years.” and insert “(a) The Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly on the proposal of the Presidential Committee for a period of five years.”.

Amendment 10 tabled by Mr. Schulte reads as follows:

10. In paragraph 3, line 9, of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter, in the proposed new paragraph (c), leave out “, the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.” and insert “and the three agencies for security questions.”

Amendment 12 tabled by Mr. Schulte reads as follows:

12. At the end of the draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter, add a new paragraph as follows:

“5. That these amendments shall come into force on 1st October 1986.”

I understand that there is a possibility of speedy agreement on Amendments 1 and 3.

Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Bianco will be taken first because it makes the biggest changes to the initial text. The amendment tabled by

*The President (continued)*

Lord Hughes which comes next can only be discussed if that by Mr. Bianco is not agreed to.

Amendment 3 by Lord Hughes is to the effect that the Clerk should be appointed by the Assembly on the proposal of the Presidential Committee whilst Mr. Bianco in Amendment 1 asks for the outright deletion of paragraph 3 of the draft resolution presented by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

I hope that our two colleagues can come to an agreement on the simpler Amendment 3 although I ought to take Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Bianco first. This would save the Assembly a considerable amount of time by avoiding six speeches.

I call Mr. Schulte.

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this point is central to our whole institution. You have just heard from the President how the two amendments differ.

Allow me, however, to point out once more that I understand from the originators of Amendment 1, the Italian members, that their wishes would be met if the amendment to the Charter specified a period of election for the Clerk but provided for the Assembly to be the electoral body. Ladies and gentlemen, if that is the case, then the two proposed amendments are identical.

May I once again point out that we discussed this at length in committee, where both viewpoints were expressed, but that a majority in the committee then said they were in favour of the Presidential Committee being the electoral body. But no one regarded this point as a *sine qua non*. So we are quite prepared to compromise here, as the President has just said.

If we accept Lord Hughes's amendment to the effect that our parliament, or this Assembly, becomes the electoral body, then I would make a plea that Mr. Bianco and his friends be asked to withdraw their proposal, since I know this amendment would meet their wishes. Then we would have disposed of the problem altogether and would be voting for a rational regulation – with the necessary quorum, I hope, Mr. President!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your co-operation, Mr. Schulte.

I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Chairman of the committee has interpreted our objectives correctly. We want two things. Firstly that the Assembly should be the

body to elect the Clerk, and secondly that the Clerk should be directly responsible to the Assembly in accordance with the existing Charter. The importance of the last point is implicit in the first, as election by the Assembly would create a direct relationship of trust between the Assembly and the Clerk.

We agree with the idea that the appointment should be for a fixed period, and we suggest that this might be for five years.

I repeat that we do not rule out the possibility of compromise, provided it is the Assembly which appoints the Clerk, and provided the Clerk is responsible to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Subject to confirmation by Mr. Bianco and the Chairman of the committee, I therefore note that it has been possible to reach agreement. Mr. Bianco agrees to withdraw his amendment in favour of that tabled by Lord Hughes who will take account of Mr. Bianco's conditions leaving open, of course, the time-limit as proposed by the committee.

I hope this interpretation has the agreement of all of the speakers.

I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Lord Hughes has proposed two amendments, one on the appointment of the Clerk by the Presidential Committee, and the other on the body to which he should be answerable.

I would like to point out that, if there were several candidates, the choice would have to be referred to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I think I can now interpret the views of everyone who has followed this discussion. I am confining myself to Lord Hughes's amendment which concerns the Charter. Lord Hughes did indeed table another amendment which relates to the Rules of Procedure not the Charter. More specifically it is an amendment to an amendment to the Charter.

I note that a consensus has been reached between the main speakers and, as everyone has spoken, I would ask you, ladies and gentlemen, whether you agree with my interpretation.

So it is Amendment 3 that is to be agreed to and I put it to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 3 is agreed to*

Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your co-operation because in this way the Assembly has saved a great deal of time.

*The President (continued)*

We now come to Amendment 10 tabled by Mr. Schulte.

Mr. Schulte, please allow me to speed up matters even more. The President will be taking part in the debate for once but this is a procedural matter.

This amendment is its own justification. In addition it reflects the facts as they are since the Rome declaration and the Council's decisions. It is a minor up-dating operation.

I think I can, without going against anybody's wishes, ask the Assembly to agree to this amendment.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 10 is agreed to.*

We now come to Amendment 12 tabled by Mr. Schulte, proposing, as you will remember, that the amendments to the Charter should enter into force on 1st October 1986.

May I now consider that this raises no problems?...

Does anyone wish to speak?...

I now put Amendment 12 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 12 is agreed to.*

The amendments to the Charter are therefore agreed to.

Ladies and gentlemen, I note that we are unanimous as regards the Charter. I will be completely frank. With your agreement I would like to conclude this long debate to which the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges devoted a considerable amount of time and energy.

The Rules of Procedure stipulate a majority for voting purposes, which means working out a particular number of votes. Would the Assembly have any objection to considering that the draft resolution may be agreed and the Charter amended without a formal vote, which would take much longer? You know the task I would be faced with in that case.

My question is therefore whether you wish to avoid that procedure and to agree by general consensus.

I see that Lord Hughes says no and one vote against seems to me enough.

I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – We have not voted on the amendments to the rules. We cannot approve as a whole a document which is in two parts. After amendments to the rules have been moved, we then have to approve the whole document.

While I am on my feet, I can save time by pointing out that Amendment 8 has exactly the same effect on the rules as Amendment 3 had on the Charter, so I do not need to speak further to that.

I have another amendment, but, in order to save time, I shall not move it. Therefore, Mr. President, will you ask the committee whether it is approving the committee's amendment to the rules and my own amendment to the rules? If that is the decision, the way will be open to the Assembly to proceed to a vote.

I must say that this is the first time that I have known an amendment to be carried without its even being moved.

The PRESIDENT (*Translation*). – Lord Hughes, I am strongly tempted to follow the procedure you suggest but formally I first have to ask the Assembly if it agrees to amend the Charter. Depending on the result of that vote the Assembly will or will not be entitled to amend the Rules of Procedure. It does not mean wasting a vast amount of time. Of course, I will take the amendments to the Rules of Procedure immediately thereafter. Personally, I abide by the precedence of the Charter. If the consensus is maintained, things will go as simply as you suggest.

I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (*Translation*). – I have no objection, but I would like to hear exactly from you, Mr. President, how the new text of the Charter reads. I would like to know what formula has been adopted under the amendment adopted by the Assembly. In a word, I want to know what we are about to decide.

The PRESIDENT (*Translation*). – With the consent of the committee, therefore, the Assembly has agreed to Lord Hughes's Amendment 3, whereby the text proposed by the committee is amended to read: "The Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly on the proposal of the Presidential Committee for a period of five years". We have also agreed to Amendment 10 tabled by Mr. Schulte whereby the words "the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments" are amended to read "and the three agencies for security questions". You already know the text of the draft resolution tabled by the committee. Your question related to the amendments that have been agreed to.

*The President (continued)*

The amendments we have just agreed to relate to sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 3 of the committee's draft resolution regarding the Charter, but of course sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 3 remain as they are because no amendments have been proposed to them either by you or by anyone else.

The Clerk asks me to point out that Mr. Bianco did not merely want a change to Lord Hughes's amendment, he wanted changes made in some other parts of the draft resolution tabled by the committee. For the moment we have agreed with Mr. Bianco, Lord Hughes and the committee on sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 3 of the committee's draft resolution concerning the way in which the Clerk should be appointed and the length of his period of office. The two paragraphs that follow have not been amended except in form, with regard to sub-paragraph (c), by Mr. Schulte's amendment. Thus, by withdrawing his amendment, Mr. Bianco is withdrawing an amendment that relates not only to the same text as that of Lord Hughes but also to all the other parts of the draft resolution, which are therefore no longer open to discussion. Everybody must surely have understood this, but what goes without saying is often all the better for being said.

It therefore seems that there may be a consensus on this point, Mr. Bianco. Since Lord Hughes has not objected to the solution I have put forward, I ask the Assembly whether in this case it is disposed to consider that there is unanimity in deeming the Charter to have been amended?

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I appeal to the Chair and my fellow delegates! I reject this method of proceeding. This is a very important matter, and it will create a dangerous precedent if we accept the President's suggestion. The rules are there to be respected. I entirely disagree to such a grave precedent being created.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – A moment ago, thinking that Lord Hughes had an objection, I said that if even one member did not wish to accept the procedure I proposed, we would proceed to a formal vote. I fully respect Mr. Cavaliere's objection and we shall therefore take a roll-call vote on the revision of the Charter. That is the rule. Please have the bells rung again.

I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – Could not Mr. Cavaliere's objection be resolved by asking members to vote by sitting and standing? Where in the rules is it said that we must have a

roll-call vote? If forty-five people stand in favour the rules are obeyed. That would be a damned sight quicker than taking a roll-call vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – My advisers on both right and left tell me that a roll-call vote is essential in this case.

I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – Where in the rules is it stated that we must have a roll-call vote? If that appears in the rules, I shall, of course, abide by them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Would the Clerk please read the relevant paragraph of the Rules of Procedure.

The CLERK (Translation). – Article XII of the Charter reads as follows:

“After consideration of the report thereon by the competent committee, or committees, such amendments require the approval of a majority of the representatives of the Assembly.”

That means that at least forty-five votes have to be cast in favour of the amendment.

The only way of telling...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – Nothing in what the Clerk read out demands a roll-call vote. The Clerk demonstrated that he cannot read the rules. The rules state that forty-five members must vote. That can be established in the ordinary way if forty-five members stand in support of the proposition. You, Mr. President, do not need to know their names.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Please keep calm. All of us are probably learning something about a part of the rules that we did not know very well. Let us take advantage of the situation. Lord Hughes has read Rule 35. Does the Clerk have something further to add to Lord Hughes's information?

The CLERK (Translation). – Rule 34 states:

“2. The Assembly shall vote by roll-call:

(a) when an absolute majority is required, in accordance with Rule 35, 1 (a), of the Rules of Procedure...”;

Rule 35, 1 (a) of the Rules of Procedure states:

“1. The majorities required are the following:

(a) for the adoption of amendments to the Charter,... a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the Assembly;”

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The voice of those who know the Rules of Procedure, especially since they participated in their drafting, seems to me fully qualified. The reference in Rule 34 to Rule 35 read by Lord Hughes means that we are required to take the vote by roll-call. As we have saved a great deal of time we shall try to get this done quickly.

I am in a kind of “free-for-all” discussion, to avoid the red tape, and I have just been told by Mr. Bianco of a misunderstanding. I hope he will allow me to try to settle this problem as I have tried to settle the others, under the vigilant eyes of the relevant committee.

Mr. Bianco did not understand, when I referred to the effects of agreeing to Amendment 3 tabled by Lord Hughes and Amendment 10 tabled by Mr. Schulte, and therefore the withdrawal of Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Bianco, what would happen to sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 3 of the draft resolution which I shall now read out to you:

“In the performance of his duties, the Clerk shall be responsible to the President. He shall provide the Assembly and its committees with such secretariat and other assistance as they may require.”

Mr. Bianco tells me there is still a misunderstanding and that he and his colleagues hope that the Assembly will amend this paragraph so as to indicate that the Clerk is responsible to the Assembly in the performance of his duties, and therefore replace the word “President” by the word “Assembly”.

Ladies and gentlemen, wanting the one means wanting the other. In order to get ahead on this to me relatively minor point, because I cannot see a President not acting in accord with the Assembly and vice versa, are you prepared to agree to this position and, whilst maintaining the unanimous opinion we voiced a moment ago, to consider that we can amend the Charter in this way? I appeal to you. Do you agree? What is the opinion of the committee?

I call Mr. Eysink.

Mr. EYSINK (*Netherlands*). – We stand by what we decided on the reshuffling of the rules. If we want to make a change we should keep to the new proposed rules as they stand rather than follow Mr. Bianco’s proposal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I thought I had made myself clear. It is no part of my intention that the Assembly should adopt any personal idea of mine. I believed – and apart from this I have declared myself in agreement to the extent of accepting

the committee’s views – that the fundamental principle should be that of election by the Assembly. The logical consequence of this is that the Clerk is answerable to the Assembly, and not to the President. It follows that, if the committee has accepted the first point, it must also accept the logical consequence which flows from it, that is that the Clerk’s responsibility is to the Assembly. I therefore accept your suggestion, Mr. President, and I declare myself satisfied with the formula adopted by the Assembly in accepting the first alteration. I will only repeat my previous remark to the effect that I now accept the committee’s position and that it was certainly not my intention to impose any personal view of my own.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Kindly permit me to intervene, Mr. Schulte. Would you be satisfied, Mr. Bianco, with a statement by the President proposing, with the agreement of the Assembly, to keep the text tabled by the committee as it stands, whilst considering that, once the Clerk is elected by the Assembly, even though he has a responsibility to the President, which is a clear and absolute necessity which I personally would insist upon, he must necessarily remain responsible to the Assembly because he cannot be other than responsible to the body that appointed him?

I have made this statement because it seems to me quite obvious as far as the responsibilities incurred are concerned. If you wish, the wording could be: “...to the President and the Assembly”. We could put both terms in, President and Assembly – they go together. Do you agree?

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I agree.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Is the Assembly in favour of this text, in which the words “the President and the Assembly” would appear?...

The committee has made an accommodating though not very enthusiastic gesture towards me.

It is so decided.

In these circumstances, we will now take a vote by roll-call on the amended draft resolution on the revision of Articles III, IV, XI and XII of the Charter contained in Document 1039.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Fiandrotti.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

*The President (continued)*

The result of the vote is as follows<sup>1</sup>:

Number of votes cast .....	49
Ayes .....	49
Noes .....	0
Abstentions .....	0

*The amended draft resolution is therefore adopted<sup>2</sup>.*

I would like to congratulate the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, which has now come to the end of its troubles. I am really very pleased for the committee and I thank the Assembly for its co-operation. The Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges deserves a warm round of applause.

Now we have to consider the amendments to the Rules of Procedure.

I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – When have we carried the amendments to the rules? We have not discussed them. You took the vote on the Charter but said that the amendments to the rules required only a simple majority. My amendment 8 and the committee's amendment to the rules have not yet been put to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I was just saying that we were now going to vote on the amendments to the Rules of Procedure.

Yesterday we agreed to eleven amendments to the Rules of Procedure.

Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Bianco falls as a result of the vote on the Charter. That leaves Amendments 8 and 9 tabled by Lord Hughes and Amendment 11 tabled by Mr. Schulte.

Amendment 8 reads:

8. In paragraph 23, line 2, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, leave out "Presidential Committee on the proposal of the Bureau" and insert "Assembly on the proposal of the Presidential Committee".

Amendment 11 reads:

11. In paragraph 23, line 17, of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the proposed new paragraph 5, leave out "the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments." and insert "and the three agencies for security questions."

Ladies and gentlemen, I note that Amendment 8 tabled by Lord Hughes and Amendment 11 tabled by Mr. Schulte have in fact already been agreed to by the Assembly in view of the fact that Amendments 3 and 10 to the resolution revising the Charter tabled by Lord Hughes and Mr. Schulte respectively have been agreed to. The texts are the same. I would therefore ask the Assembly, for the sake of consistency with the Charter, to treat Amendments 8 and 11 as approved.

Are there any objections?...

*Amendments 8 and 11 are agreed to.*

That leaves Amendment 9, tabled by Lord Hughes and others, which reads:

9. In paragraph 23 of the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure, in the proposed new paragraph 4, line 1, leave out "shall" and insert "may".

I call Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – Having had the unique experience of two of my amendments being unanimously adopted by the Assembly without my having the opportunity of moving them, I am now called upon to move an amendment which I beg leave to withdraw.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I did not want to create the precedent you referred to a moment ago. That is why I gave you the floor.

*Amendment 9 is therefore withdrawn.*

The Assembly now has to vote on the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure tabled by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Does the Chairman of the committee wish to say anything before this historic vote?

Mr. SCHULTE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – On behalf of the committee, thank you very much, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As no one has asked for a roll-call vote, the Assembly will vote by sitting and standing.

I now put the draft resolution on the revision of the Rules of Procedure contained in Document 1039 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The amended draft resolution is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

1. See page 31.  
2. See page 32.

1. See page 33.

### 9. *Reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe*

*(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1058)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendation on the reactivation of WEU – its tasks, structure and place in Europe, Document 1058, presented by the General Affairs Committee and introduced by the Rapporteur, Mr. Bianco.

Does anyone request a roll-call vote ?...

In that case, the vote will be taken by sitting and standing.

I put the draft recommendation contained in Document 1058 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

### 10. *Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council*

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1059 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council, Document 1059 and amendments.

In the debate that we interrupted this morning and are now resuming as we decided, I have the names of Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Delebarre, Mr. Gansel and Mr. Cifarelli down to speak.

I now note, however, that they no longer wish to speak.

The debate is therefore closed.

We could now go on to put the twelve amendments to the vote but that would take slightly too long because I would have to call one speaker for and one speaker against and the committee each time. That being so, as we previously decided, the voting will take place tomorrow afternoon because tomorrow morning we have decided to

consider Mr. Sinesio's report after hearing the two Ministers, Mr. Spadolini and Mr. Möllemann.

### 11. *Change in the membership of a committee*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have been informed of a change in the membership of a committee.

The Italian Delegation proposes the following change in the membership of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments: Mr. Masciadri as a titular member in place of Mr. Alberini.

### 12. *Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 4th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. European security and the Mediterranean (Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 1060 and amendments).
2. Address by Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
3. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.
4. European security and the Mediterranean (Debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1060 and amendments).
5. Draft opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1054).

Are there any objections ?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 7 p.m.)*

1. See page 37.

## FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th June 1986

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. European security and the Mediterranean (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1060 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Sinesio (point of order), the President, Mr. Kittelmann (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
4. Address by Mr. Möllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.  
*Replies by Mr. Möllemann to questions put by:* Mr. Antretter, Sir John Page, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Gianotti, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.
5. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy.  
*Replies by Mr. Spadolini to questions put by:* Mr. Cifarelli, Mr. Müller, Mr. Bianco, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Gianotti, Mr. Rubbi, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Inan (*Observer from Turkey*).
6. European security and the Mediterranean (*Debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1060 and amendments*).  
*Speakers:* Mr. Rubbi, Mr. Müller, Mr. Matraja, Mr. Milani, Mr. Cavaliere.
7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

#### 1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Would the Assembly please note that there is a technical error in the part concerning the responsibility of the Clerk in the amended Charter and the Rules of Procedure; it is that paragraph 3 of Rule 47 has not been reproduced in full.

The words “and to the Assembly” are missing and the minutes should be amended, as was decided yesterday, to read: “In the performance of his duties, the Clerk shall be responsible both to the President and to the Assembly”.

The rest is unchanged.

Are there any comments?...

*With this amendment, the minutes are agreed to.*

#### 2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be pub-

lished with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### 3. European security and the Mediterranean

*(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1060 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on European security and the Mediterranean, Document 1060 and amendments.

Before we hear the Rapporteur, I call Mr. Sinesio.

Mr. SINESIO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I must emphasise the importance of the budget in connection with both your opening speech and Mr. Bianco's report.

I should like to know whether the subject could be taken today as the budget has to be approved by the Assembly. Because of commitments in Rome, we shall have to leave at the end of the day.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Sinesio, I would remind you that yesterday the Assembly agreed, on my proposal and in deference to your obligations, to change the orders of

<sup>1</sup> See page 39.

*The President (continued)*

the day for this morning's sitting and to take the presentation of your report on the budget immediately after the debate on Mr. Kittelmann's report and the statements by the two ministers.

Your wishes are therefore being heeded.

Mr. Kittelmann, would you please come to the rostrum. Allow me at the same time to congratulate you on being elected Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

I call Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should first like to thank you for your congratulations. I hope we shall co-operate very closely.

Ladies and gentlemen, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has reported on the security situation in the Mediterranean area at regular intervals in the past. I refer you to the last three reports: Mr. Bozzi's of May 1981, Mr. Grant's of May 1978 and Mr. Buck's of May and June 1976. The last report was drawn up by Sir Dudley Smith in May 1984. It essentially concerned the western Mediterranean and Spain's position in NATO.

In our report we have returned to Spain's position because we attached considerable importance to the favourable outcome of the referendum in Spain and the consequent confirmation of Spain's membership of NATO.

I believe it will also be in your interests if I try to keep my presentation short.

The security of the Atlantic Alliance is based, as we know, on the principle of political and strategic unity of the NATO member countries and the functional interdependence of the whole military apparatus. The urgent need to stop regarding NATO's southern flank as peripheral is becoming increasingly clear. The report consequently tries to indicate where the dangers and critical points lie, with a view to encouraging the whole alliance to pay more attention to the southern flank.

In the summary we have made it clear that there are several reasons for increased attention, including the danger for the alliance of possible encirclement, and local sources of conflict. Increased defence requirements should also be mentioned in this context. The military equipment of some NATO countries is still — to put it politely — insufficient in some cases. On the other hand, some countries in the southern sector occupy a key position geographically.

The economic weakness of some NATO countries in this area is obvious. The very important contribution which the countries of the southern flank make to defence and to the policy of détente must not be underestimated.

Ladies and gentlemen, you will see that our report deals at great length with the situation in the individual countries and above all with the Soviet Union's attempts to increase its influence in this area. Let me say this in very general terms about the situation as regards the Soviet Union: we can claim with some satisfaction that there has been no direct increase in the military threat posed by the Soviet Union in recent years. The Soviet Union focuses all its efforts on increasing its political influence, by trying to exploit weaknesses arising in individual countries in this sector by offering help.

Conversely, I would say the less we worry about weaknesses in this region, the more actively the Soviet Union will try to gain influence there.

We have not considered the problems connected with Libya and terrorism in the report because these issues will be discussed tomorrow during the debate on Mr. van der Werff's report on terrorism, to which the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has today approved a supplement. The Soviet Union continues to consider itself a Mediterranean power. Its policy is geared to neutralising western influences, especially that of the United States. As I said, its aim is to increase its own influence.

In the summary we state that the Soviet Union's presence at sea as a power factor in this area is still considerable, that it is trying to increase its influence on the Arab states and that it increasingly presents itself as a protecting power. The Soviet Union is trying to demonstrate to the Mediterranean countries in particular that the Mediterranean is no longer the exclusive domain of the West and that it is legitimate for the Soviet Union to regard itself as a Mediterranean power. The attempt is consequently made to conduct peacetime surveillance of the activities of the United States fleet, to reduce its freedom of manoeuvre in order to prevent it from intervening in time of crisis and to increase the risk of actions against countries friendly to the Soviet Union.

In military terms, the Soviet Union is still intent on being able to undertake a rapid offensive against units of the Sixth Fleet in the event of a conflict.

Ladies and gentlemen, our visits to Turkey and Greece revealed how necessary it is to urge these two NATO allies to settle their differences as quickly as possible, as constructively as possi-

*Mr. Kittelmann (continued)*

ble and in the way most likely to be conducive to long-term peace in this region.

My visit to Cyprus, when I had the opportunity of talking to all the leaders in both north and south Cyprus, showed that a conflict almost forgotten by the world, on a small island, in a divided country, causes major problems for the people living there.

I must say that as a Berliner I found it particularly moving to see another divided capital with my own eyes, a capital that is divided not because of ideological difficulties between two different social orders but because of a soluble conflict.

We have consequently said in one of our recommendations that we hope the United Nations initiative concerning this area will be successful. On the other hand, we know that success not only depends on what the Cypriots themselves consider right but that Greece and Turkey should be called upon to take a particular interest in this problem area and to find long-term solutions worthy of an alliance to which we all belong.

Anyone who considers the social and economic problems in this Mediterranean area will realise that what is needed is the common will of all concerned to help the Mediterranean countries and especially those who belong to the alliance. I am thinking here in particular of Turkey, which has the main burden to bear on the southern flank because of its geographically exposed position. Being a relatively poor and developing country, it needs our special support.

Help is also needed for the countries of the Middle East which are engaged in a struggle for economic and social survival that may threaten the internal situation.

I am very pleased that we have a major United Nations initiative to combat hunger in Africa. I believe that the very poor rate of development in this continent shows what can happen when problems that have long been known and whose emergence was predictable are ignored or brushed aside and emergency measures are taken extremely late – some would say, too late. It is all the more important that we should heed the appeal publicly made by many leaders in recent months and years to take account of the social and economic problems of the Mediterranean countries, which need our help.

In the final analysis, susceptibility to terrorism, fundamentalism and radicalism of all kinds has its roots in poverty, despair and isolation. The Soviet Union may profit by exploiting this weakness, and we may be to blame for

not translating into deeds the knowledge we have long possessed.

We must continue to focus our critical attention on the Middle East region. The member countries must, however, also note with concern that little has been done about practical assistance. We should not be blind to the fact that the Arab-Israeli conflict may again assume dramatic proportions at any time unless we support the countries that are favourably disposed to the West. We have therefore appealed in our recommendations for special attention to be paid to Egypt.

I am sure, ladies and gentlemen, that the report we have drawn up – and I thank the many members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments who have lent their support – can and will help the Council to solve through positive action the main problems that plainly exist in this region. We of Western European Union have a duty to show a greater understanding of the problems facing our friends in this region, whether or not they are members of the alliance. As we know, they have great sympathy with our problems too. This solidarity, whose implications we have tried to detail in the present report, must become more evident than in the past.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your report. The debate on this important issue of European security and the Mediterranean will be opened shortly.

**4. Address by Mr. Müllemann,  
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the  
Federal Republic of Germany**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Müllemann, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany. I would like to welcome Mr. Müllemann.

The Assembly is highly honoured to have you here and at the same time to be able to say, since you are with us, how pleased it is to see members of government taking part in its work and in the related discussions. It is a method that meets our wishes. Your statement, following as it does Mr. Kittelmann's report, cannot but enrich the debate. Soon we shall be hearing your colleague, Mr. Spadolini. You too attach considerable importance to security. In this way we shall be able to establish a dialogue on concrete facts and so discharge our proper political function.

I thank you for making yourself available and invite you, Minister, to come to the rostrum.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I consider it an honour to address the Assembly of Western European Union today. I bring with me greetings from the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Mr. President, I congratulate you on your reelection to this high office. The Assembly is a thrusting and creative element of WEU, from which major impulses and ideas emerge. Its dynamic presidency has made a crucial contribution in this respect. I am convinced that you, Mr. President, will continue to exercise your office on behalf of the goal, shared by the Federal Government, of developing Europe's identity in the sphere of security policy.

I should also like to congratulate my colleagues in the Bundestag, Professor Soell and Mr. Kittelmann, on their election.

The Federal Government attaches great value to close contact with the WEU Assembly. Where exchanges of views and informal and close contacts with the Assembly are concerned, Federal Minister Genscher set new standards during the German presidency of WEU from June 1984 to June 1985. I am pleased that the Italian presidency is vigorously continuing this tradition.

I welcome the interest and close attention with which you, ladies and gentlemen, follow the progress of the development set in motion two years ago. The Assembly plays an important rôle in realising the goal of breathing new life into Western European Union. At international level it represents a bit of practical democracy in questions of security policy. It is engaged in a fruitful dialogue, which the Federal Government believes should be continued in the national parliaments of the Seven.

The revitalised WEU is intended to strengthen the European pillar of the North Atlantic defence alliance. It makes the European voice heard in the dialogue between partners which is the special feature of the North Atlantic community. Its development will help to consolidate Europe's identity and Europe's ability to take action, and this will strengthen NATO. The reactivation of WEU fits in perfectly with the Federal Government's belief that Europe should carry more weight in all world policy issues and play the peace-making and stabilising rôle which the nations of the world expect of it. With WEU reactivated and its organisation streamlined, we Europeans are taking a course that must be followed consistently and vigorously.

In EPC the European dimension is seen and used as an instrument of operational policy after over fifteen years of actual consultation. The

development of joint policy in EPC has strengthened cohesion. Unfortunately, not all the EPC partners have been prepared to extend this co-operation to include all areas of security policy. Consequently, this is now being done by the smaller circle of countries that make up WEU. The harmonisation of policy and with it the development of a European identity are still in their initial stages here.

The task is being tackled with great individual commitment by the governments of the Seven but, owing to the budgetary restraints, largely with the same personnel and physical resources as were available before the Rome initiative in 1984. So the will is there, but the resources are not as extensive as they might be. The Permanent Council in London and its working groups are working with great commitment to fulfil their mandates. WEU's newly designed agencies here in Paris are still in the process of development. Our citizens share the impatience which the Assembly has repeatedly expressed. But we must allow things the time they need to mature.

To further the necessary – but complex – process of co-ordination among the governments of the seven member states, the Permanent Council has been joined by senior officials from the capitals on several occasions for the discussion of major aspects of East-West relations. The Federal Government welcomes the lively interest shown by the Assembly in the consultations on SDI that took place following the meeting of WEU's Council of Ministers in Bonn in April 1985. This subject was discussed by the Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU in Bonn, Rome and Venice, the Permanent Council has repeatedly considered it, and the Council's SDI Working Group has had a total of nine meetings with representatives of the national governments.

These consultations are important and useful, since the question of defence against ballistic missiles directly affects our security. The Federal Government has therefore given strong support to the mandate issued in Venice for a joint examination of the politico-strategic implications of possible developments in this area. In this both Soviet and western efforts must naturally be taken into account, since research is being conducted in this field in East and West alike. The Federal Government is convinced that these deliberations in WEU will also encourage the consultations on these questions within the Atlantic Alliance.

The subject is complex. Research findings will not become available for some time. But it is important that these questions should be considered in depth even now and that specific European interests should be pinpointed. The Federal Government is determined to undertake this task, which will continue for many years to

*Mr. Møllemann (continued)*

come, and to discuss it with our partners in an atmosphere of trust and, where necessary, of confidentiality. We have already advanced quite a distance down this road.

Ladies and gentlemen, East-West relations are extremely important to Europe's destiny. They are largely determined by the relations between the superpowers. The Europeans have an essential part to play in this dialogue, the outcome of which will, of course, directly affect them. It is as important for the western alliance to be unified in the political sector as in the defence sector. The more clearly the West demonstrates fundamental solidarity in the Atlantic Alliance, leaving no room for attempts to divide it, the more successful it will be. The Federal Government therefore welcomes the outcome of the WEU deliberations in Venice and of the NATO conference in Halifax on this subject.

It goes without saying that free democracies will have different views on certain aspects, as they did in Halifax. The fact that through close consultation, common positions could in fact be developed among the Europeans and in their relationship with the United States, reflects the vitality and strength of the alliance. In Halifax too the aim of the discussions was to strengthen co-operation on the basis of common interests and a broad foundation of common policy. In this respect EPC and WEU are doubly useful, since it will do more for the vitality of the alliance if the European pillar is strengthened, that is, if the Europeans also speak with one voice and formulate their interests jointly in the alliance. Acting in the interests of European union, which all the partner countries have undertaken to do in the European act, will help to safeguard the future of the alliance. Europe must play its proper rôle in foreign and security policy, not in conflict or in competition with the United States but as an equal partner and in the interests of the alliance and all its members. Any improvement in European unification will increase European willingness to accept responsibility. And yet, ladies and gentlemen, it must also be appreciated that the Europeans have a right to decide for themselves what is implied by responsible action and then to co-ordinate their decision with the United States as equal partners.

It is now essential to seize every opportunity for genuine progress towards disarmament. As in the past, we shall not be able to justify or gain political acceptance for the sacrifices demanded of our people for their joint security in a democratic society, unless our citizens can see that we are doing everything in our power to contribute to progress in détente, co-operation and disarmament.

The American-Soviet negotiations in Geneva on strategic, intermediate-range and defensive systems are particularly important to the further development of East-West relations. The Europeans, and others besides, have a marked interest in seeing the relationship between the United States of America and the Soviet Union extend beyond improvements in the general climate to practical results and other factors generating co-operative East-West developments.

The American proposals have been lying on the table in Geneva since last autumn. On 24th February President Reagan responded constructively to the Soviet proposals of 15th January. This response was similarly preceded by intensive and comprehensive consultations among the alliance partners, which enabled the United States' European allies to make their views known.

In the area of intermediate-range weapons the American President's proposals set out the mutual global zero solution and also indicate how it can be put into effect without risk to either side: by the end of 1989 all land-based intermediate-range missiles are to be dismantled in three stages. The proposals also call for a restriction on shorter-range missiles, to prevent the emergence of new grey areas.

Through its reaction to this practical offer to destroy a whole category of nuclear weapons the Soviet Union can prove how serious it is about their abolition.

In the negotiations on strategic weapons the aim is to implement the agreement in principle to halve the number of intercontinental strategic systems. On 21st November 1985 the Soviet Union and the United States committed themselves to the appropriate application of this principle. This can only mean that the 50% reductions must be effected on the basis of a fair set of figures. We cannot agree to the Soviet Union's consigning the Europeans to a status of reduced security and ignoring what is for us the essential principle of the equal right of all countries to security.

We therefore expect the Soviet Union to revert to the definition of the strategic concept on which the SALT agreements and the joint declaration of 8th January 1985 are based.

Ladies and gentlemen, in their declaration in Halifax on 30th May 1986 the NATO countries endorsed the United States efforts to achieve drastic reductions in Soviet and American nuclear forces. We are all agreed that there should be drastic reductions – a 50% cut if possible – in strategic nuclear weapons, as advocated by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva in November 1985. All our efforts must now be directed towards this goal. In other words, what could occur on the expiry

*Mr. Möllemann (continued)*

of SALT II at the end of the year must be prevented by means of energetic negotiations. We Europeans call for the continued observance of SALT II. A meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev later this year could bring the achievement of this goal a great deal nearer.

Co-operative solutions must also be found in the area of defensive and space weapons. Only co-operative solutions will prevent the arms race in space, as agreed by the United States and the Soviet Union on 8th January 1985.

The aim will be to fix the ratio of defensive to offensive weapons at the lowest possible level and to bring uncertainties due to technology within a predictable framework of political action. A suitable basis for this is the ABM treaty, which should not be infringed by anyone and should be strictly observed by all the countries concerned.

The Federal Government believes that drastic reductions in nuclear weapons along the lines I have just described will automatically influence the need for and scale of defensive systems. In plain terms, this means that a particularly favourable outcome of the negotiations on offensive weapons could make these defensive systems, now being discussed under the heading of SDI, completely superfluous.

The Federal Government strongly advocates a comprehensive test ban at the earliest possible opportunity. The key problem is how to guarantee reliable verification. In view of the considerable relevance of a comprehensive test ban to security policy, it must be ensured that no country is able to conduct tests secretly. New technological advances in verification procedures and genuine Soviet concessions over verification in line with General Secretary Gorbachev's declarations could make current obstacles surmountable.

The Federal Republic of Germany is a non-nuclear state. We express our support for a comprehensive test ban by making practical contributions in areas in which we have expertise to offer. Accordingly, we proposed to the Geneva disarmament conference in 1985 that a worldwide seismological system should be gradually developed to record nuclear tests and also to ensure the observance of a future comprehensive test ban.

It must not be forgotten that a comprehensive test ban is no substitute for drastic reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. Only negotiations resulting in agreements on the reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons can enable an early start to be made on dismantling them.

Besides the balance of nuclear power, or indeed prior to considering that, we must concentrate on conventional stability, in view of the imbalance in Europe in the Warsaw Pact's favour. We have repeatedly called on the eastern bloc to negotiate with us on this question. We find it encouraging that on 18th April of this year General Secretary Gorbachev recognised the need for conventional arms control throughout Europe, that is, from the Atlantic to the Urals. If we in Europe want to achieve an effective turn for the better, we must strive after "stability and security in the whole of Europe, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels", to quote the NATO declaration of 30th May. This declaration recalls joint Franco-German efforts which demonstrate how important close co-operation is, not only to the European Community and WEU, but also to the western alliance. The inner cohesion of all the elements of the overall military balance of power must be taken into account. Only then can the goal of our security policy – the prevention of all wars, whether nuclear or conventional – be achieved. Given the present rate of development in arms technology, even a war waged without nuclear weapons would threaten the existence of the European nations.

Ladies and gentlemen, we want to build on the proposals made by the West in Stockholm and Vienna and are determined to reach agreements in these two forums soon. We therefore consider it essential for an early MBFR agreement to be reached on the basis of the western proposals of 5th December 1985. We are also determined that an agreement of substance on militarily significant, politically binding and adequately verifiable confidence-building measures should be reached at the Stockholm conference on disarmament in Europe by 19th September 1986. In the elaboration of new and wider-ranging ideas we intend to take account of the statement made by General Secretary Gorbachev on 18th April of this year. To this end a high-ranking working group will be set up under a chairman to be appointed by NATO's Secretary-General, Lord Carrington. It will be submitting an interim report as early as October of this year. The NATO partners will thus be able to act on the basis of jointly formulated policies at the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna.

Ladies and gentlemen, the abolition of all chemical weapons under a comprehensive and worldwide agreement has top priority for the Federal Government. Under an agreement of this kind the development, production and storage of chemical weapons would be banned and the signatory states would undertake to destroy existing stocks and to dismantle production facilities. A worldwide ban would solve the pro-

*Mr. Möllemann (continued)*

blem of chemical weapons once and for all. The recent use of such weapons in the third world underlines the urgency of an agreement banning them.

Given good will on all sides, it should be possible to achieve this fairly quickly in Geneva, or at least early enough to prevent the production of binary chemical weapons beginning in the United States on security grounds, in response to the Soviet Union's failure to match America's seventeen-year moratorium on production.

In a resolution, the Bundestag, which debated this problem at length on 15th May, reaffirmed the position also adopted by the Federal Government in the alliance.

First, the overriding objective is an agreement on a worldwide, comprehensive and properly verifiable ban on the development, production and storage of chemical weapons and the destruction of such weapons and facilities used to produce them. Every effort must be made to achieve this goal as soon as possible.

Second, the modernisation of the United States arsenal of chemical weapons, which is designed to deter a possible aggressor from making first use of such weapons in contravention of international law, shall remain an internal American decision.

Third, American chemical weapons stored on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be withdrawn by the end of 1992 at the latest.

Fourth, no new binary chemical weapons shall be deployed in the Federal Republic of Germany. Even if such a contingency should arise, American binary chemical weapons shall be deployed only after thorough political consultations within NATO; only if the broad participation of the alliance partners is ensured, so that no country is singled out, and only with the consent and at the request of the recipient countries.

The American Congress having postponed until 1st December 1987 the date set for the final production of the first binary chemical weapons, the Bundestag appealed to all the participants in the Geneva disarmament conference to take full advantage of this to agree in advance of that date on a ban on the development, production and storage of chemical weapons.

All questions of substance have been practically settled. It is now important that the Soviet Union should give proof at the negotiating table of General Secretary Gorbachev's declared willingness to accept verification. Since adequate verification is the key to all current negotiations and to confidence-building and openness and – I should add – since it is in any case important

that proposals publicly made by the Soviet General Secretary should be firmly and practically followed up by his delegations at the various negotiations. Otherwise they are no more than rhetoric on disarmament.

The Federal Government regards the CSCE as one of the most important instruments of active European East-West policy. The CSCE process has become the source of a new pan-European awareness, from which impulses go out to Central and Eastern European societies. Together we must try to ensure that this process continues beyond the follow-up meeting in Vienna, because the CSCE process offers a realistic prospect in the long term of overcoming the division of our continent. The events in Chernobyl have also made people in Europe more aware that we live in a world that has become smaller, that Europe is still a single entity, stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, even if it encompasses completely different social systems and political orders.

At their meeting in Halifax the NATO foreign ministers confirmed the strategy of the alliance, which seeks "to preserve peace and to prevent war in any form". The purport of the message from the alliance to the Soviet Union and its allies, which was once again formulated in impressive terms in Halifax, is: We want dialogue and political, economic and cultural co-operation. All this is needed if progress is also to be made towards disarmament.

Ladies and gentlemen, WEU has recently considered the problem of terrorism. Because of various tragic events on its own territory, the Federal Government's position has always been characterised by resolute condemnation of terrorism and determined measures to combat it. It is convinced of the need for close and effective international co-operation in the fight against terrorism. The Euro-Arab dialogue can play an important part in this.

In this context I should like to take up an idea to which Mr. Kittelmann has alluded. The dialogue between the Europeans and the Arabs must be strengthened. Terrorism is not a phenomenon originating in Arabia and threatening Europe. It is a threat to the countries of both regions alike and can be eradicated only if we tackle the political causes and only if Europeans and Arabs, or at least those Arabs who are willing to do so, co-operate with one another as partners.

As stated at the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Venice in late April of this year, the decision of the foreign ministers of the Twelve on the fight against terrorism takes full account of the viewpoints of the governments of the WEU member countries. These decisions are also reflected in the statements made at the

*Mr. Möllemann (continued)*

world economic summit meeting in Tokyo and by NATO in Halifax. The measures taken on the basis of these decisions have clearly demonstrated within and outside Europe, Western Europe's determination to fight terrorism.

Ladies and gentlemen, a major step towards the unification of Europe was taken with the signing of the single European act. The Federal Government would have liked to see the treaty provisions on European co-operation in foreign policy also committing EPC to wide-ranging agreement on security questions rather than being confined to political and economic aspects.

In Venice the ministers recalled the important rôle played by WEU in endeavours to unify Europe. They reaffirmed their commitment to this forum, where the governments are able to discuss specific European issues connected with all aspects of security to do with their membership of the Atlantic Alliance. We have adopted the right course in deciding to reactivate and reorganise WEU.

European unification and the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance call for harmonisation of our national security policies and a concerted effort to ensure peace. We are thus fulfilling our overriding obligation to make peace more secure in and with Europe.

We must continue down this road with energy and determination, but also with patience. The Federal Government will do everything in its power to contribute to this process.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your address. I know you have come prepared to answer questions from members of the Assembly.

I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should like to ask the Minister two questions. Firstly, I would refer him to 22nd May 1985, when the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs said here in the WEU Assembly:

“ The Council must face up courageously to all the security problems of our time, as it did successfully in Bonn. In future, we must do more than simply co-ordinate our stances on security policy issues; we must work out common European positions. ”

I wanted to ask the Minister whether the Federal Government still takes the view expressed by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs or whether it is now more inclined to the view expressed in the Venice communiqué, that WEU is merely a forum in which the governments

concerned are able to discuss security problems that are specifically European.

If I may, Mr. President, I should like to put another question to the Minister of State. I should like to know what stage the discussions have reached on the proposal put to the WEU Council by the Federal Government in the autumn of 1984 for the establishment of a European research institute for security policy and to ask the Minister whether the mandate issued by the Permanent Council in Venice on 30th April for proposals for co-operation with existing research institutes is possibly a consequence of this German proposal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – As regards Mr. Antretter's first question, the Federal Government has in no way departed from the view expressed by Mr. Genscher and we believe we are right in this. But we are only one of seven governments, and as you know from your quotation from the Venice communiqué, we have not yet succeeded in winning everyone over to this view and its practical implementation. Our conviction that this is necessary is unchanged.

Secondly, as regards the idea of a research institute, our ideal would still be to have a research institute of our own, which could also have a very strong influence on public relations work concerning security policy in Europe. But, as we know, this is specifically a question of obtaining the necessary money from the national budgets. It would, of course, be an additional financial burden and that does not look too easy at the moment. So the present initiative is a sensible one: for a start, co-operation among existing research institutes is to be encouraged. As you not unjustly assume, this may also be the result of our proposals. At the next meeting we shall be considering the scale on which such co-operation can take place, and how results achieved in this way can be used to step up public relations activities on security policy. The Secretary-General has also introduced the idea that an institute for advanced security studies involving the private and research sectors should be established. This idea will also have to be considered. My feeling is that here again the budgetary problem will probably tip the balance. I suggest that you, ladies and gentlemen, encourage support for this approach during discussions in your political groups at home and in your national parliaments and try to convince your finance ministers, who are always particularly intractable on this subject. After all, budgetary decisions are up to you – in your national parliaments, of course.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir John Page.

Sir John PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – In his wide-ranging speech the Minister mentioned the relationship between Western Europe and NATO and the obvious overlapping. Does he think that one of the important rôles for WEU is to give ministers the opportunity of putting a European act together so as to speak with a united voice at NATO meetings? If the Minister agrees that that is an important rôle for WEU, is it successful in the light of Venice and Halifax?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I believe the answer is yes, subject to the customary reservations and qualifications attached to any general statement. It is urgently necessary for the Europeans to formulate a common position in all spheres that concern NATO. As we have seen – I mentioned this in my speech because there is no denying that the Europeans and the United States, for example, differed on certain points in Halifax – it is important to do this if we want to have any influence.

Let me illustrate this with an example. The American President stated publicly and through his minister in Halifax that in certain circumstances he would probably cease to observe SALT II from the end of this year. The Europeans, regardless of their governments' various political complexions, did not regard this statement as positive in its outlook. We take the view that, even if the Soviet Union has contravened SALT II in certain specific respects, the instruments of the current arms control agreements – and there are not all that many of them so far – are so important at the moment for confidence-building and as a basis for practical activities that we should not now jeopardise them. We made that clear in Halifax, and I believe the joint European position taken there made some impression. At all events, things are not yet as we should like to see them, but life is quite often like that. If we do not co-operate, do not adopt common positions, if we allow ourselves to be divided, the result will not, of course, be a strengthening of the European position nor will any useful purpose be served in this context.

In short, then, the Venice and Halifax meetings clearly reaffirmed the need to which you referred.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – What you have said, Minister, is naturally very inte-

resting to us particularly since you represent the Federal Republic of Germany, one of the major pillars of WEU.

You have referred to new problems – the SDI and the SALT II agreements – but other, internal, problems remain threatening the solidarity of WEU in regard to its seven European partners and one of these seems to me to be the nature of the relations between East and West Germany. You rightly stressed that the cohesion of our attitudes on defence questions itself depended on the political cohesion of the Seven.

In that connection I have a double question. Firstly, what stage has been reached in recent developments in the relations between East and West Germany particularly in view of East Germany's economic growth and rising population figures? Secondly, in what ways do you think this might upset or rather, as I hope, consolidate WEU in terms of its usual or possibly new ideas? Could you give us some information or possibly some reassurance on this point, Minister?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I very much hope that the national goal which our constitution requires all parties to pursue, of doing everything in our power to enable the German people to regain its unity in free self-determination, is not one that causes you concern but one in which we have your full support. It goes without saying that this is bound to be a fundamental goal for the Germans and that we are committed to it.

We know this goal can only be achieved if we succeed, probably through the CSCE process, in developing a European framework for peace, which will create at least the minimum conditions on both sides to bring us closer to this goal. We are still a long way from achieving it. But this does not, of course, prevent us from making very serious efforts in direct negotiations with the German Democratic Republic to enable the Germans in the Federal Republic and the Germans in the Democratic Republic to be in touch with one another in as many areas and with as few impediments as possible. There happen to be a great many families who are divided between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. But we note with satisfaction that the efforts made over many years have gradually improved the opportunities for making contact, although we still regard them as unsatisfactory. It is still a one-way street in many respects.

Travel facilities from the Federal Republic to the German Democratic Republic have greatly improved, but in the other direction they are still

*Mr. Möllemann (continued)*

not good. You all know the reasons. When we talk about freedom of movement, the exchange of ideas, information and opinions, we constantly come up against those barriers which are intrinsic in dealings between free and communist countries.

That aside, I would say that relations between the two German states are at the moment as good – to put it in general terms – as East-West relations generally. They cannot, after all, develop in isolation from East-West relations. Our opposite numbers in the German Democratic Republic have not so much room for manoeuvre that, even if they wanted to, they could steer a course independent of the course steered by the Warsaw Pact as a whole. It is therefore in our national interests and in the interests of an improvement in the relationship between the two Germanies if the climate between the two blocs improves, and if the willingness to settle controversial questions through negotiation and to strengthen the dialogue is stepped up again.

At inter-state level, if I may put it that way – the Foreign Office is not involved for obvious reasons: the German Democratic Republic is not a foreign country for us, and the Foreign Minister is therefore not the appropriate minister; we have a separate department for these questions – we have reached quite a number of agreements, some of a very practical nature, on telephone communications, rail and road transport, on procedures for visits and so on. We have economic relations, which are interesting but cannot be described as particularly dynamic at the moment where growth is concerned. In other words, relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic are at present developing normally.

I do not believe that our efforts can at any time have imposed the slightest strain on our involvement in the western community. After all, at the Halifax meeting itself the traditional quadripartite talks took place between the Foreign Ministers of the three powers and our Foreign Minister, on the German problems and the specific problems of Berlin. We communicate to EPC and WEU all our observations on the general question of relations between the two German states and East-West relations and we strongly urge you to do whatever you can to support our efforts to achieve close and satisfactory co-operation between the two German states and to alleviate the consequences of the division.

To be quite honest, when I first entered the Bundestag in 1972 and spent eight years in the IPU during the first few years of my parliamentary career and then went on to the North Atlantic Assembly, I sometimes had the impression that *les querelles allemandes*, the permanent

conflict between the two German states in international forums, were not viewed with much enthusiasm by my counterparts from other parliaments. That is why we are trying to develop *la co-opération allemande* so that we may deal with matters of concern to us and not overly tax your patience.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – May I please ask the Minister of State about the uncontrolled immigration into Western Europe via West Berlin of Asiatic people who are flown by Soviet and East German state airlines to East Berlin from where they travel by underground, without check, into West Berlin and into other parts of Western Europe? As it is useless to expect the East German Government to stop this traffic, which is probably profitable to them – and which in any case can help to undermine western society – and as the traffic may include some terrorists, can I ask the Minister of State just when we can expect the Federal Republic to take some effective action as it now appears that the Federal Republic's constitutional position is causing some damage to her European partners?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – We too are giving this question very careful thought, along with the question of the right of asylum in Germany, for example. We have a very large number of foreign workers in the Federal Republic of Germany. At a time of relatively high unemployment – we have about 2.1 million unemployed at the moment – this is, of course, a source of internal controversy.

Added to this, very many people from many parts of the world want to live in the Federal Republic but cannot do so by taking up employment because we have a freeze on the recruitment of foreign workers. They consequently do so in the way you have mentioned by seeking asylum.

We are a country that must take a liberal attitude towards the subject of the right of asylum. We have had a dark period in our history, when many Germans were grateful to be granted asylum in democratic countries, because they were persecuted on racial or political grounds. We are therefore very wary about changing this right, and all parties in the Bundestag – despite differences of emphasis – and most certainly the Federal Government, do well to be wary.

But we also know that this right is abused. There is, for example, the phenomenon

Mr. Möllemann (*continued*)

of the man who seeks asylum on economic grounds, which is probably what you were referring to, the man who is not persecuted in any way and is, in fact, brought to Europe from the Far East, the Near East or wherever by some commercial enterprise.

To combat this, three measures need to be taken. First, there must be a strict policy on the issue of visas, the control of immigration and rapid processing of applications. We have now made the necessary provisions for this. We have increased the staff at the Federal Republic's embassies to deal with such applications, because they have to be processed in the countries concerned, where the staff are familiar with the situation and can decide whether or not an applicant is being persecuted. We have also increased the staff at the agencies in the Federal Republic which consider the legal side of these problems. That is one provision.

The second provision is that all the European countries should apply equally strict standards. This problem does not only concern the German Democratic Republic, which I will revert to in a moment: there are unfortunately Western European airlines that do quite well out of flying people into their countries from the region to which you alluded without paying much attention to their visas, because they know they will soon be crossing into Germany illegally. I will not go into this now, because we are already discussing the matter in the conferences of the appropriate ministers and I should not like to pick out a single example here. If I did, I should have to face the wrath of my counterparts in other European countries. We are looking into the matter. We must see it as a European task.

I now come to the specific problem of the German Democratic Republic – a problem which we are discussing with them because we have to call on them to put an end to this abuse, which is putting a strain on us and may also be putting a strain on others. You are right about that. The Government of the German Democratic Republic has given an assurance along these lines, but it has not yet been fully implemented. We shall press for this and, if necessary, link it at the forthcoming negotiations to other subjects of particular interest to the German Democratic Republic.

The German Government and parliament are fully aware of the problem. We are also discussing it at the moment and intend to deal with it at the three levels I have just described.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gianotti.

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Minister, you recalled that European reaction to the American decision to break the SALT II agreement was unfavourable. The failure of a long-standing agreement is inevitably a matter for concern. Here I agree with you. I must say – and this will be the subject of my question – that another agreement, the ABM treaty, is threatened by the strategic defence initiative. If the government has signed an agreement with the American Government on the subject how can the two be reconciled? In your speech you also said it was to be hoped that the SDI would not be signed. My question is how far has collaboration gone? Do you think it can be broken off at any time?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I will begin by reaffirming the Federal Government's interest in the continued observance of the SALT II treaty and in efforts on the basis of this agreement – which was never ratified but has nevertheless been treated as if it had been ratified – to apply the principle on which agreement was reached last year, namely that the number of long-range strategic nuclear systems should be halved.

Second, in cases where the Soviet Union has been accused of violating this agreement we feel it should be willing to clarify the situation and refrain from violations. That is, of course, a major prerequisite.

Third, on the question of SDI, our government has concluded an agreement which concerns and is designed to improve co-operation between German and American firms in the general area of high technology. We have a vital interest in this.

Our government has concluded another agreement which is intended to enable German firms to participate in the research side of the SDI project, just as many firms in many European and Asian countries, including Italian ones, as I see from the documentation, are interested in orders from the SDI sector. Italian companies have already submitted quotations and will hardly be prevented from doing so by their government, I imagine. Far from it: the Italian Government is engaged in contract negotiations. Mr. Spadolini, who has just come into the chamber, will undoubtedly be able to tell you rather more about this.

We have always made it clear – and the agreement we have concluded does not contradict this – that we want to see the ABM treaty observed in its restrictive form, as interpreted by Secretary of State Shultz. That is the position of all

*Mr. Möllemann (continued)*

parties in the Bundestag, and of the Federal Government.

I do not think, ladies and gentlemen, that we need be under any illusion: the decision-making process has yet to come. We are now at the research stage. We do not yet have the research findings. We do not even know whether the American Senate and House of Representatives will approve resources in the future. I read with interest reports that the appropriation is to be drastically reduced, but I do not know the facts.

It would consequently be premature at this stage to draw conclusions on the implications of research findings and research spending about which we know nothing at present. We did well to set up a special working group, which will be meeting in June to consider the implications for strategy and arms control policy of the possible implementation of research findings.

I believe we shall have numerous opportunities to discuss this subject in the years to come.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – In an earlier answer to Sir John Page the Minister spoke of SALT II, and I am glad that he agrees that it was never ratified. He said that at Halifax the European countries were somewhat unhappy that the Americans had said that unless certain things happened by the end of the year they might not abide by SALT II.

How many times does Russia have to break SALT II and how many times are the Americans to be forced by the opinions of their allies to do nothing about it? Surely this is the way of appeasement. If the Americans feel that SALT II is being broken over and over again – and the Russians have not denied this – why should we not act as America's allies and support them in a firm attempt to say to the Russians: "You are the cause of America deciding that SALT II shall no longer remain in force."?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MÖLLEMANN (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I do not agree with the judgment on which your question is based. Until a year ago both superpowers were claiming that, even though the treaty had not been ratified, they had abided by it. The current debate did not really begin until that time.

Nor can I confirm that the trend with regard to strategic systems departs so significantly from the agreements reached that the only conclusion to be drawn is that the treaty has been violated. We often face the situation in politics

of having to weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of a given option.

Third, what I and the rest of the gathering in Halifax were most sceptical about was that the main reason for this new position is not that the Soviet Union has violated the treaty but that the American Government generally foresees problems if the development of the future security strategy is overly restricted by such factors.

This is a new approach, which will have to be discussed quite openly in the alliance and which we will also have to discuss here. It really has nothing to do with appeasement.

I believe that in the decisions they have taken in recent years – and I record the passionate debates on these decisions, like the NATO dual-track decision and the recent decision on NATO's approval of the target for the production of binary chemical weapons – the NATO ministers have shown that they do what they consider necessary. But NATO should also bear in mind – and it does so; I hope everyone does – that our security policy includes an arms control element as well as a defence element and that these two elements make up our security policy. It must be admitted that there are differences of opinion from time to time.

I do not hesitate to recall another point I raised in my speech. If one takes seriously the statement that the interdependence of the various fields in the area of strategic systems, intermediate-range systems and space systems must be considered; if one takes seriously the claim that only a co-operative solution is conceivable, then it is impossible to say that, on the other hand, whatever the outcome of the other negotiations in Geneva, we shall go ahead with SDI.

That is what I mean by occasional differences of assessment in certain specific respects. But the good thing about us is that we discuss these matters openly and fairly and have the opportunity of persuading one or other partner to change his position.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Your concern, Minister, to reply as fully as possible to the questions from our members of parliament has made our discussions that much more valuable. As I said at the start, I am very grateful to you for your participation in our work since it demonstrates the interest taken by your government not only in our discussions but also in the organisation as a whole.

##### *5. Address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Spadolini, Minister of Defence of Italy. Ladies and gentle-

*The President (continued)*

men, I warmly welcome Mr. Spadolini on your behalf.

You are also one of us, Minister, and, through you, I would like to convey my thanks to the Italian Chairman-in-Office who in this way demonstrates the interest of the Council in the Assembly's request to have, as continuously as possible, the benefit of the presence of the defence ministers because we are the only organisation where they are members of the executive Council.

Today you are in this chamber, at your request incidentally – you mentioned this to me in Venice – to take part in a debate on European security and the Mediterranean which comes within the purview of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. Your presence among us illustrates the complementarity there is between the foreign policy of our countries and security policy.

Would you please come to the rostrum, Minister?

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, members of the Assembly, may I first offer my warmest congratulations to Mr. Caro on his third election as President of the Assembly and thank him for his words of welcome, stressing the value of the attendance of both foreign and defence ministers at meetings of the WEU Assembly since the decisions taken in Rome in 1984 on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of WEU.

Following yesterday's debate on the budget and the remarks made yesterday by Mr. Andreotti at the end of the Italian term as Chairman-in-Office may I as co-chairman and Minister of Defence make a few comments before leaving.

In my view the past twelve months have been both for us in WEU and for Europe as a whole a year of important choices, of major developments and of major confirmations.

I believe that the last year has confirmed the truth of the belief of Altiero Spinelli, the great European, who to our great sorrow died a few days ago, namely that there can be no European defence without a common European feeling for defence, as was already made clear in the Ventotene manifesto during the struggle against fascism. I would say that every month and every day of our troubled year has gone to prove that the independence which Europe must have, beyond common customs frontiers and common trade, is an independent defence and hence the capacity to influence choices relating to defence and international crises.

We do not accept the idea of a three-part world with Europe as the utopian third force. We know that our essentially defensive rôle has to be played within a democratic context respecting the Atlantic Alliance as a normal, legitimate and institutional projection of our national constitutions and our military structures.

At the same time, it is our firm belief, which we hold even more strongly at the end of these twelve months, that the Atlantic Alliance must be an alliance of equals within which the European pillar has the political, cultural and military capacity to take effective joint decisions with the American ally.

This need has been highlighted by all the crises of the last year, clearly so during the Mediterranean crises from the Achille Lauro to the massacre at Fiumicino, from Libyan aggression in the international waters of the Gulf of Sirte to the attack on the Italian island of Lampedusa and the permanent hotbed of murders in Lebanon.

But the need for more direct, immediate and closer discussions on defence questions between Europe and the United States within the alliance became apparent at other crisis points. I would mention the difficult and unco-ordinated decisions taken on SDI, the disagreements in Brussels regarding chemical weapons and the hopes and fears of Europe for a change in the terms of the balance of deterrence in the Geneva negotiations. Jokingly, I would say that if we had not already reactivated WEU, the past twelve months would have confirmed the need to do so. That is why, although I appreciate the great progress which has been made, I fully share all the doubts and impatience voiced by this Assembly over the fact that not more has been done.

Indeed, on each of the occasions I have just mentioned it has been painfully obvious to everyone that the political and parliamentary preparations leading up to the decisions taken on the matters and crises I have mentioned were inadequate.

On every occasion involving defence questions there has been a technical failure of the machinery of democratic consultation and of the tried and logical decision-taking process, in relation to public opinion, and neither governments nor national parliaments have been able – as we must recognise – to remedy that failure completely.

The reason for this is that the underlying causes of these defence crises are never confined to a single country, so that they are perceived by a single nation and parliament. They are international. In order to be truly understood, explained and measured they require effective inter-allied consultation.

*Mr. Spadolini (continued)*

Here, as always, lies the essential rôle of WEU. We must not be deceived into thinking that WEU is repeating the work of the various institutions of the Atlantic Alliance. The function of NATO is to formulate plans to deal with a possible emergency so that the terms of the discussion are much narrower. WEU alone offers an opportunity for the discussion of vital military problems in a genuinely European context. I believe that, after the past year, the value and purpose of WEU have been amply demonstrated.

It is now time for Italy to hand over to the untiring industry of the Luxembourg Government and to ensure that organisation which we planned almost completely in Venice now moves into top gear.

It is above all time that the agencies, whose essential functions as research laboratories and a source of proposals can never be over-emphasised and commended, should turn their technical resources to current problems, including the questions which SDI poses for all of us, those which will emerge from the hopefully positive outcome of Geneva negotiations, in terms of a new European balance of defence, linked with the technical problem of the standardisation of conventional weapons and other problems which will result from the progress of the disarmament negotiations and those linked with the specific and persistent crises of the Mediterranean area.

Returned to this Assembly and then to our individual governments, this work should be the basis for a full debate and firm but clear decisions. This will remove from the philosophy of European defence, which is the philosophy of liberty, the poison of hesitations and doubts which in small national institutions is made even more potent by the natural poison of internal politics and ends up by spreading to every possible approach to the problems.

A serious case which I mentioned previously in Venice is the crisis in the Mediterranean. The problem of security in that area now coincides with the southern threat in a mixture of terrorist military acts largely beyond the competence and responsibility of defence ministers and calling for wider means of combating terrorism.

I believe that the facts have now convinced us that it is no longer sufficient to deplore and deal individually with particular cases of terrorism but rather that the threat as a whole must be seen as a threat not only to the public order of our states but also to world peace and in particular to the coexistence and détente for which we are working.

It has recently become very clear that there are not only individual terrorists but also states

which plot or encourage terrorism, which pose serious problems in international law as hitherto understood and require the definition of international rules to deal with a phenomenon against which the existing law seems powerless.

More and more international and, in particular, European solidarity against terrorism is becoming the only form of political action capable of halting its spread and its capacity to upset the balance between the superpowers and also the sole means of avoiding unilateral military action like that of the United States against Libya.

That is why WEU's responsibilities have greatly increased. That is why WEU must consider appropriate measures to counter terrorist attacks in the Mediterranean, which in a word are attacks on peace and on the balances on which peace has been and still is based.

At the ministerial session in Venice, WEU for the first time included international terrorism in one of its documents and this is by way of being an historic fact; at one time the responsibility was exclusively that of the ministers of the interior and of justice whose functions as we know here often combined in western countries; today the problem has become principally one for foreign ministers as another threat to security, underlining the importance of "early and effective action to implement the measures that the countries of Western Europe have agreed upon to combat this scourge".

After Venice, at the end of April, there came the Tokyo declaration, early in May, to which we are all committed and which obliges us to take up the subject again in Paris in the WEU Assembly. Let us face the facts. Over a period of years the Mediterranean area has now become the centre of recurrent international crises, the scene of endemic conflicts with no way out and of inter-Arab political and religious rivalries which are linked in complicated fashion with the main stream of East-West relations and often cut dangerously across the process of East-West rapprochement.

Recent grave events and their repercussions on Europe and on the Atlantic Alliance itself have confirmed the danger of an indirect, many-sided strategy aimed against the West, comprising a mixture of terrorist threats, war-like threats and acts of war. With its insidious nature, this attack has created some signs of political and military disharmony, which it is in no one's interests to encourage, both between European countries and between Europe and the United States, leading to what we must seriously regard as a dangerous return to isolationism in the United States and creating the sense of isolation and frustration which partly accounts for the decisions and actions taken by the United States which we did not support.

*Mr. Spadolini (continued)*

Political and military attention must therefore be directed closely to Mediterranean problems, particularly within WEU. In few other parts of the world has the strategic pattern changed so radically since the last war. The result has been to create an obvious imbalance in the pattern of Europe's defence. Whereas acceptable balances were established in the Atlantic and Central and Northern Europe after the critical post-war phase, on the basis of deterrence matching the threat from the Warsaw Pact forces, it has to be acknowledged that in the Mediterranean the Soviet Union has gone on increasing its presence. This has created an imbalance which substantially mirrors the old political tendency of the alliance to restrict its own area of competence and to stand aside, in both the spirit and the letter of the alliance, from crises arising in the unstable Mediterranean; if not corrected this imbalance will become a serious threat to world peace.

It is not by accident that international terrorism began in 1979 and mention may be made of the taking of hostages at the Tehran Embassy and the subsequent action which cost Mr. Carter the presidency, of events in Lebanon and of all the actions attributable to Islamic fundamentalism which has nothing whatever to do with the cause of the Palestinian people; all the western powers want the Palestinians to get back a country of their own, in order to promote peace with Israel and guarantee security for everyone living in the area, both Israelis and Palestinians.

Overall, this means that the handling of the crisis in the Mediterranean has become more complicated and dangerous and the probability has increased that local and often uncontrollable crises may develop into a wider confrontation.

In this context, the accepted view of the Mediterranean area as the "southern flank" ceases to be a secondary issue and becomes part of a concept of defence which in many respects closely resembles the situation in other crucial European and Atlantic areas.

If the defence of Europe and the West is indivisible as in fact it is, the policy of international initiatives which is certainly not without value particularly within allied procedures for the division of work, nevertheless has clear limits. To leave the United States a major part of the responsibility for defending the Mediterranean and dealing with the endemic or associated crises – because in our terms the Mediterranean covers the area from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic, as we are all well aware that the war between Iraq and Iran affects the balance of the Mediterranean – means an abdication of responsibility which ultimately deprives European policy of all credibility and may have adverse effects both on rela-

tions between Europe and America and on the course of the crises themselves. The solution therefore lies in the political will of the European countries to work out a foreign and military policy which must be closely co-ordinated as regards its development, its individual initiatives and its objectives. In order to achieve this the facts must be seen as they are, and an effort must be made to identify every possible measure which will promote stability and act as a deterrent.

First and foremost, it must be understood that in the Mediterranean area there can be no forgotten or hidden areas of conflict such as Lebanon, Chad, Iraq and Iran which are important, not so much for the fact that they can harm outside interests, but because they can trigger unforeseeable and therefore uncontrollable crises. Lebanon is a case in point, despite the efforts of the European countries, in all cases outside NATO, to act as peacekeepers and to restore the situation to normal.

That is why the first need is to renew efforts at negotiation with more ideas from Europe on the Arab-Palestinian question. At the same time, the European countries must give closer political attention to the Mediterranean problems, wherever possible by way of specific economic, technical and military co-operation. In other words, the political homogeneity and practical understanding which give reality to the concept of defence in Central Europe must also be displayed in the Mediterranean area.

While in Europe itself efforts have been made for many years to further détente between East and West – efforts which must in all cases be supported even if taken by individual countries as suggested by their parliamentarians in this Assembly – and to improve the climate of mutual trust, the actual Mediterranean area has in practice been left out of this complex issue or left on the sidelines. The effect of this is to create two contiguous areas which are treated differently and this gives rise to misunderstandings in the process of European détente. Initiatives combined with those currently in progress on the mainland, such as the conference on security and co-operation and the disarmament conference, could, with a number of initial difficulties, obviously favour the establishment of a new atmosphere of understanding in the Mediterranean which could contribute substantially to the security of countries in the area. By its size the European Community would seem the best place to formulate a political will but its predominantly economic bias – I have no need to refer again to Altiero Spinelli on this point – limits its examination of the wide-ranging political and military problems, and hence the decisions to be taken. Defence questions call for the intervention of WEU as the only European insti-

*Mr. Spadolini (continued)*

tution in which such problems can be dealt with appropriately on a continuing basis.

In the gap in Europe which the Mediterranean now represents much can be done at both political and technical level; for example there is the problem of the control and surveillance of air and sea space which could well be best resolved by closer co-operation between the armed forces of our countries and also the issue of wider action against terrorism for which I have been constantly hoping for many months and which should also involve the Soviet Union if we wish to remove the reasons for misunderstanding and mistrust in relations between the blocs, which can be caused by the spread of terrorism even though linked to factors which are often independent of the superpowers' policy. And defence of the positions existing in the Mediterranean is always a matter for joint action.

One point must be clear; there is no contradiction between the security problems of the Mediterranean area and the more general problems of European security. They are two aspects of the same thing. In both cases, it is a matter of knowing whether Europe can make its voice heard, whether it can be, if not a protagonist as for such a great part of our common past, at least a main character in the drama unfolding before our eyes.

In my opinion this symbolic problem, on which I have dwelt at length, as it is such a clear example, sufficiently explains the need for it to be dealt with in depth by WEU as an institution.

May I say one thing more, namely that we can, to a certain extent only, understand the procedural delays which still advise caution and postponement of the enlargement of WEU. But at least I find it difficult to understand the political reasons, assuming there are any, for such postponement. If one believes in WEU, one believes that WEU must speak, not as a technocratic institution – a technocracy has never solved any problems – but as a political and parliamentary body, on the recurrent crisis of the western defence system and must give not a negative meaning to the word crisis but a wider and progressive logical meaning, then we need such convinced Europeans as the Spaniards and Portuguese. What further sense has such postponement? Beyond the limits of proper caution – which carry us back to the Byzantine empire – Spain and Portugal represent all that is new in Europe and bear witness to the final destruction of fascist régimes on our continent. The fact that they are asking to enter WEU means that the future of Europe once again lies through this Assembly and this organisation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Minister, for your address.

I see that you have made your preparations to answer questions.

I call Mr. Cifarelli.

Mr. CIFARELLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to express my gratitude to Mr. Spadolini for his very detailed speech, with its powerful political and scholarly content which by happy coincidence fits into our debate on European security in the Mediterranean.

The Minister has certainly taken account of this and to my way of thinking his views are completely valid, particularly as it is not possible to entertain the idea of a Europe which neglects its own defence or the idea of a Europe which, far from matching the great ally from across the Atlantic, ends up by neglecting major defence requirements.

I should like to ask two questions. First, does the Minister not think that terrorism should be fought by legal means also through international law, confirming an idea of our forebears regarding civilised behaviour and the category of international crimes which they called "delicta juris gentium", in the sense of committing everyone in specific cases to act jointly against such crimes.

Second, I would like to ask whether the Minister does not think that in the context of the reactivation of WEU steps should not be taken to re-examine and improve equipment, resources and standardisation in relation to defence so that these would become joint problems and a very practical step forward could be taken as regards the defence of Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – My thanks to Mr. Cifarelli for supporting my speech. I will answer the two interesting questions he has asked.

The first calls to mind the great and enlightened writer Aron who honoured both this country, France, and the whole of European culture and who said that in Europe over the last two centuries international law had never been as fully formulated as domestic law. There is therefore the great problem of new rules to combat international terrorism, of common rules extending beyond political blocs because there are questions which cannot be dealt with by either an Atlantic or an eastern code. I am referring for example to the decision not to refuel hijacked aircraft which can be taken as valid for both the eastern and western countries and was in fact applied by a non-aligned country such as Malta at Valletta.

*Mr. Spadolini (continued)*

Some instruments of international law and collaboration require a new legal formulation. I made the same call in another international organisation, arguing that the phase during which terrorism could be used on either side as an instrument of international policy could be regarded as closed and that every country, and particularly the superpowers, should realise the risk of breakdown behind the uncontrolled and uncontrollable spread of international terrorism. Hence, common defence, common prevention and, where necessary, common repression as it is clear that individual action by states, even with the best intentions does not reduce areas of terrorism and, as we know, such areas are reduced even less by purely military action.

In answer to Mr. Cifarelli's second question, I agree entirely on the need for a genuine strengthening of WEU but would urge the need for a gradual approach to which Mr. Andreotti also referred. In other words, the process must go forward at a rate acceptable to the parliaments of the seven European countries – we hope that they may become nine or ten in the very near future – so that every fresh responsibility and sphere of competence corresponds to something accepted by all member states of the union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The Soviet Union has taken a very great interest in the Mediterranean since 1945. We know, for example, that it wanted the United Nations trusteeship over the former Italian colonies in North Africa at that time. In this context, and thus in connection with Libya, I have two questions to put to the Minister.

With its aggression in Chad, which has been going on for years and to which there is obviously no clear political answer, Libya is contravening the prevailing and accepted principles of international law.

My second question concerns the recent events in connection with the fight against terrorism in Libya. I should like to ask the Minister how the Italian Government, and WEU too, will view the requirement in the WEU treaty that allies should automatically come to each other's assistance, if there should be a repetition of the Libyan attack on Italian territory, Lampedusa, for example.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – My thanks for the questions. The first answers itself. There is not the slightest doubt that Libya has violated

the principles of international law on many occasions and has served as a base for terrorist action, principally against neighbouring countries. We must not forget that Libya's targets have been the moderate Arab countries, in particular Egypt and Tunisia, which have been subjected to strong threats and intimidation; we must not forget that Algeria, despite the major communist influence in its history, is one of the countries most distrustful and suspicious of the "dynamism" of Kadhafi's Libya; finally, we must not forget that the unnatural accord between Libya and one of the most conservative states in North Africa, Morocco, has made the situation in Chad worse and added to the difficulties of the military position firmly maintained by France's forces.

An important development is the Tokyo declaration in which for the first time at an economic summit, the industrialised countries declared terrorism to be a threat to world stability and the economic progress of states.

As regards the threats to Italian territory, we must distinguish between terrorist acts and military action, as the launching of Scud missiles against Lampedusa was considered to be; this had no military sense and was simply an act of intimidation and terror for propaganda purposes. In fact, the communiqué on the destruction of the NATO base, which is no longer a NATO base but a small support point, was issued a minute after the actual launch without any check on the operation. I would observe that a launch over almost three hundred kilometres with a failure margin of ten kilometres which is the full length of Lampedusa, could in no circumstances have hit presumed military objectives even if they had been military.

The fact is that Lampedusa mainly provides support for merchant shipping and the service is available to all countries including the Soviet Union. I think that the response to such terrorist action could not be military, but must be political as was that taken by Italy. If there were a further attack, however, the problem of joint European defence would arise and in both my own and my government's opinion both WEU and the Atlantic Alliance would be involved at the same time. That could well be an effective deterrent to the promoters of terrorist and military action.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bianco.

Mr. BIANCO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I particularly appreciate your closely argued speech and its support for the enlargement of WEU to bring in two countries which have applied to join. This is fully in line with the report which I presented yesterday and was unanimously approved by the Assembly where this point was raised.

*Mr. Bianco (continued)*

I should like to endorse your reply to Mr. Müller because it seemed to me that the Italian Government had the idea of an exclusively Italian reply, as indicated by Mr. Craxi's statement. You dealt with the point convincingly saying that the alliances should be activated beginning with WEU which acts automatically as Mr. Müller said, without at the same time bringing in the Atlantic Alliance. I can support this striking statement. You took part in the discussions on chemical weapons and were rather reluctant to give your support. In this context there is the problem of restoring a balance in the case of both chemical and conventional weapons. Do you think that the negotiations might produce an agreement between East and West for a balance of both binary chemical weapons and conventional weapons? These negotiations seemed likely to produce results but are now held up by new friction between East and West.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – This is a very complex matter involving serious problems of conscience today. Without the slightest doubt the use of chemical weapons is rejected throughout the world. There is no doubt that the European countries have expressed reserves but at the same time realise that the chemical weapon stocks of the two blocs are unbalanced. I recall the unilateral decision which the Americans took seventeen years ago, with the backing of the whole world, to suspend the use of chemical weapons in the light of the Vietnam tragedy. I believe that the American decision before Congress containing the clause for postponement until 1987 is a deliberate attempt to bring pressure on the Soviet Union to negotiate. This is the interpretation which must be placed on the American line which clearly aims at negotiation from a position of strength and therefore adds yet another element favouring positive movement towards the reduction of all weapons including, as everyone hopes, the mutual banning of chemical weapons.

Recently, in Brussels, I restated the position of the Italian Government which has always been in favour of the 1925 agreement and therefore opposed to the use of chemical weapons; I also stressed the value of postponement. I would emphasise, solely to counter propaganda manoeuvres, that the plans of the Atlantic Alliance and American plans are matters for the individual states and there could be no right of European veto on the subject. That is why there has been no formal acceptance by the Atlantic Alliance while the American community, as is its sovereign right, stressed the need to

concentrate on a symbolic weapon in order to bring about the reduction of all chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – In your very full and objective speech, Minister, you spoke of the continuous and worrying increase in the presence of the Soviet Union and therefore of the Warsaw Pact in the Mediterranean.

The previous report which the Assembly discussed on the situation in the Mediterranean in relation to European security dates back to 1981. I would like to ask you if you consider that the military threat from the Soviet Union and therefore from the Warsaw Pact in the Mediterranean has increased since 1981. If so, what are the reasons for believing that the threat has increased with special reference to relations between the Soviet Union and Libya?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I do not know how much Soviet military forces in the Mediterranean have increased since 1981 but they were already large at the end of the seventies. I do know that instability in the Mediterranean has greatly increased, with the consequent possibility of misunderstandings and disputes which are not easy to settle between the superpowers.

I would say that since 1981 the number of states linked with the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean area has increased; for example Syria, with the part it has played in destabilising Lebanon. Syria has never recognised an independent Lebanon and still harks back to the boundaries shown on the 1914 maps. Moreover, there are the internal disputes within the Arab world itself with Arafat and the PLO and another part of the Arab world moving in opposite directions. This shows how difficult it is to discuss the subject in terms of black and white.

What is most worrying at the moment is the instability of states, which for many years has been quite independent of Soviet pressures, and has local causes on which the rivalries of the superpowers are superimposed but which go much further than anything attributable to the aid which one or other of the superpowers gives to any particular régime.

Turning to the question concerning relations between the Soviet Union and Libya, I believe that the Soviet Union has so far had a substantially moderating influence on Kadhafi. It is my impression that everything would have been much more difficult in the Mediterranean area, which in recent months has been stained with

*Mr. Spadolini (continued)*

blood by outrages ranging from Fiumicino to Berlin, if the Soviet Union had stepped up the military links which it has certainly had with Kadhafi for many years, instead of adopting a less generous attitude and, I think, showing some distrust of the Libyan colonel.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gianotti.

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, those of us who listened to Mr. Andreotti yesterday and Mr. Spadolini today will appreciate how difficult it is for an ordinary Italian parliamentarian like myself to understand exactly what the Italian Government's foreign policy is.

I should like to ask the following question. In your introduction today, Minister, you referred to a kind of a special Mediterranean vocation for WEU; if my understanding is correct, would you please explain more fully what you meant and how this vocation can be made effective? The point seems to me to be of great interest in the light of the subjects under discussion at this session.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I did not really speak of Mediterranean vocations because I follow a political tradition which, since the time of Piero Gobetti who I frequently have in mind, detests all abuse of the term "Mediterranean". I do not believe therefore – I am not Gioberti – in vocations in the history of countries nor do I believe that Italy and even less WEU has any specific Mediterranean vocation. I spoke of quite different things. I spoke of the Mediterranean threat which affects WEU thus unfortunately adding to the tasks of the southern flank of the old alliance which had always been looked upon as peripheral; tasks which I do not want but which I see as arising simply from events because I know something about Machiavelli and about the value of force relationships.

I must therefore make it clear that the Mediterranean problem and particularly the problem of international terrorism, which has become an element in security policy, involves the area, so that WEU which includes Mediterranean countries like Italy and France, and soon Spain, must think and reflect on the problem and accept a serious political commitment. I must make it clear to fellow representatives and friends in WEU and to my questioner that I have not the slightest desire for WEU to have a Mediterranean vocation; I simply wished to remind the organisation that the Mediterranean can become a destabilising element for Europe and that the

rôle of the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance which comprises countries associated politically or militarily with NATO – including France which does not belong to the military command structures – raises problems which relate strictly to defence and exclude completely any idea of the Mediterranean as opposed to Europe. My philosophy of Europe excludes any antithesis between the Mediterranean and the central area, because European civilisation is the historic product of many elements and excludes any form of Mediterranean primacy which should be relegated to the realms of ancient history.

I should like, however, to ask where specifically I was not in agreement with the Foreign Minister's speech which I had read beforehand as he had mine. I should like the questioner to explain why he considers that there may be even one reason for believing that the government did not adopt a united attitude in response to the threat. My wish is for complete unity on the subject not only between the majority parties but also with the opposition and I would remind you that we fought internal terrorism with the backing of more than the majority of the parties in the Italian parliament.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rubbi.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should like to ask three questions. First, whether the Minister will not repeat here the strong condemnation by the Italian Government and parliament of the American military attack leading to the indiscriminate bombardment of Tripoli and Benghazi and also will he confirm the total refusal of the Italian Government to allow the use of military and support bases for action not taken jointly by the alliance and not in conformity with its objectives.

Second, does not the Minister think that it is very dangerous for the immediate and more distant future to establish a new category of "terrorist states" or states which are clearly involved in terrorism. This could in practice weaken the fundamental rules of international law to such an extent as to allow arbitrary action in international relations and even military attacks. Furthermore, Israel used this as an argument to justify its bombing attack on Tunis; and last week the commander-in-chief of the South African air force said that it was precisely on the basis of the formula adopted by the western powers in Tokyo that Zambia was bombarded and military attacks were made on Zimbabwe and Botswana.

My final question is whether Italy is continuing to sell sophisticated modern weapons to Iran, Iraq and Kadhafi's Libya.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I must say to Mr. Rubbi that I declared several times in my speech that the Italian Government does not support any form of unilateral military action, and this was meant to include the American bombardment of Tripoli and Benghazi; I was repeating the united position of the Italian Government and I added on the basis of my experience as Prime Minister during the Lebanon affair and also as Minister of Defence that military action is totally useless as a means of containing and neutralising terrorism. I referred to the need for a clear political, military and economic strategy in order to remove the misunderstandings and differences of interpretation between Europe and the United States, which had some part in leading the Americans to an action which we could not endorse.

I should add that in the events which took place both in the Gulf of Sirte and even more so in Tripoli, when the aircraft from British bases which overflew the Mediterranean did not even touch Italian territory at any point, we maintained the rule we have constantly affirmed regarding the use of NATO military bases for NATO purposes and our refusal of their use for action by the United States even against international terrorism, where we approved the intent but not the method.

Turning to the second point I would say that none of us has established that there are terrorist states. In Vienna, the seven industrialised states declared that there are states which supply and finance terrorists as is confirmed by what happens every day with Abu Nidal who is the guest of Libya and Syria in turn. I am well aware of the danger of creating a category – I in fact spoke of states involved in or favouring terrorism and not terrorist states – which would cause much heart-searching in bodies concerned with international law, which as Mr. Cifarelli recalled is, however, completely inadequate and insufficient to deal with present events. If we do not produce new rules to be submitted to both blocs for simultaneous approval by the United States and the Soviet Union we shall not master the problem. Nothing should or can be done against existing international law but every effort must be made to modify international law appropriately and completely to cover the situation now facing us. It would be folly to close our eyes to what is happening in the world. Not by accident, the Soviet Union last December voted for the first time with the United States in the United Nations Assembly in favour of a joint document on terrorism. This happened a few days before the outrages at Fiumicino and Vienna.

The third question refers to sales of arms. I can say at least for the time that I was in charge of the government no arms were sold to Iran or

Iraq. I watched the situation very closely as head of a government greatly concerned over this disastrous conflict.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Sales are still continuing today. Oto-Melara and other firms are still selling.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I can say that back in 1981 I had occasion to say to parliament as Prime Minister when my first five-party administration was formed, that it had been decided to suspend all supplies to Libya. Afterwards, following the outrage at Fiumicino an embargo was placed on military supplies. And I must say to Mr. Rubbi in all honesty that I do not know how many European countries have taken the same line with Libya even since Fiumicino. I hope that solidarity can be achieved on the suspension of sales of arms to countries involved in local conflicts or committed to killing each other. Indeed, I fully agree that weapons must not be supplied to countries involved in local conflicts.

I would add on the second point which is connected with the first that I totally condemn South Africa's action and fail to understand, beyond the boastings like those of other countries, how there could be any comparison between the action taken by the United States, which we do not support, and the action of a racist régime like the present South African régime, which totally rejects the basic rules of the United Nations. In other words, there can be no comparison between Israel and South Africa.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – There might not have been any attack on Libya by the United States if only the European countries had previously been rather more consistent in their solidarity, as they were subsequently in Tokyo.

That was a statement, not a question.

I should like to ask the Minister if we should not encourage the Council to give serious thought to the southern flank in its long-term political deliberations.

I very much welcome the Minister's comments. As we have done in our report, he says that what this region primarily needs is economic aid. Apart from a verbal appeal, what practical opportunities does he envisage for economic aid in this area with a view to stabilising these countries? To whom and how should this aid be granted?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – In the second part of my speech I concentrated on the need to encourage WEU to recognise the seriousness of the Mediterranean problems and to play a part in working out and co-ordinating a European strategy not separating the northern and southern flanks of the alliance.

As regards the suggestion for specific action, this is precisely the function of the WEU bodies so I do not think it would be right for me to make any specific suggestions. I did welcome the fact, however, that in Venice WEU categorised international terrorism as a threat to détente.

I do not know how WEU can be involved in economic recovery. I call to mind the “new Marshall plan” proposed by the Israeli Prime Minister Peres as a means of solving the Arab-Palestine question.

Everything connected with economic relations between states is of great importance and major collaboration between the superpowers is called for; it seems to me however that the idea as proposed goes beyond the scope of WEU and cannot be discussed here without overlapping with other bodies.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Inan.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – Do you not think, Minister, that the Atlantic Alliance has for too long concentrated all its efforts and all its military and political attention on Central Europe and neglected the Mediterranean and the south-east flank? The consequent imbalance and weakness are by way of being an encouragement to crises in that area.

Do you not also think, Minister, that there is another essential element of weakness in the Atlantic Alliance in that area? It is precisely the extremely negative attitude of one allied country that has been paralysing all activity by the alliance in the Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea for the last ten years. Instead of joining the common stand against the threat from outside, this country is capable of creating a crisis within the Atlantic Alliance at any time because the principles it follows are if anything in opposition to those of the alliance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SPADOLINI (*Minister of Defence of Italy*) (Translation). – I stressed that in recent years the Atlantic Alliance had not paid sufficient attention to the southern flank and had left it uncovered and that this had been a source of overall weakness which had led to the emergence of various destabilising factors associated with political and religious conflicts which over the last fifteen

years have spread through the whole of the Middle East.

As regards the second point, I hope, as I always have everywhere, that the dispute between two friendly countries, Greece and Turkey, can be resolved and that as a result the efforts of two countries allied within NATO can be harnessed better than during the past ten years to achieving the common objective of providing a key element in the south-east flank of the alliance in accordance with their geographical position, their historical rôle and the balance which both Turkey and Greece should provide.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Inan was the last speaker down to ask a question. Thank you, Minister, for your readiness to answer them. I am sure that all my colleagues will agree with me in describing the quality of your participation in the debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments as exceptional. The debate will continue immediately after your departure, which we shall all regret, and I think that the replies that you have given and the ideas you have expressed will remain at the centre of the thinking of the Assembly as a whole. I hope that we will see you again and resume this discussion on the rôle of WEU in security. As you said, everything is part of a whole and all the components are of equal importance but the problem of the Mediterranean is of particular interest to WEU.

Thank you very much, Minister, for your participation.

## 6. European security and the Mediterranean

(*Debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1060 and amendments*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on European security and the Mediterranean, Document 1060 and amendments.

The debate is now open.

I call Mr. Rubbi.

(*Mr. Ferrari Aggradi, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – When I read Mr. Kittelmann’s report on European security and the Mediterranean and even more when I read the draft recommendation, I immediately turned my thoughts to the subject which has so troubled our Assembly in recent years, namely the failure to reactivate WEU and the growing disagreement with the Council of Ministers. I concluded that this is only to be expected so long

*Mr. Rubbi (continued)*

as we express such unilateral views as those contained in the report. Let us ask ourselves what European government and what political party would ever base its attitude towards European and Mediterranean security on the analyses and arguments put forward by Mr. Kittelmann?

The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact are of course partly responsible in that area and in others even more and we have always said so but this may perhaps be the time for trying to understand the true causes of instability and insecurity in the Mediterranean; the true causes of the long-running conflicts ranging from the Middle East to the western Sahara and the tension in Cyprus and between Greeks and Turks. And does this explain the recent dramatic events, the terrorist attacks, the American military attack on Libya and Libya's act of war in firing two missiles at Lampedusa which kept us all holding our breath and realising the imminence of the dangers and the source of the threat to the security and peace of all countries in the area? If this were so it would not be possible to explain public reaction, the reasons for express condemnation in such authoritative international bodies as the United Nations, the reaction of non-aligned countries and the European Parliament and the deep differences of opinion which have emerged even within the Atlantic Alliance, which not even the Tokyo summit was able to resolve.

What is the point at issue? First, assessment of the phenomenon of international terrorism and the means of combating it. To ignore, as happened in Tokyo, that the main source of terrorism in the Mediterranean area is the continuing Israeli-Arab conflict and the denial of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination is to avoid the essential need to start negotiations capable of providing a fair overall political solution which will satisfy the legitimate claims of both Israel and the Palestinians. It is even more serious to accept the new category of "terrorist state" and to engage in direct military action. The first precedent was the Israeli bombardment of Tunis, while the United States raid on Libya was immediately imitated by South Africa with attacks on independent states such as Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia.

Terrorism must be prevented, dealt with and halted by political means and not by military reprisals. Approaches and methods of solving the Middle East crisis and the Palestinian problem; approaches and means of resisting and combating terrorism; these are the real questions underlying the differences which have emerged within the Atlantic Alliance. The way suggested for overcoming them would in fact make the situation worse. It is suggested that we should accept the so-called "doctrine of the vital inter-

ests of the United States" and that the political and strategic unity of the whole of NATO and "the functional interdependence of the whole of the military structure" should be established on that basis.

In simpler terms we should, as Europeans, subordinate ourselves entirely to the overall strategic options of the United States and should provide them with all the logistic and military support they require for their military actions. What is more we should agree to the amendment of the North Atlantic Treaty to allow intervention in geographical areas outside alliance territory. This is not the way either to combat terrorism or to restore stability and security in the Mediterranean. On the contrary, independent European political action must be resumed throughout the Mediterranean area; the violated principles of its defensive nature and prior consultation on options must be restored within the Atlantic Alliance; a genuine partnership must be established between all members of the alliance and general and regional interests must be reconciled.

This seems to us to be the lesson of recent events and should provide reasons for an Assembly like ours to make its contribution by adopting positions and making constructive proposals for the restoration of stability, security and peace in the Mediterranean.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should first like to congratulate Mr. Kittelmann not only on the report he has drawn up but above all on his election as Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. He has had a good lead-in as Chairman since he is also the Rapporteur today and we thus have one man in charge of everything, as it were. That is always a good start for a chairman.

As regards Mr. Kittelmann's report, long before the United States came into being and there was consequently no such thing as American imperialism, as the Soviet Union calls it today, Russia was already showing considerable interest in the Mediterranean. Even in the eighteenth century Prince Orlov's squadron was active in the Mediterranean in the war against the Turks.

It was always one of the goals of Russian policy not only to control the straits but generally to wield considerable influence in the Mediterranean. This became particularly clear immediately after the second world war, when the Soviet Union presented Turkey with an ultimatum even though it had entered the war on the side of

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

the allies in the last few months of the conflict.

The Soviet Union called for a change in control over the straits. It wanted a military base on Turkish territory beside the straits. It also made territorial claims in eastern Turkey. At the same time, there was a civil war raging in Greece.

Even at the Paris conference of foreign ministers, which eventually broke down and helped to bring about the cold war, the Soviet Union called for United Nations trusteeship for the former Italian colonies, its interest being in Libya.

The response from the United States and specifically President Truman was the termination in the autumn of 1947 of the doctrine named after him and the deployment of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean to thwart the Soviet Union's claims in this area, because there was in effect no other power at this time capable of keeping Soviet demands within bounds. Since then and since the establishment of NATO in 1949 the Mediterranean has always been one of the disputed areas where the security of NATO and its member countries is concerned.

In his report Mr. Kittelmann gives an outstandingly clear account of the balance of forces. Above all he stresses that the right of free access to international waters must always be upheld by the Americans and the other NATO member countries. The most recent example of this took place in the Gulf of Sirte; it has also happened in the Black Sea area. It was essential to prevent undesirable developments from the outset.

When we were asking the minister questions just now it was said that NATO's southern flank had been neglected, and I believe that to be partly true, even though there have been improvements recently. I believe Spain's accession to NATO will improve the situation.

I must just add a brief comment at this juncture. Few of you know Mrs. Kelly, the Green representative, from her presence in this Assembly. She is a member of this Assembly but she does not come here very often. She could support her anti-NATO slogans with arguments here. But she preferred, for example, to speak at meetings and rallies during the Spanish referendum campaign on its continued membership of NATO. I found it very interesting to see how incorrectly the media – in the Federal Republic at least – and also the opinion poll institutes reported on the situation in Spain before the referendum.

I am consequently very grateful and happy that Spain is staying in NATO because this

greatly strengthens the situation on the southern flank.

To conclude, a few words on Turkey. I believe Turkey has a key rôle to play in the eastern Mediterranean. To be specific, it has the main burden to bear. Its military spending alone shows how prepared this comparatively poor country is to commit itself.

But Turkey too will soon be put to the test. As we all know, the 1936 Montreux Convention does not, for example, permit aircraft-carriers to pass through the straits. Now we know that the first Soviet aircraft-carrier of between 60,000 and 70,000 tons deadweight is being built at the large yard in Nikolayev. It is certainly not being built for sailing around in the Black Sea. That would indeed have been a poor investment. It will be interesting to see the Soviet Union attempting to sail this ship into the Mediterranean and the oceans despite the Montreux Convention.

I mention this point only because it shows that the potential for conflict always exists throughout the Mediterranean and that the NATO slogan "vigilance is the price of freedom" has enormous topical relevance where the Mediterranean is concerned.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Matraja.

Mr. MATRAJA (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, although not the centre of the world as it was in antiquity, the Mediterranean is still a vital area for us Europeans.

Who did not entertain the hope that, after the antagonisms of decolonisation, it would once again become the scene of international trade of mutual benefit to the countries involved which, though they have their differences, are linked by old political and cultural relations and new bonds of economic solidarity?

These many and different areas of economic solidarity, ranging from traditional agricultural exports to supplies of oil and gas, need to be preserved not only in the interests of the economic development of both importing and exporting countries but also in the interests of the political stability and progress of our Mediterranean partners and for the sake of our own economic growth. We know how greatly the European Community in particular is concerned to maintain these trade flows.

It would be all the more regrettable if Europe, with its awareness of the economic bonds linking Mediterranean countries, were to accept that these countries, so close to Europe in so many ways, should become the arena of confrontations between the two superpowers. Europe must not be a kind of political dwarf looking on, powerless

*Mr. Matraja (continued)*

to intervene, from the shores of the Romans' mare nostrum from Tunisia to Marseilles and from Libya to Spain, at the blood-spilling interplay of the interests of external powers.

In the political field, just as in the economic field, Europe must face up to its own responsibilities in this vital region.

The draft recommendation before us fails in this regard to give us complete satisfaction because essentially it contains firstly a call for the strengthening of one of the two forces facing each other – even though we are gratified that Spain is staying in the NATO framework – and secondly an invitation, more a vain hope than anything else I am afraid, to all the belligerents to find a peaceful solution to their differences.

It is only incidentally that the recommendation refers to the diplomatic efforts on which European security and that of the Mediterranean area depend and, even at that, their purpose would go no further than “agreed and verifiable arms control measures” the difficulty of which is familiar to us. And yet it seems to me that the diplomatic approach deserves more than this restrictive reference and offers the only prospect for real progress towards peace in this strife-torn region.

Since for all the countries on its shores, the Mediterranean is first and foremost the route taken by the exports and imports they all depend on, why not get negotiations going among these countries, not to set up one of those blueprints for everlasting peace whose outcome is invariably disappointing, but to draw up a more modest regional agreement guaranteeing the security of trade throughout the Mediterranean.

Whilst in no way interfering with the rights of ships from countries outside the area to sail and anchor in the Mediterranean, the agreement would guarantee free transit in Mediterranean countries' maritime economic areas under the control of a specialised agency. Similarly, the agreement could include an undertaking to refrain from any kind of blockading measure.

It is by providing for the protection of the fundamental interests of the European, African and Arab countries on the shores of the Mediterranean, namely their big trade flows, mainly of raw materials and oil and gas but also agricultural produce and manufactures, that the political as well as the economic solidarity between the various countries in the region will be strengthened.

Their present discords are blinding and weakening them, delivering them into the hands of protectors who are sometimes very demanding

and whose own interests add further complication to the local conflicts.

Perhaps Europe should launch this initiative. It might be only a modest step forward but it would consolidate both the independence of the region and its internal solidarities, thus increasing the chances of peace by guaranteeing the freedom of trade in the Mediterranean.

Those, ladies and gentlemen, are the thoughts that occurred to me on reading Mr. Kittelmann's report on European security and the Mediterranean.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Milani.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Kittelmann's report was very full and well-documented but I cannot accept the conclusions or the draft recommendation submitted to the Assembly.

Nevertheless, Mr. Kittelmann's analysis of force strengths partly clears up a number of doubtful points. Over the last few years there has been greatly increased concern over the alleged threat to the so-called southern front of the alliance; on this view the increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and the political and military adventurism of a number of Arab countries represent the most serious problems which Western Europe and the Atlantic treaty now have to deal with. It is worth recording that in some countries including Italy – the Minister of Defence also referred to the fact – the added emphasis on the southern threat began well before recent attacks on Middle East terrorism; at least since the departure of the Shah and the United States decision to create a rapid strike force for the Mediterranean and Middle East theatre.

Concern over the southern front did not therefore begin with the arguments about the terrorism of the last few months; it is rather a recurrent and basic element in the strategic pattern which has been defined by the West since 1980. The report explains to us, however, that this threat from the south has been greatly exaggerated and that all in all there is no reason for the cries of alarm which have been heard for a number of years.

All in all, the Soviet naval presence is frankly modest and well below the combined forces of the western countries; the armed forces of the Arab countries, including Libya, are certainly in no position to threaten the security of Europe in any way. It is therefore sheer self-deception to foster the idea that Europe and the whole alliance are disarmed in face of a hypothetical threat from the south – there were far more grounds for disquiet when Egypt was taking a different line.

*Mr. Milani (continued)*

There are problems which Mr. Kittelmann's report quite properly describes and reports; these include the crisis in Cyprus, the submerged conflict between Greece and Turkey – both members of the Atlantic Alliance; the complicated Lebanese tragedy but most of all the tragedy of the Palestinian people.

We are admittedly faced by a very complicated situation which requires careful analysis without hasty vilification and I would point out the serious risks underlying the hasty conclusions reached by Mr. Kittelmann in the draft recommendation. I will list briefly what, in my opinion, are definite points.

First, instability in the Mediterranean area cannot be blamed on Libyan policy and even less on the Soviet naval presence. The causes are much more complex and should be gone into in depth.

Second, the military forces of the western countries in the region have not decreased but have even been increased and diversified with the deployment of rapid strike forces. It would, therefore, be more useful to reflect on the logic behind these choices and to establish whether they are consistent with the defensive purpose of the alliance. I would also refer to the problem of bilateral relations between Italy and the United States, the use of Italian bases made available to the Sixth Fleet and its provocative manoeuvres.

Third, there is nothing more dangerous and contradictory than to declare outright that one country – Mr. Rubbi spoke at length on the subject – is responsible for terrorism in the area, particularly if military measures are to follow from such a conclusion. If it is recognised that aggression has taken place and the responsible party has been identified, then there is a state of war. There is no need for me to stress what a state of war means under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty. But if this is not the true situation – fortunately that is the case – to raise the spectre serves only to hide the more serious problem with which we must deal.

There are principally three such problems.

First, the inadequacy of European policy on the most serious political and strategic problems. There is no major question from chemical weapons to SDI, from reprisals against Libya to the production of conventional weapons systems, on which Europe and notably the WEU countries are at present united. In these circumstances many countries have sought a special partnership with the United States. At this point it is absurdly misleading to try to restore the European battle line by raising the spectre of

the Libyan threat of which we have again heard a great deal this morning.

Second, we must reckon with the United States action in the Mediterranean. Our main ally has shown time and again that it does not accept any obligation stemming from allied relations; its military actions are frequently decided and carried out on the basis of an arbitrary decision by its government. What is Europe's rôle in this context? The draft recommendation seems to suggest that the cracks be papered over by accepting the United States position without discussion.

Last, but certainly not least, there are the links between the problems underlying regional tensions. It is ridiculous to dwell on the crisis in Cyprus, even though it is serious, but to say virtually nothing about the areas which have led to the present deadlock in the Arab-Israeli conflict. We should ask ourselves how and why the parties favouring constructive negotiation are pushed to one side in favour of those who have sought to destroy Arafat's PLO physically in Beirut and Tunis; we should remember how and why Europe has quickly forgotten the commitments of the 1980 Venice summit. We should ask the United States to explain its previous support for the most extremist and militaristic elements in the Israeli Government; otherwise little credibility can be attached to our distinction between hawks and doves among the Arab countries. And in this context we have to note that the European governments – take for example the recent visits to Israel by the Italian Foreign Minister and the British Prime Minister – have not slavishly followed the unilateral positions of the United States. Above all, we must recognise that the complexity of the Middle East and Mediterranean problems requires a great effort of understanding on both sides – and not simplification of the issue of terrorism – and wide-ranging co-operation with all countries in the area, not excluding the two superpowers. Quite apart from being wrong in principle, any other approach has no chance in reality.

Finally, I consider the draft recommendation before us to be completely inadequate and mistaken.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cavaliere, the last speaker this morning.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – It is common ground that the present situation in the Mediterranean must be faced, discussed and more closely watched than in the past because the dangers have increased and directly affect European security.

I fully agree with Mr. Kittelmann except as regards the second paragraph of the preamble because I believe, as Mr. Spadolini confirmed in very diplomatic terms, that the threat from

*Mr. Cavaliere (continued)*

Warsaw Pact forces has increased since 1981. And it is in the light of these new circumstances created by an increased Soviet presence, by local conflicts, by the attitudes and behaviour of Syria and Libya that the situation must be assessed and means must be sought of guaranteeing and maintaining European security.

In his report, Mr. Kittelmann – as I have so little time I shall deal with one point only – quite rightly stressed the great importance which the Atlantic Alliance and the WEU countries should attach to relations between Greece and Turkey because these are what we may call key countries for the defence of the Mediterranean and therefore of Europe. He was right therefore to draw our attention to the situation in Cyprus which is undeniably another important element not to be overlooked. The situation in Cyprus is what it is. Because of its position, an island is an element in guaranteeing European security and I am glad that Mr. Kittelmann pointed out that the failure of the negotiations is due not to the Turks or the Turkish Cypriots but to the intransigence of the Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, events in Cyprus since 1964 are to be blamed on Greek policy on proposals and plans for annexation and the destruction of the Turkish-Cypriot community. While we should encourage every effort to reunite Cyprus, we cannot overlook the different attitudes regarding the rôle the island should play in Mediterranean and European security.

The same can be said of relations between Greece and Turkey which had deteriorated since Mr. Papandreou came to power; the fact cannot be disguised. When the WEU Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments visited Greece in March 1981, the then foreign minister said in answer to a specific question that the prospects for resolving the Greco-Turkish dispute had become better with the improvement of relations between the Greek Government and the new Turkish authorities. Since then, however, the situation has become disastrous. What are we to conclude? We should certainly encourage the negotiations and do everything in our power to help Greece and Turkey to resolve their dispute but in so doing we should bear in mind the facts of the situation and consider which side deserves more support and should be trusted. I do not wish to offer a reply because it is to be seen in the facts and if we look at those facts and quote this reply we could still take steps

to ensure that we do not in the near future find ourselves faced by a situation beyond repair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is adjourned.

### *7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Draft opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1054).
2. European security and the Mediterranean (Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1060 and amendments).
3. Canadian-European co-operation in high technology (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1053 and amendment).
4. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1059 and amendments).
5. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1055 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 1.15 p.m.)*

## SIXTH SITTING

Wednesday, 4th June 1986

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Draft opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1054*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Sinesio (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Linster, Mr. Gianotti, Mr. Sinesio (*Rapporteur*).
4. European security and the Mediterranean (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1060 and amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Rauti, Mr. Inan (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Freeson, Mr. Berger, Mr. Veryvakis (*Observer from Greece*); (points of order): Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Cox; Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Cox, Mr. Kittelmann; (explanation of vote): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Freeson.
5. Canadian-European co-operation in high technology (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1053 and amendment*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Wilkinson (*Chairman of the committee*), Sir John Osborn, Mr. Wilkinson (*Chairman of the committee*).
6. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1059 and amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Kittelmann (*Chairman of the committee*); (points of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Milani, Mr. Cavaliere.
7. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1055 and amendments*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Fourré (*Rapporteur*), Sir John Osborn, Mr. Fourré (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Wilkinson (*Chairman of the committee*), Mr. Cavaliere.
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

#### *1. Adoption of the minutes*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### *2. Attendance register*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 42.

#### *3. Draft opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986*

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1054)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1985 (revised) and 1986 and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1054.

I call Mr. Sinesio, Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Mr. SINESIO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I consider that the subject dealt with in the report which I am presenting is extremely important for the creation – and vital for the attainment of our political goals – of an organisation in which the WEU Assembly can develop its own programme to deal with the many problems continually posed by its members.

*Mr. Sinesio (continued)*

Whatever policy we wish to pursue I consider it essential to have, not empty boxes, but instruments capable of implementing the policy.

The report on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1985 (revised) and 1986 broadly follows and logically complements that on the two previous budgets presented by Mr. de Vries and Mr. van Tets. I must point out that these two reports referred to a transitional period during which the old structure of the ministerial bodies was being progressively abandoned but the new structure had not yet been defined and put into operation. The new structure is now known but is still provisional as the Council has declared its intention of re-examining and possibly modifying it at the end of 1987.

The 1986 budget is therefore based on the new structure, whereas the revised budget for 1985 is based on the previous structure and is designed to update the allocations for that year in the initial budget.

Comparative analysis of these three budgets – 1985, 1985 revised and 1986 – has enabled us to trace the course of the restructuring of the ministerial bodies and its financial impact.

In fact, the budget documents by themselves, though providing an abundance of data to the point of excessive detail, appear inadequate to justify the choices underlying the changing pattern of the allocations. This point is brought out in the first part of my report where I draw attention to the fact that an analysis in greater depth called for consultation of a variety of documents, some of them of a restricted character which prevented their being appended to the report.

It is therefore recommended that the Council examine the possibility of expanding budget documents to give a fuller explanation of reasons and in future classifying expenditure into ordinary and extraordinary items. This is necessary for a clearer understanding of the changes in allocations for the different years.

I must also tell you that the Secretary-General has recently made it known that, partially as a response to a number of comments by the auditors, arrangements have been made to change the way in which the budget is itemised.

The Rapporteur for the next financial year will have to verify whether these changes meet the Assembly's wishes and whether the documentation is more complete in its exposition of the underlying reasoning.

The budgets for 1985, 1985 revised and 1986 meet the Council's wish that the global character of the previous allocations should be maintained

with internal redistribution strictly in accordance with the restructuring stage.

The budget for 1985 included allocations commensurate with the previous size of the bodies, but these had already been considerably reduced in practice and the revisions of the budget provided the occasion for transferring the substantial surpluses from the Paris organs to the Secretariat-General.

Finally, in the budget for 1986, the lump sums finally made available on completion of the restructuring of the ministerial bodies in Paris are to be allocated to the Secretariat-General.

Taking the 1985 budget as equal to one hundred, the indices show the following trend: Secretariat-General 111.74 in relation to the revised budget for 1985 and 127.54 in relation to the 1986 budget; Paris bodies 97.50 in relation to the revised budget for 1985 and 99.32 in relation to the budget for 1986.

In support and justification of these operations, the Council and its organs have declared them to be fully in accord with the zero growth criterion laid down in the Rome declaration, since the ministerial bodies as a whole show a growth rate within that limit.

In the report which I am submitting on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration I pause at this point to draw attention to the arbitrary nature of the budget. It cannot be denied that, by acting in this way, the Council not only deprived the Assembly of any chance of sharing in the redistribution of the available resources but also, by subjecting its budget to the rigid imposition of the zero growth criterion, firmly refused it the resources it needs in order to play an effective part in the reactivation of WEU.

All this, Mr. President, at a time when the intention is to revitalise WEU and see that it becomes the lifeline of Europe, and at a time when we should be doing everything in support of the political action fundamental to the project. We are being asked to cross Paris by push-bicycle without – that is – the technological resources to match the Assembly's requirements. It is furthermore impossible that the senior body of WEU should continue to be located in London while the Assembly meets in Paris.

Some very clear choices have to be made in order to provide us with an organisation, with offices, and with professionally competent staff backed up by technologically advanced equipment.

In my own small town, where I am the mayor, even the seller of artichokes has a telex to find out the market price but we lack even this type of equipment.

*Mr. Sinesio (continued)*

Mr. President, everybody is well aware of the events which marked the process of approving the Assembly's budget for 1986. They have been mentioned by earlier speakers and in particular by the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. I will remind you only that, following the Council's unilateral decision to fix the increase for the 1986 budget at 8.6% over the budget for the previous year, the Presidential Committee had to delete from the budget the proposal on the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk and to reduce drastically the programme of activities proposed by the committees.

What is more, this rate of increase is purely nominal in view of the fact that it has to absorb the cost of the new pensions to be paid in 1986. In fact, if the pensions are taken away, the increment is reduced to 7.39%. If the Council had seen fit to apply the 8.6% rate of increase to the operating budget only, the Assembly would have been able to create two new Grade B posts in the Office of the Clerk, which had been included in the budget as a matter of the highest priority. But the Council, refusing everything proposed by this Assembly, did not agree to this. I cannot help linking this refusal with the simultaneous decision to leave vacant two Grade B posts in the organisation of the Paris agencies for which the need was not obvious. These are the facts! On them the committee bases its draft recommendation which proposes firstly the creation of an independent body for the administration of pensions in accordance with the Assembly's earlier Recommendation 357 and secondly the immediate creation of two new Grade B3 posts in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly.

Ladies and gentlemen, analysis of the new establishments for the Secretariat-General and the Paris agencies, which are not annexed to the budget documents, has prompted a number of comments from the committee which I shall mention briefly. The first concerns the adoption by the Council of the principle of dual-grading constantly suggested by the Assembly in the past – witness Recommendations 240, 250 and 340. The reappearance of this problem urges the Assembly to recommend that a general rule be laid down on the subject, applicable to Assembly staff also. I would recall that the Office of the Clerk has many officers who have been in the same grade for a long time at maximum salary. The extension of this principle to the staff of the Office of the Clerk can only be considered as an act of effective, if delayed, justice.

Another observation concerns the appointment of the head of the administration and legal affairs division of the Paris office to the chair-

manship of the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee. While expressing its esteem for the official entrusted with this task, who enjoys the unquestionable respect of WEU and the other co-ordinated organisations, the committee considers that such an appointment is prejudicial to the guarantee of absolute objectivity demanded of the Budget and Organisation Committee by virtue of its position as the technical consultative organ of the Council. In particular, that committee discusses the financial problems of the whole organisation and looks for ways and means of keeping the various budgets within the limits of the global allocations fixed by the governments of the member countries. Our committee takes the view that the dual rôle of appellant and judge which this official would have to assume in relation to the Assembly is incompatible with the requirement for absolute objectivity, as the same person cannot at the same time be both supervisor and supervised.

This fact, now added to the many differences which have arisen between the Council and the Assembly on financial matters, reminded us that the Assembly has in the past raised the delicate problem of the procedure for approving its budget. This seems a suitable time to raise the matter again and to recommend once more that the Council, in consultation with the appropriate Assembly bodies, review this procedure so as to give the Assembly a better guarantee of autonomy and independence.

The final observation concerns the duplication of services in the London and Paris offices. The establishment tables of the Secretariat-General and the Paris agencies reveal that a large part of their respective staffs is assigned to administration, general services and security services. This duplication of services could be logically resolved by bringing the two offices together, as the Assembly has recommended at previous sessions. In submitting this report, the committee wishes only to refer to the financial aspects of the problem, leaving it to the policy committees to evaluate the policy issues and the practical possibility of bringing the two offices together.

Ladies and gentlemen, during its careful analysis of the budget documents for the ministerial organs of WEU, the committee found some shortcomings in the programme for the updating and modernisation of equipment. This relates in particular to the failure to ensure that the information equipment recently acquired by the Secretariat-General is compatible with the equipment already in service for some two years in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly. The committee has therefore included in its draft recommendation a specific paragraph underlining the need to harmonise the equipment used on the basis of a study carried out by an expert. The other shortcoming is the failure to purchase such a modern, if now obsolescent, piece of equip-

*Mr. Sinesio (continued)*

ment as a telex. In spite of many requests voiced here by a large number of parliamentarians and echoed by the Assembly in its budget, the use of a telex continues to be considered a useless luxury which the governments do not intend to finance. However, although this work tool may seem obsolescent against the rapid innovation of technology, its lack is keenly felt as a means of communication. The committee felt obliged to place this on record again and to recommend that a single telex be installed in the Paris office to be available to all organs, ministerial and parliamentary, of WEU with the cost shared between them.

One final note concerning the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 426 concerning the previous report on the budgets of the ministerial organs. This really amounts to a "no reply" which fails to go beyond a generalised appeal for moderation and leaves every problem unsolved, and today's absence is evidence of lack of concern regarding the Assembly's budgets which are so critical to the organic and political well-being of our organisation. Living in a state of uncertainty deprives us of the flights of fancy which would change our situation. On this subject I can only refer to what the President of the Assembly said in his opening address for this part of the thirty-second session.

I wish to endorse the important and valid points made by our President yesterday. As Italians, we will carry the fight to ministerial level to see that all this is transformed, conscious of the disgrace that it should not be possible to advance the political concept of a united Europe open to all mankind.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have tried to summarise briefly the committee's remarks as expressed in the report which we will shortly be debating. I would just add that the members of the committee were constantly mindful of the fact that the Council and the Assembly are both essential and complementary organs of WEU – the expression of a symbiotic relationship which does not exist since the Council may be considered rather as our stepmother than as our real mother – the one embodying the authority and responsibility of government, the other the will of the peoples of the seven member countries, both linked by the obligation to achieve the European unity which was the great dream of the signatories of the protocols annexed to the Brussels Treaty, and which is, today, our ambition and the reason why we are here.

This enumeration of the many, significant differences between the Council and the Assembly on the issue of finance, is intended as an indication of willingness to co-operate rather than a declaration of war and expresses the hope that

these differences can be eliminated as quickly as possible so that the Council and the Assembly may work together in perfect harmony. At the technical level the procedure has been conducted in such a way that the Paris Assembly cannot function. We must overcome these differences and confrontations and break down the barrier dividing the two organs and separating the head from the rest of the body of this political animal in search of a way of becoming the institution which was the dream of our political predecessors and now provides substance for our day-to-day battle. This is the essential precondition if the great objectives set out in the modified Brussels Treaty are to be attained and if Europe is to achieve the unity it must have in order to continue playing on the world's stage the rôle to which it is entitled by its historical, cultural and civic tradition and by its contribution to human progress.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Sinesio, for your remarkable report and your passionate plea on behalf of our Assembly which will, I hope, be heard. Let me assure you that in spite of the rather thinly attended chamber this early afternoon, your report has already caused a stir and is attracting the attention it deserves.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Linster.

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I couple my congratulations with those which our President has just addressed to Mr. Sinesio for his excellent report. Being on the Budget Committee I know the immense amount of work carried out behind the scenes on which this report is based. I am glad that Mr. Sinesio decided and found a way to link the question of the budgets of the ministerial organs with the serious budgetary problems we have in this Assembly. Those problems are so urgent and so serious and their political implications so wide that parliamentary participation in the revival of WEU is thrown into considerable doubt, just when directly contrary wishes have been and are being forcefully and repeatedly expressed by our Assembly, the day before yesterday, yesterday and today.

In that context it is only fair to emphasise, with the Rapporteur and several speakers, and following our President, the blatant contradiction between ministers' declarations and their decisions on the rôle of WEU. It must also be recognised that as parliamentarians we shall inevitably be impelled, given what is in fact the ministers' contempt for the Assembly, to seek budgetary independence for it.

I unreservedly endorse paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, as well as the rest of the draft, and Mr. Sinesio's report, which was

*Mr. Linster (continued)*

approved unanimously by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation, which recommends the creation of an independent body for the administration of pensions, has my very vigorous support. I shall not dwell on this point, whose importance is known to us all, but I must stress one fact that no ministerial address can dispose of. As long as pension costs are included in the Assembly's operating budget the authenticity of that budget will continue to be gravely distorted and the growth rate both in budgetary terms and in terms of real effectiveness will be falsified by a radically doubtful and above all highly negative and continuously downward-tending factor. This is particularly true and serious when working on the hypothesis of zero growth, in which the only numerical increase allowed is there to offset, linearly and all too irresolutely, the rate of inflation in member states.

The inclusion of pension costs in an operating budget based on zero growth could bring things grinding to a halt because it causes an increasingly negative trend. It is intolerable and in outright contradiction not only to the concept of the construction of Europe but to any idea of reactivating and reviving WEU, the subject of our debate yesterday. In that connection I would refer to the unequivocal position taken by Mr. Caro last Monday morning. This is a situation that cannot develop without the active participation of the political organ we constitute. We have to show where the source of the trouble is, where the goad is pricking the ass that the Assembly has become in the eyes of the Council.

The constant curtailing of the Assembly's financial resources similarly reduces its political effectiveness and that is the result we have to avoid at all costs.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gianotti.

Mr. GIANOTTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Sinesio has submitted the report on the budget with great conciseness and with a combination of masterly skill and the warmth of feeling associated with his island. I have to say that I share his views and that I find in his observations confirmation on matters which give cause for concern: a 1985 budget contrived so that the allocation of funds could not be identified; a budget for 1986 giving the Secretary-General very wide arbitrary powers; and the fact that the parliamentary Assembly is condemned to operate under the conditions described by the Rapporteur with the continuing highly absurd, costly and pointless separation of

the two WEU offices. These things are nothing new and have been repeated time and time again. The condemnation voiced by Mr. Sinesio is not sufficient by itself. Something else needs to be proposed and done. But what? There is a wailing wall in Jerusalem, and one solution would be to transfer our Assembly to Jerusalem for the discussion on the budget, or alternatively a wailing wall could be built in Paris – perhaps at La Villette or in the Louvre! As these ideas do not offer much prospect of success, I believe the President of our Assembly should put the question very clearly and very forcibly. In recent days we have discussed this matter with the minister concerned and we found a sympathetic attitude on the part of the minister and the Italian Government. The President of the Assembly should act to force the governments to give us replies and decisions.

In supporting the report and the draft recommendation I express the hope that this session will result not in a repeat visit to the wailing wall but in the start of a really new initiative.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Sinesio, to reply to the speakers.

Mr. SINESIO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in thanking fellow representatives for their kind words of support I would point out that the report on the budget was intended to mark the start of a period of clearly-defined activity on my part. With thirty-five years of Italian parliamentary life behind me, including some spent as a member of the Budget Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, nobody should doubt my determination to carry on tenaciously the political struggle within this Assembly, the more so as my mandate has been renewed seven times by the Italians.

As said in the report, this forum is not just an academy, nor would it wish to be one. Heaven forbid that parliamentary chambers should echo to academic discussions on the sex of angels. Rather, in our search for the right way forward, we have to examine the real circumstances of the countries we represent. In this forum, Mr. Rubbi, we must all be able to conduct a sustained political argument aimed at achieving practical results – and financial resources are important!

When in the past I was asked to become a member of this Assembly, the problems debated seemed to me at the time to be theoretical and abstract. Now we have to compare and discuss solutions which will be right for Europe. The meeting point for this debate is WEU, an organisation which is not a cultural institution but which none the less has culture at its service. It is a meeting point which enables us

*Mr. Sinesio (continued)*

to set aside mere diatribe and has nothing to do with the abstract since, with the approval of the budget and the various proposals tabled, it reflects the real circumstances of the world in which we live.

I thank all those who have spoken. This is the beginning of a hard battle, and the Chairman of the committee, whom I have learnt to esteem over the past year, has already opened a breach through which we must deploy our political activity. If we allow the ground to be cut from under our feet we shall all have failed in our task. If it is really true that the London office does indeed share our interest, it should give a boost to our political initiative through the governments. Here in the Assembly we represent the demands coming from below.

I thank Mr. Gianotti for stressing the prime importance of the political approach if we are to find the answer to the problems raised here.

We shall have failed if we do not get the adequate reply demanded in the courageous words uttered by our President elsewhere – in Venice where he claimed for this Assembly the power to make effective political choices. In this context the budget is not a mere accounting exercise, a collection of figures, but a synthesis of the policy we wish to implement. I am unhappy and disappointed to have to say that this policy does not exist. Mr. Milani, the budget has not been maintained but is down through the effect of inflation and the absence of an upward readjustment – a double blow. Furthermore, WEU in Paris has no means of communicating with the outside world and drawing attention to its ideas and intentions. Here I have the press in mind.

I thank the President for giving me the floor and assure you that for my part I shall pursue the fight to the bitter end!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak?...

We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1054.

Since no one has asked for a vote by roll-call, the Assembly will vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously<sup>1</sup>.*

1. See page 43.

#### 4. European security and the Mediterranean

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1060 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on European security and the Mediterranean, Document 1060 and amendments.

I would remind you, ladies and gentlemen, that you must try to keep to the time-limit which is five minutes per speaker.

In the resumed debate, I call Mr. Rauti.

Mr. RAUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as on other occasions, I am very sorry that so little time is allowed to speakers as Mr. Kittelmann's report is a document of exceptional importance not only because of its method of presentation but also because of the topics and problems covered.

There are just two observations I wish to make. They concern Mediterranean security in general and the specific problem of Cyprus.

The position on security is clearly set out in paragraphs 2.8 and 2.10 of the report. The point is made here that the present equilibrium could be disturbed or destroyed by destabilisation in certain countries in the eastern Mediterranean and along the North African coast. In the background there is the continuing threat of Soviet naval and air bases being set up on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The problem is therefore clearly a political one and its solution depends more on this factor than on conventional military strategy. In this area of such vital importance to Europe we continue to witness the spread of the whole varied spectrum of that form of modern politics to which the term "revolutionary war" was applied some years ago and which has today added to its armoury the pitiless weapons of international terrorism. In the final analysis, the response to this type of war must be made in political terms and solutions must be found to problems instead of allowing them to drag on for years as in the case of the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. I know full well that there are other factors in any explanation and understanding of the problems of the Middle East which exert such an influence on the destiny of the Mediterranean area, but until the drama of the Palestinian people is resolved – that outcast people of our times who, in despair, are the tools of everybody – we shall not remove the root cause of the destabilising forces at work throughout the area and we shall not eliminate the chief weapon of the "revolutionary war" in progress.

*Mr. Rauti (continued)*

My other observation concerns Cyprus and Turkey. Here the report provides a very shrewd analysis, and I refer to paragraph 4.43 which notes that Turkey allocated 4.4% of its GDP to defence expenditure and that Turkey's is therefore amongst the highest defence efforts in NATO. This aspect of the situation should perhaps have been more strongly emphasised to give Turkey the full credit due to it. It should be noted that Turkey finds itself in an extremely difficult socio-economic situation with millions of Turks forced to emigrate in search of work. It is also true that, in the NATO area, the Turks are confronted by all the problems of very rapid demographic growth and a population comprising an increasing proportion of young and very young people, many of them unemployed. Notwithstanding this, Turkey is Western Europe's staunchest and most faithful ally and of such importance as a western bastion that it can be expressed by a politico-military equation: so long as Turkey stands fast, nothing in the area is jeopardised but should Turkey cease to stand fast, the entire balance in the Mediterranean and the security of Europe would be terribly compromised. This situation generates its own logical and indisputable corollary: we must strengthen Turkey and anchor it to Western Europe while at the same time avoiding contentious issues, especially with regard to Islamic fundamentalism, which is also making itself felt in Turkey and which it would have been better to analyse in depth in the report.

To strengthen Turkey, we should stand by it in the extremely complex situation which has arisen in the Aegean and on the no less difficult Cyprus question. In the case of Cyprus, a definitive solution could be arrived at by recognising that the de facto situation described in paragraph 5.10 of the report has now altered radically and irreversibly the earlier situation characterised by what the report correctly refers to as the inextricable mixture of two peoples. This is the first time such a thing has happened in Cyprus: the two communities are living apart, each more homogeneous in itself and each more able to live in security and calm without daily bloody conflicts born of a tormented history.

The question is: can the clock be put back on Cyprus? No sooner is the question asked than it is answered: certainly not. To put the clock back would be unthinkable. Here again, the logic is inescapable: being absolutely realistic, the partition of the island and the creation of a Turkish community on Cyprus must be considered irreversible facts of life. Whoever has visited that area – and I have been there with two fellow members of this Assembly, being cordially received and free to visit the whole of that part of the island as well as people's houses – will realise

that the population living there feels itself to be free at last, secure and peaceful, with a hardworking approach to life and possessed of a rare honesty.

Let us then face up to realities and set up the appropriate constitutional and legal structures. Let us all make an effort to see that, once the problems of detail have been solved, the two communities on Cyprus can live in peace – each in its own politically determined area, but with the cultural back-up provided by centuries of history and vicissitudes and with the recognition that the Turks of northern Cyprus are fully entitled to their own ideas. This will greatly assist Turkey in resolving its age-old and tragic problem.

I have no further observations to make on Mr. Kittelmann's report which, considered as a whole, has my full approval.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Inan.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – Mr. President, on Mr. Dogu's and my own behalf I must say how pleased and honoured we are to be with you today. I would assure you that the interest we take in your organisation, personally and nationally, goes far beyond our status as mere observers.

My congratulations and thanks to the Rapporteur, Mr. Kittelmann, who has dealt so well and so objectively with an extremely complicated subject, concerning a region that is difficult to define and even more difficult to analyse. He has done a wonderful and remarkable job.

I would also thank him for having referred in paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation to Turkey's defence efforts in our part of the world. Indeed 37% of the common frontier with the Warsaw Pact countries is defended by Turkish forces, at a time when our country is faced with economic and social difficulties. In addition, it is not a region with an easy environment.

The Rapporteur also refers in paragraph 5 to the need to persuade the Greek and Turkish Governments to resume negotiations. Let me reassure him. We need no persuasion! We are convinced of the need for dialogue. Our request to you is to join us in trying to persuade the Greek Government, which systematically refuses to hold a dialogue.

The present Turkish Government has been in power for thirty months and has appealed every month to Mr. Papandreu to come to a meeting in Turkey, Greece, or elsewhere, with or without an agenda, in order to negotiate and establish a dialogue – but always in vain. Last January, when the Turkish Prime Minister was in Davos

*Mr. Inan (continued)*

at the same time as Mr. Papandreou on the occasion of an international economic symposium, he made every imaginable effort to establish contact and begin negotiations. It proved impossible. Just a handshake at a reception, nothing more, and then a cold shoulder.

The sources of conflict are set out in Mr. Kittelmann's report. In fact, our neighbour, Greece, is claiming rights of sovereignty over 97% of the area of the continental shelf, 78% of the Aegean Sea as territorial waters and 70% of the region's airspace, based on the Greek view that every island should have an airspace of ten miles.

This would be tantamount to making the Aegean a closed sea, harking back to Grotius's theory of a *mare nostrum* to replace the *mare liberum*. It also means that our Greek friends want to bar the way, to close the natural bridge formed by the Anatolian peninsula between Asia, Africa and Europe, by building a kind of Greek wall on the model of the Berlin wall between Turkey and Western Europe. That is unacceptable.

This is not all. In flagrant violation of international agreements – the London, Lausanne and Paris treaties of 1914, 1923 and 1947 – they have armed all the islands in the Aegean against Turkey.

On top of that, late in 1984, the Greek Government decided to deploy all Greek forces, not against those of the Warsaw Pact which it no longer considers to be a threat, but against Turkey. It set up a ministry for the Aegean region and armed a 600,000-strong militia, referred to in Mr. Kittelmann's report, again with Turkey as the target. That is not the end of the list of sources of conflict and crises. The very latest is the definition of a new air corridor for civil traffic. The old G-18 across the middle of the Aegean Sea has been abolished by the Greek Government and replaced by a new corridor, the G-60, passing just forward of the Anatolian peninsula and the Turkish coast of the Aegean, so as further to restrict Turkey's outward access routes.

If all these claims were allowed, I assure you, and I am not joking, that if you ever find yourselves on the Turkish beaches of the Aegean you must not forget to have your passport, complete with visa, in the pocket of your bathing suit because as soon as you went in to bathe you would immediately find yourself in Greek territorial waters. This is inconceivable and unacceptable, Mr. President.

We seek dialogue and negotiation. We do not want a crisis to break out in the Atlantic Alliance. There are already too many of them

in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. Let us not have one among ourselves.

But we have a very difficult neighbour who refuses to enter into dialogue with us and prefers to visit Warsaw and to make statements in accordance with the terms of the Warsaw Pact. He refuses to recognise the threat from the Warsaw Pact. He refuses to recognise the threat of international terrorism. In a recent speech he absolved certain countries known to be responsible for international terrorist campaigns from any blame whatsoever.

Mr. President, the Rapporteur had the extremely difficult task of showing that within the Atlantic Alliance there is one government with which it is even more difficult to negotiate than with certain governments in the Warsaw Pact.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – I was in doubt about whether I was to be called, Mr. President. My observations will be brief. This is a good report. Although I could comment on a number of details I shall not do so. My purpose in speaking is to express my concern that the recommendation makes no reference to arms trading into the Middle East. I find that surprising.

When one considers what is going on in the Middle East and considers the sources from which military hardware used by various states and by terrorists comes, one considers it astonishing that such a report does not deal with it.

Billions of dollars' worth of equipment each year is poured into Middle East states by governments which we represent here, as well as by many other governments unconnected with WEU. If we continue to make statements and to produce good and balanced reports about such problems without attending to the specific issue of arms trading in which our governments and our industries are involved in a massive way – and in which they have been involved for many years – I must be blunt and say that we are being hypocritical.

We shall be hypocritical if we do not pay specific attention to this issue. We are talking about something that is criminal. We are acceding to something which is criminal. It is criminal that we are failing to take action.

Arms trading, not only in the Middle East but in other areas, is no longer marginal in terms of threats of law, threats of instability or of aggression from various quarters by different states, whether in the Middle East or, potentially, elsewhere. It is no longer marginal for our economies. Once upon a time arms trading was marginal, alongside our own activities concerned

*Mr. Freeson (continued)*

with our own national defence arrangements and our own economies. Today, arms trading – and arms production specifically – is conducted on such a massive scale in some instances that if we do not do something to redirect resources soon we shall risk wrecking our economies when we finally come round to reducing arms levels throughout the world.

I do not say that lightly. It is as serious as that. The type of economic activity in each of our countries and elsewhere is so powerful a generator of economic and research activity that if we were to take any significant steps to reduce arms production we would do serious damage and disrupt our economies.

I do not say that we have reached that stage yet, but we are at serious risk of doing so within the decade, and any analysis of the level or the nature of arms production in any modern country will show evidence of this. Any study into interrelationships between arms production and other elements of our economy – that are normally categorised as civil elements – will show clear evidence of that. This is very serious for us, but more immediately it is serious for peace in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Let us take some kind of action in this Assembly – if not today, as early as possible on a future occasion – to do something about it, otherwise we may talk about peace but we shall never achieve it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Berger.

Mr. BERGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, a brief comment on what the last speaker had to say: as a German representative I can but call on all members of this Assembly to join with their colleagues at home in considering whether it would not be possible for them to introduce legislation controlling weapons of war, as we have done in the Federal Republic.

But I do not think that this alone will solve the problem of these arms supplies. The international arms trade today is definitely a buyers' market: those engaged in conflicts can obtain whatever weapons they want. We shall not be able to curb this through government measures to the point where conflicts are neutralised.

I should now like to go back to our report and thank the Rapporteur once again for the work he has done. In general, it has been very highly praised today. I should like to associate myself with this praise. I also want to refer to what Mr. Müller said this morning. I will try to be as brief as possible.

A very wise admiral of a NATO unit once said to me that, if I wanted to put the cohesion of the western alliance to the test, I should do so not on the central front of NATO, our western alliance, but on its flanks. I think he was right. The whole report on the Mediterranean that we are now considering reflects the same view. The unfortunate thing is that the Soviet Union is trying all three things: it is permanently and constantly testing the cohesion of the alliance on the central front with one initiative after another, including arms initiatives, and also on both the northern and southern flanks of the alliance. It is precisely because of this that we in WEU must pay due attention to these problems on NATO's flanks and together find solutions to them.

We can say with genuine regret that the Mediterranean is no longer a western mare nostrum as it was ten or fifteen years ago. The presence of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean has not been without repercussions, and it has also increased the instability that has always been a feature of this region. Conversely, this instability has caused the Soviet Union to step up its efforts to gain a foothold there.

On the other hand, we can say with satisfaction that the Soviet Union has not so far succeeded in creating genuine bases in the Mediterranean from which it could operate far more effectively than it can at present.

I should also point out that Europe is, of course, partly to blame for some of this instability, the causes of which I do not want to analyse now – this has been done in quite excellent fashion in the report. This too gives Europe some responsibility. But unlike Mr. Milani, to whom I listened carefully this morning, I believe we can only influence these things within the alliance.

Something that again struck me this morning was that those who hamper or even reject co-operation with the United States of America from time to time are evidently the same people who are most outspoken in their criticism of the independent decisions taken by the United States. Somehow or other that is not consistent. You cannot complain about Europe's weakness and at the same time call for an increase in its influence outside the alliance. That is a contradiction in terms. It cannot be denied that there are, always have been and will continue to be, conflicts of interest within alliances.

The Soviet Union wants political influence in this zone. It shows the military flag there to gain this political influence. As I have already said, it has not yet been as successful as it might have wished. It has, thank God, not yet succeeded in gaining a real foothold on the southern coast of the Mediterranean. On the contrary, its

*Mr. Berger (continued)*

position there – in some respects at least – has even deteriorated compared with past decades.

Clearly, the Soviet Union is also uninterested in political solutions to the conflict situations in that part of the world. Quite the contrary, it is keeping all the fires there, all these epicentres of conflict smouldering, so that it can fan the flames at any time to suit its policy.

I believe the West must draw two conclusions from this situation. First, we must continue to maintain an adequate military presence, and in this respect Spain's continued membership of NATO is to be welcomed – a traditional maritime power which will strengthen forces in the Mediterranean. Second, we must increase the co-operation between the navies of the NATO countries, which are subject to integration, and France.

And there is something else we must do, as Mr. Kittelmann has made very clear in his report: we must increase our political influence with a view to stabilising this zone. We shall not be able to do this without a programme that is also capable of solving this region's economic problems, lest certain peoples or countries use these economic problems as an excuse to seek refuge in neutrality or reliance on the Soviet Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Veryvakis.

Mr. VERYVAKIS (*Observer from Greece*). – Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the opportunity to address the parliamentary Assembly of WEU. It is an opportunity to bring to you the salutations of the Greek parliament. Yours is a unique body, which examines the problems of the defence of the world but, in particular, those of Western Europe.

I confess that in coming to the step of the Assembly, I was moved not only by a desire to exercise a duty but also for the special interest in the discussion on the problems of security in the Mediterranean. To my mind many parts of the report need to be further discussed and strengthened by elements. Nevertheless, it is an interesting report. I have some questions and perhaps objections about the way in which the situation is perceived in the sensitive triangle of the eastern flank of the Mediterranean. I want especially to examine the local situation and the difficulties created over the last few years. I will not refer to all of the problems, because I do not have the time. However, I wish especially to refer to the problem of the Greek islands, Athens, FIR and the problem of Greek-Turkish relations and so many others. All of these will require further discussion.

The situation in Cyprus and the possible solutions there are at the heart of the problem. There is also the complexity of relations between Athens, Ankara and Nicosia. The difficulties contained in the six to twelve miles of the Aegean Sea, the continental shelf of the Aegean, and the American bases, need much more examination. It is not my purpose to deal with all of these matters now, and I will not do what my colleague, Mr. Inan, of Turkey, did when he seemed to suggest that Greece was a kind of friend of war that refused to discuss the problems. It is well known that all Greek governments want only to see respect for international law.

I have some questions to put to the Rapporteur relating to the topics dealt with in the report. The report refers to "conflict or conflicts" in the area. I am not sure that in his examination the Rapporteur has fully examined the legal and moral rights that are involved. It is these that are described as conflicts. Here it is necessary to ask who is the offender and who is being offended. We have to examine the causes that create conflict if we are to improve European security.

I come now to consider the recognition of the moral and legal rights of a member country and its responsibility for national as well as collective security.

Article 5 of the NATO treaty does not provide for what would happen in the event of an attack against a member state by another member state. What would be the attitude of other countries?

Because of political ill-treatment on the part of some countries, we lack defenders. Does the Rapporteur wish the question of the dialogue between Turkey and Greece to be in the frame referred to as international law? This would give an immediate answer to the problem.

I want to refer to Mr. Kittelmann's report dealing with Cyprus and would like to give some facts about the current state of the initiative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General is not acting as a mediator but is exercising his good offices. Therefore, he does not present his proposals for a solution but tries to bridge the views of the two sides.

Many previous documents that he has produced have been rejected by the Turkish side. For example, there was the document presented by the Secretary-General in April 1985, which was accepted by the Cyprus Government.

As to the most recent document of the Secretary-General...

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Veryvakis, please bring your remarks to a close.

Mr. VERYVAKIS (*Observer from Greece*). – May I have one more minute please? I do not wish to abuse your courtesy.

The PRESIDENT. – Go ahead.

Mr. VERYVAKIS (*Observer from Greece*). – In effect, Mr. Denktash, while accepting the document, has qualified his acceptance in his letter addressed to the Secretary-General by insisting that Turkish troops should remain in Cyprus, that there should be the retention of a unilateral right of intervention by Turkey in Cyprus and by a refusal to agree to the effective implementation of human rights over the whole territory of Cyprus.

The Government of Cyprus considers these issues crucial, since the crux of the Cyprus problem is that part of Cyprus is under Turkish occupation. In its reply to the Secretary-General it has expressed the wish that before it gives its views on detailed constitutional issues the following three vital points should be resolved – one, the withdrawal of the troops of occupation; two, the settlement of the issue of the fundamental right of freedom of movement and three, the right to property.

To my mind, the Cyprus Government should, with the Greek Government, assist this attempt at reaching a solution by accepting these conditions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We welcome the presence of observers from countries which are members and friends of the Atlantic Alliance but not members of WEU, and are very interested to hear what they have to say, but allow me in simple and friendly terms to ask everyone to comply with the rules that the Assembly and its members obey and without which we would never conclude our work in reasonable time. I ask you all, observers and members of parliament, to make this effort and I would be grateful if you would take care to respect this.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. It was with much difficulty that I restrained myself during the speech of Mr. Veryvakis. Those of us who are full members of the Assembly and have taken an active part in welcoming observers here must ask that they observe the same rules as apply to all others. That must apply to anyone. On a future occasion, unless you say that you have granted an exemption from the time-limits to a speaker, we shall not be so patient.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1060 and amendments.

I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I wish to move the reference back of the report under Rule 32. This is a major report and all of us who have experience of legislation and committee reports feel that the Defence Committee should be fully in support of this report. I am a member of this committee, which met this morning, and I can tell you that when it was voted upon there were no fewer than eleven abstentions. That is a clear indication of the views of the committee. There have been many speeches during this debate, including one by my friend Mr. Freeson, clearly outlining the feelings of members. He had several points to make about the report and similar comments have been made by others. On those grounds, I respectfully request a reference back.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 32 to which you have referred, a motion for reference back to committee takes priority over the remainder of the debate. I shall therefore put Mr. Cox's motion for reference back to the committee to the vote and give the floor to one speaker against before requesting the committee's opinion.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we could have considered Mr. Cox's suggestion if it had been made immediately after the presentation of the report, but following such a full presentation and debate covering the whole spectrum of possible reactions I think such a request must be rejected. We have before us all the elements needed to form a judgment on Mr. Kittlemann's report and it is immaterial whether the report was approved with eleven abstentions. This is the democratic process. I would have understood if there had been a large number of votes against, but an abstention is not a vote against. We should therefore proceed with our consideration of the amendments and with the final vote on the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, although I hold Mr. Cox in high regard, I must point out that the report we are now discussing was approved in committee by sixteen votes for, no votes against and three abstentions. What he has referred to is a supplementary report, dis-

*Mr. Kittelmann (continued)*

cussed early this morning, to the report by Mr. van der Werff, which will be considered tomorrow. The report on which we are now about to vote was unanimously approved in committee in Venice. What Mr. Cox refers to is an addendum to Mr. van der Werff's report on terrorism. I assume that now you have heard this explanation you will want to withdraw your request that the report be referred back.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – There seems to be a misunderstanding, Mr. Cox.

I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – I note the comments by Mr. Kittelmann. I apologise if my figures were wrong, but that still does not detract from the motion that the matter be referred back which I have moved. I do so on the grounds that I have already made clear. Many points are critical of the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You therefore maintain your motion for reference back to committee, though this is not supported by the committee.

The Chairman of the committee is entitled to intervene in the debate if he so wishes and I call him, although an exchange of views has already taken place.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I merely raised a point of order just now to correct a mistake. After explaining that a misunderstanding had occurred here, I had hoped that the motion would be withdrawn and we could save ourselves this trouble. I would also point out that hardly any voices were raised against the report during the debate. The only criticisms were – as usual – of details, and I therefore believe the vote can be taken on the report today.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Mr. Cox's motion for reference back to the committee of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and draft recommendation, Document 1060 and amendments, to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The motion for reference back to committee is agreed to.*

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the draft recommendation are therefore referred back to committee.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Under Rule 26, explanation of vote, I voted not to refer the matter back because I had heard the explanation and heard Mr. Cox's argument wholly demolished. Had Mr. Cox been right and had there been eleven abstentions I should have supported him. But it was made clear by the Chairman of the committee that Mr. Cox had been given wholly wrong information, and for that reason I voted that we should not refer this back.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I, too, wish to make an explanation of my vote under the same rule.

I wish to make it clear that I voted against the reference back in support of our Rapporteur and his excellent work over a long period of time. It is wholly inappropriate that the Turkish-Greek dispute should have been brought into the debate in the way that it was. It was a discourtesy to our Turkish observers that the debate should have been turned into a Turkish-Greek squabble. I thought that to refer the report back would be an insult to our Turkish friends and NATO allies and extremely damaging to the work of the Assembly. That is why I voted as I did.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Since we are pursuing the debate by another means, I must explain why I did not accept that the only points raised today were either matters of detail or matters involving the Turkish-Greek dispute over either the Aegean or Cyprus.

I do not intend to make any comment on Turkish-Greek relationships or about Cyprus, but I hope that whatever view is taken it will be accepted that the omission of any reference to massive arms trading into the Middle East by our member governments as well as others from this important report is extremely serious.

I must urge that, the vote having been taken with the matter going back to the committee, at least that major omission will be given serious study and reported upon when the subject is again before the committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed, the report having been referred back to committee by duly recorded vote.

### 5. Canadian-European co-operation in high technology

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1053 and amendment)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on Canadian-European co-operation in high technology and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1053 and amendment.

In the absence of the Rapporteur, Mr. Hill, Mr. Wilkinson, the Chairman of the committee, has agreed to take his place.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I must apologise for the absence of our Rapporteur, Mr. Hill, on important parliamentary business in the United Kingdom. In his absence, he has requested me to present Document 1053 on Canadian-European co-operation in high technology – a report which was passed unanimously by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

After the previous debate it is a pleasure to have the opportunity to present to the Assembly a report which I hope will be wholly uncontentious and which will not lead to prolonged, difficult and acrimonious debate. I am deeply aware that during this part-session our order of business has suffered because many of the items have proved to take far longer to deal with than had been intended. I am also aware that we have further important business to discuss, especially some amendments to Mr. Amadei's report on disarmament.

The visit of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to Canada from 22nd October to 1st November last year encompassed a journey from Newfoundland right through the country to Vancouver. It was an extremely timely visit. Following the election of Mr. Mulroney's government, we were keen to establish contact with our opposite numbers in Canada and to seek to advance the cause of co-operation with our Canadian allies in the NATO alliance.

We have all felt for a long time that it would be in Canada's interests and in our own if Canada were able to achieve a balanced relationship with its large and powerful neighbour to the south, the United States, and with its Western European allies. We, too, have long been enthusiastic about the idea of forging closer co-operation with the Canadians, to our mutual advantage, because they have a number of industries that are at the forefront of technology, espe-

cially in space, communications and sea sciences. That is why we went, and the visit was extremely successful. In that connection I must pay tribute to the work of our retiring Clerk, Mr. Huigens, for his administration and organisation of the visit.

The main body of the report speaks for itself. It is essentially descriptive, it has all the facts relevant to the visit, and there is nothing contentious in that part. I simply refer to the preamble of the recommendation and to the recommendation itself. First, Canada is a member, as we are, of a number of organisations such as NATO, OECD and the European Space Agency. I have mentioned that Canada is in the forefront in a number of technical subjects. One that should be mentioned is nuclear power, because its Candu reactors have been operational for some time.

We have been especially glad in our Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions that for so many years, especially following the successful Munich symposium on space, we have promoted an active, vigorous and expanding space programme, and we have valued the contribution which the Canadians, with their associate status, have made to the work of the European Space Agency. Therefore, the visit to Spar Aerospace, for example, which is responsible for the procurement and integration of all spacecraft hardware, was a particularly fruitful part of our visit.

Moving to the recommendations proper, I do not believe that members of the Assembly need to take issue with any of them. We are very interested in the possibility – and we go no further – of the participation of Canada in projects sponsored by the IEPG.

We are conscious that such participation should be favoured with reciprocity from our Canadian friends. We do not want the transatlantic two-way street to be further imbalanced by lack of reciprocity by the Canadians. We want the association of Canada with the European Space Agency to be enhanced and prolonged. Above all, we want the range of programmes with which Canada might be involved to be substantially enlarged.

We also mentioned the potential benefits to our Canadian friends of the Ariane launcher system. Looking beyond that system, the committee is active in its encouragement of the European Space Agency and its studies into land space vehicles. I am talking of reusable vehicles such as Hermes which will be carried on Ariane 5 and Hotol – horizontal take-off and landing.

We are also interested in the possibility of Canadian co-operation with Eureka, but we realise that this is a somewhat sensitive issue. We do not want to upset member coun-

*Mr. Wilkinson (continued)*

tries of the organisation which are at the forefront of the promotion of Eureka by suggesting that the Canadians should have too large a share in what is an essentially European high technology generating strategy.

Our Canadian friends are active in hydroelectricity, telecommunications and nuclear power. We want them, as a matter of routine, to procure more hardware from Europe than they have in the past.

I congratulate my colleague Mr. Hill on his work. The Canadians have now issued a space strategy which provides \$123 million in funding to science and technology via the communications agencies to the year 2001 for expanding participation by the Canadians on the earth resources remote-sensing satellite system – ERS-1 – L-Sat, now known as Olympus, and the French Hermes programme.

Interestingly, our Canadian friends are to provide, under the new strategy, \$55 million in funding for the Canadian astronaut programme and \$70 million for space science. The second Canadian payload specialist, Mr. MacLean, is to test the space vision system on a future shuttle mission. A Canadian crew is envisaged for a third mission to focus on life sciences. The names of the individuals have not yet been designated. As you will know, Mr. President, the Canadian astronaut, Mr. Garneau, was the first Canadian payload specialist to fly on a shuttle back in October 1984.

The visit was thoroughly worthwhile. I hope that our Canadian friends might be able to come here on occasions to attend and observe our debates. They were most hospitable to us in the federal parliament in Ottawa and in provincial parliaments such as Quebec and Toronto.

Mr. Mulroney's administration, now that it has decided to enhance its contribution to European defence by an extra battalion of men for the defence of Western Europe and the modernisation of its air component by the entry into service of the F-18 Hornet aircraft and the withdrawal of the F-104 units, shows that Canadian-European co-operation in terms of security policy and of high technology is alive, well and active. I hope that you, Mr. President, and members of the Assembly, will feel that our committee played its part.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for presenting the report, Mr. Wilkinson. May I join you in congratulating Mr. Hill, to whom I would ask you kindly to convey the thanks of our Assembly.

The debate is open.

I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate the new Chairman of the committee and I thank him for introducing Mr. Hill's report in a constructive and positive way. If I catch your eye later, Mr. President, I shall try to define what should concern a science, technology and aerospace committee of WEU as against the science and technology committee connected with the Council of Europe.

It would be valuable if some of the recommendations, including the modification by Mr. Hill and Mr. Spies von Büllesheim – Amendment 1 – were to be discussed by Canadian members of parliament who are concerned about defence issues. Obviously Canada has its own relationship with the United States of America and its own relationship with European countries through its traditions and history.

I much enjoyed the informative visit by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to Canada in the early autumn. We were rather surprised to land in snow when we arrived at Newfoundland.

The Canadians forgot that we were a Western European Union committee concerned with those aspects of science which are directly and indirectly connected with defence. Some members of the committee were disappointed at the emphasis on science and technology matters at the expense of aerospace matters and technical aspects of defence strategy.

I confess that as Chairman of the Joint Committee for Scientific Co-operation of the Council of Europe and as Chairman of the British parliamentary group for energy studies I found the visit constructive and informative and fully illustrative of the importance of committees from WEU and the Council of Europe visiting the United States and Canada, which I first visited in an industrial context thirty-five years ago.

I shall concentrate on the non-defence issues of the visit rather than on the defence issues. Canada has bountiful sources of energy. It has surpluses of coal, natural gas and electricity, particularly hydroelectricity. As the committee learnt in its discussions with Dr. Stuart, Chairman of the Science Council of Canada, the country has come to realise the importance to its future prosperity of science and technology and of the rôle that it can play in restoring the competitiveness of Canada's traditional industries.

Canadians have attended the Council of Europe's debates on OECD. Under Mr. Thacher, who was with us in Tokyo, and under Mr. Jack Ellis, they have been in close touch with the Science and Technology Committee of the Council of Europe. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the next European scientific conference will be held in Canada. There are

*Sir John Osborn (continued)*

difficulties, but if they were overcome that might be possible.

Obviously, oil is an important subject, and the huge reserves in the Arctic Circle off Newfoundland were one of the main points of our visit. But Canada is also interested in synthetic fuel development be it from coal or natural gas or even from the growth of alternative crops to grain which are in surplus. This was important ten years ago on a committee visit that I then attended, although it is obviously less important now at a time when there are oil surpluses.

I want to concentrate on the James Bay project of Hydro-Quebec. This was talked about in 1974. The first phase of some 25,000 MW has now been completed, and at the turn of the century Quebec will be producing for about six million people enough electricity by hydroelectric means – that is, cheap means – as is required for the population of the United Kingdom. Obviously, the sale of electricity is of importance.

The one problem that we should look at in Mr. Hill's report is the recommendation on "a most-favoured attitude to European research, development and production". In science and technology, there is a need to clarify the extent to which Canada wishes to co-operate with European friends as against the United States. There is a relationship that only they can understand.

The second matter about which I am concerned relates to the implications for European scientific manpower. We discussed Canada's requirements for some 20,000 young scientists, of whom about only 8,000 were obtained locally. I hope that this will not lead to a brain drain. But this has always been a danger. Indeed, about forty years ago, I might well have been part of the European brain drain in the first instance had not other circumstances prevented me from emigrating to Canada.

The impression that I gained during the committee's visit to Canada, which I have been seeking to convey in this speech, is that Europe could gain much from collaboration with Canada in respect of advanced technology. Canada's defence policy is governed by the policy of self-interest, as outlined by Mr. Hill in paragraph 151 of his report. Such a concept should inspire Canada and Europe to come together in relation to advanced technology to the benefit of each other. As the red light is on, I shall end on that theme.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I thank my colleague Sir John Osborn for filling in areas that I had not fully described. He has put the report in the context of European high-tech co-operation as a whole, in which he has played an active and leading part. That said, I simply wish to commend the report. We shall, of course, later consider an amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions has presented a draft recommendation contained in Document 1053.

Mr. Hill and Mr. Spies von Büllenheim have tabled Amendment 1 which reads:

1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the operative text of the draft recommendation and insert:

"To consider favourably connections of Canadian firms and research institutions with Eureka projects;"

I call Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman of the committee, to move the amendment.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – In the absence of Mr. Spies von Büllenheim and Mr. Hill, I have been asked to introduce Amendment 1. It is designed to tidy up the wording and to make it clear that we wish nothing formal other than that consideration should take place of connections between Canadian firms and research institutes with such projects as may emerge under the Eureka programme. The sponsors of this amendment feel that the wording would be more appropriate, and I gather that this is the view of the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. In that sense I commend the amendment to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I assume that the committee, represented by its Chairman, is also in agreement with the amendment.

I now put Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Hill and Mr. Spies von Büllenheim to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

The Assembly now has to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1053 as amended.

In accordance with Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Does anyone request a vote by roll-call?...

*The President (continued)*

No. We shall therefore take the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

#### **6. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council**

*(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1059 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council, Document 1059 and amendments.

Yesterday evening, the representatives down to speak in the debate withdrew their requests but since then I have received a request from Sir Frederic Bennett whom I now call.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – My remarks shall be very brief. I draw attention to what I shall say in the context of what I could not have said before we heard the ministers. During five ministerial speeches we have been totally unable to obtain any definite information in relation to the NATO force goals on chemical warfare. As I am speaking, I believe that a debate on this subject is continuing in the parliament of at least one member state. Yet in this document we are being asked to come to some definite conclusions – in some cases quite contrary to what our own government have decided.

Secondly, questions from myself and my colleagues from all political parties have failed to elicit any specific answer from any minister about whether we do or do not believe that the Soviet Union has breached the provisions of the non-ratified SALT II treaty. Each time one has pursued the argument one has received an evasive answer, because no one is sure whether breaches of this non-ratified treaty have occurred by the Soviet Union that would excuse the United States from pursuing the SALT II agreement. I am not pursuing the argument whether it has or has not. Even with the benefit of hearing more ministerial speeches than I have heard in eleven years in WEU, many of us still do not know the answer to very simple questions. In those circumstances, and, I hope, to prevent a second speech being necessary, I should like to

recall that, last night, we spent many hours on procedural matters considering whether there was a quorum and how it would be met.

Paragraph 2 of Rule 36 states:

“ All votes other than votes by roll-call shall be valid, whatever the number of representatives or substitutes present, unless, at the request of a representative or substitute before the voting has begun, the President has ascertained that the number of representatives or substitutes who have signed the register of attendance is less than a quorum. ”

In a single short speech, I must say that, to the best of my knowledge, there is no such quorum. Therefore, we cannot proceed with the vote either on the amendments or on the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Frederic. I have noted your request about the quorum which I shall answer at the end of the debate which is not yet closed because I now have to ask the Chairman and the Rapporteur of the committee if they wish to answer all members who have spoken on the draft recommendation.

I call Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my apologies, please give me a moment, because I had to leave quite suddenly and did not expect the report to be called so quickly.

I believe the Rapporteur, Mr. Amadei, explained his report in detail this morning, that the debate which took place was a heated one and that certain major sections were approved while others were not. Consequently, as the majority of the committee recommends the adoption of this report, the committee has nothing further to add.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I now come to the question raised by Sir Frederic Bennett about the quorum. A check shows that thirty-seven members are present and have signed the register of attendance in accordance with the Rules of Procedure. I therefore announce, as is my duty, that there is no quorum and that, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, I cannot put the amendments or the draft recommendation to the vote. The text nevertheless remains on the order of business for this part-session and I therefore propose to include it in the orders of the day for tomorrow morning. I will therefore call upon members of the Assembly to vote on this draft at that time.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

1. See page 45.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Paragraph 3 of Rule 36 states:

“ In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall be postponed. It may be taken at any time once there is a quorum. Any matter on which it has not been possible to vote before the end of the part-session in the absence of a quorum shall be referred to the Presidential Committee.”

Are you saying, Mr. President, that you will put the vote tomorrow morning and, in the absence of a quorum, the matter shall be referred to the Presidential Committee?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – With the assistance of the members of the Assembly who will help him to find the necessary wisdom in his judgment, the President will take a decision tomorrow, Sir Geoffrey.

I call Mr. Milani on a point of order.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would ask you to check the exact wording of the rules. On the point of order raised by Sir Frederic Bennett, you considered it proper to check that there was a quorum by consulting the signatures in the register, and noted that there was no quorum. However if this applies to the debate in progress, it must also apply to the previous debate and vote. It follows that the vote on the previous recommendation is invalid. I do not believe that the signatures were withdrawn specifically for the vote we were preparing to take – the signatures in the register were the same all the time! I ask you to give a proper ruling on this point. If it is sufficient to raise a point of order in order to cause all the documents presented to fall we shall all adopt that procedure and there will no longer be any need to pursue the work of the Assembly...!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Milani, you are an experienced parliamentarian and you know that the Rules of Procedure are the same in all parliaments. At the previous vote, no member asked for the quorum to be checked and it was therefore wholly valid. The quorum is checked only if a member asks for it prior to voting. Unfortunately, this has now happened for your amendments. I am sorry but the vote cannot take place.

Mr. Milani, I have applied the Rules of Procedure, that is all.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am not worried about my amendments, for goodness sake! It is enough to know the procedure because like that no work will get done from now on!

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Please, Mr. Milani, be reasonable. The rules are clear and

precise. The quorum has been challenged and we do not have one.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – For goodness sake, I am an advocate of order.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Milani, I do not want to have to call you to order. A moment ago I listened to you when you were speaking. I am now answering you and you pretend you cannot hear. This is not very polite towards a President who is trying to apply the rules and at the same time to be helpful as I was a moment ago when I decided that the question would stay on the orders of the day for the part-session and put it down for tomorrow. You might possibly have asked me for your business to come at the end of this part-session which would also have been possible but you did not do so. I cannot accept being accused of ulterior motives when I apply the Rules of Procedure.

It has been so decided and the decision of the Assembly is correct.

I call Mr. Cavaliere on a point of order.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I agree with your decision, but I would like to point out that the present situation places the Assembly in the difficult position of not being able to decide anything further. That being the case, it would be a good idea to adjourn the sitting this evening.

We have had the pleasure of listening to five members of government, ministers and under-secretaries and all that followed. It is indeed a great pleasure to have so many ministers and under-secretaries in our midst, but in these circumstances we should arrange for some additional sittings and organise things so that government personalities address the Assembly at night. This would ensure that the majority of delegates were present and would enable the Assembly to proceed regularly with its own work according to the normal timetable.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I note what you say and thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

### **7. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1055 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The orders of the day now call for the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence, Document 1055 and amendments.

*The President (continued)*

I call Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, allow me, before beginning the presentation of my report, to thank Mr. Huigens in particular, one of the most active members of the staff of our Assembly and our committee, who has to leave us to take a well-earned retirement. I am seizing this opportunity to thank him publicly because he helped me very actively in drafting this report and the one before it. With these words of gratitude, I associate all the members of the committee and, I am sure, those of this Assembly.

The report I have to present today is entitled scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence. A few months ago it did not have that title. At that time the intention was to reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council. Unfortunately, as you all know, that annual report was not submitted to us and the committee was therefore unable to reply to it. However, in scientific, technological and aerospace questions you all know that something new can happen every day: success or failure, or a decision that obliges us to face a number of questions. For this part-session, the committee wished to tackle the problem of European co-operation in a number of fields. That is the purpose of the report I have the honour to present to you and the draft recommendation attached to it.

The object of this document is to review efforts at co-operation, in other words to take stock of our vital collaboration in the most crucial fields, and in particular to try to identify future prospects.

A few months ago, I presented a report on information technology in the military field, a difficult, wide-ranging subject but a significant example of essential European co-operation in high technology. One fact is inescapable: information technology is becoming the biggest industrial activity in the West.

If Europe wants to carry its full weight, it must also have a unified attitude and a sustained policy of fundamental and applied research in this sector. It must bear in mind that the military use of computers cannot be dissociated from their civil applications, and there is a divergence of views on this in some western countries. Europe needs to study the conditions for interoperability of computer systems in Western European countries.

We are then faced with a fundamental question: are we convinced that bringing the economic decline of Western Europe to a halt

depends on achievements in high technology? If so, then we have to face the question of the successes, but perhaps even more of the weaknesses, or indeed failures of European co-operation in those fields.

We should be proud of our achievements: *Esprit*, a programme covering most branches of information technology in spite of the budgetary difficulties that have arisen in the EEC; *Megachip*, a programme aimed at mastering submicronic technology; *Race*, a programme of research and development in advanced communications technologies for Europe; and *ECRC*, the creation of a common computer research laboratory for Europe working on computer-assisted decision-making.

Nor should we forget the projects endorsed for *Eureka*, a vital and promising initiative now comprising twenty-six projects already approved at meetings in Hanover and London.

Let us, at the same time, be alert to the difficulties that still exist, whose causes we know and which, though they apply directly in most cases to the civil market, affect military applications as well.

The brain drain from Europe is still excessive.

The Americans and the Japanese still make intensive use of the results of European university research. Are we capable of doing the same? The fragmentation of European industry puts us at a permanent disadvantage. What can we do about it? Do governments really want to encourage transnational links? For the moment there are unfortunately no answers to any of these questions.

In the military computer field, we have already begun to make proposals to cope with the situation; let me mention two pointing in that direction. One is to facilitate the creation of a European market for military computers that would stimulate the civil market and the other is to strengthen our independence in the supercomputer field.

This does mean, of course, that we ought to take our thinking on the use of information technology in the military field further by producing a second, more detailed and fuller report highlighting what is at stake, which is not yet realised by parliamentarians and their governments. However, production of that report is so far ruled out because, up to now, it has been impossible to establish the necessary contacts for the Rapporteur, given the apparent difficulty of certain travel arrangements.

Clearly, under the heading of scientific, technological and aerospace questions, we must also refer to our European co-operation: the configuration of the *Ariane 5* launcher, for example,

*Mr. Fourré (continued)*

European participation in NASA's international space station, the Hermes manned space plane, the horizontal take-off and landing vehicle, Hotol and the Franco-German helicopter.

Ariane today, unfortunately, has suffered its fourth failure, but with fourteen successful launches behind it this is no shameful record for the engineers, on the contrary. But now, following the series of American disasters – Challenger in January 1986, the Titan rocket in April 1986 and the Delta rocket in May 1986 – the whole of the West is in a parlous plight in space, so we have to keep a close watch on this new situation.

Recently a leader-writer on a French daily paper commented: "The United States is perhaps beginning to pay for its insistence on going so fast – getting ahead of schedule, in fact. Yesterday it wanted to build enormous satellites to capture the sun's energy. Today it has decided to equip itself with a space defence system that all scientists hold to be at the very limits of the realistic." Made in this case about the United States, the comment could also be a challenge to European countries.

Europe's best reply is probably not to become dispersed, to have clear objectives and to mobilise all the energy available. But this also depends on our support for common projects and even complementary projects and our firm opposition to rival projects. From this standpoint there are at least three issues that could have serious repercussions on our desire for European co-operation.

The first is illustrated by the questions, continuously on the table in at least two of our countries, but perhaps in others too: Hermes or Hotol? Hermes and Hotol – to which my personal answer is: Hertol or Hormes.

The point is that to achieve the objective of space independence, everyone accepts that, on top of new developments in the Ariane rocket, whose payload lift capability has to be increased, we have to develop a piloted space launcher and a manned space station. So let us have resources in proportion to our ambitions in the case of the space vehicle and let us demand the kind of independence, in the framework of Euro-American space station activities, calculated to serve our interests in the future.

The second issue concerns the European fighter aircraft. In my report I noted that this project was not progressing as expected. Since this report was written things have changed, but unfortunately for the worse.

Everyone here knows about the situation created by the confirmed existence of two European

programmes: the EFA project which is the result of the agreement signed in Turin between the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy; and the ACE project – the French programme. This universally damaging situation has at least had one positive effect.

On 28th April last the ministers of the IEPG agreed, in order to initiate a special effort of co-operation in military aviation, on the need for early consultation on operational requirements and equivalent replacement schedules, the de facto need for joint research at the earliest stage possible and the need to promote co-operation among the companies concerned.

By intensifying the effort of co-operation in the whole of the sector concerned, from research to manufacture, via capital equipment and – this is the essential thing – by a vigorous policy drive, we could, I am sure, ride out the "failure" with regard to the European fighter aircraft by keeping open "cross-participation" by the EFA and ACE programmes.

The third point relates to the Franco-German combat helicopter, where enormous problems remain in terms of cost, delivery times and technical characteristics. Do we have to allow the European helicopter industry to disappear, to the greater profit of its American competitors who have already got one foot in the door with Sikorsky's participation in Westland capital?

In fact, in European co-operation, particularly in armaments, everything still remains to be done, as I think these three points demonstrate.

Happily, we see today that defence decision-makers are increasingly aware of the fact that, with the potential of science, a close relationship is being established between technology and strategy: technology in the service of strategy, which is itself defined in terms of the facilities offered by science.

Defining strategy is not the direct responsibility of your committee. On the other hand, constantly reminding our colleagues of the importance of technological developments and informing ourselves about the ways in which they may be harnessed could be the common focus of the work of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

That leaves the question of what to do in addition to our own reports and recommendations. There the simple answer is to ask the Council to instruct Agency III, the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments, to initiate studies on all these points and do what it usefully can under the heading of co-ordination.

That, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, is the sense of the draft recommendation put before you.

*(Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you Mr. Fourré for your very concise report.

In the debate I call Sir John Osborn.

Sir John OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I want first to congratulate Mr. Fourré not only on his report but on his work for the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, to say nothing of my appreciation of the work that he will be doing. I have taken part in some of the meetings concerned with his report. Unfortunately, however, he was not present when I discussed some of his recommendations with other members of the committee. That was because of his own personal transport problems. But I have made some of my views known to him.

I want also to congratulate the outgoing Chairman on three years' useful work. I also add my thanks to the Clerk, Mr. Huigens, whom I first met in 1970 during a visit of members of national parliaments to Latin America. For that reason, I greatly value some sixteen years of close co-operation with him, and his work for the committee.

I congratulate the new Chairman, Mr. Wilkinson. I hope too to give some new thoughts to our Chairman and to Mr. Fourré on the future work of the committee, especially in connection with Mr. Fourré's future work. I draw their attention especially to my question yesterday to Mr. Tindemans on the military aspects of space. In my view, WEU should take greater interest in these aspects, bearing in mind that ESA and Arianespace are, according to the terms of their charters, confined to the peaceful uses of space.

The committee's recommendation urges that the Council instruct Agency III – the agency for the development of co-operation in armaments set up after the Bonn meeting in April last year – to carry out certain inquiries. However, I should have thought that we ought to know more about the terms of reference of the agency and, indeed, of the other agencies. I hope very much that there will be informal meetings between the new Clerk, Mr. de Gou, Mr. Wilkinson and the Director of the agency so that we can know about its terms of reference and it can perhaps guide us on the aspects of science and technology that we should study in terms of defence.

In arms procurement, standards and specifications, WEU will have an increasing rôle. This suggests increased links with NATO. Mention is made in the report of participation in IEPG and CNAD. In my view the committee should have a clearer idea of what we mean by this.

The second part of my question to Mr. Tindemans referred to the fact that the Community, through the Commission, was having an increasingly active involvement in the industrial aspects of the production of armaments – perhaps on standards and procurement. In reply, Mr. Tindemans said that this was not the case, but in this Assembly a number of members, including myself, have been involved in the industrial aspects of the provision of armaments. Therefore I think that our committee should have a clearer idea of where the EEC ends and where we take over.

Then again, there is a Science and Technology Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly. Its Chairman happens to be a British member of parliament, Sir Peter Emery. I have been in close touch with him about the parliamentary scientific committee of the United Kingdom. I should have thought, therefore, that at parliamentary level a comparison with what each of the other committees was doing might be a priority that our Rapporteur and Mr. Wilkinson would take on.

This Assembly marks a turn in the affairs of WEU, because a reactivation will mean that every committee will have to redefine its rôle. In my view, WEU has been reactivated because I and others have asked what is our rôle vis-à-vis the other European institutions. I share the Minister's view that it will take time.

I congratulate Mr. Fourré on his report. I accept his amended recommendation because it highlights our difficulty in competing with the United States of America. Therefore, I shall fully support the first report on the continuing work by Mr. Fourré.

*(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – I was aware of the content of the statement by Sir John Osborn, whom I wish to thank for his kind words. I also join in his congratulations to our ex-Chairman and our new Chairman.

Sir John Osborn made a number of suggestions and I agree with him on the three main points he raised.

He spoke about the need for contact with the European Space Agency. Actually that link already exists but we need to improve it, even though ESA's work is mainly in the civilian sphere. In this report as in the previous one, I

*Mr. Fourré (continued)*

note that there is a direct connection between the applications of the new technologies in the civilian and military fields. I would also stress the rôle of Agency III whose activity is also of a practical nature. Like him, I hope that it may be even more effective and, perhaps, receive more support from the Council.

As to the suggestions about liaison with the other committees of the European institutions, we still need to define new opportunities for identifying major trends in the context of committee work. In terms of geographical, technical, civil and military delimitation, we need to meet and have joint discussions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I take this opportunity of congratulating the Rapporteur. He said: "N'ayons pas peur d'être fiers de nos réussites". That means that we should not be afraid of being proud of our successes. I believe that he was successful. He has been one of the most consistent members of our committee in producing well-researched and forward-looking reports.

I pay tribute too, to my predecessor, Christian Lenzer, who was in every way an admirable Chairman of our committee, as well as being one of the finest linguists in this Assembly.

Last, but not least, I pay tribute on behalf of our committee and personally to our Clerk, Mr. Huigens, who, sad to say, is retiring at the end of this month. He has been Clerk of the committee for twenty-one years – since its inception in 1965. He has provided wisdom, expertise, unfailing good humour and great patience. He has been a pleasure to work with and we have been very lucky to have had him associated with our work.

We wish Mr. Huigens and his family well for the future. We know that he has a pleasant house to go to in the south of France. He most assuredly deserves a long and happy retirement.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation on scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence, Document 1055 and amendments.

I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I ask that the quorum be checked.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Your request is in order.

I note that only forty-one members are present. There is therefore no quorum and there can be no vote.

As on the previous occasion, I shall retain the item on the orders of the day for the part-session and I propose that it be postponed to the next sitting. The orders of the day for tomorrow will therefore include the consideration of two additional reports.

#### **8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 5th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Security and terrorism – the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world; Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Presentation of and debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Documents 1057 and amendment and 1066).
2. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence (Vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1055 and amendments).
3. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (Vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1059 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 5.50 p.m.)*

## SEVENTH SITTING

Thursday, 5th June 1986

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.

*Speaker:* Mr. Milani.

2. Attendance register.

3. Change in the membership of a committee.

4. Security and terrorism – the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world; Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (*Presentation of and debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation*, Docs. 1057 and amendment and 1066).

*Speakers:* The President, Mr. van der Werff (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Kittelmann (*Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Berger, Mr. Stokes, Mr. Milani, Mr. Freeson, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Close, Mr. Jessel, Lady Jill Knight, Sir Paul Hawkins, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Inan (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Reddemann, Mr. van der Werff (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Kittelmann (*Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee*

*on Defence Questions and Armaments*), Mr. Dejardin, Mr. van der Werff, Mr. Close, Mr. van der Werff, Lady Jill Knight, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. van der Werff, Lady Jill Knight, Mr. Close.

5. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence (*Vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1055 and amendments).

*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Fourré, Mr. Wilkinson, Dr. Miller, Mr. Wilkinson.

6. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council (*Vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1059 and amendments).

*Speakers* (points of order): Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Milani, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Freeson, Mr. Cox, Mr. Kittelmann, Dr. Miller.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

*The sitting was opened at 10.10 a.m. with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

#### 1. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?

I call Mr. Milani.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I wish to refer to the official report, which suggests that I queried a presidential decision and that the President replied with some warmth on the subject of the proper application of the Rules of Procedure. It also suggests that I objected to a point of order raised by Sir Frederic Bennett.

These were not my intentions. I merely wanted to raise a political point and call attention to the futility of our efforts over the last few days to make the problem of the reactivation of WEU the central issue of the present session. The moment an occasion arose to discuss policy and take some significant action in

this area, that is during our consideration of the Council's annual report, a procedural point of order was raised.

This does nothing for the prestige of our Assembly and restricts our ability to intervene just when policy matters are under discussion.

I do not question the substance of the point of order raised by Sir Frederic, but I do not believe it possible to accept the argument that a vote could not be taken on the report because the United States had not yet supplied written evidence concerning the alleged violations of SALT II by the Soviet Union. This is like asking the United States to provide evidence of the acts of terrorism committed by Libya. There can never be any such documentation. It is merely a facet of the verbal exchanges between the superpowers; in these circumstances a European initiative is needed.

This was the substance of the debate and the amendments on yesterday's orders of the day, and postponing consideration of this issue reflects on the utility of the Assembly itself.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Milani. I note your comments, which inci-

*The President (continued)*

dentally relate to the official report, not the minutes. At the moment we are adopting the minutes.

As to the report, I read it while you were speaking and I therefore confirm, in the light of your statement, that the words I used when answering you in the exchange that took place between us should be treated as a comment of a general nature not applying to you personally. I also note what you say regarding your acceptance of the President's decision.

Are there any other comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

## 2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

## 3. Change in the membership of a committee

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Italian Delegation proposes the following changes in the membership of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments: Mr. Cifarelli as a titular member in place of Mr. Masciadri, Mr. Masciadri as an alternate member in place of Mr. Cifarelli.

## 4. Security and terrorism – the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world

### *Opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*

*(Presentation of and debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Docs. 1057 and amendment and 1066)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on security and terrorism – the implications for Europe of crises in other parts of the world and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1057 and amendment.

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was required to give its opinion on this report. That opinion is contained in Document 1066; it contains two amendments.

1. See page 49.

After we have heard Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, I shall ask Mr. Kittelmann, the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, to speak.

I call Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*). – The main theme of this paper is the strengthening of Western Europe in areas where other international or supranational organisations seem to fail or lack sufficient initiative, dash and push. We all know that the Common Market gives our European agriculture and industry, as well as all the people who work in those sectors, a certain protection against competition and dumping, and in that way a better standard of living.

We all agree that it is remarkable that peace has been maintained on this continent for more than forty years, and a vast majority of people attribute this safety to the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. But even when NATO sometimes shows its interest in out-of-area challenges to its security, some of its members suddenly recall at the same moment that the treaty area is sharply and clearly defined – because the United States insisted on such an area demarcation during the formation and drafting period of the alliance. Therefore, even when NATO members are aware of the fact that their common interests can be seriously affected by developments outside the treaty area, their unity most of the time – perhaps it is regrettable, but it is true – ends with that conclusion, and the members differ and disagree about the ways and means of handling or tackling such events. As a result, either nothing is done or something is done half-heartedly.

The sense of unity in the EEC, even in economic matters, is not very strongly developed. Its unity and cohesion as a political body may only be qualified as underdeveloped. For example, the chance that the members would agree to a system of economic sanctions against a state in the Mediterranean, and that they would implement such a system whole-heartedly, seems very slight.

My colleagues in this Assembly could retort: “What's your alternative? In your report you showed” – and I did – “that France's involvement in Chad against Libya, Britain's involvement in the Falklands or the deployment of British, French and Italian troops in Beirut – participation by the forces of member states – were neither officially brought to the attention of, nor discussed in, our union.”

I also draw attention to the deplorable aspect of paying lip service to restrictions on the supply of arms to belligerents while in practice selling as much as possible, without even trying to

*Mr. van der Werff (continued)*

harmonise the legal conditions covering the arms trade, informing each other, or opening up possibilities of co-operation and co-production. However, I am convinced that WEU, restricted as it is to seven member states of the same mentality, could really stand for something. The opening for the Council is there. It has only to apply carefully Article VIII (3), and that is what is recommended.

The third part of this report deals with the Gulf war. Even if the energy problems of Western Europe as a result of the war are not as grave as they would have been ten or fifteen years ago, we should continue to feel involved and not be blind to the underlying current of uncompromising ideological fundamentalism, which exerts an enormous influence on the whole Moslem world. However, I feel stricken and dumbfounded most by the human suffering, which may even be compared to the trench warfare in the first world war.

It is doubtful how far Europe or this organisation may play a rôle in restoring peace in that area. The only way that I see is by strong support for the mediation by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. That does not mean that we should not follow the conflict very closely; it is far more dangerous than just a local conflict between two parties.

The last part of the report deals with terrorism. It may seem absurd, even tragic, but nevertheless it is true, that the followers of the only three monotheistic religions in the world are fighting each other relentlessly. I could start with Bakunin or Netsjajev; I could start with all the terrorist killings on both sides of the Atlantic seaboard; I could deal with American presidents or Russian tsars and so on. However, I will just recall three individual cases of the deaths of ordinary people who were doing their duty.

Mervin Pace was only a British soldier – a sergeant, I think – ordered to keep the peace in the turmoil of the Palestinian-Israeli strife. He was brutally murdered by the Jewish terrorist underground half a century ago. In 1977, the Dutch policeman Kranenburg was killed in action during a fierce gunfight in Utrecht to apprehend the well-known German terrorist Knut Folkerts. The man was captured. Some years ago, the English policewoman Yvonne Fletcher was shot down from the Libyan People's Bureau in London. I could add hundreds of names. There are, however, two differences to notice between the cases that I have mentioned and present-day terrorist developments.

The first is that, nowadays, totally innocent citizens, or even tourists, including children and women, are the targets – in planes, at airports, in

railway and underground stations, even in disco bars and department stores. The second is that some governments wilfully not only train terrorists but order and directly subsidise terrorist actions, thus officially endorsing this internationally illegal system of warfare.

I should like to make some comments on the character of terrorism. A fierce competition exists between all terrorist groups. It is not the group or the leader with the most convincing ideological arguments – whatever they may be! – but the man or woman with the most daring and bloody action to his name that takes the lead or is recognised as chief. That is one of the main reasons for the escalation of terrorist violence and not, as has been alleged, repression by governments.

The other element of escalation is the media. As people get more and more used to news about terrorist activities – even a little blasé – and since the goal of the terrorist is widespread attention, so his or her actions escalate in brutality and horror. Some self-restraint by the media would enormously lessen the feeling of success in terrorist groups and deal a severe blow to their egos. Thirdly, if society handled the cases of terrorism in a more offhand and matter-of-fact way, its main goal – making propaganda and instilling feelings of terror – would be lost.

On the other hand, our governments have over the last decades dealt quite efficiently with Euro-terrorism; the Mediterranean version now demands a new approach. Perhaps WEU could help to find the appropriate means. To be candid, I had vaguely hoped that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments would, in expressing its opinions, have studied a strategic and tactical approach to terrorism – but perhaps that is for another time. Also, I have not had time to study in depth the paper that Mr. Bruce George of the United Kingdom submitted in Luxembourg last month to the Political Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly; it makes some valuable contributions to the discussion.

Another question is whether the superpowers are involved. The Soviet Union undoubtedly benefits from actions which disrupt western society and strength and perhaps, sometimes, indirectly provides armaments and training – although a direct link is difficult to prove and seems to me rather improbable. The United States is involved, because its citizens and soldiers form one of the prime targets.

The tension between Tripoli and the United States is of long standing. Directly after the Declaration of Independence, the United States lost the protection of the British navy. American merchant ships and citizens were captured on the coast of North Africa. The first American fleet arrived in 1801 in the Mediterranean to

*Mr. van der Werff (continued)*

safeguard United States trade, but the Libyans, under Admiral Murad Eis, originally a Scot – Peter Lisle – took the frigate Philadelphia. Afterward, the American fleet bombed Tripoli; that event was the beginning of the Marine Corps.

In American circles, the irritation against Libya is great. In the eastern Mediterranean it is growing. In particular, the statement of the Italian Government that another attack on Italian territory would lead to direct retaliation could result in a commitment for us all.

I emphasise a last very difficult problem. France has a different judicial system, and other treaty obligations, from my country, but in both cases the extradition of people wanted elsewhere for terrorist activities has to be arranged before a court of independent judges. Professor Helmut Rumpf showed in an article in *Aussenpolitik* last year the international judicial problems involved both in this aspect and on the narrow dividing line between the partisans/franc-tireurs and terrorists. I suggest that the appropriate committee would oblige not only this Assembly but our governments if it could study this problem in depth.

When that committee makes a recommendation to the Council of Ministers, it should also ask the Council to find ways and means to activate the moderate Arab powers. They exist, and they should feel sustained by Western Europe. Perhaps that is something which WEU could follow up. We as democracies should not over-react and thereby jeopardise our cherished laws and principles.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Kittelmann, Rapporteur for the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments originally intended to include the aspects of terrorism that directly concern us in our report on security in the Mediterranean, which we discussed yesterday. The debate on this present, excellent report, on which I should like to congratulate the Rapporteur on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, revealed that our committee would do better not to draw up a report of its own but instead to table two amendments to this report. Our reports are very often closely related in both form and subject matter. I hope that the arrangement we have chosen will also be acceptable to the General Affairs Committee.

I should like to keep my comments on the report as brief as possible. As I have said, we have two proposals to make. Firstly, we want a

new paragraph (iv) inserted in the preamble, recalling Recommendation 396, which WEU adopted on 15th May 1984 during the debate on Document 959 drawn up by Mr. Wilkinson. We noted in our discussions that the main problem we have found painful in recent months is a lack of consultation among the alliance partners, although it was clearly decided on numerous occasions that there should be close, prompt and detailed consultation. In its report the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments took the opportunity to recall and list these decisions. Anyone who reads the list cannot fail to be surprised. Our appeal – to the Council and others – is that we should take ourselves seriously as regards the essential conditions we have laid down and – if a critical situation occurs – should implement only those decisions which we have already taken, so that we may meet very quickly and consult.

We also considered it advisable to recall WEU's recommendation in the context of the general problem connected with the controversy over the assistance the United States expected to receive.

We should also like to see a reference made in the recommendation to what the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments regards as the clear stand at last taken in Tokyo. We of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments did, of course, have the advantage of being able to discuss this once again after the Tokyo summit. If we consider the bodies that met after the attack on Libya and after the Rapporteur had completed the report, it is surely gratifying to note that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, for example, used very clear language on 23rd and 24th April in Strasbourg. We also welcome the fact that the ministers added a few words on terrorism at their meeting in Venice on 29th and 30th April. And we were extremely pleased to see that the communiqué issued after the meeting of the ministers of the seven industrialised countries in Tokyo on 5th May 1986 included a passage which, had it been stated in equally plain terms in the preceding months – it transpired, after the Tokyo summit, that it could actually have been put into practice – might have rendered unnecessary the events that subsequently occurred. This is only an assumption and naturally I cannot prove it, but there is a great deal to be said for it.

The fact that the problem of state terrorism was at long last tackled straightforwardly in Tokyo and that Libya was mentioned by name when state terrorism was condemned by all present, has helped to bring all the countries closer together. If we consider developments since that time, we see that the many declarations were also taken seriously by those who must have felt they were being addressed. The situation has,

*Mr. Kittelmann (continued)*

after all, become far less tense in the last few months.

We of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments have noted your positive criticism that we might have carried out a more thorough investigation with regard to tactical and strategic attitudes and we will bear this in mind in future reports. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments calls on the General Affairs Committee to approve the amendments we have proposed.

*(Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Berger.

Mr. BERGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, today's report on security and terrorism – of which I believe the Assembly can be proud – and the additions envisaged by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments give me the opportunity to present to you a few ideas that I recently presented to the Council of Europe.

I think some Europeans behave as if they were not affected by the Libyan crisis, and that is wrong. The Libyan crisis is not, as some people have tried to claim, a Libyan-American problem: it is taking place on our own doorstep. Europeans too are targets of the terrorism originating in Libya.

However, as Mr. Kittelmann has just made clear again in his capacity as Rapporteur, the Europeans were by no means prepared for common action. I noted with regret that those who were not prepared to act were subsequently all the more vociferous in dissociating themselves from the American action in Libya.

That, in my opinion, is not only wrong: it is also dangerous. If the terrorists could distinguish between civilised countries which give in to them and those which do not, the whole of the free West would be the loser. In other words, terrorism is a challenge to the whole civilised world and that is a synonym for the countries whose legal systems are capable of guaranteeing the safety of their citizens and enabling them to develop in humane and decent conditions.

If, then, fanatical terrorism is a challenge to the whole civilised world, the solidarity of that world is the best and probably the only chance we have of repelling terrorism. Terrorists must understand that the path of violence, as Shimon Peres put it in the Council of Europe, leads nowhere.

This solidarity must have an impact on the places where terrorism is nurtured. Where terrorism is instigated by states, these states are beyond the pale of international law, without which there can be no peace. They have made themselves outlaws vis-à-vis the international community and must be branded as such. Those who train, feed, finance and equip terrorists do not belong to the civilised world, nor should they be allowed to share its blessings.

There are quite a few conventions designed to protect facilities particularly in need of protection, but the silly thing is that most of these conventions have not been converted into national legislation in the acceding countries. We must do something about this.

I therefore fully endorse the call in the report for a charter which would contain a catalogue of the co-ordinated measures that the civilised countries will take against countries which themselves plan and carry out or allow others to plan and carry out terrorist attacks. This convention must be clear and practicable. It must be capable of deterring – and I use the word quite deliberately – those who are prepared to make uncompromising use of violence.

This charter must therefore also answer the question whether and how the civilised world is prepared if necessary to use force to maintain the peace.

I saw the United States military action in Libya as an act of self-defence committed after negotiations, proposals for boycotts and attempts at political solutions had come to nothing. Who else but the United States, the guarantor of peace in the world, with its monopoly of power, is in a position and thus under an obligation to defend the freedom and lives of its citizens in this way if necessary?

But I should add clearly that defence must be allowed only where it is necessary. The aim is to repel violence, not to spread it. It must be used as a deterrent, to restore peace. The means used and the scale on which force is applied must be optimised to this end and limited in such a way that the means are commensurate with the end, and do not thwart the political objective of curbing and deterring terrorism.

This Assembly should unanimously demand and encourage the production of such a charter. May the governments of our free and democratic countries succeed in establishing a system of genuine provisions for peace and so at last put an end to the scourge of terrorism that has threatened our freedom and peace for twenty years.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stokes.

Mr. STOKES (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate the Rapporteur on his excellent report on what is a very difficult subject. I also greatly appreciated his speech today. What is more, I agreed very much with Mr. Berger.

Terrorism presents the governments of civilised countries with a new challenge and one which is difficult for civilised countries to combat. Much, but not all, terrorism has been concerned with the problems of the Middle East and the desire of the Arabs there to have their homeland in Palestine. Nevertheless, President Reagan made his stroke against Libya not, I believe, in that context but simply because of Libya's state-aided terrorism against the United States throughout the world. That action worried some people in Europe. Perhaps it worried the intellectuals more than the broad mass of the people who have a very robust attitude towards terrorism. But in the event the stroke has proved highly successful. The other Arab nations have not made any organised protest, the USSR has been anxious to distance herself from Libya, and Colonel Kadhafi himself seems to have been shaken by the United States action and is obviously concerned about the loss of a considerable amount of his military hardware.

It now looks likely that Libya will not, at least for the time being, organise any further terrorist activities.

I believe that Syria also has been anxious for some time to have nothing more to do with terrorism. That was certainly my impression when I was in Damascus a few months ago and had discussions with the Syrian Foreign Minister. The situation therefore does not look too bad in terms of terrorism in Europe – at least actions initiated by Libya and Syria.

As the Rapporteur said, however, it is most important for the countries of the West to continue to give help and to show friendship towards the moderate Arab countries, especially Egypt, Jordan and the Gulf states. That is especially important since, unfortunately, United States foreign policy in the Middle East is not even-handed in the Arab-Israeli dispute but shows a heavy bias towards Israel.

The threat from other terrorist sources remains formidable and sinister. In the Middle East, the situation in Lebanon – a country that I know well – continues to be appalling and shows no sign of improvement. The recent cruel and horrible car bomb explosions in the centre of Beirut show how devastating and callous terrorism can be.

I am afraid that the terrorist movements in Germany and France continue underground, and the activities of ETA, the Basque terrorist organisation, continue unabated. It is interesting that the bombing of holiday resorts in Spain

has not lessened the flow of British tourists to that area, whereas it is noticeable that American tourists still hesitate about coming to the United Kingdom where there has not been a similar spate of bombings.

However much people may criticise President Reagan for his style and possibly for the way in which his counterstroke against Libya was organised, he is the head of the country which is the foremost ally of the West and which keeps 330,000 troops in Germany. It would be unthinkable for the allies not to back him.

All the other institutions – NATO, the EEC and the Council of Europe – have not, I am afraid, gone far enough to support the United States in the fight against terrorism. It is no use our just wringing our hands and condemning terrorism but doing not much else. Terrorism threatens the very foundations of our society, and only the most determined action, especially by our intelligence services, Interpol, the police and the security organisations, can help to combat the evil of terrorism.

WEU has a vital part to play. I welcomed President Caro's initiative, and I am sorry that it was not taken up by the foreign ministers. I believe that we must continue to put pressure on our own governments to do all they possibly can to fight terrorism at every stage.

I strongly support Lady Jill Knight's amendment about improving the arrangements for the extradition of terrorists. Everyone in the United Kingdom hopes that the United States will do this in respect of the IRA. But with all the other countries of Europe there should be better extradition methods.

In the end, combating terrorism is a matter of national will. The free world must defend itself and use every possible endeavour to do so.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Milani.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I must say frankly that, within the time allowed, I intended to speak at some length on the question of terrorism. However, from what happened yesterday I gather that this Assembly is not disposed to engage in a debate on political problems as they are but prefers instead to put off discussion of the issue. In some respects I have therefore lost interest in taking part in the present debate. On the other hand, following the meeting in Venice and also as a result of the initiative taken by the President of this Assembly, and considered questionable in some quarters, a trend has manifested itself which favours militarising the fight against terrorism; and all this has happened without any preliminary attempt to define carefully a phenomenon due to entirely disparate and specific causes linked to

*Mr. Milani (continued)*

the internal circumstances of individual countries.

For its part, Italy has in the past conducted an effective fight against terrorism while respecting the constitution of the Republic and the laws governing the internal life of the country, and this has been achieved without recourse to military solutions. While some traces of terrorism still persist, it must be borne in mind that the situation was one of extreme gravity, but, in any case, no proposals have ever been made in our country – or not yet at least – which in any way suggest the adoption of some other method of dealing with the problems of terrorism.

Consequently, the idea of invoking Articles V and VIII of the Brussels Treaty to create a co-ordinated military structure to deal with terrorism strikes me as quite absurd and impracticable. The co-ordination of police forces, also touched on here a short time back, is obviously a different matter. Careful examination of the phenomenon with a view to formulating political responses dispensing with any form of police intervention is likewise something quite different.

Reference has been made here to the Tokyo meeting and to the position of the United States, but it should be noted that, even in the United States, there has recently been growing opposition to the Reagan administration's intervention in Libya. It is therefore incomprehensible that, after some time, the European countries should be incapable of more thoughtful and calmer deliberation now that – I repeat – the action of the American administration is being questioned in its own country. Furthermore, action of this kind by the major powers or by countries with powerful military resources encourages other countries to follow the same path to the point where a country like South Africa uses the term "terrorist" to describe a movement embracing the black majority and claiming the same rights as whites. More generally, there is a tendency to apply the term "terrorism" to certain types of behaviour and certain movements in order to justify intervention in violation of international law. Such a position seems unacceptable and outside the rule of law, the more so when used as grounds for the use of force.

For these reasons, I consider that the recommendation before the Assembly fails to meet the need for careful and deliberate weighing of the problem, and the proposals put forward also appear to me to be inadequate.

In passing, I should mention that the Italian parliament yesterday placed the government in a minority by approving a motion calling on it to grant official recognition to the Palestine Libera-

tion Organisation. The Italian Government has in any event made no official declaration suggesting any readiness on our country's part to use force against Libya. The Italian Prime Minister did make a statement in Tokyo – subsequently modified – in which allusion was made to the possibility of a "first strike", and there has also been a statement by the Defence Minister, although we learned yesterday what the attitude of the Italian Defence Minister would be if Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty were invoked to call on other countries to intervene in the event of an attack. We are dealing here with matters not within the jurisdiction of the government, let alone of individual ministers. Under the constitution of the Italian Republic it is parliament which has authority to decide on participation in acts of war. It is therefore unacceptable that statements by individual ministers should be quoted as authority for a supposed Italian position on terrorism, especially of the international variety.

For these reasons, I oppose the draft recommendation and will vote against it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – First, may I, like others, put on record my strong support and commendation of the initiative taken by our President, Mr. Caro, although it did not produce all the results that he and we wished. That is an understatement. The majority of us endorse the spirit and content of what he attempted to do following the Libya crisis.

I have no prepared notes. I have scribbled down a number of points which I shall try to pursue in order. Just as we need to analyse and differentiate between the different types of crime in our home territories and to differentiate between different types of warlike actions in international affairs, we must look a little more closely at the terms that we use in connection with terrorism. If we do not do that we shall indulge too much in rhetoric and not deal with reality and when we attempt to act in specific terms we shall be in danger of acting in a confused and muddled way.

I have two points to make on that score, although many more could be made. I am not trying to make an academic point. State-sponsored terrorism, as we have come to describe it in association with Libya – and also to a lesser degree with some of the Syrian Government's actions – is an act of war. Generally, other types of terrorism should not be described by means of a special label when we try to formulate conventions and actions. Terrorism is a crime. Terrorism is an international crime and should be treated in law accordingly. We

*Mr. Freeson (continued)*

should not specially categorise people who have, for example, escaped from gaols in Britain and arrived on the continent. Attempts have been made to extradite some such people. They are convicted criminals who have maimed and killed over one hundred people on the mainland of Britain, but they are treated as political animals by some European courts. The same happens in the United States.

I am not concerned today about getting involved in the detailed arguments between the President of the United States and his Congress, but it is extremely difficult to bring convicted criminals back to the United Kingdom. I am not concerned about views on the future of Ireland. I happen to have a great deal of sympathy with, and have acted politically in, the cause of reuniting Ireland. I know that others take a different view, and I do not wish to pursue the argument today. However, we should not, in any one of our courts, treat such terrorists as if they were some kind of political animal. They are criminals. The same applies in the Middle East, North Africa and South Africa. Let us make it clear that we are talking about international crime.

Through our governments we should be pressing for more resources for Interpol. Let us not bother about setting up other arrangements. Let us put more money into Interpol and get our governments and the police forces to co-operate more closely through Interpol – based in Paris – so that more is done to combat international crime of which terrorism is a powerful element. There is terrorism that is closely connected with other forms of international crime. For example, it is not unconnected with drug trafficking or with the Mafioso from which Italy suffers so badly and from which there are echoes in other countries. There are other kinds of crime that we all categorise very clearly for what they are.

I have two other points to make. We can condemn or express our concern – and we should rightly express our concern – about the action of the United States Government. I do not intend to pursue that argument any further. There are different points of view about it, but it is right to express our concern about it. One could put it more strongly if one were debating what happened some months ago in North Africa.

But we must also accept – as has been indicated a little too politely from time to time – that our governments in Europe are not in a very easy position to condemn too vigorously what was done by the United States when we know that at the time we failed to act. If we are honest with ourselves, we know that if a similar situation

arose tomorrow or next month, we would not be in a much better position, because despite the declarations – be they in Venice or Tokyo – there are things that we could have done, and we could still be doing, which because of great difficulties we have failed to do.

Why were international flights to Libya not stopped a few months ago – for example, from European countries? Why have we not committed ourselves clearly and specifically to cease trading in military materials, whether it be with Libya or governments such as Syria? Why has it taken so long for us to take action to put a stop to the training of personnel in our countries – including the United Kingdom – in things that could be applied for military purposes? Even more specifically, why have we not put a stop to the training of military personnel? Why has there been no action specifically – not by chance – to cease new investment in any country that we know from the evidence, or strongly suspect, to be indulging in state terrorism? Why has there been no attempt so far as we know – even with all the difficulties that it entails – to try to phase out major trade with Libya, for example in the oil industry? Unless we are prepared to take these difficult decisions and specific actions, we are merely indulging in far too much rhetoric.

My last point relates to paragraph 35 of the report. There are a number of details in the report that I would query, but basically it is a good report except in one important respect. I find paragraph 35 to be wrong in its essence and muddled in its formulation. Why is it unrealistic to seek to control and reduce arms trading in areas such as the Middle East? It is not even discussed. We know why it is considered to be unrealistic, although I do not consider it to be. It is because our industries, governments and parliaments want that trade to continue. Let us be honest about it.

I said this yesterday, I shall say it again today and I shall continue to say it whether or not I bore people – unless we are prepared in real terms to bring down the level of major, massive arms trading in areas such as the Middle East, we are indulging in hypocritical rhetoric. I am not prepared to accept that paragraph. It is not unrealistic to bring down – indeed to cease – the level of arms trading in the Middle East which amounts to billions of dollars, pounds sterling or any other currency one wishes to mention. This is happening on a massive scale. How then can we genuinely state our objective of peace and combating terrorism when our countries as well as others are supplying the very military hardware that state terrorists and international terrorists are using? Until we really take this seriously, we are doing no more than those whom we criticise, because we are indulging in fine words but little action.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I begin by congratulating my old friend Mr. van der Werff on a balanced and informative report. It is perhaps sad that he was persuaded not to become Chairman of that committee.

He rightly draws attention in the appendix to the determined initiative of Jean-Marie Caro some six weeks ago to ask for the formation of a European group to fight against terrorism.

What is terrorism? Is it a way of life? Is it morally justified? Is there a difference between terrorism and freedom fighters? Incidentally, I have no intention of referring to the Libyan-United States incident, but having heard the comments of Mr. Milani, the fact – and I emphasise this – needs to be put on the record that at the time, and since, the action of the United States Government has received the overwhelming support of the American people.

The answer to my first question is that I believe that many terrorists get hold of children at a very young age when they know nothing about the rights and wrongs of the cause and mould their minds so that they become wholly fanatical and no compromise seems acceptable. I also believe that very many profess terrorism in order to achieve financial gain.

Secondly, I do not believe that terrorism, whether state-inspired or individual acts, can ever be morally justified, particularly if one reads the literature of any of our major religions. Anyone who professes to be a practising member of any of our major religions and who says that he can justify terrorism will have to answer before his God when the time comes.

There is all the difference in the world between terrorists and freedom fighters. Who would dare to mention the maquis, the resistance or freedom fighters in the same breath as terrorists? The former do not operate for money, nor do they callously murder innocent people, as Mr. van der Werff made clear in his opening remarks.

Taking all these points together, we are bound to come to the same conclusion as Mr. Freeson – that terrorism is a crime that should know no national boundaries. I endorse what he said about the courts, whether they be in America or in Holland, where British politicians take a view that those terrorists are political prisoners and should not be extradited. I hope that the name of the politician – Mr. Livingstone – will be remembered for what he tried to do to sabotage the efforts of the courts.

Therefore, if we do accept this, we have to say that no honest, no honourable, person can call terrorism anything but a crime. It is a crime

which calls upon those of us who love democracy and freedom to work together to ensure that no haven is provided for terrorists. But I ask you, Mr. President – I will speak very deliberately now – how seriously do our governments take this issue and this Assembly? As Mr. van der Werff said, terrorism is surely of major, of vital, importance.

Might not such a debate as this have warranted the attendance of at least one minister from our governments? I see none. How many full ambassadors are here today? I will not embarrass them by asking them to stand up, but I doubt whether they could make up one table at bridge. I wonder now how many of our seven governments are physically represented here at this moment.

Their absence is a monstrous disgrace. I only wish that we had the names of those who are represented and who are not represented here, so that we, as members of our national parliaments, could say to our foreign secretaries: “Why were we not represented at the terrorism debate?” As someone who likes diplomats, I will not be so undiplomatic as to ask where are the representatives of seven governments here present today. But it is no good their saying: “We can read it all.” They cannot read in cold print the feelings that flesh and blood are expressing. I hope, Sir, that you will convey to the President the suggestion that he might wish to make this point at the next Council of Ministers.

So what do we have to do to wake up effectively those responsible? If we do not act together in an effective manner, we have no right to blame or to attack those who act individually. That also was mentioned by Mr. Freeson. That too we must remember very clearly.

I therefore ask – with little hope, but I am an optimist – that we should try to make a fresh, determined and concerted start, and show that democracy – it is no less than that – can win this battle against terrorism in a democratic manner. If we do not do so, future generations will condemn us for our vacillating cowardice.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Close.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, let me say immediately that I am not speaking on behalf of the General Affairs Committee but on a strictly personal basis.

I read Mr. van der Werff's report with the greatest possible interest and I must congratulate him for the seriousness and the exhaustive and topical nature of the document he has presented. I also share some of Mr. Kittelmann's conclusions. Let me explain. I shall deal with

*Mr. Close (continued)*

two subjects: the first concerns out-of-area threats and the second the American strike in Libya.

As to out-of-area threats, it is stating the obvious to say that the Soviet Union's strategy now embraces the whole world and that NATO has recognised that it is no longer solely interested in Central Europe but also in areas not covered by the treaty, including the Middle East and southern Africa, for two main reasons: the energy supplies and the strategic raw materials on which we so vitally depend – as does Japan, incidentally – and without which we could lose a war before we had fired a shot.

So I fully support the recommendations of this report and I am not therefore criticising the Rapporteur but adding a further contribution, because his recommendations seem to me rather high-flown, up in the realm of principles. What I want to know is what means are available to this Assembly and to our governments to move us on from these fine principles that we trot out in profusion, to concrete and precise measures enabling WEU to be more than just a forum for the exchange of fine phrases. Let me explain.

When we point to WEU's interest in outside areas, what is the secular arm, the practical capability available to us, quite apart from consultations and exchanges of views? Here I would resurrect an idea that has been put forward on several occasions: a European external intervention force, to serve primarily as a deterrent. This does already exist at national level: France has its FAR, Italy has acted in Lebanon and Belgium in Shaba, and there are other examples in the report. But there is no European co-ordination in this field, although it is feasible because there is a precedent. Under SACEUR we have the ACE mobile force set up by Norstad with the precise object of demonstrating the out-of-area solidarity of the allies, whether in the north or the south, and our determination in the face of threats in those areas.

Why should it not be possible to set up something similar among European allies, all with outside interests?

Secondly, the report refers to Recommendation 402, which underlines the interest shown in Africa by our governments. Would it not be possible to give material expression to this by setting up an international training centre in an African or other country, with that country's agreement, of course? It would give physical expression to our determination, should the need arise, to support out-of-area our American allies, who deplore our passive, laissez-faire attitude.

Is it feasible? Of course, because the Bundeswehr already has training areas in

Canada. I do not see why the same should not be possible at African bases which would merely have to be reactivated.

My conclusion on this first aspect is clear: we need to move from a Europe of debates and recommendations to a Europe of decision. Otherwise we shall never be taken seriously by public opinion.

That brings me to my second subject: American intervention in Libya. After the first reflex, various reactions were observed in public opinion, including cries of shame at Europe's incredible cowardice: three hundred million Europeans against three million Libyans who were already planning horrible reprisals on our continent. It reminds me of attitudes towards the end of the thirties. I was pleased to note that there was no criticism or extreme views with regard to the American action in the report, unlike what took place in the European Parliament – which I deplore – and I give two grounds for my opinion.

The first is historical precedent. If there had been a military intervention in 1936 when the Rhineland was being remilitarised, Hitler would not have been encouraged to go through with the Anschluss, to march into the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia and Poland and finally to start a war that cost us fifty million lives.

Second, there is the mounting anti-Americanism observable in certain circles over the last few years. The gap between Europe and the United States is widening because of misunderstanding, differences of opinion and a lack of co-ordination among Europeans. By letting this gap widen we are playing into the hands of Gorbachev who, watching on the sidelines, will see the achievement of the Soviet Union's primary objective – that of separating the United States from Europe. If we want that to continue we have only to go on as we are now doing and the result will be achieved, to the great advantage of the Soviet Union.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – The speeches so far have been most impressive in dealing with the terrible scourge of terrorism. I warmly congratulate Mr. van der Werff on his excellent report and on his introduction.

Although we are concerned about terrorism in general – its various aspects have been carefully defined by my colleague Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and others – I want to deal with one particular point. To cope with terrorism we need to tackle it in every feasible and effective way, and that includes reducing access by terrorists to their targets. Some of the terrorists come into Europe from outside Europe, and we must try to prevent them from doing so.

*Mr. Jessel (continued)*

Yesterday, I put a question to the Minister of State from the Federal Republic of Germany about the movement of immigrants via East Berlin and West Berlin into West Germany and thence into various parts of Europe. That flow of immigrants is uncontrolled and could include some terrorists. The traffic of immigrants is brought to East Berlin systematically and commercially by the Russian airline, Aeroflot, the East German state airline and, I am told, sometimes by the Polish state airline. The immigrants are from Sri Lanka, the Middle East and other parts of Asia.

Some of those immigrants, whose numbers have been increasing, have tried to go from East Germany to other parts of Europe such as Sweden, which traditionally has had a liberal immigration policy and which has had to take sharp action to control that flow. Now the overwhelming majority of those arriving in East Berlin go by the underground railway – what we in Britain call the tube – into West Berlin and from there they are able to move freely and uninhibitedly into West Germany and from there to other parts of Europe.

One can understand and sympathise with the deep feelings in West Germany about the constitutional unity of East and West Germany and hence its refusal to accept any boundary between East and West Germany. But it is hard for those of us who are not German to accept the logic of allowing that constitutional fact in modern conditions when we are dealing with terrorism to give rise to uncontrolled immigration which could include terrorists. That argument can be translated to other countries. Take my own country. Suppose Kent, which is between London and the English Channel, were occupied by a foreign power and large numbers of undesirable immigrants arrived in Kent. Suppose the British Government said: "Sorry, we shall not impose any check on people crossing from Kent into the rest of Britain because we do not recognise the foreign occupation of Kent." That would let undesirable immigrants, perhaps including terrorists, into the rest of the country.

The same is true of Gibraltar. Spain lays claim to Gibraltar, but no one would think that it would be sensible for Spain to say that, because Gibraltar should be part of Spain, it will not check any immigration on the border.

In these days of terrorism we should press either our German colleagues or the occupying authorities in West Berlin – the Governments of the United States, Britain and France which control West Berlin – to take early action on this matter. I am not entirely clear about the legal position of those three powers and of the West

German Government. We know that, within the past few days, the East German Government and the Soviet Government had stated that they flatly refuse to take any action to deal with this illegal and unchecked flow of immigrants.

Of course, there are other aspects of the immigration problem, such as unemployment and the social problems to which it gives rise, but in the context of this debate it is right to confine my remarks to the risk to Western Europe from terrorism which can arise from this deep hole in our security arrangements.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Lady Jill Knight.

Lady Jill KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – International terrorism is an endemic disease in the world today. It is also relatively new. Twenty years ago it would have been unthinkable that innocent civilians in a country at peace – I am not talking about war when virtually anything can happen to innocent civilians – would be blown to smithereens while shopping at Marks and Spencer or Harrods, eating a meal in a restaurant, listening to a band in a park, waiting for a flight at an airport or, indeed, while on a flight. Yet in recent times hundreds of people have been killed in those ways while merely going about their normal peaceful activities. It horrifies me that we have almost become accustomed to it. We take it almost for granted. Too many excuses are made for terrorists. We are far too weak and ineffective in our actions to stop them. Indeed, it is often claimed that human rights and individual freedom of conscience prevent us from taking all effective actions against terrorists. But ordinary law-abiding members of the public have their rights, too. Surely the primary human right is to live one's life without the danger of being killed or wounded by people who claim that they have a right by conscience to do so.

Paragraph 3 (*e*) of the draft recommendation in Mr. van der Werff's excellent report states that we should seek to "deter effectively any country from affording assistance or encouragement to organisations practising terrorism". Exactly what is to be done to further that aim? Elsewhere the report contains some useful and important suggestions. It suggests that a decision should be taken not to export arms to countries clearly implicated in terrorism, that security at airports, ports and railway stations should be stepped up, that there should be control by member states of people leaving or entering their countries – that is very much Mr. Jessel's point – and that there should be an end to the abuse of diplomatic immunity, which we all know has gone on on a wide scale.

I strongly feel that one of the biggest encouragements to terrorists is that they are able to commit an act of terrorism in one country and

*Lady Jill Knight (continued)*

are then given sanctuary in another. I could understand that if a country that was hostile to the West afforded a bolthole for terrorists who had harmed people in one of our countries – that may be reprehensible but at least it would be understandable – but it is monstrous for us to act against each other in that way. I am afraid that it negates all that a united Europe stands for.

The Secretary-General of WEU wrote recently that the free nations of Western Europe must now draw closer together. That is splendid, but I do not feel that we draw closer together when we condone terrorist actions against each other and make it easier for murderers and bombers to escape punishment.

Unless we make it clear that none of us will grant a hiding place for terrorists, we permit, encourage and facilitate terrorism. That is why I tabled an amendment to the report which I hope will be agreed to later this morning. In that amendment I urge all the member countries of WEU to agree that their courts in their individual countries will not refuse applications to extradite convicted terrorists on the ground that their terrorist acts were carried on for political motives. It really is a blank cheque to say to terrorists, "You may murder, maim or bomb to your heart's content so long as you do it only for political motives." That is what the Americans have said for years and it is, I am afraid, what a Dutch court is currently saying. It has also been said by French courts about Italian terrorists. I agree whole-heartedly with Mr. Freeson that a crime is a crime is a crime. It is an affront to common justice that we should act on any other basis.

I end by warning again that all those who create a sanctuary for terrorists are encouraging terrorism. They have innocent blood on their hands. Let us at least agree among ourselves to fight terrorism and not to sustain it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Paul Hawkins.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – As I have been listening to the debate I have scribbled down a few remarks that I wish to make. I doubt whether I can add a great deal, but I want to congratulate our President on behalf of us all on his initiative, and I hope that the report of this debate will be read by the Bureau and by the President and that he will feel heartened to carry on the fight, for such it is, with the Council and urge it to take note once again of the feelings of this Assembly.

I commend every speech to which I have listened. I must congratulate Mr. van der Werff on his excellent speech and report. I also enjoyed Mr. Freeson's and Sir Geoffrey

Finsberg's speeches both of which brought out points which should be made to the Council on our behalf.

Terrorist actions – or, as we should all now have learned to call them, these criminal acts of murderers – must be suppressed. I am glad to see that at long last British newspapers are describing these people as murderers. Their actions are the most cowardly form of war. They attack women and children as well as policemen and soldiers who are trying to keep the peace between communities and ensure the safety of civilians in all our countries.

I have a small flat within one hundred yards of the site where Yvonne Fletcher was killed. I heard the shooting. As I walk round that square and see the fresh flowers on the site where she died, I still cannot believe that it happened in Great Britain in the course of a peaceful demonstration attended by a few people escorted by a small number of policemen and policewomen.

Many members of my old regiment, the Anglian regiment, which is seemingly always on duty in Northern Ireland, have died as a result of these actions. But even more harrowing was the sight of a recent parade where a former NCO was present who had been blinded and made legless as a result of one of these attacks. Our news media, including the BBC, should bring these horrifying incidents to people's attention more than they do. But we must not overdramatise terrorist attacks. We must not make terrorists heroes, which some sections of our community and some religious leaders seem to try to do.

We must not allow our citizens to be frightened by terrorists. We must provide protection and step up co-operation between states. We ought to give far more money and strength to Interpol in its fight against international terrorism, which knows no boundaries.

We must also agree among ourselves about the extradition of convicted criminals. I hope that my Dutch friends will not mind my mentioning the apparent leniency of the Dutch courts.

Those of us in Great Britain who supported President Reagan in his attack on Libya after trying again and again to persuade the West to take united action without any physical attack find it difficult to understand the criticism of our government's support in allowing American aircraft to fly from near my home to carry out the attack. But I am extremely angry that the United States Congress and people still support the right to refuse the extradition of convicted criminals so that they may be brought back to trial in Great Britain.

It is vitally important to maintain the morale of our people whom we, as members of parlia-

*Sir Paul Hawkins (continued)*

ment, must support. The media are often to blame for the worries of ordinary citizens. After the attack on Libya by aircraft based near my home, the BBC broadcast a long programme which was concerned chiefly with showing pictures of the deaths of civilians in Libya. There was no attempt to show the other side of the coin and to explain why the action had to be taken. In this way the media can greatly encourage terrorists. In my view the media have had a lot to do with our troubles in Northern Ireland and those between the north and the south of Ireland. They show pictures of small boys who want to get into the act by throwing stones and bottles. The young are encouraged to believe those people to be heroes.

I was shocked by a few letters that I received from constituents as a result of that attack. They attacked my government because they were frightened for themselves and their children. They expressed a human feeling, but it was rather ridiculous when one thought about it and considered whether Libyans would attack the villages around our airport.

I was reminded of an occasion at the beginning of the last war. I was in church with my company of territorials. When I came out of church the police were waiting. They asked me to send some men at once to the police station to sand-bag the entrance. At the time I thought that the suggestion was sensible, but then I thought more deeply and asked myself whether Hitler was really planning to drop a bomb on a little town in Norfolk. When I returned from lunch I was called away again because a police sergeant was too large to get out of the exit that we had created by sandbagging the entrance.

I commend the excellent speeches that have been made today. Let our organisation go to town on the question of terrorism. There is a lot of meat in the debate on which to hang another approach to the Council so that it might take what we say more seriously. I hope that as a result Mr. Caro's initiative will at long last bear fruit.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the debate so far has shown that not one of the freely-elected parliamentarians who go to make up this Assembly takes terrorism lightly and there is not one who would not be prepared to fight terrorism.

The report – and here I express my warm appreciation to the Rapporteur, Mr. van der Werff – has approached this subject in a responsible and thoughtful manner.

Nevertheless, I feel we need to discuss this subject with more discrimination than some of the speeches here have indicated; otherwise we may find that just because of short-term decisions in the fight against terrorism, we end up pursuing a policy which no one wants and which spawns new terrorism.

I feel that this of all subjects shows that common action by the Europeans is essential. It is no surprise, of course, that we here are all in agreement as regards the fight against terrorism, because the spirit of individual terrorism and state terrorism is not the spirit of those who meet here as the freely-elected representatives of the parliamentary democracies.

We have every sympathy for the apprehensions of the United States Government, which wants to protect its citizens against criminal attacks. We support, and must support, the United States in this struggle. But I believe, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, that we must also be at pains not to avenge innocent victims with other innocent victims. Our goal must be to arrive at a successful policy against terrorism in co-operation with the Arab states, which have themselves been victims of terrorist attacks.

The future of the Arab countries lies primarily in their friendship with the Europeans. It is therefore essential that the European countries should speak to the Arab countries with one voice. But it is also essential that any action against international terrorism should be agreed between the allies.

What depresses us in this connection is not so much the possible danger of disagreement among the European countries as the United States Government's unwillingness, which is already much in evidence, to give a reasonable hearing to legitimate demands and wishes expressed by the majority of European countries.

The action taken against Libya was inappropriate in various respects. It was inappropriate because it punished only one country that manifestly supports international terrorism. And yet we know that other countries are doing this, and are fishing in troubled waters here. The action was inappropriate because the innocent victims outnumbered the legitimate targets. It was inappropriate because there was no agreement with the friendly countries of the European Community.

I feel it is now important that we should use the largest platform we have, the Council of Europe for example, to fight a successful campaign against international terrorism.

Like the protection of the environment and the abuse of drugs, this is further proof of the obsolescence of national frontiers. These prob-

*Mr. Antretter (continued)*

lems can only be successfully solved through international co-operation.

But, ladies and gentlemen, this will also entail a common policy on arms exports, among other things, since anyone who seriously intends to combat international terrorism must also advocate that countries willing to fight terrorism should not at the same time supply weapons to countries that support terrorism. Otherwise all our fine words today are pure hypocrisy.

I agree with the representative who said that terrorists, if they have any faith, would have to account to their maker for their actions. I would add that everyone else, and especially those responsible for policy in recent years, will have to ask themselves if they have done everything possible to create a world which does not force anyone to do what terrorists are now doing; whether as politicians they have done their share in seeing to it that thirty thousand children no longer die each day, because in the time we spend here debating, we have squandered many millions of marks, dollars, roubles – what you will – on armaments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Inan, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*). – I am conscious that an observer should not be heard too much and should probably not be too visible. However on a subject such as terrorism from which my country, I am sad to say, has suffered so much I cannot remain silent.

My country has lost 6,065 lives as well as its democratic system as a result of international terrorism. And we have still not finished.

Turkey is situated geographically in direct contact with the Warsaw Pact countries. It is in direct proximity to the terrorist-producing region of the world to which we have restrained access. It is amazing that in the western media one never reads about what happens in my country. We experience the infiltration of terrorism from the south, from the south-east and from Syria in particular. Iran and Iraq are at war and there is a weakening of the central authorities, liberating negative forces. Even when three, four or five people are assassinated we hear not a word about it on television, on the western radio or in the western press. I find that extremely sad.

International terrorism is a new kind of war. Western countries within NATO are each year spending billions of dollars on defending their societies, way of life and freedoms, but very little, if anything, is done to defend our societies and democracies against this new kind of war. Once again, the terrorists in Turkey are

trying to destabilise democracy, because they know from experience that this is the best way of cutting Turkey off from her western partners, and once a democratic system collapses, one is cut off from one's democratic family. These terrorists also know as a result of a recent sad experience that the western world is much more interested in the absence of democracy than in defending democracies.

In the past, when we suffered from the collapse of our democratic system or when it was in danger of collapse, we were not heard by our western partners. But once democracy became a victim, interest was shown and it is still being shown – for example, at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and in other organisations.

On behalf of all the democratic systems in the western world I urge Europe to defend its democratic society against this new kind of war. Much is being said in many quarters, but very little is being done. In this context, I congratulate the French Government on its firm attitude to terrorism. However, that is not the case in all Western European countries.

Resolution after resolution has been passed by the Council of Europe, but there has been very little implementation. There have been very few ministerial meetings to elaborate on those resolutions. When the United States asked Europe to act together, Europe said, "No – wait a little", and when the United States acted on its own it was criticised. No one really knows how and when Europe will finally decide to defend herself.

Unfortunately, when one country decides to do something, other countries increasingly stay in the background as spectators. It gives me no pleasure to say this in Paris, but sadly there are still capitals in Western Europe that are havens for international terrorists. Some prime ministers still say that terrorists should not be distinguished from freedom fighters, but who are those freedom fighters? They are people who kill men in the street, who assassinated the Prime Minister of Sweden, who assassinated the former Prime Minister of Turkey, and who assassinate innocent families at airports such as Orly, Rome and Vienna. They are considered to be freedom fighters, and they are given a haven.

The politicians in Brussels or Strasbourg may take collective decisions, but once they return to their own parliaments they do not urge implementation of those decisions. How can we be credible if we do not take collective measures to defend ourselves?

International terrorism is now a major danger, not only to human life but to our democratic institutions and freedom. The western world and Europe should react, and should do so urgently.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, my friend and colleague Mr. Toby Jessel referred to the specific problem of West Berlin just now. He felt that because of the lack of frontier checks in Berlin the present situation might result in terrorists crossing the frontier, not only into West Berlin but via the Federal Republic of Germany into other countries of Western European Union. In order not to leave the impression that the Federal Government, which has always been committed to the fight against terrorism, might be guilty of omissions on sentimental grounds, I should like to make four brief points to explain the actual situation in West Berlin.

First, forty-one years after the end of the war Berlin is still governed by occupation law, albeit with the full approval of the population, because of the threat posed by the Soviet troops in the surrounding areas. This means that supreme power in West Berlin is exercised by the three western powers. But it also means that both the governments of the three western powers and the Federal Government continue to operate on the basis that the whole of Berlin, including the Soviet sector, which is designated as its capital by the German Democratic Republic, is governed by the special law and that there are therefore no checks by the western powers on the boundaries between the sectors of Berlin.

Second, there is a Berlin statute which was negotiated by the governments of the western powers and the Government of the Soviet Union in 1971. It states explicitly that West Berlin is not a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and merely has certain links with it. This provision, which we understandably did not welcome, has meant that the clause in our constitution which says Berlin is a Land of the Federal Republic of Germany remains in abeyance, and that, of course, means that the Federal Republic of Germany cannot introduce frontier controls in Berlin even if it wanted to.

Third, laws passed in the Federal Republic of Germany do not automatically apply in Berlin: what is known as a transition law first has to be passed and only then does legislation apply equally in the Federal Republic and Berlin. The Federal Republic's generous right of asylum thus applies in Berlin too and binds us to grant asylum, or at least the relevant hearing, to anyone who comes to West Berlin requesting asylum there as much as in West Germany, that is to say in other parts of the Federal Republic.

Fourth, the Soviet Union and the Government of the German Democratic Republic would like us to close the frontier between West Berlin and

East Berlin because they want the rights of the three western powers in East Berlin to lapse, bringing them a step closer to their goal of designating West Berlin as a kind of free state or third political entity in Germany.

In these circumstances, I would ask you to appreciate that it is not quite so easy to solve the asylum problem as Mr. Jessel may think. I can assure you, however, that both the governments of the three western powers and the Federal Government are at present engaged in crucial negotiations with the Government of the German Democratic Republic, aimed at their restricting the outward flow of people seeking asylum.

I ask your indulgence for having felt compelled to explain this rather complicated matter but I felt I should do so to avoid any false conclusions on this particular issue.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*). – I thank members for their valuable speeches. One of the most important effects of this debate is the declaration of solidarity, as Mr. Kittelmann said. The existing conventions are not specifically directed to ways and means of action, whether preventive or retaliatory. That is the reason for the report and for this debate – in the hope of urging the Council and the governments to take a strong stand and do something.

I do not think that I should answer all the points raised, with which on the whole I agree. As Mr. Berger said, it is the duty of the western world to safeguard its civilisation and way of life. He emphasised the necessity for a sort of catalogue, which would be a good system, to give more attention to the different possibilities.

Mr. Stokes concluded – I agree – that Libya has been directly warned by the Soviet Union against further overt terrorism or support for terrorist action.

I was sorry about the intervention by Mr. Milani. He advocated the study of possibilities of political action and said that we should take a moderate view and assess the situation before doing anything. I agree, but I regret that he felt that the recommendation made no sense.

Mr. Freeson emphasised very well the necessity for closer analysis of different kinds of terrorism. I liked his comment on paragraph 35; he took up very well the provocative element there.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg referred to the human and democratic principles of our society and the

*Mr. van der Werff (continued)*

chances for that society in future. That is one of the important points in the report and I was happy to have his endorsement. As both Mr. Freeson and Lady Jill Knight said, one of the principles of our democratic society is the independence of the courts, and this produces a sort of tension. I am sure that the recommendation on which we are to vote supports the idea of the independence of the courts, because that is one of the real principles of the western world.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's demand, as an experienced member of parliament, for closer contact between the Assembly and the Council on this subject is one that I whole-heartedly second.

Mr. Close said that the recommendation was too academic. I confess that I refrained from advising concrete measures, because paragraph II of the recommendation would put before the Council the suggestion that it should assess the situation and try to get on with these matters. I agree with Mr. Close that our generation has one syndrome but that succeeding generations will have others, but we should relieve them of the syndrome of terrorism.

Mr. Jessel's speech was fully answered by Mr. Reddemann. I am happy that Mr. Reddemann spoke on this matter, because it is one of the important aspects of the unity of Western Europe that we should stand behind the Federal Republic over West Berlin, which is one of the pivots of our existence as a group of free nations.

However, Mr. Jessel did not point out – this may be more important – the difficulties that we all have – in London, in Rome, in Milan, in Amsterdam – with air traffic. People take a plane, sometimes with false tickets, and arrive from all over the world.

Lady Jill Knight said that we faced two problems with what she described as the "endemic disease" of terrorism. The first is that the terrorist groups are small and well-trained, so it is very difficult to uncover them. Secondly, she discussed the question of diplomatic immunity. Western Europe is currently doing something in this regard. She also discussed the way in which terrorists can hop from town to town with a blank cheque.

Sir Paul Hawkins gave examples of the human tragedies which flow from terrorist action. His sense of reality and humour made it clear that we have to take action in our own way; Mr. Antretter also stressed this. He said that we have to act in a balanced way and should involve the moderate Arab countries. I fully agreed with Mr. Antretter, but then he asked why we should not involve the Council of Europe. We have discussed this, but we have chosen to take the initiative here because WEU, as the smallest

European organisation, has perhaps the best chance of achieving unity and co-operation and of safeguarding democracy, which is the most important factor.

In Holland when I was a boy, we played the game of the elephant, the man and the flea. The man could kill the flea and the elephant could trample the man to death, but the flea could drive the elephant crazy by running around in his ear. We should not behave like the elephant, because it cannot crush the flea; we should act like the man and hunt and kill the flea.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does the Rapporteur for the opinion of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments wish to speak?

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments I too should like to express very sincere thanks for the debate, which has happily revealed a very high level of agreement in the condemnation of acts of terrorism and in the intention to do more to prevent them. I believe the problem of state terrorism in particular, and its consequences, will be discussed here on very many more occasions in the future. The more intensively and purposefully we act and call on our governments in the national parliaments and elsewhere to consult each other and to take joint action, the less chance terrorism will have. That, I believe, is what today's debate has shown. I am sure that the contribution from the Rapporteur and the General Affairs Committee represents a major step towards providing governments with recommendations for consistent and successful action.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does the General Affairs Committee wish to speak?...

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – No, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We now come to the vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1057.

I have three amendments: two tabled by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and included in its report expressing the committee's opinion, Document 1066, and Amendment 1 tabled by Lady Jill Knight.

We shall first consider the amendments of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, followed by that tabled by Lady Jill Knight.

The first amendment tabled by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments given in that committee's report, Document 1066, is worded as follows:

*The President (continued)*

After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as follows:

“ Recalling however its Recommendation 396 concerning the alliance machinery for dealing with developments beyond the NATO area, and reiterating its belief ‘ that in the case of such developments which the allies jointly recognise as directly threatening the vital interests of the alliance the ready assistance of all allies must be forthcoming within the area to facilitate United States deployments beyond the area ’ ; ”

I call Mr. Kittelmann to speak to the amendment.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, this amendment merely recalls Recommendation 396 adopted by WEU and does not contain anything new. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments thus simply wants to recall a recommendation already passed by WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – The text of this amendment does, of course, repeat wording already agreed to earlier by our Assembly, but in a different context. I spoke against it at the time, because it is too easy to refer to out-of-area threats to NATO in order to flout the treaty itself and to extend the de facto area of intervention beyond the boundaries drawn and accepted by our countries in NATO. In addition, the presence of this text in a report against terrorism cannot fail to be read, as I pointed out at the first meeting of the committee, as legitimisation of the American action against Tripoli. The words: “ such developments which the allies jointly recognise as directly threatening the vital interests of the alliance ” may seem a joke in the sense that recent history has shown how many times the United States, the main ally in the alliance, has intervened, particularly in the Mediterranean area, in spite of any prior consultation with its allies.

I would not like such a text, adopted by the Assembly, to be used to support the argument that our countries, and mine in particular, could be required to lend their assistance to an initiative justified on the grounds of urgency. Because of the context of this report, I cannot accept the reintroduction of this paragraph into the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the General Affairs Committee’s opinion?

I call Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*). – The problem is that the General Affairs Committee has not discussed that opinion and the first amendment proposed by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. Mr. Dejardin has referred to a different context. He was right on that point, but the Assembly has agreed to the text. I as a member may have some doubts about the automaticity involved in it, but that was the expressed aim of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. It was concerned with the joint action and initiatives of the allies. That point is in my report, also. Personally, I could accept the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does the General Affairs Committee wish to speak?...

I call Mr. Close.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – There would seem to be a misunderstanding in Mr. Dejardin’s interpretation of the wording of the amendment to the draft recommendation. The primary motivation had nothing to do with the American action in Libya, since that event had not yet taken place, but was simply that, in the event that the United States found it had to recover or divert part of its forces assigned to NATO for an out-of-area mission, the allies should be ready to shoulder their obligations and replace those forces, for example in the central European defence area.

Although this point is very clear, for even greater precision I would add that if, in the sector held by the American Seventh Army, one or two divisions were withdrawn for out-of-area commitments, it would be up to the NATO allies to fulfil their obligations and replace those forces to ensure the defence of the sector.

(*Mr. Goerens, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now shall put the first amendment of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The first amendment by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is agreed to.*

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has tabled a second amendment which is given in its report, Document 1066. It reads as follows:

At the end of paragraph (x) of the preamble to the draft recommendation add “ and the firm diplomatic and juridical measures agreed at the Tokyo summit on 5th May 1986; ”.

*The President (continued)*

I call Mr. Kittelmann to speak to the amendment.

I note that the spokesman for the committee does not wish to speak.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the General Affairs Committee?

I call Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*). – I fully endorse the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put the second amendment by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The second amendment by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is agreed to.*

Lady Jill Knight has tabled Amendment 1 which reads:

1. At the end of paragraph I.3 of the draft recommendation proper, add:

“(f) seek an agreement between member countries that their courts will not refuse extradition applications for convicted terrorists on the grounds that the act (or acts) of terrorism was carried out from political motives.”

I call Lady Jill Knight.

Lady Jill KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – I was a little sorry to hear the comments of my friend Mr. van der Werff. Of course, I completely agree that the courts must remain independent of political manipulation, but all our parliaments direct their courts on maximum and minimum sentences, on how juries are arranged, and so on. After all, courts act on laws that are made in our parliaments.

I draw the Assembly's attention to the fact that I am asking not that suspects should be brought back but that convicted criminals – those whom the courts have already convicted – should be brought back. I am not telling the courts how they should judge a conviction. I very much agree with what Mr. Freeson said.

I must say in support of my amendment that in the Dutch case there were two criminals – one a convicted murderer and the other a convicted bomber. They were convicted in fair trials and the court was not in any way manipulated by anyone. Those people escaped from prison and

at the moment are finding sanctuary. It is the principle of affording sanctuary that I am so much against. It is a slender reason for voting against the amendment to say that it might mean that we were leading to manipulation of the courts. That is not my view.

I also stress to the Assembly that I am asking that we seek an agreement between member countries, and that is all. If member countries say that they cannot do it for *x*, *y* or *z* reason, that is another matter. However, the situation as it is encourages terrorism and protects terrorists. Therefore I urge the Assembly to vote in favour of Amendment 1.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I suspect that Lady Jill Knight knows what I am about to say. There has been no final verdict. That being so, I urge that we wait until the legal outcome has been decided.

The amendment is not good enough. It gives rise to three problems for me. The first problem is its wording. If it means that other countries should change their legislation, it is wrong to speak about seeking an agreement between democratic countries, which of course they will not refuse. The problem is not the courts but the legislation.

My second problem is a legal objection. The sad fact is that many member states of the Council of Europe have not signed or ratified the European convention on extradition. It would be a great help, if, for instance, the United Kingdom and other countries did so. What is more, some member states have not signed or ratified the European convention on the suppression of terrorism. That is an extremely effective instrument in the fight against terrorism.

My third problem is a personal one. Lady Jill Knight will know that the Legal Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe is preparing a report on the fight against terrorism. I suggest that Lady Jill Knight's idea be included in that report in order to avoid a real battle about her amendment. I suggest that Lady Jill Knight should withdraw her amendment here to enable the Legal Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe to work it out.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the General Affairs Committee?...

I call Mr. van der Werff, Rapporteur.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*). – Perhaps it would be better first to ask Lady Jill Knight what she thinks about Mr. Stoffelen's idea that she should reconsider her amendment because of its legal implications.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lady Jill Knight.

Lady Jill KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – In my view, it involves a little too much hair-splitting. If we are against terrorism, we are against terrorism. I do not accept that I would do better if I tabled an amendment in a different Assembly, the Council of Europe. It is this Assembly, and this report is before it. In all conscience I cannot fail to press my amendment because I genuinely believe that it would be of great advantage in combating terrorism.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – What is the opinion of the General Affairs Committee?

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – In these circumstances, the committee is in favour of Lady Jill Knight's amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Lady Jill Knight's Amendment 1 to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

The Assembly will now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1057 as amended.

No one has requested a vote by roll-call. We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

I put the draft recommendation to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

### **5. Scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence**

*(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1055 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendation on scientific, technological and aerospace questions and Western European defence, Document 1055 and amendments.

There are four amendments: Amendment 1, tabled by Mr. Fourré, Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Gansel, Amendment 2 by Mr. Fourré and Amendment 4 by Mr. Gansel.

Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Fourré reads:

1. Leave out paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Considering that the importance of this rôle demands an independent European effort within the framework of certain activities such as those relating to the space station but also requires effective co-operation with the United States;”

I call Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman of the committee, to speak to Amendment 1.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – In the absence of Mr. Fourré, I shall move Amendment 1.

Our Rapporteur, who was not able to be present at the meeting of the committee that discussed his report, has advised me that creating an autonomous, independent European capability is the ultimate objective that he thinks we should pursue.

On the subject of the space station, he means to imply that within the overall context of a joint effort between Europe and the United States on the NASA space station, our activities as Europeans should be so organised as to enhance our capability for independent and, ultimately, autonomous action. Therefore, Mr. Fourré's amendment has the full support of the committee.

*(Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I put Amendment 1 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 1 is agreed to.*

Mr. Gansel has tabled Amendment 3 which reads:

3. After paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Noting with concern differences in policies of member countries with regard to armament exports to non-member countries, especially those in conflict areas and even those which support international terrorism, which may seriously obstruct progress towards improved defence co-operation;”

I call Mr. Stoffelen to speak to Amendment 3.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – There is hardly any need to explain the effects of the amendment after the debate which we have just

1. See page 50.

*Mr. Stoffelen (continued)*

had about the fight against terrorism. It is clear that there is a relationship between the export of armaments to areas in conflict and terrorism. For that reason I am sure that the committee and the Assembly will have no problem in supporting the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's opinion?

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – The committee has not had an opportunity to consider this amendment. Personally, whilst I agree in substance, I do not think that this wording can apply to the objectives we have set ourselves in the context of the draft recommendation I have presented. It would be better to make it the subject of another report, which is why I, personally, am not in favour of it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Stoffelen, in view of the explanations given by the Rapporteur would you be prepared to withdraw your amendment in order to submit it in committee?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – It would be illogical to do so because there is such a clear relationship between the problem mentioned in the amendment and the report. It would be illogical to withdraw the amendment, especially after the debate that has just ended. That would be just paying lip-service after the Assembly has just adopted such a good report. I cannot believe it. The amendment is logical and consistent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – As the Rapporteur has clearly stated, I must make it clear that the committee did not have the opportunity to discuss this amendment. It is noteworthy that it is signed only by Mr. Gansel, with no other signatures.

The amendment is worthy of attention and I do not dispute the intentions behind it, but it is plain that it is not in accordance with the general direction of the report which is directed towards high technology matters. Armament exports are a matter for the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments not for the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. We should not be addressing ourselves to an issue which is material to the halting of international terrorism. Mr. Gansel should have introduced his amendment in relation to the report which we discussed earlier. I support my Rapporteur. I do not want the amendment to be adopted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly being fully informed, I put Amendment 3 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 3 is agreed to.*

Mr. Fourré has tabled Amendment 2 which reads:

2. Leave out paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“the establishment of a European civil and military computer market”

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. FOURRÉ (*France*) (Translation). – In the initial form of the proposal, we stressed the need for a civil computer market which would have repercussions in the military field and vice-versa. That prompted some of us to consider the idea of an integrated market. I do not think we can go that far. Whether or not that is to be regretted I do not yet know, but I think that we have first to pass through a preliminary stage, that is the definition of common objectives with a view to setting up a European market. That is the purpose of my amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – We support the advice given by the Rapporteur that the amendment be adopted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I put Amendment 2 to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*Amendment 2 is agreed to.*

Mr. Gansel has tabled Amendment 4 which reads:

4. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Elaborate joint criteria for armament export policies of member countries, with preference in the field of defence co-operation, ensuring that no weapons or defence equipment be exported to non-member countries when this would be against the security interests of the alliance;”

I call Dr. Miller to speak to Amendment 4.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – If I understood the Chairman of the committee aright when discussing Amendment 3, he said that he considered that the amendment was not relevant. I appreciate that Amendment 4 has a

*Dr. Miller (continued)*

similar flaw and that it would be better applied to another report. In view of the powerful speech by Mr. Freeson yesterday about armaments I ask the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to consider the amendment and to see whether it is possible for them to commend at least the spirit of it to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I should be obliged if they would do that and then withdraw the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's opinion?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I understand and respect Dr. Miller's motives and I am sure that our colleagues in the Assembly were impressed by Mr. Freeson's speech. Dr. Miller is right to suggest that it would be appropriate to withdraw the amendment. I agree that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments should pay more attention to armament exports. The subject is worthy of further study. I support Dr. Miller's decision to withdraw the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Amendment 4 is withdrawn.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1055 as amended.

Since no one has requested a vote by roll-call, the Assembly will vote by sitting and standing.

I now put the draft recommendation to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

I thank the committee and in particular Mr. Fourré for their great patience.

#### **6. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council**

*(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1059 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendation on disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council, Document 1059 and amendments.

I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. As it is now getting close to lunch time, and as a number of people have gone, surely it is in the interests of everyone, whatever their views, to postpone the votes on the various amendments until the beginning of this afternoon's sitting. Perhaps you would consult the Assembly about what its feelings are.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – On the same point of order, Mr. President. I understand the reason for the request, but I fear that I must predict that there will be no quorum this afternoon. At least, that has been so on every such occasion as this in the last ten years. I personally believe in miracles but not in political miracles. Postponing the issue until this afternoon would mean that this Assembly would not be able to vote on a relevant and important report. Therefore, we must either proceed now or postpone the matter until our next session.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I support the intervention of my colleague, Sir Dudley Smith. We have before us a long series of amendments of considerable complexity that deserve to be dealt with in detail. We could be doing a disservice to the work of this Assembly if we tried to rush them through before lunch. I whole-heartedly support Sir Dudley Smith.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Milani.

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am unhappy about this attempt to postpone the vote on the amendments until the afternoon as I have to leave and will be unable to support them. I must point out that the absence of a quorum yesterday was engineered to prevent discussion of this recommendation and therefore of the amendments. What is more, Sir Frederic Bennett in his intervention stressed that it would have been impossible to deal fully with the recommendation and the amendments because none of the five ministers who had spoken during the current session had been able to state Europe's position on chemical weapons. In addition, there was the argument, based on the absence of documentation to substantiate whether there really had been violations of SALT II by the Soviet Union, that it was therefore impossible to make an informed judgment as to whether President Reagan's statement on the subject was based on facts – or should be excused as we have heard here. In conclusion,

1. See page 52.

*Mr. Milani (continued)*

we either go ahead now to discuss the amendments and the recommendation, or we postpone the vote until the Assembly receives from either the Council of Ministers or the North Atlantic Assembly the necessary documentation on the SALT II violations. At this juncture a postponement would be wise.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On the same point of order, Mr. President. The easiest way to test the feeling of the Assembly is for me to move Rule 32, paragraph 1 (*d*). I formally move the reference back to the committee.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – Can we have the bells rung?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I support Sir Dudley's suggestion that the bells should be rung. Secondly, I support what Sir Dudley and others have already said. If Mr. Stoffelen is suspicious of some form of plot, I give him my word of honour that I shall be here this afternoon to contest each and every one of the thirteen amendments. He need have no fear that I shall not be here to contest them.

For the moment, I presume that...

Mr. MILANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – So you have private information.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Oh, be quiet. I ask that my words be heard in silence, as that will enable me to make my points all the quicker. Presumably, Mr. President, at your discretion you will take Sir Geoffrey's point first so that we can have a formal vote on it before we vote on the amendments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Freeson.

Mr. FREESON (*United Kingdom*). – We do not need to hear Sir Geoffrey Finsberg again. We know what he wishes to move, and I support him. By postponing this matter for whatever reason and by whatever devices, we are moving to the situation where, to say the least, this Assembly will come into disrepute. Many members, for reasons of their own parliamentary duties and other related matters, have already planned to depart this afternoon and if the votes are taken then we shall not have behaved in a responsible manner, whatever points of view there may be about the amendments.

I would have preferred the matter to have been resolved – naturally in the way that I think – but

given that day after day this week this matter has been put off for one reason or another, the only sensible thing to do is to refer all papers back to the committee so that we can consider it on a future occasion. I shall certainly support Sir Geoffrey.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – I also support the reference back proposed by Sir Geoffrey, but I should like to add two points. Your yourself, Mr. President, have been in the forefront of trying to reactivate WEU, and I am sure that all of us support you. But this report and the vote must be the key to how the people in our own countries regard us. Our people want us to tackle matters that are of deep concern to them, and irrespective of party, I am sure that we would all agree that disarmament is one such issue.

I am sorry, Mr. President, if I am putting you on the spot, but if Sir Geoffrey's proposed reference back is carried – and the indications appear to be along those lines – can you try to use your influence to ensure that this very important item will be included in our December session, if not on first day most certainly on the second day?

Although we were all informed that this session would continue into the afternoon, many members have gone, for whatever reason. I support Sir Geoffrey, but in view of the importance of this matter, I ask you as President to try to use your good offices to ensure that we have a very early debate in December.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments I would not be particularly happy if yet another report were not taken today, because – if I may be permitted to make a personal comment – unlike the previous report, it might give rise to arguments.

None of the amendments that have been tabled has been considered by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. There was no time to discuss them. As Chairman of the committee I should like to say that I shall personally oppose all amendments because Mr. Amadei's report, which shows some consistency, was approved. Further changes would be unlikely to have the support of the majority of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – It is precisely because the amendments have not been considered in committee that I recommend support for Sir Geoffrey's motion. Amendments fall into two main categories – those which fit simply into a text and are easily understood when one is deciding whether to agree or disagree; and those, like some of these amendments, which require considerable thought to discover their exact meaning and how they fit into the text of the recommendation. For these reasons, I strongly recommend that the matter be referred back so that we can consider the whole thing.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Everyone has had an opportunity to speak.

So I have Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's formal proposal for reference back to the committee under Rule 32, paragraphs 1 (*d*), 2 and 3 of the Rules of Procedure.

Does anyone wish to speak against this request for reference back to committee?...

I now put Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's proposal to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The motion for reference back to committee is agreed to.*

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the draft recommendation are therefore referred back to the committee.

### *7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

Emerging technology and military strategy (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1052).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

*(The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.)*

## EIGHTH SITTING

Thursday, 5th June 1986

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the minutes.
2. Attendance register.
3. Emerging technology and military strategy (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1052*).

*Speakers:* The President, Mr. van den Bergh (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Berger, Mr. Close, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. van den Bergh (*Rapporteur*), Dr. Miller (*Vice-Chairman of the committee*); (points of order): Sir Paul Hawkins, Mr. Stoffelen.

4. Adjournment of the session.

*Speakers:* The President, Mr. Cox.

*The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m., with Mr. Caro, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

#### *1. Adoption of the minutes*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The minutes are agreed to.*

#### *2. Attendance register*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

#### *3. Emerging technology and military strategy*

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1052)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on emerging technology and military strategy and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1052.

I call Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur for the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Reddemann has just confided to me that he will not be taking part in the debate so as not to prolong this afternoon's proceedings. I must say that I am grateful to him for this and I am also grateful that so many members will be taking part in the debate this afternoon. I hear someone ask how many, but I cannot say because I have not counted them.

I intend to be very brief because this rather important subject was discussed in depth in committee. I am pleased that, although there are considerable political differences in the committee from time to time, it has been possible to adopt a recommendation on this subject almost unanimously. I very much hope that the members who take part in this debate will be just as unanimous.

I should just like to comment very briefly on the substance of the matter because I feel that emerging technology will be debated not only by WEU, NATO and our various governments but also by our national parliaments for many years to come. It will be a continuing debate because, while not a new problem in the history of our defence efforts since the second world war, emerging technology may well be new in terms of its nature and its importance in the conventional sphere in the years to come.

I believe – as I have said in the report – that the introduction of emerging technology, as defined by Secretary of Defence Weinberger two years ago, may – I will be cautious here – have major tactical and also strategic implications for the way in which we organise our defence efforts, and it may also have a considerable bearing on two other aspects, firstly, the way in which we handle nuclear resources and, secondly, the financial and economic aspects of defence efforts.

1. See page 54.

*Mr. van den Bergh (continued)*

As regards nuclear resources, I believe that, subtle differences aside, this Assembly generally agrees that, with the deterrence of nuclear resources retained, dependence on nuclear weapons should possibly be reduced because of the risks involved. Consequently, the conventional resources we have in NATO have always been very important, and that must continue to be the case. Leaving aside the question of the precise level of the nuclear threshold, to which there is no accurate answer, I am sure that the importance of our conventional effort can be consolidated in the next few years through the introduction of new technology, in the sense that dependence on nuclear resources and also the moment at which they will perhaps be used can be changed.

An aspect which is closely associated with this but which I do not want to discuss further at this time is that the introduction of new technology may, I believe, strengthen the defensive nature of NATO depending on the type of technology we choose. I think this is very important.

My second comment on this point concerns the financial and economic aspects. In the report the committee has used figures I obtained in the United States as Rapporteur to try to estimate the additional financial resources needed to introduce technology into the arsenals of the Western European countries as the Americans would like to see it done. The amount quoted – many tens of billions – will entail an increase in our current financial effort and we feel, or at least a number of countries feel, that the present financial effort is not enough to maintain at an adequate level what is now considered necessary in the conventional sphere. This, I believe, will be a major source of political tension in the future – in fact it is one even now because I am firmly convinced that important political choices have to be made in this respect.

The question then is whether we should do more at this time than we are really capable of, possibly neglecting what we consider necessary in the short term, or say that we intend doing first what we find necessary in the short term and then introduce, selectively and as part of a conceptual framework, which is of the utmost importance, all manner of modern technologies in such a way – I feel Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Belgium in particular, countries which perform a task in the central sector of the Federal Republic, are concerned about the way we introduce new technologies and about the possible implications for military tactics, meaning the kind of concept which will follow – that they have the support of all the countries.

Mr. President, the report presents a number of ideas on this aspect that have been put forward in committee. My experience tells me that they can generally count on political support in the Federal Republic and the other countries that play an important military rôle in the Federal Republic. This doubtless means that in the years to come we shall be introducing all kinds of new technology, which I have described in the report. I also emphasise that it is absolutely essential for the various reasons I have just briefly mentioned, which are also discussed at length in the report – military reasons, reasons of political strategy and also financial reasons – to adopt a highly selective and critical approach to emerging technology, without underestimating or overestimating its importance.

Mr. President, this was the line followed by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in drawing up this recommendation. I am sure we shall be continuing this debate in many forums and in many forms in the years to come, if only because I am inclined to the view that increasing emphasis will be placed on European interests, however they may be defined, in the introduction of new technology in the future, not least for economic and industrial reasons.

Mr. President, that is why we have drawn up this report. I hope, of course, that the many members who will be taking part in this debate this afternoon will support the committee in its wisdom.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you very much, Mr. van den Bergh, for your report and for the hope you have expressed. Coming at the end of the part-session as it does my impression is that it will be met.

In the debate, I call Mr. Berger.

Mr. BERGER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is probably no coincidence that a German is speaking first in this debate. As the Rapporteur has himself said, this subject has a particular bearing on the security of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Before I say anything about the very intelligent analyses in his report on the new weapons systems that may be introduced in the future and about the new technologies – the hardware, so to speak – I should like to make a general comment.

There is an ideologically fairly charged debate on what “follow-on forces attack” means and what the Rogers plan entails. Many analysts deduce from these plans our intention to abandon the strategic defensive, to pursue plans for a strategic offensive in the future, and, what is more, to combine this with other elements of specific policies, which might result in propa-

*Mr. Berger (continued)*

ganda against the alliance as well. Hence my basic comment just now.

We shall only ever fight follow-on forces, which are also discussed in this report, as a response to an attack against us, that is, only in our own defence. But we must fight them before they make the breakthrough, before they join in the battle. We have perhaps been far too thoughtless in leaving this to nuclear weapons, rather overlooking the fact that this would leave it to our opponent to decide on the need for nuclear escalation.

That is roughly the opposite of what we intend with the NATO doctrine of deliberate escalation.

That is why we must find better answers today than in the past. The Rogers plan or the plans to make better provision for the follow-on forces attack are not intended as a replacement for forward defences but to reinforce them, and – the most important aspect, I feel – to increase the credibility of our forward defences in the eyes of a potential aggressor and so make an independent contribution to the preservation of the state of non-war.

Following on from what the Rapporteur has said, I should like to propose a few criteria relating to the modern systems. I believe we must align these criteria with the decision that will need to be taken in the future in the alliance and in Western European Union and, of course, with the establishment of the long-term structural plans of the individual member countries.

There is no denying, in my opinion, that personnel and resources will be in short supply. The first criterion therefore is that we need new systems and must use new technologies in order to keep the number of soldiers employed as support personnel to a minimum.

Second, we need to be particularly effective against attacking armoured troops and also – this is a new element – against helicopters and airborne troops reinforcing them. We need – and this follows from what I have just said – to be particularly effective against follow-on forces before they appear on the battlefield. I feel we should concentrate on achieving this at the shortest possible distance. The shorter the distance to the target, the greater the effect on it and the cheaper the transport systems required.

Third, we naturally need – as the Rapporteur has made clear – a high level of cost-effectiveness. But that always raises the question of co-operation, because co-operation in Europe can improve cost-effectiveness.

Fourth, we need to be particularly effective against likely targets, with a realistic assessment

of the future threat. I repeat, therefore, that the future threat will be characterised by stronger armour, greater mobility of targets, particularly in the air, and new electronic protective measures. We must regard all this as being equally important.

Fifth, we must use the new technologies to find systems which favour the defender, because this will remove an incentive to a potential aggressor. The anti-tank helicopter has an important part to play in this respect, as have mines laid over long distances using a new technology.

Sixth, for economic and other reasons we need to take the greatest possible advantage of civilian technology. Too often – and I see this happening in all the alliance armies – the military manufactures something that the civilian sector can already supply. We must counteract this trend.

Seventh, we must use the new technologies to create more political room for manoeuvre. This means, for example, that we need far better reconnaissance to give us the early warning we really need if we are to co-ordinate our reactions.

Finally, I should like to say a few words about what is already emerging in the field of new technology.

First, there are the means of improving reconnaissance, in digitalised camera technology, for example. There are unmanned aircraft, which we already have, but in future they will need to be equipped with jamming-resistant communications systems that transmit their results in real time. And soon there will presumably be scatter sensors and cable sensors, which in the more distant future could be linked to the civilian glass fibre networks that will probably exist by then.

In the field of highly-effective means of interdiction, to which I referred just now, there have also been certain advances that could, for example, greatly improve strike probability over conventional and non-terminally-guided weapons and non-targeted means of interdiction to the benefit of forward defences and to the detriment of follow-on forces in specific zones, increasing the effectiveness of defence against an aggressor to what I should say is an unprecedented level. This would go a long way towards offsetting NATO's present deplorable inferiority in conventional fire-power compared with the Warsaw Pact.

This would help to raise the nuclear threshold and so respond to a demand that is widely heard in public. But here again I should like to make my opinion clear. I sometimes have the impression that those who like to see the nuclear threshold raised to infinity are the same people

*Mr. Berger (continued)*

who place major obstacles in our way when we encourage and agree on such alternatives.

A final contribution here, and probably the most expensive – which is why I refer to it last – would be what might be called intelligent submunitions.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I apologise for having been rather technical. But I feel we must think about these things in good time with a view to harmonising the national plans, some of which cover the period up to the year 2000, within Western European Union and elsewhere, so that armaments co-operation becomes possible without the constant need to agree on every new detail, every new system. This would presumably pave the way for closer co-operation than we have had in the past.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Close.

Mr. CLOSE (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it seems to me that this very thin attendance is no tribute to Mr. van den Bergh's very sound and detailed report from which, for my part, I have learned a lot. The question of the emerging technologies is important and the strategy that we are following at the moment with its gaps and its potential for improvement is important too. I shall therefore speak about both.

With regard to strategy, everyone agrees that now the Soviet Union has achieved nuclear parity at the strategic level with Europe and at the tactical level with the United States we have entered a new phase. It is quite clear that, when, in order to make up for our inferiority in conventional weapons, we introduced tactical nuclear weapons towards the end of the 1960s, when the Soviets had none, things became completely different. The second aspect is the American strategic defence initiative announced by President Reagan in March 1983, picked up by Mr. Gorbachev, of course, with the object of reducing or even eliminating nuclear arsenals.

Here there is a convergent action which renders the automatic nature of an American nuclear response in the event of conflict infinitely less credible. I am merely paraphrasing, in other words, the thinking of many strategists like Mr. Lellouche and others. The erosion of the credibility of the American response brings us into the post-nuclear era where we need to rethink NATO strategy in depth without necessarily changing its terms, but asking ourselves whether there is not a complete imbalance between nuclear weapons considered as the all-embracing deterrent and conventional forces which are in a sad plight as you know. It would

seem there is a consensus in this field with everyone agreeing that we have to strengthen conventional forces.

Where the argument begins is on how. The purpose of this report is to explain to us that future technologies will put us into a position where, once again, we will be able to counterbalance our potential enemies by higher quality technology.

Allow me to have my doubts. Let me explain. First of all, generally – and this is something I have found to be true – every technological advance on one side is matched by similar technological progress on the other. So we cannot regard recourse to increasingly sophisticated and expensive gadgets as a panacea. What surprises me, however, is that in our study of the various components of strategy no one or practically no one makes any reference to the state of our armed forces.

Now, during our recent discussions with General Rogers in the North Atlantic Assembly, this was one of our concerns. We have a linear strategy, a thin curtain eight hundred kilometres long between the Elbe and the Alps and nothing behind it. As Canby and Luttwack, known as first-class American strategists, have said, a linear strategy is the best recipe for disaster. A breakthrough on the line and you then have nothing else to throw in against a possible aggressor.

What is the remedy? Obviously, by increasing our forces, but there are only two ways to do that.

The first is to extend military service, which my country has just accepted, with difficulty, for demographic reasons which have nothing to do with strategy. I could remind you that Article 72 of the treaty of the defunct European Defence Community specified a uniform period of eighteen months' service for countries in the alliance. That is far from being the case.

The second is to make more intelligent use of the millions of reservists we have available. But are they equipped – they are motivated – are the recalls sufficient and can the mobilisation plans respond adequately in the event of a threat to our security? My reply is firmly no. We are neglecting this considerable potential which represents the biggest part of our human defence forces.

I think I have said enough on this subject and will sum up by repeating that sophisticated gadgets are all very well, because we have to keep up with our adversaries in the technological race, but we would not look upon them as a panacea. For we have to be realistic: they are extremely expensive. In this period of crisis and of austerity all defence budgets are being

*Mr. Close (continued)*

pruned and there is no hope, ladies and gentlemen, that our governments will go in for this expensive list at a cost of ten, twenty, or thirty billion dollars. That would be dreamland.

First of all we have to define priorities and I am surprised that there is no particular reference in the report to chemical weapons, which are very much to the fore at the moment, when the fact is that we are completely outstripped, with no equivalent potential and without the protective gear which would be absolutely essential – we do not even refer to it – as primary equipment for the reserve forces I have just referred to.

A last point is that if there were better co-ordination between the North Atlantic Assembly and this Assembly each of us would have on his table the report on force strengths produced by the North Atlantic Assembly whose findings are extremely enlightening.

For example, if you work out the ratio between fighting or defence forces and population for the nine European countries the result is 0.7 to 1.1% whereas the figure for Switzerland is 10%. Take a moment or two to think over these surprising figures.

I now come to the emerging technologies. When I consider this impressive list I am reminded to some extent of the advertisements you see in the shops in Texas: "If you don't know what you want, come in, we've got it."

The European countries again need to agree on reasonable priorities in the light of their defence budgets and not to toy with the idea of buying a Rolls-Royce when they do not even have enough to get to the end of the month. Secondly, let us not forget that central European defence is a mixed operation made up of eight army corps of different nationalities. It is of little use for the Bundeswehr to be tough and for the American forces to be equipped with the latest improvements if the British, Dutch and Belgians do not have them and therefore represent so many weak points – potential Sedans. Co-ordination and homogeneity are therefore just as necessary in the case of conventional forces that we make available to NATO as they are, I insist, for military service periods and for military equipment.

That is the price we must pay to ensure the necessary security of the peoples who demand that we act as statesmen, and in other words do not sacrifice the future for the present.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your contribution, Mr. Close, that the Assembly has listened to with close attention.

I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, at the end of this debate and the days we have spent considering our reports, I shall be brief. I have nothing to add to the excellent contributions of previous speakers, but would like to draw attention not just in this Assembly, but even outside the WEU institutions, to the growing problems that access to the new scientific technologies will bring and in particular to the problem of the conquest of space that will be vital for our continent.

The Challenger disaster, followed by the failure of the American rockets and that of Ariane a few days ago, are severe blows to the technological and strategic future of the West. Make no mistake, for at least six months, probably a year to a year and a half, the western sky will be desperately empty by comparison with the increasing resources of Soviet might – even if it has arrears to make up, although we are not really sure of that. This is a matter for serious concern.

I doubt whether, apart from certain specialised units in the government organisations of certain great powers, the policy makers of the European countries in general, including the members of WEU, are as aware as they should be of what this future essentially holds.

For fully justified reasons, the objective has been to try, cost what it may, to find ways of improving the defence of central Europe. We have tended, perhaps, to forget all other possible forms of conflict, to say nothing of the war without war waged against us day in and day out by terrorism, disinformation and destabilisation and the regional conflicts, which are no doubt part of a strategy for bypassing Europe.

Even at the purely European level we are still basing some of our assumptions on the possibilities of conventional aggression. We are right to think about them and to make provision for the appropriate response, including the use of intelligent weapons and the reinforcement of the defence resources both of NATO and certain European powers like France. But we must not forget those possibilities which are crucial in the longer term. The space challenge is an essential one for Europe, not only for civil applications but also for military purposes but I have a feeling that neither political will nor public opinion has been mobilised to meet that challenge. The effort has to be made. Unfortunately, I am very sad to say, the few opportunities are not taken.

The idea of a European satellite, for example, which could be built as a co-operative venture by the countries of Europe, primarily France and Germany, is still shut away in its file. As to the European shuttle of the Hermes type, only France seems to believe in it, although Germany

*Mr. Baumel (continued)*

has also shown some interest. There seems no real possibility of this being built before 1995.

I shall not even mention the manned orbital station. The only time the President of the French Republic referred to this possibility was in a speech in the Netherlands when it was greeted with frosty silence. No one took it up. It suggests we are afraid of tackling the problem. Why?

Are we so underdeveloped a continent that we cannot pool our scientific, technical and industrial resources to achieve such an objective? France managed to equip itself with a nuclear weapon on its own at a time when the whole world thought it was impossible.

We can advance at a European level by pooling our resources, co-ordinating our laboratories and research centres. I am using this opportunity to speak in order to make this point very clearly because Europe cannot leave the sky to the two superpowers. Its future, its destiny, are involved. If Europe loses this battle it will, by twenty-first century standards, be an underdeveloped continent. We must act and it would be appropriate and perfectly normal for WEU to participate, within its sphere of competence and the means available to it.

That is the call I wish to send out at the end of our session.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I had not intended to take part in the debate, but, having heard the two stimulating and well-informed speeches from Mr. Close and Mr. Baumel, I wanted to add one or two brief observations.

First, in the defence of Western Europe, we have become over-preoccupied with the rôle of armour in defence and ignored the potential of intelligent munitions for the security of the member countries of WEU. I say that because my country is spending a vast amount on re-equipping its armoured formations in BAOR and, I feel, not doing enough to deploy intelligent anti-armour munitions.

Since this is a defensive alliance and we therefore will not have the advantage of surprise or be able to initiate a pre-emptive attack to secure our nations, it will be very necessary to deploy our resources in defence rapidly and at the decisive point. We will know – we can be certain – that our potential adversaries in the Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, will have the advantage of surprise and will have ensured that they concentrate their already preponderant numbers at the point which they believe will afford them the opportunity of a decisive breakthrough.

It is part of our treaty, which of course we whole-heartedly support, that my country should station 55,000 men and a tactical air force on the continent of Europe in time of peace. I do not dispute that, but in military terms it could be argued that the political necessity of forces in being in the Federal Republic Germany has rather more importance attached to it than actually providing a credible defence were war to break out.

In this regard, I was particularly struck by the observations of Mr. Close, because what we lack is defence in depth. What we lack is mobility and flexibility, and what we lack is manpower. For defence in depth, we look to the French. For manpower, we look to the Germans and the French. But I think that Mr. Baumel, who has often been eloquent on these subjects, will agree that we look to the United Kingdom in any rational division of responsibilities for the ability to reinforce at the critical point; to provide the air power and the sea power to make sure that the forces in being in central Europe have the capacity to sustain operations for as long as it is necessary to halt the Warsaw Pact offensive; or if necessary to make the awesome decision to go nuclear.

From the point of view of my country's defence and the contribution that we can make to the future of Western Europe, I should like us to place more emphasis – as Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, I am bound to say this – on the potential of intelligent munitions and guided weapons of the fire-and-forget variety against the preponderant armoured formations of the Warsaw Pact rather than keep a very costly force in being, with all the attendant paraphernalia of swimming pools, married quarters and NAAFI shops that go with a peacetime presence.

I do not want to unravel in any sense the political commitment of our alliance, and this would be the last place to make such suggestions. But, before we spend too much money on a new generation of battle tanks, we should examine more closely the potential of intelligent munitions – the fire-and-forget airborne weapons – and should not underestimate the importance of space technology for reconnaissance and, above all, for early warning.

Key decisions will have to be made on early warning, both in the United Kingdom and in France, for our air defences. We have had a report on that subject from Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, and I do not want to enlarge on that now. I whole-heartedly support the comments of Mr. Baumel on a European space programme. It has the very greatest strategic significance. I wish that my country were able to do more. I hope that we will.

*Mr. Wilkinson (continued)*

Launchers are critical, as we have seen with the two recent failures – I am sad to say – of Ariane. We are looking to Hermes for a manned system and to support European participation in the space station. I hope that, as well as Hermes, Europe will be able to put money into Hotol, if the concept is proved to be valid. In the longer term, we shall want horizontally taking off and landing vehicles because they afford the most cost-effective long-term option for a European space programme.

I support this stimulating report. I have been immensely encouraged by previous speakers in the debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. van den BERGH (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I thank the four members who have taken part in the debate. All four approve the contents of the report. Consequently, all four have made comments which touch on the crux of the matter. What they said was also stimulating. The word “stimulating” was used by Mr. Wilkinson earlier on. I see that he is leaving, and I wanted to say a few friendly words to him.

I will begin by saying something that may sound rather provocative. I recall last December's debate on SDI very clearly. It was one of the debates in this Assembly which was genuinely political in nature, with political groups engaged in political wrangling over the significance of SDI. That was extremely interesting and extremely stimulating.

What was the gist of the report and the gist of the recommendations? It was not a question of my not being so enthusiastic about SDI for various reasons. The point was that, like Mr. Baumel and others, I feel the European countries should give, if not top priority, then at least a high priority to European co-operation in a number of fields. Mr. Baumel, Mr. Wilkinson and Mr. Close have said what these are.

What was the political outcome of the debate in December? I regret what happened. In some ways, it was to be expected, of course. The majority of this Assembly turned my recommendation round, as it were. I had said that the European countries should co-operate among themselves as much as possible and leave the Americans to work on their SDI. The final wording places far more emphasis on European participation in SDI, whatever that might mean. In my opinion, it does not mean a great deal. There were no impulses for European co-operation in this field.

I agree with what Mr. Baumel said about European observation satellites. President Mitterrand made a suggestion about this in The Hague two years ago. This was one of the main points in our recommendation last time. But this Assembly, Mr. President, cannot go on saying time and again: “If European co-operation is not compulsory in certain areas, the European observation satellites and European space technology, for example, then we will not co-operate.” I am not reproaching anyone for this, but when something is compulsory – and I say this to many members of this Assembly – we begin by looking across the Atlantic. We first ask ourselves what they think of our ideas. We then decide on our position. In my opinion, we then assume an attitude which approaches total submission to American views.

This is a dilemma and one that we should resolve here. We should have a political debate on it. Once again, I am not criticising anyone, but we should stop talking about European co-operation and then saying, the moment we have to take a decision: “But it would be so nice if our European industries could participate in SDI.” Surely we realise that, if that happens, there will be fewer and fewer opportunities for real co-operation in Europe. What we have here is a political dilemma, and I find that a great deal of the talk on this subject is not straight. But that is not the worst thing. The worst thing is that this attitude towards European co-operation, European policy and the European course does not lead to anything and will never lead to anything.

I should now like to take up something that various members have said. As Mr. Berger may have realised, the views I have taken into account were communicated to me by the German Government. The issue here is the introduction of new technologies, particularly in the central sector. I therefore think it wise to take the German Government's views into account. Let me summarise these views. Various governments, my own included, have endorsed the views of the German Government. It has explained how German defence is organised, referring to the “line” along the German frontier, the line that divides the Federal Republic from the German Democratic Republic. German defence is so organised that the prevention of a possible breakthrough in this sector is, as it were, guaranteed. That is the first aspect of the German Government's views. These views have another facet, and I would add that it is similarly endorsed by other governments, especially those with troops in the Federal Republic, in other words, the Federal Republic itself, the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom. The Americans also have troops in the Federal Republic, but not in the same way as these countries.

*Mr. van den Bergh (continued)*

The German Government's views also cover the follow-on forces attack. It is, as it were, considering things in depth. There are reasons to strengthen defences. But this must not be done at the expense of front-line defences, which have priority. That is a political premise on which a great deal of emphasis is placed. In the present political situation the Assembly cannot say that the intention is to keep the front line strong and at the same time call for rapid progress in the strengthening of defence in depth.

I would also point out, Mr. President, that views on the reorganisation of the Russian divisions, the "second line", vary somewhat. Some experts say – I do not include myself among the experts – that basically nothing has changed. The situation is the same as before. It has always been taken into account in the past. The response to this situation is the presence of aircraft.

I therefore feel, Mr. President, that we must set priorities, if only for financial reasons. We must realise this. There is no alternative. I recall the useful meetings we had in Bonn. We have also discussed this in London and Brussels. It was pointed out at the time that there are shortcomings in front-line defences. That was the first consideration; other aspects came later. But it would be impossible to make improvements in every sector at once. Mr. Berger rightly said that additions are needed here and there. We are thinking of the political priorities and the financial priorities.

Let us be honest with one another on this point: the German Government will stabilise its defence spending in the next few years. It will even reduce its spending to some extent. Despite all its fine words about the priority given to defence, the British Government has reduced its defence spending for the next few years. I am not criticising this attitude. I am just noting the facts. Each government and each parliament must evaluate its policy itself. But from a European point of view we must ask ourselves what this attitude means for our views on defence. What Mr. Berger said about this is undoubtedly important.

Mr. Close made a number of interesting comments on the importance of new technology. I would place the emphasis rather differently, but I nevertheless agree with what he had to say.

There is one thing about which we should be particularly concerned. I hope I understood Senator Close correctly. I believe he raised the following question. In the next few years new technologies will be introduced. The Americans have told us what they think about

this. Some people go so far as to say that they are forcing their views on us. These technologies are extremely complex technical systems. There is also the link between the various systems to be considered, the collection and feedback of information to headquarters behind the possible front line. Automated systems will be used at headquarters to determine what the military response should be.

One of the questions that arises in this context concerns the degree of political control that it will still be possible to exercise over the introduction of this type of system. As politicians this is one of the questions we must constantly ask ourselves. It is a fundamental question. One of the speakers also referred to it. But in everything we do time must also be set aside for deciding what form our response is to take. Political decision-making takes time after all. The introduction of complex, excessively interdependent automated systems might leave no time for this, with all the adverse consequences that could have.

I should like to make another point, which again follows on from Mr. Close's remarks. The systems we are discussing have to do with electronics, information technology and computers and much less with such traditional defence weapons as cannons and rifles. They are very complex automated systems. The question is how capable even modern armies are of coping with the maintenance, supervision and training associated with this kind of technology. Mr. Baumel referred to the disasters that have occurred in the field of space technology. As a result of these disasters we are falling well behind. I ask myself if man is not slowly reaching the limits of his ability to control complex systems – by which I mean not only nuclear power stations but also defence systems like missile systems – at least if the effectiveness of our defence is not to suffer. Mr. Close also referred to this, and you may rest assured that I understood what he was saying. His answer is rather different from mine. This point is, of course, open to debate, but it is a question which I consider to be very basic and one that will have to be discussed again in this Assembly in the years to come.

Mr. Close criticised me for not emphasising the importance of chemical weapons. I would point out that the mandate given to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was very specific. The question of chemical weapons could not therefore be discussed. I am convinced that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments will be drawing up an in-depth report on this subject in the future.

Mr. Baumel's comments, I felt, covered a wider area than we initially contemplated with this report. He referred to the European obser-

*Mr. van den Bergh (continued)*

vation satellite and co-operation in the field of space technology. I would perhaps be the first to support Mr. Baumel's views on this point. But I wonder if my support would be of any significance. This is a challenge for the European countries.

During the discussion of the first part of the report a great deal of attention was paid to SDI, with the emphasis on the European approach. I am not upset about this. Nor would anyone be interested if I were. Where this section of the report was concerned I came in for some serious criticism, even from my socialist colleagues. They considered it absolutely pointless trying to reach a compromise on a specific point. I have also been criticised by other political groups in this Assembly. They have changed the political message of the report, making it less pro-European and more pro-Reagan and pro-SDI.

Mr. President, no amendments have been tabled. I therefore assume that members generally approve my report. I am glad about that. I sincerely hope – I shall also take the initiative in this respect in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments – that we can include some of the suggestions that have been made in our deliberations.

Mr. President, this subject, emerging technology, was on the agenda for Tuesday afternoon. I was grateful for that, seeing it as an indication of the interest taken in this subject. Importance was clearly attached to a debate on it. But I was then faced with a choice: either be here on Tuesday afternoon for the debate on this subject or take the oath as a happily re-elected member of our national parliament. I chose to take the oath on Tuesday afternoon. I hope this will not be taken amiss. This is why we were not able to have the debate until this afternoon.

Mr. President, I should like to thank the Assembly. We shall undoubtedly be discussing this subject again. As other members have said, I believe it has many political, strategic, industrial and financial implications for the next ten to fifteen years. These implications are important not only for the defence of Europe but also and above all for the way in which we shape co-operation in Europe in this area in the next ten to fifteen years. I thank you and the members for their kind words.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I congratulate you, Mr. van den Bergh. As you see, thanks to an excellent report your hopes have been fulfilled and the debate has been of a very high standard. It does honour to the Assembly.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I want merely to say that the unanimity with which the report was adopted by the committee, coupled with there being no amendments to the report, is a clear testimony to the Rapporteur and to the report itself. The report is an extremely valuable contribution to what WEU is trying to do so that it is more able to protect alliance countries.

Emerging technology is indicative of what is happening. Technology is a continuing process and we must keep on top of it, although there is a time lag between the development of technology and its application. This is one of the areas about which the West can say that it is ahead of the Warsaw Pact countries. Of course, that is because of our entirely different systems. I have always maintained that there is no comparison between the two systems.

I want to add my personal congratulations to the Rapporteur. The production of the report gave him a hard job. I also express my appreciation to the staff involved with the production of that report and to the Assembly for its interesting contributions to the debate. Members of the Assembly have demonstrated clearly their interest in the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly now has to vote on the draft recommendation in Document 1052.

Under Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Does any member wish to request a vote by roll-call ?...

That is not the case. We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The draft recommendation is adopted<sup>1</sup>.*

I call Sir Paul Hawkins.

Sir Paul HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I wish to correct a wrong impression which Mr. Stoffelen might have created during our debate on terrorism. The British Government did ratify the convention on terrorism on 24th July 1978. I thought that Mr. Stoffelen gave the impression that we had not done that. I wish to correct the record.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

1. See page 55.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Further to that point of order, Mr. President. I am grateful to Sir Paul Hawkins for raising that matter. I referred earlier to two conventions. Several states ratified the conventions but the United Kingdom did not ratify the convention on extradition. That causes a problem for the courts in my country.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Note is taken of the statements by Sir Paul Hawkins and Mr. Stoffelen.

#### 4. *Adjournment of the session*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes the work of this session. Before closing the session, I should like to say something to you about security controls.

For the past year I have personally instructed the administrative services to ensure strict security control in the building during sessions, and I have requested every representative to comply with these checks in the common interest.

Bearing in mind the large numbers using the building, not all parliamentarians and Council members, I have not differentiated between those who are parliamentarians and those who are not. I know that almost all members of the Assembly have kindly accepted the checks. As President of the Assembly, it is not up to me to say how the checks should be carried out; this is a matter for the security services responsible and they have received formal instructions from me.

I wanted to say this publicly for the benefit of all concerned.

I thank all those, and it includes nearly everyone, who have accepted the checks with good grace in the common interest.

I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – I thank you, Mr. President, for your remarks. I am sure that whether we are members of the general public or members of parliament we should all follow the request made to us when security is at stake. It is regrettable that some members of the Assembly feel that they can be excluded. I do not think that they can be excluded.

Staff here are trying to do a job and it is regrettable that some members are not as helpful as they should be. Your comments, Mr. President, are well taken by the majority of members of the Assembly and I hope that when we meet in December members will observe your comments. I thank you, Mr. President, for making those comments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Cox, for your remarks and your support, which I much appreciate.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have to face the sad fact that some eminent members of the staff of Western European Union are about to leave us and we shall no longer see them in our midst.

I mention first Mr. Peter Fraser, the Assistant Secretary-General.

You are leaving us, Mr. Fraser, after thirty-seven years' service. You are virtually a founder member from the time of the Brussels Treaty, and I salute you as one of the outstanding members who have helped WEU through this historic period. I have much appreciated the cordial relations between yourself and the presidency of the Assembly.

On behalf of us all, I wish you every success, happiness and well-being in the future. I know you will not forget our Assembly and hope you will be able to come and see us often. We wish you long life and every success.

Ambassador Diesel is also leaving us. He is a member of the Secretary-General's team, which will therefore be sadly depleted.

The vacancy left will be very difficult to fill, Mr. Cahen. In Mr. Diesel you had a colleague and link with the Assembly, and the engaging and friendly presence of this highly competent senior official is very familiar to us all. And here I will let you into a secret. When you had just become Secretary-General, I sometimes contacted your deputies – Mr. Fraser especially – to pass on to you certain messages without interfering with your very full schedule. This resulted in some quite remarkable co-operation between them and us.

Mr. Diesel, thank you for all you have done for WEU. On behalf of us all I wish you long life and every success.

Mr. Gerhard Huigens is also leaving us – I cannot see if he is in the chamber, as he is always discreetly seated with the staff of the Clerk of the Assembly. He is about to embark on a new life in the midst of a large family, no doubt borne down by the mighty task of leaving but not forgetting us. He has been with the WEU Assembly from the start, and was one of the first officials engaged by the Assembly. We have to thank him for his energetic contribution, especially in all matters relating to scientific, technological and aerospace questions. As you know, he has acted as Assistant to the Clerk responsible for co-ordinating the work of the Assembly committees, having previously held other important posts, including that of Deputy Secretary-General of the Netherlands Chamber.

*The President (continued)*

I assure Mr. Huigens that he will always be at home among us, that we are most grateful to him and that we hope he will come back to see us as often as possible. Thank you, Mr. Huigens, you have served WEU and its Assembly well.

The head of the Translation Service is also departing. Is it, I wonder, the revitalisation of the Assembly which is causing us such weighty problems? I trust not. This departure will create a new situation for the Office of the Clerk, and we shall do our best to make up for the loss.

Mr. Mayault has, too, been a right arm of the Assembly and without his incalculable help the Assembly could not have done its work. Together with his colleagues in the Translation Service he has had to cope, among other things, with the extra workload resulting in part from

the reactivation of WEU and the new working practices adopted after our combined committee sessions, which have produced a flood of documents needing to be translated, printed and distributed very quickly.

Mr. Mayault, I thank you on behalf of the Assembly.

I also thank the press and permanent and temporary staff alike; and a final word of thanks goes to all those who have listened to the Assembly's proceedings from the public gallery.

I look forward to seeing you again on 1st December for our next session.

I declare the first part of the thirty-second ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European union adjourned.

*(The sitting was closed at 4.25 p.m.)*



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