

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1980

III

Assembly Documents

WEU

PARIS

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The proceedings of the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly Documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM.	ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
	BONNEL Raoul	PVV
	HANIN Charles	Soc Chr
	MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
	PEETERS Renaat	Soc. Chr.
	TANGHE Francis	Soc. Chr.
	van WATERSCHOOT John	Soc. Chr.

Substitutes

MM	BRASSEUR Guy	FDF
	DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
	LAGNEAU André	PRL
	LAMBIOTTE Fortuné	Socialist
	MICHEL Joseph	Soc Chr
Mrs	STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	Soc Chr
Mr	VAN DER ELST Frans	Volksunie

FRANCE

Representatives

MM	BIZET Emile	RPR (App)
	BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
	BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
	CARO Jean-Marie	UDF
	DEPIETRI César	Communist
	DESCHAMPS Bernard	Communist
	FERRETTI Henri	UDF
	GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
	JAGER René	UCDP
	JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem Left
	PÉRIDIER Jean	Socialist
	PÉRONNET Gabriel	UDF (App)
	PETIT Camille	RPR
	PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
	SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
	SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
	TALON Bernard	RPR
	VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM	BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
	BECHTER Jean-Pierre	RPR
	BÉLIN Gilbert	Socialist
	BERRIER Noël	Socialist
	BOZZI Jean	RPR
	COUDERC Pierre	UDF

MM	DRUON Maurice	RPR
	FORNI Raymond	Socialist
	JUNG Louis	UCDP
	KOEHL Emile	UDF
	LAGOURGUE Pierre	UDF
	LEMAIRE Marcel	CNIP
	LEMOINE Georges	Socialist
	MALVY Martin	Socialist
	MÉNARD Jacques	Ind Rep
	MERCIER Jean	Dem Left
	VISSE René	Communist
	WARGNIES Claude	Communist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

Mr.	AHRENS Karl	SPD
Mrs.	von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM	ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
	EVERS Hans	CDU/CSU
	FLÄMIG Gerhard	SPD
	GESSNER Manfred-Achim	SPD
	HANDLOS Franz	CDU/CSU
	von HASSEL Kai-Uwe	CDU/CSU
	KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
	LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
	MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
	MENDE Erich	CDU/CSU
	MILZ Peter	CDU/CSU
	MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
	PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
	REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
	SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
	VOHRER Manfred	FDP

Substitutes

MM	ALBER Sieghert	CDU/CSU
	AMREHN Franz	CDU/CSU
	BARDENS Hans	SPD
	BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
	BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
	HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
	KLEPSCH Egon	CDU/CSU
	LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
	LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
	MATTICK Kurt	SPD
	SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
	SCHEFFLER Hermann	SPD
	SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
	SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
	SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
	UEBERHORST Reinhard	SPD
	WITTMANN Fritz	CDU/CSU
	ZEBISCH Franz Josef	SPD

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AGRIMI Alessandro	Chr. Dem.
ANTONI Varese	Communist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FORMA Renzo	Chr. Dem.
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
MONDINO Giorgio	Socialist
PECCHIOI Ugo	Communist
PETRILLI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
TRIPODI Antonio	MSI-DN
VALIANTE Mario	Chr. Dem.
VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. AJELLO Aldo	Republican
AMADEI Giuseppe	Socialist
BATTAGLIA Adolfo	Republican
BENEDIKTER Johann Hans	SVP
Mrs. BONIVER Margherita	Socialist
MM. CAFIERO Luca	PDUP
CALICE Giovanni	Communist
CONTI PERSINI Gianfranco	PSDI
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Leopoldo	Communist
Attilio	
ORIONE Franco Luigi	Chr. Dem.
PATRIARCA Francesco	Chr. Dem.
POZZO Cesare	MSI-DN
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
Mrs. ROSOLEN Angela Maria	Communist
MM. SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STERPA Egidio	Liberal

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BERCHEM Albert	Dem.
MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM. GLESENER Jean-Pierre	Soc. Chr.
KRIEPS Robert	Soc. Workers
MEINTZ Carlo	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	CDA
van HULST Johan	CDA
de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
VOOGD Johan	Labour

Substitutes

MM. van den BERGH Harry	Labour
KONINGS Martin	Labour
LAMBERTS J. H.	Labour
MOMMERSTEEG Joseph	CDA
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne Maria	CDA

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Mr. Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Thomas COX	Labour
Anthony GRANT	Conservative
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
MM. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Anthony KERSHAW	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
MM. Fred MULLEY	Labour
President of the Assembly	
Cranley ONSLOW	Conservative
John PAGE	Conservative
Lord REAY	Conservative
Mr. Thomas URWIN	Labour

Substitutes

MM. David ATKINSON	Conservative
Robert BANKS	Conservative
Ronald BROWN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Robert EDWARDS	Labour
Thomas ELLIS	Labour
Raymond FLETCHER	Labour
George FOULKES	Labour
Edward GARRETT	Labour
James HILL	Conservative
Lord McNAIR	Liberal
Lord NORTHFIELD	Labour
MM. John OSBORN	Conservative
Laurence PAVITT	Labour
Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Keith STANTON	Conservative
John WILKINSON	Conservative
Sir Thomas WILLIAMS	Labour

AGENDA
of the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session
Paris, 1st-4th December 1980

I. Political Questions

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Political implications for Europe of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |
| 2. Future of European security | <i>Report tabled by Mr. von Hassel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |

II. Defence Questions

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. State of European security | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Brown on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 2. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |

III. Technical and Scientific Questions

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Energy and security | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Flämig on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
| 2. International industrial consortia and collaborative arrangements for the production of high technology military equipment | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |

IV. Budgetary and Administrative Questions

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
| 2. Accounts of the Administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 – The Auditor's report and Motion to approve the final accounts | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
| 3. Draft Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1980 | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |

V. Rules of Procedure

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Revision and interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges</i> |
| 2. Methods of voting | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Bozzi on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges</i> |

VI. Relations with Parliaments

- | | |
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| Half-yearly information report: Activities of the Committee – Relations between parliaments and press | <i>Information report tabled by Mrs. Knight on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments</i> |
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DRAFT ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session
Paris, 1st-4th December 1980

MONDAY, 1st DECEMBER

Morning 9 a.m. to 11 a.m.

Meetings of Political Groups.

11 a.m.

1. Opening of the second part of the twenty-sixth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the second part of the twenty-sixth ordinary session.
5. The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands;

Nuclear, biological and chemical protection:

Votes on the draft recommendations in Documents 837 and 838 postponed from the last session.

6. Revision and interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Debate.

Vote on the draft resolution.

7. Methods of voting:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Bozzi on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Debate.

Vote on the draft resolution.

Afternoon 2 p.m.

Meetings of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

3 p.m.

Future of European security:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. von Hassel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

6 p.m.

Information meeting of the General Affairs Committee.

TUESDAY, 2nd DECEMBER

Morning 9 a.m.

Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

9.30 a.m.

Meeting of the General Affairs Committee.

10 a.m.

1. Budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1981:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 – The Auditor's report and Motion to approve the final accounts:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Debate.

Votes on the draft texts

3. Draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1980:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Debate.

Vote on the draft opinion.

4. State of European security:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Brown on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

11.30 a.m.

5. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

6. Future of European security:

Vote on the draft recommendation.

Afternoon 2 p.m.

Meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

3 p.m.

1. State of European security:

Resumed debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

3.30 p.m.

2. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.

3. Energy and security:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Flämig on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

WEDNESDAY, 3rd DECEMBER

Morning 8.30 a.m.

Meeting of the Socialist Group.

10 a.m.

1. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

11 a.m.

2. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly.

11.30 a.m.

3. Address by Dr. Christoph van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

The political implications for Europe of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Hardy on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

THURSDAY, 4th DECEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

1. International industrial consortia and collaborative arrangements for the production of high technology military equipment:

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

Vote on the draft recommendation.

2. Relations between parliaments and press:

presentation of the report tabled by Mrs. Knight on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

CLOSE OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION

*Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly
for the Financial Year 1979*

THE AUDITOR'S REPORT

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REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ON THE ACCOUNTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1979.

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM COMMUNICATED BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE AUDITOR OF THE ASSEMBLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1979

APPENDICES

- Appendix I : Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1979
Financial position as at 31st December 1979.
- Appendix II : Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1979.
- Appendix III : Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of WEU, London, in respect of contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1979.
- Appendix IV : Provident Fund – Account for the financial year ended 31st December 1979

***Report of the external Auditor
to the Assembly
of Western European Union
on the accounts for the financial year 1979***

General

1. The following financial statements, together with an explanatory memorandum, were submitted to me by the President :

- (a) Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1979 and financial position as at 31st December 1979 (Appendix I).
- (b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1979 (showing also transfers between sub-heads) (Appendix II).
- (c) Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of Western European Union, London, in respect of contributions to the Assembly of Western European Union budget for 1979 (Appendix III).
- (d) Account of the provident fund for the financial year ended 31st December 1979 (Appendix IV).

2. My examination of the accounts has been carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

Summary of Income and Expenditure

(Appendix I)

(a) General

3. The approved budget provided for expenditure of F 8,904,000 of which F 387,000 was expected to be covered by miscellaneous receipts and the balance by contributions.

4. Actual expenditure in the year amounted to F 8,832,484. Income amounted to F 8,933,353 comprising F 8,517,000 from contributions requested and received and F 416,353 from miscellaneous receipts. There was thus an excess of income over expenditure of F 100,869 arising from a budgetary surplus of F 71,516 (as shown in Appendix II) and extra miscellaneous receipts of F 29,353.

(b) Pension Scheme

5. Under the common pension scheme implemented in 1977 by the co-ordinated organisations, Western European Union, Council of Europe, NATO, OECD and the European Space Agency, pension benefits payable by the Assembly of WEU are charged to the Assembly's budget and staff contributions under the scheme are credited to the budget as miscellaneous income. In 1979 these staff contributions amounted to F 218,101 (Appendix I).

6. Staff members who had been employed before 1st July 1974 and who had decided to join the new scheme were required to meet the cost of validating their past service through surrender of their provident fund holdings. Where these were insufficient for that purpose because of withdrawals, staff members were required to meet the deficiency, plus compound interest at four per cent per annum, by payment over a period of five years from 30th June 1978. In 1979, payments by staff members under these arrangements amounted to F 80,440 and were credited to the budget as miscellaneous income.

7. Pensions paid in 1979 totalled F 187,038 (Appendix II, Head VI). In paragraph 8 of my report on the Assembly's 1978 accounts, I referred to a decision by the Council of Western European Union that the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts should examine whether the implementing instructions issued by the Secretary-General of Western European Union, under which pension awards were calculated, were in accord with the pension scheme rules. The Co-ordinating Committee has received an interim report from two experts who were nominated to undertake the study but the Committee has not yet issued its final decision.

*Statement of budget authorisations,
expenditure and unexpended credits*

(Appendix II)

8. The transfers between sub-heads within the same head of the budget, shown in this statement, were duly authorised in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulations. These regulations contain no provision for the authorisation of transfers between heads but, in accordance with a procedure approved by the Council in 1973, the Council were informed in April 1980 that expenditure of F 104,038 had been incurred on a leaving allowance in excess of the budget provision in Head VI. The excess expenditure of F 104,038 was met from savings on Heads II, III, IV and V.

9. Of the overall budgetary surplus of F 71,516, F 69,477 arose on Salaries – Head I. Increases in salary scales retrospective from July 1979 were not approved by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts until March 1980. None of the increases was charged to the 1979 accounts and, in accordance with Article 9 of the Financial Regulations, the Assembly has informed the Council of Western European Union that the unexpended balance of F 69,477 on Head I will be carried forward to 1980 to

meet further salary payments due in respect of the period July-December 1979.

Provident fund

(Appendix IV)

10. The assets of the provident fund of the Assembly are amalgamated with the assets of the provident funds of the other organs of Western European Union in joint deposits administered by the office of the Secretary-General. The joint deposits have continued to be held in French francs, the currency in which the provident fund accounts of staff members are kept.

11. In paragraphs 10 and 12 of my report on the Assembly's 1978 accounts, I recorded the circumstances under which the provident fund accounts of staff members had been over-credited in respect of gains on exchange and under-charged in respect of transfers required for pension validation purposes, both at the expense of member governments. Correcting adjustments totalling F 75,925 were made in 1979, and overpayments to staff members have been or are being recovered.

12. The balance held in the provident fund at 31st December 1979 on the accounts of Assembly staff members totalled F 1,291,877.

13. I have received a certificate from the depositary showing the amount of the joint deposits held at 31st December 1979 and a statement from the office of the Secretary-General confirming the share of those deposits standing to the credit of the Assembly's provident fund in the office's books at 31st December 1979.

14. I wish to record my appreciation of the willing co-operation of the officers of the Assembly during my audit.

Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B.

*(Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom)
External Auditor*

30th June 1980

Explanatory Memorandum

*(communicated by the President to the Auditor of the
Assembly in connection with the financial year 1979)*

1. The statements attached hereto refer to :
 - (a) Summary of income and expenditure – financial position as at 31st December 1979 (Appendix I) ;

- (b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II);
- (c) Contributions (Appendix III).

2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits indicates that a sum of F 71,516 remains unexpended, whereas the final balance of income over expenditure was F 100,869. The difference between these two figures, F 29,353 represents :

	F	F
- Bank interest	88,679	
- Sundry receipts	9,526	
- Sale of publications .	19,607	
- Contributions 7 % ..	218,101	
- Reimbursement of loans on validation ..	80,440	
		416,353
- Less receipts for 1979 estimated in the budget		387,000
		<u>29,353</u>

3. An amount of F 69,477 in Head I represents unexpended credits in respect of staff expenditure connected with the 1979 general review on emoluments. The Council approved the increases for the "A" and "L" grades and the allowances for all grades for the period July to December 1979 on 26th March 1980. In accordance with Article 9 of the Financial Regulations these amounts have been carried forward to the budget for the financial year 1980. Nevertheless an additional amount of F 57,266 on Head I and F 25,000 on Head II for interpreters' fees is necessary to cover the total increases. The Council has been informed of this.

Validation of pensions

4. On 31st December 1979 there remained six outstanding loans on validation of pensions totalling F 123,976. In accordance with the regulations the outstanding loans must be cleared in 1983.

Transfers

5. Excess expenditure amounting to F 157,945 has been met by transfer between sub-heads within heads. Nevertheless, excess expenditure resulting from the payment on Severance Grant Head VI amounting to F 104,038 has been deducted from the overall amount of unexpended credits in Heads II, III, IV, V. The Council has been informed of this.

Contributions

6. All contributions were received from the Secretary-General WEU London before 31st December 1979.

Provident fund

7. The Assembly's funds are incorporated with those of the other organs of WEU and the entire fund is administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.

8. The Secretary-General has continued to receive advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment of the funds. These are at present held in French francs with the International Westminster Bank Ltd., London.

9. The Assembly's provident fund has been considerably reduced since the introduction of the pension scheme and on 31st December 1979 amounted to F 1,291,877 as shown at Appendix IV. At 1st January 1979 there remained loans to three staff members amounting to F 193,450. A further loan of F 30,000 was granted during the year. Repayments of F 45,600 reduced the loans outstanding as at 31st December 1979 to F 177,850.

10. Some adjustments to the calculation of validation amounts for members of the staff have been dealt with in the accounts for the financial year 1979.

11. The President would like to take this opportunity of expressing the appreciation of the Assembly for the help which was extended to the Office of the Clerk by the United Kingdom Comptroller and Auditor General.

Kai-Uwe von HASSEL
President of the Assembly

30th May 1980

APPENDIX I

Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1979

(in French francs)

Per attached statement

Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)	8,517,000
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Miscellaneous

(A) Sundry receipts

Bank interest	88,679
Sundry receipts	9,526
Sale of publications	19,607

(B) Pensions

Contributions (7 %)	218,101
Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc)	<u>80,440</u>

416,353

8,933,353

Expenditure under budget authorisation (see Appendix II)	8,728,446
Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Head VI	<u>104,038</u>

8,832,484

Excess of income over expenditure	<u><u>F 100,869</u></u>
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*Financial position as at 31st December 1979**Assets*

Cash at bank	99,237
Sundry advances	112,315
Accounts receivable	<u>98,431</u>
	309,983

Liabilities

Accounts payable	209,114
Excess of income over expenditure	<u>100,869</u>
	<u><u>F 309,983</u></u>

Certified correct :

Kai-Uwe von HASSEL
President of the Assembly

Francis HUMBLET
Clerk of the Assembly

Siegbert ALBER
Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration

I have examined the foregoing summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets and liabilities. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion these statements are correct.

Signed : Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B.
Comptroller and Auditor General,
United Kingdom
External Auditor

30th June 1980

STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE A

DETAILS	Total budget for 1979 ¹
HEAD I - EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF	
Sub-Head 1 (a) Salaries of permanent establishment	3,754,000
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling expenses and French social security	14,000
Sub-Head 2 Allowances, social charges, etc.	
(A) Allowances	
(a) Household allowance	135,000
(b) Children's allowance	170,000
(c) Expatriation allowance	310,000
(d) Compensatory rent allowance	10,000
(e) Overtime	20,000
(f)	
(g) Education allowance	60,000
(h) Allowance for language courses	2,000
(B) Social charges	
(a) Social security	275,000
(b) Supplementary insurance	150,000
(c) Provident fund	73,000
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials	
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers	1,600
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons	1,500
(c) Removal expenses	3,400
(d) Installation allowance	4,500
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials	10,000
(f) Medical examination	3,000
Total of Head I	4,997,000

1. Document 782 and Addendum.

K II

EXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1979

Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
+	—			
		3,754,000	3,691,546	62,454
19,020		33,020	33,020	—
		135,000	132,982	2,018
	22,721	147,279	142,274	5,005
	10,477	299,523	299,523	—
	2,924	7,076	7,076	—
4,617		24,617	24,617	—
	13,069	46,931	46,931	—
	1,550	450	450	—
42,865		317,865	317,865	—
	8,180	141,820	141,820	—
2,199		75,199	75,199	—
	1,600			—
	360	1,140	1,140	—
	3,400			—
	1,872	2,628	2,628	—
	2,757	7,243	7,243	—
209		3,209	3,209	—
68,910	68,910	4,997,000	4,927,523	69,477

DETAILS	Total budget for 1979
<p>HEAD II - EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY</p> <p><i>Sub-Head 3</i> 1. <i>Temporary staff</i></p> <p>Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly</p> <p>2. <i>Linguistic staff</i></p> <p>(A) <i>Interpretation services</i></p> <p>(a) Interpretation services required for meetings of the Assembly</p> <p>(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of Committees between sessions</p> <p>(B) <i>Translation services</i></p> <p>Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly</p> <p>3. <i>Insurance for temporary staff</i></p> <p>4. <i>Installation of equipment for sessions</i></p> <p>5. <i>Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions</i></p>	<p>460,000</p> <p>193,000</p> <p>170,000</p> <p>407,000</p> <p>5,000</p> <p>221,000</p> <p>41,000</p>
<p>Total of Head II</p>	<p>1,497,000</p>
<p>HEAD III - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT</p> <p><i>Sub-Head 4</i> Premises</p> <p><i>Sub-Head 5</i> Capital equipment</p>	<p>337,000</p> <p>26,000</p>
<p>Total of Head III</p>	<p>363,000</p>

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		14,000	446,000	437,314	8,686
		19,079	173,921	173,616	305
	33,079		203,079	203,079	-
		14,511	392,489	374,176	18,313
			5,000	3,714	1,286
	7,190		228,190	228,190	-
	7,321		48,321	48,321	-
	47,590	47,590	1,497,000	1,468,410	28,590
		1,165	335,835	317,817	18,018
	1,165		27,165	27,165	-
	1,165	1,165	363,000	344,982	18,018

DETAILS		Total budget for 1979
HEAD IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS		
<i>Sub-Head 6</i>	Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents	295,000
<i>Sub-Head 7</i>	Paper, stationery and office supplies	181,000
<i>Sub-Head 8</i>	Printing and publishing of Assembly documents	740,000
<i>Sub-Head 9</i>	Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.	25,000
<i>Sub-Head 10</i>	Official cars	44,500
<i>Sub-Head 11</i>	Bank charges	500
Total of Head IV		1,286,000
HEAD V – OTHER EXPENDITURE		
<i>Sub-Head 12</i>	Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs	70,000
<i>Sub-Head 13</i>	Expenses for representation and receptions	110,000
<i>Sub-Head 14</i>	Committee study missions	3,000
<i>Sub-Head 15</i>	Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	170,000
<i>Sub-Head 16</i>	Expenses of experts and the auditor	27,000
<i>Sub-Head 17</i>	Expenditure on information	142,500
<i>Sub-Head 18</i>	Expenses for groups of the Assembly	142,500
<i>Sub-Head 19</i>	Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3,000
<i>Sub-Head 20</i>	Non-recoverable taxes	10,000
Total of Head V		678,000
HEAD VI – PENSIONS		
<i>Sub-Head 21</i>	Pensions, allowances, etc.	
	(A) <i>Pensions</i>	
	(a) Retirement pension	46,000
	(b) Invalidity pension	
	(c) Survivors' pension	24,000
	(d) Orphans' pension	13,000
	(B) <i>Allowances</i>	
	(a) Household allowance	
	(b) Dependants' allowance	
	(c) Education allowance	
	(d) Relief allowance	
	(C) <i>Severance grant</i>	
Total of Head VI		83,000
TOTAL		8,904,000

The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1979, a

Kai-Uwe von HASSEL
President of the Assembly

Francis
Clerk of t

Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
+	-			
	5,000	290,000	289,167	833
8,407		189,407	189,407	-
16,899		756,899	756,899	-
	4,106	20,894	20,778	116
	16,000	28,500	27,635	865
	200	300	25	275
25,306	25,306	1,286,000	1,283,911	2,089
	11,862	58,138	36,266	21,872
		110,000	101,102	8,898
2,764		5,764	5,764	-
		170,333	170,333	-
333		35,765	35,765	-
8,765		142,500	125,338	17,162
		142,500	138,075	
		3,000	1,178	1,822
		10,000	6,799	3,201
11,862	11,862	678,000	620,620	57,380
	1,135	44,865	44,865	-
	1,015	22,985	22,985	-
	962	12,038	12,038	-
3,112		3,112	107,750	104,038
3,112	3,112	83,000	187,038	104,038
157,945	157,945	8,904,000	8,832,484	71,516

id for up to 31st March 1980, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

UMBLET
Assembly

Siegbert ALBER
Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration

APPENDIX III

**STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY
BUDGET FOR 1979**

Member states	600ths	Contributions overpaid in 1978	Budget surplus 1978	Main budget for 1979	Net contributions required
		F	F	F	F
Belgium	59	(-) 38,262	(-) 33,962	837,505	765,281
France	120	(-) 77,822	(-) 69,074	1,703,400	1,556,504
Federal Republic of Germany	120	(-) 77,822	(-) 69,074	1,703,400	1,556,504
Italy	120	(-) 77,822	(-) 69,074	1,703,400	1,556,504
Luxembourg	2	(-) 1,298	(-) 1,151	28,390	25,941
Netherlands	59	(-) 38,262	(-) 33,962	837,505	765,281
United Kingdom	120	(-) 77,822	(-) 69,074	1,703,400	1,556,504
	600	(-) 389,110	(-) 345,371	8,517,000	7,782,519

APPENDIX IV
PROVIDENT FUND
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1979

	F		F
<i>Balance brought forward :</i>			
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1979	1,149,722	Transfer to pension validation accounts	25,352
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union	115,406	Withdrawals	105,084
Repayments of loans by staff members	45,600		
Interest received during the year	111,585	Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st December 1979	1,291,877
	1,422,313		1,422,313

Kai-Uwe von HASSEL
President of the Assembly

Francis HUMBLET
Clerk of the Assembly

Siegbert ALBER
*Chairman of the Committee on
 Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

I have examined the foregoing statement. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion this statement is correct.

Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B.
*Comptroller and Auditor General, United Kingdom
 External Auditor*

30th June 1980

*Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly
for the Financial Year 1979*

**MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1979¹**

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur*

The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1979, together with the Auditor's Report, in accordance with Article 16 of the Financial Regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* Mr. Adriaensens (Chairman), MM. Jager, Kittelmann (Alternate for Ahrens) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alber, Depietri, Evers, Fletcher (Alternate: Lord McNair), Lord Hughes, MM. Jeambrun, Krieps, Martino, Orione, Peeters, Petrilli (Alternate: Agrimi),

Schleiter (Alternate: Pignion), Smith, Stanton, Tripodi, Tummers, Uehrer, Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra (Alternate: van Hulst).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics*

DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1981¹

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1981
Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads
Explanatory Memorandum

Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1981

Details	Estimate for 1981 F
<i>Head I</i> : Expenditure for staff	6,883,000
<i>Head II</i> : Expenditure relating to temporary personnel.....	1,920,000
<i>Head III</i> : Expenditure on premises and equipment	383,000
<i>Head IV</i> : General administrative costs.....	1,526,000
<i>Head V</i> : Other expenditure.....	1,000,000
<i>Head VI</i> : Pensions	106,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE	11,818,000
TOTAL RECEIPTS	460,000
NET TOTAL	11,358,000

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee and approved by the Presidential Committee with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee* Mr. Adriaensens (Chairman); MM. Jager, Kittelmann (Alternate for Ahrens) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alber, Depietri, Evers, Fletcher (Alternate: Lord McNair), Lord Hughes, MM. Jeambrun, Krieps,

Martino, Orione, Peeters, Petrilli (Alternate: Agrimi), Schleiter (Alternate: Pignion), Smith, Stainton, Tripodi, Tummers, Vohrer, Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra (Alternate: van Hulst)

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics*

Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads

Details	Estimate for 1981 F
<i>Head I – EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF</i>	
Sub-Head 1 : Salaries of permanent establishment	5,194,000
Sub-Head 2 : (A) Allowances	904,000
(B) Social charges	753,000
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials	<u>32,000</u>
TOTAL OF HEAD I	6,883,000
<i>Head II – EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY</i>	
Sub-Head 3 : 1. Temporary staff	609,000
2. Linguistic staff	979,000
3. Insurance for temporary staff	5,000
4. Installation of equipment during sessions	270,000
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions	<u>57,000</u>
TOTAL OF HEAD II	1,920,000
<i>Head III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT</i>	
Sub-Head 4 : 1. Premises	283,000
2. Work on the building (joint areas)	83,000
Sub-Head 5 : Capital equipment	<u>17,000</u>
TOTAL OF HEAD III	383,000
<i>Head IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS</i>	
Sub-Head 6 : Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents	325,000
Sub-Head 7 : Office supplies and hire of machines	210,000
Sub-Head 8 : Printing and publishing of Assembly documents ..	910,000
Sub-Head 9 : Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.	30,000
Sub-Head 10 : Official cars	50,500
Sub-Head 11 : Bank charges	<u>500</u>
TOTAL OF HEAD IV	1,526,000
<i>Head V – OTHER EXPENDITURE</i>	
Sub-Head 12 : Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs	85,000
Sub-Head 13 : Expenses for representation and receptions	132,000
Sub-Head 14 : Committee study missions	3,000
Sub-Head 15 : Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	215,000
Sub-Head 16 : Expenses of experts and the auditors	50,000
Sub-Head 17 : Expenditure on information	250,000
Sub-Head 18 : Expenses for groups of the Assembly	250,000
Sub-Head 19 : Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3,000
Sub-Head 20 : Non-recoverable taxes	<u>12,000</u>
TOTAL OF HEAD V	1,000,000
<i>Head VI – PENSIONS</i>	
Sub-Head 21 : (A) Pensions	104,000
(B) Allowances	–
(C) Severance grant	–
(D) Supplementary insurance	<u>2,000</u>
TOTAL OF HEAD VI	106,000

Head I – Expenditure for Staff

Sub-Head 1

SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT

Estimate : F 5,194,000

(a) Basic salaries

Estimate : F 5,172,000

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
The Clerk	Hors cadre	1	375,000
The Clerk Assistant	Hors cadre	1	318,000
Counsellors	A5	5	1,523,000
First Secretaries	A4	2	515,000
Secretary	A3	1	234,000
Secretaries-Translators/Publications Administrative Assistant/Assistant Translator	A2	3	520,000
Chief Accountant	B6	1	171,000
Personal Assistants	B4	4	515,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	6	630,000
Switchboard Operator	B3	1	111,000
Head of Reproduction Department	C6	1	98,000
Assistants in Reproduction Department	C4 ¹	2	162,000
		28	5,172,000

N.B. This table includes the credits required for making the part-time post of Clerk a full-time post.
It in no way prejudices any decisions which may be taken concerning the status of the Clerk nor any other possible changes in the establishment of the Office of the Clerk.

(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C),
including travelling expenses and insurance

Estimate : F 22,000

1. Regraded posts.

Sub-Head 2

ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC.

(A) ALLOWANCES

Estimate : F 904,000

(a) Household allowance

Estimate : F 194,000

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Clerk	Hors cadre	1	22,000
Clerk Assistant	Hors cadre	1	19,000
Counsellors	A5	4	72,000
First Secretary	A4	1	15,000
Secretary	A3	1	14,000
Personal Assistants	B4	2	15,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	3	20,000
Head of Reproduction Department	C6	1	6,000
Assistants in Reproduction Department	C4	2	11,000
		16	194,000

(b) Children's allowance

Estimate : F 193,000

7,700 F per year per child : F 193,000

(c) Expatriation allowance

Estimate : F 410,000

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Counsellors	A5	3	174,000
First Secretary	A4	1	51,000
Secretary	A3	1	47,000
Secretary-Translator/Publications Administrative Assistant/Assistant Translator	A2	2	58,000
Personal Assistants	B4	2	47,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists	B3	2	33,000
		11	410,000

(d) Compensatory rent allowance

Estimate : F 15,000

(e) Overtime

Estimate : F 30,000

(f)

(g) Education allowance

Estimate : F 60,000

(h) Allowance for language courses

Estimate : F 2,000

(B) SOCIAL CHARGES*Estimate : F 753,000**Estimate : F 441,000**F 441,000**Estimate : F 175,000**Estimate : F 137,000**F 137,000***(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS***Estimate : F 32,000**Estimate : F 1,600**Estimate : F 1,500**Estimate : F 3,400**Estimate : F 7,000**Estimate : F 10,000**Estimate : F 8,500*

Head II – Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly

Estimate : F 1,920,000

Sub-Head 3

1. TEMPORARY STAFF

Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly

Function	Paris : 10 days		
	Daily remuneration F	No.	Total F
Head of the sittings office	750	2 <i>a</i>	24,000
Heads of sections	512	2 <i>a</i>	42,500
	672	4 <i>b</i>	
Sergeant-at-Arms	586	1 <i>b</i>	7,000
Secretaries for the Assembly	426	2 <i>a</i>	22,600
	586	2 <i>b</i>	
Précis writers	426	4 <i>a</i>	45,000
	586	4 <i>b</i>	
Verbatim reporters	586	12 <i>b</i>	137,000
	730	6 <i>c</i>	
Assistants	411	4 <i>b</i>	163,500
	372	23 <i>b</i>	
	281	6 <i>a</i>	
	242	10 <i>a</i>	
Head ushers	215	2 <i>a</i>	5,200
Ushers	195	12 <i>a</i>	39,000
	325	4 <i>b</i>	
Roneo/Assemblers	195	12 <i>a</i>	23,200
		112	509,000

a. Recruited locally.

b Recruited outside France.

c Recruited as free-lance staff.

Travelling expenses F 100,000

F 609,000

2. LINGUISTIC STAFF

(A) Interpretation Services

(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly

Function	10 days	
	No.	Total F
Interpreters	12	220,000
	12	220,000

Travelling expenses F 16,000
F 236,000

(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions F 230,000

(B) Translation Services

Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly

Function	Daily remuneration F	No.	Estimate ¹ F
Revisers	672	3a	198,000
	1,072	4b	
Translators	544	4a	180,000
	894	4b	
Assistants	411	3b	119,000
	372	2b	
	281	4a	
	242	3a	
		27	497,000

1. Based on 32 days for the revisers and translators.

Travelling expenses F 16,000
F 513,000

a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside France.

3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF

Estimate : F 5,000

4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS

- Installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment	F 243,000
- Installation of telephone booths	F 16,000
- Installation of a teleprinter "France-Presse" for the Press Service	F 11,000

Estimate : F 270,000

5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS

- Removal expenses	F 5,500
- Medical service (Doctor and Nurse)	F 7,500
- Hire of typewriters and technicians	F 6,000
- Servicing of lifts	F 12,000
- Cleaning	F 14,000
- Miscellaneous	F 12,000

Estimate : F 57,000

Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment

Estimate : F 383,000

Sub-Head 4

1. PREMISES

- Hire of committee rooms outside Paris and installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment	F 15,000
- Joint overheads, furniture for the premises and insurance	F 240,000
- Minor repairs to equipment and machines and removal of furniture ..	F 20,000
- Miscellaneous	F 8,000

Estimate : F 283,000

2. WORK ON THE BUILDING
(joint areas)

Estimate : F 83,000

Sub-Head 5

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

- | | |
|-------------------------|----------|
| - 2 typewriters | F 14,000 |
| - 1 tape recorder | F 3,000 |

Estimate : F 17,000

*Head IV – General administrative costs**Estimate :* F 1,526,000*Sub-Head 6*

POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS

- | | |
|--------------------------------|-----------|
| - Postage | F 205,000 |
| - Telephone | F 105,000 |
| - Telegrams | F 10,000 |
| - Transport of documents | F 5,000 |

Estimate : F 325,000

Sub-Head 7

OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES

- Purchase of roneo paper, stencils, headed writing paper and other office supplies
- Hire of machines for photocopying and printing

Estimate : F 210,000*Sub-Head 8*

PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS

- Printing of Assembly documents (includes the record of debates, minutes of the Assembly and Assembly documents)
- Printing of Reports of the Council
- Printing of Texts Adopted
- Miscellaneous – Bulletins, printing of the Agenda and Order of Business of the Assembly, voting lists, etc.
- Reprints
- Brochures

Estimate : F 910,000*Sub-Head 9*

PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC.

Estimate : F 30,000

Sub-Head 10

OFFICIAL CARS

– Hire of official cars Estimate : F 50,500

Sub-Head 11

BANK CHARGES

Estimate : F 500

Head V – Other expenditure

Estimate : F 1,000,000

Sub-Head 12

TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY,
CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS

Estimate : F 85,000

Sub-Head 13

EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS

Estimate : F 132,000

Sub-Head 14

COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS

Estimate : F 3,000

Sub-Head 15

OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Estimate : F 215,000

Sub-Head 16

EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITOR

Estimate : F 50,000

Sub-Head 17

EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION

Estimate : F 250,000

Sub-Head 18

EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY

Estimate : F 250,000

Sub-Head 19

CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR

Estimate : F 3,000

Sub-Head 20

NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES

Estimate : F 12,000

Head VI – Pensions*Estimate : F 106,000**Sub-Head 21***PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC****(A) Pensions***Estimate : F 104,000*

(a) Retirement pension	<i>Estimate : F 58,000</i>
(b) Invalidity pension	<i>Estimate : pro mem.</i>
(c) Survivors' pension	<i>Estimate : F 30,600</i>
(d) Orphans' pension	<i>Estimate : F 15,400</i>

(B) Allowances*Estimate : pro mem.*

(a) Household allowance	<i>Estimate : pro mem.</i>
(b) Dependants' allowance	<i>Estimate : pro mem.</i>
(c) Education allowance	<i>Estimate : pro mem.</i>
(d) Relief allowance	<i>Estimate : pro mem.</i>

(C) Severance grant*Estimate : pro mem.***(D) Supplementary insurance***Estimate : F 2,000***Income****(A) Sundry receipts***Estimate : F 100,000*

(a) Sale of publications	F 15,000
(b) Bank interest	F 75,000
(c) Social security reimbursements	F 10,000

(B) Pensions*Estimate : F 360,000*

(a) Contributions (7 %)	<i>Estimate : F 306,000</i>
(b) Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.)	<i>Estimate : F 54,000</i>

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Adriaenssens, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. The draft budget now before you amounts to F 11,358,000. The budget for 1980 amounted to F 9,701,477. The difference is therefore F 1,656,523 (17.07 %).

2. *Head I – Expenditure for staff*

The increase (F 1,014,523) in the estimate for this head takes account of:

- (i) the effect over a full year of increases granted in 1980 in basic salaries, expatriation and household allowances and contributions in respect of supplementary insurance and social security;
- (ii) annual increments;
- (iii) the probable effect of any salary increases in 1981 due to inflation. Increases are estimated at 9.8 %;
- (iv) the creation of a full-time post of Clerk;
- (v) the regrading of two Grade C.3 posts to Grade C.4.

3. *Head II – Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly*

Sub-Head 3.1 – Temporary staff

The estimated increase is F 99,000.

Salaries for temporary staff follow the scales applied in the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. In accordance with the decision of the Budget Committee of the Council, the WEU Assembly applies automatically, in the course of the year, all increases in salary scales as and when they are applied by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. These increases follow the trend of salary scales for permanent staff.

Sub-head 3.2 (A) – Interpretation services

The increase (F 50,000) in the estimate for this sub-head takes into account probable increases in the scales applied by the co-ordinated organisations for salaries and per diem allowances payable to interpreters. These increases also follow the trend of salary scales for permanent staff.

Sub-head 3.2 (B) – Translation services

The increase (F 57,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to scales applied in the Council of Europe. It is linked with increases in salary scales for permanent staff.

Sub-head 3.4 – Installation of equipment for sessions.

The increase (F 26,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase in the cost of installing equipment needed for two part-sessions held in Paris.

4. *Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment*

Sub-head 5 – Capital equipment

The sum of F 17,000 is for the purchase of two typewriters (to replace two typewriters purchased in 1968 and 1971 respectively) and one tape recorder (needed for Committee services).

5. *Head IV – General administrative costs*

Sub-head 6 – Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents

The increase (F 30,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to an expected increase in postal rates and telephone charges.

Sub-head 7 – Office supplies and hire of machines

The increase (F 20,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the higher cost of paper and office supplies. This sub-head also covers the hire of a photocopying machine and of an addressograph machine.

Sub-head 8 – Printing and publishing of Assembly documents

The increase (F 110,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase in the cost of printing.

6. *Head V – Other expenditure*

Sub-head 12 – Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs

The increase (F 8,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the increase in travelling expenses and per diem allowances.

Sub-head 13 – Expenses for representation and receptions

The increase (F 12,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to rising prices.

Sub-head 15 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk

The increase (F 28,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increase in travelling expenses and per diem allowances foreseen in 1981.

Sub-head 16 – Expenses of experts and the auditors.

The increase (F 5,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to increases in fees payable to the auditor and experts.

Sub-head 17 – Expenditure on information

The sum of F 250,000 requested in 1980 is maintained.

Sub-head 18 – Expenses for groups of the Assembly

There are now five political groups in the Assembly. The sum of F 250,000 requested in 1980 is maintained.

7. *Head VI – Pensions*

In this budget, account has been taken of only three pensions to be paid: one retirement, one survivor's and one orphan's pension.

8. *Sundry receipts*

Expected receipts in 1981 include:

- (i) sale of publications;
- (ii) bank interest;
- (iii) social security reimbursements in respect of staff on sick leave;
- (iv) income resulting from the contribution of 7 % from staff subscribing to the pension fund and the reimbursement of loans and withdrawals.

Head I – Expenditure for Staff*Sub-Head 1*

SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT

(a) Basic salaries

Estimate for 1981	F 5,172,000
Budget for 1980 (including F 62,424 carried over from 1979)	F 4,390,454
Net increase	F 781,546

1979 expenditure : F 3,691,546

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2.

(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling expenses and insurance

Estimate for 1981	F 22,000
Budget for 1980	F 20,000
Net increase	F 2,000

1979 expenditure : F 33,020

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of increased rates payable to temporary staff.

Sub-Head 2

ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC.

(A) ALLOWANCES**(a) Household allowance**

Estimate for 1981	F 194,000
Budget for 1980 (including F 2,018 carried over from 1979)	F 160,018
Net increase	F 33,982

1979 expenditure : F 132,982

This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff.

(b) Children's allowance

Estimate for 1981	F 193,000
Budget for 1980 (including F 5,005 carried over from 1979)	F 181,005
Net increase	F 11,995

1979 expenditure : F 142,274

This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff.

(c) Expatriation allowance

Estimate for 1981	F 410,000
Budget for 1980	F 356,000
Net increase	F 54,000

1979 expenditure : F 299,523

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of non-French staff entitled to the allowance.

(d) Compensatory rent allowance

Estimate for 1981	F 15,000
Budget for 1980	F 10,000
Net increase	F 5,000

1979 expenditure : F 7,076

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the rent allowance now paid and the number of officials qualifying for an allowance.

(e) Overtime

Estimate for 1981	F	30,000
Budget for 1980	F	22,000
Net increase	F	8,000

1979 expenditure : F 24,617

(f)

(g) Education allowance

Estimate for 1981	F	60,000
Budget for 1980	F	65,000
Net decrease	F	5,000

1979 expenditure : F 46,931

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance.

(h) Allowance for language courses

Estimate for 1981	F	2,000
Budget for 1980	F	2,000
Estimate unchanged		

1979 expenditure : F 450

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance.

(B) SOCIAL CHARGES

(a) Social security

Estimate for 1981	F	441,000
Budget for 1980	F	370,000
Net increase	F	71,000

1979 expenditure : F 317,865

(b) Supplementary insurance

Estimate for 1981	F	175,000
Budget for 1980	F	175,000
Estimate unchanged		

1979 expenditure : F 141,820

(c) Provident fund

Estimate for 1981	F	137,000
Budget for 1980	F	90,000
Net increase	F	47,000

1979 expenditure : F 75,199

This calculation is based on 14 % of basic salaries for staff having opted to remain in the provident fund scheme.

(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS

(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers

Estimate for 1981	F	1,600
Budget for 1980	F	1,600
Estimate unchanged		

1979 expenditure : nil

(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons

Estimate for 1981	F	1,500
Budget for 1980	F	1,500

Estimate unchanged

1979 expenditure : F 1,140

Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff.

(c) Removal expenses

Estimate for 1981	F	3,400
Budget for 1980	F	3,400

Estimate unchanged

1979 expenditure : nil

Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff.

(d) Installation allowance

Estimate for 1981	F	7,000
Budget for 1980	F	7,000

Estimate unchanged

1979 expenditure : F 2,628

Calculated on the basis of possible replacement requirements.

(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials

Estimate for 1981	F	10,000
Budget for 1980	F	10,000

Estimate unchanged

1979 expenditure : F 7,243

Based on the number of staff entitled to home leave in 1981.

(f) Medical examination

Estimate for 1981	F	8,500
Budget for 1980	F	3,500

Net increase F 5,000

1979 expenditure : F 3,209

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the additional expenditure involved in changing the system of medical examinations for staff.

Head II – Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly

Sub-Head 3

1. TEMPORARY STAFF

Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly

Estimate for 1981	F	609,000
Budget for 1980	F	510,000
Net increase	F	99,000

1979 expenditure : F 437,314

The basis of the calculation is two part-sessions in Paris making a total of 10 sitting days.

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

2. LINGUISTIC STAFF

(A) *Interpretation Services*

(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly

Estimate for 1981	F	236,000
Budget for 1980	F	226,000
Net increase	F	10,000

1979 expenditure : F 173,616

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions

Estimate for 1981	F	230,000
Budget for 1980	F	190,000
Net increase	F	40,000

1979 expenditure : F 203,079

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

(B) *Translation Services*

Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly

Estimate for 1981	F	513,000
Budget for 1980	F	456,000
Net increase	F	57,000

1979 expenditure : F 374,176

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF

Estimate for 1981	F	5,000
Budget for 1980	F	5,000
Estimate unchanged		

1979 expenditure : F 3,714

4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE SESSIONS

Estimate for 1981	F	270,000
Budget for 1980	F	244,000
Net increase	F	26,000

1979 expenditure : F 228,190

This calculation is based on the installations necessary for two part-sessions held in Paris.

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING THE SESSIONS

Estimate for 1981	F	57,000
Budget for 1980	F	51,000
Net increase	F	6,000

1979 expenditure : F 48,321

This increase corresponds to the expected rise in the cost of living.

Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment*Sub-Head 4*

1. PREMISES

Estimate for 1981	F	283,000
Budget for 1980	F	243,000
Net decrease	F	40,000

1979 expenditure : F 317,817

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the Assembly's share in maintenance costs and the hire of committee rooms.

2. WORK ON THE BUILDING
(joint areas)

Estimate for 1981	F	83,000
Budget for 1980	F	76,000
Net increase	F	7,000

1979 expenditure : nil

This represents the Assembly's share in work on the committee rooms.

Sub-Head 5

CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

Estimate for 1981	F	17,000
Budget for 1980	F	20,000
Net decrease	F	3,000

1979 expenditure : F 27,165

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4.

Head IV – General administrative costs*Sub-Head 6*

POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS

Estimate for 1981	F	325,000
Budget for 1980	F	295,000
Net increase	F	30,000

1979 expenditure : F 289,167

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 7

OFFICE SUPPLIES AND HIRE OF MACHINES

Estimate for 1981	F	210,000
Budget for 1980	F	190,000
Net increase	F	20,000

1979 expenditure : F 189,407

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 8

PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS

Estimate for 1981	F	910,000
Budget for 1980	F	800,000
Net increase	F	110,000

1979 expenditure : F 756,899

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

Sub-Head 9

PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC

Estimate for 1981	F	30,000
Budget for 1980	F	28,000
Net increase	F	2,000

1979 expenditure : F 20,778

Sub-Head 10

OFFICIAL CARS

Estimate for 1981	F	50,500
Budget for 1980	F	44,500
Net increase	F	6,000

1979 expenditure : F 27,635

In the absence of a car belonging to the Assembly, provision must be made for the hire of chauffeur-driven cars for the President of the Assembly and the Clerk.

This increase corresponds to the expected rise in the cost of living.

Sub-Head 11

BANK CHARGES

Estimate for 1981	F	500
Budget for 1980	F	500
Estimate unchanged		

1979 expenditure : F 25

Head V – Other expenditure*Sub-Head 12*TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, CHAIRMEN
OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS

Estimate for 1981	F	85,000
Budget for 1980	F	77,000
Net increase	F	8,000

1979 expenditure : F 36,266

Travel and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly attending committee meetings, including meetings of the Presidential Committee, are paid by the governments.

The Assembly is responsible for travel and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of the Assembly, Rapporteurs and, on occasion, Committee Chairmen when such visits are connected

with the preparation of a report or Assembly business. Journeys by Chairmen and Rapporteurs are subject to the approval of the Presidential Committee.

Sub-Head 13

EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS

Estimate for 1981	F	132,000
Budget for 1980	F	120,000
Net increase	F	12,000

1979 expenditure : F 101,102

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 14

COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS

Estimate for 1981	F	3,000
Budget for 1980	F	3,000
Estimate unchanged		

1979 expenditure : F 5,764

Sub-Head 15

OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Estimate for 1981	F	215,000
Budget for 1980	F	187,000
Net increase	F	28,000

1979 expenditure : F 170,333

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 16

EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITORS

Estimate for 1981	F	50,000
Budget for 1980	F	45,000
Net increase	F	5,000

1979 expenditure : F 35,765

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 17

EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION

Estimate for 1981	F	250,000
Budget for 1980	F	161,000
Net increase	F	89,000

1979 expenditure : F 125,338

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 18

EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY

Estimate for 1981	F	250,000
Budget for 1980	F	161,000
Net increase	F	89,000

1979 expenditure : F 138,075

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

Sub-Head 19

CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR

Estimate for 1981	F	3,000
Budget for 1980	F	3,000
Estimate unchanged		

1979 expenditure : F 1,178

Sub-Head 20

NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES

Estimate for 1981	F	12,000
Budget for 1980	F	12,000
Estimate unchanged		

1979 expenditure : F 6,799

Head VI – Pensions*Sub-Head 21*

PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC

*(A) Pensions**(a) Retirement pension*

Estimate for 1981	F	58,000
Estimate for 1980	F	51,000
Net increase	F	7,000

1979 expenditure : F 44,865

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

(b) Invalidity pension pro mem.

1979 expenditure : nil

(c) Survivors' pension

Estimate for 1981	F	30,600
Estimate for 1980	F	26,000
Net increase	F	4,600

1979 expenditure : F 22,985

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

(d) Orphans' pension

Estimate for 1981	F	15,400
Budget for 1980	F	14,000
Net increase	F	1,400

1979 expenditure : F 12,038

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7.

(B) Allowances

pro mem.

(C) Severance grant

pro mem.

1979 expenditure : F 107,150

(D) Supplementary insurance

Estimate for 1981	F	2,000
Estimate for 1980		-
Net increase	F	2,000

1979 expenditure : nil

**DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1981**

***Council's preliminary opinion on the WEU Assembly
budget for 1981***

The COUNCIL TOOK NOTE of the Assembly's draft budget for 1981 as amended in paragraph 2 of C-B (80) 5, but are not yet ready to give their final opinion on this subject.

The COUNCIL NOTE that recent studies carried out on a national level by certain member states have resulted in the conclusion that further economies in the WEU budgets, as well as in the budgets of other international organisations, must be made. The WEU budgets will not exceed in real terms the 1980 budgets, and should result in savings.

The Assembly will be informed in due course of the further reductions to be sought.

*
* *

C-B (80) 5
31st October 1980

Secretary-General's note

WEU Assembly budget for 1981

1. The draft budget of the WEU Assembly for 1981 (Assembly document A/WEU/BA (80) 4), circulated under reference B (80) 20, was examined by the Budget and Organisation Committee at its meeting in London on 23rd-24th October 1980 (BR (80) 2, VII – to be circulated).
2. The Committee's conclusions can be summarised as follows:

Primary considerations

There was a measure of agreement that increases should not exceed the anticipated level of inflation in France. There was, however, some concern as to whether that should apply to each and every expenditure or to the overall total of the WEU budgets. That total could not be ascertained by the Committee because of the particular problem affecting Head I of the Assembly's budget as a result of which the credits were temporarily blocked pending a decision referred to below:

Head I – Expenditure for staff

The Committee noted that Head I was under a general reserve until a decision had been reached about the successor to the Clerk. Delegates commented that any changes proposed should not lead to increased expenditure. They rejected the request to regrade two posts from C.3 to C.4 at a cost put at French francs 3,600 in 1981.

Head V – Other expenditure

Sub-head 17 – Expenditure on information

Sub-head 18 – Expenses for groups of the Assembly

It is recalled that the Assembly had sought to increase both credits in 1980 from French francs 142,500 to French francs 250,000. The Council agreed to an increase in line with the inflation

forecast i.e. 13 %, as a result of which credits of French francs 161,000 were finally approved. In the 1981 budget the Assembly again seeks to raise the credits to French francs 250,000 (an increase of French francs 89,000 in each case).

Members of the Budget Committee were unable to accept those increases and recommended that there should be no change.

3. The immediate consequence of the Committee's recommendations, assuming that the application of inflation levels will only be decided when the total of Head I has been established, is to reduce Head V and the budget total by French francs 178,000. The modified total would be French francs 11,180,000 instead of French francs 11,358,000. There should be a further reduction of French francs 3,600 under Head I in due course.

4. Under the agreed procedure for the approval of Assembly budgets, given in the cover-note of document B (80) 20, the next stage was for the Council to give its opinion on the budget, indicating either preparedness to accept the draft or proposing amendments. That opinion has to be conveyed to the Assembly prior to the opening of the next session on 1st December 1980 in Paris. After its adoption by the Assembly the budget will be referred back to the Council for final approval.

5. The Council's opinion will be sought at the meeting to be held on 12th November 1980.

Revision and interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges²
by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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DRAFT RESOLUTION

to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.
2. *Members of the Committee* Mr. Grieve (Chairman); MM. Cornelissen (Alternate), Stoffelen (Alternate) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Battaglia, Bozzi, Brasseur (Alternate: Lagneau), Edwards, Giust, Glesener, Lord Hughes, Mr. van Hulst, Mrs. Knight (Alternate: Jessel), MM. Lagourgue

(Alternate: Talon), Lemaire, Marquardt, Michel, Mondino, Pignion, Schäuble (Alternate: Evers), Sterpa, Voogd, Zebisch.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics*

Draft Resolution
to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

The Assembly,

Considering it necessary to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure as follows:

1. The heading for this rule becomes: “ Substitutes and alternates ”.
2. In paragraph 1, replace the words “ may arrange to be replaced ” by “ may be replaced ”.
Delete the last sentence.
3. In paragraph 2, replace the words “ nominated in due form ” by the words “ duly registered in accordance with Rule 24 ”.
At the beginning of the second sentence, replace the word “ They ” by the word “Substitutes ”.
4. Paragraph 3 becomes paragraph 4 and reads as follows:
“ Representatives and Substitutes may sit on Committees either as titular members or as alternates.
Any titular member who is prevented from attending a meeting may appoint an alternate from among the alternate members of the Committee of the same nationality as himself. With the consent of the Chairman of the Committee, he may also be replaced by any other Representative or Substitute of the same nationality as himself.
The alternate so appointed shall have the same rights as the titular member. ”
5. Delete paragraph 4.
6. Paragraph 5 becomes paragraph 3,

DECIDES

To replace former Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure by the following:

“ Substitutes and Alternates ”

1. Any Representative prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly may be replaced by a Substitute.
2. Substitutes duly registered in accordance with Rule 24 have the same rights as Representatives in the Assembly.
Substitutes may not, however, be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.
3. A Substitute who is a Committee Chairman or Rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if he is not sitting in place of a Representative. In the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled to vote.
4. Representatives and Substitutes may sit on Committees either as titular members or as alternates.

Any titular member who is prevented from attending a meeting may appoint an alternate from among the alternate members of the Committee of the same nationality as himself. With the consent of the Chairman of the Committee, he may also be replaced by any other Representative or Substitute of the same nationality as himself.

The alternate so appointed shall have the same rights as the titular member. ”

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur)

1. The appointment of substitutes is provided for in Article II (b) of the Charter in order to allow enough members to be present for the Assembly to proceed with its work in spite of the hazards of parliamentary life which too often prevent some members taking their seats. This paragraph reads as follows:

“Substitutes of the representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe may sit, speak and vote in the place of representatives prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly.”

2. The conditions in which substitution is organised in the Assembly and its Committees are set out in Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure.

3. These provisions seem clear. However, members of the Assembly have on several occasions noted certain difficulties in applying them, particularly during the June 1979 session. On that occasion, Mr. von Hassel, President of the Assembly, stated that the interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure should be examined in detail. He noted in fact that there was some question as to the moment from which substitution became effective. Was it when the President made his customary announcement to the Assembly at the start of a sitting? Was it still possible to sign on as a substitute after this announcement? Did substitution apply to the whole sitting? Could a substitute replace more than one representative at the same sitting? Could a representative speak but leave his substitute to vote?

4. In order to remove all uncertainty about methods of applying Rule 7, the Presidential Committee asked the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to submit the present report to the Assembly.

5. In fact, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure may be interpreted differently according to whether the aim is to draw up a clear, final and unquestionable list of seats filled by representatives and those assigned to substitutes for each sitting or rather to assemble the largest possible number of members when votes are taken.

6. If the expression “prevented from attending a sitting” is interpreted strictly, the provisions of Rule 7 in fact allow it to be determined at the beginning of each sitting which titular members and substitutes have the right to speak and vote. However, they prevent titular members or substitutes included in the attendance

register and obliged to be absent when votes are taken from being replaced. Their effect is therefore to facilitate roll-call votes but to make it more difficult to obtain a quorum.

7. Presidents of the Assembly had therefore been led to interpret the rules more flexibly to allow a representative and his substitute to fill a seat in turn at the same sitting and consequently to have the right to speak and vote successively. It was thus easier to avoid vacant seats when votes were taken. Conversely, it could arise that there was doubt as to which member of the Assembly should be called during a roll-call vote.

8. Hence, it should be determined:

- (i) when a substitute has signed the attendance register, whether he is to replace the titular member and exercise all the latter's duties throughout the sitting, or whether he should withdraw in the event of the titular member wishing to resume his place during the sitting;
- (ii) when a titular member has signed the attendance register, whether he is still entitled to have himself replaced in the event of other commitments compelling him to absent himself during the same sitting.

9. The Committee was almost unanimous in considering that the expression “prevented from attending a sitting” should be interpreted strictly and that it was for each delegation to ensure the necessary discipline among its members so that representatives and substitutes whose names appeared on the attendance register exercised their rights throughout the sitting, except in unavoidable circumstances.

10. However, a small majority of the Committee felt that the aim of Rule 7 in making provision for substitutes was to allow delegations to fill all seats available to them. It therefore feels that too much importance should not be attached to the duration of the sitting. It should be possible for a representative to arrange to be replaced at any time. Moreover, it may happen that a representative and his substitute are both absent at the same time. In that event, another member of the delegation should be able to fill the vacant seat. In short, the minority considered that the provisions of Rule 7 should be applied flexibly in order to

ensure that a quorum was obtained and recalled that this was what Presidents of the Assembly had done hitherto.

11. The majority of the Committee preferred to give priority to the need for clarity and discipline rather than to obtaining a quorum, pointing out that members of the Assembly would be present in greater numbers when votes were taken precisely if there was more discipline in the delegations.

12. However, the Committee voted in favour of a more flexible interpretation of the Rules of Procedure where the right to speak was concerned in order to allow a member of the Assembly who had already put his name down to speak and whose speech had had to be postponed until a subsequent sitting to speak even if replaced.

13. The Committee pointed out moreover that by calling for discipline within the delegations it removed the personal nature of substitution which had seemed to apply under the present wording of paragraph 1 of Rule 7. In short, it considered that strict interpretation of the expression "prevented from attending a sitting" meant amending the expression "may arrange to be replaced" insofar as the decision to appoint a specific substitute should be taken by the delegation organising its representation in the Assembly rather than by the representative prevented from attending.

14. The Committee therefore felt that in paragraph 1 of Rule 7 the expression "may arrange to be replaced" should read "may be replaced".

15. Furthermore, in practice, it was not the representative prevented from attending who informed the President of the Assembly but the Office of the Clerk which communicated a list of representatives and substitutes present to the President on the basis of the attendance register and then to the Assembly in an appendix to the minutes of the sitting. The words "He must give notice thereof to the President, who will in turn inform the Assembly" should therefore be deleted and replaced by a reference in paragraph 2 to registration of substitutes according to Rule 24.

16. In its report (Document 843) on the interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure, the Committee proposed redrafting paragraphs 3 and 4, but on 3rd June 1980, the Assembly referred the report back to the Committee at the request of your Rapporteur. The reference back to the Committee was to allow it to study in detail the objections to this redrafting formulated by Mr. De Poi in his capacity as Chairman of the Italian Delegation.

17. Because of the large number of political parties represented on certain delegations, Mr. De Poi could not in fact accept the rule whereby, except with the special authorisation of the Chairman, titular members may be replaced only by a representative or substitute appointed for the purpose. In other words, he was against the idea of an official and permanent alternate for each titular member and considered that any alternate member of the Committee should be able to replace any titular member of the same nationality.

18. The amendment in the present report takes account of Mr. De Poi's remarks. It first stipulates that titular holders of seats on Committees may be either Representatives or Substitutes and that titular members may appoint alternates. It then sets out two methods of appointment: (1) a titular member prevented from attending a Committee meeting is free to choose his alternate from among alternate members of the Committee of the same nationality as himself; (2) with the agreement of the Chairman, a titular member may also arrange to be replaced by a member of the Assembly not belonging to the Committee, provided the Representative or Substitute concerned is of the same nationality as himself.

19. The text of paragraph 4 of Rule 7 modified by the Committee should therefore read as follows:

"4. Representatives and Substitutes may sit on Committees either as titular members or as alternates.

Any titular member who is prevented from attending a meeting may appoint an alternate from among the alternate members of the Committee of the same nationality as himself. With the consent of the Chairman of the Committee, he may also be replaced by any other Representative or Substitute of the same nationality as himself.

The alternate so appointed shall have the same rights as the titular member."

20. The last sub-paragraph of paragraph 4 of the new text of Rule 7 is worded similarly to the provisions of paragraph 3 of the present Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure in that "the alternate so appointed shall have the same rights as the titular member". These rights should be made clear and distinguished from duties such as those of member of the Bureau or Rapporteur. Alternates who are "potential" members of the Committee become "full" members only for the duration of the meeting for which they have been appointed to replace a titular member. Only then do they have the same rights as the titular member they are replacing, i.e. the right to speak and to vote.

21. Paragraph 4, the text of which was unsatisfactory, should be deleted since the new paragraph 3 renders it irrelevant.

22. Paragraph 5, relating to procedure for replacement in plenary sittings, should follow straight on from the first two paragraphs and become paragraph 3.

23. Finally, the heading for Rule 7 should now be "Substitutes and alternates".

24. The Committee therefore proposes that the Assembly adopt the attached draft resolution to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure and apply the provisions of the rule thus amended strictly.

Methods of voting

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges²
by Mr. Bozzi, Rapporteur*

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DRAFT RESOLUTION

to amend Rules 34 and 36 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Bozzi, Rapporteur

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Grieve (Chairman); MM. Cornelissen (Alternate), Stoffelen (Alternate) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Battaglia, *Bozzi*, Brasseur (Alternate: Lagneau), Edwards, Giust, Glesener, Lord Hughes, Mr. van Hulst, Mrs. Knight (Alternate: *Jessel*), MM. Lagourgue

(Alternate: *Talon*), Lemaire, Marquardt, Michel, Mondino, Pignion, Schäuble (Alternate: *Evers*), Sterpa, Voogd, Zebisch.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics*

Draft Resolution

to amend Rules 34 and 36 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

The Assembly,

DECIDES

1. To replace paragraph 2 of Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure by the following:
“ 2. Whenever ten or more Representatives so desire, the vote shall be taken by roll-call.
The roll shall begin with the names of those requesting a roll-call vote. Should there be less than seven of them present to answer when their names are called, the roll-call shall be stopped and the vote taken by sitting and standing. ”;
2. To replace paragraphs 1 and 4 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure by the following:
“ 1. The Assembly shall not take any decision by roll-call unless more than half the Representatives or their Substitutes have signed the Register of Attendance provided for in Rule 24 above. ”
“ 4. In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall be postponed until a subsequent sitting of the same part-session. Any matter on which it has not been possible to vote before the end of the said part-session in the absence of a quorum shall be referred to the Presidential Committee, which shall decide whether the text should be put to the vote at the next part-session of the Assembly or referred back to Committee.”

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Bozzi, Rapporteur)

1. The Committee already submitted a report on methods of voting at the Assembly's twenty-fourth session (Document 794). The draft order in this report advocating the full application of Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure was adopted unanimously by the Committee on 22nd November 1978. It has since been decided to instruct the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to make an overall review of the Rules of Procedure.

2. In view of the continuing difficulty in obtaining a quorum, the Presidential Committee has asked the Committee to give priority to its examination of the question of methods of voting.

3. The rigorous voting conditions which the Assembly imposed upon itself have not always been understood.

4. On occasion, the Assembly has in fact not been able to vote on important but controversial texts. Rather than being a sign of weakness, your Rapporteur considers that this rigour is an expression of dignity and illustrates the importance the Assembly attaches to its task.

5. In Document 794 mentioned above, it was stated that: "Unlike a national parliament, the WEU Assembly is a purely consultative body. It has no legislative powers and cannot overthrow a government. The value of a recommendation adopted by the Assembly thus lies in the force of the political conviction it expresses and the degree and genuineness of the support it receives. A recommendation adopted by a narrow margin and not an effective majority of the members of the Assembly would carry little weight."

6. However, this opinion no longer seems to be so widely shared. Some consider that the Assembly should be released from the statutory shackles which sometimes prevent it from voting.

7. Some Committee members felt that the only effective procedure for guaranteeing the adoption of draft recommendations or opinions on which there has to be a vote by roll-call would be to introduce proxy voting, now prohibited under Rule 37, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Procedure.

8. These Committee members proposed that a representative who had attended at least one sitting and found it impossible to be replaced by a substitute might ask another representative

or substitute to vote on his behalf on one or more texts on which there was a roll-call vote during a sitting or part-session. No member of the Assembly should be able to vote for more than one other member.

9. A large majority of the Committee was opposed to these suggestions.

10. Other members proposed the idea that normal procedure should be to vote by sitting and standing. In their view, roll-call votes should be the exception.

11. Advocates of this view therefore suggested bringing the Rules of Procedure of the WEU Assembly into line with those of the Assembly of the Council of Europe and, to this end, wished to follow the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Rule 35 of that Assembly's Rules of Procedure which state that votes shall be taken by roll-call whenever ten or more representatives so desire or, in the case of a vote on a draft recommendation, resolution or opinion as a whole, whenever five or more representatives so desire.

12. The new paragraph 3 of Rule 34 would therefore read as follows:

"The vote on a motion to disagree to the annual report, or to any part of it, shall be taken by roll-call.

The vote on the draft reply to the annual report and on a draft recommendation or opinion considered as a whole shall be taken by roll-call whenever five or more representatives so desire."

13. However, other Committee members had reservations about this. Your Rapporteur for his part feels that the remarks on which the Committee's earlier report to the Assembly was based still apply. He therefore considers it would be politically inexpedient to make more flexible the provisions of Rule 34 relating to methods of voting.

14. He also considers that greater recourse to the simplified procedure referred to in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the abovementioned report would foster uncertainty over procedure. Such uncertainty has already, on occasion, provoked complaints in the past when simplified procedure has been applied.

15. The simplified procedure should therefore be applied more strictly. Announcement of a single vote "against" should make the application of normal procedure mandatory.

Simplified procedure might be considered acceptable for saving time when there are only abstentions.

16. Your Rapporteur recognises the need to find a means of avoiding a minority being able to manœuvre to make it impossible for the Assembly to vote on a controversial text, i.e. by expressing its opposition and then withdrawing from the chamber to ensure that there is not a quorum. The majority of the Assembly should in fact be guaranteed the right to express its convictions by voting on a text. To this end, your Rapporteur suggests giving a more precise definition of the quorum and stipulating in Rule 36, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Procedure that account is taken of those present rather than of those voting.

17. Such a provision would conform to the spirit of the rigorous interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure given by the Committee Chairman, Mr. Grieve, in his report.

18. The obligation incumbent on a representative or substitute who signs the attendance register to exercise all attendant rights and duties throughout the sitting in question allows him to be considered as present even if, for any reason whatsoever, he does not take part in the vote. An Assembly document, i.e. the attendance list appended to the minutes of the sitting concerned, is official proof of his presence.

19. Your Rapporteur proposes that the attendance register rather than the number of those taking part in the vote be taken as the basis for determining whether there is a quorum, and suggests amending paragraph 1 of Rule 36 to read as follows:

“The Assembly shall not take any decision by roll-call unless more than half the Representatives or their Substitutes have signed the Register of Attendance provided for in Rule 24 above.”

20. The result of the vote would then be announced as follows: ayes..., noes..., abstentions..., did not take part in the vote...

21. It should be pointed out that there have been cases of sufficient members being present according to the attendance register but the number of votes cast in a roll-call vote being less than the 45 required. The proposed provisions would have allowed the Assembly's decision to be recorded.

22. Moreover, rather than systematically postponing the vote until the next session, your Rapporteur believes it might be preferable to refer to the Presidential Committee any matters left outstanding for lack of a quorum. Thus the Committee which prepares the Assembly's agenda could decide, case by case, whether the text in question will still be topical six months later or whether it should be referred back to Committee.

23. Your Rapporteur therefore proposes amending paragraph 4 of Rule 36 to read as follows:

“In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall be postponed until a subsequent sitting of the same part-session. Any matter on which it has not been possible to vote before the end of the said part-session in the absence of a quorum shall be referred to the Presidential Committee, which shall decide whether the text should be put to the vote at the next part-session of the Assembly or referred back to Committee.”

24. Finally, to avoid manœuvres to prevent the Assembly voting on matters other than those requiring a roll-call vote under the Rules of Procedure, your Rapporteur proposes adding the following text to paragraph 2 of Rule 34 on methods of voting:

“The roll-call shall begin with the names of those requesting a roll-call vote. Should there be less than seven of them present to answer when their names are called, the roll-call shall be stopped and the vote taken by sitting and standing.”

25. In conclusion, your Rapporteur recalls that the required quorum represents only one-quarter of the total number of representatives and substitutes. The system of substitutes should therefore allow the requisite number of members to be present whenever necessary for voting purposes.

26. It should be repeated that it is for the chairmen of delegations and political groups to come to grips with absenteeism and ensure discipline and for each member of the Assembly to be conscientious in contributing to the work of the Assembly whenever his presence is required.

Methods of voting

AMENDMENT 1 ¹
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen

1. After paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, insert the following:
“ To replace paragraph 3 of Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure by the following:
3. The vote on a motion to disagree to the annual report, or to any part of it, shall be taken by roll-call. The vote on the draft reply to the annual report and on a draft recommendation or opinion considered as a whole shall be taken by roll-call whenever five or more representatives so desire. The roll-call shall begin with the names of those requiring a roll-call vote. Should there be less than three of them present to answer when their names are called, the roll-call shall be stopped and the vote taken by sitting and standing. ”

Signed: Stoffelen

1. See 8th Sitting, 1st December 1980 (Amendment amended and negatived).

Methods of voting

AMENDMENTS 2 and 3 ¹
tabled by Lord Hughes

2. In paragraph 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, line 4, leave out “ present ” and insert “ Representatives or their Substitutes who have signed the Register of Attendance provided for in Rule 24 above ”.
3. In paragraph 3 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, line 3, leave out from “ Representatives ” to the end of the paragraph and insert “ the Representatives or their Substitutes has not signed the Register provided for in Rule 24 above ”.

Signed: Lord Hughes

1. See 8th Sitting, 1st December 1980 (Amendments agreed to).

Future of European security

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee²
by Mr. von Hassel, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 2 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Sir Frederic Bennett (Chairman); MM. De Poi, Porthéine (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Berrier (Alternate: *Baumel*), Mrs. Boniver, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Brugnon, Conti Persini (Alternate: *Amadei*), Deschamps, Druon, Gessner (Alternate: *Vohrer*), Hanin

(Alternate: *Michel*), Hardy, von Hassel, Lagneau, Lord McNair (Alternate: *Kershaw*), MM. Mangelschots (Alternate: *van Waterschoot*), Mende, Mommersteeg, Müller, Périquier, Lord Reay, MM. Thoss, Urwin, Valante, Vecchietti, Voogd.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on the future of European security

The Assembly,

Considering that the joint interest of all its members is to promote collective security so as to consolidate peace and promote détente and disarmament;

Considering that Europe has to face a threat that is now formidable because of the Soviet Union's superiority in many fields;

Considering that the Soviet Union's operations beyond the European continent extend this threat to the economic and political fields;

Considering that Europe's security can be guaranteed only by the cohesion and strength of the Atlantic Alliance and the resolve of its members;

Considering that the fulfilment of this requirement calls for close agreement between the European and American members of the Atlantic Alliance on their joint defence policy;

Considering that the situation requires the European element of the Alliance to make a greater effort to take part in joint defence and disarmament initiatives, particularly with regard to conventional weapons;

Considering that, to be effective, this effort implies close co-operation in the production of armaments;

Considering that the European Community has established solidarity between most European members of the Atlantic Alliance so that on many matters they are in a position to express joint views on questions which are outside the Community's purview;

Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty, with the North Atlantic Treaty, constitutes the basis of European security;

Considering that the European Community is not in a position to replace WEU in exercising that organisation's defence and armaments responsibilities but that steps should be taken here and now to face up to the requirements of European security,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Set up a working group to examine measures to be taken by all member countries to adapt WEU to the present requirements of European defence and instruct it to study in particular:

- (a) the co-ordination of member countries' policies in its areas of responsibility, namely defence, armaments and disarmament;
- (b) the participation of Ministers of Defence or their representatives in its meetings when matters which concern them are discussed;
- (c) the convening of meetings before those of the North Atlantic Council with a view to identifying the joint views of its members on matters relating to Europe's security;
- (d) the question of inviting all countries which are members of the EEC, have applied for membership or are European members of NATO also to negotiate their accession to the modified Brussels Treaty or, if they do not wish to do so, their association with the activities of WEU;
- (e) the action to be taken on the study being conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee so that the outcome may be a true European armaments policy.

Draft Resolution
on the future of European security

The Assembly,

Considering that the WEU Assembly remains the only European assembly with responsibilities in defence questions;

Considering that the election of the parliamentary assembly of the European Communities by direct universal suffrage gives that assembly new authority in the framework of the Rome Treaty;

Considering it desirable to establish links between these two assemblies,

DECIDES

1. To instruct the Presidential Committee, on its initiative, to consider with the Bureau of the assembly of the European Communities the possibility of organising an exchange of observers between the two assemblies;
2. To instruct its President to examine with the President of the European Parliament all the questions raised by this exchange of observers;
3. To instruct the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee to contact the Chairman of the Political Committee of the assembly of the European Communities with a view to co-ordinating the political work of the two assemblies.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. von Hassel, Rapporteur)

1. Europe's security aims

1. There were about eight million victims during the first world war in Europe. In the second world war, almost 45 million Europeans were killed. The subsequent growth in armaments, and nuclear armaments in particular, has been such that there is every reason to think that a third world war would leave Europe in a state of almost total devastation and that the population would be practically wiped out, even if nuclear weapons were not used. But this is hardly probable. It is enough to glance at a map of the world to see that Europe could not be spared in the event of hostilities between the Soviet Union and the United States. Its wealth, its population and the narrow confines between the iron curtain and the shores of the Atlantic make it a vital stake and any future war will inevitably be fought on its soil.

2. There is therefore no interest, whether national or ideological, which would warrant the risk of any European country or nation sparking off a war. This fact cannot and does not escape any of the Western European countries and, since the end of the second world war, no European government has even thought of using force, let alone done so, to obtain benefits of any kind whatsoever, at least in Europe.

3. No political party, whether in government or in opposition, has ever considered war as a means of attaining aims of any kind whatsoever. This means that some have accepted a situation which, in another age, would have seemed intolerable, such as the division of Germany and the German people and the situation imposed on Berlin. But no one, in Germany or elsewhere, has done anything to start a war that might change this situation. No one has even considered doing so. Consequently, any accusations that may have been levelled at a European state, or even a party, of militarism, revanchism or aggressiveness are and were unfair, completely unfounded and slanderous. They are, and remain, dangerous insofar as they are liable to incur or perpetuate mistrust for which today there is no justification but which may sow discord between nations with common situations and aims.

4. Peace can be secured only if an opponent refrains from the idea that an attack on Western Europe could be of advantage to him. The West's policy must also be a defence policy, which means the opponent is deterred from any

attack or pressure. This policy is no longer conceived as an instrument of a foreign policy directed towards the attainment of national goals but merely as a means of ensuring security, i.e. peace, no longer for one country or another, but for the whole of Europe, since no one can hope to evade a war which might break out on the European continent.

5. This desire for peace does not mean that Europe is not prepared to make the sacrifices it considers necessary to defend its freedom. The whole population of all the countries of Europe has steadfastly accepted such sacrifices because it realised the need for them. Most Western European countries have compulsory military service for their youth. All spend a considerable proportion of their gross national product on maintaining and equipping their armed forces. When, in 1979, it became apparent that an additional financial effort was necessary to ensure Europe's security, all the members of NATO accepted the principle of an annual increase of at least 3 % in constant values in their defence budgets, in spite of the difficulties they were all experiencing due to a long-term deeply-rooted economic recession.

6. Thus, there can be no ambiguity in Europe's attitude towards everything contributing to a policy of détente. All Europeans seek détente in East-West relations provided it does not weaken their security. They all have the same interest in limiting as far as possible the sacrifices which they have to make to ensure their defence. But they cannot agree to a foreign policy which diminishes the effect of these sacrifices, i.e. which jeopardises their security.

7. The policy of détente cannot therefore be separated from Europe's overall defence policy. It is closely linked with and an integral part of defence policy since it seeks to strengthen security while reducing expenditure on armaments. It is therefore an unassailable responsibility of Western European Union under the modified Brussels Treaty. It has long been prominent in WEU's work and the Assembly has on many occasions examined its aspects and implications, even after nine-power Europe took over many of these questions in the framework of political consultations between the nine governments.

8. Disarmament and the limitation of armaments have always been a major aim of Europeans but only in the framework of a global policy which includes consultations amongst

allies and negotiations with the Soviet Union, its allies and all countries concerned. In varying ways and to a greater or lesser extent they have all taken part in disarmament negotiations, particularly in the framework of the Geneva Disarmament Committee. The United Nations special session on disarmament in 1978 showed the interest and importance of disarmament for European countries whichever alliance they belonged to or whether they were neutral or non-aligned. Europe played a decisive rôle at that session and was very largely responsible for the changes then made in the composition and methods of work of the Disarmament Committee.

9. Although the European countries were not asked to take a direct part in the SALT negotiations, they have followed them very closely, particularly in their consultations with their American partner, and have made it clear that they wish them to be successful as long as they do not in any way compromise Europe's security. Similarly, the European members of NATO have taken part in the MBFR talks and have tried to make them advance in the same direction.

10. Your Rapporteur points out that after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan some politicians were heard to say that the only way to overcome the mounting tension would be by a policy of disarmament. Your Rapporteur is in favour of all serious talks on disarmament. But those who believe this might be a remedy for the crisis should note that the Geneva Committee held its 867th meeting in 1980 without recording any major results in terms of European security and disarmament. The least that can be said is that its work is desperately slow, even assuming that there is still hope of some outcome. Naturally, events in 1979 and 1980, particularly the invasion of Afghanistan, did nothing to raise hopes and it is now unrealistic to base a policy on disarmament which would be tantamount to responding to a succession of challenges to Western Europe's security by a display of weakness and an attitude of appeasement, the effects of which would probably be the reverse of the aim sought, i.e. the consolidation of peace. Indeed, at the present juncture, the development of détente and disarmament cannot be envisaged without, to say the least, a new appraisal of the threats to international peace and an assessment of the forces deployed by the Soviet Union and its allies.

11. Any initiatives the Soviets may take at present in the name of détente and disarmament do not seem to be aimed at achieving concrete results based on maintaining the balance and developing peaceful relations but rather at undermining the unity of Europe and the Atlantic Community and weakening their

determination to continue to make the sacrifices necessary for their security.

12. Europe's freedom is indivisible and the West must do its utmost to avoid being carried away by proposals which conceal such dangers. In facing up to the implications of the present situation and examining the threats facing Europe our sights must be set firmly on the objective of security based on détente and effective disarmament.

13. Soviet moves to denounce NATO as a militarist, aggressive or revanchist undertaking must be discounted straight away. The Atlantic Alliance is in fact purely defensive and NATO is in no way designed for an offensive policy, nor an offensive strategy: NATO is absolutely unable to attack. There are therefore no grounds for ideas that the West should show understanding for the Soviet Union which feels itself surrounded and hence threatened by the West. Such views take no account of the Soviet Union's perfect knowledge of the text of the North Atlantic Treaty, the structure of NATO and the democratic decision-taking machinery of all the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance under parliamentary supervision. The Soviet Union fully realises what it is doing in pursuing, for political purposes, this line of propaganda which seeks to divide the West and weaken its defence effort. The West must not forget that peace in Europe since 1945 cannot be attributed to international opinion, the United Nations Charter and its application or talks on détente and disarmament but only to the balance of force guaranteed by NATO which alone has given certain shape – still ill-defined – to an international order which it alone maintains. This means that however great may be the attachment to peace and the desire to bring about real disarmament and détente on the part of the members of the Atlantic Alliance, they would be running counter to their aims if they did not first seek to maintain – or, at the present juncture, restore – the balance without which there can be neither peace nor law.

II. Threats to European security

1. Political aspects

14. The seizure of power by the Communist Party in Russia in 1917 introduced a completely new concept of international relations on the part of the Bolcheviks. They saw the Russian revolution merely as a step towards world revolution and revolution in any one country meant the power, army and external policy of the Soviet Union being placed at the service of that revolution. Since then, therefore, the cause of revolution and that of the Soviet

Union have become merged in the eyes of communist leaders the world over – admittedly with a few exceptions such as Tito in Yugoslavia and Mao Tse-tung and his successors in China. Hence, they consider that it is the class struggle – which they believe to be history's principal driving force – which is expressed in international relations and that this struggle cannot come to an end until communists have assumed power throughout the world.

15. However, this does not mean the Soviet Union is prepared to leap blindly into any venture in the name of revolution. On many past occasions, it has shown great flexibility in implementing its schemes and has applied them very realistically. As long as the "capitalist world" has sufficient cohesion and force to inflict defeat or intolerable losses on the Soviet Union in the event of open hostilities, the latter will be deterred from taking the risk of a direct confrontation, in Europe at least, as long as it knows the West will not hesitate to use its full force to ensure its security. This has led it to use other means of weakening the capitalist side, leaving itself room to build up its strength and perhaps, tomorrow, to win the day while avoiding open confrontation.

16. But such means can be deployed only under cover of Soviet strength. The Soviet Union has therefore started to build up what is probably the largest and best equipped army in the world, forming a navy equal to the strongest in the world, i.e. that of the United States, and developing nuclear power equal to that of its potential enemy in every field and which now in many respects is in the lead.

17. The economic and social cost of this tremendous armaments effort has been considerable and has left the Soviet people far behind Western Europe and the United States in terms of personal consumption. To impose these sacrifices, the Soviet Government has for several decades had to maintain a dictatorship difficult to tolerate and a main effect of which has been the complete isolation of the population to prevent it from knowing the true situation in the rest of the world. This dictatorship is an essential condition for the success of Soviet external policy.

18. A revolutionary policy has been worked out for countries where capitalism is firmly entrenched which includes weakening western positions outside Europe and cutting the western countries off from their essential resources, particularly Middle East oil and ores for the European market mainly from southern Africa. It is from every point of view in the interests of the Soviet Union to win over to its ideological system the countries recently freed from colonialism or bring them under its domination. If at one time it had such illusions, its

experience with China certainly quelled them. The communist order is intended for industrialised countries in which it can lean on a large and organised working class, but marxist logic, which here corresponds to a fairly realistic assessment of the facts, holds that capitalism is inherently condemned to expand continually and consequently all forces opposing such expansion can halt it and thus provoke its self-destruction.

19. That is why the Soviet Union has no hesitation in encouraging all movements capable of destabilising regions whose production or markets may be useful to the West and to this end it relies equally on nationalist forces and religious, ethnic or economic movements. This does not mean the Soviet Union gives equal support and assistance to all such forces but it is liable to make use of them or even stir them up if they are likely to play a rôle in world strategy. This is probably the explanation for the operations instigated or supported by the Soviet Union in South-East Asia, the Near and Middle East and Africa.

20. A look at a map of the Indian Ocean indicating all the subversive movements encouraged, aided or provoked by the Soviet Union and its conquests and those of its allies in the past five years would show a threefold pincer-movement closing on the ocean through which most Middle East oil has to pass: much of the oil consumed by the United States, 60 % of that consumed by Western Europe and 90 % of Japanese requirements. As long as the West remains as dependent as it now is on oil imports from the Middle East, the ability to close the Persian Gulf will give the Soviet Union strong means of pressure. The West has of course sensed the danger and taken steps to allow it to escape this pressure in the future, first by building up oil reserves which now amount to about four months' consumption and second by developing, as decided in Venice in June 1980, alternative forms of energy for the western economy to depend less closely on Middle East oil, its price and supply routes. However, the effects of these measures will be felt only in the long term and, for the next ten years at least, the West will remain very largely dependent on that area of the world.

21. On the eastern side of the Indian Ocean, the three claws of the pincer are clearly discernible: the seizure of the whole of Vietnam by a pro-Soviet régime, the domination of Laos, the conquest of Cambodia and the outbreak of fighting between Vietnam and Thailand in June 1980 indicate that the Indochinese peninsula is in the process of falling entirely into the hands of the Soviet Union or its friends. The invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 allowed the Red Army, in crossing the highest mountain barrier in the world, to come 500 km closer

to the Strait of Hormuz from which it is now separated only by a crumbling Iranian state and the Baluchi province of a singularly weakened Pakistan. Finally, the third claw of the pincer is in the northern Near East where the Soviet Union is encouraging continuous internal disturbances in Turkey with several hundred victims of terrorism each month, where Syria seems on the brink of another revolution and Iraq has an army almost entirely equipped by the Soviet Union.

22. In face of this direct or indirect thrust by the Soviet Union towards the south, the development of Soviet influence in the Arabian peninsula and Africa is the second part of the pincer movement closing on the Indian Ocean. The Arabian peninsula is threatened by a dynamic South Yemen, with the powerful assistance of the Soviet Union, and by a Palestinian diaspora which may now be said to be threatening the stability of nearly all the states in the region. Although little is still known about the events in Mecca in autumn 1979, they indicate that the strength of dissenting forces has become considerable, even in Saudi Arabia. There are numerous Palestinians and they hold key positions in the Gulf oil states. They have their political and military organisation and constitute a major threat to stability in the area.

23. In Africa, the Soviet Union has found a series of staging posts, some in the north, others in the centre or south of the continent, *inter alia* in Algeria, Libya, Ethiopia, Guinea, Benin, Zambia and Mozambique. The presence of a large Cuban contingent and a number of technicians from East Germany allows these countries to be used as a base for bringing pressure and steady threats to bear on South Africa and for fomenting instability, unrest and dissent in most African countries. But South Africa alone accounts for 40 % of African industry and 45 % of its mining output, 86 % of world platinum output, 83 % chromium, 14 % vanadium, 49 % gold, 48 % manganese and 46 % fluorine, not to speak of the importance of the Cape route for world trade since 78 % of Europe's oil supplies pass by that route, including 68 % of those of the Federal Republic and 99 % of those of France, plus 80 % of Western Europe's imports of raw materials.

24. It is therefore impossible to isolate the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan from a whole series of other events occurring all round the Indian Ocean and which show a coherent attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to use this region in a global strategy.

25. The present economic crisis in the West provides the Soviet Union with an excellent opportunity for developing this undertaking by strengthening all the elements of internal dissension in the "capitalist" countries. The

communist parties may play this rôle, but they do not have a monopoly. The development of terrorism in Turkey and its continuation in Italy are alarming factors of destabilisation. The crisis also allows advantage to be taken of growing differences between the western countries' economic interests in order to break up the cohesion of the capitalist world. Communist party exploitation of national feelings in certain European countries and above all the spread of nationalist claims in the industrial, trade and even agricultural fields indicate that this is a concerted operation designed to ruin the western alliance and weaken the ability of each western country to resist Soviet pressure and, furthermore, to annihilate the West's overall ability to resist this pressure by destroying its cohesion.

26. Such an undertaking implies the use of propaganda as an essential means of separating the West from the third world countries by assimilating the cause of the West's security to that of imperialism, colonialism and capitalism. This propaganda campaign of course finds many footholds in the third world and in the West and its effectiveness cannot be denied. The exploitation of feelings left over from past history, however unjustified they may now be, is a habitual method of destroying the West's cohesion. Anti-Americanism in Europe or anti-Germanism in certain countries are the themes of propaganda which has been pushed relentlessly ever since the end of the second world war. Moreover, the assimilation of Soviet policy to the interests of peace or even justice and freedom is a leitmotiv propagated by a large number of organisations, some of which, directly or indirectly run by Moscow, such as the "Peace Movement", aim at weakening the western societies' will to resist. In this field too times of crisis favour the development of such propaganda.

27. These various factors do not allow it to be concluded that the Soviet Union is preparing for a final assault on the capitalist world. It is far more likely that it is seeking a position of force from which to negotiate with the capitalist powers, whose inevitable decline can but be speeded up by the economic crisis, in order to work out, at least in the first stage, a sort of division of the world, of influences and of wealth. Without taking any risks, of nuclear war at least, the Soviet Union would thus have gained a strong position for the subsequent stages of a necessary world revolution in face of which the West would be divided, weakened and demoralised, if not neutralised. Shifting from the class struggle to the foreign policy and diplomatic field also means proceeding with caution and moderation so as not to compromise certain results by resorting to reckless policies.

28. This probably explains the moderation shown by the Soviet Union once it realised that its intervention in Afghanistan might jeopardise its whole external policy, make it lose the advantages it had gained and create tension which could but isolate and weaken it. At the end of June 1980, just before the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the Soviet Union, announcing the withdrawal of a few troops from Afghanistan after having told the world a few weeks earlier that it would apply the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty for socialist states, showed that it did not intend to press on with the confrontation with the West, which was determined to refuse the fait accompli and had the support of a large proportion of the non-aligned countries. It should be noted moreover that according to available information the Soviet troops withdrawn from Afghanistan were immediately replaced and everything indicates that the size of the forces engaged in that country increased during the summer.

29. It is with this in mind that the Soviet Union's military threat to the free world must be assessed: for the Soviet Union, there is no truly military field separate from the political field, the military being placed at the service of a highly political cause, particularly since political action itself is thought out as strategy.

2. Military aspects

(a) Armaments

30. Such a policy could not in fact be pursued without the Soviet Union building up military strength which on the one hand ensures the country's security and, on the other, allows it to protect its operations against any intervention by the capitalist powers and furnishes a means of acting against and bringing pressure to bear on countries where it wants its will to prevail. This explains why, since the 1917 revolution, the Soviet Union has been making a steady armaments effort. Since 1945, its aim has been to ensure that it has overwhelming military superiority over absolutely any adversary in every field. Since that date, it has regularly assigned 11 to 15 % of its gross national product to defence as compared with a current figure of less than 6 % for the United States and 3 to 4 % for most European members of the Atlantic Alliance in the last five years. In 1979, NATO decided on an increase of 3 % at constant values in the military budgets of member states. But it will take about ten years for this decision, if effectively and continuously applied, to produce an increase of even one per cent in the proportion of gross national product assigned to defence since it is only about 1⁰⁰⁰ of the GNP. This constant

imbalance in military expenditure between the two sides explains why, for the past few years, the Soviet Union has been on the way to becoming the world's leading military power, although NATO still considers it can to a certain extent make up for its quantitative inferiority by its more advanced technology.

31. (i) *Where strategic nuclear forces are concerned*, the SALT II agreements, signed in 1979 but whose ratification by the United States Senate was postponed *sine die* after the invasion of Afghanistan, reflected the real balance of forces by acknowledging that the Soviet Union can claim definite superiority as regards the number of delivery vehicles. In view of the characteristics of the means of delivery, the number of MIRVed warheads on each side, the number of nuclear submarines deployed and the total number of strategic nuclear weapons available, this numerical superiority does not seem to give the Soviet Union decisive superiority over the United States. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Soviet Union has, to say the least, achieved parity in such weapons.

32. (ii) *For long-range theatre nuclear weapons* the situation is quite different. Since 1978, the Soviet Union has been deploying a new generation of multi-warhead missiles, the SS-20, particularly on the European side, which already ensure overwhelming superiority and this will be the case for some time to come. These weapons are capable of attaining with extreme accuracy any target whatsoever on the territory of Western Europe and are thus very largely capable of disarming NATO forces without the latter being able to retaliate with weapons of an equivalent type. It is currently estimated that there are 450 Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and 180 SS-20 missiles (each with three nuclear warheads making a total of 540 nuclear warheads) deployed in Europe. To these should be added the long-range nuclear weapon-carrying bombers known in the West as the "Backfire" bombers. SS-20 missiles are being deployed at a rate of more than one a week, which means that if the West keeps exactly to its present time-table, in 1983, when the first western long-range theatre nuclear weapons are deployed, the Soviet Union will already have deployed about 400 SS-20 missiles. In these circumstances, for a long time to come the Soviet Union will be able, in the event of hostilities, to choose the level of operations and hence dissociate the interests of the United States, which are above all to avoid using strategic nuclear weapons, from those of Europe which has as much to fear from SS-20s as from strategic missiles.

33. (iii) *In conventional weapons*, the Soviet Union and its allies have long had considerable numerical superiority in troops, aircraft and

tanks and now the same is true for the quality of their equipment since the Soviet Union, for instance, has already introduced a third generation of aircraft since the second world war whereas NATO is still at the second generation. In spite of the larger number of weapons deployed by the Soviet Union, the West for many years considered that its superior technology allowed it to have more perfected, reliable and effective weapons systems, thus offsetting its quantitative inferiority. However, large-scale investments by the Soviet Union in its armaments industry and the systematic guidance of its best scientists, engineers and managers mean, according to all available information, that it has now achieved qualitative parity, thus depriving the West of its last remaining advantage. With a long period of military service, some 27,000 combat tanks in Europe compared with 11,000 for NATO, very powerful artillery and a numerous and modern air force (5,800 tactical aircraft for the Warsaw Pact in Europe compared with 3,300 for NATO), the Soviet Union is almost certain of being able to beat NATO forces in the event of generalised hostilities which remain below the nuclear threshold. The Soviet Union is therefore able to force NATO into the difficult position of having to be the first to use nuclear weapons, which may obviously raise doubts about the western deterrent, i.e. about the determination of the NATO countries to resist Soviet pressure.

34. It can thus be seen that Leonid Brezhnev's promise to the Czechoslovak Communist Party in Prague in February 1977 is gradually coming true: "In 1985, we shall have attained most of our objectives in Western Europe and the reversal of forces will then be so decisive that we shall be in a position to impose our will each time this is necessary".

35. (iv) *In the naval field*, the Soviet Union has made a major effort in the last ten years and it now has a nuclear or conventional capability of intervening anywhere in the world. Admittedly, it has fewer and smaller aircraft-carriers than the United States and its allies but the presence of Soviet aircraft-carriers in the Indian Ocean is a means of bolstering Soviet political and military influence there. The entire Soviet surface fleet numbers 132 vessels compared to 196 for the United States but its naval tonnage exceeds that of the United States and, in view of the United States' need to defend long lines of communication, this ensures the Soviet Union clear superiority.

36. It has 305 submarines of which 87 have a missile-launching capability, 83 are nuclear-propelled attack submarines and 135 conventionally-propelled attack submarines, compared with 41 strategic submarines, 70 nuclear-propelled attack submarines and 8 convention-

ally-propelled submarines for the United States plus 9, 11 and 49 submarines of the three categories for the European Community countries. The Soviet Union is therefore ahead of the West and can intervene in force along the lines of communication between Europe and the United States. Thus, following recent naval manoeuvres, the Soviet commander-in-chief announced triumphantly in a wireless message, not in code, that he was in a position to cut the links between Western Europe and the United States for five days in the event of hostilities.

(b) *Strategic positions*

37. The Soviet Union is therefore becoming the world's leading military power and its qualitative and quantitative lead is growing steadily. Its power is further strengthened by the strategic positions threatening the West's security that it has gained since the second world war and which enhance the value of its armaments.

38. (i) *In Europe* itself, from the North Cape to the Black Sea, it is deploying nuclear-warhead missiles capable of destroying in a few minutes the principal towns or a large number of military installations in all the Western European countries and thus practically annihilating the forces deployed by NATO. The stationing of the Soviet army in Czechoslovakia in 1968 placed it at the very centre of Europe and, even with conventional forces, it can threaten the principal route between Northern and Southern Europe.

39. (ii) *In Asia and Africa*, the Soviet Union now has a large number of bases which allow it to maintain a vast fleet in the Indian Ocean and supply any of its allies with weapons and equipment at very short notice. If it is borne in mind that, for the Soviet Union, the distance from its frontiers or coasts to the oil-producing areas of the Persian Gulf varies from 1,400 to 2,400 km by air and is 2,800 km by sea (to Syria), whereas for the United States the distance varies from 6,000 to 7,000 km in the first case and from 10,000 to 15,000 km in the second, that the Soviet Union has 15 airborne divisions which can be brought into the area, 2 of them within 5 days, whereas the United States has to allow about 18 days to bring 2 divisions into the Gulf, and that the occupation of Afghanistan has further improved the Soviet transport capability, the magnitude of the Soviet Union's ability to intervene can be seen. Control of Aden and the coast of Ethiopia further increases its superiority and extends its reach to a large part of the African continent.

40. Conversely, countries wishing to rely on the West for their security, whether in Asia or in Africa, are now threatened. In particular,

this is so for Pakistan, shut in between a hostile India and Afghanistan which is occupied by the Red Army, Thailand, now under direct attack by Vietnamese forces armed and assisted by the Soviet Union, and South Africa, isolated by Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique which are also to varying degrees armed, assisted or advised by the Soviet Union.

(c) *Soviet aims*

41. This incredible military deployment is not necessarily destined to make an all-out assault on the free world, in the immediate future at least, but rather to weaken the West materially and place it at the mercy of Soviet good will for supplies of oil and raw materials needed for its economy and to induce the western countries to seek security by coming to direct terms with the Soviet Union because they no longer have confidence in the effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance. The Soviet Union has already announced that it could guarantee Western Europe's oil supplies, which is the same as saying that it could also deny them. In this way, the Soviet Union would assume an overwhelming influence over the European members of the Atlantic Alliance and would deprive NATO of its substance by gaining control over the economic survival and military capability of these countries.

42. In the event of war, the Soviet Union would be able to choose the level of hostilities and consequently place the enemy before the choice between escalation, thus assuming responsibility for and risk of destruction, or bowing to Soviet demands. Thus, the ultimate aim of all these military means designed to undermine the Atlantic Alliance and to disrupt NATO is to isolate the Western European countries in face of Soviet pressure and to give full effect to the political means used to ensure Soviet preponderance in the world.

43. Admittedly, in recent years the Soviet Union's intentions have seemed peaceful. It has taken major steps in the limitation of nuclear weapons and in security and co-operation in Europe, it has given up its claims to control West Berlin and has taken part in the MBFR negotiations and the Geneva Disarmament Committee. But for it to continue along this course the Atlantic Alliance must remain strong: the stronger it is, the longer the Soviet Union's peaceful intentions will last.

44. But since 1970 the Soviet Union's military potential has become strong enough for it to enjoy the full spectrum of political and military options and it can henceforth undertake anything anywhere at any time. All in all, this potential will be a far greater danger to the West than any intentions that, rightly or wrongly, may be attributed to it.

III. *The requirements of western security*

45. Faced with such a many-sided threat covering so vast an area, the West's security depends on unyielding cohesion. No state, probably not even the United States, can think of taking on the Soviet challenge alone.

1. *Military solidarity*

46. In the military field, only the United States, thanks to its own nuclear potential, is able to provide a credible deterrent to Soviet strategic weapons. This is beyond the ability of even the European powers that have nuclear weapons and for Europe there is no alternative to the NATO guarantee that the American deterrent will work. NATO ensures the presence of American conventional and nuclear forces on European soil and hence that any attack on Western Europe will meet United States and Canadian forces and, consequently, the whole spectrum of American strength, including its strategic nuclear weapons.

47. When General de Gaulle worked out and described the basic strategy for the French nuclear force, he made it clear that France did not intend to leave the Atlantic Alliance and that its strategy had a place only in relation to the strength of American deterrence and in the framework of a policy of collective defence which gave the national character of the French strike force its full value: insufficient on its own to deter Soviet aggression, it sought to give France, a European power, a means of transforming any conflict whatsoever into nuclear war and therefore gave Europe a new element of deterrence and hence of security.

48. The very concept of the British nuclear force is closely linked with that of the United States, and it is placed under NATO integrated military command in peacetime, subject to the right to withdraw it in the event of the United Kingdom's vital interests being at stake. There is therefore no question of the United Kingdom's defence being separated from that of the Alliance as a whole. A fortiori, the defence policy of all the other European countries depends on the integrated defence system which guarantees the umbrella of American strategic weapons as well as the reinforcement of United States theatre nuclear weapons on the continent of Europe.

49. In these conditions, anything that may weaken the links between Western Europe and the United States and Canada is a serious danger for the security of all and especially of the European members of the Alliance. The Soviet Union is aware of this and, in peacetime, deploys every political means available to stir up differences between the members of the

Atlantic Alliance and, in wartime, its strategy would be first and foremost to break the links between Europe and the United States and Canada. Hence, any indication of Europe moving away from its North American partners in the Atlantic Alliance would be a serious threat to the security of Europe. There is a risk of any call for Europe to become independent of the United States and Canada leading to a break-up of NATO, thus destroying the security of the western world and above all of the part of Europe which has remained free.

2. Political solidarity

50. This obviously does not mean that Europe has no right to criticise the United States, but in its own interests its criticism must not be overdone and Europeans must not lose faith in American policy nor, above all, in the determination of the United States to defend Europe in the event of attack. Any signs of this might well induce the United States and Canada to react negatively towards Europe as happened to some extent in the early months of 1980, when American public opinion felt that Europe was not giving President Carter its full support in the dispute with Iran and in his strong complaints about the invasion of Afghanistan. Any increase or prolongation of such reactions from American public opinion would inevitably leave room for doubts about the United States' determination to use all the means at its disposal to ensure the defence of Western Europe and would consequently make a *de facto* division between Europe and the United States and therefore weaken the European defence system.

51. Moreover, if the two groups of partners in the Atlantic Alliance were thus to drift apart, it might induce certain European states to try to ensure their own security by means which would quickly break up the Alliance and weaken collective security. This would be the case in particular if some sought, through direct and isolated closer contacts with the Soviet Union, the illusory guarantee of their own security at the expense of that of the European continent as a whole. Together, these two effects would be a real triumph for Soviet strategy since they would allow the Soviet Union to attain one of its principal goals without even having to resort to force. It is therefore evident that such attacks, aimed at destroying the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance, are part of the Soviet Union's political and strategic calculations and that Europe must be careful not to heed them.

52. To be effective, the Atlantic Alliance's defence policy must be based on a realistic view of the threats to the West and take account *inter alia* of the fact that détente is possible only if the Warsaw Pact powers, which are the other side of the world balance with the Atlan-

tic Alliance, are absolutely convinced that they must take the free world, its determination and strength seriously. This means that to ensure its security the West must be united and determined to remain so, it must be well-enough armed to meet any threat effectively and respond to any attack and it must be resolutely determined to defend itself.

3. Flexible response

53. None of the experts, whether in universities or in the armed forces, any longer denies the fact that the Warsaw Pact has far more armaments than are needed for a defensive strategy and a military policy based merely on the defence of its positions. Its armed forces are organised and deployed in terms of an offensive policy, not a defensive one.

54. In view of its situation, Europe cannot consider a strategy of confrontation with the Soviet Union and must consequently base its security on deterrence alone, which does not mean, in the present state of the balance of forces, that only nuclear forces play a part. For deterrence to be fully effective, it is in fact essential that the timing and nature of the West's retaliation to any aggression should be and remain uncertain and incalculable for the Soviet leaders. For instance, they must not be sure of being able to conduct aggression at a level fixed by them beforehand and they must have to reckon on American nuclear retaliation before Western Europe has been invaded. This element of deterrence is essential if the Soviet Union is to be prevented from relying on its conventional superiority in order to envisage winning a war by keeping it at conventional level and convinced that the risk it would take by attacking would be impossible to calculate beforehand. The same is true of its superiority in medium-range nuclear weapons as long as the American decision to station 600 Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe (i.e. with three warheads per missile, a total of 1,800 nuclear warheads) has not been implemented.

55. The doctrine of flexible response is therefore the only one which meets the needs of Western European security. It means that at every level NATO must have means of beating Soviet aggression and, short of this, it must be able to escalate the fighting to a higher level without immediately launching an exchange of strategic nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union. NATO forces must be deployed so as to convince Soviet military planners that there could be no certainty or even serious hope of conducting the fighting on their own terms.

56. The effectiveness of the flexible response therefore depends on the Alliance being in

strong enough shape to assure observers that Europeans and Americans are determined to defend Europe and that they have the means of doing so, i.e. that they have sufficient forces, equipped with weapons of all kinds, to make credible any threat on their part to resort to escalation to counter possible attacks. This has military implications – not to allow the Soviet Union to have a weapon against which the West has no means of retaliating, as tends to be the case at present for long-range theatre weapons – and political implications – the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance.

4. Requirements of a policy of deterrence

57. A long history of international relations has shown in fact that it is often for lack of internal cohesion rather than because of attacks from without that alliances fail to work in that either they no longer manage to avoid war or they break apart – sometimes during the wars they have not been able to avoid. Thucydides already gave a masterly demonstration of this in relation to the Athens maritime confederation, and the history of Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provides many other examples.

58. The unity and solidarity of the western community have already proved their effectiveness. Thus, the West's vital interests have not been defied or called in question whenever the West has clearly demonstrated that it was united in its determination to defend them. A first instance was the attempt to blockade Berlin in 1948, when the United States found the appropriate response and showed that any further escalation of the Soviet operation would run up against American military might.

59. This determination and the maintenance of a balance of force in Europe in spite of the gigantic military effort made by the Soviet Union over the years led to the emergence of détente and its progressive development through increased trade, meetings, conferences and negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons, the reduction of conventional forces and security and co-operation in Europe since this process called for mutual confidence which could not find a guarantee in the Soviet Union's need to respect force. Thus, far from being an obstacle to détente, as communist propaganda has been trying to show for more than a quarter of a century, the West's strength and solidarity are a condition of détente and, more than any other factor, they have prevented any attack on the territories guaranteed by the Atlantic Alliance ever since its formation.

60. There is no reason to doubt the future of this cohesion, whatever might have been said or thought in recent years. France's withdrawal

from the NATO integrated military organisation may have opened the door for such speculation, but General de Gaulle and his successors have never called in question France's determination to stand by its undertakings under the North Atlantic Treaty and the modified Brussels Treaty. All that is known about the trend of its defence policy and its foreign policy, its nuclear effort and the deployment of its forces totally negates the idea that it might be a weak link in the defence system of the Alliance.

61. Your Rapporteur believes there is no question of making an indirect attempt to bring France back into the NATO integrated commands. As then Federal Minister of Defence, your Rapporteur deplored France's withdrawal from NATO. But this is now a fact and France's decision must be respected: the defence of Europe must be based on the idea that France will not return to NATO in the foreseeable future but will in no way call in question its membership of the Atlantic Alliance. This seems to be a basis of understanding between France and its partners, particularly as political circles in all the countries of the Alliance fully realise that there can be no European defence policy without the United States and France. Similarly, discussions in France about defence show that that country too considers there can be no defence without the participation of the United States. Outside NATO, France plays a special rôle and, because it feels responsible for Europe's security, it is a particularly strong element of the European pillar of the Alliance. In his speech at the *Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale* on 11th September 1980, Mr. Barre left no doubt about this rôle, underlining the priority France gave to deterrence, its determination to have the most effective weapons and its concern not to dissociate its security from that of its neighbours.

62. Similarly, the unswerving determination of all members of the Alliance in face of approaches or pressure by the Warsaw Pact countries to make them go back on their undertakings in the Atlantic community is most promising for the future. For thirty years, there has been no rift in the solidarity of the Atlantic community for the defence of the freedom of all its members, nor has any member tried to avoid its commitments.

63. It is precisely this remarkable success of the Alliance that now raises the question of its adaptation to take account of the changes that have occurred both inside and outside the Atlantic community and of the evolution of the threats it is designed to meet so that it may continue to play its full rôle in the interest of the security of all its members and of peace and the pursuit of détente.

64. Here, it is the joint management of the Alliance that ensures that efforts made by each member country have a maximum effect for the benefit of the security of all.

IV. *The European pillar of the Alliance*

1. *Europe's place in the Alliance*

65. The West's security cannot be guaranteed unless account is taken of the nature of the political aims of the Soviet Union, the strength of the Warsaw Pact forces deployed against Western Europe and the close link between the development of détente and the maintenance of security. There can be no question of any member of the Atlantic community conducting its policy in the light of just one of the joint aims and, in particular, the idea that the North American members of the Alliance might specialise in defence and the European members might play the rôle of détente would have disastrous consequences and destroy the solidarity on which deterrence is based. Everyone's security depends closely on the policy of common defence and the development of détente.

66. This means that the Alliance must, so to speak, be jointly managed by all its members so that, on the one hand, each one's efforts produce the maximum results for joint security and, on the other hand, no rift may form between the members in questions of defence policy or in their relations with the Warsaw Pact countries.

67. One way or another, strengthening NATO means strengthening its European element. Changing circumstances and growing threats to world peace and the obligations they impose on the American partners of the Alliance, particularly in areas not covered by the North Atlantic Treaty and especially in the Middle East, call for a special effort by Europe. Europeans must in fact be able, should the need arise, to take over from any American forces temporarily withdrawn from Europe for deployment in another part of the world so that the security guaranteed by the NATO military system is not jeopardised. It remains that the deterrent value of the Alliance is largely based on the physical presence of American forces in Europe, particularly in the Federal Republic, where no European forces can reasonably replace them.

68. But apart from this particular problem, the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance cannot be truly ensured unless there is some degree of balance between its European and American components. This was the idea advanced by President Kennedy in his speech at Philadelphia on 4th July 1962 when he referred to the

organisation of an Atlantic community based on two pillars. This concept is still just as topical, even though it is taking longer to implement than John Kennedy thought.

2. *The European components of the Alliance*

69. The present growth of the European Communities is the first sign of this European pillar as it creates a community of interests between the various Western European states. However, this community of interests does not always mean community of views on defence matters and a number of measures may be envisaged in order to strengthen the cohesion of the European pillar of the Alliance in the near future.

70. For instance, *Greece* should be encouraged to resume its place in NATO without delay. Its differences with Turkey are not sufficient reason for Greece to sever ties with its allies, particularly as it has no true deterrent of its own.

71. At the NATO ministerial meeting in Ankara in June 1980, Mr. Muskie, United States Secretary of State, held separate talks with the Greek and Turkish Ministers for Foreign Affairs and subsequently said there were quite good prospects of Greece returning to the organisation which it had left after the Cyprus affair in 1974. The Greek Government for its part agreed that priority should be given to returning to NATO in connection with a bilateral Greek-American agreement on American military bases in Greece. In other words, Greece seems convinced that joining the EEC and returning to NATO are two parallel steps, the aim being for Greece to play a full part in both.

72. In the case of *Spain*, its accession to the Atlantic Alliance has become a necessity and the Spanish authorities seem to be aware of this, as recalled by President Carter on 25th June 1980 when he was visiting Madrid. Spain is linked to the United States by a treaty of mutual assistance which expires in 1981 and grants the United States one naval base and three air bases on Spanish territory in exchange for economic and military assistance amounting to \$ 1,250 million but the United States and the Spanish Government have apparently agreed to replace this bilateral treaty by Spain's accession to NATO: Mr. Ouja, Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, has announced that his country would apply for accession in 1981 and might become a member in 1983. However, Mr. Ouja asked for two guarantees:

- (i) that the process of integrating Spain into the EEC would be continued

because of the interdependence between the economic and military integration of Spain in Western Europe;

- (ii) that the Spanish-British negotiations on transferring the sovereignty of Gibraltar to Spain be well under way, preliminary negotiations having already begun between the United Kingdom and Spain.

73. Apart from a 200,000-strong army, a 48,000-strong navy and a 40,000-strong air force, Spain would bring the Alliance a highly valuable strategic position both on the Mediterranean and on the Atlantic, thanks to the Canary Islands.

74. Conversely, it might be in the joint interest of the Europeans to link the accession of Spain to NATO with membership of the European Economic Community. Its accession to NATO might be examined at the same time as its admission to the EEC. In fact, just as Spain does not intend to join NATO without being admitted to the EEC, and for the same reasons, its partners may link its admission to the EEC with membership of NATO. Moreover, there is every indication that the Spanish socialists, who were for a long time hostile to Spain's participation in the Atlantic Alliance, will no longer refuse to have Spain take its place in the West's collective defence system in Europe. As a condition, they wish the Spanish people to be consulted by referendum. Nor would anything prevent the three countries which have applied for membership of the European Community being encouraged to accede at the same time to the modified Brussels Treaty and WEU, thus giving an institutional framework to the European pillar of the Alliance. Finally, a solution should be found whereby Ireland, in view of its special situation, might be associated in one way or another with its European partners in the defence field.

75. Broader foundations might naturally be envisaged for the European pillar, particularly since Norway and Turkey are members of NATO and the Mediterranean is still Europe's *mare nostrum*, providing access to its vital centres whose control is essential for its security, and the Norwegian Sea is a route between Europe and North America, *inter alia* for Soviet submarines.

76. As a result of a referendum, Norway refused to join the EEC. The distances separating its most exposed territories – the Great North and the islands in the Barents Sea – from the central sector of European defence are so great that Norway is hesitant about its defence being too closely associated with that of the Central Europe sector and hopes for a special contribution to its defence from the United States and

Canada. In these circumstances, an attempt should be made to find a special solution to the problem of its participation in the European pillar of the Atlantic community.

77. This also applies to *Turkey*, whose relationship with the EEC will have to be determined in the next few years and whose position at the heart of the Middle East and on the frontiers of the Soviet Union raises particular problems.

78. The fact that the means of all the European members of the Atlantic Alliance are not identical in no way weakens the cohesion of the European pillar of the Alliance. On the contrary, the British and French nuclear forces can, and in fact do, make a major contribution to collective security. In recent years, *the United Kingdom* has been wondering whether to modernise its nuclear force by adopting a new generation of means of delivery. It has decided to make the necessary financial sacrifices to modernise its nuclear force and has thus committed itself to a long-term defence policy in which nuclear weapons will play an essential rôle.

79. *France* for its part is in the process of modernising its strike force. It is replacing the missiles on the Plateau d'Albion by more powerful and more accurate means. It has just decided to build a sixth nuclear submarine and on 27th June 1980 President Giscard d'Estaing announced that research had been carried out since 1976 for developing enhanced radiation weapons and missiles with mobile launchers. The French neutron weapon should be ready for deployment in 1983.

80. The existence and modernisation of the British and French nuclear forces considerably strengthens the Alliance's deterrent capability and more effectively than could be done by a European nuclear force which has often been mentioned but never seriously envisaged by the governments of any of the countries capable of playing a major rôle in its formation. The United Kingdom has never responded to approaches about the development of Franco-British nuclear weaponry. At the very time he was setting up the French strike force, General de Gaulle announced that he intended this force to remain under the sole responsibility of the French head of state. The idea of Franco-German nuclear co-operation has never been part of the French Government's policy nor that of the Federal German Government.

81. Indeed, *the Federal Republic* has always considered that it would derive no advantage from the possession of nuclear weapons and to have them would involve a strong risk of special difficulties in its relations with the Eastern European countries. Moreover, it fears that

the production of a European nuclear weapon might provide a reason or pretext for reducing the American presence in Europe.

82. This does not mean that the Federal Republic, any more than its European partners, is against the existence and development of the French and British nuclear forces. It therefore considers, as the North Atlantic Council formally declared in Ottawa in June 1974, that the French and British nuclear forces make a most useful contribution to the joint defence of the West on the one hand because of the weapons themselves and on the other – and above all – because they help to make it even more difficult for the Soviet Union to calculate the nature of the response to be expected in the event of attack.

3. Europe's armaments

83. Further, NATO, and particularly its European component, must make a major effort to make up for the time it has lost in the last ten years in the power and modernisation of its armaments, both nuclear and conventional. *In the nuclear field*, which mainly concerns the Americans, this implies *inter alia* the introduction of new weapons in response to the long-range theatre nuclear weapons deployed by the Soviet Union, particularly the SS-20s. These weapons are Pershing II and cruise missiles. It is surprising how slow the European members of NATO are to agree to the deployment of these weapons, which are essential for Europe's security, on their territory. At present, the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom are known to have accepted the principle and in June 1980 the British Government even indicated the sites it was reserving for cruise missiles on its territory. Italy has also agreed to the deployment of cruise missiles on its territory. Belgium has again postponed taking a decision, and there has been no positive sign from the Netherlands. Europe therefore bears heavy responsibility in the delays accumulated by the Alliance in the sector of long-range theatre weapons.

84. However, it should be noted that it will not be possible to start deploying the Pershing II before 1983 and that, in view of the present rate at which the SS-20s are being introduced, the Soviet Union will still have a considerable lead in theatre weapons for a long time to come.

85. Moreover, in view of the overwhelming tank superiority of the Soviet Union and its allies it seems essential for NATO to introduce as soon as possible a weapon capable of preventing the Soviet Union taking advantage of this superiority, i.e. enhanced radiation missiles, commonly known as *neutron shells*. It is well

known that for several years the Soviet Union and the communist parties have been conducting a vast propaganda campaign to induce the West to renounce this weapon for the very reason that they consider it to be effective. It would be most dangerous for the West to pay heed to such propaganda and further delay the development of this weapon. The French Government for its part seems to have understood this.

86. In fact, the Alliance as such has already taken its decision. In 1965, when Federal Minister of Defence, your Rapporteur had an opportunity of discussing with his then United States counterpart, Mr. McNamara, the need to increase the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent capability by developing an extremely accurate and highly mobile nuclear weapon with a very limited target area – about a square kilometre – and little fallout so as to cause only a minimum of radioactive pollution over a small area and for a short time in order to meet the challenge of Soviet conventional armaments – and particularly its tank superiority – without jeopardising the survival of a civilian population far from the battlefield. Such limitation of its effects should make the use of such a weapon credible and make it an effective instrument of deterrence. This weapon, which is merely a piece of artillery, is now being developed and meets the Alliance's requirements in the framework of a defensive strategy based on deterrence.

87. The deployment of *new conventional weapons* mainly concerns Western Europe. This is essential since Europe has fallen well behind the Soviet Union, particularly where aircraft are concerned. Thus, NATO forces must now be equipped with anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles with conventional warheads to prevent the Soviet Union taking advantage of its superiority in these two areas.

88. This effort is quite clearly in Europe's interest since it must prevent the United States being faced with a choice between nuclear war involving the use of strategic nuclear weapons and abandoning Europe. Only if Europe has the means and determination to defend itself effectively will the United States find itself really committed to apply the strategy of flexible response. A passive or cowardly attitude on the part of the Europeans can but spark off isolationist reactions in the United States and consequently aggressive reactions in the Soviet Union.

4. European armaments policy

89. This would mean the European members of NATO calling up troops who would have to be armed and equipped at very short notice.

This has implications in many fields, including that of armaments. The symposium organised by the WEU Assembly in Brussels in October 1979 showed – if it was not already evident – how incoherent the armaments policies of the European states are and how intolerable such a position is becoming. In spite of an agreement of principle on the need for interoperability of equipment of the various armies deployed in Europe, progress in this field has been insignificant and the forces having to take part in a common system on the same territory may well not be capable of operating because every country clings jealously to national concepts based more on traditions and peculiarities of military headquarters than on necessities.

90. It is essential for NATO to ensure without delay that all the forces that might have to operate on the Central European front can stock up in the armouries of any national army and that a maximum of interoperability is achieved as soon as possible. In Central Europe, there is no longer any national defence or any particular theatre of operations. In the event of war, any commander-in-chief must be able to call on contingents from any other country to meet the urgent requirements he has to handle.

91. The absence of standardisation and a fortiori inadequate joint production of armaments lead to competition in weapons production by European manufacturers with ruinous repercussions on military budgets and, hence, European taxpayers. Unit production costs are too high, making users prefer, in many cases, to procure the armaments they require outside Europe, which further increases the waste of public money and prevents the best use being made of the already inadequate credits earmarked for defence equipment by the European countries.

92. Since WEU started, its member countries, through the *Standing Armaments Committee*, have been defining European defence equipment requirements and types of armaments corresponding to these requirements so as to unify the European armaments market as far as possible. It has to be recorded that the SAC has so far managed to achieve only very limited results with considerable loss of time. Even its study of the situation in the European armaments industries is advancing at the speed of a tortoise, not by fault of the international secretariat of the SAC which has zealously tried to pursue its study but rather of the governments which have been very parsimonious in providing the necessary elements of information and above all have shown no interest in a task which they themselves decided should be undertaken. It may be wondered whether the vast amount of work already done is not des-

tined to lie dormant in the drawers of national administrations without their doing anything to draw the consequences in the field of joint production.

93. Further, the European members of the Atlantic Alliance organised the *Independent European Programme Group*, also intended to promote co-operation between military headquarters and the appropriate departments of Defence Ministries with a view to promoting the joint production of armaments. Although its sub-groups have proliferated, this group has in turn met the same difficulties resulting from an absence of will to succeed on the part of national departments which intend to remain *de facto* masters in their areas of responsibility.

94. Finally, it is on a *bi- or trilateral basis* that a number of weapons, including a few surface ships, aircraft and missiles, and even, more recently, tanks have been produced on a joint basis. But the standardisation of European armaments is essential and will become increasingly so, and the European Community will no longer be able to dissociate itself from this matter, as Mr. Davignon, member of the Commission, underlined at the Brussels symposium.

95. However, since the European countries' forces are solely or almost solely intended for deployment in a European theatre of operations, unlike American forces which may have to intervene in any part of the world, there is no technical reason why European armaments should not be unified. The only explanation for these difficulties and delays is the rigid attitude of military headquarters and of the relevant technical services or the special interests of armaments-producing firms and the pressure they are able to bring to bear on states. Similarly, the lack of determination on the part of governments to overcome these obstacles leads to incredible delays both in interoperability and in joint production or standardisation of armaments in Europe.

5. Inter-allied consultations

96. Finally, all these necessary arrangements require increased consultations between the American and European partners of the Alliance in the framework of NATO, without it being necessary to extend the defence area defined in the North Atlantic Treaty or to offer Europe's military support for an American policy aimed at curbing Soviet expansion in Asia and Africa. This policy was expressed *inter alia* in the "Carter doctrine", announced after the invasion of Afghanistan, according to which any further steps by the Soviet Union to attain its objectives would be considered sufficient reason for military action and thus involve an

inestimable risk. Such a declaration is particularly important in view of the threat to countries such as Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Oman, Iran and Saudi Arabia. It implies a redeployment of American forces, particularly in the Indian Ocean, and, above all, much greater mobility.

97. The West's aim is not and must in no case be to bring about a "division of the world" into two zones of influence but on the contrary to prevent Soviet policy imposing its views – as in Afghanistan – on countries which wish to remain non-aligned. The West can respond to the Soviet challenge by defending the freedom of peoples to choose their own course in their political, economic and social systems and in their external relations. This is the purpose of the measures taken by the United States.

98. The Soviet Union must not be given the impression that this American reaction might bring the advantage of separating the United States from its European allies. Consequently, Europe must show unremitting interest in and support for American policy outside Europe, but this it will not do if procedure for consultation in the framework of NATO is not considerably improved.

99. Hence, for the sake of western security Europe must participate to a greater extent than in the past in decisions taken jointly by members of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly in the framework of the North Atlantic Council. Such participation is essential if there is to be a real increase in the sacrifices made by Europeans for the joint defence, financially and where troop levels are concerned, and if decisions taken by the American authorities without consulting their European partners are not, as on several occasions in the recent past, to arouse misunderstandings and negative reactions among Europeans. It might also be said that, in the same way, decisions taken by one or other Western European country or even by the Nine on several occasions in recent months have aroused similar reactions among the American partners in the Atlantic Alliance because there was no prior consultation. The slow reactions of the Nine in following up the decisions taken by the United States regarding the crises in Iran and Afghanistan and the steps taken by the Nine to express their views on the Palestine situation provided several examples which are still fresh in our minds. Consultations between allies should be extended systematically to cover all aspects of the threat to the Atlantic Alliance, including those which concern its plans or its periphery and also the non-military aspects since a global challenge should be met by a global strategy. It is in no one's interest to exclude countries which are not able, or are not called upon, to take part in

military measures which might be taken by one country or another.

100. Generally speaking, it seems clear that Europe is in no way willing or prepared to intervene in any way whatsoever in the Middle East, whereas the United States is setting in place the military means to counter a possible Soviet aggression in the area by stationing a naval force off the coast of Oman, reorganising its Diego Garcia base and building up, on American territory, a combat-ready force of 110,000 men with the necessary air transport. But this in no way means that Europe can or wishes to dissociate itself from this area, which is vital for its oil supplies.

101. Certain European countries have forces capable of intervening outside the European theatre, particularly in Africa, where several military operations have been conducted on a limited scale in which others did not wish to or could not participate. Insofar as such operations concern the security of Europe and of the whole western world, they should be the subject of consultations between the partners in the Atlantic Alliance.

102. These consultations should also cover doctrine for the use of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons. Countries without nuclear weapons are closely and directly concerned by the way the nuclear powers intend to use their forces, and in particular their tactical nuclear weapons, in case of hostilities, since fighting would inevitably cover the whole territory of Europe. It should be added that a doctrine based on deterrence concerns all countries taking part in the deterrence, even if they do not make a nuclear contribution.

103. Although the idea of a European nuclear force does not seem to conform to Europe's true possibilities today, this in no way means that the Western European countries have no interest in jointly examining their approach to the problem of their defence which can no longer, in present technical conditions, be ensured by each country in isolation. On the contrary, there is every reason for them to examine together how the forces of each country should be deployed in peacetime and used in wartime to ensure maximum effectiveness and there is nothing to prevent these consultations also covering the use of nuclear weapons and their deployment in the NATO system. In view of the special status of the French deterrent and the rôle it plays in Europe's defence policy, consultations – Franco-German in particular – on its use might make a useful contribution to the western deterrent.

104. Finally, consultations should also cover all problems linked with the limitation of arma-

ments, force reductions and disarmament. There is a problem with regard to the SALT negotiations where the American participants obviously kept their allies informed, in the framework of NATO, of the progress of work, but such consultations were sometimes inadequate or too late. Naturally, negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe cannot succeed – and cannot even take place – without close consultation between all the members of NATO but, if these negotiations are to be continued, it would be desirable for France to take part in them so that all the problems raised by maintaining or transforming the balance of force in Europe may be considered. Finally, the prospects of a meeting to be held in Madrid in autumn 1980 to examine and verify the application of decisions taken at the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and which is *inter alia* to cover confidence-building measures, or of a European disarmament conference proposed by France, imply the existence and operation of a system of close consultations between the members of the Atlantic Alliance.

6. The frameworks of European co-operation

105. Whether it is a question of armaments production, the preparation of disarmament negotiations, the limitation of forces and armaments or events which concern international peace but which take place outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, there are obviously differences between the ways in which these matters are understood or handled on either side of the Atlantic. But if Europe wishes its American partners to listen to it, it must be in a position to know, express and uphold its views and interests in face of the United States which individual European states cannot do. The existence of a European pillar in a balanced alliance means Europe must exist politically.

106. The European Community is of course the principal factor of cohesion of this European pillar, even if not all the European members of the Alliance belong to the Community and certain members of the Community are not members of the Atlantic Alliance. Nevertheless, the establishment of a European economic entity expresses and strengthens *de facto* economic solidarity. This solidarity has been strengthened by the creation of a monetary union between several countries and the recent election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage which have made Europe more and more of a reality. However, in defence matters there is no satisfactory expression of solidarity since the Communities have no responsibilities in this area and certain Community countries are radically opposed to Community responsibilities being extended to cover defence.

107. Although it is evident that joint industrial policy concerns the armaments field and nine-power political consultations concern defence policy, which forms part of foreign policy, particularly where East-West relations are concerned, it does not seem possible at the present time to consider overcoming the obstacle constituted by opposition to extending the Community's work to include the military field.

108. Furthermore, *Western European Union* which, under the modified Brussels Treaty, has undeniable defence responsibilities, does not at present have a sound basis of solidarity and has never been able to work out a European defence policy for lack of agreement between the European governments on this point. The second pillar of the Atlantic Alliance therefore in fact exists at economic level but it has never been possible to build anything solid in the field of foreign policy and still less in that of defence.

109. Yet the development of the *European Communities* leads towards European defence policy being handled by Community bodies primarily because of the place occupied by the armaments industry in the European economy, a place which is continually growing and which, thanks to the development of the latest technology, in particular in the nuclear, electronic, computer and aircraft sectors, means that today the number and skill of firms working for defence and armaments are growing. But for this reason it is increasingly difficult to distinguish firms working solely for the civil sector. Commercial, technological and financial exchanges between European industries are and will become ever more numerous, so a common industrial policy henceforth calls for a common armaments policy.

110. Moreover, the Community has expressed the wish to give shape to the co-ordination of member countries' foreign policies in the framework of nine-power political consultations. This has had noticeable results and, during the first months of 1980, Community positions and declarations have been worked out on many matters relating to European security. But those consultations do not seem to have prevented certain governments from taking unilateral action, without warning their partners beforehand, in a number of matters which nevertheless related to the security of Europe as a whole. The development of nine-power consultations, soon to be twelve or thirteen powers since there is talk of Turkey being associated with them even before it joins the EEC, and the practice of holding consultations at short notice in the event of emergency are becoming an absolute necessity.

111. Finally, the European Communities quite evidently constitute the hub round which the Europe of the future is in the process of organising itself which means that security and defence questions must one day find a place in the work of the Communities. The necessary immediate measures can therefore be of only a provisional nature and designed to prepare for this Community future of which there are now glimpses.

112. The day the obstacles are removed – the present limitation of Community responsibilities, the refusal by certain countries to have these responsibilities extended and the fact that several European members of the Alliance are not yet members of the EEC – it will probably be possible to achieve early and complete identity between the European Community and the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

V. *The organisation of European security*

1. *The modified Brussels Treaty*

113. In present circumstances, *WEU* is still the only truly European organisation with responsibility for defence matters, which should enable it to help to form the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty confers this duty on it, providing for close co-operation between *WEU* and NATO:

“In the execution of the treaty, the high contracting parties and any organs established by them under the treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.”

114. There is therefore no legitimate reason for setting a European defence organisation, *WEU*, against the Atlantic Alliance since the Brussels Treaty was modified specifically in order to organise Europe's participation in western defence. However, the same treaty gave a special dimension to European solidarity in its Article V, which provides for all the *WEU* member countries to afford each other automatic assistance in the event of one of them being attacked. This is an extremely serious undertaking since the party attacked has to be afforded “all the ... assistance in their power” and is therefore far more binding than the corresponding article in the North Atlantic Treaty, which makes provision only for consul-

tations in the event of an attack on one of the signatories. Consequently, any speculation there may be about the nature of the participation of any of the members of *WEU* in the common defence would be based on the supposition that the member concerned would not respect its signature, which there is no reason to think would be the case.

115. Moreover, Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty is completed by Article VIII which set up a Council that can meet at short notice at the request of any one of the member countries to examine all matters relating to co-operation between these countries in every field so that the Alliance might effectively be based on true solidarity.

116. But *WEU* suffers from a number of political handicaps. First, it groups only some members of today's Community Europe and a fortiori a smaller proportion of the members of the future Community, which will probably have twelve or thirteen members. Moreover, the *WEU* Council has never really exercised all its responsibilities under the modified Brussels Treaty since, from the outset, it relied on NATO for everything relating to defence proper and the exercise of its cultural and social responsibilities was subsequently handed over to the Council of Europe. Since the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Community, it has relied wholly on the Community to exercise its economic responsibilities, and the development of nine-power consultations has removed much of the substance of consultations held in the *WEU* Council.

117. The Council as it now is no longer plays any rôle at all. This might be welcome if its responsibilities were effectively exercised satisfactorily in wider frameworks. This is obviously not so for all that relates to defence and armaments, and the weakness of the *WEU* Council corresponds to a very real weakness of Europe.

118. The modified Brussels Treaty also includes differences between the rights and obligations of its members which were perfectly comprehensible at a time when, less than ten years after the end of the second world war, the protocol modifying the Brussels Treaty was drawn up, signed and ratified. Some of these inequalities are still topical. For instance, the fact that the United Kingdom has to maintain an army and an air force on the territory of the Federal Republic is as necessary as ever for Europe's security. Similarly, the Federal Republic has no desire to have the restrictions on the production of NBC weapons lifted as it has no intention of acquiring them.

119. Conversely, the restrictions on the production of conventional weapons by the Federal Republic hindered the competitive capacity of

that country's naval industries without meeting any present need and made it more difficult for the Federal Republic to take part in a joint armaments policy until the WEU Council decided, on 21st July 1980, to accede to Germany's request by removing the naval restrictions imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany.

120. Finally, there are differences of interpretation about the way certain powers intend to fulfil their undertakings in the event of a crisis. This applies essentially to France, which withdrew from the NATO integrated commands at the time it developed its nuclear force. It is understandable that the French Government should wish there to be some uncertainty about the cases in which it would engage its nuclear force. This is in the interest of the joint deterrent, in view of the fact that France has never questioned its signature of the North Atlantic Treaty or the modified Brussels Treaty which commits the French nuclear force under Article IV. Nevertheless, this ambiguity, particularly when it extends to the deployment of France's conventional forces in the Federal Republic, may be a factor of weakness for Europe if France's withdrawal from NATO is not offset by its close participation in military consultations between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance.

2. WEU bodies

121. If WEU is to play its due rôle in setting up the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, its structures must be adapted to Europe's joint defence ambitions. In particular, the Council should regularly include defence questions on its agenda, including matters relating to disarmament, which means that the Ministers of Defence or their representatives should take part in the work of the Council. As long as the WEU Council only includes representatives of the Ministries for Foreign Affairs, it is hard to see how it could co-operate effectively in building a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. The Council might also meet at an appropriate level prior to meetings of the North Atlantic Council so as to ascertain Europe's point of view on matters to be handled subsequently in the Atlantic framework.

122. It would also be advisable to make full use of the Standing Armaments Committee, as your Rapporteur has suggested above. In its reply to Recommendation 331, the Council recently agreed that the SAC might carry out work for the Assembly. It is now for the Assembly to avail itself of this possibility, but such co-operation must not be detrimental, as the Council specifies, moreover, to the pursuit of the SAC's normal work or of its present study; placing a ministerial institution at the disposal of a parliamentary body must in no

way be taken to mean that the government authorities are losing interest in that institution.

123. Finally, WEU should be enlarged to include all the members, and consequently also the new members, of the EEC so as to involve them more closely in the examination of the requirements of joint security. Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty provides for such enlargement and there is no need to let it lapse, although it has never been applied in the twenty-five years of WEU's existence.

124. Consideration of all the questions raised by this necessary adaptation of the structures of WEU to the realities of European security should be undertaken immediately since it meets an urgent need both in the field of armaments and in that of Europe's defence and security. It is naturally the WEU Council that will have to assume responsibility for this examination and to this end it should set up a permanent working group on which member countries would be represented. This group should be instructed to decide on measures to be taken with regard to the activities of WEU, including the revision of Protocol No. III, action to be taken on the SAC's study, the possible enlargement of WEU to include all member countries of the European Community and the countries which have applied for membership and the new course to be given to the Council's work, with all the implications this may have, *inter alia* through the effective participation of representatives of the Ministries of Defence.

125. Moreover, the WEU Assembly must be associated with this work and it should instruct the General Affairs Committee, through officially-communicated information, to follow the work of the Council and consider what subsequent action should be taken.

3. The WEU Assembly

126. *The WEU Assembly* for its part might play an active part in setting up the European pillar of the Atlantic Community. As the European parliamentary organisation responsible for defence, armaments and disarmament matters, set up under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, it has sole responsibility for defence matters. At the present juncture, it would not be reasonable to call in question the modified Brussels Treaty in view of the security benefits Europe derives from Article V. All the governments seem agreed on this point. The full treaty must therefore be applied effectively, including Article IX which specifies that the Assembly shall be "composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe", while allowing the WEU Assembly to

become the effective parliament of Europe in areas which are its sole responsibility.

127. However, it is clear that, because it was elected by direct universal suffrage, the European Parliament is destined to become the parliamentary component of the Europe of tomorrow. In the future it will therefore be its task to constitute the parliamentary element of a Community whose responsibilities would be extended to cover defence and armaments matters and it would be logical for the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament to be brought closer together now. It is not possible to have identical membership in the immediate future because the modified Brussels Treaty specifies that it is the delegations of the WEU countries to the Council of Europe Assembly that constitute the delegations to the WEU Assembly and, very soon, these delegations, or most of them at least, will no longer include any members of the European Parliament because of the latter's election by direct universal suffrage which often makes plurality of office impossible *de facto* if not *de jure*.

128. Furthermore, the WEU Assembly has an organic link with the national parliaments which alone can supervise member states' defence policies and it is through these parliaments that the WEU Assembly can and does exercise an influence – naturally difficult to assess – on national defence policies and hence on Europe's defence policy since this is still a mere conglomeration of national policies.

129. However, the WEU Assembly must here and now associate itself with the European Parliament, which represents some 250 million inhabitants of Western Europe, will represent even more in a few years' time and supervises the European Communities over which it exercises effective powers.

130. Cutting the links between the European Parliament and the national parliaments has at the same time the effect of conferring specific legitimacy on the European Parliament because it is based on the will of its European electorate. A connection between the two assemblies seems clearly necessary, but for the time being this cannot be done officially. A connection is possible however through the appointment of permanent observers to each other's assembly.

131. Answering Senator Boucheny on 6th June 1980, Mr. François-Poncet, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, said:

“There is no provision in the Brussels Treaty or the Rules of Procedure of the WEU Assembly for inviting observers. To create special observer status for a delegation from the assembly of the European Communities would be to disregard the respective responsibilities of

the WEU Assembly and of the assembly of the European Communities, the latter not being competent to discuss armaments or defence questions. As far as the French Government is aware, moreover, no such proposal has yet been submitted to the Assembly or the Presidential Committee of WEU.”

132. This answer invites comment for, although the composition of the WEU Assembly was specified in the treaty, the invitation of observers has never been the subject of any provisions by the governments which have always accepted the practice of all the European parliamentary assemblies inviting parliamentary observers. There is wide experience of this since observers from the parliaments of several non-member countries of WEU, members of the Atlantic Alliance, attend each of the WEU Assembly's sessions.

133. Observers sent by the European Parliament to the WEU Assembly might however play a larger rôle. They might, for instance, be more numerous – a figure of about twenty might be agreed upon, which would represent hardly more than a fifth of the number of members of the WEU Assembly – but, unlike observers from national parliaments, they would no longer have to confine their speeches to matters of direct concern to their countries. Everything that concerns Europe concerns the European Parliament, so its observers should have all the rights of members of the WEU Assembly, i.e. the right to speak and the right to attend committee meetings. Only the right to vote could obviously not be granted to them.

134. Your Rapporteur realises this proposal arouses some mistrust and reservation among members of the WEU Assembly. However, he wishes to recall that the modified Brussels Treaty was drafted and adopted at a time when the European Parliament did not exist. Had it then existed, the WEU Assembly would have been associated with that parliament rather than with the Council of Europe for constituting its delegations.

135. At the present juncture, it is therefore normal to allow all the main tendencies in the European Parliament to be represented in a delegation of observers which should be large enough, but not so large as to upset the normal course of work in the WEU Assembly. Insofar as these observers would not be entitled to vote, this would have no effect on Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty. Their presence would obviously not be as beneficial to the European Parliament as to the WEU Assembly since the latter would be able to take advantage of the potential strength of the European Parliament and its political groups, whereas the European Parliament would have little to expect of

observers sent to it by the WEU Assembly, except perhaps for the link with the national parliaments which it will be lacking in the near future.

136. In any event, if some such solution is not found in the fairly near future, it will be impossible to prevent the European Parliament from discussing matters which are as vital for Europe as peace and war, security, détente and disarmament. To take cover behind claims of exclusive responsibility will remain without effect. It is better to make the most of a situation than to hide one's head in the sand without a thought for the future.

137. In the long run, it is hoped before the end of this new decade, such participation should lead to a merger of the two assemblies in a single European Parliament with universal powers, i.e. capable of being the true parliament of a Europe master of its destiny. The present proposal merely paves the way for this solution, without requiring any revision of the modified Brussels Treaty or of the treaty setting up the European Community. It is hard to see what principle could be invoked for refusing to allow the members of Europe's Parliament to take part in the work of the only European assembly with responsibilities in defence matters.

VI. Conclusions

138. As Professor Wilhelm Grewe, former Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic to NATO, said in a recent speech at Wolfsburg: "Criticism within the Alliance is inevitable and legitimate, but it must be constructive and strengthen its resolve, not just assert verbal solidarity in order to evade the issue." This is the sense of the present report.

139. A few obvious facts should therefore be recalled:

(i) Although détente and disarmament are Europe's goals, it cannot consider sacrificing its security for them, as was stressed in the Harmel report which, already in 1967, examined measures to be taken to achieve a better balance in NATO.

(ii) Security is above all the result of deterrence, ensured mainly by the United States, and means maintaining American forces in Europe as a guarantee of the United States' determination to defend Europe by every means at its disposal.

(iii) It is therefore ensured by the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance and by all the forces that NATO can earmark for a strategy of flexible response.

(iv) Cohesion, essential for meeting both political and military threats, means the Alliance must rest on a strong European pillar, based on the awareness of the European members of the Alliance of the interdependence of their destinies.

(v) Any adaptation of the Alliance to a world in which threats are becoming increasingly imminent depends on the formation of the European pillar.

(vi) This calls for a regrouping of the Western European countries, the elaboration of a common armaments policy and close co-ordination of their foreign and defence policies, also covering areas outside the North Atlantic Treaty area.

(vii) The European Community is the natural framework for this regrouping.

(viii) At the present juncture, WEU is still the only European organisation in which member countries are required to co-ordinate their defence policies.

(ix) Consequently, WEU must be quickly adapted to the present requirements of the Atlantic Alliance so that it may help to form the European pillar of the Alliance.

(x) At the same time, WEU must help to prepare the future, which, in the parliamentary field, means establishing permanent links between the WEU Assembly and the European Parliament.

(xi) To this end, the WEU Assembly should extend a permanent invitation to observers from the European Parliament to take part in all its work, but without the right to vote.

Future of European security

AMENDMENT 1¹
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere

1. In paragraph 3 of the draft resolution proper, after “ to instruct ”, insert “ the Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and ”.

Signed: Cavaliere

1. See 10th Sitting, 2nd December 1980 (Resolution not moved).

Future of European security

AMENDMENT 2 ¹
tabled by MM. Wilkinson and Stainton

2. Leave out the second and third paragraphs of the preamble to the draft resolution.

In paragraph 1 of the draft resolution proper, line 1, leave out from “Committee” to the end and insert “to examine means of associating more fully parliamentary representatives of the European member countries of NATO with the work of the Assembly of WEU;”.

Leave out paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution proper.

Signed: Wilkinson, Stainton

1. See 10th Sitting, 2nd December 1980 (Resolution not moved).

Future of European security

AMENDMENT 3 ¹
tabled by Mr. Stainton

3. At the end of the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft resolution, add “though defence is *ultra vires* that treaty;”.

Signed: Stainton

1. See 10th Sitting, 2nd December 1980 (Resolution not moved).

Future of European security

AMENDMENT 4 ¹

tabled by Mr. Caro

4. In paragraph (d) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “also to negotiate their accession to the modified Brussels Treaty or, if they do not wish to do so, their association with the activities of WEU ” and insert “to take all steps and measures likely to promote the closest possible participation of their activities in the achievement of the aims of the modified Brussels Treaty”.

Signed: Caro

1. See 10th Sitting, 2nd December 1980 (Amendment agreed to).

Future of European security

AMENDMENT 5 ¹
tabled by MM. Baumel and Valleix

5. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph (d).

Signed: Baumel, Valleix

1. See 10th Sitting, 2nd December 1980 (Amendment negatived).

*Political implications for Europe
of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan*
— *Implications of the deterioration of East-West relations
from the invasion of Afghanistan to the Madrid conference*

REPORT ¹

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. Hardy, Rapporteur*

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¹ Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 3 abstentions.

² Members of the Committee: Sir Frederic Bennett (Chairman); MM. De Poi, Portheine (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Berrier (Alternate: Baumel), Mrs. Boniver, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Brugnon, Conti Persini, Deschamps, Druon, Gessner, Hanin, Hardy, von Hassel (Alternate: Redde-

mann), Lagneau, Lord McNair, MM. Mangelschots (Alternate: van Waterschoot), Mende, Mommersteeg, Müller, Périquier (Alternate: Forni), Lord Reay (Alternate: Atkinson), MM. Thoss, Urwin (Alternate: Pavitt), Valiante, Vecchiotti (Alternate: Antoni), Voogd.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.

Draft Recommendation***on the political implications for Europe of
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan***

The Assembly,

Considering the invasion of Afghanistan to be a challenge to international law and a violation of the final act of the Helsinki conference, particularly paragraphs II and VIII of the declaration on principles;

Considering that security and co-operation in Europe require respect for human rights within each of the countries taking part in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe;

Considering therefore that the verifications to be effected at the meeting of the CSCE in Madrid and the decisions it will take must concern to an equal degree the fields of security, economic co-operation and guarantees granted to persons;

Considering moreover that the balance of forces which ensures peace in Europe is threatened by the superiority acquired by the Soviet Union in both conventional forces and continental-range nuclear weapons, that the limitation of armaments and the reduction of forces and weapons, provided this helps to restore the balance, are still an essential means of ensuring Europe's security and that realistic proposals made by several countries for limiting or reducing forces and armaments or for confidence-building measures should allow significant progress to be made in this field in the coming years;

Considering that application of the right of the Afghan people to self-determination, independence and territorial integrity remains a basic aim to which the West must give priority in its relations with the Soviet Union,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge and remind the governments of member states to emphasise that the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan is a continuing unacceptable violation of international law and human rights and call for the removal of these troops;
2. Follow attentively developments at the CSCE meeting in Madrid and ensure close consultations between its members so as to allow substantial and a comparable degree of progress to be made with all the various items on the agenda;
3. Urge all participants in the CSCE to apply the provisions of the Helsinki final act in full;
4. Endeavour to ensure that the subsequent meeting of a conference on disarmament in Europe proceeds without serious delay;
5. At the same time pursue consideration of developments in the MBFR talks and encourage ratification of SALT II and the opening of SALT III with the aim of achieving true parity of forces and armaments in Europe and an overall nuclear balance;
6. Ask the governments of member countries to respect undertakings they have entered into, particularly in the framework of NATO, with a view to improving the West's defensive potential in Europe in both conventional and nuclear fields should progress in the achievement of disarmament not be made;
7. Continue and intensify the assistance which the EEC grants Yugoslavia;
8. Encourage application of the agreements between the Polish state and strikers of September 1980, *inter alia* by affording Poland economic and food assistance;
9. Pursue efforts undertaken in the framework of nine-power consultations to promote the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East;
10. Examine the possibility of full financial assistance and, if necessary, supplies of military equipment to the Afghan resistance movements until the USSR proves it is ready to negotiate the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan;

11. Together with all the arms-exporting countries, seek to confine deliveries of military equipment within the obligations of member states under the Charter of the United Nations;
12. Show its determination to use all necessary means to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to shipping;
13. Do its utmost to circumscribe the conflict between Iran and Iraq, to obtain a cease-fire and to seek the conditions for a fair and lasting peace between these two countries;
14. Maintain its support for the efforts of the United States with a view to obtaining the liberation of the American diplomats being held hostage in Tehran.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Hardy, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The massive intervention of Soviet forces in Afghanistan in December 1979 is an essential reason, and not the only one, for re-examining all the problems raised by Western European security. This invasion in fact affects the balance of forces in Asia at the expense of those countries most in favour of normal co-operation with the West, particularly as it occurred shortly after the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia which for its part ensured the preponderance of the Soviet Union's allies in South-East Asia. Events in Iran and the unrest rife throughout the Near and Middle East made the region particularly sensitive, and the massive military presence of the Soviet Union close to this area which is vital for the economy of Western Europe is in itself a threat the West must take fully into account.

2. In many respects, it may be considered that the military coup d'état in Turkey and the war which broke out between Iraq and Iran in September 1980 were influenced by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

3. Second, the reasons given by the highest-ranking Soviet leaders, beginning with Mr. Brezhnev, to justify the invasion of Afghanistan invoked the famous "Brezhnev doctrine" used for the first time in 1968 with regard to Czechoslovakia. This meant that the idea that the sovereignty of countries with so-called "socialist" régimes was limited by the overall interests of the communist cause, i.e. that of the Soviet Union, is and remains one of the essential bases of Soviet policy, in spite of the final act of the Helsinki conference, both the spirit and the letter of which proclaim the "sovereign equality" and "respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty" of states and in spite of all the progress which might have been made towards East-West détente and co-operation. The unrest in Poland in August 1980 means particular attention must be paid to Soviet reactions to any calling in question of the economic and social, or even political, régime of a people's democracy by its own working class. The Brezhnev doctrine is certainly a challenge to international law, its application is hardly compatible with the pursuit of détente and there is even a risk of its leading to further international crises and opportunities for conflict in which the western countries will perhaps not always be able to remain spectators.

4. The invasion of Afghanistan is a very direct violation of the United Nations Charter but also of the Helsinki final act of 1975 which formed a kind of juridical basis for détente. Admittedly, most provisions of the Helsinki final act concern only relations between participating states and do not apply to Afghanistan. However, paragraph II of the "Declaration on principles guiding relations between participating states" extends undertakings relating to "refraining from the threat or use of force" to all international relations in the following words:

"The participating states will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the present declaration. No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of forces in contravention of this principle.

.....

No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions likely to give rise to disputes, between them."

5. Similarly, paragraph VIII of the same declaration, entitled: "Equal rights and self-determination of peoples", is in no way limited to the signatory countries:

"The participating states will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of states.

By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.

The participating states, reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and

effective exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of friendly relations among themselves as among all states; they also recall the importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this principle."

6. Thus, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in itself calls in question the fundamental text on which détente was based and it is to be wondered whether the Soviet Union has not thereby put an end to détente. This would mean that all the agreements between western countries and the Soviet Union, whether they concern disarmament, the limitation of armaments or economic and cultural co-operation, would have been rendered null and void by this intervention, particularly as the resistance of the Afghan people has led the Soviet Union to increase its intervention forces, in spite of its undertaking to withdraw them by stages at an early date, which makes it very unlikely that the situation will in the near future evolve in a direction favourable to détente.

7. The NATO countries examined this question in the early months of 1980 and reached agreement on a number of important points.

8. First, they all agreed to refuse to recognise that the invasion of Afghanistan gave the Soviet Union any rights to seek to maintain either presence within or control of that country.

9. Second, none of them considered the direct use of force to oppose the Soviet invasion, but they all agreed to improve the West's defensive capability in order to meet the newly-created situation, with a view to deterrence limited not only to the case of a massive aggression by the Soviet Union in Europe but also covering threats of peripheral action, aimed in particular at the Near and Middle East. The United States is known to be establishing and to have started deploying a large military force in the Gulf area.

10. Third, all the western countries agreed to maintain the planned date of the meeting of the review conference of the Helsinki final act, due to open in Madrid in autumn 1980. In view of the dates fixed for the United States presidential elections in particular, it would perhaps have been reasonable to postpone the conference for a few months since there is a risk of strong clashes between East and West and also of certain differences of views between the western countries on the consequences to be drawn from the invasion of Afghanistan. However, the West thought it preferable to maintain what had been planned rather than to seem to neglect a major opportunity for a dialogue with the Soviet Union and with its partners.

11. Conversely, the United States Government decided not to submit the SALT II agreements to Congress for ratification and the opening of the SALT III negotiations was therefore postponed to a date still to be fixed, in spite of a Soviet proposal not to await the ratification of SALT II before embarking on a first examination of matters relating to theatre nuclear weapons. However, on 16th September 1980 the Soviet Union and the United States decided to organise a meeting in Geneva on 15th October with a view to defining conditions for SALT III, although it is clear that no major decision can be taken in this field before the American elections on 4th November.

12. But it became clear that measures for applying the principles defined in the framework of NATO in the early months of 1980 raised difficulties and serious divergences of views between the western countries. For instance, it was most regrettable that the West was unable to take a common decision with regard to its participation in the Olympic Games, held in Moscow in the summer of 1980. Admittedly, the absence of American athletes and athletes from a number of other western countries was a demonstration of protest which could not go unseen among the Soviet people, but the fact that other member countries of the Atlantic Alliance took part in the games also gave the impression that the West was far from united and that certain western countries were perhaps not prepared to take part in such demonstrations. It should be noted that those present in Moscow during the Olympic Games were unable to inform the Soviet people of their feelings, although some tried to do so, because of the very strict measures taken by the Soviet Union to isolate foreigners who went to Moscow.

13. The economic measures envisaged or taken by certain western countries, particularly the United States, have not always been followed by all the Western European countries. This removed much of the impact of these measures and aroused the mistrust and displeasure of American public opinion towards the European members of NATO.

14. There were also divergences over the possibility and necessity of pursuing diplomatic talks with the Soviet Union. Mr. Giscard d'Estaing's visit to Warsaw, followed by Mr. Helmut Schmidt's visit to Moscow, brought these divergences out clearly.

15. Can disarmament talks continue when an armaments effort seems essential for the West's security? Can consideration be given to increasing arms limitation measures when dealing with a partner who does not respect his undertakings and sees such limitation as a means of strengthening the military superiority

acquired in recent years? Is it conceivable to discuss with such a partner measures relating to the freedom of persons and human rights when it is quite evident that the measures agreed upon in Helsinki are not applied within that partner's frontiers nor in the countries under its control?

16. In the West, there is an ever-growing tendency to consider that détente is impossible as long as the Soviet Union has not shown it is thoroughly changing its intentions and methods, while for another section of European public opinion détente remains an aim which must be pursued even if serious difficulties are encountered. Depending, for instance, on whether one considers the Helsinki final act to be a reference and an encouragement for those who uphold respect for human rights in the Soviet Union or on the contrary that such encouragement in itself made the Soviet authorities harden their attitude towards dissidents of all kinds and towards other countries within its sphere of influence, the Madrid meeting will be tackled with very different prospects in mind. Depending on whether one considers that détente weakens the democratic countries' desire to defend themselves or that it causes splits in the Soviet camp, its pursuit and development will be viewed more or less favourably.

17. In any event, the West must be very careful to avoid the kind of unconcerted and sometimes contradictory unilateral measures which have been increasing in number since December 1979 and hold more consultations during and after the Madrid conference on all measures concerning its relations with the East and its security in order not to aggravate the political and military repercussions of the invasion of Afghanistan.

II. *Conference on security and co-operation in Europe*

1. *Background*

18. For several years it had been planned to hold a conference to review application of the Helsinki final act in Madrid in autumn 1980. A preparatory conference was held at the beginning of September 1980, the ministerial meeting being planned for November. Meetings of experts were already held in 1979 and at the beginning of 1980.

19. The question of whether it was possible and expedient to maintain the Madrid meeting arose after the invasion of Afghanistan. It will be remembered in particular that a review conference held in Belgrade in 1977-78 was in every respect a failure. But the circumstances

prevailing in 1980 seem even less favourable than those in 1977. The Afghanistan affair is of course a backcloth which makes any talks between the Soviet Union and the western countries, as well as the neutral and non-aligned countries, difficult, because it endangers the balance of forces on which peace is based and makes the confidence needed, if such a conference is to progress, even more impossible and because, as has been shown, the invasion of Afghanistan is a direct violation of the Helsinki agreement.

20. But this is not the only affair to have created a rather unpropitious atmosphere for making a serious review of application of the Helsinki final act and *a fortiori* progressing towards co-operation, détente and disarmament. In its internal affairs, the Soviet Government has in fact constantly infringed the undertakings entered into in Helsinki. As from 1975, it became apparent that the Helsinki final act provided arms for those known as the Soviet "dissidents", i.e. those who call for greater freedom within the Soviet Union. Far from granting such freedom, the Soviet Government put down attempts at dissidence, in the best of cases expelling persons contesting the régime or simply protesting against certain of its excesses and depriving them of their Soviet nationality or, more generally, by internment, with or without trial, sometimes in psychiatric hospitals regarding which there has been much information about them being subjected to inhuman treatment and sometimes in prisons or concentration camps, often situated in regions with particularly rigorous climates.

21. Holding the Olympic Games in Moscow in summer 1980 might have provided an opportunity for various kinds of contact between the many westerners who attended and the Soviet people. The Soviet Government did its utmost to prevent such contacts by restricting the freedom of circulation and expression of those westerners who, in spite of the invasion of Afghanistan, took part in one way or another in the Olympic Games, and by evacuating a large number of inhabitants from Moscow before the games started, under the pretext of making room for foreign visitors. These measures allowed the Soviet Government to avoid responding in any way to the numerous approaches made on the occasion of the Olympic Games in favour of the dissidents and, the very day the games ended, to resume the arrest and repression of "dissidents" or those accused of being so.

22. Everything is as if the Soviet Government considered that the country's very régime would be fundamentally called in question if its citizens were granted more freedom and came in contact with nationals of non-communist countries. Proof of this is to be found in the

resumed jamming of western Russian language broadcasts, a clear sign of this will to isolate the Soviet people and prevent them having any contacts with the outside world. As long as the Soviet Union continues to consider that the highest interests of the state and régime preclude application of the principles to which it thought it could subscribe when signing the Helsinki final act, it must be noted that any verification of the application of this act will result in accusations being levelled at the Soviet Union by western public opinion and probably also by that part of public opinion in the eastern countries which can be informed of what is happening in Madrid.

23. Moreover, it is hard to see how the Soviet Union could subscribe to concessions which go further than the undertakings it entered into in Helsinki in the field of human rights and the free movement of persons, when it seems incapable of applying the principles defined in 1975. It should be added that events in Poland in August 1980 may make it still more difficult to pursue détente and ensure the success of the Madrid conference where the right of peoples to self-determination is concerned in view of the mistrust which developments in the people's democracies cannot fail to arouse in Moscow and in view of the reaffirmation of the Brezhnev doctrine in connection with Afghanistan.

24. The events in Poland were in fact accompanied by two demonstrations of the fear of continued détente felt by the leaders of the eastern bloc. It was understandable that Mr. Gierek should have renounced his planned visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, in view of the internal situation in Poland, but for the Government of the German Democratic Republic at almost the same time to have made it necessary for Chancellor Schmidt to renounce his visit to the German Democratic Republic in September 1980 clearly shows that the Polish affair has had repercussions even on relations between the two Germanies which everyone knows are an essential element of détente in Europe because the Pankow Government may be unable or unwilling to take the risk of a contact between the East Germans and the Federal Republic. These visits have been postponed *sine die* and everything indicates that they will not take place before the Madrid conference. This means that the conference will meet without such essential problems as those of relations between the two Germanies having been examined seriously by the heads of government the most concerned by the application of the Helsinki final act. It will be recalled that the Helsinki conference was preceded by many contacts between the two parts of Germany.

25. Finally, the question has arisen to what extent the Mediterranean countries not on the European continent might participate in the Madrid conference. Israel and Egypt were allowed to take part in the meeting of experts of the CSCE countries held in Valletta in 1979, which to a certain extent heralded their participation in the Madrid meeting. This seemed reasonable in the context of an extension of détente, security and co-operation to all the shores of a sea bordering on Europe and essential to Europe's security from both a strategic and an economic standpoint. The European countries on the shores of the Mediterranean had insisted that the Helsinki conference raise Mediterranean problems essential to their security. It might have seemed normal for non-European Mediterranean countries to go to Madrid, particularly in view of the fact that the presence of the United States and Canada at the CSCE along with thirty-three European countries prevented an over-restricted limit being placed on the geographical criteria for participation.

26. But the policy embarked upon by Israel in the occupied territories, particularly in Jerusalem and on the West Bank, and in Southern Lebanon has led Egypt itself to interrupt the process of détente in Palestinian affairs which it had been working for since the Camp David agreements. At present, no element of a solution can be found to the Palestine problem in the framework of the CSCE, but there is a strong risk of its distracting attention from truly European problems, allowing the Soviet Union to engage in intense propaganda against the West and compromising the results of the conference.

27. It would probably be rather unreasonable at the present stage to include other states in the Madrid meeting, but it is difficult to agree to the Palestinian question being raised there in the absence of the Arab countries concerned and it may be felt better to drop this matter from the agenda of the conference, which would mean not accepting the participation of any country on the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

2. Topics of the conference

28. In spite of all these difficulties, the NATO countries decided by common agreement to continue to prepare for the Madrid meeting, and the Soviet Union, its allies and the neutral European countries have done likewise, which means this meeting is now almost certain to take place. However, even before it is held it must be realised that its results can but be very limited, or even negative in many respects.

29. Where the principles laid down in 1975 are concerned, and in particular human rights, it is hard to see how any progress can be made in relation to the Helsinki final act. It would already be a major success to recall what was decided upon with regard to co-operation in humanitarian and other fields, including information.

30. Although no illusions must be cherished about what it will be possible to achieve in this field and although, in the interests of peace, security and co-operation, the Soviet Union must not be placed in a situation which compels it, in order to protect its own security, the stability of its régime and internal peace, to take measures directly opposed to those binding it under the Helsinki final act, it must also be demonstrated that the West considers détente to be indivisible and that the Soviet Union can expect no progress with regard to economic co-operation or confidence-building measures if nothing is achieved with regard to human rights and personal relations. In Helsinki, this requirement allowed positive results to be achieved. Neither verification of the application of the Helsinki decisions nor the extension of these measures can be confined to one area, and no area can be neglected, particularly when such essential matters as respect for human rights are involved.

31. Economic co-operation also raises serious problems because a number of measures were taken in the West, and by the United States in particular, following the invasion of Afghanistan in order to use economic sanctions to induce the Soviet Union to renounce its intervention in Afghanistan. What the western powers then wondered was to what extent one or other side would benefit from increased trade between East and West. Those in favour of a boycott felt that the Soviet Union was sufficiently short of a number of resources essential for its security and even its food supply for a boycott policy pursued by all the western countries to force it to modify its foreign policy.

32. For instance, it is known to have difficulty in obtaining grain and its industry cannot produce the equivalent of certain items which the West supplies and which are essential to the development of its industry or even its armaments. But nor should it be overlooked that the western countries too – and particularly the Western European countries – need to maintain their trade with the Eastern European countries, on the one hand because they too suffer from certain shortages, particularly where energy is concerned, and import admittedly rather small quantities of Polish coal and Soviet oil, but above all because their balance-of-payments difficulties make it very difficult for them to give up markets which may be large and provide work for their firms. Nevertheless it

would be appropriate for greater recognition to be afforded to the extent to which western economic activity and resources sustain the Soviet Union.

33. These matters have been a subject of disagreement between the United States and its European partners and the pursuit of economic co-operation, particularly between the Federal Republic, Italy or France and the Soviet Union, has certainly aroused strong reactions in the United States, where the European countries have sometimes been accused of practising dedicated egoism in this field at the expense of the elementary principles of international ethics and the cohesion which the countries of the Atlantic Alliance need in their relations with the Soviet Union.

34. However, it should be noted that the United States Government has not always consulted its allies before taking measures of this kind and that the latter, while respecting the formal undertakings entered into by all the western countries to submit to a ban on delivering to the Soviet Union products or techniques included in the so-called COCOM list and on the other hand not to take advantage of the application of boycott measures to seize markets in the Soviet Union, have been able to carry out some worthwhile business thanks to the American boycott.

35. In fact, some of the western countries' trade with and investments in the Soviet Union seem to be contrary to these principles, even if they do not actually violate them. This is in particular the case of the Franco-German consortium which started to build an aluminium factory in Siberia when ALCOA stopped building factories for the same purpose.

36. A major article by Mr. Giovanni Agnelli, who is particularly representative of European leaders, in the summer issue of the American revue *Foreign Affairs* defines the principles which he would like to have applied to economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union and he sums up his views as follows:

“ 1. Trade, according to western values and culture, is, in itself, a good thing, and we should pursue it with the eastern bloc as well, unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary.

2. The idea that Soviet global or domestic policies can be modified and improved through trade ‘linkage’ has been proved unrealistic. One cannot reduce the expansionist impact of Soviet policies by withholding trade. On the contrary, one might even increase it.

3. The claim that Soviet policies will become more moderate and peaceful as a

result of a higher level of trade and economic interdependence with the West is also beyond proof. Yet, experience tells us that the growth of trade strengthens forces and individuals inside Soviet society which are recognisably committed to détente with the West and to peaceful policies.

4. The danger that economic interdependence may bring about the 'Finlandisation' of Europe and the West remains, for the time being, purely a theoretical possibility, not a reality. The true danger of 'Finlandisation' was actually removed when Western Europe became a powerful economic community, strongly embedded into the fabric of international trade.

.....

5. A certain number of well-defined areas of strategic importance ought to be excluded from East-West trade, in order to deprive the other side of goods which could be used for military purposes.

6. A distinction should be made between trade with the Soviet Union and trade with the eastern bloc countries. Some of the political arguments being currently advanced in the West against excessive dependence of our economies on trade with the Soviet Union could be used in favour of an increasing level of trade between some of the Soviet Union's European allies and the West. Should two separate sets of rules be devised?

7. Any strategy agreed upon in the matter of trade with the Soviet bloc must either be a common policy for all western countries, or it will be no policy at all. If the rules of the game are not respected by all (the present rules very often are not), no policy will prove workable. (For example, it is known that the recent Paris agreements on government-assisted credit aids have been overtly violated by some countries just a few hours after the signature).

8. In view of the different relative importance of trade with the Soviet bloc for western countries, it is not advisable that policy changes be decided unilaterally by any single member of the western alliance, without prior consultation and agreement among all nations concerned. At present, the political instruments for achieving this new kind of co-ordinated policies do not seem to exist. It is unthinkable that it is just up to the businessmen to fill up such a vacuum.

9. Unilateral actions of any kind, creating a fait accompli and facing others with an apparent choice between 'loyalty' and 'vital interest' are dangerous for the unity of the western alliance. The lack of a comprehensive western strategy today is evident: so long as the situation remains so, the prime beneficiary will be the USSR. Necessary rules should be established that take into account the relative exposures to risks of the individual members both in economic and political terms."

37. These points of view are certainly not shared by a large section of American public opinion and are a major source of divergence between the European and American partners of the Alliance. If the Madrid conference were to stress the development of economic trade at the expense of the other Helsinki "baskets", the Soviet Union would achieve a considerable success since it would then manage to ensure tacit condemnation of the American boycott measures, divide the West and make it look, in the eyes of its own public opinion, as if it were responsible for the inadequate application of the Helsinki final act. The West must therefore be particularly careful to stand united on this question and accept increased economic relations only insofar as substantial progress is achieved in other "baskets".

38. Where confidence-building measures are concerned, it seems that the Helsinki final act has been applied more or less satisfactorily by all signatories and that it may be possible to go into the undertakings entered into in Helsinki in greater detail and extend their scope, particularly where the announcement of manœuvres on European territory are concerned. In particular, the limit above which any manœuvre must be announced might be lowered to 10,000 men, the invitation of observers to these manœuvres made compulsory and obligations relating to land manœuvres be extended to naval manœuvres without affecting the vital interests of any participants. This is one of the only points on which it seems possible to make significant progress on the Helsinki final act. But we know that the impact of measures of this kind is still very limited and that mutual confidence depends less on the announcement of military manœuvres than on the general policy pursued by signatory countries.

39. There remains one point which was not on the agenda at Helsinki but which is to be on that of the Madrid conference, i.e. the proposals which have been made with regard to disarmament in Europe. These consist essentially of the French proposal to convene a "confer-

ence on disarmament in Europe", made in spring 1978, the Soviet proposal for an "all-European conference on military détente and disarmament", made in March 1979, and the Polish proposal to hold a European conference on disarmament in Warsaw, made by Mr. Gierak in February 1980. These three proposals have common aspects which may allow them to form a good foundation for future negotiations since all three are addressed to all participants in the CSCE, come within the framework of this conference and envisage a progressive procedure starting from measures intended to establish confidence, leading subsequently to a reduction in armaments.

40. At the outset the French proposal is known to have encountered reservations among the member countries of NATO which feared that the pursuit of the MBFR talks might be compromised by a wider project, which also included the neutral countries and concerned the whole European continent, and that it might become even more difficult to achieve results in such conditions. Today, these reservations seem to have been overcome, particularly because of an assurance that the MBFR talks would in any event continue. The neutral countries were worried because the French proposal concerned only conventional and not nuclear weapons. In present circumstances and in view of the fact that the Soviet Union is deploying SS-20 missiles on European territory as fast it can, while the West is lagging seriously behind in the deployment of continental-range missiles in Europe, it seems difficult to reach an agreement establishing a true balance in the nuclear field, because of the western countries' particularly unfavourable starting-point for any limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe. Hence, it seems realistic to consider, at least initially, only a stabilisation or reduction of conventional weapons. The fact that this examination covers the whole of Europe is also a strong point in view of the possibilities which the Soviet Union has of taking advantage of an armaments freeze in Central Europe to strengthen its flanks, while the West has far fewer possibilities in this respect.

41. Finally, caution must be shown in approaching the Soviet proposal that the nuclear powers should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, since such a promise would give a considerable advantage to the first power not to respect it and, above all, in view of the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority over the Atlantic Alliance, it would considerably reduce the deterrent effect of western armaments and consequently help to make war less improbable.

42. Naturally it cannot be expected that the text of a disarmament treaty will be drawn up at the Madrid meeting but a decision might be

taken to pursue negotiations in this field at a specialised conference to be held within the next few years.

43. There is thus every indication that in the military field proper the conference on security and co-operation in Europe can make progress at the Madrid meeting, while at political level and in cultural exchanges, movements of persons or economic co-operation, it is hard to see how the results obtained on paper at Helsinki but not achieved since can be improved upon. However, it will still be primordial not to ignore or neglect any of the Helsinki "baskets" in Madrid. The Afghanistan affair is a further reminder that détente is indivisible and that disarmament in Europe makes sense only if all the elements on which confidence can be based are the subject of a joint examination and are effectively applied. Respect for the sovereignty of states, non-intervention in their internal affairs and freedom of persons and trade remain the essential conditions for any true progress in the field of disarmament.

44. The opening stages of the Madrid preparatory conference were hardly encouraging: it proved very difficult to draw up the agenda and order of business for the conference proper and in three weeks practically no progress was made. The principal obstacle was the time the Madrid meeting should devote to verifying application of the Helsinki final act. The West considers this to be an essential part of the conference and progress would be impossible if achievements were not checked first; it therefore wishes the weeks up to the Christmas break to be concerned with this aspect alone. For reasons easy to guess, the Soviet Union and its allies wish, on the contrary, to move on quickly to the second part of the conference to examine areas where progress is to be made, glossing over as far as possible the questions raised by the defective application of the Helsinki final act. Clearly the West cannot bow to these demands.

III. *Peace and security in Europe*

45. In certain respects, it may be held that the invasion of Afghanistan, far from having aggravated immediate Soviet threats to Western Europe's security and peace in Europe, somewhat improved a situation which had been difficult because of the considerable growth in recent years in Soviet conventional and theatre nuclear weapons. Although Soviet superiority in conventional forces and weapons had been clear for a long time, the rapid deployment of SS-20 continental-range missiles and the development of long-range Backfire nuclear bom-

bers has in the last two years extended this superiority to the field of continental-range means of delivery.

46. The West had for a long time been aware of the need to meet this threat and it was before the invasion of Afghanistan that the members of NATO undertook to increase their defence budgets by 3 % per year at constant values and the United States Government started to develop Pershing II continental-range missiles and cruise missiles. Similarly, the announcement in August 1980 that the United States Government was developing a nuclear bomber undetectable by radar shows that the relevant studies had been under way for some time.

47. However, both in the United States and in Europe governments faced difficulty in securing public and parliamentary approval of increased defence budgets. Very active Soviet propaganda denouncing these measures appeared to be well received in a number of European countries. Moreover, most European countries were having great difficulty in ensuring acceptance of the stationing on their territory of a new type of American missile with nuclear warheads, although they considered the deployment of these missiles in Europe to be essential for the security of their own countries.

48. The invasion of Afghanistan seems to have reminded public opinion of the seriousness of the threat to Europe and thus allowed governments to do what they had not managed to do before. Thus, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany have endorsed the stationing of Pershing II and cruise missiles on their territory and this stationing has in fact since begun. Although Belgium and the Netherlands have not yet taken a final decision in this respect, they now seem less opposed to the idea. France for its part has announced that it has decided to pursue studies which should allow it to deploy the neutron bomb in a few years' time, and the United States Government has announced that work has started on a new undetectable aircraft. Furthermore, the governments of most European countries have managed to obtain an effective increase in defence budgets.

49. This accumulation of armaments, and nuclear weapons in particular, in Europe may of course be deplored, particularly as it seems likely to continue for some years. But insofar as it is the balance of forces and armaments that ensures Europe's security and the maintenance of peace, the unbalanced situation which had been developing for several years was in itself a danger to peace and the decisions taken

by the United States and by the European members of NATO should allow this to be met fairly soon.

50. In spite of the growing number of Soviet declarations since the beginning of 1980, there is no proof that the West's desire to strengthen its defensive capability hampers progress towards disarmament or the controlled limitation of forces and armaments in Europe. This appears even more clearly since the Soviet Union, following the decisions taken by NATO in 1980, seems far more prepared than in the past to make the necessary concessions so that the MBFR negotiations, which have been under way in Vienna since October 1973, may at last lead to a first agreement between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

51. In fact, the principle of "approximate parity" has now been recognised by all participants in those negotiations as the fundamental condition for adequate security for all, and this has led them to accept the principle of "selectivity" in the reduction of arms and forces thanks to reductions affecting each side to an unequal extent. Similarly, the principle of a two-stage process has been accepted which should make it easier to reach a first agreement without prejudice to the results of subsequent negotiations. On 10th July 1980, the Soviet Union, in reply to a proposed provisional agreement submitted by the western participants, agreed that the withdrawal of 13,000 men on the American side could be accompanied by the withdrawal of 20,000 men on the Soviet side. Of course, there are still many difficulties, particularly about the method of calculating the forces now present on European territory. Apparently, however, the proposed withdrawals should lead to a numerical balance of forces at a level of about 765,000 men on each side in the central sector of Europe. This would be a very desirable first step in the reduction of tension.

52. Moreover, probably because of the success of the confidence-building measures defined in the Helsinki agreements, participants in the Vienna negotiations have accepted the association of measures designed to re-establish confidence with the force reductions and, in a speech on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the German Democratic Republic on 6th October 1979, Mr. Brezhnev announced that the Soviet Union would henceforth be favourable to such measures.

53. On 21st October, NATO made seven proposals aimed at extending to any movement of forces equal or superior to a division the obligation to warn the other side, which should be allowed to send observers. Moreover, NATO proposed carrying out eighteen inspections a year on that portion of the territory of

the other side which formed part of the reduction zone and the stationing of permanent observers on the boundaries of that zone. Finally, it proposed the periodical exchange of information on force movements on either side and the creation of a consultative commission to facilitate the implementation of any agreements reached.

54. These proposals as a whole seem to provide a realistic basis for the pursuit of the MBFR negotiations which it is to be hoped will manage to reach a first agreement reasonably soon if other events do not arise which again disturb the mutual confidence of its participants.

55. But the Afghanistan affair and ensuing reactions seem to have limited the Soviet Union's possibilities of action even more where relations between the Soviet Union and the Central and Eastern European countries are concerned. It was in fact first noted that the European members of the Warsaw Pact all, in different ways and sometimes only by their delay in approving the Soviet intervention, showed their disapproval of the invasion of Afghanistan. In any event, none of them took part in this purely Soviet operation. Consequently, although the invasion of Afghanistan quite obviously reminded the Soviet Union's friends that the Brezhnev doctrine was still in force, it also showed the Soviet Union itself that its allies were either not prepared to become involved in a conflict which was of no direct concern to them or else accepted the application of this doctrine in the case of Afghanistan only with the utmost reluctance.

56. The Soviet Union could not ignore these reservations, and its caution during the events in Poland in August 1980 shows, as far as it is possible to judge at present, that it has learnt the lesson. In other circumstances, the Soviet Union would probably have been quick to deploy resources to control the strikers. But, when these events occurred, the Soviet Government did not appear willing to do so, whereas in 1968 it did not hesitate to invade Czechoslovakia with the forces of the other people's democracies at its side. It is naturally difficult to assess the extent of the concessions which the new Polish Government has said it is prepared to make, particularly as regards trade union freedom, and the way it will fulfil the promises it has just made. It is even more difficult to know to what extent the Soviet Union approves the concessions made to the Polish working class. It nevertheless appears that it did not oppose these concessions and that it has consequently left the Polish Government some degree of freedom of reaction to the internal dangers it was running. If this attitude is compared with that adopted by the Soviet Government in 1968 when the Czechoslovak

Communist Government decided to make major and liberal concessions to local public opinion, it can be seen that the Afghanistan affair has had a calming influence on Soviet policy in Europe.

57. But it was probably in the case of Yugoslavia, when the question of the succession to Marshal Tito at the head of the state arose, that Soviet caution was demonstrated the most clearly. Tito's death was admittedly not unexpected and the collegiate leadership which took power following his death had been able to prepare for the event. It had to be alert to all the dangers which any sign of division on its part might have involved. Nevertheless, six weeks after Marshal Tito's funeral, these leaders were able to welcome President Carter to Belgrade and show, without giving rise to Soviet reactions, that it was unanimously in favour of a policy aimed at preserving the independence of the state, the freedom of its foreign policy towards the blocs and an economic policy based on self-management.

58. Agreed, the situation in Yugoslavia is far from reassuring. There are still many difficulties, both in the economic field, where the deficit in the balance of payments amounted to \$ 6,000 million in 1979 and Yugoslav industry seems hardly competitive compared with industry in Western Europe, and in the political field where the problem of nationalities, perhaps not taken sufficiently into account in Tito's policy, continues to weigh on the country's future.

59. The Yugoslav Government is perfectly aware that the country's economic weaknesses aggravate a political problem and it has found widespread understanding in Western Europe since in spring 1980 it was able to sign a co-operation agreement with the EEC. The latter, in spite of the relatively slow economic development of Yugoslavia compared *inter alia* with the strides being made in countries like Spain and Greece, granted considerable assistance to Yugoslavia in the form of very low interest-bearing loans. At the same time, at the end of 1979 the Yugoslav Government gave up attributing the difficulties encountered by Yugoslav exports to EEC protectionism. It fully realises that Yugoslavia's economic difficulties are essentially domestic problems.

60. It nevertheless seems that Yugoslavia's rôle as leader of the non-aligned countries, which it had played since 1955, will be to some extent eclipsed. This group is increasingly divided and until 1979 Yugoslavia was constantly opposed to those who wished to make the Soviet Union the protector of the non-aligned countries. The inevitable decline, perhaps only provisional moreover, of Yugoslavia's rôle following the death of Tito could but strengthen

the pro-Soviet tendency in the non-aligned group. But here too the invasion of Afghanistan has had the opposite effect since that country belonged to the non-aligned group. For the immediate future at least, it may be thought that Yugoslavia has escaped the threats which many thought would face it as soon as the "post-Tito" era began.

61. There is no question of Western Europe guiding Yugoslavia towards a more or less disguised form of accession to the Atlantic bloc; the West must use all available means to help it to resist Soviet pressure, maintain internal cohesion and pursue its policy of true non-alignment and a form of economic development which conforms to its fundamental choices.

62. There is every reason to think that the western countries, particularly the members of the EEC, have clearly understood that this must be kept in view in their policy towards Yugoslavia. Together with the unity and firmness being shown by the Yugoslav leaders, it may thus be hoped that Yugoslavia will manage to overcome the obstacles in the way of its continued independence and contribute, as it did in Tito's days, to the maintenance of peace in Europe and the security of southern Europe.

63. The invasion of Afghanistan probably had some effect on developments in Turkey. Threatened by internal instability due to a sharply declining economy and the development of terrorism which was claiming a growing number of victims, Turkey could not, in view of its extensive frontiers with the Soviet Union, allow its internal situation to grow worse without its independence being threatened. Unacceptable though it must be perhaps the military coup d'état on 12th September 1980 may not be entirely similar to the one which overthrew democracy in Greece in 1967. Ever since the reign of Kemal Ataturk, the Turkish army has been a support for democracy in Turkey, particularly during the 1960 and 1971 coups d'état, and measures taken since the latest coup d'état to restore order and security at home and to respect human rights, to form a provisional government and to draw up a new constitution give rise to some hope that this will again be the case.

64. In any event, it seems premature to consider the western partners taking sanctions against Turkey – except perhaps in the framework of the Council of Europe where, naturally, only democratically-elected parliamentarians may sit. But economic sanctions could but delay the country's recovery, which is necessary for the consolidation of democracy, and any measures which might separate Turkey from NATO could be catastrophic for the country's independence and the security of the

West. On the contrary, it is probably by assisting Turkey economically and keeping it closely associated with NATO that there may be hopes of encouraging the early restoration of a democratic régime. This is, in any event, the meaning of the decision taken by the Nine on 16th September 1980 when they decided not to freeze Turkey's association with the EEC as they had done in the past in the case of Greece, while expressing the wish that the promises made by the new Turkish Government will be fully and quickly carried into effect.

IV. *Extra-European factors*

65. A number of factors in the world situation affect Europe's security more or less directly, and first and foremost the development of Soviet strength, particularly naval.

66. In the last twenty years, the Soviet Union has built up a powerful fleet capable of intervening on all the oceans of the world. It outclasses the American fleet in the number of ships, particularly submarines. However, western naval strength is still superior to that of the Soviet Union and its allies because of the number of aircraft-carriers belonging to members of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly the giant American nuclear-propelled carriers.

67. Hitherto, the Soviet Union had been content with building three or four medium-tonnage aircraft-carriers, but in summer 1980 it was learned that Soviet shipyards in turn were starting to build giant nuclear-propelled aircraft-carriers. It may consequently be expected that the Soviet Union will soon have the most modern and powerful navy in the world, thus considerably increasing its means of action outside European and Asian territories. This growth in the Soviet Union's naval armaments may be one explanation for its attempts to obtain positions along the shores of the Indian Ocean, in Asia and in Africa and means that from now on the Soviet military threat has assumed world dimensions not only in nuclear weapons but also in conventional armaments.

68. The invasion of Afghanistan may be viewed from two standpoints: increasing Soviet power and the Soviet threat in Asia. The deployment of Soviet forces closer to the Strait of Hormuz and the Indian Ocean makes it materially possible for the Soviet Union to intervene in the Near and Middle East, at least by air. However, the invasion of Afghanistan has many worrying repercussions for the Soviet Union, both in the East and in Europe. In fact, all the Moslem countries, including those which are not at present on friendly terms with the West, have become extremely sensitive to

the Soviet threat and are anxious not to come under the Soviet area of influence, having seen clearly from the Afghanistan affair that their independence would be endangered if they came under Soviet protection or even had communists participate in their governments since such participation seems liable to make these countries subject to the Brezhnev doctrine, as was the case in Afghanistan.

69. Thus, Iraq, where the tendency had hitherto been to co-operate closely with the Soviet Union, is trying to diversify its economic partners, particularly in Europe, and Iran, in spite of the crisis in its relationship with the United States and most western countries following the fall of the Shah's régime, the incarceration of the American Embassy hostages in Tehran and violent demonstrations in London, Washington and Rome, has shown the greatest concern to be independent of the Soviet Union and has extended its repressive measures to the leaders or even followers of the Tudeh Party, the local version of the communist party. Although India for its part had been able to obtain considerable Soviet assistance – military in particular – to strengthen its positions with regard to Pakistan and China, it has shown concern at the invasion of Afghanistan.

70. The whole Middle East has been alive to the growth in the Soviet threat. This does not mean that most countries in the area have drawn noticeably closer to western positions. They are very largely prevented from doing so by the development of the situation in Palestine and in particular by the measures taken in recent months by the Israeli Government which has, on the one hand, established new settlements on the West bank and, on the other, annexed the Arab part of Jerusalem and a fairly extensive area round the city. It has also increased its military interventions in southern Lebanon and is now threatening to annex the Golan Heights, where it has granted Israeli nationality to the Druse element of the population.

71. This Israeli policy is in the process of dashing all hopes which some had placed in the Camp David agreements. One sign of this was seen in August 1980 when, on the one hand, President Sadat refused to hold any further talks with Israel in present circumstances and, on the other hand, United States abstention allowed the Security Council to adopt, with the unanimity of its other members, a resolution forbidding United Nations member countries setting up or keeping their diplomatic representations in Jerusalem. The Netherlands and certain Latin American countries which had had their embassies in the Israeli part of the city since the early days of the state of Israel had to withdraw them.

72. In present circumstances, there is no doubt that the Palestinian affair continues to give a foothold to Soviet propaganda in Arab public opinion and that the West is still accused – very largely erroneously – of giving *de facto* support to the annexationist policy of Israel, in spite of the positions adopted by the Nine in 1979 and 1980 when the policy pursued by Israel in Palestine was condemned.

73. In view of the fact that the position of the United States Government and its freedom of action in the Middle East may well be weakened for many months to come by the election campaign, Europe is particularly well placed to take steps to find a settlement to the Palestinian affair which takes account of the right of peoples to self-determination and the wishes constantly expressed by the international community since 1967 and expressed in the United Nations resolution.

74. The Nine showed their intense awareness of the importance of this affair at the Venice summit meeting in June 1980 by instructing Mr. Gaston Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg and President of the European Council, to make an on-the-spot study of the points of view of countries in the region on statements by the Nine with a view to preparing, for the European Council meeting on 2nd December 1980, a European initiative for promoting lasting, and hence fair, peace in the area.

75. However, there is a risk of this initiative being hindered considerably by the outbreak of armed conflict between Iraq and Iran on 21st September 1980. The Iraqi Government under Mr. Saddam Hussein alone may have found sufficient reasons for trying to reverse by force a situation imposed *inter alia* on 6th March 1975, in the Algiers agreements, by the Shah's government at a time when he dominated the region: partitioning of the Shatt-al-Arab, Iranian domination over the Khuzistan oil region, annexation of the islands in the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and a Kurd revolt fostered on Iraqi territory. The weakness attributed to the new Iranian régime, the peace restored with the Iraqi Kurds followed by the revolt of the Iranian Kurds, the assumed disorganisation of the Iranian army and the breakdown in relations between Iran and almost its only supplier of arms, the United States, brought about a situation favourable to revenge by Iraq, which could thus hope to go back on the concessions imposed on it by Iran's preponderance in the region. The affair of the American hostages was a guarantee that the United States would not support its former allies. In short, Iraq had no need of Soviet advice to make it wish to take advantage of this reversal of the situation, and the early days of

the war seemed to show that it was right. However, the Iranian army has not broken up, the state has not collapsed and, after initial successes, the Iraqi forces seem to have stopped advancing at the beginning of October. It is at this point that the possibility of Soviet involvement must be taken seriously.

76. However, neither East nor West can dissociate itself from this new conflict, first because the military operations have taken place in an area which is very rich in oil (90 % of Iranian resources are in Khuzistan and 40 % of Iraqi resources in the Rumaila area. Most oil from Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar and Saudi Arabia comes from near the battlefield and were the conflict to spread to the Strait of Hormuz there would be a risk of Europe being deprived of 75 % of its oil imports). Although the industrialised countries now have oil stocks equivalent to about four months' consumption, they would very soon be affected if they found themselves cut off from the Gulf oil sources.

77. At the time of writing, the conflict seems liable both to become entrenched and to spread. Several Arab countries, particularly Jordan, and most of the states on the shores of the Gulf have proposed military assistance to Iraq. Saudi Arabia has received American early-warning aircraft equipped with the AWAC system and deliveries of American arms to Jordan are continuing. On 8th October, the Soviet Union for its part signed a treaty of friendship and co-operation with Syria. Finally, Iran has announced its intention to close the Strait of Hormuz if the Arab Gulf states join forces with Iraq. For all these reasons, it is to be feared that there will be a spread of the conflict from which the two great powers may not for long be able to remain aloof. The continued supply of oil to the West is thus far from certain even though Saudi Arabia and the other Arab producers seem to have decided to increase their oil output to offset the closing of the Iranian and Iraqi markets to western importers.

78. The West clearly has no interest in becoming involved in this conflict as long as the Soviet Union does not intervene. But it could not tolerate the closing of the Strait of Hormuz and needs a very rapid return to peace in the region. The Soviet Union for its part seems anxious for this to happen because it cannot for long maintain forces both in Afghanistan and in face of Poland and Iran. Hence, there is a growing risk of this conflict continuing and spreading, bringing the two great powers into confrontation; it is not yet possible to foresee in what conditions. It is not only to defend principles but also because of imperatives which are vital for its security that it is absolutely essential for Europe not to intervene

but to encourage the restoration of peace and a return to a durably stable situation in the Middle East. It must be noted that in this field it has few of the instruments necessary for carrying out such a policy since among the various powers only the United States has sent a few forces to the Gulf area. Britain has one warship there. Your Rapporteur considers Western Europe's policy should be to press for the limitation of conflict, to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, to deter any impulse by the great powers to intervene and to encourage a cease-fire and peace negotiations between the belligerent parties.

79. The WEU Assembly has made its views sufficiently clear as far as the Palestinian situation is concerned for there to be no need to repeat here what has been said, apart from underlining the interest with which the reply of the Council, i.e. Western Europe, will be examined by the Assembly.

80. It is obviously not a matter of Europe or the West attempting to re-establish itself in the Middle East. It is on the contrary a matter of calming the fears which may be felt by countries in this region in face of the approaching Soviet divisions and showing the importance which Western Europe attaches to the maintenance of their independence, sovereignty and freedom to run their own internal affairs and their foreign policy. It is in no way an attempt to involve them in a western defence system but rather to provide them with any means and assistance they may request to defend their freedom themselves against any threat from any direction.

81. The invasion of Afghanistan also led to increased tension and danger throughout Southern Asia, particularly as it occurred shortly after Vietnam, allied with the Soviet Union, had invaded Cambodia under the pretext of putting an end to a particularly odious and bloodthirsty dictatorship but also to carry out imperialist designs. The maintenance of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia and Laos and the growing number of incidents between Vietnam and Thailand are a danger to peace in South-East Asia and, apart from China, no state now seems capable of countering Vietnamese expansionism, actively supported by the Soviet Union, and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan considerably strengthens the means of action of the Soviet Union in the area.

82. It is quite evident that after the two Vietnam wars the West hardly has the moral or material possibility of intervening in that part of the world and that, here too, strengthening existing states and maintaining their stability is the best guarantee for the maintenance or restoration of peace which corresponds to the

West's fundamental interest. In face of Soviet imperialism, there is no solution other than to support the independence of states and peoples.

83. It is not the purpose of the present report to examine the problems of maintaining a military – and above all nuclear – balance in the world. Since the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is to devote one of its reports to the prospects of the SALT III negotiations, your Rapporteur will confine himself to recalling that the invasion of Afghanistan induced the United States Government to renounce the idea of proposing that Congress ratify the SALT II agreement. It probably knew that in any event ratification would encounter serious difficulties because of prevailing anxiety in the United States about the growing imbalance of nuclear forces in the world.

84. But in spring 1980 the Soviet Union, which had made ratification of SALT II a prior condition for opening the SALT III negotiations, accepted the possibility of starting SALT III before ratification. Moreover, during the summer the Soviet Union, which had always asserted that the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe would prevent the opening of negotiations on continental-range nuclear weapons, dropped this condition too, as Mr. Brezhnev already informed Chancellor Schmidt when he visited Moscow in June. Hence, the Soviet Union is apparently still prepared to hold talks with the West on problems relating to the limitation of weapons, at the level of both intercontinental missiles and Eurostrategic missiles.

85. The Afghanistan affair has made the West drop the idea of such negotiations for some months. However, one may wonder to what extent this attitude may change Soviet policy in Afghanistan and make the Soviet Union withdraw its forces from the country. A fairly realistic analysis of the situation leads to the conclusion that it cannot do so. Consequently, the interest for the whole world – for the West as well as for the eastern countries – of seeking agreements on the limitation of strategic weapons is so great that it seems unreasonable to wait for rather unlikely events before resuming talks on this point, provided particular attention is paid to ensuring that the West's security is not jeopardised.

86. It should be added that, at its Thirty-Fourth General Assembly, the United Nations adopted a resolution recommending that all countries examine the possibility of establishing confidence-building measures comparable with those worked out in Helsinki in the European framework. On that occasion, it was decided to study these measures for the Thirty-Sixth General Assembly. This opened at the end of August 1980. Through the inter-

mediary of the United Nations, the principle of confidence-building measures might thus no longer be limited to the European area proper or to the framework of the CSCE but be extended world-wide through an international convention whose effect would be beneficial to peace throughout the world and to the security of the most threatened areas.

87. Because of all these factors, your Rapporteur thinks the benefits the Soviet Union has so far derived from the invasion of Afghanistan are, to say the least, very limited. It had to engage a large force without obtaining significant strategic results and it cannot consider withdrawing them without defeat becoming glaringly apparent to the world and the Soviet people, which would probably have grave consequences for present Soviet leaders. All the forecasts made by the latter, particularly about the possibility of a cut in the forces engaged in Afghanistan, have proved illusory. The Soviet Union's relations with the third world as a whole and with a number of Middle East countries in particular have seriously deteriorated. It has not been able to take advantage of the crisis between Iran and the West to improve its relations with the former; on the contrary, plans for natural gas and oil co-operation, drawn up in the Shah's days, have been abandoned. Finally, the Soviet Union must be particularly careful in its relations with the Eastern European countries at a time when the effects of the world economic crisis are being felt in these countries and are endangering their stability.

88. These various considerations indicate that the Soviet Union has a greater need than ever for developing, in coming years, agreements on disarmament, the limitation of armaments and economic co-operation. The time has probably come for the West to make it understand that this implies parallel development of the political aspects of détente which cannot be limited to territories covered by the CSCE: the Afghanistan affair and subsequent reactions will probably have shown that, contrary to what the Soviet leaders had probably hoped, it is not possible to count on a sort of neutralisation of the European sector to undertake an imperialist policy in Asia and Africa and that if détente is not divisible into chapters at the Madrid meeting it is not divisible into geographical areas either.

V. Conclusions

89. Although in the last decade the balance of forces both in Europe and throughout the world seemed to be developing to the advantage of the Soviet Union, which might have thought that in the next decade it could enjoy the fruits

of its policy of giving first place to armaments, the invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent events seem to show that this was not at all so. Cracks have appeared even within the Soviet Union, the Polish affair shows that nothing is permanently settled in its relations with the people's democracies, the resistance of the Afghan people demonstrates that its military power is not unlimited and the reactions of the non-aligned countries prove that its positions cannot be permanent unless they are effectively occupied by Soviet armed forces.

90. Some might draw the conclusion from this that the West might be able to take advantage of the situation which thus emerges to make up for lost ground, re-establish military superiority, recover lost positions in Asia and Africa and encourage the revolt of peoples under Soviet domination. This is not your Rapporteur's opinion. He considers on the contrary that the time is perhaps approaching to make a better effort to ensure peace based on limitation of armaments and forces and then on effective disarmament and at the same time on the principles defined in Helsinki. This does not mean your Rapporteur considers disintegration of Soviet society or the Warsaw Pact would necessarily be a factor of peace but rather that the Soviet Union's present fears should make it more aware of the need to ensure lasting peace. He sees encouraging signs in the Soviet proposals with regard both to the Madrid conference and to the MBFR or SALT III talks in the early months of 1980.

91. It would naturally be illusory and dangerous to base international peace on the maintenance of Afghanistan under Soviet domination, but it would be no less dangerous not to make use, because of Afghanistan, of circumstances favourable to the organisation of peace, in view of the fact that organising peace will necessarily mean granting a political status to the Afghan people which it would be prepared to accept. This may have been the basis of the British proposals for a neutralisation of Afghanistan: they were designed to allow the Soviet Government to withdraw its forces without having to present public opinion with the appearance of a bitter defeat.

92. Since the Helsinki conference in 1974-75, western positions have not fundamentally changed: they still consist of viewing détente as a whole and linking it closely with the limitation of forces and armaments, respect for sovereignty and frontiers, safeguarding human rights and economic exchanges. Your Rapporteur considers that this should remain the West's position towards the approaching Madrid meeting, the continuation of the MBFR talks and the opening of SALT III. To make the evacuation of Afghanistan a prior condition for any discussion with the Soviet Union would probably mean becoming entrenched in a fruitless position and allowing a good opportunity of consolidating peace to escape. To make it one of the aims of negotiations on détente, for which the Soviet Union seems more anxious than ever, seems to be a reasonable and realistic course.

*Political implications for Europe
of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan*

AMENDMENT 1¹
tabled by Dr. Miller and Mr. Pavitt

1. Leave out paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed: Miller, Pavitt

1. See 13th Sitting, 3rd December 1980 (Amendment withdrawn).

*Political implications for Europe
of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan*

AMENDMENTS 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 ¹
tabled by Mr. Dejardin

2. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “to respect undertakings they have entered into, particularly in the framework of NATO, with a view to improving the West’s defensive potential in Europe” and insert “to ensure that the balance of forces in Europe is maintained”.
3. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “*inter alia*”.
4. Leave out paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
“10. Afford greater humanitarian assistance, particularly medical supplies, food and clothing, to the Afghan people, whether refugees or on Afghan territory;”.
5. Leave out paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper.
6. In paragraph 12 of the draft recommendation proper, add “political” after “necessary”.

Signed: Dejardin

1. See 13th Sitting, 3rd December 1980 (Amendments 2, 4, 5 and 6 negatived; Amendment 3 agreed to).

Energy and security

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions²
by Mr. Flämig, Rapporteur*

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DRAFT RECOMMENDATION
on energy and security

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submitted by Mr. Flämig, Rapporteur

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Declaration issued after the summit conference in Venice – 23rd June 1980

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Valleix (Chairman); MM. Lenzer, Wilkinson (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaenssens, Amadei (Alternate: *Orione*), Antoni, Cornelissen, Fiandrotti, Forma, Garrett (Alternate: *Jessel*), Hawkins,

Konings, McGuire, Malvy, Mart (Alternate: *Thoss*), Müller, Péronnet (Alternate: *Petit*), Scheffler, Talon, Ueberhorst (Alternate: *Flämig*), van Waterschoot.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation

on energy and security

The Assembly,

Convinced that the most important aim of any European energy policy should be to achieve maximum independence from imported oil in the shortest possible time;

Noting that costly long-term structural changes are needed to make a considerable reduction in oil consumption and Western Europe's dependence on imported energy for 63 % of its requirements;

Seriously concerned that since 1973 neither the Western European countries nor the western world as a whole has been able to implement proposals and decisions agreed upon either by the European Council or by the leaders of the main industrialised countries;

Endorsing the statement of the Venice summit conference of June 1980 in favour of the development of new coal and nuclear energy programmes as the only medium-term solutions to the energy problem;

Aware that while oil and raw materials, sea lanes for their transport and markets are becoming increasingly important strategically, Western European economies are becoming ever more dependent on trade with the East;

Conscious of the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz, particularly in the light of the war between Iraq and Iran, especially for Western European oil imports from Persian Gulf states,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To adopt, in the absence of agreement to implement a stringent Western European policy, convergent energy measures, and, together with the United States, Canada and Japan, formulate a co-operative global economic strategy, and also provide the necessary financial means for their implementation;
2. To establish and implement common plans for energy self-sufficiency and common guidelines for better use and conservation of energy, and to encourage lower oil consumption and the use of other energy resources such as coal, nuclear means and renewable energy resources;
3. To implement the coal objectives formulated by the International Energy Agency coal industry advisory board;
4. To agree, for Western Europe's electricity requirements, on common plans for better use of the scarce uranium resources of the western world through increasingly widespread use of fast-breeder reactors which would consequently mean recycling spent fuel elements in order to recuperate uranium and to obtain plutonium for fast-breeder reactors or, in a mixture with uranium or thorium, for light-water reactors;
5. To determine the acceptable threshold of safety and security for imports of energy or rare raw materials by the western world from the eastern bloc countries;
6. To participate in contingency plans for keeping open all international shipping lanes, such as the Strait of Hormuz.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Flämig, Rapporteur)

Introduction

1. The North Atlantic Alliance guarantees security in Europe and its partners have means of co-operating to maintain their basic economic and social stability. However, recent events have made them realise that their continued well-being and safety depend on the world outside the treaty area. Oil and raw materials, sea lanes for their transportation and markets in which to earn the money to pay for them, have now become the strategic stakes.
2. European Economic Community exports to the COMECON bloc consist of 88 % machinery and other industrial goods, the remainder being foodstuffs. Imports from the East are 8 % machinery, 17 % semi-finished goods, the remainder being oil, gas and raw materials. In particular, imports from the Soviet Union show a growing prevalence of fuel, oil and raw materials. In the EEC, coal, oil and gas imports from the Soviet bloc amount to between 5 % and 6 % of the EEC's total primary consumption. During the last decade the relationship between imported and exported goods has remained almost unchanged. The present overall levels of trade make the western economies increasingly dependent on eastern trade.
3. The year 1979 also brought into the open geopolitical and internal revolutionary dangers. The collapse of the Shah's régime and Soviet aggression in Afghanistan illustrate the vulnerability of practically all the producing countries. Europe has an overwhelming interest in Persian Gulf oil on which it depends for 60 % and will continue to do so for many years to come.
4. The seven WEU countries all agree that if no major changes are made in their dependence on imported energy they will reach a point where they will not be able to maintain basic economic and social stability.
5. The main question on energy and security is what action can be taken by the seven countries to diminish their dependence on imported energy resources.
6. A distinction has to be made between fossil fuels such as oil, natural gas, lignite and coal, on the one hand, and renewable energy resources such as biomass, hydroelectric, solar and wind energy on the other. Nuclear energy is, of course, in a special category.
7. The seven countries are trying to reduce their dependence on imported energy in very different ways: Belgium's electricity depends for 25 % on nuclear energy, France is building up its nuclear energy power plants, while Italy is using oil to fuel its conventional power plants, and the Netherlands is even using gas as fuel for its power plants; the United Kingdom and Germany are still largely dependent on their coal, the United Kingdom having its own North Sea oil. How can one solution be found with these differing policies?
8. The Western European governments have been trying to develop a western strategy involving the United States and Japan as well. The seven main western industrialised countries discussed the energy position in Venice on 22nd and 23rd June 1980¹ and considered that permanent machinery should be set up to forge better links between the western industrialised countries. The present system of *ad hoc* diplomatic consultation should be replaced by a framework for permanent diplomatic consultation.
9. Within Europe several proposals have been made to restrict energy consumption. Energy prices and national plans now have to be harmonised in both the short and long term.
10. Guidelines will have to be drawn up for better use of energy, lower oil consumption and the use of other energy resources such as coal and nuclear means. Without joint Western European guidelines investment programmes will lack coherence.
11. It should not be forgotten however that the European Community is not authorised to deal with security matters, nor is there any treaty link between the economic policy of the Community and the security of energy supplies. Some of these aspects are studied in the framework of European political collaboration, but more from the political than the security angle. The Coal and Steel Community and Euratom were set up to deal respectively with coal and steel and nuclear energy, but they were granted no specific power in overall energy questions.
12. The Community has prepared a number of documents on oil, coal, gas, nuclear energy and new sources of energy, but its aim is not so much to establish a stringent Community energy policy for all member countries as to induce governments to adopt convergent policies which certainly do not exist at present. However, it must be acknowledged that a true Common Market can hardly exist without a

1. See the declaration issued after the summit conference in Venice at Appendix.

common energy policy. For that reason an energy price and tax harmonisation programme will have to be introduced.

I. Energy conservation

13. Energy conservation measures will have to be adopted for buildings, households, industry and transport. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany believes such measures should be promoted through information and advice, voluntary action and financial incentives. Legal provisions such as raising the thermal insulation standards of new buildings might also have to be adopted as market forces are not directly operative for this type of conservation. The government can also set a good example in the public sector by converting public buildings to energy-saving technological concepts and installing energy-saving means of heating. So far, an increase in a country's gross national product meant its energy consumption increasing at the same percentage. This increase in use of energy should be reduced to 0.8 or 0.5 in relation to the increase in gross national product. This means that new techniques will have to be introduced to achieve the same growth in production using less energy.

14. A number of measures could be adopted to replace oil in power plants by converting them to use coal or nuclear energy.

II. Oil

15. For a long time to come Western Europe will be dependent on oil, especially for transportation purposes, and it will take at least ten years to reduce this dependence from 61 % to about 55 %. At present the oil market is in balance, but the situation is so volatile that foreign policy decisions or economic factors could sharply reduce supplies without notice. Our aim should therefore be to try to develop programmes "away from oil".

16. It should be mentioned here that Western Europe is not without its own oil reserves. In 1978 oil exploitation brought in 63 million tonnes, i.e. 12 % of its consumption; 85 % thereof came from oil in the United Kingdom. In the 1980s the United Kingdom's production may rise to 100-150 million tonnes of oil per year, but even this would not constitute more than 20-25 % of Western Europe's requirements.

17. Your Rapporteur wishes to mention here that when the Committee met the United Kingdom Minister of State at the Department of Energy, Mr. Hamish Gray, and his collabora-

tors, the Minister gave some useful information about the United Kingdom's energy policy. By the end of 1980 the United Kingdom may be producing as much oil as it consumes, although for reasons of refinery balance it will continue to import heavy crude and export a substantial proportion of the light crude produced in the North Sea. The United Kingdom's estimated indigenous resources in oil and coal will last for about 16 years and 300 years respectively.

18. As far as other European countries are concerned, their companies have an interest in six of the fourteen oilfields in production and a further four oilfields under development as well as in three gas deposits in production. Companies of other member states have an interest in about one-eighth of the total area under licence.

19. About half of the United Kingdom's North Sea oil production is exported, over half of this going to other European countries. In 1980 they will probably receive some 65 % of the volume exported, i.e. one-third of total production.

20. The main purpose of Western Europe's longer-term policy should be:

- (a) to diversify oil imports in order to become less dependent on oil from the Middle East;
- (b) to promote prospecting for oil in Western Europe;
- (c) to promote prospecting for oil in other parts of the world;
- (d) to promote oil conservation by the use of other fuels such as coal and nuclear energy.

III. Coal

21. As coal could be an important substitute for oil, the technology to make better use of coal should be promoted not only for heat but also, for instance, for the chemical industry. Moreover, it is possible to increase coal imports from America and Australia, but for this shipping capacities and harbour facilities should be increased. The present main coal-producing countries in Europe are the United Kingdom and Germany; the Coal and Steel Community could help to finance investments in research and development of the liquefaction and gasification of coal. Coal exploitation could also be mechanised, but this would result in the energy from coal becoming more expensive since manpower cost is a very important factor in this field because in many countries coal miners are among the best paid workers. Germany also has a problem in that the layers of coal to be exploited are plunging deeper as the upper

layers run out. It exploits reserves at a depth of 1,500 metres and the minimum seam thickness considered acceptable for mining is between 0.5 and 0.7 metres, according to quality and recoverability. In coal-mining, improved means of extraction and a steady improvement in mining methods may lower costs. In particular, *in situ* gasification may be of great importance for reducing coal industry losses in the future.

22. The German Government hopes research and development in the gasification and liquefaction of coal will bear fruit in the mid-1980s. It is earmarking some DM. 13 billion for this purpose from 1980 to 1993. Part of the money will be used to fight pollution which the use of coal or its derivatives will automatically create. The German Government also hopes to have some industrial spin-off from this programme as other countries might wish to use German equipment for their gasification or liquefaction of coal.

23. In the United Kingdom much has already been done on gasification problems, but success is certainly not round the corner as new difficulties have arisen at every stage.

24. Before and during the second world war, large-scale installations for coal liquefaction, i.e. the manufacture of liquid hydrocarbons from coal by hydrogenation, were being operated in Germany. Other types of liquefaction processes which will probably be more economical are in the research and development stage. The large-scale introduction of new coal technologies will involve long lead times. The viewpoint of the experts of the world energy conference, held in Munich from 8th to 12th September 1980 and attended by your Rapporteur, is that the economical large-scale introduction of the manufacture of formed coke cannot take place before 1988-90. Coal liquefaction will not be introduced before 1990 and the large-scale gasification or liquefaction of coal using the process heat from high-temperature nuclear reactors will not take place before 1995-2000. Improved combustion techniques, e.g. fluidised bed combustion, could open up substantial new markets for the use of coal in industry by the 1990s avoiding environmental problems as the emission of sulphur fallout would be very low.

25. On 25th April 1980, the newly-established International Energy Agency coal industry advisory board had its first meeting. The board stated that the difficulty of increasing coal production, trade and use should not be underestimated. If governments and industries were prepared to act and exploit fully the present opportunities to increase the use of coal, the requirements for oil could be lowered considerably.

26. The board emphasised that due to the long lead times for securing approval, financing and implementation of projects, governments and industry would have to work closely together to deal with the following matters if their coal objectives were to be met:

- (i) Although it is widely accepted that coal will have to be more extensively used in the future and coal production and transportation capacity greatly expanded, the required investments are not being made. The investment climate must be improved and there has to be a better understanding and harmonisation of consumer and producer interests.
- (ii) Government energy and trade policies should be reviewed and changed if necessary to ensure that investment is encouraged at all stages of the coal chain.
- (iii) The regulatory process in many IEA countries will have to be made more efficient to expedite coal projects.
- (iv) Bottlenecks in the transportation system are already a problem and more co-ordination is required between the public authorities and private entities involved.
- (v) It is accepted that important environmental and land-use considerations will have to be met at each stage of the coal chain from the mine to the consumer. Increased stability in environmental protection standards is, however, a requirement. Industry should be allowed more flexibility to introduce cost-effective technology to meet environmental standards.

IV. Gas

27. Gas is quite important as the reserves within the Community are considered to be 10 billion metric tonnes, which is 4.5 % of the world's commercially exploitable gas reserves. 53 % of these reserves are in the Netherlands' and 27 % in the United Kingdom's part of the North Sea. In 1978, production was about 135 million metric tonnes, i.e. about 14 % of the energy used by the Community. It is considered that the Netherlands' production will reach its peak next year and that the United Kingdom will likewise attain maximum production in 1985. This means that the EEC countries are obliged to conclude contracts with gas-exporting countries in order to increase gas imports. They should be increased by 300 % in 1985 and by 400 % in 1990.

28. There is, of course, the possibility that new gas deposits might be found in the North Sea. The British Government has already given its approval for a £1-£1.5 billion North Sea pipeline project; the network will be 572 miles long. Norwegian interests might also be involved if gas from that sector flows into the pipeline. The recommended pipeline system would be capable of collecting all the gas available in the British Northern North Sea oil-fields. Much of that gas would otherwise be flared. Production is estimated at 1 billion cubic feet a day by 1990, increasing to a peak of 2 billion by the end of the century.

29. The price of gas in domestic markets and some sections of the industrial market in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands has been low compared with its true economic value and the policy of both governments is to raise prices to discourage waste of this important and irreplaceable resource. New methods are being studied for the exploration and recovery of natural gas deposits. Conventional gas deposits are often abandoned when the well-head pressure falls below the operating pressure of the pipeline. New technologies are being studied to bring the low-pressure gas up to the pressure of the pipeline.

30. It would be of great importance for Europe if the existing Western European network of gas pipelines were standardised. At present many of the national and private networks have different specifications and cannot be interconnected.

31. The Federal Republic of Germany imports 17% of its gas requirements from the Soviet Union. So far the Soviet supply has been steady and without difficulties.

32. Your Rapporteur believes that in the field of energy or rare raw materials it is very important to agree on common policies in order to reduce western dependence on any single source of such vital resources. Present overall levels of trade with the East are still well below the point at which the western economies would become dangerously dependent on the East. Although trade with the East may still be within the safety limits there is an urgent need for a multilateral body capable of determining how close the limit of safety may be.

V. Nuclear energy

33. The progress of industrial nations in the last century was characterised by technological developments based on the steadily-growing use of energy resources. Until the end of the nineteenth century energy was coalbased, followed increasingly in this century by oil, and since the second half of the twentieth century by ura-

nium and other nuclear fuels in addition to the two earlier sources.

34. Since the second half of the 1970s there has been much uncertainty about uranium supplies and demand. From the 1950s onwards saturation in military requirements led to a slump in demand at a time of record production which reached more than 33,000 tonnes of uranium in 1959. The resulting cutback in production and excess capacity lasted until 1965, by which time civilian nuclear programmes had developed to the point where there was a significant requirement for nuclear fuel. This led to a gradual rise in production, mainly in the United States and Canada, South Africa and, to some extent, in Europe. By 1978 annual production had risen to more than 34,000 tonnes of uranium, mainly for enrichment contracts for the nuclear utilities.

35. In June 1980 the worldwide uranium industry published a report by the commodities research unit in London stating that a substantial jump in productive capacity should be phased over the next decade. This increase in capacity will certainly lead to lower prices as there is already a substantial oversupply and reduced demand because of the slowdown in nuclear power development.

36. The present trend suggests that world uranium requirements might remain quite high until at least the year 2000, but in quantities much lower than were considered valid in the early 1970s. Uranium prices have fallen from about \$ 43 per pound to \$ 32,

37. The present instability of the market, high inflation rates and environmental concern have profoundly affected market structure, costs and prices. Over the longer term the rapid development of fast breeders and the possible introduction of nuclear fusion could abate the anticipated shortfall in uranium supply capability.

38. The world energy conference estimates that by 1985 plant production capacity in the United States will be 30,000 tonnes of uranium annually and about 14,400 tonnes in Canada. The total production capability in Western Europe by 1985 is not expected to exceed 5,900 tonnes of uranium per year, of which nearly 70% will be produced in France.

39. The uranium resources of Western Europe are mainly in Sweden, Greenland and France. There are also some uranium resources in Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Austria, the United Kingdom and Finland.

40. Because of downward revisions in nuclear plant construction there is an excess of supply over demand, but this is not expected to persist

beyond the 1990s and additional production capability must be established by then.

41. The Venice communiqué of 22nd and 23rd June 1980 on energy encourages the development of new coal and nuclear programmes. Great hopes are pinned on coal and nuclear energy as a medium-term solution to the energy problem, but both involve environmental risks and, moreover, atomic energy will certainly encounter much political opposition in many countries.

42. The great advantage of electricity from nuclear power plants is of course its cost. Electricity from oil power plants costs about 20 % more than from coal power plants and nearly 40 % more than from nuclear power plants.

43. On 27th February 1980, the sixty-six countries of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Committee concluded that world nuclear energy development must be continued despite the danger of a proliferation of nuclear weapons. The committee's technical studies endorsed both the development of fast-breeder nuclear reactors and the reprocessing of used nuclear fuel rods.

44. Will new safeguards, technical and institutional measures, such as multinational ventures, constitute a promising approach?

45. In March 1980, a publication by the nuclear research centre in Karlsruhe stated that a new step had been made in the development of a new type of pressurised-water reactor enabling a great saving in the use of uranium by converting the abundantly available uranium 238 into plutonium 239. Another advantage was that this type of reactor could be derived from light-water reactors which existed in nearly all European countries.

46. At the end of January 1980, the French Minister for Industry, Mr. André Giraud, stated that effective control of the uses of nuclear capabilities had been made possible by a new technology that was relatively resistant as regards proliferation if combined with a few additional political safeguards. He added that carefully increased western support for nuclear energy could actually improve the climate for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Special protection should be given in the key areas of vulnerability: nuclear fuel, reactor choice and reprocessing. The resultant plutonium could be placed under international safeguards.

47. A major point is the energy self-sufficiency which might result from the increasingly widespread use of fast breeders. By 1985, European stocks of plutonium will be considerable and, if used in fast-breeder reactors,

would adequately cover all the electrical requirements of Western Europe for half a century at the annual energy consumption level predicted for the year 2000.

48. The importance of the fast-breeder reactor does not lie primarily in its ability to generate electricity at comparatively low cost but in the fact that it allows plutonium from spent fuel to be used instead of having to store it for tens of thousands of years as nuclear waste. Fast breeders allow nuclear energy to become a practical, inexhaustible source of energy and hence constitute the necessary and logical consequence of nuclear power.

49. During its visit to the nuclear research centre in Karlsruhe on 14th October 1980, the Committee was briefed on the importance of the fast-breeder reactor for the energy supply of the Western European countries. Although there are several possibilities for developing other types of reactor, the scientists in Karlsruhe believed it was now time to take decisions on a follow-up for light-water reactors. They considered the fast-breeder concept to be the safest and, technologically speaking, the most realistic. However, the construction of fast-breeder power plants would cost more than light-water reactors but the running costs may be less. The western world's first commercial-size fast-breeder reactor, the Super Phénix at Creys-Malville, will be operational in 1983.

VI. Other new sources of energy

50. The fifth element to be mentioned is research and development in new sources of energy. However, it is not estimated that new sources will ever produce more than 5 % of the world's requirements. In Karlsruhe it is felt that this would be no more than 3 % of total energy demand.

51. The most important types of renewable energy resources are geothermal, solar, wind, wave, tidal, ocean thermal and flow, biomass and hydraulic energy.

52. Geothermal energy is mainly exploitable in the volcanic zones of the earth. The total installed electrical capacity of geothermal plants is some 1,800 megawatts. In the next decade an operational plant producing commercial quantities may be installed in one of the volcanic zones. Such a plant might in the future represent a domestic energy potential for developing countries with few natural resources. However, once new methods of deep drilling have been developed, this type of energy could also become important for industrialised countries.

53. Solar energy is already used in different conversion devices to provide heat for warm

water supply. However, much research and development will have to be done on production of photovoltaic generators and solar mirrors to produce electricity.

54. Wind energy, as in the case of solar radiation, involved the problem of limited temporal availability. Windmills, mainly for agricultural application, have a long tradition of successful operation. Wind generators for electricity production could help to conserve fossil fuels but could not, of course, replace them altogether.

55. Of wave, tidal, ocean thermal and flow energy, wave energy is probably the most promising¹. Tidal energy might be used at about only thirty chosen locations throughout the world. Unfortunately, there are not many sites in Western Europe where this type of energy could be exploited; very high tides are comparatively rare in Europe.

56. Biomass production might make a substantial contribution to renewable energy resources. It could be used as a substitute for oil by producing gasohol. Your Rapporteur wishes to point out that the use of maize, wheat, sugarcane and sugar-beet as fuel should be seen in the light of the need for foodstuffs in third world countries where the populations are threatened with starvation.

57. Hydraulic energy is traditionally used in suitable topological locations, but the reserves of hydraulic energy in Western Europe are rather small as most of the sites for power plants are already in use.

Conclusions

58. When the Committee entrusted your Rapporteur with the task of writing a report on energy and security he did not foresee the many uncertainties and difficulties with which he could have to cope:

- What will be the outcome of the Iraq-Iran war?
- What will be the outcome of the occupation of Afghanistan?
- What repercussions will there be on oil supplies, especially for Western Europe?
- How will the negative outcome of the Geneva non-proliferation conference influence the exchange of nuclear reactor technology?

¹ See Document 737, Safeguarding Europe's energy supplies - new maritime sources of energy, Rapporteur: Mr. Jessel.

- What will be the consequences for Europe of the OPEC conference held in Vienna in September this year?
- What dangers face the developing countries as a result of rising oil prices?
- How is it that the West cannot work out a way to share and withstand the common danger?
- Will the price increases and material shortages of 1979 force governments and people to increase the efficiency of energy use or will they produce further stagnation and unemployment?
- Can Europe have economic, political and military security without energy security?

59. These and many other questions may be raised but cannot be answered since there are too many uncertainties.

60. Recommendation 332, adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1979, stated that the Assembly was "convinced that safety problems in respect of nuclear facilities and radiation, and environmental problems associated with new sources of energy call for solutions which cut across national frontiers", that it regretted "that even the increasingly-serious energy crisis since 1973 has failed to stimulate further pragmatic arrangements for more joint action, co-operation and the definition of a medium- and long-term European energy policy", and that it was "aware of the enormous sums Western Europe will have to pay for oil and convinced that in the near future oil will have to be replaced by alternative sources of energy".

61. The Assembly recommended that the Council:

"Promote a major concerted research and development effort and launch a co-ordinated programme in:

- (a) energy-saving technologies to be applied in households and industries;
- (b) alternative sources of energy based on new technologies such as non-conventional gas, shale oil, liquified coal, and the use of solar, wind and water energy;
- (c) examining the possibilities of European co-operation in energy matters;
- (d) co-operation on the safety and environmental impact of nuclear facilities, particularly where they create trans-frontier dangers;"

and "Start a detailed and continuing dialogue with the oil-producing countries with a

view to adjusting production capabilities and requirements;”.

62. The Council of Ministers then replied on 24th October 1979 that:

“Current and future problems of energy supply represent a big challenge which can only be effectively met by a collective and intensified effort. In view of this, the Council attach considerable importance to continuous co-ordination of the energy policy measures of member states. This also applies to research and development.

Particularly of late, member states have increased their co-operation in the field of energy policy, both within the European Communities and the OECD. This relates in particular to energy saving and the use of alternative sources of energy. The Council also attach great importance to international co-operation on matters concerning security in the nuclear field. In all of these fields, efforts are being made in the established agencies to find common solutions to the problems that have emerged as a result of recent events. Consequently, the Council deem it unnecessary for WEU to take initiatives in energy policy matters.

In view of developments on international oil markets in recent months, the Council support closer contacts between oil-consuming and oil-producing countries. In this context, they consider discussion of energy matters with the oil-producing countries to be desirable and necessary and welcome steps which can be taken towards that end.”

63. However, the “collective and intensified effort” led to results so meagre that at the Venice conference of the seven western leaders the central issue under discussion again was how to ride out the energy crisis in the 1980s and, in particular, how to formulate a co-operative global economic strategy. What crisis planning can cope with a sudden sharp cut in world oil production, as may possibly happen as a result of the Iraq-Iran war? Domestic economic decisions are very closely linked with foreign policy and security. The more money the West spends on oil, the less it is able to spend on its own defence and that of vulnerable oil producers.

64. In the European Community the Council of Ministers rejected even an energy research budget of 95 million units of account.

65. The energy problems of the free world are interwoven with each other and the world at large and your Rapporteur therefore wishes

to mention here that during recent visits to the United States he was informed of the terms of the United States’ energy security act which it is estimated will help to create at least 70,000 jobs a year in designing, building, operating and supplying plants for synthetic fuels and for the production of alcohol and other biomass fuels. The act provides \$1,000 million for synthetic fuels. Production should be 500,000 barrels of crude oil equivalent per day by 1987, increasing to two million barrels per day by 1992.

66. The financial resources available to the Synthetic Fuels Corporation for the next twelve years would rise to a maximum of \$88 billion, subject to appropriations. The corporation’s initial authorisation amounts to nearly \$19 billion.

67. The defence production act was amended to designate “energy” as a “strategic and critical material”.

68. The energy security act deals with synthetic fuels, biomass and alcohol fuels and urban waste, energy targets, renewable energy initiatives, solar energy and energy conservation, geothermal energy, studies on acid precipitation and carbon-dioxide, and, finally, the strategic petroleum reserve.

69. Your Rapporteur does not wish to go into further detail. The report shows the many aspects of energy and security and the possible impact of an oil shortage. Convergent energy measures have to be adopted and a co-operative global energy strategy formulated and implemented, for which the necessary financial means must be guaranteed.

70. Regarding the use of nuclear energy, your Rapporteur wishes to stress how seriously the consequences of the Three Mile Island (Pennsylvania) incident are being examined in the United States.

71. As may be seen in the explanatory memorandum, it is clear that no other resource can replace oil in the near future. Some thirty years or more might be needed to shape an energy economy based overwhelmingly on sources other than oil, and even this goal might be unattainable if the European peoples wish to sustain a sound rate of economic growth. A start should be made here and now and the only way to achieve self-sufficiency in energy is through the further development and increasingly widespread use of fast-breeder reactors to cover Europe’s electricity requirements.

72. As far as fusion is concerned your Rapporteur learned during the Committee’s visit to the Max Planck Institute in Garching, near Munich, that it might be over-optimistic to think in terms of a fusion demonstration plant by the end of this century. Nevertheless,

it was generally considered that research was taking the right direction, even if the generation of scientists now working in Munich and elsewhere would not live to see the final results of the new technology.

73. During the next three or four decades Europe will still depend largely on oil, 60 % of which will have to be imported from the Persian Gulf. This area is, of course, exposed to geopolitical and internal revolutionary dangers, intraregional conflicts and even war.

74. There is thus a clear and present danger that oil imports from the Gulf may be halted. This is a matter for urgent consideration by the governments of the Western European countries, the United States (which imports 30 % of its oil consumption from the Gulf) and Japan (which imports 70 % of its oil from that area). If the vital oil facilities of the three main ports are destroyed, Western Europe, Japan and, to a lesser extent, the United States, will not be able to manage for very long without supplies from the Gulf. Will the individual European countries then each go their own way to work out a special relationship with oil-producing countries? Will special conditions not lead to political favours, military hardware or nuclear information or supplies?

75. How would this affect our relationship with the United States Government?

76. Medium- and even longer-term prospects for the security and availability of oil and for

the economic and political stability and security of Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance are indeed sombre.

77. The western world should draw up contingency plans for keeping open all international shipping lanes.

78. The dangers of depending too much on eastern bloc countries for trade in supplies of energy or raw materials should be assessed in terms of the safety and security of Western Europe.

79. The decisions taken at Venice should not remain empty words but be given enough substance to withstand the threats of the situation today. A co-ordinated approach to the OPEC countries should be agreed upon and each country should renounce individual action and any attempt to gain favours by ingratiating itself with OPEC countries in any way.

80. During the Committee's discussion on the report it was pointed out that all realistic sources of energy should be used to the full. It is not a question of using one source or another but of making full use of all sources. The world population now numbers some 4.5 billion and this might be doubled by the end of the century. The developing countries will also claim their share of the world's energy resources. Therefore the Western European countries should agree forthwith to establish a firm, common and effective energy policy.

APPENDIX

*Declaration issued after the
summit conference in Venice**23rd June 1980***I. Introduction**

1. In this, our first meeting of the 1980s, the economic issues that have dominated our thoughts are the price and supply of energy and the implications for inflation and the level of economic activity in our own countries and for the world as a whole. Unless we can deal with the problems of energy, we cannot cope with other problems.

2. Successive large increases in the price of oil, bearing no relation to market conditions and culminating in the recent decisions by some members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) at Algiers, have produced the reality of even higher inflation and the imminent threat of severe recession and unemployment in the industrialised countries. At the same time they undermined and in some cases virtually destroyed the prospects for growth in the developing countries. We believe that these consequences are increasingly coming to be appreciated by some of the oil-exporting countries. The fact is that the industrialised countries of the free world, the oil-producing countries, and the non-oil developing countries depend upon each other for the realisation of their potential for economic development and prosperity. Each can overcome the obstacles to that development, but only if all work together, and with the interests of all in mind.

3. In this spirit we have discussed the main problems that confront us in the coming decade. We are confident in the ability of our democratic societies, based on individual freedom and social solidarity, to meet these challenges. There are no quick or easy solutions; sustained efforts are needed to achieve a better future.

II. Inflation

4. The reduction of inflation is our immediate top priority and will benefit all nations. Inflation retards growth and harms all sectors of our societies. Determined fiscal and monetary restraint is required to break infla-

tionary expectations. Continuing dialogue among the social partners is also needed for this purpose. We must retain effective international co-ordination to carry out this policy of restraint, and also to guard against the threat of growing unemployment and world-wide recession.

5. We are also committed to encouraging investment and innovation, so as to increase productivity, to fostering the movement of resources from declining into expanding sectors, so as to provide new job opportunities, and to promoting the most effective use of resources within and among countries. This will require shifting resources from government spending to the private sector and from consumption to investment, and avoiding or carefully limiting actions that shelter particular industries or sectors from the rigours of adjustment. Measures of this kind may be economically and politically difficult in the short term, but they are essential to sustained non-inflationary growth and to increasing employment which is our major goal.

6. In shaping economic policy, we need a better understanding of the long-term effects of global population growth, industrial expansion and economic development generally. A study of trends in these areas is in hand and our representatives will keep these matters under review.

III. Energy

7. We must break the existing link between economic growth and consumption of oil, and we mean to do so in this decade. This strategy requires conserving oil and substantially increasing production and use of alternative energy sources. To this end, maximum reliance should be placed on the price mechanism, and domestic prices for oil should take into account representative world prices. Market forces should be supplemented, where appropriate, by effective fiscal incentives and administrative measures. Energy investment will contribute substantially to economic growth and employment.

8. We welcome the recent decisions of the European Community (EC), the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding the need for long-term structural changes to reduce oil consumption, continuing procedures to monitor progress, the possible use of oil ceilings to deal with tight market conditions, and co-ordination of stock policies to mitigate the effect of market disruption. We note that the member countries of the IEA have agreed that their energy policies should result in their collective 1985 net oil imports being substantially less than their existing 1985 group objective, and that they will quantify the reduction as part of their continuing monitoring efforts. The potential for reduction has been estimated by the IEA secretariat, given existing uncertainties, at around 4 million barrels a day (MBD).

9. To conserve oil in our countries:

- we are agreed that no new base-load, oil-fired generating capacity should be constructed, save in exceptional circumstances, and that the conversion of oil-fired capacity to other fuels should be accelerated;
- we will increase efforts, including fiscal incentives where necessary, to accelerate the substitution of oil in industry;
- we will encourage oil-saving investments in residential and commercial buildings, where necessary by financial incentives and by establishing insulation standards. We look to the public sector to set an example;
- in transportation, our objective is the introduction of increasing fuel-efficient vehicles. The demand of consumers and competition among manufacturers are already leading in this direction. We will accelerate this progress, where appropriate, by arrangements or standards for improved automobile fuel efficiency, by gasoline pricing and taxation decisions, by research and development, and by making public transport more attractive.

10. We must rely on fuels other than oil to meet the energy needs of future economic growth. This will require early, resolute and wide-ranging actions. Our potential to increase the supply and use of energy sources other than oil over the next ten years is estimated at the equivalent of 15-20 MBD of oil. We intend to make a co-ordinated and vigorous effort to realise this potential. To this end, we will seek a large increase in the use of coal and enhanced use of nuclear power in the medium term, and a substantial increase in

production of synthetic fuels, in solar energy and other sources of renewable energy over the longer term.

11. We shall encourage the exploration and development of our indigenous hydrocarbon resources in order to secure maximum production on a long-term basis.

12. Together we intend to double coal production and use by early 1990. We will encourage long-term commitments by coal producers and consumers. It will be necessary to improve infrastructures in both exporting and importing countries, as far as is economically justified, to ensure the required supply and use of coal. We look forward to the recommendations of the international coal industry advisory board. They will be considered promptly. We are conscious of the environmental risk associated with increased coal production and combustion. We will do everything in our power to ensure that increased use of fossil fuels, especially coal, does not damage the environment.

13. We underline the vital contribution of nuclear power to a more secure energy supply. The rôle of nuclear energy has to be increased if world energy needs are to be met. We shall therefore have to expand our nuclear generating capacity. We will continue to give the highest priority to ensuring the health and safety of the public and to perfecting methods for dealing with spent fuels and disposal of nuclear waste. We reaffirm the importance of ensuring the reliable supply of nuclear fuel and minimising the risk of nuclear proliferation.

14. The studies made by the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation group, launched at the London summit in 1977, are a significant contribution to the use of nuclear energy. We welcome their findings with respect to: increasing predictable supplies; the most effective utilisation of uranium sources, including the development of advanced technologies; and the minimisation of proliferation risks, including support of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. We urge all countries to take these findings into account when developing policies and programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

15. We will actively support the recommendations of the international energy technology group, proposed at the Tokyo summit last year, for bringing new energy technologies into commercial use at the earliest feasible time. As far as national programmes are concerned, we will by mid-1981 adopt a two-phased approach: first, listing the numbers and types of commercial scale plants to be constructed in each of our countries by the mid-1980s and,

second, indicating quantitative projections for expanding production by 1990, 1995 and 2000, as a basis for future actions. As far as international programmes are concerned, we will join others in creating an international team to promote collaboration among interested nations on specific projects.

16. A high-level group of representatives of our countries and of the EC Commission will review periodically the results achieved in these fields.

17. Our comprehensive energy strategy is designed to meet the requirements of the coming decade. We are convinced that it can reduce the demand for energy, particularly oil, without hampering economic growth. By carrying out this strategy we expect that, over the coming decade, the ratio between increases in collective energy consumption and economic growth of our countries will be reduced to about 0.6, that the share of oil in our total energy demand will be reduced from 53 % now to about 40 % by 1990, and that our collective consumption of oil in 1990 will be significantly below present levels so as to permit a balance between supply and demand at tolerable prices.

18. We continue to believe that international co-operation in energy is essential. All countries have a vital interest in a stable equilibrium between energy supply and demand. We would welcome a constructive dialogue on energy and related issues between energy producers and consumers in order to improve the coherence of their policies.

IV. Relations with developing countries

19. We are deeply concerned about the impact of the oil price increases on the developing countries that have to import oil. The increase in oil prices in the last two years has more than doubled the oil bill of these countries, which now amounts to over \$ 50,000 million. This will drive them into ever-increasing indebtedness and put at risk the whole basis of their economic growth and social progress, unless something can be done to help them.

20. We approach in a positive spirit the prospect of global negotiations in the framework of the United Nations and the formulation of a new international development strategy. In particular, our object is to co-operate with the developing countries in energy conservation and development, expansion of exports, enhancement of human skills, and the tackling of underlying food and population problems.

21. A major international effort to help these countries increase their energy production is

required. We believe that this view is gaining ground among oil-exporting countries. We ask the World Bank to examine the adequacy of the resources and the mechanisms now in place for the exploration, development and production of conventional and renewable energy sources in oil-importing developing countries, to consider means, including the possibility of establishing a new affiliate or facility, by which it might improve and increase its lending programmes for energy assistance, and to explore its findings with both oil-exporting and industrial countries.

22. We are deeply conscious that extreme poverty and chronic malnutrition afflict hundreds of millions of people of developing countries. The first requirement in these countries is to improve their ability to feed themselves and reduce their dependence on food imports.

We are ready to join with them and the international agencies concerned in their comprehensive, long-term strategies to increase food production, and to help improve national as well as international research services. We will support and, where appropriate, supplement initiatives of the World Bank and of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and to improve grain storage and food-handling facilities. We underline the importance of wider membership of the new food aid convention, so as to secure at least 10 million tons of food aid annually, and of an equitable replenishment of the international fund for agricultural development.

23. High priority should be given to efforts to cope with population growth and to existing United Nations and other programmes for supporting these efforts.

24. We strongly support the general capital increase of the World Bank, increases in the funding of the regional development banks, and the sixth replenishment of the international development association. We would welcome an increase in the rate of lending of these institutions, within the limits of their present replenishments, as needed to fulfil the programmes described above. It is essential that all members, especially the major donors, provide their full contributions on the agreed schedule.

25. We welcome the report of the Brandt Commission. We shall carefully consider its recommendations.

26. The democratic industrialised countries cannot alone carry the responsibility of aid and other different contributions to developing countries: it must be equitably shared by the oil-exporting countries and the industrialised communist countries. The personal representatives are instructed to review aid policies and

procedures and other contributions to developing countries and to report back their conclusions to the next summit.

V. *Monetary problems*

27. The situation created by large oil-generated payments imbalances, in particular those of oil-importing developing countries, requires a combination of determined actions by all countries to promote external adjustment and effective mechanisms for balance-of-payments financing.

We look to the international capital market to continue to play the primary rôle in rechannelling the substantial oil-surplus funds on the basis of sound lending standards. We support the work in progress by our monetary authorities and the Bank for international settlements designed to improve the supervision and security of the international banking system. The private banks could usefully supplement these efforts.

28. Private lending will need to be supplemented by an expanded rôle for international institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We are committed to implementing the agreed increase in the IMF quotas, and to supporting appropriate borrowing by the fund, if needed to meet financing requirements of its members. We encourage the IMF to seek ways in which it could, within its guidelines on conditionality, make it more attractive for countries with financing problems to use its resources. In particular, we support the IMF's examination of possible ways to reduce charges on credits to low-income developing countries. The IMF and the World Bank should work closely together in responding to these problems. We welcome the Bank's innovative lending scheme for structural adjustment. We urge oil-exporting countries to increase their direct lending to countries with financial problems, thus reducing the strain on other recycling mechanisms.

29. We reaffirm our commitment to stability in the foreign exchange markets. We note that the European Monetary System (EMS) has contributed to this end. We will continue close co-operation in exchange market policies so as to avoid disorderly exchange rate fluctuations. We will also co-operate with the IMF to achieve more effective surveillance.

We support continuing examination by the IMF of arrangements to provide for a more balanced evolution of the world reserve system.

VI. *Trade*

30. We are resolved further to strengthen the open world trading system. We will resist pressures for protectionist actions, which can only be self-defeating and aggravate inflation.

31. We endorse the positive conclusion of the multilateral trade negotiations, and commit ourselves to early and effective implementation. We welcome the participation of some of our developing partners in the new non-tariff codes and call upon others to participate. We also call for the full participation of as many countries as possible in strengthening the system of the general agreement on tariffs and trade. We urge the more advanced of our developing partners gradually to open their markets over the coming decade.

32. We reaffirm our determination to avoid a harmful export credit race. To this end we shall work with the other participants to strengthen the international arrangement on export credits, with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution covering all aspects of the arrangement by 1st December 1980. In particular, we shall seek to bring its terms closer to current market conditions and reduce distortions in export competition, recognising the differentiated treatment of developing countries in the arrangement.

33. As a further step in strengthening the international trading system, we commit our governments to work in the United Nations toward an agreement to prohibit illicit payment to foreign government officials in international business transactions. If that effort falters, we will seek to conclude an agreement among our countries, but open to all, with the same objective.

VII. *Conclusions*

34. The economic message from this Venice summit is clear. The key to success in resolving the major economic challenges which the world faces is to achieve and maintain a balance between energy supply and demand at reasonable levels and at tolerable prices. The stability of the world economy, on which the prosperity of every individual country relies, depends upon all of the countries concerned recognising their mutual needs and accepting their mutual responsibilities. Those among us whose countries are members of the European Community intend to make their efforts within this framework. We, who represent seven large industrialised countries of the free world, are ready to tackle our own problems with determination and to work with others to meet the challenges of the coming decade, to our own advantage and to the benefit of the whole world.

Energy and security

AMENDMENT 1 '
tabled by Mr. Hardy

1. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

Signed: Hardy

1. See 14th Sitting, 4th December 1980 (Amendment negatived).

Energy and security

AMENDMENT 2¹
tabled by Mr. Flämig

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ or thorium ”.

Signed: Flämig

1. See 14th Sitting, 4th December 1980 (Amendment agreed to).

Election of the Clerk of the Assembly

REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the Bureau
by the President of the Assembly*

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REPORT OF THE BUREAU

submitted by the President of the Assembly

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Report of the Bureau

(submitted by the President of the Assembly)

1. On 1st June 1980 I informed the Assembly that the present Clerk, Mr. Francis Humblet, had asked to be discharged of his duties at the end of this year and I publicly announced the vacancy of the post on that day.

2. The Bureau, as required by the Charter and Rules of Procedure, meeting on 20th June to make the initial arrangements for replacing the outgoing Clerk, decided:

- (1) to recommend to the Assembly the nomination of a full-time Clerk;
- (2) to follow the procedure adopted in 1956 when the first Clerk of the Assembly was nominated, and to call for applications from candidates, at the same time informing the Presidents of the parliaments of the WEU member countries, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament of the vacancy;
- (3) to ask me to examine together with the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers of WEU the level of the salary to be paid to a full-time Clerk.

3. At a meeting on 1st September in The Hague the Chairman-in-Office of the Council intimated that it would be difficult to obtain an increase in credits to cover the salaries of both a full-time Clerk and a full-time Clerk Assistant.

4. At its meeting on 18th September the Bureau agreed on the text of the letter to be sent to the Presidents of parliaments, indicating the salary of the Clerk which has in theory been agreed to by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council and the closing date for applications from candidates.

5. On 23rd October the Bureau considered the thirteen applications which had been received and from which it seemed clear that the three candidates from the Office of the Clerk had far more experience than those from outside the organisation, some of whom had never been officials in a parliamentary assembly and others of whom had only acted for a short time in committee or other parliamentary services in their national parliaments. This judgment was confirmed by a large majority of the Bureau at their meeting on 7th November after reports of further enquiries had been received.

6. Indeed, Mr. Moulias, Mr. Huigens and Mr. Whyte, the three senior officials from the Office of the Clerk, have either acted as Clerk Assistant or been responsible for the secretariat of two major Assembly committees for fifteen to twenty years, thus being fully acquainted with the workings of the organisation they have served so long. A majority of the Bureau, in consideration of Mr. Moulias' experience as Clerk Assistant and of his having acted when the Clerk was not available, expressed a preference for his election as the new Clerk.

7. Nevertheless, having invited applications from qualified persons in member countries, the Bureau felt it should also propose two candidates from amongst those applications and add Mr. Nehring of Germany and Mr. Rogati of Italy to the three candidates from the Office of the Clerk (Mr. Moulias, Mr. Huigens and Mr. Whyte) for the consideration of the Assembly. The Bureau propose therefore that, as required by its Charter and Rules of Procedure, the Assembly should elect a new Clerk, to be employed on a full-time basis, from the following five candidates (in alphabetical order):

Mr. Gerhard HUIGENS
Mr. Georges MOULIAS
Mr. Jürgen NEHRING
Mr. Elio ROGATI
Mr. Stuart WHYTE

8. Appendix I gives details of these candidates as supplied by themselves; Appendix II gives a summary of other candidates who are not presented by the Bureau for the Assembly's consideration. Appendix III gives relevant extracts from the Rules of Procedure concerning the appointment of a Clerk.

9. The appointment of a full-time Clerk, together with the loss to the Assembly of Mr. Humblet's long and outstanding experience, will require a reassessment of the organisation of the senior posts in the relatively small Office of the Clerk. The Bureau will undertake this task in conjunction with the new Clerk as a matter of urgency. In particular, there will be budgetary problems since it is clear that no member country is anxious to increase the Assembly's budget beyond a small amount for inflation and these questions will have to be

resolved with the Council of Ministers. In any event, the question arises as to whether a post of Assistant Clerk (without other duties) is necessary or desirable now that a full-time Clerk is to be appointed, although obviously arrangements will have to be made for responsibilities to be undertaken in his absence. The Bureau are also aware that the Presidential Committee has recorded its opinion that a high priority for any additional funds that become available should be a bigger allocation to political groups.

10. Although the Clerk is required formally (Rule 47) to renounce any national considerations in the exercise of his duties and to act always as a European civil servant, and indeed this tradition has been maintained by all members of his staff throughout the Assembly's history, the Bureau are conscious that some member nations have none of their nationals among the senior appointments in the Office of the Clerk. If and when vacancies occur, subject to their having the necessary qualifications and experience, the Bureau will be inclined to give preference to nationals of countries not already represented. However, it should also be stated that in assessing the allocation of senior posts between the nationals of member states within WEU, regard must also be made to the other institutions, namely the Office of the Secretary-General, the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

11. I am grateful to all members of the Bureau for their participation in these meetings and for their assistance to me in reaching these recommendations. They are:

Mr. Francis TANGHE
Mr. René MART
Mr. Jean VALLEIX
Mr. Gerhard REDDEMANN
Mr. Pam CORNELISSEN
Mr. Fabio MARAVALLE

Unfortunately, Mr. TALAMONA of Italy died tragically shortly after our first meeting and was replaced by Mr. MARAVALLE.

Fred MULLEY
President of the Assembly

APPENDIX I

*Curriculum vitae of the five candidates
put forward by the Bureau**(in alphabetical order)***Mr. G.M.A.M. HUIGENS**

Original: French and English

Date and place of birth: 21.6.1921, Elst (Netherlands)

Address: 14, avenue de Rueil, 92420 Vaucresson
Tel: 741.14.50

Career:

18.12.1944 Master of Laws, University of Nijmegen

1.9.1944 Volunteer, Royal Netherlands Navy

1.5.1945-1.9.1948 Naval lieutenant – served in England, India, Ceylon, Netherlands-Indies

1.9.1948 Civil servant in the Netherlands-Indies, Head of department of justice and social affairs, State of Madura

1.5.1950 Secretary, Second Chamber of the States-General *

19.11.1952 Clerk-Assistant, Second Chamber of the States-General

Since 1.1.1961 Assembly of Western European Union:
– January 1961-December 1963, Committee Secretary (A.4)
– Since January 1964, Counsellor (A.5)

Languages: Dutch, English, French and German.

Mr. George MOULIAS

Original: French and English

Nationality: French

Date and place of birth: 28th March 1928 in Algiers

Family status: Married

Studies: Bachelor's degree in arts
Diploma of higher university studies in philosophy
Former student of the *École Nationale d'Administration* (ENA),
Diplomatic Section
– Training course in administration in Germany (one year)
– Training course in economics with Royal Dutch Shell (three months)

Career:

July 1956 Entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
– 1956-1957 French Embassy in London
(Private secretary to the Ambassador)
– 1957-1958 Economic Affairs Directorate
Economic Co-operation Department
(European Economic Community)

* Officer in the Order of Orange Nassau.

- 1959 Archives and documentation
 - 1959-1961 Nuclear Affairs
 - 1961-1964 French Permanent Mission to the United Nations (New York):
 - responsible for the Special Political Committee, the Economic and Financial Committee and the Legal Committee
 - 1964-1965 Political Directorate (Europe)
- June 1965 Joined the permanent staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly as Clerk Assistant
- Other activities (1960-1961):*
- Lecturer on international relations at the *École Nationale d'Administration* (ENA)
 - Lecturer at the *École des Hautes Études Commerciales* (HEC):
 - Explanatory lectures on texts;
 - Introductory lectures on solving economic problems (case studies)
- Languages:*
- Mother tongue: French
 - Very good knowledge of English and German
 - Knowledge of Italian
- Honours:*
- Chevalier de l'Ordre du Mérite

Dr. Jürgen NEHRING

Original : German

- 10.3.31 Born in Berlin
- Son of Joachim Nehring (editor) and his wife Wilhelmine, née Heyn
- 23.2.1950 Passed final school-leaving examination at the Salzgitter College
- 1.4.50-30.10.50 Commercial training at the firm Salzgitter Maschinen-AG
- Winter 50-Summer 51 Studied political economy at the Brunswick Technical High School (two terms)
- Winter 51-beginning 55 Studied law at Goettingen University
- 19.3.55 Passed first-level state law examination
- 1.5.55-4.9.59 Trainee official (*Referendar*) in the Brunswick Higher Provincial Court
- 4.9.59 Passed second-level state law examination
- 1.10.59-30.9.60 Legal work with a firm of lawyers and solicitors (Binder) in Clausthal-Zellerfeld, working in the Brunswick and Sighting courts
- 14.11.60 Administrator under contract at the Bundestag
- 28.6.62 Appointed to the grade of *Regierungsassessor* (civil servant)
- 16.7.62 Transferred to the Federal customs administration
- 6.5.64 Appointed to the grade of *Regierungsrat*, thus becoming a permanent civil servant
- 1.6.65 Returned to the Bundestag
- 22.12.66 Appointed to the grade of *Oberregierungsrat*
- 29.5.69 Appointed to the grade of *Regierungsdirektor*
- 3.7.74 Appointed to the grade of *Ministerialrat*

Dr. Elio ROGATI

Original: French

- Counsellor at the Chamber of Deputies
- Assistant Director of the International and Community Relations Department
- Secretary (for the Chamber) of the Italian Parliamentary Delegation to the Assemblies of the Council of Europe and Western European Union

- Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Committee from 1972 to 1979 (senior adviser to the following Committee Chairmen: Mr. Aldo Moro, 1972-73; Mr. Giulio Andreotti, 1973-74; Mr. Carlo Russo, 1974-79; Mr. Francesco Cossiga, summer 1979)
- Joined the staff of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1965 after passing a national competitive examination for five permanent executive posts
- Languages: (a) very good knowledge of English (proficiency certificate in English of the University of Michigan)
(b) very good knowledge of French
(c) some Spanish
- Professional journalist from 1960 to 1965; subsequently, and to date, *pubblicista* journalist. From 1962 to 1964, permanent correspondent of the Italia press agency in Algiers; from 1963 to 1964, also deputy correspondent of RAI
- Author of the book *La seconda rivoluzione algerina*, Rome, 1965
- Born in Rome on 23rd November 1938. Married to an Englishwoman. Two daughters. Address: Viale Cortina d'Ampezzo 79, 00135 Rome
- Italian nationality
- Degree in law (Degree summa cum laude, University of Rome, March 1961). Tutor: Mr. Antonio Segni, former President of the Republic
- Throughout his career, Dr. Rogati has continued to write on legal matters and parliamentary procedure but in particular on international politics for publications such as *Relazioni Internazionali*, *Affari Esteri*, *La Comunità Internazionale* and *Europa*.
- Dr. Rogati has visited all the continents for his studies and work and as a tourist

List of his publications since 1965

(No account is taken of publications during years as an active journalist)

1. Libro: "La seconda rivoluzione algerina", ed. Opere Nuove, Roma 1965
2. "Relazioni Internazionali", settimanale di politica estera dello Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale (ISPI) di Milano - E' tra i collaboratori e redattori stabili.
 - (a) Il lavoro italiano all'estero - 21/1973
 - (b) L'emigrazione italiana stabilizzata - 22/1973
 - (c) Emigrazione: smentire Nitti - 23/1973
 - (d) La politica estera del Governo Rumor - 29/1973
 - (e) L'emigrazione non si affronta con il libro dei sogni - 30/1973
 - (f) La tragedia cilena a Montecitorio - 40/1973
 - (g) Dissenso nell'URSS e distensione - 40/1973
 - (h) L'Italia e il Medio Oriente - 43/1973
 - (i) Pacifismo e ragion di Stato - 47/1973
 - (l) La politica estera in Parlamento - 50/1973
 - (m) Relazione di Moro alla Camera - 10/1974
 - (n) Conferme e novità nel programma di Rumor - 13/1974
 - (o) Diritto interno e diritto comunitario - 14/1974
 - (p) Impegno preciso per la conferenza sull'emigrazione - 17/1974
 - (q) Rinnovata polemica italo-jugoslava sulla zona B - 18/1974
 - (r) Emigrazione e politica in America Latina - 22/1974
 - (s) La politicizzazione degli emigrati - 42/1974
 - (t) Continuità in politica estera - 9/1976
 - (u) L'emigrazione dopo la conferenza nazionale - 10/1975
 - (v) La ratifica del trattato nucleare - 18/1975
 - (z) Trieste e zona B alla Camera - 42/1975
 - (ab) CIA e Lockheed a Montecitorio - 10/1976
 - (cd) Cooperazione dell'Italia con il terzo mondo - 32-33/1976
 - (ef) La politica estera del Governo Andreotti - 34-35/1976
 - (gh) Italia e Libano - 38/1976
 - (il) Gli accordi di Osimo - 52/1976
 - (mn) Dialogo euro-arabo - 18/1977
 - (op) Missione italiana in Egitto - 28/1977
 - (qr) Italia e bomba N - 43/1977

- (st) Parlamentari italiani al Cremlino – 50/1977
 - (uv) Italia e disarmo alle Nazioni Unite – 22/1978
 - (zz) L'Italia e la cooperazione allo sviluppo – 42/1978
 - (a1) Cuba: apertura all'occidente – 7/1979
 - (a2) Il voto europeo degli emigrati – 15/1979
 - (a3) Settima legislatura e politica estera – 22/1979
 - (a4) Esperti a convegno per l'energia – 28/1979
 - (a5) Il dramma indocinese a Montecitorio – 30/1979
 - (a6) Confronto Egitto-Israele a Strasburgo – 42/1979
 - (a7) Difesa europea – 44/1979
 - (a8) Italia e Afghanistan – 3/1980
 - (a9) Il rapporto Europa-Usa dopo Kabul – 14/1980
 - (a10) La strategia di Carter – 15/1980
 - (a11) L'Italia e la crisi mondiale – 20/1980
3. RAI – Alcuni numeri della rubrica radiofonica “XXmo secolo”, quindicinale, storico e di attualità politica, della durata di 15 minuti – programma nazionale – 1968
 4. Saggio: “L'influenza dei federalisti sulla politica estera italiana”, pubblicato nel secondo dei tre volumi “La politica estera della Repubblica italiana” – ed. di Comunità 1967
 5. “Situazione interna e politica estera dell'Algeria indipendente” nella rivista trimestrale della SIOI “La Comunità internazionale” vol. XX, n. 1
 6. Vari pezzi sul Parlamento e la politica internazionale apparsi sul quindicinale “L'Europa”.
 7. “I problemi dell'emigrazione e il Parlamento italiano” – “L'Europa” 5/1973
 8. “Legislazione italiana e comunitaria” – “L'Europa” suppl. al 4/1973
 9. Rubrica fissa “Parlamento” su tutti i numeri della riv. trim. “Affari Sociali internazionali” dal 1973 ad oggi
 10. “Pro e contro le Regioni” – riv. “Nord e sud” 1/1968
 11. “Le Commissioni parlamentari” riv. “Il Politico” dell'Università di Pavia 1970
 12. “La Camera dei Deputati: struttura e funzioni” – nel vol. “La Camera dei Deputati”
 13. “La politica diplomatica italiana nel 1971” in “L'Italia nella politica internazionale” a cura dell'Istituto Affari Internazionali 1972
 14. Servizi telefonici per la RAI dal Brasile (1973) e dall'Etiopia (1974) in occasione di convegni sull'emigrazione.
 15. “Affari Esteri”: “La politica estera in Parlamento” 25/1975
 16. “Brevi considerazioni pratiche sui lavori parlamentari in periodo di crisi di Governo” – riv. “Il Politico” Università di Pavia 2/1975

Mr. Stuart Whyte

Original: French and English

I. Personal details

Full name: George Stuart Whyte
Home address: 7, place de l'Église, 78810 Feucherolles, France
 (Tel.: (3) 056.46.21)
Born: 3rd December 1922
 York, England, of British parents
Age: 57
Nationality: British
Civil status: Married; 2 boys, born 1964, 1966, one girl born 1968.
 Wife and children, British nationality, are bilingual English-French, Daughter attends the Lycée International, St-Germain-en-Laye, France; two boys at Marlborough College, England.

II. *Education*

State Council Schools – 1929-1934
Leeds Grammar School – 1934-1941
Cambridge University (Trinity College), 1947
Read natural science (physics); Master of Arts
Sorbonne, Paris, 1950
Diplôme de Civilisation française

III. *Languages:*

Mother tongue English
Fluent French speaking and drafting, having worked in French-speaking office for twenty-five years
Normally read routine correspondence in the other languages of WEU countries, but not practised to conversational standard
Innsbruck University vacation course in German, 1951; slight knowledge Russian and Urdu (Hindi)

IV. *War Service* (between school and university)

Royal Artillery (Field) voluntary enlistment July 1941
Demobilised 1947. Final rank: Captain;
Served North-West Europe 1944-1945;
Seconded to Indian Army 1945-1947.

V. *Residence outside United Kingdom*

India 1945-1947 (Army);
France 1955-1966; 1968 to date;
United States 1966-1968.

VI. *Employment record*

1. Schoolmaster (taught physics and mathematics), and temporary posts with Council of Europe 1951-1954.
2. Appointed reviser of technical translation in NATO Secretariat 15th August 1955, Grade 11 (now A2), promoted Grade 12 (A3) on 1st January 1957.
3. Seconded to Office of the Clerk of the Assembly of WEU, at the request of the Clerk, from 1st December 1957, as Assistant Secretary to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and translator, Grade A3 (period of secondment covered period of sabbatical leave taken by then Clerk-Assistant).
4. Returned to NATO on conclusion of secondment 1st November 1958. Posted to Executive Secretariat as minute-writer, preparing records of meetings of North Atlantic Council and its committees, promoted Grade A3 step 6, on 5th November 1959.
5. At the request of the Clerk accepted permanent appointment in the Office of the Clerk of WEU Assembly on 1st March 1960
Assistant Secretary to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments
Secretary to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges
Promoted A4 step 2 on 1st April 1963
Appointed Counsellor in Charge of Defence Questions, promoted Grade A5 on 1st July 1965, responsible chiefly for the secretariat of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
6. At the request of Head of Personnel, UN Secretariat, seconded for two years to UN Secretariat as Political Affairs Officer in the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, based in New York and Geneva, 15th May 1966.

Duties while with UN Secretariat:

- Analyse current developments concerning disarmament and related issues, in particular in UN organs and in the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC, as it then was), Geneva.
- Maintain contact with national delegations to these bodies.
- Prepare briefs and recommendations for UN officials as required.
- Assist Rapporteurs of the First Committee of the General Assembly.
- Assist the Special Representative of the Secretary General to the ENDC (Geneva), providing the secretariat to the conference and preparing daily reports and periodical assessments for the Secretary General.
- Supervise junior staff assigned to the foregoing.

In particular while with UN:

- (i) Edited and supervised the writing of first edition of “The United Nations and Disarmament” – the official secretariat account of post-war disarmament negotiations;
 - (ii) followed the concluding negotiations on the non-proliferation treaty and supervised the concordance of the treaty text in the official languages other than English and Russian.
7. Returned to post of Counsellor in Charge of Defence Questions in the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly on completion of secondment to the UN Secretariat, 15th May 1968
Present Grade A5, step 10.

VII. *Membership of institutions*

Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London.
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

VIII. *Publications*

- (Example of official writing):
“The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-65” (Editor-in-charge and part author)
- Author of pamphlets and studies advocating British membership of European Coal and Steel Community; European Defence Community; etc.; published by European Movement, etc. 1952-1954.

IX. *Demonstrated interest in European affairs*

Hon. Secretary, later Chairman, Cambridge University Federal Union 1947-1949.
Member national Executive Committee of (United Kingdom) Federal Union (affiliated to European Movement) 1951-1954.
Delegate to international conferences, etc.

X. *Referees*

Superiors in present and previous posts may be contacted.

APPENDIX II

List of candidates not presented by the Bureau to the Assembly

<i>Name</i>	<i>First name</i>	<i>Date of birth</i>	<i>Nationality</i>	<i>Present function</i>
BERNABEI	Giannino	17.4.1945	Italian	Responsible for international affairs in the General Confederation of Italian Industry
CROCELLA	Carlo	13.5.1942	Italian	Research Department in the Italian Chamber of Deputies
DE SUTTER	Guido	June 1938	Belgian	Research Department in the Belgian Chamber of Deputies
HOCHBAUM	Ingo	February 1928	German	Representative of the Schleswig-Holstein Land on Bundestag and Bundesrat Standing Committees
JAGER	François	May 1939	French	Executive in French industry
KNUTH	Harald	24.7.1927	German	Committee Secretary in the Bundestag
LOHMEIER	Martin	11.8.1941	German	Official in the Sitings Office of the Bundestag
REBHAN	Axel	February 1934	German	Land parliamentary official

APPENDIX III

*Extracts from the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly
concerning the appointment of a Clerk**Rule 47*

1. The Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly, on the proposal of the Bureau. He shall provide the Assembly and its Committees with such Secretariat and other assistance as they may require.

Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a solemn declaration before the Assembly that he will perform his duties in complete independence and uninfluenced by national considerations, that he will neither seek nor receive indications concerning the performance of his duties from any Government or authority other than the Assembly, and will refrain from any action incompatible with his position as a European civil servant.

.....

Rule 35

The majorities required are the following:

.....

(c) for appointments, subject to the provisions of Rule 10 above [election of the Bureau]: an absolute majority of votes cast at the first ballot and a relative majority at the second ballot.

State of European security

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr. Brown, Rapporteur*

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Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 14th May 1980

1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 4 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); MM. Bozzi, van den Bergh (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Ahrens, Banks (Alternate: Sir Frederic Bennett), Bernini, Bizet, Bonnel, Boucheny, Cox, Dejardin, Edwards, Fosson (Alternate: De Poi), Grant, Handlos, de Koster (Alternate:

Mommersteeg), Lemmrich (Alternate: Kittelmann), Maravalle, Meintz, Ménard, Onslow, Pawelczyk, Pecchioli (Alternate: Martino), Péronnet, Schmidt (Alternate: Vohrer), Scholten, Tanghe.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Introductory Note

In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows:

2nd-4th July 1980 – Disarmament Committee, Geneva

H. E. Mr. David Summerhayes, Ambassador, Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation ;
Mr. Noel Marshall, Counsellor ;

H. E. Mr. François de la Gorce, Ambassador, Leader of the French Delegation ;

H. E. Mr. Richard Fein, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation ;

H. E. Dr. Marko Vrhunec, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of Yugoslavia ; Mr. Dragomir Djokić, Counsellor ;

Mr. R. Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament, and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations ;

H. E. Mr. V. L. Issraelyan, Ambassador, Head of the Delegation of the USSR ; Mr. Prokofiev ;

H. E. Mr. Curt Lidgard, Ambassador, Alternate Leader of the Swedish Delegation ;

Mr. Teodor Melescanu, First Secretary of the Delegation of Romania ;

H. E. The Hon. Charles Floweree, Ambassador, United States Representative ; Senator Charles Percy (Republican, Illinois).

15th and 16th September 1979 – NATO Headquarters, Brussels

Admiral Robert H. Falls, CA CF, Chairman Military Committee ;

H. E. Mr. Joseph M.A.H. Luns, Secretary-General ;

H. E. Sir Clive Rose, KCMG, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom ;

Dr. H.C. Lankes, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs ;

H. E. Mr. Claude Arnaud, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France ;

The Honorable Maynard W. Glitman, Minister, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States.

16th September 1979 – SHAPE, Casteau

General Sir Jack Harman, UK Army, Deputy SACEUR ;

Admiral Luther, German Navy, Deputy SACEUR ;

General William Y. Smith, US Air Force, Chief of Staff ;

Vice Admiral Ugo Masetti, Italian Navy, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Armaments and Administration ;

Lt. General L.P.G. Domröse, German Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations.

The Committee as a whole met in Paris on 17th September when it discussed an outline of this report. It next met in London on 22nd and 23rd October, and met finally in Rome on 17th November, when it was addressed by Mr. Pasquale Bandiera, Italian Under-Secretary of State for Defence, and adopted the report as a whole.

The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials, senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the Committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee.

Draft Recommendation

on the state of European security

The Assembly,

- (i) Observing that the trend of the East-West military balance over the last two decades has been towards rough equivalence in many sectors following the disproportionately large Soviet allocation of technological resources to defence, but that the disturbing superior Soviet concentration of tanks and divisions on the central front still exists ;
- (ii) Noting that the nature of the Soviet challenge is no longer exclusively a military threat to Europe, but has become a world-wide search for influence, backed by the use of military force, either directly or by proxy ;
- (iii) Deploing the outbreak of hostilities between Iraq and Iran, but noting with satisfaction that external powers have refrained from intervening ;
- (iv) Believing that despite the withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure the cohesion of the Alliance has improved over the last two decades with more joint planning and better provision for consultation and collective decision-making, but regretting the weakness of allied consultation in particular cases ;
- (v) Noting that so far arms control agreements and current negotiations have not reduced levels of forces and armaments, but have contributed to better understanding of the military balance in certain areas ;
- (vi) Believing that on balance European security has not diminished ; that in present circumstances it can be ensured only in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance ; and that to maintain it continued and equal emphasis must be placed on allocating adequate resources to defence, on the one hand, and on pursuing negotiations on arms control and disarmament on the other,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge member governments to impress on the United States, at the highest level, the need for continuous awareness of the allied dimension of all security issues and the overriding need for prior consultation in the North Atlantic Council ;
2. Urge member governments to maintain and improve their contribution to allied defence, with particular provisions to enable certain United States resources to be devoted to defensive operations outside the Atlantic area from time to time ;
3. Urge member governments to call in the North Atlantic Council for no less emphasis to be placed on arms control and disarmament negotiations with a view to improving security and reducing forces and armaments.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Brown, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. The WEU Assembly was created only in the 1954 modification of the original Brussels Treaty, which was then six years old. The Assembly met for the first time in July 1955, within two months of the entry into force of the modifying protocol, and moved quickly to examine European defence and security. Its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was established in October and the following year the first report on the state of European defence¹ was submitted to the Assembly. The Committee there recognised that, as the Council has reported to the Assembly, the mutual defence functions briefly exercised under the Brussels Treaty in 1949 had been transferred to NATO when its military structure had been established in 1950, and this transfer had been confirmed in Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty. The Committee nevertheless stressed that the mutual defence obligations of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty retained their full value, and asserted the right of the Assembly to discuss all aspects of European defence and security, whether exercised directly by member governments or, collectively, through NATO. The Council subsequently recognised this right of the Assembly and, although the Assembly has at times challenged its effectiveness, a dialogue with the Council on all aspects of defence, in particular in the form of Assembly recommendations and the Council's replies thereto, and the Council's observations in its annual report, has been maintained since 1957.

1.2. The Committee's first report on the state of European defence, having asserted the Assembly's right to discuss these matters, addressed itself to European defence and nuclear warfare, to the progress of West German rearmament, and to the maintenance of British forces on the mainland of Europe. The following year, the Committee produced its first report to be entitled state of European security² in which it reported on its visit to Headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe (then in Fontainebleau), and dealt broadly with the problems of defence on the central front. Thereafter, it produced regular reports on the

state of European security, which dealt broadly with aspects of European defence other than those which the Committee covered in more detail in specific reports such as those on the joint production of armaments or on arms control.

1.3. Since 1967, however, the more broad-ranging reports on European security have been the exception, while the more specific reports have been more numerous. On this occasion, however, the Committee returns to its earlier practice. In another report¹ the Committee deals with the nuclear forces of two member countries, the question of long-range theatre nuclear forces and associated arms control negotiations. In the present report, the Committee looks at other aspects of European security, in particular at the trends which can be perceived over the more than twenty years which have now elapsed since the Committee's first reports were produced.

II. The balance of force in perspective

2.1. The table, at Appendix II, giving a global comparison for the years 1960-70-80 of the balance of defence efforts and forces, other than strategic forces², has been compiled largely from data given in successive annual editions of the IISS military balance, the first of which appeared in 1959, supplemented where necessary from other sources. One feature of this comparison is that considerably more detailed information is available for recent years compared with 1960, both as far as allied forces are concerned as Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces.

2.2. Two general reservations need to be borne in mind when studying the bare figures. The estimates of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces and defence effort are contemporary estimates; if past estimates of Warsaw Pact force levels have subsequently been scaled down by western intelligence, this fact will not be revealed in the figures; in general it is to be anticipated that the more recent figures will be more reliable. Secondly, the very broad global figures for

1. Document 28, 3rd October 1956, Rapporteur Mr. Fens.

2. Document 38, 27th March 1957, Rapporteur Mr. Fens.

1. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces, Rapporteur Mr. Mommersteeg, Document 859.

2. Strategic forces are discussed in another report from the Committee: SALT and the British and French nuclear forces, Rapporteur Mr. Mommersteeg, Document 859.

military hardware give no indication at all of the considerable changes in capability of different categories of equipment which are lumped together in the table under general headings. Thus the greater bulk of the 16,000 combat aircraft shown for the Warsaw Pact in 1960 were air defence fighters which could not have been used in offensive strikes against allied forces on the central front. A larger proportion of the 7,000 odd shown in 1980 have a ground support or tactical bombing rôle. Similarly, of the 260 NATO attack submarines in 1960 only some 6 were nuclear-propelled, whereas the 221 shown in 1980 include 85 which are nuclear-propelled.

2.3. With these reservations in mind, some broad conclusions can be drawn about the trend in the forces and defence spending of the two alliances. Over the last twenty years, NATO countries have consistently outspent the Warsaw Pact on defence, but the margin of advantage has drastically shrunk. Too much importance should not perhaps be attached to the figures for 1960 showing NATO outspending the Warsaw Pact by a factor of more than 3, because the basis of the 1960 figure for the Soviet defence budget is presumably based only on an estimated realistic rate of exchange for the rouble. In subsequent years CIA estimates of the dollar cost of the Soviet defence effort have been available, and on this basis NATO countries spent 70 % more than the Warsaw Pact on defence in 1970 but only 44 % more in 1979 – the latest year for which figures are available. While the Soviet Union has been devoting an increasing proportion of its GNP to defence, current estimates ranging between 11 and 13 or even 14 %, that of its Warsaw Pact allies has been declining as has the proportion spent by all NATO countries.

2.4. An intelligence review of Soviet defence expenditure which appears to have been released to the press in London in July¹ claims a 35 % increase in real terms in Soviet defence expenditure during the 1970s. This corresponds to a mean annual increase throughout the 1970s of 3.05 %, but the estimate claims the increase to have been higher – 3.7 % a year in the first part of the decade up to 1978, after which it declined on the completion of a number of major equipment programmes. In contrast, the undertaking of the NATO countries to achieve a 3 % real increase in their defence expenditure each year only got under way in 1979, and reports in September 1980 suggest that Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey and the United Kingdom will fail to meet that increase in 1980. France and Luxembourg

appear to be the only European countries which plan to meet the goal.

2.5. As far as the *regional* balance on the central front is concerned, the crude figures for total numbers of battle tanks show the situation to have been stationary or to have evolved unfavourably to NATO over the last ten years, while those for combat aircraft show an essentially static situation as the following table, computed from three different sources, shows. These figures cannot, however, be taken to denote a deterioration in NATO's defensive capability, because over the same decade the tank has ceased to be the single most effective anti-tank weapon with the entry into service with NATO forces on the central front of second generation anti-tank missiles. Figures for these deployments are not available, but NATO is reported to have superiority over the Soviet Union in this field in both numbers and capabilities. Nevertheless, the superior concentration of tanks and of divisions on the central front is a disturbing and unaltered feature over the last twenty years.

2.6. As far as the combat aircraft are concerned, the roughly static ratios conceal an increase in the proportion of Warsaw Pact fighter-bomber and ground-support aircraft compared with purely air defence aircraft, but again the effective combat radius of most NATO ground-support and fighter-bomber aircraft is greater than that of Warsaw Pact aircraft.

Central front regional balance – ratios

	1970	1979		
Source	IISS ¹	German WP	United Kingdom WP	IISS ¹
Tanks	1 : 2.5	1 : 2.5	1 : 2.8	1 : 2.9
Combat aircraft	1 : 1.8	1 : 1.3	1 : 2.2	1 : 1.8

1. Central and northern front.
WP = Defence white paper.

2.7. The defence efforts of the NATO countries in money and men over the last twenty years is compared in the table at Appendix II. The salient conclusion from this table is the proportionate increase in the share of the total NATO defence burden that is borne by the European countries –from 21.7 % of total defence expenditure in 1959, the share of the European NATO countries rose to 43.4 % in 1979, while the United States share

1. The Times, 9th July 1980.

declined correspondingly. The index of defence expenditure at constant prices (1970 = 100) for European NATO countries has risen steadily from 79.5 in 1960 to 98.8 in 1969 to 129.6 in 1979. Corresponding United States expenditure increased proportionately less from 76.5 in 1960 to 81.5 in 1979, having peaked at 110.8 in 1969, corresponding to the period of the Vietnam war. In terms of total manpower in the armed forces, on the other hand, the share of the European NATO countries has remained almost exactly constant at 56.5 % in 1959 and 56.9 % in 1979, having dipped in 1969 to only 45.2 %, corresponding to the peak in United States military manpower of 3.45 millions in 1969. Total NATO manpower has nevertheless declined over the twenty years from 5.9 million to 4.9 million, while Soviet manpower declined only from 3.9 million to 3.7 million over the same period.

2.8. Thus, the last twenty years have seen a significant, absolute and relative increase in the material resources devoted by the European countries to the total NATO defence effort, while their manpower contribution has declined in absolute, but not in relative terms. Despite the reduction in total United States armed forces from 3.5 to 2.0 million over the last ten years, the number of United States army personnel stationed in Europe over the same time has remained constant at about 206,000, but reorganisation to reduce the administrative tail has increased the number of United States combat formations in Europe by two brigades over the same time. Mansfield resolutions in the United States Senate for the reduction of United States forces in Europe have disappeared with the Vietnam war, but with increasing insecurity in the area of the Persian Gulf the trend now is for measures to release from Europe certain United States mobility forces – especially naval units.

2.9. The most striking change in the relationship between NATO and Soviet forces over the last twenty years has undoubtedly been the emergence of the Soviet navy as an ocean-going force capable of helping to exert Soviet influence in any part of the world. As the detailed analysis in the Committee's previous report showed however¹, the superiority of NATO naval forces with good sea-keeping capabilities is not in doubt. In this area, European NATO countries contribute more than half of the destroyers, ocean-going escorts, and attack submarines in the NATO navies, but relatively few cruisers or aircraft carriers compare with the United States.

1. The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands, Document 837, 29th April 1980, Rapporteur Mr. Ahrens – see explanatory memorandum, paragraphs 2.1. et seq. and Appendices I and II thereto.

2.10. On 3rd June 1980, the Assembly adopted Recommendation 348 on the report of the Committee, which recommended that the Council cancel all restrictions on German naval shipbuilding imposed by the modified Brussels Treaty. On 21st July, the Council duly took that decision; Germany would now be free to construct for example ocean-going escorts over and above the eight originally authorised by the Council in 1961. The Assembly, in the same recommendation, also called for the assignment of German naval forces to SACLANT with the aim of "making the best use of all available allied forces for the common defence". The Committee welcomes the decision of the Security Council of the Federal Republic in June to remove the previous restriction on German naval operations to 24 hours' steaming from the Baltic, enabling German naval units to operate in the Norwegian Sea and mid-Atlantic.

(a) *The flanks*

2.11. This report does not deal in any detail with the situation on the flanks. The northern flank has been very recently reviewed by the Committee¹ and the situation in the Mediterranean will be reported on to the next part-session of the Assembly. In reviewing the trend of the military balance over the last twenty years, however, it has to be noted that the defensive capability of Norway has improved in relative terms despite the very large Soviet strategic installations in the Kola peninsula, and the Committee welcomes in particular arrangements for reinforcing Norway, including the prepositioning of certain equipment for use by Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States marines. On the southern flank, while the varying state of relations between Greece and Turkey has been a long-term factor of uncertainty and weakness, the Committee strongly welcomes the decision taken by Greece in October 1980 to fully rejoin the integrated military structure of NATO and notes with satisfaction that this decision was supported by a vote in the Greek parliament on 24th October 1980 of 183 votes to 20 against, although with 94 members of the Pasok opposition party absenting themselves from the house.

2.12. The question of Spanish membership of NATO has been referred to by governmental spokesmen of that country on a number of occasions and may be pursued more actively later in 1981 after the conclusion of the Madrid conference on CSCE.

1. Document 837.

(b) Soviet perceptions of the balance

2.13. The Committee has drawn attention on one occasion¹ to likely Soviet perceptions of trends in the military balance. Over the last twenty years, the Soviet armed forces have much on which they can congratulate themselves. On two significant occasions in the past, the Soviet Union has surprised the West at the speed with which it has developed defence-related technology. The first Soviet nuclear explosion in August 1949 came far sooner than the United States anticipated while the first Sputnik in October 1957 beat the United States to earth orbit capability by four months. From a position of naval humiliation following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 when the Soviet navy had no ocean-going naval forces capable of protecting convoys to Cuba, it now has ships capable of showing the Soviet flag in any part of the world. From a position of overwhelming United States superiority in strategic nuclear weapons systems in the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union has today reached broad parity, codified in the SALT agreements. But if the position of strategic nuclear stalemate has been reached, the Soviet naval capability is still very far short of a war-fighting capability at any distance from Soviet territory. There is no fixed-wing aircraft (other than VTOL) capability from ships and the Soviet amphibious forces number 12,000 compared with 184,000 of the United States Marine Corps alone without counting the marines of other allied countries. Worldwide military bases and facilities available to the Soviet Union can still not compare with those available to the United States. Although the relative position of the Soviet Union has improved with bases ranging from Vietnam to the Red Sea, it has at the same time lost its secure air and naval bases in Egypt. In qualitative terms, United States assessments, basic defence technology and weapons systems in service still favour NATO as the tables from the United States Department of Defence report in Appendix III show.

2.14. By far the most significant change in the Soviet defence position since the early 1960s has been the quality of its relationship with the NATO countries on the one hand and China on the other. From being a nominal ally in 1960, China has become an antagonistic power enjoying steadily-improving relations with the NATO countries and having concluded a recent friendship treaty with Japan, the long-term consequences of which must appear very ominous to the Soviet Union. At the same time, the Japanese defence capability is improving somewhat and the country is under some pres-

sure from the United States to do much more in the field of defence. Both China and Japan have territorial disputes with the Soviet Union.

2.15. Despite the invasion of Afghanistan, and the vagaries of the United States elections, however, the Soviet Union's relationship with the United States and NATO countries as a whole is more stable than in 1960; it is based on a number of agreements including the CSCE, a number of arms control agreements, and more extensive economic relations.

III. The cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance

3.1. It has not proved easy, on the basis of the interviews conducted by your Rapporteur, to describe the development of collective defence planning in NATO – which, in accordance with the 1950 decision of the Council of the Brussels Treaty Organisation, and Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, is the military structure on which WEU relies for collective defence planning. The individual memory of most persons in positions of authority within the Alliance today who have a detailed understanding of the present situation in NATO does not extend to the period twenty or even ten years ago. It is, however, instructive to present a brief comparison on the basis of the historical record.

3.2. Perhaps the most tangible and objective aspect of common defence arrangements is the NATO common infrastructure programme, which by 1970 had provided 220 airfields; a fuel supply system with 10,000 km of pipeline and 2 million cubic metres of storage; a signals network providing over 50,000 km of radio and land links; the radar network known as the NATO air defence ground environment; anti-aircraft missile sites, storage sites for nuclear warheads, underground war headquarters, naval facilities and radio navigational aids to a total cost of nearly £ 3.5 billion spread over twenty years.

3.3. The basic infrastructure once in place, the last decade has seen some change in orientation of programmes towards the integrated communications system, which brings all communications links under one authority embracing satellite, radio and landlines, integrated into a single, automatically switched system providing rapid and secure communications both for political consultation between the North Atlantic Council and national capitals and between military commanders. Following the lessons learnt in the 1967 Middle East conflict, aircraft shelters have been provided on most NATO airfields and the infrastructure required for the reception of reinforcements from the United States has been improved.

1. See Appendix I to Document 809, 22nd May 1979, The balance of force, Rapporteur Mr. Pawelczyk.

The present needs in the common infrastructure field are for an improved assessment of command and control requirements in the age of the microchip – an increasingly complex field which holds the danger of drowning commanders with too much information – speeding up the completion of the NATO integrated communication system and better arrangements for prepositioning of equipment in Europe for reinforcement of forces, chiefly from the United States. The basic infrastructure provided in the earlier years is in permanent need of maintenance and in some cases upgrading.

3.4. In the field of joint planning and joint training, there has been outstanding progress in making NATO forces more cohesive and more responsive to jointly agreed NATO strategy. With the move to Brussels, which followed the 1966 French decision to withdraw from the integrated military structure of the Alliance, an operations room was established in NATO headquarters making it possible to inject political consultation directly into the conduct of NATO military exercises, with the participation of the national delegations to NATO. Over the last five years, there has been a significant increase in NATO as opposed to purely national military exercises. It is interesting to note from the table at Appendix IV, showing notifications of exercises under the CSCE final act, that over the last six years there have been 31 NATO exercises involving troops from several NATO countries compared with only six such exercises by Warsaw Pact countries. Most Warsaw Pact exercises involve Soviet forces only. This difference in the pattern of exercises by NATO and Warsaw Pact countries of course reflects also the difference in the

balance of contribution within the two alliances – whereas the Warsaw Pact is essentially a Soviet military institution with smaller, sometimes nominal, contributions from the other Warsaw Pact countries, the majority of conventional NATO defence resources within Europe are those provided by the European countries themselves.

3.5. Another trend of the last twelve years has been a certain Europeanisation of the NATO military structure coinciding with the move to Brussels. Hitherto, overall military direction of NATO had been in the hands of the Standing Group, comprising representatives of the chiefs of staff of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, acting as a steering body for the Military Committee on which all member countries were represented through their chiefs of staff. With the abolition of the Standing Group which, together with the Military Committee, had been housed in the Pentagon in Washington, the Military Committee was moved to the same building as the political headquarters of NATO in Brussels. The Chairman of the Military Committee, the senior officer in the NATO military establishment, is usually a European, the post having rotated over the last ten years among Germany, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Canada.

3.6. The decision of France in 1966 to withdraw from the integrated military structure of the Alliance and to require the removal of allied military installations from French territory was regretted by the Committee at the time. In a review of the evolution of NATO over the last ten years, it is appropriate to describe briefly the present status of France's relations with NATO. France did not of course

NATO and the Warsaw Pact

(numbers of multinational exercises compared)

Year	Major exercises (over 25,000 men, notification compulsory)				Minor exercises (fewer than 25,000 men, notification optional)			
	Multinational		Single country		Multinational		Single country	
	NATO	WP	NATO	WP	NATO	WP	NATO	WP
1975	2	–	0	–	2	–	1	–
1976	3	1	0	2	4	1	0	1
1977	2	0	0	2	2	–	3	–
1978	4	0	0	3	2	–	0	–
1979	3	1	0	2	2	1	2	1
1980	3	1	0	1	2	1	1	0
Total 1975-80	17	3	0	10	14	3	7	2

Source: Notifications of military manœuvres under the Helsinki final act (Appendix IV).

withdraw from NATO as such; since 1966, it has retained its permanent representative on the North Atlantic Council and continued to participate in consultation at that level. Discussions involving the integrated military structure have since that date been conducted by the other NATO allies within the Defence Planning Committee, which, like the Council, can meet at ministerial or permanent representative level and is in fact quite simply the North Atlantic Council in the absence of the French representative. French nationals have continued to serve, chiefly in political and economic posts, in the NATO international staff, and in July 1980 a French national was appointed Assistant Secretary-General for Scientific Affairs – the most senior appointment to be held by France since 1966.

3.7. France has continued to participate in NATO arrangements for the joint production of armaments, remaining a full member of the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG), while the NATO Hawk Management Office, concerned with the joint production of the surface-to-air missile, continues to be located near Paris. France still participates in certain NATO infrastructure projects, including the central pipeline system which runs across French territory and is operated by the NATO Central European Operating Agency in Versailles. The French air defence warning network has remained linked with the NATO NADGE, and France has recently announced its participation in the NATO integrated communications system, but not for purposes of the military command network. While French officers were withdrawn from all NATO integrated military headquarters in 1966, France has since then maintained liaison officers at all of them so that some day to day contact is still maintained.

3.8. French participation in NATO has in fact been described as *à la carte* – a fair description which depends on the acceptance of an integrated military structure by the other allies to provide the *carte*. While the Committee continues to regret the special position of France within NATO, which a majority of the Committee believes weakens the Alliance as a whole, the Committee makes no specific recommendation in this connection as the French position is well understood and is supported by most French political parties. French defence strategy as described in the significant speeches to the *Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale* by President Giscard d'Estaing on 1st June 1976 and by the Prime Minister, Mr. Barre, on 11th September 1980, does not appear to diverge greatly from that of NATO, despite the rejection of the concept of integrated defence.

3.9. If the overall picture that emerges is one of a more cohesive and better integrated Alliance than existed ten or fifteen years ago, this picture is essentially true of the European NATO countries around the central front and Italy, for whom the central focus of national defence planning and policy has become the national contribution to NATO. In peacetime, forces remain national, under purely national control (except for air defence, for which NATO commanders assume certain responsibilities in peacetime). The rôle of NATO military headquarters in peacetime is one of planning and the conduct of exercises, although there has been improvement in the earlier release of forces to NATO command at various stages of alert. On the south-eastern flank the dispute between Greece and Turkey over the last six years has been a major source of weakness and the practical implications of the decision now announced by Greece to return to the integrated military structure of the Alliance remain to be seen. The Committee intends to report on this area to the first part of the next session.

IV. Defence outside the NATO area

4.1. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty – the mutual defence obligation – provides that “The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all...”. Article VI prescribes the geographical limits to which that undertaking applies:

“An armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, ...on the occupation forces of any party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on any of the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the parties.”

It is clear from collective defence and command arrangements subsequently made by NATO that the allies deem the areas covered by the treaty to include the Mediterranean and Black Seas and the Norwegian Sea as far east as the Norwegian-Soviet frontier.

4.2. As the Committee has pointed out, Article VI does not specifically preclude NATO staffs from planning defence arrangements covering areas further afield, but the Committee understands that NATO commanders, acting in their NATO capacity, do not do so. The issue is politically sensitive, and proposals for example for NATO defence planning to include contingency arrangements for areas where the

vital interests of members of the Alliance may well be held to be threatened – such as the Middle East, the Persian Gulf or the South Atlantic – would be politically divisive because divergent views on the issue are held by different member countries. However, for the last ten or fifteen years, political consultation within the North Atlantic Council has become more firmly established and much wider ranging, and in the Ottawa declaration of 1974 all NATO countries declared that they were:

“firmly resolved to keep each other fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations by all means which may be appropriate on matters relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind that *these interests can be affected by events in other areas of the world.*”

This arrangement is accepted by all NATO countries, including France, and indeed in reply to a question on 30th July, the French Foreign Minister, Mr. François-Poncet, specifically reaffirmed that:

“This definition of Atlantic consultations given in 1974 has lost none of its value. We are therefore not opposed to the appropriate bodies of the Alliance being the framework for exchanges of views on problems outside the areas of its responsibility, provided such exchanges of views are justified by exceptional events which themselves have repercussions on the tasks incumbent on the Alliance.”

4.3. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union on Christmas Eve 1979 found NATO more or less closed for the Christmas holidays. Consultation within the North Atlantic Council at permanent level may well have taken a day or two longer to get underway than would normally have been the case. Certainly, the pressures of American political life, especially in an election year, with a built-in expectation of immediate presidential reaction, preferably on television, gave rise in January to an appearance of allied disunity over the appropriate response, with the media concentrating on the United States proposal for a boycott of the Olympic Games, but also with underlying disagreement on appropriate economic sanctions if any.

4.4. Later in January, in his State of the Union message on 23rd January 1980, President Carter made clear the “stiff economic penalties” the United States was imposing on the Soviet Union as a result of the invasion, and the supporting action it was requesting from its allies:

“I will not issue any permits for Soviet ships to fish in the coastal waters of the

United States. I have cut Soviet access to high technology equipment and to agricultural products. I have limited other commerce with the Soviet Union and have asked our allies and friends to join with us in restraining their own trade with the Soviets and not to replace our own embargoed items. I have notified the Olympic Committee that with Soviet invading forces in Afghanistan, neither the American people nor I will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow.”

He then defined the strategic importance of the region and called for collective action to meet the new threat:

“The region now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: it contains more than two-thirds of the world’s exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Strait of Hormuz – a waterway through which much of the free world’s oil must flow. The Soviet Union is attempting to consolidate a strategic position that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.

This situation... demands collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the Persian Gulf and South-West Asia. It demands the participation of those who rely on oil from the Middle East and are concerned with global peace and stability. And it demands consultation and close co-operation with countries in the area which might be threatened.”

and finally gave an unequivocal undertaking to use military force if necessary in the Persian Gulf:

“Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. And such an assault will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force.”

4.5. See in perspective ten months after the event, allied disagreement on the Olympic boycott can be dismissed as trivial, the apparent disarray being the consequence of too hasty public statements. The Committee’s visit to the United States from 25th February to 5th March, as always most informative thanks to the unfailing openness and co-operation of the United States authorities, was noteworthy on this occasion for the defensive attitude of State Department officials briefing the Committee at

a time when the press was dwelling on the lack of allied consultation. Allied solidarity cannot be obtained without consultation, and consultation must always be paid for with time, precluding immediate public reaction to events.

4.6. By the time of the June ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, there had been time for more effective consultation, and the final communiqué of the meeting contained an unequivocal condemnation of the Soviet invasion¹:

"Ministers... regard as unacceptable this armed intervention and the attempt to crush the national resistance of the Afghan people by massive military force... Ministers noted that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan carried with it very serious implications for the general strategic situation... While recognising that the security of the region is primarily the concern of the countries there, Ministers welcomed the fact that members of the Alliance are, by reason of their relations with those countries, in a position to make a contribution to peace and stability in the region. Ministers agreed that the international crisis caused by the Soviet intervention calls for a resolute, constant and concerted response on the part of the allies..."

4.7. More specific defence measures called for by the invasion of Afghanistan had earlier been spelled out by the ministerial meeting of the Defence Planning Committee (in which France does not participate) at its meeting on 13th and 14th May 1980²:

"5. Ministers further agreed that the stability of regions outside the NATO boundaries, particularly in the South-West Asia area, and the secure supply of essential commodities from this area are of crucial importance. Therefore the current situation has serious implications for the security of member countries..."

6. It is in the interests of members of the Alliance that countries which are in a position to do so should use their best efforts to help achieve peace and stability in South-West Asia, taking into consideration the interests of the regional countries and the value of their political co-operation. The burden, particularly insofar as defence measures are concerned, falls largely upon the United States, which has already taken steps to enhance its effectiveness. Ministers noted that this commitment, which in certain

circumstances might substantially increase, could place additional responsibilities on all allies for maintaining levels and standards of forces necessary for defence and deterrence in the NATO area. Ministers agreed on the need for ensuring that at the same time as the United States carries out the efforts to strengthen defence capabilities for South-West Asia described above, allied capabilities to deter aggression and to defend NATO Europe are also maintained and strengthened.

...They noted that the United States has no plans to withdraw any United States forces permanently stationed in Europe for use in South-West Asia. Ministers of other countries agreed to do their utmost to meet additional burdens for NATO security which could result from the increased United States responsibilities in South-West Asia."

4.8. Thus the thrust of the NATO reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan is first in effect to underwrite President Carter's declaration in his State of the Union message, by asserting that the security of member countries can be detrimentally affected by events in the South-West Asia area; secondly that defence measures in that area can most appropriately be taken by countries having established relations with countries of the region, and that the defence burden falls largely upon the United States; thirdly, while it is recognised that United States forces stationed permanently in Europe will not be affected by defence capabilities being built up by the United States for possible deployment in the South-West Asia area, the European NATO allies must be prepared to plug any gaps that may be left in Europe by the redeployment of mobile United States forces – in particular, units of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean – or by the reallocation of reserves based in the continental United States.

4.9. The question of concerting defence measures outside the NATO area is not one for the formal structures of NATO. France in particular, and also the United Kingdom, possess forces which can be used in the area, but any co-ordination of plans is a matter for bilateral consultations. But other frameworks have also played an important rôle. The Venice summit meeting of the heads of government of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States on 22nd and 23rd June 1980, to have been devoted primarily to energy questions, opened with the agreed statement that:

"The Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan is unacceptable now and we

1. Full text of paragraph 3 of the communiqué at Appendix V (Rapporteur's italics).

2. Text at Appendix VI.

are determined not to accept it in the future. We have taken note of today's announcement of the withdrawal of some Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In order to make a useful contribution to the solution of the Afghanistan crisis, this withdrawal, if confirmed, will have to be permanent and continue until the complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops."

While the formal communiqué at the end of the meeting dealt with energy, subsequent statements by participants made it clear that mutual security had been discussed in the light of the invasion of Afghanistan. President Carter, at the final joint press conference on 23rd June, said:

"...We have pledged to oppose the Soviet invasion with the means at our disposal..."

4.10. Mrs. Thatcher, describing the summit to the House of Commons on 24th June, said:

"We broke new ground by discussing the major international political issue of the day – the invasion and continued occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. The meeting offered a timely opportunity for the seven heads of state and government to reaffirm their unity of purpose on the political and economic difficulties we face. That opportunity was taken."

Asked whether the arming of Afghanistan freedom fighters was discussed at the summit, Mrs. Thatcher said:

"Only very much in the margins. That is a matter which, of course, we shall have to consider in the future."

4.11. Consultations between the major industrial powers at meetings such as the Venice summit, outside the Alliance framework, have been a source of misgiving to some of the smaller NATO countries, but there is an inevitable conflict of interest in a situation where NATO itself cannot plan military measures beyond the NATO area, because of the reluctance mostly of the smaller countries which would not in any case have the resources to support any such plans.

4.12. Interpretations of Soviet motives in invading Afghanistan do, of course, differ. Geographically, the occupation does not bring Soviet forces nearer to the oil-fields at the head of the Persian Gulf, although it does bring them nearer to the strategic Strait of Hormuz. Here again, however, the lines of communication across Afghanistan and southern Iran would not be the most attractive ones for military operations at the mouth of the Persian

Gulf. But even if the Soviet objective is merely to impose the friendly régime on a bordering country, the allied countries cannot afford to allow Soviet forces to invade a neutral country without both making it clear that such action is totally unacceptable to the West, and at the same time taking military precautions to remove any temptation that might subsequently arise for the Soviet Union to make further use of its armed forces. The area obviously holds great attraction for it – both because of its access to warm sea ports, and because of the petroleum supplies which will become increasingly attractive to the Soviet Union over the next decade as its own requirements are likely to outstrip its indigenous resources.

4.13. In the month following the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States in particular moved rapidly to enhance its ability to intervene in the area of the Persian Gulf. It has negotiated base facilities in Egypt and in Oman and, more controversially, in Somalia where it will now have access to the base originally constructed by the Soviet Union at Berbera. In Oman in particular the agreement signed in June 1980 provides United States forces with the use of the island of Massirah, as well as port facilities in three ports and two airfields. In the southern Indian Ocean, in addition to the base at Diego Garcia, the United States has concluded an agreement with Kenya for the use of port facilities at Mombasa.

4.14. Secondly, the United States, by reorganising existing military resources, is building up a rapid deployment force. There might be up to four divisions available from the United States and one or two marine amphibious forces – of about divisional size; up to 31 fighter attack squadrons; a contingency naval force which could easily call on up to three aircraft-carriers; and a considerable airlift capability. Despite the considerable resources available, however, movement from continental United States to the area would be a slow process for anything more than token forces. One authoritative estimate puts ten to fifteen days on the time to deploy one airborne division and a total of two months before infantry divisions and marine amphibious forces could be fully deployed. Naval contributions by Britain and France in a situation where agreement was reached on the need for the operation would be invaluable for assisting to protect the sealanes, but would not be capable of making a significant contribution to the United States assault and ground intervention capability. The scenario for such operation in any case must assume an invitation from a friendly government to intervene in a situation where it was threatened by Soviet invasion. The existence of these arrangements will have a powerful deterrent effect in making any further military

adventures by the Soviet Union in the area extremely unattractive.

4.15. The situation in the area of the Persian Gulf deteriorated rapidly with the outbreak of hostilities between Iraq and Iran. Iraqi forces are equipped largely with Soviet weapons, including over 2,600 tanks; it has also 100 French AMX-30 tanks, French helicopters and French fighter aircraft on order. Iran has 1,700 British and American tanks and American aircraft. This is only one example of the many potential sources of conflict in the complex multi-polar world, which do not arise from the antagonism of the main power blocs, although the intensity of hostilities when they break out are largely determined by the weapons supplied by bloc countries. That the conflict has remained limited so far demonstrates the restraint of both superpowers in refraining from intervention in a situation which could otherwise lead to direct conflict between them. But the demands on military spares and ammunition by both sides involved in the fighting place their suppliers under great pressure to continue to provide them, especially as Iran is using the United States hostages as a bargaining counter.

V. Arms control and disarmament

5.1. A retrospective survey of the state of European security covering the last twenty years finds a good deal of change in the area of arms control, although sadly no concrete progress on disarmament proper. Progress depends on the state of East-West relations and while these have continually fluctuated over the period, and can only be qualified as bad in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan or of Czechoslovakia, the long-term trend over the last twenty years has undoubtedly been towards greater stability in East-West relations with more contact between the countries of the two blocs and a greater degree of interdependence in their relations, not only in the field of trade. There are at present no fewer than six separate sets of arms control negotiations in progress with countries of the eastern bloc (which are described in the following paragraphs); while the occupation of Afghanistan has inevitably affected the atmosphere of these negotiations and therefore the prospects of early agreement, it is to be noted that neither side has chosen to link the events in Afghanistan with arms control negotiations directly, because the mutual advantages to be derived from properly verifiable measures of arms control are clearly perceived.

5.2 If the 1963 partial test-ban treaty was a milestone in East-West relations as far as arms

control was concerned, the trend in the Alliance as a whole can be more easily dated from the Harmel plan leading to the report on the future tasks of the Alliance adopted by the North Atlantic Council in December 1967. It recognised the two main functions of the Alliance were to provide for military security and to seek a more stable relationship in Europe. It recognised that "military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary". In the period following that report, the periodical ministerial communiqués of the North Atlantic Council and of the Warsaw Pact came to constitute a dialogue which, after the signature of the German-Soviet treaty on 12th August 1970, paved the way both for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and the opening of the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions.

(a) Confidence-building measures in the framework of CSCE

5.3. The final act of the Helsinki conference signed on 1st August 1975 included in the first basket "questions relating to the security of Europe", a section on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament. Participating states undertook to give prior notification of major military manoeuvres exceeding 25,000 troops taking place on their territory in Europe or – in the case of the Soviet Union – within 250 km of its European frontier. Notification has to be twenty-one days in advance or at the earliest opportunity for manoeuvres arranged at short notice. Parties to the agreement "may also notify smaller-scale military manoeuvres to other parties with special regard for those near the area of such manoeuvres". Furthermore, "the participating states will invite other participating states, voluntarily and on a bilateral basis... to send observers to attend military manoeuvres".

5.4. The record of performance under these provisions as far as NATO and Warsaw Pact countries are concerned is shown in the table at Appendix IV. The final act also makes the optional provision that participating states "recognise that they may, at their own discretion... notify their major military movements". Other measures referred to include exchanges of military personnel and visits by military delegations. Major military movements do not appear to have been notified by either NATO or Warsaw Pact countries.

5.5. The record of implementation of the confidence-building measures will be discussed in the CSCE review conference opening

formally in Madrid on 22nd November. As far as they go, the confidence-building provisions appear to have been respected by the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, but there are several areas in which the provisions themselves should be improved. Notification of major manoeuvres has been satisfactory, but the provision could be strengthened by reducing the numbers for compulsory notification to 10,000 for example. The optional invitation for observers to attend the manoeuvres has been extended by NATO countries in respect of more than 80 % of the major manoeuvres notified, compared with less than half for the Warsaw Pact countries. But more important than the proportion of invitations are the facilities provided for observers. The final act is restrictive – in each case the inviting state is to determine in the invitation the number of observers, the procedures and the conditions of their participation, and it is to provide merely appropriate facilities and hospitality. Facilities provided for western observers at Warsaw Pact exercises have been uniformly disappointing. The exchange of observers would be far more effective as a confidence-building measure if minimum conditions were laid down, including, for example, sufficient mobility for observers to determine numbers taking part in an exercise and the type of equipment employed.

5.6. Most important of course from a confidence-building standpoint is the geographical limitation – the measures apply on the territory of the Soviet Union itself only to a band of territory 250 km wide on its western frontier. Coupled with compulsory provisions for the notification of troop movements as well as manoeuvres, and some permanent stationing of observers with adequate facilities, an extension of the territory covered as far as the Urals would make a major contribution to confidence and stability in Europe. The French proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe, originally put forward at the special session on disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly, is now attracting growing support. Open to the participating states of the Helsinki final act (all European countries, as well as the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union), it is proposed that the conference, in a first phase, should discuss confidence-building measures concerning conventional forces only but over the geographical area extending from the Atlantic to the Urals.

5.7. The Committee believes that if review of existing confidence-building measures at the Madrid conference is satisfactory, every effort should be made to convene a conference on disarmament shortly afterwards to discuss the strengthening of confidence-building measures on the foregoing lines.

(b) Negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions

5.8. Starting in 1973, these talks, which resumed after the summer recess on 25th September, are now in their twenty-second round. The agreed position of the NATO countries participating has from the outset been that initial troop reductions should relate to United States and Soviet forces only and that in general reductions should lead to mutually-agreed, common collective ceilings on forces for each side, without imposing specific limits on individual countries. For reductions to be meaningful, agreement has first to be reached on numbers of forces presently deployed, and reductions will have to be coupled with associated measures – types of confidence-building measures such as the permanent stationing of observers to assure that any agreement on force reductions are respected. Reductions under discussion would relate to forces stationed in the guidelines area, comprising the territory of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the Federal Republic of Germany on the NATO side and that of East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the Warsaw Pact side. The status of Hungary in this equation remains undefined.

5.9. After two years without progress, the NATO countries in December 1975 put forward their Option 3 under which NATO would withdraw 1,000 United States nuclear warheads together with delivery systems – 54 F-4 combat aircraft and 36 Pershing IA missiles. In return, common collective ceilings of 700,000 ground force personnel, and 900,000 men on each side would have to be accepted and the Soviet Union would have to withdraw a complete tank army including 1,700 main battle tanks. As NATO in the context of the December 1979 decision on the modernisation of long-range theatre nuclear forces has announced the unilateral withdrawal of 1,000 United States tactical nuclear warheads from Europe, and as this issue is now being discussed bilaterally in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union in the context of the LRTNF talks, Option 3, which was never accepted by the Warsaw Pact countries, is no longer directly relevant to the MBFR talks.

5.10. The most recent western proposals put forward in December 1979 were for a first phase interim agreement on United States and Soviet troops only to comprise the simultaneous reduction of 13,000 and 30,000 ground forces respectively, and then to proceed in a second phase to provide mutual collective ceilings of 700,000 ground troops and a total of 900,000 combined ground and air forces on each side. Unspecified associated measures to ensure respect to the agreement would be required at the same time.

5.11. Just before the talks rose for the summer recess in July, the Warsaw Pact countries put forward a new proposal for withdrawals of 13,000 men and 20,000 men respectively by the United States and the Soviet Union in the first phase, in addition to the withdrawals of 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks from Eastern Germany announced by Mr. Brezhnev in October 1979. In accepting the concept of asymmetrical reductions and waiving, at least in a first phase, the previous insistence on ceilings for the forces of each individual participating country, the new Warsaw Pact proposals appear to be a step forward but before even a phase one package could be acceptable to NATO countries, there would have to be simultaneous agreement on appropriate permanent associated measures to verify the withdrawals and continued respect of the reduced levels, together with agreement on numbers of forces at present within the area. NATO has claimed from the outset that Warsaw Pact ground forces number 925,000 at present compared with 777,000 for NATO ground forces. The Warsaw Pact countries declined to reveal any figures at the outset of the talks, but in June 1976 claimed that they had only 805,000 ground forces and a total of 965,000 of ground and air forces combined. Discussions on the definitions of categories of forces included in the data proffered by each side have not as yet made much progress, but there is some scope for detailed discussion of, for example, the larger number of civilians employed by NATO forces in the area concerned.

5.12. In summary, there is now agreement between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries on: (i) the goal of parity and, at least in the first phase, common collective ceilings; (ii) concentrating on reductions of manpower; and (iii) reductions of Soviet and United States forces in the first phase. The discrepancy between the Warsaw Pact figure for their ground forces of 805,000, and the NATO claim of 925,000 represents a disagreement of only 13 % on current levels, but of course would be a very much more serious discrepancy after reductions to a common collective ceiling of 700,000.

5.13. Agreement on reductions in the MBFR framework would be the first and most significant tangible disarmament agreement in Europe. The prospects are better than before, both sides clearly wish to continue the negotiations, but agreement on the data base and on adequate associated measures remain a precondition of any acceptable agreement.

(c) Committee on Disarmament

5.14. Following the United Nations General Assembly special session on disarmament in 1978, the Conference of the Committee on

Disarmament (CCD) – the Geneva Disarmament Conference – was reorganised by enlargement to forty members and abolition of the original co-chairmanship arrangement whereby the United States and the Soviet Union jointly had the right to determine the agenda and dates of sessions of the conference. France and China both joined the committee which they had previously shunned, chiefly because of the co-chairmanship arrangement. In his discussions with many delegates to the conference in July of this year, your Rapporteur was able to note that the work of the committee was proceeding in a satisfactory atmosphere, although the deterioration in East-West relations following the invasion of Afghanistan led to no expectation of specific agreements in 1980.

5.15. Although it was widely recognised that substantive discussion on the more important aspects of arms control was taking place outside the conference proper – in the trilateral discussions on a comprehensive test ban, and the bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons ban – the Committee on Disarmament was discussing aspects of these subjects as well as the nature of security assurances to be given to non-nuclear weapons countries (in the framework of non-nuclear proliferation policy), a treaty to ban radiological weapons (hypothetical weapons that would use a conventional explosion to spread radioactive material over a target), and on the more esoteric comprehensive programme on disarmament.

5.16. With its increased size, including twenty-one non-aligned countries, the Committee on Disarmament is inevitably more cumbersome as a negotiating body, the contributions of many of the non-aligned countries appearing largely irrelevant both to NATO and Warsaw Pact participants. It, nevertheless, remains an important framework where the final draft on a multilateral comprehensive nuclear test ban and on a chemical weapons ban would have to be negotiated if and when the initial drafts emerge from the bi- and trilateral negotiations.

(d) Chemical weapons ban

5.17. Since 1974, the United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating on a convention to ban chemical weapons. Your Rapporteur understands that these talks have now made more progress than in the previous two years. On 7th July, the United States and the Soviet Union made a joint report to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress of their talks which showed agreement on the scope of a convention which would ban the development, production or stockpiling of chemical weapons; they had agreed on the defi-

dition of three categories of chemicals to be covered – super-toxic lethal chemical; other lethal chemical; other harmful chemical – with toxicity criteria attached to each which would facilitate verification procedures. It is agreed that declarations on stockpiles would be made within thirty days of a state acceding to a convention, together with plans for destruction of both weapons and production facilities which would have to be completed within ten years of accession. Agreement has also been reached on quantities of super-toxic lethal chemical that might be held for non-military purposes (not exceeding one metric ton).

5.18. It was further agreed that adequate verification measures must be included in a convention, including the right of on-site inspection by request but “the question of whether this type of on-site investigation, together with other verification measures, would constitute a verification system capable of providing adequate assurance regarding the implementation of a convention remains unsolved. The two sides believe that it is necessary to develop procedures for on-site inspection, including provisions regarding the rights and functions of the inspection personnel, and the rights and functions of the host side. Specific issues in this area are the subject of continuing negotiations”.

5.19. The Committee recalls that the United States has not manufactured chemical weapons since 1969, and understands that other NATO countries do not now produce them. No information appears to be available on current production of chemical weapons in the Soviet Union, but it is believed to have considerable stockpiles of chemical weapons, albeit unquantified by United States intelligence sources which claim merely that they are sufficient for the purposes of the Soviet Union. United States stockpiles are very large as the Committee has reported¹, but of declining utility as the weapons – delivery systems – for which they were designed become obsolescent. The Committee believes, however, that proposals in certain quarters of the United States military establishment for the production of a new generation of binary chemical weapons should be held in abeyance for at least twelve more months to allow more time for agreement on a chemical weapons ban.

(e) *Comprehensive test ban*

5.20. Since 1977, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States have been negotiating in Geneva on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which would ban all nuclear tests in all environments. This is undoubtedly the most important arms control agreement in

prospect, and up to July this year more progress has been made than on any other single arms control issue. In a joint report to the Committee on Disarmament on 30th July 1980, the three countries point out that:

“The treaty directly affects vital national security concerns... in spite of these challenges, however, [they] have made considerable progress in negotiating the treaty.”

It is agreed that the treaty will prohibit any party from conducting any nuclear explosion and from assisting anyone else to do so. A separate protocol on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes will be attached to the treaty under which there will be a moratorium on peaceful explosions until agreement is reached on arrangements for such explosions that would be consistent with a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Agreement has not yet been reached on the duration of the treaty (which your Rapporteur understands may initially be for three years).

5.21. It is agreed that verification measures will include national means of verification; international exchange of seismic data; on-site inspection by request (not by right); and additional verification measures to be agreed between the three parties. These will include detailed procedures for on-site inspection with a definition of the rôle of the host party during an inspection, and “the installation and use by the three parties of high quality national seismic stations of agreed characteristics”. It is understood that agreement in principle has been reached on the installation of ten seismic stations by the United States and the Soviet Union has also demanded the right to install ten stations on British territory. It is believed that agreement may be reached on a total of some twenty-one stations. The tripartite report notes however that “despite significant accomplishments there are important areas where substantial work is still to be done”.

5.22. Your Rapporteur, after detailed discussions in Geneva, left with the impression that the technical difficulties in the way of final agreement on a draft treaty to be submitted to the Committee on Disarmament could be overcome in a few months of negotiation if a political decision were taken by the United States and the Soviet Union to conclude such a treaty.

VI. *Conclusions*

6.1. Any survey of the state of European security over the last ten or twenty years inevitably reveals patches of light and shade, but on balance, by any objective standards, the military strength of the Alliance has increased and its cohesion improved. The proportionate share of the total allied defence effort provided

¹ Nuclear, biological and chemical protection, Document 838, 29th April 1980, Rapporteur Mr. Banks.

by the European countries has doubled in the last ten years and allied consultation has increased in scope. The military strength of the Soviet Union, however, has been increasing more rapidly, especially in nuclear weapons and naval forces, and it has retained its superiority in numbers of tanks.

6.2. Yet while the Soviet Union today may perceive a state of rough parity and balance in nuclear weapons, and be aware of a new-found ability to project its influence around the world, there is no conceivable objective basis on which Soviet military planners today could assume anything but inferiority in the face of the countries and alliances that surround it from China to Norway, whose territory obstructs Soviet naval access to the oceans, and four of which possess their own nuclear weapons. Ideologically threatened by Muslim fundamentalism in the South and by consumer-oriented societies in the West – which, despite a severe recession, are still far more successful than the Soviet Union in the quality of the living standards that they achieve – the aging Soviet leadership, still with vivid memories of Soviet territory laid waste in World War II, have sought in their defence policy to line the lengthy frontiers with military forces and client states, and to do this have devoted an extravagantly large proportion of national wealth, especially industrial and scientific resources, to defence.

6.3. In an increasingly complex, multi-polar world of 160 sovereign states, when industrialised western countries are vulnerably dependent on external supplies of energy, there is a dangerous tendency in the United States and Europe alike, frustrated at their inability to control external events, to blame their failure on military weakness, when in reality it springs from the declining relevance of military power, especially nuclear weapons, to the daily problems of foreign relations. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union has been any more successful than the West in arranging the rest of the world to its liking, or that it shares some western perceptions of allied weakness. The evidence points the other way.

6.4. In an unpredictable world, the Alliance will continue to need a strong defence effort to match the Soviet Union, sufficient to ensure that military expansion will never appear an attractive option to that country. At a time of severe economic recession on the one hand, and

external danger and frustration on the other, the countries of the Alliance must avoid the twin dangers of military over-reaction – which could lead the Soviet Union to react in turn leading to an ever-increasing arms spiral – or of allowing their defences to decline through apathy or the competing demands of social expenditure. The Committee believes that until there is firm evidence of a reduction in the Soviet defence effort, an annual increase in real terms in allied defence expenditure will be needed; that consolidating conventional defence in Europe must have priority. At the same time the continued search for détente must be the counterpart of the defence effort, and all arms control and disarmament negotiations must be pursued.

6.5. The Committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation. The preamble first refers to the trend of the military balance which is described in Chapter II of this explanatory memorandum and in Appendices I to III. Paragraph (ii) refers to the nature of the Soviet challenge today, outlined in paragraphs 2.13. and 2.14. above. Paragraph (iii) mentions the conflict between Iraq and Iran described in paragraph 4.15. above. The cohesion of the Alliance mentioned in paragraph (iv) is discussed in Chapter III, while arms control negotiations (paragraph (v)) are described in Chapter V.

6.6. In the operative text, paragraph 1 deals with the imperative need for allied consultation, described in paragraphs 4.1. et seq. of this explanatory memorandum. Paragraph 2 deals with improvements in defence efforts called for by the present situation, described in paragraph 4.8. above. Paragraph 3 of the recommendation reiterates the need for no less emphasis to be placed on arms control and disarmament – current negotiations are described in Chapter V.

VII. *Opinion of the minority*

7.1 The report as a whole was adopted by 13 votes to 4 with 1 abstention. In the draft recommendation, the minority would have inserted the words “moving towards Soviet superiority” after the words “rough equivalence” in paragraph (i) of the preamble; would have deleted paragraph (iv) and would have reworded the first line of paragraph (vi) as follows: “Believing that the threat to European security has not diminished...”

APPENDIX

Balance of defence efforts and forces
A global comparison

	Defence budget (\$ m)			Defence budget (as % of GNP)			Numbers in armed forces (thousands)			Numbers of tanks		
	1960	1970	1979	1960	1970	1979	1960	1970	1980	1963	1970	1980
Soviet Union	17,000	53,900	165,000	n.a.	11.0	12	3,623	3,305	3,568	35,000	23,150	50,000
Other Warsaw Pact	n.a.	7,515	16,670	n.a.	4.9	3	811	971	1,101	3,000	12,530	15,000
Total Warsaw Pact	19,500 ^e	61,415	181,670	n.a.	9.6	9.4	4,434	4,276	4,669	38,000	35,680	65,000
United States	46,545	77,827	122,261	10.1	8.6	5.7	2,489	3,161	2,050	n.a.	n.a.	11,500
Other NATO	15,862	26,459	139,110	5.6	4.1	4.0	3,475	2,993	2,847	n.a.	n.a.	15,000
Total NATO	62,407	104,286	261,371	8.6	6.7	4.6	5,964	6,154	4,897	16,000	n.a.	26,500

Note: n.a. = not available.
e = estimate.

I

(other than strategic nuclear forces)

1960-70-80

Combat aircraft (other than strategic bombers)			Aircraft carriers			Battleships and cruisers			Destroyers and ocean-going escorts			Submarines (other than strategic missile)		
1960	1970	1980	1960	1970	1980	1960	1970	1980	1960	1970	1980	1960	1970	1980
14,000	7,175	5,000	—	—	2	25	26	39	230	200	269	430	320	250
2,000	2,150	2,226	—	—	—	—	—	—	n.a.	8	11	n.a.	7	8
16,000	9,325	7,226	—	—	2	25	26	39	n.a.	208	280	430	327	258
3,750	6,500	3,700	31	20	14	55	10	25	630	224	122	174	103	81
2,630	4,000	3,466	9	8	5	14	9	5	316	238	275	86	111	140
6,400	10,500	7,166	40	28	19	69	19	30	946	462	397	260	214	221

APPENDIX

*Defence effort**A comparison*

	Defence expenditure									
	\$ m current prices			at constant prices index, 1970 = 100			as % of GNP (f.c.)			
	1959	1969	1979	1960	1969	1979	1955	1959	1969	1979
Belgium	374	630	3,636	72.5	94.0	152.3	3.8	3.6	3.1	3.3
France	3,659	6,124	18,776	85.7	101.1	132.8	7.7	8.2	5.0	3.9
Germany	2,640	5,584	24,391	70.2	99.2	126.9	4.9	5.2	4.1	3.3
Italy	1,067	2,259	7,089	67.0	94.8	126.2	4.6	4.2	3.0	2.4
Luxembourg	8	8	42	81.5	98.3	165.8	3.6	1.9	1.0	1.0
Netherlands	396	1,017	4,767	65.6	96.1	133.4	6.2	4.3	4.0	3.4
United Kingdom	4,461	5,497	17,572	100.6	100.2	123.8	9.3	7.5	5.9	4.9
Total WEU	12,605	21,119	76,273	81.8	99.2	128.8	6.9	6.3	4.5	3.6
Denmark	143	352	1,559	71.4	102.0	135.9	3.6	2.9	3.0	2.0
Greece	158	425	1,600	44.2	92.6	153.3*	6.4	5.9	5.9	n.a.
Norway	150	350	1,421	59.2	99.8	130.3	4.4	4.1	4.0	3.1
Portugal	98	371	587	37.3	91.0	68.6	4.6	4.9	7.2	4.0
Turkey	240	599	2,591	68.4	92.6	182.3*	5.6	5.1	5.2	n.a.
Total all European NATO countries	13,394	23,216	84,031	79.5	98.8	129.6	n.a.	6.1	4.5	3.6
Canada	1,642	1,757	3,751	105.3	95.2	116.8	7.6	5.3	2.8	1.7
United States	46,614	81,444	114,503	76.5	110.8	81.5	11.1	10.5	9.4	5.2
Total NATO	61,650	106,416	202,285	77.7	107.7	93.5	9.6	8.9	7.4	4.3

Note: n.a. = not available.

f.c. = factor cost.

e = estimate.

* 1978 figures.

II

in NATO countries

1959-1979

						Numbers in armed forces						
per capita US \$			% of total of NATO countries			thousands			% of total of NATO countries			
1959	1969	1979	1959	1969	1979	1959	1969	1979	1959	1969	1979	
41	65	378	0.6	0.6	1.7	120	102.4	86.8	2.0	1.6	1.8	Belgium
81	122	417	5.9	5.8	10.3	1,026	503	509.3	17.5	7.8	10.4	France
51	95	417	4.3	5.2	11.4	206	465	495.5	3.5	7.2	10.1	Germany
22	42	129	1.7	2.1	3.4	400	420	365.0	6.8	6.5	7.5	Italy
26	23	117	0.01	0.01	0.02	3.2	0.6	0.7	0.05	0.01	0.01	Luxembourg
35	79	355	0.6	1.0	2.3	130	124	114.8	2.2	1.9	2.4	Netherlands
85	99	245	7.2	5.2	8.9	614.2	405	322.9	10.5	6.3	6.6	United Kingdom
57	88	330	20.4	19.8	38.1	2,499	2,020	1,895	42.5	31.2	38.8	Total WEU
31	72	297	0.2	0.3	0.7	45	45.5	34.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	Denmark
19	48	n.a.	0.3	0.4	0.7	157.9	159.0	184.6	2.7	2.5	3.8	Greece
44	91	358	0.2	0.3	0.7	40	38.0	39.0	0.7	0.6	0.8	Norway
11	39	78	0.2	0.3	0.4	79	182.0	60.5	1.3	2.8	1.2	Portugal
9	17	n.a.	0.4	0.6	1.2	500	483.0	566.0	8.5	7.5	11.6	Turkey
49	77	310	21.7	21.8	43.4	3,321.3	2,927.5	2,779.8	56.5	45.2	56.9	Total all European NATO countries
94	83	173	2.7	1.7	1.9	120	98.3	80.0	2.0	1.5	1.6	Canada
262	402	555	75.6	76.5	56.4	2,435	3,454	2,022	41.4	53.3	41.4	United States
132	202	414	100	100	100	5,876	6,480	4,882	100	100	100	Total NATO

APPENDIX III

*Relative United States/USSR standing
in the twenty most important basic technology areas*

Basic technologies	US superior	US/USSR equal	USSR superior
1. Aerodynamics/Fluid dynamics		×	
2. Automated control	×		
3. Computer	← ×		
4. Military instrumentation	×		
5. Directed energy		×	
6. Electro-optical sensor (including IR)	×		
7. Guidance and navigation	× →		
8. Hydro-acoustic	×		
9. Intelligence sensor	×		
10. Manufacturing	×		
11. Materials (light weight and high strength)	× →		
12. Microelectronic materials and integrated circuit manufacture	← ×		
13. Non-acoustic submarine detection		×	
14. Nuclear warhead		×	
15. Optics	× →		
16. Propulsion (Aerospace)	× →		
17. Radar sensor		×	
18. Signal processing	×		
19. Software	×		
20. Telecommunications	×		

1. The list in aggregate was selected with the objective of providing a valid base for comparing *overall* US and USSR *basic* technology. The technologies were specifically not chosen to compare technology level in currently deployed military systems. The list is in alphabetical order.

2. The technologies selected have the potential for significantly changing the military balance in the next ten to twenty years. The technologies are not static; they are improving or have the potential for significant improvements.

3. The arrows denote that the relative technology level is changing significantly in the direction indicated.

4. The judgments represent averages within each basic technology area.

Source: United States Department of Defence FY 1981 programme for research, development and acquisition, statement by the Under-Secretary of Defence Wm. J. Perry, 1st February 1980.

Relative United States/USSR technology level
in deployed military systems*

Deployed system	US superior	US/USSR equal	USSR superior
STRATEGIC			
ICBM		×	
SSBN/SLBM	× →		
Bomber	×		
SAMs			×
Ballistic missile defence			×
Anti-satellite			×
TACTICAL			
Land forces			
SAMs (including naval)		×	
Tanks			← × **
Artillery	× →		
Infantry combat vehicles			×
Anti-tank guided missiles		×	
Attack helicopters	× →		
Chemical warfare			×
Theatre ballistic missiles		×	
Air Forces			
Fighter/attack aircraft	×		
Air-to-air missiles	×		
PGM	×		
Air lift	×		
Naval forces			
SSNs		×	
Anti-submarine warfare	× →		
Sea-based air	× →		
Surface combatants		×	
Cruise missile		×	
Mine warfare			×
Amphibious assault	× →		
C ³ I			
Communications	× →		
Command and control		×	
Electronic countermeasure		×	
Surveillance and reconnais- sance	× →		
Early warning	× →		

* These are comparisons of system technology level only, and are not necessarily a measure of effectiveness. The comparisons are not dependent on scenario, tactics, quantity, training, or other operational factors. Systems farther than one year from IOC are not considered.

** The arrows denote that the relative technology level is changing significantly in the direction indicated.

APPENDIX IV

*Military manoeuvres notified in 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980
under the provisions of the Helsinki final act*

A. Allied manoeuvres

Sponsoring country	Name of the manoeuvre	Type of the manoeuvre	Area	Size	Participating forces	Period of the manoeuvre	Invitation to observers
1975							
A. Major manoeuvres							
Fed. Rep. of Germany	Grosse Rochade	Ground/air	Bavaria	68,000	GE-CA-FR-US	15th-19th September	—
United States	Certain Trek ¹	Ground/air	NW Bavaria	57,000	GE-CA-FR-US	14th-23rd October	Yes
B. Smaller scale manoeuvres							
Turkey	Deep Express	Joint	Aegean Sea and Turkish Thrace	18,000	TU-US-UK-GE BE-IT-NL	12th-28th September	—
Norway	Batten Bolt 75	Joint	Oestfold (NO)	8,000	NO-UK-DE-NL	3rd-7th October	—
Netherlands	Pantersprong	Ground/air	Western part of Germany	10,000	NL	28th October-6th November	—
1976							
A. Major manoeuvres							
Fed. Rep. of Germany	Grosser Baer	Ground/air	North-West Germany	50,000	GE-NL-UK-US	6th-10th September	Yes
United States	Gordian Shield	Ground/air	Hesse (GE)	34,000	US-GE	7th-11th September	—
United States	Lares Team	Ground/air	Southern Germany	44,000	US-CA-GE	13th-17th September	Yes
B. Smaller scale manoeuvres							
Norway	Atlas Express	Joint	South West Troms	17,000	CA-GE-IT-NL NO-UK-US	24th February-23rd March	—
Norway	Teamwork 76	Joint	Trøndelag (NO)	13,500	NO-NL-UK-US	10th-24th September	Yes
Denmark/GE	Bonded Item	Joint	Jutland & Schleswig-Holstein	11,000	DE-GE-US	11th-21st October	—
United Kingdom	Spear-point	Ground	North-West Germany	18,000	UK-DE-US	2nd-11th November	Yes

Sponsoring country	Name of the manœuvre	Type of the manœuvre	Area	Size	Participating forces	Period of the manœuvre	Invitation to observers
1977 A. Major manœuvres United States	Carbon Edge	Ground /air	Germany	58,700	US-BE-CA GE-NL-UK GE-US	13th-23rd September 12th-15th September	Yes
Fed. Rep. of Germany	Standhafte Chatten	Ground /air	Germany	38,000			Yes
B. Smaller scale manœuvres United States	Certain Fighter	Ground /air	Germany	24,000	US	1st-8th May	—
Denmark	Arrow Express	Ground /air	Denmark	16,000	BE-CA-DE-GE IT-LU-NL- UK-US	19th-23rd September	Yes
Belgium	Blue Fox	Ground	Germany	24,500	BE-GE-US	12th-23rd September	—
Netherlands	Interaction	Ground /air	Germany	12,000	NL	24th September- 1st October	Yes
Turkey	Tayfun 77	Ground /air / naval	Turkey	15,000	TU	13th-14th October	Yes
1978 A. Major manœuvres Fed. Rep. of Germany	Blaue Donau	Ground /air	Nurnberg Regensburg Augsburg Uhlm	46,000	CA-GE-US	17th-21st September	Yes
United States	Certain Shield	Ground /air	Bad Hessfeld Schweinfurt Darmstadt Monburg	56,000	BE-GE-LU UK-US	18th-28th September	Yes
Netherlands	Saxon Drive	Ground /air	Limburg Luneburg Wafsburg Hannover	32,500	GE-NL-US	18th-29th September	Yes
Fed. Rep. of Germany	Bold Guard	Ground /air	Bremen Schleswig- Holstein Baltic Command Area	65,000	DE-GE-UK-US	19th-22nd September	—
B. Smaller scale manœuvres Norway	Artic Express	Ground /air	Troms	15,300	CA-GE-IT-NL NO-UK-US	1st-6th March	Yes
	Black Bear	Ground /air	East Agder	8,200	NL-NO-UK-US	22nd-26th September	—

Sponsoring country	Name of the manœuvre	Type of the manœuvre	Area	Size	Participating forces	Period of the manœuvre	Invitation to observers
1979							
A. Major manœuvres							
United States	Certain Sentinel	Ground	N. Baden Württemberg	66,000	CA-GE-LU-NL UK-US	30th January- 6th February	Yes
United States	Constant Enforcer	Ground with air support	W. Bavaria Wissen/Sieg Frankenberg Kassel Eschwege - Bad Hersfeld Giessen Diez/Lahn	29,000	BE-CA-GE-US	10th-21st September	Yes
Fed. Rep. of Germany	Harte Faust	Ground with air support	Oldenburg Osnabrück Münster Nordhorn	60,000	GE-NL-US-DE	17th-21st September	Yes
B. Smaller scale manœuvres							
Norway	Cold Winter 79	Ground/air	County of Troms	10,000	CA-NL-NO UK-US	17th-22nd March	—
Turkey	Display Determination 79	Joint	Aegean Sea and Turkish Thrace	18,000	IT-TU-UK-US	28th September- 14th October	—
France	Saone 79	Ground	Haute-Marne Haute-Saone Doubs - Jura Côte d'Or	16,000	FR	1st-7th October	Yes
United Kingdom	Keystone	Ground	Hameln Hildesheim Salzgitter	18,000	UK	15th-27th October	—
1980							
A. Major manœuvres							
Fed. Rep. of Germany	St. Georg	Ground with air support	Dillenburg Eschwege Bamberg Heilbronn	44,000	GE-US	15th-19th September	Yes
United States	Certain Ramparts	Ground	Southwest of Nürnberg	40,000	CA-GE-US	15th-24th September	Yes
United Kingdom	Spearpoint	Ground	Osnabrück Minden Nienburg Wolfsburg Braunhage Unna	90,000	GE-UK-US	15th-25th September	Yes
B. Smaller scale manœuvres							
Norway	Anorak Express 80	Joint	Troms area	18,200	CA-GE-IT-NL NO-UK-US	14th-19th March	—
Norway	Teamwork 80	Joint	North Møre South Trøndelag	16,800	NL-NO-UK-US	18th-24th September	Yes
France	Marne 80	Ground with air support	Aube - Marne et Meuse	17,000	FR	6th-10th October	—

Note: "Major manœuvres" are those involving more than 25,000 men.

1. Within Certain Trek the United States notified Reforger 75 a ground/air manoeuvre of 10,000 troops.

B. *Warsaw Pact countries' manoeuvres*

Sponsoring country	Name of the manoeuvre	Type of the manoeuvre	Area	Size	Participating forces	Period of the manoeuvre	Invitation to observers
1975 None							
1976 A. <i>Major manoeuvres</i>							
USSR	Caucasus	Ground /air	Kutaisi-Tbilisi	About 25,000	Soviet	25th January-6th February	Yes
USSR	Sever	Ground /air	Yerevan Leningrad Military District	About 25,000	Soviet	14th-18th June	Yes
Poland	Shield 76	Ground /air	Bydgoszcz Szczecin Wroclaw	35,000	POL-USSR CZ-GDR	9th-16th September	Yes
B. <i>Smaller scale manoeuvres</i>							
Hungary	—	Alert/ tactical exercise	Denafolovar (Central Hungary)	About 10,000	Hungarian	6th April	—
Hungary	—	Ground /air	Tisza /Danube and Danatul	15,000 ¹	Hungarian Soviet	18th-23rd October	—
1977 A. <i>Major manoeuvres</i>							
USSR	—	Ground /air	Kiohinev Odessa	25,000	Soviet	31st March-5th April	—
USSR	Carpathia	Ground /air	Nikolayev Lutsk, Lvov Rovno	27,000	Soviet	11th-16th July	Yes
1978 A. <i>Major manoeuvres</i>							
USSR	Berezina	Ground /air	Minsk-Orsha	25,000	Soviet	6th-10th February	Yes
USSR	Tarcza 78	Ground /air	Polotsk GDR	30,000	Soviet	3rd-8th July	—
USSR	Kavraz II	Ground	Kutaisi Batumi and Kirovabad (Trans-Caucasus MD)	25,000	Soviet	5th-20th September (notified 5th-12th September)	—

Sponsoring country	Name of the manœuvre	Type of the manœuvre	Area	Size	Participating forces	Period of the manœuvre	Invitation to observers
<i>1979</i>							
<i>A. Major manœuvres</i>							
USSR / Czechoslovakia	Druzhiba	Ground /air	Western Czechoslovakia	26,000	Soviet Czechoslovak	2nd-7th February	—
USSR		Ground /air	Rovno-Ivano Frankovsk	About 25,000	Soviet	2nd-7th April	—
USSR	Neman	Ground /air	Panevejis Taurage-Alitus	25,000	Soviet	23rd-27th July	Yes
<i>B. Smaller scale manœuvres</i>							
Hungary	Shield 79	Ground	Area between Lake Balaton and Tisza River	less than 25,000	BU-CZ-HU-RO USSR	mid-May	—
<i>1980</i>							
<i>A. Major manœuvres</i>							
USSR	—	Ground /air	Stendal Magdeburg Cottbus Brandenburg	30,000	Soviet	10th-16th July	—
German Democratic Republic	Brotherhood in arms 80	Ground /air Amphibious	GDR-Baltic Sea Coast	40,000	WP countries	First half of September	—
<i>B. Smaller scale manœuvres</i>							
Hungary	Dyna 80			18,000	HU /Soviet	23rd-30th August	—

1. Including certain staffs and units of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary.

APPENDIX V

*Final communiqué issued after the meeting of the
North Atlantic Council**26th June 1980*

I

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session at Ankara on the 25th and 26th June 1980.

2. In reviewing the international situation, Ministers noted with concern that the past six months have been overshadowed by developments which challenge the foundations of stability in the world. The rules which govern relations between states are defined in the United Nations Charter: the violations of these rules have led to tensions which are prejudicial to the understanding and trust which ought to govern relations between states. Ministers underlined the opposition of their governments to threat or use of force and they reaffirmed their commitment to the peaceful settlement of international disputes. They considered it particularly important in present circumstances to reaffirm their determination to work together for the achievement of the fundamental ideals and aims of the Atlantic Alliance: national independence, security, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. In this connection they underlined the importance of close political consultation within the Alliance.

3. Ministers expressed their deep concern at the continued occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet armed forces. This occupation of a traditionally neutral and non-aligned country of the third world has aroused the resistance of the Afghan people, led to the flight of about a million refugees and has been condemned by the overwhelming majority of the international community in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations Human Rights Commission, the Islamic Conference and other bodies. They regard as unacceptable this armed intervention and the attempt to crush the national resistance of the Afghan people by massive military force, and they note that the arguments used by the Soviet Government to justify its actions are totally unconvincing. Reaffirming the words of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 14th January 1980, adopted by 104 votes, Ministers stressed the need for "immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan" and urged the Soviet

Government to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country and the rights of the Afghan people freely to determine their future.

Ministers noted that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan carried with it very serious implications for the general strategic situation. By using its own military forces directly to impose its will, this time on a non-aligned country, the Soviet Government has clearly demonstrated its readiness to exploit opportunities to shift the balance of forces in its favour. It has thus given rise to grave concerns about its future intentions and is threatening the security of a region which is vital for world peace and stability. While recognising that the security of the region is primarily the concern of the countries there, Ministers welcomed the fact that members of the Alliance are, by reason of their relations with those countries, in a position to make a contribution to peace and stability in the region.

Ministers agreed that the international crisis caused by the Soviet intervention calls for a resolute, constant and concerted response on the part of the allies. It is vital that the Soviet Government should be left in no doubt as to the extremely grave view which the allies take of this situation which jeopardises world peace. Ministers reaffirmed that there could be no question of accepting a *fait accompli* resulting from the use of force. Afghanistan should be neither a pawn nor a threat for anyone. They stressed the need for a political settlement which must necessarily provide for the total and immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces so as to enable the Afghan people to decide on its future peacefully with complete freedom and without any outside pressure. The recent announcement that some Soviet troops are being withdrawn from Afghanistan would only be of interest if it were the beginning of a total withdrawal. Ministers welcomed the important rôle which the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement have assumed in the search for a political solution. Ministers noted that while there had been various proposals formulated or inspired by the Soviet Union, including the ideas advanced in the declaration

of the Warsaw Pact states of 15th May 1980, none of them had addressed the basic issues and all would subject the national independence and right of self-determination of the Afghan people to restrictions unacceptable in international law.

Ministers noted that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had done serious damage to détente, to which they reaffirmed their attachment. They restated their willingness to work for the improvement of East-West relations and their wish to keep open the channels of communication between the countries of East and West, so as to make their views clear, to prevent misunderstanding, to facilitate a resolution of the present crisis, and to foster constructive co-operation, as circumstances permit. They reaffirmed, however, that détente cannot be pursued in one region of the world regardless of developments in another. Moreover, they agreed that restoration of a co-operative relationship must be based on a foundation of mutual confidence, and this has been shaken by recent Soviet actions. It will need to be rebuilt by positive action on the part of the Soviet Government to live up to the peaceful intentions which it professes.

4. In addition to the concern created by the invasion of Afghanistan, Ministers noted that, despite Warsaw Pact statements that they did not seek military superiority, there was no sign of any slackening of the substantial rate of growth in the quality, readiness and strength of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces which threaten to increase the present military disparities, particularly in Europe. Ministers, therefore, re-emphasised their governments' resolve to take all necessary steps individually or collectively to maintain an adequate level of deterrence and defence across the full spectrum.

They reaffirmed that more effective use of resources through co-operative equipment programmes and increased standardisation and interoperability of weapons systems was a key element in conventional force modernisation and they noted with satisfaction further progress in this respect. They reaffirmed too that they would continue to work through the transatlantic dialogue toward more balanced relations among the European and North American allies in armaments development and production and toward heightened availability and quality of new defence equipment. In this connection Ministers welcomed the work of the Conference of National Armaments Directors. They also commented on the importance of the work of the Independent European Programme Group and the progress they expected of it. They re-emphasised the need to bear in mind the interests of the less industrialised members of the Alliance in the course of improving armaments co-operation. Ministers

also stressed the significance of maintaining the technological advantages which NATO members possess.

5. In parallel with the efforts of their governments to maintain and strengthen their defence capabilities, Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the pursuit of effective, balanced and verifiable measures of disarmament and arms control. They nonetheless noted that the prospects for success will depend on the restoration of international confidence and stability. Ministers emphasised that their governments wished to avoid a competitive arms race, but the substantial reductions in the level of forces which they seek will only be possible if negotiations are based on a genuine willingness to achieve undiminished security for all participants and if the Warsaw Pact countries are convinced of the determination of the allies to maintain an adequate level of defence capabilities. They devoted particular attention to the various initiatives of members of the Alliance in the area of arms control. They noted that these proposals had not met with a positive response. Ministers reaffirmed the determination of their governments to play their full part in the current disarmament work of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva as well as of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and other United Nations bodies. They underlined the importance they attach to the frequent and active consultations which take place on arms control and disarmament questions within the context of the permanent machinery of the Alliance.

6. Ministers reaffirmed their support for the SALT II treaty which represents a significant contribution towards curbing the arms race and to ensuring the security of the Alliance and the stability of East-West relations. They expressed regret that the current international crisis had delayed until now the process of ratification of the treaty. Ministers expressed the hope that circumstances would make possible its ratification by both sides at the earliest opportunity. They hoped that the continuation of the SALT process on the basis of further close consultations within the Alliance would make possible further reductions and qualitative limitations in the nuclear field between the United States and the USSR and create a favourable climate for progress in other fields of arms control.

7. The Ministers of the countries participating in the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions affirmed the continued importance of progress in those negotiations as a means of achieving a more stable force relationship in Central Europe on the basis of genuine parity in military manpower in the form of a common collective ceiling on ground force manpower and a combined common col-

lective ceiling on ground and air force manpower for each side. The determination of western participants in those talks to achieve progress and to come to early results was demonstrated by their presentation in Vienna in December 1979 of important new proposals for an interim phase I agreement and associated measures as part of the programme of arms control initiatives approved by those Ministers earlier in December 1979. These proposals, which thus far remain unanswered by the East, are the most recent substantive proposals advanced in the Vienna talks. They provide a realistic framework for achieving a first negotiated result, including the reduction and limitation of United States and Soviet ground force manpower in the area on the basis of agreed data on these personnel, and associated measures which would aid verification of reductions and limitations, increase military stability, enhance mutual understanding of the military posture and activities of the other side, and diminish the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation.

These Ministers noted the expression in the recent declaration of the Warsaw Pact states, of a desire for more rapid progress in the Vienna talks. They called on the Warsaw Pact states to give concrete expression to this statement through practical movement on the data issue and through an early, constructive and substantive eastern response to the western proposals of December 1979.

8. Turning to the process initiated by the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, Ministers noted that, in this field also, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan had seriously affected the confidence necessary for progress. They recalled that in the CSCE final act, the participating states had declared their intention to conduct their relations with all other states in the spirit of the principles guiding relations between themselves. It was therefore a matter of particular concern that the Soviet Union had acted and was still acting in Afghanistan in a manner violating the principles to which it had committed itself at Helsinki at the highest level. Ministers also deplored the increased suppression in certain countries of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the harassment, imprisonment, internal exile and banishment of those who strive for implementation of the final act. They expressed their concern that despite some positive developments, implementation in the field of human contacts remained uneven. They also noted with regret the lack of progress towards the freer flow of information.

Against this background Ministers considered the approach to the forthcoming CSCE follow-up meeting at Madrid. They stressed the importance of maintaining the integrity of

the final act. They agreed that the emphasis must be placed on full implementation of its principles and provisions. Therefore, allied representatives at Madrid will engage in a thorough, frank and measured review of implementation with a view to stimulating improvement.

Ministers noted that the prospects for progress at Madrid and in particular for the consideration of new proposals, would be influenced by the course of this review and would depend on the international situation at that time. With this in mind, and recognising the importance of the CSCE process for promoting contacts and negotiations between participating states, Ministers agreed to continue to develop a balanced group of proposals and remain prepared to discuss and to take account of concrete proposals for balanced and significant progress in all fields of the final act which may be advanced by other participants.

Ministers reviewed the various proposals that have been developed so far in the field of CBMs and of certain aspects of security and disarmament. In this connection, Ministers recalled their agreement at the North Atlantic Council meeting of December 1979, to work toward the adoption during the Madrid CSCE meeting, as part of a balanced outcome, of a mandate for further negotiations under the aegis of the CSCE, as proposed by the Government of France, on militarily significant and verifiable CBMs, applicable to the entire continent of Europe, this means including the whole of the European part of the Soviet Union. They expressed the hope that circumstances noted above would permit concrete results in this regard at the Madrid meeting. They noted that work was continuing in the Alliance on CBMs related to military activities which would accord with these prerequisites. They agreed to continue their common efforts in this area, while recognising that present circumstances required the Council in Permanent Session to evaluate developments on a constant basis.

9. Ministers examined developments with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole since their last meeting in December 1979. They expressed satisfaction with the working of the quadripartite agreement of 3rd September 1971 and agreed that the situation in and around Berlin has continued relatively quiet. They underlined the fundamental importance of an undisturbed climate in Berlin and on the access routes for the maintenance of security and stability in Europe.

Ministers noted with satisfaction the conclusion of the agreements and arrangements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on 30th April 1980. They welcomed the favourable

effects which these will have, particularly for Berlin.

In connection with the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the Bonn and Paris Conventions, Ministers recalled that these conventions enabled the Federal Republic of Germany to become an equal member of the North Atlantic Alliance, laid the foundations for its close co-operation, based on mutual trust, with the partners in the Alliance and contributed thereby to the strength of the Alliance and to the preservation of peace and security in Europe. They took this opportunity to recall also the importance for the improvement of the situation in Europe of the treaties of the Federal Republic of Germany with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia as well as with the German Democratic Republic. Recalling that these treaties did not affect the rights and responsibilities of the four powers relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole, they reaffirmed their support for the political objective of the Federal Republic of Germany to work towards a state of peace in Europe in which the German people regains its unity through free self-determination.

10. Ministers noted the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions and underlined again the necessity of maintaining the balance of forces in the whole area. They requested the Council in Permanent Session to continue its consultations on this subject and report to them at their next meeting.

Ministers noted that the recent developments in South-West Asia have brought even more sharply into focus the great strategic importance of the south-eastern flank for the security of the Alliance and for the overall balance of power in the region, the maintenance of which is essential for international stability. Ministers therefore stated that the urgency of strengthening the economic and defence postures of these member countries has further increased. In addition Ministers stressed, in the interests of the Alliance's collective defence, the importance of the initiatives undertaken to strengthen the cohesion of the south-eastern flank. In this connection, Ministers also stressed that in the interests of the Alliance's collective defence, the restoration of full and undiminished solidarity between the member countries concerned takes on a special significance.

11. The Ministers welcomed the continuation of the dialogue between Greece and Turkey and expressed the hope that they would pursue their joint efforts for a peaceful solution to the differences between the two countries.

12. Ministers reviewed the particular problems faced by the economically less advanced

member countries in the light of a report by the Secretary-General. Noting that in the present circumstances the need for a clear demonstration of allied solidarity is even more important, Ministers reaffirmed their attachment to the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty and their continued political support for the process of enhancing the economies of those countries. In this context they reiterated the urgent need for an increase in financial assistance and economic co-operation from the allies which are in a position to do so, through the appropriate bilateral and multilateral channels. They welcomed the efforts being made to find a solution to Turkey's economic problems, recognising time was necessary for the current efforts to become fully effective and that they would need to continue over a number of years.

13. Ministers recalled the welcome they gave at their spring session in 1979 to the intensified consideration being given by the Science Committee to the possibilities of reducing scientific and technological disparities between member countries through co-operative activities. They endorsed the establishment of a special five-year programme, "Science for stability", proposed by the Science Committee, to strengthen the scientific and technological capabilities of Greece, Portugal and Turkey by means of co-operation with scientific institutions in other countries of the Alliance and thereby contribute to the economic development of these three countries. The modalities of implementation of this programme will be decided by the Council in Permanent Session.

14. With respect to the Middle East, Ministers reaffirmed the importance of a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They reviewed the situation in the area including the progress achieved by Egypt and Israel in developing their mutual relations. Ministers believed that such a settlement should ensure the right of all states in the area, including Israel, to live within secure, recognised and guaranteed boundaries, as well as the achievement of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Ministers affirmed that all the concerned, including representatives of the Palestinian people, should participate in a negotiated settlement. Ministers considered that Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, together with the principles stated above, should form the framework for such a settlement. They deemed it essential that this framework should be accepted by all the parties concerned.

15. Within the context of their discussion of the need for enhancing global stability and security, Ministers called upon all countries to assume their share of the responsibility for seeking solutions to world economic problems and for contributing to the economic and social

progress of the developing countries in order to bring about a more equitable international economic system. They observed that positive results from the proposed global round of negotiations within the United Nations concerning raw materials, energy, trade, development and monetary and financial questions would serve the interests of developing as well as developed countries.

II

16. Ministers of countries who participated in the decision of 12th December 1979, to pursue the two parallel and complementary approaches on long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) modernisation and on arms control involving TNF, having received a report on progress in TNF arms control discussions, welcomed the repeated efforts of the United States, based on full consultations among the allies concerned, to engage the Soviet Union in serious negotiations in the SALT III framework aimed at achieving verifiable limitations on Soviet and United States land-based LRTNF consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. In particular, these Ministers supported the United States readiness to engage in preliminary exchanges on such limitations without precondition or delay, as a useful starting point for negotiating on TNF in the SALT III framework. These Ministers regretted that the Soviet responses do not contain anything which would constitute practical measures designed to restore a balanced situation. Neither has the Soviet Union so far shown any willingness to enter into serious negotiations or even to engage in preliminary exchanges. They noted that although there have been some indications that the Soviet Union recognises that SALT III could be the appropriate forum for negotiations involving TNF, the Soviet Union continues to repeat, most recently in the Warsaw Pact declaration, unrealistic and unacceptable preconditions which would perpetuate inequality.

These Ministers therefore once again called on the Soviet Union to respond promptly and positively to the United States offers to

negotiate and to enter into preliminary exchanges without any preconditions before the ratification of the SALT II treaty.

These Ministers expressed their concern about Soviet preponderance in LRTNF systems deployed to date, and noted that the systems deployed have already reached a dangerously high level. In addition to its existing force of 450 SS-4 and SS-5 LRTNF, the Soviet Union has at present deployed approximately 450 warheads on 150 SS-20 launchers. The SS-20 deployments are continuing at a rapid pace. The Soviet Union is in the process of deploying for its SS-20 force alone more warheads than are planned for the entire modernisation programme agreed to in December 1979. By contrast, deployments in allied countries will not begin until late in 1983.

These Ministers pointed out that it was the need to preserve the Alliance's deterrent capability against the background of existing disparity in LRTNF in favour of the Soviet Union which gave rise to the decision of their governments to modernise LRTNF, and that the continuing Soviet deployments of new SS-20 missiles will further increase that disparity.

These Ministers further noted that the modernisation programme was deliberately restrained as compared with the qualitative and quantitative growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities. In this regard, they also noted that the withdrawal of 1,000 United States nuclear warheads from Europe as an integral part of the LRTNF modernisation and arms control decision has begun; they recalled that the new LRTNF warheads decided upon on 12th December 1979 would be accommodated within the reduced level.

These Ministers recalled their statement of 12th December 1979, that arms control, by constraining the Soviet build-up, can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's long-range TNF requirements, and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence and détente. Ministers reiterated that the scale of NATO's long-range TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results achieved through negotiations.

APPENDIX VI

*Final communiqué issued after the meeting of the
Defence Planning Committee of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation*

14th May 1980

1. The Defence Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation met in Ministerial Session in Brussels on 13th and 14th May 1980. Foreign Ministers of countries participating in the integrated military structure of the Alliance took part in the session of 14th May. In appreciation of the important contribution made by the Federal Republic of Germany to allied defence and co-operation, Ministers drew attention to the 25th anniversary of its accession to NATO on 6th May 1955.

2. Ministers carried out their discussions against a background of the major strategic issues facing the Alliance in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the implications of that action for stability in South-West Asia. Foreign Ministers looked forward to a full discussion of the political aspects of these developments at the forthcoming ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ankara.

3. Ministers expressed their concern that for the first time in the post-war era the Soviet Union had used military force to impose its will on a non-aligned country of the third world and in a way which affected the overall strategic situation. Ministers denounced this use of force which jeopardises international peace and stability and strikes at the principles of the United Nations' Charter, and called for the total and immediate withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The people of Afghanistan must be free to shape their future without outside interference.

4. Ministers expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would re-establish the conditions for more positive and productive East-West relations. They stressed their readiness to continue the search for progress in the field of arms control and disarmament on the basis of realistic balanced and verifiable measures. They reaffirmed their support for the SALT II treaty as a major contribution to détente and to security and looked forward to its early ratification. Ministers recalled the wide range of initiatives particularly in the field of confidence building and arms control contained in the communiqués of 12th and 14th December 1979

and designed to improve mutual security and co-operation in Europe. They appealed to the members of the Warsaw Pact to make their contribution towards this goal and to respond positively to these western proposals. At the same time, in the present circumstances, Ministers underlined the continuing need to maintain and strengthen the Alliance's defence posture in the interests of deterrence.

5. Ministers further agreed that the stability of regions outside NATO boundaries, particularly in the South-West Asia area, and the secure supply of essential commodities from this area are of crucial importance. Therefore, the current situation has serious implications for the security of member countries. The altered strategic situation in South-West Asia warrants full solidarity and the strengthening of allied cohesion as a response to the new challenges. Ministers recognised that maintenance of the special relationships of allies with the regional countries are in the interests of the West as well as of the countries of the region.

6. It is in the interests of members of the Alliance that countries which are in a position to do so should use their best efforts to help achieve peace and stability in South-West Asia, taking into consideration the interests of the regional countries and the value of their political co-operation. The burden, particularly insofar as defence measures are concerned, falls largely upon the United States, which has already taken steps to enhance its effectiveness. Ministers noted that this commitment, which in certain circumstances might substantially increase, could place additional responsibilities on all allies for maintaining levels and standards of forces necessary for defence and deterrence in the NATO area. Ministers agreed on the need for ensuring that at the same time as the United States carries out the efforts to strengthen defence capabilities for South-West Asia described above, allied capabilities to deter aggression and to defend NATO Europe are also maintained and strengthened.

7. In discussing the effect of recent events on the NATO area, Ministers agreed that there was no sign of any relaxation in the efforts being undertaken by the Warsaw Pact and, in

particular, the Soviet Union to increase substantially the quality and readiness of their forces. Despite a slowdown in economic growth and increasing difficulties in the energy sector, Soviet defence expenditure still amounted to 11 to 13% of its GDP, and continued to receive top priority despite the needs of the civil economy.

8. Ministers pledged themselves to increase their efforts to improve the capabilities of the full spectrum of forces committed to the Alliance. They received the assurance of the United States Secretaries of State and Defence that the security of the NATO area remains central to United States policy, and they noted that the United States has no plans to withdraw any United States forces permanently stationed in Europe for use in South-West Asia. Ministers of other countries agreed to do their utmost to meet additional burdens for NATO security which could result from the increased United States responsibilities in South-West Asia.

9. As an expression of their willingness to respond to the needs of the present situation, Ministers agreed upon a number of near-term defence measures to be undertaken by individual countries. Action would represent earlier or augmented implementation of urgently required defence measures designed to improve force capabilities in the NATO area. These measures are derived largely from existing national plans and based on comprehensive Alliance defence planning.

10. Ministers also called for a report, for the December 1980 Defence Planning Committee meeting, establishing again on a country-by-country basis further specific measures for prompt or accelerated implementation. In the main, these would also be selected from current defence programmes; they would take account of the evolution of the international situation in general and of the situation in South-West Asia in particular, and of the possible effects of this situation on the reinforcements available for the defence of the NATO area. Areas suitable for consideration would include readiness, reserve mobilisation, war reserve munitions and materiel, maritime defence, airlift enhancement, support by nations of reinforcing forces, military assistance to Portugal and Turkey and the NATO infrastructure programme.

11. Ministers agreed that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its implications for international stability including in South-West Asia made it more than ever necessary to maintain solidarity, cohesion and undiminished strength throughout the Alliance. These developments also brought more sharply into focus the strategic importance of the Mediterranean area and the pressing need for strengthening the

economic and defence postures of member countries on the southern flank.

12. Ministers also discussed a number of issues related principally to the continuation and implementation of current NATO defence plans designed to maintain the credibility of the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture.

13. They discussed the status of the long-term defence programme and approved recommendations designed to ensure steady progress in a number of key areas. These areas included certain readiness and reserve mobilisation measures, a number of maritime equipment projects, the provision of electronic warfare units and war reserve stocks.

14. Ministers once more reviewed the serious economic difficulties of Portugal and Turkey. Their effect on the defence capabilities of both nations, but in particular of Turkey, continues to give grave concern. Problems and possible remedies were identified and highlighted. Noting that satisfactory progress has not been made up to now, Ministers agreed that allied military assistance needs to be intensified and accelerated to meet the critical requirements in a timely way. In this respect they welcomed the decision of Germany further to increase its already substantial aid programme for Turkey. To strengthen the Alliance's maritime posture, particularly in the field of anti-submarine warfare, Ministers also supported the Portuguese Government in its plans to acquire three modern frigates and agreed to consider the best ways to provide assistance for them.

15. Ministers welcomed the evidence of closer collaboration amongst member nations in defence equipment matters as reported by the Conference of National Armaments Directors. They noted with satisfaction that the NATO armaments planning review is already providing a useful means of identifying opportunities for co-operation development and production of equipment and for improving interoperability, and that the trial of the periodic armaments planning system is proceeding well. They welcomed the progress being made towards ammunition interchangeability and the establishment of several new project groups for future equipment, including air-delivered missiles and a frigate replacement.

16. Ministers noted with interest the greater emphasis being placed on transatlantic co-operation in the development of families of weapons. In this respect they welcomed the progress being made in the field of third-generation anti-tank weapons and air-to-air missiles and the prospects for a family of maritime mines. They encouraged the search for greater use of new technology, including that now available in the commercial sphere, for

application to systems which will enhance the effectiveness of NATO defence including that of members of the Alliance which are less industrialised. To safeguard the military advantages accruing to NATO from the application of advanced technology, Ministers considered that close attention should be given to the implementation of trade control provisions, so that Soviet forces cannot benefit from the transfer of any technology which would enable them to modernise their forces more quickly and at lower cost.

17. Ministers received a statement by Dr. Hans Apel, German Defence Minister and Chairman of the Eurogroup. They reaffirmed their support for the continuing work of the Eurogroup aimed at strengthening the cohesion of the Alliance and at making the European contributions to collective security as effective as possible. They welcomed the determination of Eurogroup members to continue steady and sustained force modernisation; and to ensure that resources available for defence are used to maximum advantage through co-operation and collaboration in practical fields of activity. In this connection they noted the continuing progress in the fields of logistics, training, communications, equipment co-operation, force structures and medical co-operation.

18. Ministers noted that the NATO military commanders had presented a case for an augmentation and acceleration of the current five-year 1980-1984 NATO infrastructure programme and agreed to consider a more substantive report at their December 1980 meeting.

19. Ministers endorsed a new procedure to extend NATO's defence planning progressively into a longer timeframe, with the goal of achieving closer co-ordination at both the national and international level in setting Alliance objectives and in allocating resources for defence.

20. Ministers recalled their decision of 12th December 1979 to pursue the two parallel and complementary approaches on long-range theatre nuclear force (TNF) modernisation and on arms control involving TNF, and took note of the progress report on the proceedings of the Special Consultative Group on arms control involving TNF. Ministers expressed support for the repeated efforts of the United States to engage the Soviet Union in serious negotiations aimed at achieving verifiable limitations on Soviet and United States land-based long-range TNF consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. This offer was first made following the December TNF decision and was repeated by the United States Secretary of State on 4th April 1980. Ministers regretted that the Soviet Union has in response reiterated its

rejection of the offer to conduct serious negotiations and is instead advancing conditions which would perpetuate inequality. The Soviet Union has until now posed unacceptable pre-conditions for negotiations, and is continuing the process of deploying SS-20 missiles at a rapid pace. Ministers therefore called on the Soviet Union to respond positively and to accept without delay the United States offer to negotiate.

21. Ministers expressed their concern about the Soviet superiority in long-range TNF systems. They recognised that the continuing deployment of new Soviet long-range TNF systems, particularly of the SS-20 missile, further increased the already existing disparity in long-range TNF in favour of the Soviet Union. They noted that the Alliance's long-range TNF modernisation programme in which an initial operational capability for modern long-range TNF in Europe is anticipated towards the end of 1983, is a deliberately restrained one compared with the qualitative and quantitative growth in Soviet nuclear capabilities facing the Alliance which has already taken place and is continuing. The Soviet Union is already in the process of deploying for its SS-20s alone more warheads than will be involved in the entire Alliance modernisation programme. Ministers reiterated that the scale of NATO's long-range TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results achieved through negotiations.

22. Ministers recalled that it was decided at the December 1979 meeting that 1,000 United States nuclear warheads should be withdrawn from Europe as an integral part of the decision to modernise TNF without increasing NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons, and to pursue arms control involving TNF. They noted that this withdrawal has begun, as has implementation of other parts of the December decision.

23. Ministers took note of the present state of negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions. They urged eastern participants to make a positive response to the recent western proposals for an interim phase I agreement, and for a package of associated measures which forms an integral part of the interim agreement proposal.

24. Ministers concluded their meeting by endorsing NATO force goals for the period 1981-1986 established on their behalf by the Defence Planning Committee in Permanent Session. There was full recognition that in view of the current imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, implementation of these force goals would represent a major factor in the maintenance of adequate Alliance defence.

25. Accordingly Ministers pledged themselves to preserve and strengthen the military capabilities of the Alliance. They reaffirmed the importance of member countries achieving and sustaining the aim, endorsed by heads of state

and government, of increases in annual defence expenditures in real terms in the region of 3%. They expressed their confidence that those countries who have not yet been able to meet this goal will make every effort to do so.

State of European security

AMENDMENT 1 ¹

tabled by MM. Onslow, Grant and Kittelmann

1. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ on balance ” and “ has not diminished; that in present circumstances it ”.

Signed: Onslow, Grant, Kittelmann

1. See 11th Sitting, 2nd December 1980 (Amendment agreed to).

State of European security

AMENDMENTS 2, 3 and 4 ¹
tabled by MM. Valleix and Bozzi

2. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ despite ” and insert “ since ”.
3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ with particular provisions ” to the end of the paragraph.
4. In the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 4 as follows:
“ 4. In the framework of the Madrid meeting, negotiate the terms of a conference on disarmament in Europe. ”

Signed: Valleix, Bozzi

1. See 11th Sitting, 2nd December 1980 (Amendments 2 and 4 amended and agreed to; Amendment 3 negatived).

SALT and the British and French nuclear forces

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments²
by Mr Mommersteeg, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in Committee by 11 votes to 3 with 3 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Cavaliere (Chairman); MM. Bozzi, van den Bergh (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Ahrens, Banks (Alternate: Sir Frederic Bennett), Bernini, Bizet, Bonnel, Boucheny, Cox, Dejardin, Edwards, Fosson (Alter-

nate: De Poi), Grant, Handlos, de Koster (Alternate: Mommersteeg), Lemmrich (Alternate: Kittelmann), Maravalle, Meintz, Ménard, Onslow, Pawelczyk, Pecchioli (Alternate: Martino), Péronnet, Schmidt, Scholten, Tanghe.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Introductory Note

In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows:

15th and 16th September 1980 – NATO Headquarters, Brussels

Admiral Robert H. Falls, CA CF, Chairman Military Committee;
 H.E. Mr. Joseph M.A.H. Luns, Secretary-General;
 H.E. Sir Clive Rose, KCMG, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom;
 Baron Seeger J.J. van Voorst tot Voorst, Minister, Netherlands Deputy Permanent Representative;
 Dr. H.C. Lankes, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs;
 H.E. Mr. Claude Arnaud, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France;
 The Honourable Maynard W. Glitman, Minister, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States.

16th September 1980 – SHAPE, Casteau

General Sir Jack Harman, UK Army, Deputy SACEUR;
 Admiral Luther, German Navy, Deputy SACEUR;
 General William Y. Smith, US Air Force, Chief of Staff;
 Vice-Admiral Ugo Masetti, Italian Navy, Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, Armaments and Administration;
 Lt. General L.P.G. Domröse, German Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations.

6th October 1980 – Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Paris

Mrs. Renouard, Head of Strategic Affairs and Disarmament Service;
 Mr. Jacques Louveau.

16th October 1980 – Bonn

Ministry of Defence:

Dr. Stütze, Director of Planning Staff;
 Dr. Weise;
 Colonel von der Hagen.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs:

Dr. F. Ruth, Ambassador, Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control;
 Dr. Wilfried Bolewski;
 Dr. von Wagner.

21st and 22nd October 1980 – London

Ministry for Foreign Affairs:

Mr. Douglas Hurd, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs;
 Mr. David Logan;
 Mr. Patrick Moberley, Assistant Under-Secretary of State.

Royal United Services Institute:

Rear Admiral E.F. Gueritz, Director;

Group Captain David Bolton, Deputy Director;

Dr. Lawrence Freedman, Head of Policy Studies, RIIA.

International Institute for Strategic Studies:

Dr. Christoph Bertram, Director.

Ministry of Defence:

Lord Strathcona, Minister of State for Defence;

Mr. Michael Quinlan, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Defence (with special responsibility for the nuclear force and SALT).

28th October 1980 – Bonn

Mr. Berndt von Staden, Head of the Foreign Policy and Security Section, Office of the Chancellor.

On 17th September 1980 at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, the Committee as a whole discussed the theme of the report with the following members of the French parliamentary defence committees:

*Defence and Armed Forces Committee
of the French National Assembly:*

General Bigeard (Chairman)

MM. Bozzi¹

Cabanel

Mrs. d'Harcourt

MM. Lancien

Mauger

Tourrain

*Foreign Affairs and Armed Forces Committee
of the French Senate:*

MM. d'Aillières (representing the Chairman)

Boucheny¹

Bourguin

Pontillon

The Committee next met in London on 22nd and 23rd October when it discussed the theme of the report with the following members of the House of Commons Defence Committee:

Sir John Langford-Holt, Chairman

Mr. Bruce George

Mr. J.W. Gilbert

and their adviser Dr. Lawrence Freedman.

The Committee was then addressed by Colonel Jonathan Alford, Deputy Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and discussed a first draft of this report.

The Committee met finally in Rome on 17th November, when it was addressed by Mr. Pasquale Bandiera, Italian Under-Secretary of State for Defence, and adopted the report as a whole.

The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the members of the British and French parliamentary committees who met with it to discuss the theme of the report, and to the Ministers, officials and senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the Committee and replied to questions.

The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee.

1. Also members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Draft Recommendation

on SALT and the British and French nuclear forces

The Assembly,

- (i) Believing that armaments and arms control-disarmament are two sides of one coin: security;
- (ii) Noting that its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments intends to follow closely the SALT process and report regularly to the Assembly on this vital subject;
- (iii) Considering the twofold decision of the special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers of 12th December 1979 to be a realistic basis for negotiating reductions of long-range theatre nuclear forces with the Soviet Union;
- (iv) Noting that the 572 United States missiles to be deployed from 1983 will be accommodated within the reduced ceiling of United States nuclear warheads in Europe resulting from the unilateral reduction of 1,000, whereas the Soviet Union is now deploying SS-20 missiles at a rate which would provide 250-300 with 750-900 warheads by the end of 1981;
- (v) Welcoming the opening of preliminary bilateral talks on LRTNF reductions, believing that they should aim to establish a balance at the lowest possible level, as part of the global strategic nuclear balance;
- (vi) Stressing that nuclear forces are only a part, although a very important part, of the deterrent and that sufficient conventional forces form an equally essential part;
- (vii) Recalling that the 1974 Ottawa declaration recognised that the British and French nuclear forces were "capable of playing a deterrent rôle of their own contributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance", and noting that, if there is no reduction in the conventional defence, the view is held in the Alliance that the independent centres of decision add to the uncertainty facing Soviet planners, which is an essential factor of deterrence;
- (viii) Believing SALT II to be to the mutual advantage of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact;
- (ix) Considering that despite an inevitable interaction between Soviet actions and arms control negotiations in many fora, there should be no formal linkage with specific agreements when these are to the mutual advantage of the parties;
- (x) Recalling paragraph B.2. of Recommendation 346, urging member governments to submit annually to their parliaments reports on the arms control implications of all new defence equipment programmes,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call on member governments to urge the North Atlantic Council:

1. To call for the observance of the SALT II limits and the earliest resumption of the SALT process, irrespective of other aspects of East-West relations;
2. To recommend that any modernisation plans for British and French nuclear forces should not lead to the diversion of resources from conventional defence;
3. To call on the governments of NATO countries, in consultation with their national parliaments, to study the possibility:
 - (a) of improving nationally as well as in the framework of NATO methods of linking both armaments and arms control with security planning;
 - (b) of arrangements for continuously informing and consulting parliament, on a confidential basis where necessary, on these two sides of security planning and on progress of arms control negotiations.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Mommersteeg, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1.1. The Committee originally considered preparing a report on the future of the British and French nuclear forces in June 1979 when it was expected that modernisation plans for both would shortly be made known. It decided early in December 1979, when ratification of SALT II was expected to lead to the opening of negotiations on SALT III, to study the future of the forces in the context of those negotiations.

1.2. When your Rapporteur came to prepare the first draft of this report, the situation had however changed. With the invasion of Afghanistan the prospects of early ratification of SALT II had receded, and now with a new administration about to take over in the United States an attempt may be made to renegotiate parts of it. The two-part NATO decision of 12th December 1979 to deploy new United States long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe, while limitations on such United States and Soviet systems are negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework, is another factor to be taken into account.

1.3. Accordingly, this report first places the French and British forces in the context of the global nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and, after describing the two national forces, turns to the prospects of arms control.

II. The global strategic nuclear balance

2.1. This report first describes the global strategic nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the NATO allies so that the British and French nuclear forces may be seen in perspective. Although they are numerically small, comprising about 300 independent warheads carried by long-range missiles and aircraft, compared with the 9,200 independent warheads of the United States or 6,500 of the Soviet Union, the British and French forces are still a powerful deterrent in the eyes of Soviet planners because of the large uncertainty introduced by two additional independent centres of decision, and because these thermonuclear warheads in any case are some tens of times as powerful as the nuclear weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

2.2. The numbers of strategic missiles and aircraft in service appear to be reported with some reliability both in respect of the Soviet Union and of allied countries. When estimates of the

total number of bombs or independent warheads are made, the situation has been impossibly complicated with the introduction in the early 1970s of multiple, independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) first by the United States and some five years later, inevitably, by the Soviet Union. The number of MIRVs on a missile cannot be determined by "national means of verification" – i.e. observation systems such as satellites operating outside the territory of the country concerned. They can be detected only in the course of test flights of a missile, when the number of independent re-entry bodies can be detected at a distance. But there is no means of knowing what proportion of missiles so tested are fitted with the maximum number of MIRVs observed, nor how many of the re-entry vehicles are warheads and how many decoys or other penetration aids. Indeed, for the purposes of the SALT II agreement, the assumption is made that any missile known to have been tested in a MIRVed mode is thereafter counted as if all such missiles were MIRVed. Some uncertainty also arises concerning the number of bombs or standoff missiles likely to be carried by strategic aircraft.

2.3. With these reservations, the table at Appendix I estimates force loadings for the strategic nuclear balance at mid-1980. It shows first the United States and Soviet systems covered by SALT – those systems based on the territory of one superpower, or in submarines, which are capable of reaching the territory of the other superpower. This table gives the Soviet Union a total of some 2,300 missiles and 156 heavy bombers compared with some 1,700 and 350 respectively for the United States. Total numbers of warheads, calculated on the assumptions shown in the table, amount to some 6,500 for the Soviet Union and 9,200 for the United States.

2.4. The table at Appendix I shows secondly other strategic nuclear systems of the Soviet Union and of allied countries. These are taken as allied systems capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union, and comparable Soviet systems – with a range exceeding 1,000 km. This table shows a total of 660 missiles and 1,065 aircraft for the Soviet Union compared with 162 missiles and 490 aircraft for the allies (including French and British systems). It shows some 2,800 warheads for the Soviet Union compared with little more than 1,200 for the allies. It must be recognised, moreover, that due to geographical differences the Soviet

Union can reach most targets in Western Europe with other weapons also – systems of a range of about 600 km if they were deployed in East Germany or Czechoslovakia – whereas western weapons systems capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union must have a range exceeding 1,000 km.

2.5. If both these categories of weapons systems (which can be fairly termed strategic by the countries whose territory they can reach) are totalled, the figures in the table provide 9,300 warheads for the Soviet Union compared with 10,430 for the United States and its allies.

2.6. The advent of nuclear capable China complicates the picture with a further 300 warheads if it is assumed that China has produced sufficient nuclear bombs to equip all its TU-16 “Badger” aircraft. As the Committee has previously pointed out¹, about one-third of the Soviet SS-20 missiles are usually reported as being deployed against China as are between one-tenth and one-quarter of the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles². The position of China is important to the Soviet perception of a nuclear balance, because the Soviet Union alone among the nuclear powers perceives itself as surrounded by four potentially hostile and independently-controlled nuclear forces. A longer-range Chinese ICBM was successfully test-fired on 18th May 1980 over a range of 10,000 km into a previously designated impact area of 70 nautical miles radius, where the splashdown was independently monitored by Australian warships and aircraft. Designated in the western reference system the CSS-X-4, there are reports that it may have a maximum range of 13,000 km and be fitted with a 3-4 megaton warhead.

2.7. Against these very large totals of warheads, the 300 contributed by the British and French strategic systems are seen in true perspective.

2.8. The totals of paragraph 2.5. take no account of the medium-range, battlefield and defensive (SAM, ADM) weapons systems, many dual-capable, having a range of less than 1,000 km. The NATO stockpile in Europe is traditionally reported to be 7,000 warheads, of which NATO has unilaterally undertaken to withdraw 1,000, while the Soviet stockpile, previously taken to be 3,500, is now assumed by the United States to exceed that of NATO³. Numbers of French and British tactical nuclear warheads have not been specified, but are

obviously much smaller (see paragraphs 3.10. and 4.13.).

(a) Future trends

2.9. The nuclear balance is not static. Both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the smaller nuclear powers, continue to improve their nuclear forces. The submarine-launched ballistic missile force remains undoubtedly the least vulnerable leg of the nuclear trend of both powers, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Soviet anti-submarine warfare capability is less advanced than that of the United States. Moreover Soviet submarines, in travelling from the open ocean from Soviet naval ports, must always pass through “choke points” where the territory of allied countries provides bases for the advanced United States SOSUS bottom-mounted submarine detection system, but geography provides the Soviet Union with no similar advantage against allied submarines. However, Soviet submarines with SSN-8 and SSN-18 missiles can deploy in the Norwegian Sea and Sea of Okhotsk without crossing the SOSUS line, and still be in range of the United States.

2.10. The new, longer-range Trident C-4 missile is being fitted progressively into 12 of the 31 Poseidon-class strategic submarines; 48 missiles are currently operational. A larger Ohio-class Trident submarine carrying 24 missiles is under construction; the first will enter service in 1981, the construction of 7 more is currently planned with an option to exceed this number. A larger Trident D-5 missile, with a 6,000 nautical miles range, capable of carrying 14 MIRVs (the largest number permitted on SLBMs under SALT II), is under development.

2.11. The United States ICBM force, although now held to be vulnerable to the latest and more accurate Soviet ICBMs, remains an important part of the deterrent because the inherent accuracy, flexibility and responsiveness of this force make it possible to use it in a limited “warning” initial strike against a precise military target. 300 of the 550 Minuteman III ICBMs are being progressively fitted with the higher yield Mark 12A re-entry vehicle: “... because of accuracy and yield improvements, the Minuteman III will, by the 1980s, give us a considerable counter-silo potential...”. Full-scale development of the MX missile is now being undertaken to provide an initial operational capability in 1986, and an eventual total of 200 mobile missiles which it is intended should move over 200 separate “race tracks” each some 30 km long, so as to distribute the

1. Document 827.

2. There is now doubt as to the numbers of the obsolescent SS-4 and SS-5 still deployed, especially against China.

3. Committee on Appropriations, Sub-Committee on Department of Defence Hearings, Part 3 Research and Development and Acquisition, prepared statement by Dr. Wm. Perry, Under-Secretary of Defence, 5th February 1980.

1. United States Department of Defence annual report, fiscal year 1981, page 90 – 29th January 1980.

missiles at random among a total of 4,600 concrete silos. With 10 MIRVs, the system would provide an additional 2,000 highly accurate, independently targetable warheads. This project, which will require some 18,000 sq. km. of land in Utah and Nevada, is proving to be controversial.

2.12. President Carter cancelled a programme for a new B-1 penetrating bomber (the prototype of which was inspected by the Committee in 1977) on the grounds of its vulnerability to improving Soviet air defences, and instead has selected the Boeing version of an air-launched cruise missile to equip the present fleet of B-52 bombers. The contract, signed on 2nd May 1980, provides for the production of 3,148 ALCMs by 1987, at a cost of \$ 4 billion, including subcontracts. Deliveries are due to begin in November 1981. The range of the ALCM will obviate the need for B-52s to penetrate Soviet air space. A new B-61 air-droppable nuclear bomb is also being developed for the B-52.

2.13. At a press conference on 22nd August 1980, the Secretary of Defence, Mr. Brown, announced that the air force had developed a new "stealth" aircraft that was nearly undetectable by radar, and would "alter the military balance". Although the FY 1981 Department of Defence report on research, development and acquisition contains some hints of this development: "Study efforts for the next generation of penetrating bomber will concentrate on designs which achieve very low observables" (page VI-9) and also reports research on radar absorbing materials, the precise status of this new development remains unclear. The announcement may have owed more to the presidential election than to the imminent entry into service of a radar-invisible aircraft.

2.14. These new nuclear weapons programmes, and the programmes for long-range theatre nuclear force deployment in Europe, will place a heavy strain on the United States production capacity for fissile material for making the corresponding nuclear warheads. The press reports doubling of expenditure in this area to \$ 25 billion over the next five years¹.

2.15. The three plutonium production reactors at Savannah River in Southern Carolina are scheduled to expand production and a fourth reactor is to be reopened. These reactors are all some 26 years old and a joint Department of Defence/Department of Energy committee had recommended in May 1980 the construction of a new plutonium production reactor at a cost of \$ 3 billion to ensure production capability until the year 2000. The study covered a range of possibilities from a cutback on the present

stockpile of about 25,000 tactical and strategic warheads, to a programme of a steady increase in production if SALT II were not ratified.

2.16. Details of future Soviet plans for weapons development are not, of course, available; what is observed is the trend in weapons currently entering service which reflect Soviet policy decisions taken up to ten years earlier. The spur to the large increase in United States nuclear weapons production has been partly the introduction of the SS-20 medium-range missile referred to below and the new fourth generation of large ICBMs, SS-17, 18 and 19, which all first entered service in 1975, with a large throw-weight (7-9,000 kg for the SS-18) which could theoretically offer the possibility of carrying up to 40 MIRVs each, and several different modifications of which are now operational.

(b) Targeting policy

2.17. In August 1980, the press reported the recent signature by President Carter of presidential directive 59 which, in a speech at the Naval War College on 20th August, Secretary of Defence Harold Brown described thus:

"Operationally, our countervailing strategy requires that our plans and capabilities be structured to put more stress on being able to employ strategic nuclear forces selectively, as well as by all-out retaliation in response to massive attacks on the United States. It is our policy that – and we have increasingly the means and the detailed plans to carry out this policy – to ensure that the Soviet leadership knows that if they chose some intermediate level of aggression, we could, by selective, large (but still less than maximum) nuclear attacks, exact an unacceptably high price in the things the Soviet leaders appear to value most – political and military control, military force both nuclear and conventional, and the industrial capability to sustain war. In our planning we have not ignored the problem of ending the war, nor could we ignore it in the event of a war. And, of course, we have, and we will keep, a survivable and enduring capability to attack the full range of targets, including the Soviet economic base, if that is the appropriate response to a Soviet strike."

2.18. Earlier press reports suggested a completely new development in President Carter's association with this targeting policy, it represents the fruition of improvements to Minute-man put in hand by the then Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger in 1976, and now

1. International Herald Tribune, 9th October 1980.

provides the ability described in the annual report of the Secretary of Defence for FY 1981:

"We have recognised for many years that our strategic nuclear capabilities could deter only a small number of contingencies. But there can be no doubt that these capabilities still provide the foundation on which our security rests. Without them, the Soviet Union could threaten the extinction of the United States and its allies. With them, our other forces become meaningful instruments of military and political power.

With the growth of Soviet strategic capabilities, we have concluded that credible deterrence depends on our ability:

- first, to maintain the second-strike forces necessary to attack a comprehensive set of targets, including targets of political and military as well as of economic value;
- second, to withhold retaliation against selected targets;
- third, to cover at all times a sizable percentage of the Soviet economic base, so that these targets could be destroyed, if necessary; and
- fourth, to hold the elements of a reserve force for a substantial period after a strategic exchange."

The concept of providing a United States president with a range of options in any circumstances in which he might be called upon to consider using nuclear weapons had originated eighteen years earlier. An earlier Secretary of Defence, Mr. McNamara, speaking at Michigan University on 16th June 1962, had called for the option of striking military targets: "That is to say, principle military objectives in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of its civilian population", and the annual report of the Department of Defence under Secretary of Defence Schlesinger for fiscal year 1976 pointed out that:

"The ICBM force, the heart of which is the Minuteman series, continues to give the accuracy, flexibility, and control necessary to deal with and thereby deter a wide range of attacks on military targets. It provides the most reliable source of limited response options so essential to nuclear deterrence under conditions of nuclear parity."

(c) *Long-range theatre nuclear forces*

2.19. The Committee reported in detail at this time last year¹ on the problem of what, since 1977, had become known as the long-range theatre nuclear forces. These are essentially the Soviet SS-4, 5 and 20 missiles, which have no counterpart at all in NATO inventories, and the Backfire bomber. They are included in the table at Appendix I under "Other strategic systems". The Assembly adopted without amendment the accompanying recommendation²:

"That the Council call on the North Atlantic Council: To seek to redress the military balance, now threatened in particular by the deployment of new Soviet nuclear weapons systems:

(a) by taking the decisions necessary to ensure that the growing imbalance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO long-range theatre nuclear forces is corrected in due course;

(b) by accompanying these decisions by a firm offer to enter into arms control negotiations with a view to limiting long-range theatre nuclear force deployment on both sides;

(c) by continuing to seek agreement on significant reductions in present numbers of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons;

(d) by relying meanwhile on the whole range of existing weapons systems based in Europe, at sea, and in the United States to counter the threat posed by present levels of Soviet weapons;..."

2.20. At a special meeting of foreign and defence ministers of NATO countries (except France) in Brussels on 12th December 1979, a decision was taken:

"To modernise NATO's LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of United States ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers which would replace existing United States Pershing IA and 464 GLCMs all with single warheads. All the nations currently participating in the integrated defence structure will participate in the programme: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries and certain support costs will

1. Document 827, New weapons and defence strategy, a report submitted on behalf of the Committee by Mr. Roper, Chairman and Rapporteur, and Mr. van den Bergh, Rapporteur, 3rd December 1979.

2. Recommendation 345 (text at Appendix II) adopted by the Assembly on 2nd June 1980 by 41 votes to 9 with 6 abstentions. The Assembly had been unable to vote on the draft recommendation at its December 1979 session through lack of a quorum.

be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. The programme will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this connection, ministers agreed that, as an integral part of TNF modernisation, 1,000 United States nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges".¹

The Netherlands expressed the reservation to the effect that it would take a decision on stationing of GLCM on its territory in December 1981 "on the basis of the criterion whether or not arms control negotiations have by then achieved success in the form of concrete results". Belgium, stressing its solidarity with the allies, suspended application of the decision on its territory for six months with a view to taking account of any progress in the corresponding arms control negotiations. On 19th September 1980, a Belgian Government statement said that Belgium would accept the conclusions of the negotiations "and execute the share that fell to it in the framework of the Alliance"; if the negotiations did not succeed Belgium would take "all measures to have been agreed between the NATO partners"; the progress of the negotiations would be reviewed every six months. On 23rd September, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Nothomb, clarified the position:

"That means in practice

- that if our ideal objective is achieved, that is the complete abolition by both sides of all medium-range missiles, we will not have to station any in Belgium;
- that if the final agreement establishes only certain limits, certain ceilings for the deployment of these missiles by both sides, we will agree to take proportionally our share of the missiles to be deployed;
- that if the negotiations do not succeed we would agree, in solidarity with our allies, to the complete implementation in Belgium of our share of the measures agreed between NATO partners."

2.21. Since the Committee adopted its earlier report, the number of Soviet SS-20 missiles has increased from 120 to 160, of which some 80

and 110 respectively are assumed to be deployed against European targets.

2.22. Development of the new NATO weapons systems continues in engineering development in the United States with funding approved for procurement of the GLCM in FY 1981. The GLCM is now expected to begin deployment in Italy and the United Kingdom at the end of 1983, and bases for it in the United Kingdom have been designated at Greenham Common, Berkshire, and Molesworth, Cambridgeshire. Deployment will not be complete until 1988¹. It is understood that reported delays in the test programme will not affect initial operational capability.

III. British nuclear forces

(a) Relations with the United States

3.1. At the conclusion of the second world war, the United States authorities took a surprise decision to suspend the collaborative arrangements which had led to the successful Manhattan project and the first use of nuclear weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, on which many allied scientists from Britain, France and Italy had worked. The decision was subsequently enshrined in the 1946 McMahon Act. Britain that year initiated a nuclear weapons programme which remained purely national, leading to a first (fission) nuclear explosion in October 1952 and an experimental thermonuclear (fusion) explosion in May 1957.

3.2. Both Britain and the Soviet Union (which had conducted its first fission explosion in August 1949, and a thermonuclear explosion in August 1953, only nine and a half months after the United States) had made much faster progress in the development of nuclear weapons than originally anticipated in the United States, which progressively revised its policy on the communication of information². The 1946 McMahon Act was replaced by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which permitted information to be communicated to allied countries for training in the use of nuclear weapons, and bilateral agreements were concluded with nine NATO countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In 1958 the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 underwent significant amendment, and thenceforth permitted information and fissile material for the produc-

1. The Times, 14th October 1980.

2. For military purposes. This report does not discuss United States policy concerning co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy initiated in President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" programme.

1. Text of communiqué at Appendix III.

tion of nuclear weapons to be transferred to an allied country that "has made substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons". It further permitted information, plant and fissile material to be transferred for the production of nuclear propulsion plants for naval vessels (particularly relevant to submarines). Exchanges under the act were to be covered by bilateral agreements with a country concerned, subject to ratification by the United States Senate.

3.3. Within a day of the 1958 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, an agreement was concluded with the United Kingdom providing for the mutual exchange of information on the construction of nuclear warheads and propulsion reactors; providing for the transfer to the United Kingdom of one complete submarine propulsion plant, and the supply of replacement cores and nuclear fuel to operate it. The agreement was extended in 1959 to provide for the exchange of fissile and other nuclear material for the operation of propulsion reactors and for the construction of nuclear warheads. The exchange of information on the construction of propulsion reactors and warheads is subject to termination on one year's notice to take effect on 31st December 1968 and every five years thereafter – so that it cannot currently be terminated before 31st December 1983. The provisions for the exchange of fissile material for propulsion plants and for nuclear warheads have been variously extended from time to time, most recently on 5th December 1979, to keep them in force until 31st December 1984. The other provisions of the 1958 agreement are of indefinite duration, and it naturally precludes either party communicating information or material exchanged under the agreement to third parties without the permission of the second – which in the case of the United States would presumably involve action by the Senate.

3.4. The British programme for research, development and production of nuclear warheads since 1958 has been on the basis of exchange of information and materials with the United States, but construction of the warheads has remained in Britain. The provisions of the 1968 non-proliferation treaty in fact preclude the transfer of nuclear explosive devices from one nuclear weapons power to another, although they do not preclude the provision of assistance or materials for the construction of nuclear explosive devices to other nuclear weapons powers as defined by that treaty. The United Kingdom closed down its military grade uranium enrichment plant, finding it more economical to exchange plutonium, which the United Kingdom continues to produce, for uranium 235 from the United States. In 1976, the United Kingdom undertook construction of

a tritium production plant on the grounds of convenience and a saving in dollar costs, but the decision clearly enhanced British autonomy. Tritium is an ingredient of current designs of thermonuclear warheads, but with a half-life of twelve and a half years requires to be renewed more frequently than the fissile material of the warhead; it had originally been obtained from the United States.

3.5. British production of nuclear propulsion reactors for submarines appears to be based on continually improved British designs derived from the original United States Skipjack reactor transferred to the United Kingdom under the 1958 agreement. It is not clear to what extent information on improved propulsion plants has been exchanged between the two countries since the transfer of the Skipjack reactor, although the United States continues to supply the highly-enriched uranium for fuelling the British propulsion reactors.

3.6. While Britain retains a national capacity for the production of nuclear warheads, aircraft and submarines, it abandoned national production of strategic missiles in 1960 (when the Blue Streak liquid-fuelled missile was cancelled, largely on the grounds that liquid fuels had become obsolete) in favour of procurement from the United States of an air-to-surface ballistic missile, Skybolt, but the United States abandoned development of this missile in December 1962. Agreement was then reached between Mr. Macmillan, the then British Prime Minister, and President Kennedy of the United States in the Nassau agreement of December 1962 for the supply to Britain of the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile instead of Skybolt, on the understanding that the British Polaris force would be assigned to NATO "except where Her Majesty's Government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake...".

3.7. The British strategic nuclear force today consists of four Polaris nuclear-propelled submarines, each equipped with 16 Polaris A-3 missiles with a range of 4,000 km. This missile is fitted with three separate thermonuclear warheads, each of 200 KT yield, designed to fall in a pattern around a target (MRV) – they are not independently targetable (MIRV).

3.8. It was announced in January 1980 that a warhead improvement programme, Chevaline, had been undertaken, which included advanced penetration aids and the ability to manoeuvre a payload in space. The original 3×200 KT warheads are understood to have been "hardened" against nuclear ABMs, but it does not amount to a MIRVed system¹. The total cost

1. Britain and nuclear weapons, L. Freedman, 1980, page 49.

was said to be £1 billion, and was designed chiefly to preserve the credibility of the Polaris force at a time when it was thought that Soviet anti-ballistic missile defences around Moscow were being improved – retaining the “Moscow option” was thought to be essential for deterrence. The Soviet Union has since informed the bilateral Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission established under SALT I (anti-ballistic missile treaty) that it was dismantling 32 of its permitted 64 anti-ballistic missile launchers around Moscow. It is not known if these deactivated missiles will be replaced by more advanced weapons systems.

3.9. In addition to the submarine force, Britain retains in service some 56 Vulcan bombers (of which perhaps 48 are operational) with a combat radius of 2,800 km, each believed to carry two nuclear bombs. These aircraft have been in service since 1960. However, their ability to penetrate Soviet air defences is diminishing, and they are due to be phased out of service in 1981.

3.10. Few details have been made public about the precise position concerning British nuclear warheads for shorter-range weapons systems. There are 60 Buccaneer strike aircraft (950 km combat radius) and 72 Jaguar strike aircraft (720 km combat radius) of which it is assumed that 40 are nuclear capable, and the British white paper¹ states that British thermonuclear weapons are available for its strike aircraft. In addition, there are British-made nuclear depth bombs for naval helicopters.

3.11. Britain relies on United States warheads, retained in United States custody, for its Lance battlefield missile and for anti-submarine depth bombs for the Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft.

(b) Future British strategic nuclear force

3.12. The Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Pym, announced in the House of Commons on 15th July 1980 that the present British Polaris force would be replaced by the Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile system developed by the United States. Mr. Pym said:

“The agreement that we have reached is on the same lines as the 1962 Nassau agreement, under which we acquired Polaris. We shall design and build our own submarines and nuclear warheads here in the United Kingdom, and buy the Trident missile system, complete with its MIRV capability, from the United States. Once bought, it will be entirely

in our ownership and operational control, but we shall commit the whole force to NATO in the same way as the Polaris force is committed today. The new force will enter service in the early 1990s and will comprise four or five boats. We need not decide about a fifth boat for another two or three years, and we are leaving the option open meanwhile...

We estimate the capital cost of a four-boat force, at today's prices, as up to £5 billion, spread over fifteen years. We expect rather over half of the expenditure to fall in the 1980s. We intend to accommodate this within the defence budget in the normal way, alongside our other major force improvements. We remain determined to uphold and, where necessary, strengthen our all-round defence capability, and that applies to our conventional forces no less than to our nuclear forces.

I intend that as much work as possible should go to British industry. At least 70 % of the total cost will be spent in this country, and that will be reflected in a substantial amount of employment.”

3.13. An exchange of letters between Mrs. Thatcher and President Carter dated 10th and 14th July respectively was published. Mrs. Thatcher's letter reproduced in part the language of the earlier Nassau agreement:

“3. The successor to the Polaris force will be assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, like the Polaris force; and except where the United Kingdom Government may decide that supreme national interests are at stake, the successor force will be used for the purposes of international defence of the Western Alliance in all circumstances.”

Mr. Carter in his reply wrote:

“2. I view as important your statements that the Polaris successor force will be assigned to NATO and that your objectives take advantage of the economies made possible by our co-operation to reinforce your efforts to upgrade the United Kingdom's conventional forces...”

3.14. The accompanying letter from the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Pym, dated 14th July makes it clear that:

“1. The Polaris sales agreement of 1963 and its implementing agreements will be the general pattern for the sale of the Trident (C-4) system.”

In particular, *the United Kingdom pays only a 5 % surcharge on the cost of missiles and equip-*

¹. Statement on the defence estimates 1980, Volume I, paragraph 220 (April 1980).

ment as a contribution to the research and development costs of Trident, but acknowledges that the waiver of further charges by the United States "will fully satisfy the requirement that the United States Government give defence assistance of corresponding value to the United Kingdom defence budget in return for the manning by the United Kingdom of rapier air defence of United States air force bases in the United Kingdom".

3.15. An informative memorandum on "The future United Kingdom strategic nuclear deterrent force" was published by the Secretary of State¹. It examines the alternatives to Trident and explains the advantages of this system. The cost of the Trident force is estimated at £4.5-5 billion at current prices spread over fifteen years; the additional cost of a fifth submarine would be about £0.6 billion at current prices. The programme is estimated to absorb an average of 3 % of the total defence budget between 1980 and 1995. The equipment portion is unlikely to absorb more than 5 % of the equipment component of the defence budget. Broken down over the different periods, the total cost is expected to amount to 1.5 % of the total defence budget up to 1984; about 5 % (or 8 % of the equipment component) from 1985-1990; and then 1-2 % between 1990 and 1995. These figures assume a 3 % growth in real terms in the defence budget over the next three years. It is pointed out that the build-up of the original strategic bomber force in the 1950s accounted for a larger proportion of the defence budget, and that the current Tornado aircraft procurement programme accounts for 7 % of the total defence budget. The Trident force is expected to be as economic in manpower as the present Polaris force, taking only 2,500 personnel – less than 1 % of the total armed forces.

3.16. The Trident missile, with a range of 4,000 nautical miles (full payload) to 6,000 nautical miles (reduced payload), will undoubtedly provide a highly survivable strategic nuclear force, offering up to ten times the ocean area in which the strategic submarines can patrol within range of their targets, compared with the existing Polaris force (2,500 nautical miles range). The ability to carry up to eight independently targetable warheads would provide up to an eightfold increase over the present number of Polaris warheads, or a tenfold increase if the fifth submarine is constructed. The Defence Council memorandum points out, however, that this number of warheads will actually be a smaller proportion

of the number of Soviet warheads anticipated under the terms of SALT II, than were the existing Polaris warheads compared with the total number of Soviet warheads in existence (in pre-MIRV days) when the Polaris force first entered service.

3.17. While a submarine force is highly survivable, and hence particularly suited to a second strike rôle, there are two inherent limitations – limitations which still lead the United States and France to devote a large part of their strategic nuclear effort to land-based ICBMs. In the first place, the accuracy of the submarine-launched missile is inherently less than that of an ICBM because both submarine and missile rely on inertial navigation systems, so that the error in the estimate of the submarine's position at the time of launch has to be added to the error of the missile itself. Secondly, communication with a submerged submarine is slow and unlikely to be continuous. The chief communication system, very low frequency radio, can penetrate at most a very few metres of water, so that to receive instructions the submarine must rise nearer to the surface than its optimum depth for concealment. Moreover, transmitters operating at very low frequencies require antennae several kilometres in length; the British transmitter at Rugby would be highly vulnerable to an initial strike by the Soviet Union. It is possible, however, that alternative arrangements have been made through the United States airborne strategic communications system, TACAMO.

3.18. All British nuclear forces, strategic and tactical, are assigned to NATO. The targeting of the present and future submarine force, together with the 400 United States Poseidon warheads assigned to SACEUR, is undertaken by NATO officers (at present drawn from Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States) assigned by SACEUR to the United States Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff in Omaha, Nebraska. In the course of its visit in March of this year, the Committee was fully briefed by NATO officers on the intricate arrangements made through the JSTPS computers to ensure the optimum coverage of all targets designated by the European commanders, together with co-ordination of firing times to prevent mutual interference of warheads.

IV. French nuclear forces

(a) History

4.1. In the immediate post-war years, France found itself in much the same position as the United Kingdom following the surprise United States decision to suspend co-operation on nuclear energy. It was not, however, until July

1. Defence Council memorandum circulated, together with the other documents communicated to the Committee by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, as A/WEU/DA (80) 11.

1952 that a first French five-year nuclear energy plan was drawn up. As this provided for the construction of the G1 plutonium producing reactor at Marcoule, the option to produce nuclear weapons was inherent in the programme, although not explicitly stated at the time¹.

4.2. Successive governments under the Fourth Republic had ambiguous attitudes to nuclear weapons programmes and indeed Mr. Edgar Faure in April 1955 declared that military applications of atomic energy would not be pursued in France. The following month, however, the first protocol was signed between the French Atomic Energy Commissariat and the armed forces which formally initiated the development of nuclear weapons. The first plutonium producing reactor G1, constructed under the pre-existing programme, started up only eight months later in January 1956; the first experimental fission explosion was conducted in the Sahara on 13th February 1960, and the first thermonuclear explosion in the Pacific on 26th August 1968.

4.3. The pattern of the delivery systems equipping the present French nuclear forces was first laid down in the programme law adopted by the National Assembly on 6th December 1960, at a time when United States atomic energy legislation has been modified to permit co-operation on the production of nuclear weapons with an allied country that had made "substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons". This appears to have been interpreted as a country having conducted a thermonuclear explosion, and France, under the Fifth Republic, was committed to purely national production of its nuclear forces.

4.4. Following the Kennedy-Macmillan agreement on the supply of Polaris missiles to the United Kingdom in December 1962, however, President Kennedy wrote to President de Gaulle offering to supply Polaris missiles to France on the terms outlined in the Nassau agreement. Following a meeting of the French Council of Ministers on 3rd January, the Minister of Information, Mr. Peyrefitte, said that "France at present has neither the submarines required for the Polaris missiles nor the warheads" and that "one cannot therefore see how the offer could have any immediacy... France is busy with her own efforts and there is no reason why she should give them up. She

intends to pursue them by her own means. There is obviously no question of closing the door to anything... but France adheres to the principles of her own defence and the independence of her own defence". France appears to have given consideration to the option of co-operation with the United States at that time, but at a press conference on 14th January 1963 President de Gaulle finally rejected the option of participation in the Nassau agreement¹.

4.5. The French strategic nuclear force today comprises eighteen ICBMs in silos in the Plateau d'Albion in Provence. Since May 1980, nine of these have been the improved S-3 missile, fitted with a thermonuclear warhead and nine the older S-2 missile to be replaced by the S-3 in 1982. As well as having a thermonuclear warhead, the S-3 provides a greater range of some 3,400 km compared with 3,000 for the S-2.

4.6. With the entry into service of the Tonnant in May 1980, the strategic submarine force now comprises five submarines, each equipped with sixteen missiles. The improved M-20 missile has replaced the earlier M-2 on all submarines, giving a range of 4,800 km and the same thermonuclear warhead as the S-3. The airborne component is based on 50 Mirage IV aircraft (thirty-three are reported operational) each carrying one AN-22 nuclear bomb, and having an un-refuelled combat radius of some 1,600 km. This range is considerably extended by air refuelling from the eleven KC-135F tanker aircraft.

4.7. Thus, while the French force has been produced entirely from national resources, it does owe something to United States assistance. In addition to the KC-135F tanker aircraft, the first enriched uranium fuel for the land prototype of the submarine propulsion reactor was also supplied by the United States, enabling the development of this reactor to be completed much earlier than would have been possible if deliveries of French-produced uranium from the Pierrelatte enrichment plant had been awaited.

4.8. There are continual plans for the improvement of the French nuclear force, more on a "rolling" basis than the complete replacement of the force as planned by the United Kingdom. In September 1978, it was announced that construction of the sixth of the current series of strategic submarines was being abandoned in favour of one of improved design "Inflexible"; in particular, the new submarine will be designed to be quieter than the existing five, which are said to generate more underwater noise than comparable submarines in

1. "The 1952 five-year plan made no reference to the possible military use of plutonium, as such a decision did not have to be taken for several years, but it is certain that this aspect of the atomic problem was in the mind, no doubt predominantly, of the initiators and of those responsible for the plan", Bertrand Goldschmidt (then Director of External Relations and Programmes of the French *Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique*), "L'Aventure atomique", page 98 (Fayard, 1962).

1. Paragraph 6.5. below.

service in other countries. It is due to enter service in 1985, and from then to 1991 some of the other submarines currently in service are scheduled to undergo conversion to the improved design. Beyond that, design studies are now under way for completely new third-generation strategic submarines.

4.9. In 1985 a new missile – the M-4 – for the submarines will enter service which will have six miniaturised thermonuclear warheads, understood to be an MRV system like Polaris A-3, but not a MIRVed warhead capable of striking separate targets.

4.10. In September 1979, a decision was taken to develop a medium-range air-to-surface missile (ASMP) designed to extend the life of fifteen Mirage IV bombers up to 1985, after which that missile will still equip the new Mirage 2000 aircraft for tactical strikes. There is to be no replacement for the Mirage IV as such.

4.11. In June 1980, a study was initiated on the replacement for the ICBM force which may take the form of a mobile missile system; the study is not due for completion until 1982.

4.12. Mr. Bourges, the retiring Minister of Defence, on 30th July 1980 gave the following figures of expenditure on French nuclear forces.

Expenditure on French strategic nuclear forces

million francs

	1959-69	1970-74	1975-80
Research and development and testing	20,976	11,056	26,846
Industrial investment	8,100	835	51
Military infrastructure	984	1,244	2,146
Production of delivery vehicles and weapons	6,048	8,188	13,015
Total	36,108	21,323	42,058

4.13. Shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons systems produced by France are the 32 Pluton battlefield missiles with a range of 120 km and a 15-25 kiloton warhead, the tactical aircraft, 80¹ Jaguar (produced jointly with the United Kingdom), and 30 Mirage III with a combat radius of 720 km and 600 km respectively; and the 36 carrier-borne Super Etandard with a combat radius of 560 km.

1. Forty-five are nuclear-capable (IISS Military Balance 1980-81, page 119).

(b) Enhanced radiation weapon

4.14. The Minister of Defence, Mr. Bourges, in a statement on 7th May 1980 discussed the enhanced radiation weapon (or neutron bomb) adding “we have not decided to deprive ourselves of it”. It has been confirmed that France is continuing research and development on this weapon which the Chief of Staff, General Méry, on 24th April 1980, claimed could reduce blast and heat effects by a factor of 10 compared with current tactical nuclear weapons. A decision on production will not be taken for some years but the weapon could be in service by 1985.

V. Contribution of French and British nuclear forces to allied defence

5.1. Eighteen years ago, the Committee drew attention to the scepticism with which the then United States Secretary of Defence viewed independent nuclear forces¹. Mr. McNamara said in a speech at Michigan University, Ann Arbor, on 16th June 1962:

“In short then limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent. At the same time, the general strategy I have summarised magnifies the importance of unity of planning, concentration of executive authority and central direction. There must not be competing bad conflicting strategies to meet the contingency of nuclear war.”

5.2. At that time, the United States was already co-operating with the United Kingdom on the production of nuclear warheads, under the terms of the 1958 agreement referred to in paragraph 3.3. above, and within six months was to conclude the Nassau agreement on the sale of the Polaris missile system. If that was not seen as a reversal of United States policy, that was because, under the Nassau agreement of 21st December 1962, the existing British nuclear forces “6. ...would be assigned as part of the NATO nuclear force and targeted in accordance with NATO plans” while the Polaris missile force, to be constituted under the agreement, “will be assigned and targeted in the same way as the forces described in paragraph 6”.

5.3. Official recognition by NATO of the contribution made by the British and French nuclear forces to the defence of the Alliance

1. Document 251, State of European security – a NATO nuclear force, Rapporteur Mr. Duynstee, 16th October 1962, see paragraph 3.15. of the explanatory memorandum.

came twelve years later in the declaration published by the North Atlantic Council in Ottawa on 19th June and subsequently signed by the fifteen heads of governments in Brussels on 26th June 1974:

“The European members who provide three-quarters of the conventional strength of the Alliance in Europe, and two of whom possess nuclear forces capable of playing a deterrent rôle of their own contributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance, undertake to make the necessary contribution to maintain the common defence at a level capable of deterring and if necessary repelling all actions directed against the independence and territorial integrity of the members of the Alliance.”

5.4. The position of the present United States administration was made clear in the statement issued by the White House on 15th July 1980 together with the exchange of letters between President Carter and Mrs. Thatcher confirming the sale of Trident missiles to the United Kingdom. The accompanying statement reads in part:

“The administration believes the independent British strategic nuclear force which is assigned to NATO makes an important contribution to the ability of the North Atlantic Alliance to deter Soviet aggression. For this reason the President decided to assist the United Kingdom in the maintenance of a modernised independent British deterrent force into the twenty-first century...”

5.5. In political circles, among the non-nuclear European members of NATO, the view has been expressed that the smaller nuclear forces represent a wasteful diversion of limited resources away from conventional forces necessary to maintain the military balance in Europe, or that the existence of these smaller national forces might reduce the credibility of United States nuclear forces being used in the defence of Europe. An illustration of this view is the memorandum submitted (as personal views) by two Labour members of the Netherlands Parliament, Mr. Klaas de Vries and Mr. Harry van den Bergh (Vice-Chairman of the Committee), to the United Kingdom Defence and External Affairs Sub-Committee of the House of Commons Expenditure Committee in March 1979. The sub-committee had been enquiring into the future of the United Kingdom's nuclear weapons policy, and had circulated a list of questions including:

“3. In what way does the United Kingdom Polaris force make a contribution to NATO's strategic deterrent?”

and

“4. Does the existence of a United Kingdom strategic nuclear deterrent decrease the probability, however small, that the United States could dissociate itself from a war between East and West in Europe?”

The de Vries-van den Bergh memorandum in its general remarks stated in part:

“The same factors of uncertainty concerning the United States guarantee which requires the United Kingdom to retain a degree of independent decision over its nuclear forces, would also operate for European countries vis-à-vis the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent. In other words, the United Kingdom's nuclear forces as currently structured would contribute little to the credibility of a European defence... From the Alliance perspective, the United Kingdom's nuclear force cannot be said to be the most rational way for the United Kingdom to spend its defence resources. In an era where the term rationalisation represents a concerted effort to avoid unnecessary duplication of military effort the force of the United Kingdom is a clear example of duplication.”

Specifically in reply to question 4, the memorandum states:

“If the United Kingdom were to substantially increase the potential of its strategic forces, the danger of ‘decoupling’ the United States from the events in Europe seems more likely¹.”

5.6. In his discussions with the various NATO civilian and military authorities, your Rapporteur put similar questions to those of the Defence and External Affairs Committee quoted above. Without exception, he has encountered the view that the factor of uncertainty facing Soviet military planners and political authorities, arising from the ability of Paris and London to decide quite independently on the use of their nuclear forces, adds to the deterrent effect of allied nuclear forces as a whole. Opinion is divided as to whether these forces deter attacks on British and French territory only, or whether they deter attacks on NATO as a whole. It is difficult to envisage a scenario in which Britain or France would alone initiate the use of its nuclear forces against the Soviet Union in circumstances in which no other nuclear forces would be

1. Sixth report from the Expenditure Committee, pages 264, 266, House of Commons, 3rd April 1979.

employed; it is even more difficult to envisage a situation in which the Soviet authorities would believe that they were faced with the nuclear forces of a single country and act accordingly in concentrating their own nuclear forces against it. It is indeed more likely that in the confusion of nuclear war it would never be possible to determine with sufficient certainty the source from which a particular nuclear strike had originated, and the devastation which even the small French and British nuclear forces can inflict is already several thousand times that of the first nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

5.7. The Committee will conclude that the French and British forces contribute to the effectiveness of the allied nuclear deterrent, but to an extent that cannot be defined. The effectiveness is enhanced when the forces are assigned to NATO, and especially when targeting is co-ordinated with those of all other allied nuclear forces.

5.8. French policy as is well known lays particular emphasis on the national control of French nuclear forces, but it has also been made clear that the vital interests which they would be used to defend are not limited to French soil. The Prime Minister, Mr. Barre, speaking at the *Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale* on 11th September 1980, said:

“The aim of this defence policy is to avoid war by stopping the process of violence at its origins. Our military structure... through the flexibility with which its resources can be employed should enable the head of state to influence the will of the leaders of the adversary throughout the development of a crisis, even if this at the beginning is in the nature of an armed confrontation which either concerns us directly from the outset, or were initially to affect only our neighbours and allies before reaching us...”

and further

“...I remind you that in Europe we are directly concerned by the security of our immediate neighbours; we could not therefore remain indifferent to any action that affected their freedom.”

VI. Allied co-operation on nuclear weapons

6.1. It has been noted in paragraph 3.2. above that since 1954 bilateral agreements have existed between the United States and nine NATO countries covering training in the use of nuclear weapons. These countries – Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Greece, Netherlands,

Turkey and the United Kingdom – have acquired battlefield delivery systems such as the Honest John or, now, the Lance missile system, or nuclear capable tactical aircraft, for which the United States provides nuclear warheads, retained under United States custody prior to nuclear release. The United States warheads for the French Honest John missiles ceased to be available when French forces were withdrawn from the integrated military structure of NATO in 1966. These arrangements all concern forces assigned to NATO.

6.2. This chapter of the report examines in particular arrangements or prospects for co-operation on the production of nuclear weapons systems and on the operation of strategic nuclear systems.

6.3. Co-operation on the production of nuclear weapons systems can be subdivided into co-operation on the production of nuclear warheads themselves – an area of co-operation which is subject to certain restrictions under the non-proliferation treaty – and co-operation in the production of delivery vehicles which, strictly, should be taken to include missiles, strategic submarines and aircraft. As, however, nuclear capable aircraft are all dual purpose, capable of delivering either conventional or nuclear bombs, joint production arrangements in this area are commonplace – they include the Anglo-French Jaguar; the F-104 aircraft produced under licence in several European countries; and the Tornado aircraft produced jointly by Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom – they are not further considered in this report.

(a) Co-operation on the production of nuclear warheads

6.4. As noted in paragraphs 3.2. and 3.3. above, United States legislation did not permit co-operation on the production of nuclear weapons until after the 1958 amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, and then restricted it to co-operation with countries that had made “substantial progress in the development of atomic weapons”. In practice, this appears to have been interpreted as meaning allied countries that have exploded a thermonuclear device. The time-scale of the national nuclear programmes meant that that option was available as far as the United Kingdom was concerned from May 1957, and as far as France was concerned only from August 1968. Since 1958, there has been a continuous exchange of information and of fissile material between Britain and the United States on warhead design, but Britain has still maintained an independent design and production capability at Aldermaston and produces its own nuclear warheads for the weapons systems described in the previous chapter.

6.5. While there is some co-operation between the United States and the United Kingdom in the design of nuclear propulsion reactors for submarines, it appears on the basis of published information that this co-operation and exchange of design information is less extensive, and dates essentially from the first transfer of the Skipjack design in 1958. The difference in the time-scale of the national nuclear weapons programmes of Britain and France, coupled with greater United States reticence concerning co-operation on nuclear propulsion reactors, goes some way to explain the decision of France, in early 1963, to reject President Kennedy's offer of the sale of Polaris missiles on the same terms as they had been offered to the United Kingdom under the Nassau agreement. In his press conference of 14th January 1963, President de Gaulle said in part:

"Then in the Bahamas America and Britain concluded an agreement to which we also were asked to adhere... The British have the benefit of American assistance for building these submarines and projectiles¹. I might add in this respect that such assistance has never been offered to us and in spite of what has been said, it must be stated that we have never requested it... It would really be no use for us to buy Polaris missiles when we have neither the submarines to launch them nor the thermonuclear warheads to arm them..."

6.6. It has not been French policy, at least under the Fifth Republic, actively to seek co-operation with the United States on the production of nuclear weapons although there were negotiations concerning nuclear propulsion reactors which as noted above led finally to the supply of enriched uranium fuel elements for the land prototype of the French propulsion reactor. The present status of the French nuclear programme would clearly entitle France to claim the same co-operation as had been offered to Britain. Britain certainly derives considerable financial advantage from nuclear co-operation with the United States, partly through avoiding duplication of research, and partly through the exchange of fissile material whereby Britain exchanges plutonium for uranium 235 for which production costs are higher in Britain. Thanks to this co-operation, the state of the art in Britain is ahead of that in France, perhaps most noticeably in the field of miniaturisation of thermonuclear warheads. Three separate (MRV but not MIRV) warheads have been in service with

the A-3 Polaris missile since 1967, whereas France is not expected to deploy similar technology until the future M-4 missile becomes operational in 1985. There is thus no military or financial incentive at the present time for Britain to seek co-operation with France in the field of the production of nuclear warheads. Because the exchange of information under the 1958 agreement has been mutual, Britain or the United States would have to seek permission of the other partner if they were to undertake co-operation with France in this field.

6.7. As far as France is concerned, there would be obvious technological advantages in an exchange of information and production assistance in the field particularly of the miniaturisation of thermonuclear warheads, but for political reasons, in the light of the frequently reiterated attitude of successive French governments, and indeed of most political parties in France today, there would appear to be no prospect of such co-operation being sought.

(b) Production of missiles

6.8. The British choice of the Trident C-4 SLBM for the 1990s rules out the option of co-operation with France on the French M-4 missile due to enter service in 1985. The Committee does not therefore pursue this hypothetical option, as the Trident is already operational in United States submarines and is judged in the United Kingdom to provide an independent force with better performance at lower cost:

"48. Another possibility, considered at an early stage, was a European solution. Collaboration in the European context could have been of considerable political significance. But it was soon apparent that this option had a number of disadvantages, in particular related to cost. There is no likelihood that the United Kingdom could have acquired by this route an effective deterrent force at a cost, either in initial investment or in subsequent support, which could compare with that for the proven Trident system, especially when account is taken of the economic advantages of our long-established arrangements for collaboration with the United States in nuclear forces. The government therefore sees no adequate basis on which such an option could now have been pursued."¹

1. In the context this reference to projectiles must have referred to thermonuclear warheads, not the Polaris missiles which Britain was purchasing from the United States and not receiving assistance to build.

1. The future United Kingdom strategic nuclear deterrent force, United Kingdom Defence Council paper, July 1980, communicated to the Committee by the Secretary of State for Defence.

This view is supported by Vice-Admiral Paul Delahousse, former French Defence Attaché in London¹:

"The assignment of this force to NATO – more precisely to SACEUR – should not conceal the reality... The Trident will be under British control as is the Polaris today... There were two choices for Britain in renewing its Polaris force... buy from the United States, or co-operate with France... In choosing American, is Britain turning its back on Europe? Whatever may be the contribution of insular calculations on the part of our cross-Channel neighbours, the determining factor lies elsewhere. The French choice was in any case difficult. Like it or not, we have to understand that a British admiral, professionally concerned with operational efficiency, is naturally in favour of the most powerful missile with the highest performance immediately available, and no doubt the least expensive."

(c) Construction of strategic submarines

6.9. As far as the next generation of strategic nuclear submarine is concerned, French and British requirements are more nearly in phase, both countries within the last few months having announced their decision to design and produce an entirely new generation of these boats – for the Trident missile system in the case of the United Kingdom, and the third generation of boats in the case of France – both to enter service in the 1990s. Because the nuclear propulsion reactor is virtually an integral part of these boats, no doubt permission of the United States would be required for such Franco-British co-operation, but there is no overriding reason to imagine that it would not be forthcoming. But expert opinion rules out this option partly because of British preference for its own design of nuclear-propelled hunter-killer submarines (SSN) now operational, on which the new boats will be based, partly because of the shortage of time (co-operation always imposes delay), and partly because in shipbuilding design costs (which alone might be reduced through co-operation) are a small proportion of construction costs.

(d) Operational co-operation

6.10. If the fundamental political and technological position of the French and British Governments with respect to their nuclear forces are accepted, there still remains the prospect of operational co-operation in areas which need

not affect either the issue of assignment or non-assignment to NATO; the independent control of nuclear forces; or classified technological information. The Committee has suggested on a number of occasions in the past that the patrol programme of French and British strategic submarines should be co-ordinated in such a way as to ensure that major refits of French and British submarines do not coincide. This co-operation would not even require agreement on the routes or areas in which the submarines patrol. At present, out of the force of five French submarines that country is able to maintain a maximum of two, or sometimes three, submarines on patrol simultaneously. The British force of four submarines permits one, or sometimes two, to be permanently on station. Co-ordinated refit programmes could ensure that out of the combined fleet of nine there would never be fewer than four vessels on station. At the moment if programmes are out of phase the number on station can fall to three.

6.11. The targeting of the present British submarine force is closely co-ordinated with other nuclear forces assigned to NATO in the JSTPS as described in paragraph 3.18. above. There presumably exists a separate programme of targets which the British force would engage if ever the supreme interest clause of the Nassau agreement were to be invoked by Britain; missiles can very readily be re-targeted while submarines are actually on patrol. There need be no interference with stated French defence policy if a separate co-ordinated set of targets for all French strategic forces were to be agreed through French liaison officers to be attached to the JSTPS, for use in situations in which the French force might be used in co-operation with that of its allies.

(e) Recent attitudes to co-operation

6.12. The prospects of Franco-British co-operation in the nuclear field are frequently discussed in political circles, but not often with reference to the hard facts of existing arrangements. On 27th January Mr. Poniowski, former French Minister of the Interior, and a close confidant of President Giscard d'Estaing, spoke in general terms of the creation of a European nuclear force:

"We should constitute a sufficient nuclear force, and we will have it within three or four years. All the French submarines, and the sixth as well, will be armed with multiple warheads, 500 altogether, and if we reach agreement with England there is a genuine deterrent force."¹

1. *Le Monde*, 14th October 1980.

1. *Le Monde*, 29th January 1980.

Mr. Poniatowski envisaged such a policy leading towards what he called "de-NATOisation" – a development which would not be welcomed by the United Kingdom or by other WEU countries. A spokesman for the British Ministry of Defence on 29th January confirmed:

"There can be no question of creating a Franco-British nuclear force outside NATO."

6.13. More recently, however, Mrs. Thatcher, addressing the Franco-British Council in Bordeaux on 19th September said:

"And for nearly eighty years, Britain has devoted all its efforts to joint action with France for the defence of our two countries and of Western Europe... These last few years, some aspects of our co-operation in the military field have marked time. But let me say clearly this evening that Britain is ready at any time to develop with France fuller and closer co-operation in defence. Meanwhile let us continue to build on the success of our joint production of military equipment. The cost of weapons systems will continue to increase and effective collaboration is a far from negligible means of reducing the cost. It is a field where Britain and France have led the way in Europe and they must continue to do so."

Sir Reginald Hibbert, the British Ambassador in France, speaking to the French Association for European Union on 29th September, is reported as saying in reply to a question that he hoped that co-operation would develop in the field of conventional defence, and possibly in the deployment (*mise en œuvre*) of nuclear defence, but excluded any co-operation in the production of nuclear weapons because the French and British systems were "based on secrets which cannot be shared".¹

6.14. The Committee draws particular attention to its proposals for operational co-operation outlined above, and to the scope for co-operation in the construction of the next generation of strategic nuclear submarines.

VII. Arms control

7.1. Two eminent allied defence experts have recently thrown doubt on the wisdom of allocating such large resources to strategic nuclear weapons as the West, the United States in particular, is currently doing. General Maxwell Taylor, now retired, Chairman of the

United States Joint Chiefs of Staff during the presidency of Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Johnson, has recently pointed out¹:

"For an administration seeking military funds from Congress, [weapons of strategic warfare] have the advantage of bearing familiar names like MX missile, the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine, the new cruise missiles and once abandoned anti-ballistic missile. Since their manpower needs are small, they have the further advantage of not raising the embarrassing manpower questions regarding the need to return to some form of conscription... This big weapon bias implicit in an arms race is ample ground for rejecting it as a substitute for a sound military policy. By giving top priority to strategic weapons and thereby to preparations to forestall the least probable of our major military threats, it will lead us to expend much of our resources on the wrong things or in wrong order of priority. It will confirm us in the neglect of our conventional forces... yet these are the forces needed right now to discourage any further Soviet advance toward Middle East oilfields..."

7.2. Lord Zuckerman, formerly chief scientific adviser to the British Ministry of Defence and successively chief scientific adviser to the government, has called for a drastic reduction in the levels of strategic nuclear weapons. In particular, he has drawn attention to the self-perpetuating mechanisms of the arms race:

"When we move into the nuclear world, I would go further and submit that military chiefs... merely serve as a channel through which the men in the laboratories transmit their views... It is he the technician, not the commander in the field, who starts the process of formulating the so-called military need. It is he who has succeeded over the years in equating, and so confusing, nuclear destructive power with military strength, as though the former were the single and a sufficient condition of military success. The men in the nuclear weapons laboratories of both sides have succeeded in creating a world with an irrational foundation on which a new set of political realities has in turn had to be built..."

Lord Zuckerman draws attention to the views of Dr. York, the designer of the first thermonuclear weapon, that "much more important than money as a motivating force are the individual's own psychic and spiritual needs; the majority of the key individual promoters of the

1. *Le Monde*, 1st October 1980.

1. *The Guardian*, 22nd September 1980.

arms race derive a very large part of their self-esteem from their participation in what they believe to be an essential – even a holy cause. They are inspired... to match or exceed technological progress by the other side or even by a rival military service here at home, and victimised by rumours and phoney intelligence... If one were to leave out the matter of financial gain, I imagine that the same words could equally be applied to the Russians.”¹

7.3. The Committee can agree with these sentiments as far as they go – but they completely ignore the existence of two mutually suspicious political systems which make any agreement difficult, and they ignore the important step taken by both sides in SALT I in 1972 in accepting the concept of nuclear parity, instead of a continuous drive for superiority. Arms control is the process of regulating forces and armaments by mutual agreement so as to enhance international stability, and make international relations more predictable – it is not the same as disarmament. The two terms have been defined by the German Government for example thus:

“Arms control is the totality of co-operative efforts designed, in an armed world and in spite of continuing conflicts, to limit the use of military power, promote stability and transparency in the military sphere and thus improve the prospects of crisis management and prevention of war.

Arms control means in particular arms limitation and arms reduction oriented to the goal of achieving a stable balance.

Disarmament is the long-term aspiration in the sense of complete and general disarmament under effective international control and a worldwide process aimed at the progressive elimination of armaments.”²

7.4. Negotiations to control strategic armaments – SALT and the earlier partial test-ban and non-proliferation treaty – have not (except for the ABM treaty in SALT I) succeeded in reducing levels of these armaments. They may have prevented even greater increases through codifying contemporary levels³; SALT II, if it enters force, will require a slight reduction in Soviet totals. Article 6 of the non-proliferation treaty provides that each signatory “undertakes

to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament...” Yet the levels of United States and Soviet warheads are now four times the levels at the time of signature in 1968. SALT I came too late to prevent the deployment of MIRVs. Partly in response to allied views the SALT process so far has deliberately excluded forward-based systems – which would have had to include the Soviet long-range theatre nuclear forces – and thus made no attempt to regulate them in SALT I and II. (The Soviet Union had sought to define strategic weapons as “weapons of one party so deployed as to reach the territory of the other”. This would have excluded Soviet but included United States FBS – hence the allied decision at that time to exclude all FBS.)

7.5. The future SALT III negotiations, the framework for which was laid down in the SALT II agreement, are intended both to seek lower levels of United States and Soviet central nuclear systems, and to include certain theatre systems, although the small British and French nuclear forces, as these countries have made clear, will be excluded from the talks. The decision on deployment of LRTNF taken at the special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers on 12th December 1979 specifically included an offer to negotiate limitations on LRTNF bilaterally in SALT III.

7.6. Events since the signature of SALT II in June 1979, and since the NATO decision of 12th December 1979, have delayed the programme – both the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the pressures of a presidential election year in the United States have imposed a postponement of SALT II ratification (although so far both the United States and the Soviet Union continue to respect the provisions of SALT II). The Soviet Union responded to the 12th December decision by withdrawing the Brezhnev offer of October 1979 (analysed in paragraphs 14 et seq. of Document 827) to reduce numbers of medium-range weapons deployed in the western parts of the Soviet Union if none were deployed in western Europe, and demanded cancellation of the NATO decision as a precondition of negotiations on LRTNF.

7.7. It took the meeting between Chancellor Schmidt and Mr. Brezhnev for the Soviet precondition to be withdrawn, and permit the bilateral preliminary talks between the Soviet Union and the United States in Geneva on 16th October. NATO insists that these talks are bilateral, and preliminary, and that LRTNF limitations will be negotiated in SALT III once SALT II has been ratified.

1. Science advisers, scientific advisers and nuclear weapons, Menard Press, October 1980.

2. *Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Grosse Anfrage der Fraktionen der SPD und FDP (8/2195); Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Grosse Anfrage der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU (8/2312)*, February 1979, paragraph 7.

3. The chronology of SALT agreements and the missile and warhead balance is at Appendix IV.

7.8. The Committee believes that the mutual fourfold increase in the number of United States and Soviet Union warheads that has occurred over the last ten years while maintaining parity, has not increased European security. It believes that every effort must be made in negotiations to provide for security at lower force levels, with a view to returning to stability with relatively few, but highly survivable weapons, sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on an adversary; it believes that theatre nuclear weapons must never be considered in isolation from the global nuclear balance. It recognises that until the global balance is based on lower numbers of Soviet and United States nuclear weapons, the numbers in the British and French nuclear forces cannot enter into account for arms control purposes, but that account will have to be taken of them in the longer term.

7.9. On a report from the Committee¹, the Assembly on 6th December 1979 adopted Resolution 64:

“Concluding therefore that the SALT II agreements should enhance the security of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance and will not in any way diminish the credibility of the United States strategic deterrent... Expresses the hope that the Senate of the United States will approve the ratification without amendment of the treaty on the limitation of strategic arms signed in Vienna on 18th June 1979.”

The Committee continues to believe SALT II to be in the mutual interest of the whole Western Alliance and of the Soviet Union, so that its entry into force should not be linked to other aspects of East-West relations. There is a network of East-West negotiations in many fora. Even if specific agreements are not formally linked to Soviet actions in other fields, there is an inevitable interaction between Soviet actions and the course of negotiations.

7.10. President elect Reagan, however, in the course of his election campaign, first opposed SALT II but later committed himself to the continuation of the SALT process. It is too early to know what the definitive attitude of the new United States administration to the present SALT II will be. In his first interview after the election, Mr. Reagan, asked how he would open the SALT dialogue, said:

“We could open it by telling them that we have to renegotiate SALT II. We could take what is usable out of SALT II and then tell them that we are not going to

ratify the treaty the way it is and then make it plain that we are ready to sit down to legitimate negotiations...”

Mr. Reagan agreed that the United States should seek an interim agreement while a longer-term SALT III was marked out, and that “there has to be linkage between arms control and other areas of difference...”, but declined to make specific commitments such as a pull-out from Afghanistan as a price of serious arms control negotiations¹. Should it prove impossible to secure the early ratification of SALT II in its present form by the new United States administration, the Committee would then call for the earliest possible resumption of SALT negotiations, which must incorporate the LRTNF talks referred to in paragraph 7.7., with a view to the rapid conclusion of an interim agreement pending later negotiations on SALT III. It calls for the provisions of SALT II to be continued to be respected by both sides, pending ratification or an alternative agreement, as they have been so far.

7.11. The Soviet leadership has been careful to hold open prospects of agreement on arms control. Commenting on the results of the United States election, Mr. Tikhonov, the new Soviet Prime Minister, said:

“The Soviet Union is prepared to reach an understanding on the reduction or ban of any weapon, above all nuclear, and the prevention of the manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction².”

But if certain clauses of SALT II are renegotiated, the Soviet Union can be expected to have its own demands as well.

7.12. The Committee finally stresses the need for the closest allied consultation in the arms control process, and notes with satisfaction that it has been effective in the case of the LRTNF decision and its arms control aspects.

VIII. Conclusions

8.1. The Committee's principal conclusions are set forth in the draft recommendation. The preamble first states in other terms the well-known position of NATO laid down thirteen years ago in the report on future tasks – that the Atlantic Alliance has two main functions; “military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary”. Paragraphs (iii) and (iv) concern the LRTNF decision described in paragraphs 2.19. et seq. of

1. SALT II and its implications for European security, Document 816 and Addendum, Rapporteur Mr. Cook.

1. Sunday Times, 9th November 1980.

2. International Herald Tribune, 7th November 1980.

this explanatory memorandum. The opening of the preliminary bilateral talks referred to in paragraph (v) is described in paragraph 7.7. above. Paragraph (vi) is necessary in a report devoted chiefly to nuclear weapons in order to recall that conventional forces are an essential part of a deterrent. Paragraph (vii) describes the contribution which British and French nuclear forces make to the overall defence of the Alliance – an issue discussed in Chapter V above. Paragraphs (viii) and (ix) stress the advantages of SALT II (an opinion already expressed by the Assembly) and refer to the problem of linkage – described in paragraph 7.9. above.

8.2. In the operative text, the Committee in paragraph 1 first calls for the SALT II limits to be respected and for the earliest resumption of the SALT process. This position is elaborated in paragraphs 7.8. to 7.10.

8.3. In operative paragraph 2, following the emphasis placed on conventional forces in paragraph (v) of the preamble, it is stressed that modernisation plans for British and French nuclear forces should not lead to the diversion of resources from conventional defence – these

modernisation plans are described in paragraphs 3.12. et seq. and 4.8. et seq. respectively.

8.4. Operative paragraph 3 of the recommendation stresses the need for the requirements of arms control to be taken into account in all aspects of defence planning and for parliament to be fully consulted. These are matters which the Committee has stressed in a previous report¹.

IX. *Opinion of the minority*

9.1. The report as a whole was adopted by 11 votes to 3 with 3 abstentions. In the draft recommendation, some members of the minority would have deleted paragraph (iii) of the preamble on the grounds that negotiations should have preceded the decision of 12th December 1979. Others would have deleted paragraph (vii), claiming that the British and French nuclear forces did not contribute to overall deterrence in the Alliance. Yet others would have referred in paragraph (viii) to “a renegotiated” SALT II, on the grounds that the present SALT II was not to the advantage of NATO.

1. New weapons and defence strategy, Document 827.

APPENDIX I

Strategic nuclear balance at mid-1980
(estimated force loadings)

1. Systems covered by *SALT* (i.e. systems based on the territory of one superpower, or in submarines, capable of reaching the territory of the other superpower):

(a) *Soviet Union*

Type	Maximum range km	No.	No. of independent warheads each	Assumed total No. of warheads	Notes
ICBMs					
SS-9	12,000	(believed withdrawn)			
SS-11	10,500	520	1 or 3	1,150	assumed 2/3 MIRVed
SS-13	10,000	60	1	60	
SS-17	10,000	150	1 or 4	1,100	assumed 2/3 MIRVed
SS-18	9-10,500	248	1 or 8-10	1,390	assumed 2/3 MIRVed
SS-19	11,000	300	6 or 1	1,300	assumed 2/3 MIRVED
Sub-total		1,278		5,000	
SLBMs					
SSN-5	1,120	21	1	21	
SSN-6	2,400-3,000	469	1	479	
SSN-8	8,000	302	1	300	
SSN-17	5,000	12	1	12	
SSN-18	8,000	160	3	400	
Sub-total		1,003		1,200	
AIRCRAFT	Combat radius km				
Bear					
Tu-95	5-6,000	113	2-4	250	
Bison					
Mya-4	4-6,000	43 ¹	1-2	50	
Sub-total		156		300	
TOTAL				6,500	

(Assumptions on numbers of bombs and MIRVs adjusted to produce total of 6,500 warheads quoted by Aviation Week and Space Technology, 16th June 1980.)

Other so *Other sources:* United States Department of Defence Annual Report FY 1981 ; IISS Military Balance 1980-81.

1. Assuming half the Bison fleet to be converted to tankers.

(b) United States

Type	Maximum range km	No.	No. of independent warheads each	Assumed total No. of warheads	Notes
ICBMs Titan II	15,000	53	1	53	One destroyed in accident September 1980
Minuteman II	11,300	450	1	450	
Minuteman III	13,000	550	3	1,650	
Sub-total		1,053		2,153	
SLBMs					
Polaris	4,600	160	1	160	
Poseidon					
C-3	4,600	448	10-14	4,200	
Trident					
C-4	7,400	48	8	384	
Sub-total		656		4,744	
AIRCRAFT					
B-52		570 ¹	4	2,280	
TOTAL				9,177	

1. 570 reported in SALT II data base includes 220 in “deep storage”.

2. *Other strategic systems* (i.e. all other allied systems capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union, and comparable Soviet systems – range > 1,000 km):

(a) *Soviet Union*

Type	Maximum range (combat radius for aircraft) km	No.	Assumed No. of independent warheads each	Assumed total No. of warheads
ICBM, MRBM and SLBM				
SS-4	1,900	380	1	380
SS-5	4,100	60	1	60
SS-20	5,000	160	3	480
SSN-5	1,100	39	1	39
Sub-total		660		960
AIRCRAFT				
Backfire				
Tu 22M/26	4,000	75	3	225
Tu 16 Badger	2,800	465	2	636
Tu 26 Blinder	3,100	155	2	250
Su-24 Fencer	1,600	370	2	740
Sub-total		1,065		1,850
TOTAL				2,810

(b) *Allied countries*

Type	Maximum range (combat radius for aircraft) km	No.	Assumed No. of independent warheads each	Assumed total No. of warheads
<i>(i) France (missiles and aircraft)</i>				
IRBM S-2/S-3	3,000	18	1	18
SLBM M-20	3,000	80	1	80
Aircraft				
Mirage IV	1,600	33	1	83
Sub-total		98 (missiles) 33 (aircraft)		131
<i>(ii) United Kingdom</i>				
SLBM Polaris A3	4,600	64	1	64
Aircraft				
Vulcan	2,800	57	2	114
Sub-total		64 (missiles) 57 (aircraft)		178
<i>(iii) United States (aircraft with combat radius > 1,000 km, not covered by SALT II)</i>				
FB-111A	4,000	65	4 or 6	260
F-111	1,900	282	2	564
A-6	1,000	50 ¹	2	100
Sub-total		397		924
TOTAL				1,233

1. Assuming five aircraft-carriers out of seven in the United States Second and Sixth Fleets within range.

(c) *China*

Type	Maximum range (combat radius for aircraft) km	No.	Assumed No. of independent warheads each	Assumed total No. of warheads
ICBM CSS-3	6-7,000	4	1	4
IRBM CSS-2	2,500	65-85	1	75
MRBM CSS-1	1,800	50	1	50
Avions				
Tu-16	2,800	90	2	180
TOTAL				309

APPENDIX II

RECOMMENDATION 345 ¹*on new weapons and defence strategy – modernisation of theatre nuclear forces* ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Regretting the deterioration in the military balance resulting from the steady increase in levels of many Soviet weapons systems, and deploring in particular the increased nuclear threat posed by the deployment by the Soviet Union of new medium-range nuclear weapons – the SS-20 missile and Backfire bomber – and large numbers of battlefield nuclear weapons;
- (ii) Believing it essential for the Alliance to maintain and update whenever necessary a complete range of weapons systems to ensure a credible military capability in all parts of the triad of conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons on which the strategy of deterrence through a capacity for flexible response is based;
- (iii) Believing further that political responsibility for and the risks of this policy must be shared by all countries of the Alliance, in particular, while recognising various national conditions, through readiness to accept the stationing on their territory of such weapons as may be necessary for its implementation;
- (iv) Believing the essential continuity between the three parts of the triad would be dangerously weakened if the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20 missiles and Backfire bomber were not to be countered by the Alliance's overall strategic capabilities;
- (v) Recalling moreover that the policy of the Alliance is to seek security through détente as well as deterrence, and that reliable arms control agreements and confidence-building measures can contribute as much to the establishment of military balance as the provision of adequate weapons systems;
- (vi) Noting therefore that Mr. Brezhnev's speech in East Berlin on 6th October 1979 may be a sign that the Soviet Union now understands that the NATO countries consider the deployment of the SS-20 a serious threat, and is prepared for negotiations on the whole question of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, although many points still have to be clarified,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call on the North Atlantic Council :

To seek to redress the military balance, now threatened in particular by the deployment of new Soviet nuclear weapons systems:

- (a) by taking the decisions necessary to ensure that the growing imbalance between Warsaw Pact and NATO long-range theatre nuclear forces is corrected in due course;
- (b) by accompanying these decisions by a firm offer to enter into arms control negotiations with a view to limiting long-range theatre nuclear force deployments on both sides;
- (c) by continuing to seek agreement on significant reductions in present numbers of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons;
- (d) by relying meanwhile on the whole range of existing weapons systems based in Europe, at sea, and in the United States to counter the threat posed by present levels of Soviet weapons;
- (e) by seeking any opportunity for agreement on mutual and balanced reductions of central and theatre nuclear weapons and of conventional forces and weapons.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd June 1980 during the First Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (1st Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 827, Part I).

APPENDIX III

*Communiqué issued after the special meeting of NATO
Foreign and Defence Ministers**12th December 1979*

1. At a special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels on 12th December 1979:

2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 summit where governments expressed the political resolve to meet the challenges to their security posed by the continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up.

3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been especially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet decisions to implement programmes modernising and expanding their long-range nuclear capability substantially. In particular, they have deployed the SS-20 missile, which offers significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theatre rôle. During this period, while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) both quantitatively and qualitatively, western LRTNF capabilities have remained static. Indeed these forces are increasing in age and vulnerability and do not include land-based, long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

4. At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a modernisation and expansion of their shorter-range TNF and greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the background of increasing Soviet intercontinental capabilities and achievement of parity in intercontinental capability with the United States.

5. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance, because, if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theatre nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in intercontinental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the

spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression.

6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain credible. After intensive consideration, including the merits of alternative approaches, and after taking note of the positions of certain members, Ministers concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance would best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernisation and arms control.

7. Accordingly Ministers have decided to modernise NATO's LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of United States ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing United States Pershing I-A, and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads. All the nations currently participating in the integrated defence structure will participate in the programme: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries and certain support costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. The programme will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this connection, Ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernisation, 1,000 United States nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, Ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group is undertaking an examination of the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of rôles and systems in NATO's nuclear armoury as a whole. This examination will form the basis of a substantive report to NPG Ministers in the autumn of 1980.

8. Ministers attach great importance to the rôle of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of détente

This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and détente in the 1980s. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member states and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcome the contribution which the SALT II treaty makes towards achieving these objectives.

9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NATO, arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain United States and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems. This would reflect previous western suggestions to include such Soviet and United States systems in arms control negotiations and more recent expressions by Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

A. Any future limitations on United States systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems.

B. Limitations on United States and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on United States and Soviet land-

based long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.

10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the United States' negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defence Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations as well as in other arms control negotiations at their semi-annual meetings.

11. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defence and thus maintain the security of its member states.

A. A modernisation decision, including a commitment to deployments, is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defence needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.

B. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements, and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence and détente as enunciated in the Harmel report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.

APPENDIX IV
SALT and MIRVs chronology

IC and SL ballistic missile balance

	Total missiles		Total missile warheads	
	United States	Soviet Union	United States	Soviet Union
1960 (probable date) United States MIRV development programme initiated				
1967 (probable date) Soviet Union MIRV development programme initiated	1,710	590	1,710	590
1970 First United States ICBM MIRV operational	1,710	1,604	1,730	1,604
1971 First United States SLBM MIRV operational	1,710	1,975	2,486	1,975
1972 SALT I signed	1,710	2,027	3,550	2,027
1975 United States ICBM MIRV programme complete; first Soviet Union SS-18 operational	1,710	2,311	6,410	2,311
1976 United States MIRV programme complete	1,710	2,322	7,274	2,322
1977 First Soviet Union ICBM MIRV operational	1,710	2,259	7,274	3,079
1978 First Soviet Union SLBM MIRV operational	1,710	2,428	7,274	4,000 ^e
1979 SALT II signed	1,710	2,426	7,274	5,000 ^e
1980	1,709	2,426	7,273	6,200

^e = interpolated estimate.
SALT I was signed in 1972 when the balance in IC and SL ballistic missiles was 1,710 to 2,027 in favour of the Soviet Union, and in warheads 3,550 to 2,027 in favour of the United States. The foregoing tables place this event in chronological perspective.

SALT and the British and French nuclear forces

AMENDMENTS 1 and 2¹
tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett

1. In paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “Believing” insert “a revised”.
2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “process” to the end of the paragraph.

Signed: Bennett

1. See 13th Sitting, 3rd December 1980 (Amendment 1 negatived; Amendment 2 agreed to).

SALT and the British and French nuclear forces

AMENDMENT 3¹
tabled by Mr. Wilkinson

3. Leave out paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Signed: Wilkinson

1. See 13th Sitting, 3rd December 1980 (Amendment negatived).

*Replies of the Council to Recommendations 345 to 354***RECOMMENDATION 345¹***on new weapons and defence strategy – modernisation of theatre nuclear forces²*

The Assembly,

- (i) Regretting the deterioration in the military balance resulting from the steady increase in levels of many Soviet weapons systems, and deploring in particular the increased nuclear threat posed by the deployment by the Soviet Union of new medium-range nuclear weapons – the SS-20 missile and Backfire bomber – and large numbers of battlefield nuclear weapons;
- (ii) Believing it essential for the Alliance to maintain and update whenever necessary a complete range of weapons systems to ensure a credible military capability in all parts of the triad of conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons on which the strategy of deterrence through a capacity for flexible response is based;
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- (vi) Noting therefore that Mr. Brezhnev's speech in East Berlin on 6th October 1979 may be a sign that the Soviet Union now understands that the NATO countries consider the deployment of the SS-20 a serious threat, and is prepared for negotiations on the whole question of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, although many points still have to be clarified,

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- (b) by accompanying these decisions by a firm offer to enter into arms control negotiations with a view to limiting long-range theatre nuclear force deployments on both sides;
- (c) by continuing to seek agreement on significant reductions in present numbers of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons;
- (d) by relying meanwhile on the whole range of existing weapons systems based in Europe, at sea, and in the United States to counter the threat posed by present levels of Soviet weapons;
- (e) by seeking any opportunity for agreement on mutual and balanced reductions of central and theatre nuclear weapons and of conventional forces and weapons.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd June 1980 during the First Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (1st Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum see the Report tabled by Mr. Roper on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 827, Part I)

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 345

The Council agree that it is essential for the Alliance to maintain sufficient forces to ensure adequate deterrence in the face of the steady build-up of Soviet military forces across the board. In particular in the age of strategic parity the need is felt for a capability to deter the Russians from calculating – however incorrectly – that they could use or threaten to use their nuclear forces against Europe without putting Soviet territory at risk because the Americans would be deterred from responding with their central systems. The present systems of the Alliance capable of providing this long-range capability are aging, increasingly vulnerable to the new and highly accurate Soviet weapons, particularly the Backfire and the SS-20, and do not include land-based long-range theatre nuclear systems.

It was against this background that ministers participating in the special meeting of foreign and defence ministers on 12th December 1979 agreed to modernise the long-range theatre nuclear forces stationed in Europe by the deployment of United States ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles from the end of 1983. Those members of the Council whose governments were parties to the decisions of 12th December 1979 believe that this step taken along with other measures in the defence field represents a measured and realistic response to the Soviet military programmes.

In parallel, the ministers of the governments concerned also agreed to support an American offer to the Russians to negotiate limitations on United States and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear forces in the context of SALT. After initially rejecting this offer on the grounds that they were not prepared to negotiate until NATO's TNF modernisation decision had been revoked or suspended, the Russians have indicated a certain willingness to negotiate. The Council note with interest that in accordance with a previously reached understanding the heads of the United States and the USSR Delegations met on 17th October 1980 to begin discussions of questions related to the limitation of certain United States and Soviet nuclear forces.

The TNF arms control offer was part of a wider package of arms control measures put forward last December including:

- the unilateral withdrawal of 1,000 United States nuclear warheads from Europe as part of the decision on TNF modernisation, and the decision to withdraw other warheads on a one-for-one basis as new systems are introduced;
- a proposal for an interim Phase I agreement designed to facilitate progress in the MBFR negotiations;
- a package of associated measures in MBFR designed to ensure compliance with an agreement and to make military activities more transparent, thereby improving mutual confidence;
- in furtherance of the CSCE process, readiness to examine proposals concerning confidence-building measures and a conference on disarmament in Europe.

These proposals represent a serious effort to stimulate the arms control process in Europe. The programme of action which they envisage offers a major new opportunity for creating more constructive relations between East and West.

¹ Communicated to the Assembly on 17th November 1980.

RECOMMENDATION 346 ¹

on new weapons and defence strategy – the impact of technology ²

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting with approval that NATO strategy has placed progressively greater emphasis on the rôle of conventional weapons in recent years and that new precision-guided conventional weapons have replaced nuclear weapons in certain specific military applications;
- (ii) Recognising that the application of new technologies to defence purposes may have unexpected repercussions on the military balance and on arms control arrangements, and calling therefore for continued proper political control to be exercised over such application,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

A. Call on the North Atlantic Council:

- 1. To take into account the implications of the application of new defence technologies on arms control negotiations such as SALT III and MBFR;
- 2. To continue actively the present policy of replacing nuclear weapons systems by conventional systems where militarily feasible and of equal deterrent value;

B. Urge member governments:

- 1. To establish machinery to ensure that the application of new technologies to defence purposes continues to be subject to deliberate and properly informed governmental decision;
- 2. To submit annually to their parliaments reports on the arms control implications of all new defence equipment programmes.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd June 1980 during the First Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (1st Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum, see the Report tabled by Mr. van den Bergh on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 827, Part II).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 346

A.1. Allies involved in arms control negotiations have always taken into account new developments in defence technologies when defining their negotiating aims and negotiating strategy, and surely continue to do so in the context of current arms control negotiations.

A.2. In May 1978, heads of state and governments of the member countries of the integrated military structure agreed to improve the Alliance's defence capability by modernising and strengthening its conventional weapons component. They have, thereby, reacted adequately to changes in the strategic situation and have contributed to the maintenance of a credible deterrence capability.

In addition to that commitment to strengthen conventional systems, it continues to be of crucial importance to maintain the coupling of the three elements of the triad, i.e. conventional forces, theatre nuclear forces and strategic nuclear forces. The evolutionary adjustment of the nuclear capability as concluded in the twofold decision of 12th December 1979 constitutes one of the consequences of this philosophy.

NATO will continue to explore the capabilities of modern conventional technology and its possible use – in line with the demands of the strategy of “flexibility in response” – for improving its capacity for collective defence.

B.1. The Council wish to confirm that appropriate and efficient machinery already exists within CNAD, Eurogroup and IEPG and that member governments have undertaken to ensure through CNAD and its defence research group in particular that the application of new technologies to defence purposes continues to be subject to deliberate and properly informed governmental decision.

For more than one year CNAD has been engaged in drawing up guidelines adopted by national armament directors at their autumn 1980 meeting in Brussels. These guidelines provide for the screening of existing armament technologies for any specific inherent capabilities to improve defence-effective weapons systems. The North Atlantic Council welcomed this initiative and endorsed the CNAD activities.

Thus the Council are of the opinion that at present there is no need to modify or expand the existing machinery.

B.2. The decision whether to submit annually to their respective parliaments reports on the arms control implications of new defence programmes is a matter to be discussed and decided by individual governments of the member states concerned.

In each of the member states, the adoption of defence programmes has been subject not only to military but also to arms control considerations, both aspects being extensively discussed in parliament as well as in public.

It will suffice to cite, as a recent example, the parliamentary and public debates in various member states on the subject of NATO's LRTNF modernisation programme adopted, together with an arms control negotiating offer, on 12th December 1979.

¹ Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1980.

RECOMMENDATION 347 ¹*on political developments in Europe –
reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council* ²

The Assembly,

Remembering that the year 1980 marks the beginning of the second half of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and welcoming the fact that the relationship between the WEU Council and the Assembly rests on a sound basis;

Noting with appreciation that the Council has again shown its intention to continue the dialogue with the Assembly on the various questions relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty and also the flexible and effective manner in which it has generally provided information, particularly concerning the results of the study being carried out by the Standing Armaments Committee;

Considering that while Article I of the modified Brussels Treaty is opposed to duplication of work, it also advocates affording the most effective assistance to "the work of other economic organisations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented";

Welcoming the fact that at its joint meetings with Assembly Committees the Council proposes to incorporate an informal procedure "so that each member of the Council can give his government's views" along with the expression of its collective views;

Anticipating that, in due course, WEU may be expected to participate in a wider framework of European co-operation and that the General Affairs Committee should examine any consequential changes in the organisation of WEU;

Aware that Europe, in order to be master of its destiny, would have to be politically organised, based on genuinely integrated and co-ordinated foreign and defence policies,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue its effort to keep the Assembly regularly informed, by all appropriate means, about:
 - (a) the progress of work in the Independent European Programme Group, particularly in the Assembly's specific fields of interest;
 - (b) those parts of the study undertaken by the Standing Armaments Committee which have been completed and which are not covered by military secrecy;
 - (c) matters important to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when they are dealt with by the member governments within other organisations;
2. Should not omit, in informing the Assembly of the results of political co-operation between member states, to report also on subjects on which satisfactory results have not been obtained or even sought;
3. To this end, seek better liaison both between governments and between NATO and other relevant organisations, so that questions not dealt with in these organisations may be the subject of exchanges of views within the framework of the WEU Council;
4. Examine, with the President of the Assembly, the ways in which questions to be raised in joint meetings by members of relevant Committees may receive "collective" answers;
5. Examine the organisational measures to be taken now so that, when the time is ripe, WEU may be prepared to take its place in a wider framework of European co-operation.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd June 1980 during the First Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (2nd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Page on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 834).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 347***

1. As in the past, the Council endeavour to maintain with the parliamentary Assembly of WEU good relations which will enable the parliamentarians of the member countries to be informed of their government's activities in the fields of security and defence.
2. The Council recall that the WEU Assembly, with the responsibility vested in it by the modified Brussels Treaty, constitutes the only European parliamentary institution empowered to deal with defence questions. In this capacity, it provides the forum where parliamentarians and ministers from Western European countries discuss politico-military questions. In this respect, in the place which it occupies beside the various European institutions, the WEU Assembly retains an importance which was reaffirmed during the recent commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the signature of the Protocols modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty.
3. Each of the governments represented in the Independent European Programme Group remains responsible for informing the parliamentarians who are members of the WEU Assembly, on a national basis.
4. The Standing Armaments Committee, in accordance with the mandate which it received in 1977, has completed the second, economic, part of its work which was submitted to the Council during the spring. A document to be sent to the Assembly is at present being prepared.
5. The Council regularly employ the procedures laid down for informing the Assembly on those questions which are within its competence. Replies to Assembly recommendations and questions, the Council's annual report and statements by government spokesmen from member states at plenary sessions of the Assembly and at informal joint meetings, are all used to reply to the questions of the Assembly, some of which may concern the results of consultations in other fora where political co-operation takes place on matters relating to the application of the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty.
6. In accordance with Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, member states ensure that the WEU bodies co-operate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. They are keeping in mind the possibility of using WEU as a forum for exchanging views on defence problems not dealt with elsewhere.
7. Regarding the Assembly's wish for "collective" replies to questions put by members of the Assembly, it is customary for the Chairman-in-Office to inform the parliamentarians of the result of discussions at meetings of the Council at ministerial level.
8. Finally, the Council note the Assembly's wish that organisational measures be considered for possible future tasks of the organisation.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1980

RECOMMENDATION 348 ¹

***on the application of the Brussels Treaty
following the invasion of Afghanistan
by the Soviet Union ²***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that at a time when the forces of the Soviet Union have just invaded a non-member country of the Warsaw Pact it is essential to reaffirm the mutual defence obligations of Articles IV, V and VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (ii) Recalling the recommendations in the report on strategic mobility prepared by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments *;
- (iii) Considering that no provision of the modified Brussels Treaty should jeopardise the security of the Alliance and noting that the Council applies only partially the controls provided for in Protocol No. III;
- (iv) Anxious to clarify the state of commitments entered into in the framework of the treaty,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Consider that consultations in the North Atlantic Council may supplement, where appropriate, those provided for in Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty, thus reaffirming the proper responsibilities of each of the seven member countries and the respective provisions of the Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties;
2. Call for the strengthening of the defence of all member states through the urgent implementation by the states concerned of measures of the long-term defence programme to take account in particular of the situation in the Middle East;
3. Approve, in the appropriate NATO bodies, the assignment of German naval forces to SACLANT and to SACEUR with the sole aim of making the best use of all available allied forces for the common defence;
4. Delete paragraph V of Annex III to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty;
5. Make use of the procedure whereby NATO may provide material for replies to appropriate Assembly recommendations;
6. Amplify, in future annual reports, the present reference to United Kingdom land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe by a corresponding reference to the United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force and any redeployment of such forces liable to affect the accuracy of the figures given;
7. Clarify, in its twenty-sixth annual report, the present situation as regards stocks of chemical weapons held by member countries and publish in it the list approved by the Council, currently in force, of chemical products to be controlled by the Agency.

* Document 758.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1980 during the First Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (3rd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 836).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 348

1. The Council note with interest the view of the Assembly as stated in their Recommendation 348, Article 1, that consultations in the North Atlantic Council may supplement, where appropriate, those provided for in Article VIII, 3 of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Furthermore, the Council wish to emphasise that member states at all times have been aware of their obligations as set out in the modified Brussels Treaty and, acting accordingly, have discharged themselves of the full range of their responsibilities both as member states of Western European Union and as partner within the Atlantic Alliance.

2. At their joint meeting on 14th May 1980, the Defence and Foreign Ministers of the countries participating in the integrated military structure approved two programmes designed, in view of the changed international situation,

- to strengthen the Alliance's defence capability in Europe through short- and medium-term measures and thus to safeguard the policy of détente;
- to mitigate, through division of labour and increased efforts on the part of the countries concerned, any military weaknesses arising from the possible deployment in South-West Asia of United States reinforcement forces originally intended for Europe.

At the DPC meeting due in December 1980, the Ministers intend to decide on individual measures in certain sectors such as mobilisation of reserves; build-up of war reserves; improvement of air transport capacity; maritime defence planning; host nation support; defence aid for Portugal and Turkey; infrastructure.

3. The German Federal Security Council decided on 19th June 1980 that

- the Federal Republic of Germany will declare to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation its willingness to let German naval and naval air forces henceforth be deployed also outside the area limits at present existing for the German navy in the northern flank command;
- this measure does not imply the intention to reinforce the German naval and naval air forces beyond the present level or beyond the level at present projected;
- this offer shall affect neither the German navy's present chain of command nor the limits of the NATO command area as applying at present;
- the German Government will make this offer to the competent NATO bodies.

4. In response to Recommendation 348, Article 4, of the Assembly the Council should like to communicate that the Federal Republic of Germany, in accordance with the procedure foreseen in Article II, Part I, Protocol No. III, of the revised Brussels Treaty, on 18th June 1980, introduced into the WEU Council a formal request for the cancellation of the provisions concerning limitations on the construction of naval ships as contained in Article V, Annex III, Protocol No. III, of the said treaty. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe fully supported this request and recommended that it be approved by the Council, thus enabling the Council on 21st July 1980 to take their unanimous decision to cancel the provisions mentioned above.

5. As to NATO material and background information the Council have always made use of such information in their replies to appropriate Assembly recommendations where necessary and in conformity with the respective regulations, and will continue to do so.

6. The Council have been informed by the Government of the United Kingdom that they will in future provide an annual statement of the strength of the United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force and a reference to any redeployment affecting this strength. This information will be published in future annual reports.

7. The Council recall that in their last report to the Assembly they specified that the Agency for the Control of Armaments had asked all member States, as it did every year, to indicate whether they held stocks of chemical weapons and they all replied in the negative.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th October 1980.

RECOMMENDATION 349 ¹*on the impact of the evolving situation
in the Near and Middle East on Western European security* ²

The Assembly,

Considering that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is a threat to the fundamental principles of international law and is a serious threat to the balance and peace in an area which is vital for the security of the western world;

Believing that this intervention makes it essential to take urgent measures to guarantee the maintenance of peace in the Middle East;

Considering furthermore that democratic countries must make use of all the peaceful means at their disposal to demonstrate their non-acceptance of the fait accompli;

Considering also that the holding of United States diplomats as hostages in Tehran is an intolerable violation of international law and a threat to peace in Asia and prevents the improvement of relations with Iran;

Believing that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan makes it essential to strengthen without delay the defence means of the members of the Atlantic Alliance and considering that in this context the establishment of just and lasting peace in Palestine is essential for stability in the area;

Recalling that in their declaration of 29th June 1977 the Nine said that fair and lasting peace could only be established in the Middle East in an overall context. Such a settlement must be based on relevant resolutions of the Security Council and establish the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland, through self-determination, without prejudicing the existence of Israel as an independent state within internationally secure and recognised boundaries;

Recalling that the Nine deplored the policy of settlements pursued by the Israeli Government in the occupied territories, which is illegal from the point of view of international law and contrary to decisions of the Security Council in its most recent resolution;

Noting that the Palestine Liberation Organisation is the only body recognised as representing the Palestinian people by the Arab states as early as in 1974;

Noting that an increasing number of western countries, including several WEU member states, have acknowledged that a solution of the Palestine problem is difficult, if not impossible, to attain without the participation of the PLO;

Considering that Europe, when it manages to speak with a single voice, could be in a position to make an effective contribution to the maintenance of peace with justice in the Near and Middle East;

Recalling and reiterating all the as yet unfulfilled and still relevant recommendations in Recommendation 341, approved by the Assembly of WEU in December 1979 ;

Noting with approval the declaration on the international situation adopted by the Nine on 28th April 1980 affecting the matters raised in the present document,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Intensify consultations between its members on all questions concerning the balance and security in areas not covered by the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to agreeing on joint action whenever and wherever possible;
2. Develop forthwith the means of defence at Europe's disposal and reinforce, on the most appropriate basis, the capacity of Pakistan and other threatened countries in the region to defend their territorial integrity;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1980 during the First Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (4th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 844).

3. Make use of all means at the disposal of member countries without resort to military measures to demonstrate collectively their non-acceptance of the fait accompli by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan;
4. Demonstrate their solidarity in requiring Iran to free the United States diplomats now being held hostage;
5. Supply Turkey with economic support to assist in overcoming the difficulties it is encountering and for associating that country as closely as possible with the economy of Western Europe;
6. Initiate, after 26th May 1980, new steps necessary to contribute to the establishment of a just and lasting peace in Palestine;
7. Urge the Security Council either to review and supplement Resolution 242 to express beyond argument the original fundamental purposes and scope of that resolution; or else to consider and declare a new composite resolution on the one hand designed to provide adequate security for the integrity of Israel within secure and internationally-recognised boundaries whilst on the other hand assuring Palestinians of an inherent right of self-determination on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip to establish their own homeland;
8. Propose, thereafter, the preparation of a conference between Israel, all adjacent Arab countries, a delegation truly representative of the Palestinian people, the United States and Western European countries in a position to contribute to its success;
9. To this end, endeavour to secure before that conference unequivocal declarations by the Arab participants in this settlement recognising Israel's right to exist and by Israel recognising the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 349

1. The Council recall that already in December 1967 NATO stated that it favoured consultation among its members when crises and conflicts arose outside the North Atlantic Treaty area which might affect the security of the Alliance, either directly or by altering world balance.

In the declaration approved by the North Atlantic Council at Ottawa on 19th June 1974, consultation between the member states of NATO is envisaged within the Atlantic Alliance for "matters relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind that these interests can be affected by events in other areas of the world".

The present situation, particularly in Afghanistan, underlines the importance of such consultation. In their communiqué of 26th June 1980, Alliance ministers "agreed that the international crisis caused by the Soviet intervention calls for a resolute, constant and concerted response on the part of the allies".

2. Confirming the position regarding Afghanistan which they had expressed on 19th February 1980 through the Presidency, the Nine, at the European Council of 27th and 28th April 1980, reaffirmed the need to find a solution through the formulation of the concept of a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan.

In its statement on Afghanistan, the European Council held in Venice on 12th and 13th June recalled the proposal it made in Luxembourg on 28th April that the great powers and neighbouring states should undertake the necessary commitments to allow Afghanistan to remain outside the competition among the powers and to return to its traditional position as a neutral and non-aligned state.

The Council also repeated its readiness to support any meaningful initiative designed to promote a solution of the Afghan crisis.

3. Expressing their solidarity in efforts to obtain from Iran the freeing of the American diplomats held hostage, the Nine, through their Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd April 1980, noted the results of the démarche of their Ambassadors to Tehran, decided upon by them at their previous meeting in Lisbon on 10th April, and decided:

- (1) to put into effect without delay measures relating to: reduction of the staffs of diplomatic missions exchanged between member countries and Iran; reintroduction of controls regarding the movements of Iranians travelling to the member states; and suspension of the supply of arms or defence-related equipment to Iran by the member countries;
- (2) to provide for the imposition of economic sanctions against Iran in accordance with the Security Council Resolution on Iran of 10th January 1980 which was vetoed, and in accordance with the rules of international law.

The European Council of 28th April 1980 in Luxembourg confirmed this decision and the Foreign Ministers of the Nine at their meeting in Naples on 17th and 18th May 1980, concluding that there had been no significant progress towards the release of the hostages since their declaration of 22nd April, decided to apply the sanctions provided for, with the sole object of hastening the release of the hostages.

The Ministers also confirmed their support of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and their intention to remain in constant contact with him so that the measures taken with regard to Iran could be suspended rapidly if the United Nations mission made satisfactory progress.

When they met in Ankara on 26th June, the Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries published a fresh appeal to the Iranian Government to release the American hostages, alive and well, immediately.

¹. Communicated to the Assembly on 6th November 1980.

4. In the OECD, member states gave broad support to the programme for Turkey adopted on 15th April 1980 and to the agreement of 23rd July 1980 on the consolidation of a substantial part of Turkey's debt. They also co-operated fully in working out the three-year standby agreement arrived at by the International Monetary Fund on 18th June 1980.

Finally, as regards the close association of Turkey with the economy of Western Europe, a major step was taken at the session of the EEC-Turkey Association Council of 30th June 1980.

However, at their meeting in Brussels on 15th September last, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Nine discussed the Turkish situation and took note with concern of political developments in Turkey. They noted the assurances given by the military authorities regarding the speedy re-establishment of democratic institutions, respect for human rights and guarantees concerning the treatment of persons in public life under house arrest. They entertain the firm hope that these declarations will soon be put into effect in full. It is in this spirit that the Community will continue its co-operation with Turkey.

5. In their declaration on the situation in the Middle East at the European Council held in Venice on 12th and 13th June 1980, the Nine agreed that growing tensions affecting this region rendered a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and more pressing than ever.

Considering that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to play a special rôle and now require them to work in a more concrete way towards peace, the Nine decided to make the necessary contacts with all the parties concerned.

The making of these contacts was entrusted to the Presidency of the Nine, with the objective of ascertaining the position of the various parties with respect to the principles set out in the Venice declaration and in the light of the results of this consultation process, to enable the Nine to determine the form which such an initiative on their part could take.

The Venice declaration also provided the Nine with the opportunity to set out the basic principles governing the search for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, with special emphasis on:

- the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel;
- justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, who must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully their right to self-determination.

In his speech on 24th July 1980 to the Special General Assembly of the United Nations on Palestine, the Foreign Minister holding the Presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Community recalled these principles and confirmed the will of the Nine to promote a peace settlement.

RECOMMENDATION 350 ¹

***on co-operation between WEU member countries on
video communication systems ²***

The Assembly,

Having become acquainted with recent developments in the United Kingdom with the Prestel view-data system, in France with the Antiope videotex system and in other member countries in this field;

Aware that in the absence of appropriate American developments in this area the United States Federal Communications Committee is studying the abovementioned and similar systems and is considering their adaptability for the American market;

Recalling that current developments are sponsored jointly by government departments and private enterprises;

Convinced that these new communications systems will also have a significant impact on military communications systems;

Seeking to promote co-operation among European countries so as to foster the possibility of gaining access to American and world markets,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL INVITE GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES

1. To concert their efforts to establish European standards for video communication systems applicable to world markets through the CEPT and, to this end, to approach the bodies or firms concerned;
2. To urge all authorities and industries concerned to promote co-operation with each other in these matters.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1980 during the First Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (5th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr Vallex on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 839)

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 350***

1. On the basis of recent developments in the field of video communications systems in certain member countries, the Council will seek to promote, insofar as is compatible with the principles of fair and equitable competition, co-operation among European countries with a view to fostering access for their technologies to outside markets.

2. To this end, the Council will call on the governments of member countries to encourage consideration of a harmonisation of standards through existing standards bodies which could lead ultimately to co-operation in the matter of video communications.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st November 1980.

RECOMMENDATION 351¹

on the international situation and European security²

The Assembly,

Considering that the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan is a pure violation of the law of nations as defined *inter alia* in the Charter of the United Nations and the final act signed in Helsinki;

Considering that Soviet expansion in the Middle East is a threat to stability in that area which is of vital interest to the West;

Considering that the deployment of new weapons in Eastern Europe is also liable to upset the balance on which peace depends;

Considering that consultations between members of the Atlantic Alliance were not held quickly enough or in sufficient detail to allow a joint policy to be drawn up in face of these threats;

Deploing in particular that these countries were not in a position to define jointly the measures made necessary by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan;

Recognising nevertheless the need for the decision taken by the members of NATO to increase progressively the proportion of their expenditure allocated to joint defence;

Endorsing the proposal by the Nine to seek the departure of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, a status of neutrality and non-alignment being conferred on that country by agreement between the parties;

Considering that the search for a balance of forces and armaments in Europe at the lowest possible level, even if this cannot be achieved in the short term, is still in conformity with the interests of the West;

Considering that it is in the interest of all to develop contacts and exchanges of all kinds between Eastern and Western Europe;

Considering that the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all countries is still one of the West's major objectives,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Ensure that the European members of the Atlantic Alliance concert regularly and efficiently the policies they pursue outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty;
2. Ensure that the members of the Atlantic Alliance agree on effective measures to be taken to convince the Soviet Union of their unanimous condemnation of the invasion of Afghanistan;
3. Ensure that its members pursue their efforts to sustain the defensive capacity of the Atlantic Alliance in face of new Soviet weapons;
4. Ensure the pursuit of negotiations with the Soviet Union and its allies to achieve a limitation and reduction of forces and armaments to establish a true balance in forces and in conventional weapons and continental-range nuclear missiles at the lowest possible level;
5. Ensure that the application of the final act signed in Helsinki is the subject of strict and exhaustive scrutiny at the Madrid conference.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1980 during the First Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (5th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Vohrer on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 845).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 351

The Council share in general terms the concern expressed by the Assembly in its recommendation with regard to the international situation and security in Europe and wish to refer in this connection to the communiqué issued after the ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council on 25th and 26th June last.

The Council recall the grave concern that was expressed by the Ministers at the continued occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet armed forces. They agreed that the international crisis thus caused called for a resolute, constant and concerted response on the part of the allies.

In line with the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 14th January 1980, which appeals to all states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan and to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of that country, the Ministers at the Ankara meeting stressed the need for an immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. While recognising that the security of the region is primarily the concern of the countries there, Ministers welcomed the fact that members of the Alliance are by reason of their relations with those countries in a position to make a contribution to peace and stability in the region.

The Council recall equally the ministerial session of the Defence Planning Committee of NATO on 14th May 1980. Against the background of the Soviet military intervention in a non-aligned country, in a way which affects the overall strategic situation and which upsets stability in South-West Asia, the member countries of the Alliance, both individually and collectively, underlined at this meeting the need to maintain and strengthen the Alliance's defence posture in the interests of deterrence. At the same time they pledged to increase their efforts to improve the capability of the full spectrum of forces committed to the Alliance.

In the face of growing Soviet military strength, particularly in the field of theatre nuclear weapons, the Council recall the decision of the member countries of the integrated military structure to undertake a modernisation programme on long-range theatre nuclear forces, at the same time offering a wide range of arms control initiatives, including an offer to negotiate limitations on LRTNF in the SALT III framework, which ran parallel and was complementary to the modernisation decision. In this connection, the Council note with interest that exchanges on this subject between the United States of America and the Soviet Union are being held in Geneva.

The member states of Western European Union participating in the Vienna talks on mutual and balanced force reductions continue to attach great importance to these talks as a means of seeking a more stable force relationship in Central Europe. A first reaction, recently given by the East to the western proposal for an interim phase I agreement for MBFR of December 1979, is being carefully studied by the members of the Alliance concerned. The Council may finally reiterate the firm determination of the member states to enter at the forthcoming CSCE follow-up meeting at Madrid into a thorough and frank discussion on the implementation of the principles and provisions as laid down in the final act of Helsinki and to work towards the adoption, as part of a balanced outcome, of a mandate for further negotiations under the aegis of the CSCE on militarily significant and verifiable confidence-building measures, applicable to the entire continent of Europe.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 12th November 1980.

RECOMMENDATION 352 ¹

***on defence-related information technology* ²**

The Assembly,

Conscious that in the crucial sector of microelectronic components Europe imports more than 80 % of its requirements in integrated circuits;

Aware that European computer firms supply only 16 % of the world market and that Japan has made remarkable progress in this field;

Regretting that Europe has not so far exploited the fact that it itself constitutes a continental-size market and has not followed Japan in pursuing a coherent policy and commercial strategy to capture part of the world market;

Considering the link between telecommunications equipment for civil and military purposes,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To promote European collaboration at governmental level and between European industries concerned with microelectronics, communications and telematics, computers and software, and the production of interface equipment with users so as to ensure the establishment of a sound European industrial base in this field to counter American and Japanese activities in European and world markets;
2. To establish a truly homogenous European market for telematic equipment and services for both civil and military uses;
3. To make an effort to co-ordinate orders from both civil and military public authorities so as *inter alia* to allow interoperability of equipment when justified.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th June 1980 during the First Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (6th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Brasseur on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 840).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹***to Recommendation 352***

1. The Council share the concern expressed by the Assembly that European firms have so far failed to capture a satisfactory share of the European and world markets for microelectronic and associated equipment. The Council favour practical international action which offers the prospect of assisting European firms to win a larger share of the international market. They also welcome the recent initiatives of the European Commission but take the view that, while the main impetus for change must come from the industries in question themselves, new initiatives will be necessary in order to co-ordinate national action to support these industries in achieving a competitive position in the world market.

2. In the defence field considerable progress has been made in bringing together national requirements ensuring compatibility of national systems. The defence world, indeed, has a particularly acute awareness of the benefits of common standards. Considerable effort in CNAD and in Eurogroup is being devoted to agreeing common parameters for systems intended to be brought into service. As the volume of such equipment destined for introduction with allied services grows the need to work to agreed standards – which might also apply to the civil sphere – increases in proportion. It should be noted however that the standards which will best contribute to the efficiency of the Alliance and those which will help European industry in the worldwide market are world standards rather than exclusively European standards. For this reason Eurogroup's work is being channelled through scheme-wide institutions. The Assembly has rightly drawn attention to these matters, which it can be assured the WEU governments intend to take into account.

3. Defence accounts for a large share of the public purchasing of information equipment. Interoperability of the equipment – especially communications equipment – with that used by allied forces is a high priority for all WEU governments. A large proportion of the Alliance's spending on communications equipment is indeed funded through the NATO infrastructure budget and provided as a facility which more than one nation can use. It should not be assumed that there is advantage in ensuring interoperability of equipment for civil and military use. Whilst this may be the case in most circumstances, it does not follow as a general rule.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 24th October 1980.

RECOMMENDATION 353 ¹

*on a European earth resources detection satellite
programme* ²

The Assembly,

Aware of the success of the United States Landsat, Seasat, Nimbus and Goes satellite programmes in the earth resources, oceanographic and meteorological fields respectively;

Conscious of the important infrastructure for the acquisition and dissemination of remote-sensing satellite data which exists in a number of European countries under the ESA Earthnet and Meteosat programmes and the success of a number of ESA-sponsored space projects to date;

Believing that European experience through the first Meteosat meteorological satellite points to the positive benefits derived from further European remote-sensing satellite programmes;

Considering that current developments within Europe through the Spacelab and French Spot programmes should be regarded as the foundation for further endeavours on a European collaborative basis in the realm of earth resources satellite programmes;

Confident that the studies so far undertaken within and on behalf of the European Space Agency, especially regarding land applications satellite systems (LASS) and coastal ocean monitoring satellite systems (COMSS), indicate both technical feasibility within the resources potentially available to Europe and worthwhile returns for these projects;

Mindful of the military surveillance and reconnaissance implications which in addition to the long-term commercial desirability of a European remote-sensing satellite programme enhance its strategic importance to European nations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the member states:

1. To put greater political emphasis on the final definition and initiation of an agreed earth resources satellite programme and on the continuation of the Meteosat meteorological programme;
2. To co-ordinate their efforts in remote sensing by satellite through the European Space Agency, for which they should evolve a European space policy and a more closely involved political direction of the Agency, and invite the Italian Minister in charge of space questions, Chairman-in-Office of the ESA Ministerial Council, to prepare and convene a Council meeting in the near future to establish that European policy since ESA is at a crossroad for its new programmes;
3. To build on existing national programmes such as the French Spot system, either by a renewed effort at their Europeanisation or by integrating such programmes with an approved ESA schedule of compatible earth resources satellite launches;
4. To devote adequate funding for a worthwhile European earth resources satellite programme through the European Space Agency as being the most cost-effective instrument for its development so as to be able to exploit the industrial, technical, environmental and strategic benefits of a substantial and carefully prepared remote-sensing satellite programme;
5. To evolve the most appropriate mechanisms both for the practical application of remote-sensing satellite observations and the commercial exploitation of such satellite systems;
6. To encourage within the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) the concerted study of the military requirements for remote-sensing satellites on a European basis, the definition of any resulting satellite projects and their economic and efficient procurement;
7. To urge the Councils of the European Communities and the Council of Europe to co-ordinate the possible application of European earth resources satellite programmes to the benefit of European overseas aid programmes and the economic development of poorer countries of the third world.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1980 during the First Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (7th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 842).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 353

1. The Council are fully aware of the importance of extending the application of space techniques as a means of increasing knowledge of member countries' natural resources and putting them to fuller use. They recognise that orbital observation offers a wide variety of applications of practical and economic value for the satisfaction of social needs and the development of natural resources.

2. In this context, therefore, the political will exists for the development of a European remote-sensing programme to be implemented through the European Space Agency. The first stage of this programme provides for the improvement of data-processing techniques at ground stations where the Agency will operate through Earthnet and the ESRIN data bank at Frascati and through the launching of appropriate satellites developed within ESA.

3. Furthermore, the governments of the majority of ESA member countries favour the continuation of the Meteosat programme and plan to improve arrangements for the distribution of meteorological data, possibly including the use of a special relay satellite (Sirio II).

4. It is obvious – and from a correct scientific point of view, it could not be otherwise – that the European remote-sensing programme will have to be suitably co-ordinated with NASA's existing Landsat satellite system and with the French Spot system now being developed on a national basis. It is to be hoped that an agreement can be reached by the member states of ESA on a European remote-sensing satellite programme as well as on the possible use of experiments on Spacelab.

5. The governments of the member countries will do their best to provide adequate funds for the European Space Agency's programme.

6. The land and coastal observation programmes worked out in ESA should provide member countries with a large amount of data on a wide variety of subjects which will help in reaching decisions on the use of resources, environmental planning and the prevention of pollution. Applications of particular interest for the ESA countries concern agriculture and forestry, fisheries, mineral resources, oceanography, the environment, town and country planning and the management of water resources.

In this respect, the European remote-sensing programme is an important vehicle for European scientific and economic co-operation and seems likely to become one of ESA's major applications programmes in the years to come.

7. The European governments believe that ESA's remote-sensing programme and the Meteosat programme can contribute substantially to resolving some of the third world's problems. Space techniques, with the wide range of services which they involve, among others in the field of communications, are in some cases suited to deal with development problems associated with the large-scale promotion of natural and human resources. The importance of space techniques for the developing countries lies *inter alia* in the fact that they provide access to a whole set of economically and socially valuable services without the need to install costly infrastructure systems on the ground.

The Council fully share the view that "co-operation is the key to Europe's success", expressed by the Committee on Science and Technology of the Council of Europe on 6th June 1980. In order to be effective, this co-operation need not be limited to the European Community.

8. Finally, as regards prospects for military collaboration in the field of remote-sensing satellites, none of the projects under consideration in the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), for possible joint implementation, is concerned with such satellites. Indeed it should be noted that there is no link between the activities of ESA and those of the IEPG.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st November 1980.

RECOMMENDATION 354¹

***on the state of European aerospace activities –
reply to the twenty-fifth annual report of the Council²***

The Assembly,

Considering that the ESA convention has been in existence since 30th May 1975 and that France, although playing an important rôle in the Agency which has its seat in Paris, has still not yet ratified the convention;

Considering the separate development of French and German national direct broadcasting spacecraft and ESA's large satellite;

Agreeing with the Council on the European industry's need to receive a fair share of orders for military application satellites;

Aware of the deteriorating situation with regard to Western Europe's energy supplies and the consequent threat to Europe's political and military posture;

Gratified that several member countries are nearing agreement on a development plan for a tactical fighter aircraft – the European combat aircraft – for the 1990s;

Welcoming the establishment of a European Airbus family of aircraft, but regretting that the Fokker-29 development programme is not yet associated with the Airbus programme,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge the French Government to ratify the ESA convention in 1980;
2. Invite the governments of the member states of the European Space Agency to take appropriate steps to ensure a close link between the French and German national programmes for direct broadcasting spacecraft and the ESA L-sat programme so that European space interests will not be divided on the world scene and in the world market;
3. Invite the governments of the member states of ESA to consider the political importance of space co-operation for Europe and the need to take decisions concerning the future of the Agency at an appropriate political level;
4. In view of the threat to Europe's security, urge member governments to decide on the necessary practical application measures further to the resolution adopted in Dublin in November 1979 to develop a more effective energy policy for the European Community and to elaborate a common European energy plan up to 1990;
5. Invite
 - (a) the governments of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom to ensure the implementation of the industrial feasibility study which has been carried out on the European combat aircraft; and
 - (b) the other member countries to be associated with this important European venture and to participate in the production of this aircraft;
6. Invite the Netherlands Government to use its political and financial influence to promote a European solution associating the Fokker-29 programme with the Airbus programme.

¹ Adopted by the Assembly on 5th June 1980 during the First Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session (7th Sitting).

² Explanatory Memorandum, see the Report tabled by Mr Scheffer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 841)

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 354

1. Since the procedure of French parliamentary approval has been concluded, it can be expected that, before long, France will deposit the instrument of ratification. The ESA convention will then enter into force.

2. As the recommendation recognises there is already an encouraging degree of co-operation underway on a number of projects. The Council welcome this, but recognise that basic differences in approach and timing led to the separate ESA L-Sat and Franco-German projects being set up. There is no doubt that the successful demonstration of European industrial capabilities in the construction of direct broadcasting satellites should open up access to the world market.

The Franco-German project envisages the development, production and geostationary placement of two satellites of largely similar construction. The development stage is now starting following the signing of the intergovernmental agreement on 29th April 1980. Both satellites conform to the WARC 77 rules and they are designed for national use in Germany and France.

Negotiations on the implementation and financing of the L-Sat project have yet to be completed. The satellite is planned for launch some six months after the first of the Franco-German satellites, and its ambit is rather wider than just direct broadcasting. It will carry a variety of broadcasting and telecommunications experiments.

It is hoped that co-operation, particularly in the provision of mutual components, will develop as the projects approach the marketing stage. Both systems are capable of being launched on the European Ariane rocket and will therefore help to consolidate European collaboration in the Arianespace company.

3. The member states of ESA are aware of the Agency's outstanding rôle in space co-operation in Europe. The ESA Council, which is the competent body to deal with this matter, is engaged in deliberations on ESA's future terms of reference and new programmes, for instance with regard to remote-sensing and terrestrial research, and will take the necessary decisions in due course.

Future activities in the field of space travel and outer space research will, however, be determined not only by scientifically and technologically feasible and desirable objectives but also by the financial resources available.

4. Following the meeting of the European Council in Dublin on 29th and 30th November 1979, a number of decisions have been taken within the EEC in order to promote the development of a common energy policy:

(a) The EEC Council of Ministers on 4th December 1979 agreed on a breakdown of overall oil import targets 1980 and 1985 into individual targets of member countries. A regular monitoring of oil import targets has also been decided upon.

(b) At the meeting on 27th and 28th April 1980 in Luxembourg the European Council pointed out that a policy of structural changes should be developed in order to achieve a gradual reduction in the dependence on oil and a replacement of oil by alternative sources of energy.

(c) The EEC Council of Ministers subsequently on 13th May 1980 adopted two resolutions on energy objectives for 1990 and the reduction of energy consumption. In the first resolution the following guidelines for 1990 have been agreed upon:

- The ratio between the rate of growth of energy consumption and the rate of growth of the gross domestic product should be reduced to 0.7 or less.
- The oil consumption in the Community should be reduced to about 40 % of the gross consumption of primary energy.

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st November 1980.

Other points of this resolution refer to the increased use of solid fuels and nuclear energy for generating electricity, to the promotion of renewable sources of energy and the energy price policy.

In the light of these decisions the Community will keep under review the energy programmes of member states directed to achieve the medium- and long-term targets agreed upon.

5. The industries of France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany were requested on 12th February 1980, through the respective national armaments directors, to continue the studies started in the autumn of 1979 regarding a European combat aircraft.

On 3rd April 1980, the firms of Avions Marcel Dassault/Bréguet Aviation (AMD), British Aerospace (BAe), and Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) submitted to the respective national authorities a European combat aircraft report containing the results of the studies.

The results of the assessment, including a recommendation, and a joint report by the national armaments directors of France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany were submitted to the governments concerned for their approval.

6. The Council are of the opinion that a viable civil aircraft industry is of utmost importance for a strong and expanding industrial capability in Europe.

The Council therefore welcome the idea of well-balanced European aircraft development programmes in which all the available capabilities in the various European companies are taken into account and exploited to the maximum extent possible in economically viable programmes. These programmes should therefore be pursued, both for commercial purposes and for the maintenance of an advanced European technological capacity. The current co-operation programmes in the aero-engine sector with the United States and Japan are also endorsed in this context. The Council welcome all efforts by member governments concerning joint programming among major aircraft manufacturers.

Questions regarding specific co-operative programmes will be considered by the governments concerned in the light of the general approach as outlined above.

*Written Questions 205 to 223 and the replies of the Council***QUESTION 205**

*put by Sir Frederic Bennett
on 17th January 1980*

205. The Nine have already held consultations on the problems arising from developments in Iran and Afghanistan. When will the WEU Council meet according to Article VIII of the revised Brussels Treaty with a view to concerting their approach to define a common position?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 22nd February 1980*

205. The Council's position on the points raised in Written Questions 205 and 207 to 214 will be stated in their reply to Assembly Recommendation 341 on the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security, which is now under consideration.

QUESTION 206

*put by Sir Frederic Bennett
on 17th January 1980*

206. What guarantees are the WEU member countries prepared to grant for the security and integrity of Pakistan and Iran against external aggression?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 23rd April 1980*

206. The governments of the member countries of WEU are considering in consultation with other governments how to respond to the severe threat posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for the stability of an area of vital geopolitical importance. They have called for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. At their meeting on 19th February 1980, the Foreign Ministers of the

Nine expressed the desire to seek out ways and means of restoring a situation in line with the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 14th January, which appeals to all states to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan and to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of that country. They took the view that, in this spirit, the crisis could be overcome constructively through an arrangement which allowed a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan to be outside competition among the powers. The governments of the member countries of WEU are committed to pursuing their efforts to work for peace and security in the region. They have registered favourable reactions to their endeavours from several third-world countries and in particular from those belonging to ASEAN, who, like the Nine, consider that the crisis could be overcome by the emergence of a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan. The governments of member countries of WEU are considering how best to help individual countries of the region. They will be watching with great concern future Soviet intentions in this area and will continue to concert their position with all allied and friendly countries and with all countries having an interest in the equilibrium and stability of the region.

QUESTIONS 207 to 214

*put by Sir Frederic Bennett
on 17th January 1980*

207. Are the WEU member countries unanimous in imposing a moratorium on the sale of arms to Iran?

208. What steps are the WEU member countries collectively prepared to take by joint agreement to obtain the release, by the Iranian Government, of the hostages held in the United States Embassy?

209. Do the WEU member countries agree on the limits of the secure and recognised boundaries mentioned for Israel in Security Council Resolution 242? Are they prepared to spell out their views on this point and defend them in the Security Council?

210. Are the WEU member countries unanimous in asking Israel to renounce its policy of settlements on the West Bank and to allow self-determination for the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?

211. Do the WEU member countries agree to urge the PLO to recognise Israel's right to exist and to be secure within the borders mentioned in Resolution 242?

212. In the light of the continuing failure of Israel and Egypt to make any progress in regard to the constitutional future of the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, is the Council prepared to promote a conference, grouping all the countries directly involved in the Palestinian problem, with a view to achieving a general final agreement on this question?

213. Is the Council now prepared collectively to urge upon both sides a total abandonment of all acts of violence, which call into question the validity of any such declarations, in order to help to create the necessary climate for a permanent settlement of the Palestinian question?

214. Does the Council agree that the Camp David agreement, while serving a useful purpose in securing a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, is unlikely to contribute to a settlement of the Palestinian problem insofar as the status and rights of the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are concerned?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 22nd February 1980*

207 to 214. The Council's position on the points raised in Written Questions 205 and 207 to 214 will be stated in their reply to Assembly Recommendation 341 on the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security, which is now under consideration.

QUESTION 215

put by Mr. Wilkinson on 8th April 1980

215. Whether in view of the reluctance of the British Government to accept for the British army the adoption of the common specification for a new battle tank jointly agreed by the French and German Governments, the Council will ask the Standing Armaments Committee of WEU to investigate the possibility of standardising ammunition between the new British and Franco-German main battle tanks?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 25th July 1980*

215. Franco-German design studies on a new main battle tank are proceeding on the basis of common military specifications. At the present stage of these studies, the United Kingdom cannot come to any final conclusion as to whether the vehicle could meet the requirements of the British army and national work is continuing.

The new concepts covered by the Franco-German studies include a smooth-bore gun whereas the United Kingdom continues to favour a rifled-bore gun.

In these circumstances, the standardisation of ammunition would unfortunately not be possible and the Council can see no advantage in asking the Standing Armaments Committee to investigate the matter. The Council however wish to seize this opportunity to reiterate the great importance that member countries attach to increasing their co-operation in armaments production.

QUESTION 216

put by Mr. Valleix on 18th April 1980

216. It is to be feared from the attacks in Toulouse in April 1980 on software, telematic and electronic equipment belonging to Philips and Honeywell-Bull-CII that the international terrorist organisation which perpetrated them was trying to undermine the position of France and Europe in the economic, industrial and perhaps military fields.

Does the Council not consider that similar threats are hanging over the whole of Europe's advanced industry and that WEU member governments should take co-ordinated steps to protect themselves against such attacks?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 26th November 1980*

216. In the Council's opinion, there is no systematic threat to European advanced industry as a whole at the present moment. It should be recalled that industrial security is the responsibility of industrial concerns themselves and that the protection of both property and persons already forms part of the general duties of the security forces in each

country within the context of existing legislation.

In recent years much work has been done at international level on measures to combat terrorism in all its forms and a number of agreements on the subject have either been drawn up or are being drafted. Their scope is universal in some cases (The Hague Convention of 16th December 1970 and Montreal Convention of 23rd September 1971 on the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft, New York Convention of 14th December 1973 on the protection of diplomats, New York Convention of 1979 on the taking of hostages) and regional in others (Council of Europe Convention of 27th January 1977 on the repression of terrorism, Agreement between the Nine of 4th December 1979 concerning the application of the European Convention on the repression of terrorism, work now in progress between the member states of the European Communities on a European judicial area).

In view of the extent and diversity of this work on measures to combat terrorism, it would appear neither useful nor desirable for Western European Union to take any fresh initiative in the matter.

QUESTION 217

put by Sir Frederic Bennett on 25th June 1980

217. In its reply to Recommendation 341 the Council recalls that "the governments of member states have supported all moves... to secure the immediate and unconditional release" of the American diplomats being held as hostages in Iran. In what manner did these governments associate themselves with the American operation of 25th April 1980 which sought to free these hostages?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 26th September 1980*

217. The member governments of Western European Union were in no way involved in the United States' attempted rescue bid.

QUESTION 218

*put by Sir Frederic Bennett
on 25th June 1980*

218. In its reply to Recommendation 341 the Council recognises "that a just and lasting

peace can be established only on the basis of a comprehensive settlement" of the Middle East conflict, account being taken "of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to a homeland". Does it consider this includes the right to self-determination for the Palestinians living in the territories occupied by the state of Israel since 1967?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 26th September 1980*

218. As to the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people, the Council recall Article 6 of the Venice declaration of the European Council (13th June 1980) which states in the second sentence:

"The Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully its right to self-determination."

QUESTION 219

put by Sir Frederic Bennett on 25th June 1980

219. In its reply to Recommendation 341 the Council recall "the terms of the statement issued by the Nine on 18th June 1979 deploring... Israel's claim to eventual sovereignty over the occupied territories". Would the Council specify whether this feeling also extends to the measures taken by Israel to annex the Arab part of Jerusalem?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 26th September 1980*

219. The Council regard East Jerusalem as part of the territories occupied in 1967 and therefore as subject to the provision of Security Council Resolution 242 calling for Israeli withdrawal. The Council cannot accept the acquisition of territory by force of arms. The status and future of Jerusalem remain undetermined and should be negotiated between the parties concerned as part of a comprehensive settlement. The Council do not accept Israel's moves to determine Jerusalem's status unilaterally.

QUESTION 220*put by Sir Frederic Bennett on 25th June 1980*

220. In its reply to Recommendation 341 the Council notes "that the member states are determined to continue their efforts to further the search for an overall settlement of the Middle East conflict". Does the Council consider that the Camp David agreements, under present or easily foreseeable circumstances, truly contribute to the search for such a settlement?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL*communicated to the Assembly
on 26th September 1980*

220. The Camp David agreements led to the establishment of peace between Egypt and Israel, which the Council believe to be an important step forward in the search for a comprehensive settlement. However this achievement must be built on. The negotiations on the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip have so far been inconclusive and future prospects are not encouraging. Nevertheless the Council continue to believe that agreement on full autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza, capable of being accepted and worked by the Palestinians, could be a useful interim stage towards full self-determination for the Palestinians in the framework of a comprehensive settlement.

QUESTION 221*put by Sir Frederic Bennett on 25th June 1980*

221. In the view of the Council, who are "all the parties involved" who "should be called on to participate in working out and implementing" a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East conflict, referred to in paragraph 3 of the reply to Recommendation 341?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL*communicated to the Assembly
on 24th October 1980*

221. All the parties involved are those whose participation in negotiations designed to lead to a comprehensive settlement is considered essential. These parties are naturally those directly

involved in the conflict, including the Palestinian people, which implies the association of the PLO with the negotiations.

QUESTION 222*put by Mr. Boucheny on 21st July 1980*

222. In accordance with Article IV of the Brussels Treaty, which specifies that the Council of Ministers must give their opinion on military matters, Mr. Boucheny, Paris Senator, asks the WEU Council of Ministers what action it intends to take on the statements by Mr. Sean MacBride, former Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs. At a press conference in Geneva, Mr. MacBride spoke of a meeting held in Zurich in 1976 between Mr. John Vorster and Mr. Henry Kissinger in the presence of General Alexander Haig, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander. In the course of this meeting it was decided to help the racist government of South Africa to acquire atomic weapons. The former Irish Minister said in particular that the Federal Republic of Germany had played a very active rôle in providing the technology and part of the necessary equipment to allow South Africa to acquire a nuclear capability, and mentioned also the assistance afforded by the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Mr. Boucheny wishes to know how the policy of support for the racist régime of South Africa is compatible with United Nations resolutions asking states to boycott this inhuman régime. This adventurist policy of the member countries of WEU is liable to increase tension in southern Africa. Does the Council of Ministers intend to work for peace and détente in the demilitarisation of southern Africa and for the respect of human rights in South Africa?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL*communicated to the Assembly
on 26th November 1980*

222. The Council are not of the opinion that the purported statements of Mr. Sean MacBride solicit any action on their part.

As to the alleged meeting between Mr. Vorster, Mr. Kissinger and General Haig, they are not in a position to comment as none of the member governments participated at such a meeting.

However, it is well known that none of the member governments of WEU pursues a policy of support for the apartheid system in South Africa. On the contrary, all of them vigorously condemn apartheid in all its forms

and endeavour with all peaceful means at their disposal to influence the South African Government to bring about those fundamental changes which are inevitable in order to achieve in South Africa a society that is based on equality, justice, and respect of human rights irrespective of colour or race. It would be totally inconsistent with this policy if the member governments of WEU were to assist South Africa in the military field or in acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Furthermore, such assistance would also be in contradiction of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa of the United Nations Security Council of 4th November 1977 (Resolution 418) to which all the member countries of WEU strictly adhere. This resolution was actively supported by the western members of the United Nations Security Council at that time.

QUESTION 223

put by Mr. Valleix on 10th October 1980

223. Can the Council indicate the reasons why the social security agreement between WEU and the Government of the French

Republic signed on 21st June 1979 has not yet been ratified by the two parties?

In view of the fact that the agreement was to become effective on 1st January 1979, is the Council not afraid that certain permanent officials in service on 31st December 1978 will thus be deprived of the possibility of joining the French scheme before retiring?

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL

*communicated to the Assembly
on 26th November 1980*

223. Like other similar agreements, the social security agreement between France and WEU signed on 21st June 1979 has, until now, been subject to certain verifications, as a result of recent developments in French social security legislation. This review is almost complete and approval of the agreement is expected shortly. Moreover, appropriate action has been taken to ensure that the position of beneficiaries under that agreement shall not be jeopardised as a result of this long delay.

**OPINION ON THE BUDGET OF THE MINISTERIAL ORGANS
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1980¹**

*submitted on behalf of
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration²
by Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur*

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submitted by Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur

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Draft Opinion

*on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU
for the financial year 1980*

The Assembly,

Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter,

Having taken note of the contents,

Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated.

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. *Adriaensens* (Chairman); MM. *Jager*, *Kittelmann* (Alternate for Mr. Alber) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Ahrens*, *Alber*, *Depietri*, *Evers*, *Fletcher*, *Lord Hughes*, MM. *Jeambrun* (Alternate: *Pignion*),

Kriepe, *Martino*, *Orione*, *Peeters*, *Petrilli*, *Schleiter*, *Smith* (Alternate: *Kershaw*), *Stainton*, *Tripodi*, *Tummers*, *Vohrer*, *Mrs. van der Werf-Terpstra*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation***on improving the status of WEU staff***

The Assembly,

Conscious of the fact that despite the many years' existence of the majority of the co-ordinated organisations problems affecting the careers of officials in these organisations still remain unresolved;

Regretting the necessity to revert to its Recommendation 340;

Regretting also the element of stagnation manifest in the Council's reply to this recommendation and previous recommendations submitted on identical matters,

REQUESTS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Appoint an expert, within the framework of the co-ordinated organisations, to study the desirability of setting up an independent body for the administration of pensions as a natural follow-on from the joint pensions administrative section and to make proposals;
 2. Continue to review the possibility of creating a single appeals board for pensions in the light of experience in view of the possibly divergent views taken by appeals boards of the various co-ordinated organisations and the inherent risk of prejudice for officials in these organisations;
 3. Transmit any conclusions which the various co-ordinating agencies may have come to on the problems outlined in paragraph 3 of Recommendation 340 and request these agencies to continue their studies and to report without avoidable delay;
 4. Provide information concerning the number of meetings held by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts in 1980, the duration of these meetings, the subjects discussed and the positive decisions which resulted;
- II. Invites the Secretary-General to ensure that notice of all staff vacancies of A, L, B and C grades arising in the co-ordinated organisations be circulated to the staff of the others.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur)

I. Budget of the ministerial organs of WEU

(i) Approval

1. I have studied the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1980 and have no comment to make for the

time being. I therefore submit the attached draft opinion and draft recommendation to the Committee for approval.

(ii) The budget

2. The total budget of WEU for 1980 as compared to 1979 is as follows:

	1979 budget		1980 budget		% increase
	£	F	£	F	
Secretariat-General	786,660		895,600		13.85
Standing Armaments Committee	—	5,299,865	—	5,975,945	12.75
Agency for the Control of Armaments .	—	11,928,930	—	13,013,155	9.09
Office of the Clerk	—	8,517,000	—	9,632,000	13.09
TOTAL BUDGET OF WEU ...	786,660	25,745,795	895,600	28,621,100	

(iii) WEU establishment

3. The total establishment of WEU for 1980 is as follows:

Secretariat-General	48
Standing Armaments Committee ..	28
Agency for the Control of Armaments	52
	128
Office of the Clerk	28
TOTAL ESTABLISHMENT OF WEU FOR 1980	156

II. Pension scheme

4. The overall increase in the WEU budget for 1980 as compared with 1979 figures in the above table and would appear reasonable in view of the present inflationary situation in both France and the United Kingdom. However, it should be noted that appropriations for pensions now represent an important element in the budgets of all the co-ordinated organisations. This fact is largely illustrated in Table 1 hereafter, which shows the percentage increase for the various organs of WEU between 1978 and 1980.

5. The number of pensions paid out by WEU over the same period is shown in Table 2.

6. Governments should not use the ever-increasing cost of pensions over the years as an excuse for reducing the remainder of the budget in order to keep it within certain limits. It will be noted that the percentage of the Assembly's budget devoted to pensions is at present only 0.94 %. This is accounted for by the fact that recruitment policy in the Assembly has been such that virtually all staff members will have completed at least twenty-five years of service with the organisation before qualifying for a pension. It is obvious that, on the whole, this recruitment policy has not been pursued elsewhere in WEU.

Joint pensions administrative section

7. A progress report on the work of this section will be found at Appendix. The unit is now fully operational and the co-ordinated organisations rely entirely upon it for pension calculations.

8. The Assembly has previously drawn attention to the desirability of creating an independent body to administer staff pensions and continues to believe that a study to this effect should be started as soon as possible. While the Assembly does not in any way wish to criticise the work or functioning of the joint pensions administrative section, it does feel that to guard against the possibility of an organisation being wound up or of a member country withdrawing from an organisation, the only

Table 1

	1978			1979			1980		
	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)	Budget total	Appropriations for pensions	Pension/budget ratio (%)
Secretariat-General	£ 666,705	£ 27,425	4.11	£ 786,660	£ 66,420	8.44	£ 895,600	£ 81,500	9.10
Standing Armaments Committee	F 4,747,625	F 365,000	7.68	F 5,299,865	F 421,200	7.94	F 5,975,945	F 602,000	10.07
Agency for the Control of Armaments	10,207,655	704,300	6.89	11,928,930	2,007,400	16.82	13,013,155	1,905,000	14.63
Office of the Clerk	7,778,000	62,000	0.79	8,517,000	83,000	0.97	9,632,000	91,000	0.94

Table 2

Pensions	1978					1979					1980				
	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total	SG	ACA	SAC	O of C	Total
Retirement	4	16	8	1	29	5	17	8	1	31	7	19	8	1	35
Survivors'	1	5	1	1	8	1	7	2	1	11	1	8	3	1	13
Orphans'	3*			1	4	3*	1*		1	5	1*	2*		1	4
Invalidity	1				1	1				1	1				1
Totals	9	21	9	3	42	10	25	10	3	48	10	29	11	3	53
Total establishment**	45	54	27	26	149	45	54	27	26	149	45	54	27	26	149

SG = Secretariat-General.

ACA = Agency for the Control of Armaments.

SAC = Standing Armaments Committee.

O of C = Office of the Clerk.

* Paid in conjunction with a survivor's pension.

** Excluding hors cadre officials.

guarantee for the payment of staff pensions is the creation of a truly independent body for this purpose.

9. In the interim period, the joint pensions administrative section might be entrusted with related tasks, such as the recuperation from each co-ordinated organisation of the validation papers in respect of all staff members having opted for the pension scheme, up-to-date information concerning changes in grade and family status, together with details of new recruitments (automatically affiliated to the pension scheme) being communicated to the section at regular intervals by the organisation concerned. Such information would enable the unit to make relatively accurate forecasts in respect of staff going onto a retirement pension at any given time. Sight should not be lost of the fact that organisations are holding validation files for staff members who may only be retiring in approximately twenty years' time and it would therefore seem logical for as much information as possible to be centralised. Additionally, the unit might effectively forecast the financial implications of pensions in the budgets of each of the co-ordinated organisations on a year-to-year basis.

Single appeals board for pensions

10. In its reply to Recommendation 340 the Council reject the idea of establishing a single appeals board at this juncture on the grounds that it would be premature. The Assembly cannot share the Council's view that a system of mutual information and concertation among appeals boards of the various organisations would be the right way to deal with an appeal since, by their very nature, boards set up for this purpose only meet when a specific case arises. Such a system would be both cumbersome and time-wasting and, in view of the widely differing composition of each board, would in no way preclude the possibility of divergent conclusions being reached, with possible ensuing prejudice to a staff member. Finally, while accepting the point put forward by the Council that the Secretary/Director General is responsible for the administration of his organisation, it must be borne in mind that the financial responsibility is that of governments.

Auditing of pensions

11. At present audit systems differ in each of the co-ordinated organisations, to wit:

WEU - The Assembly has a single parliamentary auditor who is also the Comptroller and Auditor General of the

United Kingdom; *the other organs of WEU* have a board of auditors which rotates every three years and which is drawn from three member countries;

OECD has a board of auditors which rotates every four years. It is drawn from three member countries and, in addition, is headed by a Chairman nominated by the French *Cour des Comptes*;

The Council of Europe has a board of auditors which holds a six-year mandate, non-renewable, and which is drawn from three member countries;

ESA has a board of auditors drawn from three member countries, rotating every three years;

NATO has a board of auditors drawn from five member countries, rotating every three years.

It is obvious that with time a unified system of auditing should be adopted for all the co-ordinated organisations to ensure that different interpretations are not given for the payment of pensions.

III. Careers and conditions of employment

12. As the Assembly pointed out in its last report (Document 824), it has put forward many recommendations in respect of career problems affecting staff in the co-ordinated organisations. We are told that such matters are under consideration and the Council's reply to Recommendation 340 testifies to this:

"3. The Council have considered the possibility of setting up a committee of senior experts, but have come to the conclusion that the problems which such a group of experts would be qualified to consider should be discussed beforehand between the co-ordinated organisations themselves and, in the framework of the Co-ordinating Committee, with experts from the member governments.

Certain co-ordinating agencies are looking at the problem and any conclusions which may emerge from this consultation should be awaited.

In these circumstances, the Council recognise that the specific problems listed by the Assembly in point 1.3. of its recommendation should receive the attention of the organisation and, in particular, of its Secretary-General:

(a) With regard to the grading system and the introduction of a dual grading

system the problems are still under consideration at the administrative level.

(b) The staff rules of each of the organisations contain many provisions, in particular regarding types and duration of contracts, which all have to take into account the specific circumstances of each organisation; nevertheless, those responsible within the organisation make every effort to harmonise these provisions wherever possible.

(c) The Council consider that the indemnity for loss of job is satisfactorily dealt with by the staff rules, particularly for staff members with long service in the organisation.

(d) The methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another are governed by both the staff rules and the pension scheme rules of each of the organisations concerned; as far as the Council are aware, this problem has given rise to little difficulty; only experience will show whether it will be possible in the future to consider simplifying these rules."

13. As is clear from the above, little progress is being made. The Council have considered the possibility of setting up a committee of senior experts but state that such a committee could only eventually come into existence after the co-ordinated organisations themselves had examined all the problems. We are led to believe that discussions in this connection are currently in progress in some of the organisa-

tions and that their conclusions should be awaited. The Assembly is anxious to know how much longer these discussions are likely to continue since it has been waiting for twelve years already.

14. At the December 1979 session of the Assembly, Mr. Warren and Mr. Adriaensens drew attention to the cumbersome machinery of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and called in question the usefulness of this body, particularly in view of its cost to the taxpayer. When all our member governments are having to look closer than ever before at their national budgets, one is led to question whether some reform of this committee is not called for.

15. The Assembly therefore wishes to know how many times the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts has met in 1980, for how many days, which problems have been under discussion and what decisions have resulted.

IV. *Staff vacancies in the co-ordinated organisations*

16. The Assembly welcomes the fact that staff vacancies arising in WEU are now circulated within the organisation but would be happy if the Secretary-General could ensure that the Director/Secretaries-General of the other co-ordinated organisations circulate notice of vacancies in these organisations to their colleagues, thus permitting some mobility of staff.

APPENDIX I

WEU BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR 1980

Proposed expenditure and income

	A*	B*	C*	TOTAL B+C
	£	Francs	Francs	Francs
Salaries and allowances	1,001,217	7,814,300	16,223,000	24,037,300
Pensions	81,500	602,000	1,905,000	2,507,000
Travel	36,885	93,700	380,900	474,600
Other operating costs	155,575	427,620	613,520	1,041,140
Purchase of furniture, etc	10,465	13,075	28,935	42,010
Buildings	—	68,000	123,000	191,000
Total expenditure	1,285,642	9,018,695	19,274,355	28,293,050
WEU tax	350,322	2,712,800	5,562,400	8,275,200
Other receipts	15,590	55,950	95,800	151,750
Pension receipts	24,130	274,000	603,000	877,000
Total income	390,042	3,042,750	6,261,200	9,303,950
NET TOTAL	895,600	5,975,945	13,013,155	18,989,100

National contributions

	600ths	A*	B* C*	Office of the Clerk
		£	Francs	Francs
Belgium	59	88,100	1,867,300	947,150
France	120	179,110	3,797,800	1,926,400
Federal Republic of Germany .	120	179,110	3,797,800	1,926,400
Italy	120	179,110	3,797,800	1,926,400
Luxembourg	2	2,960	63,300	32,100
Netherlands	59	88,100	1,867,300	947,150
United Kingdom	120	179,110	3,797,800	1,926,400
	600	895,600	18,989,100	9,632,000

Total WEU budget

£ 895,600

Francs 28,621,100

- * A - Secretariat General.
B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.

APPENDIX II
Table of establishment
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

	A ¹	B ¹	C ¹	Total A, B, C	Office of the Clerk	
Secretary-General	1	—	—	1	Clerk	1
Deputy Secretary-General	1	—	—	1		—
Director of the Agency	—	—	1	1		—
Assistant Secretary-General	1	1	—	2	Clerk Assistant	1
A7	—	—	1	1		—
A6	1	—	3	4		—
A5	2	1	6	9		5
A4	—	4	8	12		2 ²
A3	3	—	1	4		1
A2	2	—	2	4		3 ²
L5	1	—	—	1		—
L4	1	1	—	2		—
L3	1	3	2	6		—
L2	1	—	—	1		—
B6	—	—	—	—		1
B5	—	—	—	—		—
B4	8	4	8	20		4
B3	7	7	8	22		7
B2	5	—	2	7		—
B1	2	—	—	2		—
C6	—	—	—	—		1
C5	—	—	1	1		—
C4	1	4	—	5		—
C3	8	3	9	20		2
C2	2	—	—	2		—
	48	28	52	128		28

1. A - Secretariat-General.
B - International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee.
C - Agency for the Control of Armaments.
2. Including four secretaries Translations/Publications.

APPENDIX III

RECOMMENDATION 340¹***on improving the status of WEU staff²***

The Assembly,

Welcoming the decision of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to grant a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for widows of male staff;

Considering that the establishment of a single appeals board would be the logical follow-up to the establishment of a joint section for the administration of pensions;

Again regretting that the Council has still not answered the Assembly's recommendation to set up a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

- I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations*:
 1. The creation of a single appeals board as soon as possible;
 2. The creation before 1983 of a joint body for the administration of pensions for staff of the co-ordinated organisations;
 3. The establishment of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote a personnel policy and in particular:
 - to review the structure of grades;
 - to study the possibility of introducing a dual grading system at every level of the hierarchy;
 - to study the type and length of contracts;
 - to co-ordinate staff rules;
 - to review the indemnity for loss of job;
 - to study methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another;
 - to make clear the financial consequences of their proposals;
- II. Invite the Secretary-General to inform WEU officials of all staff vacancies so that they may take advantage of all possibilities for promotion which may arise within the organisation.

* OECD, NATO, WEU, Council of Europe, ESA.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1979 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Fifth Ordinary Session (11th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 824).

REPLY OF THE COUNCIL¹

to Recommendation 340

Member governments have always been concerned that the pension scheme should be applied with maximum uniformity in all the co-ordinated organisations.

I. 1 and 2. However, the creation of a single appeals board specifically to deal with matters concerning pensions would only be feasible if the joint pensions administrative section were to be given the power to take decisions.

As it is, this body which started its operational work on 1st January 1980 and was set up with a view to achieving maximum uniformity in the implementation of the pension scheme is only an advisory body to the co-ordinated organisations. It should be noted therefore that final responsibility for the uniform application, entitlement and subsequent payment of pensions rests with each organisation and its Secretary/Director-General.

Commensurate therefore with the responsibility of each Secretary-General and each autonomous organisation is the institution of an appeals board for each of those organisations with responsibilities covering all appeals arising out of the application of the staff rules.

The creation of a single appeals board to deal with pension matters and, even more, the establishment of a joint body for the administration of pensions as a legal entity could, in the interests of the staff, only be considered and gone into after an adequate running-in period – the length of which cannot be assessed at this stage – and in the light of experience.

Whilst not rejecting the idea of developments along the lines suggested by the Assembly, the Council therefore feel that any initiative of this nature would, in present circumstances, be premature. In this context it is recalled however that the Co-ordinating Committee, in its 149th report, recommended that a system of mutual information and concertation should be established among the appeals boards of the co-ordinated organisations in order to avoid their reaching different decisions regarding similar cases.

3. The Council have considered the possibility of setting up a committee of senior experts, but have come to the conclusion that the problems which such a group of experts would be qualified to consider should be discussed beforehand between the co-ordinated organisations themselves and, in the framework of the Co-ordinating Committee, with experts from the member governments.

Certain co-ordinating agencies are looking at the problem and any conclusions which may emerge from this consultation should be awaited.

In these circumstances, the Council recognise that the specific problems listed by the Assembly in point I.3. of its recommendation should receive the attention of the organisation and, in particular, of its Secretary-General:

(a) With regard to the grading system and the introduction of a dual grading system the problems are still under consideration at the administrative level.

(b) The staff rules of each of the organisations contain many provisions, in particular regarding types and duration of contracts, which all have to take into account the specific circumstances of each organisation; nevertheless, those responsible within the organisation make every effort to harmonise these provisions wherever possible.

(c) The Council consider that the indemnity for loss of job is satisfactorily dealt with by the staff rules, particularly for staff members with long service in the organisation.

(d) The methods of transferring an official from one co-ordinated organisation to another are governed by both the staff rules and the pension scheme rules of each of the organisations concerned; as far as the Council are aware, this problem has given rise to little difficulty; only experience will show whether it will be possible in the future to consider simplifying these rules.

II. The Council can inform the Assembly that the Secretary-General has taken all the necessary measures to ensure that all members of staff are informed of vacancies within the organisation. It should be recalled in this connection that WEU policy is to take account first of the possibilities for promotion within the organisation, before turning to the other co-ordinated organisations and, finally, to the open market. Moreover, selection of candidates is made in such a way that, as vacancies are filled, equitable proportions of nationals of the member states are observed, although this rule is not applied with such mathematical rigidity as to impair its implementation.

¹ Communicated to the Assembly on 14th May 1980

APPENDIX IV

Progress report on the joint pensions administrative section of the co-ordinated organisations¹

.....

Work done

7. The section carries out its duties in accordance with the directives given it by the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General of the co-ordinated organisations (OECD, NATO, WEU, the Council of Europe and the European Space Agency). The staff of the section is split up among three units: the pension study unit, pension computation unit I, located at OECD, and pension computation unit II, located at NATO Headquarters, Brussels.

8. The activities of the joint pensions administrative section during the financial year 1980 may be summarised as follows:

A. Pension study unit

- With the recruitment of an administrator during the first half of 1980, all posts allocated in the budget to this sector are now filled;
- the pension study unit has provided the Secretariat for PACCO and prepared the agenda and minutes of the meetings;
- it has produced a set of studies and research papers on specific points with a view to clarifying the interpretations of several provisions in the instructions and bringing out any practical difficulties encountered in the implementation of the pension scheme rules in a uniform manner;
- in accordance with the rôle assigned to it, the unit has examined all provisional assessments of pension entitlement to ensure that these are in conformity with the pension scheme rules and that all beneficiaries receive uniform treatment. It has transmitted reports to PACCO setting out its conclusions and has supplied any additional information needed by that committee to make recommendations on the subject;
- the unit has drawn up a draft co-ordinated formal procedure for approving recommendations concerning

amendments to the rules and instructions. It has designed and implemented a communications network and a procedure for exchanging information (a) between the section and the service managing pension affairs in each of the co-ordinated organisations and (b) between PACCO and the various bodies with responsibility for pensions;

- the unit has started to collect detailed documentation for updating the rules, in the light of the discussions and recommendations of the committees. These files will provide each organisation with clear and precise information regarding the implementation of the various provisions of the scheme in a uniform manner. They will also be useful in producing the basic data to be taken into account when calculating pension rights;
- it is also endeavouring to settle tax adjustment problems through contact, as and when necessary, with the national tax authorities concerned;
- next, the pension study unit is trying to collect all the information it needs to begin negotiations for reciprocal agreements with national bodies on the transfer of pension rights in application of Article 12 of the rules;
- finally, the head of the section has made special efforts to harmonise progress in the activities of the two computation units. Exchanges of technical information have been held. Nevertheless, a system of cross-testing and comparative analysis of two software systems will have to be designed and used to ensure that the two computation units produce identical and correct results.

9. Having caught up, in the course of 1980, the backlog in the checking of all provisional assessments of pension entitlement for the pensioned staff of the five co-ordinated organisations from 1973 to 1979, the unit will tackle the following tasks over and above its usual administration and management duties during the next financial year:

- improving its management services to the co-ordinated organisations particularly as regards the budget and accounts;

1. Regulations for the joint pensions administrative section of the co-ordinated organisations were given in Appendix VI of Document 783, 26th September 1978.

- extending and diversifying its studies on the provisions of the rules;
- keeping a close watch on developments concerning rights to tax adjustments and conditions and procedures for applying them;
- extending negotiations with outside bodies;
- ensuring that the conversion of computer programmes for use on new types of computer is carried out in conditions of total security;
- designing a new integrated computer programme so that fuller use may be made of the extra capabilities provided by the new computer to be installed during the second half of 1980;
- establishing full compatibility between the two computation units and checking at regular intervals any improvements or amendments to the two computer programmes.

B. Pension computation unit I

10. Unit I began to operate in October 1979. Its first task was to assess how administrative procedures and software design stood at that date. The first survey revealed a number of defects and resulted in the unit taking immediate action with the object of:

- improving procedures for the input of data relating to pensioned staff, and also other data for the system;
- establishing a formal procedure for requesting changes or improvements to the system and for reporting problems encountered during trials and normal operations;
- specifying the improvements needing to be made to the documentation relating to the system;
- implementing a rational plan with the object of testing and operating the system;
- designing and producing all the outputs needed by the co-ordinated organisations.

11. The object of all these measures was to make full use of the limited software resources available so that the quality of the system might be gradually improved.

12. During the first six months, the unit checked and acquired data and verified calculations concerning more than 550 pensioned staff

of four of the co-ordinated organisations belonging to the pension scheme. The complete series of trials carried out brought to light some hundred extensions, changes and corrections needed in order to bring the software up to the required level for the initial phase of operation of the pension system.

13. With the improved and more powerful IBM 4331 computer, it will be possible in the long term to produce programmes designed to allow a more integrated system of pension computation.

14. The tasks that will be continued and undertaken in 1981 consist, in particular, of:

- converting and testing the data files and existing programmes (with reference to the IBM 4331 system),
- continuing the development and maintenance of the system, in particular the integration of the computer terminals, automatising the calculation of social security deductions, and improving the system's logic and outputs with regard to the processing of tax adjustments,
- designing new specifications which, when introduced, will overcome some of the present system's main defects, and implementing a more integrated system capable of using the capacity of the new equipment to the full.

.....

C. Pensions computation unit II (NATO)

19. The responsibilities of this unit, and particularly those which involve collecting and centralising basic data concerning pensioned staff from the various agencies of the organisation, and also managing the software for pension computation and payment, were devised as as one of the various elements comprising a more comprehensive system of personnel management (Personnel management information system - PMIS).

20. The implementation of a specific computerised programme for computing and managing pensions progressed during the year concurrently with the preparation of the integrated global system, the object being to derive the maximum advantage from the centralisation of data.

21. Computation unit II also drew up a plan of work involving completion of the following four objectives:

- (i) computation of annuities and the rate of pension;

- (ii) monthly computation of pensions and family allowances;
- (iii) computation of arrears;
- (iv) computation of tax adjustments.

22. Thanks to the data stored for each pensioner, the unit is now in a position to proceed with the final trials of the computation programme based on staff members' situations at 1st January 1980.

23. In the short term, and during the course of the 1981 financial year, the unit intends:

- to complete the computation programme;
- to finalise the data collection system (PMIS) so as to be able at regular intervals to update the data bank with the help of information from all the NATO agencies;

- to study and carry out new programmes whereby to produce listings adapted to the needs of these different centres;
- to consider, in conjunction with computation unit I, how to achieve maximum compatibility between the two computerised systems in operation.

.....

*Pensions paid by the co-ordinated organisations
at 30th June 1980*

	<i>Number of posts</i>	<i>Number of pensioners</i>
OECD	1,699	304
Council of Europe	824	133
WEU	149	51
ESA	1,428	66
NATO	<u>4,946</u>	<u>350</u>
TOTAL	<u>9,046</u>	<u>904</u>

APPENDIX V

Budgetary establishments of the organisations as at 30th June 1979 by countries

Countries	Co-ordinated Organisations															Observers						Total		
	OECD			Council of Europe			NATO + SHAPE			ESA			WEU			ECMWF ¹			EPO ²					
	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC	A-L	B-C	ALBC
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
Germany							189	180	369	160	102	262							350	356	706	699	638	1 337
Belgium				1	1	2	647	1 188	1 835	1	—	1										649	1 189	1 838
Canada								—															—	
Denmark							5	21	26													5	21	26
Spain										5	—	5										5	—	5
United States	2	—	2				27	3	30	5	—	5										34	3	37
France	656	1 062	1 718	281	522	803	98	192	290	192	123	315	43	61	104							1 270	1 960	3 230
Italy							149	394	543	36	22	58										185	416	601
Japan	2	—	2																			2	—	2
Luxembourg							164	608	772													164	608	772
Norway							20	53	73													20	53	73
Netherlands							278	382	660	514	283	797							473	345	818	1 265	1 010	2 275
Portugal							4	3	7													4	3	7
United Kingdom							12	7	19				12	33	45	79	62	141				103	102	205
Turkey and Greece							46	72	118													46	72	118
Grand total	660	1 062	1 722	282	523	805	1 639	3 103	4 742	913	530	1 443	55	94	149	79	62	141	823	701	1 524	4 451	6 075	10 526

1. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting.

2. European Patent Office.

APPENDIX VI

Membership of the co-ordinated organisations

Member countries	Co-ordinated organisations					Observers	
	OECD	Council of Europe	NATO	ESA	WEU	ECMWF ¹	EPO ²
EUROPE							
Germany	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Austria	x	x				x	x
Belgium	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Cyprus		x					
Denmark	x	x	x	x		x	x
Spain	x	x		x		x	
Finland	x					x	
France	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Greece	x	x	x			x	x
Ireland	x	x		x		x	x
Iceland	x	x	x				
Italy	x	x	x	x	x		x
Liechtenstein		x					x
Luxembourg	x	x	x		x		x
Malta		x					
Monaco							x
Norway	x	x	x				x
Netherlands	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Portugal	x	x	x			x	
United Kingdom ..	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Sweden	x	x		x		x	x
Switzerland	x	x		x		x	x
Turkey	x	x	x			x	
Yugoslavia						x	
AMERICA							
Canada	x		x				
United States	x		x				
ASIA							
Japan	x						
AUSTRALASIA							
Australia	x						
New Zealand	x						
TOTAL	24	21	15	11	7	16	16

1. European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting.
2. European Patent Office.

*Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs
of Western European Union for the financial year 1980*

AMENDMENT 1¹
tabled by MM. Stainton and Smith

1. At the end of the last paragraph of the draft opinion, add " except to draw attention to the fact that the terms of reference of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration are restricted to expenditure incurred by the Office of the Clerk (F 8,517,000 in 1979; F 9,632,000 for 1980) or some 34 % only of the total budget. The cost effectiveness of the other 66 % has not been examined by or reported on to this Assembly. "

Signed: Stainton, Smith

1. See 10th Sitting, 2nd December 1980 (Amendment negatived).

*International industrial consortia
and collaborative arrangements for the
production of high technology military equipment*

REPORT¹

*submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions²
by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur*

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Introductory note

In preparing this report your Rapporteur has taken evidence from the Aircraft and Dynamics Groups of British Aerospace, from Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, from Dornier GmbH, from Panavia Aircraft GmbH, from General Dynamics Corporation, from Westland Helicopters Limited, from The Boeing Company, and from McDonnell Aircraft Company. He wishes to express his grateful thanks to the representatives of the above industrial companies for the time they generously gave for his interviews and researches. He finally acknowledges his gratitude to the Clerk of the Committee who accompanied him on study visits throughout Europe and recorded the minutes of evidence.

1. Adopted in Committee by 14 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Mr. Valleix (Chairman); MM. Lenzer, Wilkinson (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaenssens (Alternate: Brasseur), Amadei, Antoni, Cornelissen,

Fiandrotti, Forma, Garrett, Hawkins, Konings, McGuire, Malvy, Müller, Péronnet, Scheffler, Talon (Alternate: Petit), Ueberhorst (Alternate: Flämig), van Waterschoot.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Draft Recommendation
on international industrial consortia
and collaborative arrangements for the
production of high technology military equipment

The Assembly,

Aware that in spite of repeated political recommendations and constant efforts at an official level progress towards the standardisation and interoperability of defence equipment within the western Alliance remains inadequate ;

Conscious that as economic recession and the growth in the price of petroleum products limit resources for defence and place additional constraints upon national defence budgets, improved cost-effectiveness in weapon procurement will become even more necessary ;

Believing that collaborative definition, development and production of high technology defence equipment can bring substantial benefits of commonality between the procuring services in Europe as well as important savings in development costs, and a larger assured market for the participating industrial companies ;

Understanding the need to preserve as widely as possible within the European armaments industry an independent capability to design, develop and build high technology weapons systems ;

Realising that the impetus towards collaborative defence equipment projects should be commercial and industrial as well as military and logistic ;

Considering that differences in operational requirements and procurement time-scales continue to be an unnecessarily major obstacle to effective international collaboration in the field of military equipment in Europe ;

Convinced that progress towards more effective collaboration in the high technology military equipment sector lies not through the evolution of new bureaucratic structures but by a practical and pragmatic approach at an industrial level, allied to the closest co-operation between national military staffs and above all a common political will shared at the highest level in Europe to see joint collaborative solutions to the individual requirements of Alliance nations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Monitor on a regular basis through the Standing Armaments Committee progress towards achieving the interoperability and standardisation of defence equipment within the Alliance, and encourage where practical Western European industrial collaboration to achieve these objectives ;
2. Persuade the governments of the Western European Union countries to establish a link whereby the Assembly of Western European Union is kept regularly informed of the work of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) as this Assembly is the only European parliamentary assembly with a *locus standi* established by treaty on defence matters, and has invaluable connections with national parliaments and ministers ;
3. Invite the governments of member countries to convene a West European strategic summit at the earliest practical opportunity to seek agreement at the highest political level on the collaborative definition and development of the next generation of military projects such as a new European combat aircraft (ECA) to replace the Jaguar in the French and British air forces and to replace the Phantom in the German air force ;
4. Promote a European policy for high technology weapons with a view to ensuring the development of a genuinely balanced transatlantic market whereby the standardisation of equipment within the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole would be enhanced: such a two-way street on a strictly equitable basis between the United States and Western Europe should involve on an increasing scale co-operative production programmes and the placing of offset work rather than outright purchases of equipment " off the shelf " ;
5. Press the member nations to ensure that when their military staffs issue requests for proposals (RFPs) to industrial manufacturers to meet a specified military requirement, they issue RFPs to existing industrial consortia as well as to individual firms ;
6. Continue to press member countries working through the Independent European Programme Group to harmonise to the maximum extent possible the requirements of their armed forces and the joint phasing of their re-equipment plans.

Draft Resolution

***on a colloquy on
international aeronautical consortia***

The Assembly,

Considering that the promotion of European co-operation in aeronautical consortia is one of its main concerns ;

Believing the development of a concerted policy to be in the best interests of Europe's aeronautical industries and defence posture ;

Considering the positive results of former colloquies held in Paris and Toulouse,

INSTRUCTS its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to organise a colloquy on aeronautical consortia in 1981 or early 1982 on the same basis as earlier colloquies.

Explanatory Memorandum

(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction

1. The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions has always played a leading rôle in the encouragement of collaboration and co-operation in the field of high technology defence equipment and has organised two colloquies on European aeronautical policy. The reports of Mr. Valleix, Mr. Warren, Mr. Richter and Mr. Scheffler were noteworthy in this respect.

2. Furthermore, in its reply to Recommendation 325 on a European armaments policy¹ the Council of Ministers of Western European Union stated that:

“The Council consider that efforts to organise European co-operation in the field of armaments production are essential and should be vigorously pursued.”

3. This ministerial response to the Critchley report received wholehearted endorsement in the Prime Minister of Belgium, Mr. Martens' speech at the opening of the WEU symposium on a European armaments policy in Brussels on Monday, 15th October 1979:

“In the present circumstances, all elements speak in favour of renewed efforts in order that the European members of the Atlantic Alliance jointly organise their armaments production.”²

4. These are but two of countless political injunctions in favour of European co-operation and joint production in the field of armaments. If political exhortation alone were sufficient to induce a collaborative approach to European development, manufacture and procurement of high technology defence equipment, commonality of weapons would long since have characterised the inventories at least of the European members of the Alliance.

5. The reality is very different and the causes for the disappointing progress towards European co-operation were again well summarised by Mr. Martens in his Brussels speech²:

(a) the failure to reach an agreement on the norms which the various types of material must answer, in accordance with the nature of the missions and

the manner in which they are accomplished;

(b) time differentials between the national schedules for replacement of material;

(c) the conflicts between national economic and industrial interests.

6. Nevertheless it would be wrong to conclude that progress towards achieving European co-operation in high technology defence equipment was insignificant. A large number of sophisticated weapon systems have either already been produced or are currently under development on a collaborative basis – mostly in the field of aerospace projects, both military aircraft and guided weapons.

7. This study will concentrate on the aerospace sector of high technology defence equipment seeking to record some of the judgments and views of manufacturers of such equipment and to analyse the lessons of their experience of European and transatlantic collaboration.

II. Historical background

8. Two of the first collaborative projects of major military importance were the Atlantic maritime reconnaissance aircraft and the Transall transport aircraft. Both were operationally successful and indeed continue in service today. Although the mechanisms of collaboration since the Atlantic and Transall programmes of the 1960s have evolved from agreements between separate national companies, through the establishment of small joint “nameplate” companies, like Sepecat for the Jaguar, with the management delegated to the constituent national companies, to the establishment of a common development and management company like Panavia for the Tornado, the rationale for collaboration remains basically unchanged.

9. This rationale can be easily summarised as follows¹:

(a) sharing of development costs;

(b) sharing of development risks;

(c) broadening of background: experience, capacity;

¹. Document 786.

². Official record, page 20, column 2.

¹. Cf. Document 738, A European armaments policy (Dankert report), page 9, column 2.

- (d) reduction of procurement cost: larger quantity and cadence;
- (e) advantages in logistics and readiness to act.

10. As the effects of economic recession, the escalating cost of energy and budgetary constraints have restricted governmental funding available for weapon procurement in Europe and as the costs of high technology defence equipment have tended to exceed the rate of inflation, financial and economic factors in favour of collaboration have powerfully reinforced the military arguments of interoperability and standardisation, so that now most of the major European equipment programmes are being pursued on a co-operative or collaborative basis. Furthermore, the necessity to maintain a high technology base in Western Europe has been an additional impetus towards European co-operation in the field of defence equipment and the preservation of European design and development expertise. The alternative would be an excessive dependence on American arms imports which would be industrially and strategically damaging to Western European interests.

11. Nevertheless the inventories of the West European armed forces still display remarkable disparities of equipment. To take the three largest North European countries of France, Germany and the United Kingdom as an example, their armies operate the AMX, Leopard I and Chieftain main battle tanks respectively, and although the new Franco-German tank agreement will standardise the principal equipment of the French and German armoured forces in the 1990s, there is no prospect of standardisation in this decade. The French are ordering more AMX-30 medium tanks, the Germans the Leopard II and the British the improved Chieftain, designated Challenger.

12. In the air forces, for which the need for interoperability and preferably standardisation is greatest in view of the rapidity and range of air operations and the potential destruction of bases and consequent need to disperse and divert aircraft in time of war, the lack of commonality is even more striking at present.

13. The Royal Air Force operates some Lightning F-6 and mostly Phantom FGR-2 interceptors in the air defence rôle. The French air defence force is comprised of some Mirage III-C fighters and mostly of Mirage F-1 fighters. The Luftwaffe flies Phantom F-4F interceptor fighters.

14. Immediate re-equipment plans for these three air forces will not rectify the situation. The Royal Air Force is due to re-equip its air defence squadrons with the air defence variant

(F-2) of the Tornado from about the middle of the decade. The French air force is to re-equip its interceptor force with the Mirage 2000 a little earlier. The Luftwaffe, however, is retaining the Phantom F-4F aircraft in front line service until the 1990s.

15. In the development of helicopters in support of land operations by France, Germany and the United Kingdom there are striking examples of the improved commonality which collaboration can bring, together with equally striking examples of failure to standardise both in terms of aircraft and their related weapons.

16. The Anglo-French helicopter agreement between Aérospatiale and Westland Helicopters Ltd. was the first example of the "family of projects" concept put into practice on a collaborative basis. Others are Airbus Industrie's A-300 airliner and derivatives, and the new anti-tank guided weapons being developed by Euromissile Dynamics Group. At least the British and the French both fly the Puma and the Gazelle in support of ground operations, although the British army air corps are converting to the multi-rôle Lynx which will operate the American-built Tow anti-tank guided missile whereas French army aviation flies the Gazelle with the Euromissile Hot missile in the anti-tank rôle.

17. German army aviation operates a mixture of American, French and German helicopters, although the Euromissile anti-tank missile Hot is standard anti-armour equipment for its units. Such an arrangement is not as illogical as might appear at first sight since a good degree of commonality is achieved with the helicopter formations of the American and French divisions in Southern Germany. Also the procurement of the BO-105 has underpinned the helicopter division of the principal German aerospace manufacturing company Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB).

18. Finally, in the field of advanced flying training aeroplanes there is little commonality in Western Europe. This category of aeroplane is relatively cheap to develop and produce. Its low development and production costs can be amortised over relatively short production runs and the export market is large enough to sustain penetration by several advanced training aeroplanes.

19. As a result the French and Belgian air forces operate the Marcel-Dassault-Dornier Alpha-Jet for advanced flying training, the Italian air force the Aermacchi 326 and 329 and the Royal Air Force the British Aerospace Hawk. As for the Luftwaffe, it trains its pilots in the United States of America on the Northrop T-38 Talon. There is at present very little evidence of progress towards stand-

ardised flying training in Western Europe on common training aeroplanes, although one significant step forward has been taken which stems directly from collaboration in high technology defence equipment. The Trinational Tornado Training Establishment (TTTE) has just opened at Royal Air Force, Cottesmore, in the United Kingdom, where air crews of the three countries are due to begin conversion training on the aeroplane next year.

III. Some current examples of collaboration

Jaguar

21. The Anglo-French Jaguar programme was initiated by government agreement in 1965. It differed from a number of subsequent projects in that project definition for the French *École de Combat et Appui Tactique* (ECAT) aircraft was almost complete before the Anglo-French ministerial agreement was signed. Also, the industrial collaboration was based on adapting an existing Bréguet design rather than on designing and developing the project totally *ab initio*. The ministerial decision to proceed with the project was taken on the basis of common operational requirements agreed by the two air staffs.

21. Unlike the previous examples of the Atlantic and the Transall, it was decided to form joint companies: Sepecat between Bréguet Aviation (latterly Avions Marcel Dassault-Bréguet) and British Aircraft Corporation (latterly British Aerospace) for the development and production of the airframe, and a joint company between Rolls-Royce Ltd. and Turbomeca SA for the development and production of the engine.

22. The ministerial agreement was that costs and work on the aeroplane would be equally shared between the French and British. The management and contractual arrangement was that the *Direction Technique des Constructions Aéronautiques* (DTCA) of the French *Ministère des Armées* placed contracts on behalf of both governments upon Sepecat. Likewise the Ministry of Technology (Mintech) initially, and then the Procurement Executive of the British Ministry of Defence (MOD-PE), placed contracts on behalf of both governments upon Rolls-Royce/Turbomeca.

23. The management of the project has been supervised from the government side by a small management committee of official experts in technical, financial and air force matters. Chairmanship of the official management committee alternated between the French and the British, as did the chairmanship of Sepecat, which was responsible for ensuring that the industrial workload was shared equally between

AMDBA and BAe. Four hundred aircraft were ordered: two hundred for the *Armée de l'Air*, two hundred for the RAF.

24. The Jaguar was produced in four basic variants originally: "A" (*Appui*) single-seat offensive support for the French air force, "B" two-seat trainer for the Royal Air Force, "E" two-seat trainer for the French air force, and "S" single-seat strike variant for the Royal Air Force. The airframes and engines were basically identical although the avionics and navigation and attack systems varied between the French and British aeroplanes.

25. In addition, international variants of the aircraft were developed for overseas markets, and the aeroplane is now also in service with the air forces of the Sultanate of Oman, India and Ecuador. Nevertheless the Jaguar has never realised its full overseas sales potential, perhaps because one of the manufacturing partners had in the Mirage range of fighters a series of well-proven, high performance aircraft of considerable versatility although optimised for air defence. In those circumstances it was hardly surprising that Avions Marcel Dassault have tended to promote more wholeheartedly the sale of Mirages overseas, which they build alone, than of Jaguars, in which they have only a 50 % share.

26. The marketing overseas of the Jaguar has been one of the principal weaknesses of the programme. It has relied on the efforts and co-operation of the partner companies which have been less than totally committed. By contrast, the Airbus Industrie and Panavia consortia have their own sales forces which are separate from those of the participating companies in the project.

27. The Sepecat/Rolls-Royce-Turbomeca approach to collaboration has, in conclusion, proved successful. The Jaguar programme was effectively managed and no horrendous cost overrun occurred. Furthermore, the system of project management proved itself flexible enough to adapt to the cancellation of the French maritime "M" variant early in the programme, to the production of international variants of the aeroplane, and a continuing process of performance enhancement. The management has been unbureaucratic and no elaborate management structures at either an official or an industrial level have been superimposed on the project to create unnecessary overheads or to slow down the decision-making process. In short, the Sepecat model has proved practical.

Alpha-Jet

28. Collaboration between Avions Marcel Dassault SA (initially Bréguet) and Dornier GmbH on the Alpha-Jet advanced jet trainer

and light attack aircraft has also worked well. Although a Dornier design was adopted for the Alpha-Jet project, leadership has in effect been vested in Avions Marcel Dassault, and AMDBA has acted as prime contractor, so the industrial organisation involved has in essence been similar to that for a purely national programme.

29. Cost control has been most effective and, according to a paper submitted by the Federal German Defence Department to the Defence Committee of the Bundestag, the cost of the Alpha-Jet now is as envisaged at the beginning of the project. The only cost increase has been caused directly by inflation and is at the rate of 6 % for West Germany and 12 % for France.

30. The incorporation of two operational requirements for a light attack aircraft to replace the Fiat G-91 in service with the Luftwaffe, and for an intermediate/advanced jet trainer to replace the Fouga Magister in service with the *Armée de l'Air*, in a single project has endowed the Alpha-Jet with considerable versatility and sales potential. Furthermore, because a German manufacturer has married its industrial efforts to a French company whose record in the field of military sales is unsurpassed in Europe, any political inhibitions to vigorous export promotion of the Alpha-Jet have not been apparent. The aeroplane has been sold to nine air forces and an agreement has been reached with the Lockheed Corporation to promote the aircraft for the United States navy advanced trainer requirement, just as British Aerospace has teamed up with the Douglas Aircraft Division of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation to market the Hawk jet trainer and attack aircraft for the same requirement.

31. The Alpha-Jet has just completed a demonstration tour of 100 hours' flying in the United States which was extremely successful. The aeroplane is one of six short-listed by the United States navy; two of the others being existing aeroplanes and the other three new projects.

Tornado

32. The Tornado is by far the biggest single collaborative project in Europe, and a total of 805 aircraft have been ordered for the West German navy and Luftwaffe, the Italian air force and the Royal Air Force. The project's management structure was well documented in the Crichtley report (Document 786, paragraphs 47-59).

33. On the industrial side it is vested in two joint companies. One is Panavia, based on a core of permanently seconded personnel at a working level from the three participating

companies, Aeritalia, British Aerospace and Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm, with a board of management drawn from these companies and chairmanship alternating between them. The other joint company is Turbo Union, the joint engine manufacturing company consisting of representatives of Motor Turbinen Union (MTU), Fiat and Rolls-Royce, which is operated and managed in a similar way to Panavia.

34. The governmental organisation established to control the project is interesting and important. There is a supervisory board of directors with technical, financial and military representatives of the three governments (NATO Multi-Rôle Combat Aircraft Management Organisation - NAMMO). The chairman is a senior official of the British Ministry of Defence.

35. The detailed supervision and management of the project is the responsibility of a permanent body of British, German and Italian experts co-located in the same office building as the Tornado industrial management company Panavia. This official agency (NAMMA) is headed by a German officer with a British and an Italian deputy. This body is responsible for placing all contracts and supervising the programme of the project under the general direction of the board of directors.

36. Criticism has often been levelled at the Tornado programme on grounds of excessive cost escalation. In fact the basic flyaway cost of the Tornado "has remained constant (excluding official corrections for inflation and fluctuations in exchange rates) since 1976, when the series production contract was signed with industry commitment to a maximum price for 805 Tornados and including a specific maximum price for the first batch", according to Minister Dirigent Hans Ambos, Director, Tornado Weapon Systems, Ministry of Defence, Bonn¹.

37. "The final fixed price of the first batch was in fact 7 % below the maximum price agreed at that time between customer and industry. Trinational programme cost increase in real terms between 1970 and 1980 was 17.8 % which was accounted for by additional and subsequent customer requirements with regard to equipment, e.g. electronic counter-measures (ECM)."¹ There have of course been higher wages and material costs which have not been contained within the original estimates.

38. Mr. Ambos gave the flyaway cost of the Tornado, at the economic conditions at the end

1. See Panavia News, No. 28, August 1980, for Mr. Ambos' speech on 8th August 1980 at the German Defence Ministry, Bonn.

of 1979 based on a production run of 805 aircraft, as DM 35.26 million. Flyaway cost includes airframe, engines, avionics, general equipment and guns.

39. Ninety-five per cent of modifications either necessitated by the experience of development flying or stipulated by the customers have been incorporated into the aircraft. Fifty per cent of the weapons development has been carried out and 25 % of the ECM development completed. The first British and German GRI interdiction-strike aircraft are in service at the Trination Tornado Training Establishment at RAF Cottesmore where instructor training has begun in preparation for the first pupil conversion courses next year. Furthermore, the British air defence variant (F-2) is undergoing development at the prototype stage and performance of the aeroplane appears to be good, although the integration with the airborne radar system has yet to come.

40. All in all the Tornado programme is proving technically reasonably successful, although as with the Jaguar it would have facilitated the aircraft's development if a proven power plant had been used. However, the RB-199 should have considerable development potential during the service life of the aircraft. Standardisation in weapons has not been fully achieved owing in part to the need to utilise existing stocks in British, German and Italian inventories, which is regrettable. Nevertheless, a major step forward in standardisation and interoperability is being achieved as a result of the Tornado.

41. Panavia is now dealing with logistic support of the aircraft in the fields of equipment and spares provisioning, the procurement of tools and other aspects. Although Panavia is undertaking these additional tasks, and although the third production batch of the aircraft has been authorised, the Panavia management staff remains at 200 people, the same as it was at the outset of the production phase.

42. A future European collaborative military aircraft project could well benefit from the procedures developed by Panavia. For example, Panavia has evolved a common standards system as well as a successful comprehensive system for equipment procurement. Panavia should be invited to tender if requests for proposals (RFPs) were issued for future European combat aircraft. It would be wrong to allow such a wealth of expertise in European collaboration not to be fully utilised and even if Panavia were not awarded another military aircraft contract after Tornado, the official management agency, NAMMA, has expertise also which could be utilised to control another project.

43. There is no doubt that the mechanism of collaboration for the Tornado and communication between partner companies requires special effort. But the additional burden due to partnership arrangements is to some extent inevitable, as any major project involves literally hundreds of suppliers and if a comparable project were being undertaken in the United States, distances between the makers of the major components would be probably even greater. Nevertheless, the influence of NAMMA does not speed decision-making and its approval is required before relatively minor modifications or programme changes can be initiated. It is bureaucratic but that is the price of detailed official cost control and it is not an essential feature of the Tornado management arrangement which is true partnership.

General Dynamics F-16 "Fighting Falcon"

44. A form of collaboration which should not be lightly dismissed and which could have considerable potential for the future is exemplified by the General Dynamics F-16 programme whereby the Belgian, Danish, Netherlands and Norwegian air forces, in addition to the United States air force, are procuring the aircraft. Each of these European countries is involved in F-16 construction on a sub-contractor basis.

45. Belgium has ordered 116 of the aeroplanes, Denmark 58, the Netherlands 102 and Norway 72, making the total procurement of the European participating countries (EPCs) in the F-16 programme 348. By the time that the production of F-16s for the four European air forces is concluded at the end of 1984, a total of 1,233 F-16s should have been built for all customers and it is expected that the United States air force will have taken delivery of 1,388 F-16s by the end of the decade¹. In addition, it is expected that the United States air force will operate between 240 and 350 F-16s in Europe. There will be a total on their projections of eleven F-16 main operating bases (MOBs) and seventeen co-located and dual operating bases.

46. The United States Air Forces Europe main operating bases for the F-16 will be in West Germany and Spain. These aircraft may be augmented by F-16 squadrons of tactical air command, and latterly the Air National Guard and United States Air Force Reserve. All F-16 main operating bases will be capable of providing first and second line servicing on the aircraft. Third line servicing will be done at maintenance depots with specialised depot repair facilities in each European participating country.

1. See Appendix.

47. The logistic support for the F-16 is one of the most impressive aspects of this important re-equipment programme for North European air forces. To date nine European locations have been identified for depot support with some locations providing support for more than one category of equipment. In particular there will be three F-16 engine depot facilities – Fabrique Nationale in Belgium, Woensdrecht in Holland, and Royal Norwegian Air Force Material Command in Norway.

48. In the avionics field each European participating country has responsibility for test and repair of specific categories of avionic components that are not repairable at base level. Depot repair and calibration of support equipment will be available at two locations in Europe – Royal Norwegian Air Force Material Command in Norway and Rhenen in Holland.

49. Last but not least, other potential sources for depot repair capabilities are the European F-16 coproducers, principally SABCA and SONACA in Belgium, Per Udsen in Denmark, and Fokker in the Netherlands. These coproducers provide a potential source of spare parts and an important source of technical expertise.

50. There are two principal merits in the F-16 programme. One is military and involves a degree of interoperability and standardisation hitherto not achieved in Europe. The European air forces flying the F-16 will benefit from the technical data on the aircraft collated at USAF Systems Command Headquarters at Dayton, Ohio, from the experience of all user air forces. Secondly, European instructor pilots converted to the aeroplane at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, before the four national conversion units were opened in Europe. The interchange of experience between the European air forces and USAF is valuable and reports on the flying qualities of the F-16 from European pilots are enthusiastic although as yet the radar's performance is disappointing.

51. In conclusion, the industrial aspect of the F-16 collaboration has lessons. With General Dynamics as prime contractor the management structure is direct. It was agreed that 58 % of the value of the F-16s bought by the European participating countries would be placed in orders on suppliers in these countries. About 53 % has been achieved to date. The shortfall is due to the relative lack of high technology industries in Norway and Denmark. This factor has made balanced offset between the European participating countries hard to achieve and evidence of the divergence of industrial capabilities lies in the location of the two final assembly lines and flight operations centres with SABCA at Gosselies, Belgium, and Fokker at Schiphol in Holland.

52. The F-16 procurement system has proved flexible enough to permit the development of special features for individual European nations such as a brake parachute for the Norwegians, an Orpheus reconnaissance pod for the Dutch and the Rapport III internal electronic counter-measures system for the Belgians. Up to July 1980 the European production programme was proceeding on schedule with 62 aircraft delivered as against 61 scheduled in the original 1975 plan when the order was placed. The cost of the aircraft is apparently within the "not to exceed" figure quoted, and the Europeans are also building 15 % of the F-16s being procured by other air forces.

Helicopters

53. To a considerable extent the helicopter industry in Europe developed from the licence construction of American machines – principally Bell and Sikorsky designs. In a number of instances this proved lucrative business for European manufacturers, particularly in the case of the Westland/Sikorsky SH3D Sea King anti-submarine helicopter following the granting to Westland Helicopters of sales rights of the aircraft in a number of territories overseas.

54. The transformation of the European helicopter industry came with the Anglo-French helicopter agreement whereby Westland Helicopters and Aérospatiale agreed jointly to develop a family of three helicopters, the Gazelle, Puma and Lynx, on the "Alpha-Jet principle"; that is, in each case one of the two partners became prime contractor. For the Gazelle and Puma it was Aérospatiale, for the Lynx Westland Helicopters. Commercially the arrangement was extremely satisfactory for the companies although Westland Helicopters, who had not developed a new design before, encountered problems in the early stages of the Lynx programme and overran their cost estimates with temporarily alarming financial implications. Nevertheless the Anglo-French helicopter agreement for the Gazelle, Puma and Lynx provided a "home market" of some 900 aircraft for the French and British armed forces alone, with hundreds more ordered for numerous export customers.

55. If the Anglo-French helicopter agreement was the second stage of the development of the European helicopter industry, the signature of the industrial memorandum of understanding between the four principal European manufacturers, Aérospatiale, Agusta, Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm and Westland in 1975 was the third. The companies which compete vigorously both in European and export markets met to lay down a joint strategy for the future. It is noteworthy that the impetus was

not the result of some institutional inspiration or governmental directive but an industrial initiative, and the results were considerable.

56. It was agreed to hold regular meetings of the principals of the four companies – called the Inter-Company Co-operation Committee (ICCC). Reviews were to be instituted of the likely future needs of the European market and the prospects for collaboration to meet these requirements evaluated. Rules were established to govern participation and non-participation in collaborative projects, together with rules to govern disclosure of information for collaborative purposes and for the protection of new technology jointly developed.

57. In 1978 this industrial initiative was followed up by the signature on the part of the British, French, West German and Italian Governments of a declaration of principles for collaboration in helicopter programmes and the establishment by the governments of a steering committee for European collaboration which meets regularly in each country in turn and at the same time meets with the Inter-Company Co-operation Committee to review policy and progress.

58. The declaration of principles signed by the Ministers of Defence of the four countries states that:

- (a) the Governments of France, Italy, the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom seek to work together to develop and produce new helicopters, including their engines and equipment;
- (b) the four governments will:
 - (i) make every effort to reconcile their future requirements by agreeing common technical definitions and time-scales so that their requirements can be met on a collaborative basis;
 - (ii) define a management structure for each collaborative project and seek to achieve an equitable sharing of responsibilities between the four countries over the whole field of helicopter co-operation;
 - (iii) seek to develop by this method a family of products suitable for sale to other countries;
 - (iv) pursue a common policy with industry to promote closer industrial collaboration, in particular by encouraging the creation of a working group composed of delegates from SNIAS, MBB, Agusta and WHL;

- (v) inform each other and consult together before selecting new equipment and to make every effort to meet their needs with helicopters developed jointly in Europe;

- (vi) endeavour to obtain the same commitment from the other IEPG countries.

59. At present two third-generation European helicopter programmes are envisaged on a collaborative basis. They are for a specialist two-seat anti-tank helicopter/gunship designated PAH-2 to be developed jointly by MBB and SNIAS for the French and West German armies, and for a Sea King anti-submarine helicopter replacement designated EH-101 for the Italian and Royal navies to be developed jointly by Agusta and WHL.

60. Although the requirements appear clear enough, official endorsement of these projects as conceived by the manufacturers is less than speedy. Debate continues whether a specialist anti-tank helicopter is preferable to a multi-rôle helicopter such as the Lynx equipped with Hot or Tow anti-tank guided weapons.

61. On the naval side, debate persists about the optimum all-up weight of the ideal future Sea King replacement in view of the uncertainties about the precise nature of the anti-submarine weapon systems to be carried in the late 1980s. In these circumstances industry has taken the initiative in advance of a decision by the governments to launch full development of the projected ASW helicopter EH-101 by forming a joint company E.H. Helicopters Limited, registered in London and owned on a 50:50 basis by Agusta and Westland. Staff are already being recruited for it and as a result the industrial partners have ensured that if any delay occurs with the project it cannot be attributed to any failure on industry's part to provide in good time the necessary management structures. Furthermore, delay could inhibit other potentially important collaborative programmes such as the Rolls-Royce/Turbomeca 321 engine, which should also be officially supported.

Guided weapons

62. The first generation of guided weapons in Europe were purely national programmes. The second generation were both national programmes, like the British Rapier, Sea Wolf, Sea Skua, Sea Dart, Blowpipe and so on, and collaborative like the family of Euromissile guided weapons, Hot for the air-to-ground anti-tank rôle, Milan for the infantry anti-tank rôle and Roland for surface-to-air use. Euromissile is a joint company between MBB and SNIAS with

an official management committee superimposed.

63. As with helicopters, the three Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the United Kingdom agreed a memorandum of understanding to collaborate on third-generation guided weapons. A new joint company, Euromissile Dynamics Group (EMDG), was formed on 1st January 1980, registered in Paris with equal shares between SNIAS, MBB and the Dynamics Group of British Aerospace. BAe Dynamics Group had already been involved in the licence manufacture of Milan and this is now a trinational arrangement under the EMDG umbrella with the United Kingdom enjoying a third share in future export sales.

64. Following the memorandum of understanding, a trinational feasibility study has been placed with EMDG which should last two years for future anti-tank guided weapons, both long- and medium-range, to replace Swingfire, Hot and Milan. There is also a quadripartite memorandum of understanding with the United States which allows for information exchanges in this field.

65. Under a quadripartite letter of intent EMDG and the Hughes Corporation are teaming up to respond to a quadripartite request for proposals for multi-launch rocket system (MLRS) ammunition.

66. Under a trinational agreement a feasibility study is being funded for a new medium-range surface-to-air missile system (MSAMS) to replace the Bloodhound and Hawk in the 1990s. The partners are BAe Dynamics Group, MBB and Thomson-CSF of France. The feasibility study is due to begin next year. A joint industrial company is under discussion. The competition is the American system Patriot already adopted as the Nike replacement in the United States and promoted in NATO to replace Hawk also.

67. BAe Dynamics Group is the prime contractor for the NATO 6S programme for the new naval point defence missile system for defence against missile attack in the 1990s (Sea Wolf replacement). The other countries involved are France, Germany and, to a lesser extent, Denmark. The project has just completed the feasibility stage. A large number of companies are involved and industrial arrangements have not been finalised.

68. A trinational project entitled ASSM for a family of anti-ship missile systems for the 1990s is at the project definition stage. These missiles are to replace Exocet and Harpoon. The participating countries are France, West Germany and the United Kingdom. SNIAS, MBB and BAe Dynamics Group are the lead

companies and have formed a joint company, Anti-Ship Euromissile (ASEM). If the programme goes ahead, ASEM will be merged into EMDG.

69. Lastly and perhaps most interestingly, under a recent quadripartite memorandum of understanding signed by the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom, it was agreed that the United States should develop the next generation of advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM) to replace the AIM-7 Sparrow and Skyflash, and that the Europeans should develop the next generation of advanced short-range air-to-air missiles (ASRAAM) to replace the AIM-9 Sidewinder and Magic missiles currently in service. France is a signatory government with the option of becoming a full participant in the programme if the missiles meet its requirements. For ASRAAM, BAe Dynamics and Bodenseewerk Gerätetechnik (BGT) are collaborating on the development. The in-service dates may present conflicting requirements and there is a danger that longer production lines for ASRAAM, made under licence in America, could enable them to dominate the export market to third countries.

70. The Governments of Germany, Norway, Italy and the United Kingdom have recently agreed a joint programme to manufacture the AIM-9L Sidewinder under licence with BGT as the prime contractor.

IV. Conclusion

71. In spite of the apparent lack of progress towards interoperability and standardisation as evidenced by current European inventories of high technology defence equipment, the reality is that important progress was made first with the Transall and Atlantic co-operative programmes and the licence manufacture of hundreds of F-104 Starfighters. Then the second generation of collaborative equipment carried the process further with the Jaguar, Tornado and Alpha-Jet, the Anglo-French family of Gazelle, Puma and Lynx helicopters and the Milan and Roland guided weapons.

72. Now the third generation of equipments is either entering service, or is in the development, project definition or conceptual stages. In the missile and helicopter sectors governmental memoranda of understanding together with joint industrial companies underpin the common political determination to proceed on a collaborative basis in Europe. This is important evidence that a strategy of collaboration is evolving jointly to develop and manufacture whole families of weapon systems.

73. This process is taken further in the case of the AMRAAM and ASRAAM missiles. The Americans view the memorandum of understanding on these as confirmation that the Europeans have embraced the United States Administration's family of weapons concept whereby coproduction of each missile system would take place on both sides of the Atlantic on the basis of unified research and development; on the American side in the case of AMRAAM and on the European in the case of ASRAAM.

74. The family of weapons concept is part of the "triad of co-operative actions" recently initiated by the Alliance along with general and reciprocal memoranda of understanding and dual production. In early 1978 the United States proposed a list of seventeen candidate weapon systems for European dual production. The unfavourable response has been interpreted from Washington as confirmation of a predominantly "buy European" rôle on the part of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) which had been initially seen as an essential mechanism to concert the European inputs to a growing "two-way street" in high technology weapon systems.

75. Although the common theme of the memoranda of understanding is the elimination of restrictions on defence equipment imports from other NATO countries, little progress has been made so far in the eyes of the Europeans towards the acceptance of European equipment in the United States. The Roland experience was not a happy one and even the development of the superlative British Aerospace Harrier into the McDonnell Douglas AV8-B has been sustained only by Congressional funding against total lack of funding by the Administration. If approved by the United States Government, the McDonnell Douglas-British Aerospace AV8-B could prove an outstanding example of transatlantic co-operation not just in the airframe partnership between McDonnell Douglas and British Aerospace under McDonnell Douglas' leadership, but also in the partnership on the Pegasus engine between Pratt and Whitney and Rolls-Royce under Rolls-Royce's leadership. The aircraft itself meets a United States Marine Corps requirement very well and is also a candidate for an order from the Royal Air Force.

76. Furthermore, the General Electric/SNECMA collaboration on the CFM-56 turbofan is beginning to bear fruit. A number of DC-8 civil aircraft are being retrofitted with the CFM-56 engine to improve fuel economy and reduce noise and a similar programme is under way to retrofit a significant number of KC-135 tankers in service with Strategic Air Command. The installation of the CFM-56 engine has also been proven on a Boeing 707. The French air force has decided to re-equip one of its four Douglas DC-8 long-range transport aircraft with the General Electric/SNECMA CFM-56 engine. The aim is to prolong the operational life of the aircraft by retrofitting it with a more modern, powerful and economical powerplant. The CFM-56 will probably also be installed in other existing transport aircraft of the French air force. It is also the intention of the French air staff to procure this engine for retrofitting into the Boeing KC-135 tanker aircraft currently in service with the French air force. A definite decision will be taken after the completion of trials on American KC-135 tankers presently being conducted by the United States air force.

77. Lastly, the lessons of the biggest collaborative programmes in Europe, the F-16 and the Tornado, show two equally valid approaches to joint production, both of which enhance interoperability and standardisation in the front line. Perhaps the F-16 route is the appropriate one for smaller countries and licence construction of an American aeroplane just as valid as offset in the form of licence construction of a European aircraft. However, the Europeans often see coproduction merely as a Trojan horse for American industrial domination and the erosion of European design expertise and technical capability. For the bigger nations such as France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, with independent design capabilities and an experience of developing sophisticated military aircraft, the Tornado road is usually the right one. Collaboration depends on political will allied to magnanimity and vision in high places. Given those prerequisites it should be possible for Britain, France and Germany to sink their petty industrial and air staff differences to develop the next generation of combat aircraft they all will need. If the political will to collaborate exists at all WEU must encourage it.

Poland and European security

MOTION FOR AN ORDER

*tabled by Mr. Valleix and others
with a request for urgent procedure*

The Assembly,

Expressing its attachment to the principles of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and in particular the inviolability of state frontiers and the ban on the threat or use of force as a means of settling disputes between states;

Recalling the unanimous condemnation expressed by the WEU member countries when Warsaw Pact troops entered Czechoslovak territory in 1968 in violation of Czechoslovakia's national sovereignty;

Reaffirming the traditional attachment of democratic Europe to the independence and sovereignty of Poland;

Considering that the existence of an independent and sovereign Polish state is an essential part of European security;

Disturbed by the many recent statements made in the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia about the situation in Poland,

I. INSTRUCTS ITS GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

To follow developments in Poland and to report to it on this question at the next part-session;

II. INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

To convene an extraordinary session forthwith should the independence and sovereignty of Poland be jeopardised by an armed foreign intervention, *inter alia* in order to be able to recommend that the Council of Ministers meeting at the level of Ministers of Defence take all appropriate measures in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Signed: Valleix, De Poi, Pignion, Druon, Lenzer, Wilkinson, Baumel, Reddemann, Bennett, Bozzi, Caro

Relations with Parliaments

INFORMATION REPORT

***submitted on behalf of the
Committee for Relations with Parliaments
by Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur***

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INFORMATION REPORT

submitted by Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur

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Information Report

(submitted by Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur)

1. As often stated by the WEU Council of Ministers, by national Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Defence, and during this session in the General Affairs Committee's report on the future of European security, at the present juncture WEU remains the only truly European organisation with responsibility for defence matters, and WEU has an organic link with national parliaments, which alone can supervise member states' defence policies. For its part the WEU Assembly can influence defence policies not only through the WEU Council but through national parliaments as well.

2. There are two ways of reaching these parliaments and your Rapporteur believes they should be used simultaneously:

- (a) the transmission of adopted texts with the request that parliamentarians put questions or intervene in debates on matters raised in the WEU Assembly;
- (b) exerting pressure on national parliaments from the outside through the press and the electors.

3. The Assembly should make use of both these methods. Therefore this report will have two parts:

- I. Activities of the Committee ;
- II. Relations between parliaments and press.

I. Activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

4. Since its creation the Committee for Relations with Parliaments has been in touch with the parliaments, including several regional parliaments¹ and all parliamentarians from member states. The Committee has also regularly reported to the Assembly of Western European Union on parliamentary matters of interest to members². Since November 1979, the publication "Collected texts relating to parliamentary action in implementation of recom-

mendations adopted by the Assembly" has included a chapter on questions and debates on defence matters in the assembly of the European Communities. This decision was taken at the request of certain Committee members in Besançon in October 1979.

5. The Rapporteur of the Committee's last report (Document 835), Mr. Schlingemann, very clearly set out what your Committee can and cannot do to promote the aims and work of WEU in the different national parliaments. This need not therefore be repeated but the Assembly must be shown exactly what the Committee has achieved.

6. At the end of the last session it selected two texts for transmission to the national parliaments:

- Recommendation 349 on the impact of the evolving situation in the Near and Middle East on Western European security (report tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, Document 844);
- Recommendation 352 on defence-related information technology (report tabled by Mr. Brasseur on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 840).

As always, these texts were chosen with a view to their suitability for action in parliament. All texts are printed in the orange booklet on each part-session for transmission to all members of parliament of the member countries.

7. The Chairman of the Committee wrote to all members of the Committee with copies "for information" to the secretaries of the national delegations sending several pro forma questions which might be put on the two recommendations selected, and asked that the questions actually put, the answers and speeches in debates be sent to the secretariat of the Committee. Although the secretariat has to read all parliamentary proceedings and documents from the seven member countries in order to prepare the monthly bulletin on European activities, it helps very much if members send in the details of their action.

8. The results gathered have been rather promising: from the June session to the end of

1. See Appendix III: Visits by the Committee.

2. See Appendix II: Studies undertaken.

September a total of sixty questions, answers and speeches have been recorded and circulated to members of the Committee prior to being printed in Collected Texts 32. Bearing in mind that this period covers some two months of summer holidays, your Rapporteur finds this most gratifying.

9. Table II, giving the breakdown by recommendation, shows that members have often been able to put questions on recommendations other than 349 and 352, and especially 348 where the French asked a large number of questions on the abolition of paragraph V of Appendix III to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty, allowing the Federal Republic to build certain warships. Recommendations 347, 350, 351, 353 and 354 were also mentioned in the parliaments. In addition, WEU in general was mentioned in fourteen speeches (ten in France, two in Italy and two in the United Kingdom).

10. Apart from the Committee's activities proper, Collected Texts 32 include for information (see paragraph 4) questions put in the Assembly of the European Communities relating to arms, ammunition, military security, etc. Your Committee has noted four such texts since June.

II. Preliminary observations on relations between parliaments and press

(i) Situation country by country

A. Federal Republic of Germany

11. After the second world war political life in Germany started again at regional level (Länderrat or Council of Regions in the American zone). In 1948, the Parliamentary Council met to prepare a new constitution, which was adopted in May 1949.

12. In September 1949 a press service was created to handle newspapers, the radio and television, and on the 7th of that month the first plenary session could be heard over the radio. The first televised plenary session was viewed on 6th October 1953. Since 1970 the Press Centre has had three sections: PZ 1 for press, radio and television; PZ 2 for correspondence with parliament (documentation centre); PZ 3 for visitors to the Bundestag and to the Reichstag building in Berlin; editing information booklets and films. Since 1978 the Press Centre has had its own building for receiving visitors to the Bundestag.

13. The number of accredited journalists rose from 200 in 1949-52 to 600 in 1960-69 and is

now around 700. The number of visitors to the Bundestag and to Berlin was as follows:

Bundeshaus

1949-52	920,000	1961	195,614	1970	173,586
1953	55,227	1962	214,649	1971	237,102
1954	557,703	1963	112,428	1972	207,889
1955	461,586	1964	117,715	1973	254,398
1956	409,178	1965	115,714	1974	235,456
1957	289,746	1966	107,131	1975	218,153
1958	258,930	1967	174,090	1976	232,168
1959	225,310	1968	164,512	1977	197,468
1960	193,715	1969	149,751	1978	200,708

Reichstag

Year	Visitors		Visitors to exhibitions
	Number of groups	Number of participants	
1974	1,455	36,396	134,035
1975	5,012	124,798	421,713
1976	5,700	142,630	426,771
1977	6,258	150,451	460,419
1978	5,891	147,282	534,621

14. The Press Centre has so far prepared the following publications:

Collection "The Bundestag from A to Z".

Collection "Zur Sache".

1. Magazine "Parliamentary News".

2. Magazine "Reichstag".

3. Leaflet "Legislative procedure".

4. Leaflet "The Reichstag in German history".

5. Poster "Forum Parliament".

6. Booklet "The German Bundestag".

7. Booklet "In plenary sitting" (for visitors).

8. Ernst Deuerlein: "The Reichstag. Essays, records and statements retracing the history of parliamentary representation of the German people" (second edition of a booklet published in 1963 by the *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*).

9. Calendar "Parliament in Germany".
10. Album "Portrait of a parliament".
11. Exhibition of photographs "The defender of all the Germans" (in all the Bundestag constituencies).
12. The federal assembly election of the Federal President 1949-74. Documentation.

15. Section 2 edits four publications which appear every week or two weeks: HIB: Today in the Bundestag; WIB: The week in the Bundestag; Mitteilungen: Information from the Bundestag; Fernsehdienst: Information for television. The totals for the years 1970-78 were as follows:

Year	Today in the Bundestag	The week in the Bundestag	Information from the Bundestag	Information for television
1970	117	—	18	—
1971	357	13	44	—
1972	213	17	41	—
1973	277	22	49	96
1974	277	24	50	84
1975	271	25	32	99
1976	206	20	40	76
1977	247	23	47	95
1978	251	24	39	71

B. Belgium

16. Whether a specific newspaper is linked with a given political trend or not, political information, and summary records in particular, and scrutiny of the activities of the legislative occupy a prominent place in the columns of Belgian daily papers.

17. The political authorities have always been aware of the importance of free and pluralist information, which is guaranteed by adequate constitutional and legal provisions. The authorities even took active steps in this sense by deciding to grant material assistance to the press.

18. As well as indirect, not to say covert, assistance, through preferential postal rates, the legislative authorities have, for several years, voted direct credits designed, in the words of the relevant bills passed each year, "to maintain the diversity of opinions in the press".

19. The facilities afforded to journalists in carrying out their work are essentially the responsibility of the parliamentary bureaux and

their decisions are complemented by unwritten rules confirming well-established traditions. Thus, the two Belgian chambers have procedure for accrediting parliamentary journalists and there is a post of parliamentary press syndic. There are special galleries, offices and lounges for journalists.

20. Note should also be taken of the weekly publication of a parliamentary information bulletin by the Chamber of Representatives. This bulletin, destined for both the press and the public, gives a brief but complete account of this Assembly's work and records the activities of members of parliament in international organisations.

21. As for the so-called "electronic" press, there has been television in the Chamber of Representatives for several years. One may wonder, however, whether the desired aim of bringing citizens nearer to their representatives and familiarising them with the operation of the parliamentary system has been fully attained. The fact is that there has never been a very large audience and, with time, numbers have fallen.

22. It has therefore been concluded that it is preferable to keep to occasional broadcasts of short extracts from major parliamentary debates rather than to televise them direct and in full.

C. France

23. Relations between the National Assembly and the press vary considerably depending on whether work in the plenary sitting or in committee is considered.

24. Plenary sittings are open to the public and hence the press has access. A gallery is reserved for duly-accredited journalists, of which there are about 250. The Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms is responsible for accreditation, which is in principle reserved for staff of daily and weekly publications and press agencies, and which gives them access to part of the premises of the Palais Bourbon and consequently allows them to meet parliamentarians.

25. The main debates are televised by two of the three national channels, TF1 and Antenne 2, under the supervision of the Bureau of the National Assembly.

26. Committee meetings, which are an important part of parliamentary work, are not open to the public. Journalists are informed of this work by press communiqués which committees have to issue after each meeting. There is one exception to this rule. The activities of committees of enquiry and supervision, which are set up for specific purposes and for periods of six months, are wholly secret.

27. Finally, various documents published by the National Assembly are available to the press: summary reports circulated a few hours after debates, weekly bulletins setting out work conducted in plenary sitting and in committee, which are useful for reference, and reports submitted by members of parliament on bills and motions for laws and on budgetary texts.

D. Italy

28. There is a maximum of co-operation in relations between the Italian Parliament and the national and foreign press. Journalists are free to follow all debates from their own gallery. Officials of the Italian Parliament provide printed versions of decisions taken during debates and summaries of speeches by members of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate within thirty minutes. This greatly facilitates the work of journalists. Parliament places at their disposal a large press room with telephones, telex, typewriters and telescriptors free of charge.

29. The system for work in committees is different: journalists are not admitted except in specific cases. Here too, officials hand out as soon as possible summaries of discussions and decisions in committees.

30. Italian and foreign television teams are allowed to transmit live broadcasts of debates in plenary session after securing the permission of the President.

31. Parliamentary journalists have their own association with its seat in the parliament building, but even journalists who are not members of this association may be authorised to attend in both chambers.

32. Journalists are free to avail themselves of all the services provided for members including telephones, hairdressers, the restaurant and bar, sports facilities, the post office, and so on. Once a year, in the summer, they are officially received by the President of the Chamber who is traditionally given a fan bearing the signatures of the bureau of the association. This ceremony goes back to the last century when, during a very hot summer (and in the 19th century there was no air conditioning), the President was hardly able to direct the work of the Chamber. The journalists gave him a fan and, by tradition, he is still given one today although he no longer needs it. The ceremony symbolises the homage of press to parliament. By and large Italian newspapers, radio and television record what happens in Parliament and it cannot be said that Italians are not kept informed.

E. Luxembourg

33. The Luxembourg Parliament co-operates as much as possible with the national press, for whose representatives a gallery is reserved from which they may follow debates in public sitting.

34. Ushers regularly distribute to journalists the official texts circulated to members of parliament (parliamentary questions and government replies, amendments, motions, resolutions, parliamentary documents, reports) and, whenever possible, copies of speeches made during sittings.

35. Parliamentary journalists have a press room equipped with telephones, typewriters and a loudspeaker so that debates in plenary sitting may be followed at all times.

36. Several times a year, the President of the Chamber of Deputies receives the parliamentary press at a press conference during which he gives appropriate information about the future work of the chamber and answers questions put by journalists. Recently at such a press conference a further improvement in the working conditions of parliamentary journalists in the Chamber of Deputies was announced (an extra office, etc.).

37. Starting with the current session (October 1980), a booth has been installed in the press gallery to allow Radio Luxembourg to record debates. When parliament is sitting, the radio broadcasts daily summaries of debates and live extracts during newscasts. So far, only more important events have been televised (opening of the session, particularly important statements and debates).

38. All the various daily newspapers publish substantial summaries of debates in public sitting (followed about two weeks later by the verbatim report of debates distributed free of charge to all elector households by the Office of the Clerk of the Chamber of Deputies).

39. Committee meetings are held in camera and the press is not admitted.

F. Netherlands

40. Within the Office of the Clerk the section Information and Public Relations is responsible for the relations with press and other media.

41. Those journalists who regularly come to the parliament are considered parliamentary journalists. They are given a permanent entry-pass to the buildings. Journalists who work ad hoc at the parliament are issued with a temporary pass. Journalists with either a temporary or a permanent pass are free to move within the building, with the exception of those parts marked "for members only".

42. Television crews and photographers are subject to a special set of rules. The general idea is that only national media are given permission to operate in the assembly hall.

43. The permanent journalists are associated in the Parliamentary Press Club, that has its own board. This board acts as spokesman in discussion with parliamentary authorities. The Parliamentary Press Club members are given some special facilities.

44. On both sides of the assembly hall, the parliamentary press has special offices, with telephone booths where journalists can telephone free of charge.

45. The seats in the two press galleries on the balcony of the assembly hall are allocated to the main papers or permanent journalists.

46. All parliamentary documents distributed among members of parliament are sent free of charge to the members of the Parliamentary Press Club.

47. The information section issues a daily bulletin on days the chamber sits with information on the plenary session, committee meetings, working visits, demonstrations, etc. Usually this bulletin is available in the morning between 11 and 11.30 a.m.

48. All that is said in the public plenary session (and in public committee meetings) is taken in shorthand and is available within one hour for journalists (at the office of the stenographers). If desired, photocopies can be made.

49. In principle committee meetings are public. If that is not the case, the reason is stated. Public committee meetings are open to the press, naturally.

G. United Kingdom

50. A democratically-elected parliament governing a free people must have ample and efficient channels through which news can flow to the public. The concept is so fundamental and obvious that it goes without saying in Britain today, although it was not ever so.

51. The Press Gallery of the House of Commons grew up against a background of resentment and mistrust, with Mr. Speaker himself ordering its beginning. This was in 1803. William Pitt made a very important speech on the war against the French but it went unreported because the public had rushed in and filled up all the seats reserved for reporters. Mr. Speaker ordered that the back row of the Strangers' Gallery should be reserved for the press – and the press alone.

52. Today the entire Upper Gallery of the north end of the chamber is reserved for the press. 296 journalists hold gallery tickets, which includes journalists working for BBC, ITN and IRN (commercial radio). There are also some 100 foreign journalists included in membership of the gallery.

53. Lobby journalists have their own restaurants and bars, from which members of parliament are barred unless specifically invited by a press man or woman. Reporters have access to desks and phones, and BBC TV and ITN have their own studios adjacent to Westminster.

54. An experiment to broadcast Prime Minister's question time live was recently discontinued, but the most authoritative parliamentary broadcasting from the chamber is the daily programme "Today in Parliament" which is a carefully edited and balanced programme using live quotes. Another regular programme "The Week in Westminster" is dealt with by studio interviews of members of parliament involved in various aspects of each week's work. Both programmes cover also the very considerable work of the House of Lords, and press arrangements for both Houses of Parliament operate in the same way.

55. Both radio and television frequently have up-to-the-minute interviews with politicians in newscasts.

56. The press also attend many meetings of committees where so much parliamentary work is done.

57. All British members of parliament are well aware of the importance to themselves of personal relationship with journalists in the house, particularly with reporters from their own local newspapers. Whatever resentment may have been apparent in the past, there is none today. Publicity is very much part of the politicians stock-in-trade and even if reporters do not print exactly what the member would wish, he knows that without the means to publicise his personal contribution to the mother of parliaments, he is under a serious disadvantage.

(ii) The WEU Assembly and the press

A

58. Unlike the other international assemblies (assembly of the European Communities, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe), the WEU Assembly has always suffered from a basic handicap in its relations with the press.

59. Whereas the WEU Assembly, the only European assembly with defence responsibilities, has developed its activities, set up committees and organised colloquies, the WEU Council has decided to restrict the areas in which it exercises its responsibilities. The inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the studies of the Standing Armaments Committee are not likely to attract the attention of public opinion. Ministerial meetings are now held only once a year and are limited to necessarily confidential exchanges of views. Hence, there is a disparity between on the one hand the Assembly, which endeavours to draw the attention of public opinion to the positions adopted and, on the other, the Council and its ministerial organs, which seek discretion and whose activities do not lead to the kind of action which is likely to make an impression.

60. Armaments resulting from European co-operation always stem from specific agreements between partners. Apart from an armoured transport vehicle, it is difficult to name a piece of military equipment resulting from co-operation in the framework of WEU. WEU has no military command or machinery for permanent defence consultations. It organises no manoeuvres which can be televised. Real defence co-operation is carried out in the bodies of the Atlantic Alliance and of NATO.

61. In spite of this serious handicap, the WEU Assembly has managed to make its voice heard like the other European assemblies. Nevertheless, since 1973, when the United Kingdom joined the European Communities, certain doubts have been expressed about the value of its recommendations and even the reason for its existence.

62. Not least among the problems of the Assembly's press department has been the attitude of some of the official information departments of member governments, particularly (as has happened) when they refer to WEU as "an organisation of the past".

63. To make the situation even worse, the Assembly itself has, on occasion, adopted recommendations urging that certain of WEU's activities, in the armaments field for instance, be transferred to other organisations such as the Communities. It must be recognised that, whatever may be the grounds for such a position from a political standpoint, when the Assembly itself proclaims that WEU's responsibilities would be better handled elsewhere it is very difficult for the Press Counsellor to interest journalists in the WEU debates. The assemblies of the European Communities and the Council of Europe have always been careful to avoid undermining their own positions in this way.

B

64. At the request of the Assembly, the Council agreed in 1979 to increase amounts earmarked in the budget for information from about 40,000 French francs to 160,000 francs, the Assembly having requested 250,000 francs.

65. The new amount is a considerable increase but the present figure of 160,000 francs must be compared with the 3 million francs available to the Council of Europe under this head.

66. Increased credits have allowed the Press Counsellor:

- (i) to organise more press operations outside Paris: meetings have been held in London, Bordeaux, Besançon, Luxembourg and Bonn as it is now easier for the Press Counsellor to travel;
- (ii) to create a network of consultants: these journalists know the Assembly and are paid a very modest daily fee for the two or three days each year when they are required to assist the Press Counsellor in their home country;
- (iii) to invite journalists to attend plenary sessions at the Assembly's expense: it might have been thought that a free journey to Paris plus a subsistence allowance would be attractive and readily accepted. This is not so; what might please a journalist is not so agreeable to the chief editors of his paper who sees no interest in depriving himself for four days of the services of a member of his staff.

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67. Finally relations between the press and the Assembly might be improved if the governments of member countries agreed to invite the information departments of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministries to give consideration to the recommendations and resolutions of the European assembly with defence responsibilities and inform the press of the interest with which its work should be followed.

68. For its part, the Presidential Committee might adopt a vigorous and imaginative policy of inviting guest speakers from member and non-member countries. Thus, it might be noted that the address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 30th September 1980 aroused very great interest and dealt precisely with security matters.

APPENDIX I

*Table of action in the parliaments of member countries**(Totals by country for each session)*

Recommendations adopted in	Member countries							Total
	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	
1956	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3
1957	4	0	1	0	0	5	2	12
1958	2	0	3	0	0	4	3	12
1959	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	9
1960	3	12	2	8	0	3	1	29
1961	0	2	0	3	0	6	0	11
1962	2	4	4	6	2	3	10	31
1963	0	0	13	22	1	2	3	41
1964	4	14	9	11	1	5	2	46
1965	0	11	12	24	0	5	28	80
1966	2	12	12	49	1	4	18	98
1967	14	9	22	29	2	6	16	98
1968	6	14	20	22	1	16	47	126
1969	11	15	17	8	0	4	36	91
1970	3	15	15	7	2	3	10	55
1971	0	4	19	9	0	6	10	48
1972	0	6	2	1	0	1	0	10
1973	0	4	2	6	1	0	0	13
1974	0	1	3	13	2	0	0	19
1975	10	28	8	19	3	11	3	82
1976	16	40	13	14	2	3	8	96
1977	4	18	4	15	1	1	14	57
1978	17	49	12	21	4	10	14	127
1979	9	47	12	10	12	1	14	105
1980	0	20	14	10	6	0	2	52
Total	107	325	231	307	41	99	241	1 351
Annual average	4.28	13	9.24	12.28	1.64	3.96	9.64	7.72

APPENDIX II

Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1978

Session	Recommendation	Transmitted to parliaments	Belgium	France	Federal Republic of Germany	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	United Kingdom	Total	Total for each part session
June 1978	312									-	33
	313	x	2	2					2	6	
	314	x	2	2		1	2	3	2	12	
	315		2			2				4	
	316									-	
	317		2			1				3	
	318	x	3	1		1			2	7	
	319									-	
	320									-	
	321					1				1	
Nov. 1978	322					1				1	94
	323	x		6		1				7	
	324					1				1	
	325			7	2	1		2		12	
	326	x	2		4	3			2	11	
	327									-	
	328	x		2	2	4	2	2	4	16	
Other action			7	26	4	4		3	2	46	
June 1979	329	x	2	2	2		2		2	10	36
	330									-	
	331			2						2	
	332									-	
	333	x	2	2					2	6	
	334									-	
	335	x	2	5	2				6	15	
Resolution 63						3				3	
Dec. 1979	336									-	69
	337	x			2		2		2	6	
	338	x		1					2	3	
	339	x		2						2	
	340									-	
	341	x		2			8			10	
	342									-	
	343									-	
Other action			3	31	6	7		1		48	
June 1980	345									-	52
	346									-	
	347					2				2	
	348			7						7	
	349	x		1	2		6			9	
	350					2				2	
	351			2	2					4	
	352	x			4	2				6	
	353					2				2	
	354				6					6	
Other action				10		2			2	14	

APPENDIX III

Visits by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

22nd February 1963	Paris
10th October 1963	Rome
11th-12th November 1964	Bonn
28th-29th April 1965	The Hague
15th-16th December 1965	Brussels
30th October-1st November 1966	London
23rd-24th November 1967	Berlin (Regional parliament of Land Berlin)
2nd-3rd April 1968	Luxembourg
26th-27th March 1969	Rome
27th-28th October 1969	Paris
14th-15th April 1970	Bonn
1st-2nd April 1971	Rome
4th-5th November 1971	Bonn
24th-25th February 1972	The Hague
18th-19th September 1972	Florence (Regional parliament of Tuscany)
1st-2nd May 1973	St. Hélier (Regional parliament of the States of Jersey)
15th-18th October 1973	Munich (Regional parliament of the Free State of Bavaria)
8th-10th July 1974	Palermo (Regional parliament of Sicily)
27th-28th October 1975	The Hague
11th-12th May 1976	Luxembourg
25th-26th November 1976	Brussels
9th-10th May 1977	Rome
3rd-4th November 1977	Bonn – Wiesbaden (Regional parliament of Hesse)
31st May-1st June 1978	Paris – Cergy/Pontoise
3rd November 1978	Rome
3rd-4th May 1979	The Hague
29th-30th October 1979	Besançon (Franche-Comté region)

Poland and European security

DRAFT ORDER ¹

*submitted on behalf of
the General Affairs Committee ²
by Mr. De Poi, Rapporteur*

The Assembly,

Expressing its attachment to the principles of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and in particular the inviolability of state frontiers and the ban on the threat or use of force as a means of settling disputes between states;

Recalling the unanimous condemnation expressed by the WEU member countries when Warsaw Pact troops entered Czechoslovak territory in 1968 in violation of Czechoslovakia's national sovereignty;

Reaffirming the traditional attachment of democratic Europe to the independence and sovereignty of Poland;

Disturbed by the many recent statements made in the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia about the situation in Poland,

I. INSTRUCTS ITS GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

To follow developments in Poland and to report to it on this question at the next part-session;

II. INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

To convene an extraordinary session forthwith should the independence and sovereignty of Poland be jeopardised by an armed foreign intervention.

1. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 1 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee:* Sir Frederic Bennett (Chairman), MM. De Poi, Portheine (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Berrier, Mrs. Boniver, Mrs. von Bothmer, MM. Brugnon, Conti Persini, Deschamps (Alternate: Caro), Druon (Alternate: Valleix), Gessner, Hanin, Hardy, von Hassel, Lagneau

(Alternate: Michel), Lord McNair, MM. Mangelschots (Alternate: van Waterschoot), Mende, Mommersteeg, Müller (Alternate: Reddemann), Pèridier, Lord Reay (Alternate: Atkinson), MM. Thoss (Alternate: Berchem), Urwin, Valiante, Vecchietti, Voogd.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

Poland and European security

AMENDMENT 1 ¹
tabled by Mr. Hardy

1. In part II of the draft order, leave out “extraordinary session forthwith” and insert “an urgent meeting of the Presidential Committee which may consider either convening an extraordinary session or arranging a special meeting of the General Affairs Committee,”.

Signed: Hardy

1. See 13th Sitting, 3rd December 1980 (Amendment negatived).

Poland and European security

AMENDMENTS 2, 3 and 4 ¹
tabled by Mr. Gessner

2. Leave out the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft order.
3. At the end of the preamble, add a new paragraph as follows:
“ Welcoming the attitude of the European Council with regard to Poland as expressed in the declaration of 2nd December 1980 and associating itself with this declaration, ”.
4. In part II of the draft order proper, leave out “ should the independence and sovereignty of Poland be jeopardised by an armed foreign intervention ” and insert “ should further developments in Poland make this necessary ”.

Signed: Gessner

1. See 13th Sitting, 3rd December 1980 (Amendments 2 and 4 negatived; Amendment 3 agreed to).

Poland and European security

AMENDMENTS 5 and 6 ¹
tabled by Mr. Caro and others

5. After the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft order, add a new paragraph as follows:
“Considering that the existence of an independent and sovereign Polish state is an essential part of European security;”.
6. At the end of part II of the draft order proper, add:
“*inter alia* in order to be able to recommend that the Council of Ministers meeting at the level of Ministers of Defence take all appropriate measures in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.”

Signed: Caro, Valleix, Baumel, Lemoine

1. See 13th Sitting, 3rd December 1980 (Amendments negatived).

Poland and European security

AMENDMENTS 7, 8 and 9 ¹
tabled by Mr. Pecchioli and others

7. Leave out paragraphs 1 to 4 of the preamble to the draft order and insert “Considering with grave concern recent developments in Poland;”.
8. Leave out part I of the draft order proper and insert:
“Wishes the process of renewal to be pursued positively without any outside interference and therefore with absolute respect for the sovereignty and independence of the Polish nation and state in the spirit of the principles affirmed in the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe;”.
9. Leave out part II of the draft order proper and insert:
“Instructs the Presidential Committee to follow the evolution of the situation in Poland and, should the situation so require, order a report to be submitted to the Assembly.”

Signed: Pecchioli, Vecchietti, Bernini, Antoni, Martino, Rubbi

1. See 13th Sitting, 3rd December 1980 (Amendments negatived).

FD IMPRIMERIE ALENÇONNAISE
Rue Édouard-Belin, 61002 ALENÇON
Dépôt légal : 1^{er} trimestre 1981
N° d'ordre : 92043

