

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-SIXTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1980

IV

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION
43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tel. 723.54.32

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The Proceedings of the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly Documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
BONNEL Raoul	PVV
HANIN Charles	Soc. Chr.
MANGELSCHOTS Jan	Socialist
PEETERS Renaat	Soc. Chr.
TANGHE Francis	Soc. Chr.
van WATERSCHOOT John	Soc. Chr.

Substitutes

MM. BRASSEUR Guy	FDF
DEJARDIN Claude	Socialist
LAGNEAU André	PRL
LAMBIOTTE Fortuné	Socialist
MICHEL Joseph	Soc. Chr.
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	Soc. Chr.
Mr. VAN DER ELST Frans	Volkunie

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BIZET Emile	RPR (App.)
BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF
DÉPIETRI César	Communist
DESCHAMPS Bernard	Communist
FERRETTI Henri	UDF
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
JAGER René	UCDP
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
PÉRIDIER Jean	Socialist
PÉRONNET Gabriel	UDF (App.)
PETIT Camille	RPR
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SÉNÈS Gilbert	Socialist
TALON Bernard	RPR
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM. BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BECHTER Jean-Pierre	RPR
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BERRIER Noël	Socialist
BOZZI Jean	RPR
COUDERC Pierre	UDF

MM. DRUON Maurice	RPR
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
JUNG Louts	UCDP
KOEHL Emile	UDF
LAGOURGUE Pierre	UDF
LEMAIRE Marcel	CNIP
LEMOINE Georges	Socialist
MALVY Martin	Socialist
MÉNARD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
MERCIER Jean	Dem. Left
VISSE René	Communist
WARGNIES Claude	Communist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

Mr. AHRENS Karl	SPD
Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
EVERS Hans	CDU/CSU
FLÄMIG Gerhard	SPD
GESSNER Manfred-Achim	SPD
HANDLOS Franz	CDU/CSU
von HASSEL Kai-Uwe	CDU/CSU
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU/CSU
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU/CSU
MILZ Peter	CDU/CSU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHMIDT Hermann	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP

Substitutes

MM. ALBER Siegbert	CDU/CSU
AMREHN Franz	CDU/CSU
BARDENS Hans	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU/CSU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
MATTICK Kurt	SPD
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU/CSU
SCHEFFLER Hermann	SPD
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM Adolf	CDU/CSU
UEBERHORST Reinhard	SPD
WITTMANN Fritz	CDU/CSU
ZEBISCH Franz Josef	SPD

ITALY

Representatives

MM. AGRIMI Alessandro	Chr. Dem.
ANTONI Varese	Communist
BERNINI Bruno	Communist
BONALUMI Gilberto	Chr. Dem.
CALAMANDREI Franco	Communist
CAVALIERE Stefano	Chr. Dem.
DE POI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
FORMA Renzo	Chr. Dem.
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
FOSSON Pietro	Val d'Aosta Union
MARAVALLE Fabio	Socialist
MONDINO Giorgio	Socialist
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PETRILLI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
TRIPODI Antonio	MSI-DN
VALIANTE Mario	Chr. Dem.
VECCHIETTI Tullio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. AJELLO Aldo	Republican
AMADEI Giuseppe	Socialist
BATTAGLIA Adolfo	Republican
BENEDIKTER Johann Hans	SVP
Mrs. BONIVER Margherita	Socialist
MM. CAFIERO Luca	PDUP
CALICE Giovanni	Communist
CONTI PERSINI Gianfranco	PSDI
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
GIUST Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Leopoldo	Communist
Attilio	
ORIONE Franco Luigi	Chr. Dem.
PATRIARCA Francesco	Chr. Dem.
POZZO Cesare	MSI-DN
ROMANO Angelo	Ind. Left
Mrs. ROSOLEN Angela Maria	Communist
MM. SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STERPA Egidio	Liberal

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BERCHEM Albert	Dem.
MARGUE Georges	Soc. Chr.
THOSS Maurice	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM. GLESENER Jean-Pierre	Soc. Chr.
KRIEPS Robert	Soc. Workers
MEINTZ Carlo	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	CDA
van HULST Johan	CDA
de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
VOOGD Johan	Labour

Substitutes

MM. van den BERGH Harry	Labour
KONINGS Martin	Labour
LAMBERTS J. H.	Labour
MOMMERSTEEG Joseph	CDA
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
Mrs. van der WERF-TERPSTRA Anne-Maria	CDA

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

Mr. Alan BEITH	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Thomas COX	Labour
Anthony GRANT	Conservative
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
Paul HAWKINS	Conservative
Lord HUGHES	Labour
MM. Toby JESSEL	Conservative
Anthony KERSHAW	Conservative
Mrs. Jill KNIGHT	Conservative
Mr. Michael McGUIRE	Labour
Dr. Maurice MILLER	Labour
MM. Fred MULLEY	Labour
President of the Assembly	
Cranley ONSLOW	Conservative
John PAGE	Conservative
Lord REAY	Conservative
Mr. Thomas URWIN	Labour

Substitutes

MM. David ATKINSON	Conservative
Robert BANKS	Conservative
Ronald BROWN	Labour
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Robert EDWARDS	Labour
Thomas ELLIS	Labour
Raymond FLETCHER	Labour
George FOULKES	Labour
Edward GARRETT	Labour
James HILL	Conservative
Lord McNAIR	Liberal
Lord NORTHFIELD	Labour
MM. John OSBORN	Conservative
Laurence PAVITT	Labour
Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Keith STAINTON	Conservative
John WILKINSON	Conservative
Sir Thomas WILLIAMS	Labour

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

EIGHTH SITTING

Monday, 1st December 1980

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
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| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes.2. Examination of Credentials.3. Address by the President of the Assembly.4. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.5. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session (Doc. 849).6. The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands; Nuclear, biological and chemical protection (<i>Votes on the amended draft Recommendations post-</i> | <p><i>poned from the First Part of the Session, Docs. 837 and 838).</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">7. Revision and interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure (<i>Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 852).</i>8. Methods of voting (<i>Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 853 and Amendments).</i>9. Changes in the membership of Committees. |
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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 11 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes

The President announced the resumption of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

The Minutes of Proceedings of the Seventh Sitting on Thursday, 5th June 1980, were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Examination of Credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stating that the Assembly had ratified the credentials of Representatives and Substitutes whose names were published in Notice No. 8.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, and subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the

Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of Mr. Berchem as a Representative of Luxembourg in place of Mr. Mart.

4. Observers

The President welcomed to the Second Part of the Session as parliamentary observers:

- Mrs. Madsen and Mr. Petersen, members of the Danish Folketing;
- Mr. Furberg and Mr. Bondevik, members of the Norwegian Storting;
- Mr. Vyzas and Mr. Koutsogiorgas, deputies from Greece.

5. Earthquake in Italy

The President expressed to the Italian Delegation the sympathy of the Assembly.

6. Tribute

The President paid tribute to the late Mr. Talamona, former Vice-President of the Assembly.

Speaker: Mr. De Poi.

7. *Address by the President of the Assembly*

The President addressed the Assembly.

8. *Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly*

The President informed the Assembly that, in accordance with Rule 10 (9) (b) of the Rules of Procedure, the Italian Delegation had proposed that Mr. Maravalle should fill the place of the late Mr. Talamona as Vice-President, and that this proposal had been ratified by the Presidential Committee in accordance with the same rule.

The Assembly confirmed by acclamation the decision of the Presidential Committee.

9. *Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session*

(Doc. 849)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session.

Mr. Stoffelen proposed that the Report tabled by Mr. von Hassel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee be withdrawn from the draft Order of Business.

Speakers: Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Stoffelen, Dr. Miller (point of order).

The proposal was withdrawn.

Speaker: Mr. Valleix.

The Assembly adopted the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session.

10. *The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands*

(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation postponed from the First Part of the Session, Doc. 837)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the amended draft Recommendation.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Bozzi.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 355)¹.

11. *Nuclear, biological and chemical protection*

(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation postponed from the First Part of the Session, Doc. 838)

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

1. See page 18.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 37 votes to 26 with 0 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 356)¹.

12. *Methods of voting*

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 853 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Mr. Bozzi, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: Lord Hughes, MM. Grieve, Antoni, Page and Stoffelen.

Mr. Bozzi, Rapporteur, and Mr. Grieve, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Resolution.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Stoffelen:

1. After paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, insert the following:

“ To replace paragraph 3 of Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure by the following:

3. The vote on a motion to disagree to the annual report, or to any part of it, shall be taken by roll-call. The vote on the draft reply to the annual report and on a draft recommendation or opinion considered as a whole shall be taken by roll-call whenever five or more representatives so desire. The roll-call shall begin with the names of those requiring a roll-call vote. Should there be less than three of them present to answer when their names are called, the roll-call shall be stopped and the vote taken by sitting and standing.”

A manuscript Amendment was tabled by Mr. Stoffelen.

In paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, leave out lines 2 to 4.

Speakers: MM. Stoffelen, Antoni, Bozzi, Grieve and Hanin.

The Amendment and the manuscript Amendment were negatived.

1. See page 20.

Amendments (Nos. 2 and 3) were tabled by Lord Hughes:

2. In paragraph 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, line 4, leave out "present" and insert "Representatives or their Substitutes who have signed the Register of Attendance provided for in Rule 24 above".

3. In paragraph 3 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure, line 3, leave out from "Representatives" to the end of the paragraph and insert "the Representatives or their Substitutes has not signed the Register provided for in Rule 24 above".

The Amendments were agreed to.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Antoni.

The amended draft Resolution was agreed to. (This Resolution will be published as No. 65)¹.

13. Revision and interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 852)

The Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Stainton.

Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Resolution.

The draft Resolution was agreed to. (This Resolution will be published as No. 66)¹.

14. Changes in the membership of Committees

In accordance with Rule 8 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the provisional nominations to Committees made by the Presidential Committee and, in accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes proposed by national delegations:

COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Fed. Rep. of Germany:</i>		Mr. Kittelmann (in place of Mr. Klepsch)
<i>Italy:</i>	MM. Bernini Cavaliere Fosson Maravalle Pecchioli	MM. Calice Giust Tripodi Mondino Amadei

GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

<i>Italy:</i>	Mrs. Boniver (in place of Mr. Talamona)	
<i>Luxembourg:</i>		Mr. Berchem (in place of Mr. Mart)

¹. See page 22.

¹. See page 23.

COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS

Italy: Mr. Amadei (in place of Mr. Foschi) Mr. Maravalle (in place of Mr. Labriola)

COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION

Italy: Mr. Tripodi (in place of Mr. Pozzo) Mr. Ajello (in place of Mr. Agrimi)
Mr. Pozzo (in place of Mr. Ajello)

COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES

Italy: Mr. Mondino (in place of Mr. Maravalle)

United Kingdom: Lord Hughes (in place of Mr. Mulley)

15. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. Marquardt Mende <i>Wittmann (Milz)</i> Müller <i>Mattick (Pawelczyk)</i> Reddemann Hermann Schmidt Vohrer	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bonnell Hanin <i>Dejardin (Mangelschots)</i> <i>Van der Elst (Tanghe)</i>		MM. van Hulst de Koster Stoffelen Tummers
France	Italy	
MM. <i>Baumel (Bizet)</i> Boucheny <i>Lagourgue (Ferretti)</i> <i>Bozzi (Grussenmeyer)</i> Petit Pignion Schleiter Valleix	MM. Agrimi Antoni <i>Giust (Bonalumi)</i> <i>Martino (Calamandrei)</i> Cavaliere De Poi Forma <i>Orione (Foschi)</i> <i>Fiandrotti (Fosson)</i> Maravalle Mondino Pecchioli Petrilli Tripodi <i>Amadei (Valiante)</i> Vecchiatti	United Kingdom
Federal Republic of Germany		Lord <i>McNair (Beith)</i> Sir Frederic Bennett MM. <i>Foulkes (Cox)</i> Grant Grieve Hardy <i>Banks (Hawkins)</i> Lord Hughes MM. Jessel Kershaw Mrs. Knight Mr. <i>Pavitt (McGuire)</i> Dr. Miller MM. <i>Edwards (Mulley)</i> Onslow Page <i>Wilkinson (Lord Reay)</i> Urwin
Mr. Ahrens Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders Flämig Gessner <i>Lemrich (Handlos)</i> <i>Lenzer (von Hassel)</i> Kittelmann <i>Spies von Büllesheim</i> (Lagershausen)	Luxembourg	
	MM. Berchem <i>Glesener (Margue)</i> <i>Kriepps (Thoss)</i>	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Jager Jeambrun Péridier Péronnet Sénès Talon	Italy
MM. Peeters van Waterschoot		MM. Bernini Rubbi
France		Netherlands
MM. Brugnon Caro Depietri Deschamps	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Cornelissen Scholten Voogd
	Mr. Evers	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 7 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on nuclear, biological and chemical protection (Doc. 838)¹:

Ayes	37
Noes	26
Abstentions	0

Ayes:

Mr. Agrimi	MM. Lemmrich (Handlos)	MM. Wittmann (Milz)
Lord McNair (Beith)	Hanin	Müller
Sir Frederic Bennett	Lenzer (von Hassel)	Onslow
MM. Berchem	Banks (Hawkins)	Page
Giust (Bonalumi)	van Hulst	Pecchioli
Cavaliere	Jessel	Petit
De Poi	Kershaw	Petrilli
Lagourgue (Ferretti)	Kittelmann	Wilkinson (Lord Reay)
Forma	Mrs. Knight	Reddemann
Orione (Foschi)	MM. Spies von Büllersheim	Tripodi
Grant	(Lagershausen)	Amadei (Valiante)
Grieve	Glesener (Margue)	Valleix
Bozzi (Grussenmeyer)	Mende	

Noes:

MM. Adriaensens	MM. Gessner	MM. Edwards (Mulley)
Ahrens	Hardy	Mattick (Pawelczyk)
Antoni	Lord Hughes	Pignion
Bonnel	MM. Pavitt (McGuire)	Hermann Schmidt
Mrs. von Bothmer	Dejardin (Mangelschots)	Stoffelen
MM. Martino (Calamandrei)	MM. Maravalle	Tummers
Foulkes (Cox)	Marquardt	Urwin
Enders	Dr. Miller	Vohrer
Flämig	Mr. Mondino	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 355

on the northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the defence of the northern flank is inextricably linked to the defence of the adjoining seas and Atlantic Ocean;
- (ii) Believing that defence of the northern flank must be based on the early arrival of adequately-prepared reinforcements to meet an attack because geographical and political factors impose an imbalance in permanently-stationed forces;
- (iii) Believing further that geographical factors and the present qualities of the naval forces of most NATO countries provide a reasonable measure of naval capabilities at the present time, although specific deficiencies need to be urgently remedied and future trends in the size of Soviet naval ships will require to be offset in long-term NATO naval construction programmes;
- (iv) Calling for better use to be made of existing allied naval resources;
- (v) Noting that the reference to the Tropic of Cancer in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty imposes no geographical limitations on the responsibilities of NATO naval commands;
- (vi) Recalling that by virtue of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty the WEU Council relies on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the North Atlantic Council:

1. To improve allied naval capabilities in the Atlantic and Channel areas and in sea areas adjacent to the northern flank:
 - (a) by calling for long-term national naval construction programmes to maintain the strength and average hull age of naval vessels, and to keep abreast of any further increase in Soviet naval capabilities;
 - (b) by calling for urgent steps to remedy specific deficiencies especially of escort forces, mine counter-measure vessels and maritime patrol aircraft, and to improve interoperability of weapons and communications and transmission equipment;
 - (c) by making better use of existing naval resources forthwith, as recommended by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments:
 - (i) through the improvement of joint naval operations planning and control in the Atlantic and Channel areas and the sea areas adjacent to the northern flank;
 - (ii) through flexible use of naval forces, irrespective of command boundaries, including appropriate German naval forces, to ensure that the necessary ships are available at earlier stages of alert;
 - (iii) by calling on France to allocate naval forces to SACLANT on the same basis as other WEU countries;
 - (d) by establishing at appropriate naval headquarters a daily record of the location of all Warsaw Pact merchant ships in port or at sea in the NATO area;
2. To improve the defence of the northern flank:
 - (a) by calling on all allied governments to provide political support for the Danish and Norwegian Governments to resist constant pressure from the Soviet Union designed to prevent legitimate defence arrangements;
 - (b) by calling for mountain and arctic warfare training in the area to be extended to all troops likely to be available as reinforcements, and for standardised equipment to be provided for units of ACE mobile force;

- (c) by urging the governments concerned to conclude urgently agreements on stockpiling in the area ammunition and heavy equipment for reinforcements;
- (d) by calling for those improvements in the direct defence capabilities of indigenous forces which are required for the area to be defended until reinforcements arrive, and to provide for the reception and deployment of these reinforcements;
- (e) by calling for the air defence of Danish territory to be placed on the same basis as that of neighbouring allied countries.

RECOMMENDATION 356

on nuclear, biological and chemical protection

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that whilst international agreements have banned the production, stockpiling and use of biological weapons, few limitations have been imposed on stocks of nuclear and chemical weapons ;
- (ii) Aware that a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons may not be attainable in the short term and that it is essential to world peace that NATO nuclear forces should balance those of the Warsaw Pact, while negotiations continue to secure mutual reductions in their numbers ;
- (iii) Recognising that adequate on-site verification procedures must be an essential part of any agreement to eliminate and ban the manufacture, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons, but that such procedures still remain to be negotiated with the Soviet Union, and believing that until present negotiations reach a conclusion, stocks and types of chemical weapons held by NATO partners should be brought up to sufficient levels to provide any necessary deterrent and retaliatory capability ;
- (iv) Further believing that the non-use of chemical weapons is best ensured by an equality of retaliatory and defensive capability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact whilst awaiting agreements to prohibit such weapons ;
- (v) Considering that whilst nuclear and chemical weapons remain in existence military personnel and civilian populations remain exposed to the threat and consequences of their use ;
- (vi) Convinced that effective NBC defence equipment and procedures for all allied forces can drastically reduce casualties ;
- (vii) Believing that whilst allied governments must vigorously pursue mutual and balanced force reductions, they also have a moral duty in peacetime to keep their populations objectively informed of the consequences of nuclear, biological and chemical attacks and to implement civil defence programmes for the survival of their people,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments, acting where appropriate through the North Atlantic Council :

1. To recognise the full implications of the threat of battlefield chemical and nuclear attacks and to take immediate steps :
 - (a) to improve protective and decontamination equipment and procedures for military personnel, to protect electronic and communications equipment against electromagnetic pulse effects, and to remedy the other deficiencies identified by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in its report* ;
 - (b) to achieve better co-operation for research, development and the production of equipment and its interoperability ;
2. To review existing usable stocks of chemical weapons and to take steps to ensure that the NATO deterrent and retaliatory capability is equal to the estimated offensive capability of the Warsaw Pact ;
3. Actively to encourage bilateral and multilateral negotiations to ban the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons with adequate verification ;
4. To implement urgently a co-ordinated and common "stay-at-home" civil defence programme in peacetime to include essentially the provision of :
 - (a) objective information to the public on survival in conventional, nuclear, biological and chemical war ;

* Document 838, paragraph 5.8.

- (b) an organisation with protected and up-dated communications to provide warning and monitoring services for nuclear, biological and chemical attacks, fully co-ordinated within NATO ;
 - (c) plans for the co-ordinated use of military reservists, the police, fire brigade, Red Cross, similar organisations, and civilian volunteers in a war alert, attack and post-attack period ;
 - (d) fallout shelters in public buildings and in the home ;
 - (e) self-help equipment for sale to the public including home shelters, protective clothing, respirators, dosimeters, etc. ;
5. To call for NATO to publish annually comparable statistics, to an agreed common definition, of national expenditure on civil defence.

RESOLUTION 65***to amend Rules 34 and 36 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly***

The Assembly,

DECIDES

1. To replace paragraph 2 of Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure by the following:
“2. Whenever ten or more Representatives so desire, the vote shall be taken by roll-call.
The roll shall begin with the names of those requesting a roll-call vote. Should there be less than seven of them present to answer when their names are called, the roll-call shall be stopped and the vote taken by sitting and standing.”;
2. To replace paragraphs 1 to 4 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure by the following:
 - “1. The Assembly shall not take any decision by roll-call unless more than half the Representatives or their Substitutes have signed the Register of Attendance provided for in Rule 24 above.
 2. All votes other than votes by roll-call shall be valid, whatever the number of Representatives present, unless, before the voting has begun, the President has been requested to ascertain the number of those Representatives or their Substitutes who have signed the Register of Attendance provided for in Rule 24 above.
 3. A vote by roll-call shall in no circumstances be valid, nor the result be made public, if the vote shows that a majority of the Representatives or their Substitutes has not signed the Register provided for in Rule 24 above.
 4. In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall be postponed until a subsequent sitting of the same part-session. Any matter on which it has not been possible to vote before the end of the said part-session in the absence of a quorum shall be referred to the Presidential Committee, which shall decide whether the text should be put to the vote at the next part-session of the Assembly or referred back to Committee.”

RESOLUTION 66

to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly

The Assembly,

Considering it necessary to amend Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure as follows:

1. The heading for this rule becomes: "Substitutes and alternates".
2. In paragraph 1, replace the words "may arrange to be replaced" by "may be replaced".
Delete the last sentence.
3. In paragraph 2, replace the words "nominated in due form" by the words "duly registered in accordance with Rule 24".
At the beginning of the second sentence, replace the word "They" by the word "Substitutes".
4. Paragraph 3 becomes paragraph 4 and reads as follows:
"Representatives and Substitutes may sit on Committees either as titular members or as alternates.
Any titular member who is prevented from attending a meeting may appoint an alternate from among the alternate members of the Committee of the same nationality as himself. With the consent of the Chairman of the Committee, he may also be replaced by any other Representative or Substitute of the same nationality as himself.
The alternate so appointed shall have the same rights as the titular member."
5. Delete paragraph 4.
6. Paragraph 5 becomes paragraph 3,

DECIDES

To replace former Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure by the following:

"Substitutes and Alternates"

1. Any Representative prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly may be replaced by a Substitute.
2. Substitutes duly registered in accordance with Rule 24 have the same rights as Representatives in the Assembly.
Substitutes may not, however, be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.
3. A Substitute who is a Committee Chairman or Rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if he is not sitting in place of a Representative. In the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled to vote.
4. Representatives and Substitutes may sit on Committees either as titular members or as alternates.
Any titular member who is prevented from attending a meeting may appoint an alternate from among the alternate members of the Committee of the same nationality as himself. With the consent of the Chairman of the Committee, he may also be replaced by any other Representative or Substitute of the same nationality as himself.
The alternate so appointed shall have the same rights as the titular member."

NINTH SITTING

Monday, 1st December 1980

ORDERS OF THE DAY

Future of European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 854 and Amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. *Adoption of the Minutes*

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting would be considered at a later Sitting of the Assembly.

2. *Attendance Register*

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. *Future of European security*

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 854 and Amendments)

Speakers (points of order): Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Urwin and Stoffelen.

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Reddemann, in place of Mr. von Hassel, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Wilkinson (point of order); MM. Vecchiotti, Urwin, Druon, Hardy, Vyzas (*Observer from Greece*), De Poi and Pignion.

Mr. Maravalle, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Wilkinson, Boucheny, Osborn, Bozzi, Kershaw and Hermann Schmidt.

Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Cavaliere, Caro and Baumel.

Sir Frederic Bennett, Chairman of the Committee, and Mr. Reddemann, in place of Mr. von Hassel, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

4. *Date and time of the next Sitting*

The next Sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 2nd December, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 6.03 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. Kittelmann Marquardt Mende Müller <i>Mattick</i> (Pawelczyk) Reddemann Hermann Schmidt Vohrer	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bonnell Hanin <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i> (Peeters) Mr. <i>Van der Elst</i> (Tanghe)		MM. Cornelissen <i>Portheine</i> (de Koster) <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen Tummers
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. <i>Baumel</i> (Bizet) Boucheny Caro <i>Bozzi</i> (Grussenmeyer) Pignion <i>Druon</i> (Talon) Valleix	MM. Agrimi Antoni Bernini <i>Giust</i> (Bonalumi) <i>Martino</i> (Calamandrei) Cavaliere De Poi Forma Mondino Mrs. <i>Boniver</i> (Pecchioli) MM. Petrilli Tripodi <i>Amadei</i> (Valiante) Vecchietti	Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Cox Grant <i>Osborn</i> (Grieve) Hardy <i>Stainton</i> (Hawkins) Lord Hughes MM. <i>Smith</i> (Jessel) Kershaw Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire Dr. Miller MM. Onslow <i>Atkinson</i> (Page) <i>Wilkinson</i> (Lord Reay) Urwin
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
Mr. Ahrens Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders <i>Böhm</i> (Evers) Flämig Gessner <i>Lemmrich</i> (Handlos) <i>Lenzer</i> (von Hassel)	MM. Berchem Margue Thoss	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Jeambrun Péridier Péronnet Petit Schleiter Sénès	Italy
Mr. van Waterschoot		MM. Foschi Fosson Maravalle Rubbi
France	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
MM. Brugnon Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Jager	MM. Lagershausen Milz	MM. van Hulst Voogd

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

TENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd December 1980

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 (Doc. 851 and Addendum); Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 – The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Doc. 850 and Addendum) (*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts*, Docs. 851 and Addendum and 850 and Addendum).
2. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1980 (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation*, Doc. 862 and Amendment).
3. State of European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 858 and Amendments).
4. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
5. Future of European security (*Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 854 and Amendments).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous two Sittings were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981

(Doc. 851 and Addendum)

Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 – The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts

(Doc. 850 and Addendum)

(Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 851 and Addendum and 850 and Addendum)

The Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration were presented by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Antoni, Cornelissen, Mrs. Knight, MM. Stainton, Valleix and Page.

Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 in Document 851 was agreed to with one abstention.

The Motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 in the Addendum to Document 850 was agreed to unanimously.

Speakers (explanation of vote): MM. Antoni and Martino.

4. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1980

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 862 and Amendment)

The Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Wilkinson.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Opinion.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by MM. Stainton and Smith:

1. At the end of the last paragraph of the draft opinion, add "except to draw attention to the fact that the terms of reference of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration are restricted to expenditure incurred by the Office of the Clerk (F 8,517,000 in 1979; F 9,632,000 for 1980) or some 34 % only of the total budget. The cost effectiveness of the 66 % has not been examined by or reported on to this Assembly".

Speakers: MM. Stainton, Smith and Kershaw.

The Amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 357)¹.

The draft Opinion was agreed to unanimously. (This Opinion will be published as No. 27)².

5. *State of European security*

(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 858 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Brown, Rapporteur.

6. *Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher replied to questions put by MM. Valleix, Osborn, Gessner, Pignion, Brown, De Poi, Page and Bozzi.

1. See page 31.

2. See page 32.

7. *Future of European security*

(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 854 and Amendments)

The President informed the Assembly that the draft Resolution had not been moved.

Mr. Stoffelen proposed that the draft Recommendation and the Report be referred back to the Committee in accordance with Rule 32(3) of the Rules of Procedure.

Speakers: Mr. Hanin and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Motion was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

Speaker (point of order): Sir Frederic Bennett.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by MM. Baumel and Valleix:

5. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph (d).

Speakers: MM. Baumel, Wilkinson and Sir Frederic Bennett.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Caro:

4. In paragraph (d) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "also to negotiate their accession to the modified Brussels Treaty or, if they do not wish to do so, their association with the activities of WEU" and insert "to take all steps and measures likely to promote the closest possible participation of their activities in the achievement of the aims of the modified Brussels Treaty".

Speaker: Mr. Caro.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Stoffelen.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 33 votes to 24 with 3 abstentions; 17 Representatives who had signed the Register of Attendance did not take part in the vote. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 358)¹.

1. See page 33.

8. Poland and European security

(Motion for an Order with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 864)

In accordance with Rule 43(3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the Motion for an Order tabled by Mr. Valleix and others.

Speaker: Mr. Valleix.

Urgent procedure was agreed to unanimously.

The Motion for an Order was referred to the General Affairs Committee.

9. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 1.20 p.m.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. Marquardt Mende <i>Wittmann</i> (Milz) Müller <i>Mattick</i> (Pawelczyk) Reddemann <i>Holtz</i> (Hermann) Schmidt)	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bonnell Hanin <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i> (Peeters) MM. <i>Van der Elst</i> (Tanghe) van Waterschoot		MM. Cornelissen van Hulst <i>Porthoine</i> (de Koster) <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen Tummers <i>Lamberts</i> (Voogd)
	Italy	
France	MM. Agrimi Antoni Bernini <i>Giust</i> (Bonalumi) <i>Martino</i> (Calamandrei) Cavaliere De Poi Forma <i>Orione</i> (Foschi) Fosson Maravalle Mondino Pecchioli Petrilli Mrs. <i>Boniver</i> (Rubbi) MM. Tripodi <i>Conti Persini</i> (Valiante) Vecchiètti	United Kingdom
MM. <i>Baumel</i> (Bizet) Caro Deschamps <i>Bozzi</i> (Grussenmeyer) Pignion <i>Druon</i> (Talon) Valleix		Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Cox Grant <i>Osborn</i> (Grieve) Hardy <i>Stainton</i> (Hawkins) Lord Hughes MM. <i>Banks</i> (Jessel) Kershaw Mrs. Knight MM. <i>Pavitt</i> (McGuire) <i>Edwards</i> (Miller) <i>Brown</i> (Mulley) <i>Smith</i> (Onslow) Page <i>Wilkinson</i> (Lord Reay) <i>Ellis</i> (Urwin)
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
Mr. Ahrens Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders Evers Flämig Gessner <i>Böhm</i> (Handlos) <i>Lenzer</i> (von Hassel) Kittelmann <i>Spies von Büllesheim</i> (Lagershausen)	MM. Berchem Margue Thoss	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Jeambrun Péridier Péronnet Petit Schleiter Sénès	Federal Republic of Germany
MM. Boucheny Brugnon Depietri Ferretti Jager		Mr. Vohrer

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 8 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on the future of European security (Doc. 854)¹ :

Ayes	33
Noes	24
Abstentions	3

Ayes:

Mr. Agrimi	MM. Grant	MM. Mende
Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)	<i>Osborn</i> (Grieve)	<i>Wittmann</i> (Milz)
Sir Frederic Bennett	<i>Böhm</i> (Handlos)	Müller
MM. <i>Giust</i> (Bonalumi)	Hanin	<i>Smith</i> (Onslow)
Caro	<i>Lenzer</i> (von Hassel)	Page
Cavaliere	<i>Stainton</i> (Hawkins)	Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i> (Peeters)
Cornelissen	<i>Banks</i> (Jessel)	MM. Petrilli
De Poi	Kittelmann	<i>Wilkinson</i> (Lord Reay)
Evers	Mrs. Knight	Reddemann
Forma	MM. <i>Spies von Büllenheim</i>	van Waterschoot
<i>Orione</i> (Foschi)	(Lagershausen)	
Fosson	Margue	

Noes:

MM. Adriaensens	Lord Hughes	MM. <i>Mattick</i> (Pawelczyk)
Antoni	MM. <i>Pavitt</i> (McGuire)	Pecchioli
Bernini	<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	<i>Holtz</i> (Hermann)
<i>Martino</i> (Calamandrei)	Maravalle	Schmidt)
Cox	Marquardt	Stoffelen
Enders	<i>Edwards</i> (Miller)	Tummers
Flämig	Mondino	<i>Ellis</i> (Urwin)
Gessner	Brown	Vecchiatti
Hardy		

Abstentions:

MM. <i>Baumel</i> (Bizet)
<i>Bozzi</i> (Grussenmeyer)
Valleix

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 357
on improving the status of WEU staff

The Assembly,

Conscious of the fact that despite the many years' existence of the majority of the co-ordinated organisations problems affecting the careers of officials in these organisations still remain unresolved ;

Regretting the necessity to revert to its Recommendation 340 ;

Regretting also the element of stagnation manifest in the Council's reply to this recommendation and previous recommendations submitted on identical matters,

I. REQUESTS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Appoint an expert, within the framework of the co-ordinated organisations, to study the desirability of setting up an independent body for the administration of pensions as a natural follow-on from the joint pensions administrative section and to make proposals ;

2. Continue to review the possibility of creating a single appeals board for pensions in the light of experience in view of the possibly divergent views taken by appeals boards of the various co-ordinated organisations and the inherent risk of prejudice for officials in these organisations ;

3. Transmit any conclusions which the various co-ordinating agencies may have come to on the problems outlined in paragraph 3 of Recommendation 340 and request these agencies to continue their studies and to report without avoidable delay ;

4. Provide information concerning the number of meetings held by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts in 1980, the duration of these meetings, the subjects discussed and the positive decisions which resulted ;

II. Invites the Secretary-General to ensure that notice of all staff vacancies of A, L, B and C grades arising in the co-ordinated organisations be circulated to the staff of the others.

OPINION 27***on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU
for the financial year 1980***

The Assembly,

Noting that in communicating the budget of Western European Union as a whole the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;

Having taken note of the contents,

Has no comments to make at this stage on the figures communicated.

RECOMMENDATION 358
on the future of European security

The Assembly,

Considering that the joint interest of all its members is to promote collective security so as to consolidate peace and promote détente and disarmament;

Considering that Europe has to face a threat that is now formidable because of the Soviet Union's superiority in many fields;

Considering that the Soviet Union's operations beyond the European continent extend this threat to the economic and political fields;

Considering that Europe's security can be guaranteed only by the cohesion and strength of the Atlantic Alliance and the resolve of its members;

Considering that the fulfilment of this requirement calls for close agreement between the European and American members of the Atlantic Alliance on their joint defence policy;

Considering that the situation requires the European element of the Alliance to make a greater effort to take part in joint defence and disarmament initiatives, particularly with regard to conventional weapons;

Considering that, to be effective, this effort implies close co-operation in the production of armaments;

Considering that the European Community has established solidarity between most European members of the Atlantic Alliance so that on many matters they are in a position to express joint views on questions which are outside the Community's purview;

Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty, with the North Atlantic Treaty, constitutes the basis of European security;

Considering that the European Community is not in a position to replace WEU in exercising that organisation's defence and armaments responsibilities but that steps should be taken here and now to face up to the requirements of European security,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Set up a working group to examine measures to be taken by all member countries to adapt WEU to the present requirements of European defence and instruct it to study in particular:

- (a) the co-ordination of member countries' policies in its areas of responsibility, namely defence, armaments and disarmament;
- (b) the participation of Ministers of Defence or their representatives in its meetings when matters which concern them are discussed;
- (c) the convening of meetings before those of the North Atlantic Council with a view to identifying the joint views of its members on matters relating to Europe's security;
- (d) the question of inviting all countries which are members of the EEC, have applied for membership or are European members of NATO to take all steps and measures likely to promote the closest possible participation of their activities in the achievement of the aims of the modified Brussels Treaty ;
- (e) the action to be taken on the study being conducted by the Standing Armaments Committee so that the outcome may be a true European armaments policy.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd December 1980

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
2. State of European security (*Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 858 and Amendments*).
3. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.
4. Energy and security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 856 and Amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Cornelissen, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting would be considered at a later Sitting of the Assembly.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

One candidate had been proposed for the vacancy for the post of Vice-President caused by the departure of Mr. Mart, namely Mr. Berchem.

The Assembly decided unanimously to elect Mr. Berchem by acclamation.

Mr. Berchem was elected Vice-President by acclamation.

4. State of European security

(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 858 and Amendments)

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Grant, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Fletcher.

Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The Debate was adjourned.

5. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic

Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Bernard-Reymond replied to questions put by MM. Caro, Dejardin, Wilkinson, Dr. Miller, MM. Valleix and Page.

Speaker: Mr. Cavaliere.

6. State of European security

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 858 and Amendments)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Onslow, Pecchioli, Dejardin, Tripoli, Banks and Kittelmann.

Mr. Brown, Rapporteur, and Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

Speakers (point of order): MM. Banks and Onslow.

Mr. Banks proposed that the draft Recommendation and the Report be referred back to the Committee in accordance with Rule 32(3) of the Rules of Procedure.

Speakers: MM. Dejardin (point of order), Fletcher and Brown.

The Motion was negated.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by MM. Valleix and Bozzi:

2. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "despite" and insert "since".

Speakers: MM. Valleix, Brown and Cavaliere.

A manuscript Amendment was tabled by Mr. Valleix:

In paragraph (iv) of the preamble, leave out "despite" and insert "independently of".

Speakers: MM. Valleix, Brown, Dr. Miller and Mr. Valleix.

The Amendment as amended was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Onslow and others:

1. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "on balance" and "has not diminished; that in present circumstances it".

Speakers: MM. Onslow, Dejardin and Brown.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by MM. Valleix and Bozzi:

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "with particular provisions" to the end of the paragraph.

Speakers: MM. Valleix and Brown.

The Amendment was negated.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by MM. Valleix and Bozzi:

4. In the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 4 as follows:

"4. In the framework of the Madrid meeting, negotiate the terms of a conference on disarmament in Europe."

A manuscript Amendment was tabled by Mr. Valleix:

In the draft recommendation proper, add a paragraph 4 as follows:

"4. Urge member governments at the Madrid meeting to seek to negotiate the mandate of a conference on disarmament in Europe in the framework of the CSCE."

Speaker: Mr. Valleix.

The Amendment as amended was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Deschamps.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 37 votes to 1 with 13 abstentions; 21 Representatives who had signed the Register of Attendance did not take part in the vote. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 359)¹.

7. Energy and security

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 856 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Flämig, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: Dr. Miller, MM. Hardy, Müller, Antoni, Valleix (point of order), McGuire and Osborn.

The Debate was adjourned.

8. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 3rd December, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 6.40 p.m.

¹. See page 38.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Marquardt Mende <i>Wittmann (Milz)</i> Müller <i>Mattick (Pawelczyk)</i> <i>Scheffler (Hermann Schmidt)</i>	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bonnell Hanin <i>Dejardin (Mangelschots)</i> Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas (Peeters)</i> MM. <i>Van der Elst (Tanghe)</i> van Waterschoot		MM. Cornelissen <i>Portheine (de Koster)</i> Scholten Stoffelen Tummers <i>Konings (Voogd)</i>
France	Italy	
MM. Brugnon Caro Deschamps <i>Bozzi (Grussenmeyer)</i> Petit Pignion Valleix	MM. Agrimi Antoni Bernini Bonalumi <i>Martino (Calamandrei)</i> Cavaliere De Poi Forma <i>Orione (Foschi)</i> Fosson Maravalle Mondino Pecchioli Petrilli Mrs. <i>Boniver (Rubbi)</i> MM. Tripodi <i>Giust (Valiante)</i> Vecchietti	United Kingdom
Federal Republic of Germany		Lord <i>McNair (Beith)</i> MM. <i>Osborn (Sir Frederic Bennett)</i> <i>Foulkes (Cox)</i> Grant <i>Banks (Grieve)</i> Hardy Hawkins <i>Fletcher (Lord Hughes)</i> Mr. Jessel Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire Dr. Miller MM. <i>Brown (Mulley)</i> Onslow Page <i>Wilkinson (Lord Reay)</i> <i>Garrett (Urwin)</i>
MM. <i>Zebisch (Ahrens)</i> <i>Bardens (Mrs. von Bothmer)</i> Enders Flämig Gessner <i>Böhm (Handlos)</i> <i>Lenzer (von Hassel)</i> Kittelmann <i>Spies von Büllenheim (Lagershausen)</i>	Luxembourg	
	MM. Berchem Glesener	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Sénès Talon	Luxembourg
MM. Bizet Boucheny Depietri Ferretti Jager Jeambrun Péridier Péronnet Schleiter	Federal Republic of Germany	Mr. Thoss
	MM. Evers Reddemann Vohrer	Netherlands
		Mr. van Hulst
		United Kingdom
		Mr. Kershaw

¹ The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 9 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on the state of European security (Doc. 858)¹:

Ayes	37
Noes	1
Abstentions	13

Ayes:

MM. Agrimi	MM. <i>Michel</i> (Hanin)	MM. Mondino
Berchem	Hardy	Müller
<i>Zebisch</i> (Ahrens)	<i>Lenzer</i> (von Hassel)	<i>Brown</i> (Mulley)
Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)	<i>Fletcher</i> (Lord Hughes)	Onslow
MM. <i>Bardens</i> (Mrs. von Both-	Kittelmann	<i>Mattick</i> (Pawelczyk)
mer)	Mrs. Knight	<i>Wilkinson</i> (Lord Reay)
<i>Foulkes</i> (Cox)	MM. <i>Spies von Büllesheim</i>	Reddemann
De Poi	(Lagershausen)	Mrs. <i>Boniver</i> (Rubbi)
Enders	McGuire	MM. <i>Scheffler</i> (Hermann
Flämig	Maravalle	Schmidt)
Forma	Marquardt	Scholten
Gessner	Dr. Miller	Stoffelen
<i>Böhm</i> (Handlos)	Mr. <i>Wittmann</i> (Milz)	Tummers
		<i>Konings</i> (Voogd)

Noes:

Mr. Deschamps

Abstentions:

MM. Antoni	MM. Grant	MM. Page
<i>Osborn</i> (Sir Frederic	Banks	Pecchioli
Bennett)	Hawkins	Valleix
Bernini	Jessel	Vecchietti
<i>Martino</i> (Calamandrei)	<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 359
on the state of European security

The Assembly,

- (i) Observing that the trend of the East-West military balance over the last two decades has been towards rough equivalence in many sectors following the disproportionately large Soviet allocation of technological resources to defence, but that the disturbing superior Soviet concentration of tanks and divisions on the central front still exists ;
- (ii) Noting that the nature of the Soviet challenge is no longer exclusively a military threat to Europe, but has become a world-wide search for influence, backed by the use of military force, either directly or by proxy ;
- (iii) Deploring the outbreak of hostilities between Iraq and Iran, but noting with satisfaction that external powers have refrained from intervening ;
- (iv) Believing that independently of the withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure the cohesion of the Alliance has improved over the last two decades with more joint planning and better provision for consultation and collective decision-making, but regretting the weakness of allied consultation in particular cases ;
- (v) Noting that so far arms control agreements and current negotiations have not reduced levels of forces and armaments, but have contributed to better understanding of the military balance in certain areas ;
- (vi) Believing that European security can be ensured only in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance ; and that to maintain it continued and equal emphasis must be placed on allocating adequate resources to defence, on the one hand, and on pursuing negotiations on arms control and disarmament on the other,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge member governments to impress on the United States, at the highest level, the need for continuous awareness of the allied dimension of all security issues and the overriding need for prior consultation in the North Atlantic Council ;
2. Urge member governments to maintain and improve their contribution to allied defence, with particular provisions to enable certain United States resources to be devoted to defensive operations outside the Atlantic area from time to time ;
3. Urge member governments to call in the North Atlantic Council for no less emphasis to be placed on arms control and disarmament negotiations with a view to improving security and reducing forces and armaments ;
4. Urge member governments at the Madrid meeting to seek to negotiate the mandate of a conference on disarmament in Europe in the framework of the CSCE.

TWELFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd December 1980

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 859 and Amendments*).
2. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly.
3. Address by Mr. van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
4. Energy and security (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 856 and Amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. *Adoption of the Minutes*

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous two Sittings were agreed to.

2. *Attendance Register*

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

3. *SALT and the British and French nuclear forces*

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 859 and Amendments)

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Mommersteeg, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Bernini, Baumel, van Hulst and Lord Duncan-Sandys.

The Debate was adjourned.

4. *Election of the Clerk of the Assembly*

(Doc. 857)

The President paid tribute to the services of Mr. Humblet, who was retiring from the post of

Clerk of the Assembly which he had held since 1956.

The President informed the Assembly that the Bureau proposed, in alphabetical order, the names of Mr. Huigens, Mr. Moulias, Mr. Nehring, Mr. Rogati and Mr. Whyte, as candidates for the office of Clerk of the Assembly, and that a majority of the Bureau had expressed a preference for the election of Mr. Moulias.

In accordance with Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim moved a dilatory motion, that the election of the Clerk of the Assembly of Western European Union be referred back to the Bureau and not proceeded with until the terms of employment, duration of tenure and the future position of the Clerk Assistant have been formally placed before and approved by this Assembly.

Speakers: Mr. Stoffelen; (points of order): Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim; the President.

The Motion was negated.

Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Müller were chosen by lot to be tellers.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Hawkins.

The Assembly proceeded to the election of the Clerk of the Assembly by secret ballot by roll-call at the Tribune.

**5. Address by Mr. van der Klaauw,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council**

Mr. van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressed the Assembly.

**6. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly
(Doc. 857)**

The result of the ballot was declared as follows:

Number of Representatives voting: 82.

Number of blank or spoiled ballot papers: 0.

Number of valid votes cast: 82.

Absolute majority necessary: 42.

Mr. Moulias: 29

Mr. Whyte: 20

Mr. Huigens: 17

Mr. Rogati: 10

Mr. Nehring: 6

No candidate having obtained an absolute majority of the votes cast, the President informed the Assembly that a second ballot would be necessary.

**7. Questions to Mr. van der Klaauw,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council**

Mr. van Klaauw replied to questions put by MM. Jager, Portheine, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Konings, Cavaliere, Bozzi, Dr. Miller,

MM. Deschamps, Stoffelen, Mommersteeg, Page and Lord Duncan-Sandys.

**8. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly
(Doc. 857)**

The President informed the Assembly that Mr. Rogati had withdrawn his candidature.

Mr. Reddemann informed the Assembly that Mr. Nehring had withdrawn his candidature.

The Assembly proceeded to a second ballot in the election of the Clerk of the Assembly by secret ballot by roll-call at the Tribune.

The Sitting was suspended at 12.53 p.m. and resumed at 1.03 p.m.

The result of the ballot was declared as follows:

Number of Representatives voting: 81.

Number of blank or spoiled ballot papers: 0.

Number of valid votes cast: 81.

Mr. Moulias: 45

Mr. Whyte: 29

Mr. Huigens: 7

Mr. Moulias, having the largest number of the votes cast, was declared elected.

9. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance 1:

Belgium	MM. Evers <i>Scheffler</i> (Flämig) Gessner <i>Böhm</i> (Handlos) <i>Lenzer</i> (von Hassel) Kittelmann <i>Spies von Büllesheim</i> (Lagershausen) Marquardt Mende <i>Wittmann</i> (Milz) Müller <i>Mattick</i> (Pawelczyk) Reddemann <i>Bardens</i> (Hermann) Schmidt)	Luxembourg MM. Berchem Margue Thoss
MM. Adriaensens Bonnell Hanin <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i> (Peeters) MM. <i>Van der Elst</i> (Tanghe) van Waterschoot		Netherlands MM. Cornelissen van Hulst <i>Portheine</i> (de Koster) <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen Tummers <i>Konings</i> (Voogd)
France		
MM. <i>Baumel</i> (Bizet) <i>Druon</i> (Boucheny) Brugnon Caro <i>Forni</i> (Depietri) Deschamps <i>Lagourgue</i> (Ferretti) <i>Bozzi</i> (Grussenmeyer) Jager <i>Bechter</i> (Jeambrun) <i>Berrier</i> (Péridier) Péronnet Petit Pignion Schleiter <i>Lemoine</i> (Sénès) <i>Koehl</i> (Talon) Valleix	Italy Mr. Agrimi Mrs. <i>Boniver</i> (Antoni) MM. Bernini Bonalumi <i>Conti Persini</i> (Calaman- drei) Cavaliere De Poi Forma <i>Orione</i> (Foschi) Fosson Maravalle Mondino Pecchioli Petrilli Rubbi Tripodi <i>Giust</i> (Valiante)	United Kingdom Mr. Beith Sir Frederic Bennett MM. <i>Garrett</i> (Cox) Grant Grieve Hardy Hawkins Lord Hughes MM. <i>Atkinson</i> (Jessel) <i>Smith</i> (Kershaw) Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire Dr. Miller MM. <i>Edwards</i> (Mulley) Onslow Page <i>Wilkinson</i> (Lord Reay) <i>Ellis</i> (Urwin)
Federal Republic of Germany		
Mr. <i>Zebisch</i> (Ahrens) Mrs. von Bothmer Mr. Enders		

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

Federal Republic of Germany	Italy
Mr. Vohrer	Mr. Vecchietti

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

THIRTEENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd December 1980

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 859 and Amendments*).
2. Political implications for Europe of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 855 and Amendments*).
3. Poland and European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 866 and Amendment*).
4. Energy and security (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 856 and Amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting would be considered at a later Sitting of the Assembly.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 859 and Amendments)

The Debate was resumed.

Speaker: Mr. Tummers.

Mr. Mommersteeg, Rapporteur, and Mr. Cavaliere, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett:

1. In paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Believing" insert "a revised".

Speakers: Sir Frederic Bennett, Dr. Miller, MM. Mommersteeg and Cavaliere.

The Amendment was negated.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Wilkinson:

3. Leave out paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

Speakers: MM. Wilkinson, Mommersteeg and Cavaliere.

The Amendment was negated.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett:

2. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "process" to the end of the paragraph.

Speakers: Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Cavaliere.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 35 votes to 3 with 10 abstentions; 18 Representatives who had signed the Register of

Attendance did not take part in the vote. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 360)¹.

Speakers: MM. Grieve (explanation of vote) and Hardy (point of order).

4. Solemn declaration of the Clerk-elect before the Assembly

The President asked the Clerk-elect to make his solemn declaration before the Assembly.

The Clerk-elect made his solemn declaration before the Assembly.

5. Political implications for Europe of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 855 and Amendments)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Hardy, Rapporteur.

Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Müller, Rubbi, Dr. Miller, MM. McGuire, Lemoine, Dejardin, Atkinson, Cavaliere, Koutsogiorgas (*Observer from Greece*), Holtz and Caro.

Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Forni and Hill.

Mr. Hardy, Rapporteur, and Sir Frederic Bennett, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Dejardin:

2. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "to respect undertakings they have entered into, particularly in the framework of NATO, with a view to improving the West's defensive potential in Europe" and insert "to ensure that the balance of forces in Europe is maintained".

Speakers: Mr. Dejardin, Lord Duncan-Sandys and Mr. Hardy.

The Amendment was negatived.

1. See page 48.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Dejardin:

3. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "inter alia".

Speakers: MM. Dejardin and Hardy.

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Dr. Miller and Mr. Pavitt:

1. Leave out paragraph 9 of the draft recommendation proper.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

An Amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Dejardin:

4. Leave out paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"10. Afford greater humanitarian assistance, particularly medical supplies, food and clothing, to the Afghan people, whether refugees or on Afghan territory;"

Speakers: MM. Dejardin, Forni, Grieve, Gessner and Hardy.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Dejardin:

5. Leave out paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers: MM. Dejardin and Hardy.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Dejardin:

6. In paragraph 12 of the draft recommendation proper, add "political" after "necessary".

Speakers: MM. Dejardin and Hardy.

The Amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

Speakers (points of order): Lord Duncan-Sandys and Mr. Stoffelen; (explanation of vote): Mrs. von Bothmer.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix III) by 30 votes to 5 with 6 abstentions; 25 Representatives who had signed the Register of Attendance did not take part in the vote. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 361)¹.

1. See page 49.

Speakers (points of order): MM. Smith and Grieve.

6. Poland and European security

(Presentation of and Debate on the oral Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 866 and Amendments)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. De Poi, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Grieve.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Order.

Amendments (Nos. 7, 8 and 9) were tabled by Mr. Pecchioli and others:

7. Leave out paragraphs 1 to 4 of the preamble to the draft order and insert "Considering with grave concern recent developments in Poland;"

8. Leave out part I of the draft order proper and insert:

"Wishes the process of renewal to be pursued positively without any outside interference and therefore with absolute respect for the sovereignty and independence of the Polish nation and state in the spirit of the principles affirmed in the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe;"

9. Leave out part II of the draft order proper and insert:

"Instructs the Presidential Committee to follow the evolution of the situation in Poland and, should the situation so require, order a report to be submitted to the Assembly."

Speakers: MM. Vecchietti, De Poi and Caro (point of order).

The Amendments were negatived.

Amendments (Nos. 2, 3 and 4) were tabled by Mr. Gessner:

2. Leave out the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft order.

3. At the end of the preamble, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Welcoming the attitude of the European Council with regard to Poland as expressed in the declaration of 2nd December 1980 and associating itself with this declaration,"

4. In part II of the draft order proper, leave out "should the independence and sovereignty of Poland be jeopardised by an armed foreign

intervention" and insert "should further developments in Poland make this necessary".

Speakers: MM. Gessner, Reddemann, Caro and De Poi.

Amendments 2 and 4 were negatived.

Amendment 3 was agreed to.

Amendments (Nos. 5 and 6) were tabled by Mr. Caro and others:

5. After the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft order, add a new paragraph as follows:

"Considering that the existence of an independent and sovereign Polish state is an essential part of European security;"

6. At the end of part II of the draft order proper, add:

"*inter alia* in order to be able to recommend that the Council of Ministers meeting at the level of Ministers of Defence take all appropriate measures in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty."

Speakers: MM. Caro and De Poi.

The Amendments were negatived.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

1. In part II of the draft order, leave out "extraordinary session forthwith" and insert "an urgent meeting of the Presidential Committee which may consider either convening an extraordinary session or arranging a special meeting of the General Affairs Committee,"

Speakers: MM. Hardy, Grieve, De Poi and Cavaliere (explanation of vote).

The Amendment was negatived.

A manuscript Amendment was tabled by Mr. Grieve:

In paragraph II of the draft order proper, leave out "Instructs its Presidential Committee" and insert "Requests its President".

Speaker: Mr. Grieve.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Order.

The amended draft Order was agreed to. (This Order will be published as No. 53)¹.

7. Date and time of the next Sitting

The next Sitting was fixed for Thursday, 4th December, at 10 a.m.

The Sitting was closed at 7.15 p.m.

1. See page 51.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Müller <i>Mattick</i> (Pawelczyk) Reddemann Hermann Schmidt	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens Bonnell <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)		MM. van Hulst <i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen Tummers <i>Konings</i> (Voogd)
Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i> (Peeters) Mr. <i>Van der Elst</i> (Tanghe)	Italy	
	Mr. Agrimi Mrs. <i>Boniver</i> (Antoni)	
France	MM. Bernini Bonalumi Cavaliere De Poi Forma <i>Orione</i> (Foschi) Fosson Maravalle Mondino Pecchioli Petrilli Rubbi Tripodi <i>Giust</i> (Valiante) Vecchietti	United Kingdom
MM. <i>Forni</i> (Brugnon) Caro <i>Lemoine</i> (Sénès)		Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith) Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Cox <i>Banks</i> (Grant) Grieve Hardy Lord <i>Duncan-Sandys</i> (Hawkins) Lord Hughes MM. Jessel <i>Smith</i> (Kershaw) Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire Dr. Miller MM. <i>Edwards</i> (Mulley) <i>Atkinson</i> (Onslow) Page <i>Wilkinson</i> (Lord Reay) <i>Ellis</i> (Urwin)
Federal Republic of Germany		
Mr. <i>Zebisch</i> (Ahrens) Mrs. von Bothmer MM. Enders Evers <i>Scheffler</i> (Flämig) Gessner <i>Böhm</i> (Handlos) <i>Lenzer</i> (von Hassel) Kittelmann <i>Spies von Büllesheim</i> (Lagershausen) <i>Holtz</i> (Marquardt) Mende	Luxembourg	
	MM. Berchem <i>Glesener</i> (Margue)	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Jager Jeambrun Péronnet Petit Pignion Schleiter Sénès Talon Valleix	Italy
MM. Hanin van Waterschoot		Mr. Calamandrei
France		Luxembourg
MM. Bizet Boucheny Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Grussenmeyer		Mr. Thoss
	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
	MM. Milz Vohrer	MM. Cornelissen de Koster

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 10 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on SALT and the British and French nuclear forces (Doc. 859) ¹:

Ayes	35
Noes	3
Abstentions	10

Ayes:

MM. Adriaensens	MM. <i>Orione</i> (Foschi)	Dr. Miller
<i>Zebisch</i> (Ahrens)	Fosson	MM. Müller
Berchem	Gessner	<i>Edwards</i> (Mulley)
Mrs. <i>Boniver</i> (Antoni)	Hardy	Pecchioli
Lord <i>McNair</i> (Beith)	<i>Lenzer</i> (von Hassel)	Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i> (Peeters)
MM. Bonnel	Lord Hughes	MM. Hermann Schmidt
Cavaliere	MM. van Hulst	<i>Mommersteeg</i> (Scholten)
Cox	McGuire	<i>Van der Elst</i> (Tanghe)
De Poi	<i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)	Tripodi
Enders	Maravalle	<i>Ellis</i> (Urwin)
<i>Scheffler</i> (Flämig)	<i>Glesener</i> (Margue)	<i>Giust</i> (Valiante)
Forma	<i>Holtz</i> (Marquardt)	

Noes:

MM. Stoffelen
Tummers
<i>Konings</i> (Voogd)

Abstentions:

Sir Frederic Bennett	Lord <i>Duncan-Sandys</i>	MM. <i>Wilkinson</i> (Lord Reay)
MM. Bernini	(Hawkins)	Rubbi
<i>Banks</i> (Grant)	MM. Jessel	Vecchiotti
Grieve	<i>Osborn</i> (Onslow)	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX III

Vote No. 11 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on the political implications for Europe of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (Doc. 855) ¹:

Ayes	30
Noes	5
Abstentions	6

Ayes:

MM. Adriaensens	MM. <i>Böhm</i> (Handlos)	MM. McGuire
Agrimi	Hardy	Müller
Sir Frederic Bennett	<i>Lenzer</i> (von Hassel)	<i>Atkinson</i> (Onslow)
MM. Berchem	Lord <i>Duncan-Sandys</i>	Page
Bonalumi	(Hawkins)	<i>Wilkinson</i> (Lord Reay)
<i>Forni</i> (Brugnon)	Lord Hughes	Reddemann
Caro	MM. van Hulst	Stoffelen
Cavaliere	Jessel	Tummers
De Poi	<i>Smith</i> (Kershaw)	<i>Ellis</i> (Urwin)
Forma	<i>Spies von Büllenheim</i>	<i>Konings</i> (Voogd)
Grieve	(Lagershausen)	

Noes:

Mr. Bernini
Mrs. von Bothmer
MM. <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots)
Rubbi
Vecchietti

Abstentions:

MM. Enders
<i>Scheffler</i> (Flämig)
Gessner
<i>Holtz</i> (Marquardt)
<i>Mattick</i> (Pawelczyk)
Hermann Schmidt

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 360

on SALT and the British and French nuclear forces

The Assembly,

- (i) Believing that armaments and arms control-disarmament are two sides of one coin: security;
- (ii) Noting that its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments intends to follow closely the SALT process and report regularly to the Assembly on this vital subject;
- (iii) Considering the twofold decision of the special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers of 12th December 1979 to be a realistic basis for negotiating reductions of long-range theatre nuclear forces with the Soviet Union;
- (iv) Noting that the 572 United States missiles to be deployed from 1983 will be accommodated within the reduced ceiling of United States nuclear warheads in Europe resulting from the unilateral reduction of 1,000, whereas the Soviet Union is now deploying SS-20 missiles at a rate which would provide 250-300 with 750-900 warheads by the end of 1981;
- (v) Welcoming the opening of preliminary bilateral talks on LRTNF reductions, believing that they should aim to establish a balance at the lowest possible level, as part of the global strategic nuclear balance;
- (vi) Stressing that nuclear forces are only a part, although a very important part, of the deterrent and that sufficient conventional forces form an equally essential part;
- (vii) Recalling that the 1974 Ottawa declaration recognised that the British and French nuclear forces were "capable of playing a deterrent rôle of their own contributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance", and noting that, if there is no reduction in the conventional defence, the view is held in the Alliance that the independent centres of decision add to the uncertainty facing Soviet planners, which is an essential factor of deterrence;
- (viii) Believing SALT II to be to the mutual advantage of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact;
- (ix) Considering that despite an inevitable interaction between Soviet actions and arms control negotiations in many fora, there should be no formal linkage with specific agreements when these are to the mutual advantage of the parties;
- (x) Recalling paragraph B.2. of Recommendation 346, urging member governments to submit annually to their parliaments reports on the arms control implications of all new defence equipment programmes,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call on member governments to urge the North Atlantic Council:

1. To call for the observance of the SALT II limits and the earliest resumption of the SALT process;
2. To recommend that any modernisation plans for British and French nuclear forces should not lead to the diversion of resources from conventional defence;
3. To call on the governments of NATO countries, in consultation with their national parliaments, to study the possibility:
 - (a) of improving nationally as well as in the framework of NATO methods of linking both armaments and arms control with security planning;
 - (b) of arrangements for continuously informing and consulting parliament, on a confidential basis where necessary, on these two sides of security planning and on progress of arms control negotiations.

RECOMMENDATION 361

*on the political implications for Europe of
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan*

The Assembly,

Considering the invasion of Afghanistan to be a challenge to international law and a violation of the final act of the Helsinki conference, particularly paragraphs II and VIII of the declaration on principles;

Considering that security and co-operation in Europe require respect for human rights within each of the countries taking part in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe;

Considering therefore that the verifications to be effected at the meeting of the CSCE in Madrid and the decisions it will take must concern to an equal degree the fields of security, economic co-operation and guarantees granted to persons;

Considering moreover that the balance of forces which ensures peace in Europe is threatened by the superiority acquired by the Soviet Union in both conventional forces and continental-range nuclear weapons, that the limitation of armaments and the reduction of forces and weapons, provided this helps to restore the balance, are still an essential means of ensuring Europe's security and that realistic proposals made by several countries for limiting or reducing forces and armaments or for confidence-building measures should allow significant progress to be made in this field in the coming years;

Considering that application of the right of the Afghan people to self-determination, independence and territorial integrity remains a basic aim to which the West must give priority in its relations with the Soviet Union,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge and remind the governments of member states to emphasise that the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan is a continuing unacceptable violation of international law and human rights and call for the removal of these troops;
2. Follow attentively developments at the CSCE meeting in Madrid and ensure close consultations between its members so as to allow substantial and a comparable degree of progress to be made with all the various items on the agenda;
3. Urge all participants in the CSCE to apply the provisions of the Helsinki final act in full;
4. Endeavour to ensure that the subsequent meeting of a conference on disarmament in Europe proceeds without serious delay;
5. At the same time pursue consideration of developments in the MBFR talks and encourage ratification of SALT II and the opening of SALT III with the aim of achieving true parity of forces and armaments in Europe and an overall nuclear balance;
6. Ask the governments of member countries to respect undertakings they have entered into, particularly in the framework of NATO, with a view to improving the West's defensive potential in Europe in both conventional and nuclear fields should progress in the achievement of disarmament not be made;
7. Continue and intensify the assistance which the EEC grants Yugoslavia;
8. Encourage application of the agreements between the Polish state and strikers of September 1980 by affording Poland economic and food assistance;
9. Pursue efforts undertaken in the framework of nine-power consultations to promote the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East;
10. Examine the possibility of full financial assistance and, if necessary, supplies of military equipment to the Afghan resistance movements until the USSR proves it is ready to negotiate the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan;

11. Together with all the arms-exporting countries, seek to confine deliveries of military equipment within the obligations of member states under the Charter of the United Nations;
12. Show its determination to use all necessary means to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to shipping;
13. Do its utmost to circumscribe the conflict between Iran and Iraq, to obtain a cease-fire and to seek the conditions for a fair and lasting peace between these two countries;
14. Maintain its support for the efforts of the United States with a view to obtaining the liberation of the American diplomats being held hostage in Tehran.

ORDER 53***on Poland and European security***

The Assembly,

Expressing its attachment to the principles of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and in particular the inviolability of state frontiers and the ban on the threat or use of force as a means of settling disputes between states;

Recalling the unanimous condemnation expressed by the WEU member countries when Warsaw Pact troops entered Czechoslovak territory in 1968 in violation of Czechoslovakia's national sovereignty;

Reaffirming the traditional attachment of democratic Europe to the independence and sovereignty of Poland;

Disturbed by the many recent statements made in the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia about the situation in Poland;

Welcoming the attitude of the European Council with regard to Poland as expressed in the declaration of 2nd December 1980 and associating itself with this declaration,

I. INSTRUCTS ITS GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

To follow developments in Poland and to report to it on this question at the next part-session;

II. REQUESTS ITS PRESIDENT

To convene an extraordinary session forthwith should the independence and sovereignty of Poland be jeopardised by an armed foreign intervention.

FOURTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 4th December 1980

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. International industrial consortia and collaborative arrangements for the production of high technology military equipment (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution*, Doc. 863).
2. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*, Doc. 865).
3. Energy and security (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 856 and Amendments).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous two Sittings were agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. International industrial consortia and collaborative arrangements for the production of high technology military equipment

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Order, Doc. 863)

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur.

The President informed the Assembly that for procedural reasons the draft Resolution should become a draft Order.

The Debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Martino, Lenzer and Konings.

Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur, and Mr. Valleix, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 362)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Order.

The draft Order was agreed to. (This Order will be published as No. 54)².

4. Relations with Parliaments

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 865)

The Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Smith.

Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur, and Mr. Agrimi, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speaker.

The Debate was closed.

1. See page 56.

2. See page 58.

The Assembly took note of the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

5. Energy and security

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 856 and Amendments)

The Debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Forma, Ellis, Konings, van Hulst and Lenzer.

Mr. Flämig, Rapporteur, and Mr. Valleix, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Hardy:

1. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers: Mr. Hardy, Dr. Miller, MM. Lenzer and Flämig.

The Amendment was negatived.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Flämig:

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " or thorium ".

Speaker: Mr. Flämig.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 31 votes to 3 with 3 abstentions; 17 Representatives who had signed the Register of Attendance did not take part in the vote. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 363)¹.

6. Close of the Session

The President declared the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly closed.

The Sitting was closed at 12.25 p.m.

¹. See page 59.

APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance¹:

Belgium	MM. Müller <i>Mattick</i> (Pawelczyk) Hermann Schmidt	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens <i>Dejardin</i> (Mangelschots) Tanghe		MM. van Hulst <i>Lamberts</i> (Scholten) Stoffelen Tummers <i>Konings</i> (Voogd)
France	Italy	
MM. Boucheny Valleix	MM. Agrimi <i>Conti Persini</i> (Bernini) Bonalumi <i>Martino</i> (Calamandrei) Cavaliere De Poi Forma Fosson Maravalle Mondino Petrilli Tripodi <i>Giust</i> (Valiante) Vecchietti	United Kingdom
Federal Republic of Germany		MM. Beith <i>Ellis</i> (Cox) Grieve Hardy <i>Hill</i> (Hawkins) Lord Hughes MM. Jessel <i>Smith</i> (Kershaw) Mrs. Knight Mr. McGuire Dr. Miller MM. <i>Edwards</i> (Mulley) Page <i>Wilkinson</i> (Lord Reay) <i>Fletcher</i> (Urwin)
MM. Ahrens <i>Bardens</i> (Mrs. von Bothmer) Evers Flämig Gessner <i>Böhm</i> (Handlos) <i>Lenzer</i> (von Hassel) <i>Spies von Büllenheim</i> (Lagershausen) Marquardt Mende	Luxembourg	
	MM. Berchem <i>Glesener</i> (Margue)	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Petit Pignion Schleiter Sénès Talon	MM. Pecchioli Rubbi
MM. Bonnel Hanin Peeters van Waterschoot		Luxembourg
		Mr. Thoss
France	Federal Republic of Germany	
MM. Bizet Brugnon Caro Depietri Deschamps Ferretti Grussenmeyer Jager Jeambrun Péridier Péronnet	MM. Enders Kittelmann Milz Reddemann Vohrer	Netherlands
		MM. Cornelissen de Koster
	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. Antoni Foschi	Sir Frederic Bennett MM. Grant Onslow

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 12 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on energy and security (Doc. 856)¹:

Ayes	31
Noes	3
Abstentions	3

Ayes:

MM. Adriaensens	MM. Fosson	MM. Marquardt
Agrimi	Gessner	Mende
Ahrens	Grieve	Dr. Miller
<i>Bardens</i>	<i>Böhm</i> (Handlos)	MM. <i>Edwards</i> (Mulley)
(Mrs. von Bothmer)	<i>Lenzer</i> (von Hassel)	<i>Mattick</i> (Pawelczyk)
Berchem	<i>Hill</i> (Hawkins)	<i>Wilkinson</i> (Lord Reay)
Cavaliere	Lord Hughes	Tanghe
<i>Ellis</i> (Cox)	MM. van Hulst	<i>Fletcher</i> (Urwin)
De Poi	<i>Smith</i> (Kershaw)	<i>Giust</i> (Valiante)
Flämig	McGuire	Valleix
Forma	<i>Glesener</i> (Margue)	

Noes:

MM. Stoffelen
Tummers
<i>Konings</i> (Voogd)

Abstentions:

MM. Beith
Hardy
<i>Lamberts</i> (Scholten)

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 362***on international industrial consortia
and collaborative arrangements for the
production of high technology military equipment***

The Assembly,

Aware that in spite of repeated political recommendations and constant efforts at an official level progress towards the standardisation and interoperability of defence equipment within the western Alliance remains inadequate;

Conscious that as economic recession and the growth in the price of petroleum products limit resources for defence and place additional constraints upon national defence budgets, improved cost-effectiveness in weapon procurement will become even more necessary;

Believing that collaborative definition, development and production of high technology defence equipment can bring substantial benefits of commonality between the procuring services in Europe as well as important savings in development costs, and a larger assured market for the participating industrial companies;

Understanding the need to preserve as widely as possible within the European armaments industry an independent capability to design, develop and build high technology weapons systems;

Realising that the impetus towards collaborative defence equipment projects should be commercial and industrial as well as military and logistic;

Considering that differences in operational requirements and procurement time-scales continue to be an unnecessarily major obstacle to effective international collaboration in the field of military equipment in Europe;

Convinced that progress towards more effective collaboration in the high technology military equipment sector lies not through the evolution of new bureaucratic structures but by a practical and pragmatic approach at an industrial level, allied to the closest co-operation between national military staffs and above all a common political will shared at the highest level in Europe to see joint collaborative solutions to the individual requirements of Alliance nations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Monitor on a regular basis through the Standing Armaments Committee progress towards achieving the interoperability and standardisation of defence equipment within the Alliance, and encourage where practical Western European industrial collaboration to achieve these objectives;
2. Persuade the governments of the Western European Union countries to establish a link whereby the Assembly of Western European Union is kept regularly informed of the work of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) as this Assembly is the only European parliamentary assembly with a *locus standi* established by treaty on defence matters, and has invaluable connections with national parliaments and ministers;
3. Invite the governments of member countries to convene a West European strategic summit at the earliest practical opportunity to seek agreement at the highest political level on the collaborative definition and development of the next generation of military projects such as a new European combat aircraft (ECA) to replace the Jaguar in the French and British air forces and to replace the Phantom in the German air force;
4. Promote a European policy for high technology weapons with a view to ensuring the development of a genuinely balanced transatlantic market whereby the standardisation of equipment within the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole would be enhanced: such a two-way street on a strictly equitable basis between the United States and Western Europe should involve on an increasing scale co-operative production programmes and the placing of offset work rather than outright purchases of equipment "off the shelf";

5. Press the member nations to ensure that when their military staffs issue requests for proposals (RFPs) to industrial manufacturers to meet a specified military requirement, they issue RFPs to existing industrial consortia as well as to individual firms;
6. Continue to press member countries working through the Independent European Programme Group to harmonise to the maximum extent possible the requirements of their armed forces and the joint phasing of their re-equipment plans.

ORDER 54***on a colloquy on
international aeronautical consortia***

The Assembly,

Considering that the promotion of European co-operation in aeronautical consortia is one of its main concerns;

Believing the development of a concerted policy to be in the best interests of Europe's aeronautical industries and defence posture;

Considering the positive results of former colloquies held in Paris and Toulouse,

INSTRUCTS its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to organise a colloquy on aeronautical consortia in 1981 or early 1982 on the same basis as earlier colloquies.

RECOMMENDATION 363***on energy and security***

The Assembly,

Convinced that the most important aim of any European energy policy should be to achieve maximum independence from imported oil in the shortest possible time;

Noting that costly long-term structural changes are needed to make a considerable reduction in oil consumption and Western Europe's dependence on imported energy for 63 % of its requirements;

Seriously concerned that since 1973 neither the Western European countries nor the western world as a whole has been able to implement proposals and decisions agreed upon either by the European Council or by the leaders of the main industrialised countries;

Endorsing the statement of the Venice summit conference of June 1980 in favour of the development of new coal and nuclear energy programmes as the only medium-term solutions to the energy problem;

Aware that while oil and raw materials, sea lanes for their transport and markets are becoming increasingly important strategically, Western European economies are becoming ever more dependent on trade with the East;

Conscious of the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz, particularly in the light of the war between Iraq and Iran, especially for Western European oil imports from Persian Gulf states,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To adopt, in the absence of agreement to implement a stringent Western European policy, convergent energy measures, and, together with the United States, Canada and Japan, formulate a co-operative global economic strategy, and also provide the necessary financial means for their implementation;
2. To establish and implement common plans for energy self-sufficiency and common guidelines for better use and conservation of energy, and to encourage lower oil consumption and the use of other energy resources such as coal, nuclear means and renewable energy resources;
3. To implement the coal objectives formulated by the International Energy Agency coal industry advisory board;
4. To agree, for Western Europe's electricity requirements, on common plans for better use of the scarce uranium resources of the western world through increasingly widespread use of fast-breeder reactors which would consequently mean recycling spent fuel elements in order to recuperate uranium and to obtain plutonium for fast-breeder reactors or, in a mixture with uranium, for light-water reactors;
5. To determine the acceptable threshold of safety and security for imports of energy or rare raw materials by the western world from the eastern bloc countries;
6. To participate in contingency plans for keeping open all international shipping lanes, such as the Strait of Hormuz.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

EIGHTH SITTING

Monday, 1st December 1980

SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Examination of Credentials.
4. Observers.
5. Earthquake in Italy.
6. Tribute.
Speakers: The President, Mr. De Poi.
7. Address by the President of the Assembly.
8. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
9. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session (Doc. 849).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Stoffelen, Sir Frederic Bennett; (point of order): Dr. Miller; Mr. Valleix.
10. The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation postponed from the First Part of the Session, Doc. 837*).
Speakers: The President; (explanation of vote): Mr. Bozzi.
11. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation postponed from the First Part of the Session, Doc. 838*).
12. Methods of voting (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 853 and Amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Bozzi (*Rapporteur*), Lord Hughes, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Page, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Bozzi (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Grieve (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Bozzi, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Hanin; (explanation of vote): Mr. Antoni.
13. Revision and interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 852*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Grieve (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Stainton, Mr. Grieve.
14. Changes in the membership of Committees.
15. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 11 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. – The Sitting is open.

I declare resumed the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union, which was adjourned on Thursday, 5th June 1980, at the conclusion of the Seventh Sitting.

In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the Seventh Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been

notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Examination of Credentials

The PRESIDENT. – The Orders of the Day now provide for the examination of credentials of the new Representatives and Substitutes whose names were published in Notice No. 8.

The credentials of all but Mr. Berchem, a Luxembourg Representative, were ratified by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or its Standing Committee on 3rd July and 24th September 1980. These credentials were attested, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure of our Assembly, by a statement of ratification communicated to me by the President of the Assembly of the Council of Europe.

¹. See page 16.

The President (continued)

Mr. Berchem's appointment has been made since the adjournment of the Council of Europe's session. It therefore falls to our Assembly to ratify his credentials in accordance with paragraph 2 of Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure.

The appointment has been properly made in accordance with our rules and his credentials have not been opposed.

Is there any opposition to the ratification of these credentials?...

The credentials of Mr. Berchem are agreed to, subject to subsequent ratification by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Consequently, Mr. Berchem, as a Representative of Luxembourg, is authorised to take his place in the Assembly of Western European Union.

I offer our new colleague a warm welcome.

4. Observers

The PRESIDENT. – I am also glad to inform the Assembly that we have a number of observers. I welcome these observers, who are doing us the honour of taking part in our deliberations: Mrs. Mette Madsen and Mr. Gert Petersen, members of the Danish Folketing; Mr. Petter Furberg and Mr. Kjell Magne Bondevik, members of the Norwegian Storting; Mr. Thenistocle Vyzas and Mr. Koutsogiorgas, deputies from Greece.

5. Earthquake in Italy

The PRESIDENT. – As soon as I heard of the great tragedy that struck southern Italy by violent earthquake, I sent a message to Mr. De Poi, Chairman of the Italian Delegation, on behalf of the Assembly. Today I am sure that I speak for all members of the Assembly in conveying our deepest sympathy to our Italian colleagues and to the Italian people in the aftermath of this terrible earthquake and express the hope that the solidarity of Italy's partners will allow the most effective assistance to be brought to the survivors of this catastrophe. It would be appropriate if we were all now to stand for a moment in silence to the many who have lost their lives, as a mark of our sympathy and sorrow.

(The Representatives rose)

Thank you very much.

6. Tribute

The PRESIDENT. – I have also now a very sad additional duty. It is to report to the Assembly the death of Mr. Talamona, a Vice-President of the Assembly, who died tragically last July on his way back to Italy from Madrid. He was a member of the Italian Senate and of our Assembly from 1972 to 1976. He was a Vice-President at the time of his death. In the name of the Assembly, I wish to express our sympathy with his family and the Italian Delegation. I think that we should pause for a moment's silence.

Thank you.

I call Mr. De Poi.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, as leader of the Italian Delegation, it is my unfortunate duty, at the start of our session, to speak of two most distressing events affecting us as Italians, which have aroused such expressions of sympathy and solidarity in this Assembly.

First and foremost, I would speak of the earthquake which has struck some particularly inaccessible and impoverished regions of southern Italy, where the people are suffering the greatest hardships. Our gratitude goes out to all the countries of Europe and to all those who personally have expressed their solidarity with the people of Italy in this time of great trial. We are also convinced that the difficulties experienced in bringing succour are being eased as best possible by the vast scale of the international aid so promptly given.

The territory affected stretches over an area measuring 120 kilometres by 70 with some hundreds of villages which means that the work of relief is particularly difficult.

I should also like to remind the Assembly, which is concerned primarily with defence questions, of the unstinting assistance so promptly brought by Italy's armed forces in parts of the country far distant from the places where they are mainly stationed. Some years ago it was possible to bring help more swiftly to the Friuli region where many of the forces defending our frontiers are stationed. Without question, however, Italy's armed forces working together with other state services and various organisations, have done and are continuing to do all in their power to help in solving a problem rendered very urgent by the bad weather and the severity of the earthquake.

For their sympathy, and understanding, we thank the President of the Assembly and all who both individually and in the name of their political groups are doing everything possible to collect help and to see that it is delivered to the stricken areas.

Mr. De Poi (continued)

Secondly, I wish to thank the President for his tribute to our departed friend and colleague, Augusto Talamona. He was not here with us for long but we were all able to appreciate his devotion to this Assembly. In particular, we appreciated his calm and thoughtful contribution to our delegation. May his memory serve as an encouragement and comfort to us in continuing to work in a manner worthy of our task in this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. De Poi. I am sure that your words will have been listened to with very great care and interest. I am sure that in our respective countries we shall all endeavour to do what we can to assist the Italian people in their dire difficulties following this great catastrophe which still, I gather, has not completely ended. There is still the possibility of more damage and of more seismic problems.

7. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – At this stage it is usual for the President to address the Assembly, although when one looks through the order of business one finds few points that one can make in respect of the responsibilities with which we are concerned in international and defence matters that will not come up one way or another. I do not think that it is good practice for the President to make comments on debates before they start, not least because, by the rules, the President is not allowed to participate in the debates of the Assembly. However, I should like to make one or two observations concerning both the world as it is and, more particularly, how we in the Assembly endeavour to make our contribution to the solution of some of the problems.

My first thought on looking at the order of business is that we are again seeking to pour a quart into a pint pot. I am not sure how that old English saying translates into metric form. Perhaps I should say that we are trying to put two litres into a seventy centilitre bottle. We always try to cover too much ground in the limited time available to the Assembly.

In the world outside there is great cause for concern. I suppose that uncertainty is an inevitable and, indeed, essential element in the period of deterrence in which we have lived over the last years. Uncertainty in recent months has mounted to a stage where it is a matter of considerable anxiety and discomfort.

The American hostages have still not been released, Soviet forces are still active in Afghan-

istan and the situation in the Middle East has become worse and threatens to become still more difficult. A new President and administration are shortly to take office in the United States and we are not sure how that will affect the policies of that great nation in respect of NATO and other matters concerning us.

However, we must again underline the need for co-ordination among the members of WEU and stress to the new administration in the United States the importance of consultation between the European and the North American parts of the Alliance.

There is growing anxiety in all our countries about the growth of nuclear weapons and the seeming failure to accept even the most modest proposals of the SALT II agreement. While one well understands the difficulties facing those concerned with making progress towards détente or arms control in the present situation, I shall never give up the belief that the only safe way to avoid war is by arms control and disarmament.

As I had the responsibility at the time for inserting into the non-proliferation treaty Article 6, which places the obligation for nuclear negotiations on the nuclear powers – which led to the SALT process – I wish to see that process restarted as soon as possible. Having made proposals in Geneva and at the United Nations which at least led to the ban on biological weapons, I am disappointed that no progress has been made towards banning the use of chemical weapons as well.

In all our countries, and certainly in the United Kingdom, we are gravely concerned about the economic recession, with the social and other difficulties that it is bringing to our peoples. It is bound to affect the willingness and ability of our countries to meet targets for defence expenditure. All those matters will be discussed during the week.

I should also like to say a word about the rôle of our Assembly. In a sense, we are at the end of an era, because we have to elect a Clerk for the first time since the first meetings of our Assembly, when our predecessors were so wise as to choose Mr. Humblet.

In other respects, too, we have to look at our procedures, because we have a rôle to play in guiding public opinion in our countries and, in particular, by the quality of our reports from committees and debates here, influencing the views and debates in our national parliaments.

A great source of distress to me has been the seeming failure to provide a quorum for important debates and votes. While we here know why that is so – and it is not the case that members do not take their work seriously – it

The President (continued)

has often been represented outside that this is not a serious body, because we are unable to provide a quorum on these occasions. I am grateful to the Committee on Rules of Procedure for the consideration that it has given to these matters. It is not for me but for the Assembly to judge what steps we should take. Certainly I hope that we can arrive at a system that will permit us not only to discuss the great issues facing Europe at present and in the future but to come to considered decisions on them. We certainly have a full week's work ahead of us and I hope that it will be possible for us to sustain a quorum throughout the week.

Finally, I look forward, with my wife, to receiving you for some refreshment this evening, when it would also be appropriate to pay informal respects, as distinct from the formal respects that we shall want to pay on Wednesday, to Mr. Humblet for his great career as Clerk of the Assembly.

8. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – We have to elect a Vice-President in place of Mr. Talamona, whose death I mentioned earlier and to whom Mr. De Poi paid tribute for his work for the Assembly.

In accordance with Rule 10, paragraph 9 (b), the Italian Delegation proposed that Mr. Maravalle should fill his place as Vice-President. This proposal was ratified by the Presidential Committee in accordance with the same rule.

Mr. Maravalle's election as a Vice-President depends, however, on the Assembly. If there is no objection, I propose that the Assembly now confirm the decision of the Presidential Committee by electing Mr. Maravalle a Vice-President of the Assembly by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

Mr. Maravalle, you are elected Vice-President of the Assembly

9. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session

(Doc. 849)

The PRESIDENT. – The Orders of the Day call for the adoption of the draft Order of Business in Document 849 dated 25th November 1980.

Normally, I ask for comments on the draft Order of Business. However, I have been given a document signed by about ten members of the Assembly. They wish the report, which was to have been presented by Mr. von Hassel, to be referred back to the General Affairs Committee. I refer to Document 854. I am not sure whether the sponsors of the motion wish it to be taken now. If so, it would be in order to put it on the agenda and to consider it in the usual way this afternoon.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I speak on behalf of the Socialist Group. I do not have any preference about whether we discuss the order of this afternoon's session now or this afternoon. It would be much easier to discuss it now. With your permission, Mr. President, I should like to explain the request that we have already made in written form.

The PRESIDENT. – You can move that the item be deleted from the agenda. However, we cannot have a full debate on the whole of the report. Unhappily, Mr. von Hassel is ill and cannot be present. I understand that the motion will be moved on behalf of the Committee, and it will then be possible to hold a debate and to put this proposition at the end of the debate.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – In that case, I move, on behalf of my group, that the report's recommendations and resolutions be referred back to Mr. von Hassel and the General Affairs Committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Do you wish to do that under this Order of the Day? Do you move that it be deleted from the Order of Business? Is there any opposition to that proposal?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – No reasons have been given for this unusual step. Unhappily, Mr. von Hassel is seriously ill. On many other occasions circumstances have prevented a Rapporteur from being present or have prevented a Rapporteur from putting forward his report.

On those occasions, someone else has taken his place. A British colleague of mine, Mr. Roper, took that step and recently moved a report when the Rapporteur was not available. The report was considered in Committee and was carried by a large majority. My colleagues and I oppose this request.

There is great contention over the draft resolution, as opposed to the main part, namely, the draft recommendation. Although Mr. Reddemann has agreed to take Mr. von Hassel's place it would be difficult for an acting Rapporteur to deal with the situation. I am empowered to say that, if this matter comes to a vote, the Chairman and Rapporteur will delete and

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

withdraw the draft resolution and refer it back to the Committee. However, we shall not withdraw the draft recommendation and the report. It would be a pity if we were to use procedural devices to prevent discussion of the report. It has been considered for many months in Committee and a large majority vote for it has been gained.

In view of what has happened and in a spirit of conciliation, the acting Rapporteur and I are prepared to recommend and accept that we refer the draft resolution back, on the understanding that a debate is still held, as it appears on the agenda, on the recommendations and the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Stoffelen, do you wish to press deletion from the agenda, or do you prefer that it should be taken this afternoon, given the Chairman's observations on the suppression of the draft resolution?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – That was my intention, but, after the Chairman's very short speech, I might be misunderstood if I did not explain the reasons for our request. It is for you, Mr. President, to decide whether it is better for me to express my views and have the vote now, or this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT. – I understood that it was not only the absence of the Rapporteur or any such technicality that was at issue. I understand that the argument is about the substance of the report. That would be better taken in debate than on an order of the day motion.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I should make clear that, according to Rule 32, I have formally moved a procedural motion to the effect that the whole of the report's recommendations and resolutions should be referred back. We must vote on the procedural motion before we can begin our discussion of the report's resolutions and recommendations.

If this subject is discussed this afternoon, that will involve a procedural motion to the effect that the whole of the report and the recommendations must be referred back. That is clear.

The PRESIDENT. – That has clarified the matter. You are not required to give formal notice by tabling a motion. It is a matter that concerns the substance and would be better taken then than moving that a report be taken off the Assembly's programme. That would be unsatisfactory.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. A spokesman has moved that an item should be deleted

from the agenda. That is a procedural matter. I oppose that motion. Any arguments used during discussion are not relevant to the fact that a motion, which I oppose, has been moved. I therefore ask that we vote on that basis now.

The PRESIDENT. – I thought that Mr. Stoffelen had withdrawn that original motion in favour of deletion. If not, I must put the issue to the Assembly.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Rule 32, paragraph 3, states:

“In debate on the above matters, the following only shall be heard: the proposer of the motion, one speaker against the motion, the Rapporteur and the Chairman of any Committee concerned.”

So far, I have not been able to explain the reasons behind the motion and the request. I should like to explain the reasons for our request before any vote.

The PRESIDENT. – The idea of referring this subject back to the Committee occurs after the resolution has become part of the Assembly's business. That is the difficulty. Until it has been moved, it is not strictly speaking before the Assembly. We are now discussing whether this subject should be on the programme. When it has been moved by the Rapporteur, it will be in order for you, Mr. Stoffelen, or another member, to move that it be referred back to the Committee.

As a procedural matter, it cannot be debated at large. That is the difficulty. If the motion to delete this subject from the Orders of the Day is not withdrawn, I must put the question to the Assembly without further debate. I must then hear a speech for the motion and a speech against.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President, I seek clarification. It is a little unfair that it should be argued that Mr. Stoffelen is putting forward merely a procedural motion when in fact that is all that we can actually be discussing because it is actually a vote on the draft recommendation. I ask your guidance, Mr. President. I am sure that there is a procedure for this. It is not right that Mr. Stoffelen should be accused of taking refuge in a procedural motion when in fact there is nothing that he can do but move the reference back on this matter, or allow speeches for and against.

The PRESIDENT. – The motion before us is to adopt the whole of the business for the week. If we are to have speeches on every motion, we shall never get anything actually proposed.

The President (continued)

I understood that Mr. Stoffelen had accepted that it would be better to wait until the motion was actually before the Assembly. The procedure that he envisages would then be completely in order. He would then be under the normal procedure and able to put forward his view and the Chairman and Rapporteur would put forward theirs. The Assembly would then vote on whether to accept the procedural motion or continue with the debate on the report itself, which seems to me the best course.

If we were to allow a general debate on the merits of every Order of the Day, the first morning of the Assembly would probably last until Wednesday afternoon. Does Mr. Stoffelen wish now to move that it be deleted from the Orders of the Day? No. So there is no new motion before the Assembly except the general motion that the draft Order of Business be adopted.

I should inform the Assembly that we have a very unfortunate problem, though I understand that it is not serious. Mr. Grieve has met with an accident and his arrival is delayed, so Mr. Bozzi's report will be taken before Mr. Grieve's report. I hope and believe Mr. Grieve will be here in time to introduce his report. If not, I am sure that in the circumstances the Assembly will agree that it should be deferred.

May I now have the draft Order of Business for the second half of the twenty-sixth ordinary session adopted?

Is there any objection?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to draw your attention to the arrangements for the debate we are to have tomorrow, Tuesday. The difficulty lies in finding a suitable time to take the report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions by Mr. Flämig.

Mr. Pierre Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, is likely to be speaking until about 5 to 5.30 p.m., including answers to questions. I should not like to see the debate beginning at that hour and above all our being unable to complete it.

Mr. President, I feel it would be preferable for Mr. Flämig's report to be presented on Tuesday morning, then the debate would begin on Tuesday afternoon, as scheduled. But arrangements would probably have to be made for it to be concluded on Wednesday morning.

The PRESIDENT. – One of our difficulties is that when Ministers are invited they usually do not accept, and then later they ask whether an

under-secretary can come, and, under our rules, any Minister of any member country has a right to address us. Then they change their time. I had hoped to arrange for a ministerial speech today, but I believe that the French Minister is now due to come at 3.30 p.m. rather than 4.30 p.m., which will probably ease the position.

I accept that we could not expect Mr. Flämig to present his report at a very late hour tomorrow. We must see how we go. We have already had three changes for the French Minister's speech and we may well have another two before he actually arrives tomorrow.

With the undertaking that we shall do what we can to assist Mr. Valleix, may I have the draft Order of Business approved?

The draft Order of Business is adopted.

10. *The northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands*

(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation postponed from the First Part of the Session, Doc. 837)

The PRESIDENT. – We have now to deal with reports that were not voted on at the last part-session because of the absence of a quorum.

The first is a report on the northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 837, submitted by Mr. Ahrens.

If there is no opposition, we can proceed without a roll-call vote.

Is there any opposition to the amended draft recommendation?

Mr. Bozzi, do you wish to oppose this recommendation?

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, during the debate on this report I tabled several amendments which were not adopted by the Assembly. Consequently – and this is an exception – the Joint Democrat Group will abstain during this vote. To facilitate the proceedings of the Assembly, we shall not vote against, which will obviate the need to resort to the tedious business of voting by roll-call.

The PRESIDENT. – I am much obliged to you, Mr. Bozzi, not only for the views you have just expressed about a roll-call but for the work you have done in trying to improve matters.

If there is no opposition, I do not think it necessary to have a roll-call vote. That has been the practice so far.

The President (continued)

*The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted*¹.

I understand that there is no opposition to the report, although there were some abstentions.

11. Nuclear, biological and chemical protection

(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation postponed from the First Part of the Session, Doc. 838)

The PRESIDENT. – The second recommendation is on nuclear, biological and chemical protection, in a report from the same Committee, Document 838, the Rapporteur being Mr. Banks.

Is there any opposition to this recommendation? Yes, there is. Therefore, we must proceed by roll-call vote. There cannot be any debate at this stage on reports that have been deferred and on which we have already had a debate.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Forma.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows²:

Number of votes cast	63
Ayes	37
Noes	26
Abstentions	0

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted*³.

12. Methods of voting

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 853 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the report from the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. As I said, as Mr. Grieve might have been a little late arriving, I asked Mr. Bozzi to move his report on the methods of voting, followed by the debate and vote on the draft resolution, Document 853 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall keep my remarks on the essence of this matter very brief. Two years ago, in connection with this amendment of the Rules of Procedure, we unanimously adopted a draft report in which we said:

“ The value of a recommendation adopted by the Assembly thus lies in the force of the political conviction it expresses and the degree and genuineness of the support it receives. A recommendation adopted by a narrow margin and not an effective majority of the members of the Assembly would carry little weight. ”

The amendments to the Rules of Procedure which I have the honour of presenting to you on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges must be regarded as the half-way stage in a necessary process of adapting the Rules of Procedure: we simply wish to ensure, on the one hand, that the absence of a quorum can be declared only on the essential grounds that, regrettably, not enough members are present, thus preventing the use of ploys to this end and, on the other hand, that the Rules of Procedure are not manipulated or interpreted too freely as a means of removing all force from the political recommendations we are called upon to adopt.

Starting from these principles, the Committee was faced by a number of proposals which I would describe as “ asking for most ”.

One of these proposals sought to emulate the practice of various of the parliaments we represent here and to introduce no more and no less than proxy voting. But such voting is prohibited under Rule 37, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Procedure. Like the Chairman, Mr. Grieve, I opposed this proposal, and on two occasions, when dealing with this report, your Committee rejected it by a very large majority. I hope no one will renew this proposal.

Another proposal, which appeared to be more acceptable, was that our Rules of Procedure should be brought into line with those of the Council of Europe, under which voting by roll-call is the exception and voting by sitting and standing more or less the rule.

After discussing the subject at some length, also on two occasions, in Bonn and more recently in Paris, your Committee rejected this proposal, which would have perpetuated an ambiguity in the interpretation of votes. This ambiguity has, as you will recall, sometimes been the source of painful incidents, which your Committee has sought to avoid.

1. See page 18.

2. See page 17.

3. See page 20.

Mr. Bozzi (continued)

But as we have to overcome these difficulties, which led the Presidential Committee to instruct the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to submit a solution to you – I hardly dare call it a trick, but that is in fact what it is – we propose not that the method of voting should be changed, this being part of the Rules of Procedure for which we would wish to retain a suitably strict and formal character, but that the method of calculating the quorum should be modified. In other words, the fundamental change would consist in basing the quorum not on the number of those taking part in the vote but on the number of signatures in the attendance register, which is an official document annexed to the minutes.

It would then be impossible for a minority to express its opposition, thus necessitating a vote by roll-call, and then to withdraw from the chamber to ensure there was no quorum at the time of the vote.

The second proposal suggests that roll-calls should begin with the names of those requesting the procedure and, following an amendment by Lord Hughes, that if fewer than seven of these members answer when their names are called, the roll-call should be stopped and the vote taken by sitting and standing. What we have here, if you will pardon the word, is a cunning way of preventing those who have requested a vote by roll-call from ensuring that a quorum does not then exist. It is thus quite legitimate to begin the roll-call with their names so that, at the very least, it can be established that they want the roll-call and are present to answer when their names are called. If seven of them do not answer when called, the roll-call stops and we revert to voting by the simplified procedure of sitting and standing.

The third proposal is a practical one, but certain Committee members were afraid when it was put forward that its object was to transfer some of the responsibilities which are properly the Assembly's to the Presidential Committee, whose task it is, as you know, to draw up our order of business. But this proposal is in fact less ambitious and less revolutionary than that. It merely seeks to allow the Presidential Committee to decide from a consideration of the reports, the general political context and various other factors whether a vote should be postponed until a later part-session, as has happened today with the Banks and Ahrens reports, or whether reports should be referred to Committee where they have become devoid of any topicality.

That, Gentlemen, is the gist of the draft before you. In Committee Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. Stoffelen, Lord Hughes and Mr. Voogd

played an active part in the drawing up of the report, irrespective of whether they agreed or, as in the case of Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. Cornelissen, disagreed with my conclusions.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Bozzi.

We now proceed to the general debate.

The first speaker whose name I have is Lord Hughes.

Lord HUGHES (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, as Mr. Bozzi has said, I was present at the meeting of the Committee when this matter was considered. In fact, it was the first time I had been there, because I took the place which you, Mr. President, vacated on that Committee by becoming President.

At the end of the meeting I indicated to the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Grieve, that I wanted to reconsider some of the items since we had finished up rather hurriedly. I do not disagree with what has been put forward. My reason for speaking today is that I do not think that the changes go far enough: not only the change to Rule 34 but the change to Rule 36. As the Rapporteur has said, the purpose of these changes is to make it more difficult to manoeuvre to prevent our taking a vote and yet reasonably to protect the rights of minorities.

There are four parts to Rule 36. The purpose of the change, as Mr. Bozzi has said, is to substitute for half of the Representatives present those who have signed the register. That change takes place in the first part of Rule 36. The difficulty in which I find myself concerns paragraphs 2 and 3 of the rules. Paragraph 2 of Rule 36 says:

“ All votes other than votes by roll-call shall be valid, whatever the number of Representatives present, unless, before the voting has begun, the President has been requested to ascertain the number of those present. ”

As we change the first paragraph from those present to those who have signed the register, it does not make sense to talk about those present in the second paragraph. That, I submit, should be altered to “ unless the President has been requested to ascertain the number of those who have signed the register ”

Similarly, in paragraph 3:

“ A vote by roll-call shall in no circumstances be valid, nor the result be made public, if the vote shows that a majority of Representatives was not present. ”

Again I suggest that it is necessary, in order to make the change in paragraph 1 make sense, that this be altered to “ unless it shows that a majority of Representatives or Substitutes have signed the register ”. I do not know whether it

Lord Hughes (continued)

is possible to make these changes now. If they are made, I think Mr. Bozzi's proposal will be successfully carried out. If not, there will be confusion about the circumstances in which a roll-call is valid. I hope that the Chairman will be able to say that paragraphs 2 and 3 could be similarly changed.

The PRESIDENT. – On a procedural matter, if the Rapporteur and the Chairman are agreeable, those two consequential amendments could be made if the first point were carried.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – Lord Hughes drew this matter to my attention just before I came in. As you will realise, Mr. President, I was a little pressed because I arrived late, for the reasons which you know. It seems to me that the point made by Lord Hughes is well founded. The Rapporteur and I have just agreed that we should be willing to substitute those words in Rule 36, paragraphs 2 and 3, to meet the point that Lord Hughes has very properly made.

The PRESIDENT. – I will accept those as manuscript amendments. Perhaps the Chairman and the Rapporteur would write them down and hand them in.

The next speaker is Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I took part in the discussion on the rules and I agreed with the recommendation referred to by the Rapporteur. However, not being a member of the Committee, I did not take part in its work. After listening closely to the Rapporteur and to the last speaker, I should like to raise two points. I should first like to refer to the way in which the question was posed: the two unamended clauses of the rule, for which a manuscript amendment is now proposed, in fact conflicted with the Rapporteur's proposals and rendered the rule itself non-applicable. In my opinion, the system proposed by the Rapporteur raises doubts concerning both the decisions and whether the proposal itself is consistent with those decisions.

In reality, the Assembly was seeking to avoid both so-called "surprise votes" and any abuse of the right to take part in the Assembly. It seems to me that, all things considered, the proposal now before us to some extent works to the disadvantage of the opposition to a measure at any time, because in practice the quorum is not checked when a subject is discussed but at the start of the sitting when a check is made to see whether enough members – the majority – are present and have signed the register. After that, the matter just proceeds: what is more, the members calling for a vote by

roll-call – involving as many as ten people – are sometimes missing when the vote is actually taken and thus automatically lose the right to vote.

In my view, Mr. Rapporteur and Chairman of the Committee, this would not seem to be the spirit in which we approached the matter at the last session. I believe that we should settle the right to vote in a more open manner. I cannot, therefore, fully share the Rapporteur's view, although I do appreciate the effort which has been made to improve the efficiency of our work. I do not think that this is the best way; I would enumerate more precisely a number of subjects on which a vote by roll-call is allowed and, in fact, compulsory in each case, and in this respect I support the proposed amendment; then, the rules for votes in the chamber would have to be such that it would be possible at any time to call for a vote by roll-call or for a check of the quorum, if need be allowing some time to enable absent delegates to be present, possibly by postponement until the afternoon sitting or the next day. This would avoid adopting a rule which would ultimately leave us in a situation where a vote by roll-call could be taken with only a minority of the Assembly present. I urge members to consider this point; in practice, a minority of the Assembly would become a majority and this does not seem right to me.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Antoni.

The next speaker is Mr. Page.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – This is the first time in about seven years that I have dared to intervene in a debate on Rules of Procedure, and I do so with some hesitancy. I feel in general that we should accept the suggestions put forward by the Rapporteur, but I should like to make a further strong recommendation that could perhaps be discussed at a later stage by the Committee on Rules of Procedure.

Since the power of the use of the quorum politically is to be greatly reduced, it is important that care be taken about when votes are called, particularly on important debates, but generally on all debates. There can be few sittings, particularly in the afternoons, when fewer than the sufficient number of members will have signed the roll. As an example of the point that I wish to make, I refer to the afternoon debates of today and tomorrow.

Today's debate is on the von Hassel report on the future of European security. It starts at 3 p.m. and many members will wish to take part in it. I can easily believe that it will go on to 6 p.m. or 7 p.m. or even later. I should like to know by what procedure the vote on the debate is to take place after 11.30 a.m. tomorrow. Is the vote to take place then

Mr. Page (continued)

because the debate may go on late and therefore there may be only a few members present at 7 p.m. or 8 p.m. to take part in the vote?

Tomorrow afternoon there is to be a debate on energy and security which is unlikely to start before about 5.30 p.m. There is to be a vote on a draft recommendation and as the debate will not start until 5.30, plainly it will go on until 6.30 or 7.30 or later. Would it not be right, as a general rule, for votes to be taken on the following day for debates that take place in the latter part of the afternoon? That would seem to be fair.

Finally, I turn to a general matter of voting. I know that the Committee on Rules of Procedure and the secretariat have looked at this matter in the past. I am a member of a number of international organisations and I find the voting procedures here less clear and more muddled than any elsewhere. I want to know whether the bell has been rung in this building, or at what stage it will be rung, to announce that there may be a vote on this subject. I ask the Committee to be kind enough to have another look at the informing, by bells or however, of members of the Assembly that votes are to take place.

I also feel that at the start of the voting procedure there should be from your rostrum, Mr. President, greater clarity in the way that names are called. At the Inter-Parliamentary Union there is an electronic computer containing the names of all members, which prints out within five seconds of the completion of a vote the names of those who took part, how they voted, whether they abstained and so on. Such a system would be valuable to you, Mr. President, and the secretariat.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Page. I do not think that we can adopt any of your ideas in the current debate. They go beyond the scope of manuscript amendments.

One of the difficulties in this Assembly is that half of us are Representatives and the other half are Substitutes. Substitutes are often not notified in time or do not sign the register. There is the problem of knowing whether the name of the Representative or the Substitute should be called. I agree that we should look at any possible way of improving the methods of taking votes.

The next speaker is Mr. Stoffelen. This is part of the general debate and you may move your amendment, Mr. Stoffelen, when that is concluded.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Since I wish to speak in my capacity as a Dutch Representative, I shall speak in my own language.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

(Translation). – Mr. President, this is a matter that seems unimportant, but one that has caused a great deal of irritation to everyone who works here. I have been a member of this Assembly since 1972. In every sitting that I have attended, the President has had to grapple with the stipulation in our Rules of Procedure that every vote must be a roll-call vote. Every President is obliged to become almost schizophrenic. On the one hand he has to respect the rules, while on the other knowing that practical work would become extraordinarily difficult if the rules had to be obeyed. There would have to be roll-call votes, with the risk of not finding a quorum present. For eight years past I have been determined to do something to help in getting this irksome rule changed.

I compliment the Rapporteur on his efforts and his attempts to solve the problem. He is however asking us for something rather strange – to say that someone who is not voting is in fact voting, and that someone who is not present is in fact present. As a lawyer I am willing and able to go in for a fair measure of acrobatics; but this is going very far indeed.

What is worse is the fact that the proposal does not solve anything. The rule that a roll-call vote is being held remains, so there are still problems with the roll-call vote. This, already, is one reason for not being happy with the proposed amendment.

There is a second reason. The members present here are all members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Factually and formally, our Assembly has a link with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Obviously therefore, there should not be any divergent rules. I ask those of our colleagues who have more to do with the Council of Europe than with WEU whether they are able, at any given moment, to be sure which rules apply in whatever meeting they happen to be in at the time. Let us try therefore, as much as we can, to work with the same rules. This will save both you, Mr. President, and us a lot of time and trouble.

The most important reason is this: since I have been a member of this Assembly, and as Chairman of a political group – though I am not speaking now in that capacity – I have tried to see that this Assembly becomes a true parliament with normal rules, one that commands authority and understanding through its attitudes, through the force of its arguments and the logic of its rules.

I would wager that in every normal parliament the rule is that ordinary votes are taken

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

by sitting and standing, and by a show of hands. Let us try to make this Assembly into a real parliament, and grasp this opportunity of bringing in normal parliamentary rules for the way we do our work.

Bearing in mind what I have just said, I have proposed that the rules of the Council of Europe be adopted here. This means normal voting by sitting and standing, except when five members demand a roll-call vote. I find that the text of my amendment has given rise to the impression that I want to combine my proposal with the essence of that put forward by Mr. Bozzi. This is not so; my proposal forms a complete alternative. It must therefore mean doing away with the proposal by Mr. Bozzi to replace the present paragraph 1 by a rule saying that those who are not present are in fact present, and that those who are not voting are in fact voting. Naturally I am against that. The consequence of my amendment is therefore that the normal rules, which apply in any respectable parliament, should be brought in here.

The PRESIDENT. – Perhaps Mr. Stoffelen can help us. Mr. Stoffelen intends to move his amendment when the debate has finished. As drafted, it will be an addition to that of Mr. Bozzi. When Mr. Stoffelen moves his amendment, he may wish to modify it. I cannot allow a proposal in general terms. I must receive a precise proposal as to how it is to be amended.

Does any other member wish to take part in the general debate?...

If not, I shall ask the Rapporteur to speak.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). – I shall be very brief. I can tell Lord Hughes straight away that I am in a position to move an amendment which makes the text of Rule 36 much more logical. This amendment, to paragraph 2 of Rule 36, could be worded as follows:

“All votes other than votes by roll-call shall be valid, whatever the number of Representatives present, unless, before the voting has begun, the President has been requested to ascertain that the Register of Attendance has not been signed by a majority of the Representatives or their Substitutes.”

The argument put forward by Mr. Antoni is furthermore absolutely contrary not so much to the decisions of the Committee – to which it was not put by Mr. Antoni, who, if I remember rightly, attended one of its two meetings – but to Mr. Stoffelen's proposals. These proposals are contradictory. For Mr. Antoni says – and you will see that this argument is not without a

semblance of common sense – that if we go strictly by the number of those attending as shown by the signatures in the Register of Attendance at the beginning of the sitting, it is possible that when the voting takes place there will be only five or six persons still present. And he adds: as, in order to establish the quorum, you take as the basis not the number of persons actually present but the number of signatures in the Register of Attendance it would in the extreme – I would indeed add, most absurd – case be possible for an important draft resolution to be passed by only four or five members of the Assembly.

A general remark is called for at this point: if we really want to sabotage our Assembly's work, we can do so by getting into such an extreme situation. By “extreme situation” I mean one in which an important draft resolution might be passed by only four or five Representatives. What self-respect would we have if we could conceive of such a situation occurring?

That is why the Committee is unwilling to accept Mr. Antoni's amendment, since it is understood that it is up to every member, group or chairman of a political group of our Assembly to attend as often as possible.

On this subject I should like to say to Mr. Page, who made a very apposite contribution and whose observations are not at variance with the Rapporteur's conclusions, that during the previous debate, which he probably did not attend, we adopted a number of practical measures. The most spectacular, the most resounding – if I may so put it – was the practice of announcing a vote by ringing a bell in the building. These arrangements were in line with his proposals.

Mr. Stoffelen wishes to model our rules on those of the Council of Europe. This proposal may seem tempting, but there is a danger of its leading to a laxity which we have rejected twice in public sittings and twice more in Committee.

I revert to the introductory theme of my report. We are a small assembly, discussing complicated problems which are of decisive importance for the life of our peoples. Much more so than those, of a philosophical and liberal nature, dealt with by the Council of Europe, of which I am also a member. The original drafters of the two sets of rules were thus quite right in establishing different provisions. Acceptance of Mr. Stoffelen's proposals would simply mean reverting to a deplorably easy-going system which you unanimously rejected two years ago. That is why, in agreement with the Chairman of the Committee, with whom I have just been talking, I shall shortly ask you to reject Mr. Stoffelen's amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – I call the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I entirely agree with the Rapporteur in the matter of the amendment proposed by Mr. Stoffelen, which he has not yet moved formally but to which he is speaking. As Mr. Stoffelen himself said, his amendment would change completely the sense of what the Committee has sought to do in Mr. Bozzi's report. Mr. Bozzi's report was agreed after considerable debate in Committee, after Mr. Stoffelen had already made the points he has made in connection with this proposed amendment this morning.

On the point made by Lord Hughes, I have already indicated that the Rapporteur and I would agree that it would be logical in paragraph 2 of Rule 36 to substitute after the word "ascertain" the number of those Representatives or Substitutes who have signed the register, and in paragraph 3 that a majority of Representatives or Substitutes was not present. That would make it logical and would fit in with what was the desire of the Committee in this regard. I am grateful to Lord Hughes.

I think I have made myself clear. Mr. Bozzi has already dealt fully with the point made by Mr. Antoni and I ask my colleagues in the Assembly to agree to this change in the rules. I would only say – and I shall no doubt repeat myself in a few minutes' time when, with your leave, Mr. President, I hope to move my own report – that our rules are designed to make this Assembly function efficiently. This requires constant attention to the rules, and I am very glad to say that at the moment the Committee on Rules of Procedure is giving consideration to the rules in their entirety.

For various reasons, some suggestions which are of immediate practical importance are being made to the Assembly from time to time in the form of reports made by members of the Committee but the whole will be subject to review because it is essential, first, that we have discipline and, secondly, that we be flexible. It is not always very easy to combine those two, but that is what we are aiming at. Mr. Bozzi's suggested amendments are a step forward in this direction and I commend them to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – That concludes the general debate.

I ask Mr. Stoffelen to move his amendment. Obviously, if it is successful, the amendment that the Rapporteur and Chairman have suggested would not arise; but if it is not successful I will put that amendment separately later.

Mr. Stoffelen, you have spoken to this amendment but you may wish to say something further.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Indeed, Mr. President, I shall now officially move the amendment. As the written text is incomplete, I would add the following to it. My proposal means that normally speaking a vote would be by sitting and standing, and a roll-call vote should be held only if five members ask for it. The amendment thus logically also involves deleting the first part of paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, that is to say altering paragraph 2 in such a way that only paragraph 4 is amended. It therefore also means removing that part of the Rapporteur's proposal which – as I have said – lays down that people not voting are nevertheless voting, and that people not present are nevertheless present.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Stoffelen, could you start again? I am not clear what you want me to do.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I think it will be much easier if I speak in English. As I have laid down in my written document, my proposal is to insert a new paragraph after paragraph 1 of the draft resolution and I added to replace paragraph 2 of the draft resolution by the following text:

"To replace paragraph 4 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Procedure by the following:

'4. In the absence of a quorum the vote shall be postponed...'"

The PRESIDENT. – So in essence you are moving to delete the first part of the second paragraph.

Does anyone wish to speak to this amendment?...

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I agree that the work should go ahead quickly, but I should like to refer briefly to Rule 32, paragraph 1 (a), of the Rules of Procedure. I do not fully understand the amendment proposed by the Rapporteur, but I would also note that there are amendments which have been tabled, amendments which have been agreed but not tabled and one amendment which we are told is agreed now. I had intended to explain my views further by adding something of which I informed the Rapporteur but which he did not see fit to mention. My view is that the fact of recalling signature of the Register of Attendance, as required by Rule 24, without any formality does not guarantee the Assembly. I believe therefore that some solution should be found whereby signature is changed from an act external to an act internal to the Assembly, which in fact is the kind of rule applied in every parlia-

Mr. Antoni (continued)

ment. I had prepared an amendment under the terms of which the President would have been empowered, at the opening of each sitting, to inform the Assembly, on request, which members had signed the Register of Attendance. To this end, I do not think that it serves any purpose simply to read Rule 24, because this text provides only that Representatives shall sign the Register of Attendance.

Secondly, I submitted another amendment not mentioned by the Rapporteur. I am, in any case, very doubtful as to what decision to take.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Antoni, you cannot go on to move amendments verbally in the course of your speech. You must please address your remarks to the amendment before the Assembly.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – In conclusion, I said that I submitted another amendment as a solution to the problem. I think, however, that the vote should be deferred and that the matter should be referred back to the Committee for more detailed consideration of this delicate question, postponing a vote if need be until tomorrow's sitting. It is important that we should arrive as far as possible at a unanimous decision. I apologise if I have not been brief enough.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Antoni.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, although the Committee has not discussed it and I have not even had time to speak to its Chairman about it, I would not be opposed to the tabling of an amendment to Rule 24 which would meet Mr. Antoni's wishes. Rule 24 reads:

“Each Representative shall sign the Register of Attendance at each sitting before taking his place.”

My amendment would consist of the addition of:

“The President shall, at the beginning of each sitting, read out the names of those who have signed.”

This would fulfil, very strikingly and fairly, the condition referred to by Mr. Antoni, to whom I would incidentally point out that there is nothing to prevent him, as things stand at present, from going to the President's office and examining the Register of Attendance.

As for the second point in Mr. Antoni's amendment, I believe – although it has not been moved – that it tends to reduce the scope of the change proposed by the Committee.

The Rapporteur, who is in favour of strictness, could just stretch a point. But, as the text was approved by a vote of the Committee, which discussed it at length, and since Mr. Antoni's text – as I understand, because we do not have a written text – would tend to reduce the scope of the vote I am asking for, I can only suggest that you reject it.

But if the Chairman of the Committee, the President of the Assembly and our colleagues agree, I will not oppose a brief reference back to the Committee to enable Mr. Antoni's wishes to be studied with the text on the table.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – The debate has illustrated the difficulties of discussing details in the plenary Assembly. It is obviously impossible for the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure, the Rapporteur and those intimately concerned with procedure to make snap decisions on proposals for amendment of matters which have been debated at considerable length in Committee, to which people have given their best attention and on which they have produced the best fruits of their deliberations.

If it is thought that there is substance in the proposal by Mr. Stoffelen or in that of Mr. Antoni, which has not even been moved in the form of an amendment, I would much prefer that the matter be referred back to the Committee for consideration, when these matters can be dealt with in detail. It would do violence to the way in which rules should be drafted if they were dealt with in an unconsidered fashion in debates in the plenary Assembly. That is not the way we work.

Therefore, instead of amendments being accepted or rejected, I would rather that this proposal went through unanimously, or that it were referred back to the Committee. In the circumstances, since the Rapporteur has seen force in what Mr. Antoni has proposed, I think that it would be much better if it were referred back.

The PRESIDENT. – I would not accept an amendment now on Rule 24, because that is not before the Assembly, even if the Chairman and Rapporteur were willing to accept it.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – Quite right.

The PRESIDENT. – The only reason that I accepted the manuscript amendment suggested by Lord Hughes was that it was consequential on what was proposed. Mr. Stoffelen has taken the trouble to table an amendment, so it must be considered. Since it was not clear, I invited him to propose words that had been left out, so as to clarify the matter. Normally, I will not take manuscript amendments, and

The President (continued)

amendments cannot be proposed in the course of debate on this or any other question.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – Therefore, may I propose that we take a vote on Mr. Stoffelen's amendment and on Mr. Bozzi's report? The further matter may then be considered in Committee.

The PRESIDENT. – I understand that you would consider the matter, and the rules provide for that.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – Yes, that can be considered under our normal rules.

The PRESIDENT. – Yes, there are no practical problems in getting people to sign the register. I would counsel against taking the question at the beginning of the sitting because when I came in this morning at 11 o'clock, although the Council and the government advisers were well represented, there were not six members of the Assembly present. Thus, if we had taken it at the beginning of the sitting, we would not have had a morning sitting at all. I now want to put Mr. Stoffelen's amendment.

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I support what you have just said. We are in fact working very badly. How can we possibly come to a decision on amendments which have not even been tabled and which none of us has therefore had a chance to study?

Personally, I consider that, if our debates are to proceed properly, we should not discuss amendments which have never been tabled and of which the members of this Assembly are consequently unaware.

The PRESIDENT. – I am well seized of the point. Even if the whole Committee supported an amendment to Rule 24, if it had not been properly tabled, I would not accept it.

Mr. Stoffelen has tabled his amendment and I will now put it to the Assembly, with the following addition: that he wishes to delete the first part of paragraph 2 of Mr. Bozzi's draft resolution – that is, the amendment to the first paragraph of the existing Rule 36.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 1 and the manuscript Amendment are negatived.

It was a very narrow vote, and I thought that I might have to use a casting vote but, fortunately, that was not necessary.

I now have to put to the Assembly the amendment suggested by Lord Hughes, which is

really consequential and which has been accepted by the Chairman and the Rapporteur. That would mean that Rule 36, paragraph 1, would stand as printed, but in paragraph 2, instead of "the numbers present", it would insert:

"the number of those Representatives or their Substitutes who have signed the Register of Attendance provided for in Rule 24 above".

The same amendment would be made in the third paragraph. The fourth paragraph remains as printed.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendments 2 and 3 are agreed to.

I now put the whole resolution as amended by the last amendment and the consequential amendment. That is the whole of the draft resolution in Document 853. Fortunately, it does not require a roll-call.

Is there any opposition?...

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am not in favour but I shall not call for a vote by roll-call as has happened in other cases.

The PRESIDENT. – There is opposition, so I would ask those in favour of the draft resolution to stand.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amended draft resolution is adopted¹.

13. Revision and interpretation of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and Vote on the draft Resolution, Doc. 852*)

The PRESIDENT. – I now call upon Mr. Grieve to move the Report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, which will be followed by a debate and vote on the draft Resolution, Document 852.

In view of his misfortunes earlier today, I am very glad that Mr. Grieve is well enough to be here.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I hope that this report will commend itself to the unanimous approval of the Assembly. The Assembly will recall that when your predecessor, Mr. President – Mr. von Hassel – was President, a number of problems arose on the interpretation of the existing Rule 7 of our

1. See page 22.

Mr. Grieve (continued)

Rules of Procedure, and that it was referred to the Committee.

The problem resided in this: when a man signed in as Substitute, was he Substitute for the whole of the sitting for which he signed in as Substitute or, if the Representative turned up in the course of that sitting, did the Representative take over? The Committee was divided. A minority – of whom I confess immediately, I was one – felt that the aim of Rule 7 as set out in paragraph 10 of my explanatory memorandum, was to allow delegations to fill as many seats as were available. They therefore felt that too much importance should not be attached to the duration of the sitting and that it should be possible for a Representative to be replaced at any time. But that was not the view of the Committee. In order to avoid difficulties in the interpretation of the rule, the Committee was requested to consider a redrafting of the rule.

I hope that we have arrived now at a redrafting that will meet the needs of all the representations that we have received. I was about to present my report, as it then was drafted, to the Assembly in June of this year, when the Italian Delegation drew to my attention the fact that the rule as it had then been redrafted would not meet the difficulties which sometimes were met in arranging for Substitutes to attend in place of Representatives in Committee, in the case of countries where there is a large number of parties and where it was not possible to leave the matter merely to the head of a delegation to decide. What we have arrived at, therefore, is as follows.

Will my colleagues be so good as to look at Rule 7 as it now is? I will not deal with the whole of the draft resolution point by point but will read out the new rule which is proposed. "Substitutes and alternates" becomes the title. Paragraph 1:

"Any Representative prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly may be replaced by a Substitute."

It will be observed that the original rule said:

"Any Representative prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly may arrange to be replaced by a Substitute."

The word "arrange" in those circumstances was not helpful. Busy parliamentarians, for various reasons, fail to attend our session and it is left to their colleagues to make the arrangements; they do not make them themselves.

It was said that he must first give notice thereof to the President, who would in turn

inform the Assembly. That was a rule more honoured in the breach than in the observance. Again, it was not practical. Therefore we have substituted for it:

"Any Representative prevented from attending a sitting of the Assembly may be replaced by a Substitute."

We go on to show how this will be done. Paragraph 2 read originally:

"Substitutes nominated in due form have the same rights as Representatives of the Assembly. They may not, however, be elected to the Bureau."

We now substitute:

"Substitutes duly registered in accordance with Rule 24" –

thereby underlining the fact that the Substitute is the person who signed at the beginning of the sitting in place of the member –

"have the same rights as Representatives in the Assembly. Substitutes may not, however, be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly."

So once the Substitute at the beginning of the sitting has signed in the register, he shall have all the rights for that sitting which would have accrued to the Representative. This is clear and deals with the problem of interpretation which occurred under the old rule.

Then paragraph 3, we have a new rule:

"A Substitute who is a Committee Chairman or Rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if he is not sitting in place of a Representative. In the latter case, however, he shall not be entitled to vote."

This gives to the Chairman and Rapporteur the right and prerogative of speaking which – good heavens! – we have been doing for years. This change shows how necessary it was that it should be made.

Finally, paragraph 4 is substituted for the old paragraph 3:

"Representatives and Substitutes may sit on Committees either as titular members or as alternates."

This change, may I explain, has been made to meet the point made by Mr. De Poi and our Italian colleagues:

"Any titular member who is prevented from attending a meeting may appoint an alternate from among the alternate members of the Committee of the same nationality as himself."

Mr. Grieve (continued)

So the first person who can appoint an alternate to the Committee is the Representative member of the Committee:

“With the consent of the Chairman of the Committee, he may also be replaced by any other Representative or Substitute of the same nationality as himself,”

which means whether or not the Representative or Substitute is a member of that particular Committee. This should enable our Committees to be very much better attended and manned when, as frequently happens, members of the Committee and Substitutes serving on the Committee are unable to be present.

“The alternate so appointed shall have the same rights as the titular member.”

I said earlier that the function of our rules was to enable this Assembly to function efficiently. I emphasise the word “efficiently”. I am not saying that we have achieved perfection by this change, but we are seeking to get as near perfection as we can. The Committee on Rules of Procedure of this Assembly is seized by now with a reconsideration of all our rules, many of which require quite minor amendments, though some of which may require major amendment. I hope, however, that this particular amendment will commend itself to all members of the Assembly. I hope that it will be passed unanimously and that it will bury once and for all the difficulties which we have had in recent assemblies when there was a very interested member of the British Delegation who was quick to spot any lacuna in our rules. Thank you very much.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Does anybody wish to speak to this debate?

Do you wish to speak, Mr. Stainton?

Mr. STAINTON (*United Kingdom*). – Very briefly, Mr. President. Mr. Grieve dwelt upon this point but I have not comprehended it. I do not understand the meaning of the second sentence in the large second paragraph of what now becomes paragraph 4. As it is now printed, it strikes me that it is merely supplementary to the preceding sentence. I wonder whether Mr. Grieve could clarify that sentence.

The PRESIDENT. – I will ask the Chairman and Rapporteur to reply.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I apologise, Mr. President, I have not got the point. It is no doubt my fault. I wonder whether Mr. Stainton could kindly explain it again.

Mr. STAINTON (*United Kingdom*). – I hesitate to be tedious. It is a question of doubt in my mind. In draft new paragraph 4, the second paragraph consists of two sentences. I am bewildered as to the true purport of the second of those sentences, which appears, in many regards, merely to reiterate the content of the preceding sentence.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I think I can explain. We have introduced new expressions: alternate and titular members. Mr. Stainton will be aware that in Committee Substitutes can serve on the Committee as full members of the Committee. Those on the Committee who are not full members of the Committee we are now calling alternates. When they are appointed to stand in for a full member of the Committee, they have the same rights as that full member. What the second sentence of that paragraph is designed to do is to emphasise that fact.

The PRESIDENT. – Following that explanation and as no one else wishes to speak, we shall now vote on the draft resolution in Document 852.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

The draft resolution is adopted unanimously!

14. Changes in the membership of Committees

The PRESIDENT. – I have to inform the Assembly that the Orders of the Day provide for the ratification by the Assembly, under Rule 8, paragraph 3, of the Rules of Procedure, of provisional nominations to Committees made by the Presidential Committee following changes proposed by the Italian and United Kingdom Delegations.

The Assembly must also agree in accordance with Rule 39, paragraph 6, changes in the membership of Committees proposed by the German and Luxembourg Delegations. Those changes are set out in Notice No. 8.

Are there any objections to these changes?...

The nominations are agreed to.

15. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this after-

1. See page 23.

The President (continued)

noon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

Future of European security (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 854 and Amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.)

NINTH SITTING

Monday, 1st December 1980

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. Future of European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 854 and Amendments*).

Speakers: The President; (points of order): Sir Frederic Bennett (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Urwin, Mr.

Stoffelen; Mr. Reddemann (*for Mr. von Hassel, Rapporteur*); (point of order): Mr. Wilkinson; Mr. Vecchiotti, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Druon, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Vyzas (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. De Poi, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. Osborn, Mr. Bozzi, Mr. Kershaw, Mr. Schmidt, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Caro, Mr. Baumel, Sir Frederic Bennett (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Reddemann (*for Mr. von Hassel, Rapporteur*).

4. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. – Since the Minutes of Proceedings of the last Sitting have not yet been distributed, they will be considered at a later Sitting.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

I ask all members and Substitutes acting as members to ensure that they sign the Register of Attendance. In view of this morning's decision, it has a significance above that of a mere register of those present. It is now relevant to any question of a quorum.

3. Future of European security

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 854 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – I am sure that it is the wish of all members that I send to my predecessor, Mr. von Hassel, warm wishes for a speedy recovery and a good convalescence. We are sorry that illness has prevented his being here this afternoon to present the report to which he

has devoted a tremendous amount of time, thought and energy. For some time he has been personally committed to the issues involved. This is a particularly disappointing occasion for him and us. I understand that as he is no longer a member of his national parliament, this would have been the last session of WEU that he would have attended as a member. We hope that he will find time to visit us in future in that capacity. I am sure that it is your wish that I should transmit the Assembly's good wishes to him.

The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 854 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Reddemann, who has undertaken to present the report to the Assembly on behalf of Mr. von Hassel, Rapporteur.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. As a result of your remarks this morning, I understood that an attempt would be made to refer back the report for debate at this stage. It does not appear that that is happening. With the agreement of the Rapporteur who is acting on behalf of Mr. von Hassel – to whom we pay tribute – and as Chairman of the Committee, I made an offer this morning. I do not withdraw offers as a result of what I shall refer to as “changed circumstances”. The Rapporteur will not be addressing himself to the resolution. This morning, I said that in Mr. von Hassel's absence we should not put forward the resolution contained in this document. Therefore, the Rapporteur will speak only to the report and recommendations and not to the resolution. Just because another reference back has not been moved, what I said on behalf of Mr. von

1. See page 25.

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

Hassel, the Rapporteur, and myself this morning is not altered.

The PRESIDENT. – I am grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for clarifying the position. Perhaps I should clarify the procedure. This morning, I suggested that it would be wrong for the Assembly to take a decision about whether the report should be referred back to the Committee before that report had been presented. In Britain, unless a motion has been moved, it does not become the business of the chamber – a motion must be moved before anything can be done with it. I took the view that until the Rapporteur, or his substitute, had presented the report on behalf of the Committee, I would not be prepared to entertain any motion to refer it back.

If, as is probable, a motion is moved after the Rapporteur has presented the report, I must accept that motion and put it to the Assembly for decision. The rules will permit only one speech in favour and one against. The Chairman and the Rapporteur may then speak. I gather that there are many precedents for that in the proceedings of the Assembly.

I have read the rules and it would appear that this procedure takes priority over other business only when we consider amendments. The rule in question, Rule 29, is headed "Amendments". I understand that the procedure that Mr. Stoffelen relied on this morning has often been adopted. In such circumstances, I am advised that this course should be followed. As the Committee has presented a report with a majority, as you said, Sir Frederic, it is right that the Assembly should hear the reasons from the Rapporteur. The Rapporteur will suggest that the Assembly adopt only the recommendation, not the resolution. If a motion is moved and carried, it will bring the debate to an end. If the motion is defeated, the debate may continue and only the recommendation will be put to the Assembly for decision. I hope that that clarifies the position. I apologise, Mr. Reddemann, for delaying you.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President, I feel distinctly unhappy about your ruling, even though it was clearly based on our existing rules. It needs to be said that there was nothing in what Mr. Stoffelen intended to say this morning that was in any way designed to obviate the debate on which we are about to embark. It may be that he was wrongly advised, but in any event the position of the Socialist Group, which he sought to reserve, was not by any means intended to eliminate the debate.

I am unhappy because it seems to me implicit in what you say that, in accordance with the rules and constitution of the Western European Union Assembly, it is necessary, after a Rapporteur has presented a report, for Mr. Stoffelen once again to reiterate the position of the Socialist Group in relation to his attempt to seek reference back.

Personally – and this is my personal view – I should be deeply regretful and somewhat resentful if we were not to have a full debate following the presentation of the deputy Rapporteur's report. That would not be in the best interests of this Assembly and certainly would not be courteous to the absent Rapporteur, Mr. von Hassel.

Therefore, I urge the importance of trying to seek a different way round it, because, clearly, if Mr. Stoffelen's motion – as it will become then – is accepted by the Assembly, from what you have said, Mr. President, there will certainly not be an opportunity to debate the report.

The PRESIDENT. – I am grateful to you, Mr. Urwin, for making your point. I hope that I clearly stated that putting to the Assembly the subject of the reference back to the Committee would arise only if and when such a motion was moved. Of course, it is in order for such a reference back to be moved at any time.

I agree that it might well be more appropriate if that motion were moved and the reasons for it were given after some substantial debate and before we consider amendments – for undoubtedly there will be amendments, although if the resolution itself is not proposed, that may well reduce their number.

At the conclusion of the debate it could then be moved and debated and, if Mr. Stoffelen is agreeable, it would certainly be my view that that would be for the convenience of the Assembly. Of course, if somebody on a point of order moves such a motion after the debate has started, the practice, as I understand it, is that I have no option but to accept the motion. I do not know whether Mr. Stoffelen will accept Mr. Urwin's suggestion that the motion could be deferred until the end of the general debate, before we actually come to vote on any of the issues arising from the report.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – As it is plain that the Chairman of the Committee wants a debate and as it is clear that many colleagues want to take part, it is certainly not our wish to prevent such a general debate. For those reasons, it is my intention to table a motion at the end of the debate to make it perfectly clear that we do not want to make it impossible to have this debate, and to make clear that we certainly do not want votes or

Mr. Stoffelen (continued)

decisions to be taken on the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – If it should happen that we would go very late, we would defer the matter until tomorrow. We have a long list of speakers. I hope that they will all adhere to the time they have given. I hope also that any other Representatives who wish to speak will put their names down quickly. I should like the list of speakers in this debate to be closed at 4 o'clock.

Mr. Reddemann, after this further delay, may I ask you to introduce the report?

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have the honour to present the report on the future of European security on behalf of my friend and colleague, Mr. von Hassel, who is ill.

May I first of all express my best wishes for his recovery, underlining what the President has just said. You will moreover understand that I would rather Mr. von Hassel had had the opportunity of addressing the Assembly himself.

I do not intend to add anything more to the debate on the rules that took place this morning and again just now. May I simply quote what a British colleague said recently in the Council of Europe: "I am still confused but on a higher level".

This little prelude, Mr. President, was by way of avoiding too solemn an approach to a situation that is admittedly serious enough in itself.

Whatever political camp we happen to belong to, I am sure we all agree on one point: the world situation has changed drastically in the last twelve months – unfortunately to the detriment of peace. Afghanistan is only one example, and there are a number of lesser but, I believe, no less dangerous ones.

If, like me, you had the daily task of reading the press of the countries governed by communist parties, you would know how loud the clamour against liberalisation in Poland has grown in recent weeks. If, moreover – and I assume you have as much information as I do – you have been following the reports of troop concentrations on the Polish frontiers, it will be very clear to you that many developments have taken place in the last twelve months that none of us, in the interests of peace and détente, would have wished to see.

In such a difficult situation, it seems to me that our Assembly too should define its position and plainly re-state its view of the present

situation. Let me say right away that I do not believe we are on the threshold of a major war. I do not think that our situation is the same as in 1914, nor do I anticipate a new 1939. The potential horrors of war are now so great that, even after their invasion of Afghanistan, we cannot suspect the Soviet Government of intending to start a third world war.

The danger confronting us, in the opinion of the Rapporteur – and here I agree with him entirely – depends more on the possibility of the Soviets misjudging the West's resolve. May I remind the Assembly that the problem is not a new one – it has merely resurfaced in updated form as a result of the events of the past twelve months.

In the thirties, especially, it was precisely the liberal and socialist newspapers which tackled this subject very often and, in my opinion, very often brilliantly. They showed that a difficult situation can arise if one allows a potential aggressor to capture positions A, B and C and then suddenly has to make it clear to him, at point D, that he cannot proceed without the risk of war. If you now replace A, B, C and D by Afghanistan, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and perhaps one other name, you will see what I mean. I am afraid that we could slide into war unless we adopt a firm position in good time, and unless we make it clear in good time that our desire for peace cannot be a desire for peace at any price, and that peace in our time – pending genuine disarmament – unfortunately requires the maintenance of armed readiness.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the report – and I would say this particularly after Mr. Stoffelen's speech this morning – is based, practically speaking, on the arguments consistently put forward in the thirties by the "New Statesman". I hope I may quote this socialist supporter!

The report regards the close link between the European member states and the United States of America in NATO as the foundation for ensuring peace. In response to the world situation, it calls for greater efforts by the European partners on behalf of their joint defence, particularly in the field of conventional weapons – or, in practical terms, effective and close co-operation in arms production.

There can be no doubt, Mr. President, that the report and recommendation are asking for something rather more than the Assembly has usually called for in the past. I admit – although I have been here only four years and cannot speak of what happened before then – that boldness in making demands of the Council of Ministers has not always been the hallmark of our Assembly. But surely there is

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

nothing in the rules to prevent us from ever exceeding our previous demands and bringing in new forward-looking concepts that I believe to be vital to peace.

Let me briefly recapitulate the most important demands made by the Rapporteur in his report and in the draft recommendation.

First, the Permanent Council should set up a working group to examine possible measures to adapt WEU to present-day defence requirements.

Second, the group should draw up special proposals for the co-ordination of member countries' policies on defence, armaments and disarmament.

Third, greater participation by defence ministers than hitherto.

Fourth, the WEU Council should deliberate, before the meetings of the NATO Council, on matters the latter is to discuss.

Fifth, those member states of the European Community that do not yet belong to Western European Union should be invited to join.

Sixth, examination of the present-day relevance of the provisions of the protocols to the Brussels Treaty.

Seventh, the Standing Armaments Committee should be more heavily involved in the development of a European armaments policy.

I can see nothing revolutionary in this list of demands, Mr. President, nor anything unreasonable. On the contrary, it reflects that commendable level-headedness which has always been characteristic of Mr. von Hassel. Make no mistake: this is a European who wants the WEU member states to speak at last with one voice in matters of defence, armament and disarmament.

May I add a few glosses to the list of demands. I would like to highlight only two points, because they are of special importance to the Assembly.

This morning saw an enthusiastic debate on our Rules of Procedure. Our colleagues in the relevant Committee advanced the view that problems arise because our Assembly, like other parliaments, is all too often empty and accordingly lacks the necessary quorum to pass a decision. I have the impression that part of the discussion was off-target. Our colleagues justified this absence by claims on our work in the national parliaments, our commitments in the capitals of our own countries. However, my personal experience leads me to fear that some members of the Assembly, though in

Paris at the time, do not take part in the sessions because we are inclined to wax very academic on subjects that would doubtless lead to brilliant proceedings in an institute for political studies, while neglecting to include on the agenda topical political questions that the NATO Council will be discussing a few days later.

So I suggest that when Mr. von Hassel proposes in his report and recommendation that a political assembly like ours should be more concerned with such matters, this is not simply an idea he has plucked out of the air but a self-evident truth and, indeed, a necessity.

I come now to the second point: his desire, and the desire of the Committee, that the defence ministers should play a greater part in the work of Western European Union and hence also of this Assembly. In Germany we have a saying, and I think it is quite true, that defence is too important to be left to the generals and defence ministers. I would fully endorse this saying, but I also think that defence, armaments and disarmament are too important to be left to the foreign ministers alone. I would therefore think it sensible to accept the proposal to allow defence ministers to attend the Council of Ministers at appropriate times so that they can contribute their expert opinion to that forum, just as the foreign ministers and their representatives have been doing up to now.

Mr. von Hassel – and now I come to the point where we broke off today – wanted to stand his report on a second plank. He was anxious to achieve permanent close co-operation between the Assembly of Western European Union and the European Parliament – the European Community. This was the committed European, whom we should respect. However, discussions on the sidelines made it quite clear that there would not be a majority in favour of this demand at the present time. Reservations were expressed both by strong supporters of integration within the European Community and by those who think the present level of integration is already too high. I think it would be prudent to take account of these reservations by asking our colleague De Poi to raise this subject again in his coming report – the follow-up report already planned – to give both the Assembly and the Committee concerned, the General Affairs Committee, the opportunity to discuss the whole matter at their leisure.

For Mr. von Hassel, as the President has already remarked, this report is his farewell to us. Having been elected to the European Parliament, he will no longer be a member of the German Delegation to this Assembly. Assessing the report as a whole, I think that as “act-

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

ing Rapporteur" I may be allowed to say that few colleagues have left behind them, in addition to all their work in the Assembly, so excellent a parting gift as the report which Mr. von Hassel has presented to us. I would like to express my thanks to him, and I invite the Assembly to begin the debate.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Reddemann. I am sure that the whole Assembly shares at least your final views about the enormous debt we owe to Mr. von Hassel. I hope that it will be of some gratification to him, in his unavoidable absence because of serious illness, to know that we are thinking of him along these lines. Perhaps you would pass on those sentiments.

The first speaker in the debate is Mr. Vecchiatti.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I gave notice of my intention to move an amendment. I was unavoidably detained in Committee at the beginning of Assembly proceedings this afternoon. Would you...

The PRESIDENT. – You cannot move an amendment now, Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – No. Would you say at what stage of the debate amendments may be tabled?

The PRESIDENT. – We follow the normal procedure. There is a general debate on the report. Then amendments are considered. In order that it may be considered, you should give notice in writing of the amendment. Naturally, the sooner it can be handed in, the better, but it will not be considered until the general debate is concluded.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I am grateful for that advice. The amendment was put in in writing and you have notice of it, Mr. President. The amendment fundamentally affects the whole nature of the potential debate on the report itself.

The PRESIDENT. – I understand. I now have the text of the amendment, which is to remove the whole of the draft resolution. That would be regarded as a direct negative, and in fact that has not been moved. I have not seen the text of your amendment. However, we do not take amendments at the beginning of a general debate. I shall have a look at the amendment and give a ruling upon it, but amendments come after the general debate in the normal way.

The only way in which one could stop the debate would be to use a guillotine motion.

If that were carried, that would be the end of the debate. Unless that is moved, I go through the list in the normal manner. I shall ask for your amendment, Mr. Wilkinson, and will have a look at it. I have not seen it. However, we cannot pursue amendments at this stage. We have only just had the Rapporteur's report.

I call Mr. Vecchiatti.

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the most striking feature of the report and of the draft recommendation is that Europe's security is seen in terms of a Manichean world, presented as black and white, good and evil and, moreover, as strictly bipolar. From this it follows that every position abandoned by the United States, falls or is destined to fall into Soviet hands and that any tendency towards an independent policy, even within the Atlantic Alliance, is objectively a factor which will weaken the western line-up and is therefore to the advantage of the USSR.

It is on the basis of this logic that the Rapporteur arrives at the paradoxical conclusion that Western Europe should unite more closely or with the United States in order to meet a global challenge with a global strategy, in which I do not know what would remain of the defensive and geographically limited character of the Atlantic Alliance.

And in this context, the Rapporteur indulges in somewhat obvious polemics against the actions and policies of some European members of the Alliance who are seeking to prevent the world from becoming caught up in an endless arms race. Also in this context, this report on the future of European security pays no attention at all to the future of relations between the industrialised countries and the third world on which the future of world peace and therefore of European security so largely depend.

Fortunately, however, in many respects and on many questions at least, the facts are not as they are presented.

The view that the world is bipolar and will continue to be so ignores the fundamental causes of the crisis of bipolarism, the policy which spawned and developed the cold war, Foster Dulles' mania for pacts and Stalin's monolithic form of socialism. It also ignores the value of the trend, emerging with détente, towards less rigid structures within the European military blocs; in Western Europe with the development of more or less autonomous national or European policies in the various capitals; in Eastern Europe, even after the Czechoslovak crisis, with the consolidation of Yugoslavia's non-alignment and the achievement of some small measure of autonomy by Romania.

Mr. Vecchiatti (continued)

Recent events in Poland confirm at least in part that independent trends in the establishment of socialism are emerging in that country also as a consequence of the crisis in the monolithic concept of the socialist bloc.

Outside Europe, there is not only the example of China but also the painful development of the whole third world. To believe that the countries of the third world, with their differing international relationships and their differing internal régimes can and must be pawns of one or the other bloc, is to ignore the underlying facts, as evidenced by the most recent examples of the Iranian revolution and the conflict between Iraq and Iran which fall outside the logic of the blocs as do the factors leading to the cohesion of the Arab world, when they dominate the factors leading to division, of black Africa as a whole and the new line taken by India.

We know that world peace still depends essentially on relations between the United States and the USSR, so that the future of European security also depends first and foremost on the improvement of relations between the two superpowers. But we also know that world peace can no longer be based on the logic of bipolarism which, on the contrary, is becoming the source of fresh tensions whenever and wherever it is applied. Even at the risk of over-simplification, it seems to me that it is now fair to say that while the United States and the USSR may still be militarily dominant they can no longer exercise political hegemony over the rest of the world.

This is why we think that the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact should not be called in question by unilateral measures which would threaten stability and would jeopardise world as well as European security. But even starting from within the blocs, can it really be Europe's rôle to bank on the arms race as the only guarantee of security, to negotiate on matters in dispute only from a position of strength and to assume that the USSR is Europe's only real and undying enemy and the United States its only real and undying friend? In substance, all this is affirmed in the report. We believe that Europe should have a different rôle and fortunately we are not alone in believing this. Several European governments hold the same view and this includes the Italian Government to judge from Mr. Forlani's policy statement; socialists and social democrats are convinced of this, as are catholic and protestant forces, most of the world of culture and large areas of the business world. For our part, we believe that world peace and therefore the future of European security depend on a courageous, determined and trusting peace

policy using peaceful means. First and foremost, in order to restore an atmosphere favourable to détente, which does not mean the abandonment of principles, such as the right of the Afghan people or even of the Palestinian people to self-determination. On the contrary, it is only through détente that the necessary political bases for the respect of these rights can be laid.

It is our view, therefore that, starting from within the traditional alliances, it is essential to promote and foster every move to stop the present mad arms race, to cut armaments beginning with tactical and strategic nuclear weapons and to work for a European security based on a balance of armaments at the lowest possible level. It is against this background that the preliminary talks for negotiations between the United States and the USSR for an agreement to limit and reduce long-range theatre weapons should be encouraged, as should moves to have the SALT II agreements ratified or renegotiated and thus to open the way to the other objectives set for the future SALT III.

We are not talking, therefore, of vague alternative proposals or of taking the place of the superpowers but of having a European vision of peace policy. For these proposals, European unity, the co-ordination of European policies and instruments to which the report also refers are of positive value. This is not true, however, if this demand for unity and co-ordination is directed to other aims, such as that of uniting Europe so that it fits better into American world strategy, in line with one of Washington's long-standing aspirations which the Rapporteur endorses. In part at least, this policy has not yet met with complete success because it conflicts with at least some important aspects of the policy of several European countries; but most of all it does not truly express Europe's vocation which is to make its own contribution to world peace and thus to ensure the future of European security for peaceful ends, by peaceful means. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Vecchiatti.

May I clarify the issue raised by Mr. Wilkinson. It seems not to be clear to a number of other members. The resolution attached to the document has not been moved on behalf of the Committee. Therefore, it will not be put to the Assembly and there is no need for any amendments to be submitted. It will not be called and therefore it cannot be amended. I have received a number of amendments, but clearly they must all fall, because there is no resolution to be amended. Amendments to the recommenda-

The President (continued)

tion are in order and will be taken at the proper time, at the end of the debate.

The next speaker is Mr. Urwin.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to support the remarks of Mr. Reddemann, whom I describe as the deputy Rapporteur in the unfortunate and unavoidable absence of Mr. von Hassel. Clearly, much of the report is based on the three years' experience that Mr. von Hassel recently ended in his capacity as President of this Assembly. I would not describe it as a swan-song, even though that description could be applied to the report. He is leaving behind a legacy as regards the work and, as he sees them, the future objectives of WEU.

The theme of the report appears to underline heavily what Mr. von Hassel regards as the inadequacy of WEU as at present constituted and operated. It is not my intention to follow Mr. Vecchietti and the polemics that he has introduced. I have always been fully aware of the absolute need for an adequate European defence policy and it is in that context that I address myself to the von Hassel report.

I wish to refer first to the difficulties that are clearly apparent in any attempt at expansion of the membership of WEU. There are obvious structural problems and domestic problems of individual states. There is also the question of the disproportionate representation – seven member states in WEU and nine in the Common Market, an organisation to which Mr. von Hassel addresses considerable attention.

One is entitled to speculate what the reaction of Ireland, for example, would be if the von Hassel ideals and objectives were eventually realised. Ireland is not a member of WEU, but it is a constituent member of the European Parliament. In addition, what would be the position of the Federal Republic of Germany, which has dual membership of WEU and EEC? That position does not apply to Germany alone, but we understand that WEU was set up in order to exercise control over German rearmament.

There is also the possible forfeiture of national sovereignty in defence matters if we accept the von Hassel report in its entirety.

The Rapporteur's idea of an extension of the rôle of the EEC in defence matters causes me considerable anxiety. I have said on at least one previous occasion in this Assembly that since direct elections to the European Parliament it is understandable that members of that Assembly should be exercising their minds

about the possible extension of their rôle and seeking a new rôle in defence matters.

It is understandable that politicians from individual member states of the Community may have found that there was not enough scope for their activities and abilities and that launching into another sphere, such as defence, would be close to their hearts. But the stark reality is that the Treaty of Rome firmly precludes any participation by the Community in defence matters. There is therefore no mandate for the EEC in this area. Such participation would require a fundamental constitutional change in the treaty.

The second important question is whether the Community would readily acquiesce in the use of WEU, even by invitation, as a platform to achieve what is probably its objective by prescribed participation in what would surely be a new supranational authority.

The Rapporteur clearly believes firmly that Europe should have a common defence policy. One of his targets is the guarantee of a speedy, co-ordinated response to world developments and a rationalisation of the Euro-armaments industry.

The next direction in which the Rapporteur travels is his understandable, justifiable and objective criticisms of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Independent European Programme Group. He is on common ground with many of us who have heavily criticised the activities and slowness of action of both organisations.

Mr. von Hassel succinctly rehearses all those arguments in the main body of the report. He succeeds in echoing and more heavily emphasising the reservations that some of us have expressed all too frequently in this Assembly. He makes the allegation, probably not without foundation, of a reluctance of member states to provide information on the SAC review. He has an absolute right to draw attention yet again to these apparent weaknesses and omissions.

However, one has to ask whether, with all the warts of the SAC and the IEPG, the addition of twenty observers from the European Parliament would have any tendency to improve the present situation. One can visualise overcrowded debates and the possibility of not having enough time to deal effectively with the reports that are constantly presented. There is an outstanding demand that Western European Union should put its own house in order on such matters.

I completely reject the idea that the Assemblies of WEU and the EEC should eventually merge and become a single

Mr. Urwin (continued)

European defence entity. There is one obvious weakness! There is no reference in the recommendations or in the resolution to the twelve democratic states that are members of the Council of Europe but not members of the EEC or WEU. They are not sufficiently important to be regarded for inclusion in this context. Nevertheless, they have a continuing concern for the comprehensive defence of Europe. If we consider expansion of WEU membership – even on the basis of observer status – we should give earnest consideration to the rights of those twelve member states of the Council of Europe and to whether they should be given that status.

I have already said that my colleague, Mr. Pieter Stoffelen, was probably misunderstood this morning. The Socialist Group did not intend that the document should be withdrawn or that any debate should be curtailed. The comments in paragraph 2 of the draft resolution are worthy of further consideration. I could not support that paragraph, or paragraph 2 as regards a wider Europe.

It is not only the resolution that causes concern. I was pleased to hear the Chairman of the Committee say that there was some agreement to withdraw that resolution. There are deep reservations about the IEPG. It is already in a position to take account of the criticisms mentioned in paragraph (e) of the recommendation.

I also object to the first line of the recommendation, which refers to the establishment of a working group in the name of the Council. I favour a political working group that would be comprised of the elected members of the respective parliaments and delegates to WEU. There is a good deal for us to get our teeth into. Mr. Reddemann referred to a follow-up report by Mr. De Poi. That is the first time that I have heard of a follow-up report. I support that, as it will mean that the whole report will be referred back.

Mr. von Hassel has done a remarkable service to WEU and has drawn attention to the important problems that confront the work of WEU. I trust that he will forgive me if I do not accept the remedies that he promoted in the report.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Druon.

Mr. DRUON (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. von Hassel's report is undoubtedly a most interesting document. The extensive information it contains bears witness to the work of a great expert on these matters,

who has long given our Assembly the benefit of his lofty abilities.

Mr. von Hassel's report aptly and lucidly expresses much that is unmistakably true. He is right, for example, to describe the present situation in the world as very disturbing, very alarming. He is right in his account of the continuing and fresh cases of open conflict in the Far East, in the Near and Middle East, in Africa and, one might say, even on Europe's very doorstep, and in his references to latent conflict and the dangers of greater upheavals. He is right to stress the importance of the Afghan tragedy and to emphasise the oil strategy, as I myself have long done on so many occasions, he is right to be alarmed at the tremors that have shaken the Arabian peninsula, to cast an anxious eye at the Strait of Hormuz and to speak in such bold imagery of the threefold pincer-movement closing on the Indian Ocean. He is right not to overlook the play of ideological pressures. He is stating a hard fact when he points out that the Soviet Union has overtaken the West in naval power, enabling it to "intervene in force along the lines of communication between Europe and the United States".

In his expert analysis of the superiority the Soviet bloc has achieved in nuclear weapons and any other systems, in describing this superiority as "overwhelming", in stating that this superiority will enable the Soviet Union to choose the level of military operations and thus to force NATO into the difficult position of having to be the first to use nuclear weapons, which, he says, "may raise doubts about the western deterrent", he is highlighting very serious issues. In reaffirming that Europe must form one of the two pillars of the Atlantic Alliance and in listing all the factors which demonstrate the difficult situation that NATO, the Atlantic Alliance and the West in general might face in the various possible circumstances of conflict, he is bravely enunciating something which must be said and which must be known, so that the public and governments – and above all we ourselves in this Assembly – shall not be prey to any illusions.

But after that, I do not understand the logic of the solutions or remedies he proposes. And here I have some sympathy with the remarks made by the previous speaker: if NATO is in danger of being overtaken, hamstrung in the face of the choice of strategies available to its adversary, if in fact there is a possible doubt about its deterrent, why – and this is what the report implies – is it essential for the powers whose forces do not at present come under the integrated NATO command to fall into line from now on? Is it not precisely this which

Mr. Druon (continued)

might prevent a response to a diversity of strategies?

Is Europe not more likely to succeed in forming the second pillar of the Alliance by seeking to have an independent defence system, or by retaining some of its independence, than by becoming even more closely amalgamated with the Atlantic organisation than it is at present? You do not strengthen a building by propping up the roof twice at the same point.

When the report, without exactly advocating the transfer of powers from WEU to the European Communities, does go so far as to recommend an exchange of observers between the two assemblies, which should, or might, be a prelude to such a transfer, I feel it is completely off course.

Is this, in short, to be the end of WEU? I fear so. At any rate, that is the path on which we would be entering, and I personally cannot see where the advantage would lie.

Happy as I am to see the draft recommendation inviting the member states of the EEC or countries which have applied for EEC membership to accede to the Brussels Treaty, something which I myself proposed two years ago in a report the subject of which was judged inopportune at the time, so I now find it inopportune to propose close links, or the beginnings of close links, between WEU and the Communities, for the simple reason that these two institutions differ in their aims and composition – as has just been said – and are governed by different treaties. Any change in their terms of reference, any form of partnership therefore presupposes the modification of the two treaties. And that is dependent on agreement between the states and the willingness of the parties concerned.

How can we overlook the legal and political difficulties we would encounter and the considerable time involved, just when we are faced with emergency situations? We simply do not have the time to start overhauling our legal instruments in order to meet dramatic situations which may be very close at hand.

Let us therefore make the best of the tools we have, let us strengthen Western European Union to the best of our ability so that it may influence the conduct of the states and, where possible, the course of events.

But let us not invite another body, which – as the last paragraph of the preamble to the recommendation clearly states – is not in a position to do so, to take on the responsibilities which are ours, through exchanges of observers, who would be observing – what? What we

already know. Let us not call on another institution to take on our responsibilities, and let us not expect that institution, which has more than enough on its hands with economic matters, to be effective in the field of defence, which can only fall within our own purview.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). – Hear, hear.

Mr. DRUON (*France*) (Translation). – Thus, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall vote against the draft recommendation and against the draft resolution, because of the direction taken, explicitly or implicitly, by the report on which they are based.

The PRESIDENT. – The next speaker should have been Mr. Baumel, but as he has not been able to be here, it is Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I first congratulate Mr. Reddemann on standing in so ably, and I join with him, Mr. President, in endorsing your own comments and expression of good wishes to Mr. von Hassel. It is very sad that he cannot be with us. Had he been, he would have recalled, as will other Representatives, that I have also been extremely critical of this report. The Economic Community has quite enough on at present without adding to its responsibilities, and if these responsibilities were added, the resulting uncertainties would be extremely damaging to the western Alliance and the cause of détente.

Certainly I agree that we should see more co-operation among European countries. Certainly we are entitled to hope for a better outcome of the work of the Standing Armaments Committee. But I believe that the consequences of the movement advocated by Mr. von Hassel could be extremely perilous, and I am particularly concerned about the draft resolution, although there are parts of the draft recommendation about which I cannot enthuse. For example, in the eighth and tenth paragraphs of the preamble to the draft recommendation there is cause for concern. They more or less say that black is not white and that therefore we should begin to say that it might be. I do not particularly favour recommendation (d) in the draft recommendation, for it is absolutely unnecessary.

That said, it is the draft resolution that should concern us. Some member states may feel that there is advantage for them from the draft resolution, but, in the interests of the western Alliance as a whole, we are entitled to reject the resolution. Greece is about to enter the Community. There is already a great deal of dispute there.

I was in Greece a week last Sunday and saw there the biggest political demonstration that I

Mr. Hardy (continued)

have ever seen. It was a demonstration to commemorate students who died in the overturning of the junta, but an overwhelming number of those taking part were carrying banners denouncing NATO. If at this time we were to change the nature and character of the Community, we should be strengthening those forces in Greece that may not be serving the best interests of the Alliance.

Similarly, we have to recognise the position of Ireland. It is a member of the Community and it is traditionally neutral and at this sensitive time any threat to the position of Ireland would not be helpful. In the United Kingdom there is enormous criticism of the Economic Community and if we were to transfer that criticism to a criticism of defence and defence alignment, that would be a major disservice. But more important than the effect on existing or would-be member states is the effect on the western Alliance as a whole. If the Community became increasingly concerned with defence, that would not be in accordance with the treaty and we should see great anxiety for the central area, the central front of NATO, and far less anxiety for the flanks, which are of equal importance.

There may be an imbalance in the disposition of our forces in the central area, but that imbalance is by no means so acute as that existing on the Turkish border and, given the difficulties of Turkey, extra uncertainty would not be welcome. Similarly, the northern approaches to the Atlantic, the northern flank of NATO, are of enormous importance, too. Norway has rejected membership of the Community and if the Community is seen as likely to become the defence organisation of Europe, there are serious problems for the Scandinavian position. Given that the northern approaches to the Atlantic are vital to Europe and certainly to the United Kingdom, anything adding to the imbalance in that area is not to be desired.

The Community has quite enough to do to deal with matters for which it is responsible. Obviously, there is ground for anxiety about financial management, budgetary policy and accounting in the Community. There is ground for concern about the dominant interest of agriculture and there is obvious ground for anxiety about the inadequacies of the bureaucracy in Brussels – and I say that not because I was critical of Britain's entry into the Common Market but because I believe that public spending and public organisation should be reputable. If we are to accept a responsibility and concern for defence for an organisation that has yet to demonstrate its efficiency, the

western Alliance would suffer an enormous hazard.

For that reason, I suggest that, whilst we may thank Mr. von Hassel, while we may earnestly hope for his speedy recovery, we should be very ill-advised to act on his draft resolution.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

The Greek observer, Mr. Vyzas, has asked to make a short intervention. I am sure that we look forward to hearing him.

Mr. VYZAS (*Observer from Greece*). – Thank you, Mr. President, for your kind words of welcome.

I wish to concentrate on paragraphs 70 and 71 of the excellent and extensive report on the future of European security, by Mr. von Hassel. After an absence of six years, it was announced on 20th October this year that Greece was to return to the integrated military command structure of NATO. Greece withdrew from that structure in 1974, following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Although Greece applied in 1976 to be reintegrated with the unified NATO command and agreed in 1978 to a specific relationship on terms worked out with the former NATO Supreme Commander, General Haig, it proved impossible until now to effect Greece's return, in the face of Turkey's insistence on conditions unacceptable to Greece.

The agreement now achieved, which was at once approved by the Defence Planning Committee of NATO in Brussels, emerged from an intensive round of discussions between the NATO Supreme Commander, General Rogers, and the governments and military leaders of Greece and Turkey.

In view of the importance of the issue and the strenuous objections to Greece's reintegration raised by most of the political opposition, the Greek Government gained parliamentary approval for the decision on a vote of confidence.

I emphasise that Greece's reintegration in NATO complements its future membership of a united Europe by strengthening the defensive position of both countries and the southern flank of the Alliance as a whole.

I would remind all members of this Assembly, which is the only European assembly with responsibilities in defence matters, that Greece has made great efforts, devoting between 7 and 8 % of its annual gross national product to defence. Thus, military assistance to Greece is of great significance in terms of Greek needs and of maintaining an Aegean balance.

Mr. Vyzas (continued)

Greece has taken no exception to the granting of financial and military aid to Turkey, given the economic situation in that country. But, it should not be extended so much as to upset the existing regional balance of forces, which is a factor in building peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Vyzas.

The next speaker is the leader of the Italian Delegation, Mr. De Poi.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, having before us such a lengthy and important report as that presented by Mr. von Hassel, we might be tempted to look for weak points and to be very severe critics. It has always been a habit of our Europe, which longs for perfection and then falls into error in its day-to-day management and in its small daily contribution to what the future can achieve, to try and accomplish all this in a single leap forward or in actual practice to stop in embarrassment at each small advance. And it is precisely for this reason that to seek perfection in a new and interesting approach to the common defence and in a great effort of imagination seems to me to be ungenerous to a man who has given much to this Assembly and who, even if in a wholly personal way, is a genuine and sincere protagonist of sharing our strength for the greater unity of our continent, so that it may speak with one voice in the world and be better equipped to discharge its defence obligations, both for its own autonomy and real independence and its implementation of the solemn and binding commitments which it has to its allies.

It is here, therefore, that I shall try, on the contrary, to find in Mr. von Hassel's report the elements which suggest the right lines along which our action should develop and which offer our Assembly a potential for action which has perhaps rarely been the case in its more than twenty years of existence. I acknowledge that Mr. von Hassel's effort of imagination combines institutional proposals with a number of more contingent assessments which we could discuss at length. It is a fact that our countries are greatly attached to the process of détente; it is a fact that none of the seven member countries of Western European Union has threatened world peace and that even in these difficult times they are seeking openings for understanding with those confronting us in other military alliances. But this cannot hide the realities. Over the last few years a tactical imbalance has been established in the heart of our continent and we are threatened with a strategic imbalance, which is the reason why

the United States itself is hesitating to sign the SALT II treaty. We also recognise that, despite loud demands and urgings from various quarters and often from this Assembly, European co-ordination and responsibility in the matter of defence and armaments are still very seriously lacking.

I should therefore like to remind colleagues who are seeking to interpret Mr. von Hassel's position as a return to the cold war that we can interpret the facts in different ways but that we cannot close our eyes to a number of facts, namely that there is now an imbalance, that the threat to peace which once lay in the heart of our continent has now spread to the heart of other continents; we should also remind ourselves that our power to retaliate is still very limited or non-existent, as are our ability to play an authoritative rôle in the Atlantic Alliance and our capacity to co-ordinate. These are facts, which however you look at them, cannot by their nature be refuted and it is on these that I wish to take my stand in assessing Mr. von Hassel's report.

To continue, if we want peace and want to continue to work for détente we must not only want it for the world as a whole; we must also achieve a balance of forces and a reduction of armaments in all parts of the world, bearing in mind always that the progress of both disarmament and the reduction of armaments must be balanced. Thus, the indivisibility of détente must be matched by equilibrium in every regional theatre of the continent where détente may be threatened.

I believe, therefore, that, against this background, Mr. von Hassel's proposal seeks both to restore equilibrium in order to bring about a balanced reduction and to restore a balance within the Alliance to which all the members of Western European Union belong in a wider sense. I would say that the Italian Government also shares this aim. I would not wish to give a wrong interpretation of what the Prime Minister said in his policy statement but it seems to me that a peace policy is being maintained by the Italian Government, has been reaffirmed by Mr. Forlani and is to be pursued with determination, but at all times in full realisation of the facts of the situation, which a few months ago led the same majority and the Italian Government to decide that missiles should be deployed in our country.

Turning to the institutional proposals, I find however that Mr. von Hassel's proposal contains – as compared with Lord Gladwyn's earlier proposals which came from the European Parliament – a significant and specific indication of the rôle, nature and responsibilities of our organisation. In Mr. von Hassel's words: "At the present juncture, Western Euro-

Mr. De Poi (continued)

pean Union remains the only European organisation with responsibilities in defence questions." and therefore is the organisation which can make a serious contribution to help in forming the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. All those who seek autonomy and wider options should welcome this and not be opposed to what in substance is to be found in the report as its specific and original content. This basically is the difference between Lord Gladwyn's earlier report and Mr. von Hassel's report now before us. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that a growing Community which is seeking its rôle in the world and in relation to its allies and which seeks to speak with a single voice must equip itself with coherent means of protecting its freedom and independence.

Again, a common industrial policy requires a common armaments policy. And at a time when one aspect is indistinguishable from the other at certain technological levels, it is inevitable that the European Community should find some points of contact with our work and our responsibilities.

Mr. President, I have from time to time spoken of the need for parallelism in the progress of the Community and the progress of WEU, not only in terms of responsibilities but also in terms of geopolitical area. It seems to me that Mr. von Hassel has taken up this kind of proposal and has developed it as regards the link both with NATO's responsibilities and with the wider responsibilities of the European Community which includes the group of countries belonging to Western European Union.

It is therefore as an example of this type of parallelism and this search for a key idea on which our work should be focused that I take a favourable view of this report; at the same time however I believe that we should all reflect on the matter further because a dialogue must be started soon. I myself was the bearer – and I think that Mr. Reddemann was talking of past events – of an information report on relations between the European Parliament and our Assembly.

It is necessary to sound out the views of the other party before any proposals can be made for exchanges between us and the European Parliament.

In agreement with Sir Frederic Bennett, I would say therefore, that it might perhaps be better to follow the lines of the recommendation, as the ideas in the report are largely a reflection of the writer's own views.

We are waiting for the resolution in order to put it into better shape and make a full propo-

sal concerning institutions; but we here and now recognise the stimulus it has given to our work and its importance in the light of the anxieties and aspirations of the peoples of Europe today.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. De Poi. I let you go on for rather longer than usual, but it was an important speech. Also, you rather skilfully said in conclusion what you had already said during the earlier part of your speech. Thank you for a very important contribution.

The next speaker is Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Rapporteur's analysis of the problems of European security undoubtedly contains a number of positive elements which various members have already emphasised. I shall therefore not refer to these again. However, certain criticisms may be in order, and I shall devote myself to them.

When threats to European security are mentioned, they are restricted to the permanent threat – essentially a military one – brought to bear on all our countries by the Soviet Union. As regards the desire to export Marxist revolution, one cannot claim that it is anything new, since the policy has been the same for twenty years. Given the extent of the Soviet Union's supposed military superiority, it is surprising that it has been unable to realise this aim. We owe this, incidentally, to our democracies. For this reason, to consider only one aspect of European defence – its mobilisation against the prospect of the spread of Marxist imperialism – seems to me inadequate.

The Rapporteur's argument rests on the whole series of direct and indirect interventions by the Soviet Union in a number of African and Asian countries. While the threats posed by these – mainly military – interventions must be taken very seriously, it is important to emphasise that the Soviet presence is not necessarily meeting with real success, especially in Africa.

Furthermore, in the case of Afghanistan, which we shall be discussing later, the people's fierce will to resist is manifestly proving a major obstacle to the Soviet Union's will to establish its hegemony over the country.

As to the threat to Africa's mineral resources and to the oil route, in the first case, certain European countries must take a large share of the blame, especially when, as in South Africa, a régime practising apartheid is being supported for economic reasons. They are helping to reinforce the repressive nature of the existing government and creating the conditions for future instability.

Mr. Pignion (continued)

In the second case, the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, which neither of the great powers seems able to control owing to specific underlying problems, shows that a hypothetical Soviet threat to access to the Persian Gulf should not be regarded as the Europeans' sole cause for concern.

These different examples reveal a tendency to lay the blame for the main threat to our security on the Soviet Union, but this is not entirely satisfactory, because there are certain other factors to be taken into consideration.

The development of the Middle East conflicts, the economic and political frailty of some of those countries, the extreme poverty of the African countries, are just as much of a threat to European security in the short term as the desire, too often attributed to the Soviet Union, to conduct a resolutely aggressive policy towards European countries.

Of course, the Soviet Union is a military colossus, but its political strength is basically dependent on that fact. The Soviet Union is a frail giant in economic terms; the crisis in the West affects both it and its satellites. To be objective we must therefore take account of the weaknesses inherent in the Soviet economic structure and the internal tensions in the Soviet Union and its satellites. Poland is a striking example.

My criticisms are therefore aimed at this overestimation of the Soviet threat, based solely on its military capability. The pamphlet by my friend and colleague Charles Hernu discloses facts which are worth registering in this respect.

Mr. von Hassel's insistence on the need to consolidate the Atlantic Alliance with the Americans at all costs seems to rule out any attempt to look for other support. Would it not be desirable, Ladies and Gentlemen, to consider other possible combinations? The People's Republic of China exists; a Euro-Japanese alliance is not out of the question... There are so many possible ways of strengthening European security without letting it rest solely on American willingness to intervene, which, as has been said, and as you know, is not automatic.

The fear of Soviet armaments may lead Europe to take greater responsibility for its own defence and bring Europeans closer together in order to solve one of the problems contributing to the relative weakness of their armed forces: the lack of standardisation of equipment which concerns us in WEU and which seems to have resulted from concern for economic profitability rather than from political considerations.

Then let us fight for arms control and disarmament. It would be rash, I repeat, to make light of the military threats.

In response to these military threats, Mr. von Hassel argues the need to strengthen military and political solidarity, stressing the importance of unity with the United States on both the military and the economic level. We French socialists are more cautious about the need for Europe to be too heavily dependent on its American ally. Mr. Kissinger recently remarked that American nuclear protection was not automatic and that it was up to Europe to develop independent means of defence.

The Rapporteur has reviewed the situation concerning all the European institutions involved in defence problems. His opinion, which coincides with that recently expressed by Mr. Leo Tindemans, is that, in the medium term, WEU's prerogatives should be taken away and transferred to the European Parliament. This has already been said, but it must be repeated.

According to Mr. von Hassel, the problems of defence policy should be debated in the framework of a European union with real political powers. We cannot follow him on this. On the contrary, I hope and remain convinced that WEU is the institutional cornerstone for the establishment of a coherent defence policy. I agree with the acting Rapporteur that our institution deserves a little more dignity, a little more reality than an academic institution. It is vital that WEU should receive all the means which are its due and which have been transferred to other institutions over the years.

Finally, it is desirable - this too has been mentioned but there is no reason not to repeat it - that governmental participation within the Council should be strengthened by the presence of top-level representatives of the various defence ministries.

When one has cause to consider too many divergent viewpoints within the European Communities, resulting from what has perhaps been too rapid an enlargement, and when one calls to mind the "variable geometry" of Europe, it may appear Utopian to seek to solve defence problems in the framework of an enlarged community when it is already very difficult to do so here or through bilateral or trilateral negotiations. I would therefore be in favour of setting up a working group to adapt WEU to present European defence requirements, for it is important to remember that WEU is the only European alliance providing for automatic assistance in the event of military threat.

I would add that the withdrawal of the draft resolution has our full approval and I am glad we do not have to discuss it.

(*Mr. Maravalle, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to apologise to the Assembly for the slight contretemps that held up proceedings at the beginning of the afternoon. I had missed the opening two or three minutes and was therefore not aware that the draft resolution was not to be moved.

Nevertheless, it is perhaps relevant for the Assembly to know the amendment to the draft resolution that I would have moved had I been able to do so. I would have sought to delete the second and third paragraphs of the preamble to the draft resolution and to delete paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolution itself. I would have sought to amend the first of the three paragraphs of the resolution proper as follows:

“ Decides

To instruct the Presidential Committee to examine means of associating more fully parliamentary representatives of all the European member countries of NATO with the work of the Assembly of WEU. ”

There is no doubt that Mr. von Hassel has done WEU a signal service in his excellent report. It is tragic that, for reasons of health, he is not able to be here to move it. I have not read a wider-ranging or more profound strategic analysis from WEU in recent years. As the draft resolution is not to be moved, the main force and merits of the report should not be lost to the Assembly, and I hope that we shall be able to accept the draft recommendation.

I understand the points made by Mr. Hardy and others about Mr. von Hassel's reference to the EEC, particularly with reference to item 8 in the draft recommendation. Nevertheless, those are detailed points. I understand that paragraph (d) may cause slight difficulty to some members.

On balance, however, the report is admirable. It draws attention to the weaknesses of western security as a whole and emphasises the great importance of establishing a European dimension to Atlantic security policy. Therefore, it would be a great mistake if we were to allow to fester differences of view about the institutional framework within which the European element of Atlantic security is built.

I hope that we shall be able to invite other European NATO member countries that are not members of WEU to become signatories of the modified Brussels Treaty. That is one of

the important recommendations in Mr. von Hassel's paper. At present, it would be inappropriate to involve the EEC in security policy questions.

Mr. von Hassel's report makes clear the direction in which it is suggested we move. In paragraphs 133, 134 and 135 he attaches an importance to members of the European Parliament that he would not ascribe to members of WEU. I dispute that suggestion. Members of WEU have access to Ministers. Most members of the European Parliament do not enjoy such access. As a result of our membership of national parliaments, we can have a significant influence on the determination of our national defence budgets.

As far as we can foresee, there is no possibility of European defence being constituted in any manner other than through national defence budgets, applied collectively to our common security interests. It is inappropriate to suggest that the European Parliament should have any rôle in that context. Mr. Hardy and Mr. Urwin reminded us of the political difficulties. European security can be best guaranteed by ensuring the maximum possible agreement and support of the European peoples.

There are difficulties between parties. Mr. Hardy reminded us of the difficulties in Greece and, to a lesser extent, of those in the United Kingdom. There are similar difficulties in Spain. We should try to make existing institutions work. That is important. Perhaps governments have failed when they have not paid sufficient attention to the resolutions passed by this Assembly. Perhaps we have failed when we have made an inadequate contribution.

The fact that the Assembly of WEU is located in Paris is a great political strength. France lies at the heart of Western European security. Because WEU has the wholehearted support of the French Government, it carries great weight. Members should read paragraph 131 of Mr. von Hassel's report and note the observations of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. He reminded us that WEU is the only body competent to discuss armaments. The EEC Assembly is not competent to discuss such questions. I do not want to invite observers to this Assembly to take part in our proceedings and to sit on our Committees when they cannot have the ultimate responsibility of voting.

If, as Mr. von Hassel suggests, we invite observers here from the European Parliament and allow them to speak but not to vote, we shall prostitute our Assembly. It is the action of voting and the responsibility for votes taken that a member of parliament has to his electors that are important. Those who elect members

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

to the European Parliament do so because they wish their members of the European Parliament to modify, if they think appropriate, the budget of the European Community. Members are not elected to the European Parliament on universal suffrage because the electors want them to influence Europe's security policy.

It is a wide-ranging and impressive report. There is no doubt that it should be carried. It is right, however, that we should delete the draft resolution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Boucheny has the floor.

Mr. BOUCHENY (France) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the French communists will vote against the draft resolution; they will, moreover, vote against the report which has been presented to us, because they regard it as being conducive to a return to the cold war.

This document contains an unvarnished statement of an extremist war-mongering policy. To adopt Mr. von Hassel's arguments would mean, first of all, creating the conditions for extreme tension in Europe, an unbridled race for the most destructive armaments. This report crudely exposes the hidden aims of capitalist and militarist circles whose only dream is of holocausts which will keep their profits coming in.

Behind it all, with its clumsy larding of untruths, stands the age-old spectre of the threat from the East. In order to persuade the peoples to lay down their lives on the altar of anti-Sovietism, the Russian bogey-man has to be inflated and brought to life.

Our sole reason for denouncing the untruths of Mr. von Hassel and his emulators is that they run counter to the interests of the French people, the European peoples and peace in general.

We do not wish to speak on behalf of the Russians, or even to defend them; they do not ask us to and I think they are big enough to do it for themselves. But it is impossible to leave unanswered such obvious untruths as the alleged massive superiority of the Warsaw Pact armies in all military areas – on land, in the air, in tactical, ballistic, nuclear and naval weaponry.

Mr. von Hassel and the propaganda stewpots which supply these lies make a tally of the entire Warsaw Pact forces but, on the other hand, single out the Atlantic forces, those of the Americans and sometimes even those of France. Whether Mr. von Hassel likes it or not, this will in no way alter the fact that the

Soviet Union is part of the continent of Europe: its troops should indeed be stationed there, unless he would rather send them to the moon.

Mr. von Hassel assumes with impressive confidence what he well knows to be untrue. He asserts, for instance that the Soviet Union has a navy which seems to have become the most powerful in the world. But an Italian admiral gives the game away by telling the WEU armaments committee that a change is observable in the balance of forces in the Mediterranean. Obviously, not so long ago there was no Soviet navy in the Mediterranean!

When they speak of Soviet superiority, the cold war enthusiasts are thinking of and working for Atlantic superiority; they do not want a world balance of forces at any price. Now everybody naturally knows that the imperialists' military forces include those of the ex-colonial countries, of South Africa and of the South American dictatorships – forces which of course are far superior to the military forces of the socialist countries. It is this overwhelming superiority which creates the greatest dangers to peace, and not the other way round.

In short, the fact that peace has been preserved up to now is due to the combination of two factors: first, the struggle for peace by all the peoples of the world; secondly, the peace policy of the socialist countries – their strength, their determination to reduce tensions and to try to settle all disputes by negotiation.

This being so, it is not surprising that Mr. von Hassel fulminates against détente; that is very far from being his concern. He proposes to extend NATO's field of activity to practically the whole globe and calls for intervention in the Indian Ocean. The Mediterranean is, according to him, Europe's *mare nostrum* – which was once the theory of Rommel and the Afrika Korps. He says the odious régime of apartheid in South Africa must be supported in order to make that country the policeman of Africa, which, according to him, is subject to "steady threats", doubtless from the oppressed black majority!

NATO must also concern itself with the situation in Asia. Only South America is not mentioned. He must feel that the Pinochets, the torturing generals in Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Paraguay and Uruguay can be trusted.

To ensure the superiority of the imperialist militarists, Mr. von Hassel argues that it should be based on two pillars: the United States and Europe. This theory, incidentally, makes nonsense of an allegedly independent Europe between the two blocs. The Christian Democrat von Hassel cuts the ground from under the feet of the Socialist International, which hides its

Mr. Boucheny (continued)

support for imperialism under the mantle of an independent Europe.

The European pillar is, in fact, only a branch of the imperialist tree, and Mr. von Hassel says so clearly:

"Hence, any indication of Europe moving away from its North American partners in the Atlantic Alliance would be a serious threat to the security of Europe. There is a risk of any call for Europe to become independent... thus destroying the security of the western world and above all of the part of Europe which has remained free."

Mr. von Hassel contradicts himself.

The European pillar of the champions of the cold war is an "integrated Europe". As Mr. von Hassel says, this means that the "Alliance must... be jointly managed" so that "no rift" may form. On this basis the theoreticians are waging a new battle against the national independence of the peoples whom they intend to merge in the Atlantic conglomerate dominated by the United States and the Federal Republic. Mr. von Hassel's report sets forth bluntly, indeed cynically, the hidden reasons for economic integration. He is in favour of:

"the three countries which have applied for membership of the European Community being encouraged to accede at the same time to the modified Brussels Treaty and WEU, thus giving an institutional framework to the European pillar of the Alliance."

He shows that, via the Common Market, what interests him and NATO is military integration. The Greeks, who only now are demonstrating against their country's entry into the Common Market, may draw some conclusions from this. What interests him is the abolition of national armies and national armaments industries. He takes up the idea expressed by Mr. Davignon during the symposium on the standardisation of armaments of a Common Market combining the arms industries. He writes: "a common... policy henceforth calls for a common armaments policy".

But there is one field where the WEU report goes still further: it calls for new rights for West Germany in the nuclear field. It says:

"On the contrary, there is every reason for them to examine together how the forces of each country should be deployed in peacetime and used in wartime to ensure maximum effectiveness and there is nothing to prevent these consultations also covering the use of nuclear weapons and their deployment in the NATO system. In view of the special

status of the French deterrent and the rôle it plays in Europe's defence policy, consultations - Franco-German in particular - on its use might make a useful contribution to the western deterrent."

Since West Germany has been allowed to have a navy, the only restriction still imposed on it concerns nuclear weapons. West German imperialism now considers itself strong enough to demand nuclear weapons. We note - a significant point - that the West German militarists hope to use the abandonment of all-round defence by the Giscard government in France as a pretext to obtain the nuclear weapon, and it is Mr. von Hassel who gives the game away. The Giscard government, which has taken over from the Americans in introducing the neutron bomb, does indeed deserve the congratulations of Mr. von Hassel, who offers them gladly and awards top marks. Referring to the French neutron bomb he writes: "It would be most dangerous for the West to... further delay the development of this weapon. The French Government for its part seems to have understood this."

On this basis, the West German arms merchants claim that: "the restrictions on the production of conventional weapons by the Federal Republic hindered the competitive capacity of that country's... industries."

The fact remains that WEU is realistic. Notice does have to be taken of the struggle of the European peoples demonstrating at Kaiserslautern, in Amsterdam, in Belgium and in France, and fighting against nuclear death and the criminal war-mongers.

That is why Mr. von Hassel thinks that "it does not seem possible at the present time" to consider overcoming the obstacle constituted by opposition to extending the Community to include the military field. WEU is therefore to be the contraption enabling the European army for which the militarists are praying to be achieved. All this until such time as the Assembly of the European Communities, wrongly called the "European Parliament", extends its powers, if possible, sufficiently to be able to deal with military problems of foreign policy. That is why the report proposes that the WEU Assembly could "become the effective parliament of Europe" in the area of military policy.

The communists firmly oppose the dangerous policy advocated by Mr. von Hassel. He speaks of the danger in the East but does not mention that the Federal Republic of Germany is the only European country which has territorial demands. It is relying on the countries of the European Community to achieve its aims, since the German revanchists cannot do so themselves.

Mr. Boucheny (continued)

The communists firmly oppose the militarists' intention to turn the territory of Europe into a battlefield again, leaving the United States as a sanctuary.

Mr. von Hassel's report is a downright declaration of war on the peoples of Europe. Thanks to the peace campaign, the people have stayed the criminals' hands. The communists will make every effort to prevent Europe from being laid waste.

The PRESIDENT. – The next speaker is Mr. Osborn.

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – It had not been my intention to speak in this debate, because I have not been a member of the General Affairs Committee. However, in the party political committee this morning I had to assert a point of view; I accept, however, that this report is positive. Perhaps I have not given it the detailed thought that it deserves because I have read it only this weekend, for reasons that will become apparent.

I wish to give some positive thoughts to this Assembly, because I welcome this report from Mr. von Hassel. I accept the amendment of my colleague, Mr. John Wilkinson, and I am aware that colleagues in my own political party and in the country, the Conservative Party of Great Britain, have reservations about this draft resolution. But I am impressed by this report.

It is a bold report and I would hope that this Assembly will give it careful thought, not only in this debate but in the General Affairs Committee in time to come. There has been some controversy about the draft resolution on the future of European security and Sir Frederic Bennett, as Chairman of the Committee, has undertaken to withdraw it. I welcome his asking to do so, bearing in mind the representations of Mr. Stoffelen and those of Mr. Urwin on this matter, but I believe this resolution to be moving in the right direction. I am aware of the national views of certain countries, particularly France, which are mentioned in the report, and the political views of parties, and not only the speech we have heard from the Communist Party but the socialists.

Mr. Reddemann, whose regret I share that Mr. von Hassel cannot be here to present the report, referred to troop concentrations, whether from the Soviet Union or from the DDR, around Poland. I hope that he is right when he assumes that we are not returning to the days of 1914 and 1939.

In the past few weeks I had the privilege of leading a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association delegation from the United Kingdom to

Australia. We visited the Federal Parliament in Canberra and the state Parliaments of Melbourne, for Victoria, and Adelaide, for South Australia. There is a fascinating relationship between the different parliaments.

On my way out, I visited India, to attend a delegation of members of parliament, which met around the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. I was aware that Mrs. Gandhi was having difficulty in speaking for all India. I met parliamentarians from Assam, close to the Chinese border, which has the oil and gas fields which supply India.

On my return, I came through Vancouver, one of Canada's provincial parliaments, and visited the British Columbian capital, Victoria. The next day I flew to Ottawa and saw at first hand the constitutional conflict caused by the British North America Act of 1867, which is being played out on the floor of the parliament and in a special select committee. It involves the constitution and charter rights. The Canadian Prime Minister feels that he cannot speak for Canada because each state has autonomy.

Coincidentally, as a member of the British Select Committee on Education, Science and the Arts, I was in Washington in the autumn. The United States had just appointed a minister for education, a subject which the states regard as no business of the Federal Government.

When I was in Australia, the parliamentarians that I met were critical of the EEC. Mr. Antoni had been in Brussels before their recent elections. In answer to the criticisms, I said that Europe was following the path on which Australia started in 1901 and which it completed in 1926-27.

The lesson of my visits to those countries is that there is still debate as to what issues are state or provincial issues and what are federal, confederal or Commonwealth. That is why the Canadian convulsions are reaching such a pitch.

For four years I was a nominated member of the European Parliament, a member of the Conservative Group there, which now calls itself the European Democratic Group. Coincidentally, I was involved with a group called European Federalists, which wanted to move towards federalism. When I discussed my view of European co-ordination in foreign policy and other issues with Canadian academics less than a week ago, they said that, although unwilling to admit it, I was a European federalist.

The draft resolution, which has been greeted with so much reservation in the Assembly, deals with this important relationship between

Mr. Osborn (continued)

WEU and the EEC. It is not appropriate now to develop my views on the Madrid conference and the future of European co-operation and security – the IPU conference is in Brussels in May – but in the Council of Europe last September, I commented on a speech that I made at the IPU meeting in East Berlin earlier that month. I referred particularly to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its superiority in conventional and nuclear arms in Central Europe.

I welcome the invitation to members of the European Parliament to attend this Assembly as observers and I hope that that will continue. However, as a conservative member of the European Parliament for four years, I can categorically claim that I wanted the Commission and the European Parliament to concern themselves with a common European foreign policy and the co-ordination of defence policies. I supported Lord Gladwyn when he concentrated the minds of the Commission on defence procurement. The wider EEC has a rôle to play.

This is why the report and the draft resolution are so significant. I sense that WEU is sensitive to the fact that defence in Europe is its prerogative, although WEU must be part of the Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, there may be a preference for preserving the status quo.

I believe in a Europe united on economic, industrial and social policies, on common foreign policies and, so far as possible, on defence policies, which I regard as defence policies within NATO, using WEU as a catalyst.

I am also aware that federal, confederal and Commonwealth nations are not always as united as they might be and that Prime Ministers and Presidents cannot speak for their countries as they claim to do.

Let us have no illusions: the relationship between the Kremlin and the various states in the Soviet Union is sometimes equally tenuous.

As a conservative member of parliament and a citizen of Europe, I have wanted the sovereign states of Europe to work more closely together, particularly on procurement, standardisation and defence policies.

We have an excellent recommendation before us. It says:

“Considering that the European Community has established solidarity between most European members of the Atlantic Alliance”

and

“that the European Community is not in a position to replace WEU”,

the Council should set up a working group to do various things that I support, including studying the question of inviting

“all countries which are members of the EEC, have applied for membership or are European members of NATO, also to negotiate their accession to the modified Brussels Treaty or, if they do not wish to do so, their association with the activities of WEU.”

I accept the sentiments behind the draft resolution, but I hope that the General Affairs Committee will consider the resolution and find a *modus vivendi* between our national governments and parliaments, the Commission and the European Parliament, so that Europe can work better for defence, defence procurement and standardisation.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to join with other speakers in stressing that Mr. von Hassel's excellent report reflects the concern broadly felt in this Assembly by all those who fear that, if we are not careful, Europe, which has so often made history, will one day become its victim.

How can we fail to approve when the report says that Europe is called upon to bear a larger share of the burden of its own defence today, that it faces specific threats which weigh more heavily on it than on its distant and powerful North American ally? Mr. von Hassel also maintains that Europe's voice in the Atlantic dialogue must be louder and clearer.

All that is perfectly acceptable.

I would refer, somewhat mischievously, to the attention to detail Mr. von Hassel has shown, at least in the text of the draft resolution and draft recommendation – the explanatory memorandum has, however, succumbed to common usage – in calling the Assembly of the European Communities by its proper name rather than by the incorrect label of “European Parliament” so often used here and elsewhere.

But his train of thought also leads him down what I consider to be dangerous paths, and there I cannot follow him.

He seems to think that the direct election of the Assembly of the Communities makes it the proper and competent forum for the discussion of all Europe's problems, including defence problems. Does he not say towards the end of his report: “Everything that concerns Europe concerns the European Parliament”? Everything, including defence matters!

Pending the achievement of his desire for a genuine merger between our Assembly, on

Mr. Bozzi (continued)

which the treaties confer exclusive powers in this area, and the Assembly of the Communities, which is explicitly denied such powers by the treaties, he proposes that the two organisations should be associated through an exchange of observers.

We could not agree to this proposal without encouraging the already overt tendency of the Assembly of the Communities – rightly denounced with some vigour by Maurice Druon earlier on – to depart from the rôle – important as it is – assigned to it by the Treaties of Rome and Paris. The need for strict observance of the treaties stems not from a simple desire to see the law obeyed to the letter, but principally from a feeling of caution learnt from the lessons of the past. To go too far too quickly is to risk losing partners on the way, beginning with France, where, despite what Mr. Boucheny may say, the President of the Republic and the government, and all sections of public opinion, believe in the strict observance of the treaties.

After all, the Communities have specific terms of reference which forbid them to interfere in areas other than those assigned to them by the treaties. They have well-integrated machinery for their operation. They have the power to enact legislation with immediate effect in the member states without the need for ratification at national level. A Court of Justice is responsible for ensuring the supremacy of this legislation over our national legislation.

An organisation of this kind, although necessitated by the pressing need for the economic and social unification of our old continent, can on no account deal with areas for which individual states have sovereign responsibility.

It cannot be said often enough that the idea of nationhood is a new one. Nations exist. We cannot take the risk of encroaching on national interests in an area where they rightly appear sacrosanct to the public and to governments, however unworthy they may be of the name. The European Community is an association of states which have come together in their economic interests but which have not adopted the same position on defence questions.

Ireland is neutral, Denmark refuses to allow forces equipped with nuclear weapons to be stationed on its soil, the Federal Republic of Germany is subject to various arms restrictions, the United Kingdom and France are nuclear powers. But France, though it remains, and is anxious to remain, an active member of the Atlantic Alliance, has not belonged to NATO for several years.

Against this varied background, it seems obvious that the machinery provided by the Treaty of Rome for the achievement of economic objectives simply cannot, as the treaties stand and in the present climate, be used to co-ordinate security policies. Is it not significant, after all, that the political co-operation now emerging among the nine member states of the Community is developing outside the confines of the Treaty of Rome and without following the procedures for which it provides.

Rather than attempting to achieve this institutionalisation through a hypothetical merger of the European Community and WEU, it would undoubtedly be better to aim at giving full effect to the existing treaties, while respecting the specific nature of the organisations established under them.

Of course, Europe is an entity, and the various systems of co-operation it incorporates must be complementary. They cannot merge without ruining everything. But Europe's economic and social unification, its progress towards the political unity, which is no doubt desirable in the long term, and the establishment of the elements required for a common defence, also desirable in the long term, cannot proceed at the same pace nor even be linked by a mutually dependent relationship. With this reservation, but you will appreciate that it is fundamental, one can agree with Mr. von Hassel when he calls for WEU to play its rôle effectively and to accomplish at last the mission assigned to it by the treaty under which it was established.

Our Assembly is the natural framework for dialogues and deliberations among the states of Western Europe on security problems, not only in Europe but anywhere in the world. It is the only European institution in which European co-operation on armaments has been initiated systematically and on a clearly-defined legal basis.

We agree that this co-operation should assume definite shape, since it is recognised that our Assembly is the only body in which the option of a European defence is satisfactorily maintained for all the European states.

It must be said again and again, without boasting but also without inhibition, that WEU exists; let us give it bolder and, if possible, more effective life. Europe exists. We agree that the states it comprises should co-ordinate their policies and their defences more closely. But, for goodness' sake, let it not be imagined that we can be dragged with impunity into institutional adventures, which, to be quite frank, we do not want.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Kershaw.

Mr. KERSHAW (*United Kingdom*). – When WEU was founded, the only important area of military danger was in Western Europe. It could then be said that if the East-West confrontation in Europe could be contained and stabilised, peace was secured. Today, things are different. Whilst the western front remains vital, it is not the only front about which we must worry. In Africa our interests have been heavily attacked, and continue to be so. In the Middle East and the Gulf and farther east in Afghanistan, a volatile and dangerous state of affairs poses difficulties impossible exactly to calculate.

There is another sense in which the situation has changed. Defence is less and less a matter only of weapons, of matching numbers and of comparing quality of strike power, though these cannot be ignored. Increasingly, however, we realise that weapons can often not be used, that military strength cannot be deployed.

Defence is also composed of diplomatic, economic and industrial ingredients. This fact, combined with the spread of adventurism throughout the world, leads me to think that Mr. von Hassel was right when he invited us in his report to widen our horizons, both geographically and organisationally.

WEU is, through no fault of its own, no longer enough. NATO is not enough. We in the West must in future think and act in a wider sphere, and I therefore welcome the impulse towards that change of attitude contained in Kai-Uwe von Hassel's report.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Schmidt.

Mr. SCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to ask Mr. Reddemann, who has been kind enough to step in, as it were, as substitute Rapporteur, to convey our greetings and best wishes to our old and mutual friend Mr. von Hassel, to whom I should also like to express my gratitude and appreciation for the analysis provided in this report.

Now it would be possible – as has already happened here – to raise the major aspects of defence and security policy. This I shall not do, although I am tempted to. What I would like to examine is something which was also touched upon by Mr. Reddemann, namely the confusion at a higher level. I should like to ask a few questions about this. I am very sorry that Mr. von Hassel cannot be here, for he would no doubt have been able to answer them straight away. So I have to ask them through Mr. Reddemann. These questions really ought to have been clarified, and that is why the Socialist Group too asked for the report and the draft recommendation to be referred back to the

Committee – because it wished to obtain further clarification of these questions.

I would like to put forward a few points on this subject. The draft recommendation naturally contains a number of well-worn truths. But perhaps it is quite a good thing for us to refresh our memories by hearing them again.

After a mention of the leading NATO power, our American friends, the discussion was about co-operation on arms production in Europe. Mr. President, I should not like this to be construed in any way as an antithesis: we talk about our big brother in America, but think only of the European aspect. This is impossible. I simply want to get this antithesis out of the way.

It is said that we should discuss European security measures with the EEC, although defence matters do not concern the Community. There is nothing about this in the treaties. WEU's topics are not those of the EEC, and I consider it very hazardous for us suddenly to venture together onto new ground, knowing the difficulties involved. I am therefore convinced that institutionalising the presence of observers, for instance, is also unnecessary. There is no need for it; every parliament is a sovereign body and is no doubt always ready to invite colleagues from other parliaments when important questions arise.

It is proposed that a working group be set up to examine five questions, including the possibilities of accession to or association with WEU. We do not know – I am still referring to the draft recommendation – what the member countries' position is on this, what their comments are, whether they have reservations or whether they agree. I do not think it would be a good thing for national parliaments to be taken by surprise by our addressing ourselves to major political issues over their heads.

It is proposed that European armaments policy, and hence also of course armaments production, be discussed. Ladies and Gentlemen, I have been a member of the Defence Committee of the Bundestag for twenty years and I know – having seen it from my very first day – how greatly we have been concerned, over and over again, with the standardisation of armaments and hence with rationalisation in this field. I now believe – and I have worked in industry – that no great progress can be expected here unless we can advance in certain quite specific areas, perhaps by a system of compensation or by one country's giving up manufacturing a given product in favour of another. But the repercussions, either on employers or on trade unions, would be considerable. Jobs and many other things are involved. I assure you, bilateral and trilateral co-operation is no

Mr. Schmidt (continued)

substitute for broad co-operation over armaments, because production in different countries – as painful experience in other countries and in the Federal Republic of Germany has shown – substantially pushes up costs. We all have to economise. We had to economise before, and now we have to economise in all these areas.

It has already been said that WEU consists of seven countries, NATO of thirteen countries and the EEC of nine. If we remember this, and if we also bear in mind Ireland, France's special status in NATO and many other things, we know that it is virtually impossible to widen our horizons, as it were, by setting up new bureaucracies or expanding existing ones. I rule this out, and would urge that these facts be borne in mind when the decision is taken on the report. I would issue a strong warning, Mr. President, against the creation of still more bodies – foredoomed to failure – to cover the subjects already dealt with by the Eurogroup and other NATO institutions. This leads nowhere and achieves nothing. That is why the Socialist Group, discussing these misgivings, came to the conclusion that we ought to reconsider this matter in Committee to see if these questions can be answered in advance. This is not possible, which is why we have to table them here.

And now, since our communist colleague is present again, I would like to add this comment: he eloquently reeled off a speech which had doubtless been drafted for him. He insulted countries and politicians, including some from my own country. I could make a sharp rebuttal, but his statements contained far too little substance for me to be able to say anything at all about them. But they did remind me of one thing. It is indeed true, as a great lady politician said, that in democracy freedom is always for the other fellow's viewpoint. And our colleague certainly makes ample use of that freedom.

(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the draft report contained points which aroused serious concern and the draft resolution contains others which we may be unable to accept. But after the withdrawal of the draft, I feel that all members of the Assembly except those who are institutionally opposed to WEU can look at this report with special attention and can find in it sound and genuinely valid points for the future of our Assembly. The report of course looks

to the resolution and it could not be otherwise; it therefore still includes ideas which may leave us divided and may be unacceptable. Today, however, all this must be seen exclusively in terms of the draft recommendation. Moreover, I have always known – and all of us know this – that the report is something which belongs to the Rapporteur and is not endorsed by the Assembly. The Assembly adopts only the draft recommendation, as in the case under consideration.

This being so, I find that the draft recommendation dispels our anxieties and matches our determination and commitment to work for the security and future of a free Europe. Mr. von Hassel expresses concern regarding the threat to Europe, saying that détente is being called in question or even endangered by Soviet interventions not only in Europe but all over the world. And the Soviet Union has been able to do this because of the military strength it has built up, while over the last fifteen years the Atlantic Alliance and NATO have thought only of not being overtaken and have pursued an armaments policy aimed at increasing their forces alone.

Now, while it cannot be denied that the overall situation has moved in favour of the Warsaw Pact and while it cannot be denied that in Europe in particular, the Warsaw Pact has superiority over NATO in both theatre nuclear weapons and in conventional armaments – and this is a danger which cannot be underestimated – it is clear that we must prepare the most suitable means for peace and not for war, in order that is to increase our security by working towards, first, a reduction in armaments and secondly a presence more adequate to the needs of the moment.

I would remind members of the Assembly that the Soviet Union is showing no signs of détente and is offering us nothing as a basis for assessing its possible attitude to détente. So much has already been said about Afghanistan that I have no wish to go into this event which has caused us such anxiety and is still doing so. What I would say is that we should think rather of the attitude of the Soviet Union one year after the invasion of Afghanistan and of its attitude at Madrid where it has even assumed the rôle of accuser of the western world; we should think of the threat to Poland and to the countries of the western world – we have indeed witnessed naked threats to countries prepared to accept the new missiles offered by the United States. We should think of all these points and should recognise that the position has become worse and more worrying.

If things are as I have described, I believe that the draft recommendation now before us meets a number of definite requirements. What are

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

they? We ourselves and the public at large must be alerted to this situation; WEU must be given the means to carry out its rôle. Here we are talking of a revitalisation of WEU, because I have heard it said in some quarters that this organisation has become run down. What is the aim of this draft recommendation? It is that WEU should be made more effective and that it should be better equipped to discharge the functions given to it by the Brussels Treaty. This need is met both by the proposal to set up a working party and also by the invitation to ministers of defence to attend meetings of the Council more directly concerned with defence and armaments questions; I agree that this would call for closer co-ordination of policy by the countries of Europe and an invitation to EEC countries – I would go so far as to say the European countries belonging to the Atlantic Alliance – to join Western European Union, which will then really be in a position to express the joint will of the whole of Europe, thus enabling our continent to face the future with confidence and to continue to guarantee its peace and security.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I think Mr. von Hassel has chosen an eminently suitable title for a report of this magnitude: “The future of European security”. That future, of course, is in the hands of all of us, for we cannot surrender to any power – we ourselves must be masters of that future.

Mr. von Hassel's report is reassuring: the European spirit has in no way been affected by the tribulations of recent years. And whatever efforts the nations make, whatever relative strength we can put forward in a genuine future *Kriegsspiel*, it seems clear that only an organisation based on solidarity can succeed in this immense and still uncertain gamble: ensuring European security.

Everyone, including the man in the street, knows that the solidarity in question implies Atlantic solidarity. It is worth recalling, incidentally, that European solidarity was rescued at the time of a certain abrupt stop to Soviet attempts to install missiles in Cuba.

Policies yield only when actions are matched by genuine relative strength, and not the reverse. Even so, one must be organised for this to hold good.

We cannot but agree with Mr. von Hassel when he reminds us of the importance of setting up the European pillar. But we also know that this European pillar, which, in the organisation of joint defence, must be matched by a

political resolve, will never exist or be effective unless it is based on political power. And if this European political power is to exist, there must be political resolve at its base, that is to say among the nations who make up the European pillar.

I would therefore like to add to the Rapporteur's excellent comments a demand which seems to me fundamental, without questioning the rôle, mission and responsibilities bravely assumed by each of the European countries in these difficult times. I am referring to the fundamental responsibility borne, especially in nuclear matters, by two European countries, the United Kingdom and France, and, in regard to strategic positions in the European theatre, by the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. No progress can be made, either technically or politically, towards joint European defence until these three countries have agreed to act in concert in a spirit of European and Atlantic solidarity that will one day enable Europe to be truly European and to have its own defence.

All the same, there will have to be political moves in this direction. Then again, if such political moves are about to take place at European level, they must be acceptable to our Atlantic allies, in particular the United States.

What would be the point of expressing the kind of hopes I have outlined unless the United States were to release the United Kingdom from the ban on giving nuclear information to third countries?

This is obviously a case of a common understanding for a common aim and, for my part, I have no objection when Mr. von Hassel speaks of joint management of the Atlantic Alliance, that is of Europeans managing their own destiny on their own account in this framework of solidarity.

When I see détente smashed by the attack on Afghanistan, when I see what is looming up on the horizon – viewing it with some anxiety when one remembers Prague or Budapest – and when I think of what could happen to Europe in the event of a Polish crisis, I say quite simply that it is time for the legal quibbles, the diplomatic discussions and the confrontation of national interests to give way to a precise awareness of the situation.

The people are waiting for their states and parliaments to bring their ideas up to date. Action is urgently required. What would we say if, in a tragic situation such as that caused in Italy by the recent earthquakes, instead of sending aid, instead of mobilising to save all those souls in peril, we were to leave the solution of the human and material problem to a group of seismologists who would try to make

Mr. Caro (continued)

sure that another catastrophe of the kind did not claim any more victims? Are we going to go on doing the same thing for Afghanistan, relying on conferences and speech-making to settle a human problem? Are we going to be stuck in front of our television screens day after day, following the drama being played out over there, listening to the latest news and the progress of an invasion like that one, without adopting a common attitude?

Of course, it is easy to say that we must intervene. But with whom and how? This is the question to which Mr. von Hassel has asked us to respond. I for one am sure that the Assembly will respond with determination.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Baumel, who has kindly said that he will take only five minutes, because I want to close the debate before the important meeting at 6 p.m.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I very briefly make a number of comments on Mr. von Hassel's report on the future of European security.

While the future has been gloomy for the last few sessions of our Assembly, Mr. von Hassel's report contains some positive elements, particularly the denunciation of the serious threat to Europe from the Soviet Union and of the growing imbalance in the armaments of East and West.

Nevertheless, in our view, Western European Union is the only existing forum that can retain the option of European defence. If all its members were in agreement – but are they? – WEU could serve as a useful framework for discussion and reflection on the problems of European and world security. WEU is in fact the only European institution in which co-operation on armaments has been initiated between the countries of Europe. It would be wise to keep what we have, especially by maintaining the present structure of the Standing Armaments Committee.

In my view such joint reflection and co-operation on armaments does not call for a special effort to co-ordinate defence policies within WEU. Consequently, the attendance of defence ministers at the WEU Council could not be considered, except on specific occasions.

We do not see the point of holding WEU Council meetings before those of the NATO Council. As far as those of us who belong to both assemblies are concerned, our position at such meetings could not differ from what it would be the next day in the Atlantic Council. There is no position that could be adopted by

the Seven that would enable us to speak with one voice at meetings of the Fifteen.

I shall not dwell on the possible enlargement of WEU, bearing in mind the very limited time at my disposal, but I will say that a great deal of discussion and very deep thought will be needed before we commit ourselves to measures very seriously affecting the balance of power in Europe and WEU's real potential for action.

We attach great importance to the retention of the Standing Armaments Committee. Every effort to reactivate the Committee, so that it may give rise to genuine European co-operation in the armaments field, should be supported.

Starting with the fact that the WEU Assembly is the only European assembly with responsibilities in defence questions under the treaties, and that election by direct universal suffrage has given new authority to the Assembly of the Communities, wrongly referred to by some as the "European Parliament", the draft resolution accompanying Mr. von Hassel's report envisages the possibility of an exchange of observers between the two assemblies.

Such a project must be opposed for the following specific reasons. Defence is a sector totally outside the terms of reference of the Treaty of Rome. To allow the Assembly of the Communities to send observers to a body dealing with defence would only encourage the European assembly itself to raise this type of problem – which would be contrary to the treaty. Basically, it should be remembered that the French Government regards as null and void any deliberations and resolutions of the Assembly of the Communities that transcend its terms of reference.

That is why, although we think Mr. von Hassel's report contains a number of undeniably positive elements and could serve to initiate an extremely interesting and useful debate within our Assembly, we unfortunately cannot support some of its provisions. Incidentally, I introduced, in the General Affairs Committee, a number of amendments that Mr. von Hassel was kind enough to accept and which were adopted unanimously by the Committee.

We have, then, a number of reservations, especially about certain paragraphs; but I shall not press the matter this evening. We shall be voting tomorrow and will have to take a stand then.

Let me conclude by saying that talking in European parliamentary assemblies about strengthening security, is one thing, and actually doing it is another. It is indeed a rather ironic paradox that France, the only country to have pulled out of NATO, puts more into defence and security than any of the

Mr. Baumel (continued)

faithful members who remain in the organisation but refuse to make any additional effort.

One has to be frank and make a choice: if we want security for Europe, we have to pay for it and not wait for the Americans. If we want to be respected by the Americans, Europe cannot be defended by the Americans alone, with feeble support from the Europeans. It is the Europeans who must contribute to the defence of Europe, supported by the Americans.

That is why I think we should reflect seriously about the problem of European security. Mr. von Hassel's report is an interesting topic for reflection. Unfortunately, some of its provisions contravene the treaties, and some of us will be unable to accept them.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Baumel. I am sure that your remarks about the increase in French defence expenditure will have been noticed.

Does the Chairman or the acting Rapporteur wish to comment ?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – Both the Rapporteur and I would like to comment, but, because of the other meeting to which you referred, Mr. President, Mr. Reddemann has kindly said that he has no objection to my speaking first on behalf of the Committee.

This report was adopted by a vote of twelve to two with one or two abstentions. In the interim, it has become clear that, whatever the views in the Committee, there is no consensus in favour of the draft resolution. Therefore, with the agreement of the acting Rapporteur and that of many of my colleagues, I said at the start of this debate, and again later, that we would not pursue the resolution.

With respect to all who have spoken, I think that many critics had prepared their speeches before they knew that the resolution would not be moved. Their criticisms were directed largely towards that resolution. I blame no one for that. I did not know until today that the resolution would not be moved.

However, it will not be moved. Tomorrow, there may first be a move to refer the whole thing back. That is not for me to decide, but the Rapporteur and I would oppose it.

On the positive side tomorrow, the Committee will be putting forward only the recommendation. I do not know in detail whether there will be amendments, since most of the earlier amendments were directed towards the resolution, which is not relevant anyway, since it will not be moved. Therefore, it would be appro-

priate to delay any comments on our attitude to amendments until the recommendations are debated tomorrow.

Tonight I endorse completely what Mr. von Hassel has done, which is to tell the truth. No one today has denied the stark truth of his report, but we are not voting on the substance of the report, which is the province of the Rapporteur and is not voted on in the Assembly. We shall be voting on the recommendations.

If we can take that attitude tomorrow, I think that the resolutions will not be moved and that we shall vote on the recommendations. Therefore, I hope that your task, Mr. President, will not be long and that the result of this report will be a positive attitude to our recommendations.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the acting Rapporteur wish to speak ?

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – First of all, Mr. President, my grateful thanks to all those who have taken part in this debate. While I am naturally pleased about those who have agreed with Mr. von Hassel and myself, I would assure all those who have been very critical that I have been listening extremely carefully and now understand some of the objections better than I could have expected before.

I owe Mr. Boucheny a special word of thanks, although that may surprise one or two people at this moment. Mr. Boucheny has once again strikingly demonstrated the way in which communists are prepared calmly to turn a statement into its opposite even when the assembly they are addressing knows the truth. Mr. Boucheny's speech says more about the truthfulness of communist assurances of peaceful intentions than many an analysis heard in this Assembly.

Let me briefly comment on what appear to me to be the three main points raised in the debate.

The first was concern that closer co-operation between European states in the armaments sector might interfere with the necessary co-operation with the United States. I totally disagree: on the contrary I take the view that it is absolutely necessary to develop such co-operation within Europe. After all, we are no longer manufacturing swords, halberds, flails and the like – which the village blacksmith could turn out in any country – but a range of weapons requiring exceptionally high technology, often transcending national borders. Mr. Schmidt, though he took a critical view, rightly recognised that co-operation is necessary if only because, in the case of these new weapons sys-

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

tems, certain countries will have to give up production, in the interests of rational European co-operation and, I would add, economic efficiency as well. So I believe that Mr. von Hassel's ideas on this particular point are born of necessity – and I would ask you to take this into account.

A second point: when considering the extent of possible co-operation between the European Parliament and Western European Union, the strongly military aspect of this Assembly was repeatedly emphasised. I must point out, however, that the general terms of reference of Western European Union extend to political matters and that the permanent restriction to exclusively military fields is simply not in accordance with the treaty. So I wonder if we are not isolating ourselves by restricting ourselves excessively, or exclusively, to military matters? If so, I am sure that other parliamentary assemblies will take over functions that could actually be exercised here.

The third point is really a question, addressed to all those who have today resolutely rejected co-operation – the exchange of observers – even as a future possibility. What will we do if the European Parliament one day approaches us with the suggestion that an exchange of observers might be appropriate? I fear we shall not get very far with the answers forthcoming from certain quarters in this house.

Mr. President, in the brief time available that is all I wished to say on the general debate.

I would urge all those who, for one reason or another, do not feel able to vote for the recommendation as a whole, to sleep on it, and consider whether their position is not partly based on the imputation of ideas, or even prejudices, which were not held by the Rapporteur and General Affairs Committee in the way they fear. I therefore call upon you to vote for the recommendation tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Reddemann.

That concludes the debate on the report. The amendments and the votes upon them will be taken tomorrow.

4. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday 2nd December, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 (Document 851 and Addendum); Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 – The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Document 850 and Addendum) (Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Documents 851 and Addendum and 850 and Addendum).
2. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1980 (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Document 862 and Amendment).
3. State of European security (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 858 and Amendments).
4. Address by Mrs Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
5. Future of European security (Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 854 and Amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 6.03 p.m.)

TENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd December 1980

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 (Doc. 851 and Addendum); Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 – The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Doc. 850 and Addendum) (*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts*, Docs. 851 and Addendum and 850 and Addendum).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Adriaensens (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Antoni, Mr. Cornelissen, Mrs. Knight, Mr. Stainton, the President, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Page, Mr. Adriaensens (*Chairman and Rapporteur*); (explanation of vote): Mr. Antoni, Mr. Martino.
4. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1980 (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation*, Doc. 862 and Amendment).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Kershaw (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Stainton, Mr. Smith, Mr. Kershaw (*Rapporteur*).
5. State of European security (*Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 858 and Amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Brown (*Rapporteur*).
6. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Replies by Mrs Hamm-Brücher to questions put by: Mr. Valleix, Mr. Osborn, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Pignion, Mr. Brown, Mr. De Poi, Mr. Page, Mr. Bozzi.
7. Future of European security (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 854 and Amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Hanin, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Wilkinson, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Caro, Mr. Stoffelen (explanation of vote).
8. Poland and European security (*Motion for an Order with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 864).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Valleix.
9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous two Sittings have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings ¹.

1. See page 29.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981

(Doc. 851 and Addendum)

Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 – The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts

(Doc. 850 and Addendum)

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 851 and Addendum and 850 and Addendum*)

The PRESIDENT. – The first Order of the Day is the presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981, Document 851 and Addendum.

The President (continued)

With that document it will be convenient to take the presentation of the Auditor's report on the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 and the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 850 and Addendum.

I call Mr. Adriaensens.

Mr. ADRIAENSENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have the honour to submit to the Assembly the draft budget for 1981 as adopted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee.

As has been the practice for several years, the draft budget was passed to the Council for its opinion. The Council gave an opinion on some points but deferred its reply on the budget as a whole. It conveyed to the Assembly a preliminary opinion which appears in the Addendum to Document 851. A distinction must therefore be made between the amendments requested by the Council, as appearing in the Secretary-General's note referred to in the preliminary opinion, and the general reservation made in this opinion in terms which appear to leave no room for discussion: "The Assembly will be informed in due course of the further reductions to be sought."

Under Head I of the Assembly's budget we asked for the regrading of two posts from C.3 to C.4. This has already been refused by the Council. I should like to ask the Assembly not to accept this decision, since it seems to me unfair to these members of staff; furthermore, the additional expenditure is minimal.

With regard to the two other points raised by the Council, concerning expenditure on information and on political groups, I should like to remind the Assembly again that originally, in 1979, we asked for a credit of 250,000 francs for each of the two items. In 1979 we obtained 142,500 francs for each; and 161,000 francs in 1980; the Council now tells us that it is unable to accept an increase and recommends that these credits should remain unchanged.

Here again, Mr. President, I do not think that we can accept that the Council, after so much discussion since 1979, can still make objections.

Moreover, the Assembly notes that it can only approve its budget subject to possible restructuring of the Office of the Clerk following the appointment of the new full-time Clerk.

The Assembly also has to take note of the general reservation regarding the overall amount of its budget. As soon as the Assembly is informed of it, the position adopted by

the Council will have to be examined by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, which will inform the Presidential Committee of its views and any amendments to the budget.

As this notification will be received between sessions it seems to me that the Assembly's directing body should be called upon to give its decision in accordance with paragraph 2 of Rule 14 of the Assembly's Rules of Procedure:

"In between sessions or part-sessions and subject to subsequent ratification by the Assembly, the Presidential Committee shall take all such measures as it considers necessary for the activities of the Assembly to be properly carried on."

The measures adopted by the Presidential Committee in accordance with this procedure will be submitted to the Assembly for ratification during the first part of the twenty-seventh ordinary session, that is, in June 1981. The Assembly should, however, bear in mind that we shall begin 1981 without yet knowing what credits will be placed at our disposal to finance our work. The Committees are in fact at present drawing up their work schedules, which will form the basis of our activities for the first half of 1981. Mr. President, we cannot stop the Committees' activities. That is why I ask the Council to be very quick, so that we can know the result of its examination as soon as possible.

Mr. President, the second part of my statement will be shorter, and I shall speak in my mother tongue, Dutch.

(The speaker continued in Dutch)

We are dealing here with the accounts from 1979, from which we see that there is a surplus of 100,869 francs. As the report says, account has to be taken of the fact that a sum of 69,477 francs is being carried over to 1980, in connection with adjustments to salaries backdated to 1st July 1979. These salary increases however received Council approval only in March 1980.

There should thus be in 1979 a surplus of 40,399 francs; but we have to allow for revenue being lower by an amount of 29,353 francs and this brings the actual surplus in 1979 to 11,039 francs.

I am quite sure that the ministers' representatives, when they hear these figures, are convinced of the fact that this Assembly makes very scrupulous use of the funds it asks for, and takes care to see that the funds are managed as strictly as possible. I would venture to add that if the finance ministers of our various countries achieved similarly satisfactory and accurate results, they could be very pleased with themselves in these difficult times.

Mr. Adriaensens (continued)

Finally, I would like to thank my predecessor, Mr. Alber, who is here with us today and who, following after Mr. Dequae, has for so many years taken on the chairmanship of the Budgetary Affairs Committee. And as the Clerk, Mr. Humblet, did yesterday evening, I would offer a very sincere word of thanks to the person who has charge of it all, Miss Cohen.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Rapporteur.

As the first speaker in the debate on Documents 851, 850 and addenda I welcome and call Mr. Antoni.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we have already had occasion in this Assembly to note with regret, as our Rapporteur in fact did this morning, the excessive rigidity of the items of our budget. I am sure that members will recall our procedural objections and our attempts to obtain changes in the procedure for drafting the budget itself which is still in the same form as in the past.

In practice, we have no certainty concerning the budget or concerning the sums which will be made available to the Assembly. And yet, as the Rapporteur recalled and is proved by the final figures for 1979, the Assembly's funds are most strictly managed. As regards the actual content of the budget items, I believe that we are entitled to expect different treatment from the Council. In practice, the budget procedure amounts to nothing more than a straightforward recognition – often only partial – of the progress of inflation; in technical terms it is even possible to say that it is a budget subject to unchanging laws, marking the increase in unavoidable expenditure, relating in particular to the payment of staff.

The value of our Assembly has been discussed on numerous occasions with numerous arguments in support; indeed, I think that we all share the view that it is the only political Assembly in Europe which discusses defence and armaments questions. One fact is certain, however: quite apart from the uncertainties mentioned by the Rapporteur with reference to the Council's objections, the budget does not match this view and even contradicts it to some extent.

Expenditure is increased by 17%, almost 80% of which goes to cover staff costs. Then, a number of items decided by the Assembly are unchanged but the Council considers that they should be cut. I am referring to the votes for political groups and information. So that the import of this remark is clear to everyone, I would specify that these two items taken sepa-

ately is each more or less the same as a secretary's basic salary and less than two-thirds of the Clerk's basic emoluments. This means that they are very small. Now the Council informs us that the Assembly will be advised in due course of the reductions to be sought and that it continues to challenge the size of the budget which should be cut, thus maintaining and accentuating the contradictions which we must resolve somehow or other if this Assembly is to make itself heard in practice as we believe it should.

I therefore support the points raised by the Rapporteur in his statements and urge the Council to reach a decision quickly so that the Assembly knows what funds it will finally be able to count on.

We insist that for the preparation of the next budget, the need for changes in the present procedure be recognised and we are convinced that member governments will understand this need, unless some different policy line is taken. If that is the case, full discussions would be necessary because if, in practice, the intention is to obstruct or limit the political activities of this Assembly, this would mean that the political option is not as we see it.

In addition to sharing the Rapporteur's view, we confirm our reserves and call attention to the question of procedures, hoping in conclusion that staff problems, particularly as regards uniform treatment for the various European organisations, including the question of pensions, may be finally resolved.

It is not possible that an Assembly like ours should end up with funds less than those of the Agency for the Control of Armaments; it is not possible for the Assembly to carry out its political activities within the limits we have mentioned.

For these reasons, we shall abstain on the vote on the budget, not, I repeat, because we contest the figures presented by the Rapporteur and the Committee but because we want a change in its whole line. We are ready and willing to work for such a change.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Antoni.

I call Mr. Cornelissen.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I would like to thank our colleague Mr. Adriaensens for a report which, as I expected, has given us a very clear picture of the expenditure of our Assembly. If I have understood him properly, the funds available to the Assembly will not be increasing in the future; indeed, there will in the years ahead be a drop in real terms. This obliges us to think about, and to cast a critical eye over, how we spend our money. The report shows, of

Mr. Cornelissen (continued)

course, that a large part of our expenditure is made up by staffing costs. I wonder whether we, as the Assembly, ought not to take a look at the salary scales in our organisation. I have in mind particularly the top levels. This is not a very pleasant task, but I feel it is one we cannot shirk. And I think there is good reason for such an examination.

I shall try to show what I mean by giving an example. Tomorrow we shall be electing a Clerk, and this allows me to put forward an example without it being attached to any particular person, since this person has still to be elected. We shall be electing a full-time Clerk. This is an important post, and we shall have to make sure that it is well paid. We cannot judge our salary scales separate from those in other international organisations. And we have to keep it in mind that on this point the governments have an important say in the matter, to choose one's words carefully.

All that said, I find myself wondering whether, despite the importance that I admit attaches to the post of Clerk, it is altogether right and proper that we should in this year of 1980 be creating a post with a net available salary – i.e. after deduction of taxes where these have to be paid, and of other charges – of 25,000 to 30,000 francs a month, depending on nationality, composition of family and so on. Is this not rather a lot? I compare it with a post in my own country, that of the Prime Minister; this post carries an available salary of roughly half as much. The Clerk of our Assembly is of course somebody rather different from the Prime Minister of a small country like the Netherlands. Yet I do ask myself whether a salary of twice as much for the Clerk is not too much of a good thing.

Let me give a further example. You, Mr. President, are an honourable member representing the people of the United Kingdom. You do not, of course, have a separate income as the President of this organisation. If I have got things right, your Clerk, your right-hand man, will soon have a net available income three or four times your own. Does not this ratio call for some thought? As I have said, you are of course only an honourable member of the British parliament, and not the Clerk of this organisation.

Let me make a final comparison. In my own, and I gather in other countries, there is a major discussion going on about how we, under the pressure of circumstances, will have to get people on a minimum income to earn less in real terms. Tomorrow we shall be electing a Clerk with a net available income at least ten times the net minimum income in my coun-

try. I can understand people saying that I ought to be cautious in making comparisons, and that everything is relative. I do ask myself, however, whether we are not making ourselves absolutely ridiculous in the eyes of our citizens, whom we represent here, when we cannot find the courage not only to put matters like these on our agenda but also to take decisions after discussing them. Who could do this better than our Budget Committee?

In my opinion there will have to be discussions between the organisations involved, and we shall have to start by expressing a readiness for a substantial reduction in the salary scales. We should not be satisfied with saying that this is not something that concerns us. Why cannot we, for once, admit to our own faults? I think I am right in saying that the Chairman of our Budget Committee, Mr. Adriaensens, is a socialist through and through. From his political viewpoint, he will see it as a challenge to tackle this. I therefore look forward to his reply with great interest.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Fortunately, or unfortunately, the President is forbidden by the rules to take part in debates, much as I might wish to follow up some of the remarks of Mr. Cornelissen.

I now call Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – I endorse everything said by Mr. Cornelissen and would only add that, unless I am wrong, the Clerk's job is part-time anyway.

As we read this excellent report and consider the enormous amounts spent to keep this organisation going, we should ask whether we give value for money. We labour hard and long, burning much midnight oil, to produce reports. When they come to the hemicycle, we argue about amendments and seek to trade – “If you do not move that amendment, I will agree to delete this paragraph”. We go on producing reports and at the end it all amounts to nothing, because no action is taken on any of them.

If that is so – I recently discovered that it is – we should ask what justification we have for spending this immense amount. If we are to go on spending, we must try – in a report that I shall produce on Thursday, I shall suggest some means – to make ourselves much more efficient so that we can look our member governments in the eye and justify the money that they spend on WEU. At the moment, I could not go to any minister in my government and justify it, because nothing ever comes of anything we do.

What justification is there for our labours unless we produce some helpful action for our

Mrs. Knight (continued)

governments? I believe strongly in the principle of WEU. Nobody supports the defence of Europe more strongly than I do.

If we had ever produced anything that was acted upon, I would feel differently. What has become of reports by members who have acted as Chairmen and Rapporteurs? I have no doubt that those reports were the result of first-class work, but what is the point of employing highly-paid clerks and interpreters and spending vast amounts getting us to this place when nothing happens in the end?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. Knight.

The next speaker is Mr. Stainton.

Mr. STAINTON (*United Kingdom*). – It would be remiss of me not to support Mrs. Knight since her words find a ready reverberation in my own heart and mind. However, it is only right to point out that about two-thirds of the WEU budget is devoted not to the activities of the politicians but to those of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments, two very important and continuing bodies. As we move down the agenda, I may make some critical comments about their activities and their lack of accountability, but they account for two-thirds of the budget.

Mr. Cornelissen talks about the extraordinarily high salary paid to the Clerk of WEU. Mrs. Knight echoed what he said, and I wish to reinforce it. I am utterly horrified by the figure of 375,000 French francs. I, too, understand that the appointment is not full-time, and if the procedures existed, I would move to amend that figure. I presume that salaries in WEU are constructed on a pyramid basis, so that kind of figure at the top must mean complementarily high salaries for other high officials.

To that figure must be added children's and household allowances and heaven knows what else, making it perhaps twice the salary of the Prime Minister of the Netherlands and certainly twice that of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. That is intolerable. When we consider the appointment of a new Clerk or a revision of the situation later this week, we may be able to address ourselves to that figure and its implications.

There is much ado about pensions in the budgetary documents, but one cannot decipher the source of the funding of the pensions. It seems that staff do not make a contribution and that pensions are paid for directly out of the budget. Perhaps I am wrong, but that is the

best interpretation that I can draw from these voluminous documents. I should like clarification and to know why staff do not contribute to pensions, if that is the case. If they do, what is the percentage?

Conjointly, I should like to know whether pensions are index linked. Index linking is a matter of great controversy in the United Kingdom, where the Prime Minister recently appointed a committee to re-examine the thinking behind these arrangements. It would be incompatible with the policy of my government mutely to endorse inflation-proofed pensions in a very subsidiary institution.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Stainton.

In view of the apparent misunderstanding, perhaps I should say that the Bureau will recommend to the Assembly tomorrow that the appointment of the Clerk should be full-time and not part-time as hitherto. Of course, until that report is adopted by the Assembly, our present Clerk, who is to retire at the end of the month, has been on a part-time appointment. However, the Bureau's recommendation is that the new Clerk to be elected tomorrow should be full-time. If members would read the report presented on behalf of the budget, they will see the reasons we give for that.

The final speaker I have notice of is Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall not draw the debate out too long as it has already been a very full one.

The position taken by the Assembly – which the Bureau, prompted by yourself, Mr. President, has fully respected – is an important one. It is twofold, providing for measures in regard to information and increasing the capacity of the groups to develop their activities thanks to more substantial finance. It seems that this position is to be maintained – and I am glad it is, because it is a good one – despite the limitations of our budget.

The previous speaker stressed the size of the budgetary appropriation and the relative scale of the activities of bodies such as the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency.

With regard to the Standing Armaments Committee, we, like the Assembly no doubt, are convinced that as we seek, through the Independent European Programme Group, to improve the co-ordination of our activities with those of our Atlantic partners in respect of armaments, so the rôle of that Committee is being consolidated. This permanent structure at the heart of WEU will thus become the active instrument of the wishes of our Assembly.

Mr. Valleix (continued)

In compliance with your request, Mr. President, I shall try to keep matters as clear as possible. The debate about the burden imposed on the budget by salaries is a delicate one today because, in view of the consultations we shall be attending tomorrow, it will take place at a moment when matters have, as it were, come to the boil. We must therefore approach the subject tactfully to avoid confusion between considerations of principle and personal implications.

As you have mentioned, the Bureau has proposed the new step of appointing a full-time Clerk. The question of Mr. Humblet's successor is a difficult one because of the personal qualities and very exceptional position of the – so to speak – founding Clerk of our Assembly, who occupied a part-time post while exercising effective responsibility.

I understand the comments of our Dutch colleague, Mr. Cornelissen, but my position is somewhat different.

Our budgetary proposal covers not only the remuneration of a full-time Clerk but also that of a Clerk Assistant. We have wisely avoided pre-empting the organisation of the Office of the Clerk, which will be worked out once the new Clerk has been freely selected.

May I draw the attention of the Assembly to the fact that our decision will increase the overall budgetary allocation for the Office of the Clerk, since there will be a full-time Clerk and it is planned to call on the services of a part-time Clerk Assistant.

May I repeat here, on my own behalf, what I said at the meeting of the Bureau. The presence of a part-time Clerk will be useful in the future in our new organisation, but it is the full-time Clerk who will be in charge of the Office of the Clerk after his appointment and who will therefore be presenting proposals for the organisation of his department.

I would therefore draw your attention to the fact that our budgetary provision is a maximum one. It may enable our Assembly to operate with maximum efficiency in the future. If it proves excessive, we can always review the matter.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

The last speaker I have on the list is Mr. Page.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I shall be very quick, because I know that you wish to complete this debate. As an ex-Rapporteur for the Budget Committee, I want to congratulate the Rapporteur on successfully

doing what is always known to be an extremely difficult job.

At this time of world and European recession, it is the duty of the Assembly not to try to demand funds from their countries above the agreed inflation figure. That should be the absolute maximum in our minds. I would not approve any increase in expenditure on the WEU Assembly, particularly in connection with the expenditure on political groups, which I consider would be unnecessary and unwise at the moment. If there were to be any reorganisation of our spending pattern, I should like economies to be made so that more money could be spent on the information services, on the basis of good commercial practice: that when business is bad, you spend more money on advertising.

Finally, I come to the awkward, embarrassing and difficult subject for us all of the appointment of the new Clerk. As I see it, the Assembly, and the Council, have at least one hand tied behind their backs until a decision is made whether we should have a full-time Clerk and a full-time Deputy Clerk. If we have a full-time Deputy Clerk as well, that will make a major difference to the totality of the money to be spent.

I have to say that I do not agree with my honourable friends Mr. Cornelissen and Mr. Stainton about salary scales. No Prime Minister of any country, so far as I know, has applied for this job, so, whatever we may think, we have to pay the rate for the job.

It would be extremely derogatory for this Assembly to try to make the appointment of a Clerk at a lower figure than those that apply equally in the co-ordinated organisations. I suspect that this means that we should finish up with a full-time Clerk but no Deputy. We have a full-time Clerk. He has new and important managerial and administrative responsibilities. I wonder whether we should have both a full-time Clerk and a full-time Deputy. Until that matter is cleared up, is it fair to ask the Assembly to vote tomorrow on a position that is so difficult and so nebulous? Before the vote, should not new guidance be given to the Assembly by the Bureau?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Page.

That concludes the general debate.

I call Mr. Adriaensens to reply.

Mr. ADRIAENSENS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I would like to thank the various people who have spoken. Like Mr. Antoni, I must stress that it is very uncomfortable when one is drafting a budget not to know how much money there is available. So I can only say,

Mr. Adriaensens (continued)

with Mr. Antoni, that we hope that for 1982 we shall know in advance what budget we have at our disposal. I hope that then we shall be able to arrange things better.

All the others have spoken in the same key; their comments came down to asking how we can manage our affairs more economically, while still carrying on our activities just as effectively. This is of course a problem with which nowadays every national parliament and every government is having to grapple.

Mr. Cornelissen referred to my political affiliations. I, as a socialist, have no difficulty in saying that just like Mr. Cornelissen I am in favour of savings where savings have to be made. There must obviously be major savings where people are well able to put up with them, and naturally no economies ought to be made where people are finding things difficult. Where that is concerned, there is no difference in our points of view.

Where the Clerk's salary is concerned, I will only point out that the figures in question have been known for many years past, because they have been shown in the budget year after year. So it was possible years ago – as it is now – to put forward amendments to make some alteration in this. So far, that has never been done in the Budget Committee. We have never been presented with amendments of this kind.

I would point out to the speakers that here there is alignment with the other European organisations. I would not of course have any objection to an attempt being made to review the situation; but this cannot be done unilaterally, in just one of the organisations. It would have to be done in all the European organisations.

Last but not least, I would add that the problems that have been raised do not come within the purview of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, nor within the competence of that Committee's Chairman or Rapporteur. By their very nature, they concern the Presidential Committee. I know that Mr. Cornelissen – himself a Vice-President – has already raised this at a previous meeting. It is not the Budget Committee's job to discuss this. I can safely put the ball in the court of the Presidential Committee, which is where the problem can be discussed further.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Adriaensens.

The Assembly will now vote on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 in Document 851.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1981 is adopted unanimously.

The Assembly must now vote on the motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1979 in the Addendum to Document 850.

Are there any objections to the motion?

Are there any abstentions?...

The motion is adopted unanimously.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I have already stated that the communist group will abstain on the vote on the draft budget for the financial year 1981.

I request that this declaration be formally recorded.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – I wish to associate myself with the statements made by Mr. Antoni.

The PRESIDENT. – That will be recorded, Mr. Antoni, but I must ask members to respond immediately when I ask whether there are any abstentions or objections.

4. Opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1980

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft Opinion and draft Recommendation, Doc. 862 and Amendment)

The PRESIDENT. – The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for the financial year 1980 and votes on the draft opinion and draft recommendation, Document 862 and Amendment.

I call Mr. Kershaw, Rapporteur of the Committee, to present the report.

Mr. KERSHAW (*United Kingdom*). – The opinion on the budget is given in accordance with Article VIII (c) of the Charter, which stipulates that the Assembly shall express its view in the form of an opinion or recommendation on the annual budget of WEU as soon as it has been communicated.

The tables in my report refer to WEU agencies, and the Assembly is also included, so that, as in the past, members can assess the total

Mr. Kershaw (continued)

cost of WEU. The opinion given refers to 1980 and members will appreciate that the budget of WEU is forwarded with the annual report in the spring and it was decided several years ago that the Assembly would, if possible, deal with all the administrative questions once a year.

This is the third year running that I have had the honour to present the report and draft opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU. I looked at my two previous speeches and I wonder whether I need to change them. I could just circulate those speeches.

I have been disheartened by the lack of urgency that the Council of Ministers shows towards the proposals put forward by the Assembly. For the past twelve years, we have put suggestions, but little has been done. As politicians, we realise that the budget is a small one and certainly lacks political sex appeal, but nevertheless we do not come here to waste our time and I believe that the Council of Ministers ought to give more attention to what we say.

In the previous debate my colleague, Mr. Stainton, called attention to the lack of comment in the report and the opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs. However, it is difficult to know exactly what we could say as a Budget Committee. As my Chairman said in the previous debate, the question whether ministerial organs should have that amount of money cannot be debated. It is a matter for the Presidential Committee and is a question of policy. The Budget Committee cannot usefully comment on it. The sort of expenditure that we were dealing with is shown on the second page of Appendix I to Document 862.

The expenditure deals with salaries, allowances, pensions, travel, other operating costs, purchase of furniture and maintenance of the building. The Committee could not contribute very much to any debate on those expenditures. If members wish to discuss their relevance and importance, the Presidential Committee will probably prove to be the correct place.

I shall answer two questions that my friend, Mr. Stainton, asked. First, staff contribute to their pensions. Indeed, they contribute 7%. Secondly, the pensions are index linked. I have a feeling that the Co-ordinating Committee is a victim of inertia. In a good speech last year, our former colleague, Mr. Warren, drew attention to that. In all member countries of WEU there are public bodies. In my country, they are called quangos, or quasi autonomous national government organisations. "Quango" has become a term of

contempt and carries the implication that no concrete decisions are likely, or even wanted.

I am beginning to wonder whether the Co-ordinating Committee of Budget Experts is another of those bodies that has been allowed to grow imperceptibly over the years, at a heavy cost to the tax-payer, and with little or no supervision from governments. Let us be clear: the organisation comprises administrators from the co-ordinated organisations and civil servants. A great deal of paper is produced.

Indeed it produces far more paper than this Assembly does. However, the recommendation in my report makes clear that few results have been achieved. It is up to us, as parliamentarians, to press for results and decisions.

It would be wrong to take up the Assembly's time by going over all the points in my report. It is desirable and a matter of urgency that the councils and the co-ordinated organisations study the problems involved in setting up an independent body on pensions. We know only too well that the machinery of government grinds slowly. It will take several years to complete the study. The longer governments take to put this matter in hand, the longer it will take for such a useful body to come into existence.

The Council replied to Recommendation 340 and rejected the idea of setting up a single appeals board. The arguments put forward are groundless. An appeals board would be easy to set up, would inspire confidence among the staff, and would not give rise to expense. I outlined my views in paragraph 10 of the report.

I turn to the careers and conditions of the staff. This morning, we have heard about salaries. However, when I presented my report in 1978, I pointed out that I had been away from WEU for about ten years. I added that on returning I had been astonished to find that the same people were filling the same jobs at WEU. Given the smallness of our size and our activities, there has been no chance of promotion. It is harmful to the staff's morale that prospects of promotion should be so small.

In 1968, my friend, the late Sir Peter Kirk, recommended in his report that the Council should make the necessary arrangements to ensure that the careers of officials of the organisation did not come to a halt after a few years' service. The Council agreed that it was necessary to consider the career prospects of the staff, and said that governments would try to find procedures that would meet that end.

In 1969, Sir Peter Kirk recommended that the Council ask the Secretary-General to place proposals before the Secretaries-General of the

Mr. Kershaw (continued)

co-ordinated organisations as soon as possible so that they could be submitted jointly to the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts and so that the present grading structure could be revised. Very little – practically nothing – has been done. Over the years, we have continued to press for the creation of that Committee. Members of the Assembly will have had an opportunity to read the Council's replies.

We have come to a sort of crossroads. The Assembly has been very patient. It is up to the Council to say whether it will be able to create favourable conditions for staff promotions. We do not underestimate the difficulty of having a small staff nor do we underestimate the fact that its activity is limited as a result of the treaty. That activity cannot necessarily be increased. However, it would be desirable to find a better method than we have alighted on so far. The Co-ordinating Committee should address itself to this issue as a matter of urgency. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Kershaw, for your speech.

The first speaker is Mr. Martino. As he is not here, I shall call the next speaker, Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – First, I should like to express my appreciation of the hard work done by my colleague, Mr. Kershaw. I also appreciate his evident concern for the effectiveness and well-being of this organisation's staff.

Paragraph 14 of the report by Mr. Kershaw on the draft opinion on the budget mentions that in December 1979 Mr. Kenneth Warren and the Chairman of the Budget Committee, Mr. Adriaensens, drew the Assembly's attention to the cumbersome machinery of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts. I regret that this year, yet again, lack of decisive action by that body continues to give cause for complaint.

Every three years there is a general review to bring the remuneration of the staff of the co-ordinated organisations into line with salaries of the equivalent grade in member countries and in the Communities. The co-ordinated organisations are, as you know Mr. President, NATO, OECD, the Council of Europe, the European Space Agency and WEU.

Associated with them are the Medium-Term Weather Forecasting Centre in the United Kingdom and the European Patents Office Organisation. All in all, those bodies involve some 18,000 persons, half of whom are in

NATO and its subsidiary agencies. Incidentally, the European Patents Office and Weather Forecasting Centre personnel have only observer status in the co-ordinated organisations' committees, although they have the same terms of service as personnel from the other co-ordinated organisations. They should be made full members as soon as possible.

In the three-yearly review, the A and L grade salaries – the salaries of senior administrative personnel and linguistic personnel, such as translators and interpreters – are equated with those of national civil servants in member countries and the EEC. In addition, B and C grade salaries – the salaries of secretaries and industrial personnel – are compared with the salaries paid by the best local employers in the country of service. The last study was completed for July 1979.

I fully realise the problems involved in the three-yearly review. A delay of about three months might be a reasonable time for solving them. In the intermediate years, a minor review is carried out every six months, which is related to the cost of living and the inflation rate in the country in which the organisation is established. Certain rules have been adopted that could be applied without much discussion as the inflation rate is established by national authorities.

The present half-yearly review of the situation, as at 30th June 1980, was circulated on 8th October. This was in the form of a note by the Secretary-General in accordance with the rules adopted by the national administrations and the co-ordinated organisations but – and this is the frustrating part for the personnel concerned – the formula used for the 1979 biennial major review was questioned in 1980. This process leads to delays of anything up to six months. Consequently, when the sum in arrears is finally paid, its purchasing power has already been eroded by inflation, which in France, for example, is some 13 % per annum.

This withheld sum benefits national exchequers instead of the international staff to whom it is due, and the staff consequently suffer unfairly from the fact that it takes such a long time to prepare every minor intervening review and to approve consequent salary adjustments which really should be virtually automatic. It seems to me, for instance, that the six-monthly cost-of-living reviews should even be completed within one month, in which case payment of arrears would be only minimal.

At present, each review can take up to six months or more. Clearly, for these reviews the present position is cumbersome and unsatisfactory from a staff point of view. I regret very

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

much that things have not improved at all since Mr. Warren's speech on this same subject to the part-session of the Assembly a year ago. This is a situation which now needs to be put right. In Mr. Kershaw's colourful language, this subject may have no political sex appeal, but that is no excuse whatever for inactivity in official quarters.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone else wish to speak?...

If not, does Mr. Kershaw wish to reply?...

The debate is closed.

There is an amendment. I will ask Mr. Stainton to move it.

Mr. STAINTON (*United Kingdom*). – My amendment is No. 1. It seeks to add words after the very brief comments on the draft opinion on the inside of the cover of Document 862: At the end of the last paragraph of the draft opinion add "except to draw attention to the fact that the terms of reference of this Committee" – that is, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration – "are restricted to expenditure incurred by the Office of the Clerk" – and the figures are there spelled out – "or some 34 % only of the total budget. The cost effectiveness of the other 66 % has not been examined by or reported on to this Assembly."

The second page of the explanatory memorandum to which Mr. Kershaw addressed himself indicates a 1980 budget total of 28.6 million francs plus £895,000. Given that those figures are embraced in a paper submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration with Mr. Kershaw as Rapporteur, on the face of things it would not be unreasonable for anyone to assume that the said Committee is responsible for these very large total figures. That, I have discovered, is not the case. Some 34 % only – that is, the figure of 9.6 million francs – Office of the Clerk – alone comes within the purview and scrutiny of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs. I feel that this should be clarified.

Following on from that point, however, I am nonetheless concerned that the balance of 66 % which is deployed on the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments appears to elude, I do not say audit, but certainly democratic scrutiny. This is money that is forthcoming from the exchequers of our various countries, in other words, from our respective tax-payers, and the most recent document that I can discover relating to these two bodies is Document 836, which we discussed at our summer part-session. If one

examines that one sees that there is no attempt in it to evaluate the cost effectiveness of these two bodies and in looking, for example, at the activities of the Agency, one is left in the year 1979 with 70 control measures, and what is being attempted is to divide the figure of 70 into the cost of 13 million francs. It finishes up with 186,000 francs per control measure.

In default of anything else one can but apply such a rule of thumb. It is wholly inadequate and of course there is even less information on the activities of cost effectiveness of the Standing Armaments Committee.

In summary, therefore, in moving this amendment in my name and that of my colleague, Mr. Dudley Smith, I believe that it has two virtues. First, it clarifies the fact that as at presently constituted the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration is concerned only with expenditure of the Office of the Clerk. Secondly, it shows that some 66 % of the expenditure of WEU which is devoted to the Standing Armaments Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments completely eludes democratic, elected expenditure control and appraisal. I beg to move.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone else wish to speak to this amendment?...

I call Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I support my colleague, Mr. Keith Stainton. When I became a member of this Assembly from Great Britain at this time last year, I was amazed to learn about the structure, of which I then knew little or nothing, of the armaments section. Since then, in co-operation with my colleague, I have done a little probing.

It may well be that a great deal of these activities are important and should be sustained and perhaps even enhanced. On the other hand, I agree entirely with Mr. Stainton that there should be some proper public scrutiny by our respective governments and our elected assemblies of this subject. We have heard that a very great deal of money associated with WEU is spent on this particular part of the activities. Certainly, I believe we should all of us be assured, both older serving members here and those who are comparatively new, that we are getting value for money as part of the European concept of defence. Therefore, I support entirely what my colleague has said.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone else wish to speak? Does the Rapporteur wish to speak?

Mr. KERSHAW (*United Kingdom*). – I have already said what I feel about the amendment. Any examination of the reason for the expenditure by the agencies upstairs is not

Mr. Kershaw (continued)

properly a matter for the Budget Committee. It is a matter of policy and should be examined by the Presidential Committee. The task of the Budget Committee is to see that the accounts are properly drawn. We have tried to do that by publishing the appendices to the report and in Appendix I we set out the ways in which those expenditures have been made.

As I said, the opinion, which is given, is in accordance with Article VIII (c) of the Charter, so we are bound to present the opinion in this way. I believe that the Budget Committee has acted quite correctly. It could not have acted in any other way and I am afraid that I must resist the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to speak?

As he does not, I shall first put the draft recommendation to the vote.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

*The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously*¹.

I now must put to the Assembly the amendment to the draft opinion moved by Mr. Stainton.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

I now have to put the draft opinion. The Assembly has already unanimously passed the draft recommendation, which I took first because the amendment concerned the draft opinion.

If there are no objections to it and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

*The draft opinion is adopted unanimously*².

1. See page 31.

2. See page 32.

5. State of European security

(Presentation of the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 858 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We come now to the presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 858 and Amendments.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – My paper is an attempt by the Committee to reinstitute a system which was prevalent in the Assembly from about 1955 onwards. In the introduction I give the reasons for this approach. This was done in 1967, and I think that I did the last one. The object is to review the historical factors involved.

When this is done more frequently, a great deal of background is not necessary, but as this has not been done since 1967, I took the view that I should look at the period from 1960 to 1980 to update the Assembly on events and compare European security now with security at the earlier date. I have tried to give the latest information, including informed opinion and military action and reaction to recent events.

I have tried to anticipate requirements, but not to fashion thinking. I have acted as a genuine Rapporteur and reported events. I have not interpreted them in an attempt to influence the Assembly.

Part II, the balance of force in perspective, sets out the quantifiable aspect of the balance of force over the past twenty years and tabulates defence expenditure in manpower, numbers and characteristics of major weapons systems, and seeks to provide both a western and a Soviet perception of the balance. Although security cannot be measured, it should not be concluded that the change of the balance between East and West has necessarily diminished security – although, naturally, the superiority that the West previously enjoyed has to some extent been redressed. I highlight that effect.

In paragraph 2.3 I compare the trends in forces and defence spending. There are some misunderstandings about this. I have been subjected to some pressures, because it is argued that one cannot compare expenditure because of currency differences. I have never accepted that, and I have tried to evaluate expenditure. The onus of proof lies upon those who say that I am wrong. The document contains the answer that I have come up with.

I have also identified the sources of information, and I believe that I was right to try to put the record straight. At a briefing meeting

Mr. Brown (continued)

recently, some high-powered ministerial colleagues said that I could not do this because of currency differences. I have tried to take all that into account, and still make some assessment.

In paragraph 2.4 I make a judgment, after talking to many military, civilian and political people – I have come under pressure on this as well – that the members of the Alliance, apart perhaps from France and Luxembourg, intend to honour the 3% growth target but will not be able to do so.

My own country was hurt when I reported that it would not reach the target. A briefing note to my colleagues said that I was wrong, but at the briefing meeting an amendment was tabled to say that the United Kingdom would “nearly” make the target. That is all that I have said. I do not know how close the nations will get to 3% but I do not think that they will reach it.

Paragraph 2.7 for the first time debunks the idea that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the defence burden of the Alliance. I felt that this myth had lasted long enough. We appreciate the enormous contribution of our American partners, but it is time that we got away from the idea that they are carrying the major part of European defence. I have produced these figures to show that Europe has, and can clearly be seen to have, moved up in its share of the defence budget since the 1950s.

In paragraph 2.9 I have tried to illustrate the most striking change that has taken place during the past twenty years. The emergence of the Soviet navy as an ocean-going force must impress itself upon the Assembly.

In paragraph 2.13 I have tried to interpret, although I am not sure that I am capable or competent so to do, the Soviet perceptions of the balance. Our people often try to argue their case without stepping back a few paces to find out what the Soviets are thinking about the same thing. Therefore, in paragraphs 2.13 and 2.14 I have attempted to do that.

In paragraph 2.14 I have tried to identify some of the problems of the Soviets. It is not always plain sailing for them. They previously had the Chinese as their allies but they are now faced with a different situation. Recently I was in Japan. They are quite definite that they are going to argue about taking back the islands that they regard as theirs. I indicate there that the Soviets have preoccupations as well as the ones concerning NATO.

In paragraph 2.15 I point out that I believe that notwithstanding the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan and what I call “the vagaries of the United States elections”, on balance the Soviet Union’s relationships with the United States and the NATO countries as a whole are more stable than they were in 1960. I highlight many of the things which indicate that.

I have devoted Part III to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance. I have tried to indicate the reasons why I believe that there has been an improvement in the Alliance. I have highlighted the various development systems and have identified many of the movements that have taken place in the infrastructure. I draw attention in particular to paragraph 3.3. There is something there that worries me. Communications systems are becoming so good and so sophisticated that I say at the top of the eighth page that there is “an increasingly complex field which holds the danger of drowning commanders with too much information”. One wonders whether or not we are getting far more information than the ordinary commander is able to assimilate and take action upon.

Appendix IV shows the notifications of exercises in accordance with the Helsinki agreement to which I shall refer later. There is a great deal of exchange of information between ourselves and the Soviets on the notification of exercises, as agreed in the Helsinki agreement.

In paragraphs 3.6 to 3.8 I set out the situation regarding the French withdrawal. A great deal of comment has been made about the French withdrawal in 1966 and its effect upon the Alliance. I have never been persuaded that the effect on the Alliance has always been as bad as was alleged. I set out in paragraphs 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 the tremendous co-operation and understanding that exist between the French and the Alliance, which I do not think in any way undermines the Alliance.

I hope that by putting in these paragraphs I have been able to illustrate the situation. In paragraph 3.9 I say that the overall picture that emerges is one of a more cohesive and better integrated Alliance than existed ten to fifteen years ago. This picture is essentially true of the European NATO countries. I feel that this puts into perspective the continuing criticism that is made of the French for being outside the Alliance.

In Part IV I discuss defence outside the NATO area. There is much discussion of this topic. I took evidence from many people. I came back to the view, however, that it did not seem to me to be very profitable to continue discussing the renegotiation of the Brussels Treaty in order to extend the boundaries of NATO. Even if it were possible, I am not sure that I would be in favour of it. The evidence that I was able to adduce is that it is not poss-

Mr. Brown (continued)

ible, in any event. I hope that the Assembly will not try to make a great issue of extending the northern or the southern flanks of NATO, because I do not think that it will be a runner.

In paragraph 4.3 I discuss the events following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The problem is that the Alliance has still not been able to understand how to react to issues as they arise. I have carpingly indicated that I think that NATO was on holiday when the Russians moved. The problem was that the American President was in the situation of having to make decisions in advance of consulting his allies. I ask the questions "You had a red telephone. What went wrong?" It may be that the red telephone rang but there was nobody at the other end, and that President Carter went ahead, believing that a decision had to be made. The result was – it is clear in my report, for I do not hush it up – that there was total disarray in the Alliance. We could not get it right. Then, as always in Europe, we had to find somebody to blame, so we blamed the Americans for making the decision.

The most worrying thing was that it spelt out to the Soviets, in a way that words never could, the total disarray in the Alliance when a crisis arises. The Alliance had better understand that if it is to be credible and to do its work it must have a system whereby it can find the time to consult, so as to ensure that we reach a decision behind which we can all stand. The problem with democracy is that it is its own worst enemy when it tries to do something. But we shall not accept anything less than democracy. Therefore, we have to find a way to develop a time scale in which consultations can take place.

In paragraph 4.15 I comment on the Iraq-Iran situation. I felt that a document such as mine could not end without recognising that this situation has come about. I am bound to add a word of warning. Many nations, including some of the Alliance nations, at the time when there was no Iraq-Iran war, gave undertakings to Iran that, provided it released the hostages, they would resume selling supplies – armaments, equipment, replacements – for which the Iranians had already paid. Those supplies were embargoed as part of the general deployment for the release of the hostages.

If the hostages are released we shall be in a very difficult situation, because many nations will have to honour that pledge. Because of the Iraq-Iran war, they will be accused of intervening on one side of that war. We are able to say in paragraph 4.15 that the greatest value so far is that nobody has intervened. In that sense it has been contained as a bushfire war. But

once the hostages are released we shall face a problem. I hope that the Alliance is already examining the situation to find out how we can deal with it when it arises. We do not want to be pushed into the situation of arguing among ourselves.

In Part V, I, like you, Mr. President, regard arms control and disarmament as of prime importance and to be a major component in the defence posture. I took the opportunity to have meetings with a number of ambassadors in the Committee on Disarmament. This gave me an opportunity to discuss in depth the attitudes, objectives and general assessment of present and future tasks, together with the ambassadors' identification of problem areas arising from recent events and the effect these events will have on and the implications for the disarmament conference itself. The general opinion that I formed from those discussions was that the least one could say was that 1980 was not a good year for disarmament, so Part V deals in some detail with the developments that have taken place.

Paragraph 5.5 spells out some improvements that have taken place to enhance the value of confidence-building measures. They are some of the major steps forward of the past twenty years. Paragraphs 5.8 to 5.13 deal with MBFR – an important element which, if only we can achieve success, will be a major thrust and significant success in disarmament in Europe. I hope that we shall push as hard as we can to obtain a solution.

Paragraph 5.14 encompasses an interesting experience for me. I sat in on the work of the Committee on Disarmament. Since 1978 there has been an enlarged committee and it was fascinating to see the emerging nations taking part, though I watched them with a sense of sadness because I thought that they would have learnt from the mistakes of older nations, but they were arguing just like the rest. It seems to have made little difference that they have only just arrived. I hope that they will learn that the committee needs to take positive action instead of continuing to emit hot air.

I note that you have already looked at your watch, Mr. President, to remind me to get on. Paragraph 5.17 deals with chemical weapons. I took the opportunity to discuss with the appropriate ambassadors the problem of confidence-building measures. There are difficulties, and we need mutual trust.

For example, on the Sverdlovsk incident, I put it to the ambassador that there was a biological problem there. Anthrax was discovered, and it was alleged that it was pulmonary anthrax. That does not tie up with the explanation that it was caused by the eating of bad meat, since that type of anthrax cannot be

Mr. Brown (continued)

contracted from eating bad meat. The only way to rebuild confidence is for us to be able to go to the site and investigate the incident. I told the ambassador that if he would allow an inspection he would allay suspicion. It is important for people to have confidence if we are to make progress in other spheres.

In paragraph 6.4 I attempt to evaluate, in an unpredictable world, what the future looks like. We face a situation that was summed up by Protagoras, who said in about 395 BC, as you know, Mr. President: "Man is the measure of all things." Is that not our criterion for today? Should we not ask at the end of our discussions whether what we are doing is in the interests of mankind and whether we have contributed to man being the measure of all things?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Brown. I am sorry that you had to rush your introduction of an interesting and important report.

The debate stands adjourned.

6. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

The PRESIDENT. – It is my great privilege and pleasure to welcome to the Assembly again Mrs. Hildegard Hamm-Brücher, the Minister of State in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Bonn. As members will know, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher came to that post after long experience in municipal, Länder and other federal ministerial posts. She was Secretary of State for Education and has been in her present post since 1976 and has taken a particular interest in the affairs of this Assembly and European parliamentary matters generally. It is a great privilege for me to ask you, Madam Minister, to address us. We are happy to welcome you.

Mrs. HAMM-BRÜCHER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first of all thank you very much, Mr. President, for your kind words of welcome. For my part, I am very happy to have another opportunity to speak in the familiar forum of the WEU Assembly.

Mr. President, before I begin, please allow me to extend to our Italian colleagues my sincere condolences, and those of my government, for the dreadful earthquake disaster that has struck so many people in southern Italy. Our Italian friends can be assured that our government is doing everything in its power to help, and that

the German people are also ready and willing to bring a measure of comfort to the people affected.

In a few weeks the year 1980 will be drawing to a close and this would seem a good occasion to take stock. The balance sheet – how could it be otherwise? – has its positive and its negative sides. Some international developments are bound to fill us with deep concern for the future. Mr. Brown has listed and vividly described some of these concerns in his report.

At the turn of the year 1979-80 the Soviet Union invaded its non-aligned neighbour Afghanistan. Since then the Afghan people have made it distinctly clear that they are in revolt against the Soviet occupation. The Soviet Union has twice been called upon by the overwhelming majority of the United Nations General Assembly to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. It has not responded to that call. The tragedy of the American Embassy personnel illegally held as hostages in Iran continues. A war has broken out between two Islamic states in the Gulf, Iran and Iraq, a war which has been conducted with great fury for several months and threatens not only the whole region but world peace.

In Europe, particularly in view of the events in Poland, the policy of détente is being put to the test. By drastically increasing the minimum amounts of currency which visitors have to exchange at the border, the German Democratic Republic has negated some of the progress that had been made in the humanitarian sphere for the benefit of the people in both German states. We see this step as a grave setback for all Germans.

Finally, Mr. President, the world economic situation has deteriorated – in East and West and in North and South. The price of oil has gone up again and this has a destabilising effect on the weaker economies in particular.

The world thus faces serious challenges and dangers. It is therefore all the more imperative that we in the WEU Assembly as well should discuss these international contingencies, and let me say that it is not only important to me but also a pleasure to speak to you again. Please take this as a further sign of my government's unabated interest in your work and in the debates of the WEU Assembly.

This year, Mr. President, Western Europe has again been spared any severe blows, but we all fully realise that we are very greatly affected by the events in other regions further away I have just referred to. The close political, economic and cultural bonds between our countries have indeed created a solid community, and only by remaining united shall we be able to cope with

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

the challenges of the years ahead. Divided we would be their victims.

What could be more appropriate for me, as representative of the country which lies on the line where East and West meet, than to select, from among the multitude of problems referred to, those which affect my divided country in particular? These are most of all the question of the future of East-West relations and in this context particularly the questions of security and disarmament, which concern you in this Assembly.

The deterioration of East-West relations began with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Its implications and consequences overshadow that relationship and are a threat which has stretched détente and co-operation almost to breaking point. Recent months have made it clear that Afghanistan is by no means – as the Soviet Union would have us believe – a bilateral Soviet-Afghan or regional problem, but one of fundamental significance for the further development of East-West relations. The flagrant violation of binding rules of international law by the Soviet Union and the infringements of the declaration of principles embodied in the Helsinki final act have seriously shaken confidence in the Soviet Union's respect for the rules of peaceful international relations. The military invasion of a non-aligned country marks a turning-point in Soviet foreign policy. None of us can accept the Soviet Union's pretext that its security was threatened.

In Europe, Mr. President, the Soviet Union and some of its allies are apparently very worried about events in Poland. There the situation remains critical. And this therefore calls for a very carefully assessed and co-ordinated policy. The Federal Government will continue to exercise considerable restraint in its public comments on developments in Poland. Any allegation of interference in the recent political developments in that country is totally unfounded. The Federal Government will, on the other hand, continue to do what it can financially, in response to Poland's request for economic support. It welcomes similar steps by other partners, particularly food aid from the European Community.

The relationship between the two German states has been and remains an important and indispensable part of our policy of co-operation and active efforts to safeguard peace in Europe. That is why the Federal Republic of Germany has over the past ten years consistently and resolutely striven to develop good-neighbourly relations with the German Democratic Republic and to widen the range of co-operation. This policy has considerably eased

the situation of the people in both parts of Germany. It is therefore all the more regrettable that the German Democratic Republic, by drastically increasing the minimum amount of currency which visitors, now including pensioners and children, have to exchange, has struck at the very substance of the improvement that has so far been achieved in intra-German relations. This, Mr. President, is a measure which in a tragic way damages the many family ties between people in the two German states. By introducing it, the German Democratic Republic demonstrates its efforts to seal itself off and calls in question an essential element of European détente.

Aware of its responsibility for the cohesion of the nation, my government will not react to the German Democratic Republic's policy of delimitation with delimitation measures of its own. In fact it will try to get the German Democratic Republic to revoke the restrictions it has imposed so as to maintain the relations established up to now between the two German states – in the interest of stability and co-operation in Europe and in the interest of the people affected – and where possible to develop them further still.

In this connection special mention must be made of the city of Berlin. The situation in and around Berlin is still a barometer of détente in Europe. The recent constraint on travel between the two parts of Germany is of course a painful blow to the Berliners in particular, living as they do in a divided city. In order to maintain calm in and around Berlin it is therefore essential that the quadripartite agreement of 3rd September 1971 should function smoothly and that the progress achieved under its aegis should not be unilaterally impaired.

Mr. President, we are willing to continue our policy of promoting understanding and reconciling mutual interests. To us, who live on the line joining East and West and in a divided country, this is a realistic, a sober policy which also serves our own interests. Because of this we were glad to hear that the CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid was able to begin on time after all, and that, ultimately, agreement was reached on an agenda which largely corresponds to our wishes. We also see it as a positive sign that in the opening statements by the western, neutral and non-aligned countries the problems between East and West were referred to in unequivocal terms but at the same time the will to continue the CSCE process was emphasised. We take a realistic view of the prospects of progress on the substantive issues in Madrid, but we must grasp every opportunity to achieve progress, however small.

Ladies and Gentlemen, in recent years East-West discussion has focused more on the mili-

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

tary aspects of détente. We still hold to the principle that our policy of adjustment and co-operation with the East will be successful only on the basis of security and a balance of strategic arms. Without such a balance between East and West there will be neither security nor stable peace. An imbalance in favour of the East could be an invitation to the Warsaw Pact to take bigger risks. In a world in which states prove by their actions that they are not prepared to forgo the use of military power to effect political aims, an arms control policy aimed at maintaining balance and stability must be based on the will and the ability to defend oneself.

The security of the Federal Republic of Germany rests upon its membership of the Atlantic Defence Alliance and of the European Community. Both communities are founded on common ideals as regards the dignity of man, freedom and self-determination. The Federal Republic of Germany is willing to adapt the contribution it is making towards western security within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance to the changing international conditions. The Federal Republic of Germany is bearing its full share of the measures adopted by the Alliance with a view to strengthening the western defence capability following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

As regards the relative size and significance of our defence contribution, we occupy a leading position in the Alliance. In this connection the Federal Government welcomes the WEU Council's decision of 24th July 1980 to lift the outdated restrictions on shipbuilding contained in Article V, Annex III, Protocol No. III, of the revised Brussels Treaty of 1954. It considers that this step has done a great deal to promote partnership and co-operation on a basis of equality in an important sector of common defence planning. On behalf of my government, I should therefore like to thank the members of this Assembly sincerely for their support in this matter.

Mr. President, the opening of talks between the United States of America and the Soviet Union in Geneva on the limitation of medium-range theatre nuclear forces speaks for the correctness of the assumption that a meaningful dialogue on disarmament is possible only on the basis of a firm intention to maintain one's defence capability and the principle of mutual security as a result of a balance of forces. These negotiations would not have been possible without the twofold decision taken by NATO on 12th December 1979, a decision which coupled the offer of arms control with the determination to take any steps necessary to restore the balance. We consider the opening

of these talks an important step on the way to a mutual limitation of these weapons systems aimed at establishing a stable relationship of forces in harmony with the principles of parity and equality.

The ongoing negotiations in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions are in the Federal Government's view still of considerable significance in terms of security policy in spite of the fact that no concrete results have been produced so far. They make it possible for the Atlantic Alliance to attempt to supplement its defence policy with arms control. In this difficult overall political situation we attach special importance to the stabilising effect of the MBFR negotiations on both the Alliance and East-West relations.

The Vienna negotiations are now focused on the western proposals tabled in December 1979 for an interim agreement and associated measures. True, the East still has not given a comprehensive reply to these proposals but with its partial proposals of June and November of this year it has indicated that it is moving towards the western concept of an interim agreement.

Mr. President, the principle of collectivity remains an essential element of the western negotiating position. It guarantees the workability of integrated defence within the Alliance and ensures that no separate security arrangements will be imposed on any member of the Alliance situated in the area where reductions are being made. The West can accept only collective reduction commitments, the breakdown of collectively agreed reduction quotas being a matter for autonomous decision within the Alliance. The East still has to make its contribution to the solution of the data issue. Agreement on the data base for the forces of all direct MBFR participants in the area of reductions remains an indispensable condition for the establishment of parity, which the East has accepted in principle as a negotiating objective. In the Federal Government's opinion, the Vienna negotiations can produce an initial result if the East makes the necessary practical contribution explaining the discrepancy, at least as regards the data necessary for an interim agreement, namely American and Soviet data.

On grounds of both détente and security, the Federal Government attaches great importance to the treatment of the military aspects of security within the CSCE process as well. The framework for negotiation provided by the Helsinki final act affords a suitable basis on which to contribute to the stabilisation of the military situation on an all-European scale, a basis which would also be a meaningful supplement to other efforts to achieve arms control, especially MBFR. In Madrid, too, therefore, we

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

and our allies recommend agreement on verifiable confidence-building measures of military significance which should apply throughout Europe, including the European territory of the Soviet Union. An appropriate forum for this would be a special conference of all CSCE participants which could be convened on the basis of a resolution by the follow-up conference in Madrid and would have to remain firmly incorporated in the CSCE process.

The Federal Government has thus supported from the outset the proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe put forward by France in the Alliance. The fact that it would have a Europe-wide application is of great importance to us, because security and peace in Europe are not divisible. The geographical limitation of confidence-building would carry within it the seeds of more mistrust. And the principle of equality of all states demands that any agreements adopted at a European disarmament conference would have to apply in equal measure to all participating states in Europe.

But whilst acknowledging the importance of the military aspects of security in the CSCE process, the mandate for a European disarmament conference must not be the only outcome of the Madrid follow-up. It is essential to keep the CSCE process as a whole intact, and this means that equal attention has to be paid to all three baskets of the CSCE final act.

In the United Nations, the Federal Republic of Germany, together with other states, has taken the initiative over a study of the applicability of the concept of confidence-building in all regions of the world and over the development of specific measures for the generation and preservation of confidence. We are also advocating within the United Nations a universal disclosure of military budgets.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me close with one general observation. However much the changing international situation compels us to be constantly reviewing our policies – and after all the semi-annual debates of your Assembly are an important contribution to such a review – it is at the same time important for us to show determination and consistency in our pursuit of policies we regard as right. It is in this spirit that our countries should continue their policies with regard to East-West relations and thus constantly show themselves to be reliable partners. Thank you. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. – I am sure that I speak on behalf of all my colleagues, Madam Minister, in thanking you for the interesting and comprehensive speech that you have made.

We greatly appreciate your kind references to the work of this Assembly.

The Minister has kindly agreed to answer questions, but since we now have an additional item to deal with under the urgent procedure before lunch, she has agreed to answer them all at one time. It is tempting when we have a Minister captive to address speeches to her, but I hope that members will ask questions.

I first call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – The idea of a division of labour within the Atlantic Alliance put forward by the German Government implies that Europe will assume a larger share of the burden of its own defence.

Does the Minister consider this idea compatible with the difficulties which the Federal Republic of Germany is at present having in reaching the target of a 3% annual growth in its defence budget in real terms?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for your question, Mr. Valleix and for setting us such a good example.

I now call Mr. Osborn.

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate the Minister on her presentation of the German case. She referred to the Madrid conference on European security, co-operation and détente. Outside observers – I was one privileged to attend – at the IPU conference in East Berlin feel that the relationship between West Germany and the DDR might be a little one-sided, particularly in the application of the 1971 agreement. Do the Federal German Government and its people feel this to be so? When it comes to disarmament and the inspection and monitoring of disarmament, there is a feeling that each side should know more about what the other is doing on the European scene. Does the Minister support that view?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Osborn.

I call Mr. Gessner.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should like to take advantage of the Minister's presence to ask a question which is not directly connected with her statement but will, I feel, be of interest to the Assembly. This morning we discussed the budget of Western European Union. Would you be so kind as to state the Federal Republic's position on WEU's overall budget?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). – My question is certainly not of crucial importance but is aimed at improving relations between the partners, in accordance with the hope expressed by the Minister a moment ago.

Does the Minister think that there are divergences between the French and German Governments concerning the terms on which jointly-produced arms are sold to countries outside the Atlantic Alliance?

Does she consider that such divergences could constitute a particular obstacle to the joint production of a European tank?

The PRESIDENT. – I now call Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister said that the Federal Republic is willing to adapt its contributions to western security, within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance, to changing international conditions. Can she amplify that? What does it mean? Is she proposing the same for the rest of the Alliance, or is this a unilateral decision by Germany to go it alone?

The PRESIDENT. – I now call Mr. De Poi.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I should first like to thank the Minister for her kind remarks concerning the disaster which has recently struck the people of Italy and also to thank the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the massive aid in men and materials now reaching the stricken regions in southern Italy.

I would also like to ask her – since she said that a measure of the problem of détente in Europe also rests on what is happening in Berlin and on finding a solution for the problem raised by that city – what she thinks about what is happening here and now with the closure of the frontier between the German Democratic Republic and Poland.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I now call Mr. Page.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – One has to admit that the initial European response to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was slow and disunited. In her clear speech today, the Minister outlined many other areas of destabilisation throughout the world. Does she feel that any lessons have been learned by the western partners from the Afghanistan response which could produce a more united response in the event of a new international crisis?

The PRESIDENT. – I now call Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). – May I ask the Minister whether the decision adopted

by the Council last July lifting the restrictions imposed on the Federal Republic of Germany with regard to warships satisfies the Federal Government?

As a subsidiary point, I should like to know whether WEU's image in Germany has improved as a result of this important vote.

Lastly, what practical conclusions does the Federal German Government propose to draw from this new possibility with regard to naval shipbuilding?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Does anyone else wish to ask a question?...

I am afraid that we have given the Minister a formidable list of questions to answer and I would now ask her to be kind enough to do so.

Mrs. HAMM-BRÜCHER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall do my best to answer the questions in the order in which they were put. My answer to the first question, from Mr. Valleix, regarding the division of labour within the Alliance and the 3 % real increase in defence expenditure, is as follows: the Federal Republic of Germany has increased its expenditure on defence by an average of 3 % every year for the last ten years. It will achieve almost the same increase in 1980 as well. These increases have been made principally under the investment programme. Particular emphasis will again be placed on such investment measures in 1981. As before, we shall make every effort to attain our target of increasing the defence budget next year as well. As the honourable member knows, general conscription enables us to achieve the planned strength of 500,000 in the Federal armed forces, and in our country reservists also have to be included in the defence planning.

Mr. Osborn referred to the IPU conference and relations between the two parts of Germany. He asked – if I understood his question correctly – whether we should know more about each other. We are working on it. As I said in my statement, we do not want to retaliate in kind to the German Democratic Republic's unfortunate policy of limitation *vis-à-vis* the Federal Republic, because we are determined, wherever possible, not to jeopardise the improvements achieved.

Mr. Gessner asked for an opinion on the present budget of WEU and its Assembly. I am quite prepared to state the position. Ladies and Gentlemen, you all know that in relation to the early seventies the economic and financial situation has deteriorated everywhere, resulting in drastic cuts in our national bud-

Mrs. Hamm-Brücher (continued)

gets. These cuts are unpopular everywhere. The Federal Chancellor told us in his governmental declaration last week that there will be only a nominal rise of 4% in our budget next year. This rate of increase is based on the likely rate of inflation. On no account, Ladies and Gentlemen, can we therefore expect a real growth in public expenditure next year. In fact, we must prepare ourselves for a real decrease in our national budget. This will inevitably mean substantial and very painful cuts in our public spending.

Such savings cannot be confined to the national sector alone all the more so since we are faced with the need for further financial efforts particularly in respect of defence, as I have said.

Our efforts to economise in the WEU budget must also be seen in this context. But I can assure you that the Federal Government's interest in WEU's unqualified ability to function effectively has in no way diminished. We feel, however, that this can also be done by greater rationalisation, something which we have undertaken very seriously in those areas within our national purview. I therefore ask for your understanding and co-operation on our proposals. I have already heard that they will be forthcoming.

Mr. Pignion's question was, I assume, a reference to Franco-German co-operation on armaments. There are no fundamental differences here. And when problems do arise, they are solved, as always, in the spirit of Franco-German friendship. My government hopes that co-operation with France and our other partners will continue to grow.

I now come, Mr. President, to Mr. Brown's question, which I have in fact answered in my replies to the previous questions. I did not say in my statement that we intended to increase our contributions unilaterally. All I said was that we are making the necessary efforts to remain among the foremost contributors to the Alliance in defence spending.

Mr. De Poi asked about Berlin and the process of détente and the closing of the border between the German Democratic Republic and Poland. We always deplore such actions because the closure of frontiers is an obstacle to the process of détente and above all conflicts with the principles of détente as laid down in the third basket.

The subject of the next question was whether we had learned any lessons from Afghanistan and the events since Afghanistan. Just now, as I arrived, I heard Mr. Brown being very forthright and critical in regretting the West's slow

and clumsy reaction after the invasion of Afghanistan. I believe the West has learned from this. The West has made its position very clear from the outset. It has called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Since the invasion, we have deliberately strengthened the adjacent areas. We Germans have greatly increased aid to Turkey, and this also extends to the division of labour within the Alliance. We have also provided Pakistan with a great deal of development aid. We are stepping up co-operation with the Gulf states. I am sure that the Federal Republic of Germany has not been alone in adopting the appropriate measures following the invasion of Afghanistan and taking political action accordingly, so making its reaction to the Soviet invasion perfectly clear. In my view, Ladies and Gentlemen, the fact that this invasion has twice been condemned in the United Nations – on the second occasion the number of states condemning the invasion was, at 114, higher than the first time, when there were 104, has helped to show the Soviet Union that the world community wants the troops to be withdrawn from Afghanistan.

As to the last question from Mr. Bozzi, I made it very clear in my statement how much the Federal Government welcomes the lifting of the restrictions on shipbuilding and how grateful we are to this Assembly in particular for its support in this respect. I recall earlier questions to me in the Assembly which showed even then that representatives were much in favour of the abolition of these provisions, which for us were undoubtedly discriminatory.

WEU has always enjoyed and will continue to enjoy a favourable image in my country, Ladies and Gentlemen. It was, of course, also recognised that this represented an important adjustment.

As to what this will mean to our shipbuilding industry, it is important to my country, particularly as regards co-operation on armaments. But at the moment – I can say this quite explicitly – there are no plans to build larger vessels for the Federal navy. I would like to emphasise this.

Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – I am sure that I speak for all of us, Madam Minister, when I thank you most warmly for your careful and comprehensive replies to a vast number of difficult questions. We are now even more in your debt. I thank you, again. It was delightful to have you here as a representative of your country. We shall understand if, after that demanding task, you need to have some refreshment rather than stay to listen to our debate, though you are welcome to stay if you wish.

7. Future of European security

(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 854 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We now come to the report of Mr. von Hassel on the future of European security, Document 854 and amendments. I should make clear that only the draft recommendation is before the Assembly. The resolution was not moved and therefore the amendments to it of which we have been given notice cannot be called.

Mr. Stoffelen has given notice that he wishes to refer back the recommendation. That has precedence. There are permitted a speech of five minutes in favour of that course and a speech of five minutes against. The Chairman or Rapporteur may also speak.

If Mr. Stoffelen's proposal is carried we shall not proceed to the amendments. If it is defeated, we shall consider the amendments of which notice has been given.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – There is no doubt that the report, recommendation and resolution of Mr. von Hassel deal with a subject of utmost importance, namely, the future of European security. We are grateful to Mr. von Hassel. The presentation of his report has been of great benefit to WEU and western defence.

However, for a number of reasons it is my conviction that the report, resolution and recommendation deserve and need further thorough consideration and study. The first reason is that it is illogical to deal with and vote on the draft recommendation now that the Committee has decided to withdraw the draft resolution. Let us face the facts. The report deals with relations between WEU and the Community and the western Alliance.

The report leads to the conclusions, *inter alia*, that the Community should deal with defence matters and that there should be a relationship between members of the Community and countries that have applied for membership, and our union. The report leads to a request to Assembly Committees and Chairmen to examine those suggestions, and to a further request to the Council of Ministers. It is illogical to conclude that the request to Assembly Committees needs further study, but to go on with the request to the Council. That is not fair.

The second reason for reference back is that the report, resolution and recommendation plead for the establishing of relations between, for instance, Ireland, Norway, Spain and

Greece and WEU. Ireland has a specific neutral position in relation to the Alliance. Norway refused to become a member of the EEC. In Spain and Greece there were, not so long ago, enormous and emotional demonstrations denouncing NATO. All those aspects need further thorough study.

The third reason for reference back concerns relations with the Community. The political reality is that the EEC has to overcome tremendous problems – budgetary problems, problems concerning employment policy, problems concerning agriculture politics and regional politics. It is unwise to try to make the tremendous burden of the Community even heavier. In addition, it is not within the mandate of the Community to deal with defence matters.

The fourth reason for reference back is that in some member countries there is a great difference between understanding and sympathy for the EEC and understanding and sympathy for the western Alliance. We should not mix up all these matters.

We all know that in the United Kingdom, for example, there is a widespread criticism, scepticism and even antipathy in relation to the EEC, but a positive feeling and attitude towards the western Alliance. It is a fact of life that if the Community were able to deal with defence matters it could seriously damage understanding and positive feelings for the western Alliance.

Do we really want to damage positive feelings and attitudes in member states towards the western Alliance? We do not, and I hope that the Rapporteur and the Chairman of the Committee do not want to damage those feelings. For those reasons, I move on behalf of the Socialist Group the reference back to the General Affairs Committee of the report, the draft resolution and the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – There is not a draft resolution to be referred back. Only the recommendation and report can be referred back. Do you accept that, Mr. Stoffelen? Thank you.

Under the rules, there can be a speaker against the proposition and he may speak for five minutes. That is to be Mr. Hanin.

We have a procedural problem, because the English text says that the Rapporteur and the Chairman of a Committee may speak for five minutes. The French text says that the Rapporteur or the Chairman may speak. I hope that in the interests of time we shall follow the French text in this case.

I call Mr. Hanin.

Mr. HANIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I oppose the request for reference back to the Committee.

I listened very carefully to the arguments put forward by Mr. Stoffelen in favour of reference back, but did not find that they contained anything to justify it.

I fully understand that people may not agree with the view expressed by Mr. von Hassel in his report, and I respect those whose opinions differ from mine. But, I repeat, Mr. Stoffelen puts forward nothing which warrants reference back to the Committee.

He says that it is illogical to take a decision because the draft resolution has been withdrawn. But the withdrawal of the draft resolution is in fact a step forward intended to enable the Assembly to decide without creating what might seem to be intolerable strains within it. We must not, therefore, use a step taken by those in favour of this resolution as an argument for justifying reference back to the Committee.

The second, third and fourth reasons are reasons of substance for which Mr. Stoffelen asserts that we should not accept the conclusions of Mr. von Hassel's report.

Mr. President, when is it justifiable to refer a report back to the Committee? When it is incomplete, or when its preparation by the Committee has been botched. But this report was in fact drawn up with extreme care; it was adopted by the Committee, amendments were submitted and accepted and there has been no criticism of the way in which it was drawn up.

Reference back to the Committee may also be justified when a new fact has emerged. This is not the case. Mr. Stoffelen says that the situation is a changing one. That is obviously so, and a few minutes ago the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany said that a constant watch must be kept on the development of this situation.

Obviously, if we postpone discussion of Mr. von Hassel's report, in six months' time we shall be in precisely the same situation as we are now; and it will then be possible to say that the situation is changing and that, consequently, the draft resolution must be postponed again, which will have an extremely damaging effect – and I will conclude on this point – namely that our Assembly will give the impression of being incapable of decision.

I should like to speak directly to the opponents of the draft resolution. They are certainly entitled to oppose it and to move

amendments. But to act in such a way, because a difficult and important matter is at issue, as to make our Assembly incapable of decision and cause it to delay a draft resolution indefinitely until a time when the decision will be without significance or effect would do the Assembly the greatest possible harm, whereas the stated intention is to defend it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hanin.

The Chairman of the Committee wishes to speak.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – My friend and colleague, Mr. Hanin, has explained the position so well that I shall not speak for more than a couple of minutes. Neither the Rapporteur nor I want the five minutes that are allowed.

Because of Mr. von Hassel's absence we have been put in a difficult position. The Rapporteurs and members of other groups have been very helpful. They realise that under the circumstances we made a considerable gesture of conciliation by separating the resolution. We wish to achieve a consensus. We have referred the resolution back to the Committee for consideration.

I shall address my remarks solely to the recommendation. I hope that we can now deal with the substance of the issue. We are discussing the recommendation, and it is upon that that we shall cast our votes. I oppose the proposal that the report and recommendation should be sent back, for the reasons that Mr. Hanin gave. He is more eloquent than I.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Frederic.

I must now put the question to the Assembly.

The question is that the recommendation and the report, Document 854, be referred back to the General Affairs Committee. The motion was moved by Mr. Stoffelen on behalf of himself and a number of his colleagues.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The motion for reference back is therefore negatived.

I have two amendments to the recommendation. As I have explained, amendments to the resolution are not relevant, as the resolution has not been moved. One amendment stands in the names of Mr. Baumel and Mr. Valleix. There is also an amendment in the name of Mr. Caro. If Mr. Baumel's amendment is carried, Mr. Caro's amendment will fall.

I shall call Mr. Baumel or Mr. Valleix to move the amendment.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Perhaps I can help to expedite matters. The two amendments follow one another. Those moving the amendments might like to know that the Rapporteur and I have decided readily to accept Mr. Caro's amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – It is for Mr. Baumel to decide whether he wishes to move his amendment in those circumstances. If he wishes to move his amendment he is entitled to do so. If the amendment is successful, the second amendment will fall.

Mr. Baumel, do you wish to move your amendment? Mr. Baumel must first move his amendment to delete the whole of paragraph (d). If that is carried, the question of amending paragraph (d) cannot arise.

Mr. Baumel, do you wish to move the amendment in your name?

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – The purpose of the amendment moved by my colleague, Mr. Valleix, and myself is to have paragraph (d) of the draft recommendation deleted.

Although we voted against reference back to the Committee, the reason for our wishing to have this paragraph deleted is that the idea that the geographical boundaries of WEU and the European Community should coincide seems open to criticism from the legal point of view and difficult to defend politically.

It is open to criticism because the European Economic Community includes, for instance, a neutral country, Ireland, and a country which subjects itself to special disciplines with regard to defence, namely Denmark. From the political point of view the EEC has specific economic and social aims and its own highly integrated forms of organisation and decision-making procedures.

The extension of WEU to include all the European members of NATO seems even more unrealistic. The differences between the military and political situations of these countries are so great that they would probably preclude any move of this kind for quite a long time to come. It is moreover rather difficult to propose such an extension of an institution which is as inactive as WEU, whatever may be one's opinion of it. It would be more reasonable to think first of strengthening WEU and giving it a more genuine content.

I will conclude by saying that it is by effectively implementing the Brussels Treaty, that is, by entrusting WEU with concrete tasks, such as the strengthening of armaments co-operation or

the achievement of concerted European action on security, that the best conditions for future European defence can be prepared.

It would be dangerous for our Assembly's credibility to allow it to be thought that this result could be achieved by embarking on a geographical reorganisation which, as things stand at present, cannot be other than purely speculative.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Baumel.

Does anyone wish to speak to Mr. Baumel's amendment?...

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I hope that Mr. Baumel's amendment is not carried. The draft recommendation is quite specific. It recommends the Council to set up a working group to study the question, so it is not a definite or specific recommendation that is being made. In any case, it is merely studying the question of inviting the countries concerned, who may or may not wish to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty. It is up to them. I see nothing wrong in principle in inviting either EEC member countries or members of the Eurogroup of NATO to associate themselves with the Brussels Treaty. I believe that it would very much invigorate this organisation.

In the Assembly this morning we have had many criticisms from representatives of how moribund our proceedings are becoming and how little attention is paid to our recommendations by the governments. I believe that the Assembly has rightly been critical of any idea of involving the European Parliament in security policy matters. Sir Frederic Bennett has quite clearly made that distinction by withdrawing the draft resolution. I hope, therefore, that we will allow sub-paragraph (d) to stand and the draft recommendation to be carried in its entirety, and will not carry Mr. Baumel's amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Does the Chairman or Rapporteur wish to speak?...

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – It was precisely because I realised the apprehensions that Mr. Baumel voiced that I said in advance what I did. I agree with Mr. Wilkinson that we should study the situation as it actually is and not as a matter of apprehensions, but I realise that those apprehensions are real. It was for that reason that I tried to indicate something that ought to remove all possible misunderstandings and should be accepted. If, as I hope, Mr. Baumel's amendment is not carried, I have already given notice that the Rapporteur and I will support the amendment

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

by his French colleague, which I believe clears up all misunderstandings and will leave the text unaltered, at least in substance. It is a pity when we have an amendment to take out whole pieces of a report. We should try to make things clear, and I believe Mr. Caro's amendment makes them clear.

I hope, therefore, that the Assembly will vote against this amendment and will in due course support Mr. Caro. In that case I will not speak, but I give my advance support now.

The PRESIDENT. – I now put the amendment moved by Mr. Baumel on behalf of himself and Mr. Valleix. This is Amendment 5: in the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph (d).

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is negatived.

Mr. Caro, would you like to move your amendment? As the Chairman of the Committee is going to accept it, perhaps you can move it formally.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall say just a few words so as to save the Assembly's time. My aim is to find common ground between the problems raised by Mr. Baumel and Mr. Valleix and the general economy of Mr. von Hassel's report.

It seems to me absolutely necessary that this draft recommendation should include the idea of expansion, co-ordination and implementation of all measures calculated to strengthen the objectives of the amended Brussels Treaty, not only in the framework of the participation of the member states of Western European Union but also in the context of a European defence conceived realistically. This is the perfectly logical consequence of the development of an idea which very many of us subscribe to – the idea of the European pillar.

A start has to be made somewhere. European power is fragmentary: economic power on one side, political power on the other; defence here and culture there. Every time we try to solve a problem, to find a synthesis, we are blocked by the institutions and legal machinery devolving from the treaties which, apart from anything else, we are there to implement. That is why, without wishing to drag us down into an institutionalist debate, I fall back on a functionalist position, which will remind a good many of us of the old debates of yesteryear.

On the basis of as narrow as possible a participation of the countries referred to in para-

graph (d), I hope to win the Assembly's approval.

The PRESIDENT. – The amendment has been moved and it has been accepted in advance by the Chairman and the Rapporteur.

Does anyone wish to speak to it?...

I put the amendment to the Assembly.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

I now have to put the recommendation, as amended.

If there are no objections, we could dispense with a roll-call vote. An objection has been taken, so we shall have to proceed with a roll-call vote.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – All members of the Socialist Group wish to vote against the amended draft recommendation, so I feel that we must have a roll-call vote.

The PRESIDENT. – Yes, we shall have a roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Grussenmeyer, but I understand that he has been substituted by Mr. Bozzi.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	60
Ayes	33
Noes	24
Abstentions	3

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted².

8. Poland and European security

(Motion for an Order with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 864)

The PRESIDENT. – We now have to deal with the matter of urgency raised by Mr. Valleix. The question before the Assembly is only the question of urgency – whether the issues raised in the motion are so urgent and

1. See page 30.

2. See page 33.

The President (continued)

important that they should be added to our agenda, probably tomorrow. We cannot now debate the merits.

Therefore, would Mr. Valleix give us his reasons for wanting this urgent debate?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – It is not the urgency of the hour that should detain you, Ladies and Gentlemen – nor, indeed, encourage you to leave – but the urgency of the motion for an order which I am tabling. And I have no doubt that you will find its urgency beyond question.

Statements hostile to the Polish state are currently increasing in the USSR, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. Military steps have been taken. This very morning the USSR declared a strip of East German territory along the Polish frontier a strategic zone.

Without wishing to interfere in any way in the affairs of Poland, we cannot but view with concern any deterioration in the situation in that country.

It was said recently, following a Franco-German meeting, that détente would not survive a second shock similar to the invasion of Afghanistan. The use of force against the independence and sovereignty of Poland would constitute an event far more serious, from the point of view of its consequences for East-West relations, than the invasion of Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is therefore important, on the one hand, for our Assembly to be able to state its position quickly on developments in the Polish situation – which is the first item in the recommendation addressed to our General Affairs Committee – but it is also important, on the other hand, that in the event of a crisis our Assembly should have made sure it can react immediately – and that is the second point submitted to you in the motion for an order where it instructs the Presidential Committee to meet.

Those, Mr. President, are the reasons for the urgency. I believe our Assembly shares them

and I have nothing more to say for the moment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Valleix.

Is anybody against an urgent debate, which would probably be tomorrow afternoon, on the subject of Poland?...

People who send their names and objections up to the table but who are not in their place cannot be called. This has happened several times. If nobody is against the proposition, I take it that the Assembly accepts that this is an urgent procedural matter and that it should be on the agenda tomorrow afternoon. Thank you very much.

9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
2. State of European security (Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 858 and Amendments).
3. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.
4. Energy and security (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 856 and Amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 1.20 p.m.)

ELEVENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd December 1980

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
4. State of European security (*Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 858 and Amendments*).
Speakers. The President, Mr. Grant, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Fletcher.
5. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic.
Replies by Mr. Bernard-Reymond to questions put by: Mr. Caro, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Wilkinson, Dr. Miller, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Page.
Speaker Mr. Cavaliere.
6. State of European security (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 858 and Amendments*).
Speakers. The President, Mr. Onslow, Mr. Pecchioli, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Tripodi, Mr. Banks, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Brown (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Cavaliere (*Chairman of the Committee*); (points or order): Mr. Banks, Mr. Onslow, Mr. Dejardin; Mr. Fletcher, Mr. Brown, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Brown, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Brown, Dr. Müller, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Onslow, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Brown, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Brown, Mr. Deschamps (explanation of vote).
7. Energy and security (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 856 and Amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Dr. Miller, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Müller, Mr. Antoni, Mr. Valleix (point of order), Mr. McGuire, Mr. Osborn.
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Cornelissen, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. – The Minutes of Proceedings of the last Sitting have not been distributed. They will be considered at the next Sitting.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – The first Order of the Day is the election of a Vice-President to fill the vacancy caused by the departure of Mr.

René Mart. May I use this opportunity to speak in my own language about Mr. Mart?

(The President continued in Dutch.)

(Translation). – In the ten years I have been a member of this Assembly, I have had the great pleasure of having a lot to do with our ex-colleague René Mart. This was in meetings both at home and abroad, as well as here in the Assembly and during the working visits I paid, together with him, to various countries. I have the pleasantest memories of these contacts, so I am very glad to be able to take this opportunity of offering thanks, from the chair, to René Mart for all that he has done for the Assembly. And I would thank him, too, for the friendship he has shown to me and to others.

(The President continued in English.)

In accordance with Rule 10, no Representative can stand as a candidate for Vice-President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more Representatives.

I have received only one nomination, that of Mr. Albert Berchem (Luxembourg).

If the Assembly is unanimous, I suggest that Mr. Berchem be elected by acclamation.

¹. See page 36.

The President (continued)

Are there any objections?...

The Assembly is unanimous and I therefore declare him elected as Vice-President of the Assembly of Western European Union.

4. *State of European security*

(Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 858 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The next Order of the Day is the debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 858 and Amendments.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Grant.

Mr. GRANT (*United Kingdom*). – I start by saying that I hold the Rapporteur, my friend, Ron Brown, in high esteem. Although he is a member of a different party, I know that his heart is in the right place and that he believes passionately and strongly in the defence of the West. I put that on record.

There is a great deal in the report that is extremely good. There is much carefully researched factual information which is of immense help to the Assembly, and I agree with Mr. Brown's warnings about the extent of Soviet influence. It was alert of him to highlight the problems that will arise as a result of the Iraq-Iran conflict, and I agree about the need for the cohesion of the Alliance.

However, there is a dangerous assumption underlying the recommendations which strikes at the root of the credibility of the whole. It is the assumption that there is something which is loosely called balance between East and West. There is also an implication that that is a steady, continuing state.

The Rapporteur has visited distinguished persons and gone to great trouble to get their views, but, while I have been concerned with defence at the Assembly, I have asked leading authorities throughout the world whether balance exists between East and West. After shedding tears and moaning about how the West has been falling behind the East in so many areas, they always say, rather reluctantly, "But of course we have a rough balance". It would be surprising if they conceded anything else.

We know that there has been great unease for years about the well-known build-up of Soviet forces compared with those of the Alliance. We know the enormously increased proportion

of GNP that the Soviets have applied to defence compared with the efforts of the West. Indeed, it is to the credit of the Rapporteur that those facts are starkly exposed in an appendix to the report. In addition, paragraph 6.1 of the conclusions states:

"The military strength of the Soviet Union, however, has been increasing more rapidly, especially in nuclear weapons and naval forces, and it has retained its superiority in numbers of tanks."

The Rapporteur recognises the dangers.

When the world held its breath at the time of the Cuban crisis, when the Soviets were moving towards Cuba and everyone throughout the world was in a state of tremendous anxiety and when President Kennedy made his stand, the United States had about four times the nuclear power and strength of the Soviets. Today, in no less dangerous a world, the position on the nuclear front is approximately even. That indicates the shift that has taken place and is continuing.

It was in that context that NATO decided that it was vital to have a 3% increase, in real terms, in our defence contribution. If, as the report suggests, there is a balance, whatever was NATO thinking about in advocating a 3% increase? What was the Rapporteur saying in his recommendation, when he appeared to advocate that there should be an improvement in allied defences? Given today's economic circumstances, which affect all the countries of the western Alliance, how can we convince nations that it is necessary to meet the increased 3% defence target if we, as a responsible body, say that everything is in balance and that all is well?

If we give the impression that there is a balance, those responsible for defence in the western world will be put under pressure – if they are not already under pressure – to back-track on current commitments. I refer to all those responsible for defence outside the Warsaw Pact. Of course, those in the Warsaw Pact will take no notice. The enemy of security is complacency. I object to the report because it implies complacency. It argues that there is a balance and that all is well.

The late Sir Winston Churchill was asked how he would describe the 1939-45 war. He paused for a moment and then replied that he would call it the unnecessary war, because if the allies had not been complacent in the 1930s, and if they had not held the view that there was a balance in world defence, that war would never have occurred. We should take heed of that.

An amendment is called for. I support my friend, Mr. Onslow, who has tabled an amend-

Mr. Grant (continued)

ment. I ask the Rapporteur to reflect during the course of the debate on its wisdom. I hope that he will be prepared to accept it. If he does not, I shall not be able to support an otherwise good report because of its dangerous allusion to balance. It could well sap the determination and will of the western democracies to resist the existing and continuing Soviet threat.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – As I am not Chairman, I am happy to find that I can speak my mind, unlike this morning when I was bound by certain restrictions on my freedom of movement.

I agree with Mr. Grant about the bulk of the report. I have learned a great deal of extremely valuable information. Given the facts revealed in the report, and those in the report adopted this morning, I cannot understand how the Rapporteur and the Committee could have concluded that western security had not diminished during the past decade.

Mr. Grant referred to some of the facts. This is a most paradoxical report. We shall not vote on the body of the report, although I should not find it difficult to do so. However, we are voting on the draft recommendations. They do not follow the information at our disposal. As a result of an amendment, proposed, I believe, by the Chairman of the Committee, the first paragraph admits that there is an increasing and disturbing superior Soviet concentration of tanks and divisions on the central front. I have yet to meet a general who genuinely believed that by using conventional weapons alone we should be able to resist an attack for long. That is partly the result of a material difference and partly the result of Soviet superiority. However, the inability to resist is due to an even greater extent to the reserves available to the Warsaw Pact.

European security has diminished. The best evidence comes not from my conclusions but from the fact that every country in the Alliance has decided, rather tardily, that there should be a substantial increase in our efforts as the result of that diminution.

If European security has not diminished and if rough equivalence still exists, I shall find it difficult as a politician to justify appealing to the public for more money for armaments at a time of economic difficulty. I should find it hard to ask the public to spend at least 3% more on real resources at the same time as I told them that there was still an equivalence between East and West. If there were an equi-

valence, why should I ask for extra effort? Such a contradiction is unacceptable.

Despite the amendment moved by the Chairman in Committee, I am not happy about the wording of the first paragraph. I have already told the Rapporteur that I shall reluctantly abstain and suggest that my friends abstain if, and only if, the Rapporteur accepts the amendment tabled by my colleague, Mr. Cranley Onslow, and supported by Mr. Grant. I do not think that I shall be the only one to vote against the report. As Mr. Grant said, the report disputes the facts and claims that all is well and that a balance remains. I could not justify such a claim and ask for extra expenditure and effort because the balance has been disturbed by the increase in Soviet armaments. I shall not go into the details about Soviet tanks and aeroplanes and nor shall I discuss the navy about which we read every day.

It is not true that rough equivalence was obtained during the past decade. In the beginning there may have been a trend towards that, but the time of equivalence passed some time ago. Therefore, western governments are being asked to make an extra effort. I hope that the Rapporteur will find it possible to accept the amendment, which will at least permit some of us to abstain. I do not wish to indulge in tit-for-tat politics; nor do I wish to refer back the report. I shall not do that, despite the example set this morning. Nevertheless, I shall oppose the report. I do not wish to rely on the lack of a quorum. I shall vote in the same way as I and several of my friends voted during consideration of the report in Committee in Rome.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now call Mr. Fletcher.

Mr. FLETCHER (*United Kingdom*). – The Rapporteur has tried to do the impossible in the report. A military balance can be tested only by the conflict of armed forces and by the result of that conflict. Nevertheless, it is useful to have the information tabulated and laid before us in such a way.

In my opinion, it does not in any way conflict with the need for eternal vigilance. It does not even conflict, in many important respects, with the need to raise military expenditure by on average 3% per annum, because even to maintain a state of rough equivalence requires the scrapping of certain weapons systems and their replacement by new.

In my own country, for instance, the Chief-tain tank is obsolescent already, and must very soon be replaced, and that is going to cost money. Many aircraft still in use ought not to be in use. I shall turn to the naval aspect of this later, but it is necessary for member

Mr. Fletcher (continued)

governments to take these decisions in a cool way and not a panic-stricken way.

We remember when an American presidential election was won on the argument that a gigantic missile gap existed, and panic-stricken Americans went to the polls and the incoming president found that no such gap existed. But the orders for the extra missiles had already been placed. Some of those missiles are not only obsolete: they have become dangerous.

It is essential, therefore, to have a cool appraisal that does not pretend to be an arithmetical statement of the military balance between the two great military blocs. It is necessary to have this before us so that decisions are not made in a state of panic or on the assumption that the potential enemy has us beaten in every area on every front.

In the past twenty years the Soviet Union has been ejected from more places than it has entered, whether by military means or by political influence. Consequently, let us not be hypnotised by this idea of a monolithic giant able to stride over Europe, to stride into Africa and to move by sea towards America with nothing whatever to stop it. This is not the actual picture and I do not think that we should pretend that it is, whether or not we are trying to justify defence spending to our constituents.

I want to deal with what I consider to be the most important paragraph of the report, paragraph 2.9, which states:

“The most striking change in the relationship between NATO and Soviet forces over the last twenty years has undoubtedly been the emergence of the Soviet navy as an ocean-going force capable of helping to exert Soviet influence in any part of the world.”

This is something new in Russian history, although Peter the Great once dreamed of it. This Russian navy, under the command and control of perhaps the ablest sailor now afloat, Admiral Gorshkov, is exerting influence all over the world. I have seen it, and many other Representatives in this Assembly have seen it. It does not have to do anything more than Victorian ships did in the nineteenth century – fly the flag. It has to fire no shots at all to exert and direct a continuing political influence all over the world.

This is the new factor and, although ship for ship, submarine for submarine and so on, we may match it, there are in terms of quality features of that navy that we cannot match. There is the new submarine about which we have recently had the first details, three times

as long as a jumbo jet and twice as wide. What kind of thing is this? What is inside that gigantic hull? It can go deep. Presumably, it has a hull reinforced with titanium. This is a qualitative change of which we have to take account.

Let us have a look at the major navy in NATO, or serving NATO, the United States navy. It is perfectly true that the nuclear capability of the United States navy is to be increased as the Trident missiles replace Polaris missiles. It is perfectly true that the Trident submarines carry twenty-four, which is eight more than the Polaris submarines carry. It is perfectly true that the Tridents are more lethal than the Polaris missiles. That, perhaps, may be a net gain.

But navies do not consist only of missiles, submarines and floating ships. Navies consist of sailors of all ranks and what do we see in the United States navy? It is short of 20,000 petty officers and you, Mr. President, with your experience as a Minister of Defence, will know quite well that there are always plenty of admirals available, but that the petty officers, who are, as it were, the backbone of any navy, are very hard to come by and very difficult to train. It is the petty officers who keep ships sailing and submarines under the sea.

Because of shortages, the Sixth and Seventh Fleets have to spend 25% more of their time at sea than was the case a year ago – another deficiency. We find, too, that the 10,000 petty officers who will be required – and this is in addition to the 20,000 shortfall on existing naval strengths – for the fifty or sixty extra ships which are supposed to enter fleet service by 1985 are simply not there.

I do not underrate the importance of the European theatre. Nevertheless, I do not believe that any Soviet aggression will take the shape of a gigantic tank attack across the frontiers of East and West Germany, driving towards Western Europe. I believe that the Soviet Union can gain what it wants – what I believe it wants – by naval influence, naval action, by encouraging smaller wars in different parts of the world; in other words, holding a kind of freeze in Europe and being active in a whole series of small-scale operations by land and at sea in other parts of the world.

If we accept that assumption – and we all have to make assumptions when we talk about defence – we have to qualify it. I am reminded of the famous quotation of the German General von Moltke, who said, “The enemy always has three plans available to him – the two that we have prepared for and the one that he actually operates on”. We are in the same position. With the best will in the world, I could now be

Mr. Fletcher (continued)

engaging in an act of unconscious deception. I do not know what is in the mind of Leonid Brezhnev, or Admiral Gorshkov, or Marshal Ustinov, the Soviet Minister of Defence. Therefore, we must make guesses.

We do not militate against our determination to defend freedom, Europe and everything that this Assembly stands for if we take a cold look at such facts as are available and at least realise that we are not totally helpless or doomed to be ground to powder under the tracks of thousands of Soviet tanks. We have something in the locker, although it needs replenishing and renewing and a good deal of military research is required to produce new types of weapons to deal with missiles before they leave the launching pads and not after they have hit their targets.

We are engaged in a series of speculations, but the bulk of this report is not speculation. The facts cannot but be inadequate, since Mr. Brown is not a confidant of Mr. Brezhnev – he would not be a friend of mine if he were – but we have as much as we can possibly get together. It gives us a first approximation. We have to work on the assumptions threaded through the report, which derive inevitably and logically from the facts contained in it. Therefore, without hesitation, I intend to vote for both the report and the recommendations.

(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is adjourned.

5. Address by Mr. Bernard-Reymond, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic

The PRESIDENT. – It is now my pleasure and privilege to welcome again to the Assembly Mr. Bernard-Reymond, who addressed us almost exactly a year ago. We look forward very much to hearing what the Minister has to say. I am sure that I speak for all my colleagues when I say that we are glad to see you again, Minister, and that we are grateful for your generous invitation to us to attend a reception at the Quai d'Orsay this evening.

Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have twice had the privilege of addressing you on the subject of France's attitude to security questions. I welcome this opportunity to do so again today, when the international situation is threatening in so many ways.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has profoundly affected the climate of international relations. More recently, the conflict between Iraq and Iran has joined the elements of instability which already existed in the disturbed area of the Middle East.

We feel that this situation makes it more necessary than ever for France to maintain its efforts, firstly, to ensure its own security, thus contributing to that of its allies and, secondly, to work towards the reduction of sources of tension in the world.

France is constantly seeking means of ensuring its security. It is persevering in its aim in three ways: by maintaining its own defence effort, by showing solidarity with its allies and by proposing an ambitious but realistic plan for European disarmament.

In 1981 France's defence budget will be 17.9% up on the figure for the present year, which in real terms means an increase of almost 4%.

In this context, our efforts will be concentrated in three main directions: continued development of existing nuclear forces and preparatory work on future generations of weapons systems, higher credits for study and research and completion of the main programmes for the supply of equipment to our conventional forces.

The variety and persistence of these efforts underline our determination to keep France's forces at the level required in order to ensure the credibility of its deterrence.

Having read the conclusions of some of your Rapporteurs, I think it relevant to remind you that France's nuclear forces are independent. France does not, therefore, intend to leave others to decide how far it should carry the modernisation of its national strategic force. France's own analysis of the requirements of deterrence constitute the sole criteria for its decisions.

I would add that this position is in the interests of all our allies, because the value of the contribution of the French forces to the overall deterrent capacity of our Alliance is in line with the extent to which they can be used independently and modernised freely as techniques evolve. This is why France can in no circumstances agree to the inclusion of its forces in the SALT negotiations.

This does not mean that France considers independence to be synonymous with isolation. It is of course determined to honour its commitments within the Atlantic Alliance, as it restated in a solemn declaration at the Franco-German summit last February.

Mr. Bernard-Reymond (continued)

It is in this spirit that France, as the President of the Republic has declared, will continue to contribute to the building of Europe, since it is more essential to rectify the anomaly of its exclusion from world affairs since the end of the last war. As the head of state said, France will do this "in order that the friendly dialogue natural to them and the co-operation which will help to maintain peace and defend freedom in the world can be established between a strong America and a Europe assured of its strength and its rôle".

It is in this spirit and for these reasons that France wishes its allies to persevere in their own defence effort with the same determination.

Security and the maintenance of balances calculated to ensure peace do not, however, depend exclusively on national or joint defence efforts, but also on what can be achieved materially in the matter of disarmament.

France approved the SALT agreements for two reasons: because it has always held the view that it was primarily for the USSR and the United States, which already have substantial nuclear arsenals, to stop their arms race; and also because it was satisfied that these agreements did not threaten the security of other countries and of France in particular.

The same criteria will govern our attitude to any future agreement covering other weapons systems. Not being a member of the integrated military organisation, France was not associated with the decision to "modernise" theatre nuclear weapons, nor with the accompanying negotiation proposal. It will therefore refrain from expressing an opinion. At the same time it wishes to reiterate vigorously how dangerous it would be to set up a nuclear balance in Europe in isolation from the overall strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The maintenance of an overall nuclear balance is indeed essential to the maintenance of peace and security in our continent. This does not mean, however, that France is unaware of the dangers associated with the build-up of conventional weapons in Europe. This Assembly already knows of the proposed European disarmament conference, for which France hopes that the present meeting in Madrid will adopt terms of reference.

I believe this proposal is a perfect illustration of the conditions which can ensure that an ambition is more than a vain hope: our sights are set high – the purpose is to improve the security of our continent at the very moment that tension is increasing – but the analysis of

the threats we face and the ideas conceived on the means of reducing them are truly realistic.

As evidence I quote the three points underlying the French move.

The first is that the improvement of security in Europe calls for the finding of a resolution of a problem peculiar to our continent: the unbalanced stockpiling of conventional weapons behind the screen of the nuclear deterrent. France is convinced that, although the Europeans are unable, at the regional level of the forum of the Thirty-five, to control the nuclear balance, they do have the means, provided they have the will, to harness the proliferation of conventional arsenals.

The second point is that this can only be done in an area of military significance, in other words the continent of Europe as a whole. That is the natural area for conventional military activities; that too is where they may give cause for concern.

The third point is that, although this can obviously only be achieved gradually, since distrust must first be reduced before a process of reductions and limitations can begin, a start must be made immediately. It is only necessary for the countries meeting in the Spanish capital to decide to set up in 1981 the forum where the thirty-five European countries can embark on the discussions they all long for, on the security of our continent.

Of course, it would be ridiculous, and a guarantee of serious disappointment, for such a decision to be taken without the aims and scope of the exercise being accurately defined. The ambition to which I referred just now must be set out in the actual terms of the mandate to be adopted in Madrid. This is the very core of the proposal which France will be putting forward. It is inconceivable that we should enter into negotiations which will necessarily be lengthy, unless the mandate sets out the basic principles. This means that the measures to be taken must apply to Europe as a whole, from the Atlantic to the Urals, that they must be mandatory, and subject to scrutiny, and that the process must be structured and begin with the adoption of militarily-significant confidence-building measures.

But France does not intend its contribution to security and peace in Europe to stop at the frontiers of our continent. The French Government is endeavouring to help eliminate sources of tension in the world and to prevent actions which would endanger western security and world stability.

Hence France's emphatic and consistent refusal to accept Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as a *fait accompli*. As the General

Mr. Bernard-Reymond (continued)

Assembly of the United Nations has just reaffirmed by an even larger majority than in January, a political settlement entailing the withdrawal of foreign troops and the restoration to the Afghan people of their sovereign rights as an independent, neutral and non-aligned state is the only means calculated to restore peace to this region.

As regards the Middle East, Europe is the channel through which France is currently acting in the search for a solution to the conflict.

The adoption of the Venice declaration represented a decisive stage in these efforts by stressing the principles on which a just and lasting peace might be based. It stated that the time had come to encourage the recognition and application of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right of all states in the region, including Israel, to existence and security, and justice for all their peoples, implying the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The Venice declaration was followed by Mr. Thorn's European mission. The Nine are today trying to establish the basic provisions of a peace settlement.

France has also called for an end to the conflict between Iraq and Iran and for a negotiated settlement of their dispute. It consequently played an active rôle in the Security Council's deliberations on this topic in November. It supported the Council's unanimous resolution calling for a cease-fire. France naturally supports any initiative which might be taken to encourage the opening of negotiations. The French Government has also stressed the cardinal importance in these circumstances of freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz and the necessity that shipping should in no way be interfered with. It has taken certain practical measures indicative of its vigilance in this respect.

Thus, in these difficult times and faced with a resurgence of tension in the world, France remains faithful to its security policy.

France is maintaining the means of its independence by continuing its efforts on behalf of a defence which is being strengthened, diversified and modernised.

It reaffirms its loyalty to the Alliance.

It proposes realistic methods for the disarmament of our continent.

It plays an active part in any initiative which might lead to a peaceful solution to the various conflicts in the world.

It reaffirms its support for the preservation of national sovereignty in Europe and elsewhere, and of the opportunity for each state to choose and freely develop the political, economic, social and cultural system best suited to its requirements.

This fivefold effort has a single goal: peace.

I am glad to have been able to reaffirm this to you, because, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this is your own ambition, too. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT. – Minister, we are much indebted to you for the very clear and important statement which you have made to the Assembly. You have kindly said that you would be willing to answer questions. If this is agreeable to you, I suggest that questions should be answered together at the end; I know that you have other engagements and have to leave at a certain time.

I now invite members of the Assembly to put questions to the Minister.

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – This morning we had the pleasure of listening to Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany. She told us of her government's concern at the measures taken by the German Democratic Republic restricting the movement of persons between the two German states. Mrs. Hamm-Brücher expressed the wish that the guarantor four powers who signed the quadripartite agreement of 1971 should ensure that nothing was done to obstruct its full implementation.

Could the Minister tell us what is the position of the French Government, since, in view of its constant very close co-operation with the Federal Republic of Germany, it has surely taken some steps to allay this concern?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. Caro.

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – In his statement, for which I thank him, the Minister mentioned the major effort made by the French Government to increase its defence expenditure. He said that the increase would be 4 % in real terms.

Reading the French newspapers – as I do every day – one notes that, in France as in Belgium, pressure is being exerted on the working population to moderate its claims for social benefits and wage increases.

Is there not a contradiction between calling for moderation in social and wage claims,

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

because of the economic, social and monetary crisis our countries are going through, and encouraging one's partners in the Atlantic Alliance to spend more on defence?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister mentioned in his interesting speech practical measures in connection with maintaining freedom of passage through the Strait of Hormuz. We are all aware of the emphasis placed in France's growing defence budget on a programme to improve the effectiveness of French sea power. Does the Minister believe that Western European countries that are interested in ensuring western interests beyond the limits of NATO could more effectively concert security policies to bring that about?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister will be aware that relations between France and Israel have been strained since 1967. Can he tell the Assembly what were the heads of debate during the discussions that took place between the Israeli Foreign Minister and President Giscard yesterday?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Dr. Miller.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – We discussed budgetary problems this morning, and I shall refrain from assailing the Minister with questions of this kind.

However, noting the budgetary difficulties encountered by any parliamentary assembly, we tried to take a clearer measure of our responsibilities as WEU representatives, whose task it is to defend this Assembly, while at the same time bearing in mind the financial constraints arising in various areas. It would not do for WEU to find itself restricted in the performance of its duties because of such budgetary difficulties.

Could the Minister therefore tell us what is the position of France with respect to giving WEU the necessary financial means to carry out its functions properly in conjunction with its partners?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Valleix. We shall all listen with great care to the answer to that question.

I call Mr. Page.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – Would the Minister care to comment on how he feels the western Alliance might be able to help the people of Afghanistan in their fight against the oppression to which they are having to submit?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Page.

There are no other questions, but we have given you a wide range of problems to deal with, Minister, and it would be greatly appreciated if you would now give us your response.

Mr. BERNARD-REYMOND (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic*) (Translation). – Mr. President, before replying to the questions put to me, I would like to add my sympathy to that already expressed in this Chamber with the Italian Government, which in the last few days has had to face terrible difficulties. May I also express my sympathy with the victims of the disaster.

The first question, put by Mr. Caro, refers to the measures taken by the German Democratic Republic with regard to Berlin.

Now, although the quadripartite agreement has not been contravened, the measures referred to unquestionably infringe its spirit – and France of course greatly deplores this. As regards these measures, France has adopted an attitude in the form, and at the level, desired by the Federal Republic of Germany.

Another question referred to wage claims. Was there not a contradiction between calling for greater defence expenditure and at the same time taking a firm line on wage claims and calling for harder work?

To that I would reply that the level of our defence expenditure matches the degree of our concern and our analysis of the situation. That is why, given the present fresh upsurge of tension in the world, France considers it its duty, for the sake of its own security, to increase its defence expenditure. I believe I can say that this is perfectly well understood by the French people as a whole. In our country there is a very broad consensus on the need to modernise our defence and increase our efforts in this respect. What is more, as far as employees in the arms industry are concerned, this kind of question has not even crossed their minds.

One speaker raised the question of the Strait of Hormuz. We are indeed concerned by the need to maintain free movement through the Strait. As you know, an appreciable part of the French navy is deployed in the area. This is an independent decision, like those other nations are making on the spot. I do not think it is for us to pass judgment on decisions other countries might take along the same lines. France could only welcome it if other countries

Mr. Bernard-Reymond (continued)

agreed with our analysis and took the same steps.

As regards the problem of Israel I regret to have to inform the questioner that, as the President of the French Republic will be receiving our Israeli guest on Thursday, the day after tomorrow, I cannot anticipate what will be said on that occasion. I would simply express the wish that the position of France will be understood by the Israeli Government.

In reply to Mr. Valleix's question on the budget, I would point out that France pronounced in favour of the 12 % increase in the budget requested by the Assembly. In our view this does not imply a change in the status of the WEU organisation, but neither does it prejudice a degree of rationalisation of its services that WEU might deem necessary.

Finally, a question was put about Afghanistan. France is supplying food aid to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. At the diplomatic level, moreover, it has adopted the positions of which you are aware and to which I drew attention in my speech earlier on.

These, Mr. President, are the few brief comments I wish to make in reply to the questions we have just heard. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Cavaliere, do you wish to ask a question?

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I wish to thank the Minister for his expressions of sympathy to Italy in its ordeal and, through him, I should like to thank all his government and all France for the material aid which they are giving in the affected areas to help in alleviating the very serious damage caused by the earthquake and in resolving the many immense problems left in its wake.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for that intervention. It is most appropriate that a senior member of the Italian Delegation should express the Assembly's thanks to the French Government. All our governments are doing what they can. We must do even more to help the Italian people to deal with the very great disaster that has struck them.

Once again, I thank you, Minister, on behalf of the Assembly, for coming along and stating clearly your government's views. I also thank you for answering questions so competently. We might have hoped that the French Government's response to the budget would have been a little above the amount required to keep pace with inflation. However, that is not an argument to take up with you personally.

We are grateful to you for your attendance. We shall not worry you with this subject this evening, when you will be kind enough to act as our host at the reception. Thank you very much.

6. State of European security

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 858 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We now resume the debate on European security, Document 858.

The next speaker is Mr. Onslow.

Mr. ONSLOW (*United Kingdom*). – This has been a disjointed debate. I apologise for going over ground that has already been covered by my colleagues, Mr. Grant and Sir Frederic Bennett, in what they said about the report introduced by Mr. Brown this morning.

That was some time ago. Although I admire the work that has gone into Mr. Brown's report, and although the Assembly will be grateful to him for his thorough research, it is difficult to support the draft recommendation, particularly draft recommendation 6. That is why I have tabled an amendment, which has some support.

The facts that the Rapporteur has related and the facts that should be related do not justify the conclusion that European security has not diminished during the past ten years. If the Assembly drew that conclusion, it would fly in the face of other recommendations before us. I refer to those of Mr. von Hassel, Mr. Hardy and Mr. Mommersteeg. It is inconsistent with the general drift of reports that have come before the Assembly to ask us to endorse that recommendation.

Mr. Hardy drew up an excellent report on Afghanistan. In the fourth paragraph it states that the balance of forces that ensures peace in Europe is threatened by the superiority acquired by the Soviet Union in both conventional forces and continental-range nuclear weapons. The same message appears in Mr. von Hassel's report and in that of Mr. Mommersteeg. On those grounds alone the report cannot be accepted without amendment.

There are contradictions in Mr. Brown's report that would undermine our confidence. The first recommendation emphasises that there has been a major shift of military advantage towards the Soviet Union.

It states that there is a disproportionately large Soviet allocation of technological resources for defence, and a disturbingly superior concentration of tanks and divisions on the central front.

Mr. Onslow (continued)

Paragraph 2.3 draws the conclusion that the margin of advantage has shrunk drastically over the past twenty years. Paragraph 2.6 also states that the roughly static ratios of aircraft conceal an increase in the proportion of Warsaw Pact fighter-bomber and ground-support aircraft: in other words, that there are aircraft that are predicated towards a defensive rôle.

Mr. Fletcher drew our attention to the passage about the enormous increase in the Soviet navy's aggressive power and its capability to exercise a global rôle. That is spelt out in paragraphs 2.9 and 2.13. Those factors undermine the conclusion that Mr. Brown wishes us to accept. Let us consider those elements in the balance with which the report does not deal.

Paragraph 2.11 admits that the report does not deal with the tanks in any detail. Whatever conclusion one may draw about the situation on the northern flank, few of us would accept that the Mediterranean flank of the Alliance has become more stable or more secure during the past ten years. An obvious example could be given, namely, the unfortunate conflict between Greece and Turkey and the situation in Cyprus. Factors concerning the instability of the Eastern Mediterranean cannot be ignored.

For those geopolitical reasons, the report cannot be accepted in its present form. I cannot accept the statement in paragraph 2.15 to the effect that on the whole the Soviet Union's relationships with the United States and with NATO countries are more stable than in 1960. Perhaps the report was written some months ago. In the past few months there have been events in Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. There may also be a problem between Jordan and Syria.

Such events give rise to anxiety about the extent to which Europe's security has been maintained or eroded. One must remember the situation in Poland and developments in oil supplies. Indeed, our distinguished German visitor drew attention to such matters this morning. All those events give us a clear picture of military and political power shifting against Europe.

I cannot accept the thesis – despite Mr. Brown's statistical reports – that there has not been a considerable accession of military might to the Warsaw Pact that would give the Warsaw Pact a relative advantage over the position of the NATO countries as it existed ten years ago.

Look at qualitative improvements – forget quantity, feel the quality – in the Soviet

armoury of tanks, air and sea transport, electronic warfare, personnel carriers, artillery, helicopters, combat aircraft and missiles, all presenting us with a Soviet military machine geared to aggression in a way that must have diminished the security of Europe.

We have also to take account of the fact that in the past ten years some of the capabilities of the NATO Alliance have diminished. The current pressure for reinforcements in NATO nuclear weapons stems from an open admission of that fact. We have SS-20s deployed in a threatening posture against Europe. That is the reason the Americans have acceded to the move to reinforce their own nuclear theatre capability. Mr. Mommersteeg's report is clear on that, it is well established that Europe has lagged behind the aggressive potential deployment of the Warsaw Pact in this period.

A further and perhaps final issue to which Mr. Brown has not been able to draw attention in his report must nevertheless be considered. Earlier in the preparation of his report I asked him whether he could find some way of covering the important question of the morale and commitment of the forces ranged on either side to the defence of their countries and their countries' interests in the event of a shooting war. I am bound to say that I am worried about the extent to which the political will to resist with military means has been, or may have been, eroded in European countries and in the United States itself.

In the past six months or so I have been fortunate enough to see something of the capability of American forces in the United States and also as deployed in Europe. I am bound to say that it worries me greatly to see how badly the morale and the commitment of the rank-and-file American serviceman have been eroded by the extent to which his pay has fallen behind that which he should deserve. It must be a high priority of the new administration in the United States to put that right. It is also right that we should say frankly that there are many of us who are deeply anxious about the extent to which the culture of today may have debilitated the disciplines and training capabilities of some American servicemen.

To be candid, I have been greatly disturbed to learn that it has been stated by a commanding general of the American armed forces, in evidence to a Congressional committee in Washington, that 5% of his men were on hard drugs and 25% on soft drugs. These are factors that we ignore at our peril and they are not covered in this report. So I must say to Mr. Brown that I see absolutely no justification for his conclusion that the military security of Europe has not been diminished in the past ten years. I see every sign that the threat that Europe faces, should it come to a shooting war,

Mr. Onslow (continued)

is much more real, much more dangerous and much more imminent than it was in 1960 or 1970.

I say these things now to save having to repeat them in moving my amendment, which I shall do if that is necessary. I say to Mr. Brown that I see no way in which in conscience this Assembly can endorse this recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Onslow. You greatly exceeded the estimate of your speech, seven minutes. But in mitigation I understand that you are not going to take long in moving your amendment, which will undoubtedly be called unless you decide otherwise.

I ask colleagues to speak as briefly as they can. I do not like to keep interrupting, because that can lose as much time as it saves, but we shall not get through our business today without a great deal of co-operation. I do not think it does the Assembly any good to sit after half-past six and I would certainly not propose to do so on a day when we are invited on an official reception by our host government here in Paris. I want to close the proceedings and I should like to keep to the Orders of the Day if we can, so I ask speakers to keep within their times.

The next speaker is Mr. Pecchioli.

Mr. PECCHIOLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, unlike previous speakers I find some positive new features in Mr. Brown's report. I shall deal with three in particular. The first is the fact that the countries of Europe are urged not to look to the growth of military power as the way to solve international problems but rather the governments are urged to be measured and clear-thinking in that assessment of defence problems and to pursue negotiations in all cases. The second positive new feature is that the Rapporteur makes an objective assessment of strengths and recognises that, in substance, there is rough equivalence between East and West, which the West should maintain, refraining from measures which might induce the Soviet Union to follow suit, and thus trigger off a fresh arms race. Lastly, I find it of particular interest that the Rapporteur, after rightly condemning the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, in fact also criticises the retaliatory measures taken by the Carter administration without previously consulting the allies.

In a moment, I shall be speaking of our reasons for criticising other aspects of the draft recommendation and of the report. For the moment, I acknowledge that on some important points in both the analysis and the draft the

Rapporteur has rightly moved away from views which have several times been expressed in the Assembly. I am referring, for example, to analyses not backed by facts, seeking to show the existence of a firmly established imbalance to the disadvantage of NATO and to the advantage of the Warsaw Pact; I am referring to what I would call absurd proposals, seeking to resolve security problems in the crude terms of a straightforward increase in military forces, setting at naught patient efforts to find negotiated ways out; and finally, I am referring to the frequent urgings which we hear from some western quarters to stand foursquare with United States decisions, often taken without consultation and without recognising the interests and independence of every country.

Having said this, however, I wish to point to a number of contradictions which I find in Mr. Brown's report. I refer to the unclear or even ambiguous position as regards the area assigned to NATO. I think that this point should be made extremely clear; Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty defines very exactly the geographical limits of the NATO commitment and any *de facto* acceptance of the hypothesis of the extension of that area would be a serious mistake, fraught with dangerous consequences. The risk – I warn you – is not hypothetical: over the past few months there have been calls from various political quarters in Europe and America for allied intervention in the Persian Gulf area. The same thing happened previously in the case of the Middle East and today attempts are being made in some political quarters, including our Assembly, to raise the question of an assumed interest and hence the hypothesis of extending the NATO area of intervention to the South Atlantic.

In my view, these demands should be firmly rejected, not only on legal grounds connected with the fact that the treaty sets objectives, limits and areas of authority which cannot be set aside, but primarily for political reasons connected with the overriding interest of working for a negotiated solution to disputes, of not provoking fresh tensions, imbalances, reprisals and of not providing new incentives for an arms race.

I agree that the Rapporteur recognises that any extension of the NATO geographical area would give rise to deep divisions of opinion between the allies. In my view, however, it is not enough to hope to avoid such divisions by way of the famous frank and timely consultations instituted by the Ottawa declaration. What must be avoided is any involvement of the Alliance in problems outside its geographical area; rather efforts should be directed to ensuring that both the Alliance as a whole and each of the member countries follow policies which will help to resolve possible external

Mr. Pecchioli (continued)

tensions by peaceful means and to prevent such tensions from developing by resuming the process of détente. Neither the report nor the draft recommendation is clear on this point of major importance; rather, at most, they can provide cover for any American military decisions which may be wrong for the overall international situation and may involve increasing the allies' military forces – and therefore their expenditure – to take the place of American forces withdrawn from NATO missions for service in other parts of the world.

Finally, a reference to the second paragraph of the draft recommendation concerning the Soviet challenge. This contains a statement which I cannot endorse because it fails to mention that certain Soviet actions – equally to be condemned – such as the military intervention in Afghanistan, rather form part of the perverted logic which unfortunately is widely present in today's international relations, including not a few American lines of action: the logic, that is, which confuses the need to seek a balance with the dangerous bidding for supremacy. As everyone is aware, international relations are going through a very difficult and dangerous phase; there is a war in progress in the Persian Gulf; there are many sources of friction; the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is continuing; more and more is being spent on increasing arsenals when the world needs something different, needs to resolve the problems of hunger and underdevelopment, needs to face up to the problem of North-South disequilibrium, needs to invest for economic and social development, for the discovery of new sources of energy and in measures to prevent disaster and provide protection.

I too would like to express my gratitude for the sympathy shown by many members concerning the recent earthquake in Italy. I would add that this dramatic event, added to the recent earthquakes in Yugoslavia and then in Algeria, represents in some measure the whole series of human problems which are facing the international community and must be resolved. Otherwise civilisation will not advance; rather there is a danger of falling back into barbarism. Against this background therefore the resumption of détente and international co-operation and a commitment to disarmament throughout the world are the true, basic conditions for the progress of mankind. May I repeat that this positive approach is to be found in Mr. Brown's report; but in view of the contradictions which I have mentioned, the Italian communists will abstain. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Pecchioli, especially for keeping precisely to your time.

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – At the risk of compromising my colleague, Mr. Brown, I should like to express to him my pleasure, if not joy, at being at last able, in this Assembly, to give my almost unreserved approval to a report produced by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. It is an event rare enough for me to take the liberty of drawing attention to it!

When listening to some of our colleagues, unfortunately absent at the moment, particularly Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Onslow, may I be allowed to say that, although I am no horseman, I have had the impression of hearing the bugles of the Light Brigade sounding the charge? Draw sabres! Up and at them!

I would furthermore emphasise that Mr. Brown's report is a most welcome breath of fresh air after the imperialistic talk which we too often hear about the Soviet Union. What villains, daring to do what we have been doing for a century, especially having their missiles pointing towards the West! But in which direction are our own missiles pointing? Not to mention the Japanese, Chinese, Norwegian and other missiles...

Those who oppose this report seek to blind the Assembly by alleging that it describes a position in which all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.

Everything is not going so well since, if we are to believe the figures quoted by Mr. Brown – in whom I have every confidence – our countries have made considerable efforts in the matter of military expenditure. They are in fact said to have spent 70 % more than the Soviet Union and its satellites in 1970; in 1979 the West was still spending 44 % more.

This will probably prompt the retort that in the Soviet Union military expenditure amounts to 13-14 % of the gross national product. That is true, but it is still necessary to specify what the GNP of the Soviet Union represents in comparison with that of the western countries. I should like to have details of the amount spent per head of population, depending on whether the country lies west or east of the iron curtain.

We have just heard a number of speeches calling for the fulfilment of undertakings entered into – in my opinion somewhat lightly – in 1978 for the stepping up of defence expenditure by 3 % in real terms. True, this is likened to taking out a fire insurance policy with the fire brigade. But who gains by this military expenditure? I hope one day someone will have the courage to say who benefits from the profits on

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

arms contracts and whether by chance certain politicians' personal interests might not be linked with the business of some arms firm or with this or that arms deal of which there is much talk without any real effort being made to denounce it.

It is nowadays claimed that the object of military orders is no longer to make war but to create jobs. How charmingly ironic, when we consider the atmosphere which is developing today. It is time things were understood a little more clearly, and I take the liberty of suggesting to the Assembly that it should genuinely concern itself with the consequences of this arms trading, whether it is done by the East or by the West.

This report is presented to us in a context of conflict – worsened, it is true, by the economic and social crisis which Europe is experiencing, but also by predicted threats to Europe's raw material supplies. We cannot but observe that the braided watchdogs are growling both in the West and in the East! Let us hope that, provoked by their mutual fear, they will not be induced to bite each other and cause a dreadful disaster. And it might also be feared that they could be tempted to try out new techniques in order to prove their present theses.

This atmosphere of conflict is dominated by a particular sensitivity, of which there is talk at each of our meetings, concerning the balance of armaments between the communist bloc and the world of the Atlantic Alliance.

We hear various speeches and a certain right-wing element delights in spreading the idea that "the Soviet Union has now caught up with the United States in strategic armaments; its aim is superiority, creating imbalance and resulting in a relationship of forces unfavourable to the Alliance." This is a theme which we hear very often, and increasingly. It can perhaps be likened to an assertion which was made here this afternoon, to the effect that the Soviet Union and its satellites are arming themselves to the teeth with a view to aggression.

Mr. President, we must be consistent and logical. If we believe that the Soviet Union and its allies are better armed than the western world, and that their intention is to threaten and engage in aggression, then why are they not in Paris now? Fortunately, this is not how they look at things.

I am very largely in agreement with the remarks made by Mr. Pecchioli, and that is why I could so greatly reduce the extent of my intervention in this debate.

I am particularly in agreement with paragraph 6.3 of Mr. Brown's excellent report; it is

strikingly true – its truth being of a kind which we do not always dare to tell, because some people might regard it as a sign of lack of intelligence. Our colleague says:

"...there is a dangerous tendency in the United States and Europe alike, frustrated at their inability to control external events, to blame their failure on military weakness, when in reality it springs from the declining relevance of military power, especially nuclear weapons, to the daily problems of foreign relations."

These words are an illustration of the line of argument: "I didn't start it, Sir, he did!" or "He's the bad one!"

In conclusion, I am firmly opposed to Mr. Onslow's amendment. It is in fact an amendment which he is moving for the second time, as he moved it previously in Committee. He is now returning to the charge just before the vote is taken in defence of a text which reverses the whole tenor of the report and is calculated to make it say the opposite to the truth, the opposite to what Mr. Brown has actually proved to us.

As for the amendments moved by Mr. Valleix and Mr. Bozzi, I shall support them.

May I be allowed to congratulate the Rapporteur once more on his objective and truthful report. He has outspokenly told this Assembly some truths which we have not very often had the chance of hearing.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

I call Mr. Tripodi.

Mr. TRIPODI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the proof of the extent to which European security is threatened by the growing armaments and territorial expansion of the Soviet Union is to be found in incontrovertible facts. Even Mr. Brown's much-criticised report basically demonstrates the disturbing rearmament of the Warsaw Pact countries, by comparing the figures with those for the NATO countries, so that there is no need to repeat the accurate and complete data produced during the debate in speeches contradicting the rash optimism of the report.

I should prefer to take up a number of political rather than strategic points and to recommend that WEU urge the member states most strongly to discharge the duties of the Alliance with a sense of responsibility – sensibly and not crudely Mr. Pecchioli.

The first point to bear in mind is that détente and security are indivisible. However generous and noble the aim of East-West détente it will

Mr. Tripodi (continued)

be drowned in a torrent of words and will never become effective, will not guarantee peace, if Europe is not sure of being able to defend itself against the threat posed by the warlike preparations of the Warsaw Pact countries. This security is undermined by one incontestable fact; over the ten years since 1970, the Soviet military budget has increased by at least 35-37 % in real value; in the NATO countries the agreed increase in armaments at the rate of 3 % per annum became obligatory but not yet operative, only last year, except in France and Luxembourg, the only two European countries which are complying – and in France, as we have just heard from the Foreign Minister, it is increasing at the rate of 4 %.

Western Europe is therefore lagging so far behind in its own nuclear and conventional defence that it will be betraying itself, if in pursuit of détente it forgets its elementary duty of putting an end to the insecurity stemming from its own military inferiority.

It is really astonishing that yesterday, during the discussion of the von Hassel report, one member, the French communist Mr. Boucheny, was able to turn this situation upside down and to talk of western imperialism, accusing the West of provoking a return to the cold war.

The second idea I wish to stress is that détente is indivisible of itself. Détente is either worldwide or is not détente. It is inconceivable that the Soviet Union should occupy Afghanistan by armed force, should supply Iraq with two thousand six hundred tanks to use against Iran, should unsettle the African continent lying just beyond the seas of southern Europe which is also insecure as a result, and should then dare to accuse Italy or the Federal Republic of Germany of prejudicing détente because they are preparing to install Euromissiles in defence of their own territory threatened by the deadly warheads of the nuclear devices which the Kremlin is already producing at the rate of one a week.

It is more than inconceivable, it is frightening and so serious that matching security measures are essential now that frightening messages are coming out of the eastern countries regarding the threat to Polish independence. We have gone beyond the stage of vague Soviet warnings to the independent Polish unions. With Pravda and Tass the day before yesterday reproducing – and endorsing – the article from the Czechoslovak newspaper Rude Pravo hinting at military intervention in the form of “fraternal internationalist aid” against Walesa’s unions, accused of being anti-socialist, the threat of occupation is more explicit. And if Polish security is destroyed, the security of

Western Europe itself would be shaken so that if we do not persuade our countries to take measures to dissuade the Kremlin, all that we are saying is likely to remain no more than a dream.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Tripodi.

The next speaker is Mr. Banks.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, Mr. President. May I say first that I think that the report of Mr. Brown is a useful vehicle for this debate, and the debate has been stimulating for the interesting speeches that we have had.

Mr. Brown has, in my view, fallen into the trap of providing conflicting evidence. This is highlighted by paragraph (vi) in the draft recommendation which is the subject of an amendment tabled by my colleague, Mr. Cranley Onslow. In the second half of the recommendation, the Rapporteur says that equal emphasis must be placed on allocating adequate resources to defence. I wholeheartedly agree with that, but in paragraph (i) he says: “the disturbing superior Soviet concentration of tanks and divisions on the central front still exists”. To my mind, that does not give authority to the first half of the recommendation. Therefore, I fully and wholeheartedly support the amendment tabled by my colleague, Mr. Onslow.

There are other factors that lead me to the conclusion that the balance of European security has diminished. I should like to turn the attention of the Assembly to the matter of chemical weapons, which is dealt with in the report. The fact is that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact forces together have a formidable and, for some people, terrifying capability to launch and deploy chemical weapons.

There is documentary evidence that speaks of a large, well-equipped and well-trained chemical organisation as being organic to the Warsaw Pact force structure. The Soviet Union has a chemical capability which is certainly in no way matched by the forces of NATO. It is estimated that possibly one-sixth – it could even be one-fifth – of the total of Russian military munitions are chemically armed.

If we just take that fact alone, we have to come to the conclusion that the balance of forces has tilted distinctly in favour of the Warsaw Pact. That is an alarming factor and one to which the West as a whole, not only this Assembly, but NATO as well, must direct urgent attention.

In his report Mr. Brown gives us some encouraging information about the talks that have been dragging on since 1974 between the Soviet

Mr. Banks (continued)

Union and the United States in order to reach an agreement to ban the use of chemical weapons. But the fact is that agreement has not been reached and I take issue with Mr. Brown, who says in paragraph 5.19:

“ The Committee believes, however, that proposals in certain quarters of the United States military establishment for the production of a new generation of binary chemical weapons should be held in abeyance for at least twelve more months to allow more time for agreement on a chemical weapons ban. ”

In the first place, I do not think that it is for us to dictate to the United States the length of time for which it should hold back any move to produce a new generation of chemical weapons, particularly in the light of the talks that the United States alone is having with the Soviet Union. Secondly, if we did that, the United States would lose the power in its persuasive arguments to come to terms with the Soviet Union and reach an agreement.

The worst possible thing is for a party to go into those talks and say: “ We have agreed to what WEU has called for and we will not begin to produce binary weapons for a further twelve months. ” Surely, but surely, that would give the Russians a further period of twelve months to continue to delay the negotiations. Would it not be more sensible to leave the matter open and for the United States to make decisions in its own time in the light of discussions that take place? Some would say that an announcement that the United States was prepared to go ahead and start producing binary weapons would be an impetus to the Soviet Union to reach agreement. The whole of defence strategy could rest on the question of the use and deployment of chemical weapons.

In the light of those talks on the situation in Poland, which is causing concern and the fact that there are discrepancies in the report, I believe that it would be as well for the Rapporteur to refer the report back to the Committee, to give further consideration to the issues that have been raised and to elaborate on some of the sections that have been discussed in the debate.

Finally, I turn to a matter that is relevant to the report, namely, the notification of manoeuvres and movements of troops. I congratulate the Rapporteur on the way in which he has assimilated impressive evidence in the back of his report, listing the number of manoeuvres that have been reported between NATO and the Soviet Union. It is useful to be able to refer to that information, but the central point has been missed! Unless we reach an understanding with the Soviet Union about the

reporting of troop movements, we run the serious risk of reacting to an exercise or movement of troops that has not been properly reported, and that could accidentally spark off a war-retaliation situation.

That nearly happened when there was a deployment of Soviet forces over, I believe, Saudi Arabia. Those forces and air movements had not been reported beforehand and there was some alarm in NATO force structures over that surprising quantity of movements of Russian military personnel and weapons. As it happened, that turned out to be an exercise, but unless we reach an understanding that movements must be reported, there will always be a risk that a trigger could be pulled to retaliate against a threat, as seen, but not intended. That is a view I should like to have seen endorsed in the report.

I resume my seat with a plea to Mr. Brown to refer his report back to the Committee for further consideration.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Banks.

The next speaker is Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to thank the Rapporteur for his detailed report. Some things have already emerged from previous speeches, so I can be brief and confine myself to just a few points. The basic question is this: are the conclusions drawn in Parts I and VI of the report logical and imperative, or are they in need of correction? Whether or not our security has diminished is a question of balance. Whether the balance has been maintained is a question not of faith, but of the actual figures. Two and two make four, and anyone who thinks he can prove that one and two make four is trying, as many members of this Assembly constantly feel themselves justified in doing, to argue ideologically that we are maintaining our security even when the balance is impaired.

We have just heard the strange logic employed by a member of this Assembly who said that if the balance were really impaired, the Soviets would already be in Paris. As they are not yet in Paris, our balance cannot be impaired. At one time we all attached very great importance to balance because we were convinced of our defensive position and therefore of the necessity to maintain even a slight superiority.

But we should not be talking about balance alone. We should not throw dust in our own eyes in this Assembly, nor, if we take our job seriously, should we throw dust in the eyes of the public, because they are listening to what

Mr. Kittelmann (continued)

we say and decide here. The NATO decision to increase expenditure on armaments is based on the realisation that there has been a negative shift in the balance, or that there is at least a danger of a negative shift occurring. If this is right, then who can doubt that the conclusions the Rapporteur draws in his report are wrong? What would be the point of an incorrect conclusion? To give the national parliaments an excuse not to honour their commitment to a real increase in their defence budgets? It is the task of this Assembly in particular to help ensure that the national parliaments honour their commitments on the basis of the facts. I will therefore conclude, Mr. President, by urging the Rapporteur, inasmuch as his report contains certain conclusions which are not correct, to alter those conclusions and to agree to the amendments that have been tabled. That would be a great help to us all. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Kittelmann.

That concludes the general debate. I shall ask the Rapporteur and the Chairman to reply, if they so wish. Will they bear in mind that we are running late and that there is great difficulty? There is an enormous list of those who want to speak on the next report. We shall not get through our business at a reasonable hour. Therefore, I ask everyone to exercise the maximum restraint.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – Your plea to me, Mr. President, leads me to an extraordinary conclusion. As Rapporteur for the Committee, I rose at 10.31 this morning. By 10.37 you were already tapping your watch. I sat down at 10.44. It was not a bad effort to present a report of such dimensions to the Assembly in that time.

The PRESIDENT. – I do not wish to have an argument.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – With great respect, I understand.

The PRESIDENT. – You are entitled, Mr. Brown, to take as long as you like. I merely made an appeal. In fact, you took half an hour to present the report. I was told that you would take fifteen minutes. However, there is no time-limit on Rapporteurs. I merely appeal to you to exercise discretion. Indeed, you began to speak after 11 o'clock, not at 10.31.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – You and I, Mr. President, should compare watches some time. I have got a Seiko. What have you

got? We do not agree. My colleagues in the Conservative Group, who oppose the report, all exceeded their time. You did not tap your watch at them. I thought that you were using a special device and that you did that to me but not to my friends because they are conservatives. Perhaps I should change parties and join them.

I am grateful to all those colleagues who have taken part in the debate. I am most grateful to my colleague, Mr. Grant, for his kind words. They make it all the more difficult for me to make my next remarks.

I do not understand why my colleagues consider that the term "rough balance" is wrong. There is a rough balance. It was called a rough balance by everybody with whom I spoke. My colleague says that they did not mean that. He says that they were just being friendly and that was not what they meant. He is wrong. I have some figures and have published them in the appendices.

Mr. Grant and his colleagues said that the figures that I called a "rough balance" were incorrect. The onus of proof is on them. They have had several weeks in which to put this matter to their ministers and in which to consider the figures and deny them. Their ministers could have produced a series of appendices to show that I am wrong. Mr. Grant knows that we had a meeting. Our Foreign Office produced a document that purported to show that my report was not acceptable. When we held a meeting with our ministers, I showed that they were incorrect. Since then, I have done some more homework. Unfortunately, the Assembly has not got the original document on which my colleagues based their arguments against the report.

Government ministers argued that my figures on the gross national product – GNP – were wrong, and that they referred to gross domestic product – GDP. The government produced figures that purported to show that my figures were incorrect, and that they should have been based on the GDP over the past ten years. However, in the past ten years, NATO has not used GDP. It only used it for five years. Therefore, the comparison is false because such GDP figures were not available either in 1970 or before then. I could point out many other factors where the advice was incorrect.

Mr. Grant received advice from the government that was incorrect. As Rapporteur, I can only produce the evidence that I gained. If Mr. Grant wishes to challenge me on the width of that evidence and if he wishes to argue that those to whom I spoke were not representative of those in NATO who know, that is another argument. He should not argue that, because I use the term "rough balance", I conclude that

Mr. Brown (continued)

all is well. I did not use such words. Everything is not well. I drew attention to that.

One of my colleagues referred to the fact that my report was paradoxical. I can only draw facts to my colleague's attention. Of course there are paradoxes. That is one of the problems of the Alliance. It is riddled with paradoxes. Nevertheless, Mr. Grant, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Onslow should consider Appendices I and III. I shall not waste the Assembly's time by going through the figures. I beg members to look at the document and at Appendix I. The Russians are not in even greater ascendancy in any area. The gap has been narrowed; that is true.

In Committee, I dealt with specific issues, such as tanks. I explained that the Alliance's strategy did not rely on the number of tanks. It is not surprising that the Soviet Union has more tanks. It relies on that strategy. Perhaps my colleagues are right. The Alliance may be wrong. Perhaps we should have more tanks. I do not know. I was advised that the strategy was different. It is no good looking at the number of tanks and arguing that, as the Soviet Union has a greater number of tanks than the Alliance, it must hold a balance against us. That is not true.

If we take in tactics and strategy, this goes for some of the other criticisms made by some of my United Kingdom Conservative colleagues. They were saying in effect that it was nonsense to argue that there was parity because of paragraph 2.6 in my report. That paragraph spells out why I put in my speech to the Assembly the caution about crude figures. It is because when we are talking about combat aircraft, for example, the major difference is that we as an alliance do more with our combat aircraft than the Russians can do with all of theirs. Therefore, this is a significant difference in strategy. Just to say that they have more combat aircraft than we have and therefore, QED, they must be stronger, is not true and cannot be maintained.

I urge them, therefore, to look at the issue and try to appreciate that there just cannot be a statement in rebutting my report simply saying: "Of course, he really cannot use words like that." Then Sir Frederic Bennett argued that in his view the detail was not correct or was not as he would wish to see it. I cannot suppress the evidence. It is there. He may disagree with it, but, significantly, neither here nor in Committee has he produced one jot of evidence to rebut these statements in the report. He has given his subjective opinion. He has suggested what he did not want to hear; but I was not suggesting that I was writing the report with things that he wanted to hear.

I understand the difficulty of my colleagues. It is understandable because at home they have to justify spending £5,000 million more on arms. Therefore, I can well understand that they do not want to be faced with a document that shows the facts that I have produced.

I feel very much for my colleagues in their loyalty to their government.

Mr. Onslow went on to speak about items I had put down. He chose item 2.15 to identify his attack. That was where I said:

"Despite the invasion of Afghanistan, and the vagaries of the United States elections, however, the Soviet Union's relationship with the United States and NATO countries as a whole is more stable than in 1960."

That is absolutely true because in 1960 we did not have the SALT agreement. In 1960 we had none of the base agreements we have been able to achieve. I cannot believe that if President Carter had signed SALT II, a Conservative Government would have denied it.

Therefore, I say to Mr. Onslow that I cannot possibly accept his criticism of my report merely saying "Oh well, that is untrue. It cannot be." That is how it is, and I hope that perhaps, contrary to his view, there will be many more agreements. I am looking for disarmament. I am looking for arms control. I am looking for peace, and therefore this is factually true and the more we can have of it, the better I shall like it.

Perhaps my other colleagues will forgive me not answering each of their individual points. If I may come to the amendment, of Mr. Valleix...

The PRESIDENT. — We shall be taking the amendments separately.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). — I was going to give an indication of how I feel about them. I would ask Mr. Valleix to look at his Amendment 4. It does not mean very much in its present wording:

"In the framework of the Madrid meeting, negotiate the terms of a conference on disarmament in Europe"

because it does not identify who is going to do that, or where it is to be done. I draw his attention to paragraph 5.7 of the report where, he will agree, I attempted to deal with this. I began that paragraph with the words:

"The Committee believes that if review of existing confidence-building measures at the Madrid conference is satisfactory" —

and this is still going on, so we do not know —

"every effort should be made to convene a conference on disarmament shortly afterwards

Mr. Brown (continued)

to discuss the strengthening of confidence-building measures on the foregoing lines."

That it exactly what the French Government were proposing, and what Mr. Valleix has done here is just make the straight proposal that, irrespective of what happens at Madrid, somebody somewhere should go ahead.

I would say to him that I am prepared to redraft his amendment for him providing he accepts that the first part of paragraph 5.7 is operative. That is our reservation. Providing that progress is made in Madrid, we can immediately go in, at Madrid, or at the CSCE, to discuss the argument for disarmament in Europe, and perhaps in the interim he can let me know what his views are.

On Amendment 2, he is seeking to delete the word "despite" and insert "since". I ask him to carry that exercise out in fact and he will find that he finishes up by explaining that after France left the Alliance we became more cohesive. I do not really believe that is what he wants us to say.

Therefore, I would urge him to look at it and review it. I believe that he will then agree that, on balance, it would be wise not to put in the word "since", because I do not think that it attracts the answer that he really wants.

His Amendment 3 proposes to delete in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper the words "with particular provisions" leaving only the words:

"Urge member governments to maintain and improve their contribution to allied defence"

leaving out all the issue that I put in, which my report supported, with regard to the United States taking the burden of looking after areas outside the NATO area. My argument to one of my colleagues was that I do not believe we can re-devise the Brussels Treaty in the area of NATO. I would tell Mr. Valleix that I did not get the impression that his Minister this afternoon was following this argument. I would have thought that on the basis of what we have all said, and what has been said by all contributors to this debate, we were seeking defence outside Europe certainly to be maintained. All that I am saying in paragraph 2 is that we should contribute in such a way that we can release some element of support from the Americans to carry out that work in that area. I would have thought that that was well in conformity with the views of this Assembly.

Finally, Amendment 1 from my conservative colleagues seeks to leave out the words "on balance" and the words "has not diminished"

from paragraph (vi). I can only say that my words "believing that on balance" reflected my subjective judgment. I have said that European security has not diminished. I still believe that to be right. It is subjective and it is my judgment of the figures. There are colleagues who prefer to have the item read:

"Believing that European security can be secured only in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance."

I do not dissent from that view one bit. That was my view. That is the ethos of my report. The fact that I have impressed that on them urges me to accept their amendment, because if they have learnt that this afternoon, they have learnt a good deal.

I am prepared to accept their amendment. It does not do anything, but if they are pleased to have it, I am pleased to accept it.

I hope that I have dealt with all the points that were raised.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Brown, for a vigorous reply to the debate.

Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to speak?

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Onslow has pointed out that recommendations, sometimes on related if not identical matters, often contradict each other. I feel that Mr. Onslow has put his finger on a very interesting point, which calls for clarification.

I recall that at one meeting of the Presidential Committee I pointed out that it was dangerous to have several committees working on the same subject, precisely because of the risk that two different reports and recommendations on the same subject might be approved by the same assembly.

I also said this because it seemed to me that a number of matters within the competence of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments were being dealt with by other committees. I feel therefore that this question should not be passed over and I hope that consideration will be given in the appropriate place to a decision which will basically resolve itself into defending the prestige of this Assembly. And in my view, its prestige demands that the decisions which it adopts should be coherent.

I would stress one point from the wide-ranging debate which we have had: the point raised by the communists who attacked an alleged attempt by NATO to operate outside its area. It was claimed that there were attempts of the kind and implicit reference was made to a proposal of mine concerning a report on how

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

European security might be affected by the situation developing in the South Atlantic.

But we did not invent this question: everyone is now wondering whether all that is happening in various parts of the world should not be given due consideration, so that we do not allow ourselves to be surprised or overwhelmed by events. This does not mean that NATO should operate beyond its area of competence, but it does mean that an alliance cannot close its eyes, cannot ignore what is going on outside, now that distance has ceased to have any meaning. An alliance cannot ignore what may happen to lines of communication of such great importance for the supplies which are essential for the existence of Europe and the free world.

It is my hope that this subject may one day be discussed in this Assembly and I have nothing to add except that Mr. Brown has worked enthusiastically and hard.

I cannot of course support all the statements in the report but we have to concern ourselves with the recommendation; I must therefore observe that while the Rapporteur may perhaps have been over-optimistic in the explanatory memorandum, this does not apply equally to his presentation of the recommendation. But this, particularly after the amendment which he has accepted – and I think that our labour colleague can feel satisfied – should be approved even if it is not completely in line with the recommendations we have discussed and will be discussing during this session.

In conclusion, as the Committee was unable to consider the amendments, speaking as Chairman I agree with Mr. Brown and repeat that, with Amendment 1, the recommendation can be accepted, if not unanimously, at least by the very great majority of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

The debate is closed.

We now move to the amendments.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order. I proposed in my speech that this report be referred back to the Committee. We all appreciate Mr. Brown's work and there are many valuable points in the report that one would not like to be lost. We appreciate his acceptance of the Onslow amendment, but, with all the difficulties, I think that my proposal should go ahead. Cannot that question be put before the amendments are decided?

The PRESIDENT. – I did not understand your speech to be a formal moving of a dilatory motion to refer the report back, Mr. Banks, but

if you wish to move it now, I must take it. I understand that you do so wish to move and that you have given the reasons for doing so.

Does anyone wish to speak against Mr. Banks' motion?...

Mr. ONSLOW (*United Kingdom*). – Further to the point of order, Mr. President. Is it incumbent upon you to put Mr. Banks' motion now? Might it not be more helpful to the Assembly to see how far the amendments take us before Mr. Banks' motion is formally put? In other words, should not the amendments be taken first?

The PRESIDENT. – This is a matter for Mr. Banks. When a motion to refer back is moved, it is the practice of the Assembly that it be given priority over any other business. If the member concerned wishes to wait to move his motion, it may be taken later, but if Mr. Banks wishes to move it now, I am bound to put it to the Assembly immediately.

Mr. BANKS (*United Kingdom*). – In the light of the Rapporteur's remarks about the amendments, I think that it would be for the convenience of the Assembly to take the vote now, before we proceed with the amendments. I therefore beg to move, that the report be referred back.

The PRESIDENT. – Is that opposed?...

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am afraid that the interpretation from English into French must have confused me.

Is it true – and I am putting this question to the Rapporteur, because this is not what I understood, and my position will depend on his reply – that Mr. Brown accepts the whole of Amendment 1 in its present wording?

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Dejardin, I thought you wanted to oppose the reference back. Once the reference back has been moved, there can be no further debate. I may take only speeches against the motion and I will then ask the Rapporteur for his views. We cannot have a further debate on the content of the report.

Does anyone else wish to speak against?...

I call Mr. Fletcher and ask him to limit himself to five minutes as we are running very late.

Mr. FLETCHER (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I shall not need five minutes. I find it very strange indeed, when a Rapporteur has had his report subjected to the most scathing criticism and when he has responded to that criticism by accepting an amendment tabled by his critics, in particular by the most formidable

Mr. Fletcher (continued)

of his critics, that this should result in wasting the time of the Assembly, of the Rapporteur and of Mr. Cranley Onslow, who took the trouble to table his amendment, which the Rapporteur has accepted.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

Does the Rapporteur or the Chairman wish to speak? I see the Rapporteur wishes to speak.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to add only that I considered the point but I have to draw the attention of the Assembly to the fact that the only people who produced exactly the same arguments in Committee were precisely those who spoke today. We had detailed discussions and they pushed their arguments to the vote each time. I agreed to include a minority opinion in my report. It is in paragraph 7.1 of the English text. We report there exactly what was said by the same people. Today they have said exactly the same. I have tried to be helpful by going through the argument without rehearsing all the issues.

I should have liked to say a great deal more about the issues raised in the Committee. I ask the Assembly whether or not, having been so reasonable in Committee, having accepted amendments and having agreed today to accept an amendment which does not destroy the report or the recommendation, it is reasonable for me now to be asked by the same people to do something which I have done once before.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Brown.

I shall now put it to the Assembly that the draft recommendation be referred back to the Committee. That has been moved by Mr. Banks.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The motion is negatived.

We now turn to the amendments.

The first is Amendment 2, by Mr. Valleix. It relates to paragraph (iv) of the preamble. Mr. Valleix, do you wish to move your amendment?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my remark will be of a drafting nature.

Paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation begins with the words:

“Believing that despite the withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure, the ... Alliance ...”.

We proposed that “despite” should be replaced by “since”, in order to avoid a kind of cause-and-effect relationship between France’s withdrawal and the development of the Alliance. I do not think that anyone wishes to start an argument, let alone call in question a *de facto* situation of which everybody is aware.

On second thoughts, the wording of our amendment was not perhaps ideal either, and I now propose that the word “despite” be replaced by “independently of”. We should thus avoid making a value judgment about a fact the substance of which neither you nor I wish to go into.

If this new formulation could put our minds at rest, I should be very glad if the Rapporteur could accept it.

The PRESIDENT. – Could we have the view of the Rapporteur of the Committee?

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I have no quarrel with any word. I was not being derogatory. I was stating the fact that when France left the Alliance, there was still cohesion. It was meant to be not derogatory but a statement of fact. So long as the word does not imply that I am being derogatory of France, I am content to accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – You have heard that for his part the Rapporteur will be prepared to accept this textual amendment. Does anybody else wish to speak to the debate? If not, I will put the amendment.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – The word “despite” only?

The PRESIDENT. – At the moment the amendment is to delete the word “despite” and to insert the word “since”. That is the only amendment before the Assembly.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – No, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – That is the only amendment I am going to put at the moment. I cannot put the other amendments until we reach them. Mr. Valleix has spoken to the other amendments, but we cannot deal with them until we get to them. We have to deal with them one at a time.

Mr. Valleix, do you wish to speak again?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, this problem ought not to take up too much of the Assembly’s time.

Though we may have to withdraw our amendment, as we cannot obtain agreement to the word “since”, I should like to ask the Rapporteur’s opinion on replacing the French

Mr. Valleix (continued)

word *depuis* by the expression *indépendamment de*, the English translation of which is "independently of".

If this procedure could solve the problem, I should be very grateful, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – Again, I shall ask for the Rapporteur's view. This seems to me to be a very bad way to do business. I realise that there are linguistic problems with the case of the English and the French languages, but we shall not get very far if we spend all our time on these arguments.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I am only trying to be helpful. I am not concerned about the rejection of the word "since", but I ask Mr. Valleix to look at the text after he has put in the word "since". I do not know how it reads in French, but I know how it reads in English:

"Believing that since the withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure the cohesion of the Alliance has improved...".

I do not believe that that is what he wants to say, but if Mr. Valleix insists upon my accepting it, I accept it.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, may I suggest, if Mr. Valleix and the Rapporteur agree, that instead of putting in the word "since", we should insert "although France has withdrawn from the integrated military structure". Would that satisfy him?

The PRESIDENT. – I do not like this way of trying to draft in an Assembly of ninety members. We have now had three versions: "since", "independently of" and now "although". What is the wish of the Assembly? It is only part of a preamble to a draft recommendation, so I do not think we should exercise too much emotion. Mr. Valleix, what is your wish? Shall I put your amendment to the vote?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I thank the Rapporteur for his sense of humour.

Withdrawing the amendment proposing that "despite" be replaced by "since", I would ask the Rapporteur and the Assembly whether they would accept an amendment moved orally during the sitting, proposing the insertion of the words "independently of", which would enable me to escape from the comic situation in which I unwillingly find myself.

The PRESIDENT. – As an exception, I accept this rewriting of Mr. Valleix's amendment.

Is the Rapporteur prepared to accept it?

The Rapporteur will accept the amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2, as amended, is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 1, in the name of Mr. Onslow, which the Rapporteur has already indicated that he will accept.

I call Mr. Onslow.

Mr. ONSLOW (*United Kingdom*). – Lest there be any misunderstanding, I should make clear that I am grateful to Mr. Brown for accepting the amendment, but I hope that the spirit in which he appears to accept it is not the spirit in which he does so.

He suggested that the debate was one from which his critics had learnt that European security could be ensured only in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. We knew that already. It is not something that we needed to be taught. Many of us have taken an interest in defence matters for just as long as he has. I moved my amendment in order to remove the words with which we disagreed, which were based on facts that Mr. Brown had gathered but from which he had drawn the wrong conclusion, based on an inadequate study of the facts. I may seem severe on Mr. Brown, but it is important that there should be no misunderstanding. The conservatives on the Committee believe in the security of Europe, based on the Atlantic Alliance, and we welcome Mr. Brown to our ranks.

The PRESIDENT. – I hope that members will address themselves to amendments and will not go beyond them, either in support or opposition. The amendment ought to read:

"In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation... leave out the words" and so on.

Does anyone else wish to speak to the amendment?

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I have already said that I was resolutely opposed to Mr. Onslow's amendment and that this was not in itself a new text. Furthermore, when it was presented to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, it was rejected by more than two-thirds of the votes.

I do not understand how the Rapporteur can accept this amendment, which in fact embodies three different ideas: the deletion of the words "on balance", the question of whether European security – there is no reference to alliances

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

– has or has not diminished and the framework within which this security must be achieved. As I have said, these three aspects of the amendment were rejected when the Committee voted on them.

If the words “on balance” are removed, the contention is that European security has diminished, which is contrary to the whole gist of the report. Mr. Brown would then be saying in the preamble exactly the opposite of what he says throughout the seventeen pages of his report.

As regards the deletion of the words “in present circumstances”, I would remind the members of the Committee that I put to them a much more firmly worded amendment in line with a compromise proposal made by Mr. van den Bergh. According to this text, European security depends largely on the Atlantic Alliance in the present circumstances.

The removal of the words “in present circumstances” would mean my renouncing once and for all what I continue to hope, what I am fighting for, which is that Europe should one day be capable of organising its own defence, within a united framework, in an alliance, no doubt, with the United States and Canada, but a defence essentially based on the political and military will to ensure our security.

I therefore call on the Assembly to reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

If not, I call the Rapporteur to give the views of the Committee. You have indicated, Mr. Brown, that you will accept the amendment.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I know that I indicated that, Mr. President, but, having heard the remarks of Mr. Onslow, you will appreciate that I can have a second bite of the cherry. I undertook to accept the amendment in a different spirit from that shown by Mr. Onslow when he came back to the subject.

The PRESIDENT. – Order. I should rule that we are concerned with the words of the amendment and not with members' speeches.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to deal with the contribution of Mr. Dejardin, who was so kind to me in his original remarks. I am sad that we find ourselves on different sides of this argument. I ask him to bear with me.

Paragraph 7.1 records what we discussed in Committee and the opinion of the same mino-

riety which has expressed views in this debate. We refused to accept the words:

“Believing that the threat to European security has not diminished.”

We defeated that proposal and those words have not been put back. My subjective judgment is that “on balance” European security has not diminished. The preamble continues:

“in present circumstances it can be ensured only in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance”.

In considering the amendment, I read what would be left if it were included. What is left reads:

“Believing that European security can be ensured only in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.”

I accept that. I did not accept the ethos of the minority. That was soundly rejected by the Committee and it is not before the Assembly.

I think that I am justified in asking Mr. Dejardin to accept the general statement. There can be nothing wrong in that. I have been asked by the Chairman of the Committee to produce a further report next year. Perhaps we can take up this issue together with other matters that may arise. I ask Mr. Dejardin to accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly has heard the views of the Rapporteur and of those for and against the amendment.

I now put Amendment 1 in the name of Mr. Onslow and his colleagues:

1. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “on balance” and “has not diminished; that in present circumstances it”.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 3, to paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation, in the name of Mr. Valleix.

I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I understand that Amendment 3 tabled by Mr. Bozzi and myself to paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation is causing some difficulty. However, I should like to make it clear that the intention is to remove certain ambiguities regarding the notion of the division of labour within the Atlantic Alliance.

It is perfectly legitimate and necessary for Europe to try to assume a larger share of the

Mr. Valleix (continued)

burden of its own defence. On the other hand, conforming to a military strategy formulated outside Europe would create major problems, as you will appreciate. We cannot, of course, accept a kind of division of labour as between masters and servants.

But this is not really the point I am trying to make.

In view of the difficulties most of the European members of the Atlantic Alliance are having in increasing their defence effort – we have referred to this problem today, and France knows what the cost is – it can justifiably be asked whether an American withdrawal would be offset by an adequate and effective supplementary effort by Europe.

That is why I feel concerned about the strength of our European defence, with this distinction drawn, as it were, between Europe on the one hand and America on the other, with – and this may seem a shocking thing to say – America alone having the right to take an interest in the problems of the world, a right which is disputed in Europe.

I need add nothing further, Mr. President, because the amendment speaks for itself.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

Does anybody else wish to speak on the amendment?...

Can we hear the Committee's views either from the Chairman or the Rapporteur?

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). – There may be a translation problem. Everything that has been said is covered in paragraph 4.8. At the end, that paragraph refers to defence outside the NATO area. In that area the Americans bear the weight of the burden. If France wishes to bear that burden as well, that is for France to decide.

My report says:

“the European NATO allies must be prepared to plug any gaps that may be left in Europe by the redeployment of mobile United States forces – in particular, units of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean – or by the reallocation of reserves based in the continental United States.”

That is a major element that should be included in the recommendation. NATO must bear in mind such factors.

If Mr. Valleix is under the impression that I am arguing some other case, I should point out that I am not. Paragraph 4.8 faces the reality that the Americans may have to redeploy their

forces in other areas in which NATO is not allowed to operate.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly has heard the Committee's views. I shall now put the question on Amendment 3, which stands in the name of Mr. Valleix. The amendment states:

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “with particular provisions” to the end of the paragraph.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

I have been advised that Mr. Valleix wishes that Amendment 4 should be moved in a different form. I shall read out the text that has been given to me, Mr. Valleix, so that you can see whether it is right. Instead of the words on the notice paper, to put:

“Urge member governments at the Madrid meeting to seek to negotiate the mandate of a conference on disarmament in Europe in the framework of the CSCE.”

That wording will replace the formula on the printed document. I understand that that has been agreed to by the proposers of the motion and by the Rapporteur. Do you wish, Mr. Valleix, to move the amendment? Perhaps you could do so quite quickly.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – That is in fact the final form of the text, Mr. President, and I apologise for this redrafting.

I thank the Rapporteur for drawing attention to this redrafted version of the amendment, which is more consistent with the fact that we are addressing the Council. For it is right that we should “urge governments”.

Furthermore, according to the new formula, the conference on disarmament in Europe should be planned in the framework of the CSCE – on which point I was fully in agreement from the outset with the clarification desired by, I believe, the Rapporteur.

This being so, Mr. President, if the Rapporteur is willing to accept the amendment as read out by you, and if this Assembly consequently also agrees to consider it, I think we shall be putting the recommendation in a context which was proposed in Madrid and has been accepted by the Nine and in the framework of NATO. I think that we shall be suggesting a vigorous follow-up to Madrid, in the framework of the CSCE, and that this will round off in an appropriate manner the important recommendation proposed by the Rapporteur.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Valleix.

The President (continued)

The amendment has been moved.

Does anyone else wish to speak to the amendment?...

Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to speak?...

I understand that it is acceptable to the Committee. I shall put Amendment 4, as redrafted, to the Assembly.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4, as amended, is agreed to.

I now put the draft recommendation to the Assembly. If there is no opposition I can dispense with the formality of a roll-call.

Is there any opposition?...

I call Mr. Deschamps.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the French communist representatives will vote against the draft recommendation, for we do not agree with its analysis of an alleged Soviet military threat, or with the call for a strengthening of European military power under the direction of America. We consider that it is the plans for the installation of American missiles which constitute a threat to the peace of Europe. We attach great importance to the defence of our country, France, and we do not accept any European defence in any form or under any pretext.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Deschamps.

As there is opposition, we must proceed to take a roll-call on the draft recommendation.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Antoni.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	51
Ayes	37
Noes	1
Abstentions	13

The amended draft recommendation is therefore adopted².

1. See page 37.

2. See page 38.

7. Energy and security

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 856 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – We now move to the next Order of the Day, which is the debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on energy and security, to be presented by Mr. Flämig, Document 856 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Flämig to introduce his report.

Mr. FLÄMIG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it would surely be carrying coals to Newcastle to make a long speech before this Assembly on the need to ensure our security by safeguarding energy supplies as well. “No more imported oil” is the slogan. The question is, how? There has been no shortage of fine speeches, and at summit conferences the governments of our member states have taken decisions, which, sadly, scarcely a single country has observed. In Venice, for instance, our leading statesmen advocated a new coal and nuclear policy as the only medium-term solution to the energy crisis. But only a few countries show any signs of translating these decisions into practical policy.

Therefore, Mr. President, after careful consideration in the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, we call, first, for convergent energy measures and, in co-operation with the United States of America, Canada and Japan, a global economic strategy, including provision for the necessary financial means.

But we see as the primary need the implementation of common plans for the greatest possible energy self-sufficiency. This means better use of existing energy sources, it means more effective energy conservation measures, and above all it means the replacement – wherever possible – of oil by other energy resources such as coal, nuclear means and renewable energy resources.

As regards coal, it would undoubtedly be advisable to implement the recommendations of the International Energy Agency coal industry advisory board. But it should be realised that oil cannot be replaced by coal alone. For one thing, in the long term, coal is far too precious to be sent up the chimney simply to generate heat. Future generations, Mr. President, will still be valuing coal highly as a raw material for the chemical and pharmaceutical industries. For another, imported coal will undoubtedly rise in price on the world market more rapidly than we would like, increasingly rivalling the market situation of crude oil.

Mr. Flämig (continued)

We therefore have some specific proposals to make on the generation of electricity. Generating electricity with coal and oil may be an obvious solution for countries fortunate enough to have significant coal reserves or to be sitting on enormous stocks of oil. But it is not an elegant solution. And it may also be a very selfish one when we remember that many, many countries have neither coal nor oil of their own.

The use of natural gas to generate electricity must be completely rejected. As a high-grade source of energy, natural gas should really be reserved for domestic use and the chemical industry.

The solution we recommend, Mr. President – and the Committee agreed unanimously on this – is the use of nuclear energy for electricity generation. But we know that supplies of uranium are not inexhaustible either. We therefore propose that the member governments take steps to make better use of uranium. And here we see the best practicable solution for the medium term in the development of the fast-breeder reactor, which makes about fifty times better use of uranium, and of the pressurised-water reactor, which at least uses uranium eight times better.

We have been told that it is foolish to recommend a reactor system that is not yet in commercial operation anywhere. But, Mr. President, the same people recommend the development of nuclear fusion or the use of wind energy and the conversion of solar energy as alternative methods of generating electricity. Against this, experts who have visited research centres in the United States of America, France and the Federal Republic of Germany all agree that the generation of energy by nuclear fusion will hardly be technically feasible before the year 2020, let alone cost-effective, and that in our latitudes at least, wind and solar energy will account for no more than a small percentage of electricity production.

Why? Because of technical factors, including the unalterable fact that the sun only shines by day, the wind does not always blow, electricity cannot be stored in large quantities and also because nuclear energy is used to generate the base load, that is the electricity which must be guaranteed night and day, around the clock.

The fast-breeder has been in successful operation for many years as a test reactor in France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and, on a smaller scale, in Karlsruhe in the Federal Republic of Germany. France is at present building a commercial-size fast-breeder reactor, known as the Super Phénix, with a capacity of

about 1,200 megawatts, because the Phénix, with a capacity of some 300 megawatts, has proved to be reliable and also safe. Hence our proposal to make better use of uranium by means of the fast-breeder reactor.

Finally, Mr. President, in addition to these technical demands, we recommend to our member governments some extremely important political measures. We consider it necessary for agreement to be reached as soon as possible on the acceptable threshold for imports of energy and raw materials from the eastern bloc countries beyond which the safety of our free economy, not to speak of our military security, would be endangered. These considerations must, of course, also extend to the shipping lanes, such as the Strait of Hormuz, the closure of which could not fail to have disastrous consequences for the free world's energy supplies.

To conclude, I should like to make a slight correction to our draft recommendation, Mr. President. I would ask you to delete the two words "or thorium" in the fourth line of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation, because thorium cannot be used in either fast-breeders or pressurised-water reactors, which are no more than improved light-water reactors. It is used in high-temperature reactors, to which we have deliberately not referred in our draft recommendation.

We call on the Assembly to adopt our recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Flämig.

I ask the fourteen members who have put down their names for this debate to limit themselves to five minutes so as to give us a chance of finishing it tomorrow.

The debate is open.

Dr. Miller is the first speaker.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – It is a pity that such an important subject has to be condensed, but I appreciate the necessity for brevity. I congratulate the Rapporteur on an excellent report, which goes into detail on matters that have involved the Council of Europe Energy Committee for some time.

The report has implications for every western nation, and it connects energy with security. It was because they had no energy resources of their own that the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour on 7th December 1941. Their object was to knock out the United States quickly, so as to allow Japan a free hand in the oil-rich area of South-East Asia. That shows how lack of energy resources can lead to war, or at least to the breakdown of the economy of any country without energy resources.

Dr. Miller (continued)

In this respect, Western Europe does not fare well. I do not intend to list the energy limitations of all the countries of Western Europe, but only the United Kingdom has a supply of all three fuels that provide the bulk of our energy – coal, gas and oil.

Britain requires, every year, the equivalent of the energy produced by 350 million tonnes of coal. Last year, we produced a little over 100 million tonnes of coal and the National Coal Board is optimistic about increasing it to 115 million or 120 million tonnes. That is still only one-third of British requirements. Britain's needs are presently met to the extent of about 30 % by coal and about 6 % by nuclear energy, and the rest – almost two-thirds – by oil and gas.

Our oil and gas will be exhausted not in a century or two but in the lifetime of our children, so nuclear energy is essential. I know the expert, or so-called expert, views about the dangers of nuclear energy, and it would be wrong to say that it carries no risk. But everything carries a risk. We would never have developed the internal combustion engine if it had been known at the time that 50,000 people would be killed every year on the roads of the United States alone and that motor cars would travel on nothing but a rim of air in tyres. People would have said that there was too much danger of the tyres bursting. It is wrong to say that there is no risk. The risk has to be calculated against the advantages that nuclear power can bring.

I want to say a word about conservation: the biomass, wind power, sea barrages, and solar energy. According to the scientists who are involved in this, although these are coming they are a long way off. In terms of conservation they make no more than a very marginal improvement to the energy situation.

It is absolutely clear that eventually we shall have a clean nuclear energy, which will supply all our electrical power – clean in the sense that there will be practically no radioactive fallout from it. This will come when we are able to produce the fusion process from one or more of the isotopes of hydrogen. That will come from ordinary water or from sea water. There is an abundance of sea water. Even countries which have only little water will have to import relatively small amounts of water in order to produce as much electrical power as they need. It is essential that before that time the oil that we have is used mainly for transport purposes.

As the Rapporteur said, oil and coal are far too valuable to be used for purposes other than transport. Unless we want to leave to the

generations that are to come immediately after us – I am not talking about a hundred years from now but about those who are being born at the moment, and who are young at the moment – a horrific energy problem for which they will not thank us, it is essential that right now we expand our nuclear energy procurement.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, in view of your call for restraint, I shall refrain from speaking now although I shall take two minutes when I move my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – That is a most helpful contribution, Mr. Hardy. Thank you very much.

Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – A little while ago, Mr. President, a colleague asked me what energy actually had to do with security – was it not something entirely unconnected with defence problems? I believe it is actually one of the most important things, for once your energy is gone you can no longer defend yourself. Moreover, it is quite possible for the struggle for energy supplies to lead to conflicts in which defence plays quite an important rôle.

Looking at the present situation, we must be clear about the need for the member countries of Western European Union to make every effort to reduce oil consumption, not only for the sake of our own future – we know that oil is getting more and more expensive and will one day run out altogether – but also on grounds of international responsibility. Responsibility for the third world, which can no longer cope with the burden of rising oil prices, yet still needs this raw material for development in the coming decades, obliges us to use oil sparingly.

Mr. Flämig's report shows an admirable approach to the detailed problems arising in this respect, but it struck me that one of the most important points receives only two paragraphs, under the heading "Energy conservation", which would be better termed "Oil-saving". Our best chance today of winning the battle against increasing oil consumption is to make greater efforts in the field of energy savings. In my country most of the oil we use goes up the chimney – that is it is used for heating. This is exactly the area in which appreciable savings could be made through the insulation of buildings and the introduction of area heating in towns, for instance.

I really do wonder why member countries are not giving some thought to drawing up large-scale programmes to implement and finance such thermal insulation measures. We have

Mr. Müller (continued)

large numbers of unemployed in our countries. It would make much more sense to employ many of them productively on thermal insulation programmes instead of keeping them on social security benefits. A study by the Prognos-Institut in Basle shows, in the case of my own country, that 40 % of the costs of heat insulation programmes could be met by the concomitant savings in unemployment benefit.

New forms of energy, which have also been mentioned, will not do much for us. Of course, I too am in favour of solar energy, wind energy, thermal pumps and tidal energy, wherever needed; but they can cover no more than 5 %, perhaps at the most 10 % of our energy requirement. This leaves only two other energy sources: coal and nuclear power. For certain reasons, coal can no longer be used to the extent which many people think. The results of the world climate conference in Geneva made this clear. Forests, withering far away from coal-fired power stations because the waste gases are carried thousands of kilometres through the atmosphere, reveal the dangers inherent in the use of coal. CO₂ and SO₂ discharges are dangerous. The only reasonable option remaining – and here I must expressly support the previous speaker, Dr. Miller – is nuclear power. We owe a vote of thanks to those governments like the French which have the courage to pursue the use of this energy. Perhaps we ought to be a little sad about governments who lack faith in the future of nuclear energy. Only if we are prepared to explain to our fellow citizens how important nuclear power is to the future of our countries – I should mention at this point that the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* reported in March of this year that in my own country the failure to take decisions about the German economy for the next ten years has already resulted in damage amounting to billions of Deutschmarks – only if we explain this too to our fellow citizens, will we be able to guarantee our security and energy for the future as well.

Let me make one final point. The last paragraph of the draft recommendation, which takes for granted the need for a contingency plan, has my wholehearted support. We are all in the same boat. If the boat springs a leak we all have to start baling. No member country of WEU can stand aside from joint contingency plans to safeguard oil supplies passing, for example, through the Strait of Hormuz. We cannot ask one country to pull another's chestnuts out of the fire. Let me repeat, we are all in the same boat.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

I hope that members will keep to within five minutes. I know that the subject is immensely important, but its relevance to the Charter of this Assembly and the Brussels Treaty is, to say the least, not central. Although it is important, we must try not to devote the rest of the week to the subject. Therefore, I ask members to try to keep to five minutes each.

Mr. Antoni is the next speaker.

Mr. ANTONI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, our Rapporteur has done a great deal of work in compiling and writing his report and we wish to pay tribute to him for his efforts. The basic data he has provided are a most valuable contribution to a detailed knowledge of the subject, particularly as regards the actual figures for energy resources, consumption and exchanges between the Community countries – and not between them only – including the eastern countries.

We can therefore base our discussions on a number of facts which we did not have before. We are unable to be wholly positive in our judgment of the Rapporteur's conclusions and, therefore, of the document now before us. We agree that a common energy policy is essential for a common economic policy and that energy involves security problems. The truth is that a common policy is still a long way off in Europe. Which means that there are political obstacles and knots to be unravelled. These problems are primarily of European origin – I am thinking of economic relations within the Community and with the United States and of monetary questions – but more generally the question is how a period of economic stability can be achieved in Europe and the world. This is inconceivable if peaceful relations cannot be established permanently between the countries of the world. For Europe this basic condition is inescapable. The world is today economically interdependent quite regardless of the individual régimes of the various countries.

Events and facts have always driven “self-sufficiency” more and more into co-operation – in the case of energy also – at least as a practical necessity. Hence the concepts of complementarity, integration, economic participation and so on.

What is needed therefore is a wider pattern of collective security based on peace, arms cuts and disarmament. The need for a new international economic order is very widely accepted.

This morning, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, recalled very effectively in her address to the Assembly, how the political and

Mr. Antoni (continued)

economic situation had, on the contrary, deteriorated badly in recent years both in the East and in the West. She spoke of the dangers of economic instability and realistically stressed the need for friendly relations between countries—a point taken up a moment ago by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In the case of energy, the danger is that the search for supposed security conditions may hide the true facts of the problem, and instead of seeking to remedy this situation may in fact end by making it worse or at least creating new disagreements and contradictions. Quite clearly this is not the essential condition for security which is being sought.

In our view, the draft recommendation does not go deeply enough into this danger. Undoubtedly the solution lies in an energy policy which should be as completely common and harmonised as possible.

Are we really convinced that a single grouping of all the oil-importing countries is sufficient and therefore capable of moving towards a common energy policy as a realisable objective?

We are faced by widely differing situations: it is one thing to have to import practically all one's oil, as in the case of Italy and other European countries; it is quite another thing to be a major oil producer, as the United States and the United Kingdom are or are becoming.

The policies of the big oil companies financed wholly or mainly by American capital are being sharply criticised not only by the progressive Arab countries but also by countries closer to the United States. We must therefore avoid aligning ourselves with this kind of policy for supplying energy and benefiting from its distribution.

It is only by clearing up these two points—in particular the question of inequalities and imbalances—that it becomes possible to make realistic proposals for moving towards an energy policy of the kind suggested in the report.

Nevertheless, a number of facts should be realised. The vast amount of information available and the wide range of sources of energy supplies contribute effectively to autonomy. This moreover is the line now being taken by some European countries and their governments—for example, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy—which have reached agreement on the construction of a gas pipeline running from the USSR. If I remember correctly Austria, Switzerland and other countries are also associated with the project. It is hard to believe, on the other hand, that it would be right for Italy to have to continue

to depend on Algeria and the Netherlands alone. We are in favour of more detailed research aimed at diversifying sources of energy in Europe: we insist that energy must be saved.

We know that the hypothesis of a development with domestic product increasing at the same rate as energy consumption is quite untenable. It is a fact, however, that in order to remove the inequalities I mentioned a moment ago supplies matching rates of development must be guaranteed, especially in the most backward countries.

Much of course depends on research, on how it is carried out, by whom and for whom. Incidentally, during the Committee's recent visit to the North Sea platforms we learned that exploration for hydrocarbons in the Mediterranean and particularly in the Adriatic was about to be abandoned.

But, on the other hand, at a recent meeting with the Committee of the Council of Europe the Greek Minister for Energy spoke of similar exploration which his government expects to undertake with success in the same or adjacent areas. Co-ordination of exploration in this field is of fundamental importance.

In our view, to accept the impossibility of self-sufficiency in abstraction means bending every effort to diversifying the sources of energy: this is the way to limit or eliminate our dependence on oil and thus to avoid among other things becoming dependent in other directions which are hardly likely to be less burdensome.

We therefore consider that Europe should also concentrate on renewable forms of energy which are available here in greater quantity than elsewhere—for example, solar and wind energy, etc.; more coal must be used. We must not conceal from ourselves that increased coal consumption will create health and environmental problems; the idea that pollution is unavoidable must be contested.

The International Energy Agency is of the opinion that in total the sums invested by the various countries are insufficient. Action must therefore be taken to remedy this shortfall so as to make sure that development is not accompanied by even more damage to health and destruction of the environment.

The diversification of energy sources also includes some use of nuclear energy. All the more reason, therefore, for substantially improving the quality of energy policy in Europe having regard to the present state of ignorance and the need to remove dangers.

A more common and less dependent energy policy providing some kind of alternative to the present state of affairs is therefore desirable.

Mr. Antoni (continued)

We have indicated some of the conditions which we consider to be essential; we trust that you, Mr. President, the Rapporteur and representatives will take due account of them, convinced as we are that without them it will be very difficult to ensure the development and security of Europe and of our countries.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Antoni.

I propose to call two more speakers, Mr. McGuire and Mr. Osborn, and then to adjourn the debate. We shall have to continue it tomorrow, perhaps after the ministerial statement, but that depends on when we finish the debate on the previous business.

I call Mr. McGuire, and ask him to keep to five minutes.

I understand that Mr. Valleix wishes to raise a point of order.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – I take the floor on a point of order.

I think that we should continue the debate as arranged, since otherwise nobody will know, tomorrow, who has said what.

As I said yesterday when speaking about the Orders of the Day, this debate must be brought to a conclusion tomorrow morning, even though this may entail our accepting strict discipline as regards speaking time. I do not think that Mr. Mommersteeg's report would benefit by our adopting a different procedure, since there would be a danger of its being scamped if it were examined tomorrow morning before the address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and the election of the Clerk of the Assembly. Nor do I think that this would add to the clarity of the debate.

The speakers will be present tomorrow morning, but not necessarily at the end of the morning. Indeed, I understand that the Rapporteur himself would be unable at that time to answer the various speakers personally.

The PRESIDENT. – This is the difficulty that we are in. The Mommersteeg report has also been put down, and everyone knows that it is the first business for tomorrow. That Committee and its Rapporteur are in the same difficulty that we are in. We shall just have to try to get both in tomorrow. I should prefer to continue this debate after the discussion of the Mommersteeg report. Otherwise we shall have to sit late tonight, and the rules say that we must finish at 6.30 p.m. unless we make special provision.

Does the Assembly wish to continue the debate tonight? One of the problems is that not every speaker will keep to five minutes.

Some members have gone, because I said earlier that I would adjourn at 6.30 p.m. I think that we should go on to 6.30, continue the debate tomorrow, and see how we get on.

I call Mr. McGuire.

Mr. McGUIRE (*United Kingdom*). – If we are to finish at 6.30, I shall have time to say only "Hallo" and "Goodbye". I take it that you are allowing me five minutes, Mr. President. I shall try to keep to that. I do not want your pleas to fall on stony ground, and I shall cut out much of what I intended to say.

I add my congratulations to the Rapporteur, because his report, like many others on the subject, helps to concentrate our minds. The references to poor countries show that we are blessed with an abundance of energy that is still relatively cheap, compared to the primitive energy resources of those poor people.

I turn to the subject of coal and nuclear power. In the House of Commons we have a debating chamber. Sometimes we refer to what has been said in the debate. I am sorry that my colleague, Dr. Miller, has gone. He probably thought that we would have adjourned by now. He said that the solution to the problem of a continuous supply of energy rested with the nuclear power problem. The fast-breeder reactor is still only in the development stage. The stage beyond that is fusion. Dr. Miller pointed out that that was our only hope.

Nuclear power has been consistently oversold. I am not arguing that people have undersold the calamitous consequences of a large accident. There have been minor accidents at nuclear power stations. In Britain, there is a powerful lobby that consistently oversells nuclear power. When I was a coal-miner, I looked on it with a jaundiced eye. In 1954 a Conservative British Government made a promise that was sustained by the succeeding Labour Government, of which I was a humble supporter. The government promised that nuclear power would be so cheap that there would be no need to meter it. They promised that the people would get it for next to nothing. That has not happened.

People trim their sails a little when it comes to the Three-Mile Island accident. It is wrong, both intellectually and morally, to make comparisons with the invention of the internal combustion engine. Eighty years ago, a chap might have said that he had heard of a new invention – the motor car. People would have spoken about the consequences of that invention. The consequences of a motor car accident, a pile-up on the motorway, or an air crash are nothing when compared with the terrible damage that an Armageddon at a

Mr. McGuire (continued)

nuclear plant would cause. Nuclear power has been oversold, but its safety has been undersold.

I am pleased that the report mentions coal and the fluoridised bed. That shows that new technology is being used. The fluoridised bed offers considerable saving and will give rise to the use of cheap coal. The proper peroration to any speech on this subject is contained in the last sentence in the Appendix to the report which states:

“We, who represent seven large industrialised countries of the free world, are ready to tackle our own problems with determination and to work with others to meet the challenges of the coming decade, to our own advantage and to the benefit of the whole world.”

The PRESIDENT. – I ask Mr. Osborn to speak. I shall then ask the Assembly to adjourn.

Mr. OSBORN (*United Kingdom*). – This debate is a cry for a common energy policy in Europe, and was initiated by Mr. Flämig. Unlike the last speaker, he has positive policies for a nuclear programme that is part of the whole, and he praises the fast-breeder reactor. I endorse that.

Mr. Flämig and I have worked together in the Energy and Research Committee of the European Parliament. He has my respect. Since 1973 and the Yom Kippur war, I have been a member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in WEU. I have also been Vice-Chairman of a Conservative Energy Committee in the House of Commons. I have also been a member of appropriate committees in the Council of Europe.

I have always thought that there was a need for a European or EEC approach. I have been aware that Britain has made a national approach. I am glad that Mr. Flämig chose energy and security as his theme. That is what it is all about. This year I have made several speeches, not only in the British Parliament, but in the Council of Europe. I welcome the fact that the Committee has considered the security of energy supplies and that it will continue to consider that subject.

What are the implications in terms of price and in terms of industry? It is for the European Parliament to consider this problem and, perhaps the Council of Europe. WEU can inject the importance of security of supply. I endorse paragraph 12, in which Mr. Flämig says that a true Common Market can hardly exist without a common energy policy.

In paragraph 16 Mr. Flämig points out the contribution that Great Britain can make. That is valid. In paragraphs 74 and 75, Mr. Flämig talks about our reliance on the Gulf, and about what would happen if that supply should dry up. He discusses how that could affect our relationship with the United States of America. Therefore, this subject is relevant to the work of WEU.

You and I, Mr. President, are members of parliament who represent Sheffield constituencies. The British Steel Corporation, independent steel producers, the refractories industry and the clay industry of South Yorkshire, Sheffield and the Midlands say that they pay the highest price in Europe for gas and oil. Is that true? The Confederation of British Industry has backed up that statement. I have asked the CBI to refer this issue to UNICE, its counterpart in Europe, and to members of the European Parliament.

Britain's Department of Industry repudiated that statement. In paragraph 31 Mr. Flämig refers to an interesting fact that concerns his country. He points out that the Federal Republic of Germany imports 17% of its gas requirements from the Soviet Union. That is probably true. Italy and Austria import a fair amount from Algiers, Tunis and Libya, via the Mediterranean pipelines. Our British competitors buy their energy cheaply from insecure places, so forcing excessive unemployment on British industry.

Given that Mr. Flämig comes from West Germany, I hope that he will look into the fact and discover what industry pays for the gas and oil that it uses. I do not believe that Britain pays a higher price. Not all British industry will agree with me. There must be industrial comparability and fair competition. The EEC's rôle is to ensure that that is so. I hope that Mr. Flämig will inject his experience into that field.

In the interests of security, we must have secure energy supplies. We may have to pay a price for them. The main recommendation is important and I endorse it. It states:

“To adopt, in the absence of agreement to implement a stringent Western European policy, convergent energy measures.”

I also endorse the thoughts expressed in paragraph 12.

I congratulate Mr. Flämig on his first step. He should know that when getting secure supplies of energy is proving painful to British industry it is right that a body like this should look into it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Osborn.

I now propose to adjourn the sitting.

8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday 3rd December, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 859 and Amendments).
2. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly.

3. Address by Mr. van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
4. Energy and security (Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 856 and Amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 6.40 p.m.)

TWELFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd December 1980

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 859 and Amendments).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Mommersteeg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Bernini, Mr. Baumel, Mr. van Hulst, Lord Duncan-Sandys.

4. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly (Doc. 857).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim, Mr. Stoffelen; (points of order): Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Spies von Büllenheim; the President; (point of order): Mr. Hawkins.

5. Address by Mr. van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Speakers: The President, Mr. van der Klaauw (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*).

6. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly (Doc. 857).

7. Questions to Mr. van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Replies by Mr. van der Klaauw to questions put by: Mr. Jager, Mr. Portheine, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Konings, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Bozzi, Dr. Miller, Mr. Deschamps, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Mommersteeg, Mr. Page, Lord Duncan-Sandys.

8. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly (Doc. 857).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Reddemann.

9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous two Sittings have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

I would stress again the importance of all members and Substitutes acting as Representatives signing the Register in the new circumstances of the rule.

1. See page 41.

3. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 859 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The first Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 859 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Mommersteeg, the Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*). – In the eighteen months since the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments first considered preparing a report which would have dealt with the future of the British and French nuclear forces, a good deal has happened. In particular, the continually changing prospects for a SALT II agreement led the Committee to decide that the report should deal with British and French nuclear forces in the context of the SALT process and of course in the context of the nuclear balance as a whole.

Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)

The Committee has devoted considerable time to this report, as explained in the introductory note. I should particularly like to thank those members of the French and British parliamentary defence committees who met us on separate occasions to discuss the theme of the report. I also thank those ministers, officials, senior officers and experts with whom your Rapporteur has discussed the subject of the report. Last, but not least, I express my gratitude to Mr. Whyte, who, throughout this entire intensive exercise, assisted me with great expertise.

I shall not go over the whole report today, since it speaks for itself, but I shall comment on one or two recent events which concern its subject matter and finally deal with the operative text of the draft recommendation. Chapter II and Appendix I of the explanatory memorandum describe the global nuclear balance as it stands at present. If this analysis proves anything, it shows how difficult it is to measure quantitatively such concepts as balance or parity.

If we take the numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, land- and sea-based, the Soviet Union can be shown to have superiority, with 2,280, compared with 1,700 for the United States. However, in numbers of warheads of the same weapons systems, the Americans have superiority, with 9,200 to 6,500. If we limit the analysis to the longer-range theatre weapons systems, we find a Soviet superiority of 2,800 warheads, compared with 1,200 for the total French, British and United States' systems considered in Appendix I.

However, as the Committee points out, the balance is not static. All the nuclear forces on both sides of the nuclear curtain are undergoing continual improvement, particularly in military capability, with each succeeding generation of weapons. The majority of the Committee believe that there is broad parity in nuclear weapons today and that the context of SALT II, if it formally entered into force, would be to the mutual advantage of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

But there are disturbing trends in the longer term which make an early SALT agreement and, above all, the continuation of the SALT process negotiations all the more urgent to prevent the nuclear arms race from getting out of control. Only two days after the Committee adopted this report at its meeting in Rome, there were press reports that the Soviet Union had launched a new type of strategic missile submarine, Typhoon, with a displacement estimated at 30,000 tons, compared with the 18,700 tons of the United States' largest Ohio class.

Although this submarine carries only twenty missile-launching tubes, compared with the twenty-four of the Ohio, its larger displacement has led to speculation about the use to which the larger space available can be put.

A week later, there were reports that the United States Ohio programme itself was encountering building delays and that the first may not be commissioned until 1982, with the danger that the number of United States operational strategic submarines might briefly decline from forty-one to thirty-two, although it is possible for the United States to compensate to some extent by increasing the number of MIRVs on its seagoing missiles from ten to forty.

The report deals with the NATO decision of 12th December last year to modernise the long-range theatre nuclear forces by deploying 572 new weapons, reducing the number of United States warheads in Europe by 1,000, and at the same time offering to include "certain United States and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems" in arms control efforts designed to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides.

Prior to the December decision last year, the Committee submitted to the Assembly its report on new weapons and defence strategy, which included the draft that became Recommendation 345, although the Assembly, through lack of a quorum last December, was able to adopt it only in June of this year. In that recommendation the Assembly called in particular for the necessary decisions to be taken:

"to ensure that the growing imbalance between Warsaw Pact and NATO long-range theatre nuclear forces is corrected in due course"

and for such decisions to be accompanied by a firm offer to enter into arms control negotiations with a view to limiting long-range theatre nuclear force deployment on both sides.

At the same time, the recommendation urged that reliance meanwhile should be placed:

"on the whole range of existing weapons systems based in Europe, at sea, and in the United States to counter the threat posed by present levels of Soviet weapons."

The Committee remains opposed to any concept of a separate Euro-strategic balance, which could only serve to decouple European security from the global United States deterrent.

In its reply to Recommendation 345, the Council agrees with the Assembly on the need for the Alliance to maintain sufficient forces to ensure adequate deterrence. The twofold

Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)

NATO decision of 12th December of last year has been taken. It is a fact. There has been much doubt as to whether the Soviet Union would be prepared to enter into negotiations on long-range theatre nuclear forces which had been called for both by NATO and this Assembly. For the Soviet Union demanded again and again cancellation of the first part of the NATO decision as a precondition of such negotiations. It took the meeting between Chancellor Schmidt and Mr. Brezhnev for the Soviet precondition to be withdrawn, notwithstanding that Chancellor Schmidt refused to yield to the Soviet demand.

Therefore, in the draft recommendation which the Committee submits today the Assembly is asked to consider that the NATO decision of 12th December is a realistic basis, at least in the sense that it is a workable basis, for negotiating reductions of long-range theatre nuclear forces with the Soviet Union. In the meantime, I realise that such negotiations, as all negotiations on limitations of nuclear armaments, will be very complicated and difficult.

I turn now, Mr. President, to the British and French nuclear forces. The preamble of the draft recommendation notes that, provided there is no reduction in conventional defence:

“the view is held in the Alliance that the independent centres of decision add to the uncertainty facing Soviet planners, which is an essential factor of deterrence.”

The day after the report of the Committee was adopted, President Giscard d'Estaing, speaking on French television, described his personal responsibility for the employment of this force:

“The responsibilities of the President of the Republic mean that he alone must and can take decisions where deterrence is concerned... These are decisions which, if taken, are taken without any intermediary between the President of the Republic and the executive.”

Press comment showed in some detail how a presidential decision on the use of French strategic forces would pass directly from the President of the Republic through the *Centre d'Opérations des Forces Aériennes Stratégiques* at Taverny down to the weapons systems themselves. I understand that in the United Kingdom, if no similar detailed description of command arrangements has been made, it has often been said that the decision on the use of the British force is “reserved to the government at the highest level”, meaning essentially a decision of the Prime Minister.

The Soviet Union can be in no doubt about the independence of these forces and the ability of the political leaders to use them if circumstances ever warrant it. The assignment of the British force to NATO ensures that it is committed to NATO defence plans for the defence of Europe, although the British political decision would have to intervene if NATO commanders ever called for the use of the force.

As this Assembly has demonstrated its interest in allied co-operation many times, the Committee has examined at some length in this report the possibilities of Franco-British co-operation in the field of nuclear weapons.

I should like here, Mr. President, to draw attention to the particularly valuable information report on the state and modernisation of French nuclear forces just produced by Mr. Tourrain, Rapporteur of the Defence and Armed Forces Committee of the French National Assembly, which has been released since my report was adopted by your Committee. In the light of Mr. Tourrain's report I should like to comment a little further on some of the prospects of Franco-British co-operation which are in the report before the Assembly. I can only confirm the Committee's conclusion that technical considerations rule out the possibility of co-operation on the production of strategic missiles for the generation of missiles which will be in service in the 1990s.

These are the Trident C-4, to be acquired by Britain from the United States, and the M-4 missile now under development in France, which is due to enter service in its strategic submarines in 1985.

While the Trident missile cannot appear attractive to France because of its policy of relying exclusively on national manufacturing capabilities, the M-4 missile cannot appear attractive to the United Kingdom because the Trident missile, a proven weapon in service now for a year, has something like twice the range of the M-4 and can carry up to eight independently targetable warheads compared with the six for the M-4, which could not be used to attack separate targets.

Moreover, the cost of Trident would be very much less than that of the M-4. In addition, the Trident is about 5 cm smaller in diameter and 65 cm shorter than the M-4, and that fact is likely to influence submarine hull design, again making co-operation in this area unlikely.

There remains the possibility of co-operation on targeting if France were prepared to consider adopting, as Britain already does, a second set of NATO targets in addition to a purely national list. The choice of the particular target to engage can be made very rapidly when the decision to use the force is made.

Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)

The advantage to France of sending liaison officers to join the NATO cell in the joint strategic target planning staff in Omaha, which the Committee visited in March this year, would, it seems to me, have the additional advantage from the French point of view of making available to that country all the information obtained by United States observation satellites without having to wait until 1984, when the first French military observation satellite capability is expected to be operational.

During my talks in London and Paris I asked many questions about the possibilities of French-British co-operation on construction, co-ordination of targeting and operational co-operation. I must say that the answers that I received gave me no indication of any concrete new ideas in that sphere. I have the impression that on one occasion in the past a French approach to Britain for co-operation on certain aspects of nuclear weapons employment was rebuffed. It seems now that there is some political interest in Britain in seeking such co-operation, even if it is to be limited only to an exchange of information on basic concepts.

I draw attention to the remark made by Mrs. Thatcher in a recorded interview released in France on 15th November. She said:

"There are certain things which we and France have in common which are not borne in common with the rest of the Community. For example, we are both independent nuclear powers and we can co-operate the more on that."

The draft recommendation welcomes:

"the opening of preliminary bilateral talks on LRTNF reductions."

The first round of those preliminary talks in Geneva lasted one month and was concluded on the day that the Committee adopted its report. The United States of America stated at the end of the talks that they:

"were conducted in a serious and constructive manner and resulted in substantially enhancing understanding of each side's position."

Clearly, substantive progress is not to be expected until the new President of the United States of America is installed in the White House, but the preliminary talks, the subject matter of which was to be merged in the SALT III talks once SALT II had been ratified, marked the *de facto* opening of negotiations beyond SALT II, because they involved long-range theatre nuclear systems.

That brings me to the substance of the operative text of the recommendation. In para-

graph 1 the Committee calls for the observance of the SALT II limits and the earliest resumption of the SALT process, irrespective of other aspects of East-West relations. While Mr. Reagan, in the course of the election campaign, initially rejected SALT II as a "fatally flawed" agreement, he has considerably modified his attitude, talking now about renegotiating parts of it and committing himself to the SALT process.

On a number of occasions in the present report and in previous reports, the Committee has found SALT II to be to the mutual advantage of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Committee believes that the Assembly should not revoke its former stand. On the other hand, there is no hope of an early ratification of SALT II as it stands.

In an interview reported in the International Herald Tribune of 24th November, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie said that even if Mr. Carter had been re-elected, his Administration would probably have ended up doing what Mr. Reagan will probably do rather than seeking a Senate vote on the treaty as it stands. He said:

"There was no assurance that if we won the elections that we would have the constituency to ratify the strategic arms limitations treaty... we conceivably would have had to suggest to the Russians that in order to get the votes we ought to look at the treaty again to see if there were ways of making it more acceptable to our side that they could accept also."

The indications are that the Soviet Union is prepared to sit again at the negotiating table. That is the impression that one gets from publications on the recent talks in Moscow of Senator Charles Percy, an important Reagan adviser, and probably the next Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, with Mr. Brezhnev, Defence Minister Ustinov and Minister Gromyko. These are American-Russian negotiations. The only thing that we can do, in the opinion of the Committee, is to stress the desirability of the earliest resumption of the negotiations, and thus of the SALT process, and, pending the negotiations, to call for the SALT II limits to be observed by both sides, as they have been so far. That is what paragraph 1 of the recommendation does. I realise that if SALT II is to be reopened to negotiation, the Soviet Union will no doubt have as many demands for amendment as has the United States, and it is not clear to me in what way negotiations would be likely to improve it to the advantage of the Alliance.

In paragraph 2 the Committee urges that any modernisation plans for British and French nuclear forces should not lead to the diversion

Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)

of resources from conventional defence. For many, that is a cause for concern. The nuclear forces are a small proportion of the overall allied deterrent, though they are formidable forces, but the conventional forces that those countries provide on the central front, in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean are a large proportion of allied conventional forces in those areas and represent a growing proportion as certain United States naval forces or earmarked reinforcement forces are diverted to defence outside the NATO area. Any reduction in the British and French conventional defence efforts resulting from plans for the modernisation of their nuclear forces could be detrimental to the defence of Europe.

In that connection I should point out that, under Protocol No. II of the modified Brussels Treaty, any reductions in the level of British forces on the mainland of Europe would be subject to approval by a majority vote in the WEU Council. That is a subject on which the Committee regularly reports and it will be doing so next year in its reply to the annual report of the Council.

In conclusion, the Committee stresses in paragraph 3 of the operative text of the recommendation the importance of building arms control considerations into all aspects of defence planning and by involving parliaments in this process. Armaments, on the one hand, and arms control and disarmament, on the other, are two sides of one coin. The security of Europe depends on equal attention being paid to both. Thank you, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT. – I thank you, Mr. Mommersteeg, for your comprehensive introduction to a very important report from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

We now start the general debate.

The first speaker is Mr. Bernini.

Mr. BERNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to begin by expressing my great appreciation of the very full documentation provided by Mr. Mommersteeg. The explanatory memorandum shows clearly the rôle which, despite being specially deployed, the British and French nuclear forces play in the nuclear armaments system of the Alliance; at the same time it highlights how widespread nuclear weapons have become and how they are becoming increasingly difficult to control, while the destructive power of nuclear warheads has virtually quadrupled since 1968 – despite the SALT agreements – thus increasing the threat to the safety of our peoples and the risk of nuclear war in Europe and all over the world.

These risks and dangers also seem to be the origin of directive 59 of the United States Government, to which the Rapporteur refers in connection with the new “selective nuclear strategy” which, however, quite apart from what it proposes and precisely because it contemplates the possibility of a limited, selective use of nuclear weapons, lowering the threshold for their use, increases the threat of world nuclear conflict and the dangers for our continent.

For the sake of European security, therefore, the reduction and control of nuclear weapons are becoming more than ever vital – as Mr. Mommersteeg underlines; but not so that more resources can be devoted to conventional weapons as is argued but to help in reaching agreement on a reduction of military forces in Central Europe, to start the reduction of defence expenditure and get disarmament under way, in favour of the development and eradication of the underdeveloped areas which are the cause of growing sources of tension and instability in the world.

For this reason, we regard the failure to ratify SALT II which for the first time introduced limitations and reductions in strategic nuclear weapons as particularly serious. This ratification, which was the far from secondary reason for the emergence of disagreements in NATO, for the progressive worsening of relations between the two great powers and for the worrying deterioration of the world situation, has not taken place despite the urgings of the North Atlantic Council and of our Assembly.

Today, President-elect Reagan, as the explanatory memorandum states, appears to want to link SALT II with the negotiations for SALT III. In this context, we believe that in the interests of Europe, member governments and Western European Union should continue to urge that undertakings given be respected and that SALT II must be ratified; they should do so in order that the SALT II limits be observed as the recommendation urges, thus keeping open the dialogue and clearing the way for a start on SALT III, in which, with the participation of the interested parties, it may be possible to find a place for the French and British nuclear forces.

In this context, the undertaking to give a positive impetus to the Geneva preliminary talks on Euromissiles undoubtedly assumes great importance; the starting of these talks – as urged in this Assembly also – shows among other things how an effort to reach agreement, before it was decided in Brussels last December to install Pershing and Cruise missiles, might have rendered that grave decision unnecessary and might at the same time have stopped the deployment of new SS-20 missiles – which in

Mr. Bernini (continued)

fact occurred – and in any event valuable time would not have been spent in seeking a possible agreement on the balance of theatre nuclear weapons in Europe at the lowest possible level.

Today, with the Geneva negotiations, it is both possible and necessary to try to create new conditions in which it will be possible to go beyond the Brussels decisions; the conclusion of “even a provisional agreement” along these lines will determine whether or not it will be possible to establish favourable conditions for starting the SALT III negotiations, which must succeed if there is to be an effective reduction in the number of strategic and theatre nuclear weapons.

That is why, if the negotiations must take place directly between the two superpowers, the European governments must play an active and watchful part in consultations within the Alliance and must renew their commitment to détente; they must do so in order to foster East-West co-operation, to press the Committee on Disarmament to sign the treaty banning all nuclear tests and to establish the climate of collaboration and mutual trust, which is essential for the reduction and control of nuclear weapons, so that there are advantages for no one and benefits and guarantees for the security of everyone.

However, while this must be member governments' first commitment, measures to protect the peoples of our countries and ensure their safety are of equal importance in the light of the disturbing levels which nuclear weapons have reached on the continent of Europe.

We therefore concur with paragraph 3 of the recommendation concerning the rôle of national parliaments in the linking of security planning with the nuclear armaments of each country and the monitoring of the progress of negotiations – we would add in order to give them an effective stimulus – so that the parliaments themselves can discharge the responsibilities which they cannot renounce in furtherance of the interests and security of their peoples and all the peoples of the world.

In the light of these comments, the Italian communists will abstain on the draft recommendation.

THE PRESIDENT. – Sir Frederic Bennett is not here as he is in Committee. Is Mr. van den Bergh here?... Is Mr. Maravalle here?...

I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to comment briefly on the draft recommendation in Mr. Mommersteeg's report.

Firstly, I find it rather odd that WEU, which seems to want to avoid playing an important rôle itself, “recommends that the Council call on member governments to urge the North Atlantic Council...”. I do not see why WEU is not itself able to take certain measures and act within the framework of the treaties. This constant reference to the North Atlantic Council betrays a systematic policy of favouring NATO at the expense of the Community institutions and purely European opportunities for action.

Secondly, I note that paragraph 1 of the draft recommends that the Council “call for the observance of the SALT II limits and the earliest resumption of the SALT process, irrespective of other aspects of East-West relations”. I find this wording both imprecise and dangerous. For it is primarily a matter for the American leaders and President Reagan's new American team to determine under what conditions and in what areas the SALT process could be resumed. From this point of view we ought to welcome the determination expressed by the American people to have at its head someone who pursues a firmer, more definite and more resolute policy.

Consequently, apart from our own possible assessments of the SALT negotiations, it is not for us to intervene in the matter, particularly – I shall go on repeating this – as any kind of negotiation, especially on the SALT process, between the world's two leading countries is, whether we like it or not, a factor prejudicial to European interests.

We ought not to take any pride in the fact that Europe's security, and especially its safeguard against nuclear threat, is entrusted solely to American or Russian hands, and I am constantly surprised that European parliamentarians are reduced to such a policy of running away from our own responsibilities.

Thirdly, paragraph 2 recommends “that any modernisation plans for British and French nuclear forces should not lead to the diversion of resources from conventional defence”. I must ask you to excuse me for saying that such planning is the business of the French Government as far as the French force is concerned, and our country does not have to accept advice from anyone.

If France considers that it should concentrate on its nuclear force at the expense of its conventional forces, it will do so; it is in fact doing so and wishes to do so because it considers that its security and that of Europe are better safeguarded by a substantial nuclear armoury than by the addition of a few conventional infantry units which would be brushed aside in a few hours by any sudden frontal conventional attack. To think that Europe can

Mr. Baumel (continued)

be protected by conventional forces reflects an outdated way of thinking. Let us not be a war, or two wars, behind the times. Europe's true security, and in any case France's true security, is based not on battle but on the possibility of prior deterrence, through the existence of a nuclear armoury which is as large and as deterrent as possible. We are therefore unable to accept the text of paragraph 2.

Lastly, I consider that the report as a whole does not attribute sufficient importance to the specifically deterrent rôle of three separate nuclear forces. For the existence of nuclear forces other than purely American forces represents an additional element of uncertainty for potential enemies and hence a useful decision-shaping factor; this was in fact grudgingly admitted by the Ottawa Conference.

Those are the reasons why some French delegates will be unable to give their approval to this report and will vote against it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

Has Mr. van den Bergh arrived? Mr. Maravalle? Mr. van Hulst? We have difficulty because another Committee is still meeting.

Mr. van HULST (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – There are one or two comments I would like to make on the report by Mr. Mommersteeg. I will not hesitate to say that I think this is an excellent report. As a member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, I was present at the birth, early development and growth of this report. Time and again, fresh documents came to hand that presented fresh aspects that needed to be incorporated into the report. Mr. Mommersteeg was untiring in doing so. It is perhaps a good thing that the Rapporteur is neither French nor British; this is at least a guarantee of objectivity.

I consider it an important report, from a great many angles. First of all, there is the wealth of information it contains. We, as parliamentarians, need this information during the debates in our national parliaments. Saying this is not just theory – it is practical politics as well, as I can prove to you. Last week, on 25th November, I was spokesman for my party in the First Chamber during the debate with the Dutch Government, and already then I was able to make use of facts contained in this report.

I will limit myself now to a few of the main points in the report. In the draft recommendation, under paragraph (viii) of the preamble, I find the words "Believing SALT II to be to the mutual advantage of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact;". This optimistic statement echoes that adopted by the Assembly last

year. If the Assembly accepts this draft recommendation, as I hope it will, it will be showing consistency in its attitude. The line taken by paragraph (viii) of the preamble is continued in paragraph 1 of the recommendation, which says "To call for the observance of the SALT II limits and the earliest resumption of the SALT process, irrespective of other aspects of East-West relations;". I would emphasise the use of the superlative "earliest".

The talks need to continue, holding on to what has been achieved to date. SALT II is not a straw being grasped by a drowning man, but an interim phase that opens up prospects for the future. Naturally, the non-ratification of SALT II is a problem, but I hope and believe that President Reagan will pursue a policy of peace. It is a hopeful sign that Brezhnev, who knows his way around in politics, has seen clearly which parts of the electioneering speeches by Reagan as a presidential candidate were meant for home consumption, and what the essence of his foreign policy is going to be. This is why Brezhnev's reaction to Reagan being elected was, for him, a moderate one.

I agree with what the report says, and believe that the western powers should do their utmost to prevent even more national nuclear forces coming into being. The one, American, nuclear umbrella is sufficient, even though it is, at one and the same time, a protection and a danger. I also think that because of the enormous sums that are being devoted to nuclear weapons there is a real danger that conventional armaments will not be kept up to strength. The 1974 Ottawa declaration does. It is true, say "if there is no reduction in conventional defence", but the risk that there will be a reduction is a very real one.

I will end by congratulating the Rapporteur, and hope that the Assembly will accept the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Are there any other speakers on this report?

I call Lord Duncan-Sandys.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). – It is unrealistic to suggest that we should have the earliest ratification of SALT II irrespective of other aspects of East-West relations. The United States, in my opinion rightly, is clearly not prepared to go to that length. Some modification of the proposal is necessary.

Reference has been made to the recommendation that any modernisation plans for British and French nuclear forces should not divert resources from conventional defence. That is a desirable generalisation, but the amount of money available for defence in any one country

Lord Duncan-Sandys (continued)

is not unlimited. We must therefore strike a reasonable balance between the expenditure on nuclear weapons and expenditure on conventional weapons.

By stressing the importance of updating and upgrading our nuclear forces, we should not interpret that as implying that we do not recognise the immense importance of likewise upgrading the effectiveness of our conventional forces and other related aspects of our conventional defence.

The PRESIDENT. – The debate is adjourned.

4. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly

(Doc. 857)

The PRESIDENT. – The next Order of the Day is the election of the Clerk of the Assembly, Document 857.

I have received notice of a motion which has the effect of suggesting that the Assembly should defer this Order of the Day. However, I am sure that the Assembly will wish, before we proceed to the election, to place on record our appreciation of the immense services rendered by Mr. Francis Humblet, who is resigning from the post at the end of this month, having been Clerk of the Assembly on a part-time basis since its institution at the beginning of 1956.

As well as his twenty-five years' service to this Assembly, and the help, guidance and inspiration that he has given to many generations of parliamentarians from our member countries, Mr. Humblet was involved in the beginning of both the Council of Europe and the European Coal and Steel Community. He has also been active in the Inter-Parliamentary Union and in the Association of Secretaries-General. In his efficient and reticent way, he has made an immense contribution to the development of parliamentary institutions in Europe. Like me, he may not have been wholly enthusiastic about the outcome of some of the developments for which we hoped so much twenty years ago, but we owe him an immense debt.

Had we not been pressed for time, I know that many members of the Assembly would have liked to give their personal testimony, but I think that I speak for us all in expressing our appreciation and wishing him a happy retirement. Although this is the last time that he comes to us as our Clerk, he will in future always be welcome as a visitor. We hope that we shall be able to see him and Mrs. Humblet from time to time as our honoured guests.

I asked Mr. Humblet whether he would wish to say a few words on this official occasion, as distinct from the agreeable social occasion earlier in the week, but, being a true and steadfast Clerk to the end, he refused to do so, saying that it would be contrary to the traditions of European parliamentary procedure for a Clerk to address the Assembly.

The Rules of Procedure of our Assembly require that the Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly on the proposal of the Bureau. As a Bureau, we were in some difficulty. Since Mr. Humblet has held the post since the beginning, this situation is almost unprecedented and in present circumstances may not have been the best way of going about the job, but of course we had no alternative but to follow the rules.

The recommendations of the Bureau are contained in Document 857, which includes the *curricula vitae* of all the candidates recommended. At our first meeting, we decided that it was necessary to seek a new Clerk on a full-time basis, since in present circumstances we believed that we should not find someone of sufficient standing and experience who would be willing to come part-time – or whose parliament would be willing to release him, as, in the special circumstances of twenty-five years ago, to our great good fortune, the Belgian Senate did in the case of Mr. Humblet.

Mr. Humblet was willing to undertake the considerable travel involved each week between Brussels and Paris. Obviously, if a Clerk had come from further afield, that would have been an additional imposition. We took the view that we had to seek a full-time Clerk. As well as notifying our own staff, I wrote personally to the president or speaker of the parliament in each member country, as well as to the European Parliament and the Council of Europe. The Bureau was disappointed that we did not get very good applications from outside our own staff and the Bureau's view was that none of the outside candidates was any better than the three from our own office of the Clerk, who had the additional advantage of many years' experience of the workings of the Assembly. Nevertheless, we decided that it was only right, since we had asked for outside candidates, to put two of them on the list of the five that we recommend to you. They are, in alphabetical order, Mr. Gerhard Huigens, Mr. Georges Moulias, Mr. Jurgen Nehring, Mr. Elio Rogati and Mr. Stuart Whyte.

The majority of the Bureau expressed a preference for the election of Mr. Moulias. Our Rules of Procedure say that the voting must take place by secret ballot. The ballot papers are being distributed and the names of the candidates are on separate pieces of paper. You are asked to put your choice in an envelope.

The President (continued)

lope and, when your name is called, to come and put it in a box. It requires an absolute majority on the first ballot for a candidate to be elected. If there is no such candidate elected on the first ballot, there will be a second ballot, when a relative majority is sufficient.

I have been given notice by Mr. Spies von Büllesheim and many of his colleagues of a motion, which I will read. There has not been time for it to be distributed. The motion is:

“ That the election of Clerk to the Assembly of Western European Union be referred back to the Bureau and not proceeded with until the terms of employment, duration of tenure and the future position of the Clerk Assistant have been formally placed before and approved by this Assembly. ”

It would be wrong for me to rule the motion out of order, for it is a matter upon which many members wish the Assembly to come to a view.

The only way for this matter to be treated is as a dilatory motion, for its purpose is to delay a decision and to refer the matter back to the Bureau. As we shall have to treat it in that way, it means that there will be a speech in favour of the reference back to the Bureau and then a speech against, if someone wishes to speak against the motion. The Chairman or Rapporteur of the Committee concerned can then speak. As the President and Rapporteur of the Bureau, it will fall to me to make that comment. Clearly, we have not had time in the last half hour to have a formal meeting of the Bureau.

I call upon Mr. Spies von Büllesheim, or one of the sponsors – there can be only one speaker – to move his motion.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, first may I make a special apology for the fact that we tabled this amendment only this morning and consequently, as we have just heard, it can be taken only as a dilatory motion. But anyone familiar with the running of our sessions – we meet here on Monday, discuss things in our political groups, meet in our national groups and talk to our governments – knows that certain things get done only during the session itself. Thus there is always the risk of such amendments being tabled relatively late. I ask your indulgence.

Second, I would like to make it quite clear – and you will see this straight away from the list of signatories – that this draft amendment is tabled neither by a single political group nor by

a single country; nor – and I would stress this particularly – is it for or against any candidate, nor directed against particular candidate. It simply reflects a certain disquiet shared by many members of this Assembly at having to decide so quickly on such an important matter without having received adequate answers to certain questions such as, for example, the question of the duration of the appointment, the terms of employment, the question of a deputy, etc. It was clearly not possible for the Presidential Committee to deal with a number of questions raised by individual members of the Assembly.

My chief concern – and this probably applies to most of the signatories – is the duration of tenure. In other European institutions – I will simply take the Council of Europe as an example, but I could also mention the OECD and other organisations – it is absolutely contrary to practice to appoint the holder of such an important office for life. True, this has been the practice here, but in all this time we have had only one Clerk, and a very good one too, and I believe it is right simply as a matter of principle for every official to have to prove himself within four or five years and then to have to stand for re-election.

We are all parliamentarians, and we all have to submit ourselves to the decision of the electorate after four or five years, and I do not think it right that an important official of this Assembly should not have to do likewise after four or five years. If this has not been the practice so far, I think we should make the necessary change. Any parliamentarian will sympathise; we are all in the same position.

As I have only five minutes I shall not go into the other matters raised in the amendment, such as terms of employment. I do not have the time for that. Let me add just one point. Most of the candidates who have applied for this post are officials of their national governments. So if they are not subsequently reappointed, they do not land up in limbo as we parliamentarians so often do; they return to their national civil service. All the more reason why they should have to stand for re-election after five years. All of us know that having to stand for re-election is an added incentive to performance. This is true for us and it ought to be true for the Clerk we are appointing.

The only argument against this amendment is the procedural one, namely that one cannot table such an amendment five minutes, or fifty minutes or an hour beforehand. I have already referred, Mr. President, to the fact that we meet only twice a year for four or five days. How then is the individual member – how are the many individual members of the Assembly – to

Mr. Spies von Büllesheim (continued)

voice their wishes and concerns; how are they supposed to know exactly everything they want on the Monday morning when the Order of Business is drawn up? It is simply not possible. We meet twice a year for four or five days, and something is achieved. So I am not impressed by the procedural argument. It would mean that many individual members of this Assembly could not make their wishes felt at all. For in many cases their only chance is to table a dilatory motion.

I would therefore ask the Assembly to examine this motion without any reservations and, if possible, to give it their support. After all "better late than never" applies here just as much as anywhere else. If the majority of members of this Assembly feel that further consideration should be given to the duration of the appointment in particular, then they should vote for this dilatory motion.

Nor do I think there are any practical difficulties. In Mr. Moulias we already have a Clerk Assistant who has carried out his duties quite adequately, and I see no reason why Mr. Moulias should not continue to deputise for another six months as he has so often done in the past.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

Does any member wish to oppose the reference back?

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – I have some understanding of the reasons just given. Nevertheless, on three grounds it is not wise to accept this motion. First, this Assembly adopted the Order of Business two days ago. In general, it is not advisable for any assembly to state, two days later, that a decision taken on Monday was not right.

Second, it is quite clear – you have stated it in your document, Mr. President – that the Bureau dealt with the matter on 20th June, 18th September and 23rd October. During all this time, none of the Vice-Presidents apparently mentioned the problem which has just been raised. As we all know, the normal situation is that each member state has its own Vice-President. These Vice-Presidents have to consult their own delegations. I assume that every Vice-President has done so. That is why every country has its own Vice-President. If I am wrong, you can correct me, Mr. President, but it is clear that no Vice-President has made remarks concerning the period of employment. I see no reason to say that the Bureau did not prepare the appointment carefully.

Third, there is a vacancy and although one can say that the Assembly will go on even if we

do not make an appointment, I am one of those who want to consider this Assembly as a real parliamentary assembly. It has to take a decision now. There is a vacancy and I want it to be filled as soon as possible. What matters is not whether it will be disastrous if we do not make an appointment, but that if there is a possibility of going ahead today we should do so.

I understand some of the feeling of those who support the reference back, but, although I have the fullest confidence in you, Mr. President, and the Vice-Presidents, we should not wait any longer, but should grasp the possibility of appointing a new Clerk today.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Sir Frederic Bennett on a point of order.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I make no comment on the substance of the observations for or against the motion, but I must correct an unintentional mistake by Mr. Stoffelen. Because you, Mr. President, are President of the Assembly, the British do not have a Vice-President. I make no complaint about that; it is one of the rules, but I have been asked by my delegation to make clear that Mr. Stoffelen made a mistake.

The PRESIDENT. – Do you wish to raise a point of order, Mr. Spies von Büllesheim? You have had your five minutes.

Mr. SPIES von BÜLLESHEIM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, just one request on a point of order. Since it was not possible to distribute the text of this motion, I should point out that many members were not in the Chamber when you read it out, and I therefore ask you to read it once again before the vote.

The PRESIDENT. – I shall read the motion again, but the only way that it can be dealt with is by a reference back of the recommendation to the Bureau and a request to the Bureau to reconsider the matter so that we do not proceed with the election today. The motion is:

“That the election of Clerk to the Assembly of Western European Union be referred back to the Bureau and not proceeded with until the terms of employment, duration of tenure and the future position of the Clerk Assistant have been formally placed before, and approved by, this Assembly.”

I must exercise the obligation placed by the rules on the Chairman and/or Rapporteur of a Committee to comment, before asking the Assembly to come to a decision.

I am sure that if the Assembly decides that the matter should be referred back, the Bureau

The President (continued)

will do its best to reconsider the issues, but such informal consultation as I have been able to have with my colleagues in the Bureau suggests that they would not wish the Assembly to refer the matter back, partly for the reasons given by Mr. Stoffelen – there is a vacancy and we need a new Clerk – but particularly because we have no reason to suppose that we shall have a different set of candidates.

The Bureau, perhaps mistakenly, said that it wanted someone with experience in either a national parliament or a European parliamentary assembly. That limited the field and that is why we advertised the vacancy only in all the parliamentary institutions in Europe. There is no reason to suppose that we would get any different applicants and we may well return to the same situation.

Under the rules, we are not allowed to lay down the term of office. That would require an amendment to the rules, which the Bureau has no power to make. Until now, no one has suggested that it should be done. It is not a practical suggestion, because while some countries permit their officials to go on more or less indefinite secondment, and guarantee them a post of comparable seniority if they return, many other member countries, including my own, would permit officials to come on only a two- or three-year secondment. I am not sure that the Assembly would wish to change its chief official every two or three years. It would not be reasonable to ask senior officials of our member governments or parliaments to give up their jobs for a possible career here of three or four years and no future. They would then be of an age when it would be difficult to find another job. We had difficulty getting applicants on a full-time basis.

I do not understand why the reference back seems to be based on the terms of employment, duration of tenure and future position of the Clerk Assistant. Mr. Moulias has been seconded by the Quai d'Orsay – France permits a long secondment of its officials – for fifteen years and has loyally carried out the duties of the Clerk Assistant. His terms of employment are that he is on 90 % of Grade A7, step 6, which means that his salary is about 90 % of what he will be paid if he is elected Clerk. The future depends on the outcome of the election.

I did not allow the Presidential Committee to discuss the matter when it wished to do so, because I must adhere to the rules, and they provide that the responsibility is placed on the Bureau. I do not take it upon myself to amend the rules as we go along. Perhaps some presidents do so, but I do not think that that is a proper way to conduct business. It was the

Bureau's responsibility and whether that was a sensible way of proceeding was not for me to say. That is the rule. We could not involve ourselves in the question of the future rôle of the Clerk Assistant. If we had a full-time Clerk, it would not be necessary to have a full-time Clerk Assistant who has no other duties. Clearly, someone will have to be designated as Assistant, but he could probably do other duties as well.

Mr. Moulias' tenure has been indefinite. At present, his salary is about 90 % of that proposed for the Clerk. His future and that of the Clerk Assistant will depend on the outcome of the election. As I made clear in the report, the Bureau is committed to examining the structure in conjunction with the Council, and they have to find the money for the office. However, it is wrong to try to do that without involving the new Clerk in the process.

It is nonsense to try to reorganise an office when the person who is to be in charge cannot offer any observations. That is why the report says that we shall consider that as a matter of urgency. We cannot consider it properly until we have a new Clerk. Therefore, I ask the Assembly not to accept the reference back.

We shall now vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

There is a substantial majority against the adoption of the motion.

The Motion is negatived.

According to the rules, which I must follow, I shall draw the names of two tellers. They will then be asked to act as tellers in the election. The first name is that of Sir Frederic Bennett. I assure the Assembly that only chance is involved. The second name is that of Mr. Vohrer. Is he here? If he is not here, I shall take a second dip. Is Mr. Scholten here? As Mr. Mommersteeg is involved in the debate, I shall not call Mr. Scholten's substitute. Will Mr. Müller act as a teller?

Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Müller are the tellers. I shall now draw a name to start the roll-call.

The roll-call will start with Mr. Milz, who has been substituted by Mr. Wittmann. We must proceed on the basis that, as a name is called, the Representative will come and put his ballot paper in the box.

Mr. HAWKINS (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. We have four pieces of paper. What do we do with them? Do we put the name of the person whom we want in an envelope and throw the other pieces of paper away, do we cross them out, or what?

The PRESIDENT. – I was about to explain. As the Representative's name is called, he should come and put his vote in the box. There are envelopes with the words "Appointment of the Clerk" on them. They contain voting papers for five candidates. There should be five pieces of paper. Members should put the name of the candidate whom they wish to support in the envelope and throw away, or get rid of, the other four pieces of paper. Is that clear?

The voting is open.

(A vote by secret ballot by roll-call was then taken)

If there are Representatives or Substitutes present who are registered but have not yet voted, will they please come forward and give their names or the names of the Representatives for whom they are Substitutes? All members entitled to vote have now voted.

I declare the ballot closed.

In view of the shortage of time, I propose that, rather than be discourteous to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, we should ask him to address us now, and I will announce the result of the ballot at the end of his speech. I will then invite questions to the Minister and have a second ballot, if one is necessary, at the end of the question period.

**5. Address by Mr. van der Klaauw,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council**

The PRESIDENT. – The next Order of the Day is the address by Mr. van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

I hope, Minister, that you will understand the disarray in which you find us, since this is the first time in twenty-five years that we have had to elect a new Clerk, and there have been some procedural difficulties.

We are particularly grateful to you, Sir, not only for your work and interest in our activities, but particularly because you have come to the Assembly today after having been heavily involved in your own national affairs and overseas visits as well as in the European summit. We appreciate your readiness to address us.

Mr. van der KLAUW (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – It is a privilege and a pleasure for me to address the Assembly once more after having presented to you on 2nd June, on behalf of the Council of WEU, the twenty-fifth annual report on the activities of the Council.

I stress once again that my government attaches great importance to the Brussels Treaty and to the activities of your Assembly as the only parliamentary body competent in questions of European defence and security. It is the hope of my government that the valuable contacts between your Assembly and the Council will be continued.

The Assembly is meeting just after disaster has struck one of the member countries – Italy. Two days ago, in the European Council, the Prime Minister of Italy gave a résumé of how heavily Italy was affected – not just that region, but the country as a whole – and the tremendous expense which will be necessary to restore the region to normality. In solidarity, the European Council decided to give all the support in its power.

The same feelings of sympathy and solidarity with our Italian friends exist here in WEU. As President of the Council and Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, I should like to say these words here, too, to express our feelings.

(The speaker continued in French)

(Translation). – Mr. President, may I take this opportunity, on behalf of the Council and myself, to thank the Clerk of the Assembly, Mr. Humblet, for all he has done in his long years of service with Western European Union.

It has been a privilege for an Assembly, a multinational organisation like WEU, to have enjoyed the services of so qualified and experienced a man as Mr. Humblet for the performance of the demanding and difficult task of Clerk.

Mr. Humblet is leaving us for a well-earned retirement. His departure will leave a gap in the Office of the Clerk.

(The speaker continued in English)

I should now like to speak as Foreign Minister of the Netherlands. The year 1980 will not go down in history as a good year. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has caused a serious deterioration in relations between East and West and forced us to a reappraisal of our policies towards the Soviet Union. The existence of détente depends on mutual confidence that the other side will behave according to generally-accepted standards of behaviour. Subjugating a free people by military means does not conform to that criterion. It has therefore become necessary to reconsider what policies are most suitable to convince the Soviet Union that it is in its ultimate interest also to conduct itself in a manner consonant with the aim that it also professes, namely, to reach a state of genuine détente. We must make the Soviet Union understand that we shall judge it not by its words, however often repeated, but by its deeds.

Mr. van der Klaauw (continued)

At the same time, it has become clear that European-American relations deserve our attention. Since the Assembly of WEU is the only international organisation that concerns itself specifically with the security of Western Europe, I should like to deal with the problem of European security, with particular reference to the relationships between Europe and the United States.

We are all well acquainted with the discussion which has been taking place over the past year in the countries of the Atlantic Alliance. Many articles have been written and many speeches made in the United States emphasising that the Europeans are not spending enough on defence and are taking a too lenient view of the Soviet threat to the Gulf area. But in Europe complaints could be heard that American policy lacked sufficient firmness and consistency, that the United States based too much on the military aspects of the threat to the independence of South-West Asia, that the Americans were not consulting their allies sufficiently early and intensively and that they were insensitive to the special problems and interests of their allies. In this way the general impression seems to have been created that the Alliance is in disarray and that there is a serious danger that the foundations on which our collective security has been based for the last thirty years are crumbling.

What truth is there in these complaints? What remedies can be found? The first thing I wish to say is that there is no doubt in my mind that the need for the continuity of the great Alliance of the democratic countries of Europe and North America is as great as it was in 1949 when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. We share similar views on the rights of the individual and his place in society and we share a high degree of common political, military and economic interests, which we can defend only on the basis of close co-operation and mutual trust. A split in the ranks of the Alliance would put our own security gravely at risk and do irreparable damage to the cause of democracy and human rights in all parts of the world.

This, of course, is not to deny that there can be a certain diversity in the policies of western countries, each of which has its own characteristics and traditions and is conditioned by its experiences and geographic circumstances. It is my impression, however, that those who see the foundations of the Alliance crumbling take too gloomy a view.

Let us not forget that these are not the first moments of strain between the allies. I need only remind you of the failure to establish a

European defence community, the Suez crisis of 1956, France leaving NATO's integrated defence in the sixties and the failure of the multi-lateral force proposal, to mention only some of the most spectacular of past crises within the Alliance. On all those occasions gloomy forecasts were made that the Alliance was breaking up and was beyond repair, but every time the community of interests on which the Alliance is based proved it to be indispensable.

In an alliance of fifteen independent states it is inevitable that opinions should sometimes differ, but does not NATO's strength lie in the fact that it is made up of independent countries? We are not only independent countries but democratic countries. This means that our governments must take domestic factors into account when framing foreign policy, factors which often differ considerably from one country to another. As a result, the policies of individual allies have their own specific characteristics. I see nothing wrong with this situation and even if I did, this state of affairs could be changed only at the expense of our democratic attainments, which would go counter to everything we stand for.

Thus, I believe that individual accents and diversity in certain areas of policy signify inherent strength rather than weakness. They reflect the free, pluralistic structure of the West. At the same time, however, it is essential to remain aware of the need to stand together and to retain our solidarity.

As the so-called Three Wise Men who advised the NATO Council on the ways and means to extend NATO co-operation in the non-military fields concluded in 1956:

“An alliance in which the members ignore each other's interests, or engage in political or economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of each other, cannot be effective either for deterrence or defence.”

As their report made clear, consultation among the members of the Alliance is an indispensable condition for the cohesion of the West. The criticisms which have been levelled at the shortcomings of consultation inside NATO have not always been unfounded.

But we must not exaggerate. Consultation within the Alliance as I know it – and I know it well, from experience stretching back over more than twenty years – may, to my mind, aptly be described by a quote, which I borrow from my compatriot, Dr. Luns, of what somebody once said about the music of Wagner: “It is better than it sounds.”

Here I should like to sound a warning. We should be heading in the wrong direction if we were to try to remedy the imperfections in our

Mr. van der Klaauw (continued)

system of consultation by establishing a kind of exclusive club consisting of the bigger countries, working in closer collaboration with one another than with the other allies, and functioning more or less as a centre for crisis management. The divisions this two-tier system would entail could in the long run only lessen the Atlantic cohesion and weaken the Alliance. It could strengthen tendencies in some of the smaller countries to turn a back to NATO, with all the dire consequences for our security and, indeed, for peace.

Indeed, the main problem at the moment is danger of a tendency on both sides of the Atlantic to look at the international situation from too narrow a national point of view. In Europe, this tendency translates itself in an inclination in some quarters to forget the underlying realities of the East-West relationship, in an illusion that we might take a middle position between the two superpowers instead of unequivocally recognising that we belong to the free world. In the United States a new assessment of its relations with the Soviet Union gives rise to impatience with the allies. These feelings must not be allowed to gain respect, since they run clearly counter to our best interests. Therefore, we must do our utmost to fight the misconceptions behind them.

Here the main task falls upon us, the politicians. It falls on us to make clear to the public at large – first, that the Alliance is the best instrument at our disposal to assure our security and to maintain peace and stability in Europe and, secondly, that in an alliance of independent and democratic countries complete agreement on all issues is at present out of our reach. This is inevitable and should not be deplored. Indeed, there is sufficient scope for all of us to make a substantial contribution that fits into our common effort. Next to improved consultation and renewed efforts to make public opinion aware of both the importance and the limitations of the Alliance there is, I think, a third way of achieving greater cohesion among the western countries: a certain division of labour.

This applies particularly to our response to developments outside the Atlantic Treaty area. The security of the Alliance never depended only on developments in Europe and North America or their adjoining seas. Over the last decades, however, we have witnessed a diffusion of power, which significantly decreased the influence of the leading nations. At the same time, political and economic interdependence among different parts of the world has increased as never before. That has resulted in a vastly intensified political, economic

and military dependence of the allies on attitudes and developments in other parts of the world. As we all know, the Alliance has no direct responsibilities beyond the treaty area and that rule must remain unchanged.

Nevertheless, we should attempt to arrive at common concepts upon which a policy for safeguarding our vital interests can be established wherever they are at stake. Within the Alliance, the machinery and experience of political consultation are available. They should be used to make a contribution to that purpose. That would be fully in line with the recommendations made in the report of the Three Wise Men, which emphasised that the member countries should also be concerned with harmonising their policies to other areas, taking into account the broader interests of the whole international community. Common concepts thus arrived at should lead to the elaboration of some division of labour. In that way, the European member states, for example, could make a special effort to contribute to the strengthening of stability of the ASEAN region, the Middle East and Africa.

As a natural result of the growth of the economic development of Europe, there has been a shift to a more equal economic balance between the United States of America and its transatlantic partners. In those circumstances, it is not surprising that there are those who want the Europe of the Nine – from 1st January, the Europe of the Ten – to assert its own identity and to have a greater say in the process of western decision making.

Yesterday, in Luxembourg, the European Council adopted a declaration on the rôle of Europe which expressed its belief in the need for close co-operation between a strong America and a Europe which was sure of itself and its rôle in the world. Such co-operation is essential for peace and security in the world. I was happy with that declaration, because it is indeed an illusion to think that Europe can play a wholly independent rôle in international politics, politically, economically or militarily.

It is the latter to which the Assembly has mostly directed its attention recently and I should like to conclude by devoting a few words to that subject. Europe alone is no match for a superpower such as the Soviet Union, with its vast natural and human resources and a régime which, even in times of peace, puts guns before butter. Furthermore most European countries do not possess nuclear weapons and do not want to alter that situation.

Therefore, Europe can be secure, both in the nuclear and the conventional areas, only where it is in alliance with the United States of America. At the same time, European countries, in view of their economic strength and the

Mr. van der Klaauw (continued)

deterioration of the international situation, should be conscious of the growing requirements for common defence.

In that respect I mention the useful and important work done in armaments co-operation by the Independent European Programme Group. Those efforts are necessary for both the most efficient use of our defence outlay and the enhancement of our technological capabilities. It is to the benefit of us all if all our countries, large or small, are given the opportunity to participate in a common effort in that sphere.

It is by improving the process of consultation, by working out common concepts, from which a division of labour can be derived, by bringing home the message that efforts and sacrifices are needed to safeguard our independence and by attaining a degree of European coherence that is enough to make us a strong and reliable party for our transatlantic allies that we can find the solution for some of the problems that 1980 has posed us. Thank you for your attention. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Minister, for, as always, an interesting and comprehensive survey, both in your capacity as Chairman of the Council and as Foreign Minister of the Netherlands. The Assembly will greatly appreciate what you said about our Clerk, Mr. Humblet, who is due to retire shortly.

He was not present at the time, because he was supervising the ballot, but I have drawn his attention to your remarks and I am sure that he will be happy to read the record.

It is particularly welcome to us that you have come straight from the European Council and given us up-to-date details of decisions taken on European policy and with respect to the difficulties in Italy.

I suggest that if it is agreeable to you, Minister, all the questions should be answered together at the end.

6. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly

(Doc. 857)

The PRESIDENT. – The result of the ballot is as follows.

Number of votes cast	82
Number of blank or spoiled ballot papers	0
Number of valid votes cast . . .	82
Absolute majority necessary . .	42

The votes were as follows:

Mr. Moulis	29
Mr. Whyte	20
Mr. Huigens	17
Mr. Rogati	10
Mr. Nehring	6

As no candidate had an absolute majority, we shall need to have a second ballot, when the result will be decided on a relative majority. I propose to hold that ballot after questions to Mr. van der Klaauw.

7. Questions to Mr. van der Klaauw, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Jager.

Mr. JAGER (*France*) (Translation). – The Minister's German colleague, Mrs. Hamm-Brücher, stated yesterday before the Assembly that her country unreservedly supports the French proposal for the organisation of a conference on European disarmament.

What is the position of the Minister's country in this respect? Does he consider that the Madrid conference will be able to adopt a mandate for the organisation of such a conference?

The PRESIDENT. – Do you have a question, Sir Frederic? If not, I call Mr. Porthéine.

Mr. PORTHEINE (*Netherlands*). – It is a privilege to put a question to my compatriot and friend, Mr. van der Klaauw. It has been reported in the press that matters relating to European defence were discussed at a Franco-British meeting in October. Have the results of that meeting been studied in the framework of an organisation in which the European allies of France and of the United Kingdom meet?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Porthéine.

I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I apologise to the Minister and to you, Mr. President. As you know, Mr. President, I was not present during the Minister's speech because I was counting the ballot. I apologise not only for that unintentional discourtesy, but also for the fact that the Minister may have covered my question.

Recently, a ministerial reply was given to Recommendation 349 about the Middle East and the opportunities for a European initiative. In the reply, the Council refers – in connection with Palestine – to “the frame-

Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)

work of the comprehensive peace settlement". As the situation is not clear to some of us, I should like to know whether the Minister considers that that framework is defined in the Camp David agreements, or whether he envisages a wider framework than the one defined in the Camp David agreements.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Konings.

Mr. KONINGS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, there are some countries in the West who are busy supplying modern weapons systems on an ever-increasing scale to countries in the Middle East, so as to ensure their oil supplies. This is undoubtedly adding to the instability in the Middle East, and this in turn is having its impact on the oil supplies. The supply of nuclear technology, too, forms part of the picture.

I would like to ask the Minister what he thinks about this. Are arms supplies by individual countries of the Atlantic Alliance a subject of consultation? Can there conceivably, in the course of time, be a joint policy on this issue?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – First of all, I wish to thank the Minister for his words of sympathy to my country, so grievously stricken by the unprecedentedly violent earthquake which struck a vast area, unfortunately among the poorest in the country. I thank him also for the proposals and assurances of aid which he gave as a contribution to restoring life to the area.

I come to the question. Does the Minister think that the free world and Europe in particular have done all that was possible and should have been done to persuade the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan – excluding armed intervention of course? Does the Minister think that practical measures should be taken to assist the Afghan resistance?

The PRESIDENT. – I hope that members will make their questions brief, because there is a lot of business before us.

I call Mr. Bozzi.

Mr. BOZZI (*France*) (Translation). – Can the Minister tell us whether the Council has taken the trouble to check which countries – all of them of course having been called upon to do so – have increased their own defence budgets by 3 % for the year 1981?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister referred to the need for American co-operation in the defence of Europe. I

wholeheartedly agree with that sentiment. When he said that, was the Minister expressing his own opinion, or that of the Council, of which he is Chairman? If it is the Council's opinion, is he aware of anti-American influences in Europe? Is the Council doing anything to counteract such influences?

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Deschamps.

Mr. DESCHAMPS (*France*) (Translation). – The Netherlands Parliament pronounced against the American decision to produce and deploy long-range nuclear missiles in Europe. In view of this project, the Netherlands Government, I believe, has invoked executive privilege to allow it to comply with American demands for nuclear armament contrary to the wishes of the peoples of Europe for disarmament.

What attitude does the Minister intend to take in regard to the NATO proposals for the installation of American nuclear missiles in Europe?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – It is being said, Mr. President, that when the election of a new President is over, France may go on to acquire the neutron bomb. France and the United Kingdom could then develop a nuclear force which included the neutron bomb.

What would be the Minister's view of this in the NATO context, bearing in mind the overwhelming opposition there is in the Netherlands to the neutron bomb?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Do you wish to ask a question, Mr. Mommersteeg?

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Minister has mentioned one very interesting point that is of urgent concern – the fact that there ought not be any kind of directorate developing within the Alliance, since this would lead to discontent among the other countries. Are there not in fact developments under way in this direction? We have had the meeting in Guadeloupe. I get the impression that at their recent meeting the Federal Chancellor and the French President had new talks at this level in mind, and were promoting the idea of such a get-together. Is this development under way, and how can it be checked?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Mommersteeg.

I call Mr. Page.

Mr. PAGE (*United Kingdom*). – Can the Minister give any further information about yesterday's discussions in Luxembourg among EEC leaders, which covered the situation in Poland?

The PRESIDENT. – We have now had a wide selection of demanding questions. Do you wish to ask a question, Lord Duncan-Sandys?

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). – Although I very much appreciate the Minister's speech, I was a little concerned by his emphasis on the existence of different national attitudes towards international affairs. President Kennedy once said...

The PRESIDENT. – Will you please ask a question?

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). – Does not the Minister agree that unless the European members of the NATO Alliance speak with one voice, Europe will not make itself heard in international affairs? If he does agree, does he not accept that our countries should make greater efforts to develop a common international policy on great world issues, even if that involves some compromise as regards national attitudes?

The PRESIDENT. – Minister, if you would now reply to the very demanding and wide-ranging questions that have been asked, we should be most grateful.

Mr. van der KLAUW (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – Mr. President, many interesting questions have been asked, and I am very happy at the interest shown.

Mr. Jager asked me about German support for the proposal, originally French, for a European conference for arms control and disarmament. The Netherlands Government support that, too, and I assure him that all NATO countries support it. It is a common proposal which originally was French, but it has been taken over by the NATO countries. As such it will be introduced in the conference at Madrid.

Mr. Portheine asked about French-British military discussions in October. I do not know about these proposals. They have not been discussed in any other forum. Sir Frederic Bennett asked the meaning of the words "comprehensive peace settlement" in the reply to Recommendation 349. As is well known, the European countries are committed to seeing what they can contribute to a peace settlement in the Middle East. We recognise the importance of the Camp David agreement but we are of the opinion that Europe has possibilities of its own, but in harmony with the United States,

to help find solutions for this long-lasting conflict. That solution will have to be comprehensive, which means that all the parties involved will have to take part in the peace settlement.

In Luxembourg we spoke again about European efforts in the Middle East. As Representatives may know, the President of the European Community for this half year has made a voyage through the Middle East and talked to all the parties. His experiences and the answers he has received we have put down in an internal document.

It may not surprise this Assembly to know that the answers he got differ and do not show one unique solution. We have decided, therefore, that the next President of the European Community – which I have the honour to be – will go again to the Middle East and also to Washington as soon as the new administration has been installed to talk there about how we can best contribute to this peace settlement. We shall canvass new and more definite questions and see what we can do.

Mr. Konings spoke about arms deliveries to the Middle East. Whatever efforts may have been made, arms deliveries are still a national prerogative. There is no common arms policy unless it is the one towards the communist countries; but otherwise every national government has its own policy on arms exports. In view of the situation in the Middle East, it is my opinion – and I am not thinking only of the conflict between Israel and the Arabs but also of the war that is raging at the moment between Iraq and Iran, the dissensions between Syria and Iraq and between Syria and Jordan – that the utmost restraint in arms exports will have to be applied, and I can assure this Assembly, as Netherlands Foreign Minister, that that is our policy.

Mr. Cavaliere asked whether we should not have an Afghan resistance. I do not believe that it is for the European powers to help Afghan freedom fighters with arms and so on. There can possibly be such support from somewhere else, but what we should certainly do and what the Netherlands Government and other European countries are doing is giving humanitarian aid to those who are refugees in Pakistan and living in very difficult circumstances.

Mr. Bozzi asked me about the 3 % increase in budgets. I do not know the exact situation in all member countries of Western European Union and its alliance. The 3 % was decided during the summit meeting of the NATO Council in Washington and we were all hoping that we could raise this amount of budget because we all understood how necessary it was to keep up our defences. But economic reces-

Mr. van der Klaauw (continued)

sion and bigger and bigger problems have made it necessary for a number of member countries to cut their defence expenditure and perhaps lower rates of defence expenditure have been absolutely necessary. The Netherlands Government have been in that position, but we certainly hope that this is just for this one budget year and that we can go back to the promises that we, as allies, have made to each other.

Dr. Miller asked whether, when I spoke about the relationship between the United States and Europe, I spoke on a personal basis or as Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, or as Chairman. I spoke as Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, but I can assure him that there is a growing awareness in the Alliance that we have to stand together in view of the deterioration in the international situation. It is necessary. That is the only sensible answer that can be given. Therefore, I said in my speech how happy I was with the declarations that came out of the European Council in which there was a strong commitment to the solidarity of a strong America and a Europe which knows its rôle in the world and is sure of itself.

Mr. Deschamps asked about the attitude the Netherlands Government will take towards theatre nuclear forces when the two-year period of grace which we have allowed ourselves in which to take a decision is over. The Netherlands Government has said that at that time – December next year – we shall judge the situation in view of the progress made in the negotiations with the Soviet Union on limiting the number of those nuclear arms which, as he knows, are standing to on the other side of the border – SS-20s and so on.

Mr. Stoffelen asked me about French plans for a neutron bomb. I have seen articles in newspapers about this, but I have no confirmation at all that France is planning to do this, so I cannot comment on that. The attitude of the Netherlands towards the neutron bomb is certainly known to the honourable deputy.

Mr. Mommersteeg was worried that there was a risk of a development towards directorates, towards meetings of smaller groups, smaller parties. We are just as independent and proud and ready to co-operate as any other one, and I think it is unwise to come together in a small group to discuss such things and then say: "This is the solution and you have to accept it." We want to speak our minds and to help define points of view. I am not much worried at the moment about a new Guadeloupe. This idea is no longer followed, at least for the moment, but that is the present situation.

In July next year, there will be a meeting of the seven main industrial powers and there is a danger that that, too, will become institutionalised, rather than being an occasional meeting without secretariats and so on. It is important that the European Community prepares its common point of view before the meeting in Ottawa in July. As Chairman of the Council during the coming half year, I can assure you that we shall work hard to get a common European position, which will be finally established after a thorough preparation at the European summit on 29th and 30th June on the last days of our presidency.

Mr. Page asked what we discussed about Poland during the European summit. Naturally, we had discussions on Poland. We made a declaration in which we drew attention to and reaffirmed the Charter of the United Nations and the declaration of Helsinki, which spoke about non-interference in the affairs of other countries. It was a good, strong statement, and it was necessary to make it.

We also discussed the possibilities of food aid to Poland and have declared ourselves ready, in view of the difficult economic situation in Poland, to help with food if the Poles so wish.

Lord Duncan-Sandys asked that we should make a greater effort to speak with one voice for Europe on international issues. We make this effort already. You will be able to see that, in European political co-operation, our common policies are growing.

I remember that when a President of the European Community addressed the United Nations in the early days he might have two pages of comments on European policy and would then deal mainly with his national policies. Nowadays, the President speaks on European policies, with perhaps one page of national remarks. That gives a balance in international issues between the national view and the common European approach.

There are still differences, as we all know, but I see a great interest in our standing together in a difficult and divided world. It is in our direct interest to co-operate closely and politically in the Community, and we are working to that end.

As I said in my speech, there is a need for Europe to act in harmony with the United States for our own security. That remains the first need for the general peace of the world.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Minister, for the great privilege you have given us by dealing so fully and ably with many difficult questions, particularly as we know that you answer both for the Council and in your capacity as Foreign Minister of the Nether-

The President (continued)

lands. I feel guilty that your speech and the answers to questions were sandwiched between our internal procedures, at which we are not terribly skilled. We look forward to your presidency of the EEC and wish you every success in the term of office which begins on 1st January.

8. Election of the Clerk of the Assembly*(Doc. 857)*

The PRESIDENT. – We now proceed to the second ballot in the election of our Clerk. In the interim, I have had notice that Mr. Rogati wishes to withdraw his candidature. We therefore have four candidates. On the first ballot Mr. Moulias received twenty-nine votes, Mr. Whyte twenty votes, Mr. Huigens seventeen votes and Mr. Nehring six votes.

I ask every Representative or Substitute to ensure that he has signed the register, since we had some difficulties of identification on the first ballot. The procedure will be as before.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I first inform the Assembly that Mr. Nehring has also withdrawn his candidature for the second ballot.

I would besides like to make a suggestion. Since the first ballot was so difficult, I think it would make sense if the political groups could meet again before the second ballot, to give them the chance of possibly agreeing on a single candidate.

The PRESIDENT. – I think that we must now proceed. We could not get a vote in this morning if we suspended.

The roll-call will start with the two tellers, so that they may prepare themselves. Any Representatives present who have not signed the register will not be called to vote.

The voting is open.

(A vote by secret ballot by roll-call was then taken)

Are there any Representatives or Substitutes, duly registered, who have not voted?

I declare the ballot closed.

We must keep the Assembly in session because members will want to know the outcome of the vote, but I propose to suspend the

sitting until 1 p.m. We may have the result by then. Members do not have to stay, but at 1 p.m. I shall announce the result of the ballot and the Orders of the Day for this afternoon.

The Sitting is suspended.

(The Sitting was suspended at 12.53 p.m. and resumed at 1.03 p.m.)

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Sitting is resumed.

The result of the vote is as follows:

Number of votes cast	81
Number of blank or spoiled ballot papers	0
Number of valid votes cast ...	81

The votes were as follows:

Mr. Moulias	45
Mr. Whyte	29
Mr. Huigens	7

Mr. Moulias has gained the greatest number of votes. Under our rules, he is elected.

I congratulate Mr. Moulias on behalf of members, but I suggest that the formal presentation of the new Clerk to the Assembly should take place this afternoon, because there is a rather thin attendance at present. I am sure that members would wish there to be a greater attendance when Mr. Moulias takes his oath, as required under Rule 47. I therefore propose that the oath should be taken this afternoon, shortly after the beginning of the Sitting.

At that time I shall formally congratulate Mr. Moulias on behalf of members.

9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces (Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 859 and Amendments).
2. Political implications for Europe of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of

The President (continued)

- the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 855 and Amendments).
3. Poland and European security (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Order, Document 866 and Amendment).
 4. Energy and security (Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific,

Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 856 and Amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.)

THIRTEENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd December 1980

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 859 and Amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Tummers, Mr. Mommersteeg (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Cavaliere (*Chairman of the Committee*), Sir Frederic Bennett, Dr. Miller, Mr. Mommersteeg, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Mommersteeg, Mr. Cavaliere, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Cavaliere; (explanation of vote): Mr. Grieve; (point of order): Mr. Hardy.

4. Solemn declaration of the Clerk-elect before the Assembly.

Speakers: The President, Mr. Moulias (*Clerk-elect of the Assembly*), the President.

5. Political implications for Europe of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 855 and Amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Hardy (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Müller, Mr. Rubbi, Dr. Miller, Mr. McGuire, Mr. Lemoine, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Atkinson, Mr. Cavaliere, Mr. Koutsogiorgas (*Observer from Greece*), Mr. Holtz, Mr. Caro, Mr. Forni, Mr. Hill, Mr. Hardy (*Rapporteur*), Sir Frederic Bennett (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Dejardin, Lord Duncan-Sandys, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Hardy, Dr. Miller, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Forni, Mr. Grieve, Mr. Gessner, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Dejardin, Mr. Hardy; (points of order): Lord Duncan-Sandys, Mr. Stoffelen; (explanation of vote): Mrs. von Bothmer; (points of order): Mr. Smith, Mr. Grieve.

6. Poland and European security (*Presentation of and Debate on the oral Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 866 and Amendments*).

Speakers: The President, Mr. De Poi (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Grieve, Mr. Vecchiotti, Mr. De Poi; (point of order): Mr. Caro; Mr. Gessner, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Caro, Mr. De Poi, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Grieve, Mr. De Poi; (explanation of vote): Mr. Cavaliere; Mr. Grieve.

7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. – The Minutes of Proceedings of the last Sitting have not yet been distributed. The Minutes will be submitted for adoption at the next Sitting.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

1. See page 45.

3. SALT and the British and French nuclear forces

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 859 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The first Order of the Day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 859 and Amendments.

In the debate on Mr. Mommersteeg's report, the only remaining speaker is Mr. Tummers. I ask him now to address us. If he could curtail his remarks and speak for less than the ten minutes for which he has asked, that would be helpful. Today I shall ask every speaker to be as brief as possible, for otherwise we shall not get through our business in the time allowed.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – The report by my fellow-countryman, Mr. Mommersteeg, provides a useful account of how things stand with regard to the British and French nuclear weapons. The Rapporteur however avoids offering any personal political opinion, and has limited himself to setting out the facts.

What I would ask Mr. Mommersteeg is whether one can in fact, on a matter like this, dodge the question of what one's own views are. Does this not mean taking a blinkered view of how the French and British nuclear forces fit into the discussion on limiting the rôle played by nuclear weapons? Is not his own Christian Democrat party having a fierce discussion on how the number of nuclear weapons can be reduced? We feel that on this point Mr. Mommersteeg has shown less political courage than we expect from him.

In France the rôle of the French nuclear weapon is seen as a purely national concern. That is wrong, because any use of the French nuclear weapon can have consequences for the whole of Europe. For this reason, too, the French policy on nuclear arms is an idle fancy. We can see, besides, that French security can in no way be guaranteed by the existence of a French nuclear force. The presence of French troops in West Germany demonstrates how far the security of France is bound up with that of the rest of Europe. It is distressing that France has no credible policy on the need for cutting down on the number of nuclear weapons in Europe. With France's attitude to its membership of NATO, discussions on this issue are still too difficult.

Where the British nuclear force is concerned, we find that matters are quite different, since the United Kingdom is wholly integrated with NATO. The main question with regard to the British deterrent is whether this nuclear capacity makes any credible contribution, alongside the American nuclear guarantee. At the same time, one may wonder whether the British nuclear force could – were the American guarantee to be removed – provide a nuclear guarantee by itself. The first of these questions, the extent to which the British nuclear force can make an extra contribution, is I think easy to answer. In the light of the formidable nuclear capability of the United States and the very minor scope of the British nuclear force, one cannot seriously believe that a British nuclear force is essential. In other words, British nuclear weapons make little or no contribution to the credibility of European defence.

By similar reasoning, one has to suppose that – looked at separate from the American nuclear

capability – both the United Kingdom and France possess enough of a deterrent for this nuclear force to be credible. This is not however so, because one cannot conceive of the strategists in Moscow giving equal significance to the American, French and British nuclear forces. A major objection to the existence of both the French and the British nuclear forces – nationally of very limited military significance – is that they form a serious obstacle to progress towards nuclear disarmament. Nor can we see the British Government – which wants to acquire new nuclear capability at such enormous cost – or the French Government accepting a reduction in the size of their nuclear forces. While progress in the control of nuclear armaments is admittedly already minimal, the French and British nuclear forces do complicate the issue further.

Everyone in this Assembly will agree that the enormous stockpile of nuclear weapons round the world offers a serious and deadly threat. The first challenge facing us is to diminish the rôle played by nuclear weapons, so as at the same time to raise the nuclear threshold. Anyone who believes that proper defence is necessary in a wicked world – a world where using nuclear weapons would have disastrous consequences – must come to realise that for the European countries the most important thing by far is to devote the limited financial resources available to maintaining an adequate level of defence with conventional armaments. The British economy, like the French and other economies, is going through difficult times. If the French and British nuclear forces are not making any real contribution to deterrence, then keeping a French and a British nuclear potential in being is a waste of scarce resources.

The Rapporteur has not brought this out sufficiently in his report, so it will not surprise you, Mr. President, if we have to say that we have very serious reservations about what is contained in the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Tummers.

That closes the general debate.

Does the Rapporteur, Mr. Mommersteeg, or the Chairman wish to reply?

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*). – I shall comment very briefly on what our colleagues have said in this debate. First, I must express my thanks for the kind words about my report.

Mr. Bernini criticised American Presidential directive 59. I have treated that extensively in the report. The Committee criticised the way in which the decree was announced during the

Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)

election campaign, but Defence Secretary Brown gave a good explanation of that so-called "new" strategy, which is only an evolution of a strategy in line with the changing technology and possibilities of options on both sides.

Every strategy must be directed towards preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, but that means having the capability to fight such a war. That is the awful paradox. I support what Mr. Bernini said about the need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty as early as possible.

I always appreciate what Mr. Baumel says but he has said something today I cannot understand. He is against WEU appealing to the NATO Council, in which all WEU countries harmonise defence and arms control. The Brussels Treaty says:

"In the execution of the treaty, the high contracting parties and any organs established by them under the treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation."

It is therefore right to appeal to the Council when we have something to say.

I am grateful to my friend, Mr. van Hulst, for his friendly remarks. I do not know whether Lord Duncan-Sandys realised that he did not have the final text of the report. I see that he says that he has now received it, so I need not comment on his speech.

I cannot accede to Mr. Tummers's request for a political statement of my own. I am the Rapporteur. The report and recommendations are the products of intensive study by the Committee whose spokesman I am. If Mr. Tummers reproaches me for lack of vision over the policy of the Dutch Government in reducing the rôle of nuclear weapons, he cannot have read my report thoroughly. It continually stresses the need for disarmament, and particularly arms control, and takes a balanced view. My own conviction is behind that view, which I defended in Committee, and I have the Committee with me.

Mr. Tummers said that the French nuclear policy was illusory, but the independent French nuclear force is a fact with which I must reckon, since it is supported by the whole political spectrum in France – even more so than is the case in the United Kingdom.

Shall I now deal with the amendments?

The PRESIDENT. – No, we shall come to them one at a time.

On behalf of the Assembly, I thank you, Mr. Mommersteeg, for the great energy and hard work that you have devoted to this important report.

I now call the Chairman.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Just a few words, first of all to thank Mr. Mommersteeg for his remarkable effort and for his strict impartiality; and then to thank the authorities – and in particular the British – who have been truly generous in providing the information requested by the Rapporteur and the Committee.

Mr. Bernini said that the deterioration of détente and the growth of tension between East and West are a direct consequence of the failure to ratify SALT II. He pretends to ignore – I say "pretends" because he really knows – that this failure to ratify SALT II is due mainly, if not solely, to the invasion of Afghanistan. If, therefore, he claims that there should be no link between the tension created by this treachery on the part of the Soviet Union, he is making a mistake and is taking no account of the conscience of the American people; the same conscience of which we became aware when we visited the United States in February 1980.

I would add that if fresh negotiations were started – and there is a move in that direction – on missiles and nuclear theatre weapons which are of special concern to Europe, I believe – and I think that all Representatives share this view – that this is due to the decision taken in December to build up our defences to meet the atomic weapons deployed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, precisely by the installation of the new missiles.

On final remark. I am amazed at the attitude of Mr. Baumel who spoke in the name of the French Delegation – and I trust that this is not the case because the "No" vote declared by Mr. Baumel would stem from the fact that both the report and the recommendation argue that the modernisation of the French and British atomic forces should not reduce the extent of intervention by conventional weapons. Even if it created difficulties, I consider that our Assembly should reaffirm this concept with force because there is parity in strategic nuclear armaments and not parity in theatre nuclear weapons – although there are anxieties on this point – and there is an absolute imbalance between the conventional weapons held by the Warsaw Pact and those held by NATO. This is extremely dangerous for the security of Europe because – to speak in the most objective terms – virtually no one believes that a nuclear war will take place in these conditions – and I trust that this danger will in any case be averted – but precisely for this reason conventional

Mr. Cavaliere (continued)

weapons become more important since they enable the Soviet Union to indulge in expansion in various directions.

Lastly, I would say that I am worried by this situation because, with the imbalance of conventional armaments and the possibility of action being launched with them, the side in a position of inferiority and in danger of being overwhelmed might be induced to use nuclear weapons. This imbalance is dangerous therefore and I hope that WEU will realise this and emphasise the need not to neglect our presence and our intervention for the strengthening of conventional forces.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Chairman.

We turn now to the amendments. The first is that of Sir Frederic Bennett, Amendment 1.

Does Sir Frederic wish to move the amendment?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I beg to move:

1. In paragraph (*viii*) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after “Believing” insert “a revised”.

I shall try to move this amendment very briefly indeed. You are aware that in order to assist you, Mr. President, I withdrew my name from the list of speakers. So if, very unusually for me, I go a minute or two beyond the usual time for an amendment, I hope that you will understand that on this occasion you have exchanged possibly one minute extra for a ten-minute speech, to the advantage of this Assembly.

The amendment which I move is very simple. Paragraph (*viii*) of the preamble reads: “Believing SALT II to be to the mutual advantage of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact”. For realism and other reasons I want to insert: “a revised SALT II”.

I do so on two grounds. The first is that we in this Assembly often complain that we are not taken seriously overseas or, indeed anywhere because of the lack of reality of many of our deliberations and conclusions. How it is possible for a responsible Assembly to insert in a report of this nature, which presumably will find its way to Washington and elsewhere, a comment to the effect that we believe that a treaty that is as dead as a duck is to the mutual advantage of Europe, the West and everybody else, absolutely baffles my imagination.

I am amazed that my friend, the Rapporteur, has not appreciated this. In a democratic situation there is no chance at all of SALT II in

its present form being ratified by the Senate and therefore of coming into effect. Even under the previous administration the President was unable to get a majority in his own Senate. Without that majority SALT II would never have come into effect, whether or not there had been a change in the administration.

It was the President of a former administration who withdrew SALT II from the consideration of the Senate. Does anyone in this place seriously imagine that the incoming President of the United States is going to send SALT II back to Washington to be discussed and ratified by the Senate when his predecessor took the opposite view because of what had happened in Afghanistan and when a large amount of Mr. Reagan's election campaign was spent upon saying that if there were to be a SALT II, it would have to be a revised SALT II?

For my own part, I said that there were two reasons I oppose it because I never believed that SALT II in its old form was to the mutual advantage of the West and the East. I share the view of many distinguished commentators, both on the continent and on the other side of the Atlantic. Irrespective of that point of view, I feel that it is a little pathetic for this Assembly to send out a message that a proposed treaty which cannot receive ratification in a democratic country and which is not even going to be put up for ratification is something which we should seriously endorse.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Frederic.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to oppose the amendment on the following grounds. I have no real argument to put against Sir Frederic's view that the President of the United States will change the SALT agreement, but it is not up to us before his revision to comment on the way in which the President will revise the SALT II treaty. If we inserted in this sentence the word “revised”, we should be jumping the gun. In fact, we should be saying that the treaty must be revised in the absence of knowing what was in the President's mind. I remind Sir Frederic that very often yesterday's dreams become tomorrow's realities.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Dr. Miller.

Does the Chairman or the Rapporteur wish to comment?

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*). – We all know that Sir Frederic Bennett was opposed to the opinion of the majority of the Assembly that SALT II was to the mutual advantage of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but that view has

Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)

been stated by the Assembly and by all Western European governments. Why should we withdraw from that? We have to maintain that stance. That does not mean that I am not realistic. I elaborated on the matter this morning.

Paragraph 1 of the operative part of the recommendation does not call on the United States Senate to ratify the treaty. It calls for: "the earliest resumption of the SALT process" and in the meantime the observance of SALT II. That could mean ratification, but it does not necessarily mean that. There could be renegotiation. We should not withdraw from the stand that we took only a year ago.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Rapporteur.

The Chairman of the Committee wishes to speak.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – The Committee discussed the amendment and a majority was not in favour.

The PRESIDENT. – I understand that the Chairman has underlined that the Committee is against the amendment.

I now put to the vote Sir Frederic Bennett's Amendment 1, in paragraph (viii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Believing" insert "a revised".

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

The next amendment is 3. I call Mr. Wilkinson to move it. I hope that he will be brief.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – You will be aware, Mr. President, that this is an important amendment. I beg to move Amendment 3, to leave out paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

We have seen in recent days that to base foreign policy on a plan to renounce linkage has proved ineffectual. We have seen, for example, food aid provided by the EEC to the Soviet Union, grain supplied by western countries to the Soviet Union, even after the invasion of Afghanistan, and the issue of the construction of pipelines to make West Germany 30% dependent on Soviet natural gas. In addition, financial credits galore have been provided to the Soviet Union, which can only enhance its military capabilities. It could be believed by the Soviets that western countries always put their short-term commercial and financial advantages before their long-term security. I hope, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that the Assembly will consider the amendment care-

fully. The United States under the Carter administration deliberately renounced linkage in military matters. For example, it decided not to deploy the enhanced radiation weapon in Europe, and not to develop the B1 bomber and put it into service. It cannot be said that these deliberate renunciations of linkage diminished the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union: quite the contrary. It would be rash for the Assembly formally to suggest that we should renounce linkage on arms control measures.

The Committee stresses in paragraph 7.12 the need for the closest allied consultation in the arms control process. That is surely wise. In view of the statement of President-elect Reagan, quoted in paragraph 7.10, that there must be linkage between arms control and other areas of difference between the superpowers, it would surely be foolish for this Assembly, in advance of the assumption of office by the new United States administration, to take a position that appears to be diametrically opposed to what the new administration has in mind.

Flexibility and realism have to be the hallmarks of a sound foreign policy. Today, it is Afghanistan which has been invaded. Tomorrow, it may be subversion in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan and, who knows, perhaps even the invasion of Poland by East German troops the day after.

In the dire circumstances of international tension in which we live in today's dangerous world, it would be most unwise for the Assembly to forgo deliberately taking, at some stage, the ultimate sanction of withholding arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. It may be that in some circumstances that would be the only sanction that the Soviets would understand.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson. I began to wonder during one or two parts of your speech whether it was directed to the amendment. When you addressed me as Mr. Deputy Speaker, a post to which I cannot yet aspire, I thought that perhaps you had picked up the wrong speech.

Does anyone else wish to speak to the amendment?...

May we have the view of the Rapporteur?

Mr. MOMMERSTEEG (*Netherlands*). – The amendment refers to an important paragraph that could, perhaps, have been better formulated, because it does not state specifically that it relates to arms control agreements. I appreciate the explanation given by Mr. Wilkinson and I understand what he was saying.

The paragraph merely says that if arms control agreements are "to the mutual

Mr. Mommersteeg (continued)

advantage of the parties" and the United States and the West are convinced of their mutual advantage, we should accept that judgment. Of course, all sorts of things have political interaction. The invasion of Afghanistan influenced the negotiating climate, but that does not affect what is said in the preamble. If specific arms control agreements are to the mutual advantage of the parties, we should accept that fact.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Rapporteur.

The Chairman also wishes to speak. I hope that it will not be necessary for the Chairman and the Rapporteur to speak on every amendment, but if you must speak, Chairman, you must.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President I am not wasting time. The Rapporteur has given his views. It is my duty to inform the Assembly of the Committee's view on this amendment. A majority of the Committee was opposed to the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. Perhaps you, Mr. Chairman, will be the first speaker on the next amendment. Members have heard the Committee's views.

We shall now vote on Mr. Wilkinson's Amendment 3 to leave out paragraph (*ix*).

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is negatived.

I turn to Amendment 2, tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett. I call Sir Frederic to move the amendment.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I beg to move Amendment 2, in paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "process" to the end of the paragraph.

I return to the position that I was in before. Whatever Dr. Miller's views may be on dreams becoming reality, this Assembly does not deliberately indulge in nonsense. Anyone who imagines that arms control and the earliest resumption of the SALT II process can be maintained in today's world, irrespective of other aspects of East-West relations, lives in a world not of dreams but of nonsense. Everyone knows that the talks could not continue, or even begin, if the Soviet Union were to invade, for example, Poland today. We have already accepted one bit of nonsense today. We should not insert a deliberate bit of nonsense again.

I should like the paragraph to end at the word "process". Since the Chairman was

good enough to give the Committee's view on both the other occasions, I hope that he will recall the Committee's opinion on this.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I can inform the Assembly that the Committee with one abstention, was in favour of the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – The Committee is in favour of the amendment.

Does anyone else wish to speak to the amendment?...

If there are no other speakers, we shall now vote on Amendment 2 tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is agreed to by a substantial majority.

That is the end of the amendments.

I shall now put the draft recommendation, as amended, to the Assembly.

If there are no objections or abstentions, we can avoid having to take a roll-call.

Are there any objections?...

I understand that there are abstentions, but I wish to know first whether there are any objections.

I understand that our Dutch colleagues, Mr. Stoffelen and Mr. Tummers, object. Therefore, we must have a roll-call. I understand that, according to our new rules, we have a quorum on the basis of those registered as present.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Berchem.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	48
Ayes	35
Noes	3
Abstentions	10

The amended draft recommendation is adopted².

1. See page 46.
2. See page 48.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I wish to give an explanation of vote.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Grieve, an explanation of his abstention.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I shall put it very shortly. I regard this as an extremely useful report and I regret having had to abstain; but the rejection by the Assembly of Sir Frederic Bennett's first amendment and the amendment of my friend Mr. Wilkinson, both of which imported a note of realism into this report, has led me to record my abstention.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Mr President, could it be made clear whether a member is entitled to seek an opportunity to present an explanation of his abstention? I understood that it was an explanation of a vote.

The PRESIDENT. – That is a fine point but I feel that a decision not to vote is also, in a sense, a vote; but since you, Mr. Hardy, are an interested party and we are trying to get to an end of our business, I shall not seek to extend this rather metaphysical argument at this time.

4. Solemn declaration of the Clerk-elect before the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – We now move to the next item of business, to which I am sure the Assembly will wish me to move. In view of the naturally sparse attendance a little after one o'clock, when we announced the result of the second ballot for the election of our new Clerk, I shall give the figures for the benefit of those not then present: Mr. Moulias, forty-five; Mr. Whyte, twenty-nine; Mr. Huigens, seven; the other two candidates having withdrawn. Therefore, Mr. Moulias was declared our new Clerk and he will take office at the beginning of January next. I am sure that I speak on behalf of the whole Assembly in conveying our congratulations and good wishes to Mr. Moulias.

Under Rule 47, it is important that he now makes the solemn declaration that our rules require. I want formally to congratulate Mr. Moulias on behalf of the Assembly, and ask him to make the declaration. Will Mr. Moulias please come to the rostrum?

Mr. MOULIAS (*Clerk-elect of the Assembly*) (Translation). – I solemnly declare that I will carry out the duties entrusted to me as Clerk of the Assembly of Western European Union loyally and conscientiously, respecting the confidence placed in me.

I undertake to perform my duties in complete independence of, and uninfluenced by, national

considerations, and that I will neither seek nor receive indications concerning the performance of my duties from any government or authority other than the Assembly, and will at all times refrain from any action incompatible with my position as a European civil servant.

The PRESIDENT. – I am sure that we respect completely the solemn declaration that has been made and from my own experience and from what I understand from those who have been longer associated with Mr. Moulias in the work of the Assembly, I know that this has certainly been his position in the past. He has acted with complete impartiality and in the proper spirit of a European civil servant, as have all our quite small staff in the Office of the Assembly. I hope very much that we shall all be able to give him full support.

In the work of the Assembly we shall lack the great experience of Mr. Humblet. Therefore, we have all to work even more together. I hope that we can even increase the work and influence of the Assembly under our new Clerk in 1981, because we can all agree, as the Minister said this morning, that 1980 has not been a very good year.

5. Political implications for Europe of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 855 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 855 and Amendments.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I have the feeling that this report has within it items that will displease almost everyone here. However, any item which an individual may view with displeasure will, I hope, be balanced by the rest of the report and by the recommendations as a whole, and I hope that it will command general approval. I use the word "command" advisedly, since the totality of the report points to courses of action and policies which offer opportunity not only for genuine détente but perhaps for future survival.

The report is not concerned only with Afghanistan, for it is very clear that any one area of crisis and concern cannot be seen in complete isolation from others, and therefore the report is relatively broad. The general information contained in the explanatory memorandum provides detailed background which I hope will be seen as fair, accurate and realistic.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

Since I wish to avoid taking a long time in introducing the report, I must concentrate my attention in this speech upon the draft recommendations. The preamble summarises the reasons for the rather widely based recommendations – widely based because, as I have remarked, there is an inextricable relationship between one real and one potential point of crisis and another.

In recommendations 1 and 10 the report is critical of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, theoretically non-aligned Afghanistan. I suggest that this dreadful violation of both international law and human rights should cease. Representatives may be uneasy about recommendation 10, but I would emphasise that it does not call for immediate involvement in Afghanistan, whether direct or indirect, but suggests only that the possibility of assistance should be examined. Given information such as that which reached us earlier this week from visitors to Afghanistan and given information from such quarters and others about the horrors of the intervention now taking place, I believe the proposed examination is justified.

I recognise that if our call were too emphatic it could be counter-productive; but if it were too weak or non-existent, if the situation were totally ignored, there would be cause, I believe, for a degree of shame. There will be those here who feel that we should not comment at all. Let those who, like myself perhaps, were critical of aspects of the Vietnam situation not very long ago bear that in mind and they will perhaps agree with me that we cannot in all consistency ignore Soviet aggression today. I hope, therefore, that recommendations 1 and 10 will be seen not merely as condemnation but as an expression of concern, as well as an offer to achieve peace and reduce tension. That same motive underlies recommendation 7, which calls for adequate support for Yugoslavia as a means not only of assisting that country but to serve as a prevention of a potential future crisis. Similarly, recommendations 12, 13 and 14 call for attitudes and policies which could ease tension and international peril. Like other recommendations, they could be seen as a means or an attempt to reduce temperature.

Recommendation 9 has the same purpose. It calls for the pursuit of nine-power efforts aimed to secure a just peace in the Middle East. Paragraphs 70 and 74 of the explanatory memorandum, which are reflected in recommendation 9, present an honest appraisal. I make clear that I for one would not in any way wish to threaten Israel's right to exist. However, I emphasise that I do not believe that it is imperilled by the recommendation. The recommendation is relevant since the present

levels of instability in that region are not entirely unrelated to the Israel-Palestine situation.

The sensible positions taken by Western European countries should receive our support. Therefore, I hope that my colleagues, Dr. Miller and Mr. Pavitt, will not press their amendment. I accept that their priorities are honourable and their commitment just and profound, but in no way does the report challenge their priorities or question the need for justice, to which they subscribe.

The report comments on Poland, which the Assembly will debate later today. We need to choose our words with care, in this debate and the next, where Poland is concerned, but we are entitled to respond to anguish. Without encouraging it, which would be likely to bring a dreadful response, we are, or should be, able to afford Poland the support that will assist its people to reach agreement without increasing the risk of Soviet intervention. It is clear that the West has ruled out a more positive response, so we should not strike any posture that might lead people in Poland to imagine that greater support is likely to be forthcoming.

As I said in the General Affairs Committee this morning, I am not particularly keen on professional pugilism, but I am even less keen on those who might wish to encourage conflict in order to occupy a ringside seat. We should be open to that accusation if we overstated our position or were excessively intemperate in our comments. I therefore suggest that we should maintain our support for assistance to Poland in its difficulties rather than seek to aggravate them.

Recommendations 2 and 3 refer to the CSCE talks. They express a view which is both consistent in this Assembly and appropriate for our countries, since they call for the real progress that the world needs and that could be remarkable if the Helsinki final act were largely applied.

Recommendations 4 and 5 deserve our most serious attention. Despite the Afghanistan invasion, despite the neo-imperialism of Soviet foreign policy, despite the comparabilities of military strength and balance, these recommendations underline the need for early progress and willingness to reduce tension and armament levels. If further difficulties and rearmament in any way embarrass the North-South dialogue and hinder the cause of international development, the consequences could be catastrophic.

There may be anxieties about SALT, such as those which exercised our minds earlier today. There may be concern about emphasis and approach in disarmament negotiations. How-

Mr. Hardy (continued)

ever, the fact remains that those negotiations are important and should command a great deal of energy and effort. Therefore, progress towards the establishment of a European disarmament conference is desirable. Positive progress is needed, and not merely declarations of good intent, which may be pious but would also be contemptible. Therefore, that recommendation should command our support and the acceptance of both superpowers.

The time must be right for genuine efforts to achieve disarmament. The consequences of failure are obvious, but if those efforts fail, it must not be because of inadequacy, dishonesty or inertia on the part of the western countries. If there are effort, honesty and energy, yet the approach still fails, we should then have to fall back on recommendation 6.

That recommendation is sadly essential in this report, for I accept that there is a risk of failure and that conflict may be likely or possible. I hope that it is not, but since the risk is there, that recommendation is essential. It may point to a price that the world cannot afford to pay, but I do not apologise for it. Indeed, I make no apology for any of the recommendations, because each is important. I trust that they will receive the Assembly's support.

(Mr. Reddemann, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

The debate is open and the first speaker is Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, though it may on occasion be regarded as mere trimming for a speaker in a debate to begin by thanking the Rapporteur for his work, I am quite sincere in doing so today. I do so principally because we belong to different political persuasions and because I am convinced that the Rapporteur has given us the gist of the discussion in the General Affairs Committee. He has expressed himself in a way which I at least sincerely welcome. He has said that in the present difficult international situation our concern should be to find the right level in our statements in the Assembly of Western European Union, that we should behave appropriately, neither making over-emphatic demands that we might not be able to enforce, nor, on the other hand, succumbing to the temptation of ignoring things, putting them on one side and sweeping unpleasant facts under the carpet. We must be frank and honest in our analysis of the political situation.

There is no doubt, Ladies and Gentlemen, that a year ago – it is as long as that – the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops, led to a radical change in the international situation, not for the better but for the worse. In fact, I regard the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an event that really belongs in the nineteenth rather than the twentieth century. I have the feeling that what the gentlemen of the Kremlin have perpetrated here is a classic example of nineteenth century colonial policy, a policy long obsolete in this century, but one which also reveals that in the whole debate on colonialism the facts are often no longer seen in their true light. While the colonialism of other nineteenth century European powers has been irrevocably eliminated in this century, the Soviet Union has continued its colonialist policy, that is to say it has continued the policy pursued by Tsarist Russia. Of course, Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union have a decisive advantage over the other European colonial powers of the nineteenth century, in that the areas conquered by Tsarist Russia could be incorporated into the Russian Empire, since they were not remote; they became part of the empire, and hence of the Soviet Union as well.

The aims of Russian colonial policy have been clear since they first crossed the Urals in 1579. In 1864 Turkestan was conquered and finally, in 1884, Mary. Their goal has always been to extend the Russian sphere of influence southwards to include Afghanistan and to annex it. That it took until well into the twentieth century, until 1979 or 1980, to realise this policy shows that the old aims have remained the same and that despite a general change in international policy the Soviet Union is obviously still carrying on today what Tsarist Russia did in the past.

We deplore this development, all the more so because in the North-South conflict we must be concerned with recognising and tackling the problems of the South, the former colonies. Soviet policy is not helpful in this respect. It is contributing to a general build-up of armaments. Expenditure on armaments particularly in the eastern bloc is on the increase, while funds are not available for development aid. This policy is giving rise to fresh conflicts.

The assessment of Afghanistan's rôle even in the nineteenth century and the fervour with which the Afghans fought for their freedom in the nineteenth century – against, incidentally, both Russian and British attempts to colonise them are an indicator of the conflicts that raged at the time, and in which the victor was always the loser. A great German poet, Theodor Fontane, wrote a poem entitled "The Tragedy of Afghanistan". The last verse of this poem reads:

Mr. Müller (continued)

“ Those who should hear, hear no more,
Destroyed is the army that went to war.
With thirteen thousand the march began,
One came home from Afghanistan. ”

He was describing the defeat of an invading army.

The title “ The Tragedy of Afghanistan ” says all we need to say today about events in this Asian country. I believe that, embodying democratic Europe and democratic traditions as we do, we have a duty and responsibility to choose our words with care, as Mr. Hardy has said, to be neither too weak nor too strong, but to give clear expression to a policy which condemns colonialism, defends freedom and champions the independence of nations.

We should therefore endorse the report and the draft recommendation. I believe it can help to state the problems as clearly as they have to be stated.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Müller. In this debate your colleagues can only speak for five minutes.

The next speaker is Mr. Rubbi.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – We are not in favour of either the draft recommendation or of Mr. Hardy’s report, not because of the individual points covered, on some of which we are in agreement, but because of the general tenor of the document. It is known that we condemn the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan but we cannot accept the line that every current source of tension and insecurity – the fresh outbreaks of fighting, most recently between Iraq and Iran, the worsening climate of détente, the subsequent stepping up of the arms race and even the military coup d’état in Turkey – are simply the consequence of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, that intervention has increased international tension and has added further to the deterioration of détente. But other major, serious blows had already been struck before the intervention in Afghanistan. All the causes should be considered impartially.

The report, in fact, could do no less than stress Israel’s progressive drive to annex Jerusalem, the West Bank of the Jordan, and Southern Lebanon and now its designs on the Golan Heights; the overall deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and the Gulf area. We must ask ourselves whether we should be in this situation if the Vance-Gromyko agreement on the convening of a conference of all parties interested in establishing a fair and just peace had been implemented and if the world had not instead started down the vain and dan-

gerous path of partial, unilateral agreements, to the prejudice of all concerned and in particular of the Palestinian people?

Should we be in this situation if the undertaking to ratify SALT II quickly had been honoured by the United States? To the Rapporteur who states: “ ...the invasion of Afghanistan decided the United States Government not to submit the SALT II agreements to Congress for ratification...” we can reply with the words of former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance: “ if SALT II had been ratified it might have influenced events in Afghanistan and might even have prevented them...”.

Lastly should we be in this situation if, instead of deciding to produce and install new nuclear weapons in our countries, the proposal had been accepted for immediate negotiations on all medium-range weapons on both sides with the aim of establishing a balance of forces at the lowest possible level? The reluctance of governments and the mass of the population in our countries to accept missiles and to add to the already massive defence expenditure stems not from “ active Soviet propaganda ” as the report maintains, but from the growing realisation that the stockpiling of new weapons does not mean more security or a better guarantee of peace but increases the threat to Europe and the whole of the world.

A one-sided examination of the complex causes of the deterioration of the international situation and its consequences for Europe does not help in seeking and proposing the right means of solving those problems. And it is precisely the lack of adequate ideas and proposals which is the other negative aspect of the papers submitted to the Assembly.

There is an odd contradiction in Mr. Hardy’s report. His conclusion which we would accept unhesitatingly is that “ ... it would be dangerous not to make use, because of Afghanistan, of circumstances favourable to the organisation of peace...” . But the main focus of the report as a whole is the complaint that the foolish policy of boycotts and reprisals did not succeed; the insistent demand for greater alignment of the European governments with the United States of America; the restatement of such a convenient concept of human rights that the coup d’état in Turkey is presented as almost an essential remedy to guarantee the security of the West and the strength of NATO. And what of human and political rights, the principles of democracy and respect for liberty? We would not want this to have a meaning for Poland only because otherwise the intense interest which we also share in the disturbing events taking place in that country have only a propaganda meaning.

Mr. Rubbi (continued)

We believe that the recommendations to European governments should be of a different kind at a time when the Madrid conference has started and the new American administration seems intent on returning to a dialogue and East-West negotiations. We believe it is the duty of the European governments and of the Community to initiate separate international action for détente, disarmament and co-operation. Not in opposition to the United States but in furtherance of their own interests and because Europe must make its own independent contribution to the solution of these problems. In our view, the areas in which this policy should be applied in practice are the Madrid conference and support for the proposed conference on European disarmament; the search for a new basis for negotiations to find a just overall solution for the Middle East problem, recognising the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people; the starting, side by side with SALT II, of negotiations for SALT III in which the European countries would also participate; moves to transform North-South relations by active measures to correct the disastrous imbalance which condemns so much of mankind to underdevelopment, backwardness and starvation.

The European governments and the EEC can have a part to play in pursuing these objectives and in establishing the fullest possible collaboration between all the democratic and progressive forces of the left, which are those most of all interested in giving fresh impetus to détente and in guaranteeing peace as the basis for a policy of reviving and transforming our various countries and the European Community.

These are the views we wish to bring to the attention of the Assembly and which are the reason for our group's voting against the documents now before us.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, I have perused this very interesting document which contains one or two points that hold other dangers from the point of view of Western Europe. In particular do I worry about recommendation 10. We had a meeting with some Afghan representatives who told us that they were bitterly disappointed that their Moslem brothers, by which they meant the Arab states, were not forthcoming with assistance to them in their struggle against the Soviet Union.

It is difficult for us in Europe to try to pledge such assistance. To a large extent, we are

being held to ransom by the oil-producing countries. We pay them large sums for their oil and we are proposing to use part of our hard-earned GNP to supply arms that the Arab nations ought to be supplying to their Moslem brothers. I do not stick on that point, but it ought to be borne in mind by all members.

Mr. Hardy mentioned my amendment and I shall concentrate on three or four issues. It is ludicrous, and demonstrates a point of view that is becoming an obsession with some individuals, always to seek to involve Israel in everything that occurs in the Middle East. According to some individuals, nothing that happens in that area happens without Israel's being involved. Such people and some countries even attempt to blame Israel for what happens. That is an easy way out. One can think of many examples of abstruse second- and third-stage knock-on effects throughout the world. Of course, nothing that happens anywhere occurs without having an effect on us, it is ridiculous and ludicrous always to pinpoint Israel.

I do not see what relevance Israel has to a report dealing with Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. I do not understand how one can, by a tortuous process of thinking, involve Israel in that. It seems that the first thought of some people is: "How can we get Israel involved?" They then begin a process of tortuous thinking which somehow manages to bring little Israel into whatever is happening.

The Iran-Iraq war is fairly solid evidence that, if Israel did not exist, the Arabs would have to invent it. Members should note that the Arabs do not call upon the Iraqis and the Iranians to stop murdering each other on the basis of any humanitarian principles. They say to the two countries: "For goodness sake, do not fight each other. You are detracting from the real struggle, which is to destroy the little state of Israel."

The difficulties in the Middle East antedate the existence of the state of Israel. As I said, if Israel did not exist, the Arab nations would have to invent it. They would go on fighting among themselves for a long time.

I strongly object to any initiative in the Middle East being undertaken by countries and peoples who have indicated time and again in the past few years that they have a one-sided point of view. However, as I have a feeling that the part of the report to which I object – paragraph 70 – was probably not written by my colleague, Mr. Hardy, or was included by him under pressure from others, there is no point in my pursuing the amendment and I hope that my colleague, Mr. Pavitt, will agree that it should be withdrawn.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Dr. Miller.

The next speaker is Mr. McGuire.

Mr. McGUIRE (*United Kingdom*). – I hope that you will not think me impertinent, Mr. President, but it seems that, every time that I wish to speak, the Assembly is told that we have only a few minutes for the debate. I always keep to time. When I spoke yesterday, I kept well within the time-limit that had been prescribed. However, the report needs a little more time for discussion than we have been allowed and although I shall comply with your request, I may speak for a minute or two longer than you wish.

Many of the debates in the Assembly inevitably overlap other debates with which they are inextricably linked. This debate is a good example. I add my congratulations to my colleague, Mr. Hardy, on his industry in producing the report. The report refers to the invasion of Afghanistan. Everyone in the Assembly and almost everybody in the free world has condemned that brutal invasion, and I repeat my original objections.

I was interested to read the references to Yugoslavia. Like the Rapporteur, I was sorry to note the poor economic development of Yugoslavia, compared with Spain and Greece. As socialists, we are bound to note that that has much to do with the economic structures of those countries. We are all pleased that in the post-Tito era the unity of Yugoslavia appears to be as secure as ever.

There are one or two gems in the report that interest me and will, I hope, whet the appetites of subsequent speakers. The report refers to the “famous” Brezhnev doctrine – I think that it ought to be the “infamous” doctrine – that attempted to justify the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

The answer to that doctrine was given by the Papua New Guinea Delegate to the United Nations conference at which the non-aligned countries became non-aligned for the first time and demonstrated their abhorrence of the Soviet invasion. The Papua New Guinea Delegate asked whether delegates were being asked to believe that the then head of the Afghanistan state invited the Russians in to defend his country when the first thing they did was to bump him off. He said that they believed a lot of things, but that was a little more than they were accustomed to believe. He was right.

I was particularly touched by the reference to the Olympic Games. I was one of the few in the Labour Party who, following the invasion of Afghanistan, opposed the holding of the Olympic Games. People with greater minds than

mine said that those from the West might not be able to talk in a friendly way to the Russian people. They queried whether people from the West would be able to tell the Russians that although they had done a terrible thing, the Olympic Games was above it. They queried whether they could say that they hoped that the Russians would mend their ways and would allow the free dialogue that we are used to.

Those who believe that that is possible have not got enough sense to come out of the rain. The Soviet Union isolated anyone who might have been contaminated by such ideas. They put up a *cordon sanitaire*, and ensured that no one got near such people. The Olympic Games went ahead, and the Russians claimed that they represented the imprimatur of the world's approval for the Soviet system.

We are about to have a debate on Poland and on a proposition that Mr. Valleix and his colleagues will put to the Assembly. I realise that the situation is delicate. We do not want to offer people something that we cannot deliver. Let us make no mistake about the position. The Polish people want to determine their own destinies. They do not want any outside interference, either from us or from those whom they fear. They fear the man who will once again enunciate the Brezhnev doctrine and send tanks rolling in. The Russians will take such action simply because the people want, as a starter, free trade unions. They want trade unions that will not be the government's puppets and that will not enslave them yet more firmly.

I do not know what we can offer the Polish people, but I hope that we shall offer them something more substantial than soft words. We should be judicious. We should say that we are watching the situation carefully. We should not say that we can do nothing if the Russians move in with their tanks, suppress the Polish people, and use all types of euphemisms to justify that. If we were to say that, we should condemn people to perpetual slavery. They would be locked into a system from which they could not break out.

Although we do not want any wild histrionics and although we do not want to offer the Polish people something that we cannot deliver, I hope that we shall offer them more than soft words. If that is all that we can offer them, God help us.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. McGuire.

The next speaker is Mr. Lemoine.

Mr. LEMOINE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should first like to thank you for calling me now, because in a few minutes I

Mr. Lemoine (continued)

shall have to go back to the Congress of the Association of French Mayors.

It may seem surprising that the Assembly of Western European Union should have to deal with the problem of Afghanistan. But, as is rightly emphasised by Mr. Hardy, commissioned by the General Affairs Committee to present a report on this question, we consider the invasion of Afghanistan to be a violation of the final act of the Helsinki conference, which still remains the touchstone of détente in Europe.

It will certainly be no surprise to the Rapporteur if I mention a number of reservations which we have concerning his analysis of the Afghan crisis and his draft recommendation.

First of all, we would ask him to render unto Caesar those things that are Caesar's. It seems to us that, unless we are to fail completely to understand the events which have been shaking the world during the last few months, we must examine each international crisis in its context before trying to establish possible connections between the whole series.

We have to deal today with the effects of the invasion of Afghanistan on détente and security in Europe. We are not sure that paragraphs 9, 12, 13 and 14 of the draft recommendation are altogether germane to this issue.

Admittedly, Iran, Iraq and the Middle East pose serious problems, and no one would think of denying it. But in any case the Middle East crisis and the holding of fifty American diplomats in Tehran are prior to events in Afghanistan, and we believe that the war between Iraq and Iran would have broken out even if the Kabul coup had not taken place.

We have the same to say about the military coup d'état in Turkey referred to in the explanatory memorandum. We would go further: at the possible risk of surprising some of you, we would also say that the references to Yugoslavia and Poland are not – at least not at present – relevant to this debate. Yugoslavia's economic difficulties are nothing new, nor is the Polish crisis. All this undoubtedly forms part of a tragic wrangle between the blocs which the world has been witnessing for the last twenty years, but, in any case, part of a process which still seems to us to be secondary. What is said on all these subjects is admittedly interesting, but it does in fact tend to obscure the assessment which has to be made of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. That is why, beyond the dramatic circumstances of the general context and repercussions of this affair, it is necessary to weigh up very carefully the consequences of the action taken by the Soviet Union and to

identify the principles now challenged by the Russians.

We see four of these: first, the serious infringement of the principle of non-interference by a country in the affairs of another country; second, the violation of the peoples' right of self-determination; third, the Soviet Union's deliberate intention of absorbing into its direct sphere of influence one of the so-called "non-aligned" countries; fourth and last, the impairment of the atmosphere of confidence favouring détente and peace, which, despite some probably inevitable ups and downs, had prevailed since Helsinki in relations between European countries with different political systems.

I am coming to a close, Mr. President.

We can therefore say that we French socialists are not completely satisfied with the text submitted to us as it stands at present. But we are of course willing to reconsider our position if improvements are made to it, taking into account proposals which may be put forward, particularly by our colleague Mr. Forni.

By invading Afghanistan, the Soviet Union took upon itself the grave responsibility of heightening tension, thus seriously eroding the confidence necessary for the pursuit of détente. In this dangerous situation for peace, the conditions for a dialogue must be re-established; but it must be quite clear that this is necessary for Europe as well as for the United States and the Soviet Union.

In any case, the French socialist representatives in this Assembly will do everything possible to convince the Soviet leaders and all who bear responsibility for the deployment of Soviet troops in Afghanistan that, in the assemblies in which we are entitled to be represented, we shall take a firm line, asserting that in our opinion every effort must be made to safeguard the spirit of détente, but that there is a limit beyond which we are not prepared to go.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Lemoine.

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – This part-session is decidedly beneficial as far as I am concerned, and I welcome Mr. Hardy's report. He has said that anyone might find something in it to disagree with. Well, except for what I pointed out as being a variance with the report by his friend and colleague Mr. Ronald Brown in regard to balance and security in Europe, I must confess that the report is in tune with my concerns and way of thinking.

Curiously, however, while the report itself seems so good to me, the draft recommendation seems so opposed to it that I asked two of my

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

colleagues who are members of the Committee whether amendments were not made in Committee that turned the original text on its head. Really, I cannot see any continuity of thought between the report and the text proposed, particularly in regard to the fourth paragraph of the preamble, which is directly opposed to Mr. Ronald Brown's conclusions, and also paragraph 10 of the recommendation, to which I shall return and which seems to me foolhardy, to say the least.

Nonetheless, Mr. Hardy's report contains some elements that I may be able to use in future in public debates and political polemics. There is, in particular, a statement that confirms what some people, including myself, had already guessed. In paragraph 2 of his report Mr. Hardy states that the military coup d'état in Turkey was influenced by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. I am grateful to him. What, then, of the official justifications being rammed down our throats at Strasbourg, to the effect that the coup d'état in Turkey was due to terrorism, socio-economic stagnation and political impotence?

In reality, the Turkish generals' coup d'état was motivated by strategic considerations, and behind it one can make out the huge threatening shadow of NATO, just as in Greece in 1967 on the eve of the colonels' coup d'état. Is it necessary to remind the Assembly in this connection that in Greece there were also NATO manoeuvres, as in Portugal in April 1974 when the American navy was cruising off Lisbon because the Americans feared that the overthrow of the Portuguese dictatorship might threaten the balance as they conceived it?

But of course, as the title indicates, the main problem is "the political implications for Europe of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan".

I have taken particular note of certain points in the report, which I read attentively. I hope I shall not be misrepresenting the Rapporteur's thinking too much.

In paragraph 6 Mr. Hardy states that "the resistance of the Afghan people has..." – yes, indeed, unfortunately! – "... led the Soviet Union to increase its intervention forces." We ought to think about that in conjunction with paragraph 10 of the recommendation.

In paragraphs 7 and 8 of the report Mr. Hardy refers to statements by the NATO Council to the effect that the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan do not give the Soviet Union any right to seek to maintain either presence within or control of that country. I entirely agree. In paragraph 9 he adds that none

of the NATO countries "considered the direct use of force to oppose the Soviet invasion". Nevertheless, according to paragraph 10 of the recommendation we are agreed that we should ask the Afghans to go and get themselves riddled with bullets in our place! This is a fresh illustration of the hypocrisy of a Europe that buys its own peace at the price of crimes committed in its name in the third world, especially in the poorest countries of the globe. To those who dreamt up the text of paragraph 10 of the recommendation I therefore say "watch out!".

The point here is – and I trust nobody will disagree – to condemn once again the invasion and permanent occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Mr. Hardy reminded us quite rightly that he was one of the all-too-rare people who protested at the time at a similar aggression against Vietnam. There can of course be no question of keeping quiet. Nor can an aggression of this kind be covered up because its aims or those who perpetrate it may happen to be in harmony with our political or strategic aspirations. We fully agree on this point.

We have not the slightest intention of justifying the occupation, but certain facts ought nevertheless to be borne in mind. Soviet domination of Afghanistan is nothing new. Does the Assembly need to be reminded that Afghanistan was the first to enter into a treaty of friendship with the young Soviet Union in 1921 and that Soviet influence has manifested itself in that part of the world ever since? Does it still need to be reminded of the permanent domination of Kabul, when thirty kilometres away no government was able to impose its rule?

I must, moreover, stress the cruelty of the situation. We have had to wait for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan for the western world to become aware of the suffering and misery of the Afghan people, who have been dying for centuries of the effects of feudalism, exploitation, sickness and illiteracy. Before the invasion of Afghanistan nobody in the West felt sorry for the Afghan people. Today, advantage is taken of the invasion to justify a strategic concept.

Much remains to be said, Mr. President, but in compliance with your request I shall confine myself to commenting briefly on paragraph 91 of the report, in which Mr. Hardy says that "it would naturally be illusory and dangerous to base international peace on the maintenance of Afghanistan under Soviet domination," but that this must not mean abandoning the Afghan people and that ways must be found of granting them a real political status.

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

It is not by procuring arms for the gangs of the self-styled "Islamic" emirs that we shall attain this goal. Let us not forget who put Khomeini in power in Iran. It is easy to condemn him, but did the West have nothing whatever to do with his coming to power?

Let us therefore make sure that whatever aid we give the Afghan people is not diverted and used by local barons who want to reassert the domination which they lost as a result of the actions of another tyrant.

May I finish by quoting the conclusion of the Congress of the Socialist International held in Madrid on 16th November last: "We democratic socialists remain convinced that only détente can lead to peace, security and international co-operation."

I would also like to remind you that, in this forum which we know so well, détente is too often invoked and manipulated for purposes other than its own.

The PRESIDENT. — Before I call the next speaker, I remind members of my request that they take only five minutes each.

I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — I welcome Peter Hardy's report which is wide-ranging, global in its coverage of present and potential trends in East-West relations and, unlike many reports that we receive, timely, with its references to the current Madrid conference and the evolving events in Poland.

It is also a courageous report in the way that it faces realities, ruthlessly exposing the fantasies of détente. What it fails to do is enlarge sufficiently in its recommendations on Afghanistan, Poland and Madrid. I hope to make up for some of those deficiencies.

First, however, I congratulate the Rapporteur on pointing out, in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and elsewhere, how ineffective western retaliation has been to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. I expressed similar sentiments in the debate on European security at our last sitting. Western technological assistance, the sale of American grain and of European meat and butter, have all been maintained, with but the barest hiccup and on terms of credit at half the interest rates paid by many of the exporters in their own countries. I cannot see how that will encourage the Kremlin to think twice about intervening in Poland or anywhere else.

I am pleased to see the reference in paragraph 32 to the extent to which western economic activity and resources sustain the Soviet Union. We in the West have permitted a veritable flow of technology into the Soviet eco-

nomy. It has amounted, in effect, to Marshall Aid in reverse. It has allowed the Soviet Union to release internal resources and to substitute for internal reform, to enlarge its military machine and to achieve its political objectives throughout the world.

For example, Afghanistan costs the Soviet Union £10 million a day, aid to Cuba £3 million and to Vietnam £5 million. In effect, the West is picking up the bill. Moreover, the West has contributed directly to its being overtaken by the Soviet Union in military superiority. Since the end of the Vietnam war we have supplied that country with technological aid and equipment worth £25 billion, from engine assembly lines to chemical plants, from oil drilling equipment to computers.

The American superiority in missile accuracy has been eroded because the Russians could buy sixteen Centreline B machines which manufacture the miniature ball-bearings which enable missiles to alter direction. The Red Army in Afghanistan rides into battle in lorries produced by American-designed plant turning out 150,000 a year.

An Austrian company supplies forging equipment which mass-produces high quality gun barrels for the Soviet Union. The entire Soviet computer system is based on two IBM models bought in America by the KGB. At the time that President Carter was applying trade sanctions in January this year, following the Afghanistan invasion, the United States Government approved a contract to supply technology for producing hardened drilling bits which would enable the Russians to mass-produce more effective armour-piercing projectiles.

I hope, therefore, that it is realised that the West has contributed directly to being overtaken by the Soviet Union in military strength. Is it not time to call for an analysis of the extent to which western economic and technological aid has allowed the Soviet Union to undermine our superiority?

We should not be afraid to say what we know to be true about Poland, and what the Poles know to be true — that, at the current rate of their revolution, the point will soon be reached, as it was with Dubcek, beyond which the Kremlin cannot allow it to proceed without a permanent loss of monopoly power for the Soviet Union and the Communist Party.

If the Red Army moves into Poland, what will the West do? Of course the Secretary-General of NATO was right to say the other day that there was no question of our military intervention. I was in Wenceslas Square in Prague in August 1969, on the anniversary of the Russian invasion. When people realised

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

that I was a westerner, they asked: "Why are you not supporting us in the way that you support and maintain the independence of Israel?" We must not allow Poland to be misled in that way.

But that does not mean that we should simply watch appalled, as we did in 1956 and 1968. Now is the time to make it clear to the Soviet Union that an invasion of Poland will result in swift, united and damaging economic and diplomatic retaliation – far more effective than that which took place after the invasion of Afghanistan; that it will mean an end to détente; that it will lead to a break in diplomatic relations, a restriction of trade and particularly an end to credit; and that it will mean a western recognition of a Polish Government in exile.

It is only by the assertion of such a united resolve by the West that tragedy in Poland will be averted, Soviet interventionism contained and the communist tide reversed in favour of freedom and democracy.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Atkinson.

I now call Mr. Cavaliere.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is saddening to observe the sheer hypocrisy of some speeches and also, I am sorry to say, the attitude which Europe has adopted in this matter. From some parties we hear: we have condemned and will continue to condemn the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, but at the same time we hear that nothing should be done to persuade the Soviet Union to withdraw. This afternoon we even heard in this chamber that the invasion of Afghanistan is due to the failure of the United States to ratify SALT II, completely ignoring the fact that at the time that country still had more than a year in which to do so.

What is Europe's attitude to an indefensible situation, to the daily massacre of the people of Afghanistan and to the massive intervention of the Soviet Union? In London and, yesterday, in Paris we heard two representatives of the Afghan resistance and were all told that is happening. We all showed interest; yesterday afternoon the conference room was crammed with observers and listeners. Now, what have we done so far and what are we preparing to do? Do we intend to continue with futile condemnations without doing anything? Europe has justified itself – and we have heard this again today here – by saying that, since there was no prior consultation by the United States, Europe somehow felt itself to be excused and dissociated from the action taken by that coun-

try. We were not even capable of joining in action which was neither economic nor military but was simply a token measure of a cultural nature, namely boycotting the Moscow Olympics. Hypocritically, this was justified on the grounds that sport does not mix with politics.

We have been unable to take any practical economic measures to counter the Soviet action in Afghanistan and in other parts of the world – as the previous speaker also said. Now how is the Soviet Union responding to our attitude? Because I have only a little time, I shall simply recall what was said officially about the Red Army on the occasion of the visit to Moscow by the Soviet puppet, Karmal. Word for word it was stated that the intervention in Afghanistan is a glorious example of proletarian internationalism in action. It has also been said that we should try to take a different line at the Madrid conference. But with whom? With those who will not listen? With a Soviet Union which even in Madrid has reaffirmed that it will not leave Afghanistan until the external interference which caused the intervention has stopped? This amounts to saying "No" in one way or another.

I am coming to a close Mr. President, but may I be permitted to add that it is impossible to speak for only five minutes on a matter of such importance. It might have been better to draw lots for a few speakers from among those down to speak. My final remark is that we hope that the approval of this recommendation, and more especially of paragraph 10 will result in some practical action. But this morning the Netherlands Foreign Minister gave a negative reply when I asked if Europe is prepared to help the resistance. We shall next see what will be done for the refugees.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this is hypocrisy; Europe and the free world are digging their own grave and are signing their own sentence.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Cavaliere.

The next speaker is our guest, the observer from Greece, Mr. Koutsogiorgas.

Mr. KOUTSOGIORGAS (*Observer from Greece*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I asked for the floor in order to draw attention to a point omitted from Mr. Hardy's report and from the discussion now in progress – an omission which is liable to reduce the credibility of the indignation expressed about the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and to detract from the effectiveness of the measures advocated in the draft recommendation to the Council.

No mention has been made either in the report or in the discussion of the provocation,

Mr. Koutsogiorgas (continued)

endangering European security and peace, which, in defiance of international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter, is continuing on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, nearly half of which is still occupied by the Turkish army, in violation of fourteen United Nations resolutions and of the Helsinki resolutions.

This moral and legal anomaly is aggravated so far as to become a threat to Europe's peace and security by the massive military and economic aid given to Turkey. The destruction of the integrity of the Cypriot state is thus being rewarded, the Turkish militarists' expansionist designs on the Greek areas of the Aegean Sea are being encouraged and, worse still, the balance of forces which was a stabilising factor in this region crucial for Europe's peace and security has been upset.

I can quote as an example the German Government's recent decision to grant Turkey military aid amounting to 600 million DM, against only 60 million to Greece, thus departing from the ratio of five to three which it had hitherto observed in the distribution of this aid.

The Greek people, with its long and bitter experience, is particularly sensitive to questions of violation of human rights, and is therefore not indifferent to the censorship and torture to which the Turkish people is at present being subjected, although it is opposed to foreign intervention in the internal affairs of any country. It thus cannot do other than condemn the military coup d'état of 12th September 1980 which overthrew democracy in Turkey.

To sum up, the Greek people is convinced that the moral indignation and vehement protests about, for instance, Afghanistan expressed at western meetings would be more convincing – and less liable to be criticised as being hypocritical – if this same concern for the application of international law and this same condemnation also applied to the flagrant violations which are persisting within the free world itself and are at present being passed over in indulgent silence.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I keenly await your reaction on this major problem of Cyprus and call upon you to make our unanimous voice heard to ensure that justice to Cyprus shall serve as a safeguard for world peace.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

The next speaker is Mr. Holtz.

Mr. HOLTZ (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, all I should like to say to Mr. Koutsogiorgas is that the Federal Republic of Germany enjoys friendly relations

with Greece and has been and will continue to be particularly active in its support for that country's accession to the European Community. Mrs. Hamm-Brücher made it clear here yesterday morning that one reason for the present disproportionate increase in aid to Turkey is the events in Afghanistan. I would add, in my additional capacity as a member of the Council of Europe, which of course takes the Human Rights Convention very seriously, that we hope Turkey will revert to democracy as quickly as possible. As chairman of the Bundestag's Committee on Development Policy in Bonn, I myself have said on the subject of development aid to Turkey that we expect this aid to benefit civil projects and the population, especially its poorest sections, and that we hope there will be no further violations of human rights in the future.

Mr. President, Mr. Hardy's report provides a good basis for our debate this afternoon. My friends and I largely endorse the draft recommendation. We have some objections to paragraph 10, which concerns the possibility of military aid to the Afghan resistance movements. We largely endorse the draft recommendation, particularly because it is couched in clear language, as for example in paragraph 1, where it says that the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan is an unacceptable violation of international law and human rights, and that we call for the removal of these troops. The Afghan people have our sympathy and our support. We are prepared to provide political, moral and humanitarian aid to anyone who opposes this intervention.

I should also like to point out briefly that not only has this armed intervention resulted in a considerable increase in East-West tensions, not only does it represent a violation of international law and a violation of the Helsinki final act, but that the Soviet Union has also undermined its own plans for a conference on security in Asia.

Boris Meissner, Professor of Oriental Law at the University of Cologne, has made it clear that Article 8 of the treaty of co-operation with Afghanistan explicitly refers to joint efforts to develop co-operation among Asian states and to create an effective security system in Asia. By its intervention the Soviet Union has violated the commitments entered into in its treaty with Afghanistan to strengthen peace and security in Asia and the whole world, as the preamble states, and to deepen the process of relaxation of international tension and to spread it to all areas of the world, including Asia, to quote Article 7.

We also see this as one reason why the countries of Asia and the third world agreed to condemn the Soviet Union in the United

Mr. Holtz (continued)

Nations for the second time. I have the English text of the resolution, which was adopted in the United Nations on 20th November 1980. Apart from the call for the withdrawal of the troops, it contains two key concepts in calling on all states and international and Islamic organisations to work for a political solution and to advocate a peaceful solution. The resolution also states that the subject will be discussed again. Afghanistan has not simply been crossed off in one resolution: the countries of the third world will be raising it again at the thirty-sixth session, next year.

We have four reservations, Mr. President, which I can summarise as follows: first, the Soviet argument that Afghanistan is being helped to resist external interference would be strengthened if we agreed to paragraph 10; second, the broad consensus in the United Nations that is opposed to the Soviet occupation and favours the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan might collapse; third, the prospects for the negotiations on a settlement of the conflict would be weakened, if not actually destroyed; fourth, for historical reasons, because of its culpability over the second world war, the Federal Republic of Germany has imposed on itself strict arms controls and also restrictions on the export of military equipment, so that it does not want to supply weapons to areas of tension. I hope you will appreciate our reasons for stating this very clearly here in WEU as well. We take WEU very seriously. SWAPO has knocked at our door and asked for military assistance, so has Frelimo. Each time we have said no, for these same reasons. So please understand that we say yes to moral, political and humanitarian aid, but that we cannot join in taking this step.

I recommend the Assembly to agree to the proposal put forward by Mr. Dejardin, who has tabled an amendment to paragraph 10 stating the nature of the humanitarian aid in greater detail. Otherwise some of us would abstain. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Holtz.

The next speaker is Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops just before Christmas 1979 unleashed a crisis of unprecedented seriousness in East-West relations. The WEU Assembly is aware of this because the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, Sir Frederic Bennett, has twice arranged for representatives of the Afghan resistance to make themselves heard by European parliamentary opinion. Similarly, the Rapporteur whose

draft recommendation is before the Assembly today states that the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan remains an unacceptable violation of international law and human rights.

Since the end of December 1979 the Soviet Union has sent more than 75,000 men to Afghanistan to control the major towns and communication routes and to crush the resistance of the vast majority of the population to the government which it has imposed on them. Today Afghanistan is occupied by more than 85,000 Soviet troops, and 35,000 men are stationed along the Soviet-Afghan frontier ready to intervene in the country at any time. All Afghan Government ministers have had Soviet advisers imposed on them who dictate their actions.

This is a very serious precedent. The invasion of Afghanistan signifies the potentially unlimited extension of the Brezhnev doctrine, according to which a country that has once embarked on a path characterised by the Kremlin as “socialist” cannot turn back. It is the first time that the Soviet Union has itself attempted to take power directly by military means in a country outside the area of influence tacitly recognised for it after the second world war.

What means are available to Europe and the Atlantic Alliance? In general, the debate has given a very full description. I would simply like to emphasise the diplomatic means at our disposal.

Immediately after the invasion, the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Islamic Countries, held in Islamabad, called for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops and the restoration of Afghan sovereignty. The General Assembly of the United Nations also condemned the Soviet intervention by an overwhelming majority. The condemnation was repeated last September by the Inter-Parliamentary Union. The Soviet Union and its allies thus appear to be isolated in the international arena as regards the Afghanistan affair.

We should never forget the strength of national feeling among most of the new third world countries. Many of them have recently been subject to Soviet pressure and interference. Many have rejected them. The Europe of the Lomé Convention, which has broken with its colonial past but has managed to retain numerous links, both cultural and economic, with the new nations of Africa and Asia, can find natural support from the latter for forcing the Soviet Union to negotiate on its withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The isolation of the Soviet Union can bear even more fruit if Europe's objective is clearly determined: the re-establishment of an Afghan-

Mr. Caro (continued)

istan that is independent, free of foreign troops, non-aligned, and neither the object nor instrument of great-power competition. Achievement of this objective holds no threat to the Soviet Union. It takes account of the fact that Afghanistan is, for the Soviet Union, a militarily sensitive area, but it also requires the Soviet Government to abandon the political course it is currently following in its relations with the western countries and those of the third world.

The Soviet Union can be made to withdraw from Afghanistan. This task is all the more urgent because of the threat of other interventions. Europe and the Atlantic Alliance do not lack the economic and diplomatic means. It is important that they should find the unity and determination necessary to use them to the full.

(Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – The next speaker is Mr. Forni. I ask members to speak for only five minutes. I am sure that Mr. Forni will keep to that.

Mr. FORNI (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, if I had to give a general opinion on Mr. Hardy's report I should say that attempting to prove too much ultimately has the effect of weakening one's position and preventing the intended aims from being achieved. It may well be wondered why various countries such as Yugoslavia, Poland, Iraq and Iran were included in this report. Our problem, with which we are concerned today, is of course Afghanistan, and Afghanistan only.

I should like, in the time I am allowed, to analyse very quickly the situation with which we have been familiar for over a year.

Afghanistan is the victim of three factors. The first is, of course, Soviet imperialism. No one can deny this factor, since it took concrete form in the invasion of that country. The second factor, which is more debated and more debatable, is in my opinion the silence of the United States of America. For who can believe that if the United States had intervened effectively with the Soviet Union in one way or another, this invasion would have taken place? The third factor, perhaps of secondary importance, is the absence of any reaction from the countries of Europe. Quite a number of our governments remained silent when Afghanistan was invaded. This attitude seems to me to contain an element of complicity, if not of guilt. The present situation is very simple: a crushed nation, reduced to silence and no longer able to exercise its sovereignty. This sim-

ple – indeed over-simplified – analysis should prompt appropriate reactions from us.

This brings me to the third part of my speech: what is to be done?

One can hold forth for hours on this subject. We can go on talking indefinitely; we can even act like boy scouts, proposing humanitarian aid and moral support and condemning the Soviet Union. But is all this enough, can it enable the Afghan nation to regain its freedom? I am convinced that it is useless. That is why I argued that the recommendation submitted to us by Mr. Hardy should include the principle of genuine, effective aid, military aid, to be given to the Afghan resistance.

I will make a comparison, because some people are bound to object that such military aid would be totally ineffective against the Soviet giant. Remember, Ladies and Gentlemen, what happened in Vietnam; remember that a people's resistance, provided that it receives effective, genuine, practical support from all the free nations, can lead to victory, even if this resistance is opposed by the Russian bear or the might of the United States of America.

Because it is the only way in which the peoples of Europe can genuinely show their solidarity with a crushed people, because it is the only way in which Europe can show its independence of the two blocs, I maintain that it is better today to appear to be a warmonger than a complacent, foolish and somewhat misguided peacemaker.

That is my position, Ladies and Gentlemen.

I think that if we were to act upon the proposals put forward by several of our colleagues, Europe would present an image of itself comparable to that of the fly buzzing round the Russian bear without harming it or hurting it much.

It is for these reasons that I shall support Mr. Hardy's proposal, which was adopted by the General Affairs Committee. Apart from the economic and political aid and moral support that can be provided, this text is designed to give the Afghan people the only genuine support which it is seeking, that is, military aid.

The PRESIDENT. – The last speaker on the list is Mr. Hill, of the United Kingdom.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – It is an undeniable pleasure to be the last speaker in the debate. I have listened to the debate as a "back bencher". I get the feeling that we are once again whistling in the wind. Mr. Hardy has done his best and has covered not only Afghanistan, but Poland, the Middle East and the Strait of Hormuz.

Mr. Hill (continued)

We are involved in a gigantic chess game, which we are losing. The opening gambit was Hungary and Czechoslovakia. We lost the opening moves. Chess players will know what I mean when I say that we are being probed on the position in Poland. We have lost a knight or two in the Afghanistan affair. At the end of the day, the Soviet bloc and the Soviet people will win the game. We are doing exactly what the League of Nations did before the 1939 war. Although we continually talk, it results in little or no action. The way that the rulers of Russia think is affected only by action by institutions such as WEU.

We are in a fortunate position. Russia has economic and domestic problems. It is short of foodstuffs and of the economic resources to feed its people and to improve their way of life. If we stop giving technological aid and food aid, we shall once again hold a commanding position in the massive chess game. Only the most biased observer could fail to admit that there is genocide in Afghanistan. The Russians will win. They won the Olympic battle. They have got the whole winter in which to destroy the Afghan people.

The Russians fomented the Iraq-Iran war. They are responsible for another probing move by Syria into Jordan. They are heightening the tension between East Germany, Russia and Poland.

This afternoon, we should send out a clear message to the Soviet bloc. We should say that we are no longer merely talking. The Government of the United Kingdom are determined that we shall win this massive chess game, and that we shall not be pushed to the last resort.

We can probably only emphasise here today that Mr. Hardy's report, if it goes anywhere, goes half-way. In this amendment we are only tinkering with the matter. Will Russia or the Soviet bloc really take notice of the debate today? Will many of our member governments really take any note of this debate today? Are we not, as I said at the beginning, whistling in the dark? Can we not cast our minds back to the League of Nations, to Haile Selassie in Addis Ababa, and many other occasions when we, as the western bloc, failed to take any of the opportunities that were available to us?

We are losing the chess game. Russia is winning on every point. Can we not put more determination into our approach? Is President Reagan going to put more determination into his approach? Is the Community itself going to be strong enough to give a firm warning to

the Russian Government and people that we can take only so much and no more?

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

That concludes the general debate.

May I ask the Rapporteur whether he wishes to wind up the debate?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I do, Mr. President, and I shall take a moment longer than I originally intended because I am sorry to have to begin with a critical remark. I believe that everyone here is concerned to see Turkish democracy restored. I believe everyone here is concerned to see the Cyprus problem resolved. But I should say quite firmly, for myself, that the speech of our Greek observer was not entirely appropriate to this debate. It could be seen as something of an abuse of the guest's or observer's privilege. Perhaps the Presidential Committee will consider the implications of this.

We have had a good debate, with many splendid speeches, and with demonstrations, particularly from the very good speeches of Mr. Holtz and Mr. Forni, that brevity is not always damaging to the cause of oratory or argument. I thank Mr. McGuire for his speech. It was very pleasing to me to hear a free trade unionist speaking freely in favour of free trade unions. I believe that his speech was a very important one. I express my gratitude to Dr. Miller for his very kind offer to withdraw his amendment. I came in for some criticism from my colleague, who suggested that there were those who saw Israel's involvement in spheres in which Israel was not involved, but he went on to see an involvement of Israel that some of us might not previously have identified.

I was particularly grateful to Mr. Atkinson, who listed in his speech the considerable technological aid that has been given to the Soviet Union. I am very grateful for his remarks, although I wonder how robust a report would have to be before it met with his complete and absolute commendation. I regret that the communist representative, whilst condemning Soviet aggression and demanding world development – and, I believe, supporting disarmament – came to the conclusion that he and his colleagues could not support the report. I am very sad about that – sad but not surprised, for in politics we become used to those who wish to appear angels but contrive to brandish a pitchfork.

I hope that the debate interested everyone present, as it has certainly interested me. I thank all who have taken part, and I wish to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Burgelin for his splendid assistance. I hope that the report will meet with approbation this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly is indebted to you, Mr. Hardy, for presenting what undoubtedly is a very important and interesting report.

Does the Chairman of the Committee wish to conclude the debate?

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be equally brief. I withdrew my name as a principal speaker earlier because I felt that it was improper for a Chairman of a Committee to speak in both capacities; but as Chairman of the Committee, before we start looking at votes and amendments I want to emphasise that this is one of those occasions – illustrated not only by Mr. McGuire, Mr. Hardy and Mr. Forni – when I do not believe that questions of right and left ideologies have once entered into our discussions within the Committee. This is the kind of committee of which I like to be a member. Even more, I am proud to be a member of it. In saying that, I have to say also that perhaps occasional comments from communist members qualified the praise that I have just lauded on our Committee as a whole, but in general this has been an agreed report.

In an earlier debate, Mr. President, you said that you hoped that both the Chairman and Rapporteur would not take the opportunity to reply, each in turn, to every amendment put forward. I can tell you now that the Rapporteur and I are in agreement, and that unless we suddenly find ourselves in disagreement I propose to rely on him to abide by the understanding that we have reached in regard to a general review of amendments, apart from one or two amendments to which we have agreed. We have not had a recent meeting of the Committee, but without breaking confidences I can say that this report was adopted, clause by clause, by very substantial majorities in Committee. It would be a pity if at this time of the evening we abandoned that practice.

I have been very heartened to listen to the speeches, which have shown that occasionally a democratic assembly can forget its ideologies when it realises that an act of aggression has taken place. Having served in an army myself, I have always wondered why it is thought to be more satisfactory to die from a bullet from one ideology rather than another. Having been wounded, I can assure you, Mr. President, that in practice it is equally painful whoever is firing the gun. I am glad, therefore, that this is the way in which the debate has proceeded.

The Rapporteur was too modest to have said this, but he was criticised on the basis that influence had been brought upon him to accept some paragraphs in his text on which we are not voting today. I can assure the Assembly that anyone who knows Mr. Peter Hardy as

well as I do would know that this would be totally counter-productive. I can add that no such pressure had even been attempted. This report is his own creation, wholeheartedly endorsed by the Committee, by very large majorities, irrespective of the political parties to which its members belong, with the one very minor qualification that I do not need to re-emphasise.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Sir Frederic.

That concludes the debate.

Before I can put the draft recommendation I must first dispose of the amendments. The first is that in the name of Mr. Dejardin, Amendment 2:

2. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “to respect undertakings they have entered into, particularly in the framework of NATO, with a view to improving the West’s defensive potential in Europe” and insert “to ensure that the balance of forces in Europe is maintained”.

Mr. Dejardin, do you wish to move that?

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – The amendment I am tabling follows the logic of our work and also my own reasoning. It is prompted first of all by the logic of the conclusions of the Brown report on the balance of forces, which we adopted yesterday by a large majority, and it is also conditioned by our budgetary constraints.

Of course, commitments must be respected, whatever they are. But when the budgetary difficulties of the states are such that some of them at least cannot meet those commitments in the manner envisaged two years ago, it is pushing things a bit far to call for everything at once.

That is why I propose that paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation be worded as follows:

“Ask the governments of member countries to insure that the balance of forces in Europe is maintained in both conventional and nuclear fields”.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

Lord Duncan-Sandys wishes to speak to the amendment.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). – The amendment makes an important change. Paragraph 6 of the recommendation uses the words: “with a view to improving the West’s defensive potential”. That is what we want. The amendment merely says: “to ensure that the balance of forces in Europe is main-

Lord Duncan-Sandys (continued)

tained". That suggests satisfaction with the present position, which I am sure is not our view. Therefore, I oppose the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I now call the Rapporteur.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I must ask the Assembly to reject the amendment. I often approve of Mr. Dejardin's approach and I recognise the worth of his approach to amending the report, but if we were to accept this amendment we should impose a limit on the balance of negotiation for disarmament.

If, in one area of provision, there were a marked and particular disadvantage, the amendment would require it to be maintained. Recommendation 6 says that there would have to be an improvement in the NATO provision if progress were not made towards disarmament. I hope that we shall not have to increase military capacity, but the amendment would not be helpful if the negotiations failed. I hope that the Assembly will reject it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I now put Amendment 2.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

The next amendment, 3, is also in the name of Mr. Dejardin:

3. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "*inter alia*".

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, in support of Amendment 3 I shall first of all quote from the Rapporteur's introductory speech. He said that we must not make conflicts worse. We must not lead people in Poland to imagine that greater support is likely to be forthcoming.

Now, the draft recommendation says "*inter alia* by affording Poland economic and food assistance". I would like to ask what this phrase "*inter alia*" means. Do some people wish to imply that, forty years on, we are thinking of harking back to the slogan "To die for Danzig"? Does it mean that we ought to be considering military intervention in Poland? The expression "*inter alia*" is dangerous, for I personally feel it means that our countries might intervene militarily in Poland. That is why I propose that it be deleted.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Does the Committee wish to express a view?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I always wish to accommodate Mr. Dejardin and I am delighted to say that we are happy to accept this amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly will have heard that the Committee is willing to accept the amendment. I now put it to the Assembly.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

The next amendment, No. 1, is in the name of Dr. Miller, but I understand that he does not wish to move it. Is that correct?

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – That is correct.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. That helps immensely.

We now come to Amendment 4, also in the name of Mr. Dejardin:

4. Leave out paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"10. Afford greater humanitarian assistance, particularly medical supplies, food and clothing, to the Afghan people, whether refugees or on Afghan territory;"

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we come here, as the Rapporteur has implied, to the crux of the recommendation. The Rapporteur himself said before the Assembly that every possible means must be used to achieve peace. But I would also refer to the sentence in his report which says, and I quote: "the resistance of the Afghan people has led the Soviet Union to increase its intervention forces".

To follow the text of the recommendation would thus constitute the clearest possible interference in the internal affairs of another country. We must be clear about things. It would also mean that we accept that the Soviet Union and its allies might supply arms to the movement for Corsican autonomy or to the IRA in Ireland.

This is a serious step. I ask: whom would we be arming? A people already under arms? This is unfortunately not the case. It would mean, on the contrary, arming gangs at the service of local potentates whose only aim is to re-establish the *status quo ante*, that is to re-establish their domination of the Afghan people, for I would claim that the Soviet Union has only followed the local potentates as the oppressor of the Afghan people.

I do not wish to abandon the Afghan people. I am therefore proposing a different word-

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

ing which accords better with my humanistic approach: to afford greater humanitarian assistance, particularly medical supplies, food and clothing, to the Afghan people whether refugees or on Afghan territory.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I accept that this is an important issue, as are all the amendments, but I must ask members to be brief, simply because we have imposed on the agenda a subsequent debate on Poland under the urgent procedure.

I now call Mr. Forni.

Mr. FORNI (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I make a few comments.

Let us understand each other. It is not our intention – at least not mine, as the originator of the wording of paragraph 10 – to recommend direct European intervention in Afghanistan. The aim is to provide effective assistance – military assistance – to the Afghan resistance, which is a reality whether one likes it or not. And we know the conditions under which this resistance is struggling against the Soviet invader. My friend Mr. Dejardin has just raised the question of whom we are arming. I fear that if we had to reply to this question we would spend a long time on it, because there is fighting all over the world. Are we sure that the weapons used do not come from a number of European countries in a perfectly proper manner – nothing to do with politics – simply as a result of market and financial forces and the laws of commerce?

Whom are we proposing to arm? Let us ask the question, but, in these circumstances, let us pose it fully.

My friend Mr. Dejardin proposes that we should restrict ourselves to humanitarian aid. I, however, would like to broaden the debate or, in any event, to close my eyes and go back in time. Imagine what would have been the attitude and reaction of the peoples of Europe if, forty years ago, the free countries like the United States of America had been content, when we were invaded by Nazi Germany to send us their blessings along with some humanitarian aid!

What would have happened to a struggle which was also resistance to an invader? And I am thinking especially of the French resistance – before thinking of the Belgian resistance – and even of the German resistance. What would have happened? We would purely and simply have been crushed and we would have had no opportunity to express ourselves freely not only until 1945 but probably for decades afterwards.

Now, do not misunderstand me. It is not because the Soviet Union is involved! I call for this aid to Afghanistan just as I call for it for all the struggles taking place in the world, whether in South America or in certain Middle Eastern countries. As I am calling for it in the case of the Soviet Union, so I call for it when the United States interferes in other countries, particularly those of Latin America.

These are the points I thought it necessary to explain, which are those that led the Committee to adopt my proposal.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Forni.

Mr. Grieve?

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I shall make my intervention in no more than a minute. It is not by humanitarian assistance that the people of Afghanistan will defend their freedom. They need arms and military supplies. To erase from this report paragraph 10 would be to deny to them the very possibility so far as this Assembly is concerned of having the means to defend their freedom. Mr. Forni has already made the point and I am happy to associate myself with him. I hope that the Assembly will reject this amendment by a very large majority.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

Mr. Gessner?

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I certainly do not wish to prolong the debate unnecessarily. But I must remind you again of what Mr. Holtz said. In the Federal Republic of Germany there are certain statutory provisions which impose extremely severe restrictions on the export of arms. We shall have to observe these. Nevertheless, we are, of course, in favour of humanitarian aid being provided.

I would ask the Assembly to give a moment's thought to the fact that the Bundestag's decision to introduce legislation in this field was naturally related to Germany's past. Please bear this in mind.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much.

May we now have the view of the Committee?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – The Committee's view is that the amendment should be rejected. Mr. Forni has put the case against very well. My own view is that the amendment lacks precision. It does not say precisely what "humanitarian assistance" is. It is rather blunt and possibly even excessively positive, since the report suggests that we should examine the possibility of assistance. Mr. Dejardin's amendment is very much blunter

Mr. Hardy (continued)

than that. He refers to "on Afghan territory". I do not know whether he is suggesting that there should be an invasion of Afghanistan in order that humanitarian assistance can be guaranteed to be delivered. That may be a more dangerous situation than that which is envisaged in the report.

The Committee considered the wording of this recommendation with great care over a considerable period. I do not believe that it should be put at risk by very well-founded intentions which could be extremely dangerous.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy. In view of the time, I hope that the Assembly will decide to vote on the amendment. I accept that it is very important and that the decision involved is of great importance. However, as the Chairman and Rapporteur have said, we have had a good debate in which the various aspects, both for and against, have been brought out.

I ask the Assembly now to vote on Mr. Dejardin's amendment, which is to leave out the existing paragraph 10 of the draft recommendation and to substitute the words:

"Afford greater humanitarian assistance, particularly medical supplies, food and clothing to the Afghan people, whether refugees or on Afghan territory;".

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

We now move to the next amendment, also by Mr. Dejardin, Amendment 5, to leave out paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation.

Mr. Dejardin?

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I propose that paragraph 11 of the draft recommendation be deleted. I do not know the English version of this text, but I consider that in its French version it has no meaning. I really do not understand the meaning of this sentence: "Together with all the arms-exporting countries, seek to confine deliveries of military equipment within the obligations of member states under the Charter of the United Nations". I appeal to my French-speaking colleagues because, after carefully reading Mr. Hardy's report, I have been unable to find any link between these two texts. I therefore propose that a paragraph which, for me, has no meaning, should be left out.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Dejardin.

May I have the view of the Committee?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I very much regret that Mr. Dejardin has tabled this amendment. It may be that members of this Assembly would like international arms trade to be even more reduced than is anticipated by the recommendation. The fact remains that it would be a worthwhile step. It is one which I believe the world needs and which Mr. Dejardin himself would welcome. For that reason, I hope that he will not press the amendment. Certainly it ought to be rejected.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Dejardin, do you wish to press the amendment, or are you prepared to withdraw it?

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I maintain my amendment because the Rapporteur has not explained to me the meaning of this paragraph, which means nothing to me. What arms deliveries are these? I repeat that this paragraph is either incomplete in its French version or devoid of any real meaning. That is why I propose that it should be deleted.

The PRESIDENT. – Do you want another word, Mr. Hardy?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – The Committee considered this matter. This part of the report was included after debate in Committee and met with the Committee's approval. I have no alternative but to defend it and to point out to Mr. Dejardin that if he reads it – I do not know whether he is reading a Flemish or a French text – he will see that it seeks to confine deliveries of military equipment. Clearly, Mr. Dejardin wishes to confine them even further. The fact remains that there is a recommendation to confine them and Mr. Dejardin should welcome it, as I do.

The PRESIDENT. – There is quite clearly a difference of opinion, so I shall have to put the amendment to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is negatived.

We move now to Amendment 6, also tabled by Mr. Dejardin, in paragraph 12 of the draft recommendation proper, to add "political" after "necessary".

I call Mr. Dejardin.

Mr. DEJARDIN (*Belgium*) (Translation). – By this amendment I suggest that, in paragraph 12 of the draft recommendation, the word "political" should be added between the words "necessary" and "means".

In other words, I should like the resolution to relate to the political means necessary in order to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to shipping,

Mr. Dejardin (continued)

since our Assembly itself so often refers to NATO and the North Atlantic Treaty, which imposes operational limits on the NATO integrated military structure. I cannot see the meaning of "all necessary means" unless they are political means. This could also mean an intervention by our governments, including the Belgian naval force, and possibly a military intervention in the Strait of Hormuz, which is rather extraordinary.

I say that unless the word "political" is added, this could suggest harmful adventurism or in any case a reversion to gunboat diplomacy.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

May I have the view of the Committee?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – One hopes that the Strait of Hormuz can be kept open by political means. One cannot anticipate or even contemplate any other way of keeping those straits open. But the fact remains that we need to understand, as our people probably do, that oil is still necessary to run our civilisation in Mr. Dejardin's constituency, in my constituency and in everybody else's constituency.

I am not suggesting that we should enter into commitments to engage in gunboat diplomacy. That would be foolish. Equally, it would be foolish for us to appear to rule out flatly any other approach than a political approach.

Let us rely on political approaches as far as we can and for as long as we can, but let us make clear that we are not prepared to allow our economies and our civilisations to collapse because of piracy or adventurism in other parts of the world. I believe that we can manage the affair politically, but it would be foolish to say that we shall not take any other action if a political initiative fails.

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly has heard the view of the Committee. We shall now vote on Amendment 6.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 6 is negatived.

That concludes the amendments. We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 855 as amended.

If there are no objections to it, and no abstentions, and if the Assembly agrees, we could save the time required for a roll-call vote.

Are there any objections?

I see that there are.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. You asked whether there were any objections to the report. Those who put up their hands meant that they were against the report. You did not ask whether there were any objections to a decision being taken without a roll-call.

The PRESIDENT. – The rules do not allow members to decide whether to take a decision with or without a roll-call.

If there is an objection to the recommendation, I must have a roll-call. Mr. Dejardin says that he objects and wishes to vote "No", in which case I have no alternative, under the rules, but to have a roll-call. I have no discretion.

Under Rules 34 and 35, the vote on a draft recommendation considered as a whole shall be taken by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Konings, representing Mr. Voogd.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, may I conclude by making a personal statement?

The PRESIDENT. – Order. I had better announce the result first. Then I shall allow a short statement. But I hope that we shall not have too many statements. It is nearly 6.10 p.m. and we are not nearly through our business.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. It was clear that several of our German colleagues abstained and said so in German and their votes have been noted as "No". That is incorrect. I noted that, for instance, Mrs. von Bothmer voted "Abstention".

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*). – No.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – Certainly Mr. Gessner voted "Abstention", and I heard it noted as "No".

The PRESIDENT. – Order. We had better allow Mrs. von Bothmer to explain her position.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – At least that was true for Mr. Gessner.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mrs. von Bothmer.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I voted “No”, and I want to say why I voted “No”. I am sorry, I would have liked to support Mr. Hardy’s report because on the whole I like it. But I have a terrible feeling that most members are gradually getting into a political mood which makes it impossible for them to make a political assessment. They are actually speaking up for military force... Yes, you are thrilled when they say: “We are going to take a tough line”.

I cannot go along with this. We have never taken such a decision here before. I think we should try to take political decisions and political action for as long as we can. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Gessner, did you abstain?

(*Mr. Gessner indicated assent*)

In future I shall have to take the roll-call myself.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	41
Ayes	30
Noes	5
Abstentions	6

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted*².

I call Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I realise that the rules allow for a ballot on who should be called first on the roll-call. Would it not be simpler if we were to go through the names from A to Z, so that people knew exactly where they were?

The PRESIDENT. – I am sorry to stop you, Mr. Smith. There are a lot of things about the Assembly that I should like to see changed. I do not have the power to change them. The rules of the Assembly are specific on this point. If the Chairman of the Committee or a Representative would get on with the job and revise the rules, we might achieve a better way of conducting our business.

While I am President – the way things are going, I do not know how long I shall be here – I am bound by the rules of order. It is not for me to rewrite them. One night, I could take a couple of hours to do so. However, I cannot

do so unless the Assembly gives me such authority. I hope that the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges will stir itself and get on with the job that it has had in hand for some time.

I call Mr. Grieve

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I think you will agree, Mr. President, that the Committee has done a very good job on Rule 7. Indeed the Assembly has taken advantage of it today.

The PRESIDENT. – I am grateful for that. There are about forty other rules to which I hope the Committee will turn its attention.

6. Poland and European security

(*Presentation of and Debate on the oral Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Order, Doc. 866 and Amendments*)

The PRESIDENT. – The next Order of the Day is the debate, under urgent procedure, on the motion in the name of Mr. Valleix and others on Poland and European security, Document 866. In accordance with Rule 43, the motion has been referred back to the General Affairs Committee and our debate is now on the motion as amended by that Committee.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. De Poi, to move the special report of the Committee.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as you have just said, the General Affairs Committee this morning discussed the motion for an order on the situation in Poland tabled by Mr. Valleix and others, and it was Mr. Valleix who was asked by the Committee to report to you today. As Mr. Valleix has had to attend a meeting in Strasbourg the Committee has requested me to do so. This shows that the Committee very largely shared the views of the authors of this motion and did not question either its necessity or its urgency. For it is quite obvious today that all eyes are focused on the Polish situation and that its development is engaging the attention of everyone who is concerned about both security in Europe and the pursuit of détente. This is true for several reasons.

One is that the events which have taken place in Poland or may take place there during the coming months may well determine, for a very long time ahead, the destinies of all Poles, the whole of Eastern Europe and of détente. The question is in fact whether, once it is in power, communism has any face other than that given to it by Stalin during his long dictatorship. Is the Soviet Union willing to

1. See page 47.

2. See page 49.

Mr. De Poi (continued)

accept, not the institution of democracy as we understand it, but merely the respect of certain fundamental freedoms in the countries under its domination? If not, it is difficult to see what hope would remain not only perhaps for the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians or East Germans but even for the citizens of the Soviet Union. A régime which evolves or is capable of evolving remains tolerable. A régime in which any demand for change is a crime can only bring about revolt and leaves no hope of humanisation of the Polish dictatorship; after some windows have been allowed to be opened a little, this would be a dangerous game of double or quits on the part of the Soviet Union.

But there is another reason why we are concerned today with the fate of Poland, why a request for urgent procedure was made and accepted and why the General Affairs Committee has discussed this problem. The second reason is the insecurity created by Soviet reactions to the Polish situation. We know that the frontier between the German Democratic Republic and Poland is closed; we know that the Poles are confined within their own country and that more and more manœuvres by Soviet forces are taking place round their territory, as was the case thirteen years ago round Czechoslovakia.

There are good grounds for anxiety, all the more so because Poland is not very far from the front held by the NATO forces between the two halves of Germany. Poland is an important factor in the balance and security of Europe. Its invasion by Soviet forces would mean not only what it is to be feared would be terrible repression in a country where the economic situation and even the food situation is so disastrous but also the development and strengthening of the military system by which the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are dominated.

These are the reasons why the General Affairs Committee is asking you to approve the draft order which it has submitted to you. This text consists of two points: the first is a request that the General Affairs Committee be instructed to follow developments in Poland and to report on this question at the next part-session. This hardly calls for comment, since any threat to peace, especially in Europe, comes within the province of this Committee. It is natural that, when a crisis occurs in Europe, the General Affairs Committee should be instructed to report on it immediately. The problem with which it may be faced is that of choosing between the Middle East crisis, the Polish crisis or any others which may break out in the interval, so as to know which aspects of the current international situation will be most

urgent in six months' time. Everything suggests that the Polish situation is and will remain one of the most serious aspects and will continue to be a most urgent matter until next June, whatever may happen in that country in the meantime.

My next point is that the Committee has slightly amended the motion for an order tabled by Mr. Valleix in order to make it clear that in its opinion there was no question at all of provoking the Soviet Union or of suggesting that provocations from any quarter would receive the support of the West. Hence the aim was that our Assembly should show its support for the declarations just made by the Nine at Luxembourg and endorse that deep concern about the development of the Polish situation, but also that it should do nothing which could give the Poles hope of greater support than the West is actually willing to provide or encourage them in taking up an intransigent attitude which they would have no means of maintaining.

The second part of the order recommends that the Presidential Committee should decide to convene an extraordinary session of the Assembly in the event of armed foreign intervention in Poland. There is of course something ridiculous about the idea of convening our parliamentary assembly, which has no real powers, to oppose an armed invasion of this kind. The Committee did in fact decide to delete from the draft order the reference to the measures which Western Europe could take in a situation of this kind. What it wished to do was to give the full weight of its support to the determination which has just been displayed by the heads of state and government of the Nine at their meeting in Luxembourg, and it seems to me that the rôle of an extraordinary session of our Assembly could and should be to strengthen them in their attitude of refusal, indeed to encourage our governments to take as resolute a line as possible and to do so unanimously, well aware though we are that all our countries remain anxious to do everything they can to avoid an armed confrontation in Europe. Any illusion which we might create on this point would be exceedingly dangerous, especially as it would be contrary to the point of view defended by the West not so long ago at Helsinki and now in Madrid: that of non-intervention in the internal affairs of any country. We, too, have no wish to meddle in Poland's internal affairs. We must therefore make as great a contribution as we can to observance of the principles of Helsinki by displaying our good will and open-mindedness towards Poland, even though it has a communist government.

This is in accordance with what the Nine clearly showed by granting economic aid to the Polish Government to help it out of an

Mr. De Poi (continued)

extremely difficult situation. The Nine did not thereby take any action remotely resembling interference in Poland's internal affairs. They merely did what they could to help the Polish Government to solve its own problems.

By wording its draft order in this way the General Affairs Committee took the fullest possible account of the amendments moved by Mr. Pecchioli. I consider that this order, as submitted to you, is balanced and moderate, and I hope that our Assembly will adopt it unanimously.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you Mr. De Poi.

I must point out from the chair that the draft Order is *ultra vires*. It is in conflict with the rules, because Rule 3 for the calling of an extraordinary session says:

“The Assembly may be convened in extraordinary session by the President, either on his own initiative or following a request by the Council or by not less than a quarter of the Representatives.”

There is no provision in our rules for the Presidential Committee to call an extraordinary session. Therefore, I do not understand why it is to be allowed to do what it is not allowed to do by our rules. This is no doubt a matter that we shall consider when we get to that in the many amendments.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – As you have pointed out frequently in the last few hours, Mr. President, we are late. I shall not take up much of the time of the Assembly. Subject to the matter to which you have personally drawn attention under Rule 3, I will say to you and to the Assembly that this motion has my entire support, and I hope that it will have the entire support of my colleagues in the Assembly. As for item 2 instructing the Presidential Committee, I think that advising the President would be an adequate substitution and would meet the needs of the case. If nobody else will move it, I shall move it as an amendment later because that will deal with the point that you have just made.

I want to deal with the substance of the matter. I approach this, as I suppose I approach everything else in life, in the light of a long legal training. One of the maxims on which young English barristers are brought up when they are drafting pleadings in cases and have to draft a defence or statement or claim is “Never leap before you come to the stile.” That means no more and no less than

this. One must, in one's mind, be persuaded of what course one may take in certain circumstances, but it is unwise to jump too soon because one never knows what the other side will do, and it is unwise in terms to say what one's defence is to a certain course, taken by the other side, until one knows what it is. That maxim is applicable in life, in diplomacy, and in international affairs. It is abundantly plain that it is a good maxim for us to observe at the present time.

Russia has not yet invaded Poland. We do not know whether it will invade Poland. We do not know whether Czechoslovakia, East Germany or any other power will do so, but we ought to be on our guard and make provision for such circumstances, should they arise. I suggest, however, that it would be unwise for us to say, in terms, what we will do and what we will not do if such circumstances arise. It has been said – and obviously there is force in it – that it will not be possible for us to take a military initiative. I believe that everybody here would accept that, but I suggest that we should be discussing amongst ourselves in the free countries of the western world what our initiatives should be in such circumstances. We should be prepared, but we should keep our cards close to our chest for that eventuality, should it occur.

That does not mean that we ought not at this very moment, by every means in the power of the western world – by diplomacy, by political speeches, and in the media – to be making absolutely plain to Soviet Russia and to the Russian satellites what a devastating blow to the security of the world they would strike if they were to contemplate and carry out an invasion of Poland. We are not now in 1956. We are not now in 1968, and we have over the last twelve years, painfully and slowly tried, between the East and the West, between the free countries and the communist countries – I make no apology for so defining them, because I believe the definition to be accurate – to achieve a moderate measure of détente.

Were Russia to invade Poland, that détente would be shattered into a thousand pieces, and it behoves us, by every means in our power, to make that absolutely plain. There could be no security in Europe were there to be an armed aggression against Poland by Soviet Russia. The situation of the western world with regard to such an aggression would be totally different from that, for instance, which we have been discussing today in relation to the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan. I trust that in such circumstances we should be united in the measures that we thought it right to take, and the sanctions that we thought it right to impose upon such an aggression if it took place.

Mr. Grieve (continued)

We ought to be making it plain to Soviet Russia that the shattering of any hope of détente and of the security of the world, which I believe such aggression would constitute, would be as dangerous and as damaging to Soviet Russia and to the Russian satellites as it would be to the western world. Already Soviet Russia is spending upon arms a proportion of its revenues that far exceeds that which is being spent in any western country. Already there are dire economic effects within the Soviet bloc. How much worse would they become were Russia to indulge in aggression against Poland and to suffer the sanctions that the western world would think it right to impose in consequence?

We should be making these facts clear to Soviet Russia. That should be the intention of our policy. Among ourselves in the free countries of the western world we should be determining the policies that have united the western world and that we should be following, should that aggression occur.

This motion has my full support. I hope that it will also have the full support of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I hope that members will not stray beyond the very narrow terms of a procedure that has been invoked under the emergency rules.

Do you wish to speak, Mr. De Poi, before we come to the amendments? I see that you do not.

The debate is closed.

We will take the amendments, of which there are nine. They are to be taken in the logical sequence of the text. They are: Mr. Pecchioli's Amendment 7; Mr. Gessner's Amendment 2; Mr. Caro's Amendment 5; Mr. Gessner's Amendment 3; Mr. Pecchioli's Amendments 8 and 9; Mr. Hardy's Amendment 1; Mr. Gessner's Amendment 4; Mr. Caro's Amendment 6.

At the end of the day Mr. Grieve may wish to move a manuscript amendment.

Mr. Vecchietti is to move Amendment 7. If the Assembly is content, where there are several linked amendments it would be helpful if they were discussed together.

I call Mr. Vecchietti.

Mr. VECCHIETTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, with your permission I will speak to Amendments 7, 8 and 9 tabled by the Italian communist group. We share the deep concern expressed in the motion before the Assembly but we decided to table these amend-

ments also, for two reasons. Firstly, we disagree with the spirit of the motion which gives the impression that Soviet intervention in Poland is imminent – which none of us knows and even less wants. Our function is on the contrary to express the fervent hope that such intervention does not take place.

Secondly, the motion refers to authoritative press statements in socialist countries but makes no reference to equally authoritative – and in my view rash and damaging – opinions expressed in some western countries by governments and institutions belonging to the Atlantic Alliance.

We are deeply concerned that such a serious subject has become the subject of speculation which is unhelpful to general political aims and most of all does not help in finding a political solution for the Polish crisis. Obviously, as we indicate in our amendments, we are concerned that the process of renewal in Poland should proceed without any outside interference – by which I mean interference from both East and West. It is only in this way that Poland can overcome the grave crisis in which it finds itself.

We shall strive to ensure that the international situation gradually restores the climate of détente which is necessary for Poland's freedom and its free and independent progress.

Our amendments are intended to replace the enacting terms completely so that both our position and that of others will be clear.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Vecchietti.

Mr. Vecchietti has moved Amendment 7 and with it has discussed Amendments 8 and 9. If the Assembly agrees, since these amendments are related we could take them as a group and have a debate on them.

Does anybody wish to take part in the general discussion?...

I should explain that Mr. Valleix is very disturbed that he was unable to be present this afternoon. Today he had a Council of Europe commitment in Strasbourg, which he felt he was bound to honour, but he is coming back for our deliberations tomorrow. Mr. Valleix asked me to mention that to the Assembly.

Mr. De Poi, do you want to speak to Amendments 7, 8 and 9?

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I wish to say that this draft order was not tabled with any provocative intention but solely as a warning because, as Mr. Grieve said earlier, any invasion of Poland would be the ultimate crisis for détente. The aim of the draft order is therefore

Mr. De Poi (continued)

to maintain détente and to avoid the taking of false steps. We are therefore not in favour of these three amendments. Amendment 7 is extremely vague, and simply expresses concern regarding the most recent developments in the Polish situation. But this concern has existed for some time already, combined however with the hope that the situation will develop without outside interference. And the reason for this debate is precisely that at the moment the fear exceeds the hope.

The gist of Amendment 8 is already to be found in the first paragraph of the preamble; in my view, therefore, it cannot take the place of the clause because it would destroy the purpose of a suggestion that we should be on the alert if and when anything happens. Finally, I feel that it conflicts with the seriousness of action we shall take in this Assembly if and when something happens which we hope will not happen.

Amendment 9 is unacceptable because it does not match the urgency which is the reason for taking this stand. Moreover, if these terms were used the events with which we are concerned would be seen as routine matters and not as matters of exceptional gravity.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. De Poi.

Mr. Caro wishes to speak, but it is not in order for a member to speak to an amendment after the Rapporteur has replied. That is the end of the discussion. Your amendment will come later, Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I would like to make a point of order.

You have just called Amendments 7, 8 and 9. With all due respect, I must point out that Amendment 8 is not in the form of a draft order. In my opinion it is not admissible as such. Its form is exactly that of a draft resolution.

I therefore consider that this amendment should not even be put to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – I cannot accept that. I must rule on whether amendments are in order. I understand that the amendment would become the preamble. Amendment 9 would be the draft order. There are no textual problems. Members may have different views about the amendments, but we cannot rule them out of order on procedural grounds. If I had thought that they were out of order, I would not have allowed them to be moved. I shall put the amendments separately.

We shall now vote on Amendment 7.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 7 is negatived.

We shall now vote on Amendment 8.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 8 is negatived.

We shall now vote on Amendment 9.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 9 is negatived.

We come to Amendment 2, to be moved by Mr. Gessner. As they hang together, it may be convenient – though it is entirely up to Mr. Gessner – for him to speak to all three of his amendments, 2, 3 and 4, together.

I call Mr. Gessner.

Mr. GESSNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to take this opportunity to speak to all three amendments together.

I must begin by saying that I have no objections to the actual content of the second paragraph of the preamble; but I feel some apprehension about linking this paragraph to developments in Poland, which, after all, is what we are now discussing. I do not think we are helping ourselves by drawing a parallel between events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and events in Poland today, because we must realise that by so doing we are in fact preparing the public in Western Europe psychologically for a step which we could naturally never want, which we condemn. We are talking about Soviet intervention in Poland. I believe it is very dangerous for us to keep on dragging this up publicly in Western Europe, because far from mobilising public opinion along the lines we want, we are thereby gradually accustoming people to the idea that the Soviet Union might one day intervene in Poland. And I think this is extremely bad and dangerous. Those who plan a possible armed intervention in Poland at some time must go about their business on their own. There is not the slightest reason why we should help them in any way.

Well intentioned though it may be – I quite appreciate that – I would nevertheless appeal to you to delete the second paragraph. As I have said, I have no objections to the content as such. I feel, too, that we shall have sufficient opportunity elsewhere, in other resolutions, to restate our position on the tragic events in Czechoslovakia. But for the reasons I have given I appeal to you to delete this paragraph because it is linked with Poland.

Mr. Gessner (continued)

Perhaps I should add a few words to make my meaning a little clearer. There was an outcry in the world at the invasion of Afghanistan, not only because of the event itself – though quite dramatic enough on that count, as we all know – but also because this invasion came as a surprise. There were no obvious warning signs. If you take that into account and relate it to what I have just said – that we cannot be in the business of preparing the public in Western Europe psychologically for any kind of intervention by the Soviet Union – you will understand why, in my opinion, it is more sensible to delete the second paragraph of the preamble.

I now come to the second amendment I have tabled. The point here, Mr. President, is to indicate our solidarity with the European Council. We should avoid anything that might be construed as dissension between Western European Union and the European Council. It is just because of the extraordinarily – one can surely use the term – hazardous nature of the affair that we should demonstrate our solidarity, our common commitment to satisfactory and reasonable developments in Poland. It would therefore be entirely consistent to confine ourselves to what the European Council decided yesterday. I believe that is something we can freely accept. If you look at the declaration, I do not believe there is a single word to which you could not assent. But if that is true, we might as well also make at least a general reference to the European Council's declaration in our decisions.

As for my third amendment, I believe that we are ill-advised to make constant reference, as we have done here, to intervention by the Soviet Union. I believe it is in our interests not to add fuel to the flame. We must not do that. If we do, it will actually be contrary to the interests we are pursuing. Violent events in Poland could not possibly suit us.

To repeat what I have just said about my first amendment, I do not think it is a good thing if, by continuously stressing the possibility of armed intervention, we prepare the public in our countries psychologically for this intervention. This is the business of those in charge of psychological warfare in the Soviet system. That is not our job.

I would therefore ask you to support these amendments in the form I have proposed.

Finally, we must also assume that there may be developments which might prompt us to discussions – developments which need not necessarily be military interventions. I should therefore like us to retain the possibility of

discussing this subject at any time we see fit. I would therefore ask you to approve this amendment as well. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – I understand, Mr. Gessner, that you are agreeable to Amendments 2, 3 and 4 being discussed together. I shall then put them to the Assembly separately. Is that convenient, to you and to the Assembly?

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as always I shall be very brief. The situation in Poland and particularly along the Polish border is such, I fear, that an appropriate statement by this Assembly is called for. According to the latest information, the three western military missions based in Potsdam have recently been banned from the area along the frontier between the German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Poland, because manoeuvres are allegedly taking place there.

The European Council has drawn the logical conclusions. It has called on all the signatories to the Helsinki final act to observe the agreements, and it has also made clear, in its declaration, its sympathy for the Polish people. I believe the hint thus given supports us in our endeavour, as parliamentarians, to express a little more clearly what the heads of government also wanted to express in the European Council.

Since the American Government and Senator Percy, acting on behalf of the American President-elect, Ronald Reagan, have issued similar declarations in Moscow, I cannot quite understand why Mr. Gessner feels that as the Assembly of Western European Union we should adopt a more cautious position than many western politicians.

We all want to prevent the Soviet Union from intervening in the People's Republic of Poland, militarily or otherwise. Consequently, we must make it clear to the Soviet Union right now that it would be exposing itself to greater dangers if it decided to intervene.

I therefore urge the Assembly to reject the two amendments which do not concern the European Council and to adopt only the amendment which explicitly refers to the European Council's decisions.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. Caro, do you wish to speak?

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall be brief.

Let me say first of all that I support Mr. Gessner's Amendment 3. However, I shall not

Mr. Caro (continued)

go over the arguments already put in its favour but move on to Amendments 2 and 4.

I would ask the Assembly to reject Amendment 2. Indeed, the invasion of Czechoslovakia did meet with universal condemnation by the political parties of Western Europe. It is possible that the repetition of such an act in Poland would arouse the same universal condemnation. Such universal agreement would be a positive factor for the mounting of an appropriate response and should therefore be envisaged favourably by the Assembly.

I would also ask you to reject Amendment 4 for the following reason. If we are to dissuade the Soviet Union from any action of a grave character in Poland, we have to be precise. Economic and political pressure is already being exerted on Poland. It is part of the interplay of relations between socialist countries, which we do not accept but which does not make any real difference to East-West relations.

Armed intervention, on the other hand, would constitute a radical change in the Soviet Union's forms of action and intervention with respect to Poland. It is to this eventuality – which is in everyone's minds and which can unfortunately no longer be ruled out – that explicit allusion must be made, as incidentally the European Council did in its statement yesterday.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Caro.

I call Mr. De Poi.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – In fact I accept the suggestion because the amendments tabled by Mr. Reddemann and Mr. Caro match my ideas completely. This leads me to reject Amendments 2 and 4 and to ask the Assembly to accept Amendment 3 because it supplements the text and refers to an attitude which is not confined to WEU but is also backed by the governments of the European Community.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I shall put the three amendments separately.

First, I shall put Amendment 2, which stands in the name of Mr. Gessner and seeks to leave out the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft order.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is negatived.

I turn to Amendment 3, which stands in the name of Mr. Gessner. I understand that the Rapporteur is willing to recommend the amendment, which states :

3. At the end of the preamble, add a new paragraph as follows:

“ Welcoming the attitude of the European Council with regard to Poland as expressed in the declaration of 2nd December 1980 and associating itself with this declaration. ”

We shall now vote on Amendment 3.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is agreed to unanimously.

I turn to Amendment 4, which states :

4. In part II of the draft order proper, leave out “ should the independence and sovereignty of Poland be jeopardised by an armed foreign intervention ” and insert “ should further developments in Poland make this necessary ”.

We shall now vote on Amendment 4.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is negatived.

I turn to Mr. Caro, who has tabled two amendments. Perhaps, Mr. Caro, you will move the first amendment briefly and we can then discuss both together. Of course, we shall take the votes separately.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Ladies and Gentlemen, as one of the signatories of the motion for an order I would like to restore the original text of the draft before us.

In Amendment 5 we are seeking to restore a paragraph worded as follows :

“ Considering that the existence of an independent and sovereign Polish state is an essential part of European security ; ”

The point is that, for historical reasons, Poland has a special position in the European security system as it exists today. Even under the communist régime, especially since Mr. Gomulka returned to power, Poland has a specific rôle because of its geographical position and particular political and social organisation. At the present time there are only two Soviet divisions in Poland. The strength of the Catholic church and the small peasantry is a powerful counter-weight to the Communist Party. A reversal of this situation would be a serious matter for European security itself. That is why I think this paragraph of the preamble should be restored.

The point of Amendment 6 is to restore the last sentence of paragraph 2 of the order, as originally drafted. May I remind you that it recommends the defence ministers to take all appropriate measures in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty.

Mr. Caro (continued)

In other words, the Assembly would not be content to meet and simply define its position in the event of foreign intervention in Poland, but would call on the governments to take rapid, co-ordinated and effective measures.

Since the invasion of Poland by the Soviet Union would constitute a very serious change in the conditions of European security and would call into question current negotiations in the military field, it would appear necessary for the defence ministers, in accordance with the Brussels Treaty, to be primarily responsible for dealing with the matter. This addition therefore seems essential.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Caro.

Does the Rapporteur wish to give the view of the Committee?

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, after the very long discussion which we had this morning in Committee, I cannot accept Mr. Caro's two amendments. It is objectively our concern that independence and sovereignty may be jeopardised and it is, therefore, in the attempt – which we hope will succeed – to regain full observance of the Helsinki agreements that the draft order stresses the need for constant vigilance regarding events in Poland over the next few months. I would say therefore that this amendment might in some measure divert attention from the real object of our concern. These are my comments on Amendment 5.

I cannot accept Amendment 6, because it would create very dangerous illusions. It might well give the impression that we are contemplating some action beyond the warning and a calm and serious attempt to ensure that the little which is left of détente is not destroyed. In order to avoid creating false hopes and doubts regarding the sincerity and the diplomatic aspects of our attitude, I advise that Amendment 6 be rejected, as it was in Committee.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. De Poi.

I shall put the two amendments to the Assembly. The first is Amendment 5 by Mr. Caro and others.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is negatived.

Amendment 6 at the end of paragraph 2 seeks to reinsert the words on the paper that were in the original document as Mr. Caro explained.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 6 is negatived.

There is only one amendment remaining of which we have notice. I am sorry that it comes now. Because of the sequence, it was the first one put down by Mr. Hardy.

Will he now move it?

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I beg to move, to leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper. I am in no way minimising the gravity of the kind of developments that have concerned us today by seeking to inject an element of flexibility into the proposed arrangement. I take the view that we give people jobs, and we have given people the job of serving on the Presidential Committee. I believe that the members of that Committee, guided by your own experience, are quite capable of reaching the necessary sensible conclusions; but I believe we should leave it to them to decide whether we have an extraordinary session or whether the matter could be left for general consideration by the General Affairs Committee. The level of flexibility is relatively small and could in certain circumstances save us profound embarrassment. Therefore, in moving my amendment I hope that the imposition of this flexibility will commend itself to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I think that my amendment really meets Mr. Hardy's point, because in accordance with Rule 3 I propose that for the word "instructs" we substitute the word "requests", and that for the words "Presidential Committee" we substitute the word "President". That would leave it to the President to convene an extraordinary session, whether or not he does it in his own discretion, as he has power to do under Rule 3.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. Grieve, your amendment could be very helpful at a later stage on a second point, because I understand that it is a matter of order. Mr. Hardy's amendment would not conflict with the rules. It would make the draft order *intra vires* instead of *ultra vires*, and he is arguing that this is a matter for the Assembly. I am not allowed to express my view. It would give flexibility, which the draft order lacks at present as well as being out of order.

I must put this separately and ask Mr. De Poi whether he wishes to make any observations on behalf of the Committee.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I am in favour of the proposal just made by Mr. Grieve.

The PRESIDENT. – Mr. De Poi, we have not yet come to Mr. Grieve's amendment. First, we have to deal with Mr. Hardy's amendment. I would like your view on that, because if it is carried it would not be necessary for Mr. Grieve to move his amendment.

Mr. DE POI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I cannot support Mr. Hardy's amendment because I do not think that the Committee can take the place of the Assembly. In this respect, it seems to me that the observation which you made at the outset, Mr. President, is contestable because the 25 % of Assembly members required for convening is implicit in approval of the order itself. That is why the draft is in the form proposed.

The PRESIDENT. – There are not 25 % of the Representatives of the Assembly present, but that is beside the point. I have understood the position.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I ask to speak to declare my vote.

The PRESIDENT. – As we have had the reply from the Rapporteur, it is rather irregular for someone to come into the debate.

Mr. CAVALIERE (*Italy*) (Translation). – I wished to raise a question of principle. I shall not vote for Mr. Hardy's amendment for one reason only: it is not possible on such occasions to have recourse – as has been done at other times – to the General Affairs Committee without reference to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments which is more competent in the matter and is the first Committee of our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you. I hope that this battle between the two Committees will not continue in every debate that we have. Perhaps the Chairman and Clerks could get together for a drink so as to avoid this constant dispute.

We shall now vote on Mr. Hardy's Amendment 1.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

We now have Mr. Grieve's manuscript amendment.

I call Mr. Grieve.

Mr. GRIEVE (*United Kingdom*). – I beg to move, as a manuscript amendment, to substitute the words "Requests its President". That will put us within the rules.

The PRESIDENT. – The Rapporteur has indicated that he would be willing to accept the manuscript amendment.

Will the Assembly accept it without opposition?...

The manuscript amendment is agreed to.

I now have to put the complete draft order in Document 866, as amended by Mr. Grieve's amendment, and the earlier amendment of Mr. Gessner, Amendment 3.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amended draft order is adopted¹.

7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday 4th December, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. International industrial consortia and collaborative arrangements for the production of high technology military equipment (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Document 863).
2. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 865).
3. Energy and security (Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 856 and Amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 7.15 p.m.*)

¹. See page 51.

FOURTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 4th December 1980

SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. International industrial consortia and collaborative arrangements for the production of high technology military equipment (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Order*, Doc. 863).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*), the President, Mr. Martino, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Konings, Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Valleix (*Chairman of the Committee*).
4. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments*, Doc. 865).
Speakers: The President, Mrs. Knight (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Smith, Mrs. Knight (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Agrimi (*Vice-Chairman of the Committee*).
5. Energy and security (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 856 and Amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Forma, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Konings, Mr. van Hulst, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Flämig (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Valleix (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Hardy, Dr. Miller, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Flämig (*Rapporteur*).
6. Close of the Session.

The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m. with Mr. Mulley, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The Sitting is open.

1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT. – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous two Sittings have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The Minutes are agreed to.

2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT. – The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings¹.

3. International industrial consortia and collaborative arrangements for the production of high technology military equipment

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Order, Doc. 863)

The PRESIDENT. – The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Techno-

logical and Aerospace Questions, Document 863.

I call Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I beg leave to introduce my report on international industrial consortia and collaborative arrangements for the production of high technology military equipment, Document 863, on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, by which it was approved on Monday 1st December by fourteen votes to nil, with one member abstaining.

The report covers subject matter which has become familiar to the Assembly. I make no apology for that. The promotion of interoperability and standardisation of equipment among the member countries of WEU is one of its principal and most firmly established *raison d'être*. It is also one of the principal objectives of the Standing Armaments Committee.

The report carries further the excellent work already done in this sphere by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions which organised two aeronautical colloquies in Paris and Toulouse and adopted useful reports, subsequently passed by the Assembly, by Mr. Valleix, Mr. Warren, Mr. Scheffler and Mr. Richter.

I have sought to summarise from an industrial and practical perspective the progress made to date in industrial collaboration for the production of high technology military equip-

1. See page 54.

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

ment by the member countries of WEU. Because aviation products, namely, aerospace systems – military aircraft, helicopters and guided weapons – constitute by far the largest part of the high technology defence equipment market, I have deliberately concentrated on that sector of weaponry.

I trust that the Assembly will find my report objective and fair. I set out to write it with few preconceptions, except, perhaps, the conviction that the ultimate criteria of productive arrangements of defence equipment are operational and commercial. What matters is that the military requirements of the user armed services be met, not only in terms of operational capability, time scale and cost, but at a rate of return and in sufficient quantities to justify the investments, both industrial and governmental, in any equipment project.

My experience in the area covered by the report has been military, industrial and political. It has led me to be sceptical of grand designs and the promotion of new institutional structures. It is not bureaucracy in Brussels or anywhere else that builds sophisticated defence equipment on which our security in the Alliance depends. Nor, in the last analysis, can it be any agency other than the national user armed services which can have the responsibility of procuring the weapons with which those services may ultimately have to fight.

In essence, therefore, the report speaks for itself. I have tried to make it simple, direct and readable. Where possible, I have sought to avoid too much technical jargon. In the text, I have preferred words to abbreviations and real names to acronyms.

The Assembly may be disappointed that I have not sought to quantify precisely either the financial savings in development expenditure which collaborative arrangements should afford to governments, or, on the other hand, the additional industrial expense involved in producing an equipment project on a multinational basis.

Such figures are almost impossible to assess. Each equipment case is different and there are dangers in drawing sweeping, generalised conclusions from the example of any particular weapons project. Suffice it to say that the Callaghan report proved conclusively that the NATO Alliance as a whole could make much more economic use of its limited national budgets through the organisation of a genuinely Atlantic market for defence equipment. What is true of the Atlantic dimension is also true of the European dimension.

Anyway, in order to achieve a genuinely balanced and equitable two-way street, the European defence equipment industry must be assured of a home market large enough, and a sufficiency of new designs and development work, for it to meet the commercial challenge of American manufacturers, with their longer production runs and strong competitive position in high technology.

The report therefore traces the historical background to industrial consortia and collaboration in high technology defence equipment. I describe in detail certain significant collaborative projects and their management, such as the Alpha-Jet, the Jaguar, the Tornado, the F-16, various families of helicopters and guided weapons.

I know that we have much business to conclude this morning and I shall therefore go through the draft recommendations briefly. The first suggests that the SAC, which is conducting a study of the European armaments industry, should monitor progress towards the achievement of interoperability and standardisation of defence equipment within WEU. That is one of the principal objectives of collaborative production arrangements anyway.

Secondly, I cannot express strongly enough that there should be a formal link between the Independent European Programme Group, which is a body constituted of officials of national defence ministries, and WEU, with the group reporting to this Assembly. Obviously, such a proposal would have to be discussed with the non-WEU countries of the IEPG, that is the Eurogroup countries that are not signatories to the amended Brussels Treaty. At present, there is virtually no way in which most elected representatives are informed of the important work of the IEPG in, for example, the harmonising of time scales and operational requirements.

Thirdly, because I am increasingly convinced, after many years of experience, that political will is the ultimate determining factor in achieving important collaborative programmes, I believe that there should be convened at the earliest practicable opportunity, perhaps towards the middle of next year, a strategic summit at which western leaders should decide to promote collaboration in arms procurement.

As far as Europe is concerned, the first candidate would be a European combat aircraft to succeed the Jaguar in the Royal Air Force and French air force and to succeed the Phantom in the Luftwaffe; and two helicopters: the anti-submarine helicopter, to be jointly developed by the British and the Italians to succeed the Sea King, and an anti-tank helicopter, to be developed by the French and Germans.

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

Fourthly, the two-way street is an objective that is worth pursuing. The fact that we have been relatively unsuccessful to date does not mean that the objective is not worth while. I regard the F-16 as an important milestone. It has the merit of providing four European air forces with an aeroplane that is sophisticated and that introduces an element of standardisation that is extremely important for the Alliance as a whole.

Fifthly, as we now have consortia such as Panavia for the Tornado, and the Euromissile dynamics group, requests for proposals to meet new operational requirements ought, as a matter of course, to be put to them. They will then be able to continue in being and to produce new projects when the project for which they were originally organised has been produced.

Sixthly, the Independent European Programme Group has a key and essential function in the continuation of the excellent work of trying to phase the operation re-equipment plans of Alliance countries – Eurogroup countries – and the harmonisation of operational requirements. It is bound to be a long-term task. As different equipment will come out of service in the armed forces of member countries at different times, the work cannot be completed overnight. Nevertheless, it is important work.

In conclusion, this Assembly is the only one in Europe with the *locus standi* to concern itself specifically with defence matters. In the past, we have made important initiatives. I hope that this report will prove a useful contribution.

I therefore urge the Assembly to accept the draft resolution and to call a colloquy on international aeronautical consortia either towards the end of this year or at the beginning of next year. We should then be able to monitor progress in international aeronautical collaboration, to set down the guidelines for future collaboration and to pave the way forward, so that even more progress can be made. I beg leave to move the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson, for presenting a very important report. I am delighted that the Chairman of Committee, Mr. Valleix, has managed to be with us again. He has no doubt gone to enormous trouble to be here. Yesterday I presented his apologies, because he had an engagement in Strasbourg. We managed to complete the business on the motion of urgency that he introduced.

I must raise two procedural points. The first is not a matter of great substance. First, I am told that this should be a draft order, not a draft

resolution. The voting procedure is the same in either case.

The second point is more serious. This is an instruction in the Charter and in the rules, particularly in Rule 48, to the effect that the President is held responsible for authorising expenditure as regards the credits of the budget on behalf of the Assembly. Since the proposal was made only on Monday of this week, and has not been examined by the Presidential Committee or by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, there is no reason to say “Yes” or “No” to it.

I merely make the point that when such proposals, which are bound to involve expenditure, are suggested, there is an overall reservation that they have to fit in with the budgetary situation. I am sure that the Committee will understand that. Nevertheless, I thought that I should make that reservation clear, because circumstances may mean that we cannot do it in 1981 or even in 1982. It was not examined – as it should have been – before it became the firm decision of the appropriate Committees. I say nothing about the merits of the proposal, because I am not allowed to say anything. If I were allowed to say something, I would say it was a good idea.

The first speaker in the debate is Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I promise you that I shall not keep you long as is only right at a closing sitting. You will note that I did not say that “I shall be brief” because we know from experience that speakers who start with those words end up by falling far short of their promise.

Turning now to the subject under consideration, I would say at once that European armaments co-operation is certainly very important because it ensures the independence of the European industry, enables it to compete with the American industry and to participate in the replacement of NATO's armaments, and in so doing gives more weight to Europe and NATO in determining defence policy. All this is in the interests of European security. To an even greater extent, as indeed is implicit in the previous statement, co-operation is essential in the case of advanced technologies which are, of course, the subject of the report before us. It becomes even more important and in some respects decisive because of the positive carry-over from the development of the military to the civilian sector in Europe, which must be more vigorously promoted in future. But for European co-operation to become reality it will be necessary to remove a number of difficulties, some of which are mentioned in the report and the recommendation.

Mr. Martino (continued)

We believe that some of the causes of the persisting difficulties can be identified. In our view, the question of equality and co-operation between national industries is fundamental. The situation cannot be remedied by transferring American supremacy to the strongest European countries; this could create fresh and even less acceptable disparities. Secondly, if there is to be true co-operation it must add to the original capacity of the various national industries: it is only by such enrichment that waste of effort will be avoided. Finally, true co-operation must be established in the interests of all. We can support only some of the actual proposals on this point. We realise and accept that this is a many-sided, complex and difficult problem; and that is why we think that governments should be more involved. The right way might be to strengthen the Independent European Programme Group and therefore to take up our proposals that representatives to the committee of the IEPG should ultimately be raised to ministerial rank, in recognition of this essential greater commitment and as evidence of greater political determination. Mr. President, I am keeping my promise, adding only in conclusion that we shall abstain. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Martino.

The next speaker is Mr. Lenzer.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I had in fact asked for the floor to speak on behalf of the Chairman of our Committee, Mr. Valleix, who was not yet here when the report was presented. Since he has now returned, I shall be very brief.

Just a few comments on the report. I would like to thank Mr. Wilkinson for the work he has done. He has tackled a particularly difficult subject. The problem here is to bring practical necessities determined by scientific and technological forces and by our scientific and technical capacity under the same roof, so to speak, as political demands and economic considerations. The subject of international standardisation and interoperability of armaments often impinges on national sensibilities and arouses mistrust.

I am particularly grateful to Mr. Wilkinson for having taken the trouble to present the problems in intelligible language. This, indeed, was one of the tasks he set himself in preparing his report. A particular feature of this report is that it avoids technical jargon and indicates, in a language intelligible to us all, the possible courses of action so important to poli-

ticians like ourselves who are often no experts on technical matters. He has thus continued in the Assembly the tradition of our Committee, which has already dealt with the same set of problems on previous occasions – I recall the reports by Mr. Warren and Mr. Scheffler.

The problem here is how, in present economic circumstances, to use our technical and scientific potential for the defence of the Alliance, while at the same time achieving a reasonably fair distribution of tasks. The chief points I would like to touch on are rationalisation and standardisation. Here we need early agreement if we are to take joint initiatives. I am thinking of the European tactical combat aircraft and the anti-tank helicopter.

In this connection I need hardly mention the particular relevance given to the subject at the present time by the debate on the increase of the defence budget in the individual countries – the famous 3% debate. In view of the increasingly acute competition for the allocation of budgetary resources, it will become more and more difficult to make the necessary efforts in the field of defence. This provides a positively compelling reason for rationalisation and standardisation. The juxtaposition of the various weapons systems should really lead slowly but surely to closer co-operation with a view to standardisation and interoperability.

I realise that an important obstacle to this is the disparity between the existing economic potential of the various countries as regards their armaments industries. I believe however that with good will sensible solutions can be found in this area also.

I would like to thank the Rapporteur once again for his report and to call on the Assembly to vote for the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Lenzer.

The next speaker is Mr. Konings.

Mr. KONINGS (*Netherlands*). – In the preliminary draft recommendation, in the conclusions, and in the chapter on European-American collaboration with regard to the F-16, the Rapporteur was rather optimistic about the possibilities of collaborative arrangements for the production of high technology military equipment. He has not taken sufficient account of the difficulties which have arisen already and which will increase because of the high inflation rate in some European countries and especially in the United States.

The United States is now faltering in respect of two major commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in weapons procurement. The first is its failure to meet the funding commitment for a 3% growth in real terms for military hardware in the fiscal year

Mr. Konings (continued)

1981. Its failure here is mainly due to inflation and the shifting of funds to operations and maintenance areas.

The second is its failure to meet the funding commitment for equipping the army with the Franco-German developed Roland air defence missile system which, in the United States, was to have been produced by a Hughes-Boeing team. The decision not to fund the production of this air defence missile system is serious, as the system is needed to defend United States air force bases on the European continent.

This decision has military, political and economic consequences. Roland was widely heralded by the United States as an example of the two-way street: America would use Alliance technology to promote the standardisation and interoperability of weapons.

Another air defence system called the Divad – the division air defence gun system – is also in jeopardy, as the funding for this system has been given a very low priority. The system would use European guns, and was supposed to be yet another example of European-American co-operation to achieve standardisation and interoperability.

This failure to meet the United States army's air defence needs is partly due to the reorientation of the defence budget priorities to fund the rapid deployment force in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East. In America, the air force and navy budgets are being increased and the army's budget is being reduced, which means that the army has to use its money for programmes with a higher priority than air defence.

Within Europe itself, the Rapporteur must certainly be aware that a large number of future British defence programmes have been obscured by a fiscal cloud. The defence budget might be reduced by some £ 200 million. This may result in a low priority for the Jaguar aircraft replacement, an international venture mentioned by the Rapporteur in Chapter III. It might be postponed, as might also the production of an improved version of the British Harrier, and the development of a new anti-submarine warfare helicopter in conjunction with Italy, as mentioned in paragraph 59 of the report. The cuts might also imperil Franco-German-British joint development of the new European manned combat aircraft.

In Germany, the Federal Chancellor has already indicated that the 3% increase in the defence budget as agreed in NATO in 1978 might not be attained. This will probably mean that the production of Panavia's Tornado, mentioned in paragraphs 32 to 43,

will have to be spread over another year to ease the funding crisis now facing the Federal military services. The overall Tornado programme is already behind its original schedule, as it was postponed in the mid-1970s at the request of the British Government. This German decision will also influence planning by the British and Italian manufacturers, since any change by one partner will have repercussions on the others.

Financial difficulties in the Federal Republic will also affect the Franco-German second-generation anti-tank helicopter. Moreover, there are difficulties in reaching agreement on tactical and technical requirements and, of course, each participating country will lay claim to a preponderent rôle in the production of the planned 340 helicopters. Because of such difficulties, the German Defence Ministry might opt for the procurement of off-the-shelf, low-cost helicopters from the United States. Bell Helicopters has already demonstrated its Cobra anti-tank helicopter throughout Germany, and it is now being tested at the West German test agency for aircraft at Manching.

Wherever one turns, many projects are in difficulty due to lack of finances and one has the impression that multilateral ventures are the first to suffer. If there is a follow-up to this report, I sincerely hope that the Rapporteur will give closer consideration to these financial aspects. While I agree with the draft recommendation, I wanted to make this one comment on what is otherwise a very interesting and illuminating report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Konings.

Do any other members wish to speak in the general debate?...

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – There was great validity in what Mr. Martino said. I particularly welcomed his emphasis on collaborative high technology equipment programmes as a means of enhancing the technological base of smaller European countries. I would not want too much to be made of the argument, but it is valid.

One merit of the F-16 programme for the technological capabilities of Denmark and Norway particularly, and to a lesser extent of Belgium and Holland, lies in the know-how and industrial expertise that they have been able to derive from involvement in the project. I hope that the smaller European countries will be involved as far as possible in European collaborative ventures. Perhaps I emphasised that important point insufficiently in my report. My only regret is that, having had the genero-

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

sity to find the report's proposals acceptable, Mr. Martino somehow felt bound to abstain.

I welcomed Mr. Lenzer's generous observations. He rightly brought home the importance of rationalisation and standardisation and, above all, the cardinal importance of overcoming national sensitivities and distrust. It was the kind of generous deduction that I would have expected of him and it much improved the tone of our overall debate.

Mr. Konings brought us down with a bump to hard reality in two respects. First, he reminded us of the impact of inflation upon equipment programmes, particularly upon American programmes. Secondly, he made us realise, if we did not realise already, the impact which the development of the rapid deployment force and the overseas rapid intervention capability on the part of the Americans would have on American involvement in NATO and equipment programmes.

We should not be too recriminatory in our proceedings. Our security as Europeans is very much affected by what happens outside the NATO theatre. If any Alliance member, whether European or American, should take upon himself a task outside NATO in the interests of us all, that is broadly to be welcomed. I hope that we shall concert our efforts with the Americans to see how we can operate jointly outside the NATO area to ensure the energy and other security interests of the Alliance as a whole.

Of course Mr. Konings is right to say that budgetary constraints, at a time of recession and economic difficulty, are bound to impinge upon equipment programmes, but experience of collaborative programmes has generally shown that unilateral cuts and postponements have been kept to a minimum. Because countries in a collaborative venture are enmeshed in the activities of other countries, they have been prevented from withdrawing from a project or cutting their participation too drastically.

Mr. Konings is also right to say that in the mid-seventies the Tornado programme was delayed as part of the then British Government's reductions in defence expenditure and the Federal German Government is now looking at that programme again. However, the Tornado is a real European achievement, a milestone in industrial collaboration, interoperability and standardisation. It is a milestone from the air forces' point of view because, for example at the TTTE at RAF Cottesmore, they will actually be training together.

It is not just economic considerations that have made governments look again at the new

European combat aircraft. There are definite differences of time scale and operational requirement between the potential users in France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Those difficulties have to be solved. Economic constraints do not make the solution any easier, but they are not the only difficulties.

I welcomed Mr. Konings' support for the Franco-German anti-tank helicopter and the Anglo-Italian anti-submarine helicopter. I consider both extremely important. He brought us down to earth with a bump, but I welcomed the note of realism that he injected into our proceedings. I also welcomed his support for this report and its recommendations.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson.

I now call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President, for kindly mentioning a few moments ago the difficulty I had in arriving in time for the opening of the sitting.

I am glad to be on the Committee bench so that I can emphasise the quality of the report and pay tribute to the Rapporteur – I hope our colleague will not be offended; for the report presented on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions is, as Mr. Lenzer reminded us, absolutely first-class.

I shall not revert to the points made by MM. Martino, Lenzer and Konings, whom we thank very much for their contributions and who have been given excellent answers by Mr. Wilkinson.

Rather than make general remarks I shall concentrate on one or two aspects of the report.

Before doing this I wish to thank Mr. Huigens, who once again has given great assistance, which Mr. Wilkinson was the first to appreciate, in arranging a very large number of contacts for Mr. Wilkinson with leading representatives in various countries and from various fields of interest.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to stress the originality of this report, which, for a Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, may seem to you to be of a structural and, if not legal, at least a somewhat administrative nature, since it is not part of our Committee's function to deal at length with structural problems. And yet they in fact constitute the central theme of this report.

For our Committee – influenced in this particularly by its Rapporteur – felt that we are in a period when the need for interoperability and

Mr. Valleix (continued)

standardisation is more pressing than ever, for several reasons: firstly, for good European co-operation, of course, but also, at the same time and competing with this, for better European-American co-operation whenever possible; lastly, because we are passing through a recession which is much more a divisive factor as regards co-operation than a factor of cohesion, since everyone is primarily concerned with protecting his own business without thinking of sharing it with others.

It is in relation to these three factors, the first two being in the nature of incentives and the third – the recession – negative, that this report seemed to us to be particularly timely.

My second remark concerns a point already made by Mr. Lenzer. On no account must the Committee's initiative appear to be a sanction or any kind of reservation with regard to private or individual initiatives in the industrial field. Consortia, groups of firms, are not presented as a weapon in a war against private firms or against the ventures of this or that company.

If we look at paragraph 5 of the recommendation, in which the member nations are to be pressed to ensure that their military staffs shall issue requests to "existing industrial consortia as well as to individual firms", we see that there is no sign of hostility towards individual firms but that this is a further exhortation to take account of the structure represented by consortia. We in fact consider for various reasons that such consortia, created more often than not on an *ad hoc* basis, are tools which should remain in the service of European co-operation both for the purposes of production already started – whether it be a Tornado or a CFM-56, on the borderline between the private and military sectors, or an Airbus in the civil sector – in order to keep a product going and provide for its continuation and for the purpose of sustaining new European structures with a view to preserving and, if possible, expanding them.

My third remark concerns the Standing Armaments Committee. Personally I am glad that, at the instigation of the Rapporteur, this recommendation includes appropriate references both to the Independent European Programme Group and, with emphasis in the first point of the recommendation, to the Standing Armaments Committee, because we are fully within the bounds of the true character of our organisation and its purpose. The Standing Armaments Committee should in fact always be called upon for every initiative furthering the aims of WEU.

Mr. President, the members of the Committee particularly appreciated your proposal that the draft resolution should be changed into a draft order. Without prejudice to the decision of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs or the Presidential Committee, I should like to reassure you on one point.

As you know, WEU has already organised colloquies on armaments and aviation, which were completely successful, particularly in Toulouse and Paris a few years ago. I am merely emphasising – if this can be an aid to thinking – that the one which we are proposing would certainly be equally important, but that it would probably entail smaller contributions.

The PRESIDENT. – I do not want to prejudice the report since it was adopted only on Monday last and has not been considered. I said that it would have to be within the budgetary arrangements. I presume that can be done.

Mr. Valleix, have you anything further to say?

Mr. VALLEIX (France) (Translation). – In conclusion, Mr. President, I hope that the draft resolution – or order – will be approved by a big majority, if not unanimously, and that it can be taken into account, subject to the reservations of which the President has rightly reminded us.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

There are no amendments to either the draft recommendation or the draft order, so I shall put them to the Assembly.

If there are no objections or abstentions, we could proceed without a roll-call.

We shall now vote, first, on the draft recommendation in Document 863.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

*The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously*¹.

We turn now to the draft order which in the text is called a draft resolution. However, it is a draft order. There is no difference as to procedure.

Are there any objections to the draft order?...

Mr. MARTINO (Italy) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Italian communist group will abstain.

The PRESIDENT. – I see that there is an abstention. In that case we had better have a vote.

¹ See page 56.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

*The draft order is adopted*¹.

4. Relations with Parliaments

(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 865)

The PRESIDENT. – We now proceed to the next Order of the Day, which is the presentation of and debate on the half-yearly information report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 865.

I call Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. President, in presenting what I hope members will accept later to be merely a preliminary report, I have some remarks to make about the implications of what our Committee is trying to say. Relations between this body and the press are basic to the efficiency of the Assembly of WEU. Without publicity, I submit that we are a sterile body. We get little publicity because we are so ineffective. We are ineffective because nothing that we do is of importance. Like Mr. Truman's "buck", it just stops here. My report seeks to bring this to the notice of all members and to invite them to consider ways of improving the situation.

As colleagues will see, the report is split into three sections. In the first section we deal with the activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. That is a totally factual part of the report. Then we asked member nations to give us their individual reports upon how each parliament of WEU arranges its own relations with the press in its country. I am sorry to have to tell the Assembly that we have not yet received all the reports for which we asked. Some countries have submitted their reports, but we lack one or two important ones. I am sure that members will regret that it has not proved possible to obtain reports from each and every member nation.

I turn now to the section dealing with recommendations. It is this that most concerns me at this time. I come back to what I said at the beginning and to what I touched upon during an earlier debate of this session. At present, the Assembly of WEU is an extraordinarily useless body. So much of its work is completed only to be ignored. Reports are compiled with infinite care and with the profuse burning of midnight oil. They are argued about, amended, talked over and discussed and finally they appear in cherished print, like a much wanted child after a long and difficult labour. Alas,

1. See page 58.

their fate is only to live in the proud memory of the Rapporteur. The press and parliaments of member states take neither notice of nor action upon a single word.

Yet many, perhaps even most, reports are very good and their recommendations are well worth implementing.

The Assembly is the only organisation that specialises in the defence of Europe. It is the one place on earth where members of parliament from seven of the most deeply involved European states can concentrate entirely on the vital matter of defence and produce not a localised, country-by-country view, but a European view. France may not be in NATO, but it is in WEU. American observers have expressed their deep appreciation of this clearing house of ideas and opinions and of its uniqueness, as have other visitors. In addition, there is a treaty obligation to keep WEU in being.

Two wings of WEU, the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee, act as part of, but are independent of, this Assembly and I speak only of the Assembly. It is interesting that few members in the hemicycle know exactly what those wings of WEU get up to.

We must keep the Assembly in being, but if we are to do so, we need to alter our methods of operation in several ways. First, we must ask WEU's own Council of Ministers to back us up instead of undermining us. There must be no more decisions by our own head, the Council of Ministers, to restrict the areas of action and responsibility of its own body. The report calls attention to instances where that has occurred. It is not interesting to the press when our head suggests that our activities and responsibilities should be hived off to other organisations.

In addition, ministerial meetings of WEU ought to take place, as they used to, several times a year, and not just once. They should be seeking ways to increase the activities of, and hence the press interest in, the WEU Assembly, and not to decrease them. It is no wonder that the press is largely uninterested in WEU when our own Ministers and member governments regard the Assembly as a moribund body.

That brings me to the actions of individual governments. If the Assembly asks for a leading government speaker to address us, do we normally get a Foreign Secretary, a Home Secretary or a Secretary of State? No, we get the second, third or fourth person in line. No doubt they are important people, but they are not always of a calibre that attracts press interest. It would be infinitely more valuable to WEU to have one top VIP in each session. He would answer questions and, as happens at the

Mrs. Knight (continued)

Council of Europe, would undoubtedly get a great deal of publicity.

All members of the Assembly have a duty to influence their own member governments to take note of, and consider action on, reports passed by the Assembly. We have all been to blame. We have ways of alerting member governments to reports and recommendations and we could do much more as individuals. We all have a duty in that regard. All members must consider and weigh their actions with immense care, particularly when recommendations urging that WEU's activities should be transferred to other organisations are before us.

I may be sticking my neck out, but I believe that we could run our procedures much more effectively. Occasionally, we start a debate on one topic, something else intervenes and we may or may not return to the original subject. There is considerable mystique about when a report is to be concluded. I appreciate the difficulties. We never know how many members may wish to speak, but can we say that we cannot improve our procedures? I believe that we could. If we did so, that would reflect much greater credit on our activities.

It may be that other steps can be suggested. If so, I should warmly welcome that. The matter is of such importance that the Committee has changed its desire merely to put the report before the Assembly. We have also altered the title to "Preliminary observations on relations between parliaments and press." The Committee feels that it would be much better if we could have a debate on the matter, not as the last subject on the final day of a session, but at a peak time when members could be encouraged to make their own suggestions on how the situation could be improved.

The Assembly is like a racehorse sedated on highly expensive drugs and kept in a satin-lined stable. He can run well, he is intelligent, willing and able, but he is prevented from doing anything other than merely existing. We cannot leave the horse there. We must decide whether to take him out of the stable and off the drugs and let him run races again – he might even win – or put him down humanely and decently and spend the money on something else. I favour the first course.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs Knight, for an interesting report and some provocative remarks. I have not noticed any satin, but I hope that we shall not have it taken away, because there will not be much money available for it in the next year or two.

You did not cover what we can do in our own parliaments. Perhaps that will be dealt with in June. That is a matter which is in our hands and which cannot be delegated.

I hope that the Committee will give attention not only to direct contacts with the press, but to what we can do as parliamentarians. You and I know, Mrs Knight, that we do not see much arising from the Assembly's work being raised in the British Parliament, and I believe that that is true in other parliaments as well. However, it is not for me to make a speech. We have another speaker.

I call Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I very much agree with the comments of my British colleague, Mrs. Knight. It is the second time this week that I have heard her describe this body as useless, and the second time that I have heard her describe our proceedings as a waste of time. Although you do not make speeches, Mr. President, you underlined the seriousness of the position in a skilful way in your recent remarks.

I should have thought that WEU was crying out for reform. As members, we could achieve that reform. Therefore, we should consider debating this subject in depth when we next meet, in June. Unless we do so, this body might wither away and die. Mrs. Knight's report stresses yet again something that should be remembered. It states:

"WEU remains the only truly European organisation with responsibility for defence matters, and WEU has an organic link with national parliaments, which alone can supervise member states' defence policies."

I cannot speak for other countries, but I suspect that many national parliaments take the same view as the British Parliament, namely, that the organisation is not as important as it used to be and that it has been downgraded. When requests are made for a major speaker, we do not get the Foreign Secretary or the Secretary of State for Defence, but the second-string man or woman. That is no reflection on them, because many give an excellent performance. I should have thought that the organisation's status warranted far greater attention from member governments and a change in their approach to our activities.

WEU's rules are badly in need of change. Earlier in the week, we touched on this subject. It is of paramount importance that change should take place. In addition, we must pep up our performance if we wish to be attractive to the media. Mrs. Knight spoke about the way in which the programme is run. Members are often uncertain about the programme and about when votes and key debates

Mr. Smith (continued)

will take place. Such things need reform. We need strong comments from members.

It is ironic that we should debate this subject on the fourth morning in an almost empty hemicycle. This subject may concern the future and livelihood of WEU. This debate may be a comment on the delegations of individual member states. WEU meets for only four days and for two sessions a year. One difficulty is the lack of continuity. That is also a difficulty for the Council of Europe, but at least that meets three times a year, or four times a year if one counts its mini-session.

WEU meets only at the beginning of the summer and at the beginning of the winter. It is lamentable that we should be asked to attend for only four days and that on the fourth morning there should be such poor attendance. That is typical, and we have all seen it before. Some of us stay out of duty. Some of us stay because we are particularly interested in the subject that Mrs. Knight has mentioned. I had intended to speak about the problems of the press in relation to parliament, and particularly about how those problems affect Britain. In view of Mrs. Knight's remarks, I shall not do so. The report covers that.

The relations between any national press and its parliament are difficult. There is difficulty about the type of coverage that should or should not be given. I am acutely conscious of the fact that by and large press coverage of parliament is superficial. I should like to see that coverage improved. In a democracy, it is important that there should be adequate and sustained coverage, both of the bad and the good. Media coverage of WEU, the Council of Europe and the European Parliament is almost non-existent. If I were to go out into the streets of London and to stop the first one hundred people and ask them what WEU or the Council of Europe were, I should be unlikely to get any response. If two people were to give anything like the correct response, they would be entitled to a prize.

If we believe in democracy and if we wish to nurture the European institutions – most members of the Assembly, including myself, are European democrats, otherwise they would not be here – we must do more to ensure that they get some coverage by the media of member countries. Unless they receive some coverage, the public will continue to be ignorant and our respective parliaments will continue to ignore us, as they have done in recent years.

That would be a bad blow to democracy. Once organisations such as WEU have gone, other organisations such as the Council of

Europe will go. That acriminious body, the European Parliament, is perhaps the only body left that has constant rows that affect the EEC. Indeed, I lament the fact that such rows take place.

WEU must pull itself together. This week we elected a new and full-time Clerk. There was a good deal of controversy about the high salary that will be paid. I am prepared to pay double that salary if we can get somebody – I hope that we have got somebody – who can inject life into the organisation and who can get things moving. The new Clerk should bring about a new approach to the Assembly's work.

In you, Mr. President, we have a good President. I was delighted when you were elected. Within the confines of the rules, I am sure that you are doing a good job. You would be capable of doing a much better job if we had better procedures. Like you, Mr. President, I do not want to see your name go down in political history as the last President of WEU.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Smith. I appreciate many of the things that you said. There is an improvement in a sense. I am informed that we have a quorum today. That is the first time in recent years that we have had a quorum on the last half-day. Neither I nor the Presidential Committee can control how many members stay throughout our proceedings. No matter what the length of our proceedings, many members will come late and many will go early. It is for the political groups and the national delegations to decide. Nevertheless, Mr. Smith, you have given us much to think about.

Does anyone else wish to take part in the debate?...

I call Mrs. Knight.

Mrs. KNIGHT (*United Kingdom*). – I do not wish to say any more because, although there is a great deal more to be said, there will be a better and more crowded time in which to say it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. Knight, for the work that you are doing on behalf of the Committee.

I call Mr. Agrimi.

Mr. AGRIMI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it has been my privilege to take the place of the Chairman, Mr. Jeambrun, at the last two meetings of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. In Committee, it was decided, on the basis of the report produced by Mrs. Knight, who has shown herself as enthusiastic and hard-working as ever, to make a break with the kind of minor-key liturgy which marks the end of sessions of the WEU Assem-

Mr. Agrimi (continued)

bly; I am referring to the half-yearly report on the activities of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, in which one of the main themes this time is relations between parliaments and press. It was therefore decided to tone down the title of to-day's report which we have called: "Preliminary observations on relations between parliaments and press". The preliminary observations look forward to a fuller discussion, in a more prominent position in the next part-session in June so that it may arouse enough interest among the public at large and among the national and international press.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are no recommendations or orders to follow that most interesting report and debate.

5. Energy and security

(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 856 and Amendments)

The PRESIDENT. – The next Order of the Day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 856 and Amendments.

I regret that this debate could not be completed in one piece. We were faced with a list of speakers that would have taken three hours, in addition to the speech of the Rapporteur and in addition to the amendments. It was impossible to get through those speeches in a couple of hours. As a result, we must continue today.

Mr. Jessel sent his apologies, as he is unable to be here. In addition, Mr. Portheine is unable to be here. Mr. Ellis will come later.

I therefore call Mr. Forma.

Mr. FORMA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to say a few words on one particular aspect of the problem, arising from speeches we have heard during the session and which concerns our sole responsibility, when wider aspects of the security of development and civilian life may concern other European organisations also. The point I wish to consider is the relationship between sources of energy and the active defence of Western Europe. The overall energy problem must of course be solved so that the active defence sector can be supplied with all the special kinds of energy that it needs. And this in fact calls for an overall approach – such as the Rapporteur seems to have taken – which, while

not challenging certain principles of institutional independence, which are still greatly stressed these days, will consider the integrated operational possibility of a defence and a deterrent force which can only be seen as a whole.

The "siege strategy" is once again topical because there is an absolute need for energy over which we have no direct control but which we have to obtain, and will have to for many years, from third countries and in quite considerable measure, as the Rapporteur shows, from the very countries of the bloc with which we are faced as a consequence of the questionable Yalta decisions. Any cut in this energy would cause irreparable damage not only to life in our countries but also to the feasibility and operability of the means of Atlantic and European defence. The treaties which for better or worse guarantee peace are based on a balance between the blocs but this balance presupposes certain essential safeguards. While, to some extent, hope of reaching agreement on the proliferation of weapons has not been lost during the years of chequered fortunes of the SALT negotiations, it is a more difficult matter to guarantee the structures which create and supply our means of defence with the energy without which some balances become only apparent and are in reality propped up like giants with feet of clay.

In substance, this appears to me to be the warning we should take from the report and the draft recommendation which, in its first paragraphs, calls for convergent measures and common plans for self-sufficiency and in paragraphs 5 and 6 for the determination of an acceptable threshold of safety and security and efficient contingency plans for keeping open oil shipping lanes. This should also allow some countries to escape from the temptation of certain most unedifying bilateral agreements, whereby they export arms from Europe and in return import into Europe, together with oil, substantial causes of concern and instability. The reality which now faces us and the facts of the last few months, the acts of aggression, the not unfounded fears of free men for the integrity and independence of certain countries – and the Orders of the Day approved yesterday is an example of this – the presence in the Mediterranean of fleets which were formerly excluded, all urge us to abandon our illusions and to pay attention to vital aspects of our security and civilian life.

I believe that energy and the security of our defence are at least linked and, more than that, all aspects of the problem we have to deal with are linked, so that the uniform organisation of means of defence should be matched by a firm and convergent policy as proposed in a strong recommendation to the Council.

Turning to other aspects of the problem, I should perhaps say that I disagree to some

Mr. Forma (continued)

extent with the linking of this question and certain unspecified forms of trade between western countries and the USSR. But this goes beyond my intention which is only to stress the urgency of accepting the Rapporteur's proposals in order to ensure the security of a completely vital sector.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Forma.

The next speaker is Mr. Ellis.

Mr. ELLIS (*United Kingdom*). – I want to speak for a few moments on Mr. Flämig's report. I congratulate him on it and I congratulate the Committee on choosing this subject, because there is a clear link between energy and defence. In establishing that link and making it quite clear to parliamentarians that the link exists, he has done a great service to the whole field of energy in terms of our commercial requirements.

There is an actuarial certainty about the increasing demand for energy, and without bothering the Assembly with a lot of figures, it is perhaps useful to appreciate that in the short space of 180 years, world demand for energy has risen from an estimated twelve million tonnes of coal equivalent annually in the year 1800 to about 12,000 million tonnes annually today. If one were to draw a graph of energy consumption along the annual rate of consumption of energy covering the years from 1800 onwards, one would see the graph now almost approaching a vertical rise to infinity. So in due course something has to go, because the world is a finite place.

Remarkable though that actuarial certainty is, it is equally remarkable that people in the Community and in all our various nation states – those in authority – have failed to appreciate the consequences. If we take the European Community as an example, until fairly recently – about the middle 1970s – the policy, as far as there was a policy relating to energy, spelt out quite clearly by the European Commission was simply that the laws of supply and demand and the free market economy would establish a balance of supply with demand, although, quite patently, such a balance was not going to apply. Now, particularly after the Yom Kippur war, it does not apply. Therefore, in establishing this link with security Mr. Flämig has done us this service, because it emphasises more and more the need, as he puts it in paragraph 12, for an energy policy in the Community.

Still in many of our countries, in respect of certain sectors within the energy field, there is not a strategic policy as such being followed,

notably in my own country where our oil policy is still determined simply on very short-term commercial considerations. It is tragic that governments fail to appreciate the desperately important position that energy must have in our future security.

I want, therefore, to make two points in respect of establishing future security of supply for the developed world and in particular for the countries of Western European Union. One is to do with oil. Clearly, one thing that should have been done much more than it has been done is to establish a positive relationship with the OPEC countries. OPEC is an ambitious body. OPEC members are not simply anxious to lift the price of a barrel of oil by a few dollars every now and again. Their ambitions go far beyond that. Unfortunately, because they are a disparate, heterogenous collection of countries, there is not really an institutional arrangement within OPEC that would inject the equivalent responsibility to match those ambitions.

One thing we in the West should be doing to a much greater extent is to try to enter into a more positive dialogue with OPEC so as to develop OPEC into some kind of political homogeneous group if possible, and in particular to get OPEC, in achieving its ambitions of improving the standard of living of its countries and peoples, also to acquire the inevitable responsibilities that go with that achievement.

Some things can be done. In the light of the enormous financial surpluses accruing to OPEC, I should have thought that the OPEC countries would have much greater representations on international financial bodies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. I am baffled that the directors of the World Bank should include only one OPEC representative, whereas the West, in terms of financial balances and surpluses, is grossly over-represented. That is a simple and positive thing which could be done to establish a meaningful dialogue with OPEC.

In the light of what was said in an earlier debate, it is interesting that the price of oil has not risen so much more than that of many other commodities. That gives rise to many economic considerations. We would achieve something if we could persuade OPEC countries that it is in their interests to raise the price of oil in a steady and controlled way rather than by means of an *ad hoc* periodic hike which disrupts the world economy and increases danger and instability.

I want to put in a word for nuclear power, particularly the fast-breeder reactor. Opinions have been expressed against the fast breeder and against nuclear power in general. There is a

Mr. Ellis (continued)

great deal of confusion in my country as a result of some of the emotive issues raised in the nuclear debate. For instance, a respected political party simultaneously supports nuclear power for bombs and opposes it for electricity generation. That seems the height of absurdity and shows the need for a great deal of much clearer thought.

For example, France, applying the French logic that I admire, is committed to a strategic policy. We can argue whether it is right or wrong, but we cannot deny that in fifteen years, if there is a Channel tunnel, France will be selling electricity to Britain because France will be producing it much more cheaply. The rise in the consumption of oil – 12 million tonnes in 1800, 160 million in 1860, 1,200 million in 1920, 5,000 million in 1960 and 12,000 million this year – makes an energy shortage inescapable. Despite the occasional ratchet effect as world economies boom or slump, that is an actuarial certainty. Therefore, we must devote a large proportion of our resources to the development of nuclear power – especially as Mr. Flämig said, the fast breeder.

Any environmental disadvantages lie with the renewable sources, such as solar energy, the wind and the waves. We do not put this argument as strongly as we could. Do we want landscapes littered with huge windmills?

I support everything Mr. Flämig said. The fast breeder has major problems and much work is needed but, in Mr. Flämig's phrase, it must be better to burn than to bury the irradiated waste of conventional power stations. That also offers a way ahead in solving our energy supply problems in the future.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Ellis.

I now call Mr. Konings.

Mr. KONINGS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – There is an interesting report, Mr. President, from the American Senate's committee on energy, in which the problem of arms supplies to the Middle East is mentioned. I raised this issue yesterday in a question to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs. The report speaks of countries, such as France and Brazil, which are providing very up-to-date weapons technology to countries in the Middle East in order to ensure that they get supplies of oil. This seems to me to be a great mistake and I am glad that the Netherlands Minister agrees with me on this. These arms supplies are making the instability in the Middle East worse, and they will certainly do nothing to help make oil supplies more secure. I would expect them rather to do the opposite, for an unstable poli-

tical situation in the Middle East poses an additional threat to oil supplies.

At the moment, this still involves high-technology weapons systems. In Brazil, nuclear technology has almost reached the stage where it becomes possible to manufacture nuclear weapons. So the time is not far off when people will be trying to buy their oil by trading nuclear technology. I think this trend is extremely dangerous; this is, and I would stress the fact, one of the consequences of the further development of nuclear technology in the world.

What the report says about developing and expanding nuclear energy naturally has its consequences for the third world. We cannot lay down that the western world can press ahead with this development, and the third world cannot. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is an important factor in this. From having the technical knowledge to build nuclear power stations to developing nuclear weapons is not all that big a step. From this viewpoint, too, I would voice an urgent warning against spreading nuclear technology further. This means that the western world, too, will have to avoid expanding it. This is the standpoint we have adopted today in the Netherlands.

The report rightly says that the various member countries of WEU have different views on nuclear power. Originally the intention was to use nuclear power to bridge the gap between the end of using fossil fuels and the start of using new sources of energy. This idea has been taken further by the nuclear energy lobby to involve the permanent use of nuclear power, with a further development of fast-breeder reactors. It is often said – and I have heard it said earlier in this debate – that an accident with a nuclear power station is comparable with an accident in any other power station. We all know that this just is not so. Accidents with nuclear power stations have genetic effects which can have serious consequences for future generations. We have to choose whether we have the right. My feeling is that we do not.

I would point out that the radioactive waste disposal problem has still not been solved. In the Netherlands there is a discussion under way on processing the waste from the country's two nuclear power stations; in Borssele there is an industrial-scale reactor giving 450 megawatts, and in Dodewaard an experimental plant yielding 50 megawatts. The processing contracts with the French nuclear industry have a provision that the waste will be returned to the country from which it originated. Obviously France too does not know what to do with the waste, either; in the Netherlands, at all events, we do not.

Mr. Konings (continued)

There is also the fact that the processing contracts are secret. Dutch parliamentarians have had to set their signatures to an agreement with a French firm in which they agree to keep the terms of the contracts confidential. Members of my party have refused to do this, because this is not the way we do things in our parliament. Keeping these contracts secret does nothing to win people over to the nuclear energy cause, bearing in mind the emotions this subject generates. Strong pressure by the Netherlands Government on the French and British Governments has not led to the contracts being made public. It is a bad business altogether.

A previous speaker has mentioned the emotional arguments; we have to take these too into account. The opposition in the western world to nuclear power is growing. When people feel that they are faced with something unsafe without being able to put this feeling in a rational form, we as politicians have to make allowance for this. This is the standpoint adopted by my party, and I think it is a very acceptable one. If we allow only rational arguments to carry weight, then we are paving the way for a dictatorship of the experts. This must not happen. Everyone who feels he is being exposed to something dangerous must be given a hearing.

I believe that the report is strongly in favour of nuclear power. It has kind words to say about the fast-breeder reactor, at least. I know that the Phénix is operating in France; I know nothing about it however, because there is a great deal of secrecy about the whole thing. What percentage of the time it is working or out of service, and what the level of breakdowns is, I have no idea. I do know something about the development of the fast-breeder reactor at Kalkar; after years of development there have, to my knowledge, so far been no positive results. The negative aspect is that the cost will be ten to twenty times the original estimate.

I can find nothing in the report, either, about what the cost of the fast-breeder reactor is going to be. It does say that one objection to developing the gasification of coal is the enormous cost – the sum of thirteen thousand million Deutschmarks is mentioned. Why does the report say nothing about the cost of the fast-breeder reactor?

The report also says far too little about the alternatives, among which I would include an energy-saving programme. Our electric power is generated today on a large scale; why should there not be electricity generating on a smaller scale? Why is there nothing in the report

about using recycled heat? Interesting experiments are going on in the Netherlands on using recycled heat in horticulture, which is possible now that horticulture has been developed so that it is no longer tied to one place. There are, for instance, experiments with growing plants on rock wool. This kind of horticulture can be carried on close to power stations, providing these are large. In a complete system we might, I feel, adopt a smaller-scale approach as well.

It has been commented that windmills clutter the landscape – it is known as polluting the skyline. I might mention that in the Netherlands there are experiments going on with vertical windmills, which are fitted to electricity pylons. These pylons, too, disfigure the skyline, and yet they are still there. So they could be used for windmills.

I will stop now, because I understand that time is limited. I am sorry that during this past week this important report has been put off from one day to the next. It is, after all, a very important report. It will be obvious that my friends in the socialist delegation must, seeing things from the Dutch viewpoint, vote against the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Konings.

The next speaker is Mr. van Hulst.

Mr. van HULST (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I have read Mr. Flämig's report with great interest, Mr. President, agreeing with some points and criticising others. We all know that where energy is concerned we are going to face very difficult times.

The official price of oil may well rise by 30% in 1981, to about 185 francs a barrel of 159 litres, partly as a result of the continuing war between Iraq and Iran. A protracted war between these two countries will also seriously jeopardise the energy supplies of the third world. I would quote on this the American journal "Petroleum Intelligence Weekly", which recently pointed out that the official OPEC price of petroleum is still 140 francs a barrel; on the free market, however, people are already paying 170 francs a barrel. There is moreover the risk of a shortfall of 50 million tons of oil in 1981. In the EEC framework, and in the OECD International Energy Agency, continual meetings are going on on this subject at the present time.

I am very sorry to see that in this connection Mr. Flämig has devoted only two paragraphs to making savings in energy. My belief is that a great deal more can be done together in this sphere, not only in Europe but in and with the United States as well. When I say that what

Mr. van Hulst (continued)

needs to be done must be done, this means that the money needed for it has to be made available. It means, too, that there has to be a shared European energy policy. Already, in various summit conferences inside Europe and at meetings between a number of heads of government of the EEC countries, at the world economic summit, with the American President and the Japanese and Canadian Prime Ministers in Tokyo in 1979 and in Venice in 1980, there have been far-reaching agreements reached on energy saving and on research into and the use of new sources of energy. And yet no Western European energy policy, nor any shared energy policy between all the countries of the West, has got off the ground. A further problem is that the heads of government have too little influence over what is done and allowed by their departmental ministers, who do not carry out the plans of their government leaders to the full. It is well that Mr. Flämig has reproduced the declaration from the Venice meeting as an appendix to his report, so that we can look at it again before, as the draft recommendations says, endorsing it.

I agree with Mr. Flämig that more, and closer, co-operation is needed in Western Europe in research and development if we want to become less dependent on energy imports. Sadly, this however seems clearly impossible, at least in the European context.

In my own country we have five big projects currently under way in connection with the gasification of coal. The Netherlands association of gas supply companies has bought from the American Institute for Gas Technology the know-how for its coal gasification system, which is very similar to that of Shell. Esso is building an experimental works in the Netherlands, at a cost of a thousand million guilders, for making high-grade synthetic gas. If the tests are successful, there are plans for a commercial scale plant in the early 1990s, one that would cost 7,000 million guilders. These enormous sums are now being made available, but one gets the impression that each West European country is thinking only of its own needs and of its own research and development activities. West Germany will be spending a thousand million marks a year over a period of thirteen years on coal liquefaction and gasification. These individual projects are being undertaken because each country wants to keep the industrial advantages for itself. It is clear, however, that with policies like this, European security will continue to be in danger. It is ridiculous for Europe to be working for years on end on achieving an integrated defence within NATO, while the govern-

ments cannot manage to work together on facing the very serious threat of an energy shortage.

In his introduction, Mr. Flämig noted that there is nothing binding in the treaty in respect of the safety of energy supplies and the economic policy of the Communities. There are responsibilities in some spheres – such as those of the Coal and Steel Community and Euratom – but there is no specific responsibility for dealing with general questions to do with energy, and the aspects of security that flow from them. Nor is this the case in OECD, because the International Energy Agency – to which France, wrongly I believe, does not belong – comes into play only when shortages arise. In my judgment this is a very undesirable state of affairs.

Finally, Mr. President, I come to the nuclear power chapter of Mr. Flämig's report. Here, too, we must start by noting that co-operation between the member countries is still a long way off. Let me give an example. The countries of the European Communities now have, on their territories, a total of 120 nuclear reactors; thirty-three of these are located less than 40 km from one border or another. This proximity to a border certainly does nothing to make relations between the countries any easier. Belgium and Luxembourg, for instance, have expressed their unhappiness at the French decision to build nuclear power stations at Cattenom and Chooz. It must be obvious to everyone that common safety standards need to be worked out between the countries concerned, and that the local populace must have a voice in the matter. Actually, we had all this in the report by Mr. Lenzer back in 1975. In the report by Mr. Cornelissen in 1976 on the safety of Europe's energy supplies and new sources of energy, the Rapporteur came to the same conclusion as Mr. Flämig, other than with regard to nuclear power. Mr. Flämig may well tell us that the fast-breeder reactor can cover Europe's future electricity requirements, but so far there is not a single fast-breeder reactor in operation. It is not clear to me, therefore, how one can come to this conclusion. During the Committee's visit to the nuclear institute at Karlsruhe this was, it is true, the conclusion that was again reached; but for my taste it was not reached on sufficient grounds, because so far there is no experience to go on. Mr. Flämig mentions the French Super-Phénix, but this too, according to his report, is still not in operation; according to Mr. Flämig, it will not be so until 1983. What is more, building these fast-breeder reactors is an extraordinarily costly business, and one may wonder whether for the same money a much more efficient and less dangerous way ought not to be looked for. I can however agree with the last two paragraphs of the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. van Hulst.

The final speaker on the list is Mr. Lenzer.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I would like first of all to thank the Rapporteur, Mr. Flämig, for his very competent and objective report. With his expert's mastery of the field of nuclear energy he has painted a very realistic picture of the energy supply situation. May I also preface my remarks by thanking him for the good personal working relations we have enjoyed throughout the years. I know this is his last appearance so to speak, at the WEU Assembly, as he will no longer be a member of the Bundestag in the ninth legislative period. We have worked together very well for years on the board of the *Deutsches Atomforum*. Despite the difference in our political stance, objectivity and friendliness have always been the keynotes of our work. May I extend to him my best wishes for every success in his future activities.

The problem in dealing with energy supply as a major component of security policy is to realise that the purpose of a report like this cannot be to put forward all kinds of exotic solutions; it must be possible to secure our energy supplies under realistic conditions. By this I mean that the energy supply must be organised on the basis of the technical and scientific possibilities available to us now, not in thirty or forty years' time. The energy supply must be organised under economically sound conditions. This means – to stay with electrical energy for the moment – that the final price per kilowatt hour must be something that the consumer can afford to pay. What is the use of exotic solutions and the most amazing, technically exacting proposals, if they work out at a price of about two or three Deutschmarks per kilowatt hour? So much, perhaps, for windmills and similar proposals!

Nor, Mr. President, can the drafting of a report like this be a matter of personal taste. It must stick to the hard facts and take into account what responsible experts all over the world acknowledge as proven. I refer to the following points.

First, the priority for a secure energy supply which is also the cornerstone of our defence capability must be to become independent of OPEC oil. This has already been the subject of many proposals. The second point concerns the economic and rational use of energy. Here too, one must have no illusions. Restructuring our present energy supply system, even on the basis of an energy-saving policy, calls for massive investment, amounting to some hundreds of billions, expressed in German marks. Finally, we must remember that, as industrialised countries, we have a duty towards the third world,

namely to make full use of our technical and scientific potential wherever possible – by using nuclear energy, for instance – so that third world countries can benefit from the technically relatively manageable primary sources of energy, without our buying up under their noses – as we could do for a long time – the still more-or-less moderately priced mineral oil that it makes more sense for them to use.

Alternative sources – so all the international experts say – will be providing no more than 5 to 10 % of our energy in the year 2000, which, when talking about energy supplies, is a long way off. They can therefore make no appreciable contribution to our energy balance. So all we have to rely on are coal and nuclear power, not as mutually exclusive energy sources but as complementary ones: coal as a chemical raw material, but also in refined form as synthetic gas and fuel; and nuclear energy – this is undoubtedly a point that has already been a major issue in the debate so far – not only for electricity generation, which, in the present form of the light-water reactor, can also replace oil, but also, and in particular, in the form of the high-temperature reactor and the fast-breeder reactor. The fast-breeder reactor is often attacked. It is just as safe as any other kind; it simply has specific problems of its own. Without such reactors the peaceful use of atomic energy will be simply an interlude lasting no more than twenty-five, thirty or at most forty years.

Let me reply here to one of the frequent objections to the fast breeder. It is always said that when a country uses the fast breeder it is entering into the plutonium economy. This is quite wrong. Any country that has opted for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and built a light-water reactor is automatically in the plutonium economy, for any light-water reactor of 1,200 or 1,300 megawatts – that is the standard size today – produces, depending on fuel consumption, about 250 kilograms per year of plutonium which cannot remain in the fuel cells but must be reprocessed. This inevitably raises the plutonium problem.

May I make one more brief comment about coal. Although it is important – particularly for our countries, some of which have considerable coal reserves – to increase the exploitation of economically workable coal deposits still further, we must realise that in 1985 perhaps only 300 million tonnes of disposable capacity – and in the year 2000, according to the estimates of the Energy Conservation Commission, only about 500 million tonnes – will be available on the world market. All the remaining output is tied up in the producing countries. That is why I believe there is an absolutely ideal partnership and an ideal complementarity between the two primary energy sources, coal and

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

nuclear power. We should resist any attempt to play coal and nuclear power off against each other. We simply cannot afford it.

One more point in conclusion. All the summit conferences of recent years have repeatedly insisted on the importance and increased use of the two primary energy sources, coal and nuclear power. As to the reality in the individual countries, with the possible exception of France – which I would compliment on its consistent nuclear policy; I would not necessarily call the Soviet Union as chief witness on my behalf, but the same holds true there – it is not enough to keep pursing your lips, some day you have to whistle. All the countries of Western European Union must recognise that, over and above the decisions of the summit conferences, the general formula arrived at as an agreed wording there must also be implemented in practice at national level in each country. Thank you.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Lenzer. I am sure that the Assembly agrees with your remarks about the Rapporteur, Mr. Flämig, and the work that he has done as a member of the Assembly. We regret that, as he is a member of the European Parliament, this is the last occasion on which we shall have the privilege of receiving a report from him.

Do you wish to reply to the debate, Mr. Flämig?

Mr. FLÄMIG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to begin by thanking all those who have spoken, including those who were critical. I would now like to reply very briefly.

First, this cannot be a continuation of the nuclear energy debate we have had before. We are now concerned with the link between energy and security, in which nuclear energy plays only a marginal rôle. When reference is made to nuclear weapons in the context of the peaceful utilisation of nuclear energy, I must point out that INFCE, a committee on the evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle in London, has made it absolutely clear that nuclear power stations are not needed to make nuclear weapons. They can be made in other ways, with research reactors, for example. So those who are opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons must find political solutions, as the INFCE also suggested.

To the criticism that we should have said more on the conservation programme I would reply, Mr. President, that in our draft recommendation reference to the conservation programme and to alternative sources of energy comes before nuclear energy, before paragraph 4.

One thing at least is certain: light-water reactors exist and they cannot be argued away. Mr. Lenzer said – and of course it is quite true – that every light-water reactor produces plutonium and the question is, what are we going to do with it? Of course, it can be buried. Then, at a half-life of 240,000 years, it would have to be monitored for a million years or more. So that is not a satisfactory solution. An alternative solution is to reuse it to generate further energy. The only suitable vehicles for this are the fast-breeder and the pressurised water reactor, the two alternatives we have indicated here.

If you are sitting on a gas bubble, Mr. President, if you are lucky enough to live in a country where you have only to drill a hole and you strike gas, it is easy to do without nuclear energy. But there are many, many countries in the world, and of course in our Community too, which have neither oil nor gas. Their future electricity generation capacity must also be safeguarded. That is why we have referred here to the possibility of “coal and nuclear means”.

And in the same context, Mr. President, a slight correction: the official report of our eleventh sitting, summarising the Rapporteur's statement on this subject, says:

“The question of electricity from natural gas should also be avoided and its use should be reserved for industry.”

That is nonsense, of course. Natural gas should in fact be reserved for household use because it is a high-grade source of energy which can be used without polluting the air and is almost irreplaceable for domestic heating and cooking purposes.

Mr. van Hulst said that the conservation proposals should have been more clearly set out. We have appended the full text of the Venice declaration to our report, of which it consequently forms an integral part. It sets out the conservation proposals in considerable detail.

Incidentally I did not say there were no agencies dealing with energy policy. There certainly are some. What I said was that there was as yet no common energy policy in Europe, in the Community. That is unfortunately indisputable and that is what we are trying to change with this report.

I should like to conclude, Mr. President, by thanking, in return, those who have expressed their thanks to us here. I have found very many friends in this Assembly and in the eighteen years I have spent in European organisations. I should like to thank them warmly in my turn and hope to keep their friendship even after my departure.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Flämig.

Does the Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Valleix, wish to speak?

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall be very brief in view of the lateness of the hour and the quality of the Rapporteur's replies.

Please allow the Chairman and all the members of the Committee to endorse everything Mr. Lenzer and you yourself, Mr. President, have said about the departure of Mr. Flämig.

I see in this departure both a stroke of good fortune and a consolation. The good fortune is that Mr. Flämig will be bringing to the European Communities all the ability of which we have had the benefit up till now and that this native ability will contribute to good relations between the two assemblies. The consolation is that, while we are losing one of our Assembly's greatest specialists on energy problems, we fortunately still have Mr. Lenzer.

It now remains for the Assembly to give its support to a report which is of great current interest and essential for everyday problems, but particularly for the security of Europe.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Valleix.

I am sure we will agree that the loss to this Assembly of Mr. Flämig and a number of other colleagues who are leaving the Assembly because they are no longer members of their own national assemblies is our loss, but it will be a gain to the European Parliament and I am sure that the contribution that they have made here will be carried into their additional duties there.

The debate is closed.

Before we can vote on the draft recommendation there are two amendments. The first is by Mr. Hardy, who wishes to leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I beg to move Amendment 1: Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper.

A few moments ago one of my colleagues said that in this report Mr. Flämig had done a great service to energy. I join in paying tribute to him and in the good wishes that have been expressed. My amendment is not designed to be a sweeping condemnation of the report.

I did not speak in the debate. Had I done so I would have noted that it might have been better to place a little more emphasis on the need to develop and support the mining industry in

Western Europe, but that is not entirely neglected, and I decided not to press that point.

I am not at all happy, however, about recommendation 4. I have no objection whatever to a better use of materials and resources. Such an objective should be pursued more widely in all our countries, perhaps for all materials; but I am not at all happy about the commitment of support to the commercial-scale fast-breeder reactor, largely because I believe that this commitment is somewhat premature. Certainly there is nothing like sufficient experience of commercial-scale fast-breeder reactors to justify an immediate and very marked large-scale development, which the report appears to envisage. At this stage in man's history such development could mean that there would be increased and early international demand, and I do not believe that the world, outside Western Europe if not within it, is yet ready, able or sufficiently responsible to be able to handle plutonium with the security that the world will require.

It is all very well saying that the fast-breeder reactor will be as safe as existing thermal reactors, but the product of the fast-breeder reactor may present problems that existing nuclear technology has not yet provided. In any case, I question whether we yet need the extensive use of fast-breeder reactors that is envisaged. Already there has been reference to alternatives and conservation. I do not go so far along the road as some colleagues in advocating massive application of resources to alternatives, but I have to say that if the world were to spend as much to promote energy conservation as it is spending to promote the development of existing technology we might find ourselves in a better position than we have been in in the last few years, and it would be better for far more to be devoted to ensuring that a greater measure of conservation is achieved.

In the debate there has been reference to fusion. Dr. Miller mentioned it in his contribution in the first part of the debate. The fact remains that if there is any maintenance of the pace of knowledge, if there is any acceleration in the rate of technological advance, we could see the possibility of the commercial application of nuclear fusion by the second decade of the twenty-first century.

The Assembly would do well to bear in mind that orders placed for commercial fast-breeder reactors in the 1980s will bring those into commission in the 1990s, and will be commissioned, as we have been told, for a period of thirty, thirty-five or forty years. It is not impossible, therefore, for our pressure today for marked and massive commitment to fast-breeder technology to be actually a cause of disadvantage in the application of future, cleaner technology in the next century.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

I can see a situation in which we will have so committed ourselves to the commercial fast-breeder reactor that resources will not be available for the application of nuclear fusion. In my view, that would be a profound disservice, and I accept that it is not a disservice that the Rapporteur and the Committee in any way would support. There is, of course, a powerful lobby in the nuclear industry, and not always a particularly restrained or modest lobby. There is often an excessive impatience within it. I am reminded that a few years ago in the British House of Commons we were considering Community energy documents about nuclear power. Those documents envisaged an enormous nuclear programme, and I remember saying in that debate that if that programme actually went ahead the resources that it would command would be so enormous that there would be very little investment potential for anything else, and in that case the extra energy demand that that programme envisaged would be absolutely unnecessary.

Since then we have seen a much more moderate programme. The views of the Community have become a little more realistic, but the fact remains that the industry would have dearly liked our governments to sponsor programmes of the extent and capacity then envisaged, which would have provided for far too long an extensive capacity that the world did not need.

I believe that the nature of the product of the fast-breeder reactor should give us far more grounds for concern than the integrity of the reactor itself. I also firmly believe that we need to be very careful not to assume that the pace of knowledge and technological development will not continue, but if it continues the commitment envisaged in the fourth recommendation could be a very harmful one. I believe, therefore, that we should not advocate any more extensive development of the fast-breeder reactor than we need to maintain our capacity in research and development.

I do not believe that we should encourage any greater capacity than that which is needed for a modest level of resource utilisation. I know that Mr. Flämig will not subscribe to any immoderate view, but recommendation 4 as it stands could be seen as promoting an excessive programme. For this reason, and because I am concerned about security and about the need to harness future advance and achievement, I believe that this recommendation is a dangerous one, which the Assembly would do well to delete.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

Does anyone else wish to speak?...

I call Dr. Miller.

Dr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). – I can assure my colleague that I hesitate in opposing his amendment, because he is expressing doubts and fears which are normal, fears and doubts which ought to be expressed by everyone who is concerned about the future in respect of environment and in respect of our energy requirements. The main emphasis of his objection, however, is the opinion as to how long we can wait before getting ourselves involved in the production of the amount of energy which the world is going to require. Here I must agree that neither of us is an expert. It is my information from a number of experts who are unanimous that the fusion process is much farther away than we can think at present. According to experts to whom I have spoken, there is no sign yet of the breakthrough which is necessary to produce the fusion process.

This means that with the world's mounting demands on energy and with the few countries that can expand production – and Britain is one – there is bound to be a gap because of the scarcity of other resources, including uranium. It is necessary, therefore, that we use the plutonium in fast-breeder reactors. Probably that is the only argument that there is between my colleague, Mr. Hardy, and me. He feels that it will come more quickly. I am informed that it will be much longer before the fusion process is able to be developed.

I would not have opposed Mr. Hardy's amendment if he had expressed in a different form the views which he has adumbrated to us this morning, because he is throwing out the whole paragraph. If he had advised us to be a little more cautious in the development of fast-breeder reactors and if instead of using the words "widespread use" he had used the words "cautious development, taking into account the fears that people have", I might not have objected to it. However, since his amendment does not do that, since it throws out the whole paragraph, I have no option but to oppose it.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I call Mr. Lenzer.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I too oppose Mr. Hardy's amendment. I referred to various matters connected with the fast breeder during the debate on the report. I would like to amplify briefly what I have already said.

I must emphasise once again that we now have to find ways of restructuring our entire energy supply system without doing any damage, over a transitional period of perhaps twenty to forty years.

Mr. Lenzer (continued)

Dr. Miller, whom I hold in very high regard, has referred to the problems of controlled nuclear fusion. I can only endorse what he said. Every ten years – this is my personal experience – the scientists studying fusion at the basic research centres push back the date set for the practical use of fusion by another ten to twenty years. The technical problems, the problems connected with materials, particularly in view of the high temperatures involved – millions of degrees – are so difficult that we cannot say even now whether controlled nuclear fusion will ever be technically possible. There is not one prototype fusion reactor in the world on which a feasibility study has succeeded in showing that controlled nuclear fusion is technically possible, let alone a commercial proposition.

As regards the problem of dealing with plutonium, to which Mr. Hardy has also referred, I would ask you to remember that it has been recycled by the same method in the military sector for many years. I am referring to the “Purex” process which, chemically speaking, is identical with the civilian recycling process. So many countries have tens of years of experience in the handling of plutonium. Like Mr. Flämig, in whose constituency there are large plants of this kind, I myself have visited such installations. The handling of plutonium, I would say, can be legitimately described as standard technology.

What is important is to keep the fast-breeder technology option open. To conclude, I should like to say that, if the amendment were worded as Dr. Miller, for example, has suggested, if, in other words, it expressed the concern felt by many people and also the realisation that this technical option must be kept open, we could undoubtedly reach agreement very quickly, and I can well imagine that the Rapporteur himself would be prepared to accept such a wording.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Perhaps the Rapporteur would now like to reply.

Mr. FLÄMIG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wish to oppose this amendment. Paragraph 4 is not in fact particularly concerned with the development of fast breeders, but with the better use of the precious and scarce uranium resources of the world. That is the problem. Since unfortunately only a small percentage, 2 to 3 %, can be used in light-water reactors, and these light-water reactors then produce an additional 1 % of plutonium, the only question to be tackled was: what do we do with it? In paragraph 4 I have indicated two possibilities, not only the

fast breeder, but also – in conjunction with the uranium fuel in light-water reactors – the pressurised-water reactor. That is the other alternative.

But, Mr. President, it is quite wrong to link this with fusion. Fusion does not involve plutonium. Plutonium is already being produced in over 200 nuclear power stations, and it has to go somewhere. Fusion reactors – if they ever come – will, to put it quite simply, be fuelled by water, not uranium.

I therefore call on the Assembly to reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

Does the Chairman wish to speak?...

I now put Mr. Hardy's amendment to the Assembly.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is negatived.

Now we have a largely textual amendment to be moved by the Rapporteur himself:

2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “or thorium”.

Do you wish formally to move it, Mr. Flämig?

Mr. FLÄMIG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it would not have been right to mention high temperatures in this context as well. They are irrelevant to the question of the possible uses of plutonium. I therefore call for the deletion of these two words – or three words in the French version.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you.

I was obliged to ask the Rapporteur formally to move the amendment because we have a printed text. I do not think that anyone would wish to oppose it or to speak on it.

I now put Mr. Flämig's amendment.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

I must now put the draft recommendation itself, contained in Document 856, as amended.

If there is no opposition to the draft recommendation we need not have a roll-call.

Is there any opposition?...

I see that there is, so I must have a roll-call. Under the rules, if even one member wishes to vote against I have no option but to have a roll-call.

The President (continued)

Since the point was raised yesterday, I should also say that I have no option but to follow procedure in the rules and draw the first name for the roll-call by lot.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Urwin.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other Representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	37
Ayes	31
Noes	3
Abstentions	3

The amended draft recommendation is adopted².

6. Close of the Session

The PRESIDENT. – We have now come to the end of the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session. Before we close the session, I am sure that we all want to wish our Clerk, Mr. Humblet, although he is to remain in office until the end of the month, a very long and happy retirement and to thank him for his work for the Assembly during the last twenty-five years.

I should also like to place on record our thanks and appreciation to those members of the Assembly – unhappily it is rather a large number – who are here for the last time. The ending of the dual mandate means that they are no longer entitled to be here. This applies also to the members of the European Parliament. A number of other members are retiring for other reasons. I am sure we should like to put on record our appreciation of their services. I thank you all for your attendance.

I declare closed the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The Sitting is closed.

(The Sitting was closed at 12.25 p.m.)

1. See page 55.

2. See page 59.

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