

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1988

III

**Assembly Documents**

WEU

PARIS



ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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**Assembly Documents**

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The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU  
comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general  
index.

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## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP
BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
DERYCKE Erik	SP
KEMPINAIRE André	PVV
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP

#### Substitutes

MM. COLLART Jacques	PS
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
EICHER Bernard-J.	PS
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
NOERENS René	PVV
UYTTENDAELE René	CVP

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BEIX Roland	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep
DURAND Adrien	CDS
FILLON François	RPR
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
Mrs. LALUMIÈRE Catherine	Socialist
MM. MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PORTIER Henri	RPR
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS

#### Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRÉ René	RPR
BALLIGAND Jean-Pierre	Socialist
BARRAU Alain	Socialist
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOHL André	UCDP
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAULT Xavier	UDF (App.)
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LACOUR Pierre	UCDP
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
PISTRE Charles	Socialist
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
SOUVET Louis	RPR
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
WORMS Jean-Pierre	Socialist

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
HITSCHLER Walter	FDP
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUUK Dagmar	SPD
MM. MECHTERSHEIMER Alfred	Die Grünen
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NIEGEL Lorenz	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU

#### Substitutes

Mr. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
Mrs. BEER Angelika	Die Grünen
Mr. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. HÖFFKES Peter	CDU/CSU
KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
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Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM. PFUHL Albert	SPD
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TIMM Helga	SPD
MM. WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU
ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU
ZYWIETZ Werner	FDP

### ITALY

#### Representatives

MM. CACCIA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
FILETTI Cristoforo	MSI-DN
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
GABBUGGIANI Elio	Communist
INTINI Ugo	Socialist
KESSLER Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MALFATTI Franco Maria	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Guido	Republican
NATALI Antonio	Socialist
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLO Ugo	Communist
PIERALLI Piero	Communist
RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SALVI Franco	Chr. Dem.
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
TARAMELLI Antonio	Communist



**Substitutes**

MM. ANDREIS Sergio	Verdi
CANNATA Giuseppe	Communist
CAPANNA Mario	Prol. Dem.
CARIGLIA Antonio	PSDI
FASSINO Giuseppe	Liberal
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
GRECO Francesco	Communist
PANNELLA Marco	Radical
PASQUINO Gianfranco	Ind. Left
RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
RUBNER Hans	SVP
SCOVACRICCHI Martino	PSDI
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STEGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
TRIGLIA Riccardo	Chr. Dem.

**LUXEMBOURG****Representatives**

MM. BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
GOERENS Charles	Dem.
LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

**Substitutes**

Mr. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
Mrs. HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
Mr. KONEN René	Dem.

**NETHERLANDS****Representatives**

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
de JONG Frans	CDA
de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal
WORRELL Joop	Labour

**Substitutes**

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN	Labour
Elisabeth	Labour
MM. de BEER Leopold	Liberal
DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob	CDA
EISMA Doeke	D66
Mrs. HERFKENS Eveline	Labour
MM. MARIS Pieter	CDA
van der SANDEN Piet	CDA

**UNITED KINGDOM****Representatives**

MM. COLEMAN Donald	Labour
COX Thomas	Labour
EWING Harry	Labour
Dame Peggy FENNER	Conservative
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
MM. GARRETT Edward	Labour
HARDY Peter	Labour
HILL James	Conservative
JESSEL Toby	Conservative
Sir Russell JOHNSTON	Liberal
Earl of KINNOULL	Conservative
MM. MORRIS Michael	Conservative
PARRY Robert	Labour
SHELTON William	Conservative
Sir Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr. SPEED Keith	Conservative
Sir John STOKES	Conservative
Mr. WILKINSON John	Conservative

**Substitutes**

MM. ATKINSON David	Conservative
BOWDEN Andrew	Conservative
FAULDS Andrew	Labour
GALE Roger	Conservative
HOWELL Ralph	Conservative
HUNT John	Conservative
Lord KIRKHILL	Labour
MM. LAMBIE David	Labour
LITHERLAND Robert	Labour
LORD Michael	Conservative
Lord MACKIE	Liberal
Lord NEWALL	Conservative
MM. RATHBONE Tim	Conservative
REDMOND Martin	Labour
Lord RODNEY	Conservative
Ms. RUDDOCK Joan	Labour
MM. STEWART Allan	Conservative
THOMPSON John	Labour

## AGENDA

**of the second part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session  
Paris, 5th-8th December 1988**

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**I. Report of the Council**

Thirty-fourth annual report of the Council  
(first part)

**II. Political questions**

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq                           | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Martino on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i>        |
| 2. The reactivation and enlargement of WEU – reply to the annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |

**III. Defence questions**

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| 1. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |
| 2. Verification: a future European satellite agency                     | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Fourré on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i>  |

**IV. Technical and scientific questions**

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| 1. Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Malfatti on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i>  |
| 2. Defence industry in Spain and Portugal  | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |

**V. Budgetary and administrative questions**

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| 1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989   | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
| 2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |

**VI. Parliamentary and public relations**

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| Young people and defence – the rôle of parliaments | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Shelton on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations</i> |
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**ORDER OF BUSINESS**

**of the second part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session  
Paris, 5th-8th December 1988**

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**MONDAY, 5th DECEMBER**

**Morning**

Meetings of political groups

**Afternoon 3 p.m.**

1. Opening of the second part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session.

**3.30 p.m.**

5. Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.
6. Action by the Presidential Committee:  
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly.  
Debate.
7. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
8. Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Martino on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**TUESDAY, 6th DECEMBER**

**Morning 10 a.m.**

1. Young people and defence – the rôle of parliaments:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Shelton on behalf of the Comité for Parliamentary and Public Relations.  
Debate.  
*Votes on the draft resolution and draft order.*
2. Defence industry in Spain and Portugal:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.  
Debate.

**Afternoon 3 p.m.**

1. Defence industry in Spain and Portugal:  
Resumed debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

2. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft budget.*
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts.*

**WEDNESDAY, 7th DECEMBER**

**Morning 10 a.m.**

1. Presentation of the first part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council by Sir Geoffrey Howe, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
2. The reactivation and enlargement of WEU – reply to the annual report of the Council:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.  
Debate.

**Afternoon 3 p.m.**

1. The reactivation and enlargement of WEU – reply to the annual report of the Council:  
Resumed debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*
2. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.  
Debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**THURSDAY, 8th DECEMBER**

**Morning 10 a.m.**

1. Verification: a future European satellite agency:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Fourré on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.
2. Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council:  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Malfatti on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.  
Joint debate.

11 a.m.

3. Address by Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

Afternoon 3 p.m.

1. Verification: a future European satellite agency:

Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council.

Resumed joint debate.

*Votes on the draft recommendations.*

CLOSE OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION

## INFORMATION LETTER

*from Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU,  
on the activities of the intergovernmental organs*

*(June-July 1988)*

London, 26th July 1988

Dear President,

In order to meet the legitimate wish of the parliamentary Assembly of the organisation to be kept better and more regularly informed of the activities of the intergovernmental organs of WEU, the Permanent Council has decided to add a newsletter to the other items of information it already provides, such as the replies to recommendations and written questions or the annual report.

This letter has been drafted and issued by the Secretary-General under his own responsibility but with the approval of the Chairman-in-Office.

The frequency of its despatch will be related to the pace and substance of the activities of the intergovernmental organs but will also take account of the need to keep both you and the other members of the Assembly fully and regularly informed of developments.

To this end, enclosed herewith is a summary of the main activities of the WEU intergovernmental organs over the period June-July 1988.

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During these two months, the international situation has continued to be dominated by the intense activity which has been its hallmark for some three years, particularly as regards the situation in the USSR and in the Warsaw Pact, East-West relations, the transatlantic relationship and developments in Western Europe.

Convincing evidence of this can be found in just some of the events or positions adopted during this period:

- the Reagan/Gorbachev summit (29th May-2nd June 1988),
- the declaration by Mr. Shevardnadze to the United Nations on 8th June 1988 and the developments in the conventional stability talks,
- the North Atlantic Council in Madrid (9th-10th June 1988),
- the speech by Mr. Dukakis on 14th June 1988 to the Atlantic Council,
- the western economic summit (19th-21st June 1988),
- the nineteenth conference of the Soviet Communist Party (28th June-1st July 1988),
- the arms control proposals put forward by Mr. Gorbachev in Warsaw on 11th July 1988,
- the Anglo-German summit on 11th July 1988,
- the Italian-Spanish summit on the same day,
- etc.

Mr. Charles GOERENS,  
President of the Assembly  
of Western European Union

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\* \*

These developments have been followed closely by the intergovernmental organs of WEU, in particular by:

- its Permanent Council,
- its Special Working Group, meeting at the level of either “heads” or “deputies”.

On each major item, exchanges of information and views have taken place enabling each member state to be fully informed of the positions of the others the aim being, wherever possible, to harmonise views.

Furthermore, the Permanent Council – as the body responsible for co-ordinating the organisation’s activities – the Special Working Group and the Group of Defence Ministers’ Representatives have, during the months of June and July 1988, addressed the following three main problems:

- (a) WEU enlargement;
- (b) implementation of the “platform on European security interests”;
- (c) preparation of a report on arms control and defence requirements.

(a) With regard to the *enlargement* of WEU, the Special Working Group – under the direction of the Permanent Council – has been preparing the meetings with the two candidate countries. This preparatory work consists in formulating questions of a politico-military nature to be put to the candidate countries. The working group has also turned its attention to the legal and institutional aspects involved in the possible accession of the countries concerned. On this latter point, the Special Working Group is planning a meeting with legal national experts in September.

To date, three meetings with the candidate countries have taken place. They are chaired by the country holding the WEU presidency, the first inaugural meeting dealing with matters of protocol took place in The Hague on 21st June and 6th July 1988. The main aim of these meetings, conducted separately with Portugal and Spain, is to examine whether the candidate countries can meet, and if so how, the commitments arising from the modified Brussels Treaty and the legal “acquis” (patrimony) which has accrued since WEU reactivation in 1984, such as the “platform” adopted by the Council of Ministers on 26th and 27th October 1987 in The Hague.

More specifically, the meetings aim to determine the attitude taken by the candidate countries to:

- (i) the obligation to adhere to the principles of risk- and burden-sharing in both the nuclear and conventional fields;
- (ii) the commitment to defend any member state at its borders, as enshrined in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty and in the “platform on European security interests”;
- (iii) the need to ensure that the level of contribution of each member state of WEU to the common defence adequately reflects its capabilities;
- (iv) the commitment to improve consultations and expand co-ordination in the field of defence;
- (v) the rôle of the defence ministers in WEU;
- (vi) the rôle of WEU in concerting policies on crises outside Europe insofar as they affect our security interests.

These exchanges of view with Spain and Portugal are taking place in a very cordial atmosphere. WEU ministers will discuss this issue, in the light of the progress achieved, at their next meeting on 14th November 1988 in London.

The next expert-level meeting with the two candidate countries is planned for 16th September 1988.

(b) The Special Working Group has been mandated by ministers to prepare – under the authority and at the instigation of the Permanent Council – a report on the implementation of the “platform on European security interests” in time for the 1988 autumn ministerial meeting. This report will review developments in the strategic situation in Europe and their implications and also the consequences for European defence co-operation of the commitment contained in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. The report will focus on the need to expand co-operation between the WEU member countries on the basis of the “platform” and with particular regard to:

- the development of consultation among the Seven;
- defence contributions;
- development of bi- and multilateral co-operation aimed at strengthening security;
- arms co-operation.

The aim will be to present concrete recommendations for the new co-operation measures.

The report will also examine the approach to the out-of-area issue and the European defence identity, i.e. as it is seen in Europe and in the outside world.

The Special Working Group is helped in this task by the Group of Defence Ministers' Representatives and its work is based on the many contributions supplied by the national delegations.

(c) At their meeting on 18th-19th April 1988, WEU ministers also tasked the Special Working Group to prepare – under the direction of the Permanent Council – a report on arms control and defence requirements.

Under the mandate given to it, the Special Working Group will prepare its report on the basis of the following questions:

- goals of conventional stability talks seen in a European perspective;
- consequences for Europe of possible developments in the START talks;
- rôle in Europe's security of the nuclear and conventional components of deterrence;
- defence burden-sharing within the Atlantic Alliance and possible initiatives in this respect from European allies that are members of WEU which aim at developing sound and balanced transatlantic relations.

The work of the Special Working Group is continuing on the basis of various national contributions; it is also assisted in this task by the Group of Defence Ministers' Representatives.

All the contributions are at present being studied with a view to the preparation of the abovementioned report in time for the autumn ministerial meeting.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Permanent Council, the Special Working Group and the Group of Defence Ministers' Representatives have had to meet very frequently under my chairmanship.

It should be pointed out that the negotiations proper with the Spanish and Portuguese – as opposed to the preparation of negotiating positions of the seven member states – are taking place under the direction of the representative of the presidency, who is acting as spokesman for the seven governments.

Apart from this essentially political activity, the Permanent Council has continued to fulfil its responsibilities as regards the *administration* of WEU.

Institutional problems, personnel and budget questions feature regularly on its agenda.

It is in this context that it is continuing discussions about the problem of collocating and restructuring the ministerial organs, though no agreement has been reached so far; it has nevertheless kept up its effort in this field and ensured that the current state of affairs has no adverse effect on the smooth running of WEU. For example, it has decided to increase the degree of participation from the Paris ministerial organs in the activities of the London-based working groups.

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As to the situation in the Gulf, the national operations carried out by five of our member countries are continuing though they are based on political concertation within WEU and co-ordinated under the aegis of the organisation.

Consultations have taken place between Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom leading, last June, to the signing of a memorandum covering a joint operational command for vessels of these three countries in the Gulf, this arrangement entered into force on 1st July 1988.

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In the area of public relations, the work begun and extended since the effective reactivation of WEU has continued. In this context, I have given talks to the following institutions:

- 31st May 1988 at 12.00 – Centre for Strategic and International Studies – Washington. Talk on the subject: “ WEU, the beginning of a European pillar of the alliance? ”;
- 31st May 1988 in the evening – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Washington. Dinner discussion with Mr. Bereuter, member of the United States House of Representatives, on the topic “ Burden-sharing or burden relief ”;



- 1st June – Mid-Atlantic Club – Washington. Talk on the subject “ Strengthening the European pillar of the alliance ”;
- 3rd-5th June – Ditchley Park. Participation in a colloquium on the subject “ International security without nuclear weapons? ”;
- 17th June – Central London European Club and the Club Européen Français – London. Conference on the subject “ The defence of Europe ”;
- 23rd June – Royal Defence College and alumni of the NATO Defence College – London. Debate on “ The future security of Western Europe ”;
- 24th June – Academic Commission of the United States Atlantic Council (as part of a study trip organised by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) – Maastricht. Talk on the subject “ The prospects for European defence integration ”;
- 4th July – International Student Movement for the United Nations – Driebergen (Netherlands). Talk on the subject “ International arms trade and its influence on politics, peace and development ” as part of a colloquium organised on this subject;
- 20th July – Royal Air Force Club – London. Participation in a seminar organised by the United States Defence Department on the subject of arms co-operation. Talk on “ WEU and armaments co-operation ”.

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As every year, the date of 1st July marks the change-over in the presidency. Once again we have closed a year of (Netherlands) presidency on an extremely positive note. The year just ended has in fact been the one in which reactivation has been given concrete expression by the adoption of the “ platform on European security interests ”, the co-ordination of operations in the Gulf and the strengthening of the dialogue between the member countries on questions of European security and defence. The Netherlands presidency has also “ kicked off ” the exchanges of view with Portugal and Spain concerning the possible accession of these countries to WEU. The prospects of the coming year augur just as well; the United Kingdom presidency has immediately made it known that, whilst consolidating the groundwork done by the Netherlands, it would seek to pursue the same course with the following four objectives:

- a study of the key commitments contained in the WEU “ platform ” aimed at encouraging better practical contributions to our common defence;
- using WEU to conduct frank discussions and to study new ideas aimed at strengthening the European pillar of the alliance;
- extending our fruitful co-operation in the Gulf by making WEU a body for the co-ordination of our thinking on out-of-area problems;
- achieving a satisfactory outcome to the negotiations with Spain and Portugal.

I hope, Mr. President, that these details and information will prove useful both to you and to the members of the Assembly and will, by virtue of their substantive nature and frequency, enable you to keep abreast of the activities of the intergovernmental organs of Western European Union.

Yours sincerely,  
Alfred CAHEN

*Replies of the Council to Recommendations 455 to 460***RECOMMENDATION 455 <sup>1</sup>*****on European co-operation in armaments research and development –  
guidelines drawn from the colloquy <sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising the importance of maintaining a defence industrial base within the member nations of WEU based on an economic division of work and adapted to the relevant threat;
- (ii) Conscious that the budgetary allocations for defence are not likely to grow as much as the cost of new defence equipment in real terms, and that therefore better use needs to be made within Western Europe of existing financial provisions for defence;
- (iii) Aware that new technologies offer improved solutions to some of the security problems facing the western alliance;
- (iv) Believing that the IEPG has proved itself an effective instrument for harmonising the operational requirements and re-equipment timescales of the armed forces of Western Europe and that, without detracting from the political responsibilities of the WEU Council of Ministers and Assembly, it is now ready to be assigned a greater rôle in promoting joint military research;
- (v) Concerned that in spite of numerous successful collaborative equipment projects, governments in Western Europe have proved themselves unsuccessful as yet in organising a unified military research effort to eliminate the wastefulness of duplicated national research programmes;
- (vi) Hopeful that a more rational utilisation can be achieved of national armaments research, testing, trials and development establishments by opening them to use by the armed forces and armaments companies of other countries,
- (vii) Concerned by the increase in clandestine sales of arms to belligerent countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To fulfil their rôle, repeatedly emphasised by the Council, as members of WEU to provide political impetus to bodies concerned with arms co-operation by taking decisive action to accelerate the formulation of a common policy in IEPG for military research and more cost-effective armaments development in Western Europe;
2. To establish a European advanced defence research agency concerned with conventional capacities funded from a common budget initially provided by WEU nations and later by other European NATO member countries as well;
3. To help the IEPG to meet its goals more rapidly by:
  - (a) affording the IEPG better political support through a regular institutionalised dialogue with the Assembly of WEU;
  - (b) granting it a small permanent international specialist secretariat as recommended in the EDIS report "Towards a stronger Europe";
4. To encourage individual countries to collaborate in the use of each other's armaments research, testing, trials and development establishments;
5. To mobilise more effectively the work of the universities and of the civilian research community for defence research with a corresponding mechanism to permit civilian industry to benefit commercially from the results of military research but without effecting any reduction in research and development for non-military purposes;
6. To involve defence manufacturers much more closely in the formulation of operational requirements both on a national and European basis.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1988 during the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session (2nd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 1141).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 455***

1. The Council continues to attach great importance to enhancing co-operation in the field of armaments research and development, the aim being to save costs, reduce duplication, promote growing standardisation of equipment and hence genuine interoperability between forces.
2. The WEU will continue to play an appropriate rôle in this process which is an integral part of the security policy which its members defined in the Rome declaration and The Hague platform. The member states intend to use the existing WEU structures as well as other means of co-operation in order to give a new impulsion to European co-operation in research on the questions of security and armaments.
3. Although the Council considers that it does not fall to the WEU to provide the secretariat of the IEPG as they are two distinct organisations, it is, however, convinced that the progress which can be achieved by the organisation in the pursuit of a policy of co-operation amongst the Seven in the matter of defence and armaments, cannot but be helpful to the activities of the IEPG.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 3rd August 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 8th August 1988.

RECOMMENDATION 456 <sup>1</sup>on naval aviation <sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that the security of the highly-industrialised countries of Western Europe depends on access to overseas markets and sources of raw materials;
- (ii) Conscious that the defences of Western Europe and of North America are interdependent and that the coalition defence of Western Europe provided through the NATO alliance depends on the maintenance of secure lines of communication across the North Atlantic for the essential process of reinforcement and resupply from Canada and the United States, for which SACLANT's Striking Fleet Atlantic with its naval air and anti-submarine assets plays a key rôle;
- (iii) Noting that both recent events in the Gulf and experience in other previous conflicts have demonstrated the importance of seapower generally and of organic naval air power in particular, and not only lead to the recognition of the strategic and economic necessity for Western Europe to retain possession and availability of national merchant fleets of adequate size, but justify the suggestion that developments in the structure and ownership of international merchant shipping merits serious consideration;
- (iv) Recognising that the strong growth and development of the Soviet navy since the early 1960s into a formidable bluewater instrument of long-range projection of power and political influence is one of the most significant strategic developments of recent years;
- (v) Approving warmly the construction of new aircraft-carrying vessels by France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, to operate a variety of air defence, attack and STOVL aircraft as well as anti-submarine, assault and AEW helicopters;
- (vi) Welcoming the enhancement of naval and maritime aviation being undertaken by the navies and air forces of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom;
- (vii) Anxious that the remarkable sophistication and impressive operational capability, as well as the large numbers of Soviet submarines should not be allowed to affect adversely the balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact;
- (viii) Believing that the current superiority in naval aviation and especially in strike carriers enjoyed by NATO is a strong factor in favour of effective deterrence and the preservation of peace which ought to be maintained, unless and until a multilateral and verifiable agreement with the USSR to reduce this capacity is secured;
- (ix) Appreciating the inherent flexibility, speed of response and freedom of operation without the constraints of fixed land bases which endow naval aviation with a uniquely important rôle in exerting political influence in crisis management and limiting the escalation of conflict;
- (x) Understanding that war at sea or hostilities outside the NATO area, such as the war between Iran and Iraq, could precipitate wider conflict unless controlled by the appropriate application of external political pressure and, if necessary, force, and that consequently the western alliance must retain assets such as naval aviation which are as relevant to operating outside the NATO area as within it and to limited conflict as to all-out war,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge Western European nations to maintain their significant naval force improvement plans:
  - (a) by encouraging France to pursue its aircraft carrier construction programme through the entry-into-service of two CHARLES DE GAULLE-class ships;
  - (b) by encouraging the United Kingdom to put into service at least one aviation support ship to complement the aviation training ship RFA ARGUS and thereby to retain a capability for heliborne amphibious assault, and to proceed as soon as possible to upgrade Sea Harrier aircraft to FRS 2 standards;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1988 during the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session (3rd sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 1139).

- (c) by encouraging Italy to procure STOVL aircraft, preferably with an air defence capability, to supplement the ASW helicopters presently embarked in the aircraft-carrying cruiser, GARIBALDI;
  - (d) by encouraging the entry-into-service on the part of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal of new, or new versions of existing maritime patrol aircraft;
- 2. Persuade at least the member countries with naval forces currently in the Gulf to work together to create a European standing naval force with organic naval aviation including air defence, airborne early warning, attack, anti-submarine and heliborne assault assets for deployment under single command and unified control to areas outside the NATO theatre where Western Europe's security interests are at stake in emergency or war;
- 3. Affirm its support for naval collaborative equipment programmes such as the EH-101 and NH-90 helicopters, the T-45 Goshawk and AV-8B aircraft, and the NFR-90 anti-submarine frigate, and related weapon systems;
- 4. Discuss with NATO governments ways of ensuring that priorities between purely air force and maritime air missions are so organised that:
  - (a) naval commanders have a sufficiency of air assets under their direct control which cannot be diverted elsewhere by national air forces;
  - (b) the procurement of new air force maritime attack aircraft such as a replacement for the Buccaneer and the A-7 Corsair in Royal Air Force and Portuguese Air Force service respectively receive the priority which from the naval point of view they deserve;
- 5. Explore with the governments of the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom and possibly Italy, the feasibility of co-operation in the field of Harrier pilot training on the lines of the tri-national Tornado training establishment (TTTE).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**

***to Recommendation 456***

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1. The Council recognises that, in an era when long-range precision-guided missiles can be launched from submarines, ships and aircraft, the contribution made by naval aviation to maritime defence is of great importance. The Council welcomes the programmes initiated by member nations and other alliance countries to update and enhance their naval aviation capabilities. It warmly supports collaboration on equipment programmes and would encourage increased co-operation on training where this is practicable and of benefit to all the parties concerned.

2. As regards point 2 of the Assembly's recommendation, in the present circumstances the Council considers that the close and effective concertation of national naval forces – in which the WEU plays an important rôle – represents the best approach. A supranational European naval force for deployment out of area, with the assets listed in paragraph 2 of the recommendation, would not be an appropriate response to current circumstances in the Gulf.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 3rd August 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 8th August 1988.

RECOMMENDATION 457<sup>1</sup>*on the organisation of European security*<sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- i)* Welcoming the progress made towards the reactivation of WEU under Netherlands presidency, in particular the adoption of the platform on 27th October 1987, the co-ordinated action of member countries to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the invitation to Portugal and Spain to join WEU;
- (ii)* Regretting, however, that the WEU ministerial organs have not yet been collocated and that their restructuring has not been completed;
- (iii)* Also regretting the impossible position of the Assembly because of the tardy communication of the annual report of the Council to the Assembly, deploring the Council's reluctance to inform the Assembly of its activities through the channels provided for in the treaty and the Charter of the Assembly and, finally, insisting that ministers see to it that their officials comply with the time-scale agreed with the Council;
- (iv)* Noting that international public opinion is still hardly aware that WEU is being reactivated;
- (v)* Considering that reactivation implies not only increased intergovernmental activity but also a redefinition of the specific rôle of the organisation's permanent structures;
- (vi)* Noting that the number of budgetary posts still vacant in the WEU ministerial organs would allow the Assembly's requirements to be met without waiting for the restructuring of the WEU ministerial organs to be completed;
- (vii)* Also noting the petition addressed to the Assembly on 22nd March 1988 by Mr. Hintermann, former Assistant Secretary-General of WEU,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue to study the various implications of the platform adopted in The Hague and transmit the results to the Assembly;
2. Ensure the maintenance of a co-ordinated naval presence of its members in the Gulf as long as freedom of navigation is not guaranteed and, at the same time, take new steps to promote the application of Resolution 598 of the Security Council;
3. Inform international public opinion more adequately of the nature and scale of its operations in that area;
4. Pursue urgently the negotiations on the accession of Portugal and Spain to the modified Brussels Treaty and their effective participation in the Western European security system and take action to facilitate the accession to WEU of all the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance who wish to join and who commit themselves in advance to the same conditions as governed the Portuguese and Spanish cases;
5. Specify how it intends to implement the political impetus it decided to give, in the Rome declaration, to co-operation in armaments matters;
6. Define an active rôle for the Secretariat-General in the procedure for consultations between member countries that it has just introduced and in the regular communication of information to the Assembly and the public on its activities, including the transmission on time of the annual report of the Council;
7. Describe forthwith the status and tasks of the WEU agency and transmit to the Assembly the text of the studies it has undertaken to communicate to it;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1988 during the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1138).

8. Start or pursue, in the appropriate framework and with the possible assistance of the agency, consultations on burden-sharing in the alliance, disarmament or the verified limitation of armaments and problems facing Western Europe's security because of measures taken by its allies which might modify the deployment of NATO forces and, finally, inform the Assembly of the results of these consultations;
9. Accord the Assembly here and now the wherewithal to restructure the Office of the Clerk in accordance with its 1987 memorandum.



**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 457***

1. The Council is already studying the follow-up to the WEU platform and the European security situation. Reports on both will be submitted to the Ministerial Council in November.
2. WEU member states will continue, while appropriate, to maintain a naval presence in the Gulf. The Council recognises the importance of keeping international public opinion informed of these activities.
3. On enlargement, substantive negotiations with Spain and Portugal have already begun. The Council does not believe that it would be practical to consider further applications until these negotiations have been concluded. Thereafter, however, any further applications to join the WEU will be considered on their merits.
4. The Council attaches importance to the commitment contained in the platform to "pursue efforts to maintain in Europe a technologically advanced industrial base and intensify armaments co-operation". It will pursue this objective, as appropriate, within the WEU and in other multilateral European fora, among which the IEPG plays an important rôle in the field of armaments research and co-operation.
5. The Secretariat-General is already fully involved in the consultation procedure between member states. The Council considers that it also has an important rôle in the communication of information to the Assembly and the public. The Council fully recognises the need to ensure that in future the annual report of the Council is transmitted to the Assembly in time.
6. The future rôle and tasks of the Agency are linked to the ongoing discussions on the restructuring of the WEU. While awaiting an interim agreement, the Council recognises the need to consider any necessary measures to ensure the effective use of the ministerial organs in Paris.
7. As the President of the Council, Mr. van den Broek, indicated in his speech to the Assembly on 8th June, the Council has now agreed to the provision of four additional posts to strengthen the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 1st September 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on the same day.

RECOMMENDATION 458 <sup>1</sup>*on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union  
for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988* <sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1987 (revised) and 1988, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Recognising that:
  - (a) future development of the budgets is stymied whilst there is no positive decision on timing and place for collocation;
  - (b) the Council has thankfully removed pension payments outside the expenditure of the Assembly, thereby enabling the Assembly to prepare realistic budgets;
- (iii) Nevertheless noting that:
  - (a) the budgets of the ministerial organs, based on the former organograms of the Secretariat-General and the Paris agencies, take no account of the many posts that have become vacant in recent years;
  - (b) consequently, estimates for "Personnel costs" in the budgets of the ministerial organs are excessive and lead to the build-up of a reserve that can be used subsequently for other purposes, as was the case in 1987;
  - (c) for the budget of the Paris agencies alone, the Council has decided to block a sum of F 4 926 000 (corresponding to six posts already vacant in 1987 and seven others which will become vacant in 1988), thereby making this sum unavailable for other requirements such as the creation of four new posts in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly;
  - (d) the Council has also reserved the right to consider the Assembly's request for these four posts in the general context of the collocation of the ministerial organs and their restructuring, although no political decision on this point seems imminent;
  - (e) application of the zero growth criterion is meaningless when related to budgets which do not reflect the true financial implications of the activities of the organs concerned or, in general, their requirements,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Without further delay, follow up the decision taken by the Council of Ministers in The Hague on 27th April 1987 to collocate the ministerial organs of WEU and give them a new organogram with new terms of reference and new tasks;
2. Decide consequently:
  - (a) to have a general revision made of the budget of the ministerial organs for 1988 to take account of this new integrated single agency situation;
  - (b) to separate the pensions budget of the ministerial organs from the operating budget;
  - (c) to ensure greater clarity in the budget of the ministerial organs and prevent sums earmarked for staff salaries and allowances being used for other purposes;
3. In the meantime, give urgent consideration to the Assembly's proposal to create four new posts in the Office of the Clerk;
4. Agree to study the problem of twin-grading at every level of the hierarchy in order to determine the conditions for possible promotions so as to improve the staff's career prospects;
5. Above all, recognise that the reactivation and credibility of WEU is dependent on these decisions.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1988 during the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session (5th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Morris on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 1142).

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**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>*****to Recommendation 458***

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1. The Council remains fully committed to the principle of collocation and will continue to work towards this objective.
2. The Council agrees that the WEU budget will need a comprehensive revision following collocation but considers that such work cannot be undertaken until agreement on collocation has been reached.
3. In his speech to the Assembly, the President of the Ministerial Council, Mr. van den Broek, confirmed that the Council can now agree to the Assembly's proposal to create two new A grade and two new B grade posts in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly.
4. As stated in its reply to Recommendation 447, the Council recalls that the basic principle of dual-grading is that the senior of the two grades represents the approved position in the establishment table. The lower of the two grades is included to enable the WEU to recruit staff who have the basic qualifications required but may lack previous experience. Dual-grading, therefore, is intended to facilitate recruitment rather than create promotion possibilities.

The Council notes that the substantial difference of 30-33% between the minimum and maximum salaries in a grade is intended, amongst other things, to compensate financially for the limited career possibilities in international organisations. The Council also notes that job mobility is encouraged by the common grading and salary system and the common pension scheme for the co-ordinated organisations.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 3rd August 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 8th August 1988.

**RECOMMENDATION 459<sup>1</sup>**

***on co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada  
in security matters<sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the determination of the WEU member countries to contribute, by reactivating the organisation, to the building of Europe means tightening links between Europe and its American allies, as stated in the platform adopted in The Hague;
- (ii) Welcoming the confirmation of a consensus in this respect between the two sides of the Atlantic, as testified by the President of the United States' public approval of the reactivation of WEU and the platform adopted in The Hague;
- (iii) Convinced that the maintenance of a large American force on the territory of Western Europe is a factor of deterrence essential to the security of all the members of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (iv) Noting with satisfaction that the United States and Canadian Governments do not intend to call in question their conventional and nuclear military commitment in Europe;
- (v) Aware of the need to show the authorities and public opinion in the member countries of the alliance that the existence of a European pillar is necessary for strong, balanced transatlantic co-operation;
- (vi) Reaffirming the need for equitable burden-sharing accompanied by a better sharing of political responsibilities in the Atlantic Alliance and in any event underlining the need for regular political consultations and a real European-American partnership;
- (vii) Convinced that the negotiations on security and co-operation in Europe, disarmament and the limitation of armaments, which it trusts can be started in 1988 and lead to positive results, should help to strengthen the basis of joint defence;
- (viii) – Also convinced that European co-operation in security matters and the interests of the alliance mean taking account of the risks that might arise from events outside the North Atlantic Treaty area;
  - Welcoming the mutual understanding regarding operations undertaken by various countries to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf;
  - Noting that these operations demonstrate the need for continuous and close co-operation between the member nations;
- (ix) Wishing to develop, increase the regularity of and institutionalise its exchanges with the United States Congress and Canadian Parliament,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Keep the governments and parliaments of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance regularly informed of its activities;
2. Provide adequate information on a regular basis to the North American media and public regarding the nature, scope and aims of the reactivation of WEU, the specific constraints of the WEU countries in security matters and European co-operation in that area;
3. With the assistance of the WEU agency, study views on the future of the Atlantic Alliance published in the United States and Canada;
4. Include burden-sharing in the agenda of its forthcoming meetings, taking account of the concerns and contradictory analyses being presented in North America and in Europe on this question;
5. Instruct the agency to prepare a study of every factor to be taken into account in assessing the burdens incumbent upon each member of the alliance for ensuring joint security and communicate this study to the Assembly before the end of 1988;

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 9th June 1988 during the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Pontillon on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 1137).

6. Examine the consequences for the security of Western Europe as a whole of Canada's decision to transfer to the Federal Republic the brigade now earmarked for deployment in Norway;
7. Continue to study the implications of the platform of 27th October 1987 with a view to defining the disarmament and arms control aspects of European security requirements:
  - (i) in particular, specify the importance for Western European security of conventional disarmament establishing a balance at the lowest level in that field without which any agreement to reduce short-range weapons would worsen the consequences of the present imbalance;
  - (ii) urge the early conclusion of a fully satisfactory agreement on chemical disarmament, i.e. providing for stringent verification procedure;
  - (iii) urge the United States Government not to reduce the levels of American troops stationed in Europe without a satisfactory agreement on duly-verified conventional disarmament;
8. Regularly exchange information as necessary with the United States Government on the aims and action of forces of member countries and the United States in the Gulf;
9. Extend its own exchanges of views to include all threats to international peace.

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**

***to Recommendation 459***

1. The Council fully recognises the importance of keeping governments, parliaments and public opinion in the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance informed of the activities of the reactivated WEU.
2. The Council is already giving consideration to the question of burden-sharing and will associate the Agency with this work where appropriate. It is also continuing to study the development of the WEU platform and the implications of arms control for European security.
3. The Council does not consider that it would be appropriate for the WEU to examine the effect on European security of Canada's decision to transfer to the Federal Republic of Germany the brigade now earmarked for deployment in Norway. This matter has already been discussed within the alliance, where some steps have recently been announced to compensate for the Canadian decision.
4. The United States Government has been kept fully informed of the activities of WEU member states in the Gulf.
5. The Council already discusses international issues whenever it considers them to be relevant to the work of the WEU.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 3rd August 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 8th August 1988.

RECOMMENDATION 460 <sup>1</sup>on disarmament <sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the recent summit meeting in Moscow between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union as a further step towards arms limitation;
- (ii) Welcoming the ratification of the INF treaty by the Senate of the United States (as recommended in Resolution 77 adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1987) and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR;
- (iii) Disappointed that a bilateral agreement on reductions in strategic weapons systems was not ready in time for the summit meeting, but convinced nevertheless that there is a firm basis for such an agreement, incorporating effective means of verification, and that this should be seen as of paramount importance;
- (iv) Recalling and approving the Council statement in The Hague, that Western European Union will pursue an active arms control and disarmament policy exploiting "all opportunities to make further progress towards arms reductions, compatible with our security and with our priorities";
- (v) Convinced that the European nations and particularly Western European Union members should contribute substantially to the process of arms control,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue to press for the earliest opening of negotiations on conventional stability concentrating on asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals and for progress on all three baskets of the CSCE, particularly the one on human rights, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and understanding;
2. Express full support for a properly verifiable bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union which would provide for at least a 50% reduction in strategic missile forces;
3. Apply the principles defined in The Hague platform to determine and uphold European security interests in the context of negotiations on disarmament and the control of armaments;
4. Press member governments to initiate urgent research into verification technology so that Western Europe is ready to contribute practically to conventional arms control agreements;
5. Associate the WEU Agency closely with its reflection and work on disarmament and arms control, ensuring that the considerable expertise and experience acquired by the Agency for the control of armaments is not neglected and dissipated at the very moment that considerations such as verification are assuming paramount importance, and instruct the Agency inter alia to:
  - (a) study conditions for conventional disarmament respecting European security requirements;
  - (b) study methods of verifying conventional and chemical disarmament.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 9th June 1988 during the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session (6th sitting).

2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Kittelmann on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 1147).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>**

***to Recommendation 460***

1. The Council recalls that its approach to disarmament will continue to be determined and upheld by the principles in The Hague platform.
2. The Council supports the objective of balanced and verifiable arms control agreements and agrees with the Assembly that further progress towards arms reductions must be compatible with our security.
3. A major priority in this field would be the achievement of a START agreement cutting United States and Soviet strategic arsenals by approximately 50%. The Council supports the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union to reach such an agreement as soon as possible as it could enhance strategic stability.
4. The launching of negotiations on conventional stability remains a major priority in the arms control field. The establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional forces remains the objective of these negotiations. The Council hopes that the negotiations can begin in 1988, following the satisfactory conclusion of the discussions on a mandate for them. The negotiations should take place in the context of a balanced outcome to the Vienna follow-up meeting, which will also cover the question of human rights.
5. As part of their work programme, the WEU agencies have studied in detail questions relating to conventional disarmament and, in particular, problems relating to the technology of verification. As the recommendation suggests, the agencies' skills in this area will continue to be appropriately utilised.
6. The Council strongly advocates the establishment of a global and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons as soon as possible.

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1. Communicated to the Assembly on 3rd August 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 8th August 1988.



*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly  
for the financial year 1987*

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**THE AUDITOR'S REPORT**

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***Letter from the President of the Assembly  
to the Auditor submitting the accounts  
for the financial year 1987***

*5th April 1988*

Dear Mr. Van de Velde,

In accordance with Article 13 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly of WEU, I have the honour to submit to you the accounts for the financial year 1987 in accordance with the statements attached hereto, which refer to:

1. (a) Summary of income and expenditure – financial position as at 31st December 1987 (Appendix I);

(b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II);

(c) Contributions (Appendix III);

(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV).

As is customary, after being audited these tables will be signed by the President of the Assembly, the Clerk of the Assembly and the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration before being submitted to the Assembly.

2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits shows a saving of F 153 549, whereas the final statement

of income and expenditure shows a credit balance of F 35. The difference between these two figures, i.e. F 153 514, represents a deficit of receipts over estimates:

	F	F
- Bank interest	60 523	
- Sundry receipts	58 569	
- Sale of publications	34 571	
- Contributions 7%	<u>431 823</u>	
		585 486
- Receipts for 1987 estimated in the budget		<u>739 000</u>
		<u>- 153 514</u>

3. Excess expenditure under Heads I, II and V of the operating budget, amounting to F 251 695 has been met by transfers from other heads of the budget.

4. All contributions for the financial year 1987 (revised 1987 budget) have been received from the Secretary-General of WEU London.

5. Amounts in the Assembly's provident fund are incorporated with those of the other organs of WEU and the joint fund is administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.

On 31st December 1987, these amounts totalled F 4 425 218 as shown in Appendix IV. On that date there remained two loans to two staff members amounting to F 281 340.

The Secretary-General has continued to receive advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment of these funds. On 31st December 1987, the fund was held by Montagu Investment Management Limited in London.

6. Also appended to the accounts of the Assembly are the reports on the funds attributed to the political groups drawn up in accordance with the directives issued by the Presidential Committee (document A/WEU/CP (86) 39) as follows:

- Communist Group;
- Federated Group of Christian Democrats and European Democrats;
- Liberal Group;
- Socialist Group.

These reports will be considered as an integral part of the accounts of the Assembly;

they give details of the use of credits included in Sub-Head 30 of the operating budget of the Assembly.

Yours sincerely,

Charles GOERENS  
President of the Assembly

Mr. J. VAN DE VELDE  
Premier Président de la  
Cour des Comptes  
Rue de la Régence 2  
B - 1000 BRUXELLES

*Report of the External Auditor  
to the Assembly of Western European Union  
on the accounts for the financial year 1987*

4th July 1988

I have audited the accounts of Western European Union for the financial year 1987 in accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly in order to appraise the correct management of the budget and the book-keeping.

The final statement of income and expenditure shows a credit balance of F 35 whereas the statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits shows a saving of F 153 549.

The difference, i.e. F 153 514, stems from a deficit in sundry receipts which are F 585 486 instead of the estimated F 739 000.

The total saving in the budget may be summarised as follows:

	Total credit after transfer F	Total expenditure F	Balance F
Head I			
Permanent staff	9 990 469	9 990 469	0
Head II			
Temporary staff	2 888 065	2 888 065	0
Head III			
Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 316 740	1 217 686	+ 99 054
Head IV			
General administrative costs	1 829 065	1 777 443	+ 51 622
Head V			
Other expenditure	1 500 636	1 500 636	0
Head I			
Pensions, allowances and social charges	1 486 050	1 483 177	+ 2 873
Total:			<u>+ 153 549</u>

The financial situation on 31st December 1987 is therefore less good than it was on 31st December 1986.

In this respect it should be noted that in 1986, bank interest was F 129 456, whereas in 1987 it was F 60 523.

We have to point out that under Article 6 of the Financial Regulations transfers between heads are not authorised.

Furthermore, we have ascertained that accounts of expenditure incurred are not kept as prescribed by Article 12 of the Financial Regulations.

Apparently this shortcoming will be remedied in the course of the financial year 1988, following Office Notice 245 of 13th April 1988.

I thank the President, the Clerk and staff of the Assembly for the willingness with which all requests for information were met and for their co-operation and assistance in the exercise of my duties as Auditor.

Jeroom L.-E. VAN DE VELDE  
*(Premier Président de la  
Cour des comptes de Belgique)  
Commissaire aux Comptes*

***Financial statements of the Assembly  
of Western European Union  
for the financial year 1987***

***Certificate of the Auditor***

***4th July 1988***

In application of Article 15 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly of Western European Union, I have examined the appended financial statements of the Assembly comprising the summary of income and expenditure and the statement of assets and liabilities for the financial year 1987.

My examination included verification of the books and other relevant documents that I deemed necessary. As a result of this examination, my opinion is that these statements are a correct record of the financial operations conducted during the 1987 financial year, that these operations were in conformity with the budget estimates, the financial regulations, the financial instructions and other decisions of the legislative authority, and that they are a correct record of the financial situation for the year ended 31st December 1987.

Jeroom L.-E. VAN DE VELDE  
*(Premier Président de la  
Cour des comptes de Belgique)  
Commissaire aux Comptes*



## APPENDIX I

*Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1987*

(in French francs)

*Per attached statement*

Assessments of member states (see Appendix III) .....	18 272 025
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*Miscellaneous*

## (A) Sundry receipts

Bank interest .....	60 523
Sundry receipts .....	58 569
Sale of publications .....	34 571

## (B) Pensions

Contributions (7%) .....	<u>431 823</u>
--------------------------	----------------

585 48618 857 511

Expenditure under budget authorisation .....	18 605 781
--	------------

Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Heads I, II and V .	<u>251 695</u>
--	----------------

Total expenditure (see Appendix II) .....	<u>18 857 476</u>
---	-------------------

Excess of income over expenditure .....	<u>F 35</u>
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*Financial position as at 31st December 1987**Assets*

Cash at bank .....	985 048
Sundry advances .....	291 264
Accounts receivable .....	<u>321 289</u>

F 1 597 601*Liabilities*

Accounts payable .....	1 597 566
------------------------	-----------

Excess of income over expenditure .....	<u>35</u>
---	-----------

F 1 597 601*Certified correct:*

Charles GOERENS  
*President of the Assembly*

Georges MOULIAS  
*Clerk of the Assembly*

Roger LINSTER  
*Chairman of the Committee  
on Budgetary Affairs  
and Administration*

## STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITURE

(in French)

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1987	
HEAD I – PERMANENT STAFF			
<i>Sub-Head 1</i>	Basic salaries	7 180 000	
<i>Sub-Head 2</i>	Allowances		
2.1.	Expatriation allowance	628 000	
2.2.	Household allowance	281 900	
2.3.	Allowance for children and other dependent persons	255 000	
2.4.	Rent allowance	33 000	
2.5.	Education allowance	60 000	
2.6.	Allowance for language courses	2 000	
2.7.	Overtime	50 000	
2.8.	Home leave	20 000	
<i>Sub-Head 3</i>	Social charges		
3.1.	Social security	945 700	
3.2.	Supplementary insurance	290 000	
3.3.	Provident fund	144 000	
<i>Sub-Head 4</i>	Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials		
4.1.	Travelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts	3 000	
4.2.	Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families	2 000	
4.3.	Removal expenses	16 000	
4.4.	Installation allowance	4 000	
<i>Sub-Head 5</i>	Medical examination	8 000	
Total of Head I		9 922 600	

IX II  
 AND UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1987  
 (in thousands of dollars)

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	59 834		7 239 834	7 239 834	-
	9 902		637 902	637 902	-
	7 985		289 885	289 885	-
	1 139		256 139	256 139	-
	3 518		36 518	36 518	-
	3 129		63 129	63 129	-
		1 075	925	925	-
	21 137		71 137	71 137	-
		6 111	13 889	13 889	-
		16 879	928 821	928 821	-
		7 897	282 103	282 103	-
		1 046	142 954	142 954	-
		1 055	1 945	1 945	-
		730	1 270	1 270	-
		2 000	14 000	14 000	-
		311	3 689	3 689	-
		1 671	6 329	6 329	-
	106 644	38 775	9 990 469	9 990 469	-

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1987
<b>HEAD II – TEMPORARY STAFF</b>		
<i>Sub-Head 6</i>	Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly	
6.1.	Sittings service	1 021 875
6.2.	Interpretation service	350 000
6.3.	Translation service	700 000
6.4.	Other services	40 000
<i>Sub-Head 7</i>	Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	506 000
<i>Sub-Head 8</i>	Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	60 000
<i>Sub-Head 9</i>	Social charges	
9.1.	Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters	4 000
9.2.	Provident fund for interpreters	90 000
9.3.	Insurance for interpreters	3 000
<b>Total of Head II</b>		<b>2 774 875</b>
<b>HEAD III – EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT</b>		
<i>Sub-Head 10</i>	Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	444 000
<i>Sub-Head 11</i>	Hire of committee rooms	15 000
<i>Sub-Head 12</i>	Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	345 000
<i>Sub-Head 13</i>	Various services for the organisation of sessions	45 000
<i>Sub-Head 14</i>	Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	18 000
<i>Sub-Head 15</i>	Purchase or repair of office furniture	28 000
<i>Sub-Head 16</i>	Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	32 300
<i>Sub-Head 17</i>	Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	366 700
<b>Total of Head III</b>		<b>1 294 000</b>



	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
	242		1 022 117	1 022 117	-
	80 827		430 827	430 827	-
	122		700 122	700 122	-
		489	39 511	39 511	-
	11 320		517 320	517 320	-
	44 637		104 637	104 637	-
		1 323	2 677	2 677	-
		21 373	68 627	68 627	-
		773	2 227	2 227	-
	137 148	23 958	2 888 065	2 888 065	-
			444 000	344 946	99 054
		12 076	2 924	2 924	-
	42 249		387 249	387 249	-
		7 052	37 948	37 948	-
		16 739	1 261	1 261	-
	4 793		32 793	32 793	-
		3 246	29 054	29 054	-
	14 811		381 511	381 511	-
	61 853	39 113	1 316 740	1 217 686	99 054

PART I: OPERATING BUDGET		Total budget for 1987	
<b>HEAD IV – GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS</b>			
<i>Sub-Head 18</i>	Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	480 000	
<i>Sub-Head 19</i>	Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	258 000	
<i>Sub-Head 20</i>	Printing and publication of documents	1 190 000	
<i>Sub-Head 21</i>	Purchase of documents	60 000	
<i>Sub-Head 22</i>	Official cars	115 000	
<i>Sub-Head 23</i>	Bank charges	500	
<b>Total of Head IV</b>		<b>2 103 500</b>	
<b>HEAD VI – OTHER EXPENDITURE</b>			
<i>Sub-Head 24</i>	Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	160 000	
<i>Sub-Head 25</i>	Expenses for representation	200 000	
<i>Sub-Head 26</i>	Committee study missions	5 000	
<i>Sub-Head 27</i>	Official journeys of members of the Office the Clerk	350 000	
<i>Sub-Head 28</i>	Expenses of experts and the auditor	70 000	
<i>Sub-Head 29</i>	Expenditure on information	311 000	
<i>Sub-Head 30</i>	Expenses for political groups	311 000	
<i>Sub-Head 31</i>	Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	
<i>Sub-Head 32</i>	Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	
<b>Total of Head V</b>		<b>1 430 000</b>	
<b>Total</b>		<b>17 524 975</b>	

	Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
	+	-			
		18 930	461 070	461 070	-
	926		258 926	258 926	-
		301 576	888 424	836 802	51 622
		4 840	55 160	55 160	-
	50 470		165 470	165 470	-
		485	15	15	-
	51 396	325 831	1 829 065	1 777 443	51 622
	4 547		164 547	164 547	-
		144	199 856	199 856	-
		1 994	3 006	3 006	-
	42 556		392 556	392 556	-
		14 637	55 363	55 363	-
	43 988		354 988	354 988	-
			311 000	311 000	-
		2 350	650	650	-
		1 330	18 670	18 670	-
	91 091	20 455	1 500 636	1 500 636	-
	448 132	448 132	17 524 975	17 374 299	150 676

PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET		Total budget for 1987
<b>HEAD I – PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES AND SOCIAL CHARGES</b>		
<i>Sub-Head 1</i>	Pensions and leaving allowances	
1.1.	Retirement pensions	1 116 000
1.2.	Invalidity pensions	207 000
1.3.	Survivors' pensions	50 000
1.4.	Orphans' or dependants' pensions	
1.5.	Leaving allowances	
<i>Sub-Head 2</i>	Family allowances	
2.1.	Household allowances	48 000
2.2.	Children's and dependants' allowances	26 000
2.3.	Education allowances	6 650
<i>Sub-Head 3</i>	Supplementary insurance	32 400
Total of Head I		1 486 050
Total		19 011 025

The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1987, and paid for up

Charles GOERENS  
President of the Assembly

Georg  
Clerk

Transfers		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
+	-			
5 579		1 121 579	1 121 579	-
2 920		209 920	209 920	-
	2 127	47 873	47 873	-
	2 441	45 559	45 559	-
	4 229	21 771	21 771	-
	3 777	2 873	-	2 873
4 075		36 475	36 475	-
12 574	12 574	1 486 050	1 483 177	2 873
460 706	460 706	19 011 025	18 857 476	153 549

st March 1988, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

DULIAS  
e Assembly

Roger LINSTER  
Chairman of the Committee on  
Budgetary Affairs and Administration

## APPENDIX III

**STATEMENT OF SUMS RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY  
BUDGET FOR 1987**

Member states	600ths	Contributions overpaid in 1986	1987 Budget	1987 budget (1st revision)	1987 budget (2nd revision)	Net contributions required
		F	F	F	F	F
Belgium	59	(-) 2 039	1 730 310	57 196	9 833	1 795 300
France	120	(-) 4 146	3 519 275	116 330	20 000	3 651 459
Federal Republic of Germany	120	(-) 4 146	3 519 275	116 330	20 000	3 651 459
Italy	120	(-) 4 146	3 519 275	116 330	20 000	3 651 459
Luxembourg	2	(-) 69	58 655	1 938	334	60 858
Netherlands	59	(-) 2 039	1 730 310	57 196	9 833	1 795 300
United Kingdom	120	(-) 4 146	3 519 275	116 330	20 000	3 651 459
	600	(-) 20 731	17 596 375	581 650	100 000	18 257 294

1986 Budget surplus .....	20 731
Transfer of credits to the financial year 1988 .. (Article 9 of the Financial Regulations)	6 000
1987 Budget .....	<u>18 272 025</u>

APPENDIX IV  
**PROVIDENT FUND**  
**ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1987**

*in French francs*

	F		F
<i>Balance brought forward:</i>			
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1987	3 826 415	Withdrawals	36 885
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union	209 428	Management fee	17 607
Repayments of loans by staff members	84 468		
Interest received during the year	300 492		
Gain on valuation at 31st December 1987	58 907	Accounts of existing staff members as at 31st December 1987	4 425 218
	4 479 710		4 479 710

Charles GOERENS  
*President of the Assembly*

Georges MOULIAS  
*Clerk of the Assembly*

Roger LINSTER  
*Chairman of the Committee on  
 Budgetary Affairs and Administration*

I have examined the foregoing account. In my opinion the account presents fairly the financial position of the provident fund at 31st December 1987.

Jeroom VAN DE VELDE  
*Premier Président de  
 la Cour des Comptes de Belgique,  
 Commissaire aux Comptes*

4th July 1988

## APPENDIX V

*1987 Balance sheet for the Communist Group*

<i>Assets</i>		F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1986 (bank accounts, cash) .....		-
2. Interest .....		-
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1987 .....		35 973
 <i>Liabilities</i>		
I. Expenditure		
1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) .....		13 825
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) .....		5 162
3. Seminars and meetings .....		5 556
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .....		4 630
5. Interpretation costs .....		2 305
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) .....		3 225
7. Sundry expenses .....		1 270
II. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (bank accounts, cash) .....		-
Total .....		35 973
Signatures of the Treasurer .....		
and two auditors of the group .....		



## APPENDIX VI

*1987 Balance sheet for the Federated Group  
of Christian Democrats and European Democrats**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1986 (bank accounts, cash) .....	165 177.81
2. Interest .....	6 501.11
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1987 .....	<u>131 266.00</u>
Total .....	302 944.92

*Liabilities*

<b>I. Expenditure</b>	
1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) .....	66 405.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) .....	5 606.08
3. Seminars and meetings .....	5 492.46
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .....	39 986.38
5. Interpretation costs .....	-
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) .....	8 407.00
7. Sundry expenses .....	<u>458.30</u>
Total .....	126 355.22
<b>II. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (banks accounts, cash) .....</b>	<b><u>176 589.70</u></b>
Total .....	302 944.92

Signatures of the Treasurer .....

and two auditors of the group .....

## APPENDIX VII

*1987 Balance sheet for the Liberal Group**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1986 (bank accounts, cash) .....	44 612.99
2. Interest .....	1 472.95
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1987 .....	<u>49 783.00</u>
Total .....	95 868.96

*Liabilities*

## I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) .....	32 413.00
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) .....	6 000.00
3. Seminars and meetings .....	12 200.00
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .....	4 633.00
5. Interpretation costs .....	-
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) .....	3 055.00
7. Sundry expenses .....	17.71

II. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (banks accounts, cash) .....	<u>37 550.25</u>
Total .....	95 868.96

Signatures of the Treasurer .....

and two auditors of the group .....

## APPENDIX VIII

*1987 Balance sheet for the Socialist Group**Assets*

	F
1. Surplus at 31st December 1986 (bank accounts, cash) .....	182 365.99
2. Interest .....	9 118.63
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1987 .....	93 978.00
4. Sundry assets .....	-
Total .....	<u>285 462.62</u>

*Liabilities*

## I. Expenditure

1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) .....	64 871.50
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) .....	512.80
3. Missions and meetings .....	22 790.30
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .....	2 818.00
5. Seminars .....	-
6. Interpretation costs .....	-
7. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) .....	-
8. Sundry expenses .....	<u>19 199.15</u>
Total .....	110 191.75

II. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (banks accounts, cash) .....	<u>175 270.87</u>
Total .....	285 462.62

Signatures of the Treasurer .....

and two auditors of the group .....

*Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly  
for the financial year 1987*

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**MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY  
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1987<sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration<sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1987, together with the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Linster (Chairman); Mrs. Pack, Mr. Sinesio (Alternate: Fassino) (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Biefnot (Alternate: Eicher), Mrs. Blunck (Alternate: Ahrens), MM. Bohl, Chartron, Dhaille, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Greco, de Jong, Klejdzinski (Alternate: Buchner), Morris, Noerens, Oehler, Rathbone, Rauti, Redmond (Alternate: Lord), Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Worrell, Zierer.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**DRAFT SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE  
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1988 <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur

APPENDICES

- I. Estimates of expenditure relating to the creation of four new posts in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly
- II. Recapitulation of changes in the establishment of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly
- III. Organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

---

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee* : Mr. Linster (Chairman) ; Mrs. Pack, Mr. Sinesio (Alternate: *Fassino* (Vice-Chairmen) ; Mr. Biefnot (Alternate: *Eicher*), Mrs. Blunck (Alternate: *Ahrens*), MM. Bohl, Chartron, Dhaille, *Dame Peggy Fenner*, MM. Greco, de Jong, Klejdzinski (Alternate: *Buchner*), *Morris*, Noerens, Oehler, *Rathbone*, *Rauti*, Redmond (Alternate: *Lord*), *Triglia* (Alternate: *Giagu Demartini*), *Worrell*, *Zierer*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur)*

1. According to Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the WEU Assembly:
    - “ 1. Each year, following a report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration drawn up in collaboration with the Presidential Committee, the Assembly shall approve a provisional statement of its expenditure, divided into heads and sub-heads.
    2. The Assembly may, if necessary, approve supplementary estimates of expenditure. ”
  2. Further to this provision, the present report sets out the Assembly's additional requirements in the light of:
    - (a) the decision taken by the WEU Council of Ministers to authorise the creation of four new posts in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly. This decision was communicated to the Assembly by Mr. van den Broek, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, in his address on 8th June 1988 (cf. Official Report of Debates); he also specified that the Council was prepared to approve a supplementary Assembly budget setting out the financial implications of creating the four new posts as from 1st July 1988 (cf. Official Report of Debates);
    - (b) the payment of two new pensions which, as they relate to early retirements, were not taken into account when preparing the ordinary 1988 budget. The WEU Budget and Organisation Committee has already authorised their inclusion in a revised budget for 1988 (cf. minutes of the 132nd meeting, document BR (87) 3 Final, 20th January 1988, page 18).
  3. In regard to the four new posts, the table at Appendix I sets out the budget estimates affecting various sub-heads of Head I and the criteria governing their calculation. It was considered that three of the four posts (head of the private office, bookkeeper and assistant) might be filled by permanent WEU officials as from 1st July 1988 and that the fourth (controller) might be filled by an outside candidate as from 1st September 1988. As a result of the creation of the four new posts, the total establishment of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly will be increased from 27 to 31, as shown in Appendix II. Appendix III shows the new organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly and includes the four new posts.
  4. For the year as a whole, the two new pensions will cost F 290 000, broken down as follows:
 

Pensions .....	F 276 000
Household allowance .....	F 7 000
Supplementary insurance .....	F 7 000
	F 290 000
- This amount is included in Part II (Pensions) of the supplementary budget which also shows total contributions to the pension scheme payable by the four new officials which, as receipts, are deducted from expenditure.
5. To sum up, the total supplementary amount requested in the operating and pensions budgets is F 833 000, account being taken of receipts.

*Revised budget estimates of the Assembly for the financial year 1988*

Heads and sub-heads	Draft budget for 1988 (initial)	Supplementary budget	Budget for 1988 (revised)
<i>Head I – Permanent staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
1 – Basic salaries .....	7 200 000	342 000	7 542 000
2 – Allowances .....	1 422 000	86 000	1 508 000
3 – Social charges .....	1 421 000	62 000	1 483 000
4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials .....	154 000	77 000	231 000
5 – Medical examination .....	8 000	–	8 000
Total .....	10 205 000	567 000	10 772 000
<i>Head II – Temporary staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
6 – Staff recruited for sessions .....	2 285 000	–	2 285 000
7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions .....	500 000	–	500 000
8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk ..	80 000	–	80 000
9 – Social charges .....	129 000	–	129 000
Total .....	2 994 000	–	2 994 000
<i>Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises .....	424 000 *	–	424 000
11 – Hire of committee rooms .....	15 000	–	15 000
12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions .....	365 000	–	365 000
13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions .....	45 000	–	45 000
14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk .....	18 000	–	18 000
15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture .....	43 000	–	43 000
16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment .....	11 000	–	11 000
17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment .....	372 000	–	372 000
Total .....	1 293 000 *	–	1 293 000

\* Including F 6 000 carried over from the financial year 1987.

Heads and sub-heads	Draft budget for 1988 (initial)	Supplementary budget	Budget for 1988 (revised)
<i>Head IV – General administrative costs</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents .....	490 000	–	490 000
19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies .....	264 000	–	264 000
20 – Printing and publication of documents ...	1 214 000	–	1 214 000
21 – Purchase of documents .....	60 000	–	60 000
22 – Official cars .....	115 000	–	115 000
23 – Bank charges .....	500	–	500
<b>Total .....</b>	<b>2 143 500</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>2 143 500</b>
<i>Head V – Other expenditure</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs ..	155 000	–	155 000
25 – Expenses for representation .....	210 000	–	210 000
26 – Committee study missions .....	5 000	–	5 000
27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk .....	370 000	–	370 000
28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor .....	60 000	–	60 000
29 – Expenditure on information .....	320 000	–	320 000
30 – Expenses for political groups .....	327 000	–	327 000
31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for .....	3 000	–	3 000
32 – Non-recoverable taxes .....	20 000	–	20 000
<b>Total .....</b>	<b>1 470 000</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1 470 000</b>
OPERATING BUDGET .....	18 105 500	567 000	18 672 500
RECEIPTS .....	260 000	–	260 000
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET .....	17 845 500	567 000	18 412 500
PENSIONS .....	2 396 000	290 000	2 686 000
RECEIPTS .....	440 000	24 000	464 000
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET .....	1 956 000	266 000	2 222 000
NET TOTAL BUDGET .....	19 801 500	833 000	20 634 500



## APPENDIX I

*Estimates of expenditure relating to the creation of four new posts in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly*

Budget	Head of private office, A2/1, non-French, locally recruited, married, no children. Recruitment: 1.7.88	Controller, A2/1, non-French, not locally recruited, married, 2 children. Recruitment: 1.9.88	Accountant, B3/1, French, locally recruited, married, 1 child. Recruitment: 1.7.88	Assistant, B3/11, French, locally recruited, married, 2 children. Recruitment: 1.7.88	Total	TOTAL (round figures)
<i>Sub-Head 1 – Basic salaries ...</i>	110 880	73 920	67 392	89 604	341 796	342 000
<i>Sub-Head 2 – Allowances</i>						
2.1. – Expatriation allowance ...	22 176	14 784	–	–	36 960	37 000
2.2. – Household allowance ....	6 652.80	4 435.20	4 043.52	5 376.24	20 507.76	21 000
2.3. – Allowance for children and other dependent persons ..	–	8 472	6 354	12 708	27 534	28 000
<i>Sub-Head 3 – Social charges</i>						
3.1. – Social security .....	15 248.88	10 165.92	9 769.38	12 568.08	47 752.26	48 000
3.2. – Supplementary insurance .	4 736.13	3 444.60	2 637.06	3 650.63	14 468.42	14 000
<i>Sub-Head 4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials</i>						
4.1. – Travelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts .....		5 000			5 000	5 000
4.2. – Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families .....		5 000			5 000	5 000
4.3. – Removal expenses .....		30 000			30 000	30 000
4.4. – Installation allowance ....		37 000			37 000	37 000
	159 693.81	192 221.72	90 195.96	123 906.95	566 018.44	567 000

N.B. Estimates are based on the scales in force as from 1st July 1987 plus 4% to take account of adjustments that are to come into force on 1st July 1988.


## APPENDIX II

*Recapitulation of changes in the staff of the Office of the Clerk  
proposed in the 1988 budget (revised)*

Grade	Duties	Revised budget for 1988	1988 budget	+ or -
H.C.	Clerk	1	1	-
A6	Assistants to the Clerk	2	2	-
A5	Counsellors	4	4	-
A4	First secretaries	2	2	-
A2	Controller ; Head of private office	2	-	+ 2
A2	Translators ; Documentalist	3	3	-
B6	Chief accountant	1	1	-
B4	Qualified assistants	7	7	-
B3	Accountant	1	-	+ 1
B3	Bilingual shorthand-typists	4	3	+ 1
B3	Switchboard operator	1	1	-
C6	Head of reproduction department	1	1	-
C4	Assistants in reproduction department	2	2	-
		31	27	+ 4

Organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

APPENDIX III



\* Ad hoc service/staff recruited for sessions.

NB. Posts in brackets are those whose creation has been authorised by the Council

1 The duties of Head of the Committee Service and Secretary of the General Affairs Committee are exercised by the Clerk Assistant for Political Affairs.  
 2 The duties of Head of the Administration and Finance Service, Security and Personnel and Secretary of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration are exercised by the Clerk Assistant for Administration and Financial Affairs  
 3 Duties exercised by the assistant to the Clerk.  
 4 Duties exercised by the assistant to the Head of the Administration and Finance Service.  
 5. The duties of Head of the Translation Service are exercised by the senior reviser, since 1st October 1986 the English reviser. His assistant helps him in the exercise of his duties.

**DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE  
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1989 <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Linster (Chairman); Mrs. Pack, Mr. Sinesio (Alternate: Fassino) (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Biefnot (Alternate: Eicher), Mrs. Blunck (Alternate: Ahrens), MM. Bohl, Chartron, Dhaille, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Greco, de Jong, Klejdzinski (Alternate: Buchner), Morris, Noerens, Oehler, Rathbone, Rauti, Redmond (Alternate: Lord), Triglia (Alternate: Giagu Demartini), Worrell, Zierer.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

### *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur)*

#### *1. General*

1. 1988 was marked by two Council decisions which will have considerable budgetary implications in the coming years, i.e.:
  - acceptance of the proposal to create four posts in the framework of the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk;
  - the invitation to Spain and Portugal “ to open the appropriate discussions with a view to their possible accession ”.
2. The four new posts were already included in a supplementary budget for 1988 as from the date of their respective creation. Consequently, estimates for 1989 under Head I of this budget were calculated on the basis of the new organogram.
3. The accession of Spain and Portugal to WEU will mean adapting the means at the Assembly's disposal. It will therefore have major financial implications. The Office of the Clerk has studied the arrangements that will have to be made to take account of the future membership of the Assembly. Inter alia, it is planned to install two additional simultaneous interpretation booths in the chamber of the Economic and Social Council, to recruit two more teams of interpreters and to strengthen the five traditional teams during sessions, to strengthen the teams of verbatim reporters and translators, to rearrange the meeting rooms and, finally, to assign appropriate offices to the Spanish and Portuguese Delegations. It is clear, however, that none of these steps can be taken before the accession of these two countries to WEU. Only then will the Assembly be able to ask the Council for the necessary funds by submitting a supplementary budget.

#### *2. The ordinary operating budget for 1989*

4. The ordinary budget for 1989 therefore merely renews Assembly appropriations with the one exception of those relating to the Press and External Relations Service (see Head V below). Admittedly, there is a difference of F 1 646 500 between the net total of this budget (F 20 059 000) and the net total of the revised operating budget for the previous financial year (F 18 412 500), i.e. an increase of 8.94%. But this increase reflects the incidence on the two budgets of the creation of four new posts in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly. The corresponding cost was included in the supplementary budget for 1988 for six months (three posts) or four months (one post) whereas, in the 1989 budget, it has been included for the whole year. To this difference, which amounts to about F 604 000, should be added the reduction in ordinary receipts due to lower bank interest credited to WEU accounts (F 125 000). The real growth rate in the draft operating budget for 1989 is therefore only 4.9%, corresponding to a difference of F 917 500 compared with the revised budget for 1988.
5. An analysis of the trend of Assembly budgets from 1988 to 1989 allows more details to be given about estimates for the various categories of expenditure.
6. *Head I* – The growth rate of 10.08% is due to the implications of the four new posts referred to in paragraph 4 above, the granting of steps in the grade of a number of officials in accordance with the provisions of the Staff Rules and expected changes in salary scales that are to be proposed by the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts.
7. *Head II* – Expenditure under this head was estimated on the basis of the traditional organisation of services for sessions. Only under Sub-Head 7 “ Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions ” is there an increase of F 50 000 to take account of the more intensive programme of committee meetings which already heralds the relevant sub-head being overspent in 1988. Conversely, estimates under Sub-Head 8 “ Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk ” have been reduced by F 50 000 to take account of the fact that the creation of two new grade B posts will reduce the need for such staff who are normally recruited only to cover the absence of permanent officials.
8. *Head III* – Estimates under this head conform with current contracts for the maintenance of the Paris premises and the supply of equipment and other services during sessions or for the normal operation of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly. They are based on actual charges in 1988 increased by 3% to take account of the foreseeable trend of prices in 1989; they also take account of the inclusion in the modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk

(Appendix IV) of the proposed purchase of computer desks for three assistants (including the two new recruits) using word processors and the renewal of the current maintenance contract for the two word processors purchased in 1988. The difference between the 1989 estimates and the sums granted in 1988 is therefore justified.

9. *Head IV* – No further comment is necessary since the estimates concerned merely renew the sums granted in 1988 increased by a growth rate of 2%.

10. *Head V* – Expenditure under this head is directly and strictly related to parliamentary work. A rather large increase appeared necessary under Sub-Head 27 “Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk”. Officials have to accompany the Presidential Committee, the other committees and rapporteurs for meetings outside Paris. The Assembly’s activities have increased in line with a programme of work approved by the Presidential Committee after close examination of both political and budgetary requirements. It should be underlined that estimates under this sub-head (F 400 000) are less than actual expenditure in 1988 which – according to a valid estimate – will amount to F 450 000 compared with a sum of F 370 000 in the budget. The difference might be offset by savings under other sections of the budget. It should also be underlined that there is an increase of F 90 000 under Sub-Head 29 “Expenditure on information”, which will be used mainly to improve the working conditions of the Assembly’s Press and External Relations Service. The latter has produced a proposal for a general communications strategy aimed at improving the circulation of information between WEU and public opinion. To this end, it has prepared a list of possible actions among which the following were given priority for inclusion in the budget for the financial year 1989:

- purchase of a personal computer to allow the effective management of an enlarged press list and the drafting and page-setting of documents such as press files, session editorials and various other texts for the press;
- systematic monitoring of the press in member countries; for the time being, it is planned to take out an annual subscription only for the country having the chairmanship-in-office of the Council;
- intensification of press contacts abroad including annual visits by the head of service to present WEU member countries and countries that are to accede to the treaty.

11. *Receipts* – Receipts in this draft budget are far lower than those in the 1988 budget. Bank interest credited to WEU as from 1985 has fallen steadily due to a reduction in the interest rate and to the fact that in recent years member countries’ contributions have been paid later than in earlier years, sometimes leaving WEU accounts with a negative balance. Receipts from bank interest have fallen as follows:

1985 – F	265 165
1986 – F	129 456
1987 – F	60 523

Until the financial year 1988, the shortfall was offset by savings in each budget overall; for the next financial year, a realistic estimate has to be made, taking account, however, of a return to normal in the payment of contributions which occurred in the first part of 1988.

### 3. Pensions budget

12. In 1988, as well as the two new retirement pensions taken into account when this year’s budget was prepared, pensions are to become payable to two other officials who unexpectedly are retiring prematurely. Furthermore, another pension will be payable as from 1st November 1988 to an assistant who is also retiring prematurely. The first two were included in a supplementary budget whereas consideration will be given to the possibility of offsetting payment of the pension in November and December by savings under other sections of the budget. At the present juncture, no further pensions are expected in 1989. There is therefore an increase of 12.78% in the draft budget for 1989 compared with the previous budget, the sums requested corresponding to eleven retirement pensions, one invalidity pension and one survivor’s pension. Appendix VII shows the trend of pensions budgets from 1984 to 1989. It is interesting to note that during this period the net amount spent on pensions increased by a factor of 7.45.

### 4. Summary of the Assembly’s operating and pensions budgets

13. A summary of estimates in the Assembly’s draft budgets for 1989 (expenditure and receipts) is given in the table at Appendix V, setting out growth rates in each head, receipts and the net total compared with the previous year. For the operating budget alone, Appendix VI shows the implications of each head for total expenditure and the net total of that budget (expenditure and receipts). For the purposes of comparison, data relating to the revised budget for 1988 are given in the same table.

**Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts  
for the financial year 1989**

Details	Expenditure	Receipts
<b>PART I: Operating budget</b>		
<i>Section A:</i> Expenditure		
<i>Head I:</i> Permanent staff	11 858 000	
<i>Head II:</i> Temporary staff	3 083 000	
<i>Head III:</i> Expenditure on premises and equipment	1 442 500	
<i>Head IV:</i> General administrative costs	2 186 500	
<i>Head V:</i> Other expenditure	1 624 000	
<i>Section B:</i> Receipts		135 000
	20 194 000	135 000
NET TOTAL		20 059 000
	20 194 000	20 194 000
<b>PART II: Pensions budget</b>		
<i>Section A:</i> Expenditure		
<i>Head I:</i> Pensions, allowances and social charges	3 010 000	
<i>Section B:</i> Receipts		504 000
	3 010 000	504 000
NET TOTAL		2 506 000
	3 010 000	3 010 000
NET TOTAL BUDGET		22 565 000

*Budget estimates*

## PART I: OPERATING BUDGET

*Section A – Expenditure**Head I – Permanent staff*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1989	Budget for 1988	Expected expenditure in 1988	Actual expenditure in 1987
Sub-Head 1 – Basic salaries	8 320 000	7 542 000	7 500 000	7 239 834
Sub-Head 2 – Allowances:				
2.1. Expatriation allowance	825 000			
2.2. Household allowance	380 000			
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent persons	475 000			
2.4. Rent allowance	82 000			
2.5. Education allowance	65 000			
2.6. Allowance for language courses	2 000			
2.7. Overtime	50 000			
2.8. Home leave	20 000			
	1 899 000	1 508 000	1 680 000	1 369 524
Sub-Head 3 – Social charges:				
3.1. Social security	1 120 000			
3.2. Supplementary insurance	350 000			
3.3. Provident fund	160 000			
	1 630 000	1 483 000	1 460 000	1 353 878
Sub-Head 4 – Expenses relating to the recruit- ment and departure of permanent officials				
4.1. Travelling expenses of candi- dates for vacant posts				
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of permanent officials and their families				
4.3. Removal expenses				
4.4. Installation allowance		231 000	212 000	20 904
Sub-Head 5 – Medical examination	9 000	8 000	8 000	6 329
TOTAL OF HEAD I	11 858 000	10 772 000	10 860 000	9 990 469

*Explanations**Sub-Heads 1 and 2*

Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to permanent staff in accordance with Chapter III of the Staff Rules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of global salaries in application of the scales in force on 1st July 1988<sup>1</sup>, adjusted in accordance with an expected increase of 4.5% as from 1st July 1988 and 3.5% as from 1st July 1989. Adjustments taken into account amount to F 697 173.

1. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts and approved by the WEU Council and the councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA). In accordance with the committee's 159th report, salaries are adjusted with effect from 1st July of each year. Furthermore, should the cost of living between 1st July and 31st December rise by more than 3%, a corresponding percentage adjustment is made. (This threshold, initially 2%, was raised to 3% in the 191st report.)



Estimates take account of the financial implications of the creation of four new posts (three as from 1st July 1988 and one as from 1st September 1988) and the payment of the various allowances corresponding to the family position of officials transferred from the Paris ministerial organs to the Assembly.

The organogram of the Office of the Clerk is given at Appendix I. A list of officials, showing their grades, is given at Appendix II.

### Sub-Head 3

Estimated expenditure for "Social charges" is based on commitments stemming from:

- application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1)<sup>2</sup>;
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2)<sup>3</sup>;
- application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the Provident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary, for staff not affiliated to the pension scheme (Sub-Head 3.3).

### Sub-Head 4

No officials are expected to leave in 1989. Estimates under this sub-head are therefore given pro mem.

### Sub-Head 5

The sum requested is to cover the cost of the medical check-up which all members of the staff must undergo under Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in Paris are carried out at the OECD medical centre.

## Head II - Temporary staff

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1989	Budget for 1988	Expected expenditure in 1988	Actual expenditure in 1987
Sub-Head 6 - Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly				
6.1. Sittings service	1 107 000			
6.2. Interpretation service	419 000			
6.3. Translation service	800 000			
6.4. Other services	<u>40 000</u>			
	2 366 000	2 285 000	2 190 000	2 173 508
Sub-Head 7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions	550 000	500 000	533 000	517 320
Sub-Head 8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk	30 000	80 000	64 000	104 637
Sub-Head 9 - Social charges				
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters	12 000			
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters	120 000			
9.3. Insurance for interpreters	<u>5 000</u>			
	137 000	129 000	110 000	92 600
TOTAL OF HEAD II	3 083 000	2 994 000	2 897 000	2 888 065

2. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of family allowances and old-age pensions.

3. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the beneficiaries he has named.

### *Explanations*

#### *Sub-Head 6*

Estimates under this sub-head relate to:

(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation and translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at Appendix III.

Salaries are calculated in accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1987 in the co-ordinated organisations (on the basis of salaries paid to permanent staff of comparable grades), adjusted in the same way as for permanent staff, the rate of increase being 6.33%. These adjustments amount to F 124 602.

In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the International Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the basis of the scale in force for grade L4.8 staff, increased by 6%.

(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post office technician, typewriter mechanic, etc.).

#### *Sub-Head 7*

This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at meetings of parliamentarians between sessions (salaries and where appropriate per diem allowances, travelling time and travelling expenses).

Estimates are based on a total of 160 working days (of which 60 in Paris and 100 elsewhere). Salaries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (cf. Sub-Head 6). Their salary adjustment for 1989 amounts to F 38 000.

#### *Sub-Head 8*

Estimates under this sub-head relate to the salaries of additional staff of all grades which the Office of the Clerk may have to recruit in 1989. They include an overall sum for salaries, possible travelling expenses and insurance. The sum requested is far lower than in 1988 since it is expected that fewer staff will have to be recruited from outside due to the creation of two new grade B3 posts authorised in 1988.

#### *Sub-Head 9*

Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges:

##### *Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters*

Staff recruited for Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Office of the Clerk and 40% by staff. The estimates take account of the updating of the capital and premium as from May 1988.

##### *Provident fund for interpreters*

In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU has to pay into the conference interpreters' fund or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a contribution of 14%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters.

##### *Insurance for interpreters*

A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London, covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them from working. The premium of 1.1% of their fees (lower rate) is divided between the Office of the Clerk (0.7%) and the interpreters (0.4%).

*Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1989	Budget for 1988	Expected expenditure in 1988	Actual expenditure in 1987
Sub-Head 10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises	438 000	424 000	402 000	344 946
Sub-Head 11 – Hire of committee rooms	15 000	15 000	–	2 924
Sub-Head 12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions	407 000	365 000	395 000	387 249
Sub-Head 13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions	47 000	45 000	46 000	37 948
Sub-Head 14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk	18 000	18 000	5 000	1 261
Sub-Head 15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture	67 000	43 000	43 000	32 793
Sub-Head 16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	10 500	11 000	11 000	29 054
Sub-Head 17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other equipment	440 000	372 000	383 000	381 511
<b>TOTAL OF HEAD III</b>	<b>1 442 500</b>	<b>1 293 000</b>	<b>1 285 000</b>	<b>1 217 686</b>

*Explanations**Sub-Head 10*

Sums requested under this sub-head cover the Assembly's 30% share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises as calculated by the single WEU agency, which is responsible for managing such expenditure.

*Sub-Head 11*

For meetings outside Paris, Assembly bodies normally have committee rooms with simultaneous interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in certain cases the Assembly may have to pay for hire of a room or the cost of installing portable interpretation equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this sub-head are to allow the Assembly to cover such expenditure if necessary.

*Sub-Head 12*

As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment, telephone booths, telex, two metal-detecting doors necessary for improving security measures, screens, etc., in the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions.

Estimates take account of the foreseeable rise of 3% in the cost of services in 1989.

*Sub-Head 13*

Expenditure under this sub-head relates to contracts for the provision of various services during Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises loaned by the Economic and Social Council, etc.).

Estimates take account of the foreseeable rise of 3% in the cost of services in 1989.

*Sub-Head 14*

The same sum is requested as for the previous financial year to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the premises of the Office of the Clerk.

*Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17*

Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for equipment given at Appendix V to this budget.

***Head IV – General administrative costs***

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1989	Budget for 1988	Expected expenditure in 1988	Actual expenditure in 1987
Sub-Head 18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents	500 000	490 000	490 000	461 070
Sub-Head 19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies	270 000	264 000	260 000	258 926
Sub-Head 20 – Printing and publication of documents	1 238 000	1 214 000	900 000	836 802
Sub-Head 21 – Purchase of documents	63 000	60 000	60 000	55 160
Sub-Head 22 – Official cars	115 000	115 000	100 000	165 470
Sub-Head 23 – Bank charges	500	500	500	15
<b>TOTAL OF HEAD IV</b>	<b>2 186 500</b>	<b>2 143 500</b>	<b>1 810 500</b>	<b>1 777 443</b>

***Explanations****Sub-Head 18*

The increase of F 10 000 as compared with 1988 is calculated on the basis of an average inflation rate of 2%, this being the minimum foreseeable. In view of the increase in the Assembly's work, involving a considerable increase in the cost of the various means of communication, steps have been taken to reduce the cost of mailing documents as far as possible.

*Sub-Head 19*

In spite of the considerable increase in reproduction work and the larger number of staff in the Office of the Clerk, the increase in the estimate as compared with 1988 is slight and is due solely to the variation of prices in this sector.

*Sub-Head 20*

Estimates under this sub-head take into account the expected increase in costs (2%).

*Sub-Head 21*

There is a slight increase in estimates under this sub-head as compared with 1988 due to the need to purchase a wider range of documentation essential for the preparation of studies and reports.

*Sub-Head 22*

Expenditure relating to the hire of a chauffeur-driven car when the President of the Assembly is in Paris and the cost of servicing, repairs and insurance for the official car are charged to this sub-head. Costs for the latter are increasing from year to year and consideration will have to be given to replacing this official car, which was registered in 1981.

Estimates for 1989 remain unchanged compared with 1988 as it is expected that there will be less need to hire a car for the President of the Assembly.

*Sub-Head 23*

The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged.

*Head V – Other expenditure*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1989	Budget for 1988	Expected expenditure	Actual expenditure
Sub-Head 24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of committees and rapporteurs	160 000	155 000	155 000	164 547
Sub-Head 25 – Expenses for representation	220 000	210 000	220 000	199 856
Sub-Head 26 – Committee study missions	5 000	5 000	–	3 006
Sub-Head 27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	400 000	370 000	450 000	392 556
Sub-Head 28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor	70 000	60 000	71 000	55 363
Sub-Head 29 – Expenditure on information	410 000	320 000	390 000	354 988
Sub-Head 30 – Expenses for political groups	336 000	327 000	327 000	311 000
Sub-Head 31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for	3 000	3 000	–	650
Sub-Head 32 – Non-recoverable taxes	20 000	20 000	20 000	18 670
<b>TOTAL OF HEAD V</b>	<b>1 624 000</b>	<b>1 470 000</b>	<b>1 633 000</b>	<b>1 500 636</b>

*Explanations**Sub-Head 24*

The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly for sessions and committee meetings is borne by the governments of member countries as are those of members of the Bureau and Presidential Committee.

The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for the President of the Assembly on official visits and of rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairmen when these visits are connected with the preparation of a report or the running of the Assembly. Journeys by committee chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee.

Estimates take account of the foreseeable rise in per diem allowances and travelling expenses.

*Sub-Head 25*

The increase of 4.76% compared with the 1988 budget, based on experience, is due mainly to the foreseeable rise in the cost of meals in different types of restaurant in the Paris area.

*Sub-Head 26*

Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure linked with committee study missions. As these sums cannot be foreseen accurately, the same amount has been requested as last year.

*Sub-Head 27*

The 8.1% increase in sums requested for 1989 compared with last year is justified by:

- the increase in per diem allowances approved by the Council with effect from 1st July 1988 (229th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts);
- the increased activities of the Assembly which require more frequent travel by members of the Office of the Clerk for organising and holding meetings and visits of the various Assembly committees. Meetings and visits are authorised by the Presidential Committee on the basis of half-yearly programmes of work submitted by the various committees and of sums available in the budget.

*Sub-Head 28*

Estimates for 1989 have been increased by F 10 000 over the previous financial year to secure the assistance of experts for the colloquy to be held in Florence in March 1988.

*Sub-Head 29*

The increase of F 90 000 is requested mainly to allow the press service to improve its methods of work, as explained in the explanatory memorandum.

*Sub-Head 30*

The estimate under this sub-head is divided between the political groups. By decision of the Presidential Committee, each group has an equal fixed share and a further sum in proportion to the number of members listed. Also by decision of the Presidential Committee, as from the financial year 1987, the political groups have had to submit balance sheets at the close of the financial year. All these balance sheets are appended to the accounts of the Assembly and are consequently subject to verification by the auditor.

*Sub-Heads 31 and 32*

The same amounts are requested as for 1988.

## PART I: OPERATING BUDGET

*Section B – Receipts*

	Estimates for 1989	Budget for 1988	Expected receipts in 1988	Actual receipts in 1987
1. Sales of publications	25 000	50 000	30 000	34 571
2. Bank interest	100 000	200 000	100 000	60 523
3. Social security reimbursements	10 000	10 000	10 000	58 569
4. Levy on basic salaries of Grade A officials	–	–	–	–
<b>TOTAL RECEIPTS</b>	<b>135 000</b>	<b>260 000</b>	<b>140 000</b>	<b>153 663</b>

*Explanations*

Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are calculated on the basis of experience. It should be pointed out that bank interest in 1988 is far less than estimated due to lower interest rates for deposits and to lower credit balances, as explained in the explanatory memorandum.

In accordance with the decisions of the Council, no levies are planned on the basic salaries of grade A officials.

## PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET

*Section A – Expenditure**Head I – Pensions, allowances and social charges*

Sub-Heads	Estimates for 1989	Budget for 1988	Expected expenditure in 1988	Actual expenditure in 1987
Sub-Head 1 – Pensions and leaving allowances				
1.1. Retirement pensions	2 466 000			
1.2. Invalidity pensions	228 000			
1.3. Survivors' pensions	52 000			
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' pensions	–			
1.5. Leaving allowances	–			
	2 746 000	2 429 000	2 473 837	1 379 372
Sub-Head 2 – Family allowances				
2.1. Household allowances	110 400			
2.2. Children's and other dependants' allowances	40 600			
2.3. Education allowances	40 000			
	191 000	192 000	178 706	67 330
Sub-Head 3 – Supplementary insurance	73 000	65 000	70 450	36 475
TOTAL OF HEAD I	3 010 000	2 686 000	2 722 993	1 483 177

*Explanations**Sub-Heads 1 and 2*

In 1989, the Assembly will be paying thirteen pensions, as follows:

- eleven old-age pensions;
- one invalidity pension;
- one survivor's pension.

Estimates for expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provisions of the pension scheme rules.

*Sub-head 3*

Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19*bis* of the collective convention in force.

Estimates for expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid by the Assembly.

## PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET

*Section B – Receipts*

	Estimates for 1989	Budget for 1988	Expected receipts in 1988	Actual receipts in 1987
Contributions by permanent officials	504 000	464 000	450 000	431 823


*Explanations*

Estimated receipts are calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by permanent staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary) affiliated to the pension scheme.



Organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly

APPENDIX I



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\* Ad hoc service/staff recruited for sessions.

1. The duties of Head of the Committee Service and Secretary of the General Affairs Committee are exercised by the Clerk Assistant for Political Affairs  
 2. The duties of Head of the Administration and Finance Service, Security and Personnel and Secretary of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration are exercised by the Clerk Assistant for Administration and Financial Affairs  
 3. Duties exercised by the assistant to the Clerk.  
 4. Duties exercised by the assistant to the Head of the Administration and Finance Service  
 5. The duties of Head of the Translation Service are exercised by the senior reviser, since 1st October 1986 the English reviser. His assistant helps him in the exercise of his duties.

## APPENDIX II

*Table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk  
of the Assembly for 1989*

Grade	Duties	1989 budget
H.C.	Clerk	1
A6	Clerk Assistants	2
A5	Counsellors	4
A4	First secretaries	2
A2	Controller; Head of private office	2
A2	Translators ; Documentalist	3
B6	Chief accountant	1
B4	Qualified assistants	7
B3	Accountant	1
B3	Bilingual shorthand-typists	4
B3	Switchboard operator	1
C6	Head of documents reproduction service	1
C4	Assistants in documents reproduction service	2
		31

## APPENDIX III

*Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions**1. Sittings service*

Duties	Number	No. of days	Daily remuneration F*	Total F	Total F
Counsellors to the President of Assembly .....	1 a	16	915	14 640	
	1 b	18	1 545	27 810	42 450
Heads of sections .....	1 a	8	875	7 000	
	2 b	10	1 413	28 260	
	1 a	8	1 236	9 888	45 148
Sergeant-at-arms .....	1 b	16	1 265	20 240	20 240
Parliamentary secretaries .....	2 a	8	751	12 016	
	2 b	10	1 265	25 300	37 316
Précis writers .....	3 a	8	635	15 240	
	3 b	10	1 265	37 950	53 190
Verbatim reporters .....	7 a	8	1 101	61 656	
	14 b	10	1 265	177 100	238 756
Assistants .....	10 a	8	386	30 880	
	2 a	16	386	12 352	
	1 a	22	386	8 492	
	1 b	18	728	13 104	
	1 b	12	728	8 736	
	23 b	10	728	167 440	
	6 b	10	786	47 160	288 164
Head usher .....	1 a	10	353	3 530	
Installations usher .....	1 a	24	353	8 472	
Ushers:					
Security control .....	5 a	8	320	12 800	
Sittings office .....	4 a	8	320	10 240	
	4 b	10	662	26 480	
Messengers .....	3 a	10	320	9 600	
Cloakroom attendant .....	1 a	8	320	2 560	
Offset-assemblers .....	13 a	10	320	41 600	
Mechanic .....	1 a	8	320	2 560	117 842
	115				843 106
Adjustment for 1989 .....					53 369
					896 475
Travelling expenses .....					210 000
					1 106 475
				Rounded up to	1 107 000

\* In accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1987.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

**2. Interpretation service**

Duties	Number	No. of days	Total F
Interpreters .....	8 a	8	380 000
	6 b	10	
	14		380 000
Adjustment for 1989 .....			24 054
			404 054
Travelling expenses .....			15 000
			419 054
		Rounded up to	419 000

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

N.B. On 1st July 1987, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 2 586. In addition, interpreters recruited outside Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (one or two half days as appropriate), a daily allowance (per diem) corresponding to that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses.

**3. Translation service**

Duties	Number	Daily remuneration F	Estimates <sup>1</sup>	Total F
Revisers .....	3 a	1 021	76 575	241 675
	4 b	1 651	165 100	
Translators .....	3 a	802	60 150	239 150
	5 b	1 432	179 000	
Assistants .....	5 a	386	67 550	255 570
	2 a	444	31 080	
	4 b	728	101 920	
	2 b	786	55 020	
	28			736 395
Adjustment for 1989 .....				46 613
				783 008
Travelling expenses .....				17 000
				800 008
			Rounded up to	800 000

1. Based on 25 days for revisers and translators and 35 days for assistants.

a. Recruited locally.

b. Recruited outside Paris.

## APPENDIX IV

*Five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk**(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices)*

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets				
			1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
	<i>A. Reproduction equipment</i>						
1	1 RX 1065 photocopier	Hire (rate blocked). Maintenance.	39 600 25 000	57 600 25 000	74 000 25 000	74 000 25 000	74 000 25 000
2	1 RX 3107 photocopier	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance (blocked rate).	2 200	2 200	2 200	2 200	2 200
3	4 Gestetner offset machines	1 type 311 (1984). Maintenance (indexed rate). 1 type 329 (1985). Maintenance (indexed rate). 1 type 339 (1986). Maintenance (indexed rate). 1 type 2200. Maintenance.	8 100 5 500 6 500 750	8 100 5 500 6 500 750	8 100 5 500 6 500 750	8 100 5 500 6 500 750	8 100 5 500 6 500 750
4	3 Electrostatic stereotypers.	1 Gestetner PM/9 (1980) No maintenance contract. 1 Gestetner DT 1 (1985). Maintenance (annual indexed rate). 1 Gestetner 100 PM (1986). Maintenance (annual indexed rate).	1 400 2 850	1 400 2 850	1 400 2 850	1 400 2 850	1 400 2 850
5	1 Gestetner 100 binding machine	Purchased in 1978, this machine is in good condition. The old maintenance contract has been cancelled in the light of experience.					
6	1 Logabas-Ordina 7630 assembling machine with stapling machine	Purchased in 1977, this machine is serviced when required, since the cost of a maintenance contract is exorbitant. The estimate is based on experience.	5 000	5 000	5 000	5 000	5 000
7	1 AM International addressograph 5000	Property of the Assembly. Maintenance (indexed rate).	3 800	3 800	3 800	3 800	3 800
8	1 Fortematic 655 paper-cutting machine	This machine is serviced when required. A single annual service is enough to keep it in good working order.	700	700	700	700	700
9	1 Orpo-Planax binding machine	Property of the Assembly. Normal maintenance by the staff concerned is enough to keep it in good working order.					
10	1 Orpo-Thermatic binding machine	Property of the Assembly. Normal maintenance by the staff concerned is enough to keep it in good working order.					

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets					
			1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	
	<i>B. Typewriters and calculators</i>							
	<i>(a) Office of the Clerk</i>							
11	8 Olivetti ET 121 electronic typewriters	Purchased between 1981 and 1983, these typewriters are in very good condition.						
12	1 Olivetti ET 221 electronic typewriter	Purchased in 1983, this typewriter is in very good condition.						
13	1 Olympia SGE 51 long-carriage electric typewriter (French keyboard)	This machine is part of the old stock and will remain in service as long as possible.						
14	3 Olivetti calculating machines	These machines are in good working order.						
	<i>(b) For use during sessions</i>							
15	6 Olympia SGE 51 electric typewriters (2 English keyboards 4 French keyboards)	These machines are part of the old stock and are assigned to national delegations.						
16	4 RX 6015 electronic typewriters (English keyboard)	These machines were purchased in 1986 and are assigned to session services.						
17	1 IBM electronic typewriter (French keyboard)	Assigned to the sittings office.						
18	2 ET 109 (Italian keyboard)	Assigned to the Italian Delegation and the Italian summary reporters in replacement of two other Olivetti electric typewriters no longer in stock.						
18 bis	1 Editor electric typewriter (Italian keyboard)							
19	21 Olympia mechanical typewriters (19 with English keyboards, 2 with French keyboards)	Purchased between 1966 and 1979, these typewriters are used only occasionally because they are old models and the staff are no longer used to working on such machines. It is planned to keep the best of them in reserve in case of electricity cuts.						
20	Electronic typewriters	To meet the requirements of the various services during Assembly sessions, and subject to the possible purchase of other typewriters, the following hire programme is envisaged for each session: - 13 machines with English keyboards - 15 machines with French keyboards.	30 600	30 600	30 600	30 600	30 600	

Ref. No.	Equipment	Modernisation and equipment programme	Budgets				
			1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
21	<i>(c) Maintenance and repairs</i>	All typewriters and calculators are serviced twice a year, before each session, by a mechanic recruited for the purpose. However, a lump sum should be earmarked for possible repairs at other times.	7 000	7 000	7 000	7 000	7 000
	<i>C. Miscellaneous equipment</i>						
22	2 UHER 5000 dictaphones 1 Sony BM 80	Purchased in 1971 and 1987, these dictaphones are in good condition. It is not planned to replace them in the period 1989-1992.					
22 bis	1 UHER 4000 dictaphone	To purchase.	10 500				
23	11 Grundig Stenorette dictaphones	Purchased between 1963 and 1987, these dictaphones are in good condition. It is not planned to replace them in the period 1989-1990.					
24	1 Grandjean stenotyping machine	Purchased in 1974, this machine is in good working order.					
25		Provision for an overall sum in the budget for possible repairs to equipment in this category.	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000
	<i>D. Word processors and computers</i>						
26	10 Word processors/computers 9 Olivetti ETS 2010 1 Olivetti M 24	These have been hired on a five-year leasing basis. The two contracts expire in December 1989, September 1991 and March 1993 respectively. Cost of hire. Maintenance contract (indexed).	240 000 57 000	116 000 57 000	95 000 57 000	34 000 57 000	23 000 57 000
	<i>E. Office furniture</i>						
27	Various offices	Purchase of computer desks for three word-processor operators.	32 000				
28	Various offices	Replacement of various items of furniture	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000

**Breakdown by budget classification**

Budget classification		Ref. No. in programme	Budgets				
Head	Sub-Head		1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
III	15. Purchase or repair of office furniture	27	32 000	—	—	—	—
		28	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000
			67 000	35 000	35 000	35 000	35 000
III	16. Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment	22 bis	10 500	—	—	—	—
III	17. Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment	1	64 600	82 600	99 000	99 000	99 000
		2	2 200	2 200	2 200	2 200	2 200
		3	20 850	20 850	20 850	20 850	20 850
		4	4 250	4 250	4 250	4 250	4 250
		6	5 000	5 000	5 000	5 000	5 000
		7	3 800	3 800	3 800	3 800	3 800
		8	700	700	700	700	700
		20	30 600	30 600	30 600	30 600	30 600
		21	7 000	7 000	7 000	7 000	7 000
		25	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000	4 000
		26	297 000	173 000	152 000	91 000	80 000
		440 000	334 000	329 400	268 400	257 400	



## APPENDIX V

*Trend of the Assembly budget from 1988 to 1989*

	1988 a	1988 revised b	% $\frac{b-a}{a}$	1989 c	% $\frac{c-b}{b}$
<b>A. Operating budget</b>					
Head I. Permanent staff	10 205 000	10 772 000	5.55	11 858 000	10.08*
Head II. Temporary staff	2 994 000	2 994 000	—	3 083 000	2.97
Head III. Expenditure premises and equipment	1 293 000	1 293 000	—	1 442 500	11.56
Head IV. General administrative costs	2 143 500	2 143 500	—	2 186 500	2.00
Head V. Other expenditure	1 470 000	1 470 000	—	1 624 000	10.48
Total expenditure	18 105 500	18 672 500	3.13	20 194 000	8.14*
Receipts	260 000	260 000	—	135 000	-48.07
Net Total	17 845 500	18 412 500	3.17	20 059 000	8.94*
<b>B. Pensions budget</b>					
Pensions and leaving allowances	2 396 000	2 686 000	12.10	3 010 000	12.06
Receipts	440 000	464 000	5.45	504 000	8.62
Net Total	1 956 000	2 222 000	13.59	2 506 000	12.78
<b>GENERAL NET TOTAL (A + B)</b>	<b>19 801 500</b>	<b>20 634 500</b>	<b>4.20</b>	<b>22 565 000</b>	<b>9.35*</b>

\* If account is taken of the creation of four new posts, included for part of 1988 and the whole of 1989, growth rates become 4.47 %, 4.91 %, 4.98 % and 5.55 % respectively.

## APPENDIX VI

*Percentage of credits under the various heads of the operating budgets for 1988 revised and 1989*

	Revised budget for 1988			1989		
	Amount	% of		Amount	% of	
		A	B		A	B
A. Operating budget						
Head I. - Permanent staff	10 772 000	57.69	58.50	11 858 000	58.72	59.12
Head II. - Temporary staff	2 994 000	16.03	16.26	3 083 000	15.27	15.37
Head III. - Premises and equipment	1 293 000	6.93	7.02	1 442 500	7.14	7.19
Head IV. - General administrative costs	2 143 500	11.48	11.65	2 186 500	10.83	10.90
Head V. - Other expenditure	1 470 000	7.87	7.98	1 624 000	8.04	8.09
TOTAL A (expenditure)	18 672 500	100.00	101.41	20 194 000	100.00	100.67
Receipts	260 000		1.41	135 000		0.67
TOTAL B (net)	18 412 500		100.00	20 059 000		100.00

## APPENDIX VII

*Trend of the pensions budget*

(1984 = 100)

Year	Net total	Index
1984	336 000	100
1985	300 500	89
1986	546 000	162
1987	1 057 050	314
1988	2 222 000	661
1989	2 506 000	745

N.B. Until 1983, receipts exceeded expenditure.

*Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989<sup>1</sup>*

*Opinion of the Council*

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- II. Letter from Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, to Mr. Moulias, Clerk of the Assembly
- III. Table showing modifications approved by the Council

*Explanatory Memorandum*

1. The draft budget of the Assembly for 1989, transmitted to the Council for its prior opinion in accordance with Rule 48.3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, was examined very closely by the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee. Having noted that the total operating budget – even when account was taken of

the implications of the four new posts created in the Office of the Clerk – exceeded the zero growth rate, that committee proposed the following reductions in estimates under Heads II to V, the Assembly being left free to make the necessary adjustments within each head (see Appendix I).

	Assembly estimates	Reductions	Amended estimates
Head II .....	3 083 000	83 000	3 000 000
Head III .....	1 442 500	92 500	1 350 000
Head IV .....	2 186 500	136 500	2 050 000
Head V .....	1 624 000	24 000	1 600 000
	8 336 000	336 000	8 000 000

2. At its meeting in London on 15th November 1988, the Presidential Committee examined the abovementioned reductions. It considered that the reduction of F 336 000 in the total operating budget did not seem liable to have a serious effect on the Assembly's activities. However, it decided to charge to Head IV the reduction of F 24 000 recommended for Head V since the latter concerns particularly the work of the various Assembly bodies.

real rate of increase of 3.83%. The difference between these two rates – as specified in the explanatory memorandum to Document 1154 – is due to the fact that, since the four new posts in the Office of the Clerk were created in the second half of 1988, their financial implications affected the 1988 budget only partially.

The net grand total (operating budget plus pensions budget) amounts to F 22 229 000, representing a nominal increase of 7.73% compared with the budget for the previous financial year and a real increase of 4.80%.

3. In accordance with this decision, the initial draft budget has been reduced by F 336 000. The draft operating budget of the Assembly is thus reduced from F 20 059 000 to F 19 723 000, i.e. a nominal rate of increase of 7.11% compared with the previous budget and a

4. A breakdown of the total reduction of F 336 000 between the various heads of the operating budget is given at Appendix III.

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

*Members of the committee: Mr. Linster, (Chairman); Mrs. Pack, Mr. Sinesio (Alternate: Giagu Demartini) (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Biefnot, Bohl, Chartron, Mrs. Blunck (Alternate: Ahrens), Mr. Dhaille, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Greco (Alternate: Fassino), de Jong (Alternate: de Kwaadsteniet), Klejdzinski, Morris, Noerens, Oehler, Rathbone, Rauti, Redmond, Triglia, Worrell, Zierer (Alternate: Büchner).*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

## APPENDIX I

*Secretary-General's Note*  
*WEU Assembly draft budget for 1989*

1. The WEU Assembly draft budget for 1989 (Assembly Document 1154 of 27th September 1988) was circulated to the Budget and Organisation Committee on 11th October 1988 under reference B (88) 24 and was examined during the committee's meeting on 8th November 1988 (BR (88) 2, to be circulated).

2. As presented, the 1989 estimates were as follows:

Operating budget .....	F 20 059 000
Pensions budget .....	<u>2 506 000</u>
Total .....	F 22 565 000

These figures resulted in increases over the total for 1988 (from the Assembly's draft supplementary budget for 1988, C-B (88) 10) of 8.94% for the operating budget and 9.35% for the total including pensions. Excluding the recent addition of four posts to the Assembly establishment table, these figures would become 4.98% and 5.55% respectively.

3. The Budget and Organisation Committee's conclusions and recommendations are summarised below:

*General observations*

The principle of "zero real growth" was reconfirmed by all delegates as being applicable to the operating budgets of the Assembly, due allowance being granted in statistical comparisons for the four new posts added to the Assembly establishment table during the course of 1988. Delegates further acknowledged their obligation to preserve the financial autonomy accorded to the Assembly (C (87) 92, C (87) 123 and C (87) 142) and to this end limited their recommendations to total allocations of heads, although the discussions embraced all the detailed proposals for the sub-heads from which these are compiled. Appreciation was expressed of the clarity and attention to detail evident in the presentation of the 1989 proposals. It was generally agreed that these proposals were marginally in excess of the "zero real growth" ideal for operating costs. Since estimates of personnel costs (Head I) were considered realistic, reductions would be sought in other areas of the operating budget. The recommended amendments per head and in total are listed in Annex A.

*Head I – Permanent staff*

After examining the basis of the calculations of staff expenditure proposals for 1989 the committee concluded that no alteration should be sought.

*Head II – Temporary staff*

The committee discussed in detail the level of proposals in respect of temporary staff and were satisfied that these were subject to thorough control. It was considered that the proposed allocation of sub-head 8, temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk, was however of a provisional nature. Similar considerations on other sub-heads prompted the committee to recommend a reduction of F 83 000 to the total of Head II.

*Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment*

Certain sub-heads are typical of the sharing of joint expenditure for the premises. From the full details of the modernisation and equipment proposals, it was concluded that economies could be achieved in the course of 1989 operations, enabling the committee to propose a reduction of F 92 500 to the total of Head III.

*Head IV – General administrative costs*

Attention was focused upon the proposals regarding printing and publication of documents (sub-head 20) which it was recognised were within the scope of managerial control and subject to alternative methods of execution. A limited degree of inter-relation between this subject and the allocation proposed for sub-head 29 of Head V, expenditure on information, was noted. Before making a final decision the committee decided to review Head V.

*Head V – Other expenditure*

Consideration was given to the public image of the Assembly, dependent to a certain amount upon activities represented by the financial proposals contained within this section.

*Section B receipts*

To complete their scrutiny of the operating budget the committee examined the estimations of 1989 receipts. It was established that no connection could be drawn between sub-head 1, sale of publications, and the expenditure foreseen against sub-head 29 of Head V. It was noted that sub-head 4, levy, could now be deleted.

*Conclusions regarding Heads IV and V*

The committee felt that they had sufficiently explored the underlying details of the final heads of the operating budget to agree upon further reductions of F 136 500 in Head IV and F 24 000 in respect of Head V.

*Part II – Pensions budget*

The proposals contained in this part of the draft budget were accepted by the committee.

4. As a result of the foregoing recommendations, as summarised in Annex A, the estimates of the Assembly draft 1989 budget would be amended as follows:

Operating budget .....	F 20 059 000	–	336 000	=	19 723 000
Pensions budget .....	F 2 506 000		–	=	2 506 000
Total .....	F 22 565 000	–	336 000	=	22 229 000

5. The increase over the supplementary budget for 1988 (which included F 6 000 brought forward from 1987) would be:

Operating budget .....	7.11% (operating budget <i>excluding</i> Head I = 2.94%)
Pensions budget .....	12.78%
Total budget .....	7.73%

When allowing for the effect of the four new staff posts the committee was of the opinion that this result was commensurate with expected inflation levels in France and satisfied the general concept of “zero real growth”.

6. The committee could recommend the Council to give a favourable opinion on the Assembly's draft budget for 1989 as amended above.

7. The Council's opinion will be sought at the next meeting to be held on 23rd November 1988. It is recalled that this opinion should be conveyed to the Assembly before the next part-session opens on 5th December 1989.

## ANNEX A

*1989 draft budget of the Assembly*

<i>Part I: Operating budget</i>			
	<i>Initial proposals</i>	<i>less Amended allocations</i>	<i>= Reductions</i>
<i>Section A: Expenditure</i>			
Head I .....	11 858 000	11 858 000	–
Head II .....	3 083 000	3 000 000	– 83 000
Head III .....	1 442 500	1 350 000	– 92 500
Head IV .....	2 186 500	2 050 000	– 136 500
Head V .....	1 624 000	1 600 000	– 24 000
Sub-total .....	20 194 000	19 858 000	– 336 000
<i>Section B: Receipts</i> .....	135 000	135 000	–
Total .....	20 059 000	19 723 000	– 336 000
<i>Part II: Pensions budget</i>			
<i>Section A: Expenditure</i> .....	3 010 000	3 010 000	–
<i>Section B: Receipts</i> .....	504 000	504 000	–
Total .....	2 506 000	2 506 000	–
Total 1989 budget			
Part I and Part II .....	22 565 000	22 229 000	– 336 000

## APPENDIX II

*Letter from Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU,  
to Mr. Moulias, Clerk of the Assembly*

London, 23rd November 1988

.....

I have the honour to inform you that, at its meeting today, the Council examined the draft budget of the Assembly for 1989 and, in accordance with the procedure in force, expressed a favourable opinion on this amended budget as given in document C-B (88) 16.

I enclose copies of this documents.

.....  
Alfred CAHEN  
Secretary-General

Mr. G. MOULIAS,  
Clerk of the Assembly of  
Western European Union,  
43, avenue du Président-Wilson,  
75775 Paris Cedex 16.



## APPENDIX III

*Table showing modifications approved by the Council*

Heads and Sub-Heads	Draft budget for 1989 (initial)	Reductions made by Budget and Organisation Committee	Draft budget for 1989 (reduced)
<i>Head I – Permanent staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
1 – Basic salaries .....	8 320 000		
2 – Allowances .....	1 899 000		
3 – Social charges .....	1 630 000		
4 – Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of permanent officials .....	–		
5 – Medical examination .....	9 000		
Total .....	11 858 000	–	11 858 000
<i>Head II – Temporary staff</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
6 – Staff recruited for sessions .....	2 366 000	66 000	2 300 000
7 – Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between sessions .....	550 000	–	550 000
8 – Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk ..	30 000	15 000	15 000
9 – Social charges .....	137 000	2 000	135 000
Total .....	3 083 000	83 000	3 000 000
<i>Head III – Expenditure on premises and equipment</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
10 – Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises .....	438 000	38 000	400 000
11 – Hire of committee rooms .....	15 000	10 000	5 000
12 – Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions .....	407 000	7 000	400 000
13 – Various services for the organisation of sessions .....	47 000	–	47 000
14 – Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the Clerk .....	18 000	5 000	13 000
15 – Purchase or repair of office furniture .....	67 000	17 000	50 000
16 – Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment .....	10 500	10 500	–
17 – Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office equipment .....	440 000	5 000	435 000
Total .....	1 442 500	92 500	1 350 000

Heads and Sub-Heads	Draft budget for 1989 (initial)	Reductions made by Budget and Organisation Committee	Draft budget for 1989 (reduced)
<i>Head IV – General administrative costs</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
18 – Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents .....	500 000	–	500 000
19 – Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other office supplies .....	270 000	–	270 000
20 – Printing and publication of documents ....	1 238 000	160 500	1 077 500
21 – Purchase of documents .....	63 000	–	63 000
22 – Official cars .....	115 000	–	115 000
23 – Bank charges .....	500	–	500
<b>Total .....</b>	<b>2 186 500</b>	<b>160 500</b>	<b>2 026 000</b>
<i>Head V – Other expenditure</i>			
SUB-HEAD:			
24 – Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs ..	160 000	–	160 000
25 – Expenses for representation .....	220 000	–	220 000
26 – Committee study missions .....	5 000	–	5 000
27 – Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk .....	400 000	–	400 000
28 – Expenses of experts and the auditor .....	70 000	–	70 000
29 – Expenditure on information .....	410 000	–	410 000
30 – Expenses for political groups .....	336 000	–	336 000
31 – Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for .....	3 000	–	3 000
32 – Non-recoverable taxes .....	20 000	–	20 000
<b>Total .....</b>	<b>1 624 000</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1 624 000</b>
OPERATING BUDGET .....	20 194 000	336 000	19 858 000
RECEIPTS .....	135 000	–	135 000
<b>GRAND TOTAL .....</b>	<b>20 059 000</b>	<b>336 000</b>	<b>19 723 000</b>
PENSIONS .....	3 010 000	–	3 010 000
RECEIPTS .....	504 000	–	504 000
<b>NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET .....</b>	<b>2 506 000</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>2 506 000</b>
<b>NET TOTAL BUDGET .....</b>	<b>22 565 000</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>22 229 000</b>

*First part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council  
to the Assembly of Western European Union*

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- 

***A. Introduction***

1. This report covers the period from 1st January to 30th June 1988. During this period the WEU continued its process of revitalisation. In particular, the reinforced Council and the Special Working Group developed further as valuable fora for considering European security questions. The discussion of topical security questions in the first-mentioned body proved to be particularly useful. The reinforced Council was also instrumental in preparing the ground for the discussions now under way with Portugal and Spain about their possible accession. The European effort in support of freedom of navigation in the Gulf demonstrated that the WEU can make a practical contribution to the protection of collective security interests and the decision was taken to invite Portugal and Spain to open negotiations with a view to their joining the WEU. WEU has an important rôle to play in defining and developing a European defence identity which will help strengthen the Atlantic Alliance.

2. The active rôle of the WEU during this period was reflected in the growing number of tasks assigned to it by the Ministerial Council and the increasing number of meetings at all levels. Greater interest in the WEU was also

being shown both in Europe and elsewhere. The member states recognised the need to respond to this interest by improving the public relations effort of the organisation. One issue that was not resolved was that of restructuring. However, the lack of progress in the administration area has not been allowed to damage the real work of the WEU, namely the consideration of current security issues affecting Europe from both a defence planning and an arms control perspective.

3. The work programme of the ministerial organs for the first half of 1988 was largely determined by the WEU ministerial meeting in The Hague on 26th and 27th October 1987. At that meeting, the platform on European security interests was adopted. In addition, ministers considered a number of questions including:

- enlargement;
- the restructuring of the ministerial organs;
- security in the Mediterranean;
- the setting up of a WEU communications system;
- improved management of defence resources.

4. The work programme for the first half of 1988 was designed to follow up these questions and to prepare for the ministerial meeting in The Hague on 18th and 19th April 1988. Although the Council has responsibility of co-ordinating the work programme, the Special Working Group produced the two main reports for ministers. These covered European security in a changing international environment and the question of enlargement to include Spain and Portugal. The issues of restructuring and the setting-up of a communications system were dealt with by the Council, while the Mediterranean Sub-Group considered security in the region and the Defence Representatives Group questions concerning defence resources. Subsequent sections of this report will examine each of these areas in more detail.

### *B. The work of the Council*

5. The primary rôle of the Permanent Council during the first half of 1988 continued to be the co-ordination of the work of the ministerial organs. To this end, the Council received regular reports about the work of the agencies and the working groups and sought to ensure the smooth running of the organisation. In addition, the Council examined a number of reports prepared by the agencies in Paris. A number of these were subsequently passed to expert working groups for more detailed consideration.

6. These reports included those on "The recent evolution of the Soviet attitude with regard to Western Europe and the impact of this evolution on security policy" which was transmitted to the Assembly on 25th February 1988 and on "The experience gained in verification of controls on forces and conventional armaments" which was transmitted to the Assembly on 17th June 1988.

7. The Council also held regular informal discussions on topical questions on security issues. Such discussions have helped member states to harmonise their views on a range of issues. One example of this was the Council's handling of the visit of United States Deputy Secretary of Defence Taft to a number of European capitals to discuss questions relating to burden-sharing.

8. The Council kept the question of restructuring of the ministerial organs under review. This question will be covered separately later in the report.

9. It has been suggested that the Council should be restructured to take account of the fact that it is the reinforced Council and the Special Working Group who now take the lead in dealing with major political questions. It is generally agreed by member states that there could be

some advantage in such a restructuring. However, this could only be carried out as part of a more general restructuring of the ministerial organs.

### *C. The work of the reinforced Council and the Special Working Group*

10. The reinforced Council, composed of political directors of the foreign ministries together with their defence ministry counterparts, and the Special Working Group were responsible for preparing much of the agenda for the WEU ministerial in The Hague in April. In particular, the group prepared a report on "European security in a changing international environment". This report considered the impact of developments in East/West relations on Europe's security interests and stimulated a valuable discussion at the ministerial meeting.

11. The reinforced Council and the Special Working Group had useful exchanges of views on a number of key topics in the fields of European security and arms control. These included burden-sharing, prospects for conventional and chemical arms control and short-range nuclear weapons. Such discussions helped both to clarify the positions of member states and to identify specific European interests in these areas.

12. The question of enlargement, which will be the subject of a subsequent section of this report, was also considered by the reinforced Council and the Special Working Group which were responsible for putting forward a recommendation to ministers.

13. At the Ministerial Council in The Hague on 18th and 19th April 1988, the Special Working Group was entrusted with two main tasks. The first was to prepare, under the authority of the Permanent Council, a report on how to give effect to the platform of European security interests for the November Ministerial Council.

14. The report will concentrate on the need for closer co-operation between WEU member states on the basis of the platform. It will examine in particular:

- the development of consultation between the member states;
- member states' defence contributions;
- the development of bi- and multilateral co-operative arrangements in order to reinforce common security;
- armaments co-operation;
- how to improve consultation on crises outside Europe which may affect their common security.

15. The objective of the report will be to come forward with practical recommendations to enhance member states' contributions to the common defence. In this task, the Special Working Group will be assisted by the Defence Representatives Group and will work on the basis of contributions submitted by national delegations.

16. The second major task resulted from the discussion on East/West relations that took place in The Hague. The WEU Ministerial Council instructed the Special Working Group, under the direction of the Permanent Council, to produce a report on arms control and European defence requirements. The ministerial mandate instructed the group to prepare its report on the basis of four fundamental questions:

- the objectives of future negotiations on conventional stability seen from a European prospective;
- the implications for Europe of possible developments in the START negotiations;
- the rôle of the conventional and nuclear components of deterrence for security in Europe;
- defence burden-sharing within the Atlantic Alliance and possible initiatives from the European allies who are members of the WEU which aim at developing sound and balanced transatlantic relations.

17. Work on this report began immediately after The Hague ministerial and it will be submitted to ministers for discussion at the London ministerial in November.

18. The Special Working Group was also given responsibility for the conduct of the enlargement negotiations with Portugal and Spain.

#### *D. Enlargement*

19. WEU ministers, at their meeting in The Hague on 19th April, decided "to invite, in conformity with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, Portugal and Spain to enter the necessary discussions with a view to their possible accession". This invitation resulted from the conclusions of the October 1987 ministerial which laid down general principles relating to enlargement, notably that the WEU was not a closed shop and that enlargement must reinforce the organisation and not damage its cohesion.

20. In its first meeting of January 1988, the Council considered the question of enlargement and instructed the Secretary-General to establish a basic dossier covering the political, juridical and practical aspects of enlargement. On the

basis of this, further discussions took place in both the Council and the Special Working Group. As a result of the political will of the member states, and the strong support of the Assembly for enlargement, it proved possible to reach agreement in time for the invitation referred to above to be issued to Spain and Portugal at the April ministerial. The decision to invite Spain and Portugal to open negotiations with a view to becoming the first new members of the WEU for more than 30 years reflected their longstanding expressions of interest in joining the WEU and their willingness to accept the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty, the Rome declaration and the platform.

21. This was made clear by the preamble to the invitation to Spain and Portugal which stated that: "The Council of Ministers of the WEU took note of the fact that Portugal and Spain, fully engaged in the construction of Europe and members of the Atlantic Alliance, have formally indicated that they are ready to adhere to the modified Brussels Treaty, that they accept without reservation and in all their parts the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984 and the platform adopted at The Hague on 27th October 1987 and that they are willing to participate fully to giving effect to them".

22. The opening session of the discussions with Portugal and Spain took place on 26th May in The Hague in the presence of political directors and of representatives of ministries of defence. The primary function of this session was to agree on the way in which the enlargement negotiations would be conducted (See Annex I).

23. The first sessions of substantive discussions with both Portugal and Spain took place on 21st June in London. At these meetings a programme of work was agreed.

#### *E. Situation in the Gulf*

24. The Council, in the second part of its thirty-third report to the Assembly, referred to the co-ordination and co-operation which has taken place in the Gulf between WEU member states, in conformity with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty. This action was taken at the initiative of the Netherlands Presidency.

25. Since January 1988 this co-operation has continued. A number of meetings have taken place between senior officials of the foreign and defence ministries of member states. The press guidelines that were issued following these meetings are included in the annex to this report (See Annex II).

26. In addition, at the Ministerial Council in The Hague on 18th and 19th April 1988, the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. van den Broek,

informed his colleagues of the latest information regarding military incidents in the Gulf. A discussion of the situation followed as a result of which a ministerial declaration was issued on 19th April. This stressed in particular the importance of the early acceptance of UN Resolution 598 by all sides and of the freedom of navigation in the Gulf. The full text of the declaration is in the annex to this report (See Annex III).

27. Mr. van Eekelen, the Defence Minister of the Netherlands, noted during the press conference which concluded the April Ministerial Council, that the WEU's action in the Gulf had proved justified and effective. For the first time, not only had Belgian and Dutch units operated under joint command and in close co-operation with British frigates, but also Italian minesweepers had offered their assistance to the whole of the fleet in the area. For its part, France has maintained an aero-naval group in the region throughout the period and has participated, in co-ordination with its partners, in mine-sweeping operations. The Federal Republic of Germany has provided back-fill naval forces in the Mediterranean and Luxembourg has made a financial contribution towards the cost of operations in the Gulf.

28. Further consultations subsequently took place between Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, leading to the signing of a memorandum setting up a common operational command for the ships of these three countries from 1st July 1988. In addition to this, there has been a close co-operation both between general staffs in capitals and between commanders in the field.

29. From a European point of view, the WEU's activities in the Gulf have been extremely positive. They have demonstrated that close concertation and consultation between the WEU member states as well as operational co-ordination among the units in the area are possible and have shown that the WEU has an important rôle to play in considering a European approach to problems outside Europe. The activities in the Gulf have also demonstrated Europe's willingness to play a full part in assuming the risks and responsibilities of the common defence. This has been particularly important at a time when this subject has been assuming greater political importance both in Europe and the United States. The WEU's rôle has also attracted considerable media publicity which has helped to raise the organisation's profile.

#### *F. Institutional questions*

30. At its meeting of October 1987 in The Hague, the Ministerial Council decided to fuse the three agencies responsible for studying questions of security into a single agency under the

authority of the Secretary-General and endorsed, in principle, the collocation of the ministerial organs in a single place.

31. Between January and April 1988, the Permanent Council and the Institutional Working Group considered this question in detail and produced a report for the April ministerial in The Hague. At this meeting, the Ministerial Council took the following decisions:

- the contracts of members of the ministerial organs in Paris would be extended on 1st July 1988 for a period of six months;
- within a period of two weeks the Secretary-General would formulate new proposals, to be considered by the Permanent Council, concerning the restructuring of the Paris organs in the prospective of future collocation. These proposals would take into account the wish of the Assembly to strengthen the Office of the Clerk.

32. The Secretary-General produced his proposals which are still under consideration. However, the President of the Council, Mr. van den Broek, in his speech to the Assembly on 8th June during the first part of the Assembly's thirty-fourth ordinary session announced that the Council could agree to the request for the Office of the Clerk to be strengthened.

33. Although no decisions have yet been taken on the future restructuring of the organisation, this has not been allowed to impede its work. However, the Council is continuing to make every effort to reach agreement on future restructuring. In the meantime, the maintenance of the status quo will obviously call for measures regarding the composition and functions of the Secretariat-General and the future single agency.

#### *G. The work of the Mediterranean Sub-Group*

34. In the first half of 1988 the Sub-Group on Security in the Mediterranean met three times. It defined its work programme on the basis of four meetings per year. Its aims and working methods were spelt out on the basis of the Franco-Italian report which had defined its sphere of competence.

The sub-group is the place for consultation and joint reflection on all questions affecting security in the Mediterranean. Where appropriate, this consultation will lead to the formulation of positions or joint recommendations that may be transmitted to the Permanent Council.

The sub-group is competent to analyse all factors of destabilisation and developments in the countries situated in the vulnerable areas

both as regards internal politics and international relations, whether bilateral or multilateral and including their specifically military aspects.

In this connection, the sub-group commented on recent events in the region and analysed their implications. In particular, discussion covered Cyprus and Malta.

Moreover, two troubled areas, the Balkans and the Maghreb, have been examined in greater detail. These consultations continue.

### *H. Defence resources*

35. The question of improved use of defence resources was discussed at a successful seminar organised by the Netherlands Presidency on 14th and 15th March in The Hague. The follow-up to this seminar is being considered by the Defence Representatives Group.

### *I. WEU communications system*

36. The introduction of such a system which ministers considered desirable at their Hague meeting on 28th October 1987 was approved by the Permanent Council on 27th January 1988.

Through the efforts of the Netherlands Presidency and the effective co-operation between the technical services in Paris and London which, in a first stage served as relays, the actual introduction of the system was announced at the Council meeting on 10th February.

Each foreign ministry of the member countries now possesses a terminal.

Initially used only for timetables and work programmes, the system soon proved very useful for transmitting amendments or additions to basic documents and for the exchange of various information relating to questions addressed by the Council or the working groups.

It is now much appreciated as a flexible and speedy instrument of work and the Council is inclined to make increasing use of it. It uses also the system to speed up its procedure for replying to Assembly recommendations and written questions and also for transmitting its bi-annual report.

The Council has also considered the possibility of installing a terminal at the Secretariat-

General to avoid having to go through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London.

In the Organisations's jargon, this system is called "WEUCOM" (in French "UEOCOM").

### *J. Relations with the Assembly*

37. Relations with the Assembly have been frequently discussed by the Council; with a view to improving both official and unofficial communications procedures between the two bodies, the Chairman-in-Office has paid particular attention to this problem, as acknowledged by members of the Assembly in their joint meetings<sup>1</sup>.

The Assembly's request concerning the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk has finally been met without waiting for the completion of the restructuring of the ministerial organs in Paris.

The Assembly was informed accordingly on 8th June in Paris by Mr. van den Broek, Chairman-in-Office of the Council when he addressed the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session.

For his part, the Secretary-General addressing the Assembly on the same day, responded favourably to the Assembly's suggestion that he should transmit to it a regular political bulletin informing it of the activities of the inter-governmental organs.

The Permanent Council on 15th June agreed that the Secretary-General would transmit an information letter under his own responsibility, after presenting it to the Presidency.

The frequency of sending the letter to the President of the Assembly would be related to the pace and substance of the activities of the intergovernmental organs and would take account of the need to keep the Assembly fully and regularly informed of developments.

At the above Council meeting the future United Kingdom Presidency, in agreement with the Netherlands Presidency, agreed to follow the procedure adopted for the previous session of the Assembly as regards the preparation of replies to recommendations and written questions.

1. Letter of 24th May 1988 from the President of the Assembly to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

## ANNEX I

*Enlargement negotiations*

1. The following procedures were agreed for the negotiations at the meeting in The Hague on 26th May:
  - that the participants would be high-level representatives of the foreign and defence ministries of each member state. Meetings would be chaired by the representative of the Presidency who would act as WEU spokesman and be assisted by the Secretary-General;
  - that the meetings, which would be of a confidential nature, would take place, in principle, at the seat of the secretariat;
  - that separate discussions would take place with Spain and Portugal.
2. The meeting also laid down the following objectives for the negotiations:
  - to examine the legal problems and to assess their implications;
  - to inform the two candidate countries of the obligations which existing WEU members have undertaken and the way in which effect is being given to them;
  - to ensure that the two candidate countries are fully aware of the political and military commitments involved in accession to the WEU;
  - to confirm the two candidate countries' acceptance of these commitments;
  - to identify with the two candidate countries the forms of their contribution to the objectives of the platform and its development.
3. At the end of the session, the Presidency made the following press statement:

“ The official opening of the discussions with Portugal and Spain with a view to their possible accession to the WEU took place today, 26th May 1988, in The Hague. This follows the decision of the WEU Council of Ministers of 18th April 1988.

It is the first time since 1954 that discussions on WEU enlargement have taken place. The delegations of WEU member states, of Portugal and of Spain, proceeded to an exchange of views on all the aspects relating to accession and agreed the procedures to be followed. They noted with satisfaction the opening of these discussions.

The next session will take place in June. ”



## ANNEX II

***WEU meeting on the Gulf of 15th February 1988:  
Press guidelines for the Presidency***

High officials from the ministries of foreign affairs and defence of the member states of the Western European Union met on 15th February 1988 at The Hague. They again underlined the need to maintain solidarity.

They reviewed developments in the Gulf region since their last meeting on 7th December 1987, and reaffirmed their intention to further deepen their consultation process, and to consider possibilities for rationalisation, fully respecting the national character of their respective missions.

They reviewed the activities of the naval points of contact for intensifying co-ordination in mine counter-measure activities between WEU member nations in the Gulf.

The next meeting of the naval points of contact will be held in Paris.

***WEU meeting on the Gulf of 11th May 1988:  
Press guidelines for the Presidency***

Following the statement adopted by the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union at its meeting of 19th April 1988 in The Hague, high officials from the ministries of foreign affairs and defence of member states met on 11th May 1988 at The Hague to discuss recent developments in the Gulf.

They reiterated the importance of maintaining the freedom of navigation and safety of shipping in the Gulf.

They noted that the WEU members which maintain a naval presence in the Gulf provide, in accordance with long-standing time-honoured maritime traditions, assistance to shipping in distress, in application of established international rules.

They expressed appreciation for all measures which could contribute to achieving those aims and they noted with great interest the recent statement of the United States Government in this respect.

They will continue their diplomatic efforts, particularly within the EPC framework, to support all endeavours towards the full and early implementation of Resolution 598 of the Security Council, which is the only framework for an overall solution to the problems raised by the Iraq-Iran conflict.

## ANNEX III

***Statement on recent events in the Gulf***  
*(19th April 1988)*

The member states of WEU expressed their grave concern at the recent increase in hostilities in the Gulf following new mining activities and attacks against merchant shipping in the area.

They stress the necessity of respecting the principle of free navigation. Several member states contribute to the safeguarding of this right by their maritime presence in the Gulf. The member states reaffirm the importance of such a contribution to the maintenance of freedom of navigation.

They urgently call for an immediate end to all mining and other hostile activities against shipping in international waters, taking into account that such activities can call for measures for self defence.

They will continue their diplomatic efforts, particularly within the EPC framework, to support all endeavours towards the full and early implementation of Resolution 598 of the Security Council, which is the only framework for an overall solution to the problems raised by the Iraq-Iran conflict.

## INFORMATION LETTER

*from Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU,  
on the activities of the intergovernmental organs*

*(August-September 1988)*

---

London, 12th October 1988

Dear President,

In my letter of 26th July 1988, I had the honour to review – for you and the members of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU – the main activities of the intergovernmental organs of WEU during the period June-July 1988.

You will find below a summary of these activities in August and September.

Like the previous one, this letter has been drafted and issued by me under my own responsibility.

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\* \*

While the summer recess naturally slowed down WEU's activities in August, it did not prevent it from following current events closely and reacting whenever necessary.

Thus, sustained attention was paid to developments in the war between Iran and Iraq and their impact on the situation in the Gulf and representatives of the seven member states met in London on 3rd August – on the initiative of the British presidency – to review the first real progress recorded in the search for a peaceful solution to the war and to draw the possible consequences for the presence in the region of warships from five of our member states which are helping to ensure respect for freedom of navigation there.

On that occasion, they welcomed Iran's decision to accept Security Council Resolution 598. They expressed the hope that this would lead to the early, full implementation of the resolution under the aegis of the United Nations Secretariat-General.

They also studied the possible implications of this decision for the rôle of their naval forces in the Gulf. They expressed satisfaction at the solidarity that has been a characteristic of their activities in the Gulf. They agreed to follow developments, to keep each other informed and to meet again when necessary to consult each other in the same spirit of solidarity, with the aim of continuing to act in a concerted and coherent manner.

With the same concern for a concerted and coherent approach, member states continued their consultations in September.

There has been a continuous response to this joint political reflection in the form of technical co-ordination ensured, on the spot, between fleet commanders and, in the admiralties, between naval experts who met periodically.

All these procedures allowed actions by five member countries in the Gulf to be adapted harmoniously to an evolving situation.

It is important to specify that the two member states not present in the Gulf continued to show their WEU solidarity with the five others in the same way as before.

\*  
\* \*

Mr. Charles GOERENS,  
President of the Assembly  
of Western European Union

Furthermore, the Permanent Council – meeting in its normal form or strengthened by the political directors of the ministries for foreign affairs and representatives of the ministries of defence – and its Special Working Group – meeting at the level of heads or deputies – pursued their exchanges of information and consultations on recent topical matters concerning European security:

- the situation in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact;
- East-West relations, with particular regard to arms control;
- the transatlantic relationship.

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\* \*

The same organs, together with the Group of Defence Ministers' Representatives, continued their work on:

- implementation of the platform on European security interests;
- arms control and defence requirements.

Two reports – one on each of these subjects – are now being drafted for submission to the ministers at their meeting on 14th November.

The first will develop member states' views on each of the principles set out in paragraph III (a) 4 of the platform and make relevant recommendations to the ministers.

The second will deal with:

- the START negotiations;
- talks on conventional stability;
- the rôle of the nuclear and conventional aspects of deterrence in European security;
- defence burden-sharing in the Atlantic Alliance;
- the contribution to joint defence.

Furthermore, the relevant group of experts is continuing to assess the situation in the Mediterranean and has paid more particular attention to the Balkans, on the one hand, and the Maghreb and the Machrek, on the other, all, of course, in the context of European security.

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\* \*

The negotiations on enlargement are being continued with Portugal and Spain and a third meeting with the Portuguese and Spanish delegations was held on 16th September.

At this stage, the six points listed in paragraph (a) of my letter of 28th July have all been tackled.

The candidate countries were informed by the presidency and the other member states of the way the latter view and implement the responsibilities defined in these points. These candidate countries, for their part, indicated how they intend, in this connection, to assume their rôle and commitments in the framework of the organisation.

The exchanges of views were very searching on both sides.

Another meeting is planned for 11th October during which certain points will have to be taken further.

In addition, legal experts of the member states have met twice and are to meet again in the near future to adopt a position in regard to procedure and instruments of accession and to finalise certain matters relating to the impact that the accession of two new members may have on the organisation's budgetary situation, the composition of the staff of the administrative organs, etc.

On 14th November, the Council of Ministers will review current discussions. It should be noted that they are being held in an excellent atmosphere further enhanced by the success of the visit to Madrid by Mrs. Thatcher, Prime Minister of the country now exercising the presidency of WEU.

\*  
\* \*

The Permanent Council continued to examine the problem of collocating the WEU administrative organs.

\*  
\* \*

In the area of public relations, I first wish to note, and pay tribute to, the importance of the official visit you made as President of the Assembly to London from 20th to 23rd September.

It was undeniably a great success and was welcomed by the entire Council. It contributed to the influence of our organisation and to the development of the close working relationship between the Assembly and the Council for which you strive and to which, as you know, the Council and I are strongly attached.

Furthermore, at Lille University on 30th September I spoke on "The European pillar" in the context of a colloquy organised by the University on 29th and 30th September on "European co-operation and the Atlantic Alliance" with the assistance of the Fondation Française pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale and the Secretariat-General of NATO.

In Brussels on 8th October, I shall be speaking on "What security Europe: an overall problem?" from the tribune of Réalités Européennes du Présent.

\*  
\* \*

Thus you can see that the pace of the organisation's activities has not slackened and the objectives set by the British presidency that were listed in the penultimate paragraph of my letter of 28th July are well on the way to being attained.

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\* \*

You will have received very recently the first part of the Council's annual report to the Assembly for 1988 that will have enlightened you more fully and more systematically than this letter about WEU's progress. Believe me when I say the Council is happy that it has been possible to send this report to the Assembly in time for it to be able to pursue its work effectively.

Yours sincerely,  
Alfred CAHEN

*Young people and defence – The rôle of parliaments*

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**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Shelton, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. Members of the committee: Mr. *Pontillon* (Chairman); MM. *Ewing*, *Stegagnini* (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. *Buchner* (Alternate: Mrs. *Luuk*), MM. *Burger*, *de Chambrun*, *De Bondt*, *De Hoop Scheffer*, *Fiandrotti*, Mrs. *Fischer*, Mrs. *Hennicot-Schoepges*, MM. *Shelton*, *Tummers*, *Kempinaire*.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft resolution***on young people and defence – the rôle of parliaments*

The Assembly,

- (i) Stressing the importance of obtaining young people's understanding and support for Western European defence and security policy;
- (ii) Stating however that so far young people are not given enough opportunity to be told about WEU's rôle in this area;
- (iii) Convinced that a closer involvement of young people in the work of the WEU Assembly could enhance considerably their understanding of the specific European problems of defence and security;
- (iv) Welcoming the exemplary initiative taken by the Bundestag in organising a youth and parliament session once a year;
- (v) Regretting however that the Assembly's present means do not allow it to take meaningful initiatives for a more intensive dialogue with young people,

## CALLS ON MEMBER PARLIAMENTS

To make the necessary organisational and financial arrangements to allow members of the Assembly to invite at least once a year a group of young visitors, including journalists, to visit Paris for briefings at the seat of the Assembly during or between sessions and to meet WEU parliamentarians and officials.

**Draft order***on young people and defence – the rôle of parliaments*

The Assembly,

- (i) Stressing the importance of obtaining young people's understanding and support for Western European defence and security policy;
- (ii) Stating however that so far young people are not given enough opportunity to be told about WEU's rôle in this area;
- (iii) Convinced that a closer involvement of young people in the work of the WEU Assembly could enhance considerably their understanding of the specific European problems of defence and security;
- (iv) Welcoming the exemplary initiative taken by the Bundestag in organising a youth and parliament session once a year;
- (v) Regretting however that the Assembly's present means do not allow it to take meaningful initiatives for a more intensive dialogue with young people,

## INVITES ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

To include the organisational and financial implications of enhancing the Assembly's dialogue with young people in its further deliberations on a new information policy for the Assembly.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Shelton, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. It is widely recognised that – particularly in the present period of East-West relations – the younger generation's necessary support of western security and defence policy calls for particular attention. The importance of WEU member government's information activities in this area was underlined in Mr. Burger's report on public information activities on security and defence matters in WEU member countries<sup>1</sup>.

2. The purpose of the present report is to examine the rôle parliaments and especially the Assembly of WEU might play in enhancing the dialogue on these questions with young people. Conversely, this is not a report on young people's reflections and preoccupations. It merely seeks to study the question of whether young people are given enough opportunities of being properly informed and advised in security and defence matters.

3. The activities of parliaments in such a matter which forms a part of public relations, are concentrated in two main areas:

- following and controlling the actions of governments and, at international level, those of the relevant defence organisations;
- developing their own policy of dialogue.

4. Chapter II to V hereafter highlight the problems related to this particular subject. At the same time, the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations continued its traditional activities with a view to bringing the work of the Assembly to the attention of national parliaments and inviting them to follow it up. These activities are summarised in Chapter VI.

### *II. General remarks*

5. Approaching young people in security and defence questions has always been a delicate problem. These matters are often the subject of controversial and emotional debates in parliaments, political parties, among the general public and even in families. Nobody wishes to introduce any kind of partial indoctrination, politicisation or just military education of young people.

6. At present disarmament problems play a crucial rôle in East-West relations. But how is it

ensured that our young generation may understand western interests and positions in this area? Security matters should never be explained in an isolated way without convincing the relevant age group that there are fundamental common values to be defended in their very interest, and that the reason of their country's membership of the alliance and Western European Union is the collective determination of all member countries to fortify and preserve these common values.

7. Some of them are described in the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty when the signatory countries declared their resolution:

*“To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person...”*

*“to fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, ...”*

*“to afford assistance to each other in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace...”*

8. There is no indication that young people are less inclined towards the abovementioned values than the older generation. On the contrary. With the present easing of East-West confrontation, however, it is more and more difficult to convince the following generation that these values might be in danger and that they can never be taken for granted.

### *III. International youth work without WEU*

9. An alliance such as Western European Union and its member countries which are seeking the necessary public support for security policy should therefore have a special interest in keeping in close touch with the younger generation.

10. However, since the transfer, in 1960, of the exercise of WEU's social and cultural responsibilities under Articles II and III of the modified Brussels Treaty to the Council of Europe (with the exception of those exercised by the WEU Public Administration Committee), WEU no longer has a permanent section capable of establishing a dialogue with the younger age group in the member countries.

11. It is worth recalling that until 1960 the Secretariat-General of WEU had a Cultural

1. Document 1112, 15th October 1987.



Committee composed of Heads of Cultural Relations Departments at the Foreign Office and Secretaries-General of the Ministries of Education of the seven member states. This committee acted through the intermediary of sub-committees such as:

- a universities sub-committee,
- a government officials sub-committee (later called Public Administration Committee),
- a films sub-committee,
- an education sub-committee, and, last but not least,
- a youth sub-committee.

12. Particularly the latter was one of the most active, organising courses and meetings on various subjects for young people (for instance in 1956 one in the United Kingdom on "young people's problems arising from military service") exchanges of young workers, school-linking, etc.

13. The decision to transfer all such activities to the Council of Europe was motivated by the idea of rationalising the European institutions and by the concern to avoid duplication of work. In its fifth annual report to the Assembly on 7th March 1960<sup>2</sup> the WEU Council stressed that:

"the Council's competence under Articles II and III of the revised Brussels Treaty is in no way diminished. Only the existing activities pursued in the social and cultural fields are transferred to the Council of Europe and, if the arrangements prove unsatisfactory, they can always be reconsidered by the WEU Council."

14. But in fact, all relevant structures were abolished and consequently the WEU Assembly stopped reporting on the activities of WEU in the cultural and social fields. The then existing contacts with youth problems were lost.

15. So far in the framework of WEU's reactivation, it seems that no particular attention has been paid to the importance of a dialogue with young people. The Council's document on "WEU and public awareness" published on 23rd April 1985, makes no reference to this special problem. The present structure of the Secretariat-General allows only a very limited approach to press, information and public relations matters.

16. In order to provide proper information, adequate knowledge of the thoughts and preoccupations of the age group at which the information is directed, is crucial. This calls for units able to establish a permanent dialogue with the relevant age group and to keep in contact with

the various organisations responsible for youth questions. There is no question of calling for a reactivation of WEU activities in the cultural and social fields. But the absence of contacts between WEU and the younger generations is of sufficient importance to wonder whether our organisation should not take advantage of the work and experience in these matters of other international organisations in which WEU member countries are represented.

17. In NATO, for instance, on the initiative of the North Atlantic Assembly, a separate post of youth officer was created in the NATO information service in 1983 in order to centralise the alliance's efforts in youth questions and to facilitate contacts between young people in the various member countries. The rôle of this officer, who works within the team responsible for public relations, is threefold and consists of:

- establishing, on a strictly individual basis, contact with young people who are university students, have political responsibilities or are opinion-formers because of their interest in NATO and/or their potential ability to propagate information amongst those with whom they mix;
- organising colloquia, visits and conferences at NATO headquarters or outside;
- liaising between NATO and the youth sections of the Atlantic Associations of the sixteen alliance countries which themselves organise conferences, visits to military installations, and so on. Members of these sections, usually very dynamic, have an interlocutor in the NATO Youth Officer who can help them to create a structure in which to develop their activities, and who can assist them in making the various contacts they may need.

18. Furthermore, each year NATO awards a number of advanced research fellowships to nationals of member countries. For the period 1988/1989 twenty-two such fellowships have been announced.

19. WEU would also be well advised to follow the wide range of activities developed in the Council of Europe and the European Community in the area of youth questions, as well as intergovernmental youth co-operation in Europe. On 11th and 12th April 1988, the second conference of European ministers responsible for youth questions was held in Oslo on "strategies for European youth policies towards 2000". The final text adopted by the conference establishing a programme of work states inter alia "that young people are strongly committed to ... the maintenance of peace".

2. Document 159.

20. But the organisations contributing considerably to the maintenance of peace, such as the Atlantic Alliance and Western European Union were not taken into consideration in the various proposals and recommendations of the conference. They were directed exclusively to the Council of Europe, the European Community and the European youth organisations connected with them. This is not surprising since both the Council of Europe and the European Community are the organisations which have developed the most impressive activities and funds for the dialogue with young people.

21. For instance the European Youth Centre, set up by the Council of Europe is an educational institution designed to provide international youth organisations in Europe with a meeting place and forum involving approximately one thousand five hundred young Europeans each year. According to its programme for 1988, thirty-seven study sessions have been envisaged, one of which had a security aspect. It was a youth peace seminar held in Strasbourg on 19th-26th June 1988 on "Helsinki and beyond".

22. Substantial financial support for international youth activities is provided by the European Youth Foundation set up by the Council of Europe in 1972. The foundation's statute states that it may provide support to such youth activities "as serve the promotion of peace, understanding and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms". In 1986, the foundation supported some hundred and twenty projects on various subjects. Since 1986 was international peace year, fourteen projects were directly connected with that theme. Two of them might be quoted:

A seminar held in Norway by the International Union of socialist youth on "Peace, disarmament and security in Europe". The second was a meeting organised in Malta by the same organisation on "nuclear-weapon-free areas in the Mediterranean basin as a means of closer co-operation and peace in that region".

23. Both the European Youth Centre and the Foundation have important links with the different youth organisations at national and international level. The same applies to the European Community which supports and finances many youth activities and makes efforts to inform young people about the various community policies and achievements.

24. As the examples mentioned above show, only some aspects of security and defence such as problems of peace and disarmament play some part in the annual programmes.

25. This is a consequence of the strict separation of responsibilities between institutions responsible for cultural and social affairs, to which youth questions are supposed to belong, and those responsible for defence and security. In view of the danger of overlapping of responsibilities between the relevant international organisations, it would be unrealistic to wish WEU to have a say in establishing the annual programmes and subjects to be chosen in meetings and seminars organised for young people in the framework of the Council of Europe and the European Community.

26. There are certainly informal means and opportunities for WEU and particularly for its Secretary-General to make more use of these various forums for holding conferences and discussions with young people on subjects handled by our organisation<sup>3</sup>. But without working out its own channels and methods of dialogue with young people, WEU's means of influencing their perception of security policy remain minimal.

#### *IV. What young people have to gain from the activities of parliaments*

27. In the present unsatisfactory situation the Assembly of Western European Union might have a crucial rôle to play since it is the only European parliamentary body empowered by treaty to discuss security and defence issues. It would be very instructive for young people to be made more aware of the fact that through the existence and activities of the WEU Assembly European defence and security policy is democratically supervised.

28. Furthermore, the Assembly's debates as well as those in national parliaments, can be particularly useful for developing independent opinions among young people interested in the relevant subjects, since they provide a spectrum of the various, often controversial positions and arguments.

29. Nevertheless, there is a wide gap between ambitions and reality. At present, relations between young people and the Assembly are almost non-existent. Only very occasionally groups of young people can follow the Assembly's work in Paris during sessions or are briefed by officials from the Office of the Clerk. Unlike the practice in some national parliaments, in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, WEU Assembly members are not, or only exceptionally, involved. In member countries, the younger age group's opportunity of being

3. Of the fifteen conferences given by the Secretary-General in 1987, at least four were for youth associations or students.

informed about the Assembly's activities is hardly better<sup>4</sup>.

30. In order to elaborate proposals for improving the Assembly's dialogue with young people, it might be useful to learn from the policy followed by member parliaments in this respect, since they have the exclusive competence to decide on their countries' defence and security policy.

31. The following questionnaire was therefore sent to WEU member parliaments:

- "whether, and to what extent, your parliament - in the context of its public relations work - ensures that the younger generation can follow and understand its work on foreign policy matters, with particular regard to security and defence;
- which bodies are responsible and what means are used in your parliament for attaining these aims;
- whether, and to what extent, there is co-ordination between your parliament and your country's government with a view to interesting young people in these matters and informing them in an appropriate manner;
- whether, and to what extent, the younger generation in your country is able to participate directly or indirectly in parliamentary debates on defence and security policy".

32. When these questions were chosen, your Rapporteur was aware that defence and security matters form only a part of the wider range of problems a parliament has to debate. Furthermore, national parliaments have quite different traditions and ways of seeing their rôle vis-à-vis the public. The replies so far received from parliaments provide very useful information. The following examples may demonstrate how different parliaments have developed their public relations policies.

33. Like all parliaments which have replied to the questionnaire, the *Italian Parliament* has no programmes specially designed to make young people aware of problems relating to foreign policy and defence and security policy. However, it is not rare for private associations and other institutions concerned to take initiatives in this area by calling on parliamentarians, including members of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees of both chambers, who participate as guests, rapporteurs or chairmen.

4. See the report by Mr. Chénard on the impact of the WEU Assembly's activities on parliaments and public opinion. Document 1135 (27th April 1988).

34. In the *United Kingdom*, no general public relations work is carried out by the British Parliament. It does not have a budget or staff of civil servants for such activities. Television and broadcasting of parliamentary proceedings have been authorised only recently. But parliament plays host to journalists of most national newspapers and gives many of them special facilities for contacting parliamentarians. The House of Commons Library Department includes a public information office. It is left to the initiative of individual members of the public to ask this office for information. Associated with this office is an Education Officer, who has special responsibility for supplying schools with information about parliament. Since the select committees on foreign affairs and defence regularly hold public hearings and publish up to a dozen reports there is no lack of public information on defence and security issues. Nevertheless there is no special emphasis in school programmes on these issues.

35. When, in April 1987, Mr. Terlezki, then a member of the United Kingdom Delegation to the WEU Assembly, asked the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Education and Science if he would take steps to make available to children of school age information on United Kingdom participation in WEU and other organisations the answer was as follows:

"My right hon. Friend has no plans to do so. He hopes, however, that where opportunity to do so arises in the school curriculum, pupils' understanding of the United Kingdom's relationships with its European neighbours including the functions and work of the European Community, the Council of Europe and Western European Union will be developed as part of the process of learning about the political process and economic matters."

36. The situation in the *German Bundestag* is rather different. Its large administration includes a public relations section and a visitors section. In the context of an overall programme for visitors to the Bundestag, groups of school children and young people of military service age may follow debates in plenary sitting, including debates on matters relating to security and defence policy.

37. Furthermore, the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces briefs groups of school children visiting parliament at the invitation of members about his tasks in assisting the Bundestag in the exercise of its parliamentary supervision of the armed forces.

38. Once a year, the Bundestag organises a "youth and parliament" session at which young people can discuss political problems with members of parliament. The last youth and par-

liament session was held in Bonn from 25th to 27th September 1988 to which four hundred and fifty young people were invited as follows:

- 193 by CDU/CSU members of parliament;
- 160 by SPD members;
- 40 by FDP members;
- 36 by members of Die Grünen; and
- 20 selected by the Deutsche Bundesjugendring.

39. In the framework of this event a number of round tables were organised in which participants had the opportunity to discuss various topical political subjects with members of parliament. This year the four Bundestag parliamentary groups agreed to organise eleven round tables under the chairmanship of members of parliament. Some of their subjects might be quoted:

*First round table:* motivations for young people's political commitment – the state of responsibility and action of young citizens in a liberal state;

*Seventh round table:* military and civilian service – young people's obligations to society; the admission of women to the Bundeswehr; compulsory military service for all?

*Tenth round table:* how do we ensure peace? – Defence, détente and disarmament.

40. The characteristic of the round tables is that members of the Bundestag chair them and apply Bundestag rules. Participants' speaking time is limited to three minutes. During these round tables, speakers are chosen for the following day's closing joint sitting, to which they have to submit a report. This closing sitting is held in the chamber of the Bundestag. Participants sit in members' seats. Members of the Bundestag parliamentary groups taking part occupy the government and Bundestag benches. The President of the Bundestag or his representative chair the sitting and apply Bundestag rules again. The Bundestag meets the cost of participants' travel and hotel accommodation and the cost of meals in Bonn.

41. The detailed description of this Bundestag initiative seems to be justified since it is unique in WEU member countries and gives young people an opportunity to participate directly in the political work of parliament.

42. No parliament has reported any co-ordination or co-operation with governments in this aspect of public relations matters. The importance of political parties in keeping close touch with young people has been underlined by the Netherlands Delegation.

43. Apart from national parliaments it is also worth examining the situation in international

parliamentary bodies. The North Atlantic Assembly for instance, has devoted part of its work to problems of the so-called successor generation. In October 1979, the then Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information created a working group to study how youth is informed about international politics in general and Atlantic affairs in particular, and to recommend appropriate action to improve the successor generation's appreciation of the Atlantic Alliance.

44. The North Atlantic Civilian Affairs Committee created a sub-committee on the successor generation which was replaced by a sub-committee on Public Information on Defence and Security after presenting its final report in 1985. Their parliamentarians have had meetings with students and were invited by the Atlantic Council of the United States to hold conferences on NATO in American universities.

45. As for the European Parliament, it is well known that it devotes a large part of its activities to youth problems, particularly through its Committee on Social Affairs and Employment and its Committee on Youth, Culture, Education and Sport. In both committees, the Youth Forum of the European Community is represented as a permanent observer.

46. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is represented in the European Youth Centre and in the European Youth Foundation. Through its Committee on Culture and Education it regularly studies youth questions and preoccupations of young people.

47. As a result it must be realised that organisations such as NATO, the European Community and the Council of Europe, including their parliamentary bodies, are devoting quite a substantial part of their activities and financial means to youth questions and to their dialogue with young people. For this purpose some have created their own youth organisations, and all have established various links and communication means with young people providing them with a permanent possibility of dialogue.

48. How long can WEU, as the only European defence organisation, and its Assembly, the only European parliamentary body responsible for defence and security matters, manage without the necessary dialogue with young people on these matters?

#### *V. Conditions for enhancing the Assembly's dialogue with young people*

49. This problem is a financial and organisational one. In fact, few actions are possible without additional financial means and without reorganising the Assembly's methods of work.

50. The fact that some members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe are represented in the European Youth Centre and in the European Youth Foundation could be advantageous for the WEU Assembly, provided parliamentarians have an opportunity of influencing the activities and programmes of these organisations. But this possibility is somewhat theoretical.

51. Hosting more groups of young visitors at the seat of the Assembly, as is done in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, might be an excellent means of arousing the interest of the relevant age group and informing them about the subjects handled in WEU. Such initiatives require additional financial means. But since some member countries give their delegation members an opportunity to invite individuals or groups to visit the seat of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, it might be worth asking national parliaments to introduce similar procedure for visiting the Assembly of Western European Union. In these cases the cost would be covered by member countries.

52. Additional financial means would be required for the Assembly itself, however, if it were to take the following initiatives:

- creating WEU Assembly scholarships as is done in NATO;
- editing in a large number of easily readable information documents in all official languages, especially intended for young people;
- producing an audiovisual presentation of the Assembly mainly for visitors in Paris.

53. Financial *and* organisational measures are required if the following measures are envisaged:

- organising colloquies, round tables and conferences for young people on subjects related to security and defence matters (as is done in NATO or in the Bundestag);
- establishing contacts with the appropriate committees responsible for youth problems of the North Atlantic Assembly, the European Parliament and the Council of Europe, in order to profit from their experience.

54. It is gratifying that the Presidential Committee recently started to reconsider the Assembly's overall information policy, when it endorsed the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial

year 1989, submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. In this draft budget, an increase of F 90 000 for "expenditure on information" has been proposed, which will be used mainly to improve the working conditions of the Assembly's Press Service. To this end the latter had produced a proposal for a general communications strategy. Thus the estimates for 1989 for information purposes are now F 410 000 (Budget for 1988: F 320 000). This is still a very modest sum considering that in 1981 already the European Parliament's information budget was 2 800 000 European currency units (i.e. F 14 million) and the information budget of the Council of Europe for the same year was about F 3 300 000.

55. It is to be welcomed that thanks to the decision taken by the Presidential Committee there is now a chance to improve relations with the press.

56. Press relations are an important part of a new overall Assembly information policy. The problems of improving contacts with young people is another. It is obvious that the measures mentioned above for establishing a more intensive dialogue with the younger generation, cannot be financed by 1989 estimates for "expenditure on information". If the Assembly is determined to do more in the youth sector, it must decide how much importance it intends to attach to its youth work in relation to its other activities in the framework of a more effective overall communications strategy. This new strategy does not concern only the activities of the Office of the Clerk but also the working methods of the Assembly itself and its committees.

57. The Presidential Committee should therefore continue its deliberations on these problems. It will be necessary to submit to it all the other elements of an information strategy in which the Assembly's youth policy must be given an important place. In this connection the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations should make a meaningful contribution. At the same time, its rôle should be re-examined and the question is can it undertake such a broad spectrum of tasks in present working conditions.

#### ***VI. Action taken in parliaments on texts adopted by the WEU Assembly***

58. One of the tasks of our committee is to select from texts adopted by the Assembly those which, in its opinion should be debated in national parliaments. At its meeting in Paris on 9th June 1988, the committee decided to draw the attention of parliaments of member countries

more particularly to the following recommendations adopted by the Assembly:

- 455 on European co-operation in armaments research and development - guidelines drawn from the colloquy;
- 457 on the organisation of European security;
- 459 on co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters;
- 460 on disarmament.

59. Furthermore, it decided to transmit Order 71 and the report by Mr. Chénard on the impact of the WEU Assembly's activities on parliaments and public opinion to national parliaments.

60. Following a proposal of the committee, the President of the Assembly transmitted not only the texts of recommendations but also the corresponding reports to all Presidents of member parliaments expressing the wish that they be the subject of speeches or questions.

61. In its report on the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session of the WEU Assembly to the German Bundestag dated 21st July 1988, the German Delegation for the first time made special reference to the texts selected by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

62. In Luxembourg, the President of the Chamber of Deputies informed the Chamber at its meeting on 16th June 1988 of the texts transmitted by the President of the WEU Assembly announcing that they would be transmitted to the Committee for Foreign Affairs.

63. At the meeting of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives on 14th June 1988, the President of the Chamber informed the Chamber of the recommendations transmitted by the President of the WEU Assembly which were to be referred to the Committees for Foreign Affairs and Defence.

64. Your Rapporteur can only appeal once again to *all* delegations to keep in mind the need pointed out in the previous report by Mr. Chénard to use all possible means in order to increase the impact of the WEU Assembly's work on national parliaments and public opinion.

65. In a letter dated 6th July 1988, Mr. Pontillon, Chairman of the committee, sent committee members a number of draft questions on subjects covered in the selected recommendations emphasizing that "in order to improve the impact of the work of the Assembly in our

national parliaments, it is essential for as many representatives as possible to put questions on the basis of the texts adopted or to refer to these texts in their speeches or parliamentary action".

66. So far, your Rapporteur has information about an initiative taken by *Mr. Hill* when he used the proposed model questions to put ten written questions in the House of Commons on Recommendations 455, 457, 459 and 460. Answers were given on 29th July 1988 by Mrs. Chalker, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

67. In the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, on 14th July 1988, *Mr. Konen*, *Mr. Linster* and *Mr. Hengel*, also using the model questions, put several questions on Recommendations 457 and 459. These questions were answered on 25th August 1988 by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

68. On 13th July 1988, Mr. Natali put four written questions in the Italian Senate on Recommendations 449, 455, 457 and 459. The answers of the Italian Government are not yet known. No information on follow-up activities was reported from Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands.

## VII. Conclusions

69. Compared with other organisations such as NATO, the European Community and the Council of Europe together with their parliamentary bodies, neither the WEU Council nor the Assembly makes any special effort to establish a dialogue with the younger generation. The consequence is that they cannot exert any influence on the way security and defence questions, if they are discussed with young people, are presented. Furthermore, it is not certain that the specific European aspects of defence and security problems are properly explained. In view of the necessity of public support for WEU's activities, the lack of contact with young people is serious. But with its present working conditions and financial means the Assembly will not be able to do much to improve the situation. The dialogue with young people should be given an important place within the Presidential Committee's further reflections on the Assembly's information policy.

70. Apart from efforts made by several WEU Assembly members in the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Italy in putting questions to their governments on the basis of texts adopted by the Assembly, the impact of its work in member parliaments is still inadequate.

*Young people and defence – the rôle of parliaments*

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AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Hardy*

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1. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft resolution, leave out “and support”.
2. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft order, leave out “and support”.

*Signed: Hardy*

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1. See 8th sitting, 6th December 1988 (amendments withdrawn).

*Disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council*

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**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur*

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(i) Time-scale

(ii) Inspection

(iii) Other documents

(b) Technical aspects of the INF Treaty

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1. Adopted in committee by 11 votes to 2 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman); MM. *de Beer, Fourré* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle (Alternate: *Baumel*), Mrs. *Baarveld-Schlaman*, MM. *Cariglia, Cox* (Alternate: *Ms Ruddock*), *De Decker, Derycke, Fiandrotti, Fioret, Hardy, Irmer, Jung* (Alternate: *Koehl*), *Konen, de Kwaadsteniet*, Mrs. *Lalumière*, MM. *Lemrich* (Alternate: *Niegel*), *Matraja, Pecchioli* (Alternate: *Cannata*), *Scheer, Sinesio, Sir Dudley Smith*, MM. *Speed, Steiner, Steverlyncx*, Sir *John Stokes* (Alternate: *Wilkinson*).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*



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- V. Major conventional arms control talks
    - (a) Negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in central Europe (MBFR talks) – Vienna
    - (b) Conference on Confidence- and Security-building and Disarmament in Europe (CDE and CSCE) – Vienna
    - (c) Conference on Disarmament (CD) – Geneva
  - VI. Aspects of deterrence: the different Europes and public perceptions
  - VII. Conclusion

## APPENDICES

- I. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles
- II. The Montebello decision, Annex to the final communiqué of the autumn ministerial meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) Montebello, Canada (27th October 1983)

*Introductory Note*

The committee as a whole met in Geneva on 25th and 26th July 1988, when it was briefed by the following representatives to the Conference on Disarmament:

H.E. Miss Tessa A.H. Solesby, Ambassador, Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation;  
H.E. Mr. Adolfo R. Taylhardat, Ambassador, Venezuelan Permanent Representative to the United Nations;  
H.E. Mr. Pierre Morel, Ambassador, Leader of the French Delegation;  
H.E. Mr. Max L. Friedersdorf, Ambassador, Leader of the United States Delegation;  
H.E. Mr. Paul J. von Stülpnagel, Ambassador, Leader of the Federal Republic of Germany's Delegation;  
H.E. Mr. Chusei Yamada, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Leader of the Japanese Delegation;  
H.E. Mr. Youri K. Nazarkin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Leader of the Soviet Delegation.

In preparing this report the Rapporteur conducted interviews as follows:

*14th December 1987 – Soviet Embassy, Paris*

Mr. Viktor P. Karpov, Head of the Disarmament Department, Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

*4th March 1988 – Defence Arms Control Unit (DACU), Ministry of Defence, London*

Colonel John Speight, Acting Head, DACU;  
Mr. Malcolm Lingwood, Head of Section;  
Mr. Ian Manson.

*24th and 25th March 1988 – Vienna*

The Rapporteur had interviews with the following representatives to the CSCE talks:

H.E. Mr. Hans Meesman, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation;  
Mr. Como Van Hellenburg Hubar, Netherlands Delegation;  
General van der Graaf, Netherlands Delegation;  
H.E. Mr. Shikalov, Ambassador, Head of the Soviet Delegation;  
H.E. Mr. B. Frowick, Ambassador, Head of the United States Delegation;  
Mr. J. Félix-Paganon, French Delegation;  
Colonel Christian Méric, French Delegation;

and the MBFR talks:

H.E. Mr. T. Strulak, Ambassador, Head of the Polish Delegation;  
H.E. Mr. L.W. Veenendaal, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation;  
Colonel C. Kuypers, Netherlands Delegation;  
H.E. Mr. K. Hedemann, Ambassador, Head of the Norwegian Delegation;  
General Hammer, Norwegian Delegation;  
H.E. Mr. R.J. O'Neill, Ambassador, Head of the United Kingdom Delegation.

*5th April 1988 – Geneva*

The Rapporteur had interviews with the following representatives to the Conference on Disarmament:

H.E. Mr. R.J. van Schaik, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Permanent Mission to the United Nations;  
Mr. Robert Milders, First Secretary of the Netherlands Permanent Mission to the United Nations;  
Mr. Zharkov, Deputy Head of the Soviet Delegation;  
Mr. Richard Edis, Counsellor and Deputy Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation;  
H.E. Mr. Rolf Ekéus, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Sweden;  
H.E. Mr. Max L. Friedersdorf, Ambassador, United States Permanent Representative;  
Dr. Pierce Corden, United States Delegation.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their special thanks to all the officials and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or briefed the committee in reply to questions.

**Draft Recommendation***on disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the renewed efforts of the Council to ensure a speedy transmission of the annual report;
- (ii) Pleased that information called for in previous replies has been reinstated in the Council's report;
- (iii) Commending the Council's initiatives in promoting the present comprehensive five-nation mine-sweeping operation in the Gulf, codenamed "Cleansweep", before disengagement;
- (iv) Calling for the collective defence effort to be maintained at the level necessary to ensure the security of all countries of the alliance, while negotiations are actively pursued on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments to the lowest levels compatible with that essential security, in full accordance with the long-standing policy of the alliance;
- (v) Endorsing the approach to a bilateral agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons;
- (vi) Stressing the importance of respect for the existing ABM treaty and the limitations of the SALT accords, which can be modified only by agreement between the parties to them;
- (vii) Supporting the efforts of the nations at the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a multi-lateral treaty to ban all chemical weapons and applauding US and French initiatives to convene an international conference to help further such agreement;
- (viii) Noting with interest the Council's report on "The experience gained in verification of controls on forces and conventional armaments" (which reinforces the Assembly's belief that the Agency still has a major contribution to make in the important matter of verification), asking that such studies will be further developed and applied, and encouraged in this hope by the reply of the Council to Recommendation 460,

## RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Give substance to the principles enunciated in The Hague platform by defining and stating publicly a *Western European Union* posture on specific arms control issues, including the following criteria:
  - (a) arms control priorities should now advance conventional and chemical disarmament measures in preference to the abolition of short-range nuclear weapons which for the present remain an essential factor for deterrence contributing significantly to the maintenance of peace;
  - (b) arms control measures should be global and must not prevent some countries from doing what others are allowed to do; (the creation of denuclearised zones, for example, would be a factor of destabilisation for Europe);
  - (c) arms control agreements should include verification measures which fully satisfy all parties and which do not infringe national sovereignty;
  - (d) arms control should proceed by stages, allowing the security of all to remain assured throughout;
2. In the name of Western European Union, reply to Mr. Gorbachev's call for a pan-European summit on conventional arms by stressing that such a forum already exists in the context of the CSCE;
3. Urge more and wider adequate publicity by member governments for disarmament issues aimed at both the press and the public, including the fact that in the initial stages arms reduction and control do not necessarily imply greatly-reduced defence spending, and invite the WEU Agency to prepare studies with a view to facilitating the task of the governments of member countries in informing public opinion of security and disarmament problems;
4. Call on member governments to involve the specialist scientific and technical departments of the universities and defence institutions closely in work on arms control, and authorise the WEU Agency, in the framework of its own research for the Council, to consult certain specialised university departments and appropriate government bodies;
5. Ensure that the "appropriate utilisation of the WEU Agency in studying in detail questions relating to conventional disarmament and, in particular, problems relating to the technology of verification" (Reply of the Council to Recommendation 460) is implemented without delay.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1.1. Under the terms of the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments is required to reply to those parts of the annual report of the Council referred to it by the Presidential Committee. As in previous years this report will also examine developments in present forums for negotiations on the control of armaments and disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral, on nuclear weapons and on other aspects of armaments control.

1.2. The present report follows on logically from the committee's previous two reports on these subjects<sup>1</sup>, but for the first time in recent years, as a direct result of the Council's efforts to improve the consultative process among member states, in addition to commenting on the previous year's report (1987), the committee is also able to take account of the first part of the Council's report for the current year (1988), received by the Assembly on 30th September 1988.

1.3. As previously, the Presidential Committee has referred to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments the sections of the Council's annual report concerning:

- the Council's activities relating to security in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, the control of armaments and disarmament;
- the application of Protocol No. II on WEU forces;
- the activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and Agencies I and II.

1.4. The two major arms control events of the past year have been essentially bilateral in nature:

- (a) the treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate-range nuclear forces (the INF Treaty<sup>2</sup>) which was signed in Washington on 8th December 1987 and ratified by the Senate of the United States (as recom-

mended in Resolution 77, instigated by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and adopted by the Assembly in December 1987) and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at the end of May 1988. This treaty is examined in detail at Chapter IV:

- (b) the summit meeting in Moscow (29th May to 2nd June 1988) between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union which, as it occurred a matter of days before the last session of the Assembly was the subject of an urgent recommendation on disarmament drafted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and adopted unanimously by the Assembly on 9th June 1988 as Recommendation 460.

### *II. Activities of the Council*

#### *(a) Platform on European security interests*

2.1. By far the most significant event concerning the members of WEU in 1987 was the adoption by members on 27th October in The Hague of the platform on European security interests. The declared purpose of the platform was to define the conditions and criteria for European security and the responsibilities of the WEU partners in respect of western defence, arms control and disarmament and East-West dialogue and co-operation.

2.2. The introductory section of the platform emphasises the twin foundations of WEU reactivation: in the process of creating a security dimension to European integration on the one hand, and in the reaffirmation and strengthening of alliance solidarity on the other:

“ We recall our commitment to build a European union in accordance with the single European act, which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.” (point 2)

“ We intend therefore to develop a more cohesive European defence identity which will translate more effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity to which we

1. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council, 31st March 1987, Document 1090, Rapporteur: Mr. Amadei; and Disarmament - reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council, 2nd November 1987, Document 1116, Rapporteur: Mr. Scheer.

2. See text at Appendix I.

are committed through the modified Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties.” (point 4)

2.3. One remarkable and immediate effect of the platform was on United States attitudes generally to Western European Union. In a previous report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments<sup>3</sup> the Assembly's attention was drawn to the fact that certain parts of the United States administration had reportedly objected to the WEU Council interesting itself in arms control matters. Since those days, there have been some who obviously mistrust the idea of reactivating WEU, thinking perhaps that here was the embryo of a European Defence Community, with all the implications of a latter-day Plevin Plan...

2.4. To avoid any such inference, the theme of Europe and the alliance is repeated throughout the platform. The member states declared that it was “our conviction that a more united Europe will make a stronger contribution to the alliance, to the benefit of western security as a whole. This will enhance the European rôle in the alliance and ensure the basis for a balanced partnership across the alliance”. The member states were “resolved to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance”. (III,a,2).

2.5. The Worldnet speech delivered by President Reagan on 4th November 1987 proved that the attachment to this link was reciprocated across the Atlantic: the President welcomed the platform and emphasised the unshakeable nature of the United States' commitment to the alliance and to European security. The platform itself is unambiguous about the significance of the North American presence in Europe: “...the security of the Western European countries can only be ensured in close association with our North American allies. The security of the alliance is indivisible”. (I,4). And “The substantial presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces plays an irreplaceable part in the defence of Europe. They embody the American commitment to the defence of Europe and provide the indispensable linkage with the United States strategic deterrent”. (II,3). This latter point further legitimises Western European interests and concerns where the START talks are concerned, for example, as well as providing impetus to the burden-sharing debate which is discussed in other recent reports of the Assembly<sup>4</sup>.

3. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-first annual report of the Council, 31st March 1987, Document 1090, Rapporteur: Mr. Amadei.

4. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters, 9th May 1988, Document 1137, Rapporteur: Mr. Pontillon.

*(b) The Gulf situation*

2.6. If the platform is the “inward and spiritual grace” of Western European Union, then the “outward and visible sign” in 1987-88 has been co-operation in the Gulf, and this also has had a particular impact on the Atlantic Alliance which found itself otherwise collectively impotent when confronted with the problem.

2.7. At the invitation of the Netherlands presidency, senior officials from the WEU ministries of foreign affairs and defence met in The Hague on 20th August to consider the different aspects of the situation in the Gulf area. The meeting was held pursuant to Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty and was the first meeting of its kind held within the reactivated WEU.

2.8. The representatives had a thorough exchange of views. They stressed that United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 should be fully implemented forthwith so as to bring the conflict between Iraq and Iran to an end and that the WEU member countries would continue to support all efforts aimed at achieving this. And they affirmed that Europe's vital interests required that the freedom of navigation in the Gulf be assured at all times and that member states strongly condemned all actions contrary to that principle.

2.9. The participants also took note of the measures already undertaken or envisaged by individual member countries; the governments of Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium each decided to send naval forces to the Gulf. France and the United Kingdom had already decided to strengthen their naval presence in the region. Subsequently, the two WEU member countries not present in the Gulf expressed their solidarity with their partners. Although the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany precludes it from taking part in such operations, the German Government agreed to deploy replacements in the alliance area to cover for partners' forces sent to the Gulf. The Government of Luxembourg made a financial contribution to the maintenance of the Belgian and Netherlands naval forces in the region.

2.10. The 20th August meeting was followed by two others in The Hague on 15th September and 14th October, during which participants discussed in particular ways of improving their contacts in order to enhance co-ordination on the practical-technical level, and other meetings were held between senior officials from the foreign and defence ministries of the Seven and, on the basis of a British proposal, a consultation process initiated between the chiefs of staff in the capitals. Furthermore, regular on-the-spot contacts and exchanges of information between the naval commanders of the five WEU countries present in the Gulf were established.

2.11. This process of co-operation and concertation has continued into 1988 when the situation has eased considerably with the welcome news of the cease-fire between the two belligerents. At the time of writing, the British presidency of WEU is reported as urging a coherent mine-sweeping effort to leave the Gulf sea lanes as clear as possible before disengagement. The committee seconds the initiative wholeheartedly.

2.12. This contribution of Western European Union to improving political and military co-ordination of various national activities is viewed positively by the member states and applauded by the Assembly. It is to be hoped that it will continue and develop further, as a model for future co-operation.

*(c) Arms control and disarmament questions*

2.13. Very little detail on such topical questions as arms control and disarmament is given in the Council's annual report:

“ Member states continued consultations covering East-West relations in general and arms control issues in particular in the regular sessions of the Permanent Council as well as in the meetings of the enlarged Council (comprising the political directors of foreign ministries and appropriate representatives of defence ministries). On this base ministers in The Hague reviewed developments in East/West relations and arms control, particularly in relation to negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the global, verifiable elimination of intermediate nuclear forces. They recalled that the allies concerned at Reykjavik in June had agreed to develop further a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament and to work within the framework of this concept as envisaged in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the NAC communiqué of 12th June 1987. ”

although the platform on security interests was reasonably clear on WEU intentions:

“ 1. We shall pursue an active arms control and disarmament policy aimed at influencing future developments in such a way as to enhance security and to foster stability and co-operation in the whole of Europe. The steadfastness and cohesion of the alliance and close consultations among all the allies remain essential if concrete results are to be brought about.

3. In pursuing such an approach we shall exploit all opportunities to make further progress towards arms reductions, compatible with our security and with our priorities, taking into account the fact that

work in this area raises complex and inter-related issues. We shall evaluate them together, bearing in mind the political and military requirements of our security and progress in the different negotiations. ”

2.14. The Assembly has urged the Council to prepare a specifically European initiative, especially in the context of the proposed Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, currently being discussed in Vienna, but there is a striking lack of evidence of concertation or attempt at consensus in this important domain. The only glimmer of hope that something positive may emerge in the future comes in the Council's reply to Recommendation 460:

“ 1. The Council recalls that its approach to disarmament will continue to be determined and upheld by the principles in The Hague platform.

2. The Council supports the objective of balanced and verifiable arms control agreements and agrees with the Assembly that further progress towards arms reductions must be compatible with our security.

3. A major priority in this field would be the achievement of a START agreement cutting United States and Soviet strategic arsenals by approximately 50%. The Council supports the efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union to reach such an agreement as soon as possible as it could enhance strategic stability.

4. The launching of negotiations on conventional stability remains a major priority in the arms control field. The establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional forces remains the objective of these negotiations. The Council hopes that the negotiations can begin in 1988, following the satisfactory conclusion of the discussions on a mandate for them. The negotiations should take place in the context of a balanced outcome to the Vienna follow-up meeting, which will also cover the question of human rights.

5. As part of their work programme, the WEU agencies have studied in detail questions relating to conventional disarmament and, in particular, problems relating to the technology of verification. As the recommendation suggests, the agencies' skills in this area will continue to be appropriately utilised.

6. The Council strongly advocates the establishment of a global and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons as soon as possible. ”

This, coupled with one of the reports prepared by the agencies and transmitted to the Assembly: “ The experience gained in verification of con-

trols on forces and conventional armaments" indicates that some worthwhile if largely unsung work is indeed being conducted. The committee feels that this aspect of the WEU Council's work should be reported more fully in the future and extensively publicised to help strengthen not only the "European pillar" but the "transatlantic bridge" and thereby ultimately to help demolish walls between East and West.

*(d) Agencies for security questions*

2.15. The Council reports that in 1987 "the agencies for security questions continued to carry out the tasks assigned to them by the Council". The only elaboration of this laconic statement reached the Assembly via the letter in which the Secretary-General gave the revised terms of reference of the Paris-based agencies for security questions. Agency I for the study of arms control and disarmament questions was to work on two studies:

- " - the first relating to verification proposals in the context of current negotiations on arms control;
- the second relating to Soviet tactics vis-à-vis western European countries in regard to arms control and disarmament matters."

The agency was also to "follow changes in Soviet positions in regard to disarmament and armaments control".

2.16. Agency II for the study of security and defence questions was "to continue its consideration of resource management - on the basis of an analysis of national defence budgets - and of the non-military aspects of the threat, and to study how the public in WEU member states views the strategic balance". In connection with resource management, "the agency is to study means of achieving true comparability of criteria in western countries and rationalisation of defence budget management".

2.17. Sadly this potentially valuable research has obviously suffered from the failure of the Council to solve the related issues of merging the agencies and eventual collocation of the ministerial organs. Meanwhile, however, Western Europe is in danger of losing a vital asset in the realm of arms control, with considerable expertise and experience, at the very moment that considerations such as verification are assuming an extremely high profile (see also the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments report on "Verification: a future European satellite agency", Rapporteur: Mr. Fourré).

2.18. The committee ventures to suggest that squabbling over institutional issues should occupy far less of the Council's time: the "status

quo" on location is obviously the only alternative for the present, with secondment from national ministries being the best solution for staffing the agencies and achieving results (as is being proved already in the working of the reinforced Council and the Special Working Group).

*(e) Institutional defence tasks of the Council*

*(i) Levels of forces of member states*

2.19. The committee notes that the Council has continued with its customary tasks of forces control in implementation of Protocol No. II. As indicated in the 32nd report, and in accordance with the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984, the control of conventional weapons listed in Annex IV to Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty has been abolished as from 1st January 1986.

*(a) Forces under NATO command*

2.20. The maximum levels of ground, air and naval forces which member states of WEU place under NATO command are fixed in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty. So that it may satisfy itself that the limits laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II are not exceeded, the Council receives information every year concerning the levels in question, in accordance with Article IV of that Protocol. This information is obtained in the course of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and is transmitted to the Council by a high-ranking officer designated by him to that end. The information, as at the end of 1986, was conveyed at the appropriate time. The same procedure is reported as under way for the information as at the end of 1987.

2.21. The Council also takes the necessary steps to implement the procedure laid down in its resolution of 15th September 1956, whereby the levels of forces of WEU member states under NATO command are examined in the light of the annual review.

2.22. For the year 1986, the permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom examined the levels of forces of WEU member states and reported to the Council.

2.23. The Council noted that the level of forces of the member states of WEU, as set out in the NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II, as at present in force. It also took note of a declaration on French forces made by the representative of France.

2.24. The Council reports that the same procedure is under way for the year 1987.

*(b) Forces under national command*

2.25. As stated above, the Council is continuing with its control of forces of member states maintained on the mainland of Europe, and remaining under national command – internal defence and police forces, forces for the defence of overseas territories, and common defence forces – specified in the agreement of 14th December 1957.

*(ii) United Kingdom forces stationed on the mainland of Europe*

2.26. Under the terms of Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty, the United Kingdom undertook to maintain on the mainland of Europe the effective strength of: “four divisions and the second tactical air force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, regards as having equivalent fighting capacity”. The United Kingdom undertook: “not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the high contracting parties...this undertaking shall not, however, bind her in the event of an acute overseas emergency...”. In accordance with the procedure provided for in that article, the Council subsequently acquiesced in the United Kingdom’s request to reduce the levels of forces it maintains on the mainland of Europe, and the level now agreed by the Council is 55 000 men plus a tactical air force. At the insistence of the Assembly, acting on reports from the committee, the United Kingdom agreed to include a statement in the Council’s annual report setting forth the precise levels of the forces affected by this undertaking.

2.27. The Council’s annual report states that the “average” number of British land forces stationed on the mainland of Europe in 1987 in accordance with this commitment was 54 334 but “...in 1987 there were an average 949 men redeployed...to Northern Ireland”. This means that the underlying average number of men on the mainland of Europe was 53 385 – a shortfall of 1 615 below the current level of the United Kingdom’s obligation. As the figure quoted is an average level, it must be concluded that there were periods in 1987 when the actual level was lower still.

2.28. The committee regrets that the United Kingdom fell short of its WEU commitment by an average of nearly 3% in 1987, continuing the previous year’s trend, and would welcome an explanation of the underlying reasons, especially if the same situation is to be continued or exacerbated in the future (which, given present demo-

graphic profiles, may well be the case). The committee accepts the Council’s assurance that BAOR units redeployed to Northern Ireland would be speedily returned to their duty station in an emergency affecting NATO.

2.29. With regard to the United Kingdom’s contribution to the second allied tactical air force in 1987, the Council’s report provides the following information:

*United Kingdom contribution to NATO second tactical air force*

Rôle	Aircraft equipment	Squadrons
Strike/Attack	Tornado	7
Offensive support	Harrier	2
Reconnaissance	Jaguar	1
Air defence	Phantom	2
	Rapier surface-to-air missiles	4
Air transport	Puma	1
	Chinook	1
Ground defence	RAF regiment	1

2.30. The committee notes with satisfaction that compared with 1986, there has been an increase of one in the number of Tornado squadrons in Germany.

2.31. Where levels of forces present in Germany are concerned, the committee would like to underline the importance of maintaining agreed numbers and not making unilateral reductions, unless and until agreed and verifiable multi-lateral arms control measures are negotiated. This is particularly vital in the context of visible burden-sharing and the setting of examples which might create unfortunate precedents. Transatlantic alliance solidarity is more important than short-term national considerations now and in the foreseeable future.

*(f) Agency for the Control of Armaments*

2.32. In accordance with the Council’s decision to abolish controls on conventional weapons in WEU countries – a decision which the Assembly, on the recommendation of the committee, had been calling for repeatedly for a number of years, no such controls were carried out in 1987. The Agency for the Control of Armaments has itself been largely disbanded and comprises today a single staff member who is an expert on chemical weapons. According to the Council’s Rome declaration of 26th October 1984, which announced the reactivation of WEU, while the conventional arms controls were to be abolished from 1st January 1986, “the commitments and controls concerning ABC weapons would be maintained at the existing level and in accordance with the procedures



agreed up to the present time". The second part of the annual report for 1987 records that: "The Agency did not exercise any control in the field of atomic weapons". While the list of biological weapons subject to control, as accepted by the Council in 1981, was renewed for 1987, "...the agency did not exercise any control in the field of biological weapons". The committee notes that the situation concerning nuclear and biological weapons remains unchanged – the controls on these weapons provided for in the modified Brussels Treaty have never been applied.

2.33. The situation concerning chemical weapons is quite different, as the Agency for the Control of Armaments has duly applied the controls provided for in Protocol No. III of the modified Brussels Treaty. The Agency for the Control of Armaments circulates a questionnaire to all member countries which have not renounced the right to produce chemical weapons; two specific questions are asked: whether production of chemical weapons has passed the experimental stage and entered the effective production stage; and the levels of stocks of any chemical weapons that the member country might hold. The annual report states, as in the past, that all member states replied in the negative to both questions, and that accordingly, the agency carried out no quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 1987.

2.34. Since the committee's last report on the subject<sup>5</sup>, France has considerably modified its original stance on chemical weapons and as recently as 29th September 1988, President Mitterrand stated that France would itself renounce the future making and stocking of chemical weapons as soon as a global convention was signed. The committee welcomes this constructive development which considerably modifies the briefing it received on 26th July 1988 at the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva.

2.35. As far as Germany is concerned, it has of course renounced the right to produce chemical weapons on its territory under the terms of a unilateral declaration annexed to the modified Brussels Treaty, and the Agency for the Control of Armaments applies an agreed procedure to verify the non-production of chemical weapons in that country. At the present time, visits carried out under the agreed procedure remain the only inspections carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments which previously numbered some 70 each year when controls were applied also to conventional weapons. The annual report of the Council up to 1965 gave details of all inspections carried out by the

agency, including the numbers of non-control measures applying to the non-production of chemical weapons. From 1966 onwards, annual reports of the Council provided data only for total numbers of control measures carried out by the agency, but under a subsequent agreement with the Council, the committee was informed each year on a confidential basis of the breakdown of this number of inspections by quantitative controls and non-production controls, etc.

2.36. The Council's report for 1987 reinstates the information relating to the numbers of inspections carried out under the residual functions of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, as called for by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments which is pleased to see that this capacity, although vestigial, is being maintained.

### *III. Western European Union attitudes on arms control and disarmament*

3.1. The governments of WEU have always recognised that military strength, while being essential to security, is not the complete answer. Progress has to be maintained in the search for a more peaceful world and our nations are therefore committed to the negotiation of realistic and verifiable arms control agreements in respect of nuclear and other forces. The western alliance as a whole has long recognised that strong defences to deter aggression, and the pursuit of détente through arms control and other measures, are complementary aspects of security policy. A need for international, as opposed to unilateral, arms control is recognised, with the INF deal seen as a vindication of the West's policy of maintaining strong defences while seeking international arms control agreements. One-sided disarmament would remove the alliance's ability to deter aggression and would thus undermine security, increasing, rather than reducing, the dangers of war. It would not result in other nuclear states following a western example and would remove the incentive for the Soviet Union to negotiate proper balanced measures of disarmament. The only safe route to disarmament is seen as one in which countries act in agreement and in parallel. There would be no way that the Soviet Union could be persuaded to disarm if the West threw in its hand before the bidding started. If, while maintaining western defences, multilateral disarmament is pursued with determination and vigour, we stand the best chance of persuading the Soviet Union to reduce their nuclear and conventional arsenals in return for reducing ours, and the INF deal supports that particular view.

5. Disarmament – reply to the thirty-second annual report of the Council, Document 1116, 2nd November 1987, Rapporteur: Mr. Scheer.

*(a) Arms control priorities*

3.2. The Assembly of WEU fully supports the United States-Soviet Union INF agreement signed in Washington last December. The agreement had been a NATO priority since 1979 and is a tribute to the alliance's decision to follow the twin track of modernising its own aging forces in the face of the Soviet build-up, while seeking an arms control accord. If NATO had abandoned its own forces unilaterally, there would have been no incentive for the Soviet Union to negotiate and the INF deal might never have been achieved.

3.3. The western allies have a comprehensive set of further arms control priorities which were affirmed in Reykjavik in June last year, and these are a 50% reduction in United States and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals, a global ban on chemical weapons, and an agreement to redress the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe.

3.4. The priority in the strategic arms talks has to be reductions in the massive arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, as these are seen as vastly greater than the strategic forces of the other nuclear weapon states and that has been fully recognised by both General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan, who agree that forces from other countries should be excluded from the current negotiations. A 50% cut in the superpowers' arsenals would significantly improve international security without undermining defence strategy. The Warsaw Pact has a definite numerical advantage in conventional forces in Europe, and in chemical weapons. Agreements in these two areas would likewise be necessary steps towards greater security.

*(b) NATO forces post-INF*

3.5. The INF agreement is seen as a good one, but limited. It will change neither the essential basis of the Soviet threat, nor the nature of the necessary western response to it. The Soviet Union will still retain large numbers of nuclear weapons, including strategic systems capable of attacking intermediate targets. Its conventional and chemical superiorities remain. The alliance, therefore, has to maintain the ingredients of a flexible response strategy – that means the recognisable military capabilities – conventional and nuclear – to respond effectively at all levels of aggression. That in turn requires continued possession of adequate conventional forces, maintenance of nuclear forces in the European area and maintenance of a strategic nuclear arsenal.

3.6. There are concerns that the INF agreement damages one crucial element of the

triad by diminishing NATO's ability to deploy longer-range nuclear systems in Europe. The Pershing 2 and ground-launched cruise missile systems are reliable and effective. They provide increased flexibility and survivability. It would be wrong to pretend that the alliance is not giving up weapons of considerable military value, although the Soviet Union no doubt feels the same about the SS-20.

3.7. Alliance nuclear planning over the last five years and more has assumed the deployment in Europe of Pershing and cruise, and, with their elimination, it will be necessary to reassess and to adjust what is left. That in no sense involves a contravention of the INF agreement. The aim is to ensure that the remaining forces, which will include over 4 000 nuclear warheads assigned to SACEUR, are effective, with the necessary launchers. This process is not new, nor is it in any way inconsistent with reducing the number of nuclear weapons.

3.8. At Montebello in 1983, for example, the West agreed<sup>6</sup> to reduce its European stockpile unilaterally by 1 400 warheads and also to improve the remaining systems to ensure their effectiveness. We now have to consider what further adjustments are needed following the INF agreement, although the emphasis must surely be on the conventional and chemical.

*IV. The INF Treaty*

4.1. Many members of the Assembly have asked for a breakdown of the details concerning the INF Treaty, which has far-reaching implications as a precedent for future arms control régimes, and particularly for verification. The following section is an attempt to give the detail required.

4.2. During the second part of the thirty-third ordinary session, the Assembly voted to adopt Resolution 77 on the INF Treaty on 2nd December 1987. Resolution 77 reads:

“ The Assembly,

Endorsing the view of its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments expressed in Document 1116 that the INF agreement now to be signed by the United States and the Soviet Union should be in the long-term security interests of countries both of the alliance and the Warsaw Pact,

URGES THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

To give its advice and consent to the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces as expeditiously as possible;

6. See text at Appendix II.

## INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENT

To transmit the text of the present resolution and the corresponding report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to the President of the United States Senate for the information of all its members."

The INF Treaty was duly signed on 8th December and the text of Resolution 77 and the corresponding report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments duly transmitted to the President of the United States Senate. The full text of the INF Treaty is shown at appendix.

*(a) The INF Treaty at a glance*

4.3. The treaty is made up of 17 articles. All ground-launched missiles of the two sides with a range between 500 and 5 500 km are to be destroyed including those with non-nuclear warheads. For the future, further production, flight-testing or deployment will be banned.

4.4. The total number of missiles involved is 2 611. On the United States side there are 859 missiles made up of 247 Pershing IIs, 442 ground-launched cruise missiles, 170 Pershing IAs with a total of 283 launchers. For the Soviet Union, 1 752 missiles are involved: 170 SS-4s, six SS-5s, 650 SS-20s, 726 SS-12s and 200 SS-23s on a total of 845 launchers. Also banned are all conventional ground-launched cruise missiles.

*(i) Time-scale*

4.5. Both countries began destruction of missiles at the same time and the process is to be completed within three years. All warheads are to be removed from missiles, but the fissile material may be kept on each side together with the most sensitive parts of the guidance systems. The remainder of the warhead and the whole of the re-entry vehicle are to be destroyed.

*(ii) Inspection*

4.6. Thirty days after the treaty came into force, each side was allowed a base-line inspection to check the number of missiles and launchers in notified locations and these inspections duly began on 1st July 1988. A total of 20 short-notice on-site inspections per year will be allowed each side during the first three years. These may be carried out in third countries, but the third country inspections will be covered by a formal agreement with each host country. Once the dismantling is complete, each side will make a formal inspection of the bases and other sites to ensure that all missiles have been destroyed. In addition, each side is allowed 15 challenge inspections per year after dismantling for the first five years and then 10 a year for the next five years after that.

*(iii) Other documents*

4.7. Other documents concerning the treaty include a memorandum of understanding covering weapons and site data including types of missile, technical characteristics of missiles, numbers deployed and location, numbers produced but not deployed with location at production sites, test sites, etc.

4.8. A protocol on elimination procedures describes the means to be used to destroy missiles, warheads and launching equipment. The protocol describes what materials may be re-used. Missile destruction in the first six months may be done by test-firing or by using the vehicles for target practice.

4.9. Thirdly, there is a protocol for on-site inspections. Inspectors making short-notice inspections of suspect activity would be confined to certain areas which would include the declared sites. The inspections during the last 10 years will be permitted in the home countries only and will include the ground-launched cruise missile launcher plants in each country.

4.10. Lastly, basing country agreements have been concluded to give legal status to visits by inspectors to third countries. It is this point which has given rise on occasion to charges that such inspections are possible infringements of national sovereignty.

*(b) Technical aspects of the INF Treaty*

4.11. The INF agreement contains more clauses of a technical nature than most of its forerunners. The following paragraphs seek to explain some of the complicated ramifications.

4.12. The treaty provides for the total elimination of intermediate nuclear forces (INF) which include both longer-range intermediate nuclear forces (LRINF) and shorter-range intermediate nuclear forces (SRINF).

4.13. Attached to the treaty is the protocol on verification which is the key to the success not only of this particular agreement, but also for all other future agreements. Obviously the two parties involved must be satisfied that all provisions of the treaty are met fully: hence the intricate system of verification procedures.

4.14. These procedures call for the destruction of both sides' ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBM), which have ranges from 1 000 to 5 500 km (LRINF) and from 500 to 1 000 km (SRINF). For the United States, this encompasses the Pershing II and the BGM-109G cruise systems (LRINF) and the Pershing IA (SRINF); for the Soviet Union, the SS-20, SS-5, SS-4 (LRINF) and the SS-23 and the SS-12 (SRINF). All missiles are to be destroyed within three years of the implementation of the treaty.

4.15. During the period leading up to ratification, both sides drew up lists of inspectors. Three initial lists were prepared by each side. One included the aircrew in charge of transporting national inspection teams. Another list (*Group A*) included those who would carry out the initial missile counts and spot checks. Thirdly, there is the team (*Group B*) of those inspectors who will monitor compliance for a period of up to 13 years. As many as 200 members were included on a list. Other states besides the United States and the Soviet Union are also affected, because of the siting of the two countries' systems. For inspection purposes, there are two kinds of parties: the "inspected party" (*Party 1*) which can be only the United States and the Soviet Union, and the "basing country" (*Party 2*).

4.16. Points of entry into each country are strictly specified:

- United States: Washington DC or San Francisco;
- Belgium: Brussels National Airport;
- FRG: Frankfurt (Main Airbase);
- Italy: Ciampino, Rome;
- Netherlands: Schiphol, Amsterdam;
- United Kingdom: RAF Greenham Common;
- Soviet Union: Moscow or Irkutsk;
- GDR: Schkeuditz;
- Czechoslovakia: Ruzyně International Airport.

4.17. Advance notice of inspectors, point of entry, date and hour, will be given at least 16 hours previously. The same team, tasked also with supervising the destruction process, will, when performing that task, give no less than 72 hours advance warning of its arrival at a destruction site.

4.18. The reception accorded to any inspection team will be dictated by the country they visit. Should they arrive in the United States and the Soviet Union, only an escort from *Party 1* will be present. Should an inspection team arrive in one of the countries belonging to *Party 2*, in addition to a team from *Party 1*, an escort from *Party 2* may also be provided. (A provision inserted in order to preserve the sovereignty of each basing country.)

4.19. On Tuesday 27th September 1988 ten Soviet inspectors arrived in the Federal Republic of Germany to make the first such "short notice inspection" of an American INF missile base – exercising the right to do so for the first time. The USSR has the right to make ten short notice inspections in the FRG each year.

4.20. While performing their duty, inspectors may use all equipment allowed, apart from "photographic appliances". Should any contention arise, inspectors could ask *Party 1* (but

not *Party 2*), to photograph the object of dispute for them. The only cameras permitted are those which produce instantaneous pictures, identical copies of which will be retained by the United States and the Soviet Union. The task of the inspectors is to compile a report and it is their duty to try and resolve disputes on the spot. In the event of substantial disagreements, however, they are not empowered to propose solutions. Their inspection must be visual, aided by scientific equipment such as radiation detection devices. Should members of *Group A* come across objects contained within enclosed spaces, they are allowed to measure them and compare their size with the information provided by *Party 1*. If the information coincides with their measurements, they will not be allowed to inspect further. However, should the claims of *Party 1* seem to contradict the size and shape of an obscured object, this finding will be added to the inspectors' report. During their visit, inspectors are allowed to place guards around an installation and challenge any vehicles or movements which may take place.

4.21. Production facilities on the territory of *Party 1* are subject to continuous monitoring for a period of 13 years. *Party 1* is obliged to maintain a perimeter around such sites with one main gate, containing at most one road and rail link and two other exits. Any vehicle which could contain a missile should pass only through the main gate. Inspectors from *Group B* will live next to the facilities for the entire period, if they wish. Living accommodation will initially be provided by the host nation; construction material could also be provided for the erection of three buildings, with floor space not greater than 150 square metres. These could house a data centre and the team's headquarters. And although teams would be allowed communication with their data centre outside a facility's perimeter while inspecting such sites, this will be restricted to particular radio frequencies. Inspectors are also allowed to place sensors around the main gate to monitor movements.

4.22. From the amount of detail included in the protocol to the treaty, it is obvious that verification will not be cheap. But verification procedures must be rigorous if the treaty is to be a success. In addition, however, the procedures must be enhanced by good will on both sides and a genuine commitment to adhere to the agreement (which entails the destruction of some 4% of world stocks of nuclear weapons). The stakes are high, but if successful, the agreement will augur well for further arms limitation proposals, and especially for the reductions currently being discussed at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). Should the verification procedures outlined above prove impossible to apply practically (and equitably), the eventual success of all future negotiations could well be in jeopardy.

## V. Major conventional arms control talks

### (a) *Negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in central Europe (MBFR talks) – Vienna*

5.1. Talks began on 30th October 1973 between two groups of countries from NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The participants are:

- (i) West: Belgium, Canada, FRG, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States;
- (ii) East: Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland, USSR.

(It has also been suggested that Denmark and Hungary should join; France does not participate in the talks, although she is kept informed, e.g. in the NATO Council.)

5.2. The area covered includes the territory of seven countries only: Belgium, FRG, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, GDR and Poland.

5.3. Both sides agree reductions in the area concerned to 900 000 ground and air troops, with an initial reduction of 1 500 Soviet and 5-6 500 United States troops. But major issues still to be resolved include adequate verification measures and whether or not to include armaments in the initial reduction (at various times proposals on armaments have included nuclear missiles, nuclear-capable aircraft, tactical nuclear warheads and tanks).

5.3. The 45th round of talks finished on 30th June, but it appears likely that when a mandate is agreed for the wider CSCE talks (see below), the MBFR negotiations will probably be subsumed. Even though nothing tangible seems to have resulted from nearly fifteen years of talks in this forum, the "lessons learned" by all concerned have been considerable and have had tremendous influence both on attitudes bi- and multilaterally and in helping to generate a greater understanding of the issues involved in arms control. (In addition, the talks have also spawned a whole new specialist vocabulary...)

### (b) *Conference on Confidence- and Security-building and Disarmament in Europe (CDE and CSCE) – Vienna*

5.5. The CDE (Conference on Disarmament in Europe) is part of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

5.6. Previous talks took place in Stockholm from January 1984 to September 1986 when the thirty-four states involved agreed various confidence-building measures which developed those agreed in Helsinki in 1975. This third conference

began in Vienna on 4th November 1986, having decided a mandate to begin the talks on actual disarmament measures.

5.7. The participants now are as follows (grouped normally as NATO, Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO), and neutral and non-aligned (NNA)):

Austria (NNA)	Malta (NNA)
Belgium (NATO)	Monaco (NNA)
Bulgaria (WTO)	Netherlands
Canada (NATO)	(NATO)
Cyprus (NNA)	Norway (NATO)
Czechoslovakia	Poland (WTO)
(WTO)	Portugal (NATO)
Denmark (NATO)	Romania (WTO)
Finland (NNA)	San Marino (NNA)
France (NATO)	Spain (NATO)
FRG (NATO)	Sweden (NNA)
GDR (WTO)	Switzerland (NNA)
Greece (NATO)	Turkey (NATO)
Holy See (NNA)	United Kingdom
Hungary (WTO)	(NATO)
Iceland (NATO)	United States
Ireland (NNA)	(NATO)
Italy (NATO)	USSR (WTO)
Liechtenstein (NNA)	Yugoslavia (NNA)
Luxembourg	
(NATO)	

5.8. While all states appear to be satisfied with how the provisions of the Stockholm conference were being implemented (successful inspections, for example, on both sides), ideas are divided on how to reach agreement on the subjects for discussion. The Warsaw Pact wants CDE to begin negotiations on large-scale conventional reductions, while NATO wants such discussions to be held outside the CDE. Hence the sixteen NATO nations and the seven WTO nations are separately discussing what mandate to give European conventional arms talks and what link to have with the CSCE. This "Group of twenty-three" also has its own problems – the WTO wanting to include discussion of tactical nuclear weapons, which is strongly resisted by NATO.

5.9. Many NATO nations do not want the neutral and non-aligned states to discuss western arms reductions, so the present proposal is to discuss military reductions and stability among the twenty-three (concentrating to begin with on reductions to lessen the capability for offensive action and surprise attack) and link such talks with the thirty-five-state forum which would discuss further confidence-building measures.

5.10. France has traditionally opposed bloc-to-bloc talks on conventional arms reductions, in this and other settings, and has insisted that reference be made, in the preamble to the proposed mandate, to the Brussels Treaty, thus providing a potential direct link with Western European Union.

5.11. At the time of writing, provided agreement can be reached to make progress on human rights issues (and progress here should be possible if the same attitudes prevail as in virtually all other areas), it would appear that a mandate for conventional arms control talks in this context is highly likely in the near future.

5.12. Outside the talks, the Warsaw Pact continued its multitude of proposals. At the Moscow summit Mr. Gorbachev presented a three-stage proposal for reductions. It would begin with a data exchange and verification of the data, followed by correction of the asymmetries uncovered, through reductions. In stage two each side would reduce by 500 000 troops. In the third stage further reductions would take place and the remaining forces would be given a defensive character.

5.13. Poland on 15th June 1988 tabled details of a plan for a broader reduction, as well as a zone of dispersed armaments between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

5.14. On 11th July 1988, Mr. Gorbachev suggested a pan-European summit meeting to move ahead on conventional arms, and a European risk-reduction centre. In the same speech he said the USSR would withdraw forward-deployed nuclear-capable aircraft if the United States would withdraw the 72 F-16s which at Spanish insistence, were to be moved from their current home in Spain to Italy.

(c) *Conference on Disarmament (CD) – Geneva*

5.15. The Conference on Disarmament was created by the United Nations as a result of the 1978 Special Session on Disarmament.

5.16. Participants are as follows:

Algeria	Italy
Argentina	Japan
Australia	Kenya
Belgium	Mexico
Brazil	Mongolia
Bulgaria	Morocco
Burma	Netherlands
Canada	Nigeria
China	Pakistan
Cuba	Peru
Czechoslovakia	Poland
Egypt	Romania
Ethiopia	Sri Lanka
France	Sweden
FRG	United Kingdom
GDR	United States
Hungary	USSR
India	Venezuela
Indonesia	Yugoslavia
Iran	Zaire

5.17. The permanent agenda of the conference deals with "the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

- (i) nuclear weapons in all aspects;
- (ii) chemical weapons;
- (iii) other weapons of mass destruction;
- (iv) conventional weapons;
- (v) reduction of military budgets;
- (vi) reduction of armed forces;
- (vii) disarmament and development;
- (viii) disarmament and international security;
- (ix) collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;
- (x) comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

5.18. Most items on the CD agenda are discussed in ad hoc committees and of these perhaps the committee on chemical weapons is the one which has made the most progress. Established in March 1980, with all forty countries of the conference participating, it is attempting to draft a treaty which would produce a global ban on the possession, production, and use of chemical weapons.

5.19. Chemical weapons are those weapons which include a chemical agent: chemicals which kill after touching the skin or inhalation. They are usually delivered by shells; the term "munitions" refers to both the agent and the shell (hence the confusion caused when the Soviet Union stated that no more than 50 000 tons of chemical weapons were held: 50 000 tons of agent? Or 50 000 tons of agent *and* shell?).

5.20. The obvious complications which bedevil negotiations are:

- (i) the problem of proliferation – chemical agents are easy to produce and comparatively cheap;
- (ii) the problem therefore of agreeing a truly global ban;
- (iii) the reported current use of such agents in present conflicts (not all alleged users take part in the talks);
- (iv) the major problem of adequate verification, including, of course, fear of industrial espionage.

5.21. Where verification is concerned, your Rapporteur cannot help wondering what advice and consultation has been offered by the Council of Western European Union whose agencies have thirty years' worth of experience and expertise to contribute?

5.22. The United Nations third special session on disarmament met in New York from 31st May to 26th June, but ended without a final document. Subjects discussed included: prevention of an arms race in outer space; the relationship between disarmament and development; nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace. Although a consensus was not possible, most present agreed that "progress was made".

### *VI. Aspects of deterrence: the different Europes and public perceptions*

6.1. Development of deterrence now seems to depend on developments in high technology. But here there is a great danger of arousing special susceptibilities: advanced technology is closely linked to individual, industrial and national prestige and has particular overtones for economic stimulus.

6.2. In both eastern and western bloc countries, the birth rate is either generally static, or in some instances actually declining in real terms and such demographic developments (in particular producing insufficient manpower for present force levels to be maintained) will certainly increase the demand for sophisticated technology, leading eventually to an alienation between civilisation (technological progress) and culture (social advancement and everyday use).

6.3. For example, the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions' report on European space policy until 2000<sup>7</sup> concludes that space should be seen as a collective cultural heritage. But one must always look forward. Even in days gone by it was only by looking forward that space became any sort of "cultural heritage" (from Daedalus and his ill-fated son, Icarus, through Jules Verne to our modern communication satellites). And such was the theme which contributed to the success of the Assembly's colloquy in Munich in September 1985 (The space challenge for Europe).

6.4. The most recent colloquy, (held by the Assembly in London at the beginning of March 1988 on European co-operation in armaments research and development) pointed to various other problems which also have repercussions on disarmament. European unity is still vitally

dependent on a series of situations which prognosticate conflict rather than unison. For example: the current incompatibility between the Europes of seven, twelve or twenty-one members; the single European act, and the 1992 market; the possible enlargement of WEU as a means to reinforcing the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance, with attendant problems; the whole incongruence between the various organisations set up to ensure European co-operation in different fields; all leading to very different attitudes, influenced also by such basic elements as individual geography and therefore threat perception...

6.5. Our ideal aim would surely be to achieve mutual security for the whole of Western Europe: co-operation between the various European organisations is therefore a move in the right direction (as is the step towards enlargement of Western European Union taken by the Council at The Hague on 18th/19th April 1988). But many problems remain to be solved before our present grouping (the only European organisation with a mandate to deliberate on defence issues) becomes involved with other forums, some of which are already extending their interests into the field of security.

6.6. Some of these conceptions may appear particularly nebulous, but they have to be considered if real progress is to be made in disarmament. WEU could have a real contribution to make in this domain, especially where verification is concerned, and a positive suggestion is developed in a parallel report to the Assembly by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, "Verification: a future European satellite agency" (Rapporteur: Mr. Fourné).

6.7. Originally conceived to guard against a renewal of the militarism which had plunged Europe into conflict, the Brussels Treaty clearly shows that it is the task of the alliance to protect our everyday life from the risks of future warfare. On the wider scale, the aim is to unite Europe so that together we may prevent conflict. On a smaller scale it really is necessary to give the population of our countries a genuine perception of peace instead of always searching for a potential enemy. So links between Western European Union and other organisations based on co-operation, such as the Council of Europe, must be assessed according to their peace- and security-promoting effects. All members of the Assembly nominated from national parliaments to the Council of Europe and also to the Assembly, must make this sort of assessment for themselves and they should then pass on their assessment to all parliamentary bodies of which they are a member.

6.8. Public opinion on the promotion of peace and security through arms control, arms

<sup>7</sup> European space policy until 2000, 29th April 1987, Document 1098, Rapporteur: Mr. Valleix.

reduction and disarmament is not always based on the necessary understanding of the procedures involved and of course the exact or precise budgetary consequences. Arms control does not necessarily lead to mitigation or reduction of the burden or indeed to the burden remaining unchanged. The gap between the public and the factors affecting a whole weapons cult is still far too large. A particular phenomenon of late has been the creation of special arms control departments in ministries for foreign affairs or the various ministries of defence of the member states. The creation of such departments is to be highly recommended. Links, where they exist between these departments and the academics in the universities, are a means whereby "civilian" participation in arms control procedures may be possible, given the growing importance of verification procedures, as will be examined later in this report. A number of universities and other institutions has already begun setting up verification departments in order to examine the technical aspects of verification in particular; for example, the Free University in Amsterdam now has such a department and in London the Verification Technology Information Centre already has a great deal of experience in this field.

6.9. One factor affecting "disarmament culture" is very much subject to change because of the gradual fading-away of "enemy perception" built up during the era of the cold war. Care must be taken that strategists, whether military or academic, do not create new subjects for study which might lead to the reconstruction of that old "enemy perception". There are two aspects to this change. One consistently shows the road from arms reduction to disarmament, and the other seeks to conjure up a picture of rearmament to compensate for reductions. The first aspect must obviously be made credible through agreements on the control of armaments, through verification and inspection. The second must be prevented by improving international relations and encouraging democracy. In the latter context, the threatening concept of dictatorship usurping democracy seems to be fading, leading to an easing of tension between nations, something which is very much in line with the intentions of the treaties on which Western European Union is based. This change in "enemy perception" might imply a consequential change in the operation of deterrence.

## VII. Conclusion

7.1. The whole arms control and disarmament scene is subject to change, so it is still difficult to draw any punctual conclusion at this stage. It is obvious that with such a state of flux and given the "unknown" (for example, the United States presidential elections take place the day after this report is to be presented to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments!) follow-up reports are bound to be necessary. What is important at this stage is that we seek to control the changes currently taking place and that we should build on what has been agreed in the various forums: "we should reflect upon the style in which we negotiate. Would not it be wise to take stock and conclude...that at least there are elements...on which we do agree" (Ambassador van Schaik of the Netherlands in his address to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on 8th March 1988).

7.2. We should also try to ensure that our concerns as Europeans are taken into account, particularly where superpower arms control negotiations affecting Europeans are concerned, and that Europe is not left on the sideline when the important decisions are taken. The Council of WEU has shown some sign of such a co-ordinating rôle in the reports prepared by the Paris agencies: "The recent evolution of the Soviet attitude with regard to Western Europe and the impact of this evolution on security policy" (prepared in September 1987 and transmitted to the Assembly on 25th February 1988) and "The experience gained in verification of controls on forces and conventional armaments" (prepared in March 1988 and transmitted to the Assembly on 17th June). although, sadly, the disclaimer on the title page that the reports "reflect only the opinion of the authors and neither the member states nor the Permanent Council of Western European Union can accept responsibility for the contents" tends to detract considerably from the overall impact! The Council informs the Assembly that a number of reports prepared by the agencies has been "passed to expert working groups for more detailed consideration". The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments trusts that the above-cited report, and others, on verification issues, especially, will help define a Western European identity and bring agreement closer on these vital issues of arms control and disarmament.



## APPENDIX I

*Treaty between the United States of America and  
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination of  
their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles<sup>1</sup>*

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures set forth in this treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

*Article I*

In accordance with the provisions of this treaty which includes the memorandum of understanding and protocols which form an integral part thereof, each party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this treaty.

*Article II*

For the purposes of this treaty:

1. The term "ballistic missile" means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

2. The term "cruise missile" means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

3. The term "GLBM launcher" means a fixed launcher of a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM.

4. The term "GLCM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM.

5. The term "intermediate-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1 000 km but not in excess of 5 500 km.

6. The term "shorter-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 km but not in excess of 1 000 km.

7. The term "deployment area" means a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles may operate and within which one or more missile operating bases are located.

8. The term "missile operating base" means:

(a) in the case of intermediate-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located within a deployment area, at which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate, in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located; and

(b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a complex of facilities, located any place, at which shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located.

9. The term "missile support facility", as regards intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, means a missile production facility or a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility or a launcher repair facility, a training facility, a missile storage facility or a launcher storage facility, a test range, or an elimination facility as those terms are defined in the memorandum of understanding.

10. The term "transit" means movement, notified in accordance with paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of this treaty, of an intermediate-range missile or a launcher of such a missile between missile support facilities, between such a facility

1. Official English text.

and a deployment area or between deployment areas, or of a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile from a missile support facility or a missile operating base to an elimination facility.

11. The term "deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

12. The term "non-deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

13. The term "deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

14. The term "non-deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

15. The term "basing country" means a country other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on whose territory intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles of the parties, launchers of such missiles or support structures associated with such missiles and launchers were located at any time after 1st November 1987. Missiles or launchers in transit are not considered to be "located".

### *Article III*

1. For the purposes of this treaty, existing types of intermediate-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Pershing II and the BGM-109G, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12 and the R-14, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, respectively.

2. For the purposes of this treaty, existing types of shorter-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IA, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively.

### *Article IV*

1. Each party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the memorandum of understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either party.

2. To implement paragraph 1 of this article, upon entry into force of this treaty, both parties shall begin and continue throughout the duration of each phase, the reduction of all types of their deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the provisions of this treaty. These reductions shall be implemented in two phases so that:

(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 29 months after entry into force of this treaty:

(i) the number of deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the parties to carry 171 warheads;

(ii) the number of deployed intermediate-range missiles for each party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the parties to carry 180 warheads;

(iii) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the parties to carry 200 warheads;

- (iv) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles for each party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the parties to carry 200 warheads; and
  - (v) the ratio of the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range GLBMs of existing types for each party to the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles of existing types possessed by that party shall not exceed the ratio of such intermediate-range GLBMs to such intermediate-range missiles for that party as of 1st November 1987, as set forth in the memorandum of understanding; and
- (b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than three years after entry into force of this treaty, all intermediate-range missiles of each party, launchers of such missiles and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the memorandum of understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, shall be eliminated.

#### *Article V*

1. Each party shall eliminate all its shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment of the categories listed in the memorandum of understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18 months after entry into force of this treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support equipment shall be possessed by either party.
2. No later than 90 days after entry into force of this treaty, each party shall complete the removal of all its deployed shorter-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the protocol on elimination. No later than 12 months after entry into force of this treaty, each party shall complete the removal of all its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the protocol on elimination.
3. Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less than 1 000 km.

#### *Article VI*

1. Upon entry into force of this treaty and thereafter, neither party shall:
  - (a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or
  - (b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this article, each party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that party does not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

#### *Article VII*

For the purposes of this treaty:

1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.
2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.
3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this treaty apply.
4. The range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III of this treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested. The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III of this treaty shall be considered to be the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 km but not in excess of 1 000 km shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability in excess of 1 000 km but not in excess of 5 500 km shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles.

5. The maximum number of warheads an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile carries shall be considered to be the number listed for missiles of that type in the memorandum of understanding.

6. Each GLBM or GLCM shall be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads listed for a GLBM or GLCM of that type in the memorandum of understanding.

7. If a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs.

8. If a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM.

9. The number of missiles each launcher of an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile shall be considered to be capable of carrying or containing at one time is the number listed for launchers of missiles of that type in the memorandum of understanding.

10. Except in the case of elimination in accordance with the procedures set forth in the protocol on elimination, the following shall apply:

- (a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be counted as a complete missile;
- (b) for GLBMs which are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless a party proves to the satisfaction of the other party that it does not contain such a missile, or an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM, shall be counted as a complete missile; and
- (c) for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM shall be counted as a complete missile.

11. A ballistic missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLBM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLBM launchers. A cruise missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLCM launchers.

12. Each party shall have the right to produce and use for booster systems, which might otherwise be considered to be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, only existing types of booster stages for such booster systems. Launches of such booster systems shall not be considered to be flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles provided that:

- (a) stages used in such booster systems are different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III of this treaty;
- (b) such booster systems are used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves;
- (c) the aggregate number of launchers for such booster systems shall not exceed 35 for each party at any one time; and
- (d) the launchers for such booster systems are fixed, emplaced above ground and located only at research and development launch sites which are specified in the memorandum of understanding.

Research and development launch sites shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of this treaty.

#### *Article VIII*

1. All intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities or between missile support facilities and deployment areas.

3. Until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of this treaty, all shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located at missile operating bases, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

4. Transit of a missile or launcher subject to the provisions of this treaty shall be completed within 25 days.

5. All deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities are specified in the memorandum of understanding or in sub-

sequent updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX of this treaty. Neither party shall increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities, except for elimination facilities, from those set forth in the memorandum of understanding. A missile support facility shall not be considered to be part of a deployment area even though it may be located within the geographic boundaries of a deployment area.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this treaty, neither party shall locate intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, including stages of such missiles, of launchers of such missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities or test ranges listed in the memorandum of understanding.

7. Neither party shall locate any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles at training facilities.

8. A non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile shall not be carried on or contained within a launcher of such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities.

9. Training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles shall be subject to the same locational restrictions as are set forth for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this article.

#### *Article IX*

1. The memorandum of understanding contains categories of data relevant to obligations undertaken with regard to this treaty and lists all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, possessed by the parties as of 1st November 1987. Updates of that data and notifications required by this article shall be provided according to the categories of data contained in the memorandum of understanding.

2. The parties shall update that data and provide the notifications required by this treaty through the nuclear risk reduction centres, established pursuant to the agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centres of 15th September 1987.

3. No later than 30 days after entry into force of this treaty, each party shall provide the other party with updated data, as of the date of entry

into force of this treaty, for all categories of data contained in the memorandum of understanding.

4. No later than 30 days after the end of each six-month interval following the entry into force of this treaty, each party shall provide updated data for all categories of data contained in the memorandum of understanding by informing the other party of all changes, completed and in process, in that data, which have occurred during the six-month interval since the preceding data exchange, and the net effect of those changes.

5. Upon entry into force of this treaty and thereafter, each party shall provide the following notifications to the other party:

- (a) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility;
- (b) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and scheduled date of each change;
- (c) notification, except with respect to launches of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and stages of such missiles, and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, including:
  - (i) the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated;
  - (ii) the elimination site;
  - (iii) for intermediate-range missiles, the location from which such missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers are moved to the elimination facility; and
  - (iv) except in the case of support structures, the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this treaty and the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

- (d) notification, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, including:
- (i) the type of missiles to be eliminated;
  - (ii) the location of the launch, or, if elimination is by a series of launches, the location of such launches and the number of launches in the series;
  - (iii) the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this treaty; and
  - (iv) the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;
- (e) notification, no later than 48 hours after they occur, of changes in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers resulting from elimination as described in the protocol on elimination, including:
- (i) the number and type of items of a missile system which were eliminated; and
  - (ii) the date and location of such elimination; and
- (f) notification of transit of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, including:
- (i) the number of missiles or launchers;
  - (ii) the points, dates and times of departure and arrival;
  - (iii) the mode of transport; and
  - (iv) the location and time at that location at least once every four days during the period of transit.

6. Upon entry into force of this treaty and thereafter, each party shall notify the other party, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in paragraph 12 of Article VII of this treaty.

#### *Article X*

1. Each party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures set forth in the protocol on elimination.

2. Verification by on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the protocol on elimination shall be carried out in accordance with Article XI of this treaty, the protocol on elimination and the protocol on inspection.

3. When a party removes its intermediate-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers from deployment areas to elimination facilities for the purpose of their elimination, it shall do so in complete deployed organisational units. For the United States of America, these units shall be Pershing II batteries and BGM-109G flights. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, these units shall be SS-20 regiments composed of two or three battalions.

4. Elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be carried out at the facilities that are specified in the memorandum of understanding or notified in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Article IX of this treaty, unless eliminated in accordance with Sections IV or V of the protocol on elimination. Support structures, associated with the missiles and launchers subject to this treaty, that are subject to elimination shall be eliminated in situ.

5. Each party shall have the right, during the first six months after entry into force of this treaty, to eliminate by means of launching no more than 100 of its intermediate-range missiles.

6. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which have been tested prior to entry into force of this treaty, but never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of this treaty, and launchers of such missiles, shall be eliminated within six months after entry

into force of this treaty in accordance with the procedures set forth in the protocol on elimination. Such missiles are:

- (a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IB, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and
- (b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RK-55, which is known to the United States of America as the SSC-X-4.

7. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be considered to be eliminated after completion of the procedures set forth in the protocol on elimination and upon the notification provided for in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of this treaty.

8. Each party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities. A party shall notify the other party pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this treaty once the conditions set forth below are fulfilled:

- (a) all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been removed;
- (b) all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been eliminated; and
- (c) all activity related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles and launchers has ceased there.

Such deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities shall be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of this treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of the scheduled elimination which was notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility listed in the memorandum of understanding that met the above conditions prior to entry into force of this treaty, and is not included in the initial data exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this treaty, shall be considered to be eliminated.

9. If a party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the memorandum of understanding for use as a base associated with

GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to this treaty, then that party shall notify the other party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted.

#### *Article XI*

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this treaty, each party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections. The parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with this article, the protocol on inspection and the protocol on elimination.

2. Each party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by this article both within the territory of the other party and within the territories of basing countries.

3. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this treaty, each party shall have the right to conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities specified in the memorandum of understanding other than missile production facilities, and at all elimination facilities included in the initial data update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this treaty. These inspections shall be completed no later than 90 days after entry into force of this treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the number of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment and other data, as of the date of entry into force of this treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this treaty.

4. Each party shall have the right to conduct inspections to verify the elimination, notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than missile production facilities, which are thus no longer subject to inspections pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of this article. Such an inspection shall be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility. If a party conducts an inspection at a particular facility pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility, then no additional inspection of that facility pursuant to this paragraph shall be permitted.

5. Each party shall have the right to conduct inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 years after entry into force of this treaty. Each party shall have the right to conduct 20 such inspections per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of this treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per calendar year during the last five years. Neither party shall use more than half of its total

number of these inspections per calendar year within the territory of any one basing country. Each party shall have the right to conduct:

- (a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities, to ascertain, according to the categories of data specified in the memorandum of understanding, the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at each missile operating base or missile support facility at the time of the inspection; and
- (b) inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this treaty other than former missile production facilities.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this treaty, each party shall have the right, for 13 years after entry into force of this treaty, to inspect by means of continuous monitoring:

- (a) the portals of any facility of the other party at which the final assembly of a GLBM using stages, any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-propellant GLBM listed in Article III of this treaty, is accomplished; or
- (b) if a party has no such facility, the portals of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced.

The party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that the other party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of this treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in sub-paragraph (a). If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of this treaty, neither party conducts the process of final assembly described in sub-paragraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither party shall have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the other party unless the process of final assembly as described in sub-paragraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry into force of this treaty, the facilities to be inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in accordance with sub-paragraph (b), for the United States of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah; in accordance with sub-paragraph (a), for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

7. Each party shall conduct inspections of the process of elimination, including elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching, of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of this treaty and the protocol on elimination. Inspectors conducting inspections provided for in this paragraph shall determine that the processes specified for the elimination of the missiles, launchers and support equipment have been completed.

8. Each party shall have the right to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers eliminated pursuant to Section V of the protocol on elimination, and of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV and V of the protocol on elimination.

#### *Article XII*

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this treaty, each party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognised principles of international law.

2. Neither party shall:

- (a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article; or
- (b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices, within a deployment area, associated with normal training, maintenance and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

3. To enhance observation by national technical means of verification, each party shall have the right until a treaty between the parties reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms enters into force, but in any event for no more than three years after entry into force of this treaty, to request the implementation of co-operative measures at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a range capability in excess of 5 500 km, which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to para-



graph 8 of Article X of this treaty. The party making such a request shall inform the other party of the deployment base at which co-operative measures shall be implemented. The party whose base is to be observed shall carry out the following co-operative measures:

- (a) no later than six hours after such a request, the party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, removed completely all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures for launchers and displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and
- (b) the party shall leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until twelve hours have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a request for such an observation.

Each party shall have the right to make six such requests per calendar year. Only one deployment base shall be subject to these co-operative measures at any one time.

#### *Article XIII*

11. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this treaty, the parties hereby establish the Special Verification Commission. The parties agree that, if either party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission to:

- (a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and
- (b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this treaty.

2. The parties shall use the nuclear risk reduction centres, which provide for continuous communication between the parties, to:

- (a) exchange data and provide notifications as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article IX of this treaty and the protocol on elimination;
- (b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of this treaty;
- (c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of this treaty and the protocol on inspection; and

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA:

President of the United States  
of America

- (d) provide and receive requests for co-operative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of this treaty.

#### *Article XIV*

The parties shall comply with this treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.

#### *Article XV*

1. This treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardised its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other party six months prior to withdrawal from this treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying party regards as having jeopardised its supreme interests.

#### *Article XVI*

Each party may propose amendments to this treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this treaty.

#### *Article XVII*

1. This treaty, including the memorandum of understanding and protocols, which form an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each party. This treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Washington on 8th December 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET  
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

General Secretary of the  
Central Committee of the CPSU

## APPENDIX II

*The Montebello decision, Annex to the final communiqué of the autumn ministerial meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) Montebello, Canada (27th October 1983)*

At Montebello, Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) ministers declared that the policy of the alliance is to preserve the peace through the maintenance of forces at the lowest level capable of deterring the Warsaw Pact threat.

Consistent with this policy the alliance since 1977 has been conducting analyses aimed at assuring that nuclear weapons in NATO's armoury are held to the minimum number necessary for deterrence, taking account of developments in conventional as well as nuclear forces.

On the basis of the initial results of these analyses, the alliance decided in December 1979 that, unless obviated by successful negotiation with the Soviet Union, the deployment of longer-range weapons (Pershing II and cruise missiles) was essential to restoring the balance and maintaining the integrity of NATO's deterrent posture. The alliance remains committed to the dual-track decision and its implementation.<sup>1</sup> At the same time ministers decided to reduce the NATO stockpile by 1 000 warheads. This withdrawal has been completed. Moreover, ministers mandated further analysis to determine whether the withdrawal of weapons beyond the 1 000 then decided could be accomplished safely, in a manner consistent with the maintenance of deterrence at the lowest possible level of weapons.

With the alliance analysis now complete, the Nuclear Planning Group has decided on 27th October 1983 to withdraw 1 400 warheads during the next several years. This ministerial decision, taken together with the already accom-

plished withdrawal of 1 000 warheads will bring to 2 400 the total number of warheads to be removed from Europe since 1979. Moreover, this reduction will not be affected by any deployment of longer-range INF (LRINF) since one warhead will be removed for each Pershing II or ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) warhead deployed.

The detailed implementation of this decision as to the precise composition of the stockpile is a matter for the responsible military authorities to determine and a programme to effect this will be worked out and implemented over the next five to six years. In this context, appropriate consideration will be given to short-range systems. NATO's military authorities should report their findings at a future NPG meeting.

Recognising that for this minimum level stockpile to make the most effective contribution to deterrence, both the delivery systems and the warheads must be survivable, responsive and effective, ministers accordingly identified a range of possible improvements. Ministers established broad criteria which will remain valid for the next decade, including the continuing importance of strengthening conventional forces. The alliance must, however, take account at all times of changes to Soviet capabilities during this period.

Contrary to the impression that NATO has been fuelling an arms build-up by adding to its nuclear armoury, this sustained programme of reductions will have reduced NATO's nuclear stockpile to the lowest level in over twenty years. Ministers urged the Soviet Union to follow the example set by the alliance, to halt and reverse its build-up of nuclear forces, and to join NATO in the search for a safer future.

1. Greece has expressed its views in the minutes of the NPG at Montebello.

*Disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council*

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AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 4<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mrs. Francese and others*

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1. In paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “ in preference ” to the end of the paragraph and insert:  
“ by tackling the question of short-range nuclear weapons in parallel with progress in the reduction of conventional weapons; ”
2. Leave out paragraph 1 (b) of the draft recommendation proper.
3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “ reply ” add “ favourably ”.
4. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out “ by stressing that such a forum already exists in the context of the CSCE ” and insert:  
“ in order to promote a positive atmosphere for the negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in accordance with the mandate they will receive from the CSCE; ”

*Signed: Francese, Pieralli, Greco*

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1. See 11th sitting, 7th December 1988 (amendments withdrawn).

*Disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 5<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman*

5. Leave out paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

*Signed: Baarveld-Schlaman*

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1. See 11th sitting, 7th December 1988 (amendment negatived).

*Disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 6<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and others*

6. Redraft paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper as follows:

“ 1. Give substance to the principles enunciated in The Hague platform by defining and stating publicly a *Western European Union* posture on specific arms control issues, including the following criteria:

- (a) arms control priorities should now advance conventional and chemical disarmament measures;
- (b) in consonance with a comprehensive concept which encompasses the interrelation between the conventional and nuclear components in our force planning and negotiating strategy, negotiations should take place on tactical nuclear weapons with a range below 500 kilometres as well as conventional forces in a way which at any time contributes to stability in Europe;
- (c) in order to enhance stability and to complement and reinforce a conventional stability agreement primary attention should be devoted to reduction and withdrawal of battlefield nuclear weapons: their short range, the limited number of ammunition depots, and war-fighting rationale contribute to dangerous instability in the event of a crisis;
- (d) the idea of corridors with no nuclear weapons and particularly offensive conventional armaments should be supported as a confidence-building measure and an integral element in a régime for stability in Europe;
- (e) sub-regional nuclear weapon-free zones as part of an overall arrangement for reducing nuclear weapons in Europe could similarly contribute to stability and security in Europe at large;
- (f) arms control agreements should include verification measures which fully satisfy all parties;
- (g) arms control should proceed by stages, allowing the security of all to remain assured throughout; ”

*Signed: Baarveld-Schlaman, Stoffelen, Hardy, Ahrens, Coleman, Soell, Klejdzinski, Luuk*

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1. See 11th sitting, 7th December 1988 (amendment negatived)

*Disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council*

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AMENDMENTS 7 and 8 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and others*

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7. In paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out “ to help further such agreement ” and insert “ to reconfirm the Geneva Convention of 1925 and to take international political measures against any violation ”.
8. Redraft paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper as follows:  
“ 2. To speed up the negotiation process, take the initiative to mount a conference of the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the twenty-three states within CSCE, who carry responsibility for the European disarmament process as members of WEU, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. ”

*Signed: Baarveld-Schlaman, Stoffelen, Hardy, Klejdzinski*

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1. See 11th sitting, 7th December 1988 (amendment 7 agreed to; amendment 8 negatived).

*Disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 9<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Reddemann*

9. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 1 and insert:
- “ Priority should now be given in the field of arms control to those objectives set out in the alliance’s declaration of 12th July 1987;
- Particular importance is attributed to the elimination of the conventional imbalances which are at present favouring the Warsaw Pact and which are the key security problem in Europe;
- In conjunction herewith and with the global elimination of chemical weapons, the imbalances in the field of short-range nuclear weapons have to be abolished by reductions to common ceilings. ”

*Signed: Reddemann*

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1. See 11th sitting, 7th December 1988 (amendment withdrawn).

*Verification: a future European satellite agency*

**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Kittelmann (Chairman); MM. de Beer, Fourré (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle (Alternate: Baumel), Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Cariglia, Cox (Alternate: Ms Ruddock), De Decker, Derycke, Fiandrotti, Fioret, Hardy, Irmer, Jung (Alternate: Koehl), Konen, de Kwaadsteniet, Mrs. Lalumière, MM. Lemmrich, Matraja, Pecchioli (Alternate: Cannata), Scheer, Sinesio, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Speed, Steiner, Steverlynck, Sir John Stokes (Alternate: Wilkinson).

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*



### *Rapporteur's Preface*

This report was suggested for inclusion in the agenda of the Committee on Defence Questions by its Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur with the aim of proposing a specifically Western European Union initiative to contribute positively and succinctly to the elan characteristic of the present arms control scene. The Rapporteur is also an alternate member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions which is producing a complementary report ("Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite", Rapporteur: Mr. Malfatti) stressing the technology required for a future Western European satellite agency. It is recommended that the two reports be read in conjunction with each other: their conclusions and recommendations are very similar.

In preparing this report *the Rapporteur* had interviews as follows:

*DACU (Defence and Arms Control Unit), Ministry of Defence, London, 7th September 1988*

Ministry of Defence:

Mr. Malcolm Lingwood;  
 Captain Chris Sloane, RN;  
 Commander Trevor Dale, RN;  
 Lt. Col. Terry Taylor;  
 Mr. Richard Hoskins.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office:

Mr. Simon Gass, Security Policy Department.

*Délégation Générale pour l'Armement, Paris, 16th September 1988*

Mr. Jacques Bousquet, Ingénieur Général de l'Armement, Directeur des Engins;  
 Mr. Daniel Pichoud, Ingénieur en Chef de l'Armement, Chef du Groupe Espace Satellites.

*Paris, 30th September 1988*

Mr. Alain Simon, Conseiller pour les Affaires Militaires, CNES (Centre national d'études spatiales).

*The Rapporteur* arranged for the following interview to be conducted on his behalf:

*SEP (Société Européenne de Propulsion), Paris, 30th September 1988*

Mr. René Morin, Vice President and General Manager, Sepimage.

The committee and the Rapporteur express their special thanks to all the officials and senior officers who met the Rapporteur or briefed the committee in reply to questions.

In addition, the Rapporteur would like to acknowledge the information kindly made available by H.E. Mr. de Montigny de Marchand, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Canada to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva.

For further reading, the Rapporteur would recommend the recent (1988) Chatham House Special Paper, "Europe's future in space", published as the result of consultation between the five institutions of international affairs based in Bonn, The Hague, London, Paris and Rome, which argues the importance of establishing European autonomy in space and of ensuring that Europeans have the means of safeguarding their own security interests. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, ISSN 0143-5795.)

***Draft Recommendation***

***on verification: a future European satellite agency***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that in The Hague platform the governments of the member states of Western European Union stressed “arms control and disarmament are an integral part of western security” as well as “arms control agreements have to be effectively verifiable”;
- (ii) Convinced that high levels of arms expenditure are caused by uncertainty in the international environment and the magnitude of the perceived threat affecting in particular relations between neighbouring countries;
- (iii) Believing that this uncertainty could be reduced by the operations of a European agency for observation satellites, the data and information from which might possibly be made freely available;
- (iv) Sharing the Council’s support for negotiations towards arms control and disarmament;
- (v) Considering that new negotiations on conventional stability in Europe are to be welcomed and are likely to begin in the near future;
- (vi) Noting that effective verification will be an essential feature of any negotiated agreement and that the signatory countries must be able to commit themselves fully and also actively participate in such verification;
- (vii) Emphasising the generally-accepted principle of sharing risks, rôles and responsibilities in ensuring European security which should also apply to the verification aspects of future agreements on the control of conventional armaments;
- (viii) Aware that the Council has commissioned the Agency for the study of arms control and disarmament questions to prepare an assessment of verification measures and has already expressed the opinion that “satellites...may offer possible means of verification which merit careful examination”;
- (ix) Certain that the verification régime of any future conventional arms control agreement in Europe should include national technical means of verification, such as monitoring by satellite, as well as other co-operative systems;
- (x) In the knowledge that various member states of Western European Union have developed sufficient technological expertise to begin working on the deployment of a satellite system capable of carrying out essential verification tasks;
- (xi) Believing that the time is now ripe for the member states of WEU to take a credible political initiative towards the setting up of a European satellite agency for the verification of conventional arms control and disarmament agreements and, in a second stage, crisis situations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

*Define the conditions for setting up a European satellite agency in WEU on the basis of the guidelines in the present report with the initial task of verifying a future conventional arms control agreement,*

*and in particular, in accordance with suggestions made in paragraph 8.3 of the explanatory memorandum,*

*Identify and assess systems existing or under study in Western Europe, methods of foreseeable European co-operation – political, operational, industrial, technological and financial – and the advantages of co-operation or a merger with existing machinery in the alliance, together with the resulting institutional and legal aspects,*

*and present its conclusions to the Assembly.*

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Fourré, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1.1. What are the reasons which lead your Rapporteur to the conclusion that Western European Union should be present as an observer in space, when at this very moment, scores of other artificial "eyes" are peacefully surveying our planet? Circling the Earth at different altitudes, these man-made sensors, both commercial and military, belong to several countries and watch over us for a multitude of different reasons: some passively collect data for intelligence purposes, some monitor the growth of crops, some watch the weather, some are used for mapping land masses, others for oceanographic research. Among the array of applications for which satellites are employed, one has acquired increasingly critical importance where arms control and disarmament agreements are concerned: the use of space-based remote sensing for the purpose of verification.

### *II. What is verification?*

2.1. The dictionary defines "verify" as a transitive verb meaning "establish the truth or correctness of, by examination or demonstration". And verification is now accepted as one of the most important aspects of the growing number of arms control agreements extant or postulated.

2.2. An arms control agreement is in fact a compromise in which each side bases at least some of its national security on the promises of the other signatory or signatories rather than on the strength of its own weapons. As a direct result, reciprocal confidence that each party will live up to its obligations is vital, particularly in conditions of suspicion and uncertainty. The benefit to each participant results from the compliance of the other signatories in the agreement so there is an obvious necessity for some type of external assurance that all participants are fulfilling their obligations. Verification is the ideal way in which to achieve such assurance. The reliability and adequacy of the verification measures associated with an arms control agreement are therefore of paramount importance, both to the successful negotiation of an agreement and to its successful implementation once ratified.

2.3. The methods used to verify an arms control agreement may vary widely, depending on the type of agreement. Everything is possible, ranging from on-site inspection where inspectors physically visit a facility to the use of remote

sensors located well away from the area to be examined. The latter systems have proved of particular importance for verifying bilateral arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Such systems, called "national technical means" (NTM), are not specifically identified in the texts of the bilateral agreements. However, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has provided a very useful definition of "national technical means":

"Assets which are under national control for monitoring compliance with the provisions of an agreement NTM include photographic reconnaissance satellites, aircraft-based systems (such as radars and optical systems), as well as sea- and ground-based systems (e.g. radars and antennas for collecting telemetry)".

2.4. It is obvious that many technical systems thus come within the scope of NTM, but there is general agreement amongst the various experts (both governmental and academic) that satellite systems, because of their relative unobtrusiveness, are among the most important.

2.5. It has been particularly the United States and the Soviet Union which have adapted their space-based surveillance capabilities to arms control verification, especially with respect to their bilateral agreements. Now it is becoming more and more apparent that other nations, some already with more than an interest in space, recognise a responsibility to become more closely involved in certain aspects of space surveillance.

2.6. Indeed, five member states of Western European Union (Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) are already implicated intimately in the recently-implemented bilateral United States-Soviet Union treaty banning intermediate nuclear forces (the INF Treaty). They recognise the advantages of this treaty banning a whole range of weapons. The same Europeans, and others too, are determined to play a part in future multilateral arms control agreements concerning conventional weaponry, contributing not only to the formulation of such agreements, but also to their verification once implemented.

2.7. One possible way to achieve such European participation in a verification system (while already recognising that all verification should be treaty-specific) would be by contributing Western Europe's expertise in launching

and using remote sensors. Hence the present report, prepared for the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments which aims in conjunction with the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions' report on "Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite"<sup>1</sup>, to examine the possible rôle for a Western European agency in contributing to a verification system by satellite.

### III. Remote sensing

3.1. Remote sensing means being able to monitor objects or events from a distance. In technical terms, remote sensing is defined as the use of electromagnetic radiation to record, from a distance, data on the environment (often in the form of images), which may be interpreted to yield useful information. The design of remote sensing systems involves consideration of a number of factors such as:

- (a) the source of the electromagnetic radiation to be recorded: this source may be natural in origin, like the light of the sun and the heat emitted by the earth, or it may be man-made like radar;
- (b) target interaction: the parameters of the target will affect the amount and characteristics of the energy emitted or reflected from it;
- (c) atmospheric interaction: the atmosphere may distort or scatter electromagnetic radiation passing through it;
- (d) the sensor: the device which records the energy reaching it from the target is a key element;
- (e) data transmission: once sensed, the data has to be transmitted from the sensor platform to the ground, where it is received and stored;
- (f) analysis and interpretation: before the data may be used it must be processed and analysed (usually by a combination of skilled human interpreters and powerful computery). This aspect is significant and is often overlooked.

3.2. Remote sensors may be used on satellites to detect electromagnetic energy. Examples of such sensors include photographic cameras, return-beam vidicon cameras, infra-red detectors and various types of scanner.

3.3. Radars and passive microwave sensors can also be used from space. In addition, electronic listening devices mounted on spacecraft might be used to detect communications transmissions and radar emissions.

1. "Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite", 7th November 1988, Document 1160, Rapporteur: Mr. Malfatti.

#### (i) Civilian and military applications

3.4. Space-based remote sensors have become a favourite tool of the modern world for both civilian and military purposes. Many of the same types of equipment are used for both. The main difference, however, is that military remote sensors are designed for much higher resolution than their civilian counterparts. Resolution is related to the size of the smallest object a sensor is able to distinguish and is determined by the focal length of the sensor, its distance from the object being examined and the size of the "picture element" (pixel) of the sensor's recording medium.

3.5. Some reports have claimed that the most advanced military space surveillance systems have a resolution of the order of ten *centimetres*. In contrast, the best resolution of current commercial satellites is about ten *metres*. For some arms control verification tasks, it may be sufficient only to detect an object or activity, while other tasks may require actual identification, which is more demanding in terms of resolution. To illustrate the difference regarding the resolution required for the purpose of verification, studies have indicated that a resolution of 4.5 m is necessary to detect an aircraft by means of optical sensors, while 0.9 m would be needed for identification. (See illustrations of different imagery at Appendices III and IV.)

#### (ii) Military sensors in space

3.6. Military surveillance from space has proved beneficial in the context of arms control verification. Even when used exclusively for military purposes these systems contribute directly to international peace and security through the maintenance of effective deterrence. Without them, the fear of military escalation, even surprise attack, especially during periods of increased political tension, would have implied defence postures and deployments which themselves might have proved catalysts for confrontation. It is perhaps reasonable to conclude that military space-based surveillance systems have contributed positively to the maintenance of peace in recent times. Interfering with these functions would be counter-productive in terms of global security and military space-based surveillance systems will probably continue to be essential to the verification of significant arms control and disarmament agreements.

#### (iii) "Civilian" sensors in space

3.7. The rapid development of civilian remote sensing satellites over the past two decades has been remarkable. Among those designed to view the Earth's land surface in some detail are those which provide data to be sold commercially. Of these, the two most important operating examples are LANDSAT and SPOT. LANDSAT

is the name given to a series of remote sensing satellites launched by the United States; the programme was privatised in 1985 and continues under a consortium called EOSAT. There have been regular launchings of this series of satellites and more are planned. SPOT is the satellite developed by France and the first one of the series was launched in January 1986. SPOT also operates on a commercial basis.

3.8. Images produced from both these satellite systems which have appeared in the press and on television have suggested the possibility of using such data for arms control verification. The published photos include the following:

- (a) SPOT images of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor site in the Soviet Union which suffered a catastrophic fire in April 1986;
- (b) LANDSAT images of the Iran-Iraq war;
- (c) LANDSAT images interpreted as showing construction of surface-to-air missile (SAMSA-5) sites in Libya;
- (d) LANDSAT image interpreted as showing through-ice launch tests of Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in the Arctic Ocean, near Wrangel Island, USSR;
- (e) LANDSAT image of the Kola Peninsular in the northern Soviet Union interpreted as showing newly constructed air and naval bases, including berths for some of the latest submarines;
- (f) LANDSAT image interpreted as showing a mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (SS-20) base near Kirov, USSR;
- (g) SPOT images of Soviet space shuttle facilities at Tyuratam, USSR.

3.9. In January 1986, it was also reported that LANDSAT imagery was being used to monitor Soviet military activities in the Far East, and another interesting press report in August 1986 suggested that SPOT images taken on behalf of a Swedish firm indicated apparent preparations in the Soviet Union for a resumption of underground nuclear testing.

3.10. Existing civilian earth observation satellites could obviously be used to provide information of some relevance to arms control verification, but are not yet a universal panacea. The resolution and the design of sensors on-board current civilian satellites are unlikely to be totally adequate for verification purposes, although, in some cases such satellite data might perhaps serve as "trigger" to initiate other verification procedures, including possibly on-site

inspections to obtain more detailed information. In fact, as the resolution and coverage of commercial satellites improve, they will become increasingly effective for arms control verification. Already the equivalent Soviet system to SPOT is reputed to have doubled the resolution available.

*(iv) Limitations of space-based sensors*

3.11. It is important to note at this stage that there are various limitations to space-based sensors. Alone, they are unlikely to constitute a complete solution to all the difficulties of verifying compliance with arms control agreements. Included in the significant limiting factors which must be considered when assessing the usefulness of space-based sensors are:

- (a) constraints on resolution capabilities;
- (b) obvious sensor limitations, such as an inability to see inside buildings, underground, or deep underwater;
- (c) environmental and climatic considerations, such as the amount of available light and, especially, the extent of cloud cover;
- (d) satellite orbital and coverage constraints;
- (e) launch vehicle payload constraints;
- (f) limits to a spacecraft's fuel and inherent endurance;
- (g) data-processing constraints, caused by collection of massive amounts of satellite data;
- (h) cost and availability of relevant technical expertise;
- (i) the possibility of interference with the sensors or the use of deception methods such as camouflage.

3.12. The use of other verification methods means that many of these limitations could possibly be overcome, but to begin with the main constraint concerns the political willingness of the countries concerned to co-operate in this field.

***IV. Verification  
of multilateral conventional arms  
control agreements***

4.1. As already mentioned, and partly as a result of a series of significant bilateral arms control agreements, it is the United States and the Soviet Union which possess the majority of the global capabilities concerning verification from outer space. If one excludes the 1986 non-

proliferation treaty, it may be argued that no multilateral treaty of sufficient significance yet exists which might warrant the high level of technical development and finance required to invest in space-based remote sensing to verify its provisions. But as the arms control process continues to evolve, it does seem increasingly likely that significant multilateral treaties will be signed. The immediate possibilities which spring to mind are treaties relating to outer space itself, to chemical weapons and, most specifically, to the control of conventional armaments in definite regions, notably Europe. In all these examples, space-based remote sensing is likely to play a significant and maybe an essential rôle in the verification process.

*Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)*

4.2. The agreement reached in Stockholm in September 1986 is perhaps the best place to begin. Referred to as the "Stockholm Document", this agreement was signed by the 35 member countries of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). It involves a complex arrangement of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), intended to reduce the likelihood of surprise attack and improve trust regarding military stances in Europe. The verification methods specified include the use of ground and air inspection methods.

4.3. Obviously the development of advanced space-based remote sensors for the sole purpose of verifying the Stockholm document alone may not be justified; the CSBMs specified in the document may not deserve the same degree of concern about verification as would an agreement which substantially reduces or limits armaments. However, the political significance of the agreement must not be underestimated: it was signed by all European countries (Albania excepted), as well as Canada and the United States, and it is one of the comparatively few multilateral agreements concerning security matters to be adopted in ten years or more. So, as a successful test of the multilateral approach to East-West arms control negotiations, the signing of the Stockholm document may well foreshadow future successes in the process of multilateral arms control and disarmament. Indeed, current negotiations in Vienna on the follow-up to Stockholm may well prove the ideal forum in which to launch the idea of Europe sharing in the process of space-based verification. For it is increasingly likely that verification will involve more and more countries as additional multilateral agreements are concluded. Nations, and especially European nations, have an obvious interest in participating in particular in systems designed to monitor compliance with agreements to which they are party.

4.4. This trend toward multilateral agreements is occurring at the same time as more countries become capable of developing and employing space-based sensors to verify arms control agreements. These are two mutually reinforcing trends: more multilateral agreements and more countries with space-based sensors. A stage is approaching where the need for "multilateralisation" of arms control verification is no longer just a possibility; it is on the verge of becoming a definite reality. The next step required is the political will to devise such a "third system" of verification and to guide its implementation. (The term "third system" applies to verification capabilities which are not owned and operated exclusively by the superpowers. A "third system" would not act as an umpire or arbitrator in matters relating uniquely to the superpowers, but rather would be developed as a result of obligations assumed in the multilateral context, beginning with a *specific* arms control agreement.)

*V. Previous proposals –  
an International Satellite Monitoring Agency  
(ISMA)*

5.1. At the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978, France proposed that the United Nations establish an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA) to assist in the verification of existing and new arms control treaties as well as other crisis management functions. ISMA was to be developed on a global basis under United Nations auspices in a proposed three-stage plan. It constituted an innovative approach to the multilateralisation of verification techniques.

5.2. From the outset a number of major problems were evident. Although most of these were identified within the 1982 United Nations experts' study concerning ISMA, they did not necessarily figure in the conclusions drawn from that report. First and most notable was a marked lack of enthusiasm on the part of the superpowers. They probably felt, with considerable justification, that participation in such a scheme might have revealed too much about their own "national technical means".

5.3. Other countries have shown considerable sensitivity to the use of Earth sensing technology in other contexts. Such sensitivities would predictably be heightened if national security became more directly involved. Verification is not simply a straightforward question of gathering technical data. Interpretation of satellite imaging and judgment on compliance are more than mere technical issues; they are part of a political process.

5.4. The United Nations group of experts in 1982 replied to the French proposal, stressing:

*(a) The advantages and usefulness of satellite monitoring and of the creation of such an agency*

Satellite monitoring could be a decisive factor in monitoring certain arms limitation agreements and also in prevention and control of international crises. From the legal point of view, the rôle of satellites is already recognised by the SALT agreements, which prohibit interference with the other party's "national technical means". The problem is thus the extent to which the other countries of the international community could have access to these monitoring methods, which the two most heavily armed nations consider essential today.

The creation of an international agency within the general framework of the United Nations would be all the more justified as:

- technological development in the field of remote sensing is such, today, that an increasing number of countries are now acquiring, or will soon acquire, the technology enabling them to obtain pictures which, while not of "military quality", will, nevertheless, in the long term - taking into account the foreseeable progress of technology - raise the problem of regulating the dissemination of data useful for monitoring crises and disarmament agreements and their use in monitoring procedures;
- from the political point of view, the increasingly multilateral nature of disarmament agreements necessarily could bring with it a greater rôle for the United Nations in assisting states and implementing international monitoring methods.

*(b) The feasibility of a satellite monitoring agency*

The technical and financial difficulties involved in realising such a project are considerable but solution of them does not seem to be beyond the powers of the United Nations: the technology is (or will soon be) available and the costs, though high, are still within the bounds of possibility.

*(i) The technology*

The types of satellites that could be used to carry out the functions which would be entrusted to an ISMA already exist. The United Nations group of experts

ascertained the technical resources, especially satellites, required for carrying out the agency's functions. Those resources could be acquired in stages. In the initial phase, the agency would have only a data-processing and interpretation centre, its task being to analyse data supplied by the countries operating monitoring satellite systems. In the second phase, the agency would establish data-receiving stations directly linked to various states' observation satellites. Finally, in the third phase, it might have a segment of space, with a number of satellites suited to its functions, at its own disposal.

*(ii) The cost*

The various technical options all affect the cost, and the estimates given in the experts' report vary considerably. The capital outlay required for the first phase of the ISMA would be approximately 8 million dollars (excluding land and buildings) and the annual operational budget would be 25 to 30 million dollars. For the second phase, a ground receiving station owned by the ISMA would require a capital outlay of 6 to 8 million dollars, with annual operating costs of 2 million dollars. The number of stations needed to establish the ISMA network would depend on the functions assigned to the agency, but would not be more than about ten. Lastly, for the third phase, the significant cost factors were seen as:

- a system of three area-monitoring satellites: capital outlay of about 1 thousand million dollars and annual renewal and operational costs of 50 to 200 million dollars;
- a single close-inspection satellite: capital outlay of 1.5 thousand million dollars and annual renewal and operational costs of 120 million dollars.

The costs are high, but the experts pointed out in their conclusions that even in the third phase, when the structure would be most complete and the costs highest, an ISMA would cost the international community considerably less than 1% of the amount spent on armaments each year.

5.5. In May 1986 the periodical "Space Policy" published a succinct and useful article entitled "The ISMA proposal - time for a reappraisal" which suggested a reassessment of the context in which space-based remote sensing technology might be applied for arms control verification purposes. In addition, as recently as

June 1988, during the third United Nations special session on disarmament, the French Foreign Minister again stressed the valuable potential of such an agency.

5.6. In the absence, for the present, of a definite consensus at the United Nations in support of an international satellite monitoring agency, it falls to those most implicated in the possibility of an arms control agreement on conventional weapons to take the action necessary: i.e. the Europeans.

#### *VI. European capabilities*

6.1. Over the past ten years, by means of a series of important Earth observation programmes, Western Europe has become a major developer of technology for remote sensing. Of these, the French SPOT I, launched in 1986, is the first European satellite designed for operational remote sensing. This is not, however, the first demonstration of Europe's technical capabilities in the area. As early as 1977, Meteosat I, the first European meteorological satellite, started routine observations of the Earth's atmosphere and surface, so inaugurating a service which has become essential to European weather stations (to the delight of a new generation of television "weathermen"), as well as to various agencies involved in oceanographic activities or global climatic research studies.

6.2. In addition, experiments aboard the United States Space Shuttle such as the German MOMS (Modulator Opto-electronic Multi-spectral System) or the metric camera tested by Spacelab I in 1983, have confirmed European technical expertise in high-resolution remote sensing. European ambitions in this area are further illustrated by the exciting development by the European Space Agency of the Earth Resources Satellite (ERS). ERS-I is designed for ocean surveillance as a forerunner for operational remote-sensing spacecraft in the next decade, using synthetic aperture radar.

6.3. The European Space Agency, based in Paris, has 13 European member states, with Canada and Finland as associates. It was formed in 1975 as the successor to the European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) and the European Launcher Development Organisation (ELDO, 1962) "to provide for and promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, co-operation between European states in space research and technology and their space applications".

6.4. The key phrase is "for exclusively peaceful purposes", and it would be perfectly possible to assert that a verification régime is put in place to help "keep the peace". Why should the capabilities and successes of the European Space Agency, through its WEU members, not be used towards such a laudable aim as arms

control? Another "plus" factor here is the associate status of Canada which has made considerable progress in the evaluation of satellites for verification purposes (see Appendix I on "PAXSAT").

#### *VII. A European satellite agency?*

7.1. A joint European satellite verification system could have great political significance. It would enable Europe to monitor treaty compliance and crisis behaviour, and it would give Europe a voice in appropriate discussions on the legal aspects. European nations cannot expect to be involved in East-West discussions or be signatories of multilateral treaties without an independent capability for monitoring treaty compliance. And maybe such a system would allow eventual monitoring of crises, without having to rely on evidence received indirectly. For both uses (treaty compliance and crisis monitoring) each member government could keep its independence of decision while benefiting from a shared source of information (even to the extent, if required, of totally independent interpretation of imagery). Independent European analysis could well help, rather than hinder, transatlantic co-operation.

7.2. In essence, a satellite verification capability is distinguished as vital for the future international and diplomatic rôle of Western Europe. Arms control is the catalyst for the creation of such a capability and if the CSCE talks in Vienna prove fruitful, greatly-increased attention will be paid to the balance of conventional forces.

7.3. By taking the initiative of setting up such a European satellite monitoring agency, WEU would be offering all its partners a coherent system of monitoring from space. It would thus help to ensure recognition of its own specific rôle at the side of Europe's strategic ally, the United States. Above all, it would affirm its will to use its influence and technological capability to offer a service worthy of its vocation, defence, synonym of peace and independence.

#### *VIII. Practical considerations and conclusions*

8.1. The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions' report "Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellites" (Rapporteur: Mr. Malfatti) includes the following detailed chapters and appendices which should be read in conjunction with the present report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments:

\*\* Verification of arms control agreements, a comprehensive glossary

- (i) Verification and monitoring
- (ii) Resolution
- (iii) Satellite orbits



\*\* Basic technology

- (i) Visible light photography
  - (a) Photographic cameras
  - (b) Multispectral scanners (MSS)
  - (c) Returned-beam vidicon (RBV) camera
- (ii) Infra-red detection
  - (a) Photographic infra-red
  - (b) Thermal infra-red
- (iii) Radar and synthetic aperture radar
- (iv) Image processing
- (v) Electronic reconnaissance

\*\* Present state of remote-sensing technology in Western Europe

- (i) European Space Agency
  - (a) Meteosat
  - (b) ERS-1
  - (c) Earthnet
  - (d) Columbus development programme
  - (e) Ariane launcher programme
- (ii) National programmes
  - (a) France
  - (b) Italy
  - (c) United Kingdom
  - (d) Federal Republic of Germany

\*\* Tasks and technologies of a European satellite monitoring agency

- (i) Monitoring military manoeuvres
- (ii) Monitoring crises and preparations for a surprise attack
- (iii) Verification of future conventional arms control treaties

APPENDIX I Resolution (in metres) required for interpretation tasks

APPENDIX II Specifications of existing and near future civilian remote-sensing satellites

APPENDIX III Characteristics of some past, current and future sensors on military reconnaissance and civil earth resources satellites

8.2. Given the political will of the member states of WEU to take an initiative in creating a satellite agency for the verification of conventional arms control agreements, it is obvious that progress would be possible only in phases. A logical scheme would perhaps include the following:

- (a) 1990 (?): the establishment of an agency to monitor "confidence-building measures" (which would

comprise verification for example of fixed installations – possibly already using SPOT imagery). A modest "SPOT buying centre" comprising some 100 personnel maximum would cost in the region of 100 million francs (£10 million) but in terms of political investment would prove invaluable as a demonstration of European will. France and Belgium are already "shareholders" in SPOT so using/interpreting imagery should not prove a problem. At this stage processing equipment might be envisaged;

- (b) 1995 (?): the buying/launching of a satellite. France, Italy and Spain (the latter well on the way to joining Western European Union) are members of the Hélios consortium, aiming to be operational in 1993. Hélios 2 should be available two years later in 1995 and already other WEU countries such as the Netherlands (see the letter addressed by the Dutch Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence to members of the Netherlands Parliament at Appendix V) and maybe the Federal Republic are reported as showing interest. How much more practical to make Hélios 2 a WEU project and enhance our capabilities considerably by investing something of the order of 1000 million francs (£100 million) to participate in a programme which is already well established and also, possibly, in an autonomous, ground-based reception system;

- (c) 2005 (?): complement the optical capabilities by investing, for instance, in a radar satellite to the tune of 15-20 milliard francs (£1.5-2 milliard) or in other satellites? (In the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments' report "Disarmament – reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council", Rapporteur: Mr. Tummers, it was pointed out that verification would not necessarily be cheap, but how much more worthwhile to invest in the *control* of armaments rather than in the armaments themselves!)

8.3. The step-by-step approach outlined above, together with the possible cost, is only an approximation of one particular scenario. What is required now, practically, is that the Council of Western European Union should undertake (in either the agency which already has conducted considerable research in this area, or through the constitution of a special "ad hoc" working group (or by a combination of the two)) the necessary evaluation of the various parameters

involved. This evaluation, including the points listed below, will then be submitted to the Assembly:

- (a) technologies available and envisaged:
  - launchers;
  - satellites;
  - sensors;
  - reception stations;
  - processing equipment;
 (together with likely access for a WEU satellite agency);
- (b) a definition of the possible sources:
  - information gained from national satellites, obtained via national authorities?
  - information gained by direct reception from national satellites?
  - information gained from the agency's own satellites?
- (c) way in which information received is handled:
  - interpretation by member states?
  - interpretation by the agency itself?
- (d) capital costs - investment - running costs;
- (e) participation:
  - all members states of WEU?
  - participation by committed WEU states only?
  - inclusion of "associate" states? (European members of NATO? Canada? neutral countries?)
- (f) access to information received:
  - members only?
  - European states only?
  - all signatories to a CSCE agreement?
  - etc, etc;

- (g) who should be allowed to exploit the information obtained?
  - political authorities checking only on "verification" aspects?
  - military headquarters interested in the "intelligence" aspects?
- (h) in what form should the information obtained be released?
  - "raw" imagery?
  - pre-treated?
  - pre-interpreted?
- (i) if "pre-interpreted", by whom?
  - national interpreters?
  - agency interpreters?
  - a combination?
 (would a "verification school" for interpreters be required?).

8.4. One of the major considerations must be the question "when?" for the creation of a WEU satellite agency. Should we act as soon as possible in order to be prepared to make the offer of such an agency during the course of negotiations in general, or should a satellite agency wait for a particular agreement? Given the speed with which the arms control scene is currently evolving, the two hypotheses are in the process of merging and it would appear to your Rapporteur that the Council of the WEU must now act forthwith if a definite Western European contribution is to be made to a specific verification régime: namely the conventional arms control negotiations in Vienna which are likely to be in full swing by the time the present report is scheduled for adoption by the Assembly in December 1988.

8.5. If WEU undertakes to play its full rôle at the side of our strategic allies, we must play our full part in the verification of the agreement concerned "par excellence" with our own security: we must act decisively and we must act *now*.

## APPENDIX I

*PAXSAT<sup>1</sup>: A Canadian approach to multilateral verification*

Canada is committed to promoting progress in arms control and disarmament negotiations. The Canadian emphasis is on the practical and has identified research into the verification of arms control agreements as an area to make a useful contribution. Speaking in the House of Commons on 23rd January 1986, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, said:

“Effective verification provisions can help ensure compliance with arms control treaties as well as facilitate their negotiation. Verification is an area where Canadian expertise and diplomacy come together... We are second to none in our activity to develop verification procedures and technology that meet the practical requirements of arms control agreements actually under negotiation or envisaged.”

Certain themes form core elements of the PAXSAT concept and add to the chances of actually realising such a multilateral verification system. These include the following:

- There must be the prospect of a significant multilateral agreement to warrant the level of sophistication of technology and the expenditure of funds required for the actual development of such an advanced technical verification system.
- Parties to such an agreement should have the option, at least, to participate in its verification procedures.
- The PAXSAT system would be treaty-specific: it would be used only with respect to the agreements to which it expressly applied, as part of an overall verification process for those agreements alone.
- The treaty being verified would establish the requisite political authority for the verification mechanism and its operation.
- Technology requirements would be met by the collectivity of participants and

would not depend upon or call for superpower participation, although the treaty would, of course, be open to all states.

- PAXSAT should be based, to the extent possible, on existing openly available technology, without requiring major costly improvements. The technology possessed by the Canadian commercial sector provided a base for the PAXSAT studies.


*PAXSAT 'B': space-to-ground remote sensing*

The aim of the PAXSAT 'B' feasibility study was to examine the application of space-based remote sensing for verifying controls on conventional weapons in a regional context. To help focus the research effort, a specific well-defined geographic area was chosen: Europe. Among its preliminary observations were the following:

- The arms control agreements likely to be concluded in Europe will require various forms of verification measures and space-based verification may fulfil some of these requirements.
- Current or planned civilian remote sensing satellites have insufficient resolution performance and coverage frequencies to meet full PAXSAT 'B' requirements.
- Civilian satellites such as Canada's proposed RADARSAT do, however, have the potential to provide useful "detection" level information for use in a confidence-building context.
- Dedicated PAXSAT 'B' sensors and platforms are required to meet the full verification requirements of the expected agreements.
- The technology base exists in non-superpower nations from which the full PAXSAT 'B' system could be developed for the mid-to-late 1990s.


1. PAX - from the Latin "peace".

## APPENDIX II

*The PAXSAT Concept*


APPENDIX III

*Example of imagery possible with SPOT-type satellites*



APPENDIX IV

*Example of imagery from reconnaissance satellites*



## APPENDIX V

*Letter addressed by the Dutch Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence  
to members of the Netherlands Parliament*

19th September 1988

The President of the  
Second Chamber of the States-General  
BP 20018  
2500 The Hague

Subject: European observation satellite.

Department: Direction of the Atlantic co-operation and security affairs

Further to the publication in 1987 by the Council for Peace and Security of the report on the use of space for the purposes of security policy: a challenge for Europe, and the recommendations it contains, the undersigned decided in December 1987 to instruct an official working group to review the advantages and drawbacks of the various possibilities of a joint observation and identification capability for Western Europe by the use of satellites.

Enclosed is the report communicated to us in the meantime by the official working group. It deals with certain aspects of observation by satellite which warrant further examination.

Thus, the report reaches the conclusion that at the present time and before assessing the ratio of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and before monitoring respect for disarmament agreements there is an urgent requirement for an observation capability for Europe itself. The government shares the opinion that because of present requirements for satellite data for information-gathering and verification, the creation of such a European system – with all the resulting consequences such as the joint building of satellites, launchers and ground stations, and the organisation of a joint capability for implementation – cannot be accorded the highest priority. Moreover, we believe that the creation and operation of such a system would involve extremely high costs.

The report gives a positive answer to the question of whether in the future the requirements of such a European observation capability will increase. Satellites will continue to play a rôle in gathering information on the ratio of forces which may increase even further with the influence of steady technical improvements. It must nevertheless be noted that observation by satellite is no longer the only means of verification. In verifying agreements on armaments control, greater reliance is placed on the exchange of data relating to respective forces and inspections on the spot. The government shares the overall assessment of the working group. Undoubtedly, satellites can provide relatively quickly an overall impression of the area of operations; inspections, however, give a far more detailed picture of the unit or barracks visited than could be obtained by satellite. Nor must it be forgotten that inspectors (and also observers) on the spot are better placed than a satellite to form an opinion on what is inside buildings; satellites can observe depots but not take stock of the equipment inside. Obviously this in no way detracts from the fact that satellites will continue to play an important rôle in verifying agreements on the control of armaments.

For the above reasons, the government has therefore taken note with interest of the plea for possible future association with existing (or future) co-operation groups in the area of satellite technology. The undersigned believe that closer consideration should also be given to this problem since an observation satellite capability for Europe itself might be stimulating from the technological and industrial point of view. Furthermore, it might lead to more and better co-operation between federated information services. Closer co-operation in observation satellites with, consequently, progressively tighter economic, technological and also political links is of great importance for the countries of Western Europe.

In agreement with the suggestion of the working group, the ministry of defence will take part in technological space research, including remote sensing. Furthermore, in accordance with the proposal by the working group, the director of scientific research and development and the general directorate of defence equipment of the ministry of defence will be responsible for co-ordination in defining technical specifications for future observation satellite systems, each in close contact with serving experts. This also includes pooling knowledge linked with assessing data gathered by satellites. Questions regarding the organisation and financing of possible future co-operative projects will be examined in due course.

In addition to the answers to the above questions it will also be necessary to examine how to implement such projects with particular regard to their specifically West European character. The only programme being developed in Europe at the present time, Hélios, is a French programme in which Italy and Spain have a minority share, but it is no longer open for new participants. For the successor, Hélios-2, France is therefore apparently seeking the participation of other countries, but this obviously does not yet make it a European programme.

**It is important to include the programme in an efficient European framework. To this end we believe it will be necessary to try to develop further an exchange of views in Western European Union too on the various aspects of a joint observation capability.**

The Minister for Foreign Affairs

The Minister for Defence



*Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite  
– reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council*

**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Malfatti, Rapporteur*

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  - (iv) Image processing
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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Wilkinson (Chairman); MM. Bassinet, Hill (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens (Alternate: Noerens), Böhm (Alternate: Müller), Caccia, De Bondt, Fourré, Mrs. Francese, MM. Garrett (Alternate: Lambie), Hengel, Intini, Lenzer, Parry, Malfatti, Mechttersheimer, Schmidt, Souvet, Valleix, van der Werff, Worrell.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

VI. Present state of remote-sensing technology in Western Europe

- (i) European Space Agency
  - (a) Meteosat
  - (b) ERS-1
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*Rapporteur's Preface*

This report is complementary to a report submitted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, entitled "Verification: A future European Satellite Agency" (Rapporteur: Mr. Fourré), dealing with general aspects of the establishment of a Western European Satellite Agency. It is recommended that the two reports be read in conjunction with each other; their conclusions and recommendations are very similar.

In preparing this report, the Rapporteur arranged for the following interviews to be conducted on his behalf:

*DACU (Defence and Arms Control Unit), Ministry of Defence, London, 7th September 1988*

Mr. Malcolm Lingwood;  
Captain Chris Sloane, RN;  
Commander Trevor Dale, RN;  
Lt. Col. Terry Taylor;  
Mr. Richard Hoskins.

*Foreign and Commonwealth Office:*

Mr. Simon Gass, Security Policy Department.

*Paris, 30th September 1988*

Mr. René Morin, Vice President and General Manager, Sepimage.  
Mr. Alain Simon, Conseiller pour les Affaires Militaires, CNES (Centre national d'études spatiales).

***Draft Recommendation***

*on scientific and technical aspects of arms control  
verification by satellite –  
reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling that in the platform adopted in The Hague the member countries of WEU affirmed that “arms control and disarmament are an integral part of western security policy and not an alternative to it” and that “arms control agreements have to be effectively verifiable and stand the test of time”;
- (ii) Recalling WEU Recommendations 369, 410, 430 and 448 and noting with interest the resolution on European space policy adopted by the European Parliament in 1987 and the communication of 26th July 1988 from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council on “The Community and space – a coherent approach”;
- (iii) Sharing the Council’s commitment to negotiations on the control of armaments and disarmament;
- (iv) Considering that it is both probable and desirable for new negotiations on conventional stability in Europe to be opened in a very near future;
- (v) Noting that the existence of a verification system on which all the signatory countries of an agreement could rely and in which they would participate actively has to be an essential part of any agreement;
- (vi) Considering that the generally-accepted principle of sharing risks, rôles and responsibilities in regard to the security of Europe should also be applied to systems for verifying future agreements on the control of conventional armaments;
- (vii) Recalling that the Council has instructed the Agency for the study of the control of armaments and disarmament to prepare a study of verification measures;
- (viii) Considering that the system for verifying a future agreement on conventional stability in Europe should include national technical means of verification such as monitoring by satellite and other co-operative systems including on-site inspection;
- (ix) Taking account of the fact that the member states of WEU have developed adequate technical knowledge to begin working on the deployment of a satellite system capable of carrying out essential verification tasks;
- (x) Stressing the importance of European co-operation in space matters in the framework of ESA and noting with satisfaction the development of the latter’s programmes,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Define all the conditions necessary for creating, in the framework of WEU, a European satellite monitoring agency whose main task would be to help to verify future agreements on the control of conventional armaments,

and, in particular,

Identify and assess present or planned systems, foreseeable measures of co-operation in Western Europe in industrial and technological, political and operational areas, the problems of co-operation or integration with existing machinery in the Atlantic Alliance and the ensuing juridical and institutional aspects and present its conclusions to the Assembly;

2. Urge member governments to co-ordinate all technological research work in the member countries of WEU, the importance of which is essential for verification by satellite.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Malfatti, Rapporteur)*

### PART ONE

#### *I. The INF agreement and prospects for subsequent arms reduction agreements*

1. New, more favourable prospects of disarmament, political dialogue and East-West co-operation have emerged recently following the agreement on the total elimination of land-based intermediate nuclear forces in Europe. The zero option that therefore now applies to an entire class of nuclear weapons is the result of a joint approach and firmness by the western alliance in the negotiations and it may be said that the European allies made a decisive contribution.

2. Following the 1979 declarations by the Federal German and Italian Governments on the dissolution clause, in 1981 the allies presented the platform based on the zero option. The Washington agreement of December 1987 welcoming the western position was therefore an undeniable political success. This agreement made a remarkable contribution to opening the way for a substantial improvement in East-West relations. It is to be hoped that this will lead to speedier progress towards subsequent arms reduction agreements and greater mutual confidence, a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, the total elimination of chemical weapons and a balanced reduction of conventional forces to the lowest level.

3. The Washington agreement confirms the Atlantic political line laid down in the Harmel report following the twofold track of determination to negotiate and maintenance of conditions essential for security and stability on the continent – conditions which are also applicable in the wider all-European framework of the CSCE.

4. The importance of the agreement does not derive only from its quantitative aspect (the number of nuclear warheads involved is indeed few compared with the total number) but from the fact that it confirms two principles that are of extraordinary importance for the future of disarmament negotiations: acceptability of non-linear reductions based on a comparison of asymmetrical values and recourse to on-site verification that even the Soviet Union now accepts as an essential component of any future agreement.

5. On such bases, the Western European allies are facing prospects of subsequent East-West negotiations with confidence and determi-

nation. Paragraph I.5 of the platform adopted by WEU in The Hague last year, which relates to joint policy, notes that “political solidarity and adequate military strength within the Atlantic Alliance, arms control, disarmament and the search for genuine détente continue to be integral parts of this policy” and paragraph II.5 adds that “arms control and disarmament are an integral part of western security policy... Arms control agreements have to be effectively verifiable and stand the test of time”.

#### *II. Control measures*

6. The problem of verification and control measures is therefore of crucial importance in the context of subsequent arms reduction agreements.

7. For Western Europe in the Atlantic framework, the availability of an independent monitoring and control capability will provide an additional source of information that will be useful in ensuring the credibility of the assertion of a European identity that everyone wants in the field of security, too, particularly in the prospect of Europe becoming ever more directly involved in subsequent stages of the disarmament process.

8. In the case of agreements on conventional weapons, co-operative verification to ensure respect of the agreements signed will be essential because of the political atmosphere, i.e. the need for greater mutual confidence, and for clear, unrenounceable security reasons. The control and verification system is indeed singularly penetrating and there are no alternatives. As Europeans, verification obviously concerns us directly. In turn, national or multinational control systems, which may be operated from aircraft, from the ground or sea, or from satellites, retain their political, technical and juridical validity.

9. In making a more detailed assessment of ground still to be covered, it must be borne in mind that verification of any future agreement, particularly in regard to conventional weapons, should include on-site inspections and improved means of verification at national level, i.e. independently of the co-operation of the other side. In the last resort, this raises the problem of the availability in the European countries of national verification and control systems and an optimum degree of integration of these systems with systems used in the framework of the alliance is necessary.

10. For this purpose, the seven WEU countries should give thought to the extent of their direct participation in the verification of future agreements to which they would be signatories as well as participants, especially any agreements relating to conventional deployment. With the aim of reducing any potential for offensive and surprise attack in troop deployments or movements, thus ensuring stabilisation, in addition to respect for future agreements, verification capabilities should be developed and harmonised. In this connection, closer attention should be paid to both the technological and political implications.

### *III. Satellites and Europe*

11. An independent European contribution, combined with the United States contribution, would moreover be a useful means of ensuring the more balanced sharing of political tasks and responsibilities in the alliance that is referred to in Washington with increasing frequency.

12. Consequently, a question arises concerning the air and space observation points for monitoring the territory and corresponding specifically Western European data-processing capabilities, ranging up to a possible co-produced and co-managed satellite system for collecting data and analysing them in the framework of the verification process worked out at the negotiating table. Such means may prove essential even for defining the most suitable framework of reference for the on-site inspections necessary under the agreements concluded.

13. A technical, financial and organisational commitment is moreover now being considered even by several neutral countries participating in the CSCE process and already associated with space research in ESA. Sweden has announced publicly that it has technical know-how and industrial capability to contribute to verification by satellite of respect for disarmament treaties and is seeking wider international co-operation in this area.

14. The use of satellites to control effective respect of conditions laid down in an agreement must be considered acceptable in accordance with the many international agreements and resolutions on the peaceful use of space. The legitimacy of their use as national or multinational means of observation, verification and control derives from the SALT agreements. Your Rapporteur does not understand why this principle would have to be called in question in the event of future agreements on the control of armaments, even conventional, or in the event of European countries as well as the two super-powers having the relevant type of satellite.

15. Mention should be made of WEU Assembly Recommendation 369, adopted in 1981, which invites the governments of member states "to promote, in a North Atlantic Alliance context, the exploitation of European military communication and observation satellites", Recommendation 410 which refers to "a European surveillance and reconnaissance satellite programme", Recommendation 430 which urges member governments "to accept non-aggressive applications of military space technology such as communications, surveillance, navigation and the use of satellites for crisis management and treaty verification to strengthen strategic stability" and, finally, Recommendation 448, adopted in 1987, "stressing the urgency of establishing space co-operation for the security of the Western European countries, particularly in activities recognised to be stabilising, such as monitoring and communications" and recommending that the Council "with the assistance of the WEU agencies for security questions, examine the repercussions of establishing a European military programme for communications, navigation, observation and reconnaissance satellites".

16. The European Parliament itself, in a resolution on European space policy adopted on 17th June 1987, "notes with interest proposals which have been made in various quarters for an international satellite monitoring agency which, with the objectives of protecting peace and of releasing resources at present devoted to the needs of defence for civilian applications, would help to monitor developments in areas where there is a risk of conflict".

17. The EEC Commission in turn pointed out in a communication dated 26th July 1988 that space research in Western Europe, particularly in the sector of launching devices and communications, has now reached the commercial exploitation stage, while the single act confers wide-ranging, explicit responsibilities in technological research and development, and concludes that a corresponding effort still has to be made to stimulate the use of the potential of such technology. Moreover, Europe still has no coherent overall policy in this area which integrates the technological, industrial, commercial, social and even defence aspects.

18. However, this Community document notes that, contrary to what has happened in civil applications, European space defence activities are still conducted mainly on a national basis and that Europe has no real framework in which it can discuss problems related to the necessary co-ordination of European civil space co-operation with possible future defence co-operation.

19. A recent report on Europe's future in space, prepared jointly by several of the principal

European strategic study institutes<sup>1</sup>, made a detailed analysis of the various technological solutions and international formulae, concluding that:

“Arms control may now stand a better chance than it has for some while, and as a result increased attention will be paid to the balance of conventional forces. The Atlantic Alliance will need enhanced capabilities for observation from space, both to verify arms control agreements and to ascertain whether the military situation is stable. The European members of NATO could contribute to an equitable sharing of burdens within the alliance by creating an observation capability of their own. A West European system, adapted to the special circumstances of the European continent, would guarantee a desirable degree of redundancy within the alliance and could also strengthen the strategic consensus between the United States and its European allies. Both domestic public opinion and other interested parties could be reassured that such a West European observation system would serve no other purpose than to ensure compliance with agreed understandings and to give support for world stability.”

20. While respecting in full the treaty on the exploration and use of outer space and the convention establishing the European Space Agency, Western Europe considers there should be no offensive or defensive weapons systems in space but rather its own means of rapidly monitoring military activities, integrating those already available to the Atlantic Alliance into the framework of the development of security and confidence building measures provided for by the CSCE.

21. In order to set up a WEU agency in accordance with Assembly recommendations, existing European systems must be identified and assessed and a study made of practical ways of ensuring Western European co-operation from the technico-industrial, political and operational points of view, possible forms of co-operation or integration with the allies' present procedure and the ensuing juridical and institutional aspects. This will also allow in-depth thinking on the aims to be pursued and the corresponding sharing of tasks, responsibilities and benefits. Joint exploitation and management methods for the means envisaged must take account of the need to pursue a European foreign and defence policy with the highest level of integration to allow some forms of co-ordination at the decision-taking level.

1. Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (Bonn), Institut Français des Relations Internationales (Paris), Istituto Affari Internazionali (Rome), Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen 'Clingendael' (The Hague) and Royal Institute of International Affairs (London).

22. The firm results that will be progressively attained will ensure a harmonious evolution towards better articulated forms of intra-European and transatlantic co-ordination which will strengthen the cohesion of the alliance.

## PART TWO

### *IV. Verification of arms control agreements, a comprehensive glossary*

23. Before paying closer attention to the question of a European satellite monitoring agency to verify arms control agreements, it may be useful to define some of the terms used.

#### *(i) Verification and monitoring*

24. *Intelligence* is a general term for the full spectrum of methods by which one state acquires information about another.

25. *Verification*, when applied to the particular field of arms control and disarmament, covers all legal and intelligence activities proper carried out for the explicit purpose of demonstrating compliance with treaty obligations by means of evidence or information gathered by a variety of technical and institutional means.

26. *Espionage* implies intelligence activities which are illegal or improper under generally-accepted rules of international conduct.

27. It should be borne in mind that the clear distinction made here between different activities is valid in the application of international law. In practice it will be less easy to make the same distinction. A satellite gathering data to demonstrate compliance with specific treaty obligations will obviously also absorb other data.

28. In general, data-gathering by satellite is now considered a legitimate activity. Even the dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the monitoring of missile telemetry (see V (v)) seems to have come to an end. After the last negotiations on 23rd and 24th September 1988 between Mr. Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze it was said that the Soviet Union appeared to have agreed to stop encoding their ballistic-missile data.

29. If it comes to the activity of verification itself, one can speak of monitoring, surveillance or reconnaissance.

30. *Monitoring* is the activity of gathering data in general, which can be divided into the two more specific activities of surveillance and reconnaissance.

31. *Surveillance* is the systematic observation of some place or activity on a continuous or periodic basis.

32. *Reconnaissance* is conducted through ad hoc activities, generally aimed at a specific objective which for some reason has attracted attention.

33. In many arms control agreements signed since the ABM treaty, reference is made to "national technical means" (NTM), although not one treaty nor any accompanying protocol gives a clear definition of this frequently used phrase. It is however understood that both the United States and the Soviet Union recognise satellites used for verification purposes as national technical means.

(ii) *Resolution*

34. A key indicator for the capability of a satellite producing visual images of the earth's surface is the resolution or resolving power of its equipment.

35. For a photographic film camera system, the resolving power may be defined as the minimum distance between two identical small objects when they can still be distinguished as two separate objects.

36. In the case of electronic scanning devices one speaks rather of the instantaneous field of view (IFOV), which is the size of the spot on the ground seen by one picture element (or pixel) in the image or seen by a scanning sensor at the instant of observation.

(iii) *Satellite orbits*

37. Most monitoring satellites are in a low earth orbit which means all orbits below an altitude of about 5 000 km.

38. These low earth orbits may be equatorial, polar or inclined, depending on the orientation of the orbital plane with respect to the plane of the earth's equator. Making use of the movement of the earth below its orbit, a satellite is able to monitor the earth's surface. Only a satellite in polar orbit can cover the entire surface of the earth.

39. A satellite in a 90-minute orbit will make 16 revolutions each day, following an identical ground track pattern every 24 hours. Under these conditions, due to the restricted width of the ground track that can be monitored effectively, a considerable part of the surface will not be monitored at all. By changing its orbital period into slightly more or slightly less than 90 minutes, one can cause a satellite to have a ground track pattern which is shifted slightly sideways every day, thus making sure that eventually it will monitor the entire earth surface in a given period of time.

40. A geostationary orbit is a circular orbit at an altitude of 35 700 km with a revolution period of 24 hours. If set in an eastward equatorial orbit, a satellite remains over the same point of the equator all the time. This orbit is used for communications satellites and for the United States early warning satellite system.

V. *Basic technology*

(i) *Visible light photography*

(a) *Photographic cameras*

41. Photographic cameras have been used aerial reconnaissance of enemy territory from earliest days of aviation. Technical capabilities of photographic cameras have since improved substantially. Used in satellites, cameras are considered to be among the best sensors for reconnaissance purposes. However, the quality of the images depends on several important factors such as the satellite's orbit, camera optical quality, vibration, instability and atmospheric turbulence. To reduce the risk of energy loss caused by atmospheric drag which ultimately will terminate the life cycle of the satellite, most photo-reconnaissance satellites are being put in more or less elliptic orbit. In earlier days, a typical orbit used to have a perigee, or closest approach to the earth's surface, of 130-140 km and an apogee, or greatest distance from the earth's surface, of 300-400 km. With improved optical properties of the cameras used, there seems to be a general tendency towards higher orbit, thus permitting the extension of orbital lifetimes. The satellite will take pictures only at the perigee of its orbit. Although the strip of earth within the line of sight of the satellite at that height may be more than 2 000 km, the actual strip photographed will only have a width varying from a few hundred kilometres to a few hundred metres, depending on the resolution desired.

42. Normally, photo-reconnaissance satellites rotate in a sun-synchronous polar orbit, thus always passing over the light side of the earth at a given time. With the earth rotating from west to east, the ground track of the satellite's orbit will move westwards. If the satellite's orbit and the width of the strip of earth actually photographed are well calculated, such a satellite would be able to cover any desired area of the earth's surface. It should nevertheless be noted here that visible light photographic cameras cannot penetrate clouds. It took Landsat satellites about ten years to carry out cloud-free mapping of the whole world. Many areas in Europe – the region of prime importance for any arms control agreement – allow only a few cloud-free scenes to be collected per year.

43. In camera optics, remarkable achievements have been made by using mirrors of dif-



ferent shape in order to fold a long focal length into a much shorter distance. A long focal length is essential, given the proportional relationship connecting the sizes and positions of the object and image, which is as follows:

$$\frac{\text{image length}}{\text{object length}} = \frac{\text{focal length}}{\text{distance of object from mirror}}$$

44. Moving parts in the satellite itself and inevitable fluctuations in its temperature produce vibrations and distortions which have to be established to a very high degree in order to hold the optical axis steady.

45. It is thought that the best American and Soviet photographic military reconnaissance satellites are able to achieve a ground resolution of 10-15 cm under favourable atmospheric conditions.

(b) *Multispectral scanners (MSS)*

46. A multispectral scanner is a device which can locate objects, searching them out by looking for their overall characteristic spectral response, making use of the fact that every object on earth emits, absorbs or reflects radiation which is unique to that object.

47. In some scanners the sensor scans the earth's surface using a combination of a telescope and a rotating mirror. In others – among them the French Spot 1 – linear arrays of detectors, such as charge coupled devices (CCD), take the place of the rotating mirrors. The United States Landsat 4 and 5 have a sensor called thematic mapper, a second generation MSS with several spectral bands in different visible and infra-red wavelengths which enable them to produce theme maps emphasising specific objects on the earth's surface.

(c) *Returned-beam vidicon (RBV) camera*

48. A returned-beam vidicon camera, used in the American Landsat 1, 2 and 3 and in the Soviet Salyut 6, is a specific television camera where the images are stored on the photosensitive surface which then enables an electronic scanner to produce video images. RBV cameras are sensitive to the visible and near infra-red part of the spectrum.

(ii) *Infra-red detection*

49. While visible light photographic cameras make use of reflected light with wavelengths in the interval between 0.4 and 0.7 micrometres, objects can also be detected by making use of the radiation emitted by them in the infra-red portion of the spectrum (greater than 0.7 micrometre). Every object emits radiation with a spectrum of wavelength characteristic of its temperature.

50. As some components of the atmosphere, in particular water vapour and carbon dioxide, absorb certain ranges of infra-red light wavelengths, only a restricted number of these wavelengths can be used for reconnaissance purposes of which the most important are those from 0.7 to 1.0, from 3 to 5 and from 8 to 14 micrometres.

(a) *Photographic infra-red*

51. Cameras equipped with specific photographic films which are sensitive to reflected infra-red light with wavelengths between 0.7 and 1.0 micrometre can make pictures in the same way as cameras with visible light films. Infra-red photography has several advantages over visible light photography, because clarity and contrast is not affected by haze, vegetation clearly stands out, which helps to detect camouflage, and there is much better contrast between land and water. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the use of photographic infra-red light encounters problems similar to visible light photography. The equipment is useless during night-time and fog and when clouds obstruct vision.

(b) *Thermal infra-red*

52. The abovementioned longer wavelengths from 3 to 5 and from 8 to 14 micrometres, the thermal infra-red region, make it possible to observe infra-red light emitted from hot or warm objects.

53. In order to be able to detect thermal infra-red, a technique has been developed with semiconductor compounds absorbing infra-red light and converting the energy into electric current. The equipment used can be made both highly sensitive and of very small size.

54. A good example of this equipment's sensitivity is that early-warning satellites stationed in a geosynchronous orbit 36 000 km above the earth's surface use thermal infra-red detectors and imaging systems enabling them to detect and track ICBMs during the powered segment of their flight.

55. Due to natural and technical limitations, even the best possible thermal infra-red imagery still has resolutions a hundred times poorer than the best results achieved with visible light photography. It should be borne in mind that this resolution is quite enough to detect heat-generating industrial facilities, large underground objects or underground nuclear tests.

(iii) *Radar and synthetic aperture radar*

56. Radar systems make use of electromagnetic radiation of much longer wavelengths than light. In any radar equipment an electro-

magnetic radiation pulse is produced by a signal generator. The pulse is then emitted by an antenna, subsequently detecting the echo from objects reflecting the radiation. This echo or return signal is processed by electronic devices to make visible the detected objects.

57. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) is a specific radar system mounted on reconnaissance satellites. Here a relatively small antenna uses the forward motion of its satellite platform to simulate a very large antenna. The maximum length of the synthetic aperture is the length of the satellite path along which the moving antenna receives the reflected signals from a given target. It is assumed that a SAR satellite can achieve resolutions of 1.5 metres in the cross-track dimension and of 2.5 metres parallel to the ground track, while a 1 metre resolution by the year 2000 has been predicted.

58. An additional advantage is that the ground resolution of a SAR does not depend on the distance between the antenna and the object observed so that SAR satellites can be placed in higher, longer-lasting orbits, provided that the power source is strong enough to bridge the additional wave-propagation distance.

59. The characteristics of radar enable it to penetrate clouds and fog while it can also be used effectively both day and night. On the other hand, it is still not easy to produce radar images with a satisfactory resolution and a satisfactory ability to discriminate between different textures and objects on the earth's surface. The characteristics of radar image formation do not facilitate image processing and interpretation. At present, much research is still being devoted to these particular problems.

60. The power source of radar satellites has also been a problem of concern for a long time since they need a relatively high degree of energy to produce radar pulses. This has induced the Soviet Union to equip its radar ocean reconnaissance satellites (RORSATs) with a nuclear reactor. However, it is said that this energy problem has now been solved and future high-performance radar satellites will need considerably less power. Until very recently the main obstacle to the further development of SAR satellite capabilities has been the limited ability to process vast amounts of data at high speed. With the new developments in very high-speed integrated circuits (VHSIC) and in the equally important microwave/millimetre-wave monolithic integrated circuits (MIMIC), a solution for most problems in this field seems to be very near. Provided financial resources are available, it might nevertheless still take some fifteen years before a high-performance radar satellite capable of monitoring the earth's surface can be deployed.

#### *(iv) Image processing*

61. The techniques described above are of primordial importance for obtaining the images which may provide us with the desired information. The ensuing problem is then to transform these images to allow them to be examined and analysed. In a distant future, it is not inconceivable for this to be fully automated, making use of artificial intelligence. At present, as in the foreseeable future, however, the work of highly skilled human analysts for the interpretation of the images is indispensable.

62. Even before the analyst starts working, the raw images received from satellites are processed in order to make the job of interpretation easier. Two important categories of image processing are restoration and enhancement. Image restoration is applied in order to correct image defects such as those caused by distortions and limitations of optics, relative motion of camera and target and incorrect exposure times. With the help of image enhancement the image is altered to clarify or accentuate objects of interest and suppress unwanted background or superfluous information.

63. Nowadays, practically all image processing is carried out on digital computers, which is no longer a major problem since the speed and compactness of these computers has increased rapidly in recent years.

64. It may be more difficult to find a sufficient number of experienced, highly skilled and reliable human analysts, who, at the end of a chain of technological processes, are the key people to make the images obtained understandable.

#### *(v) Electronic reconnaissance*

65. In reconnaissance technology, mention should also be made of satellites using electronic sensors in order to perform signals intelligence (SIGINT), an activity subdivided into electronic intelligence (ELINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT).

66. ELINT equipment is applied to detect and monitor radio signals generated by military activities. Signals of this kind may originate from radars which are in use for early warning, air defence, missile defence or missile control. ELINT systems also play an important rôle in the monitoring of missile telemetry – the radio data transmissions from missiles which are being flight tested – thus providing extremely useful information on performance characteristics. COMINT covers the interception of communications in the wide range from telephone conversations and conventional radio station transmissions to the radio traffic of airport control towers, microwave transmissions and transmissions by manoeuvring military units.

## *VI. Present state of remote-sensing technology in Western Europe*

### *(i) European Space Agency*

67. It is well known that the European Space Agency (ESA), according to the convention by which it was established, can only provide space technology for peaceful purposes. It may be argued, however, that military reconnaissance is defensive in nature, and therefore peaceful. Nowadays space reconnaissance is generally considered lawful when troop positions and fixed installations are being monitored, a conclusion which was already formally adopted by both the United States and the Soviet Union in the ABM treaty of 1972. In its extensive earth observation programme, ESA is applying virtually all existing advanced observation technologies. In this framework, specific mention should be made of Meteosat, ERS-1 and Earthnet. Moreover, a metric camera was developed for the Spacelab. A programme is under way to participate in the international space station and the Ariane launcher programme has achieved the first successful launch of Ariane 4.

#### *(a) Meteosat*

68. In the Meteosat operational programme, optical sensors are applied for observation from geostationary meteorological satellites. The launching of the first fully operational European meteorological satellite MOP-1 is set for November 1988, MOP-2 for spring 1990 and the launching of MOP-3 will be decided later.

69. In the meantime, in the framework of the Meteosat exploitation project, the European Space Operations Centre has gained considerable experience in the continuous processing of images that were received from Meteosat F-1 and Meteosat F-2, two pre-operational satellites launched respectively in 1977 and 1981. This experience has led to many important improvements in processing techniques.

#### *(b) ERS-1*

70. ERS-1 is the first European all-weather microwave remote-sensing satellite. It will be used to provide data on oceans, coastal regions and polar ice areas to help in weather forecasting, assist shipping and fishing and improve understanding of ocean-related phenomena. Equipment worthy of mention is the active microwave instrument comprising a synthetic aperture radar and wind scatterometer, the radar altimeter and the instrument data handling and transmission system.

71. The great advantage of ERS-1 is that it will be able to observe the earth irrespective of weather conditions and time of day. On the other hand, the SAR images will have a rather low resolution of 20 to 40 metres.

72. The launching of ERS-1 is scheduled for May 1990, while a programme proposal for a second satellite, ERS-2, is now under consideration.

#### *(c) Earthnet*

73. Earthnet is a European infrastructure network for the acquisition, processing and handling of data received from Landsat, MOS-1, Tiros and Spot, to which in the near future ERS-1 and the MOP satellites will be added.

#### *(d) Columbus development programme*

74. The Columbus development programme comprises several ESA-developed flight elements which are part of the co-operation between ESA and NASA in the design, development, operation and utilisation of the future permanently manned civil international space station. Here, mention should be made of the so-called polar platform, an unmanned platform in polar orbit to be launched by Ariane 5 in the first quarter of 1997. This polar platform will be stationed in a 800-850 km sun synchronous polar orbit and will be used primarily for earth observation missions. The final configuration of the platform and its equipment will be defined in the near future.

#### *(e) Ariane launcher programme*

75. With its successful Ariane launcher programme, Europe will be able to launch monitoring satellites of any reasonably foreseeable size. Ariane 4, first launched on 15th June 1988, is capable of placing up to 8 000 kg in low earth orbit and 4 200 kg into geostationary transfer orbit.

76. Ariane 5, scheduled to be available by the mid-1990s, should be capable of placing around 21 000 kg in low earth orbit and 6 800 kg in geostationary transfer orbit.

### *(ii) National programmes*

#### *(a) France*

77. A very important programme is the Spot (satellite pour l'observation de la terre) programme for earth observation. The first Spot satellite was put into orbit on 21st February 1986 with three satellites of the same kind to be launched later.

78. Images taken by Spot cover an area of around 60 × 60 km. Its electro-optical imaging system makes use of HRV (haute résolution visible) sensors, which for the multispectral 3-band sensors results in a 20 metres resolution and for the monospectral sensors in a 10 metres resolution. The altitude of its 99° inclination orbit is 832 km. It seems almost superfluous to note here that the same equipment used at a

lower orbit would provide images with a much higher resolution. On the other hand, this would shorten the lifetime of the satellite. Under present circumstances, the official lifetime of Spot is two years, but in fact it is still functioning more than two and a half years after being launched.

79. Another specific characteristic of Spot 1 which deserves to be mentioned here is that the visual angle of its optical system can be changed by up to 27 degrees which allows the satellite to monitor areas of special interest even if the orbit is not at right angles with the area of interest. In such a way, a given area can be revisited once every 2.5 days as compared with once every 26 days if only vertical viewing were used.

80. The follow-up satellites Spot 2 (to be launched in spring 1989) and Spot 3 will have a capability similar to Spot 1. Spot 4 will have an enhanced infra-red capability and a resolution of 5 metres is being studied for this satellite.

81. France is now developing a purely military optical reconnaissance satellite system Helios with an Italian and Spanish participation of 15% and 5% respectively. Helios is a modified military version of the Spot satellite with an alleged resolution of 1 metre. Ultimately, the Helios system would be operational with 3 or 4 satellites in orbit.

*(b) Italy*

82. In regard to remote sensing, Italy is active in techniques for processing and analysing data, methodologies to produce maps of parameters of general interest and the development of new structures for pre-processing remote-sensing data.

83. Among Italy's activities in European programmes, special mention should be made of the development of the control station for the data relay satellite (DRS), which forms part of the preparatory programme for the data relay system. This system would allow data from low-orbit satellites to be relayed by DRS and received at any point over a wide area of Europe.

84. Italy is also responsible for developing the reception centre for data from the polar platform in connection with ESRIN as a development of the ground infrastructure for the ERS-1 satellite and in conjunction with that for the DRS.

85. In another important project, Italy is co-operating with the Federal Republic to develop a synthetic aperture radar, SAR-X, which will fly on an American shuttle mission in the 1990s.

*(c) United Kingdom*

86. Apart from its Skynet series of satellites, exclusively used for military communications, there is no national British effort in monitoring satellites.

87. A project called Zircon and meant to provide a national satellite capability in electronic intelligence was abandoned in 1987, presumably for financial reasons.

*(d) Federal Republic of Germany*

88. An important sensor developed in the Federal Republic is the modular optoelectric/multispectral scanner (MOMS) which has been developed for use in low orbits, in particular for shuttle flights. It has achieved a 20 metre resolution in a 300 km high orbit. It can also produce stereo images.

89. Moreover, its multispectral imaging system allows objects to be selected on the basis of their known spectral signature.

**VII. Tasks and technologies of a European satellite monitoring agency**

90. In Chapter III the question was raised of a European satellite monitoring agency, while Chapter V dealt with the range of technologies available for monitoring satellites. It now remains to be seen what could be monitored by such an agency, assuming that initially it would start working on a modest scale.

91. In recent literature and studies, it is suggested that in general a satellite monitoring agency could perform the following tasks:

- (a) to verify existing international treaties;
- (b) to verify possible future treaties;
- (c) to monitor crisis situations;
- (d) to prevent crisis situations;
- (e) to settle disputes between countries;
- (f) to give early warning of potential armed conflicts;
- (g) to provide information for United Nations observers and United Nations peace-keeping forces.

92. The performance of all the above-mentioned tasks would be far too much for a European satellite monitoring agency which is meant to enhance Europe's security. Such a European agency should in principle be used for:

- (i) monitoring military manoeuvres and movements;
- (ii) monitoring crises and preparations for a surprise attack;
- (iii) verification of future conventional arms control treaties.

93. Before going into detailed capabilities required for the performance of each of these tasks, it should be stressed again that monitoring

by satellite can never be the only method used. Satellites can play an important rôle in collecting data, but, especially as regards the verification of treaties, they will never be able to replace other verification methods such as the indispensable on-site inspection. Satellite data can draw attention to new developments and changing patterns and foster activities of a different kind in order to investigate more thoroughly the suspicions which have been raised. Under specific circumstances, satellite data may be clear enough to incite governments concerned to take measures at political level.

*(i) Monitoring military manoeuvres and movements*

94. Military manoeuvres may be monitored by satellite in order to verify that actual manoeuvres concord with details notified in advance. Under these circumstances, the verification tasks would involve determination of:

- type and number of ships, vehicles, tanks and aircraft used;
- location, size and geographical range;
- order of battle organisation of forces;
- temporal developments of the manoeuvre;
- details concerning possible back-up forces.

*(ii) Monitoring crises and preparations for a surprise attack*

95. Nowadays, no military crisis or surprise attack can take place without quite extensive preparations. No matter how covertly these preparations are being made, they can never go unnoticed by satellite observation. The fact is that any such preparations of a sufficiently threatening size would involve changes in temporal and spatial civilian life and traffic patterns. There would be transportation of forces by land, air or sea and inevitably there would be increased electronic signals and communications traffic.

96. In order to collect significant data concerning the activities under items (i) and (ii), a satellite monitoring agency should have at its disposal photographic sensors in visual and near visual wavelengths with 1 to 5 metre resolution, radar sensors with 5 to 20 metre resolution, infra-red sensors with 20 metre resolution and also possible hyperfrequency receivers for data relating to transmissions.

*(iii) Verification of future conventional arms control treaties*

97. While it is generally admitted that the monitoring tasks mentioned under (i) and (ii) can be performed reasonably effectively by satellites with a relatively moderate capability, the requirements for verification of conventional arms control agreements are quite different.

98. For effective monitoring of the movement of troops and military units and the build-up of forces in preparation for an attack, the whole range of photographic, radar and infra-red sensors and prospective microwave receivers is required as well.

99. To verify compliance with conventional arms control agreements, satellite images should enable image analysts to identify different kinds of armaments which would be subject to limitations, such as tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, heavy mortars, missile systems, helicopters and combat aircraft. As can be seen from Appendix I for identification of vehicles, rockets and artillery, sensor equipment with ground resolutions in the order of 15 to 30 centimetres is required. Moreover, all this weaponry can easily be hidden from satellite monitoring by hangars and other such buildings. On-site inspection is indispensable for the verification of these arms limitations.

100. For verification purposes, a full coverage of the European continent and the adjacent water surface on a day-to-day basis would be required. Only a system with several satellites would be able to accomplish this task.

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## APPENDIX I

*Resolution (in metres) required for interpretation tasks*

Target	Detection	General identification	Precise identification	Description	Analysis
Bridges .....	6	4.6	1.5	0.9	0.3
Communications					
Radar .....	3	0.9	0.3	0.15	0.04
Radio .....	3	1.5	0.3	0.15	0.15
Supply dump .....	1.5	0.6	0.3	0.03	0.03
Troop units .....	6	2	1.2	0.3	0.08
Airfield facilities .....	6	4.6	3	0.3	0.15
Rockets & artillery .....	0.9	0.6	0.15	0.05	0.01
Aircraft .....	4.6	1.5	0.9	0.15	0.03
Command & control head- quarters .....	3	1.5	0.9	0.15	0.03
Missile sites (SSM/SAM)....	3	1.5	0.6	0.3	0.08
Surface ships .....	7.6	4.6	0.6	0.3	0.08
Nuclear weapon components	2.4	1.5	0.3	0.03	0.01
Vehicles .....	1.5	0.6	0.3	0.05	0.03
Land minefields .....	9	6	0.9	0.03	-
Ports & harbours .....	30.5	15	6	3	0.3
Coasts & landing beaches ...	30.5	4.6	3	1.5	0.08
Railway yards shops .....	30.5	15	6	1.5	0.6
Roads .....	9	6	1.8	0.6	0.15
Urban areas .....	61	30.5	3	3	0.3
Terrain .....	-	91	4.6	1.5	0.15
Surfaced submarines .....	30.5	6	1.5	0.9	0.03

## APPENDIX II

*Specifications of existing and near future civilian remote-sensing satellites*

Satellite	Orbit parameter	Sensor	Spectral range	IFOV	Swath width (km)	Launch
Landsat-5 (United States)	Sun-synchronous Altitude: 705 km Inclination: 98° Repeat cycle: 16 days	TM	0.45- 0.52 $\mu$ 0.52- 0.60 $\mu$ 0.63- 0.69 $\mu$ 0.76- 0.90 $\mu$ 1.55- 1.75 $\mu$ 2.08- 2.35 $\mu$	30 m	185	1984
			MSS	10.40-12.50 $\mu$		
			0.5 - 0.6 $\mu$ 0.6 - 0.7 $\mu$ 0.7 - 0.8 $\mu$ 0.8 - 1.1 $\mu$	80 m		
SPOT (France) 1986	Sun-synchronous Altitude: 832 km Inclination: 99° Repeat cycle: 26 days	HRV	0.50- 0.59 $\mu$ 0.61- 0.68 $\mu$ 0.79- 0.89 $\mu$	20 m	60 ( $\times$ 2)	1986
			0.51- 0.73 $\mu$	10 m		
ERS-1 (ESA) 1990	Sun-synchronous Altitude: 675 km Inclination: 98° Repeat cycle: 3 days	AMI (-band active microwave instruction)				1990
		SAR mode	5.3 GHz (C band) Incident angle: 35 HH Polarisation	30 m or 100 m	75	
		Wave mode		5 km	200	
		Wind mode	5.5 GHz Incident angle: 25-55 HH VV Polarisation	50 km	400	
		RA	13.			




## APPENDIX III

*Characteristics of some past, current and future sensors  
on military reconnaissance and civil earth resources satellites*

Sensor	Sensor orbital altitude (km)	Spatial resolution (m)	Spectral region	Satellite and date of launch	Country
<b>Photographic camera</b>					
Reconnaissance camera	200-500	ca. 0.30	Visible	KH-11, Big Bird & some of the Cosmos satellites	USA USSR
Multispectral scanner (MSS)	375	ca. 30 ca. 75	Visible Infra-red	Skylab (1973)	USA
Earth terrain camera	375	ca. 15 50	Visible Infra-red	Skylab (1973)	USA
Large format camera	268 540	18 ca. 20	Visible Visible	Space shuttle STS-41G (1984) Tested on board space shuttle STS-4 (1982)	USA
MSS	920 920	ca. 140 ca. 140 ca. 240	Visible Visible Infra-red	Landsat 1 (1972) Landsat 2 (1977) Landsat 3 (1978)	USA
MSS	ca. 250	20 60	Visible Infra-red	Salyut 6 (1977) Salyut 6 (1977)	USSR
Charged couple device (CCD)	800	ca. 50 ca. 25	Visible Visible panchromatic	SPOT 1 (1986)	France
Film camera	200	ca. 0.30	Visible	KH-11	USA
Thematic mapper	500 700	80-120 25	Visible Visible, near infra-red; thermal infra-red	Salyut 6 (1978) Landsat 4 (1982) Landsat 5 (1984)	USSR USA
<b>Television camera</b>					
Returned-beam vidicon (RBV)	920	80 40	Visible Visible panchromatic	Landsat 1 (1972) Landsat 2 (1977) Landsat 3 (1978)	USA USA
	500	100	Visible	Salyut 6 (1978)	USSR
<b>Microwave</b>					
Synthetic aperture radar (SAR)	800 250 675	25 38 30	- - -	Seasat-1 Space shuttle STS-2 (1981) ERS-1 (ESA) (1990)	USA USA Europe

APPENDIX IV






*Typical distribution of military satellites  
deployed by the United States and the USSR at any given time*



Source: Scientific American June 1984.

APPENDIX V

*The effect of resolution on the satellite image of a B-52 bomber*







**B - 52:**  
 Length=48 m  
 Wingspan=56 m  
 Width of fuselage=3.5 m



(e)

Source: B. Jasani and B. Sakata, Satellites for arms control and crisis monitoring.

APPENDIX VI

*The effect of resolution on the satellite image of a F-15 aircraft*









**F - 15:**  
Length=19.4 m  
Wingspan=13.1 m  
Tailspan=8.6 m  
Wheeltrack=2.75 m

(f)

## APPENDIX VII


*Comparison between a Soviet T-54/55 tank  
and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) at various resolutions*



Source: See Appendix V.


APPENDIX VIII

*Breakdown by programme of long-term European space plan 1988-2000*  
 (in millions of accounting units – 1986 prices)



APPENDIX IX

World breakdown of space budgets for 1987 (ECUm)



\* programme authorisations for the United States & payment credits for ESA.  
 \*\* excluding military programmes.



## APPENDIX X

*Percentage participation of ESA member countries*

States	Ariane-5	Columbus	Hermes
Austria	0.4	–	0.5
Belgium	6.0	5.0	5.8
Denmark	0.5	1.0	0.45
France	44.7	13.8	43.5
Germany	22.0	38.0	27.0
Ireland	0.2	–	–
Italy	15.0	25.0	12.1
Netherlands	2.3	1.3	2.2
Norway	0.4	0.4	0.2
Spain	3.0	6.0	4.5
Sweden	2.0	–	1.3
Switzerland	2.0	–	1.5
United Kingdom	–	5.0	–
Not covered	×	4.0	0.95

Source: European Space Agency.

*Defence industry in Spain and Portugal*

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REPORT <sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Wilkinson (Chairman); MM. Bassinet, Hill (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens (Alternate: Noerens), Böhm (Alternate: Muller), Caccia, De Bondt, Fourré, Mrs. Francese, MM. Garrett (Alternate: Lambie), Hengel, Intini, Lenzer, Parry, Malfatti, Mechtersheimer, Schmidt, Souvet, Valleix, van der Werff, Worrell.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Programme of the visit  
by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions  
to Spain and Portugal*

*Spain*

*Monday, 12th September 1988*

Visit the SENER factory, Bilbao.

*Tuesday, 13th September 1988*

Visit the CASA factory, Seville.

Meeting with Mr. Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Madrid.

*Wednesday, 14th September 1988*

Meeting with the National Armaments Director, Admiral Juan F. Ruiz Montero.

Meeting with members of the Congress of Deputies.

Visit of INISEL.

*Portugal*

*Thursday, 15th September 1988*

Visit of OGMA (Oeiras) and briefing.

*Friday, 16th September 1988*

Meeting with the Secretary of National Defence, Dr. Eugenio Ramos, and the National Armaments Director, General Cravo da Silva, at the Ministry of Defence, Lisbon.

Meeting with the Defence Committee of the Assembly of the Republic.

In preparing this report, the Rapporteur has also made use of the following publication: Jean-François DAGUZAN, *L'Espagne à la croisée des chemins*, Paris 1988.

***Draft Recommendation***  
***on defence industry in Spain and Portugal***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising the benefits of a more cohesive and politically more vigorous European defence effort within the alliance which the accession of Spain and Portugal to WEU should bring;
- (ii) Aware that Western Europe's defence industrial base would be strengthened if the productive and technical potential of Spain and Portugal were stimulated by an active programme of joint research, collaborative development and production of defence equipment as well as by common maintenance and training programmes with the existing WEU member countries;
- (iii) Conscious that important recommendations in the report "Towards a stronger Europe" presented by the European Defence Industry Study Group to the ministers of the Independent European Programme Group which are of particular relevance to countries with a less-developed defence industry have not as yet been fully implemented;
- (iv) Convinced that budgetary constraints will impel all the European member countries within the alliance to promote enhanced co-operation by governments over the setting of common operational requirements through the Independent European Programme Group as well as through intensified industrial collaboration in the design, development and production of defence equipment;
- (v) Hopeful that better value for money in armament procurement for Western Europe as a whole can be obtained through the imaginative involvement of Portugal and Spain in the development, manufacture and support of a wide range of European defence equipments,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To mark the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU with a political initiative to address the industrial needs of the countries with a less-developed defence industry within the alliance;
2. To bear in mind the particular respective considerations of Portugal and Spain in implementing more fully the recommendations of the report "Towards a stronger Europe" presented by the European Defence Industry Study Group to the Independent European Programme Group;
3. To investigate the benefits to be derived to the alliance from common dependence by other WEU member countries on more specialist and economic sources of supply for defence equipments, and thereby enhance the opportunities for defence equipment procurement from Portugal and Spain;
4. To match Spanish and Portuguese commitment to a wide range of European collaborative aircraft, naval and missile programmes with the establishment of joint European training facilities and courses as well as the secondment of Portuguese and Spanish personnel to military research establishments elsewhere in Western Europe;
5. To facilitate by granting preferential terms of access the participation of LDDI nations such as Portugal in common technology projects;
6. To study the opportunities for military establishments for third line servicing within the WEU countries to bid commercially on the OGMA model for maintenance contracts from the armed forces of other western countries and from approved civilian sources.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur)*

### *Introduction*

1. In the framework of the committee's specific interest in the European armaments industries and in increasing co-operation in European defence equipment procurement, it paid a visit to Spain and Portugal from 12th to 16th September 1988.

2. As both countries have formally applied to join WEU and are negotiating the terms of their membership with the Ministerial Council, the committee considered it of particular interest to examine the general capabilities of their respective defence industries and at the same time to study the possibility of deriving additional political impetus to European armaments collaboration from the enlargement of WEU by the accession of Portugal and Spain.

3. In this report, a clear distinction will be made between the positions of Spain and Portugal since their strategic and political situations are very different. Likewise their technical and industrial experience and capabilities display important differences.

### **A. SPAIN**

#### *I. Government and defence industry*

4. In most countries, there is a close relationship between government and the defence industry. An obvious reason is that an indigenous ability to supply the defence equipment needs of the armed forces plays a vital rôle in maintaining autonomy and sovereignty in national defence.

5. Spain follows this general pattern. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for determining the national defence policy in the context of meeting the objectives of Spain's strategic and foreign policy objectives and of developing the ensuing equipment programmes. Within the Ministry of Defence, there is a Dirección General de Armamento y Material (DGAM), created in 1977. The main task of the DGAM is to co-ordinate and execute the armaments and material policy of the armed services in accordance with their respective standards and specifications.

6. Its rôle needs some clarification especially since the substantial influence of the National Institute for Industry (INI) in the armaments industry does not facilitate DGAM's rôle as a mediator and co-ordinator between the armed services and the defence industry. The INI was

established in 1941 to reconstruct the national defence industry which had been distorted and set back by the civil war and has a most important rôle. INI, after a recent restructuring, is still the main public holding company in the defence industry with an important stake in companies such as Bazan (shipyards, 95%), Santa Barbara (field armaments, 100%), CASA (aerospace industry, 73%) and INISEL (electronics, 100%).

7. The main task of INI is to create and revitalise industries according to the defence needs of the country. Moreover, it supervises all matters that it considers to be of interest for military or state reasons and exercises its supervision specifically over the larger industries. Altogether, INI controls 70% of armaments production in Spain.

### *II. Structure of the defence industry*

#### *(a) Public sector*

8. In the public sector, the state holding company, INI, exercises control over 74 companies with the defence-related companies among them covering 70% of Spanish arms production.

9. The INI defence industries are also by far the biggest employers: Bazan shipyards has 12 000 employees, ENASA, a military vehicle manufacturer, 10 000, CASA 8 000, Santa Barbara 4 200 and INISEL nearly 3 000.

10. INISEL, created in 1985 by merging six existing small electronics companies, may be considered the showpiece of INI, destined to lead Spain's battle in advanced technology in the future European defence market. Between 60 and 70% of INISEL's activities are defence-related, primarily in co-operative European programmes.

#### *(b) Private sector*

11. In the private sector of the Spanish defence industry, some 140 companies are active, including about 40 in the production of armaments, electronics and military vehicles and the others in ancillary industries.

12. Of these companies, mention should be made of Talbot (vehicles), Cecelsa (electronics, aircraft maintenance and overhaul, 1 100 employees), Marconi (electronics, 400 employees) and Sener (informatics and engineering, 700 employees). The average size of private companies in this sector is between 200 and 1 000 employees.

*(c) Associations*

13. Since most companies active in the defence industry are of a relatively small size, the Ministry of Defence has stimulated the establishment of trade associations of manufacturers, which should act as a link between industry and the ministry.

14. In 1983 this policy resulted in the establishment of the *Circulo de Electronica Militar (CEM)*, uniting defence manufacturers and university centres. The CEM especially promotes contacts between industry and fundamental research, facilitates the establishment of bilateral agreements and organises the exchange of information.

15. The *Asociacion de Fabricantes de Armas y Material de Defensa (Afarmade)*, a non-profit organisation comprising 85% of the defence manufacturers, was created in 1985. Afarmade promotes research and development in industry and is trying to restructure the armaments sector. In international programmes, it helps small companies to participate.

*(d) Size and economic output*

16. At present some 100 000 people are employed in the defence industry in Spain, including ancillary industries and support services.

17. For many reasons, such as the political isolation of Spain in the Franco era and the late entry of Spain into NATO, the production volume of the Spanish defence industry even after the Franco era has been very limited. Successive democratic governments in the post-Franco period have been convinced of the need to expand the defence sector of industry for the benefit of the overall industrial economy and the armed forces. This active policy soon resulted in considerable growth in Spanish armaments production. Excessive reliance on imports of American defence equipment (a legacy of the United States/Spanish bilateral defence treaty) is now being overcome as these figures on domestic armaments production clearly demonstrate:

FIGURE 1

*Production volume of armament industries*  
(in millions of pesetas)

Years	INI	Private	State	Total
1978	—	—	—	70 000
1979	46 000	70 000	—	116 000
1980	65 992	—	—	—
1981	108 400	± 60 000	—	170 000
1982	100 992	—	2 400	150 000
1983	—	—	2 400	—
1984	—	—	—	204 000
1985	150 000	60 000	1 200	222 000

(Source: Daguzan, *l'Espagne à la croisée des chemins*.)

*III. Products and capabilities*

18. Without claiming to be in any way exhaustive, an attempt is made here to provide a brief survey of Spain's major capabilities in the defence industrial field.

*(a) Ammunitions and bombs*

19. *Union Explosivos Rio Tinto S.A. (ERT)*, Spain's largest private chemical group, produces a full range of ammunitions, explosives and aviation bombs. Part of ERT is *Explosivos Alaveses S.A. (Expal)*, a small group of companies producing mines, aviation bombs and artillery ammunition, which exports 75% of its production. *Material de Armamento y Suministros S.A. (Maarsusa)* is another company, specialised in aviation bombs and ammunition, which exports to the African and Arabic world as well as to some European clients.

20. Research is being done now in more advanced technologies: Sener, in co-operation with the DGAM, is developing a long-range laser-guided stand-off weapon.

*(b) Aerospace*

21. *Aeronautica Industrial S.A. (AISA)* is a small company which has been responsible for several liaison and training aircraft for the Spanish air force. It is now a subsidiary of Ceselsa and engaged in repair and general overhaul of Beechcraft aircraft for the Spanish air force and also of several types of Bell helicopter and of the Boeing Vertol CH-47 helicopters for the Spanish air force, army and civilian operators. As a subcontractor, it is engaged in production programmes for the Mirage F-1 and 2000, Falcon and Alpha-jet as well as for the C-212 and Airbus.

22. Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A. (CASA) is the largest aerospace company of Spain. It has designed several aircraft under contract to the Spanish Air Ministry, including the successful C-212 aviocar transport aircraft (412 sold, 390 delivered) and the C-101 aviojet jet trainer (151 sold, 144 delivered), both of which are currently in production. Together with the Indonesian company IPTN, CASA developed the CN-235 transport aircraft, of which 114 have now been sold and 5 delivered.

23. Recently, CASA started work on the AX, a tactical aircraft for advanced training and ground support missions (see Chapter VI). In the framework of offset agreements and as a subcontractor, it is involved in a number of programmes. It is participating in the production of the recently ordered McDonnell Douglas F/A-18s and is assembling MBB BO-105 and Aérospatiale AS-332 Super Puma helicopters for the Spanish armed forces. Components are being produced for the MD-80, Boeing 757 and Canadair CL-215. As a full member of Airbus Industrie, Casa is producing components for the Airbus A 300, 310 and 320 civil airliner programmes. Maintenance and overhaul is being carried out for the Spanish armed forces aircraft inventory and for some USAF aircraft in Europe, such as the F-15. As far as international arms co-operation is concerned, CASA is involved in the programmes for development of the EFA, Tonal helicopter, MSOW, FAMS and FIMA (see Chapter VII).

24. Ibermisil is a new company, created in early 1988 under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Industry with CASA, Bazan, Santa Barbara and INISEL as participants in order to develop and manufacture missiles. In 1992, Ibermisil should deliver the first missile designed and built in 1992. The first system will be an anti-tank missile in short-range (800-1 000 m) and long-range (up to 5 000 m) versions meeting the requirements of the Spanish army. Ibermisil will also participate in international missile programmes (see Chapter VII).

25. As part of its determined policy to upgrade the national aerospace industry, the Spanish Ministry of Defence opened a competition in 1986 for a contract to modernise the 23 Mirage IIIE aircraft of the air force. The contract worth nearly US \$200 million will involve modernisation of the aircraft's avionics and radar and structural enhancement such as the fitting of canard foreplanes. Recently, the Defence Ministry awarded the contract to a team consisting of the private domestic company Ceselsa, teaming with the Israel aircraft industries (IAI), and CASA teaming with Avions Marcel Dassault-Bréguet lost. The ministry has now forced Ceselsa and CASA to create a consortium to perform the modernisation, stipulating that the

two companies are considered as equal level contractors with Ceselsa (avionics and radar) to perform a minimum of 20% of the total work. Foreign involvement should be restricted to a minimum and only on a subcontractor level. The final contract has not yet been signed and CASA is claiming that the connection with IAI could undermine its own dealings with the Arab world.

#### *(c) Vehicles*

26. The largest Spanish company in this sector, Empresa Nacional de Autocamiones S.A. (ENASA), is manufacturing a full range of special vehicles for defence purposes including all-terrain trucks, light armoured vehicles, amphibious wheeled vehicles and armoured vehicles for personnel transport and reconnaissance. ENASA is especially successful also in export contracts with its BMR 6X6, a 6 wheel drive armoured personnel carrier, available in several versions.

#### *(d) Artillery and light weapons*

27. Recently, two field guns have been developed by rival Spanish companies. Desarrollos de Sistemas y Tecnologías S.A. (Sitecsa), an ERT company, has developed the ST 155/45 gun and is developing a 203 mm gun based on the same carrier. At the same time, Santa Barbara developed the SB 155/39 howitzer. Santa Barbara also offers a wide range of light weapons. It is now testing the very short-range ground-to-air defence system Meroka which it developed for the Spanish army. A special version was developed for installation on several Spanish navy ships. Semi-automatic pistols and sub-machine guns are manufactured by Star Bonifacio Echevarria S.A.

#### *(e) Ships*

28. The only shipyard with a significant defence manufacturing activity is the state-owned Bazan shipyard. Its main activity is to carry out Spanish navy programmes. All major naval ships recently built, however, are of foreign design, adapted by Bazan to the national navy's requirements. This happened in the case of the Descubierta class frigates (commissioned 1978-82) based on a Portuguese-German design, the Principe de Asturias aircraft-carrier (commissioned 1988), based on a United States design, and the Santa Maria class frigates (being commissioned now), based on the United States FFG 7 Oliver Perry class. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that especially for the Santa Maria class frigates the national Spanish industry has developed new equipment in the field of armaments and electronics, for which Spain previously called on foreign suppliers. Bazan also builds smaller vessels, of which some types are exported; six patrol vessels are now being delivered to Morocco.

*(f) Electronics*

29. The principal Spanish group in the defence electronics sector is INISEL, created in 1985 as the result of a decision of the INI. Apart from INISEL there are 7 other companies in this group with a total of 3 000 employees. In the defence field, which accounted for about US \$100 million or 48% of the sales of the INISEL group in 1987, it is active in, among others, tactical communications, weapons electronics, avionics, optics and optoelectronics, radars, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence and software development. In the framework of offset contracts, it produced Kaiser head-up displays and other cockpit displays for the F/A-18. Recently, many of its technicians attended training programmes in United States companies associated with the F/A-18 programme.

30. Now it is involved in the development of the radar for the European fighter aircraft and it is also competing in consortia for other EFA contracts concerning cockpit displays, digital engine control and communications.

31. Also forward-looking is the private company Ceselsa, created in 1979 and now employing 1 100 in seven operating divisions. Ceselsa acquired new technology in working in computers and inertial navigation systems for the F/A-18 and AV-8B programmes for the Spanish armed forces. It recently won a contract for the modernisation of avionics and airframes for the Spanish Mirage IIIEs and is involved in the EFA programme. With government-funded research, it is now developing a three-dimensional primary radar for civilian and military use.

32. Marconi Espanola is a smaller, since 1987 wholly Spanish-owned, private company, with

400 employees. It is specialised in tactical communications, aircraft instruments and radar assemblies and is exporting defence equipment to the United States, France and Italy.

*IV. Arms sales and exports*

33. Since the beginning of democratic government in 1976 it has been standing government policy to export as many defence products as possible. This policy, by concentrating on a few not very advanced but reliable products, has been highly successful.

*(a) The legal framework*

34. Each contract for the export or import of weapons is subject to approval by a council with representatives from the Ministries of Trade and Tourism, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Industry and Energy. In formulating its judgment, this council takes into account the possible consequences for the foreign policy of Spain, the influence on national arms production and defence and, in general, if it is appropriate to import or export the material in question, making sure that the needs of the armed forces and the national industry are met. Criteria for the selection of approved countries for Spanish defence sales or imports are established by the ministerial council. In certain cases an official guarantee of destination (end-user certificate) may be required and the council can demand a clause prohibiting re-export to third countries.

35. Altogether, the Spanish legislation for the control of arms export and import is very similar to the rules existing in other Western European countries and no political controversies about it have occurred since it came into force.

FIGURE 2  
*Arms trade ranking*  
(millions of 1985 dollars)

EXPORTS			IMPORTS		
Country	1987	1986	Country	1987	1986
USSR .....	12 262	10 908	India .....	5 246	2 695
United States .....	11 547	9 965	Iraq .....	3 541	2 100
France .....	3 573	4 378	Egypt .....	2 231	1 778
United Kingdom ...	1 792	1 693	Saudi Arabia .....	1 753	2 495
West Germany .....	1 444	943	Israel .....	1 632	406
China .....	1 040	1 302	Japan .....	1 331	1 640
Netherlands .....	497	240	Syria .....	1 301	1 782
Sweden .....	380	322	Turkey .....	1 212	789
Brazil .....	369	189	Czechoslovakia .....	1 191	1 161
Czechoslovakia .....	321	276	Angola .....	1 126	720
Israel .....	268	179	Spain .....	1 111	865
Italy .....	247	327	Canada .....	677	759
Spain .....	177	210	Australia .....	654	867
Egypt .....	158	126	Taiwan .....	607	664
Canada .....	139	746	South Korea .....	556	288

(Source: SIPRI).



*(b) Volumes of exports and clients*

36. Since the early 1970s, when Spain started to export weaponry as part of a determined government policy, it climbed rapidly from a position of almost zero to the thirteenth place in the world list of weapons exporting countries.

37. It should be noted of course that the size of its exports cannot be compared with that of the six countries ranked highest on the list, who shared together about 93% of the market in 1987.

38. Moreover in 1982, weapons exports made up only 4% of total Spanish exports. For the defence industry, however, arms exports play an

important rôle, since about 50% of the total arms production is exported.

39. On the other hand, examining those countries which have received Spanish weapons, it appears that Spain's major weapons exports are directed almost exclusively to third world countries. Exports of major weapons to industrialised countries are virtually non-existent. On the list of exporters of major weapons to the third world, Spain moved from eighteenth position in the 1977-81 period to the eighth place in the 1982-86 period (see Appendix).

40. Figure 3 shows the main third world major weapons recipients from the Spanish defence industry, as compared with four other West European arms suppliers.

FIGURE 3

*Patterns of major-weapon exports of five West European arms suppliers  
1977-81 and 1982-86*

Percentage share based on SIPRI trend indicator values as expressed in US \$m., at constant (1985) prices

Supplier	Share in total arms exports to third world		Third world share in supplier's arms exports		Top 5 third world recipients, 1982-86	Combined share *
	1982-86	1977-81	1982-86	1977-81		
France .....	15.1	12.4	86	71	Iraq, Saudi Arabia, India, Argentina, Egypt .....	55
United Kingdom ..	5.3	5.1	67	85	India, Chili, Oman, Nigeria, Egypt .....	58
FR Germany .....	3.9	1.7	63	42	Argentina, Colombia, Malaysia, Bahrain, Kuwait .....	81
Italy .....	3.6	3.3	98	94	Libya, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Malaysia .....	70
Spain .....	1.6	0.2	100	100	Egypt, Mexico, Morocco, Argentina, Iraq .....	84

\* Share in supplier's total exports to the third world.

(Source: SIPRI).

41. Several factors determine the extent of Spanish weapons exports to third world countries. First, the technological level of the Spanish defence industry, as compared to other major arms producing nations in the world, is relatively low and not very sophisticated. As a consequence, Spanish arms products are relatively cheap and reliable and fit perfectly the level of requirements and financial capabilities of many third world countries.

42. Second, in recent years and under successive governments, Spain has not been fairly catholic in selecting its clients on the arms market, as can be seen in Figure 4.

*(c) An anxious perspective*

43. If Spanish weapons exports have been successful in recent years, a decline is now visible (see Appendix) and the outlook is not entirely reassuring.

44. One reason for the general decline in weapons sales of many major weapons exporters is the debt burden problem which has led many third world countries to curtail the overambitious modernisation of their armed forces. Moreover, several new exporting countries such as Brazil, Egypt and Israel have recently entered the world arms market, especially in those

FIGURE 4  
*Development of Spanish arms sales  
 1970-1982*

Europe	Middle East	Africa	Asia	America
Portugal	Saudi Arabia Jordan Syria United Arab Emirates Iraq Egypt	Uganda Senegal Libya Upper Volta Nigeria South Africa Morocco Rhodesia	Indonesia Thailand	Chile Bolivia Peru Argentina Mexico Ecuador Venezuela Uruguay

1982-1986

Europe	Middle East	Africa	Asia	America
	Saudi Arabia Egypt Turkey Iraq Jordan Iran Lebanon	Zimbabwe Sudan Angola Somalia South Africa Morocco Djibouti	Indonesia Thailand	Honduras Chile Mexico Paraguay Nicaragua Colombia Panama Peru Argentina

(Source: Daguzan, L'Espagne à la croisée des chemins).

market sectors for less-sophisticated weaponry where Spain enjoyed previously a relatively strong position.

45. It is not therefore surprising that Spain is trying as many ways as possible to acquire more technological expertise in order to enhance the competitiveness and sophistication of its defence industries. In the Spanish view particularly the trend towards improved and expanded European arms co-operation is opening vast opportunities for technology transfer. Consequently, Spain is participating in most of the main European international arms development programmes. The hard question of how Spain will be able to

meet this challenge in terms of financial resources and qualified manpower will be discussed in Chapters V and VII.

#### V. Research and development

46. Spain has only recently started to invest substantially in defence research and development. The overall picture of the defence research and development programme in Spain is not clear since the co-ordination of the different branches of relevant activity seems to be lacking. SIPRI figures quoted here therefore mention 1983 as the latest year for which reliable Spanish data are available.

FIGURE 5  
*Military research and development in some major weapon exporting countries,  
 1977-83*  
 (US \$m at constant (1980) prices and exchange rates)

Country	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
United States .....	16 363.6	16 206.8	15 850.5	15 766.5	17 125.2	19 386.4	21 050.5
France .....	1 982.8	2 235.2	2 517.1	2 685.8	3 276.1	3 116.5	3 081.3
United Kingdom .....	(2 936.8)	(3 181.8)	(3 503.9)	(3 718.7)	(3 583.3)	3 354.0	3 514.1
West Germany .....	991.1	1 047	1 072.3	951.8	813.7	809.6	873.1
Netherlands .....	43	46.9	48.7	45.8	50.4	55.2	47.2
Sweden .....	-	323	281	228.6	210.6	246.4	311.3
Italy .....	68.1	59.5	46.4	48.7	166.6	121.4	160.3
Spain .....	6.4	7.6	12.2	24.3	28.6	37.3	36.3
Canada .....	86.3	84.3	80.4	83.2	85.4	93.5	100.6

Figures between brackets are SIPRI estimates.  
 (Source: SIPRI yearbook 1987).

47. There is still a very pronounced imbalance in Spain between public and private investment in defence research and development if it is considered that three-fifths are financed by the government budget, and only one-fifth by public and one-fifth by private companies.

48. Even if a full survey of Spain's research and development spending in recent years is not yet available, the figures reflecting the development of research and development in the budget of the Ministry of Defence are evidence of the government's intentions.

49. While in 1982 only 400 million pesetas were spent on research and development, this increased to 15 000 million in 1987 and 18 000 million in 1988. The research and development component is now being progressively raised to 4% of total defence spending.

50. In 1987, 85% of the defence budget's research and development funds were destined for aeronautical research of which almost 60% went to programmes related to the EFA (European fighter aircraft), considered as the pivot programme for the acquisition and development of new technologies.

51. The lack of highly-qualified research personnel has proved one of the legacies of the Franco era causing difficulty in speeding up the country's technological development which will take some time to correct. It has since been the clear educational policy of all governments to raise the national skill and qualification base so as to provide for more well-trained research personnel.

52. The establishment of joint ventures is also consciously promoted by the Spanish Government as another efficient way of acquiring new technologies.

#### *VI. The AX, a major national development programme*

53. It is interesting to note that Spain, having some difficulty already in providing the funds for a number of ambitious multilateral European arms co-operation programmes, is working on the definition of a significant national military aircraft programme.

54. The AX project is based on an outline staff target of the Spanish air force. The AX, meant to replace the aging Northrop F-5, will be a transonic, single-engine aircraft, capable of interception, ground attack and reconnaissance missions, all at very low altitudes. It is to be equipped with advanced systems such as radar, laser, fly-by-wire and a head-up display. Advanced materials and production methods would be used for manufacturing the airframe.

55. CASA, which, together with a number of other Spanish defence manufacturers has already been studying this project, told the committee

that the official feasibility phase should start within a few months. CASA has also suggested that the AX could be a candidate for the joint NATO trainer system. First delivery of the AX fighter/trainer should then be at the end of the 1990s. Spain would prefer not to be alone in this programme and talks have been initiated with other European countries to see if they are interested.

#### *VII. International co-operation*

56. Whilst Spain is taking the first steps to develop the AX aircraft alone and has in recent years developed a number of armaments independently, a drive for a major rôle in European co-operation is a prime Spanish strategic objective, especially for the part of the defence industry concerned with the aerospace and electronics sectors as can be seen in the following table:

##### *International arms co-operation programmes with Spanish participation*

- IEPG Trigat (third-generation anti-tank missile): United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain.
- IEPG ASRAAM (advanced short-range air-to-air missile): Canada, Germany, Italy, Norway, United Kingdom, Spain.
- IEPG FIMA (future interallied military aircraft): United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain.
- IEPG Maverick "D" (air-to-ground missile) United States-European dual production; European participants: Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Spain.
- IEPG Mistral (short-range ground-to-air missile): France, Belgium, Italy, Greece, Spain.
- IEPG Medium surface-to-air missile (MSAM): United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain.
- IEPG Light support weapons: France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom (observer).
- IEPG Medium mortar: France, Italy, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom, Germany (observer).
- IEPG Short-range anti-armour weapon 600 m: France, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Spain.
- IEPG Short-range anti-armour weapon 300 m: Spain, France, Germany, Netherlands.
- IEPG Mortars: Spain, France, Italy, Norway, United Kingdom, Germany (observer).
- IEPG Microwave landing system: United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Spain.

- European fighter aircraft: United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain.
- Tonal light attack helicopter: United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Spain.
- Modular stand-off weapon: United Kingdom, United States, Germany, Italy, Spain.
- Helios (military reconnaissance satellite): France, Italy, Spain.
- NFR-90, NATO frigate replacement for the 1990s: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, United States.
- FAMS (future anti-missile system for navy): Italy, France, United Kingdom, Spain (European contender for NFR-90 NATO frigate anti-air missile system).
- NATO anti-air warfare system, based on United States Aegis architecture. United States, Germany, Canada, Spain, Netherlands and United Kingdom concluded MOU late 1987 for concept exploration of this system, lasting about eighteen months (allied contender for the NFR-90 NATO frigate anti-air missile system).
- NATO 155 mm autonomous precision-guided munition (APGM) Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, United States. MOU for expanded feasibility study signed April 1987. Contract award expected 1988.

57. The Spanish authorities are quite willing to admit that within Europe, the ultimate goal should be an open European armaments market. They believe that a transitional period of eight to twelve years should allow existing imbalances in the defence industry and technology to be corrected gradually. The creation of a common industrial and technological base which would make sure that all participating countries have the same capabilities is, from the Spanish point of view, a condition for the establishment of an open European defence market. It is well understood in Spain that participation in arms co-operation programmes is the best and virtually only way to acquire the advanced technology which is still lacking in the national defence industry. On the other hand, the government is well aware that private companies are not eager to transfer technology if their patents are concerned, these being their profit-making assets. The problem of safeguarding intellectual property rights in international programmes is notoriously contentious.

58. The idea of a common European defence research programme, as advocated in the EDIS report presented to the Ministerial Council of the IEPG in Seville in July 1987 and which is being strongly endorsed by the Assembly of WEU, is therefore now being promoted by the Spanish presidency of the IEPG. Admiral Ruiz Montero, the Spanish National Armaments Director, told

the committee that in preparatory meetings for the IEPG ministerial meeting in Luxembourg on 8th and 9th November 1988 a general consensus seemed to have developed, recognising that a commonly-funded European defence research programme is the only way towards creating a strong European defence technology base whilst making better use of available resources.

59. In existing arms co-operation programmes, Spain is insisting on obtaining a fair return for its investments. The Spanish admit that this concept of *juste retour* may cause problems in some programmes where the technical level of the Spanish industrial participation is not up to that of other participating industries. They visualise *juste retour* as a temporary industrial phase whose interpretation would become less rigid with the passage of time.

60. One other rather thorny problem is the question of the export of jointly developed armaments. In the EFA programme, rules have now been adopted which could serve as a basis for other co-operative programmes. The Spanish have made clear their view that unduly strict export rules could damage the defence industry, which seeks not only advantageous high technology transfers from its European collaborative programmes but substantial volume production also.

61. It should be noted here that the Spanish defence industry supported by the government is extending itself into new areas in its eagerness to participate in key European collaborative programmes. One example is participation in the development and production of the EJ 200 powerplant by the private company Sener, the lead company for the Spanish with a 13% share in this ultra high technology engine to be produced by the Eurojet four nation consortium for the EFA. A new subsidiary has been created for this purpose, Sener Turbo Propulsion S.A., in which Sener, CASA and Bazan together have a 51% share, Rolls Royce, MTU and Fiat together a 32% share and other investors the remaining 17%.

62. A recent example of the potentially conflicting pressures which the urge to collaborate may impose upon Spanish policy-makers is worthy of examination. A few months ago it became known that the United States company Hughes Missiles had formed a joint venture with a consortium of three Spanish companies led by Explosivos Rio Tinto (ERT) to develop a third-generation, medium-range, man-portable missile called Aries. Aries should be ready for production in 1992/1993 at the same time as the man-portable version of Trigat against which it is meant to compete. On the other hand, Spain is involved in negotiations to be an associate member of a British-French-German consortium which is developing Trigat. The Spanish authorities were keen to join the Trigat programme as

one of the major European arms collaboration programmes. Spanish industry has however started to complain that it will only play a small part in Trigat's development and production, while it is being said that the United States-Spanish joint venture for Aries could offer larger workshares.

63. It seems clear that the ERT consortium has been tempted here by Hughes with attractive promises which may prove more than worthwhile for Hughes if it manages to secure a strong foot-hold in the European market. The low cost of Spanish production must be attractive to Hughes also.

64. An example where the Spanish desire for a fair return on its investment can lead to an apparently anomalous competitive process is the programme for an EFA radar. The Spanish state-owned company INISEL is a member of both consortia now competing for this radar, one led by Ferranti with the proposed ECR 90 radar, the other by AEG-Marconi with the proposed MSD 2000. Here INISEL, as Spain's sole representative in the radar competition, can never lose and will always win, but this desirable result for Spain does not necessarily mean that INISEL derives the greatest incentive for efficiency and competitiveness, and such each-way betting must be expensive.

65. CASA, traditionally a fixed-wing aircraft manufacturer, has been participating in a co-operative study programme for a light attack helicopter, the Tonal, together with Agusta, Westland and Fokker. Here, CASA is expending energy and resources to derive expertise in rotary-wing technology of which it has little experience. So too is Fokker in Holland. As a consequence, the development of Tonal could be extended as the Westland and Agusta companies who have worked together on the EH 101 make CASA and Fokker more familiar with helicopter technology and the procedures of international co-operation. Furthermore there are imprecisions about the operational requirement and differences of view within as well as between respective national army staffs which make Spain's excursion into the anti-tank helicopter arena exceptionally bold as well as potentially problematical. The subject of the future of the helicopter industry in Europe was addressed in a previous report by the committee to the Assembly in 1986. It has hardly clarified itself since that date.

## B. PORTUGAL

### *I. Structure and capabilities of the Portuguese defence industry*

66. At present, the Portuguese defence industry is entirely state controlled. It has a capacity in conventional munitions, light hand

weapons and some related equipments and produces almost exclusively for national requirements. As far as shipyard activities are concerned, the Arsenal di Alfeite is doing maintenance work and has built some smaller vessels, e.g. patrol vessels for the Portuguese navy. Such vessels have also been built by the Estaleiros Navais do Mondego. All recent larger Portuguese naval ships, e.g. frigates and submarines, have been ordered and built abroad. In fact, the Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronautico (OGMA) is the only Portuguese defence industry establishment of any size which also works for the international market. OGMA, founded in 1918, is the department of the Portuguese air force responsible for maintenance and repair, at second and third line level of its aircraft, avionics, engines, ground communications and radar equipment. In this capacity, it works on a number of different aircraft, such as the Cessna T-37, Northrop T-38 Talon, Fiat G-91, Vought A-7P Corsair, Lockheed P-3 Orion, Casa 212 Aviocar, Lockheed C-130 Hercules and the Aérospatiale Alouette III and Puma helicopters. Yet OGMA operates commercially also. Beginning in 1959, OGMA has now established maintenance contracts with a large number of foreign customers, such as the United States air force, the United States navy, the air forces of West Germany and Angola. Recently it won a competition between eleven companies for the overhaul of Allison turboprop engines for the C-130s of the Kuwaiti air force.

67. The manufacturing division has just started working as a subcontractor in the aerospace industry and its management anticipates great opportunities in this area of activity. A recent example of industrial co-operation is the Portuguese purchase of eighteen Aérospatiale Epsilon training aircraft which will be assembled at OGMA. OGMA's total workforce now is about 2 600 people, of which 1 930 technical and production staff and 429 administrative personnel.

### *II. The future of Portugal's defence industry*

68. The Portuguese Government made it clear to the committee that at present, apart from OGMA which has been discussed in Chapter I, the situation in the national defence industry is not exactly a thriving one. There is an industrial base in conventional munitions, which needs reinforcement. Portugal would like to extend these capabilities to produce anti-tank missiles and guided artillery shells. As it has increasingly been known in recent years that the internal market is too small to maintain a fully independent defence industry, Portugal is establishing contacts with companies abroad in order to examine opportunities for joint ventures. As

far as IEPG research and technology programmes are concerned, Portugal is interested in a programme for the production of insensitive secondary explosive components with the United Kingdom as the lead nation with Italy, Norway and Spain also participating.

69. A major problem for the defence industry is the lack of technological know-how. Even if other nations were inclined to transfer technology the question is whether the Portuguese industry will then be in a position to absorb it.

70. In its fight for a fair return, Portugal is encountering problems. Even if it is true that thanks to low wages its manufacturing costs are very competitive, the national defence industry in general is not as yet able to operate to the standards of technological expertise required in major international arms co-operation programmes. Also in off-set contracts or compensation orders which are normally part of armaments purchases abroad, the mutual interest is lacking because the Portuguese industry is not able to offer the capabilities which the overseas supplier company would expect in return. In the framework of some armaments programmes with the United States, new technology was transferred to Portuguese companies but only on the strict condition that it should not be used for other purposes or for the export of new products.

71. For all these reasons, in addition to acute budgetary constraints, Portugal is not participating in any of the major European co-operative armaments programmes, but Portugal is an observer in some of them, which means that it is attending certain meetings of the relevant programme board to be able to see if it can participate at a later stage.

72. It must be understood that in Portugal there are still significant legal obstacles of a constitutional nature which prevent private companies from being active in the field of defence equipment manufacture. Believing that private initiatives could well stimulate the development of a sound defence industry, the Portuguese Government has now proposed a bill which is meant to enable private companies to become defence equipment suppliers. It is hoped by the government that parliament will adopt this bill before the end of 1988 which is an important part of its programme of privatisation and economic liberalisation.

### ***III. Portugal and the IEPG action plan for countries with a less-developed defence industry***

73. When the IEPG ministers of defence met in Seville on 22nd June 1987, they agreed that in order to improve the competitiveness of Europe's defence industry, decisive action

should be taken at short notice towards the step-by-step build-up of a European armaments market. As it was quite clear that specific difficulties of the IEPG member countries with a less-developed defence industry (LDDI) – Greece, Portugal and Turkey – should be taken into account, the ministers decided that LDDI countries should be included in armaments co-operation.

74. At the same time the ministers instructed their national armaments directors to draw up an action plan for the progressive creation of a European armaments market. This action plan will be presented to the IEPG ministers at their meeting in Luxembourg on 8th-9th November 1988.

75. During discussions with the Portuguese Secretary of State for National Defence, Dr. Ramos and the National Armaments Director, General Cravo da Silva, it was explained to the committee that there was a need for a dedicated action plan to help LDDI countries gradually enter the European armaments market.

76. Co-operative technology projects (CTPs) are considered a useful method for Portugal to acquire technology, but for the moment the entrance fee due for participation is prohibitive for Portugal. This financial inhibition which could well also apply to Greece and Turkey was a reason for this committee's clear recommendation as a consequence of its seminar in London in March 1988 which was adopted by the Assembly to the WEU Council to establish a European defence research agency funded from a common budget. This would help reduce the disadvantages suffered by the LDDIs at present in gaining access to key technologies in the defence field. This is however a medium-term objective.

77. In the short term participation in CTPs by LDDI countries should therefore be facilitated. Specific rules including less prohibitive entrance fees and the possibility of later participation in CTPs should be drawn up.

78. Moreover, it was stressed that there should also be a transfer of technology outside the framework of CTPs. OGMA is an example where high-standard maintenance licences and contracts help to improve understanding of many technologies. The maintenance capabilities of low-cost technology-hungry LDDI nations such as Portugal should be more fully utilised by the richer alliance nations who do actually face severe budgetary problems.

79. It has also been suggested that after an initial supplementary effort by countries with a fully-developed defence industry to transfer some basic technology, a number of European co-operative procurement programmes could benefit from lower production costs in Portugal.

This should even be possible in procurement programmes in which Portugal is not a full participant as a customer, provided that customer-participant nations will not claim a full fair return.

80. As far as technology transfer is concerned, the opportunities of joint ventures deserve

special attention. The government bill to allow private enterprise in the defence industry may open up new prospects. Likewise, the management of OGMA made it clear to the committee that for the time being co-operative agreements or joint ventures on a bi- or multilateral industry-to-industry basis are a most efficient way of improving its capabilities.

## APPENDIX

*Values of exports of major weapons to third world regions*

Supplier		1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
USSR	A	4 317	3 787	2 164	4 121	4 967	5 874	7 025	4 732	2 874	4 875	7 233	9 065	9 786	8 590	7 141	7 112	6 904	7 521	7 948	7 681
	B	2 845	3 398	3 871	4 183	4 830	5 344	5 094	5 076	5 348	5 756	6 766	7 910	8 363	8 339	7 906	7 454	7 325	7 433	..	..
United States	A	1 816	2 215	3 118	3 551	3 830	5 924	6 264	4 481	7 074	7 257	9 722	6 852	4 020	5 712	6 277	7 192	6 336	5 230	4 291	5 108
	B	2 017	2 442	2 906	3 728	4 538	4 810	5 515	6 200	6 960	7 077	6 985	6 713	6 517	6 011	5 907	6 150	5 865	5 631	..	..
France	A	274	580	274	693	677	786	1 643	1 263	1 144	1 398	2 157	2 409	3 264	2 356	3 134	2 892	2 778	3 654	3 796	3 566
	B	333	433	500	602	815	1 012	1 102	1 247	1 521	1 674	2 074	2 317	2 664	2 811	2 885	2 963	3 251	3 337	..	..
United Kingdom	A	478	518	1 038	472	1 212	1 195	1 307	1 071	1 196	834	1 641	1 200	773	703	1 161	1 670	579	1 135	942	1 516
	B	537	564	744	887	1 045	1 052	1 196	1 121	1 210	1 189	1 129	1 030	1 096	1 102	977	1 050	1 098	1 169	..	..
China	A	214	162	86	101	321	417	232	382	320	211	114	459	412	548	328	736	877	1 146	792	1 208
	B	154	159	177	218	232	291	335	313	252	297	303	349	372	497	580	727	776	952	..	..
FR Germany	A	66	36	56	3	86	108	-	408	261	166	204	258	162	283	931	321	1 172	1 820	505	541
	B	52	44	50	58	51	121	173	188	208	259	210	215	368	391	574	905	950	872	..	..
Italy	A	96	121	85	37	95	137	148	268	139	163	294	323	975	653	1 332	1 346	970	811	539	324
	B	73	75	87	95	100	137	157	171	202	237	379	481	715	926	1 055	1 022	999	798	..	..
Spain	A	6	12	6	-	-	10	-	-	5	7	13	30	21	9	97	371	542	525	247	107
	B	12	8	5	5	3	2	3	4	5	11	15	16	34	106	208	309	356	358	..	..
Israel	A	*	1	9	5	1	34	4	67	121	59	55	470	228	209	277	375	310	174	184	144
	B	2	3	3	10	10	22	45	57	61	155	187	204	248	312	280	269	264	237	..	..
Brazil	A	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	11	25	154	130	120	112	268	273	202	298	269	185	121
	B	*	*	*	*	*	2	7	38	64	88	108	157	181	195	231	262	245	215	..	..
Other third world	A	44	13	15	26	48	134	30	184	146	157	187	95	507	177	385	542	789	573	310	498
	B	77	81	29	47	51	84	108	130	141	154	218	225	270	341	480	493	520	542	..	..
Other industrialised, West	A	67	105	241	68	223	327	254	83	218	514	184	464	301	226	287	437	438	152	129	261
	B	117	102	141	193	223	191	221	279	251	293	336	338	292	343	338	308	289	284	..	..
Other industrialised, neutral	A	4	7	6	3	232	5	10	13	24	63	71	41	445	272	320	181	282	251	107	182
	B	12	4	50	51	51	52	57	23	36	42	129	178	230	252	300	261	228	201	..	..
Other industrialised, East	A	126	163	139	143	60	72	56	19	23	63	76	144	124	129	232	68	111	137	57	50
	B	107	135	126	115	94	70	46	47	48	65	86	107	141	139	133	135	121	85	..	..
Total	A	7 509	7 721	7 238	9 223	11 752	15 023	16 974	12 982	13 571	15 921	22 082	21 932	21 130	20 135	22 176	23 444	22 387	23 401	20 031	21 308
	B	6 338	7 451	8 688	10 191	12 042	13 191	14 060	14 894	16 306	17 297	18 927	20 240	21 491	21 763	21 854	22 308	22 288	22 114	..	..

Figures are SIPRI trend indicator values, as expressed in US \$m., at constant (1985) prices.  
A = yearly figures B = five-year moving averages  
(Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1987).



*Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq*

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**REPORT**<sup>1</sup>

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee*<sup>2</sup>  
*by Mr. Martino, Rapporteur*

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1. Adopted in committee by 15 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee:* Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); MM. Burger (Alternate: *Hengel*), Martino (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: *van der Werff*), Bassinet, Baumel, van der Biest, Chénard (Alternate: *Pontillon*), Coleman (Alternate: *Lord Kirkhill*), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Foschi, Hill, Hitschler, Koehl (Alternate: *Portier*), Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Mechttersheimer, Muller, Natali, Pécriaux, Pieralli, Reddemann, Ruet, *van der Sanden*, Sarti (Alternate: *Scovacicchi*), Shelton, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Mr. Stoffelen.

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Draft Recommendation*

*on Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the region of the Gulf is a particularly important area for the security of Western Europe and for international peace;
- (ii) Welcoming the cease-fire between Iraq and Iran on 20th August 1988;
- (iii) Regretting that the negotiations to implement this cease-fire have still not been effectively started;
- (iv) Considering that the situation thus created is still highly unstable;
- (v) Noting that the eight years of warfare illustrate the horrors that can stem from the conduct of conventional warfare;
- (vi) Believing that supplies of armaments to the belligerents have helped to prolong fighting and still contribute to instability in the area;
- (vii) Condemning the use of chemical weapons by Iraq during the war;
- (viii) Welcoming the forthcoming convening of a conference to strengthen the ban on chemical weapons;
- (ix) Considering that the Kurdish problem is also a factor of instability in the region;
- (x) Noting the many indications that Iraq also used chemical weapons against the Kurds after the cease-fire;
- (xi) Considering further that the brutal repression of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, the destruction of villages and the deportation of populations are serious infringements of human rights;
- (xii) Noting that the execution by Iran of many political prisoners and the use of procedures, contrary to the laws of war, directed against Iraqi prisoners-of-war are also infringements of human rights;
- (xiii) Welcoming the measures taken by the Council to contribute, with the United States, to ensuring freedom of navigation in the Gulf,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Endorse the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to achieve true negotiations on the implementation of the cease-fire and the re-establishment of peace, in particular by banning any supplies of arms to the belligerents;
2. Continue to follow with vigilance the evolution of the situation in the Gulf, even after the possible withdrawal of the naval forces that member countries maintain there;
3. Endorse the proposal to convene a conference to ban the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons;
4. Ask the Agency for the Control of Armaments for a report on the means of verifying that chemical weapons are not produced or stockpiled and communicate this report to the Assembly;
5. Examine carefully any sanctions that the United States might adopt against countries which have used chemical weapons in order to associate the WEU countries with them and call upon the Soviet Union and its allies to take part in these sanctions;
6. Ask the EEC and member countries of the Council of Europe to provide meaningful assistance to Kurdish refugees through the appropriate international organisations;
7. Also ask them to receive on their territory significant numbers of those who are now refugees because of persecution in Iraq;
8. Pursue the efforts undertaken to ensure the mine-sweeping of the Gulf until this operation has been completed.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. Martino, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. When your Rapporteur was asked to prepare the present report, Iran and Iraq had been at war for eight years and there was no sign of an early termination of hostilities. In summer 1988, the situation changed radically with Iran's acceptance of Security Council Resolution 598 which Iraq had already accepted a year before. On 20th August 1988, a cease-fire came into force under United Nations supervision.

2. These circumstances changed your Rapporteur's mandate fundamentally, as the Presidential Committee noted on 28th September 1988 when it adapted the title of his report to the new situation: the purpose is no longer to examine what Europe has done to protect its interests in an ongoing war or to try to induce the belligerents to stop their military operations. On the contrary, the aim is to assess the situation emerging from the cease-fire as a basis for reflection on what Europe can do to help to consolidate peace in the region. Your Rapporteur will therefore have to review a rather larger area than that formed by the two recent belligerents since the problems raised by the restoration of peace affect much of South-West Asia.

3. The main difficulty in preparing this report stems not from the absence of information but from its unreliable, sparse and often contradictory nature. None of the countries in the region allow journalists unlimited access to its territory. All try to give a picture of the facts that conforms to their own interests. Most have only mediocre statistical machinery. Nevertheless, although cross-checking information from various sources does not solve all the problems due to inadequate information, it does at least give a picture of the present situation that, it may be hoped, is fairly close to the truth.

4. Contrary to what might have been thought in summer 1988, your Rapporteur does not feel that the cease-fire that came into force between Iran and Iraq on 20th August 1988 is a guarantee of lasting peace. All the problems that arose in 1979 still exist and some of them, such as the Kurdish question, have worsened. The quantity of armaments in the possession of countries in the region has increased considerably. Governmental authority has diminished and there are fewer possibilities for action by outside powers to promote peace, particularly since they did not find a way to try to restore peace and to ensure respect for international law while hostilities were in progress, whereas those of the United Nations have been strengthened.

5. The cease-fire of 20th August 1988 cannot therefore be considered as a restoration of peace but at most as a first step in that direction. This presumably is the context in which the present situation should be viewed and an attempt made to define a possible European policy in the Middle East in the next few years.

### *II. The cease-fire*

#### *1. The end of military operations*

6. On 18th July 1988, Iran's acceptance of Security Council Resolution 598 calling for a cease-fire between Iraq and Iran on the basis of the status quo allowed military operations to come to an end. This became effective on 20th August. Since the failure of its offensives from 1980 to 1982, Iraq had been calling for a return to peace on such a basis and even more so during the period 1982-87 when Iranian counter-offensives had penetrated its territory, invaded the right bank of the Shatt al-Arab and occupied the Al Faw peninsula, Iraq's only outlet to the sea, thus also threatening its main port, the second city of Iraq and Basra, southern Iraq's oil centre. The revolt of the Kurds, which started in 1985, increased the country's difficulties. It had incurred heavy debts and managed to hold on only thanks to the material and financial support of other Arab countries such as Kuwait and Jordan, whose port of Aqaba had become Iraq's main maritime outlet, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, all anxious to avoid Iran obtaining control of the Gulf and to check the subversive movements inspired by the Iranian revolution. There was therefore no longer any question of Iraq winning the war but it was good policy to seek the backing of international society to avoid losing it.

7. On 20th July 1987, the Security Council adopted Resolution 598, which met the wishes of Iraq and also, to some extent, those of Iran. But Iran did not wish to follow it up. Ayatollah Khomeini refused any deals designed to put an end to hostilities as long as Iraq had not been condemned as the aggressor and President Saddam Hussein remained at the head of its government. For the Iranian Government, condemnation implied the payment of an indemnity to cover the war damage suffered by Iran.

8. Iran's change of tack was therefore due to developments in 1987-88, for which many causes may be mentioned although it is not possible to say which were decisive. At the front, first of all, Iraq had had a series of military successes which allowed it to recover almost all the territory Iran

had conquered between 1982 and 1987, including the Al Faw peninsula in April 1988 after the failure of Iran's offensive in Kurdistan in February. Furthermore, Iraqi forces had penetrated Iran and made it possible for the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq to conquer a sizeable strip of land and hold it for several weeks. Iran had to make a major military effort in July 1988 to overcome this operation. In themselves, these military setbacks were not very serious but they were indicative of the lassitude of the Iranian people and army. They had lost the revolutionary elation that had allowed them, at the price of heavy losses, to win the battles of earlier years over a far better equipped Iraqi army.

9. Second, Iraq's air and missile superiority, considerable at the beginning of the war, was becoming increasingly obvious, since Iran was having great difficulty in replacing lost aircraft and procuring modern missiles. On the other hand, the financial assistance of the Gulf Arab countries and generous credit facilities for its purchases allowed Iraq to renew and update its equipment and, at the beginning of 1988, to resume massive air raids on Iranian towns whereas Iran was unable to retaliate effectively. This air superiority was further enhanced by Iraq's use of poison gases; in spring 1988, it was reported to have used a new cyanuric acid gas against the Kurdish town of Halabja, occupied by the Iranian army, which was far more effective than any other known gas. Mortal in less than a minute, this gas is believed to have killed 97% of the people in the bombed area, i.e. about 5 000 victims. Iran had no means of retaliation or protection against this form of chemical war, which prevented it from regrouping forces for further offensives.

10. Finally, the intervention of western naval forces blocked any Iranian hopes of preventing navigation towards the Arab shore of the Gulf. American retaliation against attacks on ships had reduced Iran's naval capability and the accidental destruction of a civilian Airbus on 3rd July 1988, with the loss of the 290 persons on board, however deplorable, showed that the United States was determined to take action against the Iranian air force if it attacked shipping in the Gulf. The Saudi air force for its part had effectively defended Arabian territory against Iranian attacks. The permanent presence near the Gulf of two aircraft carriers, one American, the other French, showed that the West was capable of taking effective action against the very weakened Iranian air force. The arrival of mine-sweepers from several European countries and their action, co-ordinated in WEU, also most certainly had a deterrent effect by showing Iran that it could not rely on mines to disrupt navigation.

11. To these reasons might be added other, internal, events, although currently-available

information does not allow their importance to be assessed. It is believed there was an internal crisis in Iran. The falling price of oil, from \$34 per barrel when the war broke out in 1980 to \$18 in August 1988, obviously reduced its income considerably in view of the erosion of the value of the dollar during those eight years. No one gave Iran financial assistance and it had difficulties in obtaining credit and had to pay for the military equipment it procured. Iraq, on the contrary, which had a reserve of \$35 000 million in 1980, received steady financial assistance of between \$13 and 14 000 million per year from the countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council and was able to incur debts of about \$60 000 million to support its war effort. The building of an oil pipeline to take Iraqi oil to Dörtüyol near Iskenderun in Turkey and the decision taken by the Arab countries not to impose quotas on Iraq's supplies to the world oil market also allowed it to make the most of its oil resources. Thus, Iran's economic situation made it increasingly difficult for it to support its war effort and make the population accept continued hostilities at a time when Iraq was saying it was prepared to accept a break-even peace.

12. Indeed, the social and political crisis in Iran at the beginning of 1988 seems to have been quite serious. It was becoming increasingly difficult to appeal to revolutionary enthusiasm to mobilise the population and galvanise energy.

13. For all these reasons, many Iranian leaders believed the war should be brought to an end and that Resolution 598 was a means of doing so without losing face. Early in July, Ayatollah Khomeini, although not wishing to assume political responsibility for the decision, left the government free to endorse the resolution. By that time, Iraq would probably have preferred to continue operations which were turning in its favour. This was not possible because it had already, in July 1987, accepted the resolution, which moreover included most of what Iraq had been calling for since 1983. But a cease-fire at a time when it felt victorious made it feel it had been deprived of the fruits of its victory. It therefore tackled the negotiations on the application of the resolution determined to obtain a favourable interpretation of the provisions. It proved so uncompromising that the negotiations have not yet made any progress.

14. Although fighting has stopped along the frontiers between Iraq and Iran, it is for the time being only a cease-fire and differences have not been settled. The armies are still deployed and, on 20th August, Iraq took advantage of this lull to put down brutally the Kurdish rebellion which had troubled it in the last years of the war.

15. Some observers, particularly in countries in the area, attribute a decisive rôle to the two great powers which, they say, imposed the cease-fire. This interpretation seems highly exagger-

rated. It seems to stem from a tendency, frequent among the non-aligned countries, to attribute to others responsibilities which are first and foremost those of the powers which started and pursued the war. Conversely, it seems accurate to say that the attitude of the great powers helped to bring about a situation favourable to the cease-fire.

16. The attitude of the Soviet Union in particular should be stressed since, by deciding to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, it stopped being a threat to the Gulf region. Moreover, the fact that it associated itself with the United States and the other members of the Security Council to adopt Resolution 598 was a great help in giving this resolution the authority necessary for it finally to be accepted by Iran. The Soviet Union's refusal to endorse sanctions should Iran not apply the resolution made it impossible for the latter to say that it accepted the resolution because of outside pressure, which obviously would have increased the Iranian people's resentment towards international society.

17. Of course, this does not mean the Soviet Union has given up defending its interests in the Middle East. While granting considerable financial and military assistance to Iraq, including 80% of its arms, it managed not to break with Iran. It even allowed some of its allies, such as North Korea, Vietnam, Bulgaria, Poland and the GDR, to deliver military equipment to Iran. It developed good relations with Syria, an open opponent of Iraq, from which it obtained an agreement allowing it to install a naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean at Tartüs near Latakia. According to a report submitted to the United States Congress by Rear-Admiral William O. Stredeman, this is intended to allow medium-tonnage Soviet warships to be repaired without having to return to ports in the Black Sea or the Kola peninsula. This base is believed to be needed for a redeployment of the Soviet navy which is now less well represented in other parts of the world but more in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf. The Soviet Union is also reported to have an air base in Syria. According to statements by an American expert, Mr. Norman Polmar, published in the New York Times on 29th August 1988, all these advantages were obtained in exchange for arms procured by Syria from the Soviet Union: aircraft, tanks, missiles, armoured vehicles, warships and submarines. Thus, Syria is believed to have been the first of the Soviet Union's allies to receive ultra-modern MiG-29 aircraft, the figure quoted being about forty. According to statements by Israeli officials, Syria is also developing capsules for chemical weapons which could be adapted for use on missiles supplied by the Soviet Union.

18. Furthermore, for the first time in fifty-one years, the Soviet Union and Turkey have opened

a frontier post at Sarp in Armenia in order to increase trade and movements of persons in the area, thus showing a will for a rapprochement between the two countries. Bearing in mind also the opening of exploratory contacts between Moscow and Riyadh, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Oman and between the Soviet Union and the United Arab Emirates, the protection of part of Kuwait's oil exports by Soviet warships and the procurement of Soviet arms by certain Gulf countries, it can be seen that, far from being inactive, the Soviet Union has taken advantage of the war to improve its positions in the area.

19. Since July 1987, when the United States increased its naval force in the Gulf, the Soviet Union, hitherto favourable to Iraq, seems to have moved closer towards Iran, although without suspending its assistance to Iraq. It endorsed Iranian protests at the American military presence in the Gulf and proposed replacing it by a fleet under United Nations command. It also refused to support any sanctions against Iran for not applying Resolution 598. However, in August 1988, the Soviet Union welcomed Iran's acceptance of the resolution and, paying tribute to the efforts of Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar to ensure its implementation, it offered its services to the international community and to the United Nations for the re-establishment of peace, while opposing the continued presence of American naval forces in the Gulf.

20. It is just as if the Soviet Union, after renouncing an active military presence in a sector that it nevertheless considered important, apart from its relations with Syria, wished to bring about the withdrawal of western forces in the region. The destruction of an Iranian air liner by an American missile in July 1988 obviously provided it with a good supporting argument. In fact, the total abstention of the two great powers in the Middle East would probably allow the Soviet Union, because of its proximity, to regain the influence it had lost since the death of Nasser. However, since it is a rival of the Gulf countries for the sale of oil, it would probably be unable to substitute its influence for that of the western countries, the main oil customers, particularly at a time of falling prices. This concern to recover an influential position in Middle East affairs made it play a moderating, peaceful rôle just when the United States came to the conclusion that a break-even peace would be more in the West's interests than the victory of one or other of the two belligerents.

21. The cease-fire must not therefore be considered as the direct result of action by the two great powers but of action by the international community and of the United Nations coupled with developments in the local situation that proved favourable for starting negotiations at a time when both sides wanted to revert to peace

in the region. The two belligerents had indeed suffered considerable losses, although the most recent information shows figures lower than previously thought. Thus, Iraq had estimated Iranian losses at 800 000 killed and western sources at between 300 000 and 600 000, whereas Iran has just given figures of 123 230 fighters killed, 60 711 missing, many of whom are probably prisoners, and 11 000 civilian victims of air raids. Iraq has not yet given any figures for its losses, which are certainly far lower.

## 2. Negotiations

### (a) Procedure

22. Iran's acceptance of Resolution 598 should allow negotiations to start immediately on its application. However, procedural difficulties quickly arose since Iraq called for direct negotiations with Iran, while Iran refused any contact with Saddam Hussein's régime and wished to hold talks only with United Nations representatives. It required extraordinary diplomatic imagination on the part of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, to allow a first exchange of views to be started in Geneva on 25th August. However, the meetings came to naught and, since the Secretary-General was occupied by other steps to promote peace in Africa, it proved difficult to fix a new date. Iraq refused to negotiate in New York during the session of the United Nations General Assembly. Its resolve not to negotiate on United States territory was further strengthened when the United States Senate passed a bill that included a condemnation of Iraq for using chemical weapons against the Kurds. The only measure effectively taken was to send a 350-strong international team drawn from twenty-four member countries of the United Nations, including Italy, to the frontier to monitor application of the cease-fire. However, the team was able to establish itself only in the southern part of the front since it is excluded from the north either by the Kurds or because of Iraqi army operations against the Kurds.

23. Even the purpose of the negotiations is not considered to be the same by Iraq as by Iran. The former considers it to be to define the form of peace as soon as possible and to take immediate steps such as clearing the Shatt al-Arab and a return to freedom of navigation in the Gulf. For Iran, on the contrary, the question is to follow the order of the terms set out in Resolution 598 and, consequently, as a first step to lay down procedure for the cease-fire before tackling matters relating to the organisation of peace. The negotiations therefore generally consist of private, successive talks between each of the delegations and the Secretary-General or his deputy, Mr. Eliasson, with no direct dialogue, making it particularly difficult to reach compromises.

24. In reality, these procedural difficulties conceal fundamental disagreements that make the cease-fire of 20th August 1988 very fragile. Neither side accepted Resolution 598 unreservedly, and Iraq's strong position at the time it came into force does not make it easy for it to go back on its proclaimed principles, nor can Iran, without admitting its failure, too openly abandon the official declarations made by Ayatollah Khomeini during the eight-year war.

### (b) Responsibility for the war

25. Among the prior conditions for stopping hostilities insisted on by Iran were recognition of Iraq as the aggressor and the fall of Saddam Hussein's régime. The latter was in fact abandoned once Iran accepted the principle of a cease-fire since it had to be negotiated with the present Iraqi Government. It nevertheless explains Iran's opposition to direct negotiations, which does not make agreement between the two countries easy and creates a particularly tense atmosphere at each meeting.

26. Moreover, Article 6 of Resolution 598 specifies that the United Nations Secretary-General would be asked to explore, in consultation with Iran and Iraq, "the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict" and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible. This wording could not conceal from Iran that, by accepting the resolution, it would be renouncing its prior condition, since Article 6 left no doubt about the Security Council's concern to give Iran a loophole but not to take a stance on this delicate question.

27. While it is clear that in September 1980 it was indeed Iraq that initiated open hostilities, it followed several months of incidents along the frontier between the two countries and attacks provoked by partisans of Khomeini in Baghdad, which made Iraq feel it was taking up arms to defend itself. Moreover, in 1975 Saddam Hussein's government had been induced to accept the Algiers Agreements by which the Shah imposed his views on Iraq and, thanks to the preponderance of his armed forces in the region, ensured recognition of his encroachments at the expense of the Gulf countries. Iraq considers the origins of the war go back to that date, thus allowing it to present its attack in August 1980 as a military operation in retaliation against an Iranian aggressor. In the circumstances, to attribute responsibility could only be a political act that would have prevented the entry into force of the cease-fire. For Iraq to acknowledge that it was the aggressor would have been a capitulation entirely unwarranted by its military situation.

28. On 10th August, Mr. Rafsanjani, acting Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian army, recalled that Iran's acceptance of the cease-fire in

no way meant it had stopped insisting on Iraq being punished as the aggressor. He said that Iran was today accepting the resolution on the cease-fire in the hope that the committee responsible for determining responsibility would be serious. If there was an impression that Iran had been lied to on this point, he said, this might have serious consequences for the region. According to the Iranian authorities, this implied that Iraq, recognised responsible for starting the war, would have to pay compensation. This requirement obviously does not make it easy to open negotiations.

(c) *Territorial questions*

29. Iraq had never concealed the fact that its first aim in the war was revision of the 1975 Algiers Agreements. A few days before launching its forces against Iran in 1980, President Saddam Hussein had denounced this treaty and symbolically torn up the text on television. Once the war had started, he had rejected the mediation the United Nations Secretary-General had asked to be conducted by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the non-aligned movement and the late Prime Minister of Sweden, Olaf Palme, who had proposed a return to the status quo ante bellum. It required Iraq's defeats between 1983 and 1987 for its government, in July 1987, to accept Resolution 598 which, in Article 1, urged, with the cease-fire, the withdrawal of armed forces to internationally-recognised frontiers. These frontiers could only be those laid down in the Algiers Agreements, the last international text to have fixed frontiers between Iran and Iraq. There could be no doubt about this in the mind of the Iraqi Government.

30. Compelled, after its victories in 1988, to maintain its acceptance of Resolution 598, Iraq has nevertheless done its utmost since hostilities ended to mark its rejection of the provisions of these agreements and to obtain the opening of negotiations on frontiers, whereas Iran could use firm texts as a basis for refusing any such discussion.

31. The disputed territories are, however, not very extensive and are unpopulated. But they are of undeniable strategic and economic importance.

32. The most serious affair concerns the Shatt al-Arab, i.e. the eastern, most important and only navigable branch of the delta common to the Tigris and the Euphrates, whose western part is marshy with sinuous ox-bow lakes among which fighting was particularly murderous during the 1983-84 Iranian offensives. Iran's principal port and oil centre, Abadan, is on the east bank of the Shatt al-Arab while Basra, on the west bank, is the capital of southern Iraq, its principal oil centre and its only port. This shows the importance for both countries of this river,

255 km long with an average width of 500 m, which marks their common frontier. For many centuries, this frontier has separated the Aryan population of Iran, of Persian culture and Shiite religion, from the Semitic peoples of the southern part of the Ottoman Empire, who have become Arabs and among whom the Sunni religion dominates, with the twofold exception of some two million Arabs living in Iranian Khuzestan and a large number of Shiites in Iraq, where they are in the majority.

33. In 1847, for the first time, an agreement between Iran and the Ottoman Empire fixed the river frontier, giving all the waters of the river to the Ottomans. In spite of minor revisions, ships using the river had, until 1969, to fly the Iraqi flag and have Iraqi pilots. In April 1969, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi denounced these agreements. A crisis ensued, relations between the two countries were broken off in 1971 and, finally, the Algiers Agreements were concluded in 1975, placing the frontier along the thalweg line on an intangible, permanent and final basis. The remaining 1 200 km of frontier between Iran and Iraq was kept on a line fixed in 1914. It was the danger of the Kurd rebellion, supported by Iran, that led Saddam Hussein to make this concession. He was then able to terminate the uprising quickly.

34. Control of the Shatt al-Arab is, however, of far greater importance to Iraq, since it is its only outlet to the sea, than to Iran, which has the entire northern coast of the Gulf, although its principal oil industries are grouped in the area round Abadan and Khorramshahr. It is not therefore surprising that, in 1980, control of the left bank of the river was the first target of the Iraqi offensive which immediately made recognition of its legitimate rights over the Shatt al-Arab the condition for a cease-fire. On 6th August 1988, when accepting application of Resolution 598 which Iran had just endorsed, Saddam Hussein stressed that it was normal for Iraq to have navigation rights in the Gulf as soon as the cease-fire came into force in accordance with its inalienable rights and international law. This remark is ambiguous since a distinction can be drawn between Iraq's navigation rights in the Gulf which were not contested in the Algiers Agreements but which Iran had made it impossible to exercise since 1980 and sovereignty over the watercourse which was shared between the two countries.

35. The United Nations sent observers to monitor application of the cease-fire along the river. But Iran is not prepared to agree to the question of navigation on the Shatt al-Arab being a prior condition to talks. Whereas, when the cease-fire came into force, Iran was immediately able to reopen all its Gulf ports and those on the Indian Ocean had never been closed, it will take years of work before the Shatt al-Arab, which is

silted up and strewn with wrecks and mines, can be reopened as a trading port for Iraq. In other words, since the talks between the two countries have not yet really started, the affair is far from being settled. It is expected that work will probably take more than two years and, understandably, Iraq is quite anxious for it to start.

36. On 19th September 1988, the Iraqi agency INA announced that President Saddam Hussein had chaired a meeting of military leaders in order to examine the possibility of diverting the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which emphasised the importance he attaches to this question. The idea would be to enlarge the existing canal between Basra and Khawr as Sabiyah at the head of the Gulf and to the west of the El Faw peninsula for navigation by large ships. It is estimated that this operation would cost \$14 000 million. It is clear that such a decision would further complicate the current negotiations and, by setting the problem in new terms, make it even more difficult to find a solution acceptable to both parties. To divert the Shatt al-Arab waterway would completely ruin the Iranian ports of Abadan and Khorramshahr and hence such a plan would be unacceptable to Iran.

37. The second territorial dispute does not concern Iraqi sovereignty but illustrates the all-Arab nature of the conflict. It relates to three small desert islands in the Gulf waters close to the Strait of Hormuz whose access they command: Abu Musa, Bani Tanb and Tanbe-Borzog. They are also close to the offshore oilfields exploited by the United Arab Emirates. These islets were under the sovereignty of the Emir of Ra's al Khaymah when, in November 1971, the Shah of Iran had them occupied by his armed forces in spite of the protests of the Arab states in the region, including Iraq, which then broke off diplomatic relations with Iran. Nevertheless, in 1975 Iraq recognised the annexation of these islets but, in 1980, President Saddam Hussein made their return to Arab control one of his aims in the war. The war showed that keeping the islets under Iranian occupation effectively raised the problem of freedom of navigation in the Gulf since they were used for military operations designed to prevent merchant ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

38. The question of to whom Resolution 598 assigned these islets during the cease-fire period is far from clear. The Algiers Agreements do not concern Ra's al Khaymah and Iran's possession of the islets is still not official, but Iraq does not claim to have any right over them and its claim is based only on Arab solidarity.

39. It should be added that, after 20th August, Iran continued to exercise control over merchant shipping passing through the Strait of Hormuz in order to prevent the delivery of war equipment to Iraq. This practice was confirmed the very day of the cease-fire by an Iraqi ship, which was

boarded and whose cargo was checked by the Iranian navy. One may wonder whether this practice, based only on the right to blockade, is still acceptable following a cease-fire.

40. Two months after fighting stopped along the front, it would appear that negotiations intended first to allow the cease-fire to be implemented and then to lay down conditions for a return to peace, have not really started. Neither of the two governments, weakened by eight years of war, can afford, without danger for their survival, to make the concessions necessary for a dialogue to be started. For them, it is mainly a matter of demonstrating that they did not lose the war, which makes them extremely uncompromising. On the other hand, the armed forces are still ready to start fighting again. In other words, the situation in the aftermath of the war is very unstable.

### *III. The Kurdish problem*

41. There are about twenty million Kurds living in the mountainous region between Turkey and the Soviet Union in the north, Syria and Iraq in the west and Iran in the east. These countries do not keep statistics on the same basis, which makes an accurate estimate of the size of the Kurdish population difficult. It would appear that half the Kurds live in Turkey, about four million in Iran and three million in Iraq, with a smaller number in Syria and the Soviet Union. This people, of Moslem Sunni religion, is trying to retain its language and traditions but, at least in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, it has run up against the states' policy of centralisation. When the Ottoman Empire was dismantled under the Sèvres Treaty, the victorious powers promised to grant independence to the Kurds, but Atatürk's revolution and the ensuing repression of the Kurds in 1923 dashed their hopes. Similarly, in 1947 Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, by liquidating the ephemeral republic of Mahabad, under Soviet protection, triggered off Iran's first war against the Kurds, under the leadership of the Iraqi Kurd "General" Mustapha Barzani who came from Iraq with his guerrillas. He did not return there until 1958, after the independence of Iraq. In 1961, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Mustapha Barzani, conducted an armed rebellion against the Iraqi Government and managed to control part of Iraqi Kurdistan for fourteen years in spite of constant pressure from the Iraqi army. It received large-scale military assistance from the Shah and its fighters could take refuge on Iranian territory when pursued by the Iraqi army. This was the origin of a series of rebellions, interspersed with cease-fires and agreements in 1963, 1964, 1966, 1968 and, above all, 1970, when Iraqi Kurdistan obtained an autonomous régime that lasted four years. But tension between Baghdad and the



Kurds re-emerged in 1974 and General Barzani, with the assistance of Iran, Israel and the United States, resumed active military operations against the Iraqi Government.

42. The Algiers Agreement of March 1975 between Iraq and Iran put an end to this situation. In exchange for territorial concessions, Iran undertook to stop all assistance to the Kurdish rebellion and indeed repatriated without delay all weapons, equipment and even rations supplied to Barzani's forces. The Shah merely received on Iranian territory more than 250 000 Kurdish refugees chased out by the offensive that Iraq immediately conducted to put down the rebellion, which it managed very quickly. Barzani died in the United States in 1979. The Iraqi authorities deported part of the Kurdish population to the south, settled Arabs in Kurdistan and destroyed many villages along the frontiers in order to solve the Kurdish problem and, in any event, to dilute the Kurdish population living in the oil-producing region of Kirkük among an Arab-speaking population.

43. The Iranian revolution in 1979 encouraged the new leaders of the KDP, the two sons of Mustapha Barzani, to seek an alliance with the new republic in order to be able to resume their military activities on Iraqi territory. As from 1980, many Kurdish conscripts in the Iraqi army went to the rebel areas. The impact of their new rebellion remained limited until November 1986 when they concluded an alliance in Teheran with the Kurdistan Patriotic Union, led by Mr. Jalal Talabani, under the aegis of Iran, which again started to provide supplies and arms. The Kurdistan Patriotic Union had tried to take advantage of the fact that Iraq needed to devote all its forces to the war against Iran to negotiate with the Iraqi Government an autonomous statute for Kurdistan. These negotiations, which lasted from December 1983 to January 1985, eventually failed because the Kurds' territorial claims covered areas that Iraq was particularly anxious not to hand over to Kurdistan because, with Kirkük and part of the Mosul region, they included a very large part of Northern Iraq's oil reserves. This setback led to a rapprochement between the KPU and Iran and a general revolt by the Kurds in 1987. The Kurds were then well equipped and were thus able to give a new dimension to military operations and create a "liberated" area which, they estimated, covered about 10 000 sq.km. along the Turkish and Iranian frontiers.

44. In the midst of the war, Iraq thus had to divert some of its forces to put down the Kurdish revolt. It did not confine itself to operations against the rebels but undertook to settle the Kurdish problem by radical means: complete destruction of villages and, when they were not easily accessible to the army, the use of poison gas. The most spectacular operation was the

bombing of the town of Halabja, occupied by the Iranian army, on 17th March 1988, when more than 5 000 of the civilian population are believed to have been killed.

45. Furthermore, since 1984, there had been fairly serious disturbances among the Kurdish population in Turkey, with the assistance of Syria, which was trying to bring pressure to bear on Turkey to ensure a better share of the Euphrates. On 1st May 1988, an agreement was signed in Damascus between the Kurdistan Patriotic Union and the Kurdistan Workers Party directed against both Iraq and Turkey. The disturbances had led the Turkish Government to launch large-scale military operations against the rebellion. Turkey does not officially admit the existence of a Kurdish minority, called "mountain Turks" by the Turkish authorities. Teaching in the Kurdish language is forbidden and even the use of that language is repressed. As the Turkish Kurds had taken refuge on Iraqi territory controlled by the Kurdish rebels, the Turkish army several times, with the agreement of the Iraqi Government, conducted military operations and air raids on this territory. However, the hostilities conducted by Kurdish forces in Turkey were limited: it is believed there were about 700 victims in four years and fighting continued until August 1988, which explains the ambiguous attitude adopted by the Turkish Government towards the arrival of Iraqi Kurdish refugees.

46. Finally, the war between Iran and Iraq also provided an opportunity for a revolt of the Iranian Kurds, this time with the assistance of Iraq. In July 1988, much of Iranian Kurdistan along the frontier with Iraq was wholly controlled by the Kurdish rebels of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, under Mr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, and the Komala Marxist-inspired Party, which may have helped to encourage the Iranian Government to accept the idea of a cease-fire with Iraq. Unlike Iraq, the Iranian Government has not yet made major military efforts to restore its authority in the regions that have fallen under the control of Kurdish organisations that managed not to act as auxiliaries of the Iraqi army. However, they have every reason to fear the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, which should enable the Iranian army which, in July 1988, had already conducted severe attacks on the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq supported by Iran, to direct its forces against the Kurdish rebellion.

47. Iraq has already done this; since 19th July, i.e. when the Iranian Government accepted the principle of a cease-fire, and above all between 20th August and 5th September, it has intensified its offensive against the Iraqi Kurds, apparently helped by the use of poison gas. According to the Kurds, it deployed 60 000 men to reconquer the area under Kurdish control.

The first figures given by the Turkish authorities seem to indicate that 120 000 Kurds took refuge on Turkish territory at the end of August and the beginning of September 1988, including, according to western sources, victims of injuries caused by chemical weapons. At the end of September, however, the number of refugees recorded was only 65 000. This unexpected flow raised particularly serious housing and security problems for the Turkish authorities because armed detachments of rebels belonging to the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party operate in the frontier region and are believed to have conducted propaganda action among the refugees. The use of gas by the Iraqis in the region, the systematic destruction of villages and the flow of refugees seem to have caused serious tension between the Turkish and Iraqi armies and led to Turkish protests. The Iraqi army is even believed to have crossed the frontier on several occasions and to have used their arms to prevent the evacuation of refugees towards Turkish territory at the beginning of September 1988. Since 5th September, when the Iraqi offensive ended, relations between the two countries have returned to normal and Kurdish refugees have stopped arriving.

48. Western journalists who have been able to visit the region stress the remarkable efforts made by the Turkish authorities to receive the refugees, but they note that, although well treated and having rights that are refused to Turkish Kurds, the latter are kept apart from the local population. Furthermore, the approaching winter creates serious problems that the Turkish authorities probably have no means of solving as swiftly as the situation requires. Finally, they report that the Turkish authorities deny having seen the effects of chemical weapons on these refugees and will not authorise foreign experts to come and examine the question. The Turkish Government has appealed for international assistance in receiving the refugees and Western Europe must not remain deaf to this appeal.

49. Turkey has so far refused to grant asylum to the Kurdish refugees. It does not have to do so since, when it signed the Geneva Convention on refugees in 1951, it reserved its rights in the case of refugees from non-European countries. It is for humanitarian reasons that it authorised Kurdish refugees – women, children or injured persons, but not fighters – to settle provisionally on its territory, but on 5th September 1988 the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Turgut Ozal, stressed the precariousness of this permission. Some of the refugees have already chosen to leave Turkey for Iran in order to pursue the struggle against the Iraqi army.

50. Thus, the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq is not a guarantee of peace for the Kurds since it is to be feared that the two countries, not to speak of Turkey, may take advantage of the

present truce to regain control, by use of force, over the various parts of Kurdistan, as they did just after the Algiers Agreements. Moreover, Syria seems to be encouraging the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq.

51. International public opinion cannot continue to ignore the systematic massacre of the Kurdish people by the Iraqi army, the destruction of villages and the establishment of refugee camps on Turkish territory. Nor is Turkey in a position to cope with the flow of refugees who have no housing, blankets, food or medical assistance. The Turkish Government also had serious difficulty in ensuring security on its own territory in face of Iraqi incursions and attacks organised by the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party. At first, it was hesitant about appealing for international assistance, no doubt for fear that the entire Kurdish problem may be raised in the United Nations, but it encouraged the refugees to leave for Iran. In the end, it turned to the western countries for financial assistance, but not through the intermediary of the United Nations or other international organisations liable to make inquiries, in particular about Iraq's use of chemical weapons. As a result, very little assistance was obtained: Turkey estimates that \$300 million in assistance is necessary. The European Community has offered \$600 000 and Denmark \$250 000, the Netherlands has proposed taking sixty refugees and France has sent a team of doctors. This is far less than what is required and is unworthy of Europe.

52. International society certainly cannot ignore the fate of the Kurds because they are a permanent threat to peace between Iran and Iraq: each one may be tempted to use its influence over the Kurds in the other country in order to exert pressure on it. Yet so far the international community has done nothing to ensure that Kurds have the right to exist, like all peoples, and only Iraq's use of chemical weapons against them has evoked a reaction, albeit timid.

53. The Iraqi Kurds have informed the United Nations Secretary-General that in no event would they accept a settlement of the conflict which did not take their claims into account. In support of this position, they have refused to allow the United Nations cease-fire inspectors access to Kurdish territory, i.e. to about half of the cease-fire line that the inspectors are supposed to be monitoring. In other words, the Kurds have ample means to block the implementation of a settlement which, in present circumstances, would be very unfavourable to them. Iraq's announcement, on 5th September 1988, of a general amnesty for any Kurds returning home within thirty days would probably not, in such conditions, do much to restore civil peace: it has every appearance of a

measure to pacify international public opinion whereas the behaviour of the Iraqi army shows a desire to liquidate the Kurdish problem in Iraq. According to Turkish sources, 25 000 of the 50 000 refugees wish to remain in Turkey, 18 000 wish to go to Iran, 2 500 wish to return to Iraq, either to take up the fight again or to surrender, and 4 500 wish to go to western countries. The amnesty proclaimed by Iraq in September 1988 appears to have encouraged between 1 000 and 2 000 Kurds to return at the beginning of October. Iraq wished to settle the matter through a direct agreement with Turkey and the International Red Cross did not feel able to guarantee its application. Reports concerning the, in principle, voluntary displacement of Iraqi Kurds from Turkey to Iran give figures which range from 6 000 to 22 000. Most probably Turkey would have wished to transfer more, but on 12th October Iran closed its frontier, stating that it was unable to receive more refugees. In mid-October, 43 000 Kurdish refugees were reported to be still in Turkey.

54. The term genocide has been used to define Iraq's policy towards the Kurds. Uncertainty about the number of victims of the repression makes one hesitate to use the word, but it is already clear that the aim of the Iraqi Government is to solve the Kurdish problem by deporting the Kurdish people from the regions in which they have settled, by the systematic destruction of villages and massacres or by forcing them to flee. Present knowledge of events between 20th August and 5th September is not sufficient to be able to interpret the repression of the Kurdish rebellion as being a desire to massacre a large proportion of that population, but it is clear that brutal means, contrary to all notions of human rights, were used to squash the rebellion and to make its resumption impossible.

55. Since the Kurdish problem is not confined to Iraq and the international community is ill-equipped to ensure that the rights of the Kurds are respected, there is every reason to think that they will continue to be a factor of instability in the region well into the future and that any tension between neighbouring countries will continue to give rise to subversive operations of which the Kurds will again be the instruments and the victims.

#### *IV. Lessons from the war*

##### *1. The conduct of operations*

56. The wars in Vietnam, Algeria and Afghanistan showed that the existence of nuclear weapons had little deterrent effect on peoples fighting for their independence. They also proved that technological superiority and the

possession of plenty of sophisticated weaponry were not enough to ensure victory. The war between Iraq and Iran has just shown that the most conventional of wars could still, at the end of the twentieth century, last for years and cause hundreds of thousands of victims. Hence, the existence of nuclear deterrents should not be considered as a panacea that can dispense states from having conventional weapons or allow them to avoid the efforts necessary to organise peace or to work out ways of allowing the peaceful settlement of conflicts and negotiated, balanced disarmament.

57. From a truly strategic standpoint, the principal interest of the war is that it allows an assessment to be made of the results achieved, first by Iraq, when, realising that it was not managing to force a decision through the use of land forces, used a series of other means, one after the other, in order to do so.

58. (a) The bombing of rear positions and towns led to retaliatory measures against Iraqi towns and provided Iranian propaganda with a greater echo among international public opinion.

59. (b) The attack on economic targets and, in particular, as from January 1982, on the oil terminal on the island of Kharg extended the war to the Gulf waters. Iraq was at first the hardest hit by this because Iran, with outlets on the Red Sea and the Gulf out of range of Iraqi aircraft, could also block navigation in the Shatt al-Arab, and hence most of Iraq's sea traffic. It was also able to threaten navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and along the southern shore of the Gulf, which allowed it to exert pressure on the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Qatar and Kuwait. In August, Iran having strengthened defences on the island of Kharg, Iraq blockaded it and attacked oil tankers between Kharg and the Strait of Hormuz. Iran retaliated by acting against navigation using the ports of the non-belligerent Gulf countries. Thus, in spite of Iraq's superiority in the air, it was then Iran that, in 1984, became a threat to navigation in the Gulf and hence the diplomatic situation turned in favour of Iraq which also obtained considerable financial assistance from the Gulf Arab countries. The United States, the Soviet Union and then WEU countries intervened to protect their flags and, at the same time, Kuwaiti shipping against attacks coming mainly from Iran. The Soviet Union was first to allow three oil tankers to fly its flag, followed by the United States (eleven tankers) and the United Kingdom (one tanker) in the first half of 1987. These countries, which were joined by France and Italy, protected their flags by escorting their merchant ships. Finally, the possibility of using the port of Aqaba for its general trade and imports of weapons and the port of Dörtyol for its oil allowed Iraq to side-step the effects of the Iranian attacks.

60. (c) In 1986, Iraq was able to extend its area of attack to the ports of Sirri and Larak, although ineffectively, and, in April 1987, Iran's oil output passed the threshold of two million barrels a day essential for it to be able to pursue the war.

61. (d) It was then the turn of Iran, whose land offensive capability was running down, to extend its field of operations by employing new means.

- (i) Terrorist operations increased in summer 1986, especially in France in September, resulting in a Franco-Iranian crisis and a break in relations between the two countries.
- (ii) Operations by fast, light motor boats against merchant shipping led to a strengthening of the United States navy and that of other countries which, by organising convoys, inflicted heavy losses on the assailants, not well-enough armed to be really effective.
- (iii) Iran, which had started to lay mines in the Shatt al-Arab in 1980, extended operations to the coasts of Kuwait in January 1987, where they destroyed three ships, including a Soviet oil tanker. In July, the sea-lanes in the southern Gulf were mined, too, leading to the loss of an American ship and another chartered by Iran.
- (iv) The threat, never carried out, of suicide operations and of using Chinese Silkworm missiles against shipping in the strait helped to keep crews in a permanent state of alert. This was probably not unconnected with the shooting down of the Iranian Airbus by the Vincennes in July 1988.
- (v) Subversive operations against Arab states assisting Iraq provoked the reaction, on 31st July 1987, of the Saudi guards at the holy sites at Mecca and the death of four hundred Iranian pilgrims.

62. The effect of this Iranian escalation was to bring more than eighty warships to the Gulf, sent by powers outside the region. Their presence made Iranian operations completely ineffective and oil traffic in the Gulf returned to normal just when Iraqi oil was starting to reach the Mediterranean at Dörtyol and Iranian gas reached the Soviet distribution network. Iranian oil output then attained 2.8 million barrels a day, but the price of oil immediately started to drop, falling to \$17 per barrel at the end of August 1988. The price continued to fall and, after the cease-fire, was less than \$10 per barrel.

63. (e) In August 1987, Iraq, with an enhanced air capability, resumed attacks on Iranian ports and ships approaching them. For the first time, major economic results were obtained. Ninety ships attacked in 1987 compared with thirty-seven in 1986, eleven in 1985 and seventeen in 1984, reduced Iranian exports to less than two million barrels a day, while the United States navy inflicted heavy losses on Iranian mine-layers and vedettes. Fleets of western mine-sweepers cleaned up the Gulf waters and the use of the first Silkworm missiles led to American reprisals against oil installations on the Iranian coast.

64. (f) In April 1988, the Iranians, whose offensive in Kurdistan, after initial successes, had finally failed, while Iraq was strengthening its air raids on Iranian towns and shipping in the Gulf, extended their operations to the Strait of Hormuz, more suitable for the use of fast motor boats and the effective use of mines. On 14th April, an American frigate was seriously damaged by a mine, causing the United States to bomb Iranian platforms, followed by an Iranian response and finally the destruction of much of what remained of the Iranian navy by the United States air force.

65. It therefore seems that the failure first of Iraqi offensives and then of Iranian offensives led the two countries to resort to an escalation of means and an extension of the battlefield in an attempt to sway the outcome. This remark is not without significance for Europe where, in the event of war, there is every chance that the belligerents would also be tempted to resort to escalation in order to force a decision. But in that event escalation would quickly reach the nuclear threshold.

66. It is also clear that neither Iraq nor Iran was able to obtain decisive advantages from air raids on towns or attacks on shipping. Such operations merely resulted in intervention from powers outside the region and largely helped to prevent the belligerents gaining any advantage from the extension of the war. Finally, it was Iraq's modest land victories in spring 1988 and Iran's internal difficulties that led the latter to accept a cease-fire. Hence the limited intervention of the western countries and the Soviet Union played a major rôle in preventing the war spreading to the entire region and safeguarding, with freedom of navigation in the Gulf, the oil trade on which the stability of the world economy depends.

67. In the early stages of the war, the Iraqi forces' intensive use of precision-guided anti-tank weapons considerably weakened Iran's armoured material that it could not replace because of its poor relations with potential suppliers. Subsequently, the very conduct of operations, by both sides, was far more reminiscent of the first world war than of operations that tri-

umphed in the second. It is typical that mass offensives managed to take only small areas of territory and achieve almost negligible strategic results. This means that strategists are now having serious second thoughts about the rôle once played by tanks and aircraft. Apart from exceptional cases, the tank no longer seems likely to play the decisive rôle it had in the middle of this century. This is certainly not so for aircraft, but their cost and the time it takes to build them have already reduced their ground support rôle which has been taken over by helicopters and present discussions about the air equipment of countries of the Atlantic Alliance show that is necessary to reconsider air strategy and tactics in terms of these new facts.

68. The lack of western supplies for the Iranian air force very soon gave Iraq air superiority on the battlefield. For a very long time, this superiority does not seem to have allowed Iraq to make a breakthrough in its offensives. Apart from its concern not to risk having too many very expensive aircraft shot down and not to lose too many pilots, it may be wondered whether the training given in the Soviet Union for Iraqi air force officers did not hinder exploitation of this superiority in the air. For many years, Soviet doctrine for war in the air was based on very concentrated centralisation of military headquarters, leaving little room for individual initiative and for fighter pilots to adapt themselves to the current situation on the battlefield. However, experience acquired during air operations in Afghanistan will probably lead to significant changes in Soviet concepts of air support for land operations.

69. Conversely, in the second half of the war, the use of anti-ship missiles and laser-guided weapons by a new generation of pilots trained in the West undeniably allowed Iraq to raise serious obstacles to the exportation of Iran's oil production by sea.

70. Furthermore, the massive use of relatively poorly-equipped infantry in Iran's offensives against buried tanks which were used solely as artillery led to massacres without strategic results. It helped to discourage the Iranian army, which was evident as from the end of 1987. Again, Iraq's superiority in the air allowed it to conduct operations against Iranian towns and oil installations, which also explains Iran's weakening in the last months of the war while Iranian medium-range missiles failed to obtain comparable results. Finally, Iraq's use of lethal gas, which Iran was able to use only to a very limited extent, seems to have had only slight tactical effects but constituted a further demoralising factor for its enemy. Increasingly clearly as the war progressed, Iraq's superiority in sophisticated weaponry therefore offset the numerical inferiority of its army by allowing it first to resist, then to extend the theatre of operations when

this was to its advantage and finally to undermine the morale of its enemy which, in a war of attrition, was not without importance.

71. Furthermore, mine-laying in the Gulf led several European countries, at the beginning of summer 1987, to send mine-sweepers to the region. Three of them – France, Italy and the United Kingdom – protected their mine-sweepers with frigates and corvettes together with supporting craft and – in the case of France – an aircraft-carrier in the Indian Ocean. A special agreement between Belgium on the one hand and the Netherlands on the other and the United Kingdom ensured protection and support for Belgian and Netherlands mine-sweepers by the British fleet. On 1st July 1988, the three countries formed a single operational command under British leadership. Finally, in August 1987, WEU decided to co-ordinate member countries' action in the Gulf and organised consultations between the capitals for this purpose and local consultations to ensure that the European presence in the Gulf was as effective as possible. The Federal Republic, whose basic law does not authorise it to deploy warships outside European waters, took over from Italian and French mine-sweepers in the Mediterranean and Luxembourg contributed financially to the cost of operations.

72. It is difficult to assess the efficiency of this European action in the Gulf. Counting only the number of mines destroyed, it was limited but nevertheless a great help in reducing the danger for merchant shipping. Its deterrent effect should not be overlooked, however, because since summer 1987 only one further Iranian mine-laying operation was detected: the certainty that the mined areas would be swept soon afterwards was enough to discourage Iran. Finally, its political effect, although difficult to assess, was certainly not zero: not only were the Western European countries' warships not attacked but their merchant ships were also spared. Above all, Iran had to abandon all hope of acting against its opponents by attacking shipping in the Gulf and the number of attacks fell sharply in 1988.

73. The question now is whether these co-ordinated national forces should remain in the Gulf. On 6th September 1988, experts from the WEU countries met in London to consult each other on the matter. It was decided to continue mine-sweeping operations, several mines having been destroyed since the cease-fire. However, Italy and France have reduced their presence. Italy has withdrawn its three frigates, leaving only two mine-sweepers and an oil tender. France has repatriated its aircraft-carrier, an escort vessel, a mine-sweeper and an oil tender, keeping only seven warships in the Gulf. But the French communiqué specified that France was prepared to bring its presence up to strength again if warranted by the situation in the

region. The planned end of mine-sweeping operations by the WEU countries will probably be towards the end of the year. The task of protecting and providing convoys for merchant shipping came to an end in October.

## 2. *The use of chemical weapons*

74. Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran several times during the war. This was officially established by teams from the International Red Cross and the United Nations and is now recognised by international society. The WEU Assembly called attention to this grave situation in Recommendation 435. Iraq itself hardly denies it. There have been various reports about the type of products used which were sometimes said to be yperite, or mustard gas, well known since the first world war, sometimes more sophisticated products such as tabun, developed during the second world war, and sometimes more recent products such as phosgene which also affects the nervous system. Finally, since April 1988, Iraq has been using cyanide-based products which kill instantaneously. The action of these products is prolonged since they contaminate water and food and, even when they do not kill immediately, they cause incurable injuries. They are believed to have been used first against the Iranian army but to have been gradually extended to operations involving civilians. The growth of the Kurdish resistance movement finally led Iraq, in 1987 and 1988, to use chemical weapons against resistants in Iraq itself, which meant they were used against Kurdish civilians as well as active insurgents. Many observers considered that such use was continued and intensified after the cease-fire on 20th August 1988. It appears to have stopped on 5th September but was resumed in mid-October to eliminate pockets of Kurdish resistance.

75. According to Amnesty International, which testified on 23rd August 1988 before the United Nations Human Rights Subcommittee in Geneva, on two occasions in April 1988 hundreds of civilians, injured in chemical air raids, were rounded up by the Iraqi army in the regions of Sulaymaniyah and Ardil for mass executions obviously intended to wipe out all traces of the use of poison gas. Amnesty International said it has lists of some of the victims. Again, on 2nd September, Amnesty International announced the massacre of several hundred Iraqi Kurds by poison gas in North-West Kurdistan. A report by the United Nations Secretary-General, published on 23rd August, quoted the conclusions of a group of experts sent to Iran from 12th to 14th August referring to the launching of yperite bombs on Iranian territory on 2nd August leading to the hospitalisation of 2 680 civilians although there were no deaths. This was the

fourth team of experts since the beginning of 1988 to conclude that Iraq was using chemical weapons. A number of similar cases had already been detected during the eight-year war, affecting both the Iranian armed forces and civilians. The Iraqi Government has not denied these cases but claimed that they were in retaliation to the use of poison gas by Iran. Operations conducted along the Turkish-Iraqi frontier at the end of August and beginning of September are reported in the press to have caused a still higher number of deaths, although no figures can be quoted. According to the Kurdish resistance, chemical weapons were also used on 30th August for the mass execution of 2 400 Kurdish civilians, prisoners of the Iraqi army.

76. So far, the Iraqi Government has denied using chemical weapons against the Kurds and the Turkish authorities continue to affirm that Turkish doctors have found no injuries among the refugees that could be attributed medically to chemical weapons. A team of French doctors, sent by the association "Médecins du monde" to see the refugees in Turkey, made similar statements. Many of the injuries actually observed can apparently also be attributed to other causes. Furthermore, the conclusions of the doctors sent by that organisation tally with those of the International Red Cross, i.e. that chemical weapons had been used in the campaigns against the Kurds although it was not evident that they had been lethal, particularly in the case of tear gas. In October, however, a British medical team and an American team attending Kurdish refugees in Turkey confirmed having had to treat patients with lesions due to war gases. The Turkish authorities have not authorised teams of international experts to inquire into the matter on their territory and the Iraqi Government for its part has refused a United Nations team access to its territory. In these conditions it is difficult to conclude with certainty that lethal chemical weapons were used in operations after 28th August.

77. Baghdad also points out that anti-Kurd campaigns are internal police operations in which the international community has no right to interfere and which are not covered by the rules of war. However, on 17th September the Iraqi army conveyed journalists to areas where repression had been very severe. They saw that villages and crops had been totally and systematically destroyed and that men and cattle had totally disappeared from vast areas, but they saw no proof of the use of gas. They noted nevertheless that Iraqi soldiers wore gas masks in certain sectors and that their written reports and films had been censored by the Iraqi authorities. Neither of these facts proves that lethal gas was used.

78. Conversely, journalists from many western countries who have been in contact with

the refugees have obtained testimonies which leave little doubt that chemical weapons were used by the Iraqi air force, that this caused many deaths and was the origin of the refugees' injuries. On 9th September, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, told the Senate that the American authorities had proof that chemical weapons had been used against the Kurds. This proof apparently came from intercepted radio messages from the Iraqi air force but the United States has never revealed the exact nature of this "proof". In point of fact, there is now no doubt that chemical weapons were used after 20th August but the use of lethal gas, on the contrary, has not been proved. However, delay in conducting medical controls will make it increasingly difficult to obtain medical proof of the origin of the injuries observed: after a few days, or sometimes a few hours, traces of the chemical products disappear. But the injuries remain.

79. Apart from the particularly inhumane nature of chemical weapons against which civilians, and especially children, are entirely unprotected, this matter is extremely serious. It is a violation of international agreements on the law of war, in particular the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons to which Iraq is a party and it taints with suspicion all that country's international undertakings. It also involves other violations of the law of war such as limits on visits by the International Red Cross to prisoners of war, particularly those in hospital, in order to conceal the use of chemical weapons from the international community. Finally, it jeopardises something that mankind might have taken for granted because, since the first world war, war gas had almost never been used by belligerents.

80. The State Department spokesman, Mr. Redman, announced on 14th September that Libya is believed to have already built a factory to produce chemical weapons, which is particularly disturbing since, through deliveries of weapons or direct intervention, that country supports several armed conflicts in Africa, inter alia in the Western Sahara and Chad where, according to Mr. Redman, it already used chemical weapons in 1987. It has missiles of sufficient range to reach European territories and it has been noted that it does not have too many scruples about violating international law. According to other sources, Syria and Egypt already have stocks of chemical weapons, while Israel is reported to be building a plant in the Negev to produce nerve gas that it has just developed. Thus, now that East and West are negotiating an agreement in Geneva to eliminate stocks of chemical weapons and ban their production in Europe, an effective proliferation of such weapons is developing on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, which might well

thwart the success of the current negotiations. It now seems certain that twenty-four countries in the world have chemical weapons and there are probably about ten others. There is a still larger number of countries which could produce them at short notice. Iraq's massive use of chemical weapons therefore brings the world to grips with a choice that is crucial for its future: either it must react vigorously to Iraq's action or it will enter a new age in which chemical weapons become a normal means of fighting.

81. There can be no justification for this return to a barbarian, unlawful practice, and the argument that chemical weapons are the poor man's nuclear weapons is irrelevant since nuclear weapons are intended to be purely deterrent, i.e. not to be used in practice, whereas chemical weapons have no deterrent effect and have a purely exterminatory rôle for the benefit of an army in battle.

82. It would therefore have been desirable for the international community to react strongly as soon as it was informed that Iraq was using chemical weapons. This was particularly necessary since the aircraft, helicopters and missiles used to deliver chemical weapons were procured abroad, as were the raw materials used to produce the poison gases. The aim should have been to signify that it could not accept such violations of the law of war and to threaten the offender with sanctions, on the understanding that significant sanctions would be applied in the event of any repetition. Too much time was spent doing nothing, mainly in order to spare Iraq which it considered to be both an ally of the Soviet Union and the last rampart of the more conservative Arab states against an expansion of the Islamic revolution backed by Iran. In particular, no one wished to take sanctions against Iraq which could only have been trade sanctions relating to arms sales or oil imports and would have weakened it vis-à-vis Iran.

83. Other reasons for caution emerged after the cease-fire: the, after all, quite legitimate reason which seems to be paralysing the United Nations and its Secretary-General, i.e. not to harm the already difficult progress of the negotiations to restore peace between Iraq and Iran, and the less openly admitted wish not to lose the prospects of a market in a country which will have to import a great deal for reconstruction purposes. The absence of reliable information on the use of chemical weapons is probably a pretext, frequently invoked, rather than a real reason for the apathy of international society in this matter.

84. Only on 26th August 1988, i.e. after the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq had come into force, did the Security Council adopt Resolution 620, tabled by Italy, Japan, the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom, threatening with sanc-

tions any governments using chemical weapons in future armed conflicts. The Council, determined to intensify efforts to ensure that all use of chemical weapons in violation of international commitments is ended once and for all, condemned their use and encouraged the Secretary-General to conduct inquiries in view of the fact that the use of chemical weapons against the Iranians had become more intensive and more frequent. Its adoption by the Security Council was not obtained unreservedly although Iraq, clearly named in reports in the possession of the Council as being responsible for the use of chemical weapons, was not named in the text adopted.

85. Mr. Shultz's statement that the United States had proof that Iraq was using chemical weapons in its repressive operations against the Kurds nevertheless led, on 9th September, to the United States Senate passing a bill tabled by Senator Claiborne Pell, Democrat Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, which, if carried into effect, would mark a turning point in American policy towards the Middle East. This text indeed names Iraq, denounces the use of poison gas and organises a boycott of Iraq by the United States, which would stop buying Iraqi oil and stop delivering arms to Iraq. Furthermore, United States representatives in international financial organisations would oppose the granting of any credit to Iraq and the United States itself would refuse any credit or guarantee of trade credit to Iraq and any technology transfers. The bill bases these measures on the twofold accusation of using chemical weapons and genocide of the Kurds.

86. The vote in the United States Senate caused violent anti-American demonstrations in Baghdad where a number of people – estimated by the Iraqi press agency at 250 000 and by other witnesses at 150 000 – marched in front of the United States Embassy on 11th September in protest. Without having any illusions about the spontaneity of this demonstration, observers were impressed by the violence of the slogans denouncing the Senate's decision as the result of an Israeli-inspired plot and as an attack on Iraq's sovereignty. On 25th September, the House of Representatives nevertheless passed a bill similar to the one passed by the Senate. The difference between the two texts means there must be negotiations between the two houses, and the United States administration seems to be trying to seize this opportunity to have the scale of the sanctions reduced.

87. On 15th September, the European Parliament adopted by a very large majority a resolution calling on the Twelve to suspend immediately all deliveries of arms to Iraq and all exports of chemical substances and equipment that could be used to produce chemical weapons.

88. Yet so far the entire international community has been weak in this matter and in a way has become an accomplice of Iraq by avoiding, for political reasons, the assumption of its responsibilities in face of this regression in the application of international law. There is no point in underlining all the dangers of this weakness for future conflicts. It has allowed Iraq to pursue its policy of repressing the Kurdish rebellion by massacring the population or forcing them to abandon Iraqi Kurdistan. The some 600 000 Kurds who have now taken refuge in the West are liable to become desperate and resort to terrorism as the only means of making their protests heard.

89. The international community would certainly be better armed if countries participating in the Geneva negotiations on chemical disarmament were more zealous about achieving satisfactory results within a reasonable lapse of time. The fact that they have been unable to reach agreement on a text allowing possessors of chemical weapons in Europe and elsewhere ten years in which to destroy their stocks can but encourage non-aligned countries to consider chemical weapons as a normal means of fighting. This also disqualifies the countries of the two blocs when it is a matter of showing their disapproval of the use of such weapons. Since certain southern Mediterranean countries now have means of delivery that can attain Western European countries and also transport chemical weapons, it seems essential and urgent, for the very security of Europe, for chemical weapons to be really and truly outlawed.

90. In this connection, the proposal tabled by President Reagan in the United Nations General Assembly on 26th September 1988 to hold an international conference to reaffirm the ban on the use of chemical weapons is an important event. The purpose of this conference would be to draw the attention of the international community to the urgency of envisaging the total elimination of chemical weapons. This is the aim of current negotiations in the conference on disarmament. One way or another, application of any agreement in this field will require very firm political will. First, there must be the will to impose effective, binding sanctions on any power violating the new convention. Then there must be the will to enforce effective controls on all, which should concern all chemical industries. This will take a long time to achieve, but Europe certainly has an important rôle to play in bringing this initiative to fruition. The speech by Mr. Mitterrand, President of the French Republic, to the United Nations General Assembly took up the threads of President Reagan's proposal that the conference on a total ban on chemical weapons hold its first session in Paris at ministerial level before the end of the year, and the French Government has accepted this proposal.



### 3. Law of war and human rights

91. While the use of chemical weapons by Iraq is a particularly intolerable violation of the law of war, based on international agreements to which the belligerents subscribed, the war between Iran and Iraq led to other striking violations of human rights, as defined in the Universal Declaration, and of the law of war, as defined most positively in the conventions in force.

92. This is illustrated in a report to the United Nations published on 1st September 1988. Drafted by a group of three after a fortnight's visit to prisons and camps, this report was intended to give Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar information to allow him to prepare a plan for an exchange of prisoners of war between the two countries in accordance with Article 118 of the Third (1949) Geneva Convention stipulating that prisoners must be returned immediately hostilities end. It confirmed Iraqi statements that Iraqi prisoners in Iran had been subjected to mental pressure and brain-washing by followers of Khomeini to try to induce them to rebel in favour of the Islamic revolution when repatriated. Iranian propaganda films shown in the West of Iraqi prisoners hailing the Iranian régime moreover left little doubt about such practices. According to the experts, this spiritual guidance of Iraqi prisoners could not be distinguished from mental pressure.

93. The United Nations experts said that in each of the camps they had visited there were fanatical, hysterical and sometimes violent demonstrations by the prisoners. They chanted slogans hostile to Saddam Hussein and the great powers and in praise of Islam and Ayatollah Khomeini. United States and Israeli flags were burnt. Many prisoners refused to be repatriated and said they would fight against returning to their country.

94. The International Red Cross, which recorded 50 182 prisoners in Iran and 19 284 in Iraq, said it was convinced that many prisoners on both sides had not been declared in Geneva. A large proportion of prisoners and even camps and hospitals had escaped its visits, which were moreover suspended in Iran from 10th October 1984 to 4th January 1986 following a riot which had killed and wounded Iraqi prisoners in the Gorgan camp. In both countries, International Red Cross delegates saw serious, repeated violations of international human rights. Former prisoners who had been freed confirmed at a press conference in Baghdad on 28th September that they had been ill-treated in several Iranian camps.

95. Conversely, while Iranian offensives in the Shatt al-Arab sector had used tightly-packed masses of adolescents, often fourteen years old, fanaticised by propaganda and among whom

losses were high, this practice seems to have been abandoned in the last two years of the war.

96. Repression of political opposition and national rebellions deriving from it is not a direct consequence of the war, although the offensive by the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq at Kermanshah in July 1988, with Iraqi assistance, led, after initial successes, to whole-scale massacre. In September, several humanitarian organisations denounced a wave of executions of members of the opposition in Iran in the days following the entry into force of the cease-fire. According to a statement made in Paris on 28th September by the committee for solidarity with political prisoners in Iran, hundreds of political prisoners are believed to have been executed in this way. The Times of 3rd October 1988 refers to waves of arrests and summary executions of political prisoners since the cease-fire. Information from various sources that are difficult to check mentions about a thousand executions in Teheran and dozens of others in many large towns. These were mainly members of the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq but also of the Tudeh Party, the Iranian Fedayeen-e-Khalq organisation and Iranian Kurds. Conversely, religious persecution, particularly of the Bahai, seems to have diminished at the same time.

97. The Iraqi Government moreover has proved to be at least as repressive of less extensive political rebellions in Iraq. More clearly contrary to any definition of human rights was the persecution and massacre of the Bahai religious community in Iran. It was continued until recently, although these martyrs have in no way compromised themselves with Iraq. Finally, some commentators do not hesitate to speak of genocide in regard to the massacre of the Iraqi Kurds. The number of victims, as announced by Kurdish resistance movements themselves, is between 5 000 and 25 000, which does not justify the word genocide, although the massacres were collective, often carried out by means of chemical weapons and mass deportations implying many serious infringements of the most elementary human rights. These too are areas in which international society must react firmly. It must first indicate clearly each infraction and name the guilty party and then act by adopting and effectively applying sanctions commensurate with the nature and magnitude of the violation of texts defining the law of war. This is the only way to terminate practices which, it was hoped, had disappeared.

## V. Consequences of the war

### 1. Local consequences

98. Assuming that the armed struggle between Iran and Iraq has really come to an end, which is not yet obvious, it already appears that the governments on both sides will have been weakened by it.

99. In *Iran*, Ayatollah Khomeini's charismatic authority was certainly safeguarded in the main by his remaining above the conduct of military operations and attempts to achieve peace in 1988. Conversely, the authority of his colleagues at the head of the Shiite clergy and the state has now been considerably diminished due to divisions now emerging between them and the setbacks they have suffered requiring the personal intervention of Khomeini. For the first time in 1988 it was possible to voice certain forms of political opposition in Iran. Although one should be highly sceptical about rumours concerning the Ayatollah's health, because of his age the question of his succession inevitably exists, although no one has yet been able to impose himself as an unchallenged candidate for this rôle.

100. It would be pointless, on the basis of information in the press, to speculate about the chances and tendencies of anyone. But it seems impossible that the inevitable future withdrawal of the Ayatollah from political life will not be followed by major changes in Iranian politics. Internal developments in recent months indicate that the trend will be towards a more open attitude to the outside world and Iran will resume a place in international trade: the need to rebuild, the legitimate wish to resume the place in the Middle East that it occupied in the Shah's day and the population's apparent lassitude over the Islamic rigour imposed by the present régime can but strengthen this trend. Iran has already re-established, or is in the process of re-establishing, relations with the Western European countries with which it had broken its ties and is developing its trade with others. For this purpose, it has managed to make Lebanese organisations which held or still hold western hostages release some of them and the position for others is encouraging, although American and British hostages have not benefited from these steps. The United States, for its part, seems prepared to re-establish the relations broken off after the siege of the United States Embassy in Tehran. However, on 3rd October, Ayatollah Khomeini insisted that Iran be rebuilt and its army reconstituted without the assistance of the United States and the Soviet Union and he proclaimed that his country did not wish to resume diplomatic relations with Washington. At the same time, he made current negotiations for the resumption of relations with the United Kingdom more difficult by insisting that the latter be seen as the one making the request. However, Iran's losses due to the war, its present economic and financial difficulties and uncertainty as to whether the present régime will remain in office will not necessarily remove Iran from the international scene but may, on the contrary, be the first steps towards a return to a very important if not dominating position in the Gulf region.

101. From the moment Iran accepted the cease-fire, stopped threatening freedom of navigation in the Gulf and used whatever influence it may have over associations practising terrorism or hostage-taking to ensure that terrorist attacks stop and hostages are released, there was no longer any reason not to have a normal relationship with it, no judgment being passed on the country's internal régime. Development of such relations can but encourage Iran to act in accordance with the requirements of international order.

102. *Iraq* for its part is emerging from the war in an advantageous, if not victorious, military position, and President Saddam Hussein has been able to present the end of hostilities to his nation as a victory. Thanks to the weapons it procured during the war, his army is now the strongest in the region and the crushing of the Kurdish rebellion seems to have further enhanced the authority of the régime. Furthermore, the credits he has just obtained from the United Kingdom (\$300 million) and the Federal Republic (\$165 million) and the fact that the United States does not seem prepared to apply the embargo which both houses imposed on non-military products mean that Iraq is able to tackle its reconstruction in relatively favourable conditions.

103. In this position, Iraq is no longer the defender of the Arab world against Iranian imperialism, now much calmer, but on the contrary it is more dangerous for its neighbours: during the summer, its relations with Syria and Turkey deteriorated sharply. On the other hand, the countries on the southern shore of the Gulf now have the military means necessary for ensuring their own security if they pull together.

104. In such circumstances, the West has clear means of exerting pressure on Iraq to ensure that it accepts the implications of Security Council Resolution 598, renounces the use of chemical weapons, destroys stocks and shows moderation and respect for human rights in repressing the Kurdish rebellion. The abundance of oil on the world market and the credit needed for reconstruction can but leave it open to the threat of economic sanctions if it continues its earlier excesses. The immediate interest of the Iraqi market for western exporters is no reason for the West to relinquish the means at its disposal for making Iraq behave more humanely in these matters.

## 2. Regional consequences

105. The war did not concern only Iran and Iraq. All countries in the region were affected and, to varying degrees, felt threatened on the one hand due to direct attacks by the Iranian air

force, in particular on ships from all countries trading along the southern shore of the Gulf, and on the other hand due to the unrest caused by partisans of the Islamic revolution and certain Shiite communities in many of these countries, especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, where there were many acts of terrorism and sabotage, and Lebanon. The other countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council were less affected by the war. However, both Sunnites and Shiites seem to be well aware of the threat of rising Islamic fundamentalism in all Moslem countries. Dangerous for all existing regimes, it is more so on the shores of the Gulf where states have a large migrant population and national cohesion is very weak. For this reason they have leaned cautiously towards Iraq. Apart from Bahrein, they maintained diplomatic relations with Iran. It should be noted that Resolution 598 urged them to take part in the peace talks. The resulting consequences are threefold.

106. Inside states, the governments have strengthened their authority: promises to set up consultative parliamentary assemblies in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates have not been respected. In Kuwait, parliamentary activity was suspended in 1986. In Saudi Arabia, the authorities' control over the pilgrimage to Mecca was strengthened after rioting which on several occasions, particularly in July 1987 when there were about 400 victims, brought Iranian pilgrims into conflict with the forces of law and order.

107. Diplomatically, the Gulf countries have strengthened their links in the framework of the Gulf Co-operation Council, dominated by Saudi Arabia, which ensured considerable influence for itself in the region. During the war, these countries gave generous assistance to Iraq in the name of Arab solidarity and above all in order to check an Iranian threat which was already being felt before the 1979 revolution due to the Shah's activities and to which the Ayatollah's revolutionary propaganda gave a new dimension. Only Syria, Iraq's avowed opponent and beneficiary of generous oil supplies from Iran, kept its distance from the Islamic conference in Koweit in 1987 and the Arab summit in Amman which affirmed support for Iraq. The cease-fire has not brought this inter-Arab co-operation to an end but the fact that Iraq has emerged stronger from the war might redirect co-operation between the Gulf countries, which have everything to fear from a resumption of Iraqi claims, in particular to the neutral zone of Kuwait: the war has brought Iraq face to face with all the disadvantages of its narrow outlet to the Gulf.

108. The Arab League has benefited from the need for greater solidarity shown by Iraq. The latter, which obtained the expulsion of Egypt in 1979 after the Camp David agreements, was, together with Jordan, the main supporter of Egypt's return to the league in exchange for

which Egypt backed Iraqi views on the application of the cease-fire, although its reintegration in the league was delayed because of Syrian opposition. For the time being, this concern for Arab solidarity has led Iraq to adopt more moderate positions towards the Palestinian conflict since it has declared that it would no longer oppose an agreement accepted by the Palestinians. However, the consolidation of understanding between Arab countries seems to be disturbing for the Israelis.

109. The strengthening of co-operation between the Arab countries did not prevent a very swift resumption of trade, which had moreover never stopped completely, between the two shores of the Gulf as soon as the cease-fire became effective. The Emirates and the small countries of the Gulf which had backed Iraq resumed trade and two of them which, like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, had broken off diplomatic relations with Iran are now in the process of resuming them.

110. Finally, militarily the war made all the states in the region increase their arsenals considerably by procuring the most sophisticated weapons. This was particularly so for the countries with very high oil revenues.

### *3. The accumulation of armaments*

111. According to information given by Mr. Aaron Karp, Director of the SIPRI arms trade research programme, between 1980 and 1987, fifty-three countries sold arms worth \$27 000 million to Iran or Irak, i.e. 20% of the arms sold in the third world, a large part of the remainder having been delivered to other countries in the region. All attempts by the United States, Western European countries and even the Soviet Union to limit the arms race in the Middle East have come up against tough competition from other selling countries which seized every opportunity to extend their markets. Countries themselves subject to embargoes, such as North Korea and South Africa, were first in line to increase their sales, but industries in countries intending to respect the embargo quite often sold arms under the counter, with the complicity of certain government authorities. The United States was not alone with its Irangate. For instance, Iran procured clandestinely Haubitizers from Austria, Swedish missiles, French munitions and arms from many other countries.

112. The cease-fire provides arms-exporting industrialists with new arguments for bringing pressure to bear on governments to abolish all restrictions. Nor did Iran and Iraq wait for the end of the war before starting to arm their supporters, especially in Lebanon, where Iran supplied arms to the Shiites, while since the cease-fire Iraq has started to supply arms to the Christian militia in order to thwart Syria which

itself supported Iran during the war. All these facts indicate, in spite of the cease-fire, that the armed struggle between Iran and Iraq is spreading to other parts of the region and that, in particular, the threat of a crisis between Syria and Iraq is looming up.

113. Among the most recent and most significant arms contracts, mention should be made of the one between the United Kingdom and Jordan, worth \$4 000 million, and another concluded between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia since the cease-fire, worth \$20 000 million in addition to a \$9 000 million contract concluded in 1986. Both relate mainly to deliveries of Tornado combat aircraft. In Saudi Arabia, 122 aircraft of this type are now on order. Qatar has procured Stinger missiles from the United States. Kuwait, which had hitherto procured arms only in the West, wished to procure Maverick D and G missiles whose development was completed only in November 1987 and which are not yet issued to American forces, but permission was refused by the United States Senate. It then diversified its sources by ordering from the Soviet Union, too, while ordering forty fighter aircraft from the United States, from which Bahrein has ordered sixteen, while the Emirates have ordered Mirage 2000s from France. North Korea has joined with Egypt for the production of missiles and Brazil is reported to have supplied Libya with long-range missiles, while China has delivered various types of missiles to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. It denies having sold Silkworm anti-ship missiles to Iran, which means Iran must have procured its stocks and those it used in the Gulf through the intermediary of third powers.

114. Where Iraq is concerned, on 10th October, a French weekly, "Le Point" published the following information:

"The government of Saddam Hussein (Iraq) has presented French arms merchants with an enormous order. It is for equipment – such as the Mirage 2000 – far more sophisticated than any the Iraqis now have. Paris is studying the order and, in particular, the traditional payment facilities requested by Iraq."

115. The Gulf war thus led to a sharp quantitative and qualitative rise in weapons deployed in the region. Their wealth allowed oil-producing countries to bring sellers from very many countries into competition and thus procure the best equipment at the lowest prices, which is quite normal. They were thus able, however, to evade all controls and quantitative or qualitative limitations of their armaments by third countries. In this way, countries as dependent on the West for their security as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have diversified the sources of their arms in recent years, not only among the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance but also in China and the

Soviet Union. For instance, it was from China that Saudi Arabia procured 3-A missiles with a range of more than 2 500 km, while Iran, Syria, Libya and Pakistan are in the market for Chinese shorter-range M-9 missiles.

116. Furthermore, it is disturbing that Saudi Arabia now has Chinese East Wind 3-A missiles because this missile brings Israeli and Iranian territory within range and it has a nuclear warhead capability. However, China denies that it has supplied Saudi Arabia with the means to produce nuclear warheads. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia acceded to the non-proliferation treaty in October 1988. Chinese sales worried the United States Government which has approached the Chinese Government twice to try to stop the contract. In July 1988, Mr. Shultz failed to reach agreement while, in September, the Secretary of Defence, Mr. Carlucci, said: "I am satisfied with my discussions and believe the Chinese will handle this issue responsibly in the future." The Chinese Minister of Defence, Qin Jiwei, said China had to continue its arms sales because it was a poor country and that in 1987 China had fallen into fourth place for world sales behind the United States, the Soviet Union and France but that: "In the future, China will not be able to sell its weapons on a big scale. But we will continue to do so because we are still poor."

117. Procurement of sophisticated weapons by many Arab countries could not fail to worry Israel which for its part is at present making great efforts to develop its defence means. The launching of a first Israeli satellite, said to be for purely civil purposes, left little doubt about the determination of the Israeli Government to acquire means of observing the entire region, and modern launchers, possibly capable of carrying nuclear weapons, Israel's possession of which is hardly in doubt. Thus, one of the consequences of the war between Iraq and Iran has been a marked rise in the level of confrontation between Israel and its Arab neighbours at a time when unrest in the occupied territories is assuming proportions that are a threat to peace.

#### 4. International consequences

118. Although the local and regional implications of the war do not seem very reassuring, the same is not so for its repercussions on international relations. The scale of the conflict seems, indeed, to have worried the two great powers and to have induced them to take the necessary steps to avoid any extension of the crisis. The situation in the Middle East has been one of the main themes of international policy concerning which the great powers have, since 1985, exchanged views at the highest level. The United States authorities have declared several times that they have found reasonable persons of good

will to talk to in Moscow, inter alia refusing to deliver the most sophisticated weapons to the belligerents, which probably explains the share of the Middle East arms market taken by others. This understanding was certainly one of the factors that finally helped to make the belligerents accept the Security Council resolution leading up to the cease-fire.

119. This does not mean there is real agreement between the two powers, and the Soviet Union has not failed to protest at the large American naval presence in the Gulf. The United States now has twenty-six warships in the region, of which seventeen in the Gulf and an aircraft-carrier with escort vessels near the Strait of Hormuz. In one year, these vessels escorted eighty-seven convoys through the Gulf. The American presence in the Gulf dates back to 1949 but has increased considerably since 1980. The United States seems to have decided to wind down its operations only gradually, pending more definite progress towards peace, and to improve its weaponry, in particular for threat detection and reconnaissance purposes. This improvement became essential when Iran deployed Silkworm anti-ship missiles, and the destruction of the Iranian Airbus in July 1988 showed the inadequacy of the equipment on American ships. Conversely, the United States has decided to stop escorting convoys, deploying air force patrols and monitoring the Gulf with AWACS aircraft stationed in Saudi Arabia.

120. The WEU countries' ships in the Gulf had a different rôle, being mainly concerned with destroying mines laid by Iran on either side of the Strait of Hormuz. Only France sent and maintained an aircraft-carrier in the region, which it has now withdrawn. However, it is estimated that there are still about 200 mines in the Gulf and the search for them is continuing. The United Kingdom is reported to have proposed to its WEU partners that the operation be continued, not concealing from its allies that its main intention was to demonstrate to the United States that Europeans are serious about shouldering more of the financial burden of their own defence now that the United States Congress is strongly urging a greater European contribution to the expenditure necessary for joint security. The WEU countries will probably keep their mine-sweepers in the Gulf for some time to come, but they have already reduced the number of vessels that accompanied them for protection.

121. Thus, anxiety caused by the Gulf war seems to have helped to develop exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union on matters relating to international peace and the rapprochement between the United States and its European allies on an essential factor in transatlantic understanding which escapes the alliance, i.e. co-operation outside the NATO

area. Such a trend was particularly essential because the build-up of armaments in the Middle East means it is the region where world peace will be the most threatened if one or other country allows itself to become involved in the conflicts which have surely not stopped tearing it apart.

## *VI. Conclusions*

122. Among the many works of fiction published in the last twenty years describing what a third world war might be, most have made the war that was to encompass the earth start in the Middle East. The war between Iran and Iraq fitted well into such a plot and yet it proved novelists writing about the future war to be wrong because, far from calling in question the process of East-West détente, it made a major contribution to speeding it up and enhancing it. This is a reason for being at one and the same time pessimistic about developments in the region and optimistic about the future of international peace.

123. From a truly European standpoint, it may in the same way be deplored that Europe has lost much of the influence it exercised in the region after the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire but the fact is to be welcomed that, in spite of the oil aspect of the war, it did not jeopardise Europe's economic activity as was the case in 1956 and even more so in 1983. For the first time since the second world war, neither the spread of terrorism, fanned by the Iranian revolution, nor the taking of hostages in Lebanon, nor the European states' different assessments of the local situation prevented consultation between European countries leading to the implementation of co-ordinated, if not joint, action in the framework of WEU to help to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf. The political results of this operation are not easy to assess, but they certainly helped to prevent the belligerents from entertaining any hope of extending the conflict in order to solve it to their own advantage and, consequently, it paved the way for the acceptance of a cease-fire under the aegis of the United Nations. It also helped to improve the United States and Soviet perception of Europe's political effort, showing it to be an entity worthy of consideration in international life. Consequently, it allayed the United States' fear of being isolated in its peace-keeping actions in the world and convinced the Soviet Union that the realities of Europe should have a place in their concept of détente.

124. It must now be ensured that the cease-fire is a first step towards a return to true peace, which is not obvious from a study of the local situation, and that Europe, with the return to peace, does not lose the advantages it derived

from its firmness and moderation during the war. Your Rapporteur considers these should be the underlying themes of the recommendation that the Assembly has to submit to the WEU Council.

125. Even if the present negotiations concern only Iran, Iraq and, to a certain extent, the countries on the southern shore of the Gulf however, it is evident that the effects of the war in the Gulf have been far more widespread in that new factors of imbalance have surfaced in an area extending from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. Although Iran's declared aim was the deliverance of Jerusalem, the fact that Israel afforded it its support, particularly by acting as a discreet intermediary for the delivery of armaments from third countries, showed that the Israelis believed that there was a close link between the situation in Palestine and the war in the Gulf. Iraq has one of the strongest armies in the region and took part in several of the Israeli-Arab wars. It is therefore not surprising that Israel wished to weaken it whereas Iran, further away and not on good terms with most Arab countries, except for Syria and Libya, presents no immediate danger. Any victory by Iran however would probably have released a series of fundamentalist-inspired revolutions which would hardly have been advantageous to Israel's security.

126. Furthermore, the rivalry between India and Pakistan is not unknown in the countries of the Gulf where there are Indian and Pakistani immigrant minorities. India has built up a significant military capability in recent years. It has nuclear weapons and two nuclear submarines. The armaments of its ground and air forces are being modernised. At regional level at least, it is therefore becoming a major power at a time when the death of General Zia-ul-Hak raises serious uncertainty about the future of Pakistani policy. General Zia's close relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrein had previously limited India's influence in the Gulf region but it is to be wondered whether the barriers thus raised against the hegemonic views these governments attributed to India will survive the Pakistani dictator for very long.

127. Finally, the fact that Iraq, with its 15 million inhabitants and a military capability that is strong only at regional level, has been able to extend the effects of the war over a vast maritime region where it has seriously perturbed navigation and forced a number of powers to deploy strong naval and air forces is worth underlining. It demonstrates the responsibility assumed by countries that supply modern weapons to countries in highly volatile regions: to some extent it was to offset the effects of arms sold by the West that the countries of the West had to send a strong armada of warships to the Gulf area where they had to stay for more than a year. Several of them were badly damaged and human lives were lost. It is doubtful whether the benefits of these arms sales were greater than the cost of this military operation.

128. Arms procurement by countries in the area did not slow down with the cease-fire. Your Rapporteur has mentioned recent orders which Saudi Arabia has placed in the United Kingdom and those of several emirates. Apparently both Iran and Iraq are endeavouring to procure new armaments, not only from their usual suppliers but also from countries which, for the duration of military operations, had in principle refused.

129. Your Rapporteur believes that humanitarian reasons unite with the interests of peace and Europe's own interest for everything to be done to avoid all-out competition for the sale of arms. The United States seems to have persuaded the Soviet Union and China to exercise some restraint in this field. It would be regrettable if it were Europe that broke ranks in the sale of armaments. Furthermore, the political impact of such sales makes them an act of tremendous consequence and any consultation between countries that claim to examine together questions of their joint security must include the question of arms sales to the Middle East. If the question of mine-sweeping in the Gulf is soon to be removed from the Council's agenda, that of the evolution of the political and military situation in the Middle East should remain and consultations on arms sales in this region must be given a prominent place.

*Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq*

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AMENDMENT 1<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Pieralli and others*

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1. Leave out paragraph (xiii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

*Signed: Pieralli, Pecchioli, Francese*

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1. See 7th sitting, 5th December 1988 (amendment negatived).

*Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq*

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AMENDMENT 2 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Speed*

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2. After paragraph *(xiii)* of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph:
- “ *(xiv)* Noting that over the last eight years the United Kingdom and France have maintained naval units in the Gulf whose prime task has been to assist and protect merchant shipping and these forces were supplemented last year by the WEU mine counter-measures force whose task was to detect and clear mines laid by Iran or others on either side of the Strait of Hormuz, ”

*Signed: Speed*

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1. See 7th sitting, 5th December 1988 (amendment negatived).



*Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq*

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AMENDMENT 3 <sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Ahrens and others*

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3. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph:  
“ 9. Request the member countries of Western European Union to support Turkey in providing humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish refugees and urge the Iraqi Government to take measures in order to ensure, in future, a voluntary return of these refugees without repression. ”

*Signed: Ahrens, Luuk, Baarveld-Schlaman, Lambie, Lalumière, Bassinet, Holtz, Pistre, Lagorce, Blunck, Antretter, Tummers*

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1. See 7th sitting, 5th December 1988 (amendment agreed to).

***The reactivation and enlargement of WEU –  
reply to the annual report of the Council***

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**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur***

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- 1. The enlargement of WEU
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1. Adopted in committee by 16 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); MM. Burger (Alternate: Hengel), Martino (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts (Alternate: van der Werff), Bassinet, Baumel, van der Biest, Chénard (Alternate: Pontillon), Coleman (Alternate: Ewing), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Foschi, Hill, Hitschler, Koehl (Alternate: Portier), Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Meckersheimer, Muller, Natali, Péciaux, Pieralli, Reddemann, Ruet, van der Sanden, Sarti (Alternate: Scovacricchi), Shelton, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Mr. Stoffelen.*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Recommendation**

*on the reactivation and enlargement of WEU –  
reply to the annual report of the Council*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that developments in the international situation require Western Europe to assume without delay greater responsibilities to ensure its security, promote disarmament and contribute to international peace;
- (ii) Noting that the Council considers the reactivation of WEU to have been completed but that the highest authorities of certain member countries do not appear to endorse this view;
- (iii) Noting that the rôle of the WEU Agency has still not been satisfactorily defined;
- (iv) Welcoming the very definite improvement in the information the Council has communicated to the Assembly in 1988;
- (v) Noting, however, that:
  - (a) the Council has not answered all the points raised in Recommendation 457;
  - (b) the Council's communications to the Assembly contain much ambiguity about the way the Council intends to interpret and implement the modified Brussels Treaty;
  - (c) the Council's promise to communicate the agencies' reports to the Assembly has been kept only in part;
- (vi) Welcoming the progress made towards the forthcoming accession of Spain and Portugal to WEU;
- (vii) Recalling that it is incumbent upon the Council to give the Assembly detailed and accurate information about everything relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty;
- (viii) Trusting that the colloquy on the future of European security to be held in Florence in March 1989 will allow a successful definition to be made of the tasks to be accomplished so that WEU may make a meaningful contribution to building a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Answer the paragraphs of Recommendation 457 asking the Council:
  - (a) How it intends to implement the political impetus that it said it wished to give to co-operation in armaments matters;
  - (b) When it intends to transmit to the Assembly the text of the agencies' studies that have not yet been communicated to it;
  - (c) What progress has been made with its studies of burden- and responsibility-sharing in the Atlantic Alliance;
2. Inform the Assembly of the decisions taken by the IEPG at its meeting in Luxembourg on 9th November 1988;
3. Ensure that its annual report covers all its activities and the implementation of commitments incumbent upon the WEU organs under the Paris Agreements and the Council's decision of 7th May 1955, as long as these texts remain in force;
4. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions of the seminar on defence resources that it organised in The Hague on 14th and 15th March 1988;
5. In view of the nature of the subject to be tackled and the Assembly's responsibility for informing public opinion, invite the Assembly to play a full part in the seminar on informing public opinion it is planning to convene in 1989;
6. Specify whether the WEU "intergovernmental organs" referred to in the Secretary-General's letters to the President of the Assembly were effectively set up in application of Articles VIII and IX of the modified Brussels Treaty;

7. Not wait for agreement on a single seat for the WEU ministerial organs before defining the tasks of the new agency and specifying what henceforth it expects of the ACA and the SAC, as the Assembly asked it to do in Recommendations 428, 429, 432, 438, 442, 451 and 454;
8. Explain how the WEU ministerial organs will follow up the organisation of a European seminar by the French Ministry of Defence in November 1988 to make European security requirements better known to public opinion;
9. Invite member governments to be represented and play a full part in discussions at the colloquy on the future of European security that the General Affairs Committee is organising in Florence from 21st to 23rd March 1989.

## *Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur)*

### *I. Introduction*

1. The time-table of the Assembly's work obliges the General Affairs Committee to adopt, on 10th November, the reports to be presented at the second part of the thirty-fourth session. However, as the Council is not holding its ministerial meeting until 14th and 15th November, it is impossible for your Rapporteur to refer to the decisions the Council should take on that occasion. In these circumstances, the General Affairs Committee decided to discuss the text submitted to it by its Rapporteur on 10th November and to ask him to prepare, for the meeting on 7th December, another document updating and correcting the present report in the light of information received on 15th November. The final report will have to be distributed to the Assembly in the morning of 7th December so that any changes made by the committee to the draft recommendation may be voted upon by the Assembly in the afternoon of the same day. There is every reason to think that most of these changes will relate to the enlargement of WEU, but it is not out of the question that the Council will also manage to take decisions on restructuring.

### *II. General*

2. Since the ministerial meeting in The Hague in April 1988, it is agreed that the reactivation of WEU has now been completed, thus allowing thought to be given to enlargement. Some governments which hold that reactivation has now been completed seem to hesitate to spell out its impact and it is just as if they now find what they jointly agreed to assert in the platform adopted in The Hague in October 1987 to be extremely audacious and that they should take a step back from it.

3. This is apparently what the President of the French Republic, Mr. Mitterrand, deplored in his address to the Institut des hautes études de défense nationale in Paris on 12th October, when he said he thought "the only point on which there has been progress is in relations between France and the Federal Republic". He added: "I wish Europe's defence to be united but I do not have to conceal the difficulties that will be encountered and it troubles me to note that words are pronounced time and again to the effect that if reality was not what it is... we shall do our utmost to consolidate a European pillar of the alliance. This will continue to be our aim. If, in 1992-93, we have been successful, we shall be

in a position to take a decisive step towards giving real, and not only imaginary, substance to the defence of Europe... WEU needs to be reformed if it wishes to meet what many expect of it." Can it be said more clearly that the reactivation of WEU is not a reality? Moreover, as far as your Rapporteur knows, the deadline of 1992-93 has no special significance in regard to security. In any event, the difference between the utterances of the WEU Council on behalf of the Seven and those of the President of the French Republic is striking.

4. Chancellor Kohl has referred to the position of WEU twice: in Berlin on 13th October 1988 in an address on the future of Europe and Franco-German relations at the opening of the Aspen Institute and in Brussels on 19th October. In Berlin, i.e. just before his meeting with the President of the French Republic in Vézelay on 14th October, he said:

"The definition of a European security policy concept with the aim of achieving joint European defence in close liaison with the United States of America is a task to which we shall give priority in the future. The WEU platform and the inclusion of security policy in European political co-operation are the first and important steps in this direction."

Speaking in Brussels, he underlined the progress to be made towards closer European union. He added: "We cannot speak indefinitely of a 'European identity' or of a 'European pillar of the alliance' without following up such statements with firm progress", which means that such progress has not been made, which is very close to President Mitterrand's words. It is impossible not to bear these statements in mind when examining the content of the Council's communications to the Assembly in 1988, which constitute undeniable progress. In particular, the Council should lose no time in saying what it has done to follow up the platform adopted in The Hague.

5. Referring to the deadline of 1992-93 so that Europeans at last give serious consideration to matters relating to their joint security is also in many respects a way of evading specific, urgent problems. The General Affairs Committee has made a major effort to circumscribe the new facts of European security in recent years, thanks inter alia to the report on recent developments in Soviet external policy, submitted by Mr. Pécriaux in December 1987, and the report on co-operation between the United States and Canada in security matters, submitted by Mr. Pontillon in June 1988.

6. The internal evolution in the Soviet Union, which accelerated during the year, as did its external policy, offers hope of the early successful conclusion of the Vienna conference on security and co-operation in Europe and the opening, before the end of 1988, of the specialised conferences that are to follow it up, *inter alia*, where European security is concerned, the one in Vienna on conventional disarmament. Mr. Gorbachev has just proposed an all-European summit meeting to give the necessary impetus to these two conferences and President Mitterrand has proposed an East-West summit meeting in about three years' time if sufficient results have been obtained in disarmament. These facts, added to the trend of Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks and the expected opening in January 1989 of a conference on banning chemical weapons, indicate that henceforth reflection on European security should assume a new dimension and that co-ordination of the WEU countries' positions on disarmament should become an essential part of it, otherwise progress in disarmament may lead to dislocation of the western security system just when "The military balance" has announced new and dangerous deployments of conventional means by the Soviet Union.

7. One of WEU's principal rôles is to ensure that Western Europe retains the cohesion necessary in security matters to be able to tackle questions relating to détente and disarmament without jeopardising the union it is achieving in other areas – such as that of the economy – and without calling in question the bases of its security, particularly the Atlantic Alliance. It is not, therefore, enough for the Assembly to know that a Council working group is studying problems relating to disarmament; it has to know how far and on what points the seven governments are able to define the requirements of a European disarmament policy and to tackle the negotiations that are about to be started from a common standpoint.

8. Secondly, the result of the American elections implies that in the next few years the government will reconsider the way United States armed forces are deployed in the world. Mr. Pontillon's report referred to present discussions in American circles concerned with defence questions. It stressed the development of a "global" way of thinking in this area and the will of the United States authorities to ensure that the European members of the alliance assume a larger proportion of the expenditure required for joint security and perhaps also more responsibilities in the defence of the European continent and in the efforts that need to be made to keep peace in the rest of the world.

9. If a global United States defence policy is confirmed after the elections, which seems probable, this will mean some weakening in the American military presence in Europe. The call

for a better division of the burden of joint defence will certainly not be abandoned by the new administration. Furthermore, the favourable attitude of the Americans to Europe's request that better burden-sharing should be accompanied by better responsibility-sharing in the alliance allows it to be thought that, as the General Affairs Committee was told clearly when it visited the United States in April 1988, the Americans welcome the fact that the reactivation of WEU gives Western Europe a means of exercising these responsibilities and promoting a financial effort for joint defence. The WEU countries' co-ordinated mine-sweeping operation in the Gulf was a great help in making the United States accept the idea of a reactivated WEU which meant that it was no longer alone in taking action outside the NATO area. United States decisions obviously depend on purely American considerations. However, if Europe does not express its views on the question in the next few months, as the General Affairs Committee intends to do in Florence next spring, it might bring grist to the mill of those who advocate redeploying the United States army, which would weaken its security, and hasten redeployment. In any event, it will not be able to avoid examining the new situation but it has every interest in doing so before it is faced with a fait accompli.

10. In view of these requirements incurred by international developments, the Council's various communications to the Assembly give the impression that the Seven have effectively assumed their responsibilities and, whenever necessary, set up working groups on topical matters. Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand, on the contrary, say how disappointed they are at the non-existence of Europe in matters that are the responsibility of WEU. Since it must be accepted that neither of them deliberately deceives his audience and that they are both well-informed, it must be concluded that while the WEU working groups exist and are active they have not achieved significant results for lack of agreement between governments, in particular on everything relating to the application of the platform adopted in The Hague. In this case, the situation would be far more serious than the Council's communications to the Assembly suggest because it would mean that as well as disagreement over the restructuring and collocation of the ministerial organs there are far more deep-rooted differences concerning which it would be very much harder to find compromises because they are based on the countries' views on the possibility of the very existence of a European pillar of the alliance. The Assembly has done much to promote this formula. If, as Chancellor Kohl holds, it is an empty one, it is because the Council has been able to follow up neither the Rome declaration nor the platform adopted in The Hague.

11. Your Rapporteur believes this question should be raised before tackling the purpose of the report. The Assembly has every reason to welcome the attitude adopted by the Council towards it and the prospects of WEU being enlarged in the very near future to include Spain and Portugal. But it has to note that these sources of satisfaction will have only a limited impact if the Council does not give positive content to its work. Texts emanating from it so far make no mention of this content and it will probably be necessary to await the ministerial meeting on 14th and 15th November before being able to express an opinion.

### *III. Relations between the Council and the Assembly*

12. Examination of previous annual reports of the Council had led the Assembly to understand that consultations were being held between member governments in WEU on security, that the restructuring of the organisation had not been completed for lack of agreement on the location of the single seat that the Council believed all the WEU ministerial organs should have and, finally, that the informal nature of intergovernmental activities and the decline in statutory activities were preventing the Council from providing the Assembly with the information it needed to carry out its task of supervising the work assigned to the Council under the modified Brussels Treaty, which is the basis of its existence.

#### *(a) Reply to Recommendation 457*

13. The thirty-third annual report, the first part of the thirty-fourth annual report, the reply to Recommendation 457 and the information letters from the Secretary-General of WEU on the activities of the intergovernmental organs in June and July 1988 and August and September 1988, communicated to the President of the Assembly on 26th July and 12th October, confirm those views but also reveal the Council's sincere wish to alleviate the difficulties that were stressed, *inter alia*, in Recommendation 457. For reasons that are probably not solely due to the Council's activities, it may be said that there has been a positive response to most of the points in this recommendation and a start has at last been made with implementing them. It is rare for the Assembly to be able to record such action and it takes due note of this as well as of the fact that the Council's reply to this recommendation reached the Office of the Clerk on 11th August and not on the eve of the session following the recommendation's adoption, as had long been the practice. This, too, is a pleasant change

because it allows the General Affairs Committee to take account, in preparing the present report, of the Council's reply to the previous report and thus inaugurate a true dialogue between the two institutions. The swiftness of this reply and of several others was probably facilitated by the WEU-Com network for relations between the capitals, but it also benefited from the fact that the Council's reply to the Assembly's recommendations was, as is increasingly the case, vague and evasive.

14. It was through other channels, in particular the press but also, it should be underlined, the letter from the Secretary-General dated 26th July, that the Assembly was informed of action taken on its recommendation. This applies especially to the implications of the platform adopted in The Hague, the progress of negotiations on enlargement, the limitation of armaments, all of which were amply covered in the letter, and the naval presence in the Gulf, referred to again in the letter of 12th October. The latter had already been the subject of press reports. The question of restructuring the Office of the Clerk was settled satisfactorily in June.

15. The Council has still not answered three questions raised in Recommendation 457:

- It has not said how it intends to implement the political impetus it decided to give to co-operation in armaments matters and, to date, there have been few signs of such impetus. Generally speaking, there is little mention of co-operation in armaments matters in documents emanating from the Council now that it is assuming new dimensions, as was emphasised at the colloquy which the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions organised in London in March 1988, and the IEPG is reviewing its methods of work.
- It says it is prepared to give the Agency a rôle without waiting for a decision on its possible move, but it has not yet done so, and it has transmitted the text of only four of the Agency's forty-four studies in implementation of the promises it made to the Assembly at the ministerial meeting in Bonn in April 1985.
- It has not answered the recommendation relating to the study of burden-sharing in the alliance and possible changes in the deployment of NATO forces.

Your Rapporteur will therefore propose that the Assembly insist that it be given a satisfactory answer on these three points.

*(b) Second part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council*

16. Since the second part of the annual report of the Council reached the Assembly too late to be examined at the first part of the thirty-fourth session, most of the facts it mentions concern too remote a past to be suitable for a political dialogue between the two WEU organs. However, the text calls for a few remarks.

17. First, about the very presentation of the report: for the first time, matters concerning the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee and application of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty on WEU forces are no longer given in the body of the report but at appendix. This is of some importance if one looks into the reasons why the Council decided to make this change in what had been its unswerving practice for thirty-two years. The Assembly has always insisted that the modified Brussels Treaty and the Council's 1955 decision setting up the Standing Armaments Committee should be applied in full or amended. This is not a conservative attitude on its part since it welcomed the deletion, in 1985, of the lists of conventional armaments subject to control, but has never agreed to the Council flaunting the provisions of the basic WEU texts in practice that has not been embodied in an official act by the governments. This is how it has always interpreted the supervisory powers assigned to it in Article IX of the treaty. As matters now stand, it is not logical to relegate to an appendix to the annual report matters that are a statutory part of the Council's responsibilities, and this innovation makes one fear that the Council has started to shift some of its commitments to one side in order gradually to shelve them, which would foster doubts about its will to apply the 1954 agreements.

18. Your Rapporteur is well aware that the governments wish to develop European co-operation in armaments matters in the IEPG and that they have not convened the Standing Armaments Committee for more than two years. Nevertheless, the annual report notes that the SAC subgroups are still meeting. Furthermore, the fact that the IEPG still has no international secretariat and that the governments were unable to reach agreement on this question at the Seville meeting continues to make the future of that institution uncertain, not to speak of the absurd situation in which the SAC has a secretariat but does not meet while the IEPG meets but has no secretariat. It is not by concealing this fact that it will be remedied, unless a decision is taken on this matter at the IEPG ministerial meeting in Luxembourg in November.

19. This attitude in reality falls in with many others since WEU was reactivated and the aim is

to strip down the structure of the organisation to leave it as a mere forum for exchanges of views between government representatives. The result is to deprive Europe of the power the SAC had to work out draft agreements – that it could even promote in non-member countries – and also the obligation of openness inherent in the SAC's summary records and half-yearly reports, not to speak of the exchanges of views between the SAC and the Assembly's Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. The aim of the IEPG, on the contrary, is not to reach agreements and this means governments no longer have to commit themselves firmly to co-operative programmes. The SAC's openness allowed WEU to apply the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty on relations between WEU and NATO, since it allowed NATO to keep an eye on all WEU's activities in regard to co-operation. Finally, the direct link between the SAC and the Assembly, plus its indirect link through the intermediary of the Council, allowed the Assembly to exercise its right to supervise European co-operation in armaments matters. The presence of the Spanish Minister of Defence, Mr. Narcisse Serra, in the Assembly in June 1988 and his address as Chairman of the IEPG certainly open the door to exchanges between the IEPG and the WEU Assembly. But these exchanges will remain precarious as long as they are not based on a text. In short, SAC not meeting helps to destroy the structures of WEU and to weaken its Assembly's means of supervising defence Europe, whatever results the IEPG may achieve, although these are for the time being very limited.

20. Your Rapporteur is also aware that the accession of Spain and Portugal to WEU raises the problem of the application of Protocols Nos. II and III by those countries. In neither case, in fact, can they be applied in their existing form to new members since Protocol No. II fixes maximum force levels on the basis of the treaty instituting a European Defence Community. This obviously sets no maximum for these two countries as they were not parties to the EDC treaty. Once the list of conventional armaments is deleted from Protocol No. III, it no longer concerns them, since they possess none of the weapons that are still subject to control. The question will at least have to be raised and a solution found. There is no need to act as if it were already solved by making the application of these protocols appendices to the annual report, although this might be perfectly justified after the accession of Spain and Portugal if it becomes necessary to distinguish between the report on the activities of the Council of nine WEU member countries and a residual seven-power activity, just as the North Atlantic Council gives a special place to decisions taken only by countries whose forces are under integrated NATO command.



21. Regarding the description of the Council's political activities, the thirty-third annual report is extremely parsimonious and disappointing and the Assembly can but wonder why the Council took five months to adopt such a document. It has every reason to welcome its subsequent recovery with the rapid publication of the first part of the thirty-fourth annual report and the Secretary-General's two letters on the Council's activities from June to September.

*(c) First part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council*

22. The first part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council makes no mention of matters relating to the application of the protocols. This is normal since the Council has to report to the Assembly on their application only once a year. Nor is it surprising that the Council has presented its political activities in an inusual manner in a document which is, after all, only the first outline of its annual report, the only one provided for in the treaty. But, in view of the difficulty for an observer to ascertain what is actually being done in intergovernmental relations in WEU, the Council might usefully, in each report, list the meetings held at each level so that the reader may know how much importance the governments attach to each aspect of consultations in WEU.

23. Conversely, in a remarkably short time the Council has given the Assembly a summary of matters tackled at meetings at all levels, which is more specific and interesting than heretofore. This is most gratifying.

24. However, this satisfactory aspect of the report leads to a few points on which it does not give the Assembly the information it is entitled to receive.

25. (i) The promise made in 1985 and recalled on 25th February 1988 to communicate agency reports to the Assembly as soon as they had been declassified has been kept only for the report on "The experience gained in verification of controls on forces and conventional armaments", transmitted on 17th June. The Council does not refer to other agency reports.

26. (ii) The Council does not give the programme of work adopted in London on 21st June 1988 for the negotiations on the enlargement of WEU to include Spain and Portugal. This might have helped the Assembly to obtain a better idea of the questions raised by enlargement and to work more effectively on these matters. Thus, your Rapporteur has noted that the accession of those countries to Protocols Nos. II and III and to the May 1955 decision setting up the SAC raised a number of very different problems, but it knows nothing at all of how the Council is considering solving them.

27. (iii) When it visited the United States in April 1988, the General Affairs Committee was

able to assess the importance the United States Government attached to reactivated WEU as a partner with which it could examine burden-sharing in the alliance. It is therefore surprised and disappointed that, although announcing the visit by Mr. Taft, United States Deputy Secretary of Defence, to the European capitals, the report makes no mention of his contacts with WEU as such. Were there none? In his address to the Assembly on 6th June, the Secretary-General nevertheless indicated that there had been contacts. Why therefore does the Council hide them? Why too does it not say from what standpoint it decided to tackle this question, which Europe can obviously not agree to see limited to a matter of expenditure on NATO, but which must cover true responsibility- and burden-sharing inside and outside the NATO area?

28. (iv) The report refers to a seminar on defence resources organised in The Hague on 14th and 15th March. As far as your Rapporteur knows, this was a complete innovation since the Council had never organised colloquies, although the Assembly has done so on several occasions and has invited the members of the Council. The agenda may have made it necessary to limit participation for security reasons and the Assembly cannot insist on attending every meeting organised by the Council. However, in view of its interest in the questions discussed, it can but ask to be informed of the conclusions of this seminar in whatever form the Council deems appropriate.

29. Your Rapporteur has also heard that the Council is organising another seminar at the beginning of 1989 on informing public opinion about defence questions. It would be rather surprising and inappropriate if the Assembly, which has so far, because of the Council's default in this area, had almost a monopoly in keeping the public informed of the activities of WEU, were to be kept out of such a colloquy altogether. Not only does the General Affairs Committee wish to be given more details of the Council's intentions on the matter rather than to learn, six months later, that the colloquy has been held without even being notified of the results, it considers that on such a matter the Council should associate the Assembly with this colloquy on an equal footing.

30. In other words, the Assembly's approval of the first part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council is far from unreserved, in spite of all the improvements it has noted in the presentation of many of the Council's political activities.

*(d) The information letters from the Secretary-General of WEU on the activities of the intergovernmental organs*

31. Sending such letters is an innovation which corresponds very well to the Assembly's wish to receive regular information on the

Council's activities. To date, the Assembly has received two letters of this type, but it understands perfectly the Secretary-General's remark that the frequency of such letters "will be related to the pace and substance of the activities of the intergovernmental organs".

32. Such as it is, however, the letter of 26th July raises two questions. The first relates to its title, in which the word "Council" does not appear and is replaced by "intergovernmental organs". At first sight, the two terms may seem interchangeable, but it is the word "Council" that is used in Articles VIII and IX of the modified Brussels Treaty and one might rightfully wonder how far it was to avoid the obligations of these two articles that a term less fraught with obligations was preferred. The second question relates to the second paragraph, indicating that "this letter has been drafted and issued by the Secretary-General under his own responsibility", which would be clear without the further words "but with the approval of the Chairman-in-Office". The Assembly has often stressed the ambiguity surrounding the respective responsibilities of the Secretary-General, the Chairmanship-in-Office and the Council as a whole since the reactivation of WEU started. In spite of what is said in the reply to Recommendation 457, which maintains that the Secretariat-General is exercising its rôle in all the Council's activities, the Assembly is constantly faced with wording that leaves it in doubt on this point. The ambiguity increased with the letter of 12th October, which states that: "Like the previous one, this letter has been drafted and issued by me under my own responsibility" but makes no reference to the Chairman-in-Office. Is it to be concluded that, unlike the July letter, it did not have "the approval of the Chairman-in-Office" or that such approval was given without wishing to tell the Assembly, as may be understood from the words "like the previous one"? Your Rapporteur feels that the seven governments are in fact committed by all Council communications, even if they are issued under the sole authority of the Chairman of the Permanent Council, except in cases where one or other government makes explicit reservations on a point raised in such communications.

33. However, the Assembly is very satisfied with the contents of these letters and first of all with the fact that, for the first time, the Secretary-General links the Council's activities so closely with current international political events and presents the aspects which secured the attention of both the Permanent Council and the Special Working Group. The description of the political work accomplished by the Permanent Council is enough to rectify many of the opinions so far expressed about this body, of which only the administrative activities were known to the Assembly. Furthermore, the information given in the letter of 12th July on WEU's action in the Gulf is of some importance.

34. Generally speaking, these letters allow the Assembly to have a better grasp of how the Council works and which matters attract its attention. If future missives confirm the promises of the first one, there is no doubt that it will considerably facilitate exchanges between the two WEU organs.

*(e) The Assembly's budget*

35. The Assembly appreciates the Council's gesture in releasing the sums needed for restructuring the Office of the Clerk before completing the restructuring of the ministerial organs. It therefore records its satisfaction, while recalling that, although the staff problems of which it had informed the Council have now been solved, the problems of premises available to the Office of the Clerk and the Assembly have, as a result, become even more urgent than before. The reduction in the number of agency staff since 1985 should allow these problems to be solved provisionally simply by transferring offices from one organ to another, without prejudice to any decision the Council may take on the seat of the new agency. Conversely, the forthcoming appointment of Spanish and Portuguese Delegations to the Assembly will inevitably raise in new terms the question of staff and premises for both the Office of the Clerk and the Assembly itself. It is not for the General Affairs Committee to study this matter and your Rapporteur merely wishes to say how urgent it will be once Spain and Portugal are members of WEU.

36. Your Rapporteur regrets, however, the delay in implementing measures agreed by the Council relating to the use of WEU's Paris premises. The Assembly has always held the governments alone responsible for never entrusting any serious task to the agencies or, henceforth, the single agency. On the contrary, it is uncertainty about the existence of such tasks that led it to ask the Council to assign to the agency specific tasks likely to contribute to WEU's overall rôle in European security, but separate from the Secretariat-General's permanent rôle vis-à-vis the Council. The Assembly bears no responsibility for the fact that the Council has been incapable of defining such tasks and has left vacant a number of posts earmarked for the agencies. In the circumstances, it is entitled to ask the Council for permission to use the premises which are not fully occupied at a time when it is sadly short of space on a permanent basis and even more so in view of the new requirements that will shortly arise with the arrival of the Spanish and Portuguese Delegations to the Assembly.

37. Your Rapporteur considers that, for these reasons, the Assembly should grant that the Council has made major improvements in its relations with the Assembly. If he has pointed to

a number of shortcomings, it is in the hope that the Council will continue what it has started and complete the adaptation of its relations with the Assembly to the new facts of WEU's activities.

#### *IV. The reactivation of WEU*

38. Publication by the Council of the booklet entitled "The reactivation of WEU – statements and communiqués – 1984 to 1987" obviously has a specific meaning: it is presented on the lines of the booklet containing the Brussels Treaty, which has been WEU's charter from the very start, thus showing that it is an official document designed to be placed alongside the treaty and to complete it.

39. In fact, the texts the Council has transmitted to the Assembly show that its newly-oriented work has adopted a satisfactory rhythm and meets better than before the requirements of Article VIII of the treaty and the intentions expressed in the Rome declaration and the platform adopted in The Hague. The opening of negotiations on the enlargement of WEU to include Spain and Portugal also confirms that the Council considers reactivation to be complete, since it had postponed starting negotiations until reactivation was complete. However, it would appear that certain aspects of reactivation have still not reached fruition. Furthermore, the recent speeches by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl indicate that France and the Federal Republic of Germany do not believe reactivation has been completed.

##### *(a) Restructuring*

40. Everyone knows that the dispute about applying the Council's decision to reduce the number of agencies to one and to collocate it with the Secretariat-General is paralysing the restructuring of WEU. It is common knowledge that six countries wanted or accepted collocation in Brussels, while France insists on Paris. Your Rapporteur can but hope that this dispute, minor if one considers the number of persons concerned and whose symbolic importance has probably been exaggerated, will be solved in the near future. But he believes it has allowed the Council to gloss over more serious matters on which it has still not taken a decision.

41. (i) The notion of "agency" is very vague in the various texts emanating from the Council and no one knows exactly what the rôle of the single agency should be. The Secretary-General's letter contains this phrase: "It (the Council) has decided to increase the degree of participation by staff from the Paris ministerial organs in the activities of the London-based working groups." It should first be noted that the word "agency" was not used. Second, no details are given of how

these staff are to participate. Are they intended to help the Secretariat-General to ensure the smooth running of meetings? This would herald the disappearance of the agency in favour of the Secretariat-General. Are they, on the contrary, intended to make their own contribution to tasks assigned to working groups by preparing, independently, documents for study at meetings which would justify use of the word "agency" as distinct from the Secretariat-General? Are they to be experts seconded by the agencies to the working groups for specific tasks? The Assembly has never managed to make the Council say clearly what rôle it intended to give the agency and quarrels about the seat of the ministerial organs have enabled the Council to evade the question for four years. The question might settle itself with the extinction of the agency in the very near future. Is this what the Council wanted? Why did it not say so? This would in any event have allowed the inevitable staff problems to be solved far more satisfactorily.

42. (ii) The question of the subsistence of the Agency for the Control of Armaments also arises. As long as the Paris Agreements remain fully in force it cannot be abolished and must retain its independent status *vis-à-vis* the governments. However, this status is in doubt because the Council has not appointed a director of the ACA, although the post of Director is essential for the application of Protocol No. IV which is, in fact, violated by the non-replacement of the last director. At the present juncture, with chemical disarmament high among European preoccupations, it is hard to imagine the abolition of the only body in the world that controls the non-production of chemical weapons. Yet this rôle is the only one for which the ACA is still effectively responsible. What will become of the ACA if the agency is merged with the Secretariat-General?

43. (iii) Similarly, one of the duties of the present Agency III is to ensure the secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. The latter has not met for almost three years, but it has not been abolished and some of its subgroups continue to function. The Council will have to take a decision in this connection.

44. (iv) Finally, there is work relating to European security that must or should be carried out. In the event, for instance, of the European session in November 1988 organised by the French Institut des hautes études de défense nationale having a sequel, WEU alone will be able to follow up the various European sessions, since the one in Paris is to be followed by others, organised by the corresponding national institutes, in each country. What body other than a WEU agency could be made responsible for this task?

45. It should be noted that, by calling on the President of the Assembly, certain members of the Assembly and the Secretary-General of the

WEU Council, by inviting all the WEU member countries to send trainees to the session and by having the Secretariat-General take part in the preparatory work, the French institute set its initiative firmly in the framework of WEU. This is perfectly in line with the application of paragraph 12 of the Venice communiqué. The question is therefore how WEU will respond to expectations.

46. (v) Your Rapporteur has pointed out above the ambiguities that he considers still exist about the respective rôles of the Chairmanship-in-Office and the Secretariat-General. The fact that the Council denies this aspect of the matter does little to convince him.

47. Your Rapporteur is therefore still convinced that the quarrel over the seat has given the Council an excellent pretext for not dealing with certain nevertheless important aspects of restructuring and has allowed it to shirk its responsibilities. To say the least, there is therefore some exaggeration in its claim to have completed the reactivation of WEU.

#### (b) *Enlargement*

48. The various texts that the Council sent to the Assembly since June record how the negotiations on the enlargement of WEU to include Spain and Portugal have been tackled by the Council, and the Secretary-General's letter of 26th July sets out the questions that it wished to put to the candidate countries. It is natural that more cannot be said while negotiations are in progress. As your Rapporteur knows nothing about how these negotiations are being conducted, he feels free to raise here some of the questions which he thinks should be put, particularly as the Secretary-General's letter of 12th October suggests that the negotiations are near to completion.

49. Throughout the history of WEU, before and during the reactivation period, a number of problems relating to the application of the Paris Agreements have arisen, in particular when French nuclear weapons became operational, when France withdrew from the integrated NATO military commands and when the lists of conventional weapons subject to control were deleted. Your Rapporteur referred to some of these in the previous chapter, in connection with Protocol No. II and the control of armaments. Since the development of the IEPG, other questions have arisen about the Council's May 1955 decision creating the SAC. Others have been raised by the European Parliament in regard to the application of Article IX of the treaty, or even by the President of the EEC Commission in regard to armaments industries. Some have eventually been solved de facto without the law, i.e. the text of the Paris Agreements, being amended. Others still exist. The accession of new

countries to the treaty means taking up all these problems again since, on the one hand, the Paris Agreements must be interpreted to allow accession and, on the other hand, new members cannot be asked to subscribe to obligations that the old members do not apply.

50. The central question is whether the modified Brussels Treaty, as it has existed since 1954, should be revised. So far, the governments have wished to avoid starting a discussion on this point, considering that Article V of the treaty was a vital contribution to Europe's security and that Article VIII provided a satisfactory basis for WEU when it had few political activities as well as since reactivation. Although some of the other articles of the treaty do not seem fully satisfactory, they are not so important as to justify calling the whole treaty in question in order to improve them. The platform adopted in The Hague is an interpretation of the treaty in its present form and the two candidate countries have been asked to subscribe to both the treaty and the platform. They have affirmed their intention to do so. Your Rapporteur does not know whether their acceptance was accompanied by reservations but he considers that:

51. (i) The accession of Spain and Portugal to the treaty itself, as stipulated in Protocol No. I, is essential to their membership of WEU. Well aware that application of Article IX presents certain difficulties for the Portuguese and Spanish Parliaments, he recalls that similar questions arose for the parliaments of all member countries and that, subject to a less strict interpretation of the provisions of this article which would then apply for all member countries, it is unacceptable for special conditions to be made for one country about the way it is represented in the WEU Assembly. Your Rapporteur refers here to the idea once put forward that the word "representatives" as used in Article IX should be interpreted in accordance with the meaning given to it in the Assembly's Rules of Procedure, which might allow there to be "substitutes" in the WEU Assembly who were not necessarily those who are substitutes in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. This idea had been contested by certain legal experts although it was not rejected in an absolute and final manner.

52. Another possibility would be to accept that the word "representatives" in Article IX could apply both to representatives and substitutes within the meaning given to these two words in the Assembly's Rules of Procedure. In this case, it should be easy to reach agreement among the delegations that representatives to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe would be substitutes in the WEU Assembly and vice versa, thus allowing members of the double delegation from each country's parliament to be specialised. Your Rapporteur cannot see how both these solutions could be rejected.

53. Conversely, it seems dangerous to agree to each country interpreting Article IX in its own manner at a time when the substance of this article is the subject of various criticisms and suggestions from the European Parliament, from private bodies and, finally, from certain governments.

54. (ii) For the reasons given above, Protocol No. II cannot be applied in its present form to Spain or to Portugal. The purpose of this protocol was to limit the force levels of member countries' armed forces, which is obviously now no longer the aim of any country. In order to achieve this controlled limit, the treaty insisted on complete openness. Openness is still desirable, on the one hand to encourage each country to make the effort necessary for joint defence and, on the other, to be better informed of the true facts in Western Europe in the prospect of controlled conventional disarmament. However, the criteria adopted in Protocol No. II, which covers only forces assigned to NATO and "internal defence and police forces" (Article V), are now an absurd remnant of the past. For instance, all French forces, including those stationed in Germany or assigned to the Franco-German brigade, are labelled "internal defence and police forces". The special legal position of Spain's forces in NATO will raise the problem again in new terms when Spain joins WEU. Your Rapporteur feels that neither Spain nor Portugal can be expected to define in accordance with this text as it now stands the nature of their commitment to joint security, but they should be asked to give details of their military participation in the defence of Europe, which, according to the Secretary-General's letter, is precisely what the Council is doing.

55. (iii) Nor is Protocol No. III applicable to the two candidate countries. The control procedure that it introduced cannot concern them because neither has ABC weapons which are now the only weapons subject to control. It seems hardly possible, therefore, to have them take part in a control system concerning other members or, consequently, to allow their accession to Protocols Nos. III and IV, which implies that Spain and Portugal renounce participating in the work of the Council defined in Article VIII, paragraph 4.

56. From the above, your Rapporteur draws the conclusion that the opening of negotiations on enlargement points to a need to update the treaty but that revision is not essential in order to achieve enlargement. Moreover, it might be a long and delicate process. Finally, there is no reason why Spain and Portugal should not be asked to join WEU on the basis of Protocol No. I of the Paris Agreements, it being understood that all the protocols should subsequently be reviewed and that both old and new members of WEU would obviously be required to partic-

ipate. One of the aims of the colloquy the General Affairs Committee is organising in Florence in March 1989 should be to ascertain the purpose of such a step.

57. On the other hand, the fact that Spain and Portugal have said they subscribe to the platform adopted in The Hague is, finally, the real reason why Article XI of the treaty can apply to them. The platform expresses the way the seven member governments view the application of the modified Brussels Treaty in present circumstances. However, its wording is sometimes ambiguous, due to the fact that the Seven do not seem to have exactly the same view of what should be the European part of a defence policy which is also Atlantic.

58. Today, the main questions arising relate to the deployment of forces, the rôle of nuclear weapons, disarmament and the three aspects of arms limitation - nuclear, conventional and chemical, the possibility of military action outside the NATO area and burden-sharing in the alliance. All these matters are being examined in one way or another by the WEU Council, as can be seen from the Council's communications to the Assembly. One way or another, they are part of the questions the Council is putting to the candidate countries. The decision to accept the principle of enlarging WEU to include Spain and Portugal means that the Council considers it useful for these countries to participate in its exchanges of views which, it should be noted, lead only rarely to joint decisions. The decisions taken by Portugal and Spain to negotiate their accession to WEU on the basis of the platform mean that they are prepared to take part in these exchanges of view, i.e. to take account of the views of their new partners in their own defence policies. So far, the Seven themselves have not gone much further, except perhaps in the Gulf.

59. Finally, it is legitimate for the Council to ensure that the accessions of Spain and Portugal to WEU are not seen as steps towards the disintegration of NATO. This was indeed a possibility as long as Spain was conducting negotiations with the United States to obtain the partial withdrawal of American forces stationed in Spain. Settlement of this matter and of Spain's effective participation in responsibilities and risks within the Atlantic Alliance, as included among the questions put to Spain by the Council, is essential. The question of the extent to which a national command can be integrated in NATO military structures also raises a different problem from that of France, whose national command is outside NATO.

60. These, therefore, are the points, together with any that Spain and Portugal may wish to raise, that should be covered by the negotiations which, in these conditions, could be short. It is

possible that the accessions of Spain and Portugal will come into effect quickly. If it is accepted that an agreement on the principles not involving revision of the treaty and which would authorise Spain and Portugal to take part in the work of WEU was enough and that any member countries having to submit this agreement to their parliaments would do so reasonably quickly, it may be considered that their effective accession could be in 1989. Spain and Portugal may even take part in the work of the Council – as Portugal already does in the work of the Assembly – as observers before the act of accession is ratified, i.e. perhaps as from November 1988.

61. Strictly from the point of view of the Assembly, the arrival of two new delegations using two languages not now among the Assembly's official languages will raise problems of premises and staff of some magnitude, in view of the Assembly's cramped premises and the small number of staff in the Office of the Clerk. It is not for the General Affairs Committee to study this question but it must point out that, while the enlargement of the Council and the arrival of a few Spanish and Portuguese officials in the Secretariat-General should not necessitate any major administrative changes, this is not so for the Assembly.

62. However this may be, while the arrival of Spain and Portugal is a consequence of the reactivation of WEU, it might also stimulate it, because it means raising questions on which the Council has taken no decision in the past thirty-four years. Hence, it should be followed by an updating of many fundamental texts and the Assembly will have to continue to try to ensure that these matters are effectively raised and solved within the meaning of WEU's objective as described in the preamble to the treaty, the platform adopted in The Hague and the communiqué announcing the opening of negotiations with the two countries, i.e. building a united Europe, responsible for its own security. This is one of the main reasons why the General Affairs Committee is organising a colloquy on the future of European security.

#### *V. WEU and the European Community*

63. The prospect of the reactivation of WEU, although not all member countries seem convinced that it has been achieved, again raised a question which has in fact existed ever since there has been a European Economic Community and above all since political consultations have been held in a twelve-power framework, i.e. WEU's place in a future European union. The seven governments have now adopted a relatively clear attitude towards the WEU Council. The main factors are as follows:

64. (i) Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the preamble to the platform adopted in The Hague, taking up the intentions expressed by the Seven in the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty, indicate that:

“ 2. We recall our commitment to build a European union in accordance with the single European act, which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence.

3. An important means to this end is the modified Brussels Treaty. This treaty, with its far-reaching obligations to collective defence, marked one of the early steps on the road to European unification. It also envisages the progressive association of other states inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination. We see the revitalisation of WEU as an important contribution to the broader process of European unification. ”

65. (ii) It should indeed be noted that the work of the reactivated WEU Council is shaped on the same lines as twelve-power political consultations. The weakening of the rôle of the WEU Secretariat-General and the enhancement of that of the presidency brings the two bodies closer together, the fundamental difference being the number of member countries. Several of the Twelve, such as Greece, Ireland and Denmark, are not members of WEU nor are they candidates for accession. This precludes any early merger between WEU and the Twelve.

66. (iii) Logically, the development of the European Community nevertheless implies bringing the armaments industries into the purview of Community responsibilities, whereas they are excluded under Article 223 of the Rome Treaty.

67. Thus, it would appear that Europe will have to juxtapose two systems for some time. One, with a limited number of countries and respecting state sovereignty in full, would continue to operate for security matters on the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty and the platform adopted in The Hague. The other, of a community nature, would derive its responsibilities from the Rome and related Treaties.

68. For several years, the European Parliament has made many proposals for establishing permanent links with the WEU Assembly. Special mention may be made of the proposals made by Mr. Hänsch and Mr. Tzounis on behalf of the Security and Disarmament Subcommittee of the Political Committee of the European Parliament on 28th June 1988, the main points being:

- (i) that the European Parliament instruct two persons responsible for relations with WEU and any rapporteurs feeling the need to participate regularly in our Assembly's sessions and certain committee meetings;
- (ii) that in the same way members of the WEU Assembly be invited to follow the work of the European Parliament's subcommittee and Political Committee;
- (iii) that provision be made for subsequent meetings between the bureaux of the two assemblies' committees;
- (iv) that the exchange of documentation between the two assemblies be improved;
- (v) that periodic meetings be held between delegations from the bureaux of the two assemblies.

69. The WEU Assembly has always been in favour of such exchanges, which would show mutual interest without in any way affecting the exercise of the two assemblies' responsibilities. The difficulties that your Rapporteur can see relate to WEU's budgetary ability to meet this extra activity, which means the Council's agreement would have to be sought before implementing decisions such as those suggested by the subcommittee of the European Parliament. Our Assembly for its part has often noted the heavy commitments dual membership imposed on parliamentarians whose national activities necessarily remain foremost.

70. A quite different proposal is the one made by Chancellor Kohl in his Brussels speech that Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty be amended so that the WEU Assembly would be composed of member countries' delegations to the European Parliament instead of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. This is not a new proposal but it is the first time it has been officially endorsed by a member state. It perhaps also meets a wish expressed by Spain and Portugal that they should not have to send their Council of Europe delegations to the WEU Assembly.

71. This is an important question that your Rapporteur does not intend to deal with in depth here. He believes it should be tackled at the Florence colloquy. However, he wishes to mention a point he considers important: in view of the nature of the Council and the rôle of the Secretariat-General, the WEU Assembly can only address itself to the governments of member countries. It has only strictly limited supervisory powers and the ability to give impetus, without limit in scope, certainly, but very limited in its impact. It is its link with the parliaments of member countries that allows it, in the long run, to exercise some influence on

their European policy in areas within the purview of the modified Brussels Treaty. A European Parliament elected by direct universal suffrage has no such link and it can never address the ministers of defence. It may therefore be wondered whether Chancellor Kohl's suggestion would not in fact eventually weaken the rôle of parliamentarians in the definition of a European security policy. This is a wish that certain governments perhaps feel without expressing it openly. The cause of democratic Europe would not necessarily benefit.

72. It seems more reasonable to consider, for the near future, a Europe in which a Community part, supervised by a parliament elected by direct universal suffrage, would coexist with an inter-governmental part, supervised by an assembly formed of members of national parliaments. Any federal or confederal system requires a two-chamber system in which the weight of universal suffrage is moderated by that of the federated elements in a proportion varying according to the nature of the federation or confederation. However Europe develops in the coming years, it will find it hard to escape this requirement.

## VI. Conclusions

73. The Assembly cannot fail to be perplexed at the triumphant reports circulated by the Council about the reactivation of WEU and the admissions of failure of that same reactivation expressed in barely veiled terms by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl. The conclusion expressed by the two heads of state or of government is that Franco-German co-operation is the only true European foundation in security matters. Your Rapporteur is not absolutely convinced that their optimism on this point is not somewhat exaggerated. Otherwise, the situation in WEU would be even more serious because it would have failed in one of its essential vocations: to give a truly European dimension to co-operation between member countries. The establishment of a Franco-German military and political nucleus, instead of being an encouragement to Europe, would then become an obstacle to any progress towards greater European unity.

74. For these reasons, while welcoming inter-governmental activity in WEU and especially the improvement in the information the Council has given the Assembly in 1988, your Rapporteur wishes to insist that the modified Brussels Treaty be amended to allow the strict application of all the provisions that the Seven do not decide by common, public agreement to repeal. Likewise, the Assembly and the public must be kept informed of the Council's conclusions in all the areas, very wisely chosen, moreover, in which it has decided to increase consultations between member countries. This is the sense of the recommendation that he proposes.

*The reactivation and enlargement of WEU  
– reply to the annual report of the Council*

AMENDMENT 1<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. Pieralli and others*

1. Redraft paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows:  
“ Considering that the positive trend in the international situation and the forthcoming stages of East-West relations imply that Western Europe will have to assume special responsibilities in the negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons to ensure its security, promote disarmament and contribute to international peace; ”

*Signed: Pieralli, Greco, Francese*

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1. See 11th sitting, 7th December 1988 (amendment agreed to).



*The reactivation and enlargement of WEU  
– reply to the annual report of the Council*

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AMENDMENTS 2, 3, 4 and 5<sup>1</sup>

*tabled by Mr. van der Sanden*

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2. Redraft paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows:  
“ (vi) Welcoming the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU; ”
3. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as follows:  
“ Noting that the nine signatory countries of the modified Brussels Treaty agree that a revision of the treaty is necessary; ”
4. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as follows:  
“ Considering that satisfactory application of Articles V, VIII and IX of the treaty means effectively deleting or updating the protocols to the Paris Agreements that no longer meet European security requirements; ”
5. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:  
“ 10. Undertake without delay an examination of those provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty whose deletion or revision it considers necessary and inform the Assembly of the results of that examination. ”

*Signed: van der Sanden*

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1. See 11th sitting, 7th December 1988 (amendments agreed to).

*The reactivation and enlargement of WEU  
– reply to the annual report of the Council*

ADDENDUM <sup>1</sup> TO THE REPORT

*submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur*

*Explanatory Memorandum*

*(submitted by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur)*

1. As the General Affairs Committee had to adopt the report it is to present at the second part of the thirty-fourth session at its meeting on 10th November 1988, it was not able to take into account the decisions reached by the Council at its ministerial meeting on 14th November. It therefore asked your Rapporteur to update his report for the meeting on 7th December.

2. On 15th November, the Assembly received three documents signed the previous day by the ministers for foreign affairs of member countries and of Portugal and Spain relating to the accession of those two countries to WEU. Conversely, it has received no documents relating to other items on the agenda of the Council which, contrary to its oft-expressed intention of keeping public opinion better informed of WEU and its work, seems to have stopped issuing press communiqués, even at the close of ministerial meetings. It is understandable that the ministers do not wish to spend too much of their time at meetings discussing a communiqué, but it should not be impossible to have a satisfactory text drawn up by officials without the ministers having to devote a great deal of time to it. It is perhaps the mediocre results obtained that induce the Council not to adopt a text which would call too much attention to its failings.

3. The Assembly has therefore received no information other than that gathered during the talks between Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr. Younger, United Kingdom Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Defence respectively, and the Presidential Committee on 15th November. Already, on a previous occasion, your Rapporteur said that, however useful these talks may be, because of circumstances beyond the control of all concerned only very few members of the Assembly can take

part and, since no minutes are taken, they are not sufficient to ensure that the Assembly is properly informed about the Council's activities.

4. Furthermore, the European session of the French Institut des hautes études de défense nationale held in Paris from 15th to 25th November 1988 provided an opportunity for official representatives of most member countries, not to speak of the President of the Assembly and the Secretary-General of WEU, to address a selected public. Some of them have provided the texts of their addresses which contain useful information in them to which your Rapporteur will refer in the present document.

*1. The enlargement of WEU*

5. The accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU was achieved on 14th November 1988. It is the subject of three public texts: a protocol of accession to the modified Brussels Treaty, a declaration and an exchange of letters on Spain's application of Article X of the modified Brussels Treaty.

6. (a) The protocol concerns accession to the Brussels Treaty "as amended by the 'Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty', signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954". To this is added accession to the agreement on the status of WEU of 11th May 1955 and the "Agreement drawn up in implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II to the Treaty, signed at Paris on 14th December 1957". This being said, one might ask to what have Portugal and Spain acceded. Without doubt, to the Brussels Treaty as modified by Protocol No. I. However, the first paragraph of the preamble specifies that it is all the 1954 protocols that are referred to hereinafter as

1. Adopted unanimously by the committee.

2. *Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); MM. Burger, Martino (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Bassinet (Alternate: Forni), Baumel, van der Biest, Chénard (Alternate: Pontillon), Coleman (Alternate: Ewing), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Foschi, Hill, Hitschler, Koehl, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Meckersheimer, Müller, Natali, Péciaux (Alternate: Eicher), Pieralli, Reddemann, Ruet, van der Sanden, Sarti, Shelton, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Mr. Stoffelen (Alternate: van der Werff).*

N.B. *The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.*

“the Treaty”, which implies that they have acceded to Protocols Nos. II, III and IV. Moreover, Article II of the protocol of accession specifies that Portugal and Spain “become parties to the agreements concluded between the member states in fulfilment of the Treaty, listed by way of annex to the present Protocol”, which include the Convention of 14th December 1957 concerning member countries’ obligations in regard to internal defence and police forces. It must therefore be concluded that Portugal and Spain have acceded to all the protocols forming the 1954 Paris Agreements. This view seems the only one for which there are legal grounds, particularly as Article I of Protocol No. I specifies that the high contracting parties consider Protocols Nos. II, III and IV “to be an integral part of the present Protocol”.

7. Furthermore, the protocol of accession does not say whether the two countries have acceded to WEU’s decisions that are not a formal part of international agreements such as the Council’s decision of 7th May 1955 setting up the Standing Armaments Committee. The preamble contains the following paragraph, however:

“Noting that the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain have acknowledged the agreements, resolutions, decisions and rules of whatever nature adopted in the framework of Western European Union in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty.”

“Acknowledged” obviously does not mean “acceded” but since they are WEU texts it must be accepted that, if considered as such by a state acceding to WEU, that state accedes to them at the same time.

8. (b) The political declaration indicates that the nine signatories intend to re-examine “as appropriate, having regard to the practice and achievements of, and the prospects for, their co-operation in security matters” the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and its corresponding protocols. In his main report, your Rapporteur had occasion to stress that many aspects of WEU’s status were out of date. He therefore shares the governments’ views on the need for revision in order to strengthen the essential articles, in particular Articles V and VIII, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, and the principle set out in Article IX on an assembly emanating from the parliaments of member countries to supervise the Council’s activities. He is also gratified that the new members of WEU will be participating in this revision. However, having noted that some of the provisions of these texts are not applicable to Portugal and Spain, he wonders about the true substance of the commitments to which these two countries have subscribed pending a revision of the treaty which might not be effected immediately.

9. In this connection, it is not a matter of indulging in juridical speculation but of the strict application of Article IX: since the Assembly has to supervise the Council’s implementation of the treaty, its duty is to ensure that it is implemented strictly. It is encouraged in this task by a political consideration: it has always objected to any measures taken by member states that infringed the treaty because it feared that any such measure might be seen as a weakening of the will to apply a treaty which is an essential part of the deterrent value of the alliance. The Assembly can but regret that the lack of rigour shown by the signatories of the protocol of accession in this connection, perhaps in order to avoid the talks on ratification leading to pointless discussion of certain aspects of the text to which Portugal and Spain have in principle acceded without anything being said about the effective implementation of these principles in regard to all aspects of Protocols Nos. II, III and IV. It is just as if the Council had considered the application of these protocols could be ignored in texts in which it states, on the other hand, that they can be assimilated to the treaty itself. Is it not in order to conceal shortcomings in its own behaviour that the Council is taking refuge in this juridical vagueness? It is particularly regrettable since nothing indicates that the Council is prepared to reach speedy agreement on revising the treaty.

10. (c) Your Rapporteur is unable to comment on the exchange of letters on the application of Article X to Spain. He notes that similar procedure was used in 1954 to cover the reservations expressed by the Federal Republic and Italy in regard to the same Article X. He does not know whether Spain made its reservation in virtue of a general principle or, as has been reported in certain newspapers, for very specific local interests.

11. Accession will take effect when the protocol has been accepted, approved or ratified by all the member states. While hoping that accession will take effect as soon as possible, your Rapporteur believes it useful for the governments of countries where approval is subjected to parliamentary procedure to be questioned on their interpretation of the ambiguities to which he has drawn attention here.

12. The question of wider enlargement, to include Turkey for instance, seems to have been raised at the ministerial meeting in London as a result of an application from Turkey in April 1987. The Council has given no actual details in this connection but, according to the Turkish newspaper *Cumhuriyet* dated 9th November 1988, Turkey sent the members of the Council a declaration of intention including its acceptance of the platform adopted in The Hague and everything already done in WEU. Greece is also believed to have shown interest. This matter seems to have led member countries to raise the

question of a link between membership of WEU and of the European Community without having reached agreement on the matter. They do not seem to have followed up Turkey's application, but there may be other reasons for this.

13. According to a press report from Brussels on 11th November, the Turkish Minister of Defence, Mr. Encan Vuralhan, said at the close of the IEPG meeting in Luxembourg:

"There is automatism in WEU. There are factors that Turkey should assess carefully. If you say yes to a decision you are totally bound and have to act in conformity with WEU, whereas in NATO resolutions have to be adopted by the parliaments... Turkey's position is different from that of the other WEU member countries. It has long land and maritime frontiers with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. It is part of Europe and also an eastern country."

He added that accession to the Community was what interested Turkey most. In other words, Turkey does not consider its membership of NATO commits it beyond Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and it is no more prepared to subscribe to Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty than the WEU countries are to undertake to defend Turkey in the event of a conflict between it and other non-member countries of the Warsaw pact.

14. Turkey's accession to the modified Brussels Treaty therefore seems out of the question, although this does not preclude looking for an adequate means of associating it with some of WEU's activities on a basis to be defined.

## 2. Intergovernmental activities

15. Information received after the London meeting on 14th November leaves little doubt about the lack of serious progress made there in all other areas, be it the application of the platform adopted in The Hague, disarmament, responsibility- and burden-sharing in the alliance or the restructuring of WEU, not to mention the collocation of the ministerial organs. This observation comes at a time when WEU's main, defence-related activity in 1988, mine-sweeping in the Gulf, is drawing to a close. This means that if the Council continues to mark time in everything relating to action to be taken on The Hague platform, WEU will very soon again start to seem like a dormant organisation and not fulfil the rôle the governments attributed to it when it was reactivated, i.e. to make Europeans aware of their security requirements.

16. This concern brings your Rapporteur to draw attention to the European session organised

by the French Institut des hautes études de défense nationale from 15th to 25th November. In itself, this initiative, taken in the framework of WEU, is interesting and it meets a wish expressed by the Assembly on several occasions. All the member governments showed their interest by ensuring participation in response to the invitations received and most of them by having one of their members explain their position towards WEU. Your Rapporteur cannot analyse this session here, since the only information published is the text of addresses communicated by their authors. However, he wishes to underline two points that he considers important:

- (a) If such sessions are to play the rôle assigned to them, i.e. of making European public opinion aware of Europe's defence requirements, they must include, in addition to officials and military staff directly concerned with WEU's work, persons of various professions capable of propagating the conclusions they draw from these sessions.
- (b) For the same reason, this first session must be followed up and the WEU ministerial organs alone can do this, be it by co-ordinating subsequent sessions or by maintaining the relations thus created between participants. This corresponds to the proposal made by Mr. Rocard, French Prime Minister, when he said at the opening of the session on 15th November: "I wish a European institute for security studies to be set up, attached to WEU, by means that have to be worked out. This would allow WEU, which is still hesitating, to find its way more easily. So let us start by allowing it to develop joint thinking."

17. In the same address, Mr. Rocard made a proposal concerning the creation of a European "openness" centre to help with disarmament negotiations by gathering, circulating and explaining information. This proposal is too vague to be able to adopt an immediate position on it. However, it relates to an area in which WEU's Agency for the Control of Armaments, in thirty-five years' work, has acquired some experience that should not be lost if such a centre is one day to be set up.

18. Note may also be taken of the proposal by the French Prime Minister to set up, in the framework of the IEPG, a flexible body for co-ordination to promote the implementation of specific co-operative programmes between a few countries only and to follow them up. This proposal is remarkably similar to the decision taken in May 1955 to set up the SAC in the framework of WEU. It should logically lead, following the decision to establish a secretariat taken by the

IEPG in Luxembourg on 9th November, to a restructuring of organisations whose vocation is to promote armaments co-operation. Since the SAC no longer meets, there would be every advantage in the officials responsible for its secretariat being placed at the disposal of all the existing bodies dealing with the various aspects of co-operation: assessment of requirements, time schedules, research and development, joint programmes, etc.

19. Mr. Rocard's proposal to revive plans for European co-operation on an observation satellite is close enough to an item on the agenda of the Assembly's session being reported on by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions for your Rapporteur to do no more than point out this convergence.

### *3. The Council and the Assembly*

20. The Assembly can but welcome the measures the Council has taken to allow the

Assembly to meet its new requirements: the immediate assignment of offices in the WEU Paris premises in order inter alia to accommodate the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations and the officials who have recently joined the Office of the Clerk and the granting of credits to allow a study to be made of short-term requirements in respect of changes to be made to the building to adapt it to the Assembly's new needs augur well for co-operation between the Council and the Assembly.

21. For these reasons, your Rapporteur trusts that with the increased membership of WEU the two new members will accelerate solutions that the Seven have been unable to find in recent years and give the Council's activities the stimulus they need. He does not believe that events since 10th November call in question what the committee decided on that date, although some changes will be necessary in the draft recommendation adopted at that meeting.

*Accession of the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain  
to Western European Union*

*14th November 1988*

*(Documents transmitted by the Council)*

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*Protocol*

*for the accession of the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain  
to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration  
and Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on 17th March 1948,  
as amended by the 'Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty',  
signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954*

The parties to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence signed at Brussels on 17th March 1948, as modified and completed by the Protocol signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954 and the other protocols and annexes which form an integral part thereof, hereinafter referred to as 'the Treaty', on the one hand,

and the Portuguese Republic and Kingdom of Spain, on the other,

Reaffirming the common destiny which binds their countries and recalling their commitment to build a European union in accordance with the Single European Act;

Convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence;

Determined to develop a more cohesive European defence identity which will translate more effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity contained in the Treaty and in the North Atlantic Treaty;

Noting that the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain, which are fully committed to the process of European construction and are members of the Atlantic Alliance, have formally stated that they are prepared to accede to the Treaty;

Noting that these two states accept unreservedly and in their entirety the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984 and the platform on European security interests adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987 and that they are prepared to participate fully in their implementation;

Recalling the invitation issued on 19th April 1988 by the Council of Ministers of Western European Union to the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain to open discussions with a view to their possible accession to the Treaty;

Noting the satisfactory conclusion of the discussions which followed this invitation;

Noting that the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain have acknowledged the agreements, resolutions, decisions and rules of whatever nature adopted in the framework of Western European Union in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty;

Noting the invitation to accede to the Treaty issued to the Portuguese Republic and to the Kingdom of Spain on 14th November 1988;

Noting the political declaration adopted on 14th November 1988;

Considering that the enlargement of Western European Union to include the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain represents a significant step in the development of European solidarity in the field of security and defence;

Have agreed as follows:

*Article I*

By the present Protocol, the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain accede to the Treaty.

*Article II*

By their accession to the Treaty, the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain become parties to the agreements concluded between the member states in fulfilment of the Treaty, listed by way of annex to the present Protocol.

*Article III*

Each of the signatory states shall notify the Belgian Government of the acceptance, approval or ratification of the present Protocol, which shall enter into force on the day of the receipt of the last of these notifications. The Belgian Government shall inform the signatory states of each such notification and of the entry into force of the Protocol.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed the present Protocol.

Done at London this fourteenth day of November, 1988, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and certified copies of which shall be transmitted by that government to each of the other signatories.

For the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium:

For the Government of the French Republic:

For the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany:

For the Government of the Italian Republic:

For the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg:

For the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands:

For the Government of the Portuguese Republic:

For the Government of the Kingdom of Spain:

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

## ANNEX

*Agreements concluded between the member states in fulfilment of the Treaty:*

1. Agreement on the status of Western European Union, national representatives and international staff, signed at Paris on 11th May 1955.
2. Agreement drawn up in implementation of Article V of Protocol No. II to the Treaty, signed at Paris on 14th December 1957.

***Political declaration relating to the enlargement of  
Western European Union to include Portugal and Spain***

During the consultations which were held with a view to the enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain, the member states of WEU with Portugal and Spain, taking into consideration the spirit in which their security co-operation has recently developed, found that a number of the provisions of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, did not correspond to the way in which they intend to pursue and strengthen that co-operation, on the basis of the Rome declaration on 27th October 1984 and of the platform on European security interests, adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987.

Consequently, the member states of WEU with Portugal and Spain consider that the relevant provisions of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, and its corresponding protocols will be re-examined, as appropriate, having regard for the practice and achievements of, and the prospects for, their co-operation in security matters.



*Texts for exchange of letters on Article X of the modified Brussels Treaty*

*English version*

*A. Draft letter from Spanish Minister to each member state and Portugal*

“ Your Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to the Protocol signed this day for the accession of the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on 17th March 1948, as amended by the protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty, signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954, and to communicate the following in connection with Article X of the said Treaty, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Treaty’.

The Government of the Kingdom of Spain proposes in this connection that the Kingdom of Spain shall not, as a consequence of its accession to the Treaty, be obliged to submit to the International Court of Justice, without its consent, any dispute between Spain and another party to the Treaty existing prior to the entry into force of the Treaty for Spain or relating to facts or situations existing before that date.

I should be grateful if Your Excellency would confirm that your Government is in agreement with the above and that the exchange of letters thus effected will be considered as an annex to the protocol of accession, which will enter into force simultaneously therewith.

(formal close) ”

*B. Draft reply from each member state and Portugal to the Spanish Minister*

“ Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your communication of today’s date referring to the Protocol for the accession of the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on 17th March 1948, as amended by the protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty, signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954 and in particular to Article X of the said Treaty, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Treaty’.

I have the honour in reply to confirm that, in the view of my Government, the Kingdom of Spain shall not, as a consequence of its accession to the Treaty, be obliged to submit to the International Court of Justice, without its consent, any dispute between Spain and another party to the Treaty existing prior to the entry into force of the Treaty for Spain or relating to facts or situations existing before that date, and that the present exchange of letters will be considered as an annex to the protocol of accession, which will enter into force simultaneously therewith.

(formal close) ”

*Action by the Presidential Committee*

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**REPORT**

*submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee  
by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly*

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***I. Adoption of the agenda and draft order of business of the second 1988 part-session and preparation of the two 1989 part-sessions***

1. Some aspects of the Presidential Committee's action are quite clear, i.e. preparing the Assembly's agenda giving the subjects of reports and the draft order of business of sessions proposing the order in which debates should be held.

2. Thus, the Assembly's work is prepared for it, but it still has the last word. It may withdraw a report from the agenda, add another subject by adopting a motion with a request for urgent procedure or amend the draft order of business.

3. Together with the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, the Presidential

Committee has been giving thought to information policy and the Assembly will of course be kept informed of the result. Its thoughts have already found expression since the draft budget for the financial year 1989, which is submitted to the Assembly for approval, includes an increase of F 90 000 in estimates for expenditure on information.

4. Much of the Presidential Committee's action is described in its progress report so as to bring it to the attention of the Assembly and this includes forward planning for future sessions.

5. Thus, the future of European security is to be the subject of a report by the General Affairs Committee which will be prepared following the colloquy the committee is organising in Florence with the generous assistance of the Italian authorities.

6. Furthermore, the Presidential Committee decided to respond to the invitation it received from the Supreme Soviet by, in turn, inviting a delegation from the Supreme Soviet to meet a delegation from the Assembly next May in Paris. This will ensure the exchange of views on problems which concern us. The lessons learned from these talks cannot fail to enrich any future report by the General Affairs Committee on developments in East-West relations.

7. The Defence Committee for its part will be giving thought to China's rôle in the new international context and it is in this context that it has been authorised to organise a visit to Beijing next May.

***II. Dialogue with the Council and adoption of measures to allow the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations to the WEU Assembly to be accommodated next year***

8. While preparing the future work of the Assembly, the Presidential Committee pursues a continuing dialogue with the Council.

9. The Presidential Committee first acted on behalf of the Assembly by drawing the Council's attention to the importance we all attach to the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. Talks with the presidency showed that the Assembly's views were in fact shared by the Council. At the recent meeting held in London on 15th November 1988 to inform the Presidential Committee of the results of the previous day's ministerial meeting, the Presidential Committee was therefore able to congratulate Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr. Younger on having obtained, only six months after the talks started, the signing of the protocol of accession of Portugal and Spain to the modified Brussels Treaty. The Presidential Committee, which hopes that ratification procedure will be swift, has expressed the wish that a demonstration of European unity be organised on that occasion. In this spirit, it has asked the Council to agree to transmit to the governments a joint explanatory memorandum designed to present the protocol of accession to national parliaments.

10. The problem now facing the Assembly is how to accommodate the parliamentary delegations from the new member countries of WEU in accordance with the Rules of Procedure.

11. First, the Presidential Committee has decided to invite the parliamentary delegations of both countries to appoint a representative to take part in the work of the Presidential Committee even before completion of the ratification procedure and the introduction of new Rules of Procedure allowing two new vice-presidents to be elected.

12. From a linguistic standpoint, the Presidential Committee has decided not to amend the Rules of Procedure so as to apply the provisions concerning the Assembly's working languages to Portuguese and Spanish immediately the protocol of accession comes into force. In order to take part without difficulty in the work of committees, therefore, each parliamentarian must be able to speak in his own language and, for the same reason, it has been decided that, however difficult it may be to find interpreters in Paris who can interpret from Dutch into English, the necessary effort must be made to ensure that each parliamentarian can enjoy his full rights under the Assembly's Rules of Procedure.

13. The budgetary implications of increasing the number of official languages must not be concealed. More interpreters will be required and specialised staff will have to be recruited to take down speeches in Portuguese and Spanish. More and larger interpretation booths will be required for plenary sessions to allow interpretation of speeches to and from the seven languages.

14. While it is certainly possible during sessions to install interpretation booths on a temporary basis, the same is not true for committee meetings. The enlargement of WEU means larger rooms must be provided to accommodate the representatives of nine delegations and to ensure that some of these delegations will be able to arrange for interpretation into their own languages, and at their own expense, of speeches made in other languages. A feasibility study has been commissioned to determine how the Assembly's new working requirements due to the enlargement of WEU can be ensured.

15. While the necessary work is being carried out, over a period of about ten months, the Assembly and its committees will have to meet away from its seat. The programme of work of the committees will have to take due account of this. The Presidential Committee will obviously try to organise the Assembly's work so that parliamentary activities do not suffer from the transitional period that is about to start.

16. The financial implications of all these measures will be the subject of a supplementary budget that the Presidential Committee, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure, as amended last June, is now empowered to draw up. It must be made plain that this budget will be a large one because of the cost of work to be carried out and also because of the increase in annual expenditure resulting from the enlargement of the Assembly.

***III. Adoption of a report on the application of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly***

17. At the last session, a motion for an order was tabled by Mr. Soell and others instructing the President of the Assembly to seek an

agreement with the Council to limit the number of ministerial speeches at any one part-session of the Assembly.

18. This motion was referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure which reported to the Presidential Committee. The Committee on Rules of Procedure agreed unanimously to the comments in part I of the report on the application of the Rules of Procedure (see Appendix II). The committee first considered that it was for the Presidential Committee to determine which ministers it is desirable to *invite* within the political context of each session. By taking this decision, the Presidential Committee would, it believed, take account of the Assembly's wish to limit the number of ministerial speeches. It was therefore agreed to propose to the Presidential Committee that, apart from representatives of the presidency of the Council, representatives of only two other governments should be invited to address the Assembly. It would also be preferable for the ministers concerned to have different portfolios.

19. Although under the Charter the Presidential Committee cannot refuse members of governments access to the chamber and the right to speak, it might ask them to deliver their speeches on the *last* day of the session.

20. The Presidential Committee agreed unanimously to the proposals of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

21. It also endorsed the committee's proposals by deciding that senior officials members of the Assembly might wish to hear should, as far as possible, address committees since this would facilitate the preparation of committee reports.

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\* \*

22. At the last session, there were complaints about what was considered to be the inordinate lapse of time between the debate on a report and the resulting vote.

23. After examining the advantages and disadvantages of grouping votes on draft recommendations or ensuring the continuity of debates, the Presidential Committee first noted that the Assembly was master of its order of business and could therefore adapt it to circumstances. It believed, however, that when drawing up the draft order of business for submission to the Assembly the President should first endeavour to ensure that votes were taken immediately after the relevant debates.

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\* \*

24. Finally, the Presidential Committee examined the conclusions drawn by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges after

discussing Mr. Malfatti's proposal on voting on separate parts. The committee noted that there were serious practical and procedural objections to this proposal.

25. From a practical standpoint, it would lengthen debates and make the Assembly vote twice on almost identical subjects.

26. From a procedural standpoint, the adoption of this proposal would allow the time-limits imposed in the Rules of Procedure for tabling amendments to be circumvented and it might lead to contradictions in a text and delay work by forcing the Assembly to make the necessary adjustments to the texts being voted. The proposal to include voting on separate parts in the Assembly's Rules of Procedure was therefore negated unanimously by the committee and, for the same reasons, the Presidential Committee endorsed this view.

27. The whole of the report by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was therefore agreed to by the Presidential Committee (see Appendix II).

***IV. Approval of amendments  
to the Financial Regulations tabled  
by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs  
and Administration***

28. The amendments made by the Assembly to its Rules of Procedure last June led the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in turn to amend the Financial Regulations to take account of the new budgetary provisions in the Rules of Procedure. The main purpose of the changes is to spell out the framework in which the Assembly can exercise its budgetary autonomy as recognised by the Council in July 1987. The President of the Assembly is now empowered to authorise transfers between Heads II to V of the Assembly's operating budget, i.e. between all heads except Head I relating to the salaries of permanent staff.

29. Furthermore, procedure for approving amendments to the Financial Regulations by a majority of representatives to the Assembly, i.e. an absolute majority, seems unnecessarily stringent. This procedure is in fact applicable only to amendments to the Charter. Amendments to the Assembly's Rules of Procedure are approved by a majority of the votes cast.

30. Since the Financial Regulations constitute the application of the budgetary provisions of the Rules of Procedure, it is proposed to lighten the procedure by providing for the Financial Regulations to be drawn up by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and adopted by the Presidential Committee.

31. This procedure seems to be in conformity with the powers of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and of the Presidential Committee respectively under Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure.

32. The amended text of the Financial Regulations (see Appendix III) was adopted unanimously by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and agreed to by the Presidential Committee at its meeting on 28th September 1988.

33. *The Assembly is asked to ratify this decision.*

#### ***V. Adoption of guidelines on the work of representatives of the media in the chamber***

34. The Assembly's public sittings are open to representatives of all branches of the media wishing to report them. However, their activities might sometimes be intrusive to members and disturb the debates.

35. Practice hitherto followed for solving this problem required amplification and clarification.

36. A compromise was sought between the desire to allow representatives of the media to exercise their activities with enough freedom to inform the public properly of the Assembly's debates and the need to allow the Assembly to debate in an orderly, calm manner. The Presidential Committee hopes this compromise will prove effective. The guidelines at Appendix IV to the present report set out the conditions in which representatives of the media are authorised to work and provide for warnings or penalties in the event of these guidelines not being respected.

37. It is hoped that the work of members of the Assembly and representatives of the media will be facilitated by these guidelines.

#### ***VI. Adoption of a supplementary budget***

38. Further to the decision of the WEU Council of Ministers to authorise the creation of four new posts in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly, a supplementary budget has been prepared asking for the corresponding credits. This supplementary budget also takes into account two new pensions which, since they relate to early retirements, had not been included when the ordinary 1988 budget was prepared.

39. This draft budget (Document 1153), which amounts to F 833 000 (F 567 000 for the operating budget and F 266 000 for the pensions budget), was agreed to unanimously by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and subsequently agreed to by the Presidential Committee. On the recommendation of its Budget and Organisation Committee, the Council approved this budget at its meeting on 23rd November 1988. *In accordance with Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, the Presidential Committee submits its decision to approve this budget for ratification by the Assembly.*

#### ***VII. Adoption of the special rules on honorary association***

40. Since member countries' delegations to WEU are identical with those to the Council of Europe, the special rules on honorary association with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe which were adopted on 13th January 1988 could easily be applied by the WEU Assembly. The Presidential Committee therefore adopted regulations practically identical with those in force in the Assembly of the Council of Europe.

41. Consequently, honorary associates of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe from the delegations of WEU member countries will be honorary associates of the WEU Assembly and will be notified of the details of such membership.

## APPENDIX I

*Letter from Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, to  
Sir Geoffrey Howe, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*

Paris, 20th October 1988

Dear Sir Geoffrey,

In my letters of 28th September and 7th October 1988, I drew the Council's attention to the urgency of work to be undertaken to enable the Assembly to deal with the problems linked to the enlargement of WEU.

The information available to me regarding recent developments in the conversations on this question lead me to hope that you will soon be in a position to announce that Spain and Portugal are invited to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty.

It would therefore appear necessary to proceed as soon as possible with the architect's study necessary for an estimate to be made of the type, cost and duration of the work proposed by the Assembly. To this end, I wish to commit forthwith, with the agreement of the Council, the expenditure necessary for this study, the cost of which has been estimated by the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs at between fifty and one hundred thousand francs. This expenditure will be included in the supplementary budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1989.

I shall not fail to communicate this study to the Council as soon as it is completed.

Yours sincerely,  
Charles GOERENS

The Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, Q.C., M.P.,  
Secretary of State for Foreign  
and Commonwealth Affairs,  
Chairman-in-Office of the Council of  
Western European Union,  
Downing Street,  
LONDON SW1A 2AL

## APPENDIX II

*Application of the Rules of Procedure – Report to the Presidential Committee submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur**I. Presence of ministers at sessions of the Assembly*

1. Article VI of the Charter provides that members of the Council and other ministers of member states may be heard by the Assembly at their own or the Assembly's request.
2. There was a period when the Assembly regretted that so few governmental representatives took part in its debates. Now fears are voiced that too many ministerial speeches are reducing the time available for speeches by parliamentarians.
3. The fact is that since 1984 the reactivation of the Council has resulted in governments being represented more often at plenary sessions and it is not unusual for the Assembly to be addressed by an outside speaker at almost every sitting.
4. The Committee on Rules of Procedure has been invited by the Presidential Committee to examine what measures might be envisaged to allow the Assembly to have proper control over parliamentary participation in its deliberations.
5. Consideration should therefore be given to liaising with the Council to co-ordinate ministerial speeches during sessions, although this approach may not produce results because the decision to take part in a session is taken completely independently by each government in the light of purely national considerations.
6. It rests, of course, with the Presidential Committee to determine which ministers it is desirable to invite on the basis of the interests of the Assembly and within the political context of each session.
7. In view of the desire to limit the number of ministerial speeches, the Presidential Committee might consider that, in addition to the country with the Chairmanship-in-Office, two governments only should be invited to be represented at a session of the Assembly. It would be preferable for these two governments to send ministers with different portfolios: if the minister for foreign affairs of one of the countries speaks, it would be better for the other country to send the defence minister.
8. Admittedly, the Presidential Committee cannot under the Charter envisage refusing other members of the governments of member countries access to the Chamber and the right to speak. It can, however, ensure that any such ministerial speeches take their proper place in the debates. Consequently, if the speakers invited

by the Assembly make their contribution, in accordance with the proposals of the Presidential Committee, the Presidential Committee can inform other ministers wishing to speak that it will only be possible to address the Assembly on the last day of the session.

9. An invitation is sometimes sent to the Secretary-General of NATO or the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). It should be stressed that such persons may address the Assembly only if expressly invited and the provisions of the Charter do not apply in these cases. This also holds for senior officers and other experts. Generally the latter are heard in committee and their comments are incorporated in the framework of reports.

*II. Roll-call*

10. In his report to the Presidential Committee on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, dated 22nd October 1986, Mr. Schulte referred to the need for a lapse of time (generally a quarter of an hour) between the announcement of a vote and the time a vote actually takes place. The provisions proposed have so far been applied without difficulty but the report by Mr. Schulte did not envisage the problems that might arise from a very long break between the debate and the vote which should conclude it. Complaints were made at the last session because on several occasions the vote did not follow immediately after the debate on the text in question, the Assembly dealing with other subjects in the meantime.

11. The delays thus criticised often stem from the wish to group votes at the end of a sitting. This measure has the advantage of avoiding the vote being held earlier than anticipated, thus taking parliamentarians by surprise, and ensuring the effective presence at an agreed time of parliamentarians who have signed the register of attendance. The drawback is to delay until the agreed time the natural conclusion of a debate by a vote.

12. However this may be, the Assembly is master of its agenda. It gives its views at the beginning of a session when it adopts the draft order of business and at the end of each sitting when it adopts the draft orders of the day for the next sitting. It might be proposed that in drawing up these draft orders of business and orders of the day, the President should endeavour to ensure that votes follow immediately after the relevant debates.

### *III. Voting on separate parts*

13. Mr. Malfatti's proposal would have the effect of permitting the Assembly to express an opinion on each of the major topics contained within the text, as well as on particular amendments and on the text as a whole.

14. The objections to such a suggestion are both practical and procedural.

15. In practical terms, the way would be opened to a multiplicity of votes. In extreme cases, each paragraph of a very long text might give rise to a separate vote. This would permit the opponents of a text to use as a weapon for delay the fact that the Assembly meets only twice a year for four days on each occasion. The Assembly's procedure would cease to be even-handed as between proponents and opponents of a text.

16. Nor can it be argued that such a change is necessary because the rules allow insufficient opportunity for a case to be put. Members of the Assembly may present their views during the general discussion, in the course of the debate on amendments, and in explanations of vote after the adoption of a text as a whole. A member who wishes to omit (or even to abstain on) some paragraphs of a text and not others is of course at liberty to table the appropriate amendments. In those circumstances, there seems no need to ensure a further opportunity for debate and decision, particularly as a member may make an explanation of vote.

17. Indeed, since debates on amendments usually involve discussion on the whole paragraph in which the change is sought, Mr. Malfatti's proposal might in practice involve the Assembly's voting twice (perhaps by roll-call with all the delay that involves) on much the same issue.

18. Finally, the need for the presidency to interpret the phrase "logical significance" when distinguishing a case where a separate vote was allowable from one where it was not would give rise to further dispute.

19. The procedural objections are even more telling. Rule 29.2 prescribes a time-limit on the tabling of amendments. Mr. Malfatti's proposal would simply circumvent that rule. The Assembly would thus require notice of the lesser change – the amendment, perhaps to only one word in a paragraph – but not of the greater, the proposal to eliminate an entire topic. This would be entirely contrary to logic.

20. Furthermore, the multiplication of separate votes (some covered by amendments, others – under Mr. Malfatti's proposal – not) runs the risk of rendering a text inconsistent with itself. When notice is given of amendments, the President and members can readily see if any consequential changes are required should the amendment be adopted. If an entire topic is left out of a text, there will nearly always be a strong case for immediate recommittal for further consideration, since the balance of the report is often a fairly delicate synthesis of the position of each member of the committee. Under existing rules, recommittal is often sought when the Assembly adopts amendments more limited in scope than the leaving out of an entire topic. Furthermore, even if recommittal is not sought after a vote to omit a major topic, action will almost certainly need to be taken in the Assembly to make consequential adjustments to the text. This in turn (to comply with the time-limit on tabling amendments) would lead to the adjournment of further consideration of the text.

21. Finally, there would inevitably be some occasions when the Assembly's prior decision on a far-reaching amendment made it procedurally impossible for the presidency to permit the making of a motion to omit the relevant topic, because to do so would be to invite the Assembly to contradict the decision it had just taken on the amendment. This judgment would have to be made without notice, putting the presidency in a very awkward position. This would not be an easy procedure to operate or to explain.

22. For these and other reasons, whatever may be the practice of some (by no means all) European legislatures, the changes for which Mr. Malfatti is arguing will certainly not help in any way the deliberations of the Assembly of WEU.



## APPENDIX III

*Proposed amendments to the Financial Regulations of the Assembly,  
submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration**Explanatory Memorandum**(submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur)*

1. Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly governing budgetary questions was amended by decisions of the Assembly on 30th November 1987 and 9th June 1988.

The new text reads as follows:

“ 1. Each year, following a report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration drawn up in collaboration with the Presidential Committee, the Assembly shall approve a provisional statement of its expenditure, divided into heads and sub-heads.

2. The Assembly or, in between sessions or part-sessions, the Presidential Committee, in application of Rule 14, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, may, if necessary, approve supplementary estimates of expenditure, but if the latter so acts it shall submit its decision to the next sitting of the Assembly for ratification.

3. The President shall communicate these documents to the Council which shall express a prior opinion.

4. When the prior opinion of the Council includes reductions in appropriations, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration may, in consultation with the Presidential Committee, present a draft budget to the Assembly which does not conform with the prior opinion of the Council. Acceptance of such a draft budget shall require the votes of a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the Assembly.

5. If the Council refuses to adopt the draft budget accepted by the Assembly in these conditions, the Presidential Committee shall be responsible for settling the dispute with the Council and ask for a joint meeting to this end. The Presidential Committee shall report to the Assembly on the results of any such meeting and, if necessary, propose that it ratify whatever action it had to take, including acceptance of the budget as amended by the Council.

6. The President of the Assembly shall be responsible for authorising expenditure on behalf of the Assembly within the limits of

the credits specified in the budget, once the latter has been approved by the Council.

7. In the course of its first session following the end of each financial year, the Assembly shall express its approval or disapproval of the accounts for that year, on a motion tabled by a member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.”

The new provisions adopted by the Assembly should be reflected in its Financial Regulations. It is therefore proposed in the present report that amendments be made to Articles 3, 4 and 5 of those regulations.

2. The report also proposes amendments to the preamble to the Financial Regulations and to Articles 2, 6 and 17 for the following reasons:

(a) *Preamble*: The amendment is intended to make quite clear in what framework the Assembly's budgetary autonomy must be exercised.

(b) *Article 2*: Since 1985, Assembly budgets have been presented in a new, clear and detailed manner. The text of this article gives the main headings of this presentation.

(c) *Articles 6 and new 7*: The new provisions take account of the Council's decision to recognise, in the framework of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy, the President's power to authorise transfers between Heads II to V of the operating budget.

(d) *Article 17 (new Article 18)*: Procedure for approving amendments to the Financial Regulations by a majority of representatives to the Assembly, i.e. an absolute majority, seems unnecessarily constraining. Such procedure is applicable only to amendments to the Charter. Amendments to the Assembly's Rules of Procedure are approved by a majority of votes cast.

Since the Financial Regulations govern the application of the provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, it is proposed to lighten procedure by providing for the Financial Regulations and any relevant amendments to be prepared by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and adopted by the Presidential Committee.

This procedure seems to conform with the powers assigned to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee respectively in Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.

## FINANCIAL REGULATIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY

## PRESENT TEXT

*These regulations shall govern the financial administration of the Assembly of Western European Union.*

## PART I

*Financial year**Article 1*

The financial year of the Assembly of Western European Union shall be from 1st January to 31st December.

## PART II

*Preparation of the budget**Article 2*

The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration shall table a report, prepared in collaboration with the Presidential Committee, containing a provisional estimate for the financial year of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly, divided into heads and sub-heads, and supported by:

- (a) a detailed estimate of the expenditure anticipated under each head and sub-head;
- (b) an explanatory statement covering the expenditure proposed in any new field of activity or in any expansion of existing activity, and the reason for any major increase or decrease in budget authorisation requested.

*Article 3*

This report shall be considered by the Assembly. The approval of the draft budget shall require an absolute majority of the votes cast.

## AMENDED TEXT

*The political independence of the WEU Assembly has as a corollary its budgetary autonomy. These regulations determine the framework in which this autonomy may be exercised and methods to be followed in managing the Assembly's budget within the limits of the appropriations agreed by the WEU Council.*

## PART I

*Financial year**Article 1*

The financial year of the Assembly of Western European Union shall be from 1st January to 31st December.

## PART II

*Preparation and approval of the budget**Article 2*

The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration shall *prepare* a report in collaboration with the Presidential Committee. This report shall contain:

- (a) *an explanatory memorandum recapitulating the Assembly's requirements for the financial year in the light of its programme;*
- (b) *separate estimates of expenditure and receipts under Part I (operating budget) and Part II (pensions budget);*
- (c) *for each of these two parts, tables showing budget estimates divided into heads and sub-heads and explanations of the criteria governing the calculation of these estimates.*

*Article 3*

*This report shall be transmitted to the Council for an opinion. If this opinion is favourable and includes no amendments, the draft budget shall be submitted to the Assembly which shall approve it by a majority of votes cast. In the event of the prior opinion of the Council including reductions in appropriations, the procedure provided for in Rule 48, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly shall be applied.*

## PART III

*Approval of the budget**Article 4*

The draft budget, as approved by the Assembly, shall be communicated to the Council by the President of the Assembly not later than 1st November with a request that, in the event of the Council wishing to make amendments to the budget of a major order (defined as more than 20% of any one sub-head), the matter be considered at a joint meeting between representatives of the Assembly and of the Council.

*Article 5*

The approval of the budget by the Council shall constitute the necessary authority to the President of the Assembly, or to the Clerk of the Assembly acting under the authority of the President, to incur expenditure and make payments within the limits of the credits approved.

A supplementary budget shall be submitted to the Council if the necessity for further expenditure arises.

If the budget is not approved by the Council at the beginning of the financial year, expenditure may be incurred up to one-quarter of the total appropriations in respect of the relevant head for the preceding financial year increased by one-twelfth of the total appropriations for the head for each completed month; this expenditure may not, however, exceed the limit of appropriations in respect of the relevant head for the preceding financial year or the appropriations provided for the head in the draft budget.

Payments may be made monthly in respect of any head up to one-twelfth of the appropriations in respect of the relevant head for the preceding financial year; this may not, however, have the effect of placing at the disposal of the Assembly monthly appropriations in excess of one-twelfth of the sum provided for in the relevant head of the draft budget.

Should the need arise, the President of the Assembly shall, without prejudice to the preceding paragraph, request authority from the Council to make payments under a particular head in excess of the amounts authorised above.

*Article 4*

The draft budget, as approved by the Assembly, shall be communicated to the Council by the President of the Assembly. *If the Council refuses to adopt it, the procedure provided for in Rule 48, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly shall be applied.*

*Article 5*

If further expenditure proves to be necessary in the course of the financial year, supplementary provisional statements may be prepared *in accordance with procedure for preparing ordinary budgets.*

*In between sessions or part-sessions, such supplementary budgets shall be approved by the Presidential Committee which shall submit its decision to the next plenary sitting of the Assembly for ratification.*

## PART IV

*Application of the budget**Article 6*

The President of the Assembly may authorise the transfer of credits relating to expenditure only between sub-heads within the same head and within the limits of the credits voted. Such transfers shall require the subsequent approval of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the report of that committee on every such transfer shall be communicated to the Council.

*Article 7*

The President of the Assembly shall set up such internal controls as may be necessary to maintain a continuous check of all financial transactions, in order to prevent any irregularity in the application of the funds of the Assembly. The Clerk shall be responsible to the President of the Assembly for ensuring:

- (a) that all expenditure is in conformity with the credits and other financial measures voted by the Council;
- (b) that payments are made only on the basis of vouchers which ensure that the service has been rendered or the goods received and that payments have not previously been made;
- (c) the utmost economy compatible with the proper functioning of the Assembly.

*Article 8*

Except in cases where the President of the Assembly considers it to be compatible with the interests of the Assembly to proceed otherwise, contractors from the member countries shall be invited to submit tenders for the furnishing of equipment, supplies and other services.

## PART III

*Application of the budget**Article 6*

The approval of the budget by the Council shall constitute the necessary authority to the President of the Assembly, or to the Clerk of the Assembly acting under the authority of the President, to incur expenditure and make payments *within the limits of the credits allocated to the various sub-heads of the budget.*

*However, the President may authorise transfers within the same head and between Heads II to V of the operating budget without the prior agreement of the Council. Such authorisation shall be necessary for any transfer relating to Head I of the operating budget except in the case of technical adjustments made necessary by minor overspending under a sub-head due to the application of salary scales for existing staff.*

*At the close of the financial year, any variations in the Assembly budgets in application of the present article shall be notified to the Council.*

*Article 7*

If the budget is not approved by the Council at the beginning of the financial year, expenditure may be incurred:

- *for Head I of the operating budget within the limits of the amount of the monthly emoluments of the permanent staff;*
- *for Heads II to V of the operating budget within the limits of one-twelfth of the total appropriations for all these heads for the preceding financial year;*
- *for the pensions budget within the limits of the amount of monthly pensions payable to their beneficiaries.*

*Article 8*

The President of the Assembly shall set up such internal controls as may be necessary to maintain a continuous check of all financial transactions, in order to prevent any irregularity in the application of the funds of the Assembly. The Clerk shall be responsible to the President of the Assembly for ensuring:

- (a) that all expenditure is in conformity with the credits and other financial measures voted by the Council;

*Article 9*

Credits unexpired at the end of the financial year shall remain available until 31st March of the ensuing year in order to discharge liabilities in respect of supplies furnished, services rendered, or other charges incurred up to the previous 31st December and for which payment has not been made.

Any such credits remaining unexpended on 1st April of the ensuing financial year shall be cancelled and reimbursed to the Council.

If payment of a commitment for the previous year has not been made before 1st April, the credits concerned shall be cancelled automatically and corresponding credits will be taken up in the budget of the current financial year.

Such action shall be submitted to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration for approval and then brought to the attention of the Council.

## PART V

*Working capital fund**Article 10*

The President of the Assembly may draw upon the working capital fund of Western European Union to meet current expenditure pending receipt of monies corresponding to the appropriations voted by the Council or pending the approval of the budget by the Council.

- (b) that payments are made only on the basis of vouchers which ensure that the service has been rendered or the goods received and that payments have not previously been made;
- (c) the utmost economy compatible with the proper functioning of the Assembly.

*Article 9*

Except in cases where the President of the Assembly considers it to be compatible with the interests of the Assembly to proceed otherwise, contractors from the member countries shall be invited to submit tenders for the furnishing of equipment, supplies and other services.

*Article 10*

Credits unexpired at the end of the financial year shall remain available until 31st March of the ensuing year in order to discharge liabilities in respect of supplies furnished, services rendered, or other charges incurred up to the previous 31st December and for which payment has not been made.

Any such credits remaining unexpended on 1st April of the ensuing financial year shall be cancelled and reimbursed to the Council.

If payment of a commitment for the previous year has not been made before 1st April, the credits concerned shall be cancelled automatically and corresponding credits will be taken up in the budget of the current financial year.

Such action shall be submitted to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration for approval and then brought to the attention of the Council.

## PART VI

*Currency**Article 11*

The draft budget of the Assembly shall be drawn up in French francs. After approval of the budget by the Council, the President shall ask the Council to transfer the approved sums to the Assembly's bank account.

## PART VII

*Accounting**Article 12*

The Clerk shall ensure that budget accounts are kept showing:

- (a) credits available:
  - initial credits,
  - credits modified by transfers,
  - supplementary credits;
- (b) expenditure incurred;
- (c) payments made;
- (d) the assets and liabilities of the Assembly.

*Article 13*

The accounts for the financial year shall be submitted by the President of the Assembly to the auditor not later than the 15th April of the following year.

## PART VIII

*External Audit**Article 14*

Upon the proposal of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration the Presidential Committee shall appoint a parliamentary auditor having the rank of Auditor General or its equivalent in the various member countries, whose tenure of office shall not exceed three years in the first instance and may be renewed. The duty of the auditor shall be to examine the accounts of the Assembly as he may deem necessary in order to ensure that all expenditure

## PART IV

*Working capital fund**Article 11*

The President of the Assembly may draw upon the working capital fund of Western European Union to meet current expenditure pending receipt of monies corresponding to the appropriations voted by the Council or pending the approval of the budget by the Council.

## PART V

*Currency**Article 12*

The draft budget of the Assembly shall be drawn up in French francs. After approval of the budget by the Council, the President shall ask the Council to transfer the approved sums to the Assembly's bank account.

## PART VI

*Accounting**Article 13*

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- (a) credits available:
  - initial credits,
  - credits modified by transfers,
  - supplementary credits;
- (b) expenditure incurred;
- (c) payments made;
- (d) the assets and liabilities of the Assembly.

*Article 14*

The accounts for the financial year shall be submitted by the President of the Assembly to the auditor not later than 15th April of the following year.

is in accordance with the budget as approved by the Council, that the accounts are properly kept and that there are no financial irregularities; he shall have the right to make recommendations for the more efficient use of the Assembly's funds.

The Clerk of the Assembly shall provide the auditor with every facility he may require for the accomplishment of his task.

*Article 15*

The auditor shall certify the annual accounts submitted to him in accordance with Article 13 and shall submit them with his report thereon to the Assembly not later than the 30th June following the end of the financial year.

The report and the certificate of the auditor, together with any comments thereon which the President of the Assembly may desire to make, shall be considered by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

*Article 16*

Following the examination of the auditor's report by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, a member of that committee may table a motion in the Assembly approving the accounts for the preceding financial year, and discharging the President of his financial responsibility. The President will submit to the Council for final discharging the auditor's report together with any comments the Assembly may have made.

PART IX

*Adoption and amendments*

*Article 17*

The adoption, or subsequent amendment, of these regulations shall require the approval of a majority of the representatives to the Assembly.

PART VII

*External audit*

*Article 15*

Upon the proposal of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration the Presidential Committee shall appoint a parliamentary auditor having the rank of Auditor General or its equivalent in the various member countries, whose tenure of office shall not exceed three years in the first instance and may be renewed. The duty of the auditor shall be to examine the accounts of the Assembly as he may deem necessary in order to ensure that all expenditure is in accordance with the budget as approved by the Council, that the accounts are properly kept and that there are no financial irregularities; he shall have the right to make recommendations for the more efficient use of the Assembly's funds.

The Clerk of the Assembly shall provide the auditor with every facility he may require for the accomplishment of his task.

*Article 16*

The auditor shall certify the annual accounts submitted to him in accordance with Article 14 and shall submit them with his report thereon to the Assembly not later than the 30th June following the end of the financial year.

The report and the certificate of the auditor, together with any comments thereon which the President of the Assembly may desire to make, shall be considered by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

*Article 17*

Following the examination of the auditor's report by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, a member of that committee may table a motion in the Assembly approving the accounts for the preceding financial year, and discharging the President of his financial responsibility. The President shall submit to the Council for final discharging the auditor's report together with any comments the Assembly may have made.

## PART VIII

*Adoption and amendments**Article 18*

*The present regulations are drawn up and amended under the responsibility of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. The adoption, or subsequent amendment, of these regulations shall require the approval of the Presidential Committee.*



## APPENDIX IV

*Guidelines on the work of  
representatives of the media in the chamber*

- (a) Those admitted to the hemicycle will abide by any directions given by Assembly staff relating to access.
- (b) Filming, photography and related activities and sound recording may take place in the aisles and in the well of the Assembly chamber, but not from the tribune, the presidential dais or any of the adjacent stairways but no interviews shall take place on the floor of the hemicycle whilst a sitting is in progress.
- (c) Media representatives and their equipment will not impede members or any other person authorised to sit in the chamber from moving to or from their place, or impede Assembly staff from carrying out their duties.
- (d) Every effort will be made to minimise the use of equipment which by heat, light or any other means is likely to cause nuisance or discomfort to those sitting in the chamber.
- (e) The operation of equipment will be so conducted as not to interfere with the Assembly's debates or business related to it.

## APPENDIX V

*Special rules on honorary association with the WEU Assembly  
adopted by the Presidential Committee on 28th September 1988*

1. *Conditions governing the award of the title of honorary associate of the Assembly of Western European Union*

The title of "honorary associate of the Assembly of WEU" may be used by:

- (a) any parliamentarian or former parliamentarian who has been a member of the Assembly, as a representative or a substitute, for five years, consecutively or accumulatively;
- (b) any former member of the Assembly, however long his or her period of membership, who has held the post of President or Vice-President of the Assembly, Chairman of a committee or Chairman of a political group.

A diploma and an identity card mentioning this title shall be issued to such persons at their request.

2. *Prerogatives of honorary associates*

(a) All honorary associates of the Assembly shall have access, on presentation of their card, to the same premises as representatives and substitutes to the Assembly, both in Paris and elsewhere, except the committee meeting rooms when in session.

(b) At their request, they shall be included on the mailing lists for the Assembly's official documents and for certain non-confidential committee documents.

(c) They may be invited to the Assembly's colloquies and other events, on the initiative of those in charge of such events.

The above rules shall apply to former members of the Assembly who were in office on or after 1st January 1983.

INFORMATION LETTER

*from Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU,  
on the activities of the intergovernmental organs*

*(October-November 1988)*

London, 25th November 1988

Dear President,

The most important happening in the life of WEU since my last newsletter of 12th October 1988 is undoubtedly the signing by the seven member states, Spain and Portugal of the protocol of accession to the organisation of Portugal and Spain.

You yourself were present at this solemn event which took place on 14th November last during the Ministerial Council.

Following this ceremony, the Portuguese and Spanish Foreign and Defence Ministers were invited by the presidency to join their colleagues from the Seven as "participating observers" for the remainder of the Council's proceedings.

This same arrangement will apply to ensure that Portugal and Spain are represented on the organisation's intergovernmental bodies pending the necessary ratification by national parliaments formalising the accession of the two new states.

This procedure is consistent with the precedents which have already been set, notably on the occasion of the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Communities and their membership of European Political Co-operation.

Thus, the separate negotiations which began on 26th May last with each of these countries have now been brought to a close.

The process consisted of a series of detailed discussions on substantive issues of which you have been apprised in my two previous newsletters (14th July and 12th October 1988).

The last of these discussions took place on 11th October and was followed by several consultations of a legal nature that were essential to finalise the process.

All the parties involved thought that the conclusions of these discussions were highly satisfactory. The Portuguese and Spanish delegations felt that they had been given a clear idea of how the Seven construed and implemented their WEU commitments, whether in connection with the modified Brussels Treaty, the Rome declaration or the platform on European security interests. The Seven, for their part, were fully satisfied with the clarifications given by both the Portuguese and Spanish delegations regarding the way in which they conceived and would apply these same commitments following their accession to WEU.

It was on this basis that the Nine set out the framework for their future joint action within WEU, a framework that was given clear expression in the preamble to the protocol of accession in which the Nine:

- reaffirmed the common destiny which bound them together and recalled their commitment to build a European union in accordance with the single European act;
- stressed their conviction that the construction of an integrated Europe would remain incomplete as long as it did not include security and defence;
- affirmed their determination to develop a more cohesive European defence identity which would translate more effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity contained in the modified Brussels Treaty and in the North Atlantic Treaty.

Mr. Charles GOERENS,  
President of the Assembly  
of Western European Union

It was therefore in this spirit that, at the end of the substantive discussion referred to above, Portugal and Spain accepted, unreservedly and in their entirety, the Rome declaration and the platform on European security interests and stated that they were prepared to participate fully in their implementation.

To be more specific, the discussions finally confirmed that:

- the Portuguese Government fully accepted the obligations arising from the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 and accepted unreservedly and in their entirety the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984 and the WEU platform adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987;
- the Spanish Government also accepted these obligations - subject to a reserve on Article X of the Brussels Treaty - since the documents in question were compatible in content with the aim of the referendum under which the Spanish people agreed in March 1986 to remain in the Atlantic Alliance.

In particular, both countries emphasised that they shared their other partners' common perception, both of European values and of the threat and that they saw the alliance as the fundamental instrument of Europe's collective defence now and in the future. They both subscribed unreservedly, in Spain's case since the 1986 referendum, to the communiqués of the alliance. They both believe that there is no alternative, for the foreseeable future, to a strategy of defence and effective deterrence based on an adequate mix of nuclear and conventional forces. They are both actively engaged in restructuring their armed forces and recognised the need to maintain an adequate level of defence spending. They both accept the commitment to defend any member country at its borders.

It is no exaggeration to say that, under these circumstances - and the preamble to the protocol of accession stresses this point - the enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain "represents a significant step in the development of European solidarity in the field of security and defence".

In the context of the accession to the organisation of Portugal and Spain, the Nine adopted the following political declaration:

"During the consultations which were held with a view to the enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain, the member states of WEU with Portugal and Spain, taking into consideration the spirit in which their security co-operation has recently developed, found that a number of the provisions of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, did not correspond to the way in which they intend to pursue and strengthen that co-operation, on the basis of the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984 and of the platform on European security interests, adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987. Consequently, the member states of WEU with Portugal and Spain consider that the relevant provisions of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, and its corresponding protocols will be re-examined, as appropriate, having regard to the practice and achievements of, and the prospects for, their co-operation in security matters."

In your own statement on enlargement which you made during the United Kingdom presidency's press conference at the end of the ministerial meeting, you said that:

"Faced with the process, now under way, of updating the modified Brussels Treaty (the constitutive instrument of WEU), the Assembly over which I preside will clearly wish to be constructively vigilant; in this, it will remain loyal to its rôle as guardian of the treaty, in accordance with Article IX which you know so well.

What must not happen is that, on the pretext of eliminating outdated provisions, there is any undermining, even inadvertently, of the commitments whose maintenance is essential to the pursuit of the oft-repeated objective, namely to develop the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance to which President Kennedy referred as long ago as 1962."

I think I can confirm that it is the intention of the member states to ensure that no essential commitment will be overlooked in this process and that the reappraisal in question will relate only to obsolete provisions whose removal will be beneficial to the organisation.

\*  
\* \*

Both you and the other members of the Assembly's Presidential Committee were briefed - during the evening of 14th November by the United Kingdom presidency and their colleagues, the other foreign and defence ministers and, in more relaxed fashion, during the morning of 15th November by the United Kingdom co-chairmen - on the exchanges of view which took place during the Ministerial Council and on the conclusions of that meeting.

Apart from the enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain, which dominated this meeting and which has been referred to above, and the operations carried out in the Gulf to which I will refer later, ministers discussed the following:

- a report on the implementation of the platform on European security interests;
- the interest shown by Turkey in our organisation;
- a report on arms control and defence requirements;
- oral reports which I presented to ministers on the activities of the sub-group of the Special Working Group on Security in the Mediterranean, on the one hand, and on progress with institutional questions on the other.

In my earlier newsletters to you, I reported on the work which culminated in the drafting of the report on the implementation of the platform on European security interests and the report on arms control and defence requirements.

As regards the report on the implementation of the platform, the Ministerial Council noted that this first exercise in elaborating the platform principles had achieved useful results. These represented the initial fruits of the process, which was a continuing one.

In the ministers' view, a key point was the reaffirmation of the importance of European solidarity in its security dimension, and the manifest commitment of the WEU countries to their treaty obligations. The central importance of Article V of the Treaty of Brussels and the principle of "defence at the frontiers" was stressed. There was also recognition of the evolving threat which this commitment to defend each and every member must meet.

The clearest evidence of this commitment was the appropriate deployment of forces. The report recognised the different situations of different states, and the principle of deployment close to the vulnerable frontiers was strongly supported. Stress was laid on the particular importance which several member states attached to the commitment to Germany, on whose territory they stationed forces under various agreements, and to the constant effort which was required in maintaining these force levels, and force levels more generally.

The ministers also noted that the report proposed some more specific practical measures that would lead to increased co-operation among the WEU partners in the field of defence.

They agreed that this was a difficult task and one which would have to be pursued in a progressive and step-by-step manner.

In part this was because there were already very wide-ranging efforts being made within the alliance and in bilateral activities between member states to improve co-operation and strengthen the European pillar. And, of course, the fact that WEU was not an operational forum had meant that there were limits to what could be done.

Nevertheless, in the ministers' view, the report has covered a lot of ground and identified worthwhile areas for further work.

In general, the ministers approved the recommendations made in this context. Thus:

(a) Under the heading of "improved consultation and co-ordination", the report proposed studies, including:

- the scope for greater harmonisation of defence planning methods;
- European demographic problems and the means of addressing them.

The ministers encouraged an exchange of views and experience in these areas. In addition, under this section, it was proposed that the United Kingdom presidency should run a seminar on "the changes in public perceptions of European defence", which would follow the successful example of the seminar on resource allocation held earlier this year in The Hague.

(b) The report also considered "involving defence ministers in the work of WEU". The Defence Representatives Group had already been involved in work on the implementation of the platform. With this in mind, the report proposed a study of the case for high-level consultations between member states' defence staffs.

(c) Another subject covered by the report was "contributions to the common defence". It provided an analysis of trends in contributions of WEU members, and pointed up both the extent of our existing contributions and the scope for doing more in certain areas. This was a particularly helpful exercise at a time when burden-sharing was a key issue in the alliance.

(d) Consideration was also given to making "better use of resources". Further studies were here recommended, including:

- ways to improve co-operation in the field of logistics, including common use of testing facilities;
- ways of encouraging joint use of training facilities (simulators were suggested);
- the impact of the EC progress towards 1992 on European security interests.

(e) The report also considered WEU common security interests outside Europe. The most current example of this was, of course, the activity in the Gulf, mentioned later. The ministers stressed the value of WEU in this field. The presidency recognised this and had made the continued development of this rôle one of its aims. It was an area of consultation unique to that forum. To this end, there was a proposal in the report to undertake an exchange of information about the assistance already given to some non-European countries.

Of course, the importance of explaining WEU's rôle to our publics, those of our allies, was also recognised. There was an important emphasis here on the rôle of the Assembly and the report identified the key themes to be projected.

The ministers then considered how to build upon this work. The fact that many of the proposals were for studies should not discourage them. The rôle of WEU as a "ginger group" was important. It could contribute to the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance through consultation on security policy. In this forum where matters were necessarily less tied to the immediate requirements of the common defence, there was the opportunity to reflect more widely on the whole issue of European security. Some questions were highlighted by certain delegations i.e.:

- the relevance of 1992 to WEU;
- the value of defence staff consultations;
- the discussions on defence planning methods, training and logistics, with particular emphasis on defence planning methods;
- the importance of regular exchanges of research experts and also the value of discussions on space questions.

In conclusion, the Ministerial Council noted the report on the implementation of the platform on European security interests and approved all the recommendations which were made, notably those in which delegations had shown particular interest. It accepted that the scope of practical defence co-operation through WEU was necessarily limited, but also stressed the need for positive step-by-step progress to be made in carrying out the studies and other activities which the report recommended.

With regard to *Turkey*, ministers discussed that country's interest in joining WEU and recognised that it was an important and sensitive subject. A reply in formal terms to that interest had yet to be prepared. This would be considered by the Permanent Council. They took note of Turkish interest in joining WEU and recognised the valuable contribution which Turkey, as a member of the Atlantic Alliance, was making to the defence of Europe. They also noted the fact that WEU was reviewing its programme and structure following the accession of Spain and Portugal to the organisation. They agreed that Turkish interest in joining should be kept under active review and were considering the possibility of a special consultative arrangement between WEU and Turkey.

The ministers discussed a *report on arms control and defence requirements* which gave rise to discussion of three separate topics, first the conventional stability talks, secondly the implications for Europe of the START talks and thirdly the implications of the forthcoming Paris conference on the 1925 chemical weapon convention.

On the conventional stability talks, they recognised the importance of the opportunities offered by those negotiations to tackle what they regard as the central problem of European security, namely, the massive disparities in ground forces favouring the Warsaw Pact. They recognised that they needed to be ready to take advantage of more open eastern attitudes, although the real test of those would be in deed and not in word. They stressed the importance of continuing European input to the evolution of alliance thinking on this topic and the need to be ready with substantive proposals when the talks opened.

On START, they emphasised the support of all WEU members for a START treaty on the lines currently being negotiated. They thought it would be good for European security as well as western security because it would remove a substantial part of the Soviet Union's most powerful and destabilising missiles. They recognised that it was going to be a long, difficult and important task. They noted that the verification provisions were of great importance. When concluded they would enhance confidence but it was important that they should be got right. The ministers also considered the implications of a START agreement in particular for sea-launched cruise missiles.

On chemical weapons, everyone welcomed the forthcoming Paris conference on the 1925 convention and emphasised the two limbs to that conference: one, the need to reaffirm and re-establish respect for the convention and, two, to press ahead with the negotiations in Geneva for a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. The conference in January was not intended to be a substitute for progress in the Geneva negotiations.

The Ministerial Council also took note of my oral report on the *work of the Mediterranean sub-group* and invited the group to continue its work, with particular reference to Yugoslavia and the Maghreb whose evolution was recognised as crucial to the security of the WEU member states in the Mediterranean.

The Ministerial Council noted my oral report on *institutional questions* and invited the Permanent Council to keep the subject under review.

Finally, the Council agreed to make available F 100 000 needed by the *Assembly* to undertake an architectural study relating to the WEU premises in Paris as a consequence of the *enlargement* of the organisation.

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It will come as no surprise to you that the preparation of a meeting such as this and in particular the drafting of the reports on the implementation of the platform on European security interests and on arms control and defence requirements – both of which were submitted to the ministers – required an intense amount of activity on the part of the other intergovernmental organs of WEU.

Its Special Working Group – at either “heads” or “deputies” level – met regularly in the months preceding this ministerial meeting whilst the political directors from the foreign ministries and their defence ministry counterparts came together for “enlarged” meetings of the Permanent Council.

The Permanent Council, in either its enlarged or normal composition, has directed the activities of the Special Working Group and also those of the defence ministry representatives and the sub-groups of experts, particularly the sub-group concerned with security in the Mediterranean.

These various meetings also provided an opportunity for participants to continue their exchange of information and concertation on topical questions affecting European security as construed in the context of Atlantic solidarity.

Generally speaking, the Permanent Council continued to carry out its rôle as co-ordinator of WEU activities.

It also continued to ponder the question of the collocation of the administrative organs of WEU.

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The national (France, Italy) and integrated operations (United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium), co-ordinated in the Gulf on the basis of political concertation within WEU and with the support of the Federal Republic of Germany and Luxembourg, have continued.

In view of the developments in the region and the reduction of the threat to free navigation since the cease-fire, it is quite normal that the operations in their present form should come to an end. Some of the states are withdrawing their units from the region, others are adapting their presence to a situation that is different from that which led the five member states of the organisation in August 1987 to take action over the Gulf.

The conclusion of this action is in fact a final cleaning-up operation by each of the national and integrated fleets in their zones of action, in co-ordination with each other.

This operation is known as “Cleansweep”. Its aim is to complete the clearance of a shipping lane 300 miles into the Gulf from the Strait of Hormuz. It will be of benefit to all merchant shipping in those waters and will assist the return of normality in the region.

Probably it may not be possible to affirm that this success in the Gulf will constitute an argument enabling any form of “out-of-area” action to be taken in the future.

Specific needs will have to be met as and when they arise. But the WEU partners have proved capable of co-operating in connection with dangerous major tasks in a difficult part of the world. In the long term, the experience gained in the Gulf can only be of benefit to the security interests – in the widest sense – of the WEU partners.

It is no exaggeration to say that these operations have highlighted the reality of WEU's reactivation and its ability to put this into concrete form in all the spheres of its competence, including areas outside the direct security zone of its member countries whenever this security – taken in its widest sense – is threatened.

Thus substance has been given to Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty as well as Article 8 of the Rome declaration and Part III (a) 4 of the platform on European security interests, both for the present and potentially for the future, should a similar situation again arise.

At the ministerial meeting of 14th November, the ministers hailed the success of these operations. The Belgian and Italian delegations confirmed that their forces would be returning to their national ports at the end of the year.

The ministers concluded their discussions by “noting with approval the success of the member countries of WEU in concerting WEU activities in the Gulf. In particular, they noted that all member nations had contributed, either directly, or by filling in for national forces deployed to the Gulf, or financially; and that they are currently involved in the important task of clearing a shipping route (Operation Cleansweep). They agreed that the experience of operation in the Gulf would strengthen Europe's capacity for concerted action in the future”.

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Another important matter is the organisation by the Institute for Advanced Defence Studies of France of a European advanced defence studies session, within the WEU context since it is directed at nationals of the WEU member states.

This session is taking place as I write. It represents an opportunity for regular information and reflection – among the most interested sectors of the public – on problems of European security, seen of course in the context of Atlantic solidarity.

It will have considerable impact on opinion in Europe just as the seminars organised by the IHEDN at national level have had an impact on opinion in France.

Our thanks should be expressed to France for having agreed to launch the idea with the benefit of its vast experience – and particularly that of the IHEDN – in the matter.

This initiative will be continued next year because Belgium has already agreed to organise a similar session at the Royal Advanced Defence Institute.

The session began on 15th November by an address from Mr. Michel Rocard, French Prime Minister. Several members of the governments of our states – Mr. Roland Dumas, French Foreign Minister, Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, French Defence Minister, Mr. William Waldegrave, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Mr. Schäfer, Deputy Minister at the German Foreign Office, and Mr. Lothar Rühl, German State Secretary for Defence – have agreed to speak along with Mr. Malfatti, former Italian Foreign Minister and President of the Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly, General Schmitt, Chief of Staff of the French army, Mr. Champenois, Director of Politico-Military Affairs at the Belgian Foreign Ministry, several industrial leaders, such as Mr. Gergorin, Director of Strategy at MATRA head office, Ambassador Umberto La Rocca, Managing Director of Aeritalia, and experts of repute such as Mr. Pierre Lellouche of the French Institute for International Relations and Professor Caesar Voûte from the Netherlands.

You yourself have agreed to talk about the “rôle of WEU in European security” and I shall have the honour of making the closing speech.

In order to inform fully the members of the Assembly I am enclosing herewith the seminar programme and the list of attendance.

The programme shows that the French authorities have organised two visits, one to the Strategic Maritime Force in Brest and the other to Aérospatiale at Marignane. Both of these visits are of particular interest to the participants.

Following the practice adopted nationally for the former IHEDN students, an association may well be set up of former participants in the “European session”. This could contribute to the development of a European security awareness in our countries.

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The organisation's sphere of influence internationally – including outside the member states, would appear to be growing because an important colloquium on the theme “ the Atlantic Alliance and western security as NATO turns forty: setting up the agenda ”, organised in Washington by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Atlantic Commission of the Netherlands has been placed by its promoters not only under the auspices of the North Atlantic Assembly and Eurogroup but also under WEU.

Along with the Clerk of the Assembly you have agreed to attend this gathering on 28th and 29th November where I shall also be present. The event will be of considerable importance. From the American side there will be the Defence Secretary Mr. Frank Carlucci as well as several eminent members of the Senate and House of Representatives. There will be several personalities from the administration and well-known experts. From the European side there will be MM. Hans Dietrich Genscher, German Foreign Minister, Ercan Vuralhan, Turkish Defence Minister, and William Waldegrave, Minister of State at the Foreign Office. There will also be several parliamentarians including the President of the North Atlantic Assembly and well-known former ministers and experts.

This brief stay in the United States will provide an opportunity for useful contacts at a very interesting juncture, namely, the transition period between two presidents. We shall certainly have some impressions to communicate in this respect both to the Assembly and to the intergovernmental organs of the organisation.

The Secretariat-General of the organisation has pursued its public relations activities. I was represented:

- on 14th October, in Lille, by Mr. Arnaud Jacomet at the round table organised under the chairmanship of Mr. Maurice Schumann in connection with the 1988 UNOR (National Union of Reserve Officers) congress;
- on 25th and 26th October, in Paris, by General Menez at the colloquium on military space activities chaired by Mr. Hubert Curien (Deputy Minister to the Minister of State for National Education, Research and Sport, responsible for research and President of the Science and Defence Association). This colloquium consisted of classified working sessions and a non-classified round table. The organisers of the colloquium were Science and Defence, the Society of the Friends of ENSAE and the Society of the Friends of ENSTA;
- on 28th October, in Bonn, by Colonel Klaus Jacob at the meeting organised by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt.

For my part, I:

- from 13th to 15th October participated in Berlin in a conference organised by the Aspen Institute on the future of Franco-German relations;
- on 21st October gave a talk in Ghent to the Cercle Royal Mars et Mercure on the theme “ WEU at the crossroads of European construction ”;
- from 21st to 23rd October took part in a colloquium organised by the Ditchley Foundation on the subject “ the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance: a security dimension for the process of European integration? ”;
- on 31st October in London spoke to the Liberal International British Group on the subject “ the future of western defence ”;
- on 8th November gave two lectures at the University of St. Andrews (the first on the European construction and WEU and the second on a European pillar of the alliance);
- from 10th to 12th November in Oslo took part in a colloquium on the subject “ western security posture towards the year 2000 ”, organised by the Alumni Association of the Norwegian National Defence College. I also gave a lecture to present members on “ WEU, the process of European construction and the alliance ”. On that occasion I met the Norwegian Foreign Minister Mr. Stoltenberg.

*At the Foreign Ministry* I met Mme Helga Hernès, State Secretary, Ambassador Kjeld Vibe, Secretary-General, Ambassador Bjorn Kristvik, Director-General of Policy, and several other officials;

*At the Defence Ministry* I met Mr. Lasse Seim, State Secretary, Mr. Finnmolwig, Director-General for Security Affairs, and Mr. Bard Bredrup Knadsen, Adviser for Security Affairs.

I was also able to talk briefly to members of parliament of the two major political parties, the Labour Party (in office) and the Conservative Party, as well as with personalities from the academic world<sup>1</sup>.

- *on 20th November* in Valkenburg (Netherlands) spoke at a colloquium organised by the Young Europeans for Security (YES) on the theme "European security: what options?".

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As with my previous communications, this letter is intended to give you and other members of the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union the maximum possible information about the main activities of the intergovernmental organs of the organisation. It is drafted and circulated by me under my own responsibility.

I hope that the facts contained herein will be useful for you and the other members of the Assembly and will enable you to see that the pace of WEU activities has by no means slackened over the last few months.

Yours sincerely,  
Alfred CAHEN

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1. The conclusions I have drawn from these contacts are that the Norwegian Government is giving priority to "adapting" to the implementation of the Twelve's single market in 1992. In the circumstances, any intention of acceding to WEU is considered as premature. The attitude is one of "wait and see". They are nevertheless watching what happens in the organisation, especially the discussions leading to the signature of the protocol of accession to WEU of Spain and Portugal. These comments are of a superficial nature being based on brief contacts during a short stay.

*Participation of Mr. Arafat at the United Nations  
General Assembly in New York*

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**MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION <sup>1</sup>**

*tabled by Mr. Malfatti and others  
under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure  
with a request for urgent procedure*

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The Assembly,

With a view to promoting an international dialogue to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict,

INVITES THE GOVERNMENTS OF WEU MEMBER COUNTRIES

To address an urgent appeal to the United States administration to grant a visa to allow Mr. Yasser Arafat, President of the PLO, to enter the United States to address the United Nations General Assembly.

*Signed: Malfatti, Pieralli, Natali, Gabbuggiani, Pecchioli, Cannata, Kessler, Scovacricchi, Sarti, Fioret*

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1. See 7th sitting, 5th December 1988 (motion withdrawn).

*Integration of Europe with a view to European union  
(or the United States of Europe): WEU's rôle*

**MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION<sup>1</sup>**

*tabled by Mr. Pannella and others  
under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure  
with a request for urgent procedure*

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering the reactivation of WEU and its rôle as a privileged forum for matters relating to security and defence at European level;
  - (ii) Noting with satisfaction the conclusion of the protocol of accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU;
  - (iii) Stressing that once the procedure for ratifying their accession to WEU has been completed, WEU will be composed of nine of the twelve member countries of the European Communities;
  - (iv) Noting that in the abovementioned protocol of accession member states reaffirmed the importance they attach to the common destiny which binds their countries and recalled their commitment to build a European union in accordance with the single European act;
  - (v) Considering that in the same protocol the member states of WEU stated that they were convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence;
  - (vi) Wishing a new plan for European union to be drawn up in 1989 by the European Parliament to be elected next June in accordance with the broad lines of the draft treaty already approved by the European Parliament on 14th February 1984;
1. WISHES to be associated with the preparatory work in accordance with appropriate procedure;
  2. WISHES this new draft treaty, covering several areas of political integration, including security and defence, to be ratified by member states at an early date;
  3. AFFIRMS formally that the completion of this process, vital for a closer union of European nations, must mean the European union (United States of Europe) progressively assuming the prerogatives and duties now exercised by WEU;
  4. ADDRESSES this resolution to the WEU Council, the governments of member countries, the European Parliament and the Commission and Council of the European Communities.

*Signed: Pannella, Martino, Pieralli, Scovacricchi, Stegagnini, Triglia, Fassino, Greco, Francese, Rauti, Caro*

<sup>1</sup> See 8th sitting, 6th December 1988 (motion referred to the General Affairs Committee).

***Banning of low-altitude military training flights***

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**MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION <sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Büchner and others  
under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure***

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The Assembly,

CALLS ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER STATES

To ban all low-altitude military flights and air-combat exercises over heavily built-up areas and also flights towards targets such as nuclear plants, hospitals, schools, places of worship, public buildings and factories, etc.

*Signed: Büchner, Biefnot, Holtz, Eicher, Pécriaux, Stoffelen, Schmidt, Luuk, Blunck, Scheer*

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1. See 8th sitting, 6th December 1988 (motion included in the register of the Assembly).

***Banning of demonstration flights at air shows***

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**MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Büchner and others  
under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure  
with a request for urgent procedure***

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The Assembly,

CALLS ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER STATES

To ban demonstration flights, particularly at military and civilian air shows.

*Signed: Büchner, Biefnot, Holtz, Ahrens, Pécriaux, Eicher, Klejdzinski, Blunck, Stoffelen, Schmidt, Luuk, Steiner, Scheer*

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1. See 8th sitting, 6th December 1988 (urgent procedure not agreed to).

*Exchange of armed forces personnel between the national units  
of the individual member nations*

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**MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION <sup>1</sup>**

*tabled by Mr. Hitschler and others  
under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure*

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The Assembly,

- (i) Believing that additional measures must be adopted to promote partnership relations between the individual member nations of WEU;
- (ii) Expressing its satisfaction at the creation of a joint Franco-German brigade which was initiated by the formal decision on 13th November 1987 (formalised by an exchange of letters, dated 22nd January 1988) by the heads of government of the two nations;
- (iii) Regretting the absence of similar arrangements on the same scale between the other member nations;
- (iv) Asking for efforts to be undertaken aiming at enhancing co-operation between the units of the other member nations in order to strengthen and consolidate partnership relations, in particular to improve mutual understanding through daily co-operation and the dismantling of language barriers, in order to thus achieve an intermeshing of forces not only through liaison officers,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**


Take the initiative for the creation of exchange opportunities beyond the framework of integrated headquarters and other available opportunities, in order for a great number of officers, non-commissioned officers and other ranks to have the chance of doing duty for a limited period of their service in units of allied armed forces.

*Signed: Hitschler, Pfuhl, Unland, Martino, Steiner, Kittelmann, Müller, Niegel, Klejdzinski, Pack, Seitlinger, Scheer, Reddemann*

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1. See 11th sitting, 7th December 1988 (motion included in the register of the Assembly).

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IMPRIMERIE  ALENÇONNAISE  
Rue Édouard-Belin : 1<sup>er</sup> trimestre 1989  
N° d'ordre : 10671

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PRINTED IN FRANCE