

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-FIFTH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1989

IV

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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IV

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Official Report of Debates

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The proceedings of the second part of the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume III: Assembly documents.

Volume IV: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP
BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
DERYCKE Erik	SP
KEMPINAIRE André	PVV
PÉCIAUX Nestor	PS
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
Mr. UYTENDAELE René	CVP

Substitutes

MM. CAUWENBERGHS Frans	CVP
COLLART Jacques	PS
DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
EICHER Bernard-J.	PS
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
NOERENS René	PVV

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
BEIX Roland	Socialist
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
DURAND Adrien	CDS
FILLON François	RPR
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GOUTEYRON Adrien	RPR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
THYRAUD Jacques	Ind. Rep.
VIAL-MASSAT Théo	PC

Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRÉ René	RPR
BALLIGAND Jean-Pierre	Socialist
BARRAU Alain	Socialist
BIRRAUX Claude	CDS
BOHL André	UCDP
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAUULT Xavier	UDF (App.)
KOEHL Émile	UDF
LAGORCE Pierre	Socialist
LE GRAND Jean-François	RPR
MASSERET Jean-Pierre	Socialist
PISTRE Charles	Socialist
ROGER Jean	RDE
VALLEIX Jean	RPR
WORMS Jean-Pierre	Socialist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTER Robert	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
EICH Tay	Die Grünen
HITSCHLER Walter	FDP
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUUK Dagmar	SPD
MM. MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NIEGEL Lorenz	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU
WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

Mr. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
Mrs. BEER Angelika	Die Grünen
Mr. BINDIG Rudolf	SPD
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
FELDMANN Olaf	FDP
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
Mr. HÖFFKES Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. HOFFMANN Ingeborg	CDU/CSU
MM. KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
PFUHL Albert	SPD
SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans-Peter	CDU/CSU
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TIMM Helga	SPD
MM. ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU
ZYWIETZ Werner	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
FILETTI Cristoforo	MSI-DN
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
GABBUGGIANI Elio	Communist
INTINI Ugo	Socialist
KESSLER Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MALFATTI Franco Maria	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Guido	Republican
MEZZAPESA Pietro	Chr. Dem.
NATALI Antonio	Socialist
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PIERALLI Piero	Communist
RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
N...	

Substitutes

MM. ANDREIS Sergio	Verdi
CANNATA Giuseppe	Communist
CAPANNA Mario	Prol. Dem.
CARIGLIA Antonio	PSDI
FASSINO Giuseppe	Liberal
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
GRECO Francesco	Communist
PASQUINO Gianfranco	Ind. Left
RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
RUBNER Hans	SVP
SCOVACRICCHI Martino	PSDI
SPISELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STEGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
TEODORI Riccardo	Radical
TRIGLIA Riccardo	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

Mr. GOERENS Charles	Dem.
Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE Marcelle	Soc. Chr.
Mr. REGENWETTER Jean	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

MM. DIMMER Camille	Soc. Chr.
KOLLWELTER René	Soc. Workers
Mrs. POLFER Lydie	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
EVERSDIJK Huib	CDA
Mrs. HAAS-BERGER Ineke	PVDA
MM. de JONG Frans	CDA
NIJPELS Ed.	VVD
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN	Labour
Elisabeth	Labour
MM. DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob	CDA
EISMA Doeke	D66
Mrs. HERFKENS Eveline	Labour
MM. VAN DER LINDEN Pierre	CDA
MARIS Pieter	CDA
VERBEEK Jan Willem	Liberal

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. COLEMAN Donald	Labour
COX Thomas	Labour
EWING Harry	Labour
Dame Peggy FENNER	Conservative
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
MM. GARRETT Edward	Labour
HARDY Peter	Labour
HILL James	Conservative
JESSEL Toby	Conservative
Sir Russell JOHNSTON	Liberal
Earl of KINNOULL	Conservative
MM. MORRIS Michael	Conservative
PARRY Robert	Labour
Sir William SHELTON	Conservative
Sir Dudley SMITH	Conservative
Mr. SPEED Keith	Conservative
Sir John STOKES	Conservative
Mr. WILKINSON John	Conservative

Substitutes

MM. ATKINSON David	Conservative
BANKS Tony	Labour
BOWDEN Andrew	Conservative
FAULDS Andrew	Labour
HOWELL Ralph	Conservative
Sir John HUNT	Conservative
Lord KIRKHILL	Labour
MM. LAMBIE David	Labour
LITHERLAND Robert	Labour
LORD Michael	Conservative
Lord MACKIE	Liberal
Lord NEWALL	Conservative
MM. RATHBONE Tim	Conservative
REDMOND Martin	Labour
Lord RODNEY	Conservative
Mrs. ROE Marion	Conservative
MM. THOMPSON John	Labour
WARD John	Conservative

I

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 4th December 1989

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe (*Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1211).
5. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 1193).
6. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe (*Debate and vote on the request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1211).
7. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1208).
8. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
9. Revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and votes on the draft decisions*, Doc. 1199).
10. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 1201).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.20 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The President declared the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly resumed.

2. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

3. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Speed.

4. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 7 had been ratified by that Assembly.

5. Observers

The President welcomed parliamentary observers from Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.

6. Tribute

The President paid tribute to the late Mr. Antonio Taramelli, Mr. Willem de Kwaadsteniet and Mr. Lucien Pignion.

7. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

8. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

One candidate had been proposed for the vacant post of Vice-President, namely Mr. Aarts.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-President by acclamation.

Mr. Aarts was elected Vice-President by acclamation.

The President informed the Assembly that the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents was

as follows: Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Sarti, Mr. Aarts, Mr. Soell and Mr. Fourré.

9. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe

(Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1211)

The President announced that a motion for an order on the establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe had been tabled by Mr. Ahrens and others with a request for urgent procedure.

In accordance with Rule 43 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly would examine this request for urgent procedure after the adoption of the draft order of business.

10. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session

(Doc. 1193)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session.

The draft order of business for the second part of the session was adopted.

11. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe

(Debate and vote on the request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1211)

In accordance with Rule 43 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for an order for the establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe.

Speaker: Mr. Ahrens.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the request for urgent procedure.

The request for urgent procedure and referral to the General Affairs Committee was agreed to.

12. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1208)

The report of the Presidential Committee was presented by Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Vice-President of the Assembly.

The Assembly ratified the action of the Presidential Committee.

13. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU

Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. van Eekelen answered questions put by MM. Pieralli, De Decker, Büchner, Ewing and Pontillon.

14. Revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and votes on the draft decisions, Doc. 1199 and amendments)

The report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Sarti, Klejdzinski, Reddemann and Eicher.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft decision on the revision of Articles VII and XI of the Charter.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Reddemann:

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft decision on the revision of Articles VII and XI of the Charter, leave out the third and fourth sentences.

Speaker: Mr. Reddemann.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An oral amendment by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur, to leave out the third and fourth sentences in paragraph 2 of the draft decision was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote by roll-call on the amended draft decision.

The amended draft decision was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 49 votes to 0 with 0 abstentions; 24 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote. (This decision will be published as No. 3)¹.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft decision on the revision of Rules 38, 42 and 47 of the Rules of Procedure.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Reddemann:

2. In paragraph 3 of the draft decision on the revision of Rules 38, 42 and 47 of the Rules of

¹ See page 18.

Procedure, leave out the second and third sentences.

Speaker: Mr. Reddemann.

The amendment was withdrawn.

An oral amendment by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur, to leave out the second and third sentences in paragraph 3 of the draft decision was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft decision.

The amended draft decision was agreed to. (This decision will be published as No. 4) ².

15. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1201)

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Caro, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Lagorce, Eisma and Antretter.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Soell and Zaimis (*Observer from Greece*).

The debate was adjourned.

16. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees:

Defence Committee

France

- Mr. Bassinet as a titular member in place of Mrs. Lalumière;
- Mr. Masseret as an alternate member in place of Mr. Matraja;
- Mr. Pistre as an alternate member in place of Mr. Balligand;

Italy

- Mr. Mezzapesa as an alternate member in place of Mr. Andreis;

2. See page 19.

- Mr. Teodori as an alternate member in place of Mr. Pannella;

Netherlands

- Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman as a titular member;
- Mr. Maris as a titular member;
- Mr. Nijpels as a titular member;
- Mr. Tummers as an alternate member;
- Mr. De Hoop Scheffer as an alternate member;
- Mr. van der Linden as an alternate member.

Political Committee

France

- Mr. Thyraud as a titular member in place of Mr. Ruet;
- Mr. Gouteyron as an alternate member in place of Mr. Portier;

Netherlands

- Mr. Aarts as a titular member;
- Mr. van der Linden as a titular member;
- Mr. Stoffelen as a titular member;
- Mr. Verbeek as an alternate member;
- Mr. Eisma as an alternate member;
- Mrs. Herfkens as an alternate member;

United Kingdom

- Mr. Ward as an alternate member in place of Mr. Stewart.

Technological and Aerospace Committee

France

- Mr. Le Grand as a titular member in place of Mr. Souvet;
- Mr. Worms as a titular member in place of Mr. Bassinet;
- Mr. Lagorce as a titular member;
- Mr. Thyraud as an alternate member in place of Mr. Croze;
- Mr. Roger as an alternate member in place of Mr. Lacour;

Netherlands

- Mr. Verbeek as a titular member;
- Mr. Tummers as a titular member;

- Mrs. Haas-Berger as an alternate member;
- Mr. Aarts as an alternate member.

*Committee on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration*

France

- Mr. Masseret as a titular member in place of Mr. Lagorce;
- Mr. Lagorce as an alternate member in place of Mr. Matraja;
- Mr. Croze as an alternate member in place of Mr. Ruet;

Federal Republic of Germany

- Mrs. Hoffmann as a titular member in place of Mrs. Pack;

Netherlands

- Mr. Eversdijk as a titular member;
- Mrs. Haas-Berger as a titular member;
- Mr. de Jong as an alternate member;
- Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman as an alternate member.

*Committee on Rules of Procedure
and Privileges*

France

- Mr. Balligand as an alternate member in place of Mr. Forni;
- Mr. Beix as an alternate member in place of Mr. Lagorce;

Netherlands

- Mr. Stoffelen as a titular member;
- Mr. Maris as a titular member;
- Mr. van der Linden as an alternate member;
- Mr. Eversdijk as an alternate member;

United Kingdom

- Mrs. Roe as an alternate member in place of Mr. Gale.

***17. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 5th December 1989, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.

APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Hitschler <i>Klejdzinski (Holtz)</i> Irmer Kittelmann	Netherlands
MM. <i>Eicher (Adriaensens)</i> <i>Noerens (Biefnot)</i> Derycke Kempinaire Pécriaux	Mrs. Luuk	MM. Aarts Eversdijk
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Niegel Reddemann Scheer	Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Mrs. Haas-Berger)
Mr. Uyttendaele	Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (von Schmude)	MM. <i>van der Linden</i> (de Jong) <i>Verbeek (Nijpels)</i> Stoffelen Tummers
	MM. Soell Unland Wulff	
France		United Kingdom
MM. Bassinet Caro <i>Valleix (Collette)</i> Durand <i>Lagorce (Forni)</i> <i>Masseret (Fourré)</i> <i>Le Grand (Galley)</i> <i>Bohl (Gouteyron)</i> Jeambrun Jung Pontillon Thyraud	Italy	MM. <i>Thompson (Cox)</i> Ewing
	MM. Caccia Fioret Gabbuggiani <i>Stegagnini (Intini)</i> <i>Rubner (Kessler)</i> Malfatti Martino Mezzapesa <i>Triglia (Natali)</i> Parisi Pieralli Sarti	Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Redmond (Garrett)</i> <i>Banks (Hardy)</i> Mrs. <i>Roe (Hill)</i> Mr. Jessel Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston)
		Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull)
		MM. Morris <i>Litherland (Parry)</i> Lord (Sir William Shelton)
Federal Republic of Germany		Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir <i>John Hunt</i> (Sir John Stokes)
MM. Ahrens Antretter Büchner Eich	Luxembourg	Mr. Bowden
	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mr. Regenwetter	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Rodotà Rubbi Sinesio
MM. Baumel Beix Fillon Oehler Seitlinger Vial-Massat	MM. Böhm Müller	
	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. Filetti Pecchioli	Mr. Coleman

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on the amended draft decision on the revision of Articles VII and XI of the Charter (Doc. 1199) ¹:

Ayes	49
Noes	0
Abstentions	0

Ayes

MM. Aarts	Mrs. <i>Roe</i> (Hill)	MM. Regenwetter
Ahrens	MM. Hitschler	Sarti
Antretter	<i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz)	Scheer
Bassinet	Jessel	Mrs. <i>Fischer</i>
Büchner	Jung	(von Schmude)
Caro	Lord <i>Newall</i>	Mr. <i>Lord</i>
Derycke	(Earl of Kinnoull)	(Sir William Shelton)
Durand	Mr. Kittelmann	Sir Dudley Smith
Eich	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	MM. Soell
Eversdijk	Mrs. Luuk	Speed
Ewing	MM. Malfatti	Mrs. Staels-Dompas
Dame Peggy Fenner	Martino	Mr. Stoffelen
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg	Mezzapesa	Sir <i>John Hunt</i>
MM. <i>Lagorce</i> (Forni)	Morris	(Sir John Stokes)
<i>Le Grand</i> (Galley)	Péciaux	MM. Thyraud
<i>Bohl</i> (Gouteyron)	Pieralli	Uyttendaele
Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i>	Pontillon	<i>Bowden</i> (Wilkinson)
(Mrs. Haas-Berger)	Reddemann	Wulff

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

DECISION 3***on the revision of Articles VII and XI of the Charter***

The Assembly

DECIDES

To amend Articles VII and XI as follows:

1. *Article VII*

In paragraph (a), amend the titles of the committees to read as follows:

1. Defence Committee;
2. Political Committee;
3. Technological and Aerospace Committee;
4. Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration;
5. Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges;
6. Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

2. *Article XI*

In paragraph (b), after “committees”, add “or any other body created by the Assembly”.

In paragraph (c), replace “and the three agencies for security questions” by “and with the person responsible for any subsidiary body created by the Council”.

DECISION 4***on the revision of Rules 38, 42 and 47 of the Rules of Procedure***

The Assembly

DECIDES

To amend Rules 38; 42 and 47 as follows:

1. *Rule 38*

In paragraph 1, amend the titles of the committees to read as follows:

- (i) Defence Committee;
- (ii) Political Committee;
- (iii) Technological and Aerospace Committee;
- (iv) Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration;
- (v) Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges,

and add:

- (vi) Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Leave out paragraph 2 and insert: "The first and second of the permanent committees shall be composed of 34 members divided as follows: Belgium 3, France 5, Federal Republic of Germany 5, Italy 5, Luxembourg 1, the Netherlands 3, Portugal 3, Spain 4, the United Kingdom 5. The third, fourth, fifth and sixth permanent committees shall be composed of 26 members divided as follows: Belgium 2, France 4, the Federal Republic of Germany 4, Italy 4, Luxembourg 1, the Netherlands 2, Portugal 2, Spain 3, the United Kingdom 4. The Presidential Committee may, during the periods between sessions or part-sessions, provisionally fill the seats which have fallen vacant in committees with representatives or substitutes. These appointments must be ratified at the first session of the Assembly. The secretaries of national delegations shall take part in meetings of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations without the right to vote."

2. *Rule 42*

Delete Rule 42 and renumber subsequent rules accordingly.

3. *Rule 47*

In paragraph 5, replace "and the three agencies for security questions" by "and with the person responsible for any subsidiary body created by the Council".

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 5th December 1989

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1201*).
2. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
3. Address by Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council

(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1201)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Malfatti, Gabbuggiani and Tascioglu (*Observer from Turkey*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Caro, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The sitting was suspended at 10.30 a.m. and resumed at 10.35 a.m.

4. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council

Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Eyskens answered questions put by MM. Jessel, De Hoop Scheffer, De Decker, Lord Rodney, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Soell and Jung.

5. Address by Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Schäfer answered questions put by Mr. Eisma, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Lambie, Pieralli, Lord Mackie, MM. Jessel, Kittelmann, Mrs. Timm and Mr. Klejdzinski.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day of the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Hitschler <i>Klejdzinski (Holtz)</i> Kittelmann	Netherlands
MM. Adriaensens <i>Noerens (Biefnot)</i> Derycke Kempinaire Péciaux	Mrs. Luuk Mr. Niegel Mrs. <i>Hoffmann</i> (Reddemann)	MM. Aarts Eversdijk Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Mrs. Haas-Berger)
Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Uyttendaele	MM. Scheer Soell Unland	MM. <i>Maris (de Jong)</i> <i>Verbeek (Nijpels)</i> Stoffelen Tummers
France	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. Beix Caro <i>Alloncle (Collette)</i> Durand <i>Lagorce (Forni)</i> <i>Masseret (Fourré)</i> <i>Valleix (Galley)</i> Jung Pontillon Thyraud	MM. Caccia <i>Spitella (Fioret)</i> Gabbuggiani <i>Stegagnini (Intini)</i> <i>Rubner (Kessler)</i> Malfatti Mezzapesa Parisi Pieralli Mrs. <i>Francesca (Rubbi)</i> Mr. Sarti	MM. <i>Lambie (Coleman)</i> Ewing Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. Hardy Mrs. <i>Roe (Hill)</i> Mr. Jessel Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Earl of Kinnoull Lord <i>Newall</i> (Sir William Shelton) Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir John Stokes Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
Mr. Ahrens Mrs. <i>Timm (Antretter)</i> Mrs. <i>Fischer (Böhm)</i> MM. Büchner Eich	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mr. Regenwetter	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Natali Pecchioli Rodotà Sinesio
MM. Bassinet Baumel Fillon Gouteyron Jeambrun Oehler Seitlinger Vial-Massat	MM. Irmer Müller von Schmude Wulff	United Kingdom
	Italy	MM. Cox Garrett Morris Parry
	MM. Filetti Martino	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 5th December 1989

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France.
2. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1201*).
3. European security and events in the Near and Middle East (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1202 and Addendum*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France

Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Chevènement answered questions put by MM. Scheer, Müller, Hardy, Sir Russell Johnston, MM. Cox, Wilkinson, Pontillon, Speed, Ewing, Rathbone, Niegel, Fillon and Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

4. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council

*(Reply to speakers
and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1201)*

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 474)¹.

1. See page 25.

5. European security and events in the Near and Middle East

*(Presentation of and debate
on the report of the Political Committee
and vote on the draft recommendation,
Doc. 1202 and addendum)*

The report of the Political Committee was presented by Mr. Pieralli, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Gabbuggiani.

Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: Mr. Scheer, Lord Mackie, MM. Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*), Sarti and Atalay (*Observer from Turkey*).

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: Mr. Caro, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Bindig, Tascioglu (*Observer from Turkey*), Caro and Tascioglu (*Observer from Turkey*).

The debate was closed.

Mr. Pieralli, Rapporteur, and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 475)².

2. See page 27.

**6. Membership of the Committee
for Parliamentary and Public Relations**

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following membership of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations:

Chairman: Mr. Pontillon

Vice-Chairmen: Mr. Ewing
Mrs. Fischer

<i>Titular members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
MM. Büchner	Mrs. Luuk
Bühler	MM. Niegel
Caccia	Martino
De Bondt	Mrs. Staels-Dompas
De Hoop	
Scheffer	Mr. Nijpels
Ewing	Sir Russell
	Johnston
Fiandrotti	MM. Pasquino
Mrs. Fischer	Müller

MM. Gouteyron	Collette
Greco	Teodori
Hardy
Sir John Hunt	Lord
MM. Kempinaire	Collart
Kollwelter	Mrs. Polfer
Pfuhl	MM. Bindig
Pontillon	Forni
Seitlinger	Koehl
Sir William	
Shelton	Mrs. Roe
MM. Stegagnini	MM. Spitella
Tummers	Eisma
Vial-Massat	Le Grand

**7. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day of the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 6th December 1989, at 11 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Scheer Soell Unland	MM. <i>Maris</i> (de Jong) <i>Verbeek</i> (Nijpels) Tummers
MM. Adriaensens <i>Eicher</i> (Biefnot) Pécriaux Uyttendaele	Italy	
France	MM. Caccia <i>Fassino</i> (Fioret) Gabbuggiani <i>Stegagnini</i> (Intini) <i>Rubner</i> (Kessler) Malfatti Pieralli Sarti	United Kingdom
MM. Beix Caro Fillon <i>Masseret</i> (Fourré) <i>Valleix</i> (Galley) Pontillon Vial-Massat	Luxembourg	MM. Cox Ewing Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Mr. Hardy Mrs. <i>Roe</i> (Hill) Mr. Jessel Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Sir Russell Johnston) Earl of Kinnoull MM. Morris Parry Lord <i>Newall</i> (Sir William Shelton) Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir John Stokes Mr. Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mr. Regenwetter	
MM. <i>Steiner</i> (Ahrens) <i>Bindig</i> (Antretter) Eich Hitschler <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) Müller Niegel	Netherlands	
	Mr. Aarts Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Mrs. Haas-Berger)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Pecchioli Rodotà Rubbi Sinesio
MM. Derycke Kempinaire Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Böhm Büchner Irmer Kittelmann Mrs. Luuk MM. Reddemann von Schmude Wulff	
France	Italy	Netherlands
MM. Bassinet Baumel Collette Durand Forni Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Oehler Seitlinger Thyraud	MM. Filetti Martino Mezzapesa Natali Parisi	MM. Eversdijk Stoffelen
		United Kingdom
		MM. Coleman Garrett

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 474

*on WEU in the single European market -
reply to the half-yearly report of the Council*

I

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the Single European Act is in harmony with the principles and aims set out in the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly in its preamble and Articles I and II, and considering that the respective responsibilities of WEU and the European Community are complementary;
- (ii) Considering that the creation of a single European market raises problems of security for the WEU member countries to which they will have to find concerted solutions;
- (iii) Noting that the European Commission has set up a service to deal with security and defence questions but that the prospect of the development of relations between the European Community and several neutral countries or non-members of the Atlantic Alliance should deter the Community from handling such matters which, in any case, fall within the competence of WEU under the modified Brussels Treaty which has not been superseded and which are of greater importance because of recent political developments in Europe;
- (iv) Considering that the Atlantic Alliance remains the basis of European security but that the rôle played by Europe in the alliance should be re-examined,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Instruct a working group to conduct, in consultation with the European Commission, a detailed study of the problems that will arise for the security of member states when frontier controls are abolished and report to the Assembly on its conclusions;
2. Study carefully the disparities that will arise in the single European market due to the present difference between the burdens imposed on member states by their defence policies with a view to finding a remedy;
3. With the European Commission, set up a joint working group to prepare a list of products and technologies which, if released to third countries, might jeopardise world peace, the aim being to ban any such action by member countries, and endeavour to promote the same rules among other exporting countries;
4. Seek better methods so that, wherever possible, specifications and requirements may be harmonised and agreed in joint programmes, thus facilitating an effective co-ordinated European approach;
5. Examine procedures in the various member countries for placing orders for the armed forces with industrial firms with a view to achieving a unified approach;
6. In the same context, examine the obligations of staff employed by industries manufacturing partly or solely for defence purposes.

II

Furthermore, the Assembly,

- (i) Considering with regret that the Council does not make sufficient use of its statutory means of pursuing a dialogue with the Assembly;
- (ii) Considering in particular the delay in replying to Recommendation 467;
- (iii) Noting with satisfaction that, in its reply to Recommendation 472, the Council renewed its undertaking to report to the Assembly on all aspects of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty,

even when this is done in other forums, but noting that it has given no information about the activities of the European Commission in defence matters;

(iv) Welcoming the fact that the Secretary-General's address in Brussels on 21st September 1989 provided interesting information on the state of the reactivation of WEU, but regretting that the Assembly has not yet received an official communication of the same standard;

(v) Considering that the Council's requirements in respect of the management of the Assembly's supplementary budget would, if carried into effect, be detrimental to the principle of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy and the responsibilities of the President of the Assembly as defined in the Financial Regulations;

(vi) Welcoming the steps taken by the Council in 1989 to allow more in-depth thinking by the administration of member countries on keeping the public informed and on artificial intelligence and the pursuit of European sessions of defence studies,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Use its statutory means to give the Assembly precise, full information on its structures, work and plans so as to allow a true dialogue;
2. Give priority to the Assembly when communicating such information;
3. Enable the Assembly to take part in its thinking on the tasks to be attributed to the future institute;
4. Take no measures that may involve relations between the new institute and the Assembly without securing the latter's prior agreement;
5. Respect the principle of the Assembly's budgetary autonomy in the conditions that the Council itself laid down in 1987;
6. Inform the Assembly of the measures taken in the European Community to allow the European Commission to study security and defence questions;
7. Continue to associate the Assembly with the seminars and colloquies that it organises;
8. Examine in what conditions and in which framework a European centre for preventing military risks might be set up and inform the Assembly of the conclusions of its study.

RECOMMENDATION 475***on European security and events in the Near and Middle East***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling its Recommendations 349 and 403;
- (ii) Considering that Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty gives the WEU Council competence to examine threats to international peace in the Near and Middle East;
- (iii) Welcoming the Council's reply to Recommendation 472 which reaffirms its intention to report on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty, even when this is carried out in a framework other than WEU, in accordance with Article II of the treaty;
- (iv) Recalling the action taken by WEU in 1988 to restore freedom of navigation in the Gulf;
- (v) Expressing its satisfaction at:
 - (a) the continuation of the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq;
 - (b) the suspension of fighting in Beirut;
- (vi) Aware of the important consequences of the meeting of sixty-two members of the Lebanese Parliament on the initiative of the committee formed by Morocco, Algeria and Saudi Arabia to:
 - (a) work out a political and institutional solution allowing the various communities to cohabit peacefully;
 - (b) assert the integrity, sovereignty and independence of the Lebanese state, freed of interference and foreign military presence;
- (vii) Condemning unreservedly the assassination of President René Moawad of Lebanon;
- (viii) Condemning the taking of hostages, their detention and terrorism in all its forms;
- (ix) Expressing the strongest concern that no general peace process has yet been started in the Middle East in spite of the action that the international community has been taking for a long time through:
 - (a) United Nations resolutions;
 - (b) recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe;
 - (c) European Community declarations;
 - (d) diplomatic action by the superpowers;
 - (e) the good will shown by the Arab countries at their recent summit meeting in Casablanca;
- (x) Strongly disapproving the new impetus given to the arms race by states in the region, particularly in regard to long-range aircraft, medium-range missiles and chemical and nuclear weapons:
 - (a) by firms, banks and experts from European Community countries;
 - (b) by agreements with and arms deliveries and military assistance from certain Western European countries, the Soviet Union, the United States and China,which are obviously contrary to the search for peaceful solutions to the conflicts causing bloodshed in the region;
- (xi) Gratified that the European Council has taken a major step to prevent its members contributing to the production of chemical weapons by countries in the region but regretting that the Western European countries have taken no collective steps to avoid the proliferation of other types of armaments such as medium- and long-range surface-to-surface missiles and nuclear weapons;
- (xii) Endorsing unreservedly the United Nations' decision to convene an international conference on peace in the Middle East;
- (xiii) Considering that, to ensure peace and stability in the region, it is essential to seek a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that guarantees the security of the state of Israel and the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland and to self-determination in the Gaza Strip and West Bank;
- (xiv) Recognising the will of the Palestinian people who for two years have been demonstrating, with the intifada movement, their refusal to accept the prolongation of the Israeli military occupation that started in 1967,

and condemning repression, attacks and any action that violates human rights and international conventions;

(xv) Considering that the start of a general peace process, and hence the convocation of an international conference on peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the United Nations, calls for a dialogue between the parties involved as a first step,

and assessing positively:

(a) the decisions taken by the Palestinian National Council in Algiers;

(b) the rejection of terrorism by the PLO;

(c) the PLO's explicit recognition of the state of Israel;

(d) the decisions taken at the Arab summit meeting in Casablanca;

(xvi) Considering further that the Israeli Government's plan for elections in the occupied territories, if accompanied by the necessary international guarantees and negotiated between all the parties involved, might provide an opportunity to start a dialogue which cannot be held without the PLO, which manifestly has the sympathy and support of the people of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,

and expressing its disappointment at the Israeli Government's rejection of the ten points completing the Shamir plan presented by Mr. Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt;

(xvii) Wishing constructive negotiations to be started without delay between a representative and credible Palestinian delegation and the Israeli Government,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I

1. Confirm that it is fully prepared:
 - (a) to respond to any request aimed at encouraging the consolidation of the military truce, the resumption of civilian life and normal air and sea traffic in Lebanon;
 - (b) to support the action taken by Morocco, Algeria and Saudi Arabia;
 - (c) to support current efforts in Lebanon to:
 - restore peaceful cohabitation among the communities;
 - reform the institutions;
 - re-establish state authority;
 - enable all foreign troops to be withdrawn;
 - guarantee the integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon;
2. Take immediate steps to halt the arms race in the Middle East, particularly in regard to chemical and nuclear weapons, missiles and long-range aircraft and to this end:
 - (a) stop the implementation of contracts for supplies of arms and take various measures, co-ordinated between governments, to prevent firms, banks and research centres from evading control, as has already been the case;
 - (b) propose that all states, in particular the Soviet Union, China, the United States, South Africa and Brazil, adopt a similar approach;
 - (c) exert pressure on the Arab states and Israel to accept a freeze on and verification of their military potential and the progressive elimination of chemical and nuclear weapons with a view to the international conference on peace in the Middle East which will have to consider special negotiations on the reduction of armaments following the political agreements reached and as an essential guarantee of the security of all states in the region;
3. Draw up a list of products and technologies which member countries would undertake not to deliver to any Near or Middle East country and seek the endorsement of the other arms exporting countries for such a decision;
4. Ensure in particular that member states do not authorise the export to any country in the region of:
 - (a) chemical products on the list given in the European Council regulation of 20th February 1989;

- (b) technology necessary for the development of medium- and long-range surface-to-surface missiles;
- 5. Reaffirm its resolve to preserve freedom of navigation on all seas;
- 6. Announce here and now that member countries are prepared to co-ordinate the action of their armed forces:
 - (a) for humanitarian operations and international police duties at the request of the United Nations;
 - (b) with the agreement of the parties directly concerned, for guaranteeing the implementation of bi- or multilateral agreements concluded by the international conference on peace in the Middle East, or even earlier through direct negotiations between the parties to the conflict;

II

Urge member states to take action in the European Council to ensure acceptance of United Nations resolutions on Palestine and Lebanon and:

- (a) Intensify diplomatic action to promote peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq based on the full acceptance of United Nations Resolution 598;
- (b) Follow up the Assembly's earlier recommendation to give substantial assistance to Kurdish refugees and insist on respect for human rights and recognition of the cultural and administrative independence of the Kurdish people in the various states in which they live;
- (c) Recommend that member states increase, directly or in the framework of the European Community, their humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people of the Gaza Strip and West Bank whose living conditions are deteriorating from day to day;
- (d) Persevere with approaches to each state capable of exercising influence to bring about the release of all the hostages taken on Lebanese territory and the international fight against all forms of terrorism;
- (e) In any event, promote the meeting of the international conference on peace in the Middle East which only Israel and Iran are now refusing and, to this end:
 - (i) ask the Soviet Union to renew normal diplomatic relations with Israel;
 - (ii) ask the United States to raise the level of their contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organisation;
 - (iii) ask the United Nations General Assembly to stop equating Zionism with racism as approved in one of its resolutions;
 - (iv) ask the United Nations Security Council to adopt a resolution in favour of the Palestinians' right to self-determination;
- (f) Ask the Israeli Government:
 - (i) to stop its repressive action in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which has already caused several hundred deaths;
 - (ii) to abandon all practices that are prejudicial to human rights;
 - (iii) to respect the property of the population of the occupied territories;
 - (iv) to allow Palestinian universities to be reopened;
- (g) Ask the Israeli Government to agree to a dialogue with the PLO and negotiations with a credible and representative Palestinian delegation with a view to holding free elections in the occupied territories;
- (h) Ask Israel's neighbouring Arab states and the PLO to exercise their influence and vigilance in halting infiltrations of armed groups into Israeli territory;
- (i) Together with the Council of Europe and the European Community – which can place at the service of peace in the Middle East its great economic potential and vast wealth of supranational experience – take the necessary steps to define a truly Western European peace initiative with a view to:
 - (i) backing up the diplomatic effort by the United States and the Soviet Union;
 - (ii) helping to terminate the present dangerous status quo;
 - (iii) fostering an international conference on peace in the Middle East under the aegis of the United Nations.

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 6th December 1989

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1198 and addendum*).
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1194 and addendum*).
3. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe (*Presentation of and debate on the draft order of the Political Committee, Doc. 1212 and amendment*)

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 11.05 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget,
Doc. 1198 and addendum)*

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Lord, Niegel, Eicher and Morris.

The debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990.

The draft budget was agreed to.

Speaker (explanation of vote): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

*(Presentation of and vote on the motion of the Committee
on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration to approve the final accounts,
Doc. 1194 and addendum)*

The motion of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the motion to approve the final accounts for the financial year 1988.

The motion was agreed to.

The sitting was suspended at 11.55 a.m. and resumed at 12.10 p.m.

5. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe

*(Presentation of and debate on the draft order
of the Political Committee, Doc. 1212 and amendment)*

The draft order was presented by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-Chairman of the committee.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Niegel, Speed, Lord, Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Eicher and Baumel.

The debate was adjourned.

6. Change in the order of business

The President proposed a change in the order of business.

The change in the order of business was agreed to.

7. Change in the membership of a committee

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the appointment of Mr. Parry as an alternate

member of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Niegel Scheer	MM. <i>Maris</i> (de Jong) <i>Verbeek</i> (Nijpels) Stoffelen Tummers
MM. Adriaensens <i>Eicher</i> (Biefnot) <i>Noerens</i> (Derycke) Kempinaire Pécriaux Uyttendaele	Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (von Schmude) MM. Soell Unland	
	Italy	United Kingdom
France	MM. Caccia <i>Spitella</i> (Fioret) <i>Fassino</i> (Intini) <i>Stegagnini</i> (Martino) Pieralli Sarti	MM. Coleman Cox Ewing Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Garrett Hardy Mrs. <i>Roe</i> (Hill) Mr. Jessel Sir Russell Johnston MM. <i>Ward</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) Morris Parry Lord <i>Newall</i> (Sir William Shelton) Sir Dudley Smith MM. Speed <i>Lord</i> (Sir John Stokes) Mr. Wilkinson
MM. Bassinet Baumel Caro Durand <i>Lagorce</i> (Forni) <i>Masseret</i> (Fourré) <i>Pistre</i> (Oehler) Pontillon	Luxembourg Mrs. <i>Polfer</i> (Goerens) Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mr. Regenwetter	
Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands Mr. Eversdijk Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Mrs. Haas-Berger)	
Mr. <i>Steiner</i> (Ahrens) Mrs. <i>Hoffmann</i> (Böhm) Mrs. <i>Blunck</i> (Büchner) MM. Eich <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) Mrs. Luuk		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Malfatti Mezzapesa Natali Parisi Pecchioli Rodotà Rubbi Sinesio
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	MM. Antretter Hitschler Irmer Kittelmann Müller Reddemann Wulff	
France	Italy	Netherlands
MM. Beix Collette Fillon Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Seitlinger Thyraud Vial-Massat	MM. Filetti Gabbuggiani Kessler	Mr. Aarts

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 6th December 1989

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Coëme, Minister of Defence of Belgium.
2. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe (*Resumed debate and vote on the draft order of the Political Committee, Doc. 1212 and amendment*).
3. Force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) – reply to the annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1204 and amendment*).
4. Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom) (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Doc. 1207*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Coëme, Minister of Defence of Belgium

Mr. Coëme, Minister of Defence of Belgium, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Coëme answered questions put by MM. Péciaux, De Decker, Caro, Jessel and Eicher.

4. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe

(Resumed debate and vote on the draft order of the Political Committee, Doc. 1212 and amendment)

The debate was resumed.

Speaker: Mr. Ward.

Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Stegagnini, Wilkinson, Mrs. Francese and Mrs. Luuk.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: Mr. Ewing, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Sir Russell Johnston and Mr. De Decker.

The debate was closed.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft order.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Speed and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg:

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft order, before "peaceful" insert "just,".

The amendment was agreed to unanimously.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft order.

The amended draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 73)¹.

5. Force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) – reply to the annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1204 and amendment)

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. Steiner, Rapporteur.

¹ See page 36.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Speed, Klejdzinski and Hardy.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Steiner, Rapporteur, and Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. De Decker and Mr. Noerens:

1. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, insert "by the two super-powers".

The amendment was not moved.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 476)¹.

6. Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom)

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Technological and Aerospace
Committee, Doc. 1207)*

The report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee was presented by Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Lagorce and Klejdzinski.

The debate was adjourned.

7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day of the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 7th December 1989, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.

¹. See page 37.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Mrs. Luuk MM. Scheer Unland	MM. <i>Maris</i> (de Jong) <i>Verbeek</i> (Nijpels) Stoffelen
MM. Adriaensens <i>Eicher</i> (Biefnot) <i>Noerens</i> (Derycke) Kempinaire Pécriaux	Italy	
Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Uyttendaele	MM. Caccia <i>Fassino</i> (Fioret) <i>Rubner</i> (Kessler) Malfatti	United Kingdom
France	Mrs. <i>Francesca</i> (Pecchioli) MM. Pieralli <i>Stegagnini</i> (Sinesio)	MM. Coleman Cox Ewing <i>Rathbone</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Thompson</i> (Garrett) Hardy Jessel Sir Russell Johnston Earl of Kinnoull Mr. Morris Sir Dudley Smith
MM. Beix Caro <i>Lagorce</i> (Forni) Gouteyron Thyraud	Luxembourg	MM. Speed <i>Ward</i> (Sir John Stokes) Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette	
MM. <i>Steiner</i> (Ahrens) Eich <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz)	Netherlands	
	Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Mrs. Haas-Berger)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

France	MM. Hitschler Irmer Kittelmann Müller Niegel Reddemann von Schmude Soell Wulff	Luxembourg
MM. Bassinet Baumel Collette Durand Fillon Fourré Galley Jeambrun Jung Oehler Pontillon Seitlinger Vial-Massat	Italy	Mr. Regenwetter
Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Filetti Gabbuggiani Intini Martino Mezzapesa Natali Parisi Rodotà Rubbi Sarti	Netherlands
MM. Antretter Böhm Büchner		MM. Aarts Eversdijk Tummers
		United Kingdom
		MM. Hill Parry Sir William Shelton

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

ORDER 73***on the establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting with satisfaction the measures taken by the Soviet Union and several Central and Eastern European countries to:
- ensure greater respect for individual freedoms and human rights;
 - promote free expression of opinions, a free choice for the electorate and the development of a certain degree of political pluralism;
 - facilitate the free movement of persons;
 - allow freedom of information;
- (ii) In particular, welcoming with joy the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons in Berlin on 9th November 1989;
- (iii) Further welcoming the progress made towards agreements on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and conventional weapons;
- (iv) Gratified that, on 13th November, the Council held "a detailed exchange of views on the latest developments in Eastern Europe, particularly in the German Democratic Republic";
- (v) Considering that it is for the Assembly to consider without delay the new prospects these developments offer for organising peace, security and co-operation in Europe and to clarify the rôle of WEU at this new juncture,

CONSIDERS

1. That these rapid developments are likely to attenuate considerably the division of Europe that has existed since the end of the second world war and speed up "the establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe" in accordance with the aim the members of the Atlantic Alliance set themselves in December 1967;

DECIDES

2. To hold an extraordinary session during the first quarter of 1990 to examine the prospects stemming from developments in Central and Eastern Europe for the establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order in Europe;

INSTRUCTS THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE

3. To present a report to it on this subject.

RECOMMENDATION 476***on force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) –
reply to the annual report of the Council***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that the signing of the INF treaty in 1987 brought about a change in East-West relations, particularly in regard to the arms limitation process, which encourages the adoption of further disarmament measures;
- (ii) Welcoming the fact that the INF agreement generally improved the East-West atmosphere, thus making a decisive contribution to establishing confidence between the great powers;
- (iii) Aware that this agreement provides, in the form of inspections, for the most searching and extensive verification measures that have ever existed and that experience thus gained might make a valuable contribution to the conclusion of future agreements on other types of armaments;
- (iv) Considering that it is essential for the arms limitation and disarmament process to be continued step by step in Europe and worldwide;
- (v) Considering that the dynamism generated by the INF treaty should be exploited with determination to achieve the control of armaments and further reductions;
- (vi) Stressing the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union in the conclusion of a convention on a global ban on chemical weapons and of a START agreement providing for a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons;
- (vii) Welcoming the announcement by Secretary-General Gorbachev in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on 7th December 1988 that unilateral arms reductions would be made, subsequent to which the other Warsaw Pact countries (with the exception of Romania) also announced that they would unilaterally reduce forces and arms in the next two years;
- (viii) Endorsing unreservedly President Bush's disarmament initiative at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels on 29th May 1989 which is likely to lead to decisive progress in the conventional disarmament process;
- (ix) Supporting in particular the inclusion of combat aircraft and helicopters in the first series of negotiations on conventional disarmament and the West's offer to reduce troop levels significantly;
- (x) Considering that the series of proposals made by the NATO member countries in Vienna on 22nd September 1989, completing important aspects of the western proposals of 13th July 1989, is particularly likely to foster the establishment of a peaceful order in Europe based on mutual confidence and joint security;
- (xi) Concerned that the problem of short-range (less than 500 km) missiles, particularly important for Western Europe because of the deployment, range and numerical superiority of Soviet missiles, is not yet the subject of negotiations;
- (xii) Considering that the WEU member countries' security interests can be defended only in the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance but that in future they must be harmonised more consistently;
- (xiii) Welcoming the French Prime Minister's proposal of 7th September 1989 that WEU should start a specific programme of immediate co-operation with regard to verification and disarmament;
- (xiv) Pleased that the Council in its reply to Recommendation 470 is considering a WEU contribution to the CFE verification system, emphasising "the exploitation of European capabilities and the pooling of member states' assets",

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Strongly insist on a change in the alliance's priorities as defined by the NATO ministers for foreign affairs in Reykjavik in June 1987, i.e. in particular:
 - (a) a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons;
 - (b) a worldwide ban on chemical weapons;

- (c) the establishment of a stable global conventional balance through the elimination of inequalities and reductions in troop levels and arms;
- (d) significant, verifiable reductions in United States and Soviet shorter-range land-based nuclear forces;

and to act in this manner whenever possible;

2. Take up the proposal made by the French Prime Minister on 7th September 1989 and prepare a WEU programme for purposeful verification and disarmament co-operation;
3. Take appropriate initiatives to exert pressure for results to be achieved quickly in the CFE negotiations so as to allow the immediate resumption of the SNF negotiations;
4. Work out here and now the prior conditions necessary in the conceptual field for SNF negotiations to be resumed without delay after the implementation of the first CFE agreement;
5. In the framework of the CFE negotiations, take steps to obtain a verified halt in the production of new generations of conventional weapons;
6. In view of the favourable progress in the CFE negotiations, endeavour to halt the development and stationing of new nuclear weapons in Europe;
7. Seek at least a verified ban on chemical weapons in Europe if the agreement proposed by President Bush at the United Nations General Assembly on 25th September 1989 on the conclusion of an international treaty banning chemical weapons is not concluded by 1990.

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 7th December 1989

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom) (*Resumed debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1207 and amendment*).
2. Western European security: defence implications of the People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1203 and amendments*).
3. Address by Mr. Vitalone, Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
4. Western European security: defence implications of the People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation (*Resumed debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1203 and amendments*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom)

(Resumed debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1207 and amendment)

The debate was resumed.

Speakers: MM. Rathbone, Caccia and Sir Russell Johnston.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur, and Mr. Stegagnini, Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Rathbone and others:

1. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert "and for worldwide co-operation in controlling the supply of munitions and of industrial goods with military applications to terrorist groups".

Speaker: Mr. Rathbone.

An oral amendment to the amendment was moved by Mr. Rathbone to leave out "controlling" and insert "preventing".

Speaker: Mr. Stegagnini.

The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 477)¹.

4. Western European security: defence implications of the People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation

(Presentation of the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1203 and amendments)

The report of the Defence Committee was presented by Mr. Cox, Rapporteur.

5. Address by Mr. Vitalone, Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy

Mr. Vitalone, Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Vitalone answered questions put by MM. Tummers, Stegagnini and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

1. See page 42.

**6. Western European security:
defence implications of the People's
Republic of China's evolving
geopolitical situation**

*(Debate on the report of the Defence Committee
and vote on the draft
recommendation, Doc. 1203 and amendments)*

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

*Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the
Assembly, took the Chair.*

Speaker: Mr. Fassino.

The debate was closed.

Speaker (point of order): Sir Dudley Smith.

Mr. Cox, Rapporteur, and Sir Dudley Smith, Chairman of the committee, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Bindig and others:

2. At the end of paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert: "and pointing out that all member states of the United Nations, by their membership of that organisation, have solemnly committed themselves before the international community to respect in the conduct of their internal affairs the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights".

Speakers: Mrs. Luuk and Mr. Cox.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Bindig and others:

3. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert the following new paragraph:

"(iv) Considering that the essential aim of the Chinese Government to promote the country's economic and social development can be achieved only if civil and political rights are developed to the same extent;"

Speaker: Mr. Cox.

The amendment was negatived.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Bindig and others:

4. At the beginning of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph:

"1. Request the Chinese Government to accede to the two Human Rights Covenants of the United Nations, i.e., the International Covenant on Civic and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;"

and renumber the following paragraphs accordingly.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Pontillon and others:

1. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add "in accordance with the objectives fixed at the time of the Paris conference in August 1989".

Speakers: Mr. Pontillon and Sir Dudley Smith.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 478)¹.

**7. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 2 p.m.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Pontillon.

The sitting was closed at 12.15 p.m.

¹. See page 43.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	MM. Eich <i>Klejdzinski (Holtz)</i>	MM. <i>Maris (de Jong)</i> Stoffelen Tummers
MM. Adriaensens <i>Noerens (Derycke)</i> <i>Cauwenberghs</i> (Péciaux)	Mrs. Luuk Mr. Unland	
Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Uyttendaele	Italy	United Kingdom
	MM. Caccia <i>Fassino (Filetti)</i> Pieralli <i>Stegagnini (Sinesio)</i>	MM. Coleman Cox Ewing <i>Lord</i> (Dame Peggy Fenner) Sir Geoffrey Finsberg
France		MM. Garrett Hardy Mrs. <i>Roe (Hill)</i> Sir Russell Johnston Earl of Kinnoull
MM. Caro Collette <i>Masseret (Fourré)</i> Pontillon Thyraud Vial-Massat	Luxembourg	MM. Morris <i>Lambie (Parry)</i> Sir William Shelton Sir Dudley Smith Mr. Speed Sir <i>John Hunt</i> (Sir John Stokes) Mr. <i>Rathbone (Wilkinson)</i>
	Mrs. Lentz-Cornette Mr. Regenwetter	
Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands	
MM. Antretter Böhm Büchner	Mr. Eversdijk Mrs. <i>Baarveld-Schlaman</i> (Mrs. Haas-Berger)	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. Malfatti Martino Mezzapesa Natali Parisi Pecchioli Rodotà Rubbi Sarti
MM. Biefnot Kempinaire	MM. Ahrens Hitschler Irmer Kittelmann Müller Niegel Reddemann Scheer von Schmude Soell Wulff	
France		Netherlands
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Durand Fillon Forni Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Oehler Seitlinger	Italy	MM. Aarts Nijpels
	MM. Fioret Gabbuggiani Intini Kessler	United Kingdom
		Mr. Jessel

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 477***on the future of the Co-ordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom)***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that the technology gap between the western alliance and the Soviet bloc in sophisticated weaponry has narrowed in recent years;
- (ii) Confirming the continued need to protect advanced western defence technology through Cocom until arms control and reduction, confidence-building and enhanced security over a reasonable period of time justify that need being reviewed;
- (iii) Concerned at past violations of Cocom rules which have led to a serious transfer of strategic technology to proscribed countries, thus enhancing Soviet offensive capability in vital areas at the expense of western security;
- (iv) Concerned at variations in methods of enforcing export controls between Cocom member states;
- (v) Noting the concern of WEU member states at United States extra-territorial claims which effectively discourage exports of non-sensitive technology;
- (vi) Acknowledging the complaints of western high-technology companies that Cocom rules prevent them from taking advantage of valuable trading opportunities, including joint ventures in the Soviet bloc;
- (vii) Welcoming the improvements in Cocom review procedures in recent years, which have reduced the list of sensitive items, but fearing that they may still not be keeping up with the pace of progress in technology;
- (viii) Aware of President Gorbachev's appeal to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 6th July 1989 to rescind the Cocom rules;
- (ix) Noting requests to grant exceptions to Cocom rules for Hungary and Poland and the Soviet request for closer co-operation with the West on the development of new technologies,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call for

1. A fundamental reassessment of the current state of Soviet technology;
2. A complete review of the Cocom lists in the light of this reassessment, with a view to encouraging maximum opportunities for trade and for worldwide co-operation in preventing the supply of munitions and of industrial goods with military applications to terrorist groups;
3. Common export and re-export controls and common enforcement policies in the Cocom member countries;
4. Negotiations with proscribed countries for the introduction of on-site verification procedures to accompany all future sales of western strategic technology where appropriate in return for the further liberalisation of the Cocom list;
5. The forthcoming conference on economic co-operation in Europe, to be held in Bonn from 19th March to 11th April 1990, to be used for a discussion of high-technology trade between East and West and the rôle of Cocom in that framework;
6. The establishment of a committee of experts within the CSCE framework which should make recommendations for the sharing of high technology between East and West.

RECOMMENDATION 478***on Western European security: defence implications of the People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the inalienable right of the Chinese Government and people to conduct their own internal affairs but nevertheless considerably shocked and saddened by the events in Beijing and other major cities in May and June 1989, as well as by subsequent violations of human rights and pointing out that all member states of the United Nations, by their membership of that organisation, have solemnly committed themselves before the international community to respect in the conduct of their internal affairs the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- (ii) Noting the rôle played by China in maintaining a world balance and contributing to peaceful international relations;
- (iii) Considering that, insofar as the interests of China and of Western Europe converge in many areas, they should therefore continue to be developed independently of ideological and institutional differences, provided human rights are respected;
- (iv) Considering that the essential aim of the Chinese Government is still the country's economic and social development;
- (v) Welcoming the development of the Chinese economy and of exchanges of all kinds between China and Western Europe, while regretting the absence of a parallel improvement in the political situation;
- (vi) Welcoming the convergence between diplomatic action by Western European countries and by China to seek a solution to ensure Cambodian independence;
- (vii) Noting that events in China have caused concern among the residents of Hong Kong and Macau about their future, and noting also that the Chinese Government has undertaken to guarantee their rights and safety;
- (viii) Noting that for many years the Chinese have occupied Tibet and denied the Tibetan people their human rights,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Request the Chinese Government to accede to the two Human Rights Covenants of the United Nations, i.e. the International Covenant on Civic and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
2. Ensure that member countries continue firmly to express their disapproval of the measures of repression and restriction of freedom taken by China in 1989, possibly resuming regular consultations with the Government of the People's Republic of China on matters relating to the maintenance of world peace;
3. Invite member governments, in time, given the conditions laid down in paragraph 1, to proceed to develop political, technological, economic, commercial and cultural relations with the People's Republic of China;
4. Take the necessary initiatives to seek a convergence of views between member countries and the People's Republic of China on arms control and disarmament, particularly by ensuring that the negotiations on arms limitations in Europe do not lead to an increase in forces and arms deployed in Asia;
5. Pursue among member governments the possibility of concerting a policy designed to lay the foundations for lasting peace in Eastern Asia in order to maintain the independence of Cambodia in accordance with the objectives fixed at the time of the Paris conference in August 1989.

THIRTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 7th December 1989

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <p>1. Western European Union's information policy (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1205 and amendment</i>).</p> | <p>2. Western European Union (draft of a new booklet) (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1206</i>).</p> |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 2 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Western European Union's information policy

(Presentation of the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1205 and amendment)

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Sir William Shelton, Rapporteur.

Mr. Pontillon, Chairman of the committee, spoke.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft order.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Eisma:

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft order, add a new paragraph:

“(v) Noting that the seats of the Assembly and the Council of WEU are not in the same location as the press agencies specialising in defence matters;”.

The amendment was not moved.

Speakers (point of order): Mr. Pontillon and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 74)¹.

3. Western European Union (draft of a new booklet)

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1206)

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Caro.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Pontillon, Chairman of the committee, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 75)².

Speaker (explanation of vote): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

4. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were referred to the Presidential Committee for adoption.

5. Close of the session

The President declared the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly closed.

The sitting was closed at 2.50 p.m.

1. See page 46.

2. See page 47.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
Mr. <i>Cauwenberghs</i> (Péciaux)	MM. Antretter Unland	MM. <i>Maris</i> (de Jong) Stoffelen Tummers
Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Uyttendaele		
	Italy	United Kingdom
	Mr. <i>Stegagnini</i> (Sinesio)	Mr. Coleman Sir Geoffrey Finsberg Sir Russell Johnston Sir William Shelton Sir <i>John Hunt</i> (Sir John Stokes)
France	Luxembourg	
MM. Caro Pontillon	Mr. Regenwetter	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Eich Hitschler Holtz Irmer Kittelmann Mrs. Luuk MM. Müller Niegel Reddemann Scheer von Schmude Soell Wulff	Luxembourg
MM. Adriaensens Biefnot Derycke Kempinaire		Mrs. Lentz-Cornette
France	Italy	Netherlands
MM. Bassinet Baumel Beix Collette Durand Fillon Forni Fourré Galley Gouteyron Jeambrun Jung Oehler Seitlinger Thyraud Vial-Massat	MM. Caccia Filetti Fioret Gabbuggiani Intini Kessler Malfatti Martino Mezzapesa Natali Parisi Pecchioli Pieralli Rodotà Rubbi Sarti	MM. Aarts Eversdijk Mrs. Haas-Berger Mr. Nijpels
Federal Republic of Germany		United Kingdom
MM. Ahrens Böhm Büchner		MM. Cox Ewing Dame Peggy Fenner MM. Garrett Hardy Hill Jessel Earl of Kinnoull MM. Morris Parry Sir Dudley Smith MM. Speed Wilkinson

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

ORDER 74***on Western European Union's information policy***

The Assembly,

- (i) Stressing the importance of public opinion in the pursuit of a sound European security and defence policy;
- (ii) Considering, however, that the degree of public opinion's awareness of Western Europe's defence and security requirements leaves much to be desired;
- (iii) Noting that WEU's rôle and activities are still hardly known to the wider public;
- (iv) Convinced that it cannot be left to the Assembly, the Secretary-General or the press to propagate knowledge of the organisation's work and posture but that the Council itself must make a much greater effort to inform public opinion,

INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE

1. In its contacts with the Council:
 - (a) to ask how the Council intends to improve the organisation's public relations effort following the WEU seminar on changes in public perceptions of European defence;
 - (b) to request that the Council inform the Assembly of the proposals the Secretary-General has made in this respect;
2. To ask the Council to place the problem of WEU's information policy on its agenda as a matter of urgency in order to consider specific initiatives such as:
 - (a) issuing press guidelines after meetings of the Permanent Council;
 - (b) preparing and publicising understandable basic information documents to be distributed widely in all member countries;
 - (c) creating a WEU periodical in the official languages of all member countries to circulate articles, communiqués and topical information on WEU's activities;
 - (d) establishing WEU information offices in European member countries of the alliance and in particular in the United States and Canada;
 - (e) creating a logo for Western European Union, perhaps organised by a competition in member states;
 - (f) encouraging member governments to provide more information about WEU;
 - (g) defining the conditions for the organisation of opinion polls at European level;
 - (h) considering how to increase co-operation with existing relevant private groups, associations and institutes to promote interest in studies of Western European security questions;
 - (i) considering how to promote co-operation, debates and exchanges of views with social groups, industrial organisations, trade unions, cultural associations, schools and universities;
 - (j) increasing the use of the televised media for presenting WEU;
3. To ask the Council in view of the above considerations to grant the financial means needed for a WEU public information policy;
4. To remind the Council that the Assembly is prepared to discuss with the Council ways and means of co-operating in public relations activities, it being understood that the Assembly's independence will be strictly respected.

ORDER 75***on the draft of a new booklet on
Western European Union***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting the report on the draft of a new booklet on WEU submitted by its Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations;
- (ii) Considering that this text is an appropriate basis for the general information of parliamentarians and the public in member countries,

INSTRUCTS ITS COMMITTEE FOR PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

1. To ensure that a booklet based on the report submitted is published in the seven languages of the WEU member countries;
2. To ensure that the text of this booklet will be brought up to date in the event of major developments in WEU prior to its publication.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

SEVENTH SITTING

Monday, 4th December 1989

SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Adoption of the minutes.
Speaker (point of order): Mr. Speed.
4. Examination of credentials.
5. Observers.
6. Tribute.
7. Address by the President of the Assembly.
8. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.
9. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe (*Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1211*).
10. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session (Doc. 1193).
11. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe (*Debate and vote on the request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1211*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Ahrens.
12. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1208*).
13. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.
Replies by Mr. van Eekelen to questions put by: Mr. Pieralli, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Büchner, Mr. Ewing, Mr. Pontillon.
14. Revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and votes on the draft decisions, Doc. 1199 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (Chairman and Rapporteur), Mr. Sarti, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Eicher, Mr. Reddemann, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Reddemann.
15. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1201*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Caro (Rapporteur), Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Eisma, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Soell, Mr. Zaimis (Observer from Greece).
16. Changes in the membership of committees.
17. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.20 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Resumption of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

I declare resumed the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union which was adjourned on 8th June 1989 at the end of the sixth sitting.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

¹ See page 16.

3. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the sixth sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

I call Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. It would be for the efficiency of the Assembly and a courtesy to the members here if we could start on time. Many of us have been waiting here since 3 o'clock. When we have a starting time we should adhere to it wherever possible instead of starting twenty minutes late.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I apologise for the late start of the sitting.

4. *Examination of credentials*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of the new representatives and substitutes nominated since our Assembly's last part-session, whose names have been published in Notice No. 7.

In accordance with Rule 6(1) of the Rules of Procedure, these credentials have been attested by a statement of ratification from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Is there any objection to ratifying these credentials?...

The credentials are ratified by the Assembly.

I welcome our new parliamentary colleagues.

5. *Observers*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I now welcome to our debates the parliamentary observers from Denmark, Greece, Norway and Turkey together with those from Portugal and Spain who will, I hope, be taking their seats amongst us at our next session.

I also welcome the members of the Permanent Council present at this part-session.

6. *Tribute*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I regret to inform you of the death of Mr. Antonio Taramelli, member of the Italian Delegation and a representative since 1987.

I am also sorry to announce the death of two former members of the Assembly: Mr. Willem de Kwaadsteniet of the Netherlands, who was still with us at our June session, and Mr. Lucien Pignion, member of the French Delegation from 1973 to 1986, Chairman of that delegation from 1981 to 1986, former Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, who, as first Vice-President, performed the office of interim President of our Assembly.

On your behalf, I offer my condolences to their respective families.

7. *Address by the President of the Assembly*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ministers, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, our Assembly's session is being opened at a remarkable moment in the history of Europe.

Whereas it might have been thought, even a few weeks ago, that developments in Eastern Europe would proceed at a reasonable rate that would allow us progressively to adjust our policy to a new style of international relations, which we unreservedly welcome, events are now accelerating and all the firm ground on which we were thinking of anchoring our thinking has proved to be shifting and unsure. Although we rejoice at what is happening, we are finding it hard to keep foot in the torrent of changes in which we are seeking something certain to which to cling in order to try to influence a part of history over the driving power of which we have no control. In this address, I should have liked to try to mark out the channel WEU might follow in the coming years, but I shall have to confine myself to seeking a few points to which we can anchor ourselves in the short term.

The first remark that has to be made in this connection is that the structures that the western world has established for itself in the forty years now coming to an end have so far been remarkably resistant to the storm. Not so long ago challenged by the Soviet Union and its allies, NATO, the European Community and WEU have become, for them, interlocutors with whom a dialogue is sought, useful instruments for establishing a new European order and even models that they might follow. Moreover, in the West no one is thinking of sacrificing them for the achievement of new designs. I am very touched by the fact that our German friends, now that there seems to be every prospect of attaining their most legitimate national aims, are not thinking of leaving the Atlantic Alliance or the European Community or WEU in order to speed up the evolution for which they are hoping. Quite the contrary: in the ten points of the programme for restoring German unity that he presented on 28th November, Chancellor Kohl proposes making the Community the basis of truly European-wide unification, i.e. which does not stop at the Elbe. He believes, therefore, that there is no question of choosing between membership of the Community and the pursuit of a German policy but of inserting action to foster German reunification in a European process in which the Federal Republic's partners have a place. This obviously implies that they accept German aims and above all the firm decision not to use the treaties and institutions on which western solidarity is based to slow down the historic movement that we are now experiencing.

We shall be even less tempted to do so since, for us too, these rapid changes offer an immense opportunity to put an end to the artificial division of Europe and to organise a peaceful international order allowing the reunification of the whole of our continent. We shall be able to do so not by terminating the existence of present poles of stability but, on the contrary, by

The President (continued)

strengthening them and using them for this purpose. As Mr. Gorbachev's latest declarations testify, this is what the Soviet Union, for its part, has undertaken to do. Whereas, until now, the Soviet Union had always presented the dissolution of the military pacts as a major aim of its disarmament policy, Mr. Gorbachev and those mainly responsible for Soviet foreign policy, while underlining their will to progress with the limitation of armaments, have recently issued warnings in their discussions against any attempt to dismantle the Warsaw Pact.

It is not surprising that, now that everyone can see the failure of communist ideology as forged in Stalin's day and as it remained, in spite of a few adjustments, until Mr. Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet leaders are wondering about the nature of their relations with the other Eastern European countries. Until now, it was solidarity between communist régimes, i.e. the monopoly or near-monopoly of power in the hands of parties loyal to Moscow, that really cemented relations between the Soviet Union and its allies. Unlike the Atlantic Alliance, the Warsaw Pact's only rôle was one of military integration and it was in the name of socialist solidarity that, in 1968, Mr. Brezhnev orchestrated the invasion of Czechoslovakia, although Mr. Dubcek's government had declared that it wished to remain in the pact. Today, it is the maintenance of communist parties at the head of states that is being called in question, in various ways, in many eastern countries. Conversely, far more than the solidarity of still uncertain régimes, it is now the pact that is the basis of relations between the Soviet Union and its allies. It is even believed that in Prague, in 1989, it is the presence of Soviet forces that led the leaders who took over in 1968 to capitulate without a fight in face of the popular demonstrations which they were tempted to repress. In any event, the Brezhnev doctrine is certainly dead.

In these new circumstances, we must see as clearly as possible what we can expect and hope of this transformation in Eastern Europe. Is it the reconstitution of national sovereign states unreservedly free in foreign policy and defence matters? Memories of Europe between 1920 and 1939 should put us on our guard against any such aspiration. Recent events remind us that national feelings are still strong in Eastern Europe. Frontiers may soon be challenged. National minorities are often oppressed. There is much tension. Only Soviet domination and the integration of national armies in the Warsaw Pact have so far prevented them from gaining enough momentum to threaten international peace. This means the military pacts in their present form are a useful structure for allowing a new European order to be established. Now is not the time to challenge them. It will come only

when other structures embracing both eastern and western countries emerge from the present chaos.

Thus, while the events in Budapest, Warsaw, Leipzig, Berlin and Prague have been, or may be, of crucial importance for the countries they concern and for Europe as a whole, they must not be exploited as blows against the Warsaw Pact. They are first and foremost the massive claim by entire nations for radical changes in their internal régimes. It is obvious that, inherent in these events, there is the hope that what, for more than forty years, has been an iron curtain will soon be removed. It is now probable that the changes in Eastern Europe are opening the door to what might be called a reunification of Europe, i.e. a renewal of exchanges of all kinds between countries belonging to the same civilisation and which, after a long period of ideological divorce imposed in 1945 by the Stalinist concept of Soviet security, are now calling for the social and political values which they tend to have in common. It is now probable that this evolution will allow ever closer co-operation in an increasing number of areas and it is even possible that such co-operation will lead to some degree of integration within joint bodies.

We must certainly not consider openings towards the East which privilege the Central European countries to the exclusion of the Soviet Union, which no longer aims or has the means to prevent an evolution to which it itself gave the green light. Conversely, no organisation of peace in Europe would be efficient without its participation. It is therefore essential to include it in any programme of assistance, investment and development of trade to help Eastern Europe. We should not forget that, while perestroika now seems to be facing many difficulties and its future is clouded in great uncertainty, the Soviets themselves, and we too, believe its success to be the condition for the establishment and stability of a new European order.

For the time being, WEU is not of course the forum in which such co-operation can be developed. As the organisation of European participation in the Atlantic Alliance, it has to meet the Soviet Union and its allies in the framework of negotiations aimed at guaranteeing the security of all concerned. Together with the Council of Europe, soon to open its doors to all Eastern European countries wishing to enter and which fulfil the conditions, and the Community, which will have to adapt itself to the new situation in order to develop and organise trade between the two parts of Europe in a manner that cannot yet be foreseen, WEU will probably appear to be the hard core of a Western Europe anxious not to allow its security to be compromised. For a long time to come, its rôle will be to maintain the conditions necessary for Europe to be able to

The President (continued)

play its rôle at the side of the United States in a defence system which will remain western and allow the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to play their full rôle in the process of détente and arms limitation, at least where conventional weapons are concerned. Since disarmament may well lead to a rebalancing of the respective shares of the Europeans and Americans in joint defence, it is by no means out of the question that the welcome evolution of our relations with the Soviet Union and its allies gives WEU an essential rôle in a Europe which will have to organise its security on new bases.

For these reasons, I propose that, in the coming months, we pursue the study which Mr. Pierre Harmel proposed to us at the Florence colloquy last March of the three main guidelines for a European security policy in the light of the new events. While, at the present session, we are to tackle the question of WEU's place in the single market Europe, I believe we shall have to examine our organisation's rôle in an Atlantic Alliance which will inevitably be transformed and also ask ourselves about WEU's vocation in a Europe in which the confrontation of ideologies is making way for true co-operation but in which the security of all can be really guaranteed only if a balance of forces is maintained, at what we hope will be the lowest possible level.

I think our Assembly has done what was necessary to take part in this great movement that is shaking Europe, first by developing exchanges of a remarkable standard with the Soviet Government, and in particular with the Supreme Soviet. When, last July, we received a delegation from the Soviet Parliament, newly-elected in conditions which showed that considerable progress had been made towards democracy, we decided by common agreement to continue such meetings. They have certainly already given us a better grasp of the magnitude of the transformation of minds in the Soviet Union and a better understanding of the Soviet approach to disarmament and the building of the common European house.

It was more difficult to draw up the agenda of the present session since, when this was done, it was impossible to foresee the extent and speed of the changes. I therefore welcome the fact that our colleague, Mr. Ahrens, has tabled a motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure to allow us to hold a first debate on the main topics of the day, with the possibility of resuming it in June on the basis of a more elaborate report. I also wish to congratulate our rapporteurs, in particular Mr. Caro and Mr. Atkinson, who have included all the new dimensions of the situation in their reports, thus allowing us to tackle questions which certainly

already existed from the new angle imposed by the transformation of Europe.

I must also pay tribute to the Council for likewise guiding its thoughts and work towards matters which concern the Europe of tomorrow, in particular by starting to study the consequences for European security of what we hope will be the early signing of the CFE agreement and studying how Western Europe can play a full part in verifying the application of that agreement. Only thus will Western Europe be able to exist in an area that is essential for its security and participate in one of the major structures of the future organisation of peace in Europe.

Nevertheless, I wish to put two questions to the Council because they seem to me to govern the future of relations between the Council and the Assembly and also the future of WEU as a structure in this peaceful order. Has the Council done everything in its power to ensure that the Assembly participates in its deliberations and decisions? Furthermore, has it made wise use of its time and efforts in regard to the changes that have to be made to the common house in Paris that accommodates the Assembly and some of the Council's dependent organs? I believe that other common house, which has to be built and not merely patched up, deserved more of its attention.

I would add that the Assembly was the first to ask for the creation of a European institute for security studies in WEU and the abolition of the agencies which the Council did not know how to use. It will therefore welcome unreservedly the decision taken by the ministers on 13th November. However, it expects the Council to treat the staff of the agencies, who are in no way to be blamed, in a manner that obviously conforms with the law but also demonstrates the generosity WEU must show towards persons who have served it well for so many years. Information the Council has given us in this connection compels me to remind it of something that should not need to be said.

It is in the hope that the present session will convince it of the good grounds for these remarks, because it will show the seriousness of our work and the standard of our debates, that I now propose to proceed with the agenda.

8. Election of a Vice-President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Following the change in the Netherlands Delegation, we must now proceed to the election of a Vice-President of the Assembly.

One nomination has been submitted in the prescribed form, that of Mr. Aarts.

The President (continued)

If the Assembly is unanimous, I propose that the election of this Vice-President be by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I therefore declare Mr. Aarts elected Vice-President of the Assembly.

The order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents in accordance with their age is as follows: Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Sarti, Mr. Aarts, Mr. Soell and Mr. Fourré.

9. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe

(Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1211)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have received from Mr. Ahrens and others a motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure on the establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe, Document 1211.

The request has been posted up and the text of the motion circulated.

The Assembly will decide on the request for urgent procedure after the adoption of the draft order of business which is the next item.

10. Adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session

(Doc. 1193)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the second part of the session, Document 1193.

Is there any objection to the draft order of business?...

The draft order of business is adopted.

11. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe

(Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1211)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now consider the request for urgent procedure on a motion for an order presented by Mr. Ahrens and others on the establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe, Document 1211.

I call Mr. Ahrens to speak to this request.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gen-

tlemen, in the last few weeks and months the political landscape in Europe has changed more than in any other period since the last war. We must not, therefore, allow this Assembly to pass without discussing the movements that are now in progress and their possible consequences. Obviously our comments can only be provisional, and much is bound to remain speculative. We should therefore debate the subject in plenary session as soon as possible on the basis of a sound report, which must, of course, be drawn up by the General Affairs Committee, as the committee responsible, but with the collaboration of the other committees of this Assembly, such as the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

We are tabling this motion with a request for urgent procedure to provide for an initial debate on recent events. On behalf of all those who have signed this motion, I ask you to accept our request, which will give us the opportunity for an in-depth debate on Wednesday.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Are you asking for the request for urgent procedure to be referred to committee? Will the General Affairs Committee be debating the matter tomorrow morning?

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the General Affairs Committee will be appointing the Rapporteur tomorrow morning. We want to submit the report to you as quickly as possible.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I asked you this question so as to decide on the subsequent voting procedure.

Does anyone wish to speak against the motion?...

I note that this is not the case.

What is the view of the Assembly on Mr. Ahrens's motion?...

I therefore declare his request to be in order.

The vote will take place later, after the first vote which is to follow our present debate.

As the order of business of this part-session is particularly full, I propose, in accordance with Rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, a limit of five minutes for speeches in all our debates, except in the case of committee chairmen and rapporteurs.

May I remind you that, in accordance with the same rule, the Assembly votes on this proposal without debate.

Is there any opposition?...

It is so decided.

12. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1208)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee on action by the Presidential Committee, Document 1208.

I call Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Vice-President of the Assembly and Rapporteur.

Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the Presidential Committee has been very active, both politically and administratively, in the last six months. In the political sphere it has had useful contacts with the Belgian presidency. More specifically, it has urged the Council to undertake a fresh evaluation of the European security situation in the light of the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe and the disarmament talks and agreements which are likely to emerge from the negotiations in Vienna in the foreseeable future.

Where the disarmament negotiations are concerned, the Presidential Committee has placed increasing emphasis on the importance of European participation in the verification of future agreements. WEU's institute for security studies, to be established at last, after protracted pressure from our Assembly, must play an important rôle in promoting a European identity in security matters. The President of our Assembly has pointed out to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers that close co-operation between the institute and the Assembly is essential.

In July of this year the Presidential Committee received a delegation from the newly-elected Supreme Soviet, who took part in very frank talks with the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and the Presidential Committee itself. We agreed that delegations from our Assembly and the Supreme Soviet should meet regularly from now on, at least once a year, alternately in Moscow and Paris, so that the political and military aspects of European security can be discussed.

On the administrative side, the Presidential Committee has been making preparations for this part-session. It has advocated an appropriate adjustment to the Assembly's physical and financial resources, as necessitated by the imminent accession of Spain and Portugal.

As regards the agenda for this part-session, the Presidential Committee has made provision for a debate under the urgent procedure, in view of the headlong pace of developments in Eastern Europe, which is to address the establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe. We have

just considered this motion for urgent procedure.

Furthermore, the Presidential Committee has had to remove the scheduled discussion of two reports from the agenda. Of course, this is not good for the balance of our debates and the President will be calling on the committees to make realistic proposals regarding the items on the agenda and ways of bringing their activities to a satisfactory conclusion on time.

As regards the observer status of Greece and Turkey in our Assembly, the Presidential Committee has decided that the size of the Greek and Turkish Delegations will be in proportion to the number of members these countries send to the Assembly of the Council of Europe, which means that Turkey will have seven observers and Greece four.

Regrettably, the ratification of the protocol concerning the accession of Spain and Portugal has continued to drag on. Despite the approaches made by the President of our Assembly to the countries in default, the procedure could not be completed before the beginning of this part-session. Nevertheless, we hope that the two new member states will have accepted by the end of the year. We certainly expect to be able to welcome the representatives of the Spanish and Portuguese parliaments as full members at the beginning of the next part-session. In the meantime, the Assembly has taken the necessary action to ensure that the delegations of Spanish and Portuguese observers can avail themselves now of the facilities provided under the Rules of Procedure for members of the Assembly. We wish to thank the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Mrs. Lalumière, for letting us use a room in the Council's building on the Avenue Kléber for this part-session. The Assembly's premises have yet to be adapted to meet the new requirements.

This brings me to the administrative matter that has most preoccupied the Presidential Committee in the past six months: the conversion of the Assembly's headquarters. I do not need to discuss the many hazards to which the draft supplementary budget for 1989 has been exposed since it was submitted to the Council in January of this year. At the moment the situation is that the latest version of this draft has been approved by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Presidential Committee, but only with a proviso, and has been forwarded to the Council with this proviso, which concerns the office space allocated to the member states' delegations, which the relevant committees consider inadequate. On 29th November 1989, the Council approved the draft, after amending it. To some extent the Council appears to be willing to take account of the reservations expressed by the Committee on

Mrs. Staels-Dompas (continued)

Budgetary Affairs and Administration, but without accepting the principle that delegations with the same number of members should have the same amount of office space. That, then, is the situation as regards the supplementary budget for 1989. It is now up to the Assembly to give its views.

The discussion on the conversion of the headquarters did not concern the budget alone: there was also a difference of opinion between the Council and the Assembly on decision-making powers, because the Council wanted all administrative actions relating to the execution of the work to be subject to its prior approval. The Presidential Committee regards this as an unacceptable infringement of the Assembly's autonomy with respect to the budget, since this work is, after all, included in the Assembly's budget. But a compromise has been reached: the Assembly will be in charge of the work, but certain actions must be approved by the Council or the presidency.

All these discussions have upset the planning of the building works, and since it may not be possible for the next part-session in June 1990 to be held here, the draft budget for 1990 includes the appropriations for a part-session elsewhere. However, these appropriations have been frozen for the time being because the Presidential Committee does not yet know whether the June part-session can be held here or not. The Council also approved the draft budget for 1990, with some amendments, on 29th November. It will be submitted to the Assembly during this part-session.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in the last six months the Presidential Committee has been obliged to focus most of its efforts on problems relating to WEU's internal organisation. Let us hope that these problems can now be quickly settled, so that the Presidential Committee can concentrate on the political dialogue with the Council on European security problems. This dialogue is of the utmost importance in view of the recent developments in Europe and the new tasks that WEU is expecting as a result.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank you, Madam Rapporteur.

The debate is open.

Does anyone wish to speak on the report presented by Mrs. Staels-Dompas?...

I think that the Assembly will agree to ratify the action of the Presidential Committee?...

Is there any objection?...

The action of the Presidential Committee is ratified.

13. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the speech by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary-General of WEU.

I welcome you, Mr. van Eekelen, and invite you to take the rostrum.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – It is with particular pleasure that I accept your invitation and come before you today to deliver the now traditional address by the Secretary-General.

The meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers on 13th November took place at a time of radical change in Europe. It was the first important meeting of ministers of Western European countries following the breaching of the Berlin wall. The Federal German Foreign and Defence Ministers participated from start to finish, briefing their colleagues on the implications of an extremely fast-moving situation.

I am happy that ministers have endorsed the approach I outlined to you during your previous session and gave the WEU working groups a dual mandate to study the post-CFE situation and European co-operation in the field of verification in order to adapt the European defence structures to the new realities.

Current events are in fact forcing us to abandon many of our increasingly out-of-date assumptions about East-West confrontation.

We are now witnessing not a new period of détente but a complete thaw, a profound and irreversible reappraisal which is already generating proposals for the reshaping of the European continent. Each day brings confirmation of the contagious spread of the values of individual freedom and self-determination which we have enjoyed for four decades. Fifteen years on from the signing of the Helsinki final act, we look on with pleasure as the people rise up to crown that achievement and force oligarchies, whose bankruptcy had long been evident, to step down. It is highspeed perestroika. En français, perestroika à grande vitesse – PGV.

The political opening towards Eastern Europe will be the more fruitful because our countries have stuck firmly to their resolve to maintain an adequate deterrent in the face of a disproportionate arsenal, in order to prevent any surprise attack and to negate any political blackmail based on the threat of the use of force.

European history has therefore entered a new phase which will doubtless not be the end of its history but its renaissance in which the other half of our continent will play its full part by harnessing the unique talents of its people. As President Mitterrand said in Strasbourg on 25th October last, "quand les peuples bougent, ils

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

décident". On one point, the Malta summit echoes Yalta: the implementation of point V of the final communiqué of 11th February 1945 which was intended as a declaration on liberated Europe and announced that governments meeting the wishes of the people should be elected.

Western Europe must spare no effort in helping to meet this political demand of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. The clear priority now is for Western Europe to support the political reforms under way, principally by means of conditional and selective economic aid geared to the creation of new enterprises and to the development of a market economy. An immediate improvement in the living conditions of the people concerned is in fact a prerequisite for consolidating the success of their democratic demands.

The process of overcoming the division of the continent is under way, its momentum the result of a consensus on fundamental political values. The cultural revolution shaking Eastern Europe in no way presupposes that frontiers will be challenged for the sake of outdated nationalism.

Recognition of the ethnic, linguistic and even religious identities is the best antidote to the resurgence of nationalist fever after so many years of ideological oppression. The only frontiers under threat are those of protectionism and prejudice.

The new order emerging in Europe is no accident; it is history taking its revenge, an outburst by new generations on behalf of freedom against the greyness engendered by anachronistic concepts and unjustifiable deprivation.

This new awakening of the people, which has not been marred by any violence or bloodshed, means that we have to reassess our vision of Europe's future.

You will understand that, in those circumstances, I will not dwell in detail on the recent activities of the WEU Council. The information letters that I sent to your President on 18th September and 23rd November were intended to inform you of the preparations for, and proceedings of, the WEU Ministerial Council. The Permanent Council's working groups are now preparing to implement the mandates that were given to them.

My theme will therefore be essentially political today, with two aims in view: firstly, to contribute to your debates by offering some thoughts on the reports and recommendations drawn up by your committees on the subject of European security; secondly, to share with you the lessons regarding European security that

may be drawn from the comments and reactions to the present events by the European strategic community. I have just returned from Brussels where I addressed the Second European Session of Advanced Defence Studies. Credit for the remarkable success of the session must go to the dynamic presidency of the Council. I should like to take this opportunity of extending my warmest congratulations to all who organised that session.

(The speaker continued in French)

(Translation). – Mr. President, the report presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by your former President, Mr. Caro, and the draft recommendation you will be asked to vote upon contain two findings whose truth events continue to confirm.

The first is that the creation of a single European market will have repercussions on security matters. The WEU member states are concerned that their action should be concerted in this area since the subject is on the agenda of the Special Working Group, to which some national contributions have already been submitted. Others will follow very shortly. The subject is also part of the wider framework of the study commissioned by the ministers at their meeting on 13th November last on European security requirements in the period 1991-1995.

The problems of the defence economy will be tackled by the Council's working groups in the context of this same study on defence requirements. The adjustment of the armaments industry to the requirements of a geographically limited market and to the foreseeable consequences of a future CFE agreement will pose vast industrial and social problems and a positive solution to those problems will be crucial to securing an adequate technological and industrial base. It is on this that Europe's independence will depend.

The effects of exporting products or technologies for military use outside Europe are also a matter of concern to the member states which, in any case, need to work together to avoid the creation of industrial capacities that could be a potential threat to Europe's security interests. This is why the ministers confirmed the new thrust of the work of the Mediterranean Sub-Group whose task it will be to determine whether such threats exist and how great they are around the Mediterranean Sea.

The second finding concerns the Atlantic Alliance. Whilst of course it remains the foundation stone of our security, the nature of Europe's rôle will have to change. Should we now say "the Atlantic pillar of European defence" rather than "the European pillar of Atlantic defence"? It is a new division of responsibilities that has to be defined though

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

avoiding any runaway plunge into over-early and uncontrolled reductions. I shall return later to this problem of a new security relationship with our North American allies; some commentators have said they would like to see the political terms of our alliance renegotiated.

The report on force comparisons presented by Mr. Steiner on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments gives a very useful up-date on the over-armed state of the Warsaw Pact at the time when the first unilateral reductions in forces and armaments were decided. We must be careful lest we fail to see the wood for the trees. The future CFE agreement will be a major step towards reducing imbalances, but it will not eliminate them at one stroke, so a study on the structure of member states' forces will be a matter of real urgency when it comes to implementing the agreement. We must, I repeat, avoid any unilateral reductions in anticipation of the results of the negotiations. Planned reductions will need to be closely co-ordinated and scheduled, so as to maintain the credibility of the deterrent, which will continue to be based on a mix of nuclear and conventional forces throughout the successive stages of treaty implementation. This will take at least five years, or even longer if we are to believe the Soviets.

Let us not deceive ourselves. Deterrence will probably be just as necessary to maintain strategic continental balance beyond the 1990s and this is just as true of the Soviet Union. Developments in new technologies will compel us to retain a range of options of sufficient breadth to provide a realistic military basis for joint European diplomacy in the future.

The CFE agreement will have three other military consequences: the inevitable development of military mobility; the development of co-operation in the area of intelligence, which is an essential complement to the setting-up of an independent European surveillance and observation capability whose technical feasibility and costs are to be studied by an ad hoc working group; the development of co-operation in the fields of joint armaments production, logistics and training.

All these items are on the agenda of the WEU Defence Representatives Group.

In brief, we should gear the changes in our common defence towards the kind of specialisation that will enable us, together, to do just as much and better without running the risk of structural disarmament. If, in addition, account is taken of verification requirements, it is difficult to imagine that the defence budgets of WEU member states can be reduced to the spectacular extent that some would have us believe.

The USSR has coined the reassuring expression "defensive defence". We need to avoid misleading terminology which is without meaning in a situation of parity of forces, and when the need is for increased mobility and the ability to respond to aggression with constantly-improved weapons. Any defence has to be active and vigilant. The Atlantic Alliance has had no other policy for over forty years - with the success that is known to all.

History shows that "Maginot lines" always come to the same sad end. Whilst retaining adequate means for its defence, Europe must tirelessly improve the system of confidence-building measures by building up on the Stockholm Agreement and developing the feeling of confidence which is one of peace's strongest foundations.

The redeployment of Soviet forces and the present reduction in their numbers is being accompanied by modernisation at a rapid pace so that we should display at least a minimum of caution. Whatever agreements are reached on disarmament, the Soviet Union will still retain a military potential on the superpower scale and its armed forces will still have a residual offensive capability warranting an effective deterrent. The same caution should therefore apply to exports to the Soviet Union of advanced technologies of proven military value.

Irrespective of the improvements that can be made in its operation, a body like Cocom still has its "raison d'être". Reasonable application of rules tailored to the present situation would level no threat to perestroika.

I now come to the second half of Mr. Caro's report on the activities of the Council.

The mandates assigned by the WEU Council to the ministerial organs are best reported and critically assessed once they have been carried out and their results made public. It is natural that what is usually confidential work should not be divulged part-way through. This is an essential condition for the effectiveness of flexible and substantial consultation between states.

As regards the channels of dialogue between the Assembly and the Council, I feel that they are sufficiently varied to meet your legitimate expectations. Allow me to recall what they are: four meetings per year between the Council presidency and your Presidential Committee before and after the ministerial meetings. Need I emphasise the importance of strong parliamentary representation at these meetings? The two-part annual report of the Council, subject to approval by the nine member states and confined because of its very nature, to a recapitulation of current activities; lastly, the information letter - an initiative taken by my

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

predecessor – whose purpose is to inform you not only about progress made in the work of the Permanent Council and its organs, but also about the Secretary-General's public relations activities.

In the circumstances, I am surprised to find that facts already conveyed to you by my predecessor still need to be confirmed. Maybe the solution would be to arrange, where necessary, for the Secretary-General to address your committees or national delegations. If that is your wish I shall be glad to do so.

(The speaker continued in English)

The Assembly has before it today a report by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on a revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.

I welcome the up-dating of the current terminology regarding the name of three of the committees, which has been proposed by your Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. Likewise, I think it is a very positive development that the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations should be given the status of permanent committee of your Assembly, which has a key and unique rôle to play in this field. In this connection, it is vital that the ministerial organs and the Assembly pool their efforts, soon with the support of the institute, to promote the European security identity in a much more active and imaginative way. The first thing, I think, is to define a common and clearly recognisable public image for WEU, having regard to the individuality of its component parts. It is time that our organisation had a logo and other technical means at its disposal to illustrate its specific nature and *raison d'être*.

It is also very necessary to do our utmost to avoid all possible sources of confusion between the work of your Assembly and that of the Council. There have been instances of press reports confusing their respective rôles.

Assembly and Council should work together to improve matters and here there would clearly be a rôle for your committee with its new status.

(The speaker continued in French)

(Translation). – Over the past weeks I have had occasion to attend a number of seminars and meetings.

May I raise three subjects on which central questions currently arise: the road to the construction of Europe, the German question and the rôle of the alliances.

First the construction of Europe. Any thinking about the future organisation of our continent

must allow for what has been achieved in the last thirty-five years as expressed in the four concentric circles of the building of a new European order.

The outer circle is the CSCE consisting of thirty-five states attached to fundamental principles and having a common will for dialogue and co-operation in the fields of security and development. The second is the Council of Europe where a European law is taking shape and socio-cultural problems are debated by a parliamentary assembly. The third is the European Free Trade Association and the fourth the Community and the European Parliament, the hard core of which is WEU.

Obviously there is common ground between the CSCE and the Council of Europe, these two being the frame of ethical and moral reference illustrating the common values in which all Europeans recognise themselves. The political changes in Central and Eastern Europe would seem to imply the future enlargement of the Council of Europe thus giving practical form to the victory of political pluralism.

There are also connecting points between EFTA and the European Community, which together may form the platform of what Jacques Delors calls European economic "entente". It is in this framework that new formulae for economic co-operation should be worked out to help rebuild the weakened economies of Eastern Europe. Indeed, too immediate an enlargement of the Community would complicate and slow down the construction of Europe. By their very size, these challenges require us not to relax our efforts to build a union, at present limited to Western Europe, but whose ultimate ambition would be to provide the mould for future continental co-operative structures. The Europe of the Twelve has no choice but to speed up its integration. The strengthening of European cohesion is the best rampart against any upsurges in nationalism, provided that the national identities and cultures in which all Europeans are rooted are respected.

And now, the German question. The destiny of Germany is governed by its geographical position at the heart of Europe. Its division is a symbol of the division of the continent. Respect of the people's right of self-determination is the indispensable condition for gradual and peaceful emergence from a situation inherited from the cold war, whose absurdity has become obvious. Our immediate objective should be the removal of cultural and economic barriers, not the dissolution of the existing states, whose transformation should come about democratically. But at a time when Europe is forging closer links, who would wish to prevent the Germans from following Europe or even preceding it along this road. Chancellor Kohl was right to present the stages of this movement towards

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

“ a contractual community ” before the Malta summit.

Though the German problem may be back at the centre of European concerns, at least its territorial and institutional dimensions may be described as non-existent in the former case and subordinate in the latter. All Germans recognise the intangibility of their frontiers. This is not what their demands are about especially as the end of frontiers is a requirement of the day. What people are primarily seeking is freedom in various forms: personal freedom, freedom to choose their type of social organisation, free elections. When these freedoms have been won, institutions will evolve and economic co-operation will intensify. With the free movement of people, ideas and information, a certain homogenisation between the two Germanys will take place. Will this lead to a new type of confederation? This will be up to the two Germanys themselves to decide.

The future of the European security organisations is at stake, but clearly not in the same way. NATO and the Warsaw Pact cannot be considered as being on a par, nor can their respective rôles be assessed by the same criteria. This would produce a false symmetry which would be deceptive and even insulting to the peoples of Central Europe. What indeed is there in common between an alliance based on solidarity and freely entered into by democratic states and a pact that has been imposed from above?

There can be little doubt that the Soviet Union will strive to hang on to the Warsaw Pact as an instrument for its new security policy. Let us hope that the pact will develop in the direction of a regional grouping of sovereign states.

In this context, confirmation that the Brezhnev doctrine has been given up will only come when the bilateral agreements with the USSR have been rescinded.

Once a bastion against the risk of surprise attack, the Atlantic Alliance will remain necessary for four basic reasons.

It is our best insurance against a policy reversal in the East, whatever its causes and outward form. The Red Army is the guarantee of Soviet unity and constitutes the only recourse if perestroika should prove an economic failure and if the nationalist risings were really to endanger the cohesion of the Soviet state.

It will be absolutely essential for the alliance, even supposing this were to imply the continuance of the North American commitment, to retain its numerically inferior defensive potential at an adequate level for as long as first

the removal of asymmetries in conventional arsenals and then progress in nuclear and chemical disarmament fail to reach the level of verifiable fact.

The Malta summit would seem to warrant fresh hope in this respect. The alliance will remain an essential instrument for the preparation of negotiations on arms control and for managing, along with our American partners, the changes in the Euro-Atlantic strategic relationship that those negotiations will imply. Consequently, we shall continue to need the alliance even beyond the present period of transition, whose duration cannot be told in advance. From the point of view of European balance, is there any need to point out that in the wake of the political reforms national quarrels and claims are already raising their heads? The alliance and a renovated pact could offer a suitable framework for preventing any kind of armed conflict and providing a solution to the problems stifled when the status quo was imposed in 1945.

One could also imagine a form of regional co-operation to oversee the convergent development of the two Germanys from the security angle. Lastly, from every viewpoint, Europeans will need to have a politico-military structure enabling them to cohabit with the power of Soviet Russia, without the fear of a return to the temptations of hegemony.

The final reason for preserving the alliance and a strategic link with North America is the fundamental change about to take place in the military presence in Europe. The reassuring and comforting American guardianship is something of the past. It is now Europe's turn in those areas where the Europeans have the necessary capabilities and resources. In fact, this concerns all aspects of our defence and the verification of agreements on the reduction of conventional forces.

(The speaker continued in English)

Ladies and gentlemen, I am convinced that your debates this week will be equal to the historic events marking the progress towards greater democracy in the eastern half of our continent. I can assure you that I shall listen to them with the utmost interest.

Right now, the single most urgent task is to work to strengthen all the European institutions, particularly in the field of security. With no prospect of the European Community playing an active rôle in this sphere in the foreseeable future, its member states will have to make greater use of WEU for politico-military consultations to identify requirements and co-ordinate decisions in the aftermath of a CFE agreement.

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

The optimism which we rightly feel must not obscure the fact that it will be some years before we can see the tangible military consequences of the political upheavals and of the prospects for arms reductions. Until such time, deterrence will have to remain fully credible. It is likely that it will retain all its *raison d'être* even beyond that time.

Let us therefore pool our efforts to give greater prominence to WEU. In this way, we will make a valuable contribution to progress towards European union. I hope that the member states of our union will increasingly expect results. You can and you must encourage them to do so.

The security dimension of the process of building Europe is the cornerstone of European independence. Its development is therefore essential to progress towards the European union which we hope will be able, at the appropriate time, fully to shoulder its external responsibilities on our continent and throughout the world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Secretary-General, for your address. I am sure you are ready to reply to questions from members of the Assembly.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – With pleasure.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Secretary-General, I have already had an opportunity to express my satisfaction at the attitude of the Council of Ministers towards the recent sweeping and positive changes in Eastern Europe. We shall, I am sure, have many opportunities of discussing the interesting information contained in your report, beginning with today's sitting.

There is, however, something I would like to ask you with regard to the setting-up of the European security and strategy research institute that we hope the Assembly will be able to use as an instrument in its work. It may appear to be a matter of minor importance but in fact it is not. I have been told that, with the creation of this institute, forty-two employees of the agencies to be wound up will be made redundant, without consultation and without the benefit of those social cushioning mechanisms used in our countries in cases of this sort – e.g. early pensions, or the continued payment of salary for a long enough period to enable the person concerned to find another job.

Would you therefore please ask the Council not to go ahead with the decision I have referred to and to discuss it with those concerned? I have made the same request of the Italian Amba-

sador at the Council of Ministers and he has assured me of his support in the matter.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – I welcome Mr. Pieralli's support for the new institute, which will be a new organisation. It comes at an appropriate time. Its work, which will consist of convening task forces by using the potential available in member countries, will be quite new. It will contribute to building a European consensus and will help our academics and people from planning staff and other institutions to work together at a European level.

The abolition of the agencies – the Paris ministerial organs, as they are called – will be most unpleasant for the people who have worked for them and devoted part of their lives to them. I do not agree that there is insufficient information about their abolition. When the Assembly first met in June – I had been in office for only two weeks – I immediately met all the staff here. My deputy visits Paris regularly and is always available. Tomorrow, I shall have a meeting with the staff association.

It is sometimes difficult formally to anticipate ministerial decisions, but no member of staff could have been uncertain about the ultimate termination of the agencies. I am happy to be able to inform you that the Council has agreed to give the same long notice of termination of contract to every member of the Paris organs – until 1st July 1990. Even though the rules do not require us to give such long notice to the B and C grades, we have agreed that we should do so to allow them to look for new employment. We shall do our utmost to help them find new employment with other international agencies.

The staff rules make ample provision to pay those who have worked for the organs for a long time for so-called loss of job indemnity. That will tide them over the immediate effects of the end of their contracts. The social effects of the termination of their contracts are still on the Council's agenda, and this week, on its instructions, I shall inform everyone formally that by the end of July their contracts will expire. Some may be able to work with the institute, but that must be considered on its merits because it should have a new beginning with, in principle, new people.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – My question will be of a more political nature.

The revolution that we are seeing in Eastern Europe is due to a number of factors, and these three in particular: first there is the basic failure

Mr. De Decker (continued)

of communism as an economic policy, i.e. the economic failure of the Warsaw Pact countries, including the Soviet Union, linked perhaps to a certain apprehension about the success of the vast European market and the construction of Europe; next there is the success of the Helsinki conference and the will of the West to introduce the third basket of human rights; the wind of the whole philosophy of human rights has blown through the iron curtain leaving the totalitarian countries unable to resist any longer; lastly, the fact that each of the two blocs possesses the nuclear deterrent and that, moreover, the arms race does not make much sense, has convinced the Warsaw Pact countries that they had no real hope of keeping up in an arms race when faced with such forceful proposals as the United States SDI.

You told us that in the present context the Atlantic Alliance needs to remain a major feature of European policy and European security. Do you not believe that as well as maintaining the Atlantic Alliance we urgently need to quicken the process of European integration and, in particular, to integrate European security and defence policy in a far more energetic manner?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – I entirely concur with the speaker and I think I made this clear in my speech.

I agree with all three points made by Mr. De Decker, but in my view, the most interesting of them in fact is the idea of freedom. I was in Berlin three days after the opening of the wall and freedom was the most important aspect for everyone, because even those with a certain economic position in those countries want to visit the West and see what it is like. This is really the most positive aspect for us.

I agree with what you say about the failure of communism, but the failure is not only economic, it is also that of a system embracing all the activities of the state.

I do of course agree that we should speed up our work. As I said a moment ago, the time when we had to wait for an American initiative in virtually every crisis and on all issues is over. Europe must now form a clear opinion about its future, which will be an integrated future, but continue to have a security dimension.

This is why I am pleased at the Council of Ministers' decision that we should continue studying the implications of a CFE agreement: implications for our strategy, for the composition, structure and deployment of our forces,

and for the conventional nuclear mix. These are matters on which Europeans need to form their own opinion.

If we complete this task and achieve consensus on security requirements in the years 1991-1995, I hope that it will be possible to find a constructive solution to our more immediate problems, too.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Büchner.

Mr. BÜCHNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I can follow straight on from what you have just said. In your address you stressed the importance of the military blocs and, like the President, warned of the danger of destabilisation. I agree in principle, but I would like to ask if you can imagine current developments providing a good opportunity for the establishment of a pan-European security order that will one day supersede the present blocs. If this is a possible outcome, I would like to know what you think of the view being expressed, both in the United States and in Europe, that any form of reunification of the two Germanys is conceivable only within NATO?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – I personally believe it is conceivable only within NATO, but that is only a short-term view. As the British say, first things first. So we must first be able to conduct a political dialogue, we must first have self-determination in the Eastern European countries, before I can imagine our really establishing a peaceful order in Europe in the long term. But I believe that even then the American rôle in Europe will be very important. I therefore believe that, as Mr. De Decker said, through the Helsinki process and also the involvement of both Moscow and Washington in European affairs, both the Soviet Union and America will have a part to play. I think that would be the best preparation for our future security.

I do not always welcome all Washington's comments on this, and perhaps things have moved rather too quickly. I hope that, if the Russians withdraw all their troops from Eastern Europe, which they are not yet doing, we can maintain a bond with the Americans with fewer American troops on our continent, because the bond between European and American interests is very important for our people. This cannot, of course, be imposed as a condition on behalf of the Americans. But on the whole I agree that NATO will and must play a major rôle in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ewing.

Mr. EWING (*United Kingdom*). – I believe that I am quoting the Secretary-General correctly when I say that he commented that the West must be very careful about the type of technology that it exports to Eastern Europe for the next few years, in case it might be capable of being used for other purposes. Is that not a statement from the mistrusting past rather than one for the hopeful future?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*). – I hope that it was a realistic remark. I also said in my speech that I imagined that the Cocom rules would be adapted. I make two points. First, in my opinion some technology should not be exported to the East. Perhaps the list could be smaller than has been the case so far, but some technology exports should be excluded. It is also necessary to keep American confidence in what the West wants to establish in an East-West context. Secondly, and perhaps even more important, I am not convinced that the technology that the Soviets would of course like to have is essential to making perestroika work. Perestroika depends on many things – not so much on high-tech issues.

There may be the occasional sensitive point at issue. When I was in Berlin, people said: “We need a new telephone exchange. The exchange needs to be renovated.” Apparently, some of the technology involved comes under Cocom restrictions. I imagine that in specific instances, exceptions could be made and that Cocom is sufficiently flexible to allow for that. My basic point is that we should not be misled by the East into believing that Cocom is an important element in hampering perestroika. I do not believe that to be the case, or that there is any economic underpinning of such a thesis.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pontillon.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – I am sorry, Secretary-General, to come down from the heights of geo-politics to a simple matter of man management, namely, the point raised by Mr. Pieralli a moment ago and the subject, earlier on, of a written question from Mr. Péciaux.

I have to say that your answer regarding the staff question is rather vague and general and leaves us somewhat dissatisfied.

Present redundancy procedures limit compensation to twenty-four months, i.e. two years' salary, clearly penalising those officials with many years of service behind them. I would have liked to have heard some support for the suggestion by our eminent Belgian senator, namely to apply procedures used in previous cases such as the enlargement of the European Communities or the setting-up of WEU.

In conclusion, Secretary-General, and forgive me for harking back to this subject, I propose that contract terminations should not come into effect until a fair system of compensation has been set up for these redundancies.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Secretary-General.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. President, as I pointed out in my reply to Mr. Pieralli, what we have done so far already exceeds what is required under the staff rules. I also said that we are still talking over possible additional social measures. But, as far as the staff rules are concerned, we have done everything we can to terminate contracts in a fair and proper fashion.

Of course, I realise that the measures are not pleasant for the staff. Many of them have served the organisation for a long time and will therefore receive commensurate benefits: a retirement pension, or the payment of a loss-of-job indemnity which is also substantial, being equivalent to one month's salary for each year of service.

The item is on the Council's agenda. As the French say, we shall do our best to let them “partir en beauté”.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Are there any more questions?...

I thank you, Secretary-General, for replying to all our questions.

14. Revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and votes on the draft decisions, Doc. 1199 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges on the revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure and votes on the draft decisions, Documents 1199 and amendments.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – This is an amendment to the Charter, which is designed, first, to amend the titles of the committees that wish to have a change in title and, secondly, to deal with the agencies. Thirdly, the view has also been expressed to me that there was something wrong with the French version of the title of the Greffier. I shall deal with those three matters separately.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

First, the proposed title changes have come from the committees themselves, so I should recommend them. I welcome the concept of making the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations permanent. I noted what the Secretary-General said in his speech. I hope that he will recall that, on occasion, the Assembly has felt that the involvement of its members in some of the public relations efforts, particularly the colloquy in London last year, would have been helped if the Assembly had been concerned with the planning of the seminar and colloquy. I hope that, now that we are to make the committee permanent, there will be more effective liaison than in the past.

Secondly, as the agencies are disappearing, we felt that it would be wiser to find a blanket way of dealing with the future, so we have talked about the person responsible for any subsidiary body created by the Council.

Thirdly, on the title of the Greffier, I see that my friend Mr. Reddemann has tabled two amendments. I received a helpful letter from the Secretary-General on the matter, and he is right to say that there could be confusion if we proceed with the third part of the amendments. It would have been better and more helpful had he communicated that view to us earlier, but the way in which we operate means that he did not see the document. That exposes the problem of where we have failed to liaise with the Secretary-General in London. I undertake that he will receive documents from my committee so that the factual points can be established. We should not expect him – and he would not expect it – to participate in the policy points, but policy must be sensible on factual points. I shall arrange for that to happen forthwith.

To meet the point made formally by Mr. Reddemann, and which the Secretary-General communicated to me, I ask the Assembly to allow me to withdraw the references, in the two draft decisions, to the French title of Greffier. I hope that those who are experts in the French language can find a way of expressing “the Clerk”, which is all that it is. “The Clerk of the Parliament” is an honourable title in English. However, I can see that there is ambiguity in the French version, in that it can also mean someone who looks after the archives. That cannot be right. I leave it to the many experts in the French language to find a form of wording, which my committee will examine. If necessary, we shall come forward with a revised version.

On the basis that I may withdraw the two sections that cover the point about the Greffier, I am delighted to present this report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Sarti.

Mr. SARTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President I do not believe this matter has any great political or cultural importance, but questions of semantics, at least in my country, are known to have political consequences these days. My remark is addressed to our colleagues in the Italian communist party which sparked off a lively and interesting political debate when it changed its name. Terminology is very important. I hope that Sir Geoffrey Finsberg will not be offended and that Mr. Reddemann will still honour me with his friendship, which I greatly value, if I venture to express some misgivings. I prefer the wording in the Rapporteur’s original formulation.

I cannot claim to be an expert French linguist. I would like to be, but I am just an admirer of the language, nothing more. Even so, I have a feeling that the word “greffier” has a minimising and ambiguous significance in terms of the position it denotes. I should like it to be quite clear that we are using the term “greffier” in the sense correctly given to it in the report by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, who was quoting a classic authority, the Dictionnaire Robert.

I should like the explanatory principle to be stated whereby the “greffier” is the Secretary-General of our Assembly, and not a keeper of records – a meaning that would imply a relationship of dependence vis-à-vis the Secretary-General of WEU. These are two very different things.

We certainly do not want to start a war of responsibility between the Assembly and the Council on this subject, but I consider that the formal distinction needs to be drawn between two tasks which mean a lot to us. We are an assembly, and this is the right and proper manner of standing up for our rights. I am therefore in favour of the Rapporteur’s original text, on which I congratulate him for having done such an excellent job.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, just a brief comment. It makes no difference to me what somebody is called, nor do I want to get too involved in semantics. But whatever title is chosen, this should not be seen as a reason for reopening the debate on the salary that goes with this post or its grade, because that would mean another fundamental discussion in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I did not table the amendment because I was opposed

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

to our present Clerk being given a different title. It just struck me that we would then have a "Secretary-General" in the French text but not in the other official language, in which he would still be known as "Clerk". The question as I see it is: what is the public going to think of it? The impression I got was that a title was being created for internal use, as it were, for the Quai d'Orsay, not for the whole of Western European Union.

Secondly, WEU is not a large organisation, not a Europe-wide institution the size of the Council of Europe. But not even the Clerk of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe is a Secretary-General. So I felt it would be enough for us to have one Secretary-General and one Deputy Secretary-General for the whole organisation, but please let us not have a Secretary-General for the Assembly as well. I am grateful to Sir Geoffrey for withdrawing his proposal, but I am also open to the idea of finding a new title, but one which is so clearly understood in French, English and the other languages, that there is no danger of confusion. If that is possible, I will take great pleasure in giving my approval at the next part-session, when we shall be debating this again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eicher.

Mr. EICHER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I would like to be far more brief. How would it be if we invented the title "Administrateur de Greffe"?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

Amendment 1 has been tabled by Mr. Reddemann as follows:

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft decision on the revision of Articles VII and XI of the Charter, leave out the third and fourth sentences.

Do you wish your amendment to stand, Mr. Reddemann?

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I assume that Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, in his capacity as the committee's representative, has withdrawn the amendment which was in the original report. If so, my amendment automatically becomes invalid.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Reddemann's amendment is withdrawn.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur of the committee.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – As Rapporteur, I have consulted the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and

Privileges and we are agreed that the wisest course of action would be for the Assembly to accept my report in its entirety with the exception of the last two sentences of paragraph 2 of the first draft decision, and the last two sentences in paragraph 3 of the second draft decision. My committee will then consider that question again, consulting all the experts in the French and Italian languages. Perhaps the British pragmatic way will prove the best approach. At least if we do it that way the Assembly will be united and we shall save a lot of time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now proceed to vote on the oral amendment proposed by the Rapporteur and Chairman of the committee.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The oral amendment is agreed to.

We shall now proceed to vote on the amended draft decision relating to Articles VII and XI of the Charter contained in Document 1199.

The vote will be by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Dame Peggy Fenner.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	49
Ayes	49
Noes	0
Abstentions	0

The amended draft decision is agreed to².

We shall now consider the draft decision on the revision of Rules 38, 42 and 47 of the Rules of Procedure.

Mr. Reddemann has tabled Amendment 2 which reads as follows:

2. In paragraph 3 of the draft decision on the revision of Rules 38, 42 and 47 of the Rules of Procedure, leave out the second and third sentences.

I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I assume that the committee's Chairman and Rapporteur has

1. See page 17.

2. See page 18.

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

withdrawn this point, so my amendment is superfluous.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Amendment 2 is withdrawn. I wanted that to be confirmed.

We shall now vote on the amended draft decision on the revision of Rules 38, 42 and 47 of the Rules of Procedure.

In conformity with Rule 33 (1), the Assembly may vote by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft decision is agreed to¹.

15. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1201)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee on WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council, Document 1201.

I call Mr. Caro, Rapporteur.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Secretary-General, ladies and gentlemen, the Political Committee has given me the task of presenting a report which, being no doubt an indication of a very happy premonition, makes this Assembly session very much up-to-date with the events that are in our minds.

It is no longer – as was the case in the past, and as recently as the last session, thanks to the report by Mr. Stoffelen – a matter of determining what is to be the precise position of Western European Union within the Common Market, with all that that implies, but rather of placing ourselves in the context likely to arise from recent events, some of which have happened so quickly that the least that one can say is that we have been caught unawares with a good number of our major political strategies. Admittedly, reactions to the present changes in Europe, and particularly in Central Europe, have not prompted any major hesitation on the part of any of our states. National policy can

adjust relatively quickly and express its own reactions. The real problem is whether, collectively, via the existing institutions in Europe, viewpoints can be expressed swiftly enough to respond to the demands of public opinion. Of course, the task for governments is becoming increasingly difficult.

The example of direct, instinctive and thinking democracy shown by public opinion in the countries placed under the power of the Soviet Union as a result of the Yalta agreement proves that, when the people want something, and above all when they feel they are not democratically represented, they can bend history, even history imposed by ideology. In our case we know we are the legitimate representatives of public opinion in our countries. Do we have to wait until public opinion shows its feelings of weariness and criticism, probably accusing us of not grasping the meaning of recent developments quickly enough and of not acting as swiftly as it would like?

There has been much talk of European hesitation, too much debate. The European Council that met in Paris had at least one merit, that of talking the language of what is to some extent our line of approach; any discussion of Europe at the present time really means talking about Germany and the enormous problem the Germans are faced with.

Before getting down to the subject of my report, I should simply like to say that we are looking at a political equation which will be quite fascinating to resolve. When the Federal Republic of Germany decided, with Chancellor Adenauer, to join the Atlantic Alliance it was a confirmation of the Adenauer doctrine, a doctrine then followed by all German chancellors since – from Helmut Schmidt to Helmut Kohl. Faced with the choice between freedom and frontiers, the choice has been freedom. With the Berlin wall disappearing daily bit by bit – thank heaven – the word “freedom” is becoming reality again for those peoples once oppressed by a totalitarian régime. If freedom ceases to require a choice, will the problem of frontiers again be the only one to be resolved or will there be another element in the equation which will have to be grappled with in the future?

The European Council in Paris welcomed this tremendous change, this vast opening up but it imposed one condition: democracy; democracy, freedom and frontiers. Henceforth, we have to combine these two objectives in order to present a simple and clear attitude to the peoples in whose name we speak. We know that the pull of western democracy is the fruit of long years of work, and amongst these results we see the magnificent human rights achievement by the Council of Europe which has become the symbol and badge of popular action in the countries of the East. We have seen the European Com-

1. See page 19.

Mr. Caro (continued)

munity getting involved using all the means available under the Treaty of Rome and the Single European Act to complete this Common Market which, by necessity and by intention is becoming a single market. And, after years of hesitation, groping and lack of understanding, we have seen our Western Europe with its Union, the oldest of the treaties, achieving recognition and becoming a credible spokesman, not only in the context of the Single European Act, but also among all the governments concerned with security problems.

Now the question that arises is: have we gone far enough with our efforts? If we have not gone far enough, are we aware of the obstacles still to be overcome? As to security problems, whether in regard to the Mediterranean or the Central Europe theatre or our watch, via the Atlantic Alliance, over everything happening out of area, is WEU – the political expression in its Assembly or Council of the principle and statement of a European defence policy – ready to meet the demands set by events today?

Up to now the question has been how, and how quickly, we would achieve European political union, embodied of course in a political organisation which would become, through the democratic will of its member countries, a major world power capable of making the voice – the single voice – of Europe heard in the concert of international negotiations, so that this European language, that no one can replace, to which civilisation owes so much and which, as we are all aware, is hearkened to with impatience by all the third world countries with which we have privileged relations, would regain its proper place.

Achieving European union means political union. It is not just a question of creating a market, but of bringing together within one authority the means of exercising the two responsibilities; monetary and defence policy, that are the prerogative of national sovereignty.

As regards monetary matters, once the single market has been achieved the European Community will, we hope, follow up the Strasbourg summit by beginning to set in place the procedure for achieving economic and monetary union in Europe.

Does this mean that the political edifice will be complete? Of course not. But these will be foundation stones without which nothing can be done. Political authority will still be lacking.

What is this political authority? It is having influence in the world, foreign policy. And to have a foreign policy you need to have a joint defence policy. A very large majority of us here wish to see this come about as it corresponds to

the spirit of the treaties that we have all ratified since the end of the second world war, namely the political unity of Europe. We need time to achieve it and we are here to measure our steps towards it.

It remains to be seen what will be made of this defence segment of Europe's political sovereignty to come, namely security in the widest sense of the term, including all the elements through which it operates and, in particular, the production and sale of weapons.

Like it or not, in the present state of affairs there is not one single government which is either a member of WEU or another European organisation prepared to relinquish one iota of its defence capabilities nor will there be for some time to come. Whether we like it or not, this is part of the political image currently projected by the countries of Europe.

So – and this is only natural since the states will hang on to that responsibility – we have this remarkable instrument of WEU whose aim, given the fact of complete national sovereignty for defence, is precisely to achieve a community of defence by framing the definitions required for European policy, both in defence policy itself and in its economic by-products: the production, harmonisation and sale of arms.

We are quite aware that with the opening of the single market in 1992 the economic frontiers between member countries will be removed and customs duties, if any, will bear little resemblance to those in force today. Any that do survive will only be transitional measures to be phased out and perhaps even applied in random fashion, given the fact that the harmonisation of taxation systems will probably not be achieved by 31st December 1992.

Competition between businesses in the member countries however will, by definition, be total and unrestricted. In the interests of that competition there will be no protectionist measures in favour of a given national sector. With the single European market we shall have our first experience of the market economy operating on the continental scale in Europe. Moreover, this is what will govern changes in attitudes in Eastern Europe because we are well aware, ladies and gentlemen, that without a market economy of the kind we know there can be no real democracy.

Market economy, open frontiers, complete competition: what will be the situation for arms manufacturers, since these products have only one purchaser, the state, in a captive market?

Here we have an industry of national interest. Is it conceivable, at this moment, for there to be competition beyond the economic frontiers still separating the twelve member states and more particularly between the seven – soon the nine –

Mr. Caro (continued)

WEU countries? Can we imagine flows between the French, British, Spanish, German, Italian, Belgian, Luxembourg and other firms without this posing a problem for the government, and hence the state, as regards the control of its own market which, as you are aware, has weighty implications in terms of security and secrecy?

Much still needs to be done in this area. But in view of the great complexity of the fabric of the arms production industry in our countries, if we want the principle of free competition to apply to the full we have to consider not only the firms actually producing the weapons but also their subcontractors whose sometimes apparently harmless products are used as components in weapons ordered by governments. There are many examples and I shall not repeat them. The most relevant ones I have quoted in my report.

But there is another problem which needs to be brought to public notice. Weapons are supplied not only to our own countries – a necessity for the harmonisation of common defence and we know what the rules are – but also to third countries outside the European area, some of which, as you know – Brazil is an example – want European weapons but wish to pay for them in kind, very often with food and agricultural produce, for example. This means that national armaments manufacturers are paid in food products which they need to sell off. Given their status as arms producers, they receive these products as protected companies, and when they put them on the market, via the supermarkets and hypermarkets, since the goods are purchased out-of-contract and out-of-quota, they immediately cause distortions in the sale of ordinary consumer goods and therefore impair free competition. In so doing, the firms concerned expose themselves to charges by the Luxembourg Court of Justice.

Hence, when the frontiers open we shall run into a whole series of problems in the production of weapons. The issue is tricky and needs dealing with urgently. This is why one of the recommendations on behalf of the Political Committee which has approved the report unanimously is that the Council should co-operate closely in all these areas with the Brussels Commission.

In your speech, Secretary-General, I noted with great satisfaction your assurance that these defence economy problems which you referred to yourself would all be dealt with. Knowing you as I do, I am certain that they will be dealt with thoroughly and seriously within the framework of the Council's working groups.

Since it is in our interest to enable the companies of the member countries contributing to

the implementation of our European defence policy to adjust to the single market from the outset, I should like these studies to begin as quickly as possible and if resources are lacking I should like you to inform the Assembly so that it can help you and make the necessary requests to enable you to respond to this government requirement. It is imperative that we should have a clear picture on this subject by the end of 1992 rather than the vague and shadowy impression we have today.

And if, since it would be wholly within its rights, the Brussels Commission wishes to do the same thing, namely, study these implications, even taking account of defence requirements, then let it do so. We know, in any case, that the Council of Political Co-operation of the Twelve is also discussing defence. It has a right to do so, moreover, since it is not an institutional body founded under the Treaty of Rome. But the Brussels Commission should at least have the honesty, as we have here, to call a spade a spade and state out loud that it too is inquiring into the problem. This would do far more to impress the political leaders we are, instead of having to become intelligence agents looking for the truth in the face of unhelpful official denials.

So much for the technical aspect. As for the political aspect which I mentioned at the beginning, I would make one point which I feel is also fundamental in regard to our progress both within the European framework and vis-à-vis Eastern Europe.

I think that time is measured or at least not on our side. We cannot go on thinking we can respond to the enormous challenge facing Europe by naïvely pursuing our research and enquiries, and our agreements with governments, parliaments and the other, military or more general, sectors involved. I am thinking, in particular, of the press and the makers or preparers of decisions – I refer to the institute for security studies, the splendid institution which you have decided to set up and I thank you for listening to the Assembly in that matter. It seems to me that now Europe should take its place in the Atlantic Alliance, as far as defence matters are concerned, in a new way.

First of all, can this be done in the European Community – I referred to that a moment ago? For the time being this would not seem possible under the treaties. So rather than wrestling with difficulties that would delay our work let us organise a method of working together with the European Community, and in particular with the Commission and the European Parliament. Since the objective is the same, but the means are at present different, it is important that both at government and parliamentary representative level the work should be coherent, advance if possible at the same pace, and reach the desired aim at the same time.

Mr. Caro (continued)

There is no point wasting our time wondering in what area the different kinds of representatives are required. Here we are fully aware of our rôle in relation to our national parliaments, particularly when we are discussing military programmes and budgets. But we very well know that, for governments, it is vital to have the same basic reasoning used in WEU as in the Community. In this area, the unity of views between the two bodies is complementary. Between the two – one economic with a supra-national vocation and the other intergovernmental and responsible for defence matters only – bridges are needed not simply for mutual understanding but for operational co-ordination.

For years we have been discussing the fundamental problems involved in building this European pillar. You did not quite conclude, Secretary-General, but I know you, and I can venture to say that I reach the same conclusion as you would have done: I much prefer the expression European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

We know all its ins and outs and all its conditions. In the Assembly's reports we have all the materials we need to build it. If WEU, with the agreement of the governments, were capable of setting up this two-sided table within the Atlantic circle, like the Atlantic it would not have sixteen sides but only two. In the alliance, the table is two-sided: on one side there is the Atlantic coast with our American friends and on the other the European coast, the two forming a whole in which the one cannot exist without the other. It is the rôle, the vocation and the good fortune of Western European Union to live in this way. The vital thing is the way these two sides are organised.

The European side where the European pillar must be built requires that in the very short term governments – taking advantage of parliamentary pressure, that is what we are here for – must be capable of establishing a bilateral dialogue between Europe and the United States or rather between Europe and North America since we have our Canadian friends, rather than staying with conventional methods and classic bilateral diplomatic relations between the "big brother" and all the "little European brothers". This is what we have to arrive at and it is only thus, if we manage to bring into being this political unity in defence matters within the framework of the international nature of our institution and preserving our national sovereignties, that we shall have prepared the road for the Community against the day when it will need to open itself up to fresh departures.

This is the very essence of the report that I have the honour to submit to you. There is, of

course, a whole series of recommendations which you will be asked to vote upon, ladies and gentlemen. The methods of co-operation with the Commission are, I feel, fundamental. The detailed study and the Secretary-General's reply leave me hoping that this matter will be taken up speedily, so that the Assembly may be kept fully informed not only because that is the rule, and our work is a matter of verifying and proposing, but also because all our governments – and I am convinced of this – need the support of public opinion and very often need the pressure that we apply which, in this matter, will be particularly intense.

Last but not least, I now turn to certain purely administrative points relating to internal working. In this sphere – and through you, Secretary-General, I address myself to the Council – the Assembly's independence must be upheld. We have the good fortune in WEU to have an assembly that has budgetary and hence political autonomy. We know of others where this is not so. Over-runs are found in assemblies that do not have this autonomy. The sense of responsibility is greater when responsibility is actually borne. Here in Western European Union independence is a strength, not only for the governments but also for our national parliaments. You have no doubt noticed, ladies and gentlemen, the extent to which the authority of our Assembly is universally recognised in these fields where it exercises its responsibilities. This is thanks to the serious work done by each of our members and by the Council of Ministers. We must preserve this budgetary autonomy. This is referred to in the recommendation. On this point, I hope that we are accorded the assurances that we are entitled to demand.

Of course there remains the question of communication between you, Secretary-General, and us. I did not ask any questions earlier knowing that through your speech and my presentation there would inevitably be an exchange. Very simply and fairly, as in tennis, I am returning your service. Take the initiative to ask us to come and see you. We have bodies that are big and small and also simple, we have even a President of the Assembly quite capable of getting about on his own. Take this initiative to give us detailed information of interest to the Assembly on defence policy, before it is discussed and public property. This confidentiality that you referred to is an essential feature of our joint thinking. Not everything can be made public and I quite agree with you. But there are areas where the elected representatives of our Assembly need to be taken into your confidence and thus to act in concert with the executive authorities that you represent, according to the rules, vis-à-vis the Assembly.

Ladies and gentlemen, that ends my presentation of this report. I have deliberately sought

Mr. Caro (continued)

to limit its scope and to refer both to the political and technical data that arise from it, leaving myself the possibility of answering any questions that may be put. I thank you and ask you to accept and adopt this report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, after the Rapporteur's clear and detailed statement I can confine myself to just a few comments on the report.

As Mr. Caro has already said, the recent major changes in Eastern Europe have given the problems referred to in the report a higher profile, which can be summed up in the question: how are the various multilateral institutions in Europe interacting in this new political situation?

There is general agreement that, in response to the events I have just mentioned, European integration must at all events be enhanced and speeded-up. I endorse this position. Even before the recent events in Eastern Europe, we were always enthusiastic about European political union, though without being able, or needing to say precisely where it would lead. For instance, from time to time we have shrouded the security dimension of such a union in something of a fog. But we must now find a clearer answer to the question of Europe's security dimension, in the sense that any wider form of European integration – meaning not only co-operation among the twelve countries of the European Community, but also closer co-operation with the Eastern European countries – is no longer compatible with the Community's retaining a security dimension of its own. This position is also set out in Mr. Caro's report. So this affects the European Community's security dimension, to the extent that it goes further than the political and economic aspects of security referred to in the Single European Act. I detect support for this position in the recent statements made by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev after the Malta summit. Both said that the present European security system, based on NATO, including the presence of American troops in Europe, and on the Warsaw Pact, must for the foreseeable future – we cannot be too careful at this time of rapid change – remain the basis of European security and stable development in Europe.

For WEU, which is complementary to and indissolubly associated with NATO, this means retaining its own responsibilities in this sphere. What is more, these responsibilities must be more intensively fulfilled. WEU must remain fully involved in the debate on European

security. This applies to all the institutions within WEU, including the Assembly, when it decides on its agenda and has consultations with the Council of Ministers. We shall be addressed by many members of governments during the debate this week. Why have they not been asked to forward the main lines of the statements they will be making here? Should we not give this debate a more serious slant, instead of just listening to statements by members of governments and letting them go home again after three or four questions? I am simply asking, Mr. President.

To conclude, I should like to say a few words about the Rapporteur's recommendations. As regards recommendation I, 1, would the Rapporteur give precise details of the mandate he proposes for the working group. I feel the risk of some duplication of existing activities is not altogether out of the question.

As regards the second recommendation, under I, 2, I wonder which countries want to talk about sharing defence burdens, and in what context. I can imagine that member states of the Community which are not members of NATO or WEU will have difficulty in discussing the sharing of defence burdens as recommended here. I should like to be told if I am misconstruing the recommendation.

Finally, I believe the institute for security studies should be kept very small and high-level. It should be capable of competing with renowned institutes of the same type. It should be able to subcontract work. The Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, referred to task forces. That is a good idea. The institute should be a think-tank, working on behalf of the Council of Ministers and this Assembly. It should be possible to say at some time in the future: we cannot do without the institute for security studies.

(*Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – The report submitted by Mr. Caro on relations between WEU and the EEC, following the setting-up of the single European market, spells out clearly the problem of the division of responsibility between the two institutions. The writer deals with this question and carefully highlights the need for co-operation based on respect from the start for their respective responsibilities.

However, we feel that to seek to dissociate European integration in defence matters from economic integration is not entirely in keeping with international reality and the interests of Western Europe.

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

Whilst the Rapporteur's objective of preserving the transatlantic link, following up the openings in the East and respecting national sensitivities is praiseworthy, we feel that such considerations allow too much room for immobility or even an attitude of "wait-and-see" and fail to seize this opportunity for shaping events that may not occur again. In brief, today, and even more so tomorrow, Europe has an opportunity of becoming one and indivisible: let us not once more leave it to others to mould its destiny.

Mr. Caro's report also perhaps underestimates an aspect which we consider of capital importance. The speed of change in the East calls – more than ever before – for unity of intention and action within the European Community in every field. There are several factors that prompt us to think, first of all, that the giants are tired, if I may put it that way: the United States and the Soviet Union are today in a position of relative decline which is forcing them to reconsider their priorities. As a consequence, it is now more necessary than ever before for Europeans, aware of their precarious position, to proclaim loudly and strongly their intention of taking their destiny in hand and proving in concrete terms that they can.

The strength of the Atlantic link will continue to be eroded both by the setting up of the single market in 1993 and the difficulty that the United States is encountering in financing its twofold deficit. Faced with these facts, Europeans should now take an adult look at their future in full awareness of their responsibilities, otherwise they will simply find they have lost an ally and gained a master.

Whilst America has for some time been looking towards Pacific Asia, the Soviet Union has never felt so European as in recent times. Drained though it may be, the USSR has nevertheless initiated reforms which could well bring the diplomatic and strategic scenario in Europe arising out of the second world war to an end. We cannot but admire the skill of a leader whose country and empire are worn out but who knows he can count on Western Europe to provide him with the technology that his country needs to survive.

There are already cracks appearing in the western coalition, which show that some do not want to upset Mr. Gorbachev lest the iron curtain should come down again. What the West does not seem to understand is that Mr. Gorbachev, who needs us more than we need him, has trapped us in a spiral of aid to the East which is already hindering the process of European integration.

A Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals should not be our main concern. We have first to build a political and economic entity

with the ultimate target of providing its own security before thinking of integrating peoples who do not yet share our concerns. We are capable of building a common house but we will only share the rent with partners playing the same game and obeying the same rules. We should not let the Soviet Union promise us freedom for the countries of the East in exchange for some kind of political and military neutrality. On the contrary, so long as its political system and army remain what they are, let us show our imagination and try to impose a new order consistent with the interests of the Community and taking advantage of the experience of our existing European institutions, each in its own sphere, as illustrated in Mr. Caro's excellent report.

We are living in a period of transition. It is an extremely interesting period in the sense that it is a kind of testing time for the solidarity of the Community and a means of finding out whether joint interests will take precedence over national interests. It is also a dangerous period because the forces of disintegration have never been so active in this shifting and unstable world. The Community has perhaps for the first and last time a chance of becoming the second superpower of the old continent and the holder of the balance for which certain diplomats have for so long been calling.

Ladies and gentlemen, let us not allow events to impose themselves on us and dictate our actions at a time when the construction of Europe finally looks as if it is about to happen.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eisma.

Mr. EISMA (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I too should like to congratulate the Rapporteur, Mr. Caro. He himself says in his report that it is unlikely that the Single European Act and the process of abolishing frontiers will be fully implemented by the appointed time, the end of 1992. We need only think of the delay in implementing the Schengen agreement, intended as a forerunner of the integration of Europe in 1992.

There is still a long way to go before we Europeans can give our own, clear response to all the events in Eastern Europe. Mr. van Eekelen expressed a desire for this eventuality, but the fact is that European countries are reacting to developments in the German Democratic Republic, for example, in a way that smacks of pre-war reflexes. The United Kingdom welcomes any development that helps the German Democratic Republic to remain independent as far as possible. France wants to get the 1992 process moving, so that the Federal Republic of Germany may be structurally integrated into the alliance. West Germany must now ensure that

Mr. Eisma (continued)

German enthusiasm for integration is equally high on both sides of the border, east and west.

This does not give our partner on the other side of the Atlantic, the United States, much to go by in determining its own position. Nevertheless, it is a process that Europe and WEU must work on. One of the most important determining factors for the future, including WEU's future, in this process is the attitude of two member states, Germany and the United Kingdom. Germany faces a dilemma, since on the one hand, for various reasons, a delay in the Europe 1992 process is considered desirable, because the differences between East Germany and the West would not then be exacerbated. On the other hand, there are tendencies in West Germany that want to give priority to speeding up the achievement of the Europe of 1992, EMU and the union of Western Europe. The union of Western Europe in its eventual form has everything to do with a European defence policy.

We do not know which of the two movements will win. The United Kingdom also has a prominent rôle to play. I read in "Europe" that the British Foreign Secretary said on 14th November that Mr. Delors's proposals on the second and third phases of EMU were in no way determined by the developments in Eastern Europe. He said the collapse of the wall did not make Mr. Delors's proposals any more appropriate.

In short, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom will be instrumental in determining future defence policy. When we talk about Europe's future, we are also talking about our German friends, according to Mr. Caro, the Rapporteur. The German question must therefore remain on the Council's agenda. Failing to put it on the agenda will certainly not make the reunification problem go away. But if it is put on the agenda, it will be a problem to be tackled by West Germany and the Western European allies together. German reunification must not be a problem that is confined to East and West Germany. Eastern and Western Europe must also take stock of the problem, which must be resolved in that context, too. I am curious to know how Minister Schäfer will react to this when he speaks here tomorrow.

Mr. President, I will conclude with a few words on the lack of dialogue between the Council and the Assembly referred to in the report. This should not sound too querulous: we too are responsible for ensuring that this dialogue comes about. We must be selective with our reports, prepare more thoroughly for debates with government representatives and perhaps also invite fewer government officials and concentrate more on the main issues.

The Rapporteur says that the institute for security studies must work for the Assembly.

I would like to see it carrying out its studies and other activities in public. Studies by existing agencies have not as a rule been public. Even we members of the Assembly were not allowed to know what subjects were being studied by the various agencies, let alone to see the results of their work. I feel the members of the Assembly must have a greater say in the nature and scale of the studies undertaken by the new institute for security studies.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the very down-to-earth title, "WEU in the single European market", of the report presented by Mr. Caro scarcely begins to express the political topicality and significance of this extremely interesting subject and of the report itself. My congratulations to the Rapporteur and the whole committee.

This report was, of course, conceived at a time when it looked as if the implementation of the Single European Act and the establishment of a genuine European single market on 1st January 1993 would be such an enormous step down the road towards European political union that it would only be a question of time before WEU and its powers in the security and defence policy fields were swallowed up. The arguments developed in the report could not be brushed aside, even at that time. The same is true of the reflections on the implications for security policy of unrestricted freedom of movement and freedom of establishment within the Community, on future co-operation in the armaments industry, and, not least, on the arms export policy. The proposal contained in the draft recommendation that these problems should be discussed and solved in consultation with the Community's institutions not only merits our undivided support but should also be taken to heart by the members of the WEU Council.

Only a few months ago this report, despite the soundness of its arguments, would have been described by interested parties as a transparent manoeuvre primarily designed to justify WEU's existence, as distinct from a tremendously powerful European Community. The political events of recent weeks and months have given the lie to this view. But no one could have foreseen how quickly the developments in Central and Eastern Europe would confirm the justice of the analysis and conclusions of this report.

Our joy over the success of the freedom movements in Hungary, Poland, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia goes hand in hand with a host of new questions, to which we must soon find convincing answers. It would undoubtedly have been appropriate, for

Mr. Antretter (continued)

example, for our Assembly to make a joint appeal to the European Community to ensure rapid and co-ordinated aid to the needy economies of the countries concerned and to solve, without prior conditions, the most pressing supply problems faced by the people.

It will be far more difficult to predict the implications of the changes in Central and Eastern Europe for European security and the East-West relationship. This will undoubtedly be an important topic for one of the Assembly's forthcoming reports. But Mr. Caro's report undoubtedly contains important factors connected with these problems, for example where he assumes that the Atlantic Alliance will remain the basis of European security. When we talk about security, we should always bear in mind the security needs of all concerned, including the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union. We should remember that Soviet politicians are no longer advocating the early dissolution of the military alliances, as they were still doing last summer, but have begun to warn against attempts to dissolve the Warsaw Pact. East and West obviously have a common interest in continued stability throughout Europe, because that is the first requirement for everyone's security. The fact that the existing alliances, including the American presence in Europe, have a stabilising effect should be generally acknowledged and used to political advantage. WEU is also part of this system of alliances. The predominantly military nature of the alliances may give way to a more political set of instruments to be used for mutual contacts and further progress at the negotiations on arms control and disarmament, including verification.

Mr. Caro's report rightly says that the new situation compels us to take a decision we have never faced before. We must choose between the actual prospect of reuniting the divided parts of Europe, and rapid progress towards the United States of Europe. Many people argue that there is absolutely no need for this either-or situation, because every European country is free to accede to a European union with all that it entails or to opt for other, looser forms of association or co-operation. But this argument overlooks one crucial aspect: security. Both the European Community and WEU have reaffirmed their willingness to co-operate in the creation of European union and made it clear that this union must be considered incomplete until it also has authority in security and defence questions. This is a political goal, for which there is no timetable yet, and we should be happy with it. The only timetable we have concerns the completion of the single market in accordance with the Single European Act. There is no reason at all to slow down this process now

or to change the timetable. Far from applying the brakes, we Germans are pressing ahead, because we see in the growing integration and attractiveness of the Community an opportunity which can benefit both the peoples of Eastern Europe and also our compatriots in the German Democratic Republic.

As it develops in accordance with the Single European Act, the Community will be the ideal instrument for East-West co-operation in Europe, with the prospect of integrating further interested neutral countries, and even countries like Hungary, without harming the Soviet Union's security interests. However, this development presupposes a Community which is not exclusive but remains open to other European countries wanting to become full members or to be associated with it in some other way. The Single European Act explicitly affirms that any European country may join. But this possibility would remain on paper if the Community itself were regarded as being so advanced on the road to European political union that nothing was needed but to transfer WEU's functions to it as soon as possible. This step would not only change the system formed by the alliances at an inopportune moment; it would also make the Community largely useless as a forum for East-West co-operation.

In the present situation the existing European institutions should continue to work on perfecting European co-operation within the terms of reference of their respective treaties. The Hague platform rightly referred to the importance of the WEU treaty for the achievement of the goal of creating a European union. With the extensive obligations it imposed in the area of collective defence, this treaty was indeed one of the first steps towards European unification. But it can and should be put to even better use than has been the case in the past. Despite many positive and welcome beginnings, there is a persistent impression that not all the member governments are really willing to breathe life into the modified Brussels Treaty or to achieve the objectives of The Hague platform. The present Chairman of the Council, for example, makes no secret of the fact that he would actually prefer it if the Community were soon to become the European union, with defence included in its terms of reference. Early this year the Spanish Government said much the same thing, and our Secretary-General also seems inclined to this view, if press reports that he is opposed to Austria's accession to the Community are true. In view of recent events, it is to be hoped that this report will help to bring about a change of heart.

However, since WEU as an institution does not participate in negotiations and, unlike NATO and the Community, does not comment publicly on topical issues within its purview,

Mr. Antretter (continued)

except on very rare occasions, its half-yearly ministerial meetings easily fall into a routine, in which informal opinions are exchanged without any feeling of compulsion to arrive at an actual consensus. It is particularly regrettable that even after the last Council meeting, which was held at the time of the dramatic events in Berlin, the ministers could not bestir themselves to issue a joint public statement. What may have been a unique opportunity for WEU was missed. Nor, it would seem, have the ministers been prompted by the new situation in Central and Eastern Europe to instruct the WEU organs to give priority to a study of the effects of this situation on the establishment of a new European order of peace and security.

This is all the more surprising since the ministers see WEU as a particularly suitable instrument for drawing up reports and studies, as demonstrated by the creation of a WEU research institute for security questions, a practical outcome of the ministerial meeting. It remains to be seen what an institute of this kind can achieve, and especially if it can also be made available to the Assembly, rather than sharing in a few years' time the fate of the three agencies for security questions, to whose findings the Assembly had virtually no access. I am sure of one thing: WEU can survive only if, in addition to commissioning internal reports and studies, the Council does more, through political initiatives and information on its policy, to convince the public of the need for this organisation and its right to exist.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I too should like to thank the Rapporteur. His report broaches a problem that has concerned us for years, and has been exacerbated to some extent by the European Parliament's rather petty jealousies. Recent developments show that the tenor of the comments and recommendations made in this report is correct.

One of the main sentences in paragraph 8 of the report is particularly significant. As it says, not until the developments of recent years have we been presented with the option of reunifying the whole of Europe, or concentrating on pressing ahead with the integration of Western Europe. The report also makes it clear that the alternative may be a false one, when thus formulated as two extreme possibilities.

Let us remember – we should be frank about this – that in the minds of quite a few political

groups and classes, even within Europe, there persists a philosophy of balance, strongly influenced by the traditional power politics of the nineteenth century, which inevitably also play an important part in the enlargement of the Community. We already know that a neutral country can be admitted to the European Community, as an economic community and a single market: Ireland has been a member for years. The admission of Austria, for instance, which submitted its application this year, must also depend on whether the balance within the European Community shifts more towards Central Europe. There is one school of thought which feels some anxiety about this.

Other schools of thought maintain that the balance, including economic balance, within the European Community ought to shift further towards Central Europe, because its southward enlargement has created some imbalance which would be corrected even more satisfactorily if Scandinavian countries, or one or other Eastern European country that met certain requirements, were to join the Community. We should discuss these ideas honestly, for though they are legitimate, they do not really figure in Jean Monnet's initial concept. He said we must transcend traditional power politics by combining real, cultural and economic interests, and by discussions which would change governments and peoples to some extent, as they discovered more and more common interests. That was Jean Monnet's theory. I realise that the old problems persist, but by defining them we may succeed in banishing them from people's minds.

The report also takes a very close look at the problems of economic co-operation in relation to armaments, the arms trade and many other things. Economy and security cannot be separated, at least not in the debate, nor should this be done artificially. The report says, on the contrary, that a number of problems closely connected with economic co-operation, the integration of the European Community, the question of space research and co-operation in this area and the mobility of labour must be discussed here, in Western European Union.

During the debate we must remember that the problems are interconnected, though when decisions are taken the various different mandates must also be borne in mind. I believe Western European Union and its institutions have always been very good at making this distinction.

As a member of the new social democratic party in East Berlin said to me: "Years pass in days". This has been demonstrated by events in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, we should know from experience in this century that the security problems remain. We will be able to create comprehensive security structures in Europe only if we remember that

Mr. Soell (continued)

the alliances still retain their function. The emphasis is changing, their political function is growing, but we cannot assume that one alliance will disappear while the other remains.

I hope I misunderstood the Secretary-General's answer to Mr. Büchner's question, when he said a closer relationship between the two Germanys, perhaps in the form of a confederation, would result in today's German Democratic Republic belonging to NATO in a certain sense. I think that is a completely unrealistic notion. Neither the Soviet Union nor other neighbouring countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia would tolerate that.

I believe the Council of Ministers should – as the report urges it to do – take a far greater interest in this problem: how can the present security organisation be so developed that it also establishes comprehensive security structures which cover the points we are currently negotiating in the areas of disarmament, arms control and confidence-building measures?

One last comment: until a few months ago I believed, in common with many other people, that closer co-operation between the two Germanys, perhaps in the form of a confederation, would represent the keystone in the building of the common European house. I am now inclining more and more to the idea that there are many European building sites on which we should be working very hard: further development of the European Community into a single market where the members of the Community will be able to function, disarmament negotiations, negotiations on confidence-building measures, development of comprehensive forms of economic co-operation, projects set up by the European Development Bank in Eastern Europe to facilitate co-operation by easy stages in the monetary sphere so that Eastern European currencies become convertible, and many other things. No individual countries will then receive special privileges.

It must be remembered that the Soviet Union is in a particularly difficult position, because, unlike such countries as Hungary, Poland and the German Democratic Republic, it cannot officially request aid. It cannot in any sense apply for developing country status, as Hungary and Poland did last week, because it would lose face. This inevitably exacerbates the problems. It will be a very difficult winter for Mr. Gorbachev and his team.

In conclusion, as the report warns in very clear terms, governments – and especially the governments of Western European Union's member states – must find a way of responding

to the peoples' expectations of further developments in the security field. If they fail to come up with convincing projects, which both enable the alliances to progress politically and contain proposals for comprehensive security structures, not only will unique opportunities be missed for ever: acceptance of security policy as a whole will also be weakened, and that cannot be to our advantage.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Zaïmis, Observer from Greece, the last speaker on the list for this afternoon.

Mr. ZAIMIS (*Observer from Greece*). – I should like to express my appreciation of the work done on this report by our colleague, Mr. Caro, on behalf of the Political Committee. Taking into consideration the ideas expressed in paragraphs 30 and 68, I wish to explain the Greek position on Western European Union.

Please note again that Greece formally expressed in February 1987 her interest in adhering to WEU in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty. We continue today to give the same importance to the adherence of Greece to Western European Union. We are satisfied that, in accordance with the guidelines set by the Council of Ministers, which offered a ministerial level consultation mechanism, the process has already started and our government has been so informed by the Belgian presidency.

As to Greece's position on the fundamental provisions of the WEU platform specifically, we note that she has subscribed unreservedly to several communiqués of the NATO Defence Planning Committee, stating that the strategy of deterrence should be based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional weapons. Consequently, the commitments undertaken by Greece in NATO are in conformity with the fundamental principles of the platform.

We underline, as a full member of the EEC, that we consider it obvious that we should be a full member also of Western European Union, as both organisations are pursuing the main objectives of the European construction. The latter has already been mentioned by the Secretary-General, in the report of the Assembly's session of 27th-28th April 1987.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is adjourned.

16. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, I ask the Assembly to agree to the

The President (continued)

changes in the membership of committees contained in Notice No. 7 which has been distributed.

Are there any objections?...

The changes are agreed to.

**17. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 5th December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the

Council (Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Document 1201).

2. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.
3. Address by Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.

EIGHTH SITTING

Tuesday, 5th December 1989

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council (*Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee*, Doc. 1201).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Malfatti, Mr. Gabbuggiani, Mr. Tascioglu (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Caro (*Rapporteur*).
4. Address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Replies by Mr. Eyskens to questions put by: Mr. Jessel, Mr. De Hoop Scheffer, Mr. De Decker, Lord Rodney, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Soell, Mr. Jung.

5. Address by Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Replies by Mr. Schäfer to questions put by: Mr. Eisma, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Lambie, Mr. Pieralli, Lord Mackie, Mr. Jessel, Mr. Kittelmann, Mrs. Timm, Mr. Klejdzinski.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council

(Resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee, Doc. 1201)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Political Committee on WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council, Document 1201.

The debate is resumed.

I call Mr. Malfatti.

Mr. MALFATTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we were taught in school that dividing the history books into periods was simply a convenient device. Nevertheless, we have a feeling today of literally moving from one age into the next, with new events following on one another's heels as the days go by. It seems to me that there are a number of basic choices we need to hold on to with the utmost firmness whilst at the same time calling on considerable resources of imagination and flexibility in adapting to the changing face of the world.

One of the choices which must be strongly reaffirmed is the Atlantic Alliance and the pact which binds us together in the framework of WEU and in the construction of Europe. As regards the former, I must emphasise that the stabilising rôle of the Atlantic Alliance has never been so manifest. There were those who believed that the coming of a new and improved international equilibrium would have spelt the end of the Atlantic Alliance, but this forecast has been belied by the facts and not just in the way those concerned have reacted but also in the very principles discernible in the "new thinking" of the Soviets. In any event, the emphasis – I would say the correct emphasis – that is now being placed on the Helsinki final act and on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe – to the point of Mr. Gorbachev proposing a new Helsinki by 1990 as he did in his speech at the Capitol – clearly shows that the new European equilibrium and any new system of security in Europe will be impossible unless the United States and Canada are involved, in other words unless the situation crystallised for the

1. See page 21.

Mr. Malfatti (continued)

last forty years in the Atlantic Alliance and which President Bush summed up in Brussels only yesterday with the words: "the United States will remain a European power" is confirmed.

As regards the reconstruction of Europe, Mr. Caro will not be surprised if I continue, even in the present circumstances, to emphasise the need to avoid erecting barriers between the various components of the process of European reconstruction each of which is naturally subject to its own rules and its own specific institutions which of course we must all respect.

But the process of European reconstruction is one, and the point of arrival, namely European union, remains one. So it still seems to me contradictory and dangerous to go for a sharp division of responsibilities in the process of European reconstruction, full of contradictions though this may be, at this point. It is precisely because this temptation – to which, incidentally, Mr. Caro's report refers – may be even stronger today with the tumultuous changes going on in Europe, that I would like to speak out in favour of a different approach in the present situation. This approach would opt for a pragmatic handling of relations between the European Community and Western European Union, imply permeability rather than impermeability between these two spheres, involve the building of bridges between the institutions, as indeed Mr. Caro himself mentioned, and interpret the rules that govern us in dynamic rather than formalistic terms.

In his excellent report to the colloquy on the future of European security in Florence, President Harmel stressed that "from the outset the aims of joint defence were seen by the founders [Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties] as being part and parcel of the aims of European integration". In proof of this he quoted a statement by Mr. Spaak in 1942 in which the Belgian statesman said: "The security of the European countries is clearly interdependent. No political solution without an economic solution, and vice versa. In the Europe of tomorrow, the problems of security and prosperity will be indissolubly linked."

In any case, without the growth and prosperity we have enjoyed during the past forty years or so, our own European and Western security would have been weakened and perhaps endangered. The Soviet Union for its part – and this is one of the central points in Mr. Gorbachev's new thinking – cannot be "a superpower" and always expanding in the military sense, if economically the giant has feet of clay.

Hence the "new security" on today's agenda raises economic as well as military problems just

as, on another front, the redrawing of the military balances and hence the process of reducing forces to the lowest possible level also raises major problems of finance, economics and industrial conversion. Dealing with these problems in all their obvious interrelations and therefore comprehensively – and these interrelations are part of the reality that we have to control – is impossible by clinging to the concept of separate worlds. On the contrary, they would be thrown into shadow and we would be placed in the worst possible conditions for managing these processes. Which is why, both for reasons of principle – and I repeat, there is only one final objective of European union – and for reasons of realism and political expediency, I believe we must not build fences between WEU and the Community, proudly claiming our own particular spheres of responsibility; instead we have to show that in this field too we have imagination and the right measure of flexibility.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Gabbuggiani.

Mr. GABBUGGIANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Caro's report provides a full, well-reasoned picture of the problems facing us, the political processes involved and the prospects in view, and sets out certain objectives that WEU should pursue within its field of responsibility as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.

The recommendation and the report rightly draw attention to WEU's powers in regard to other institutions such as the Community and the need for a new kind of relationship with the Council of Ministers, one feature of which will, we hope, be a constant flow of information to the Assembly on the initiatives and activities of the Council of Ministers and those of the instruments at the Council's command or which it may wish to activate.

The recent meetings in Italy and Malta between Mr. Gorbachev and the Italian Government, Pope John Paul II and President Bush, prompt a feeling that old ideas can be swept away. This present time of change and hope offers us all, though for different reasons, cause for profound satisfaction and unprecedented hope for the future, even though it does also bring with it subjects of concern and complex and delicate responsibilities for all the democratic forces in the West and in Europe.

Only a few days ago, the joint declaration by President Gorbachev and Mr. Andreotti has pointed to the need for the development of political relations to be accompanied by more rapid progress in the nuclear, conventional and chemical disarmament negotiations within a framework of strengthened overall security. This, together with the confidence-building measures would constitute a considerable step towards the gradual changeover of military

Mr. Gabbugiani (continued)

structures to a defensive rôle and towards total arms transparency, including the transparency of the balance of military forces... It is in association with proposals like these that it is intended to develop contacts between the Italian and Soviet armed forces on a long-term basis, to exchange information on the conversion of the armaments industry, and to discuss the creation of a research centre for decreasing the risk of war and of surprise attack.

In our view, this will make it necessary to consolidate the political foundations of the Europe of the Twelve, so that new bridges can be built with the rest of Europe with greater efficiency and authority. The proposals put forward for more agreements with the various East European countries, the development of relations between the EEC and Comecon and the recent decisions on economic aid and co-operation for certain East European countries and Yugoslavia, point in the direction to be increasingly followed to encourage the processes of political and institutional reform now under way. As has already been pointed out, it is in this context that the need to rethink and revise our ideas on security, on military doctrines, on the defensive orientation and on the deployment of forces arises in contemporary and specific terms. These questions are already under discussion in some countries and by political forces within NATO but even more attention should now be paid to them.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I believe that the documents before the Assembly, so effectively presented by Mr. Caro, take us in that direction. My only purpose is to stress their content and relate them to the extraordinary events of recent days, which I believe we are all living through with great enthusiasm and understanding.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tascioglu, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. TASCIOGLU (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – Mr. President, thank you for calling me. Your Assembly has a remarkable tradition of meeting on the morrow of historical events. Six months ago it was the NATO summit when the heads of state and government of the allied countries solemnly declared their intention of overcoming the division of Europe. The Assembly has met on the very same day as the extraordinary NATO Council meeting at which President Bush has informed his colleagues of his talks with Mr. Gorbachev in Malta.

As the Chinese say: "we are living in very interesting times". Recent historical developments in Poland, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic and even Czechoslovakia are opening up very encouraging prospects for the

establishment of a new European order based on co-operation and disarmament. We are being given an opportunity of bringing the world closer to our vision of it: open frontiers, more freedoms, fewer armaments; a Europe without divisions and a world order characterised not by confrontation but by co-operation between East and West. At a time when the post-war economic, political and military parameters are being overturned, we are convinced that a united, integrated and powerful Europe complete with its security dimension will form one of the essential constituents in this process. In this context Turkey, a European democratic country and applicant for membership of the European Community and Western European Union, looks forward to taking its due place in the Europe of tomorrow.

Mr. President, I wish to make two short comments for information purposes in connection with paragraph 77 of the report so carefully produced by Mr. Caro.

In the first place, the Council of WEU did not defer examination of Turkey's candidature, but unanimously agreed that our application for membership should be actively considered.

Secondly, I am pleased to inform you that the process of high-level consultations between Turkey and WEU is working satisfactorily. As part of this process the Turkish authorities have had the opportunity of meeting both the Secretary-General of WEU and their Belgian opposite numbers who will be occupying the chairmanship of the Council. The Turkish Foreign Minister is preparing for a meeting with his Belgian colleagues in a few days' time in the context of the consultative arrangements under which a meeting at ministerial level is held at least once a year.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate closed.

I call Mr. Caro, the Rapporteur.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – A number of comments have been made on my report and I thank all those who have made them. May I say how pleased I am to note that all the contributions have concentrated on particularly important points bearing on the various aspects of WEU's place in the single market.

One of the main points in Mr. De Hoop Scheffer's speech concerned the sharing of the burden of security. WEU's task for the present is to work out what part it will play in the study of the burden-sharing in the defence budget, firstly among the Nine and then of course within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. This point has already been made in other reports. What is required is not simply an account-book operation, but also a political arrangement which will take due account of Europe's security

Mr. Caro (continued)

responsibilities – which are certainly not confined to budgetary considerations alone but also include economic and cultural responsibilities and the making available, if I may so put it, for Europe's defence, of a whole political and public opinion infrastructure that the United States does not have in its country.

I thank Mr. Lagorce for his remarks. Like him, I earnestly hope, on behalf of the Political Committee, that we do not underestimate the urgency of what is required, though if our governments have underestimated the urgency and scope of the necessary reaction to what is going on especially in Eastern Europe, this may be due to a lack of preparation. I said so in my speech, and am grateful to Mr. Lagorce for emphasising this point.

Mr. Eisma rightly hoped that the work of the security research institute would be made public. The fact remains that some of the research done in this institute may take the form of laboratory work since it is our intention that highly qualified specialists will give us an insight into the future shape of the concept of defence, which may be defined as the detection of possible threats – on which all our strategic thinking will be based. That being so, such studies may well be of a confidential nature, but in return, at the request of the Assembly, the institute, and hence the Council of Ministers would take steps to keep the Assembly informed and regularly consulted, failing which we could not agree to the confidentiality which would no doubt be the rule. This is something I would be the first to spell out.

Mr. Antretter very rightly raised the problem of Austria's joining the Common Market and the European Community. I did not touch on this point in my statement but mentioned it in my written report. It will indeed be revealing to see to what extent Austria's membership of the European Community will enable the country to open its doors towards Eastern Europe where Austria has a vital rôle, but at the same time Austria will be compelled to give fresh thought to its progress towards European political union, which raises the fundamental problem of defence. Who will take responsibility for defence in the meantime and how will it be possible for us to take part in the debate?

I fully agree with Mr. Soell's analysis. His remarks are clearly very relevant to the work of the WEU Assembly and we must respect the powers of all the institutions interested in current advances in Europe, whilst endeavouring to build upon the points of convergence in order to avoid any delay. Besides the political issues in our minds there is now the problem of time. We may have to gauge it very closely given the pace at which things are moving.

I was very pleased to hear our Greek friend, Mr. Zaïmis, taking part in the work of the Assembly. We know of his country's interest in WEU. Mr. Tascioglu, our Turkish friend, has just said the same thing. In this part of the Mediterranean to which WEU is devoting increasing attention, we have everything to gain in strengthening existing links with both Greece and Turkey and in bearing in mind the dominant rôle played by their armed forces, and particularly their navies, in this part of the eastern Mediterranean. But in addition, given the constraints of the Brussels Treaty, we have to work with our Turkish and Greek friends to find the language that will make our relations as operational and friendly as possible. That is the rôle of WEU, and I know it is the spirit in which you have made your comments.

I should like Mr. Malfatti to know that, together with the Political Committee, I am thinking along precisely the same lines as he in what he just said. Mr. Malfatti, let me repeat the words I used yesterday when speaking about the Commission and the European Community and placing myself at the level of the Assembly of Western European Union vis-à-vis the European Parliament; we need "bridges of operational co-ordination and not simply of understanding". I even said that at the level of parliamentary representation the work of the two assemblies should be co-ordinated, and that if possible they should advance at the same pace and reach the goal in view at the same time.

Clearly our task here is to set policy in the required direction. In common with many others and you too, Mr. Malfatti, I am involved in building up the political union of Europe. We want it to come about as quickly as possible. My report is that of an Assembly of Western European Union engaged in the political construction of Europe, but also facing very special difficulties as regards defence and security, these tasks being shouldered at the present time by all our member governments. It is in this spirit that I have produced the report.

Through it, with the help of the Council, and that of the Secretary-General whose active backing I yesterday solicited – and from his speech it is clear that he will provide remarkable support for the Assembly – I feel we shall be able to achieve the institutionalisation of our working relationships with the Brussels Commission and therefore with the European Parliament. Jean Monnet said that the only way forward is via institutionalisation. So far we, the Community and Western European Union, have been learning to live together. We have had our ups and downs. Now the time has almost come when, provided we hide nothing and say everything out loud, we shall be able to construct what, to avoid a theological debate, I have called bridges with the Community, over which we

Mr. Caro (continued)

may be able to approach this problem with greater clarity at our next session.

Thank you warmly, Mr. Gabbuggiani, for your support. We know your point of view and that of your friends in the communist group. I must tell you that, as this report deals with the rôle of WEU, the support of your group is particularly useful. With your support I hope that the report will be adopted unanimously.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Would the Chairman of the committee who has asked to reply to those who have spoken and to give the views of his committee please note that he may do so this afternoon after Mr. Chevènement's address.

I now suspend the sitting for a few moments in order to welcome the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

(The sitting was suspended at 10.30 a.m. and resumed at 10.35 a.m.)

The sitting is resumed.

**4. Address by Mr. Eyskens,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Eyskens, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Minister, allow me on behalf of all our representatives to welcome you to our Assembly. Would you please come to the rostrum.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, it is an honour and a privilege for me to be standing on this rostrum. As Belgium took over the presidency of WEU'S Council of Ministers on 1st July of this year, I have come ready to explain what the Council has been discussing, but I assume that you already have this information. Above all, I would like to exchange views with you on recent events at international level and, more specifically, what is going on in East-West relations.

I had the pleasure of welcoming you, Mr. President, in Brussels for a working meeting in the first few weeks of the Belgian presidency. This Assembly's Presidential Committee has also been invited to the Palais d'Egmont on two occasions for exchanges of views on current problems and the situation within WEU. I appreciate this close dialogue with the Assembly, which is extremely important in these eventful times. I should also like to pay tribute to my predecessor, Sir Geoffrey Howe, whose

wisdom and steadfastness during the British presidency of WEU helped to develop it into a fully-fledged consultative body for security matters. And in Secretary-General van Eekelen WEU has a great source of inspiration for our debate, a great thinker on European security problems and a generally respected guide whose public relations activities are of inestimable value.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, we are living in earth-shaking times. The unexpected is becoming commonplace. We listen to the radio and hear again and again of events which would have sounded totally unbelievable three or six months ago. We are facing a real landslide, and what is happening in the countries of Eastern Europe must strengthen our conviction that the way we have developed society here in the West, and more specifically Western Europe, corresponds to what President Bush called "a winning concept" at the NATO summit in Brussels yesterday. This winning concept applies to the European Community, it applies to our joint defence system within the alliance, and it also applies to the values we defend, in the Council of Europe for example. It applies, in fact, to everything that has been constructed here in the West since the end of the second world war. Nevertheless, we must not allow ourselves to be filled with feelings of triumph or condescension.

(The speaker continued in French)

Mr. President, I come straight to the matter in hand because I imagine you expect a brief report from me on what was said yesterday at the NATO summit in Brussels, following on the Bush-Gorbachev meeting.

I have a typescript for you in which, however, there was not time to include the conclusions of the NATO meeting. I shall therefore depart from my text in order to tell you what these conclusions were.

In his report President Bush told us: "It was a non-agenda summit and it was also a non-surprise summit", two characteristics which made the Malta meeting unlike previous summits. There was indeed no set agenda; everything came up for discussion but there were no negotiations. And it was a non-surprise summit in the sense that at previous summits in the Gorbachev era the President and General Secretary of the Soviet Union usually made use of his customary skill and the force of his analysis to take the initiative and present spectacular proposals. This time, Mr. Gorbachev did more listening than proposing. Instead it was the President of the United States's turn to put a package of proposals on the table.

His first proposal was for a rapid conclusion to the Vienna disarmament negotiations on conventional arms. These are the CFE negotiations

Mr. Eyskens (continued)

and his clearly stated wish is that an agreement should be concluded and signed in Vienna during 1990, preferably in advance of the official Gorbachev-Bush summit planned for June 1990 in Washington. You know as well as I do that there are four or five points yet to be settled. But yesterday we were in no doubt that their clearly expressed political will should enable the two sides to solve the outstanding difficulties.

The second was a matter of the will to progress with and finalise the START negotiations, with the object, here again, of concluding and signing this other extremely important agreement during 1990.

It is not impossible, it is even likely, that a meeting of the twenty-three at the level of heads of state and government will be organised in 1990 to add solemnity to the conclusion of the negotiations.

On the other hand, we heard nothing further from Mr. Gorbachev at the Malta summit about the convening of an even larger conference on the Helsinki pattern – thirty-five nations – that he had earlier proposed with some ostentation. We are not against such a meeting, but some caution is in order. Certain conditions need to be met before convening a conference of this size. Clearly the CFE negotiations need to be over and the agreement signed before the signatories of the Helsinki act meet, and a clearly defined agenda needs to be drawn up. There must be no impromptu redrawing or ratification of a new European structure under the influence of events on the ground in the countries of Eastern Europe when the options involved, which are of fundamental importance to the future of Europe as a whole and our own countries in particular, may not have been sufficiently thought through in other institutions.

The American President made many other proposals in Malta, including one for close collaboration in the protection of the environment and the ozone layer with the organisation of a number of meetings, in which economic and industrial decision-makers would also be involved.

Mr. Bush also told us about Mr. Gorbachev's extreme goodwill as regards co-operation with Europe. One very important feature appears to have been the President of the Soviet Union's repeated emphasis on the importance of maintaining the two pacts as they now operate but not precluding possible changes. It even looks as though the Soviets attach some importance to the continued presence of a sufficiency of American troops on the European continent. Like most this is only an apparent paradox. Like all the other speakers, Mr. Bush repeatedly

stressed the great difficulty of maintaining stability when so many internal changes were taking place in Eastern European countries. This by no means rules out what Mr. Bush called "a new Atlanticism" – a new and dynamic conception of the NATO pact in two senses: firstly, if we succeed in concluding a CFE agreement in Vienna in 1990 we shall clearly have to move on rapidly to its implementation at two levels, i.e. physical disarmament that includes putting certain arms into storage and the destruction of others, and secondly we shall have to tackle the whole problem of control, verification and monitoring; clearly it is in these two areas that co-operation between the two pacts would seem to be very desirable.

But Mr. Bush went beyond the military and post-military requirements and spoke of the need for our pact to evolve at least as much – we do not wish to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Warsaw Pact – towards an increasingly political, politico-military, post-cold war alliance, which might very well take on board other much more civilian tasks, including those connected with the environment. All of this made a very good impression on us Europeans, because it pointed the way to an extremely dynamic and constructive future.

The American President also stressed the need to maintain the pace of European integration. I listen regularly to the BBC, and I heard this morning that Mrs. Thatcher's spokesman had stated that Britain did not at all construe this as a kind of reproof. That was certainly not Mr. Bush's intention but his reasoning was extremely logical and coherent and I have included it in the text distributed to you. For a great many reasons the times we are passing through call for more not less Europe, and this becomes increasingly clear as the days go by.

There is the East European countries' thirst for co-operation, between sovereign states of course, but nevertheless co-operation focused on their economic and social recovery. What else but a well structured economic union can provide that? Moreover the United States and Japan, the other big member countries of the OECD, see the problem in exactly the same light because it is the European Community that the twenty-four have instructed to co-ordinate and develop this aid and co-operation programme.

We should have no illusions, if that is what they are; but perhaps they are hopes. From next year onwards, we have to increase aid and co-operation programmes twofold and more. The programmes proposed by the group of twenty-four for Hungary and Poland total \$600 million. This is not much compared, say, with Poland's indebtedness which alone amounts to \$40 billion. Then there are the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Then there will be – let us face it, there already is – the Soviet Union. Our

Mr. Eyskens (continued)

European union is thus increasingly becoming the king pin of a broad and intensive policy of co-operation with the East European countries. Without this union, or if it suffered a setback and appeared to have gone lame or into reverse and to be failing to fulfil such important commitments as 1992, economic and monetary union, and progress towards greater political unity – if all this were to spread abroad in public international opinion, we should very quickly be faced with a very serious credibility gap.

That is a first point, and there is another. Government aid alone, drawn from the Community budget and the budgets of the twelve member countries, would be wholly insufficient and too great a burden on our public finances. So the Community has to tackle the enormous task of mobilising flows of private finance towards the countries of Eastern Europe by creating new instruments and new mechanisms. This is quite essential since otherwise the domestic policy process in our twelve countries will not be able to cope. I also have serious doubts about the effectiveness of our aid if we do fail to route capital goods and investment exports to the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union. Here too the Community has an important part to play as a co-ordinating institution and as an instrument and lever.

This is why at the summit convened by President Mitterrand in Paris, Belgium stated that it strongly supported the idea of a European development bank. We also tabled a proposal – a sort of amendment – for setting up a mechanism in parallel with this Eurobank modelled on the one we have in Belgium, the *del credere*, to guarantee both private investments and the export of capital equipment to eastern countries. The system is complicated, but it has proved its effectiveness in my country. It is based on the payment of premiums by the firms concerned, but in Belgium it can also make use of a state guarantee and, at European level, a kind of reinsurance, with a Community guarantee in cases where the political risk would be too great.

So we have to make sure that flows of private finance to Eastern European countries are mobilised.

My third point concerns the continuance and development of European integration in all areas and at all levels and this includes the maintenance of our objectives underlined in the final act where the goal takes the form of a political union, though its content may still have to be spelt out. For me, political union is inconceivable without its representative democratic and political organs being concerned with security and defence policy. Fortunately, in a

context of probably complete post-cold-war détente and wholehearted co-operation with East European countries, in other words in a completely changed context, I cannot imagine a structured political Europe, with a parliament having the normal powers of a parliament, and an executive, whatever its form, shunning all responsibility in the defence and security matters.

Let me add a further and vital argument which is becoming increasingly apparent, even though it may not correspond with what the heads of the two superpowers have in mind. Unless European union enjoys full policy co-ordination in every aspect we shall, for practical purposes, be delivering ourselves up to an American-Soviet condominium. This is increasingly clear to me, though I repeat that I do not claim it is a deliberate tactic on the part of the two superpowers.

However, if we create a vacuum in Europe, it will obviously be filled by the presence of the two great powers, on the ground as well as in influence. I would not regard this as the ideal solution, and this should make us campaign more vigorously for a rapid solution of the important problems before the Europe of the Twelve, pursuing the same direction and keeping steadfastly on course.

My fourth point is that in talking about co-operation with Eastern European countries we should not forget co-operation with other groups of countries. We have, with great difficulty, concluded an agreement with the ACP countries and we had to revise the figures upwards, which I consider to be a good thing. This is a form of ad hoc association on which I shall have something more to say later.

But there is another group of countries that are very important to us: the six EFTA countries of Scandinavia, Switzerland and Austria. We are going to have an important meeting in Brussels on this subject on 14th December next. To the East European countries, even if only for the medium term, we could propose a formula of co-operation which could become a federal type formula in the case of the German Democratic Republic as Chancellor Kohl would like it to be. Mr. Kohl was very reserved in what he said yesterday: he did not talk about confederation and he claimed he had never proposed that there should be one, at least in the short term. His words were: "I proposed co-operation of a confederal type" which means that treaty agreements are signed and, as policy-makers in the German Democratic Republic are now suggesting, a "Vertragsgemeinschaft" (community by contract) is concluded based on accords that may be bilateral at Community level and therefore fall within the framework of an inter-governmental decision-making process, with separate agreements for each sector of responsi-

Mr. Eyskens (continued)

bility. If we make a proposal of this sort, to the German Democratic Republic for example – and in my opinion we shall also have to make it at some time to the other East European countries as their economic recovery proceeds – we shall have to put forward at least as elaborate a formula to the EFTA countries whose economic and political similarities with our own are far greater and of longer standing. So we have to go further than the present type of ad hoc association which we have with the EFTA countries and suggest something else much more credible to them. This is an urgent matter, and it is another reason for Europe to keep on course and for us to remain a totally reliable partner for these various groups of countries, in the short, medium and long term.

So it is all this that is at stake and the eyes of the whole world are on Europe. All the same, our minimum programme has to be for Europeans to give full time attention to their own continent and their own countries.

In brief, the NATO summit was very useful because, apart from the statement by Mr. Bush, Chancellor Kohl was able to describe and explain his position. Mr. Kohl, a man of logic and courage, repeated his determination to maintain complete solidarity not only with the Europe of today and its achievements, but also with the Europe of the future as laid down in the Single Act and in the treaty. He also reaffirmed his complete solidarity with and loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance and the future of NATO as outlined by Mr. Bush and others. Mr. Kohl made one very well-phrased remark which is worth repeating: "There are two great loyalties which for us in Federal Germany form part of the political heritage: European union, this integration, this historic, forward-looking construction is one and NATO is the other". This appeared to me to be an extremely relevant statement.

Those are the comments I wished to make about the summit and all the matters that revolve around it.

My last remarks will be about developments in the Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union. We were given some information about this during yesterday's meeting but we each have our different sources and data that we must try to fit together in a coherent way.

First of all, Mr. Gorbachev gives me the impression of being relaxed and very sure of himself. To anyone who asks he says he has the total support of all the members of the Politburo, and that his authority is unchallenged, which is something we are pleased to hear. We are all politicians and know how vulnerable we can be, even in our own parties.

Conversely the economic situation in the Soviet Union is very bad and is made still worse by the difficulties between the various republics in the empire – nationality problems, barriers to road and rail transport, supply problems in various parts of the country – situations, in short, increasingly approaching anarchy. Furthermore, the country's external debt is mounting steeply and at a very rapid rate because in order to contain inflation and maintain living standards it has to finance massive imports.

Mr. Bush told us that we must understand that President Gorbachev has no intention of going down on his knee to the Community and the West for aid, and that we must use our tact and quickly propose methods of co-operation. It was a useful message.

During the conference a very penetrating observation was made on the political future of the Soviet Union itself. As the years go by a pluralist, democratic parliamentary system based on the secret ballot will gradually take root in most countries of Eastern Europe. Can we believe for a moment that the Soviet Union will be left, in the medium or long term, as the only country of the former communist empire where a single party retains the political monopoly, even accepting the claim that a process of democratisation and pluralism is underway within that party? Most observers cannot, but the pluralism on the way in the Soviet Union raises the problem of the stability of existing structures. Mr. Gorbachev has an argument, namely that in order to maintain the unity of the empire, given the nationalities problem, that unity requires a single party. I am not entirely convinced by the argument. Belgium, for example, at present has three communities and three regions, and that does not prevent us from having several political parties. In the long term this is certainly a "headache" for the Soviet leader.

As regards the other countries of Eastern Europe, I myself visited the German Democratic Republic last week and I can tell you that the politicians I met, particularly the members of the Politburo, are no longer there – nor for that matter is the President of the Republic.

To form an opinion of events in Central Europe and to understand the attitude taken by Chancellor Kohl, it is useful to analyse what is happening in a country like the German Democratic Republic and to dig down into the thinking of the political leaders, both those for the time being in the majority and those of the opposition. I believe that they now all sincerely desire in-depth democratic reform. They have amended the first article of the constitution. They no longer recognise the leading rôle of the communist party. All that has changed; universal, secret elections will take place as

Mr. Eyskens (continued)

demanded by the opposition, probably in late 1990 or early 1991. But however this may be there is no questioning of the need for democratic reform in the present government or the opposition.

And yet all those I spoke to, including members of the opposition, told me they want to hold on to the sovereignty of their state and keep what they call a "socialist society". It is understandable that those currently in power should be of this opinion.

As regards the others, especially the small parties which are now detaching themselves from the bloc of parties collaborating with the régime and forming themselves into autonomous parties such as the CDU and the liberal party, their members will of course tell you privately that there are various forms of socialism – twelve in fact: "You must understand that if we want to preserve our state, it has to keep a characteristic distinguishing it from the western countries, not least from Federal Germany".

My answer is always the same: in the final analysis it is the people who decide and the general elections will show what the population, the electors, think about it and what the majority that will take shape among the electorate of East Germany want. And indeed we hope it will not be long before we are dealing in the East European countries with democratic governments formed as a result of universal and secret elections.

That brings me to the end of what I wished to say in the light of the flood of new events engulfing us.

My conclusion is that our organisation, of which you are the parliamentary Assembly, is, together with the EEC, the instrument of that coherence and quiet strength which the Europe of today and tomorrow must represent. I am persuaded, as no doubt you are, that WEU will be called upon over the coming months and years to play a very important part in developing the deepening and broadening structures of the European Community and to play a big part in the post-CFE context which may well be a pre-CFE 2 context. As was said yesterday at the conference, it could well be that our organisation will have to help us maintain a sufficiently multi-faceted identity for the European effort in all fields, including that of security.

I am therefore extremely glad to have had this opportunity to address the Assembly. As you know, we had an extremely useful meeting of the Council of Ministers in Brussels in November where we were able to resolve a number of problems, some of them of a physical nature and of interest to your organisation, such as the setting up of the institute. Other material

problems are still not settled and we shall apply ourselves to them.

There is considerable synergy between your Assembly and the Council; it goes without saying that the good offices of the Chairman, currently provided by Belgium, are entirely at your disposal.

I congratulate you on your work and your initiatives, and I hope they will lead us towards a Europe that will be a great cultural, economic and political homeland, not on the model of the nation-state of the last century but in accordance with the ideas of the twenty-first century, namely a tolerant community that will be a source of great hope for the younger generation and one of great pride for us who are privileged to work for it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Would you be prepared to answer questions from the members of our Assembly?

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – With pleasure, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you.

I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – I warmly congratulate the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs on a truly remarkable speech. For much of the time he appeared to speak without notes, and what he said was tremendously interesting. I have a very great affection and regard for Belgium, but that feeling is bilateral, not because Belgium is a member of the EEC. As it happens, I was one of the 38 conservative members of parliament who, in 1971, rebelled against Mr. Heath and voted in principle against Britain going into the Common Market, and I am still uneasy about any closer European union.

Does the Minister accept that, as no one knows for how long Mr. Gorbachev is likely to survive in office, and as the Russians are continuing to increase their arsenal of weaponry, despite Malta and all the previous talks, we must continue to uphold our defences, and that the pillar of those defences should be the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, since several countries in continental Europe remain somewhat soft on defence?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I thank Mr. Jessel for his remarks and for his expression of affection for Belgium. Feelings of affection among politicians are rather exceptional, so I am extremely grateful for what he said.

Mr. Eyskens (continued)

As for the rôle of NATO, it is clear that we must stick to the results of the current negotiations and the agreements that we hope to sign next year. We must underline the fact that the result of the CFE talks will be extremely favourable for both parties, but in the first place for the western alliance. For the first time we will have achieved a dramatic reduction in the asymmetry – the imbalance – between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in conventional armaments. That is a remarkable breakthrough.

We should have no feelings of fear. On the contrary, if we stick to our tactics in all these negotiations – START, conventional armaments, chemical weapons and so on – we shall improve symmetry and balance, which is a precondition for security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Hoop Scheffer.

Mr. DE HOOP SCHEFFER (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, my compliments to Mr. Eyskens on his statement. I should like to ask him a short question. Yesterday he was wearing his “NATO hat”, today he is wearing his “WEU hat”, and tomorrow he might be wearing his “EPC hat”. Does he see a more distinct rôle set aside for WEU as a result of the new political structures in Europe, and a European security system that may possibly – and I underline this word – be structured differently? How in this context does he see relations with EPC, that is, relations with the twelve member states of the Community? How does he think relations between and the responsibilities of the various multilateral institutions will develop?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I believe that in the short and medium term WEU will have an important rôle to play in the post-CFE period and perhaps in the preparations for CFE 2. We must hope that to the extent that the European Community stands by its objectives there will be room for the European pillar in Europe. Up to a point this European pillar will have to be based on an organisation like WEU. I believe, of course, that ideally the Community, having evolved into a political union, would also have powers in the area of security and defence policy. But during the transitional phase there should be a parallel situation, in case problems arise – and I can well imagine that they will – in giving this political union real substance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, my question is rather like the one that has just been asked.

First, I thank you for your brilliant exposé of the situation at all levels in the construction of Europe and developments in security problems.

You reminded us at the Malta summit the two superpowers wanted, in a way, to reassure their allies about their intention to maintain the alliances and uphold their importance. But you also warned us against allowing a political vacuum to form in which Europe would become a kind of condominium of the two superpowers.

I should therefore like to ask how, when, and in what way is stimulus to be imparted to the security dimension of the policy of European construction? Do you detect any political will to do this in the Council of Ministers?

Things are changing fast and could require us to act more rapidly than the Council has done since 1984. WEU has indeed moved into a faster stride since 1984, but it is still not going fast enough to change up to a much more active rôle.

Far-reaching changes have of course taken place in Eastern Europe but it may be wondered whether they are wholly irreversible. In this context and given a relative American withdrawal from Europe, do you not think it is high time to start a process designed to put vigour into the security dimension of the construction of political Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I hope your question will also be asked at the meeting of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, because it is of capital importance. But first the programme in progress has to be completed, i.e. 1992 and economic and monetary union, and there are still several obstacles to be overcome for that.

It may reasonably be supposed that opting for economic and monetary union makes the choice of some degree of political union inevitable. For I cannot see economic and monetary union, with all that the term implies, working very well without much closer political co-operation than at present between the twelve member countries.

It would be useful, it is in fact urgently necessary for all those with European responsibilities in the various bodies in which we meet to begin some in-depth thinking about the content of this political union and about its institutional aspects. We all know that there are white papers and drafts and there was even a major project drawn up by the European Parliament in days

Mr. Eyskens (continued)

gone by. But in the light of recent developments, I believe that a rethink has become very urgent and will be very useful.

Security problems, for their part, are inescapable. Surely we cannot follow the paradoxical logic of saying we are building Europe at the economic, monetary, social and political levels but when it comes to security policy we will rely completely and probably for ever on the Americans, the American pillar of NATO. If we did that, there would be no American pillar. It would be a one-pillar building in a situation that could become highly imbalanced and which would in fact become, as I said in my address, a condominium. And that is not our dream of Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Rodney.

Lord RODNEY (*United Kingdom*). – May I add my congratulations to the Minister on an interesting speech. Does he believe that we in the West should give financial support to countries that are still spending 17% of their gross domestic product on armaments?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – That is a difficult question, because you could and perhaps should develop the same reasoning for most third world countries. I was struck by the speech made by Minister Genscher at the June Assembly of the United Nations. He explained that the military expenditure of third world countries is four times greater than the total official development aid that we grant them.

Of course, you are referring to the countries of Eastern Europe, which are going through a period of adjustment and transition. It is more important for them that agreement is reached on CFE and perhaps on other agreements so that they can reduce their military expenses. We hope that those countries will have democratic parliamentary governments. We cannot refuse aid and co-operation because they still have high military budgets. We hope that they will develop as democracies. In that context, the issue of military expenses will become a different problem.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister spoke about WEU and defence, widened his comments to include EFTA and then spoke of democracy in the eastern countries. He spoke almost exclusively of the Twelve and made no mention of the organisation that

already covers twenty-three countries plus the four guest members. Is not the Council of Europe worth a mention in the context of a forty-minute speech? Also, has he changed WEU's policy? Until now, the Chairman-in-Office has always made the point that defence is within the sole competence of this organisation. He is now saying that perhaps at Strasbourg it should become part of the Twelve. He said that the Community cannot be left only to economic matters but should deal also with security and defence. How will a neutral country such as Ireland fit into that concept? I hope that the Minister was speaking purely in a personal capacity and not behalf of the Council of Ministers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – I did mention the Council of Europe. I remember doing so. I did not say much about it, but I could have done. We had a very useful meeting in Strasbourg a fortnight ago, when we welcomed Poland and Hungary as signatories to the cultural agreement. These two countries will be able to become full members as soon as full parliamentary democracy has been established.

I share your view that the Council of Europe is still an essential forum for promoting the moral values and great freedoms of democracy which we have always defended and which are now beginning to ripple out throughout Europe. I did not forget it, but I had no time to go into detail.

Answering your second question, I do not know if you have read the Single Act carefully but clearly I was only developing an argument. Speaking to so important an Assembly as yours let me try to make it a coherent one. It is this: can you for a moment imagine a structured political union with a kind of executive and a parliament with the normal powers and supreme authority of a democratic parliament, can you imagine a Europe like this, without the slightest responsibility for collective security? My answer is no. That is what I said, because that is what I believe and because I did, after all, wish to give a relatively coherent defence of my attitude. I therefore hand the question back to you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I too should like to ask a question which focuses on the development of the Soviet economy, although in a rather different way from the representative who spoke just now. It is certainly true that the Soviet Union spends an enormous amount on arma-

Mr. Soell (continued)

ments, but it now faces huge problems in its restructuring process, because to all intents and purposes four economic systems exist side by side: the old one, the new one, the black market and the grey market.

Was the possibility of providing some kind of emergency aid from the European Community's reserves discussed at the NATO summit yesterday, and will it be discussed at the forthcoming Community summit? Because the Russian public is now asking more and more insistently: what are the material benefits of the Westpolitik? Quite specifically, this means that we have to decide whether it would not be wise to put western goods in the shops – staple goods, rather than high-quality consumer goods. This at least is the hope expressed by Soviet citizens in private, thought not in public. After all, the Soviet Union cannot apply for developing country status, as Poland and Hungary did last week, because it would lose face. I just wanted to raise this point here.

A second brief question, which was discussed with the Secretary-General yesterday: if the revolution, the rising expectations of the silent majority in the German Democratic Republic, trigger off processes which can perhaps be best kept under control by federal or confederal structures, do you agree with your American counterpart, Mr. Baker, that the German Democratic Republic would then become, in a sense, NATO territory – that is how he put it – or do you think, as I do, that for a number of years at least, despite confederal structures, the alliances would retain a military presence, though possibly on a reduced scale, in the two parts of Germany?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – Your first question concerns economic aid to East European countries and the Soviet Union. You used the word "waiting", prompted by the nature of our co-operation and our proposals.

We have to be very clear in what we say. Aid from Europe and from America, western aid, can help towards recovery in those economies, but cannot produce recovery itself. That is a matter for the countries themselves. Furthermore, it is a kind of Pandora's box. So our aid has to be targeted in the direction of clearly defined economic reforms. When we say aid, I think much less of financial aid than of a kind of technical assistance. I had a visit from a minister of an increasingly friendly East European country who is responsible for economic reform. When I talked about sending business man-

agement specialists, he said: "Oh no, not managers yet, it's too soon. What we need are accountants, because we don't know how to draw up a balance sheet or a profit and loss account. For forty years we have been told that profit is a crime and as for losses, they are always ignored. So send us accountants". That is just one example.

So we have to start by training, technical assistance and, in several countries, monetary reform with the creation of capital markets. Savings exist in these countries: even in the German Democratic Republic there are big savings, much in foreign currencies, but these savings are not kept in the financial institutions. People have no confidence in the banking system. Mr. Mitterrand's idea, incidentally, is to set up a European bank to harvest these savings in order to reinject them into the national economies and finance investment plans.

I agree with your implicit reply. We must not expect our assistance to work miracles. It must be targeted, and it must be more like technical assistance than financial aid, which in any event would be only a drop in the ocean.

Your second question is much more tricky and difficult, namely, of what would consist the military forces belonging to the two pacts in the event of federal co-operation between the two Germanys?

To begin with, Chancellor Kohl's ten point proposals have been caricatured to make them easier to shoot down. This is a well tried tactic, because if you want to defeat a proposal you first caricature it which makes it easier to shoot at.

Yesterday Mr. Kohl explained to us the many shades of meaning in his proposals. In NATO we have made it clear that as democrats we are all in favour of self-determination. Mr. Kohl added that this right should also be exercised in a historical context including European integration and our two pact-based systems which, though in opposition up to now, could in future become pacts on co-operation.

As regards the presence of foreign troops, I see this in the framework of a bid for stabilisation in Europe. I said just now that, paradoxically, Mr. Gorbachev has nothing against the presence of a sufficient number of American troops in Europe – on the contrary he welcomes it because he regards it as a stabilising factor. Furthermore Mr. Bush has told us that whatever his Defence Minister may have said, America is going to maintain a significant military presence in Europe. For us that is a guarantee. A similar guarantee may be negotiated on the other side and this East-West symmetry will increase rather than diminish European stability.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jung.

Mr. JUNG (*France*) (Translation). – I congratulate you, Minister, on your analysis of developments in Europe with which I entirely agree.

Clearly, in our present historical situation we cannot build for the future unless we have a degree of trust in the other side. We cannot live in the past unless we forget it, but there is one aspect that worries me personally.

Much was said about Europe at the Malta summit, as you have made clear to us. But for psychological reasons the absence of Europe itself has me worried. This Europe that we wish to build together needs strong support from our peoples. What do you imagine could be done to ensure that Europe is represented at future major meetings? For despite the warm friendship we feel for our American friends and the trust we rightly place in Mr. Gorbachev, Western Europe, the Europe which we represent here, needs to have a place at the negotiating table, in the meetings and in the agreements that are to be struck.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. EYSKENS (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*) (Translation). – The Malta summit was not held for negotiation purposes. There was a very useful exchange of views, but no formal agreements were reached about anything.

The President of France, Mr. Mitterrand, who is President-in-Office of the Community, took the initiative of calling the twelve heads of government and foreign ministers together in Paris a fortnight ago. This was a very useful initiative and it gave us the opportunity of being heard and stating clearly our point of view. Hence, at least in the mind, Europe was present at Malta, the more so since Mr. Mitterrand will very shortly meet both Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Bush to speak in the name of Europe. If my memory is correct, this is the first time for such a thing to happen so quickly.

We all know that the Europe of the Twelve and the Commission have been given the responsibility of co-ordinating the whole policy of aid and co-operation with the East European countries and the United States, Japan and Canada. The remaining OECD members have given the Commission and the Europe of the Twelve a mandate to implement this policy of co-operation with the East in the field.

This is a sign that Europe exists – but not sufficiently. So I say, in view of the challenges in store and flooding in upon us, we need more Europe, we need to heighten our profile and to project our identity in every field. It also explains why the European summit at Strasbourg is so important. I hope that vital decisions for our future will emerge from that summit.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I shall now adjourn the debate. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council tells me he has to leave at ten minutes to twelve. May I remind you, however, that you can submit questions in writing to the Council. If you have any written questions I would ask the Chairman-in-Office to be kind enough to reply promptly in writing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for kindly replying to the various questions and for giving such an interesting address.

5. Address by Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Minister, on behalf of all the representatives, I welcome you to our Assembly and invite you to come to the rostrum.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am happy to be addressing you again today. When I first spoke in this forum in June 1988, it was just after the successful Moscow summit, and I asked: what specific contribution can we Europeans make in the future to maintaining our security and developing relations with Central and Eastern Europe, and what rôle will WEU play in this?

In the meantime we have all witnessed many radical changes in Europe. In Western Europe the member states of the European Community are actively preparing themselves for the challenges of the twenty-first century. With the completion of the single market, the first steps towards economic and monetary union and the development of the social dimension, we are pressing ahead with integration in the European Community.

We are equipping ourselves for the tasks we face in Europe if we are to make the Community a mainstay of the emerging peaceful order in Europe. Our goal is still the creation of a European union whose significance in international politics does not lie in its military strength but in this appeal as a model of peaceful co-existence – as an example of the value of freedom, self-determination and the rule of law in a community of free nations.

While these are still our guidelines in our part of Europe, in Central and Eastern Europe the political, economic and social system of more and more countries is undergoing fundamental change at breathtaking speed. The momentum

Mr. Schäfer (continued)

which European unification has gained as a result of progress towards integration has had a powerful influence on the reforms in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The influence and attraction exerted by the Community are making an impact, as evidenced by the memorandum sent to the Community by the German Democratic Republic the day before the meeting of the heads of state and government and the foreign ministers in Paris on 18th November.

The European Council is about to meet in Strasbourg. It is being held at a time when there is a genuine prospect of the kind of peaceful order conceived in the Harmel report as long ago as 1967. President Gorbachev has seized on this concept with his "common European house". The radical changes taking place before our eyes provide an historic opportunity for a peaceful and lasting end to the division of Europe.

The process begun in the Soviet Union, when Mr. Gorbachev helped to promote the breakthrough of the "new thinking", has surged ahead in Poland and Hungary, and now in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia as well. Changes are also afoot in Bulgaria. The call has gone out for freedom and self-determination, for democracy, for the free development of opinions, ideas, all the creative forces that express and motivate European self-awareness, and which no country and no government will ultimately be able to resist. As they prepare for reform the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are progressively translating into practical policy their recognition of the absolute necessity for a comprehensive reorganisation of the state, society and the economy. Truly an enormous task.

It is in our interests that they should succeed. These processes of reform, which are attuned to our democratic and constitutional ideals, do not threaten our security, they enhance it. What is expected of us is above all understanding and active assistance. We have no intention of deriving any unilateral benefits from the upheavals in these countries, let alone exploiting them to their disadvantage.

The meeting on 13th December of the ministers of the twenty-four countries which have undertaken to help Poland and Hungary must represent an important signal of our willingness to help.

We must proceed consistently with the development that began with the conclusion of the CSCE in 1975 and was greatly accelerated when the joint EEC-CMEA declaration was signed in June 1988. Since then the Community's relations with the Central and Eastern European

countries have strengthened to the point where we can say there is a new level of co-operation and dialogue, a perspective stretching beyond normal relations. Trade and co-operation agreements have been concluded with Hungary and Poland and extensive co-operation programmes launched. Negotiations with the German Democratic Republic and other CMEA countries will follow. The political dialogue with some of these countries is developing rapidly, becoming a valuable instrument for an exchange of views and information, which if the favourable trend continues, may be used for a political harmonisation that will stabilise the processes of reform.

The citizens of Poland, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia have demonstrated a sense of responsibility and democratic maturity which shows that they are willing and able to take charge of their own destiny. It is now up to us to create and improve through our co-operation the stable environment in which the reforms can continue. Here the Council of Europe is of pre-eminent importance with its expanding rôle as the largest and oldest international organisation on our continent and guardian of the common heritage of the rule of law, democracy and human rights. On 16th November 1989 Hungary became the first member state of the Warsaw Pact to apply for membership. We particularly welcomed this application and the first practical results of co-operation between the Council of Europe and Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union. The process of rapprochement with the help of the Council of Europe must be energetically pursued and geared to overcoming the division of Europe. The aim of our policy is to use the potential and influence of the Council of Europe and the experience of its institutions to build bridges between ourselves and Central and Eastern Europe.

In this undoubtedly historic phase, progress in the disarmament negotiations is particularly important. They must keep pace with developments on the political and human fronts. A future European peaceful order calls for new structures of co-operative security in Europe. Some initial important steps have been taken, namely the security-building and confidence measures agreed in the Stockholm document and the INF treaty of December 1987. Other agreements must follow in the conventional and nuclear sphere and on chemical weapons. After President Bush's meeting with President Gorbachev we have reason to hope that the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces will be successfully concluded next year, which will considerably change the military landscape of Europe.

As early as 1967 the Atlantic Alliance was emphasising the equal importance of military deterrence, political dialogue and co-operation

Mr. Schäfer (continued)

in the Harmel concept. It has always seen itself not simply as a military alliance, but also as a political community of free nations. Now that military confrontation is on the wane, this aspect is gaining in importance. In the Brussels summit declaration of May 1989 the alliance put forward both an overall concept for arms control and disarmament and a broadly-based programme for co-operation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, thus announcing that it also intends to be the driving force of a future stable peaceful order in Europe. We are in no doubt that even in this time of change, the alliance is performing its vital rôle. We must all think very carefully about its future rôle in a new Europe.

Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. President, we are now witnessing a period of unprecedented development that offers historic opportunities, but is not without risks. We should realise that we owe the present radical changes at least in part to decades of firmness in pursuing our alliance policy and pressing ahead with the construction of Europe.

WEU's rôle is also significant: since its reactivation it has increasingly grown into its allotted task of giving European co-operation a security policy dimension. The decisions taken in Rome and the provisions of the "Platform - European security interests" are gradually being implemented. The accession of Spain and Portugal, whose active involvement has already had a favourable impact on WEU's ongoing work, enlarges its base and clarifies the platform's claim to define the outlines of a common security policy in Europe.

The platform reaffirms that we owe it to our peoples to overcome the division of our continent and seize the emerging opportunities for further improvements in the interests of all Europeans. This is why I particularly welcome the fact that the contacts with the Supreme Soviet, already established when I last attended this Assembly in June 1988, have been extended and developed. Representatives of the other radically changing countries of Central and Eastern Europe also keep themselves informed on developments in WEU and are bound to respond to the decisions taken at the ministerial meeting on 13th November, in which WEU faces up to its tasks in the medium and longer term in a changing European security environment.

First, there was the decision to establish a WEU institute for security studies in Paris, designed to contribute to the development of concepts for a new form of European security thinking, in part through contacts with comparable institutions in Central and Eastern Europe. The studies on an earth-observation system in space, which could be used for the verification

of a CFE agreement, and on military training and the opportunities it offers for the use of simulators for environmental purposes are equally important. WEU is also concerned - and this too is reflected in the decisions taken at the last ministerial meeting - with verification questions in the context of the expected CFE verification agreement. Conceptual ideas about the post-1991 period will also be discussed by WEU working parties.

Ladies and gentlemen, a question we Germans are often asked these days is this: what do the Germans want? We recognise the sympathy and also the degree of concern reflected in these questions and can only reiterate that the Germans will not go it alone. Our destiny is rooted in the destiny of Europe. But among the realities of Europe is the reality of a German nation which is currently divided in two. The desire to overcome the division of Europe cannot logically go hand in hand with the division of Germany, though of course there are those, even in prominent positions, who fear that a reunified Germany might be a destabilising factor.

Ladies and gentlemen, Federal Minister Genscher has repeatedly pointed out in recent weeks that a democratic Germany has never posed a threat to peace in the world. And I feel we should also remember that this is the first chance the people in the German Democratic Republic have had since 1933 - for more than half a century - to regain their freedom and develop democratic structures. They have demonstrated for this in an impressive, peaceful way. The fact that the people of the German Democratic Republic are now insisting on their right of self-determination - this may eventually entail a decision in favour of German unity - will only strengthen democracy and western values in Europe. Those who believe it poses a threat to Europe fail to appreciate that this development is based on the values of the western world, on pluralism, freedom of expression, respect for human rights and close international co-operation. We stand by the view that the European Community will continue to be the model for and driving force of the unification of Europe.

Ladies and gentlemen, I can only repeat in this context what Federal Foreign Minister Genscher told the United Nations and what the German Bundestag affirmed by an overwhelming majority in its resolution of 8th November:

"Fifty years ago the Polish people became the first victims of the war launched by Hitler's Germany. They may rest assured that their right to live within secure frontiers will not be jeopardised by territorial claims from us Germans, now or in the future. There will be no turning back of the clock. We want to work

Mr. Schäfer (continued)

with Poland for a better Europe of the future. The ability to coexist in Europe is founded on the inviolability of frontiers."

As early as 1967, the Atlantic Alliance made the following important statement in the Harmel report:

"... no final and stable settlement in Europe is possible without a solution of the German question which lies at the heart of present tensions in Europe. Any such settlement must end the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe, which are most clearly and cruelly manifested in the division of Germany."

The Federal Chancellor's ten-point programme, ladies and gentlemen, is based purely and simply on this joint statement.

In his statement to the German Bundestag the Federal Chancellor emphasised that the division of Europe, and hence of Germany, can be peacefully overcome only by acting together, and in an atmosphere of mutual trust. This process, which calls for circumspection and political skill, will present the European Community, the Atlantic Alliance, the Council of Europe and, not least, WEU with a greater challenge than ever before.

The historic task we now face is the construction of a peaceful, free and democratic Europe. If East and West see this as a joint task and bend their strength to accomplishing it, we shall achieve our objective of a lasting and just peaceful order in Europe, in which the Germans will have their place with all the other nations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your address, Minister.

I am sure you would be prepared to answer questions from the members of the Assembly.

Does anybody wish to ask Mr. Schäfer any questions?...

I call Mr. Eisma.

Mr. EISMA (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I want to ask Mr. Schäfer this. What if the WEU Assembly should decide to hold a special meeting on East-West developments and to invite observers from Central and Eastern European countries. Would it be possible to hold such a meeting in West Berlin, in the Reichstag building, for example? What does Mr. Schäfer think of this idea, and in particular of the venue I have suggested?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of The Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I naturally welcome any sug-

gestion of a conference at which you have discussions with representatives of non-member countries of WEU. As regards holding the meeting in Berlin, there are, of course, certain preliminary requirements such as finding out how the allied control powers in Berlin would react to this idea. I am sure you will appreciate that we can only decide in consultation with the control powers whether such an attractive venue as Berlin – I can understand your interest in going there – can be considered for your meeting. I cannot give an answer at this stage.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – This is the second time that I have heard the Minister speak. May I compliment him on an excellent and helpful speech. He clearly understood the rôle of the Council of Europe in building a bridge to the East. He confirmed what we all know – that in the short and medium term the sole competence for defence lies with Western European Union.

As he spoke of integration, will he explain how, if Austria wishes to join the Community – it has a state treaty on neutrality – and as Ireland is already neutral, the Community will be able to participate in defence matters?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of The Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – This is, of course, a difficult question, because it touches on the very point which is familiar to us all: the question of how to reconcile the neutrality of Austria with the possible further development...

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). – And Ireland.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of The Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I am sorry: and Ireland. But I am not as sure about Ireland as I am about Austria, at least to judge by talks I have had in Dublin. Opinions vary on Ireland's future development and possible participation in a European defence system.

All we can say at the moment is that we will do all we can to consider, with Austria and with any other country wanting to accede to the European Community, how their accession can be reconciled with the new developments that have just begun and whose outcome we cannot yet predict. I therefore feel it would be premature to say at this stage that Austria will, of course, become a member. It can become a member only if it satisfies requirements which we ourselves have not as yet specified.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lambie.

Mr. LAMBIE (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to ask two simple questions. First, does the fact that the West German Foreign Minister has sent a substitute to represent him at this Assembly show the standing in which WEU is held by the West German Government? Secondly, is the future of the German Democratic Republic a German or European problem?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of The Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I believe my statement made it very clear how much importance we attach to WEU, especially during the developments with which we are all faced, and which may result in WEU being assigned new tasks. I feel that all organisations and alliances, including those in the West, now face the challenge of preparing for developments whose speed is prescribed by us. I must make that quite clear. Far from determining the time-span of the reforms in the East, we are taken by surprise by these reforms. Nevertheless, we must try to find new answers to these challenges.

As regards your second question, I have already tried to make it clear that anyone who believes the division of Europe can be overcome without ending the division of Germany in a way that will also lead to the disappearance of the frontiers between Eastern and Western Europe, is deluding himself. I believe that how this comes about will largely be decided by the people who live there. Above all, we should listen to them and what they tell us and the demands they will be making of us.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I too thank you, Minister, for the information you have given us. I have two questions. My first is as follows. We have read in the newspapers that Chancellor Kohl's proposal regarding confederation has prompted some reactions about which I am not clear. In what relationship would such a confederation stand with the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances which, although likely to change, are probably going to last in Europe?

My second question is this. I have noted the assurances given to the Poles. However, the problem of frontiers does not concern Poland alone; I should like to ask in what way the Federal German Government intends to dispel the doubts and misgivings raised by the Kohl plan as regards respect for the Helsinki agreements regarding the inviolability of the frontiers between European states as drawn after the second world war.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of The Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I believe one has to read the Federal Chancellor's ten points very carefully to see that he has drafted a concept in which he says – in point 5, for example – that in a further stage of development – he refers previously to measures that need to be taken now in co-operation with the Government of the German Democratic Republic to help it in certain ways – measures will have to be taken that cannot be taken until the necessary conditions have been created in the German Democratic Republic. By this I mean free elections and some clarity about the future economic system. None of this has yet happened. The Federal Chancellor concludes by saying that he can imagine the two countries co-operating on the outstanding issues through a network of agreements and the establishment of joint commissions at all levels. Here he is actually taking up a suggestion made by Mr. Modrow, the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic.

He goes on to say that he can envisage as a further step the development of confederal structures between the two countries, with the goal of establishing a federation.

What the Federal Chancellor has done is to open up prospects for the future. All the steps mentioned here can be taken only if the people of the German Democratic Republic are willing. For us this is the determining factor. In other words, we cannot force anyone in the German Democratic Republic to drop the idea of two separate states. On the other hand, we cannot prevent the citizens of the German Democratic Republic from calling for reunification and expressing their will in this way. I believe we must wait and see what happens.

What are undoubtedly illusory are the notions of certain intellectual circles in the German Democratic Republic, who tell us we must help them out of the mess that socialism has got them into, but they want no part of the rat-race in the West, God forbid. Our taxpayers would undoubtedly find that hard to take. We can hardly pay for the experiments of socialism with billions of Deutschmarks derived from a hated capitalist system in order to put that same socialist system back on its feet. In view of the rather eccentric ideas of some politicians in the Federal Republic, this needs to be made very clear to the German Democratic Republic.

Now to your second question. You said that any change of frontiers did not concern the Polish frontier alone. Well, the frontier between the two German states was never final; it was an unnatural, artificial frontier. I do not believe it can stay as it is. I do not therefore think that the possibility of changing this frontier, getting rid of this frontier, is bound to lead to unfavourable

Mr. Schäfer (continued)

changes in Europe. What we want is a change in an unnatural frontier, leading on to a peaceful order. This order can certainly not be expressed by the ugly symbols of the cold war. Sad to say, many people have only just realised that the wall existed. Many people had already forgotten about it.

We have seen the tremendous emotional effect produced when the wall was breached at a number of points enabling people to leave the German Democratic Republic and travel to the West for the first time in twenty-eight years. So I do not believe that the perpetuation of this frontier can be seriously compared with that of the western frontier of Poland.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE (*United Kingdom*). – I was delighted to hear both ministers who have spoken this morning speak of helping emerging democracies. I want to put a simple and practical question to the Minister. Lord Boyd-Orr, who was the first principal of the FAO, had a saying that if one offers a starving man freedom or a sandwich, the likelihood is, except in very rare cases, that he will take the sandwich. In the heady atmosphere of their great release from an intolerable tyranny, in Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and other countries, great expectations have been raised. When the exhilaration is over, something must be done to achieve practical results. I understand that, except in Hungary, the lack of food in the shops and the long queues for food are the major irritants or evils under which people labour. We in the West have plenty of food as well as plenty of expertise. Should we plan in the short term to give direct assistance in the form of food as well as of technical help to emerging countries, so that they will quickly feel the benefits of democracy?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of The Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Assistance must also be given in the short term, of course. The “sandwich” to which you refer has to some extent already been provided in the shape of the European Community’s food aid. But I would also point out that the conference of donor countries in Brussels on 13th December will have to consider this question very carefully.

As regards the extensive economic aid that will play a part in Poland’s and Hungary’s development, we are in the middle of negotiations. We have made very substantial funds available. In the long term I believe a crucial element will be the willingness of private investors to help

instal sound economic structures in Poland, Hungary and, eventually, the German Democratic Republic. Certain conditions will have to be satisfied, of course, beginning with legislation to protect investments, provision for the free movement of capital and a whole series of measures which are essential to any private investment.

But in the first phase – what you say is true, in my opinion – the aim is to get some of these countries through this winter. This will require our assistance, the assistance of all our countries, not only the countries of the European Community, but all western countries. If the worst is to be avoided, we must do even more than we have done already.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – Does the Government of the Federal Republic intend to use its influence to ensure that the rights of Switzerland and of Austria to protect their environment against heavy lorry traffic between one EEC country and another are fully respected and honoured? We are all being asked to pay more heed to the environment and to the so-called green issues. The people living in the beautiful valleys of Switzerland do not want to suffer heavy lorry traffic between Germany and Italy, and the same is true of Austria. Both Switzerland and Austria are wealthy nations and do not want to accept such lorry traffic, however much money they are paid. I have even heard it said that some interests within the EEC have proposed economic sanctions against Switzerland if it does not comply, which would seem to be utterly shocking. Economic sanctions are traditionally used only in respect of a country towards which one feels hostile. It would be outrageous to propose economic sanctions against a friendly European country that is only trying to protect the environment of its people. I hope that the Minister will renounce any such suggestion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of The Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I cannot very well speak for the European Community and the Commission here. Some countries have, of course, been criticised for imposing bans on certain types of road traffic. Although I have considerable sympathy for the Swiss valleys you mention, they are threatened not only by lorries but increasingly by the increase in the deplorable habit of skiing which has now become an epidemic resulting in the clearance of whole forests. This is not meant as a personal attack on the skiers in this chamber. I am sure there are a number of them here.

Mr. Schäfer (continued)

This issue cannot be restricted to Switzerland and Austria. In Bonn, I sometimes find it impossible to get through all the British, Dutch and German lorries which are turning our motorways into race tracks. So I feel we should all do something to create regulations which will protect the Rhine as well as the Alpine valleys against the growing volume of traffic.

I hear that, once the single European market is completed at the end of 1992, road traffic will increase 100%. The Federal Republic will not be able to stand that either. We shall all have to tax our brains to come up with a way of coping with the growing number of heavy goods vehicles.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – As the Minister will have gathered from Mr. Jessel's question, we in Western European Union are already thinking about alleviating conflicts in Europe beyond our own frontiers where this lies within our power. I greatly appreciated the Minister's statement, which – quite without prearrangement – coincided splendidly with the address by the Chairman of the Council. After these two statements can I, as a German parliamentarian, take it that, in view of Federal Chancellor Kohl's ten-point plan and Foreign Minister Genscher's remarks, the debate within the alliance will keep to Article 7 of the treaty between the two Germanys and the other assurances given to Germany? In other words, that any policy designed to overcome the division of Europe will focus on overcoming the division of Germany, resolving the German question, and that suspicion, emotionalism and nationalism will, happily, play no part in this question?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of The Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – All I can say is that I expect no further repercussions from the initial surprise of some governments over the ten-point plan. The first press reports gave a summary which did not quite accurately reflect what was actually said. It is important to realise that the Germans are slowly beginning to grow into that national pride which our closest friends in Europe take for granted. There is nothing sensational in our beginning to overcome the uncertainty which has characterised many of our political decisions since the war and to expect our friends to understand our concerns.

We do not expect an issue that should be of concern to us all in Europe to revive an image of Germany which really belongs to the past and which it would be better not to conjure up again.

I too was unhappy with some of the statements to this effect, but I feel we shall have to live with them. I also believe we have now made our future path clear; our efforts to resolve the German question will continue within a European context, and only within this context. I believe we have also made it clear that we do not now want to slow the pace of progress towards European union, but that we shall pursue our policy while, of course, seeking a solution to this problem together with our friends.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Timm.

Mrs. TIMM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – In his statement the Minister said he understood the concern also felt by our allies about German developments proceeding so quickly that destabilisation in Europe might follow. He then stressed that Germany would not go it alone and that the division of Europe must be seen in the context of overcoming the division of Germany as well. Can he tell me if our western allies really appreciate that they must not leave us alone now, either, and that the only guarantee against their fears is their own full commitment, economic and otherwise, to joining with us in ensuring the successful process of reform in Central and Eastern Europe, including the German Democratic Republic? They must not abandon us now, they must join us in this commitment. I would say that anyone who is afraid of Germany should now make common cause with the events in Central and Eastern Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of The Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I quite agree with you, Mrs. Timm. I believe it would be fatal to abandon us now. The best recipe for a revival of German nationalism, to my mind, would be to drive Germany into a kind of isolation at this stage. That would exacerbate the fears we occasionally read or hear about. If we now set about solving the problems we face together, it is no good saying: "Germany is the largest economic power and will overwhelm Europe". What we should be saying is: "We French, we British, all we members of the Community countries, are looking forward to a sizable new market, because the German Democratic Republic has none of the products that our neighbours also manufacture and will then be able to sell there."

For example, when asked on my recent visit to Africa whether western countries like the Federal Republic would not now forget about the third world while they concentrated on the countries of the East, my answer was that it is

Mr. Schäfer (continued)

indeed surprising that Poland has already declared itself to be a developing country, which I do not quite understand, but we must live with the facts. I told my questioners that when people from the German Democratic Republic streamed into the Federal Republic, bananas were sold out in a matter of hours, so Africa had a new market for its tropical goods in the GDR.

I believe the same is true of our western neighbours. Let us look on the bright side! Let us not always see the dangers which we may have been right to see in the nineteenth century or the first half of this century. You cannot applaud a democratic Germany for forty years and then, when the issue of the rest of Germany's becoming democratic arises, start talking about dangers. I fail to see the logic of this.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The Minister has just rightly referred to the economic power apparent here in Europe, but he also said how important developments as a whole were for Europe. Am I right in thinking that the process of democratisation that we all want and are witnessing so positively requires what is known as economic aid? In this connection I would also like to ask the Minister what changes he would wish to see in the Cocom list, for example, so that we are actually able to make this positive contribution?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of The Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – As you know, we – and by "we" I mean not only the Federal Republic but our Western European friends too – are discussing and must go on discussing with the United States the question of what still makes sense on the Cocom list and what does not. In view of the rapprochement that has already occurred, thanks in part to the meeting of the

two Presidents, and the continuing very rapid developments in Eastern Europe, I believe that many of our past fears in connection with the Cocom list no longer seem so important in the sense of assisting the Czechoslovakian or Hungarian armaments industries, to our own possible military detriment. Our hope is now that all those anxieties about every minor computer component which might give the other side a decisive edge in the event of war will very soon be a thing of the past. Some goods will stay on the list, as we know, but many will have to be looked at afresh in the light of developments, and will be removed from the list.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your address and for kindly answering the many questions you were asked.

6. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France.
2. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council (Vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1201).
3. European security and events in the Near and Middle East (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1202 and addendum).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.)

NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 5th December 1989

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France.
Replies by Mr. Chevènement to questions put by: Mr. Scheer, Mr. Müller, Mr. Hardy, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Cox, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Pontillon, Mr. Speed, Mr. Ewing, Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Niegel, Mr. Fillon, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.
4. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council (*Reply to speakers and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1201*).
Speakers: The President, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (*Vice-Chairman of the committee*).
5. European security and events in the Near and Middle East (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1202 and Addendum*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Pieralli (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Gabbuggiani, Mr. Scheer, Lord Mackie, Mr. Cetin (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Sarti, Mr. Atalay (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Caro, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Bindig, Mr. Tascioglu (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Caro, Mr. Tascioglu (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Pieralli (*Rapporteur*), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (*Vice-Chairman of the committee*).
6. Membership of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.
7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

I now welcome Mr. Taft who has joined us.

Mr. Taft, a former United States Assistant Defence Secretary, is now his country's permanent representative at NATO.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

¹ See page 24.

3. Address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Chevènement, Minister of Defence of France.

Your words last June aroused lively interest in this Assembly, Minister. I therefore thank you for paying us this further visit so soon.

I welcome you to our Assembly on behalf of all those present here and invite you to come to the rostrum.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – Mr. President and members of the WEU Assembly, it is with the presentiment that we are living through exceptional events that I address you today. Much has happened since June. Who of us would have believed only a few months ago that, to borrow the words used by Mikhael Gorbachev at the Capitol in Rome, the eastern bloc countries “having started on the path of radical reform are now crossing a line beyond which there is no return to the past”, never mind what the future holds? A period is coming to an end during which we had to demonstrate our steadfast determination to deter a formidable military threat coupled with a totalitarian political system. A new period is beginning in which we are challenged to construct an order of

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

democracy, prosperity and peace in Europe founded on a solid and balanced basis of security.

We are all aware that the Western European countries will have to play the leading rôle in this new phase of history through a continuous dialogue with their partners in Eastern Europe. The vice-like grip of military and political confrontation is loosening and Europe must seize this opportunity of regaining control of its own destiny. We have to show that Europe is capable of doing that by rising above the rivalries that darkened its past and curbing the temptations to excess which then arose, twice leading Europe to the brink of the abyss.

WEU can play an important rôle in this new thinking as it is the forum in which the leading countries involved in European construction meet together to discuss the central problem of their security. It is on the decisions which we shall take together that the success of the changeover to a new European equilibrium ensuring the stability and security of our continent will largely depend.

We are today involved in two, as yet unfinished, building projects which, if they are taken to their conclusion will constitute the two pillars of a future European equilibrium.

First there is the movement towards democratisation in the East, which can only be compared with such major events in European history as the revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century and those of 1848 out of which emerged the democratic régimes in Western Europe.

As happened then, the combination of popular aspirations and the resolve of a number of responsible statesmen is enabling history to resume its forward movement. Though forty years of effort and firm policy have enabled Western Europe, with the support of the United States, to show the way and hold in check the overriding ambitions of one superpower, it would be unreasonable on our part to claim responsibility for what is happening or to interpret it as a victory of capitalism over socialism.

The matter is more complicated. What we are witnessing is the victory of the peoples of Eastern Europe over fatalistic resignation under régimes whose rapid collapse clearly shows their basic weakness. Let us also pay tribute to the actions of one man, Mr. Gorbachev, who has had the courage to face the truth and to accept the inevitable changes instead of anchoring his stand on certainties and concepts which can have no future. The new development is bringing enormous hope to the nations where it is in progress.

Our first duty with regard to these great changes is respect: each nation has to choose its own path. Our next is solidarity. The transition to a more open, decentralised and a more efficient economy will be costly and difficult. The changes also present us with an opportunity – that of building a reconciled continent in which co-operation and links of all kinds can replace the frozen confrontation of two ideological blocs and in which, as a result, the different elements of the German nation can come together again and resume normal relations without upsetting either the equilibria necessary for security or the advances made by the major institutions of Western Europe.

Ten years ago in Helsinki we spelled out ten main principles which must guide the relations between the thirty-five. Today we are in a position to fill out this framework, remembering that one of these principles is the inviolability of frontiers.

The other building project in the West, our own task, is that of European construction. We have come a long way together since signing the Brussels and Rome treaties, designed first to bring about our reconciliation and thereafter ever tighter bonds between us. Today there are further stages we have to travel, in particular economic and monetary union and the definition of common policies. Let us have the wisdom to realise what is at stake at a time when the impact of our joint actions will be exceptional.

The building of Europe demands that our different nations weave together a complete fabric of economic, social, cultural and human solidarity of far greater strength than an ad hoc alliance. By 1993 we intend to make this come true by completing the area of prosperity that we have formed among the Community countries and accompanying it by the necessary common policies to ensure that all enjoy the benefits.

In spite of its present difficulties, the Soviet Union in its resources, population and size, remains a great power whose military potential would enable it virtually to dominate the Western European countries if a balance of power is not maintained. In addressing you here in the WEU Assembly I feel it is useful to repeat that the formation of a defence rôle in Western Europe based on adequate deterrence is more than ever necessary and the best guarantee for the freedom of our countries.

The two as yet uncompleted processes of evolution in the east and west of our continent to which I have just referred need to complement each other. The democratisation of the countries of Eastern Europe will contribute to the security of the whole of Europe and will make it possible to develop a joint area of co-operation. The construction of Europe, by laying the structural

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

foundations of political and strategic equilibrium in our continent, will contribute to its stability and to peace and greater co-operation.

To achieve these great but time-demanding designs requires a context of stability, peace and arms control, and this brings us to the field of responsibility of Western European Union.

In the years to come we shall have to meet a number of necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for this great change which we have to organise in a spirit of responsibility. The first is the stability of the strategic environment in order that the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in particular can apply themselves wholly to the internal transformation of their economy and their society. The continued existence of two alliances could well help the transition and ensure that a security balance at a lower level of armament can be established at each stage. We may well imagine that the powerful Soviet military machine will not be liquidated overnight and will continue to represent a considerable force for many years to come. The destruction of a large number of weapons in the Warsaw Pact forces will be a slow process for which these countries are not yet very well equipped. The same applies to the scaling down of military personnel and the switching of senior military staff to other activities which is liable to prove specially difficult. Everything counsels caution, given the truly revolutionary upheavals affecting Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. We have to be in a position to contain the violent and unforeseeable reactions which could erupt if the way events are going were seen in some quarters as a threat to the security interests of the Soviet Union. We have to be capable of deterring the East from going into reverse.

Our duty therefore is to observe moderation and prudence vis-à-vis the people of Eastern Europe. A positive change is under way. Let us do nothing to deter it, instead let us concentrate all our efforts on encouraging and assisting it. In that area, our chief responsibility is to ensure that any political or military change is negotiated with the agreement of all the parties involved.

Another thing we have to do – the second condition – is to safeguard all the advances we have made in co-operation, i.e. the bond between us in the alliance and the links between European countries in WEU, while at the same time maintaining a defence stance tailored to the changes in the threat. The political changes in Eastern Europe are altering and to some extent attenuating the traditional threat, but alongside this positive trend there are uncertainties about the future and new risks of instability.

Nothing suggests today that the Soviet Union intends to give up the main components of its military capability, particularly the nuclear forces capable of striking Western Europe. The present process of conventional forces reduction in no way covers all weapons and cannot possibly prevent a new arms race in the other areas. On the contrary, during this period of rapid change and upheaval, the risk of crisis scenarios is increased. In the face of this new type of threat the maintenance of balance in the defence field based on the presence of a sound deterrent capacity in Europe is more than ever necessary as a guarantee of continuing strategic stability, or in other words, ultimately, of peace. What we have to do therefore is to formulate step by step the main traits of a European defence identity in this new context.

I do not need to repeat my argument about geographical dissymmetry which I developed when I addressed your Assembly in June to the effect that the defence of Western Europe poses a special problem calling for the European defence identity to which I referred a moment ago.

We also need to build up momentum in our ideas and research on the forms which our joint defence should assume in future. This is specifically the field of Western European Union.

The third and last condition is the pursuit of disarmament within a negotiated framework. The purpose of balanced and verifiable reductions must be to permit a military equilibrium to be established at a lower level of armaments and the stability of the relations between the two alliances to be reinforced by confidence-building and stabilising measures. But, here again, let us be methodical. Let us be practical, avoid hasty decisions and choose instead to go ahead with carefully thought out and negotiated measures which, remember, will largely constitute the basis of our future security.

I would add here that we must limit our defence capacity to what is strictly required and we are not far from that point. We should not argue as though there were a parallel between the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand and the Western European countries on the other. We are not in the same situation. Nor must we forget that the Western European countries, especially like ours although we are not the only one, have security commitments outside Europe itself and in particular in the south of Europe. This is a consideration which must be obvious to all.

Returning now to what is happening on our continent, I am pleased to see that an initial agreement on conventional weapons could well be concluded in Vienna next year. We all hope, too, that by the end of 1990 the START talks will lead to a real reduction in the number of

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

nuclear warheads possessed by the superpowers, i.e. around 50% instead of a minor cutback of some 15% as the first results of the negotiations might have suggested. These agreements will then have to be implemented and serious thought given to what is to follow.

I hardly need to remind you that the nuclear forces of France and Britain consist of only a few hundred warheads compared with the 12 000 American and Soviet strategic nuclear warheads.

If I were to summarise my thoughts concerning the transition period we are now going through I would say that the best guarantee for the at once peaceful and ambitious political development of Europe towards a Europe of reconciliation lies in the development of confidence on all sides, which we have discussed, based on the restraint of all concerned. Any premature and abrupt change in the strategic scenario we know and any headlong plunge leaving out the necessary intermediate stages is liable to upset the peaceful course of this process, causing us to miss this historic chance or even to re-learn the tragic lesson of history. In the present circumstances France sees confirmation of the soundness of its independent defence posture based on a sufficient, and by its nature defensive, deterrent force combined with an adequate and constant defence effort enabling it to maintain its military capacity alongside its allies. It intends to retain its ability to contribute to the balance of forces and to security in Europe and will await the concrete results of the Vienna talks before embarking on any review of its defence effort, which for the time being could only be premature and counter-productive. I wish to state very firmly that France is endeavouring to equip its forces to meet a wide variety of situations so that their deterrent effect cannot be sidestepped. To do this it proposes to pursue its financial commitment in accordance with the policy decisions now being taken by parliament. France will make a very active contribution to reinforcing the solidarity of Western Europe.

Actually, ladies and gentlemen, the present changes present us with a new challenge. We need constantly to look beyond the horizon and prepare for the future. The timescale of defence is very long – unlike that of public opinion.

Although the maintenance of present security conditions has to be our priority, a change is clearly taking place. We have to move with it but with resolution and lucid thinking about the future. Ever since the war – over forty years now – the equilibrium of the European continent has depended on the balance between two alliances dominated by the superpowers – the Soviet Union and the United States. The change

already under way is going to affect their rôle which is likely to continue. Until now the strengthening of European co-operation and of the rôle of the Europeans in organising their own security was, in some quarters at least, little more than an academic question. Such an attitude is no longer possible since we are caught up in a movement forcing us, whether we like it or not, to shoulder greater responsibility for the security of the continent. In the face of this challenge, to wonder about possible conflict between a European and an Atlantic approach is both sterile and anachronistic, unless it is made an excuse for refusing to assume the new responsibilities made necessary by the change in the international situation, i.e. the strengthening of the European identity in defence matters which I mentioned a moment ago.

Today the withdrawal of the American forces from Europe, gradual though it may be, could well have commenced and we have to face a future in which the security of Western Europe will primarily have to be ensured by Europeans themselves. The time has come to think about how to build up this European defence identity in order to avoid the formation of a vacuum between the two superpowers in which the rivalries and struggles for influence of earlier times would develop once again.

This identity has to include its own deterrent capacity commensurate with the threat which the existence of a continental superpower on our doorstep, whatever its intentions, will continue to pose. Who knows what the future may hold! New political and military balances will be created. Let us make sure that in these new arrangements Europe holds a position reflecting the richness of its history, its economy and its culture and worthy of the rôle it has a right and duty to perform.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

Would you be prepared to answer questions from members of our Assembly?...

I call Mr. Scheer to ask the first question.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I have two questions to put to the Minister. He said the process of destroying stocks of weapons would take a very long time because of the economic difficulties involved. The Warsaw Pact does not have enough factories to cope with the quantities that are to be converted. What would you think of making the offer, perhaps in Vienna, that the West, with its industrial potential, should disarm eastern tanks, which would also solve the verification problem?

The process could be speeded up, in order to move on to the next phase, by an exchange of the equipment for dismantling.

Mr. Scheer (continued)

My second question concerns your comment on deterrence. When will your government also be prepared to proceed with a process of nuclear disarmament? After all, when you consider everything that is happening, nuclear disarmament surely cannot be put off indefinitely. It is becoming more and more pressing to reconcile the creation of a new spirit in Europe with the continued mutual threat of total destruction. How can more confidence be created, in view of the specific nature of nuclear weapons, whose combination of high speed and destructive power is a constant source of instability, and in view of the fact that the eastern bloc no longer has conventional superiority – or will not, once an agreement has been signed in Vienna – now that the Warsaw Pact is obviously in a process of dissolution, which may even take place on a formal basis in the near future, thus removing the West's principal argument for deterrence? Why is your government not currently involved in discussions on a process of nuclear disarmament? This, in my opinion, is the major question that you too have failed to answer.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – I have referred to the slowness of the disarmament process. It is likely that the oldest weapons will be eliminated first, both in the Warsaw Pact countries and in the West. This is a well-known system and you only have to look at the way earlier disarmament measures worked out in practice to understand what is likely to happen. That was what I meant.

As to whether the western countries could help the Warsaw Pact countries destroy their tanks, I must admit that I have not studied the question. It is certainly an idea worth considering. We could perhaps take these tanks off their hands. That would be one solution. Any other ideas? Your suggestion makes me think of many other possible answers.

Your second question is more fundamental. It relates to the retention of nuclear deterrence on our continent. In my view, any thinking about security on the European scale must allow for the asymmetry between an enormous country like the Soviet Union – the Soviet bloc stretches from the Elbe to the Pacific – and the countries of Western Europe. The distance between the Thüringen salient and the Atlantic Ocean is only just over 1 000 km. Our American allies are 6 000 km away on the other side of the ocean. Everything is subordinate to this fact, for geopolitics – a German science – largely depends on geography.

It seems to me that any thinking about European security must also include the stabilising rôle of nuclear weapons which are

political arms that are not intended to be used. They are designed not to be used but their stabilising rôle has proved effective for over forty years. Of course the arsenals now held by the two superpowers need to be reduced; they are redundant several times over. I referred to the number of strategic nuclear warheads, but we should also remember the number of tactical warheads. In both cases the figure is several thousand and I quite agree with you that it is unreasonable. Nuclear weapons need to be reduced to a level sufficient to rule out the possibility of even a conventional attack.

You referred to the total annihilation which nuclear weapons could bring, but we do not want annihilation of any kind, even partial, and the prospect of even a conventional war limited to European territory has never been part of our thinking. In our view, the only defence doctrine that is right for Europe is that of deterrence. As has been pointed out by Mr. Mitterrand, our purpose is not to win a war in Europe but to prevent it. That is our aim in maintaining adequate deterrence, which we believe creates a stable balance of security on our continent. We are not masters of our future.

I have already paid tribute to the courage of Mr. Gorbachev. We support the policy he is following. We feel it is very courageous because it means shattering decades of illusions fostered by state propaganda. It is a courageous policy but we cannot know what the future – short-, medium- or long-term – will bring. Bearing in mind the geographical asymmetry I mentioned, it seems reasonable to us to maintain minimum deterrence on both sides until such time as humanity acquires the necessary wisdom to abandon war as a political institution for the settlement of conflicts.

Everybody knows that war is a very old institution of mankind. Is there anyone who believes that humanity has changed enough within the space of a few decades to abandon armed conflict as a means of settling its quarrels? Would giving up the bare sufficiency of nuclear weapons which we now possess and keeping only conventional weapons provide a better guarantee against the danger of war? Would we not, on the contrary, bring closer the danger we wish to avert? Is it not true that the "zero deaths" option rests on the maintenance of the deterrent which, though an evil in itself, is less of an evil than war? Fear of annihilation is not good, but compared with a war, it is a lesser evil.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, no one foresaw the events of the last few weeks. No one was prepared. As you yourself said, no one knows what the future will bring. In the last few days we

Mr. Müller (continued)

have seen people taking their destiny in their own hands. To say "We are the people" is enough to stop even imperial powers from intervening.

In connection with an interview you gave to *Le Figaro* on 30th November, my question is: what chance do you see of preventing force from being used against a people whose desire for reunification may be expressed in anarchic terms?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – The will of the people is an irresistible force, but we ought not to forget that its expression is also due to Mr. Gorbachev's policy. Indeed the fact that the peoples of Eastern Europe are able to express themselves as they are now doing is due to the change in Soviet policy. Twenty years ago in Czechoslovakia the population expressed itself vociferously but the tanks rolled in. In 1956 in Hungary the population expressed itself just as strongly but once again the tanks drove in. So when we look at current events in Eastern Europe we have to bear in mind that the armed forces have received orders not to intervene. To forget that is to misjudge the situation. The Chinese people also expressed itself strongly last April, but we know what happened in May. How could we forget?

You referred to the possibility of German reunification and the right to self-determination. This is the right of every people, but it cannot, of course, be exercised to the detriment of the peace and security of all other nations in Europe and elsewhere. This is a relevant point because the history of our century has proved it true on several occasions. So there are values over and above the nation itself since they are those of mankind as a whole. We have to manage this process with care so as to avoid any sudden reversals. I do not want to repeat what I have already said because I think I was clear enough for you to understand my meaning.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister has answered in part one of the questions that I wished to ask, but another remains. He recognised the dramatic nature of the events in Eastern Europe that have made 1989 a landmark year. If political stability is maintained, there is a real prospect of the shortening and straightening of the road towards balanced and verifiable arms reduction.

May I ask the Minister about chemical weaponry? It would not be sufficient for East and West in Europe to reach an agreement about

chemical weaponry because, as the Minister will well know, the number of nations with that capacity is growing significantly. Therefore, would it not be appropriate that, in the event of any agreement on the reduction of chemical weapons between East and West, there is also a joint accord to pursue, by the most vigorous and determined diplomatic means, the elimination and discarding of those weapons by all the nations that have them? As well as serving the primary purpose, would not seeking that wider goal help towards confidence-building through co-operative endeavour? Would the French Government join in such a broad approach?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – On this score I feel the French Government has taken initiatives which have not been without effect. On 28th September 1988, before the United Nations, the French President set in motion a process leading a few months later to a conference of 160 nations in Paris whose purpose was to prohibit the use, production and storage of chemical weapons. To promote this objective France itself gave up its earlier position, i.e. the maintenance of a reserve stock, in other words it took up a vanguard position. We hope that it will be possible to reach agreement in Geneva, which is where the negotiations are taking place involving not only the East and the West but also the countries of the third world and, in particular, the Middle East where the danger of the proliferation of ballistic and chemical weapons is now a source of worry to some or, I would hope, all of us.

Here too, of course, there are problems of destruction. In our view, very close verification will be needed throughout the intermediate phase to ensure that both stocks and industrial units capable of producing chemical weapons are mothballed. The objective must be total prohibition. This is difficult, but the Geneva negotiations have shown that progress can be made, and we hope that agreement is reached at the earliest possible moment.

I have perhaps failed to reply to your first question, which I did not quite understand. You mentioned a balanced reduction, and it is of course clear that weapons reductions must be balanced at every stage. In the reduction process, the conditions in which armaments can be reduced must be defined stage by stage so as to maintain a permanent and stable balance of security at a lower level of armament.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to press the Minister further on the nuclear question. He referred to what he called a

Sir Russell Johnston (continued)

minimum deterrent on either side being a prudent requirement, because, after all, we cannot tell what will happen in future. He has also been known to speak of working towards a Franco-British deterrent that would in turn develop in some way into a European deterrent, as a permanent feature, independent of the United States or the Soviet Union. Is that still his view, or does he see the possibility of the British and French deterrents being involved at a future stage in East-West nuclear negotiations?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – We have to be perfectly clear on this subject. We have not reached the point where the French or British capability could be included in a discussion on the nuclear arsenals that I just described as gigantic and redundant several times over. There is no comparison between the two nuclear Himalayas towering over us and the modest heights reached by the United Kingdom and France. There is no comparison.

From the start our predetermined objective was the strict minimum required and we are maintaining this level but improving its credibility. We do not, however, seek any excessive development of our nuclear capability. That is no part of our objective.

As I said just now in reply to Mr. Scheer, our aim is to achieve a stable balance of security. These weapons are political, designed not for use but for deterrence. Their purpose is to create the confidence which he himself referred to. Everybody knows that an aggressor is deterred by the presence of nuclear arms, particularly on a continent with four nuclear powers involved – the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. This is enough to make anyone who might one day be tempted to resort to the use of arms to think again. No one is so tempted at the moment and I am not pointing the finger in any particular direction. It is not in anybody's mind, but our problem is to define a balance of security which guarantees peace in our continent on the scale of the next few decades. That is what we are discussing.

It would seem that often no distinction is made between the timescale of negotiations or statements and the political moods prevailing at that particular time and the timescale of defence which, for scientific, technological and strategic reasons, is very much longer. The lifetime of a weapons system is between twenty-five and forty years. Development of such a system takes ten to fifteen years. Our logic therefore has to be long-term. In my opinion the United Kingdom

and France have adhered to that reasonable level of deterrence to which the other countries, *mutatis mutandis*, need to be brought.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – Will the Minister take up a point that Sir Russell has made? It would appear from the Malta meeting that it is likely that next year there will be an agreement between Mr. Gorbachev and President Bush for further reductions of nuclear weapons. Would the French Government support that? In view of the Minister's last reply, if Mr. Gorbachev and President Bush were to take such a decision next year, would that in any way affect French thinking about the possible updating of nuclear weapons that are held by the French authorities?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – You are right to say that the START negotiations, which if I understand them aright envisage cutting the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers by half, are the number one priority. This would reduce the number of warheads from approximately 12 000 to 6 000. But you only have to compare the figures: 6 000 warheads on one hand and a few hundred on the other. I am being deliberately vague. The real figure is low down in the bracket. Given these figures the answer to the question is evident. Only if the two superpowers made a considerable further effort would we be able to discuss the sufficiency concept. This is a doctrinal debate which would be interesting to take to greater depth.

You are aware that our own concept is based on the idea of proportionality. We hold that we have to be capable of inflicting damage on a potential aggressor equivalent to our importance to him as an enemy.

Of course, we all have our own views on the subject. We have no claim to be the final authority. Nobody is infallible, and if you have other ideas on what we may refer to as "sufficient" deterrence we shall be glad to discuss them. It would be worth talking about. The point, I repeat, is to prevent war, to make it absurd. That in fact is the great advantage of nuclear arms: they make war, as a political institution for the settlement of conflicts, obsolete.

I have no doubt that you and many of your friends are wise enough to have said no, right from the start, to the use of these methods. So have we. We are not mad. But the world being what it is and international relations being relations between armed states, we cannot rule out the possible emergence of threats which we must be able to face should the occasion arise.

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

In my view, the United Kingdom and France are eminently peaceful powers. No one could imagine us having any aggressive intentions whatsoever. We are therefore stabilising factors on the international stage. I have no need to persuade you of this; I think it is obvious.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – In the new strategic era that is opening for us in Europe, does the French Defence Minister envisage significant changes in French defence policy? When we have achieved mutual security at a lower level of forces on both sides, will he need to enhance the manoeuvrability, firepower and reserves of the French armed forces to compensate for the diminution of static, in-place forces? In other words, does he envisage a steady evolution in French defence doctrine to meet the changing strategic situation in Europe, and if so, what changes does he envisage at present?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – To my mind, Mr. Wilkinson, all the changes now occurring prove the rightness of the defence posture adopted by France what will shortly be over thirty years ago. I would remind you that our policy is one of independent defence. The degree of public support for it is still impressive. An opinion poll published last week showed that 56% of the French were in favour of maintaining our nuclear effort while 53% approved the maintenance of our defence effort in general. The figures could, of course, have been higher, but I do think that in the current context these numbers reflect sound good sense.

We have, then, a policy of independent defence based on deterrence, and nuclear deterrence in particular, governed by the concept of strict sufficiency. I do not think I need to repeat what I said a moment ago about deterrence and sufficiency.

We are, of course, also maintaining conventional air, land and sea forces as part of our defence capability.

You raised the question of manoeuvrability, and this is indeed the purpose of a number of projects implemented in recent years like the "force d'action rapide". It is also the principle behind the Armée 2000 plan which I am endeavouring to put into effect. The objective here is to give priority to the operational character and the swift, not to say instantaneous, response of our armed forces to crises which might arise in or outside Europe. I would remind you here that France has defence responsibilities in four conti-

nents and on five oceans, and manoeuvrability is a high priority.

But, contrary to the views advanced by some in this Assembly and outside, I also believe that we cannot reduce our defence capability below a certain threshold, dictated by the sufficiency requirement. I repeat, there is no comparison between our defence stance and that of the superpowers. It cannot be argued from the effort that may be made – and I use the conditional advisedly – by the two superpowers or from the declarations which have been put out that we must immediately fall in behind them. In my view, we have to await the outcome of the Vienna negotiations and the actual implementation of any reductions which may be agreed. We also have to review all the forces deployed and know what strengths the United States is prepared to keep in Europe.

It is also essential that the European countries do not indulge in any premature and excessive relaxation of their defence efforts. That would not be rational but counter-productive. The whole of history tells us to be on our guard and not to pin our faith on premature hopes which later cause us bitter disappointment.

Our duty to our people would therefore seem to require a posture which is at one and the same time peaceful, rational, serious and down-to-earth.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pontillon.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – Minister, I welcome the importance you attach in several of your remarks to the Franco-British axis in security matters. It is my personal view that our situations, levels of responsibility and concerns are similar and comparable. It is important to consolidate the Franco-British alliance and to develop more opportunities for bilateral co-operation. I know that you share this view and I believe that it points in the right direction now and in the future.

But that is not actually my question. In your speech I did not hear any clear indication of the future rôle of the organisation you are now addressing. In this fluid and changing scenario and in the search for new balances of security what rôle and what responsibilities do you assign to Western European Union? I, with many here, believe that WEU has a major part to play. I should like to know your views on this.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – You are right, Mr. Pontillon, to remind me that I should have referred again to these points which I in fact developed at the last meeting of the WEU

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

Council of Ministers held not very long ago in Brussels.

As you know, the institute for security studies is going to be set up where it will be possible to compare thinking and doctrine and we all know that in this area there is at present some uncertainty or, more precisely, debate in NATO's integrated military organisation.

France, for its part, maintains the concept of deterrence, a topic which I did not pursue because I did not wish to go into detail although the question itself is very interesting. However, as I said just now to one of my questioners, there is no reason for us to abandon our posture or the development of the systems which we planned. However, the subject deserves discussion because, indeed, we lack contacts. Very often in our debates we fail to get to the bottom of things; there is no way of explaining our positions thoroughly. Misunderstandings arise which are often picked on by outsiders trying to stir up problems where there should not be any.

The second subject is the rôle that WEU might play in the field of verification and the training of disarmament verification specialists.

The third rôle could, precisely, be that of the launching of radar or infra-red satellites for verifying and monitoring events happening within or around our continent.

Armament questions are dealt with within the IEPG, and WEU should not duplicate this work. Most of the IEPG countries – nine out of thirteen – are members of WEU.

Lastly, reference has been made several times to a meeting of chiefs-of-staff. It seems clear to me that some countries are not anxious to follow up this suggestion because they wrongly fear, as I said in my address, that this might damage the Atlantic Alliance. I hold, on the contrary, that the future lies in asserting a European identity within the Atlantic Alliance, and it seems to me that WEU is the most appropriate institution for that purpose.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Minister, taking up your last sentence, may I ask you questions on two specific projects where France and Britain, both members of WEU and the only two European nuclear powers, could work more closely together? The first question deals with nuclear weapons. I understand that both your country and mine need new nuclear air-launched tactical weapons to replace obsolete systems. As both our defence budgets are under great pressure, would it not make sense for your country and Britain to share the research and

development and possibly production of such weapons in a joint nuclear partnership?

The second question has nothing to do with nuclear weapons. France and Britain are both purchasing AWACS aircraft from the United States. They will have an expensive programme to train crews and all the back-up teams. Would it not make sense – the suggestion came from this Assembly last June – for our two countries to have a joint training project so that we can save money and achieve a better standard of training for the French Air Force and the Royal Air Force, instead of both countries trying to do it individually? That would enable us to get our European act together.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – We are very much in favour of all forms of co-operation with the United Kingdom, as indeed are other European countries. However, as you point out, there is a specific feature which links France and the United Kingdom, and that is that they are both nuclear powers. Is it possible in both cases to develop a longer range air-to-ground system than that which France already has? The studies which we have carried out show that this is possible. We are therefore completely open on this question, we simply know that our British friends have made arrangements to compare the performance and cost of the French system – which does not yet exist as it is a longer-range system – with those of a system developed by the Americans. It is therefore a question to which the reply must come from the United Kingdom.

France, for its part, would be entirely willing to examine favourably the possibilities of co-operation in this matter. More generally, I would say that the scope for possible co-operation with the United Kingdom is broad. We have powerful defence industries, and considering the current world defence industry situation, we consider that co-operation in many areas would be logical. Our common interests go deep enough for us to look towards the development of such co-operation with confidence. I would also add that France has developed its industrial co-operation with Germany, and wishes to continue developing that co-operation especially as regards helicopters and missiles, with Italy in the area of missiles and torpedoes, and with Spain, when we are to buy some light freight aircraft. In my view, the European dimension of our defence industries is of considerable importance.

I know that my reply to you is not complete. You asked me about AWACS. The training programme is being very largely conducted in liaison with the United States Air Force. This

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

means that, by force of circumstances, there is already a large common core in the training of the British and French personnel who will serve in these surveillance aircraft. We should also like to co-operate more closely with the United Kingdom in surveillance satellites. At the moment we are co-operating with Italy and Spain on the launch of the Helios satellite in 1993, but there will be other generations of satellites. This brings us back to what I was saying a short time ago about projects with which WEU could concern itself – radar and infra-red satellites. The European climate is such that we have need of improved hardware for disarmament monitoring and crisis prevention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ewing.

Mr. EWING (*United Kingdom*). – Does the Minister know that the French and the Scots form a very old alliance and that therefore my question will be very friendly and in conformity with that alliance? In answer to my colleague, Mr. Scheer, the Minister criticised the human race for not being able to come up with an answer to war and for being unable to avoid war over many generations. In defence of the human race – it should be defended – is it not highly possible that the reason why the human race has failed so far is that ministers from western governments keep telling the human race that there is a distinct possibility of an outbreak of war?

In answer to my colleagues, Sir Russell Johnston and Tom Cox, the Minister talked about the need to modernise nuclear weapons. What will dictate future thinking in Western Europe? Will it be the threat of war? Does the Minister appreciate that in the not-too-distant future the threat of peace may become much more appealing to the human race than the threat of war?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – I do not consider that peace is a threat, Mr. Ewing. Peace is not a matter of luck, but something earned by the application of wisdom, and the maintenance of a policy which is both open and determined. Our attitude must therefore be a blend of openness and vigilance.

If we have succeeded in maintaining peace in Europe over the last forty-five years, it is because we have shown some degree of openness, not given in to aggressive impulses and at the same time sustained a credible posture of deterrence which convinced the Soviet Union that the arms race was a blind alley. I believe, in fact, that Mr. Gorbachev was largely the issue of this situation. This is perhaps

one point – I say so in all Franco-Scottish friendship – where I differ from you, in that I do not think that weapons become superfluous because peace prevails. Peace exists because weapons present sufficient deterrence to curb any temptation to embark on a war.

Turning to the future, I feel we have to assist in the democratisation of the countries of Eastern Europe. This is a great opportunity for a European renaissance which will generate vigour and life in our continent, so that it will bear the hopes of mankind tomorrow as it once did in the past. I also say this with an eye to the events which we see taking place on the shores of the Pacific. I am sure you know the saying that “the future belongs to the countries of the Pacific basin”.

Why not to the countries of all of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals? Why should we not see this as our great design for the future? However, if this is what we want, let us at the same time have the good sense to maintain a stable balance of security at every stage, even at lower levels of armament. Let us be reasonable and not indulge in wishful thinking – that is the best way of ensuring peace.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – Does the Minister foresee a balance between continued expenditure on the manufacture of armaments in his country and the West generally and the ability of his country and the West to offer the emerging democracies in the East the help that their economies will so desperately require?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – Let me remind you that France spends 3.5% of its gross national product on defence, Germany about 3%, the United Kingdom 4.5%. Though considerable, this is far less than the amount spent by the United States or the USSR.

We do not choose the world in which we live or the weapons systems which have to be developed to provide credible deterrence. I would add that the ability to help the emerging democracies will depend partly on ourselves and our attitude and not wholly on our financial aid. It will also depend to some extent on the determination of these countries to organise themselves and to cultivate the domestic capacity for initiative without which no economic development is possible.

It does not seem to me that the two approaches stemming from the twofold concern for vigilance and openness which I referred to a

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

moment ago need to be seen as mutually opposed.

I would also add that there is another kind of aid which we must also be able to provide, and that is to the countries of the south, which we tend to overlook. In some countries in the southern Mediterranean the population is growing so fast that it will have doubled in the space of one generation. How can it be thought that this will not one day be a source of upheaval and crisis, the prevention of which will, of course, require economic development, close dialogue and the solution of any political problems that arise?

As for the assistance you refer to, this is of course desirable, but it must be accompanied by controlled one-step-at-a-time disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Niegel.

Mr. NIEGEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, I have a document here, “Western European Union, Brussels Treaty”, which can be found on the table outside. It contains all the treaties which have contributed to the establishment of Western European Union, making it for all practical purposes the basis of our Assembly. On pages 107 and 109 there is a declaration made by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and especially – for specific reasons – the French Republic, on 3rd October 1954. These three governments declare – and I quote – that “The achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental goal of their policy”. I should like to ask the Minister if this is still completely valid today, after what has happened in the East and in central Germany.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – Of course, you yourself used the words “a peaceful Germany”. Clearly this must be achieved in conditions which safeguard peace and security in Europe. I referred to this a short time ago, and it means recognising frontiers with the neighbouring states as they were determined after the second world war. It has to be said frankly that this is a factor in the security of our continent. If I failed to do so I should not be frank. This is therefore one of the conditions which has to be met.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Fillon.

Mr. FILLON (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, really recent events in Europe put a question mark on the rôle and future of the alliances.

The Warsaw Pact alliance is no doubt now at its weakest. How could it be thought that tomorrow Germans could be fighting against other Germans?

As to the Atlantic Alliance, to my mind it has no doctrine because the graduated response assumes that there are weapons in Germany and that the battle at the front is on territories which are now making approaches in our direction.

Faced with this vacuum yawning before them, NATO officials are saying that the alliance must in future be a more political than military alliance.

I should like you to tell us how you see the future of the alliances and what could be the political rôle of the Atlantic Alliance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – As I have just said, Mr. Fillon, there has to be a transition from one state of equilibrium to another – from the equilibrium following on the second world war to the European equilibrium within which the democratisation of the East can proceed while the countries of the West strengthen their cohesion. This will not happen overnight and requires that all the European countries act closely in concert. It will be unimaginable without the agreement of all the countries concerned. That would not be reasonable and it would be wrong to try to force the hand of fate. We must handle the two exceptional opportunities before us with moderation and evenhandedly.

Should the alliances become more political in character? That is to some extent the French position. We are in the Atlantic Alliance and we are, I think, solid and reliable allies making an essential contribution to the alliance, but we are not part of the integrated military organisation though we have a contractual relationship with it. Will the same be feasible for other countries as well? We shall have to see.

What will be the content of the Warsaw Pact? I heard the statement by the Polish Prime Minister, who does not question the pact because he sees a strategic rather than an ideological justification for it in the present circumstances. He himself is a christian democrat. It seems to me that we should do what we can to increase the trust between the various peoples of Europe. As I pointed out a moment ago, this requires great restraint from all concerned. If the alliances provide a means of managing instability during the arms reduction phase on which we have begun, we must be pragmatic and look upon it as a good thing, since all is relative in the world of strategy and politics.

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

It is true that an animated debate is going on inside NATO. No one has forgotten the discussion on short-range nuclear weapons early this year. It is a little early to say that NATO has no doctrine. It would be truer to say that it has several. France, for instance, has a doctrine, but I do not believe it is in a state of crisis, contrary to what has been stated on some sides. Quite the contrary, the doctrine is sound and integrated. All our arms serve the purpose of deterrence aimed at the prevention of war. That principle is true of each and every one.

Turning now to the integrated military organisation, a discussion is in progress on the doctrine of the graduated response, and this debate must go on to the end. Would it be possible to make a start on winding up these two alliances? Perhaps, and that would probably be desirable, but it presupposes a fully reconciled Europe and we are not quite at that point yet. Time will be needed and the transition has to be engineered. I find it strange – inasmuch as you have put to me a wholly reasonable question – that a politician whom you know well and who was a minister of state in a recent government should have projected for France a situation which would bring it back to that prevailing before 1966. It does not seem to me that this is really on the agenda, and it is in contradiction with the defence concept which has enabled a certain consensus to be achieved. You see what I mean and I will not therefore labour the point.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I want to tell the French Minister of Defence that I have found the last half hour in this chamber very interesting. I feel a longer debate with this Minister on, say, the theories of deterrence and disarmament would be a highly intellectual challenge. I would like to continue this discussion with the Minister with more of my colleagues on another occasion.

At the same time, I must say that I have been rather disappointed by the Minister's replies. As a Dutch socialist I had hoped to hear from this socialist minister something of the new wind that is blowing through Europe. Both superpowers want détente, but what do I hear from this Minister? He feels that, come what may, the French Republic must keep its nuclear weapons. He is ignoring the fact that when Giscard d'Estaing was President of the French Republic he said that, if the superpowers agreed on a 50% reduction in nuclear weapons, he would certainly follow suit. But this afternoon, despite the new circumstances, I hear that the French Republic is not contemplating this at the

moment and intends to maintain its concept of security and defence. Can the Minister appreciate that I feel very disappointed about this?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. CHEVÈNEMENT (*Minister of Defence of France*) (Translation). – It would give me pleasure to pursue this interesting exchange, not as a socialist since I am, as you pointed out, a minister of the French Republic. Mind you I could quote Jaurès who explained in *l'Armée Nouvelle*, highly convincingly, that the organisation of defence is exactly the same problem as the organisation of peace, both being two sides of the same coin. Having forgotten this, in the thirties and pre-1940, some socialists in France and in other countries – including perhaps yours – relaxed into a particular attitude... I must say that this historic pacificism was shared by public opinion as a whole and by many on the right as well as on the left. Nonetheless this pacificism brought a harvest of serious disappointment and we have to know how to maintain a responsible attitude.

This is a lesson of history which socialists must not forget. I know all the socialist theories which have flowered since the beginning of the century, and I believe that a sound, serious and responsible attitude will enable socialists to be a governing force, in each particular country. What the French Republic is doing is not done out of narrow self-interest but in the interest of Europe, because it considers that its effort helps to maintain a stable balance of security. If we did not make this effort, there would be a serious imbalance which might not result in any harmful consequences for several years but would, once the crucial day arrived, prove disastrous.

Turning to the Soviet threat, we have to show more sense than is often the case. There are some today who no longer perceive the threat whereas yesterday it was an obsession. I personally am inclined to think that they are often the same people who are now telling us that everything has changed and that we have now entered into a radically new era, whereas yesterday they were still living in perpetual terror.

In a way we have to preserve our ability for reasonable threat assessment, which was probably never as terrifying as it was described. However, it has probably not become as non-existent as is claimed because no one has absolute control of the future. This is something we have to remember.

Let me now return to the lessons of history: in 1928 there was the Briand-Kellogg Pact and the illusion that we had finally left the period of confrontation behind us. Then we found that nothing of the kind had happened. Five years

Mr. Chevènement (continued)

later things were swinging the other way. It seems to me that we have to keep our sense of responsibility.

Let me remind you of the three conditions set by the President of the French Republic for France to join the efforts of the two superpowers in the field of nuclear disarmament: the reduction of their arsenal to a size comparable, *mutatis mutandis*, to ours, a halt to the race in anti-missile and anti-submarine systems, and a reduction of the asymmetry in conventional forces. It seems to me that this adds up to something solid and soundly based. If we work along these lines, we shall be playing an effective rôle in guaranteeing peace. I speak in the name of WEU, of all the parties represented here and of you all. We must maintain a very open attitude. We have to encourage what is happening in the East, but we in the West of the continent must not foster illusions which may later prove disastrous. We must have the good sense to maintain our balanced position.

I do, of course, understand the feelings behind what you say. It is kind and does you honour, but do look at the world as it is. It does not consist solely of peaceful people. It is still a difficult place full of many contradictions. We have to remember that. Thank you for your attention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Minister, your final reply concludes a highly interesting and fruitful debate. You have again proved, if that were necessary, your interest in our Assembly. I extend to you my special thanks and look forward with pleasure to your visit to another plenary session of WEU.

4. WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council

(Reply to speakers and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1201)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the reply to speakers on WEU in the single European market – reply to the half-yearly report of the Council, and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1201.

Before the vote is taken, I would remind you that we have ended the general debate and have listened to the Rapporteur. We now have to hear from the committee in the person of Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-Chairman of the committee, whom I now call.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I remind the Assembly that we are still on the original document that my colleague Mr. Caro presented to us many hours ago. We ceased that debate for various speeches at 11.30 a.m. It falls

to me to sum up on behalf of the committee and to remind the Assembly that the document is about the Western European market or, as you read in the preamble, the Single European Act.

I should like to read out one paragraph of the report, which was unanimously adopted by the committee: “ paragraph 6 of Article 30 of the single act reduces the scope of European political consultations still further where defence is concerned, although the member states indicate in that paragraph that they ‘consider that closer co-operation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external policy matters’ and that they ‘are ready to co-ordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security’.”

Here are the words that the Council of Ministers might have omitted to recall: “ This therefore excludes military aspects which the single act does not include among the responsibilities, even potential, of the Twelve.”

That is the document in front of the Assembly, and I hope that Mr. Eyskens may be reminded of that fact.

I congratulate Mr. Caro on a good report and thank Mr. Burgelin for his part. The committee found that it was a useful report to help prepare.

As the document said, we must try to establish the place not only of Western European Union in this exciting period but of the various organisations concerned with Europe. There is only one certainty, which is that there is no certainty. Those who have controlled events have found events overwhelming them. The past six months – the time when we were drawing up the report – have seen some of the most dramatic happenings for four decades which, as Mr. Caro said, have proved that the human spirit can overcome the most stubborn obstacles. Who can tell what we can expect when we present the next response to the Council’s half-yearly report? It would be a brave man to prophesy that and I shall certainly not stick my neck out and nor will Mr. Caro.

I commend the report to the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1201.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five representatives requesting a vote by roll-call?...

The President (continued)

There are not. We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted¹.

5. European security and events in the Near and Middle East

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1202 and addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Political Committee on European security and events in the Near and Middle East and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1202 and addendum.

I call Mr. Pieralli, Rapporteur of the Political Committee.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as you will note the report which I have the honour to present on behalf of the Political Committee emphasises – particularly in its conclusions – the great danger to Europe presented by the current situation in the Near and Middle East.

The report also suggests some courses of action which member countries are commended to take in order to prevent the area from becoming militarised, and sets out some suggested political initiatives towards a negotiated solution of the conflict in the Near East.

I hope that your Assembly will accept the proposals in the draft recommendation, and that the Council of Ministers will then take them on board and implement them by appropriate action.

But I should also like to say a few words about the recent deterioration in the situation in Lebanon.

After the new President Hrawi's ultimatum to General Aoun to leave the presidential palace, the Lebanese factions have again regrouped around the two traditional Christian and Islamic coalitions ready to start fighting again. Syria has sent in reinforcements and moved its forces to more advanced positions nearer Beirut. Israel has tightened its control of Lebanese airspace and territorial waters and warned Syria about the consequences of direct intervention in the fighting.

Hostilities could break out at any moment, and all the parties involved are receiving numerous appeals to refrain from precipitate

action. These include the plea made by the American and Soviet Presidents in their joint press conference following the Malta summit.

President Bush stressed the positive and constructive rôle which the USSR is now playing in the Middle East. President Gorbachev said that there was identity of views between the Soviets and the Americans as regards the peace process in the area. Both parties reaffirmed their support for the initiative of the tripartite committee of the Arab League which has set itself the task of helping to bring peace to Lebanon.

I also hope that our Assembly will express itself in the strongest terms against any resumption of hostilities and further bloodshed.

It seems clear that the most the Lebanese forces will be able to achieve on their own, or even with the aid of Algeria, Morocco and Saudi Arabia, will be to bring about a truce, start the process of peacemaking and perhaps loosen the grip that the foreign powers have on Lebanon. But, as the events of the past few days again show, they are powerless to end the interference and presence of foreign troops, who are there because of the more generalised conflict between Arabs and Israelis.

Similarly, it will only be possible to arrive at a real solution of the situation in Lebanon through a peace process launched by an international peace conference, on the decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

As stated by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe at its recent session, there is a very wide consensus in favour of an international peace conference. But before such a conference can be called, the principle must be accepted by the Israeli Government.

In the last few days the heads of state and of government, foreign ministers and international diplomatic representatives have once again called upon Israel to reconsider, pointing out that in the conditions created by the intifada, the constructive and flexible stands of the PLO and the changes now taking place in international relations, a peace conference offers the surest hope of enabling the state of Israel to live in peace behind secure and recognised frontiers.

In order to start the peace process, all the prospective participants and the protagonists must mutually recognise their respective rôles. Hence the keystone in the building of peace in the Near East from now on is the establishment of direct dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians.

The situation is not hopeless. Indeed another door has been partly opened with the acceptance by Israel and the PLO of mediation by the American Secretary of State Mr. Baker. Both parties are still insisting on conflicting preconditions, but it is our earnest hope that these obstacles will be overcome.

1. See page 25.

Mr. Pieralli (continued)

Representatives of the two nations have begun the dialogue – in Rome in May, Strasbourg in June, Milan in November and elsewhere. I regard it as especially significant that students at the Israeli University of Jerusalem should have invited the Palestinian representative Feisal Al Hussein to speak in their university on 15th November 1988, the very anniversary of the date on which the Palestinian state was proclaimed by the National Council of the PLO in Algiers.

All of this is encouraging, but when we consider the human lives that have been destroyed, the general destruction that has been caused and the risk of seeing events escalate out of control, we know that the opening of serious and constructive negotiations is urgently necessary.

Therefore it is important that our Assembly, made up of parliamentarians committed to solving the problems of the security we seek not only for ourselves in Europe but all over the world, should add its voice to that of all our governments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Gabbuggiani.

Mr. GABBUGGIANI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Pieralli's report gives an accurate description of the general situation in the Middle East, the historical processes at the origin of the present conflicts, the prospects for the future and the resistance being encountered. In his statement he has emphasised, in particular, the connection between the civil war in Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli conflict, and also the impact of the Palestine question we are now discussing on the way the overall situation in the Mediterranean is evolving.

I also believe that the number one priority today must be to take urgent action to bring peace to the region, ensure peaceful coexistence in Lebanon and achieve agreement between the Palestinian people and Israel.

Now that the international scene is shifting rapidly towards peace and disarmament and the assertion of human and national rights, I feel that a more favourable general context is developing for a solution to the problem. Let us hope it comes quickly. Recent reports following on the plan of President Mubarak of Egypt give news of considerable international diplomatic activity involving, among others, the United States of America. Italy has given its full support to the Egyptian initiative as it has to many other initiatives designed to point up the urgency of finding solutions to the Palestinian problem and the more general problem of peace in the Middle East.

The latest ideas on ways to avoid ending up in a most dangerous blind alley – a trap we must at all costs escape – are being explored. In my view, taking due account of the outcome of the recent meetings between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Bush, this should carry Europe forward to a positive initiative at Community and European level, going far beyond the mere repetition of the declarations in the Venice 1980 document, and making a real and powerful contribution to the various diplomatic steps being taken to solve the problem.

We all know that a negotiated solution of this problem, including the recognition of Israel's frontiers and the right of self-determination of the Palestinians with which both the European Parliament and the Council of Europe concur, is still not agreed by President Shamir. His attitude is not supported by the governments in Rome, Paris, or other capitals friendly to Israel, where the view is that a peace process excluding the PLO is unthinkable. As the Rapporteur pointed out, it is precisely in those territories that repression by the Israeli occupying force is still going on, whilst the Palestinian population is reacting with strikes and demonstrations of civil disobedience – sign that the intifada, which can legitimately claim to represent the liberation struggle of a people denied the right to live freely on its own territory, has reached its maturity.

There are many signs that this situation is ceasing to be acceptable, setting aside the political forces responsible for government policy, to many social strata in Israel.

The "contact group" of the Council of Europe which visited the Middle East early this year confirmed all this. Major institutions including Tel Aviv university and leading cultural figures have declared that the worst possible solution would be to maintain the status quo. Israel – so the group was told – must agree to dialogue with Arafat's PLO.

The European Community and the Council of Europe have already done very important work. A significant resolution was passed by the Italian Parliament a few days ago and I would like it to be noted in this chamber. With all the political parties in favour, parliament voted for recognition both of the PLO as representing the Palestinian nation and of its people's right to live on their own territory. The same resolution also called on the European Community to launch a peace initiative in the Middle East designed to offer effective support for the diplomatic efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union and to make a decisive contribution to the implementation of the United Nations resolutions.

I should also like to emphasise the need for the European Community to promote forms of economic action in favour of the Palestinians

Mr. Gabbuggiani (continued)

and, looking ahead, for the Community to open up relations with Israel and Palestine as tangible proof of human and economic fellowship which a Europe driven forward by the great winds of renewal should be able to express against the background of its new hopes for peace, disarmament, co-operation and understanding.

It is in this spirit that I declare my full support for what has been said here by Mr. Pieralli on behalf of the Political Committee of WEU.

(Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Scheer.

Mr. SCHEER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I do not think there is anything to add to the demands and ideas in the report on the peace process in the Near East and on the efforts of the peoples concerned to achieve peace, together with the associated right of self-determination. I fully endorse this.

I want to refer to another aspect of the draft recommendation, which discusses in general terms the security problems in the Mediterranean area, particularly in the context of the arms race and the tensions throughout the Arab region. The recommendation also refers to chemical and nuclear weapons. I feel we should give this part of the report and recommendation the attention it deserves in our debate, and I say this for the following reasons.

We are witnessing a constant process of détente in politics and in connection with disarmament negotiations in Central Europe. For decades attention has focused predominantly on this region, which is where I myself come from. It must also be said that the process of détente in Central Europe, which should and must lead to qualitative and quantitative disarmament is paralleled by an increase in tension in the Mediterranean region. Détente in one part of Europe may thus be replaced by tension in other parts of Europe, sharply affecting the southern part of Europe and ultimately all the other parts.

It would be a serious mistake for us to focus our attention solely on Central European problems, while ignoring these other developments, which call for a process of disarmament and political peace settlements covering more than just the conflict in the Near East and associated problems. This is made particularly clear by what is happening down there, and I am therefore very grateful for the reference to the problem of chemical and nuclear weapons.

There is a general demand, in this Assembly as well, for the early conclusion of a worldwide agreement outlawing chemical weapons. But we know that total abolition of chemical weapons

will not be possible, even when the differences of opinion between East and West in this matter have been overcome, primarily because there are in the Arab region a number of countries that possess or have actually used chemical weapons, as Iraq has done. The Arab countries that have chemical weapons also say they are not prepared to get rid of all their chemical weapons until the nuclear powers are prepared to renounce their nuclear weapons. In other words, there is an unmistakable link between chemical disarmament and nuclear disarmament, between the proliferation of chemical weapons and the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons. I think it worth noting that the report very rightly refers to the problem of nuclear proliferation, which is, of course, a worldwide problem and will continue to be a threat in the 1990s. This means – and this is all too easily overlooked in the whole debate on deterrence – that, as long as the present nuclear powers in the West or East continue – as we heard the French Minister say – to stand by nuclear deterrence on principle there will be, to put it bluntly, no chance of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and there will probably be no real chance of outlawing chemical weapons throughout the world.

If we, in positions of responsibility, constantly ignore this link, as our governments, governments of NATO countries, governments of WEU member countries also do every day, it should come as no surprise if developments arise elsewhere in Europe which may cause far more tension in the future than we could or would expect at the moment. We must therefore keep this link firmly in mind and combine a strict policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons with an effort to outlaw chemical weapons throughout the world. It is high time we committed ourselves to disarmament measures in the Mediterranean region, just as our Italian friends have always committed themselves to such efforts in Central Europe. The current view that, for example, naval forces should not be included in the negotiations for the time being, even where European disarmament is concerned, also needs to be reconsidered. After all, negotiations on disarmament in the Mediterranean region must include naval forces, the American Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Fifth Fleet. Mr. Gorbachev has made proposals to this effect, but as yet there has been no official response from the West as a whole. That is a mistake.

It is also a mistake to allow the build-up of nuclear weapons to continue in the Mediterranean region as before, because the situation has become more precarious. When I think of the situation in the south of Italy, which has been progressively developed into an aircraft carrier in recent years, when I think that the disputes between the United States and Libya are

Mr. Scheer (continued)

of direct concern to Europe, when I think of the potential conflict between Greece and Turkey, when I think of all the conflicts in the Near East, when I think how quickly the Mediterranean was indirectly involved when there were conflicts in the Gulf, I realise how precarious the situation is, given the growing new ideological antithesis between a revival of Islamic self-awareness, extending to fundamentalist movements, and the basic European position, dating back to the age of enlightenment, that politics and religion should be kept apart. In other words, there are political, ideological and military fields of tension here. It is very important that all this has been referred to in Mr. Pieralli's report, along with the associated focal points of disarmament. I believe we should take a far greater interest in this subject in the future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE (*United Kingdom*). – I start by congratulating Mr. Pieralli on the report. He has done a monumental amount of work and has been constantly plagued – if that is the word – by the march of events. He has had to catch up on appalling assassinations and has had to update the attitude of the PLO. I like the report because it covers a tremendous range of important subjects and other subjects which, although they may not be considered so important, we should also remember. As I said, the work has been phenomenal.

In the last century in Britain, we had a famous lawyer called, funnily enough, Smith. He was renowned for being impertinent to judges. On one occasion, after he had made a long speech for the defence, the judge said: "Mr. Smith, after that long speech I am none the wiser." Smith looked at him and said: "That is so, your Lordship, but you are better informed." In this case, I am not only better informed but, I hope, a little wiser.

If ever we needed to consider an area, it is the Middle East. We are proud of the fact that because of the policy of deterrence and of cool heads we have kept the peace for forty years in Europe.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – Hear, hear.

Lord MACKIE (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you, dear boy. Now listen to the rest of what I am about to say.

By heavens, what a mess has been made of the Middle East. There has been an appalling war between Iran and Iraq, which has killed millions of people. We have had the Palestinian wars, the beautiful and prosperous state of Lebanon has been completely destroyed by internal factors,

and régimes of a beastly character are still all over the Middle East. We should make every effort to achieve settlement and security in the Middle East.

I hope that the new détente and the new feeling between East and West, between the Russian and American powers and the Europeans, will result in a cessation of the activities of what I call beastly powers, curious powers and oppressive powers, who play one side off against the other to their benefit and to the great disturbance of world peace. Co-operation to bring states into line would be extremely welcome.

When tragedies abound, it is a tragedy that Israel, which at one time I greatly admired, has destroyed her reputation by the repressive action that she has taken against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and elsewhere. The report covers all those points well and urges the right attitude on the Council. I support all the main points in it.

I should like to mention two small points – they are, really, large, but they are small when considered against the major factors. I was glad to read a reference to the Kurdish people. If ever a people has had the rough end of the stick, it is the Kurds. They exist mainly in three nations – Iran, Turkey and Iraq. They are particularly badly treated in Iraq, but it is said that they are well treated in the other places in which they live. The report is wise to urge that we use our influence to ensure that they get autonomy or even decent treatment within the states in which they live, because the redrawing of frontiers invariably is badly done. It is much more practical simply to say: "Let us make every effort to ensure that they get some autonomy or at least decent treatment."

The report rightly draws attention to armaments sales. Paragraph (ix) of the preamble to the draft recommendation says:

"(ix) Strongly disapproving the new impetus given to the arms race by states in the region, particularly in regard to long-range aircraft, medium-range missiles and chemical and nuclear weapons:

- (a) by firms, banks and experts from European Community countries;
- (b) by agreements with and arms deliveries and military assistance from certain Western European countries, the Soviet Union, the United States and China,

which are obviously contrary to the search for peaceful solutions..."

The arms trade is a disgrace. Before the war, for some extraordinary reason a man called Basil Zaharoff received a knighthood from the British Government. He was known as the Merchant of Death, which was a true description.

Lord Mackie (continued)

We should frown on the sale of arms to poor countries seeking to buy them for reasons of prestige to the detriment of their people. Indeed, we should go further and prohibit it by every means in our power. Those are two of the smaller but important points, and I am grateful to Mr. Pieralli for bringing them to our attention. I commend the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Cetin, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. CETIN (*Observer from Turkey*). – Being very close to the region, Turkey attaches great importance to the solution of the Middle East question, the essence of which is the issue of Palestine.

The Palestinian problem affects not only the security and stability of the region but also world peace. We believe that just and effective peace in the Middle East will be established only through the withdrawal of Israel from the territories that it has occupied since 1967 and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and the rights of all parties in the region.

We must continue to support all peace initiatives, including an international peace conference, provided that all parties agree on such a conference.

I have read the report carefully and paragraph (b) of section II of the recommendation mentions the “recognition of the cultural and administrative independence of the Kurdish people in the various states in which they live”. Such a general statement is a form of intervention in very sensitive national issues. The Kurdish issue is not the same throughout all countries in the region. The issue and the situation in Iran and Iraq are completely different from the Kurdish issue in Turkey.

Despite some of the difficulties that we have faced, Turkey is ruled by a system based on democracy. Our objective is to achieve democracy, with all its rules and institutions. Some of the problems that we have with human rights will be resolved when we achieve full democracy. Our republic is not based on religion or race. In other words, there is no discrimination based on religion, race or so on. All citizens enjoy equal rights and freedoms and have equal obligations. The unity of the republic is based on the Lausanne Treaty following the independence war of the 1920s. The kind of statement made in the recommendation may create an artificial minority question, but that does not apply to the Kurdish issue in Turkey.

For all those reasons, we hope that paragraph (b) can be rewritten in order to avoid any misunderstanding of the type that I have described. As

observers, we have no right to make any amendment, but I hope that the Assembly will understand Turkey’s internal problems.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Sarti.

Mr. SARTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like briefly to give the reasons for my approval of Mr. Pieralli’s report. I voted for it this morning in committee and I shall of course be voting for it this afternoon with great conviction. Compliments should not form part of our proceedings, but I have to say that Mr. Pieralli’s report fully deserves them because it is an exemplary one. Its approach, methodology, objectivity and thorough documentation, as well as the hard work it must have entailed in travel, reading and consultation, all speak for its quality. In my opinion, this is the way rapporteurs and even parliaments should work – and not just this Assembly – to silence the detractors of the representative institutions of democracy.

The challenge of democracy, which has been called in question recently, will win the day if it also means the challenge of reliability and truth. This is the first and basic reason for my approval; when an assembly produces a report like this and the many others presented at this session, it demonstrates its vitality and the usefulness of the institution is clear to all.

The second remark I should like to make concerns the merit of the draft recommendation proper which sums up the report and which finds its most concrete expression in its support for the proposal to convene an international conference on peace in the Middle East.

I believe it is extremely important to insist again on the raising of the level of contacts between the United States and the PLO. Mr. Baker’s recognition yesterday of the validity of the PLO plan would seem to make this raising of the level of contacts even more necessary. We have a feeling that the opening of diplomatic relations between the PLO and Israel is imminent. It is essential to work for this symmetry in recognition as a prelude to a generally more operative phase.

Mr. President, these steps should ideally precede, not follow, the international peace conference. In the same way, I consider it essential and important to have the recommendation proposed by Mr. Pieralli passed which would condemn the United Nations’ equating of racism with Zionism. In fact, Zionism is the extreme expression of an age-old sentiment which is still historically understandable and legitimate, as it was when it first emerged, that is during a period of anti-Jewish persecution which resurfaced at the time of the Dreyfus affair in the critical consciousness of Hertz and thereby – whatever our way of thinking – has

Mr. Sarti (continued)

become part of the political culture of mankind.

Racism and Zionism are not comparable. This grave injustice needs to be disposed of straightaway; above all it reveals a profound cultural, historical and political shortcoming which poisons relations between the areas when the effort to bring about peace is being made.

The third and last remark I wish to make concerns the specific rôle of WEU. Mr. Pieralli deals with this subject in Paragraphs 94 and 95 of his report. I should like to support him with a personal indiscretion which it is my duty to disclose to this Assembly. The acronym "WEU" – and not just a reference to the generic rôle of Europe – occurs in a short address of welcome paid by Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO, to a very small group of European observers – including myself as representative of my party – in February 1983. It happened in Algiers, when the PLO was holding its first congress – if my memory serves me right – after the famous Fez summit, in which the Arab states indicated their willingness to recognise Israel for the first time.

Arafat expressly said that WEU had a part to play which the Middle East would have understood and encouraged if the seven countries had not only concerted their policies in the region, but also acted in specific and immediate support of the fundamental United Nations decision to halt military operations in that area and to mobilise all possible humanitarian initiatives in favour of the peoples involved.

I note with great interest that substantially the same opinion was expressed – although only in a general reference to a rôle for Europe – by Farouk Kaddoumi to Mr. Pieralli who included it as an interesting addendum to this report. It should be borne in mind that this is particularly significant, above all because this judgment was formulated very recently and because, in the internal geography of the PLO, Kaddoumi has a different position and rôle from those of Yasser Arafat – I do not know whether to define it as to the right or left. I therefore believe that this is an opinion which is worth underlining at six years' distance. Not only Mr. Arafat, but also public opinion in Europe, would understand the situation and would urge we take on this task which our Assembly has the duty of once more proposing to the WEU Council of Ministers.

Let us not forget that concerted action among the WEU countries was taken to guarantee freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. In the same way, co-ordinated action can always be taken by the nine countries of the Middle East based on recognition and common proposals for the assessment of common interests in security,

in pursuance of a shared project for this sensitive area so crucial for the peace of the world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Atalay, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. ATALAY (*Observer from Turkey*). – I wish to express my appreciation to Mr. Pieralli for the report that he has submitted to the Assembly. It is an objective report and it covers all the important topics.

The relaxation of tension and peaceful and stable international relations are the main objectives for the Middle East. All initiatives aimed at activating the peace process in the region should be encouraged. We are witnessing dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Those drastic developments are geared towards the democratisation of Eastern Europe and are the result of more than forty years of dedicated effort by the western community of nations. However, we should never forget that times of change are also times of uncertainties and are fraught with risks.

How will Turkey be affected by the recent changes in the world? Recently, Mr. Gorbachev met Pope John Paul II in Italy and subsequently attended a summit conference with President Bush. That progress is creating a warm political climate on our continent. From Turkey's point of view, we recall the so-called Yalta conference in 1945, which was organised after the second world war by the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom.

The relevant part of that conference relating to Turkey was the Montreux Agreement. Stalin had the idea of changing the agreement on behalf of the Soviet Navy to allow it access from the Bosphorus whenever it wanted. The non-aggression convention between Turkey and the USSR was also established. That unfortunate development was designed to integrate a piece of Turkish land into the Soviet borders and to allow Soviet bases on the straits.

For Turkey, the Yalta conference was the date of entering the cold war with the Soviet Union, at the time having to initiate the multi-party system in the country. Turkey has not yet rid herself of the negative impact of that event on internal political tension and did not have enough chance to establish a democratic way of ruling. It is necessary to overcome the violation of the main human rights in specific stages and to improve the living conditions of Turkish citizens by means of territorial regions.

The legislative enforcement measures being taken by the government in south-eastern Anatolia are a difficult issue, but there could never be an excuse for ignoring human rights. Solving the problems and clearing away the barriers to full democratisation in Turkey is one of the vital tasks for the Turkish democratic forces. Consoli-

Mr. Atalay (continued)

dation through integration with Western European Union will have a positive impact on achieving that objective.

I should like to comment on Document 1202 and on the draft recommendation. I should like to call the attention of the Assembly to the support for the arms race by states in the Middle East, particularly in chemical and nuclear weapons and medium-range missiles. The use of chemical weapons in early 1988 by Iraq has caused thousands of deaths of northern Iraqi Kurds, which we can all call serious genocide.

I wonder what measures are being implemented against the Iraqi Government by Western Europe?

I fully support the recommendation about disarmament in the Middle East. Immediate steps to halt the arms race and to bring about the strict control of weapons in the Middle East are vital. On the other hand, the Iraqi Kurds who have come to Turkey are living in three temporary resettlement centres. The migration of over 50 000 defenceless civilians in a very short time has caused resettlement and accommodation problems. Turkey has acted purely in a humanitarian way and has tried to take care of those people. The total of the resources spent by Turkey up to October 1989 has reached \$25 million, excluding the infrastructure investment. The present number of refugees is 32 000. Limited funds, bad weather conditions and the present living conditions are the serious problems of our society.

The amount of aid received from Western Europe is only \$3.6 million. Only 345 refugees have been accepted by Western European countries. With the regent immigration of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey, one can easily understand the huge amount of finance that is required for the resettlement of the refugees.

The legislative status of Iraqi Kurdish refugees is a key question that should be resolved. A concrete programme and the required financial and social assistance for refugees should be realised very soon. That is an inevitable task for the democratic world. The recommendation in paragraph (b) of section II of the draft recommendation refers to cultural and administrative independence of the Kurdish people in the various states.

That statement is not clear and can be interpreted in various ways. I fully agree with the assessment made by the Rapporteur about the Kurdish people living in the Middle East, but the proposed solution should take account of the reality. Legally, Kurdish people have cultural and administrative independence in Iraq, but it does not work. As the Assembly knows, hundreds of thousands of defenceless Kurdish

people in Iraq have lost their lives in the past two or three years. The liberation struggle is still going on in Iraq.

In Turkey the problem is entirely different. Nobody can ignore the identity of citizens of Kurdish origin or the existence of Kurdish people in Turkey, but Kurds are not minorities in Turkey and they were never dealt with in that way. They are one of the main components of the new nation. At the minimum, the Kurdish population is 15 million to 17 million. There are some obstacles to the political, social and economic enhancement of the Kurdish people. Many people suffered for their human rights after 12th September when the military took power. They faced torture, collective questioning and military courts.

However, those problems should be solved with the initiatives of Turkish democratic political groups. We are aware of our problems and we have the energy to solve them in a democracy. To interfere in that sensitive solution might create tensions in the country. As social democrats and responsible politicians, we shall solve those problems, giving equality to all citizens. We shall clear away all the undemocratic articles in our constitution and in our legislative system. We shall ensure full democracy for all the people. However, if the Assembly insists on the recommendation on the recognition of cultural and administrative independence, that will lead the solution into the wrong political channel. Political separation will not be accepted by the majority of citizens.

We believe sincerely that if we can enhance full democracy in our country, all the various citizens will find a way to develop. Whole nations are looking for new and bigger integrity, and it is not to the benefit of any nation to be separated from the existing political system borders and to found small states. That is against the interests of progress and the development of the world.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – I should first like to thank the Rapporteur for producing such an excellent document on problems of such complexity. I trust the Assembly will take note that this document, which we adopted unanimously in the Political Committee, represents a considerable effort to state the WEU position as clearly as possible.

The problems dealt with are so complex and so numerous that we cannot hope for anything like perfection in the opinions we have tried to express. The report is therefore an exercise in humility, and its options are tentative. Mr.

Mr. Caro (continued)

Atalay's statement provides a useful introduction to what I have to say.

All of us here are firm supporters of the European convention on human rights, of the fundamental freedoms and of the whole legal system set up to ensure that they are honoured and observed. We can but support brother peoples such as the Turks in their campaigns for the rights of their nationals, in particular with reference to the policy pursued by Bulgaria, and those of what might be called the "cultural minorities" in other countries.

In other forums, in particular in the Council of Europe, our Turkish friends know that we have helped them to the utmost of our ability. That is what I wish to do publicly here. However, there is sometimes a very big gap of action and inaction between the will and the means, and that has to be remembered.

Effort is needed from Europeans but from others as well.

Listening to our colleague, I asked myself the following question: how can we think about defending human rights and all that we have patiently built up in all the agreements that bind us to honour those rights in countries where there is no democracy? It is simply impossible. We can only do it by intervention – "foreign" intervention because to these countries we are foreigners. Some people might say that this constitutes interference in the internal affairs of those countries, even though we are pleading a cause which is now well known: human rights and respect for human rights know no frontiers. In human rights, there can be no such thing as interference, the appeal is to the universal conscience. European assemblies, and in particular the Council of Europe, have taken courageous action in defence of human rights. Therefore, Mr. Atalay, we are wholly on your side, but in order to implement these principles we have to be talking to speakers acting under real democratic mandates like our own. The countries concerned have not signed the convention and have no representative system. In our countries, and in yours, in the parliamentary democracies, wherever there are minorities be they national or cultural, wherever there are pronounced regional groups – and they exist in our own countries, here in Europe, and even in the Twelve – pluralist parliamentary democracy enables them to be democratically represented and have the right to speak in the context of a representative legislature.

The problems do not exist in the terms in which they are expressed here. So we have to develop ways in which the universal conscience can be expressed in the language and the spirit of Europe. It is only by insisting on this that we

shall achieve it, not by detailed scrutiny of the behaviour of any particular country and its customs.

Look at what has happened in the countries of Eastern Europe. We rejoice that we are victorious, not triumphing but nevertheless rejoicing. But it is these countries in love with freedom that are modelling themselves upon western freedoms and democracy, not the other way round.

Perhaps much patience and much effort will still be needed before this happens in other countries; but basically, whatever the problems that this or that label presents – and I fully understand them – when we talk about human rights, respect for human rights and self-determination, we know what we mean. If the others do not understand, we have to go on talking. Which is why what you say and what we say have to be added together the whole time.

In Mr. Pieralli's report, which covers the whole Middle Eastern melting pot where nothing is stable and everything can be destabilised and lead to terrible conflagrations, I would just pick out the very disturbing problem of Lebanon, which is bound up with the Palestinian problem.

My fervent wish is that on this subject too Europe may speak as Europe. A few days ago the superpowers met in Malta. Did this produce any clarification, I was going to say break in the clouds, bearing in mind the innumerable storms in the Middle East? Let us hope that we shall soon see the first fruits, because we should like to be informed.

But in Lebanon, it seems, they are waiting – happily without shooting at one another. As for the Palestinian versus Israel problem, that is not connected with Lebanon. But do you think it wise to demand that the country reconstruct its government and its institutions, as we in the international community are doing under the Taif agreements, whilst it is under the heel of foreign occupation?

For years and years we in our European countries fought to rid ourselves of the pressure of foreign totalitarian military occupation and be able to act as free men. Why should not we Europeans demand the same thing for Lebanon? For my part, I must do so. What is applicable to my country must also be in others.

Speaking of foreign powers, there is Syria, but there is also Israel. Is there any reason why the United States of America feels obliged to connect the problem of Lebanon with the Palestinian problem? When human rights and rights of national self-determination are in question, must we go in for Bismarckian Realpolitik and relate our political diplomacy just to the next few days, hours or months, or should our

Mr. Caro (continued)

diplomacy and strategy be designed for the long term and for future generations? Realpolitik sometimes has its advantages, but when human rights are at stake it can be pernicious.

I believe that the problem between the PLO and Israel can be resolved if Israel's determination to have secure frontiers is allowed for. Israel cannot rely simply on its territorial boundaries as a total guarantee of security, in view of its fears in respect of some of its neighbours, in particular Hezbollah, Iranian propaganda and the Syrians.

But does this mean that in order to justify the occupation of a buffer zone in Lebanon the international community should claim that the Lebanese people should have to stay under Syrian military occupation for another two years as laid down in the Taif agreements? Why should the two be linked? Why should the Lebanese be made hostages to the settlement of the Palestinian problem as well as the Palestinians? Because there is a need to create a kind of objective complicity between the Syrians and the Israelis, when we know that in reality this is not so.

My hope is therefore that we shall remain on the ground on to which Mr. Pieralli has had the courage to venture, namely the problem of respect for other peoples and other nations. Everyone has to be able to live in complete freedom, with his own nature handed down by history and developed through his religion or his culture and we must therefore at all costs defend this primary principle and pursue international policies with the necessary caution and vigilance.

That is why we are returning to the discussion we have been having since the beginning of the present session. If I had had the time, I would have told Mr. Eyskens that the remarkable speech he made to us was three years old. This is a good age for a wine, but perhaps not for politics. It was exactly what we could have said immediately after Reykjavik I.

Faced with the vacuum – and nature abhors a vacuum – faced with this situation of condominium between the two superpowers, the fundamental need for a Europe on an equal footing with them so that what it says carries its full weight, defines both its vocation and its vision of the future in store.

I therefore hope that this Europe will be capable not of intervening but of filling out and above all giving life to the arguments we must advance in the coming decades, in particular to put an end to conflicts which now concern only those who wish to exploit them for purely personal or partisan ends. Please, ladies and gentlemen, let us be firm. And whatever the diffi-

culties of terminology – I refer in particular to our Turkish colleague who has just spoken – let us approve Mr. Pieralli's report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I am very grateful to the Political Committee for seizing the opportunity provided by Article VIII of the Brussels Treaty to put the Middle East question on this Assembly's agenda. The Political Committee of the Council of Europe visited the Middle East in January 1989. During its visit President Mubarak, among others, told the committee that peace in the Middle East was very important not only to the Middle East itself, but also to Europe. We very much agreed with him and promised to do all we could to bring peace nearer in the Middle East.

Mr. Pieralli has painted a very good picture of the situation in the Middle East, setting out many aspects of the problems in this region. I just want to make a few comments on the problems he refers to. Time does not permit all the various aspects to be considered.

In the preamble to the draft recommendation, paragraph (*xii*) says that, to ensure peace and stability in the region, it is essential to seek a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I believe we all agree with him on that. As a result of current developments in Eastern Europe we are in danger of forgetting that the situation in the Middle East is still very bleak. Today's International Herald Tribune reports Minister Rabin of Israel as saying, as the third year of the intifada begins, that he is determined that the ten to twelve thousand troops stationed in the occupied areas shall remain there. He also said he would continue to suppress the uprising with all the means that have been used so far. This does not make us very hopeful. How are we ever going to get out of this situation? The Israeli Government rejects the Mubarak plan and also the Baker plan, whatever modifications may be made to it. How is an opening ever to be found, if Israel remains obdurate?

The only power capable of creating such an opening is the United States, but in the FAO the United States recently voted against a plan providing for an aid programme for the areas occupied by Israel. There were ninety-six votes in favour. It is deplorable that the United States threatened to suspend its contribution to the FAO if the resolution was adopted. Fortunately, most of the FAO's member countries took no notice of this threat, but it was still an unfriendly and unproductive act. One might wonder why the United States should make a threat like that, but not try to bring pressure to bear on Israel. Unfortunately, there has not yet been any sign of a threat in the opposite

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)

direction. A Middle East conference is, I believe, further off than ever, because other matters are claiming our attention.

Mr. President, the problems in the Middle East cannot be solved by taking only Israel's interests into account. At a conference held by the Palestinian National Council in Algiers in 1988 the PLO recognised the state of Israel, accepted United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338 and renounced terrorism.

I feel that, if the uprising in the occupied areas continues, escalation is inevitable. Concessions must therefore be made by both sides. The state of Israel must be able to exist within safe and secure borders, but the Palestinians have an equal right to live in their own country.

I hope that this report – and perhaps pressure exerted by our national governments – will help to recall attention to the problems in the Middle East.

I fully endorse the recommendations.

Paragraph (c), section II, recommends that member states, directly or in the framework of the European Community, give the Palestinian people humanitarian assistance. Why does the Rapporteur not refer to UNRWA in this context? Why, when economic aid is discussed, is there no reference to the FAO resolution I was talking about just now?

Mr. President, I will end as I began. It is not only in the interests of the countries of the Middle East that there should be peace there: it is also in Europe's interests. I hope we can still do something to ensure that a Middle East conference is held within the framework of the United Nations and that this conference will lead to peace in the region and perhaps to more peace in the rest of the world as well.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Bindig.

Mr. BINDIG (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report on European security and events in the Near and Middle East contains a number of important and interesting topics. The statements by the Turkish observers have drawn attention to paragraph (b) in section II of the draft recommendation. This refers to assistance to Kurdish refugees and to respect for human rights and recognition of the cultural and administrative independence of the Kurdish people in the various states in which they live.

I believe we must protest strongly against the statements made by the Turkish observers. Reference has been made to humanitarian assistance for the Iraqi Kurds in Turkey. Turkey has taken in these refugees and given them

assistance. That is commendable. But unfortunately it also has to be said that, in organising assistance for the Iraqi refugees, Turkey has not allowed the usual international aid measures to be provided.

The High Commissioner for Refugees has not received a mandate to look after these refugees, nor have other internationally recognised non-governmental organisations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, been allowed to function in Turkey in the usual way. Sadly, this has greatly impeded humanitarian aid. There has always been a willingness to help the refugees, but Turkey must make this possible. The basic reason is that Turkey did not want the Kurds living in camps there and could not accept that these Kurds wanted to be in touch with other Kurds already living in Turkey.

My second point concerns the recommendation made in this report to demand and insist on respect for human rights and recognition of the cultural and administrative independence of the Kurdish people. Western European Union is a security community, but it is also a community based on western democratic values and human rights. The Kurds are exposed to tough repressive measures in Turkey. Only recently in the Council of Europe the Turkish Prime Minister denied the existence of Kurds in Turkey.

Without wishing to dwell on this subject any further, I therefore feel that the passages in this report are the least this Assembly should say in a statement on the Kurdish question. The Kurds are not granted elementary human rights in Turkey. This discrimination is actually set out in the Turkish constitution.

I therefore argue that we should not agree to the Turkish observers' suggestion that this passage be amended, but that we should include it in our recommendation as it stands.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Tascioglu, Observer from Turkey.

Mr. TASCIOGLU (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – May I first clarify a point made by Mr. Caro during his brilliant speech. It is true that we have not signed the Geneva Convention. But do not forget that each country has its own special features. I repeat, we do not intend to sign this agreement because conditions in our country do not allow us to do so. Whether the democracies require it or not is another matter, but let me explain.

You are well aware that the Turkish Republic comes down from the Ottoman Empire which stretched from Tunisia to Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and on this side included Greece and Bulgaria, even reaching as far as Vienna.

We have no fears on the western side, but on the other side we have Arab countries as our

Mr. Tascioglu (continued)

neighbours. At present our population numbers 55 million, and if we had signed this agreement a great part of the Arab population would have come to Turkey as refugees which would have been intolerable for us.

You are all aware that sixty thousand Iraqis have already fled for their lives and come to us. We have accepted them not as refugees but simply for humanitarian reasons. You are also well aware that nearly thirty thousand Turkish people from Bulgaria have come to Turkey.

Turkey is not rich enough to support all those people. If we had signed the convention there would have been so many Arab refugees that we could not have taken them in. Turkey is a special case, and that is the reason why we do not wish to sign this agreement. That is my reply to Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. Tascioglu, may I interrupt?

Mr. TASCIOGLU (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – Please do.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – With the permission of the speaker, I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – There is a mistake. I was talking about the European Convention on Human Rights and naturally did not have Turkey in mind. I was thinking of other countries.

Mr. TASCIOGLU (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – You are greatly mistaken. We were the first country to sign that agreement in the Council of Europe.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – That is what I said. I referred to the European Convention on Human Rights which had not been signed by some countries with which we, and you, are in dialogue. I did not list them but I know that Turkey has signed it. But now that you have referred to the Geneva Convention, I wanted to tell you that I must have expressed myself badly, but we are in agreement.

Mr. TASCIOGLU (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – In any event I have explained the situation.

I do not accept what our German colleague says. In Turkey there is no discrimination against anybody. I should also like to make it clear that I have issued an official invitation to members of the Council of Europe's Committee on Refugees to come to Turkey to verify this. They will be able to contact all the refugees and confirm that we are an open, democratic country.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Pieralli, Rapporteur of the Political Committee.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation)., – I warmly thank the speakers in this debate. I greatly appreciate their generous compliments on my report and the work I have done.

I should like to reply briefly to some of them.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman asked me why I did not mention UNRWA and the FAO since the subject was humanitarian aid for Palestinians. It is because these organisations, particularly the former, organise the assistance given to the Palestinian people on a permanent basis under the auspices of the United Nations. What the draft recommendation refers to is assistance supplementary to that given by the European Community in view of the extraordinarily difficult economic situation which has come about in the Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank as a consequence of the intifada movement and the action to repress it.

I was surprised by the discussion which arose on another point. This was the Kurdish problem, which was not dealt with at sufficient length in the report, focused mainly, as it is, on Lebanon and the Palestinian problem. Some of our colleagues have already replied to the Turkish observers.

The draft recommendation deals with two matters. The first – following on Recommendation 403 which we approved last year after discussing Mr. Martino's report on the ending of hostilities between Iran and Iraq, is that of the humanitarian aid to be given to Kurdish refugees wherever they may be, i.e. whether in Turkey or elsewhere.

As regards the second question, I would simply say that autonomy does not mean independence and that cultural and administrative autonomy does not give rise to two states. Kurds are living in six countries: Iraq, Iran, the Soviet Union, Turkey, Syria and Israel. None of these states is named, but the question is raised in connection with the peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq. I do not see why other countries should feel that they are involved. That is a matter for their national conscience, not for decision by our Assembly.

Lord Mackie and Mr. Scheer raised the very serious question of the sale of chemical and nuclear weapons. On this matter we are all agreed and we feel that the situation now developing in the Middle East creates a number of obstacles to the international agreement which we wish to see signed. The agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons and their production anywhere in the world needs to be signed and I understand that, aside from the Bush-Gorbachev meetings, the question of the revision of the treaty on non-proliferation of

Mr. Pieralli (continued)

nuclear weapons is to be discussed during the coming year. These are questions in which the Near East, Europe and the whole world are all interrelated and I am glad that certain speakers should have drawn attention to these difficult problems.

I thank my Italian colleagues who spoke. I have to say that there is national unity on questions concerning the Middle East, which often come up for discussion both in the Italian Chamber of Deputies and the Senate of the Republic. It is a major feature of Italian foreign policy.

I was at pains to produce a report which should reflect all the opinions that have been expressed. But I naturally understand that some of us will see matters differently, depending on the way we view the situation in Lebanon or our assessment of American or Soviet policy. What matters is to have stressed in this draft recommendation the need for a European initiative in which we speak the same language in the international context.

In conclusion, may I emphasise the spirit of unity that the Assembly has shown during this debate, for which I am very grateful.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I thank the Rapporteur.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-Chairman of the committee.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I commence by congratulating my friend Mr. Pieralli on a report that we can all describe as very wide-ranging. His problem was that events were somewhat like the shifting sands that are a feature of the Middle East. As fast as Mr. Pieralli wrote a paragraph, he had to rewrite it. That was the reason for the very sad addendum, particularly in respect of Lebanon.

The report states, and the committee felt, that the cornerstone of the whole edifice is an Israeli-Arab accord, which can only come about by the two parties sitting down and talking to each other. I remind the Assembly that Winston Churchill said: "It is better to jaw-jaw than to war-war." I hope that that lesson will be taken on board in the Middle East. There is no alternative – Israel must sit down and talk with the Palestinians.

That is the clear message that comes from all parties and all religions represented in this Assembly. Once that falls into place, many other aspects of unrest in the region will begin to die down. Europe has a part to play in that because Europe has consistently emphasised the need for urgent progress towards a negotiated solution of the Arab-Israel dispute based, as we have already heard, on the two fundamental prin-

ciples of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and the right of all states in the region – including of course, Israel – to a secure existence.

There is broad international support for an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations that can serve as a framework for negotiations between the parties directly concerned. As we know, the European Council reiterated its support for a conference in its declaration on the Middle East issued in Madrid on 27th June. It is clear that the conference must not be able to veto the solutions that are agreed by the parties concerned or to impose solutions upon them.

As Mr. Pieralli rightly says, the Middle East problem has been with us for 25 years – and that it has seemed an interminable problem is a view that no one would dispute. However, would we have said anything different about the iron curtain and the Berlin wall? Yet both have disappeared in almost a trice. Who knows? If the right moves can be made in the Middle East, everything may suddenly fall into place. I say "may". It is possible, but whether it is probable I do not know. However, Mr. Pieralli's factual report lays the groundwork, and I hope that others will pick it up and will realise that if we are to make progress, they have a duty to sit down, to talk and to negotiate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1202 and addendum.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five representatives requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

6. Membership of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, I ask the Assembly to agree to the membership of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations which has been published in Notice No. 9.

Are there any objections?...

This membership is agreed to.

¹. See page 27.

**7. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 6th December, at 11 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990 (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Document 1198 and addendum).
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (Presentation of

and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the motion to approve the final accounts, Document 1194 and addendum).

3. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe (Presentation of and debate on the draft order of the Political Committee, Document 1212 and amendment).

Are there any objections?

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m.)

TENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 6th December 1989

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990 (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1198 and addendum*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Klejdzinski (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Lord, Mr. Niegel, Mr. Eicher, Mr. Morris, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (*explanation of vote*).
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts (*Presentation of and vote on the motion of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1194 and addendum*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Klejdzinski (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
5. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe (*Presentation of and debate on the draft order of the Political Committee, Doc. 1212 and amendment*).
Speakers: The President, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (*Vice-Chairman of the committee*), Mr. Niegel, Mr. Speed, Mr. Lord, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Eicher, Mr. Baumel.
6. Change in the order of business.
7. Change in the membership of a committee.
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 11.05 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings ¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and vote on the draft budget, Doc. 1198 and addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and

debate on the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990 and vote on the draft budget, Document 1198 and addendum.

I call Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in the parliament of my country it is a great honour to be called to speak about the budget, for the budget debate is the time when parliament has its say. At this point, before treating the subject in detail, I should like to express my thanks to my predecessor, Mr. Linster, who gave very expert leadership to the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and, alas, is no longer a member of this Assembly. Therefore part of what I say has been worked out by people who for reasons beyond their control are no longer here. I feel that thanks are due to them.

I believe that a word of thanks should also be said to those who have worked so hard to make the necessary infrastructural arrangements for the accession of Portugal and Spain, whilst at the same time endeavouring to give the members better working conditions. Here I should like to make special mention of the

1. See page 32.

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

strong commitment of our President. Just now he is very busy, so much so that he cannot hear the praise being accorded to him. He has made the Assembly's cause his own. However, without wishing to detract from his success, I have to say that in this matter he has not been as successful as we would expect concerning the details of our working conditions. This is the area where it becomes apparent that in budgetary matters we are not fully empowered in the parliamentary sense as we are accustomed to be, since in the last resort it is the Council that approves or disapproves, pares down or deletes items.

For example, on 20th September 1989 the Secretary-General of WEU wrote to the President of our Assembly, Mr. Goerens, as follows:

"The Permanent Council would like to scrutinise the budget at its meeting on 25th October before the budget and Organisation Committee discusses the detailed draft on 16th and 17th November, as it wishes to take a formal decision beforehand regarding the amount of the budget".

The detailed itemisation can be found in the documents before the Assembly and I do not propose to weary you by reading it all out. Contrary to the proposal of our committee that a draft budget totalling F 27 667 500 should be submitted and approved, savings amounting to F 2 208 000 have been made, so that the 1990 budget is now submitted for your decision in the amount of F 25 459 500. A number of savings have been possible because the Portuguese and Spanish Delegations are not yet with us, but some other cuts have also been made about which I will speak later.

There is an old German proverb which says that nothing can be done without money. I can only agree; at the same time this summarises how we can arrange our activities and which activities we can undertake.

I should like to give two examples of how this works. The amount originally proposed for the security of the building and its installations has been cut back on the grounds that it was not considered necessary in the present security situation. At least that is what the Council says in its document dated 30th November 1989. The sum involved was F 428 000. In my personal capacity I should like to say: as a free parliamentarian I do not feel under threat, but those who made the original proposal to do something about the security of this building must have had some thoughts on the matter. It cannot be right that such serious thinking about security should be subject to change at whim. For example, special reference was made in a

document before the Assembly to the delicate security situation here in Paris. If this is not the case, there must be somebody who explained in detail why it is not so. We discussed this at length in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and passed a recommendation which I shall not withhold from you. We say that in principle the people in the host countries who are responsible for security should have their say in the matter and should make a recommendation. We should then discuss that recommendation in detail. We should like to give consideration to the detailed implementation of this recommendation. In my opinion this question should not be handed over to some budgetary staff members with undefined responsibilities who can simply say: this is not needed, strike it out. To be frank, in that case we might as well also dispense with that audible warning frame which we members of parliament have to pass through every morning at the entrance.

I have a second observation to make. It has long been known that the personnel structure needs enlarging. Now it has been reduced, with the observation that we should first commission a management review showing why more staff are needed. Only the necessary interpreter post has been approved. Now if we look at the budget and investigate the contents of the items we find that there is no provision for management reviews; nowhere in the budget is it stated how extensive these should be. If it is then said that they should be paid for out of general funds, this means in principle that we have to pare down other activities, such as lectures by experts, or meetings. What I mean is, of course, that the small amounts available for conferences and studies for operational work should not be stretched still further by using them for such purposes.

Thinking along these lines, I have the impression that this is a way of giving an extremely solemn burial to a proposal by the Assembly, which has of course been thoroughly discussed. Now if in my parliament I do not want something done, I say: first we must have some studies done. And if the studies are not sufficient I have another study done, and if that is not enough, I call in an expert. But I do not think about the amount each individual expert costs. If management reviews have to be made on this question, then they should be made by parliamentarians, and not by people who have decided that the management reviews are to be commissioned individually.

One last observation about the infrastructure measures. We have already devoted an inordinate amount of attention to this matter and are certain to give even more. Though funds were limited, the architect's brief ran roughly as follows: first, the delegation rooms of all nine delegations were to be of comparable size, based

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

upon the current circumstances. Second, there should be two conference rooms for fifty members, two for twenty members, and seven interpreters' booths, a room for thirty-two members, one for forty observers, and seven interpreters' booths. For the administration the same amount of space as before was planned, and the individual agencies were generally allocated the same area, with the exception of parts of the second floor. In the context of such a list of operations I appreciate the thought given to them by the officers of this Assembly and would particularly revert to the hard work put in by our President in this matter; it is quite clear to me from a study of the available documents that he has spared no effort in working for our improvements. But I do not think it is right to go on to say: "We are not prepared to approve this because it should have been proposed earlier". These limitations naturally suggest that work which is also aimed at effecting a considerable improvement in working conditions – this applies particularly to the limitations imposed here – is condemned to failure from the outset.

For the sake of completeness I should like to indicate what work we or the competent committees considered to be necessary, and what was finally approved. For the 1989 supplementary budget – Document 1174 – the following building works and constructional alterations were proposed: print shop, canteen, toilets and telephone booths in the basement. Decision of the Council on 17th July: print shop deleted, telephone booths deleted. On this topic alone I can only say that working conditions in respect of communications and the telephone can only be described as antediluvian. To put it another way, considering which industrial nations are taking part in this organisation and the achievements of these nations in the communications sector, the products they create and the decisions they take in doing so, I am bound to say that the telephone facilities available to us here are by no means adequate to the working requirements of parliamentarians. I cannot even carry on a conversation with my national office without being overheard by all parties, including the administration. It is correct that we do not carry on private conversations. I am sure that if I have a telephone conversation in the concourse, the whole of Europe can and does listen in. Therefore, to speak plainly, I make few telephone calls, but the problem has to be made plain.

Other proposed building works were the construction of new conference rooms on the ground floor instead of the present conference rooms B and C and the national delegation rooms. The Council decided that there are to be two conference rooms and nothing else.

The next point was that the whole of the first floor should be occupied by all the national delegation rooms. The Council's decision is that the national delegation rooms are to be installed on the second floor, which already contains ten offices. It seems very rich to me to write into a document like this: the administration already has ten rooms, and you parliamentarians must indulge the administration! What this really means is that the parliamentarians will have fewer rooms. As the proposal to play second string to the administration was such a good one, we then added up the figures. I come now to the details, since there is actually a document that enables one to do this. For example, I discovered – please forgive this observation – that the Secretary-General, who does not have his headquarters here, has permanently available an office measuring 27 square metres, and this has not been queried.

Another proposal was that the second floor and half of the third floor should be fitted out as office accommodation for the WEU Assembly. The Council's decision on this point was that in principle the third floor is not available for the WEU Assembly. It is to be set aside for the advanced security studies institute. The effect of the Council's decision is to reduce the space available for the purposes of the Assembly by 620 square metres, i.e. 390 square metres on the individual floors and 230 square metres in the basement. For the national delegation rooms the Council's decision means that out of 482 square metres which were originally planned, 279 square metres have been approved, to be divided among the new delegation rooms. The Office of the Clerk has 131 square metres available for the whole of the administration, which is not too much.

On the instructions of the committee, I had a calculation made showing how many square metres of office space are available per individual member. If the proposal is implemented to divide up all the rooms, three in number, of the large delegations, in such a way that two rooms are available for the national delegations and the administration is to be housed in one room, then the space available for each member would be 0.5 square metres. That is a good working situation! And this applies only to the large delegations; the smaller ones are even worse off.

Ladies and gentlemen, that is the situation with which we are faced. It is sometimes argued that the space available is determined by the building itself, and that is doubtless correct. The outer walls are standing, that is correct too. But when I walk through this building with my eyes open I can well imagine that here and there some further changes could be made. I simply do not understand why a number of telephone booths could not be installed in the basement.

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

Nor do I understand why no facilities are provided in the big hall to our left for having a brief chat. A detailed inventory of the fittings would show that there is not even one chair per member in this building, to say nothing of space for clothes. Nor will I mention that, unlike the national parliaments, we have no welfare room in this building where, for example, a female member or interpreter expecting a child could take a few minutes' rest. I think this is a point that deserves attention.

If cutbacks there must be, then of course, in my view, they should not be made only at the expense of the parliamentarians. I am well aware that not every requirement can be met, and I also know that some people are too intent upon having their own ideas carried out, but as I see it a sensible compromise should have been reached in this matter so that the parliamentarians have adequate working conditions.

Subject to these preliminaries, and taking into account the situation I have described, we in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration have of course, though with some reluctance, adopted the 1990 budget together with the supplementary budget for 1989. I say "of course" simply because we know that we need a budget in order to get on with our work; but approval does not mean that we are blind to all the facts I have related. Nor should our approval be construed as meaning that we are satisfied, or would ever accept being told: "You adopted the budget, so why did you not make any comments on it?" We did not find it easy to give our approval. I ask the Assembly's indulgence, but I wished in this brief report to indicate the aspects in which problems exist.

My view is that we must all work together and that the WEU concept is not expressed in verbal statements by individuals but that those who arrive at decisions should also provide for the necessary working conditions so that those who do the work have good working conditions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Lord.

Mr. LORD (*United Kingdom*). – My remarks will be extremely brief.

I congratulate the Chairman of the committee on the excellent work that he has done preparing the budget. His work has been extremely difficult this year because we have to consider not only the budget but the alterations necessary as a result of Spain and Portugal joining WEU. That has led to exceptional considerations, probably because the boundaries between budgeting and administration and between ministerial responsibilities and the responsibility of the committee were not as well defined as they might have been. Given the time allowed for those matters,

they have been resolved as well as they possibly could have been. I congratulate the Chairman and his predecessor, who obviously was involved in those matters.

I should like briefly to draw the Assembly's attention to the speed with which our parent countries make their contributions to our finances. The position on slow payments is getting worse. The cost to the Assembly of the delays is worked out rather academically in terms of interest lost. This year, the sum involved is F 260 000. Although that is not a lot of money, it shows that the position is getting worse. The figure for 1987 was F 171 000 and in 1980 it was F 121 000. This year, F 260 000 have been lost to the Assembly because parent governments have not paid their money in time. It would help us greatly if those payments were made on the appointed day.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Niegel.

Mr. NIEGEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I too would like to thank our Chairman Mr. Klejdzinski for having presented and interpreted the budget in this way, in difficult circumstances, and for having so emphatically championed the concerns of the parliamentarians and members of the Assembly of WEU. I have now been a member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration for just on a year. I thought the budget would be our responsibility, as in a national parliament. But I feel like the well-known Munich comedian Karl Valentin, who once said we could want to, but we could not trust ourselves to be allowed to.

This is the situation: the overall structure of WEU is such that we are dependent upon the Council of Ministers and ultimately can only do what the Council of Ministers allows us to do. Within this framework we can only effect small and minute adjustments. That is a structural matter, which it is not really our task to change. But we should at least draw attention to it. We are an Assembly, we are a parliament, and we ought to let the executive know that a parliament has to be competent in budgetary matters, otherwise it is not a true parliament. That is how it was in the last century. As the democracies advanced, the first thing claimed by parliaments was competence in budgetary matters, so as to limit the powers of the executive and of absolutist rulers. I do not wish to compare the Council of Ministers with such rulers – but it sometimes looks like that.

But since we are dealing with our own concerns as a parliament, we as members should at least have the first word on the subject. It goes against our concept of ourselves as delegates if the Council of Ministers decides upon the budget. If it were only the ministers, I should not

Mr. Niegel (continued)

waste a single word on it, for in most cases the ministers are members of their own national parliaments and understand the position of members of parliament. But, as we all know, the decisions are made not by the ministers but by foreign office officials who decide for the members, and in particular on the working conditions of the members. I believe that we in this place should at least complain about that.

I would also say – and now I am speaking to our colleagues from the United Kingdom – that Her Majesty's representative in particular opposed the concerns of members when the subject of improving members' working conditions was raised in the Council of Ministers. That is not a secret; we were told about it in the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. Ladies and gentlemen, I would ask you to insist in your parliament that your representatives in the Council of Ministers do something to uphold the standing of our members. I call upon our colleagues to give this matter their attention.

Now as regards our accommodation – and I thank Mr. Klejdzinski for having raised this matter – I am bound to note that the Council of Ministers shows no sympathy in this matter. When Mr. Klejdzinski mentions that we have available only 0.5 square metres of office space each, it should be added that this will apply only after the conversion, e.g. when the larger delegations have two rooms. Calculating on the present conditions, this figure is very much smaller.

In our country – and the EC Commission has made similar rules – we have regulations on animal welfare. There are minimum parameters. If you keep animals, whether calves, pigs or hens, you must provide a minimum area for each animal. If you do not, the inspector or the police will come along and issue a summons against the owner, though I do not think that members will have the courage to summons the Council of Ministers on the grounds that we delegates are not treated as well as, say, the hens in a member country.

To proceed to another matter, I am one of those who has to make frequent telephone calls. I have an active constituency and a very hard-working office in Bonn. Sometimes one has to make or receive calls. In our building, where can one go to do this? I have to apologise to colleagues in the communist group for using their facilities without permission. I simply go in and use the telephone, because that telephone is frequently the only one in the building available for use. For example, when there is no plenary sitting and a committee has been meeting previously, and one has to telephone to one's office back home, no telephone is available. There are

two telephones in the corridors, and a further telephone for the press. The gentlemen of the press working there and telephoning give you an odd look if you, a member, ask to telephone. They say, "We want to get on with our work". In our office there are staff both from the national delegation and from the parties; these alone have a lot of telephoning to do. Then there are eighteen delegates and eighteen substitutes. You can imagine the situation – it is impossible to hold a conversation in such circumstances.

It goes without saying that political secrets might easily be revealed. Members of other political parties can hear what plans one is making for Bonn or what kind of a speech one is preparing, though I must say that our concerns here are above party or even national interests. The focus should be on the delegates, the Assembly. That would be a way to create suitable working conditions.

May I mention something else which I believe to be self-evident. We have here some very competent staff members, secretaries, specialists, former officers, etc. who are concerned about their future and want to know what is to become of WEU. What is going to happen to their contracts? They have been terminated. I believe that a member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration should also try to help in these matters. These people do not know what the future holds. I ask the President, the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and my colleague Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on the Committee on Rules of Procedure to join me in taking this matter up. We are not living in the nineteenth century, we cannot ride roughshod over our employees.

Ladies and gentlemen, I wanted to address my remarks to the officials of the Council of Ministers and of course to the ministers themselves as well, and remind them that they cannot simply set themselves above the parliamentarians with the stroke of a pen. I also call upon the Secretary-General to snow his concern, for he himself is in a sense an official, not limited to 0.5 square metres of office space. As I understand it, twenty-six square metres have to be kept available for him in this building, whether he is here or not. From this I deduce that those who will the end can will the means.

Ladies and gentlemen, in this spirit I ask you to adopt this budget, which it is no pleasure to present. It is all we can do.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eicher.

Mr. EICHER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, there is little need to add to the report by Mr. Klejdzinski, the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. All the figures and statements in the report are well-founded.

Mr. Eicher (continued)

I should, however, like to say something for the record, even if it has already been mentioned by the previous speaker. We wish to receive our Spanish and Portuguese colleagues with dignity – that goes without saying. But it should be acknowledged that the present delegation rooms, before the building is converted, leave much to be desired and are no longer functional. This too was clearly mentioned.

Members do not have even one square metre of delegation space per person. Not even one member in two has somewhere to sit down in the delegation accommodation. The existing facilities for telephoning do not meet even the minimum requirements of the national delegations. We trust that complaints of this sort will be superfluous and without foundation after the rebuilding is completed in 1990. Even though the complaints made by the committee have not yet led to the desired solutions or received the attention they deserve, it should be said that we are here in this building for different purposes. Yet this malaise ought to be aired, without anger or spite and also without irony, but both courteously and firmly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). – I compliment Mr. Klejdzinski, who has been a first-class Chairman of our committee, which I have been on for a little while now. He was right to pay our respects to Mr. Linster for much of the groundwork that was done on the budget.

I endorse the points that Mr. Klejdzinski made about accommodation. I hope very much that you, Mr. President, will be able to persuade those in authority that the views that we express on that matter should be taken seriously. I do not need to go over that again, other than to re-emphasise the points about telephones, which are fundamental in a modern age of communication.

It is not an exaggeration to say that a significant number of colleagues have fax machines in their offices in their national parliaments, or in their offices back home. I do not see why we cannot organise a proper fax-receiving service here and a method of sending faxes.

The point was made about a United Kingdom delegate on the working party of the Council of Ministers who said that, in his or her judgment – I do not know whether the person was male or female – the budget for the furniture that was supplied for the delegates' rooms was excessive. That person may have a great deal of experience in furniture and furnishings – I do not know – but the Budget Committee made it clear that this is a once-and-for-all operation, and we want it to be done properly. I hope that we shall stand

fast and ensure that we are not parsimonious in order to meet an arbitrary figure.

I should like to make one or two other points about the total budget and the amendments made by the Council of Ministers. It is not an ordinary budget. It is not just looking at last year's budget and inflationary increases. The key factor is that two new nations have joined our organisation, which is bound to have a major impact on our operation. In the same way as we have trouble with the pensions budget, it seems that we are about to go down the same road in relation to staffing. It is extraordinary that the Council of Ministers should now decide that this is the right time to undertake an analysis of staffing needs. We knew for some time that Portugal and Spain were going to join us, and if the Council of Ministers had felt that way from the start, the review should have been undertaken by now.

We made the important point in paragraph 7 of the document that: "After the enlargement of WEU, it would therefore be unthinkable for the Assembly not to be able to recruit a senior official of Portuguese or Spanish nationality." That is absolutely right, and a point that we need to re-emphasise with the Council of Ministers.

I hope that, in our summer session in June, we shall not hear that the review of the structure of the Office of the Clerk has yet to start. I hope that we can put pressure on the Council of Ministers to ensure speedy implementation so that we can get the right number of staff in position for our colleagues who join us. After all, the draft budget that we prepared before the Council of Ministers cut it was not excessive. It was an increase in staff from 31 to 37 for the two nations joining us, so we did not go over the top.

Another important point is security, which we debated in committee the other day. It is wrong that some functionary somewhere can take an arbitrary decision, striking out from our budget the need for a review of security. We all know that, in the times that we live in, security is important. One of the things that mystified the Budget Committee was who was responsible for security in the Assembly when we meet. It is up to you, Mr. President, along with the leaders of the national delegations, to make it clear to the Council of Ministers that there should be a proper review of security arrangements for when the Assembly meets and, if expenditure is necessary to change any security requirements, that should be a priority.

I should like to raise a matter on the revenue side. WEU does not have much revenue, but we have a publications division that has produced modest revenue over time. Tomorrow we are to debate a report from my British colleague, Sir William Shelton, who was in the world of pub-

Mr. Morris (continued)

licity before he entered the House of Commons. Now that the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations is to be given full status, one of the assignments that the Assembly should give the committee is to examine the possibilities of income generation. We all know that to date our publicity has left something to be desired.

The only other point that I wish to make on that committee is about the important work on an Assembly logo and the involvement of graphic design colleges in a competition to design that logo for us. This is a great opportunity to involve our younger designers, and I hope very much that we shall give that maximum support.

I was going to say a few words about when member countries make their deposits, but my colleague, Mr. Lord, has already made that point. It is important that countries make their annual payment on time and that we have the facility to juggle the figures as we wish during the year. Otherwise the Council of Ministers uses us to its benefit once again. However, this budget takes us further forward than we have come to date and we continue to make progress.

I re-emphasise the need for modern communications in our members' rooms, and I cannot emphasise too strongly the need for a review of security of this building when we meet here as members of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

Does the Chairman of the committee wish to speak again?...

That is not the case.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the year 1990.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber ask for a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1990 is agreed to.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg for an explanation of vote.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I should like

to explain my vote. Although I compliment Mr. Klejdzinski, I abstained from voting because the procedure is quite impossible. At this annual occasion a representative of the Council of Ministers should be here to answer the points that have been raised. I should like to propose that for next year. The Council of Ministers has been attacked. We do not know whether that attack was well founded or false, but the Council of Ministers should be given the same opportunity to reply as we have in most of our national parliaments. I should like that to be organised for next year.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you for your suggestion. The Assembly will act upon it as necessary.

4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts

(Presentation of and vote on the motion of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to approve the final accounts, Doc. 1194 and addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1988 – the auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts and vote on the motion of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to approve the final accounts, Document 1194 and addendum.

I call Mr. Klejdzinski, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have nothing to add to the contents of the written document. I can only say that the expenditures have been checked and the auditor's report is available. I have no other observations to make on this point.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – There are no speakers on the list.

We shall now proceed to vote on the motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1988.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten representatives requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The motion is agreed to.

The President (continued)

In the absence of Mr. Ahrens, the sitting is suspended.

(The sitting was suspended at 11.55 a.m. and resumed at 12.10 p.m.)

5. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe

(Presentation of and debate on the draft order of the Political Committee, Doc. 1212 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is resumed.

The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the draft order of the Political Committee on the establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe, Document 1212 and amendment.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg in place of Mr. Ahrens, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Political Committee.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – May I apologise for the delay. Apparently, Karl Ahrens has been taken to hospital. I have had only five minutes to prepare for the debate, so I shall do my best.

The motion speaks of establishing “a peaceful and secure order in Europe”. We must consider the history for a moment. We are seeing the breaking of the log jam which has divided Europe for forty years and which, in a strange way, has kept the peace for forty years. WEU has played a major part in that peacekeeping operation.

We must consider the changed conditions that now apply. As I said yesterday when winding up one of the debates as Vice-Chairman of the committee, the one certainty is that there is no certainty. One has only to consider the political leaders of nations in Eastern and Central Europe, who one day appear on television but the next day are under protective house arrest, to realise how difficult it is not only for the West but for the East and the Soviet Union.

It is essential that nothing is done to make the Soviet Union feel insecure or threatened. There must be mutual understanding between the East and West that their security is ensured. The West must remain cautious. As the Romans said, we must “*festina lente*”. We must ensure that words are matched by deeds.

If I had had a chance to prepare this speech yesterday I would have spoken about the one-way traffic between East and West Germany. Visas were not required to travel from East to West but were required to travel from West to East. That no longer applies, which shows how fluid the situation is.

We thought that it would be good to have a broad-ranging debate without a report, because any report would not have been worth the recycled paper on which it was duplicated. One of the report’s central proposals is that there should be an extraordinary session in the first quarter of 1990, with which could be linked a colloquy. As part of the Assembly, the colloquy could invite personalities from East and Central Europe and others so that we could have the broadest possible exchange of views. I suggest that the invitations for named people should be sent out later rather than earlier. One might invite “the Prime Minister” or “the Foreign Minister”, without naming the occupant too early. I am not sure who could judge that. The ideal place for this extraordinary session and colloquy would be the hemicycle in Luxembourg, which would be a warm tribute to you, Mr. President, as a Luxembourger, as you relinquish office. I hope that that suggestion is acceptable to everyone.

We must see two advances in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. First, we must see advances in human rights on all fronts. Great progress is being made, but more must be achieved. I noted one important statement that was made during President Gorbachev’s historic meeting with the Pope. It was said that laws will be passed to ensure freedom of religion in the Soviet Union. If that means the end of the persecution of the Catholic Church, which has persisted since the revolution, and of the imprisonment, torture and persecution of Baptists and Jews merely for wanting to practise their religion, we shall welcome that, but it must go through the process of law before it is fully established. It is a great step forward.

Secondly, we must see pluralism developed in those countries. Poland’s Government, for example, has a non-communist majority. In the upper house there are two communists but all the other members are non-communists. However, all are members of an umbrella organisation, Solidarity, which has yet to work out how to become a political organisation.

I do not believe that one can have a diverse collection of peasants, christian democrats, socialists, social democrats and intellectuals belonging to no political party that can do more than bridge the situation between totalitarianism and democracy. One cannot have a loose coalition of totally conflicting ideas operating successfully for more than a short period of time. However, it may be that it will soon find a way of restoring Poland’s desperate economic position.

When we speak of Poland, and of Hungary in particular, we must be careful not to speak necessarily of a return to democracy. I remind my colleagues that democracy, in the way that we understand it, did not exist in Poland or

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

Hungary prior to the outbreak of the last world war and to the takeover by the communists, although it did exist in Czechoslovakia. Therefore, we must be careful in our choice of language and to talk only of democracy in terms of our own countries.

There is a dichotomy between this organisation and the Council of Europe, but between us Europe must find a way of helping the emergent political parties of Eastern Europe to reform and to understand how to operate. None of them has operated printing presses or been allowed time on television or radio. They will need our help, not in any patronising way but because we already understand and operate democracy. We want those countries to implement it in their own way, not necessarily ours. Nevertheless, they will need our assistance in learning how democracy operates. That is probably the major task to be performed by the western nations – that, and helping them with their economies in a way that will buy time for the new policies.

The real problem is how long the ordinary people of Poland, Hungary or East Germany must wait for goods to appear in their shops. Some of you may have seen a television programme broadcast about four months ago in which citizens of Moscow were interviewed. One of them remarked: "Things were better for us in the shops under Brezhnev." That indicates the dangerous situation that could arise in moving towards, in time, pluralism, and at least in moving away from totalitarianism in the Soviet Union.

I began by remarking that peace has been kept in Europe for forty years because of the divisions in Europe. That peace was aided on both sides by a military alliance – NATO on the one side, and the Warsaw Pact on the other. As many people have already remarked, there is an opportunity now to turn those pacts into something different. Given the right circumstances, they could provide the right guarantee of security for all the nations of Europe. That cannot and will not happen quickly, but it could happen. However, we must not give any support to those who want to destabilise either NATO or the Warsaw Pact by withdrawing countries from them. I can think of no stronger recipe for greater distrust than for the West to try to persuade a country on the other side of the iron curtain to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. That would send the wrong message at this time. I hope equally that no one on this side of the iron curtain will be seduced into thinking that an individual deal can be done. That would be dangerous for all of us.

I have consulted the Rapporteur before presenting the document, and I promise you,

Mr. President, that there will be one reply at the conclusion of the debate, not two.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Geoffrey, for your swift decision to present this report on behalf of the Political Committee. I am sure the whole Assembly will join me in wishing Mr. Ahrens, whose absence is outside his control, a speedy recovery.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Niegel.

Mr. NIEGEL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I thank Sir Geoffrey Finsberg for explaining the reasons for the recommendation and for his position of principle on this matter. I also thank the Political Committee for having included this problem in the orders of the day as requested. As a freely elected member of parliament in the Federal German Republic, with my home and my constituency twenty kilometres from the frontier with the German Democratic Republic, I naturally have a keen interest in this problem.

It is a pity that a report cannot be produced until later, but that is inherent in the structure of this Assembly. Nevertheless, we are entitled to state our position on these matters at the present time. Indeed I would say that if we had neglected the opportunity provided by this Assembly to make our position clear we should have been guilty of an omission.

Nobody, neither we, nor you, nor our allies and friends, would have believed that developments would occur so quickly.

One naturally assumes that everyone is pleased about these developments, and that instead of talking about making the consequences of division more bearable we talk about how division can be ended. That is what we all wanted, and I cannot imagine it being otherwise. Friends – and our allies are our friends – stick together. I have no doubts about our friends. Friends stand by friends, including their friend, Germany.

Furthermore, democratic Germany is different from the Germany of 1933 to 1945.

I said that friends stand by their friends. We were assured of this by our friends in 1954 and 1955, at a time when Germany was once more needed in order to defend the freedom of the West against the threat from the East. Yesterday I asked the Defence Minister of France about the reasons for the continuance of WEU's work, and although he prevaricated slightly, in essence he supported it.

May I remind you that one of the foundation documents of WEU is the WEU agreement, together with a declaration dated 3rd October 1954 and signed by the Governments of the

Mr. Niegel (continued)

United States, the United Kingdom and the French Republic. These three governments declared that a completely free and united Germany, created by peaceful means, would continue to be an essential aim of their policy. Ladies and gentlemen, that aim has not changed; it is still valid.

Furthermore, on 23rd October 1954 before the Federal Republic became a member of NATO, a German treaty was concluded between the same three powers and the Federal German Republic. Article 7(2) of this treaty reads:

“ Pending the peace settlement, the signatory states will co-operate to achieve, by peaceful means, their common aim of a reunified Germany enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution ” – like that of the Federal Republic – “ and integrated within the European Community. ”

Was all that politically correct up to now? If so, then it also applies to tomorrow, to the reunification of Germany. The three victorious powers stipulated that all the zones of occupation, the three zones of the western powers and the Soviet zone of occupation, were to be reunited.

The fifteen members of NATO were right in stating at the NATO Council of Ministers on 14th December 1967, in the Harmel report, which also referred to the causes of the tensions:

“ But the possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded as long as the central political issues in Europe, first and foremost the German question, remain unsolved... ”

But no final and stable settlement in Europe is possible without a solution of the German question which lies at the heart of present tensions in Europe. Any such settlement must end the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe, which are most clearly and cruelly manifested in the division of Germany... ”

After that comes a crucial sentence:

“ The allies will examine and review suitable policies designed to achieve a just and stable order in Europe, to overcome the division of Germany and to foster European security. ”

When last October, at the NATO Assembly, I asked the NATO Secretary-General whether that still applied, he answered in the affirmative.

Therefore, ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to take the question of the self-determination of the German people seriously.

In conclusion may I say that I saw on French television yesterday some pictures of last Monday's demonstration in Leipzig. Banners were

being carried around, reading: “ Forty years of dirty tricks, now we want unity. ” As freely elected parliamentarians we should support this, so that Germany, as a peaceful nation, may return to the full peaceful community of free nations. We must hang on to the coat-tails of history. Missed opportunities do not return.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate my colleague, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, on an excellent introduction to the recommendation before us. I entirely agree with him about the vital importance of maintaining the stability of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Those of us who were talking to the Secretary-General, Manfred Wörner, in Brussels a few weeks ago in the Defence Committee will remember his concern, which is shared by that committee, that there could be a structural unilateral disarmament on the NATO side in anticipation of the disarmament that is taking place, the CFE talks, START and, we hope, chemical disarmament.

Similarly, it will do no good for people in the West to try to suborn individual members of the Warsaw Pact and to prise them away from that alliance. Before we make speeches, we have to read the papers and listen to the latest press communiqués to find out the latest position, as Sir Geoffrey reminded us. The present instability can contain its own dangers. It is a strange and ironic twist that the hard lines of the cold war from 1945 up to recent times have provided, in their own strange way, peace and security in Europe – perhaps at a price, but nevertheless a form of peace and security.

I have tabled an amendment to the draft order, and I hope that Sir Geoffrey and the committee will accept it. I have done so because peace and security by themselves, vital though they are, are not enough. What is happening in Eastern Europe now is connected with peace and security. It is also connected with justice, democracy and pluralism, as Sir Geoffrey reminded us powerfully, not once, but several times in his report. I could argue that one can have peace and security if one is incarcerated in the Gulag Archipelago, but one would not have justice or democracy there. Therefore, I have inserted the word “ just ” before “ peaceful ” in paragraph 2 at the bottom of the order, so that it would read: “ establishment of a just, peaceful and secure order, in Europe ”.

I remind the Assembly that the NATO Council report of 14th December 1967, which has been alluded to, stated clearly in paragraph 9 that the: “ ultimate political purpose of the alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees ”.

I am sure that we can all agree with that, but, for me, peace and security must be accompanied

Mr. Speed (continued)

by justice, otherwise the demonstrations in Leipzig, what is happening in East Berlin, Warsaw and Stettin, what Lech Walesa, the refuseniks and others in the Soviet Union have been doing, are as nothing. That is where the turmoil is at the moment.

This is a time for cool heads and clear minds in a fast-moving and fast-changing situation. The Assembly must have this wide-ranging debate today. The proposition by the committee and Sir Geoffrey of a colloquy, debate and discussion in Luxembourg in the first quarter of next year with some of our colleagues from Eastern Europe is wise and sound. That colloquy and debate will be all the better if we insert the word "just", because none of us will know what will happen, even in the next few months.

My final plea is that, before we get the arms reductions that are being discussed and debated in the various forums, we must make sure that we match those reductions and embrace wholeheartedly the economic co-operation that we wish, so that the various countries in Eastern Europe can start to rebuild their economic structures. They are not likely to get justice, peace or security without that. However, at the same time, we should not rush helter-skelter into trying to break up the alliances that have served us so well and, if I am totally realistic, the fact is that they have served the other side well from a security point of view. At the end of the day, those alliances and pacts can be transformed in the way that Sir Geoffrey suggested, to meet the genuine security aspirations of Eastern Europeans, wherever they come from, and to bring for the first time – for decades in many cases – justice to Eastern Europe, which is what we all want.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lord.

Mr. LORD (*United Kingdom*). – In all these dramatic events, the way forward may be as yet unclear, but what I feel is clear is that WEU must play its part in finding that way forward. The situation is changing so rapidly that it is impossible even to give a precise summary of the position to date, let alone any sensible prediction of events. However, since the motion, which I fully support, calls for an up-to-date report to be presented to us in June next year, it is reasonable to ask what we should like to see in that report.

What is the rôle of WEU in these events? Is it to follow, to take note of, to record? Perhaps it is to monitor and to attempt to keep abreast of events. Or is it to initiate, to take the lead, to help set the agenda? I believe the latter. If we want, as many delegates have declared, WEU to play a major rôle, we need to alter our agendas,

earn the respect and recognition of our parent nations and tell people what we are doing. What should our agenda be? What is our strategy? What events can we foresee and what measures should we take? What sort of Europe do we envisage and how do we achieve it? At what speed do we think that it is safe to travel?

We should have a framework and a goal. The framework should be sensitive and flexible, but it should be in place. I shall now make one or two suppositions and I hope that the Assembly will bear with me. I believe that it is reasonable to suppose that European disarmament will accelerate, that Germany will reunify, that Russian power over the Warsaw Pact countries will diminish, and that involvement of the United States of America in NATO will be under discussion.

It is stating the obvious to say that a reunified Germany would have to be in the Warsaw Pact or in NATO, or in neither. As there would be the strongest possible objections from the respective sides to a reunified Germany being in either the Warsaw Pact or in NATO, I suggest that it is reasonable to suppose that she would belong to neither. There are also compelling reasons why she should not remain neutral.

So at this point we have a reunified Germany in a Europe where many eastern states are establishing their own democracies, which is becoming less controlled by blocs and which is looking more like a patchwork quilt. To continue that analogy, in WEU we talk constantly about pillars of support, like the pillars in the chamber. Perhaps we should think of Europe as a tapestry – like the tapestry on the walls of the chamber – made up of all the individual nations but woven together in a way that prevents conflict. Why should not WEU and the Council of Europe together play a major rôle in that protest? We must persuade our governments that those two organisations, which are already so closely linked, can be used in tandem to great effect.

The Council of Europe contains all the democracies in Europe. Russia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia now have guest status, and Hungary is applying to join. So we have a forum which regularly could include in debate all the nations about which we are concerned so that they can become increasingly familiar with each other in the way outlined by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg earlier. WEU will soon contain nine nations and there is no reason why others should not be added. Is it too much to suggest that in the fullness of time a unified Germany and other Eastern European countries might join? Perhaps in the long term even Russia might join. Given the terms of WEU, that we must all go to the aid of a fellow member that is attacked, that ought to be a great reassurance to every country concerned, including Russia. Then our European

Mr. Lord (continued)

tapestry would be complete. Instead of Western European Union, we would have European union.

I appreciate that what I have said may sound like wishful thinking and it is impossible to solve all our problems that simply, but I hope that some of those ideas will be explored in the report before our Assembly next June.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – A fortnight ago, I was in Berlin with other members of the Defence Committee. I took my turn symbolically to chip at the wall with a hammer and chisel. People were lining up to do that. The Clerk of our committee also asked two German guards how long they had been in the East German army and how much longer they had to serve. He received quite a civil reply in English. Had we done that even a month before we probably would have been shot. Certainly we would have provoked a diplomatic incident of considerable proportion. When one experiences the situation personally, it comes home more realistically than all the newspaper headlines and television coverage. The change is enormous. It has brought complications for the residents of Berlin, and it is permanent, although a great deal has yet to be worked out.

An extensive tour around the suburbs of East Berlin shows it to be a poor and drab place and the life there bears no comparison with that in West Berlin. It is also interesting to note that graffiti are appearing on the other side of the wall. That would have been quite impossible a few weeks ago.

We need to analyse what is likely to happen and what we can do to further the cause. There are four important factors. First there is the Gorbachev factor. It behoves all sensible democratic assemblies to do what they can to support what President Gorbachev is trying to achieve in his own country and in Eastern Europe. Recently a sovietologist told me that everywhere President Gorbachev goes he receives a film star's reception and a great deal of adulation. Public opinion polls throughout Europe show Mr. Gorbachev to be the most popular politician, yet the expert I spoke to considered that if there were public opinion polls in the Soviet Union and if the Soviet Union were a democracy President Gorbachev would rate only 15% support. That is a dangerous level in the valuation of leadership, as many of us know in our respective countries. In his own country President Gorbachev is in a certain amount of peril due to the non-delivery of food and jobs and the restructuring of his country and he will

remain so for quite some time. Thus, we are greatly affected by the Gorbachev factor.

The second factor is German reunification. There is no doubt that the two Germanys will reunite, but when it happens it will take a considerable time and will require a great deal of patience and planning. We should be realistic and understand that it is absolutely inevitable, so it should be welcomed and helped. However, it exercises considerable influence on our future strategy for the NATO countries and on Western European security.

The third factor is public perception. Already too many people are saying that it is all over now, Mr. Gorbachev has waved a magic wand, there will never be another war and politicians should throw away their arms and get down to ordinary talking. Of course, anyone who has studied these matters will realise that that is superficial nonsense. We have to bear in mind that there is a considerable increase in public opinion to the effect that European defence is redundant and irrelevant.

Fourthly, there is the question whether NATO and WEU will be able to carry on. We must carry on because we must have a logical and secure defence system. We must work for balanced reductions carried out soberly and realistically. Any talk of NATO being redundant is fanciful and dangerous. It is constantly being emphasised that we have vital work to do in the next decade and today's decade is underlining that again. The fact that we are tackling our work optimistically is all the more reason why we should achieve success.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eicher.

Mr. EICHER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I thank the Rapporteur and his colleagues for having taken the initiative to include as an order of the day for this sitting an emergency debate on the situation created by current events in the East European countries.

I wholeheartedly support the draft order before us. Present developments and their impact on European security and on the rôle of WEU need thorough discussion.

There is no longer any doubt that these are real and profound changes but they still have to be correctly interpreted. What troubles me in many western comments is a certain note of triumphalism about what is happening. It is being said that the communist system has come to grief and that this is due in large measure to the attitude adopted by the West. Our insistence on the third basket of the Helsinki agreements, the firmness with which NATO has maintained its strategy of deterrence and the model and pole of attraction that the European Community appears to be, have all contributed greatly to the

Mr. Eicher (continued)

current developments. However, I think these statements need to be set in their proper context.

As regards the failure of the communist system, this is not quite so general as some people appear to believe. Economically, yes, there has been a failure, but politically and ideologically the statement has to be qualified.

With respect to the countries we used to call satellites, it is legitimate to say that communism is being rejected as a political and ideological system. But the case of the Soviet Union itself is very different. There can be no doubt that for Mr. Gorbachev the form that communism had taken, with its mania for secrecy, its distortions of history, its repression of freedom and the rights of the individual and the corruption and principles of its leading class was a degeneration which he wanted to end and replace by a new form of communism. Mr. Gorbachev does not question the leading rôle of the communist party in USSR society. It may be asked – indeed the Chairman of the Council has asked here – how Mr. Gorbachev can tolerate the rejection of communism in the countries around his and still wish to keep it, though in a different form, in his own.

For the time being, communism as a political and ideological system in the Soviet Union has not stepped down.

It is even less true to refer to failure in the military sphere. As Mr. Steiner's report shows, the USSR has not lost the armaments race. Actually, the poor state of the USSR economy is partly due to the vast spending in the military sector, though another reason, of course, is what might be paradoxically called "the chaos of planning".

It would be an exaggeration to say, as of now, that communism has lost, and even more so to say that the West can take any great credit for what is now happening in Eastern Europe. The very most that can be said is that so far the West has reacted positively and with the proper caution to the news reaching us from those countries.

It would be wrong to think that the Soviet Union agreed to negotiations on arms reduction primarily on account of NATO's firmness. It would be wrong to think that the liberalisation now taking place in the East is mainly due to the West's persistent emphasis on human rights in the framework of the Helsinki process.

And it would be wrong to think that the countries of Eastern Europe want economic reforms because they are so attracted by the EEC. The eastern countries want change primarily for domestic reasons. The reforms in the direction

of parliamentary democracy now under way in some of those countries are due to the tens and hundreds of thousands of people who have come out on to the streets to demand freedom and democracy with a dignity and discipline that would make one think they had been doing it all their lives.

However, the main reason for my opposition to any kind of triumphalism in the West is not just that it is an insult to the peoples of the East European countries; it is primarily that this might at some time prevent us from having the right kind of attitude towards the changes.

In particular, it might prevent us from keeping pace with events in our thinking and our attitude towards the East. If our past policy towards Eastern Europe was so "successful" there would be a great temptation to say: "Let's not change our attitude; a slight adjustment is all we need", and then the danger would be that of not adjusting enough.

Fortunately, western leaders appear resolved not to make this mistake. According to what the Chairman of the Council told us yesterday, President Bush himself stressed that NATO should be kept in being, as it guarantees our security vis-à-vis a USSR which after all is still a military superpower; but it will have to be increasingly focused on military and civil co-operation. For if events continue to develop as they are now doing it is likely that during the next few years the West will be investing enormous sums in the economic recovery of these East European countries.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Eicher, will you please finish.

Mr. EICHER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – One more minute.

That being so, would it not be a paradox for the West to think of its security purely in terms of a military system organised against countries in which it would then have a large interest? To simplify a little, I might say: if we assist the Eastern European countries it is because we regard them as friends. Do we aim our guns at friends?

In short, I am advocating more humility on the part of the West, because this will help us to make sound political decisions about the countries of the East. The same applies to the question of German reunification. We are told that this is a question for the Germans on the basis of national self-determination. All right, disregarding for the moment the misgivings which other countries might have about German reunification, we still do not know what the wishes of the people of East Germany are in the matter. When the communist régime has been replaced by a more representative government, the new leaders of the country will be men and

Mr. Eicher (continued)

women with no experience of the exercise of power or of international relations. We shall have to give them time to decide what their position is with regard to reunification in the best interests of their country.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I really must ask you to conclude Mr. Eicher, otherwise I shall have to stop you.

Mr. EICHER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – That position will depend upon the specific way in which they shape their society.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Baumel, the last speaker for the morning sitting.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). Mr. President, I shall be as brief as possible.

A new Europe is taking shape before our wondering eyes. In this new situation it is essential to plan as clearly as possible what WEU should become and what useful rôle the institution can now play.

Its rôle as a forum of reflection has often been referred to. That is a somewhat slender rôle compared with the historic events we are living through. WEU needs to take on fresh responsibilities. It has just been suggested that we should hold an extraordinary meeting in Luxembourg to meet some of the new leaders of Eastern Europe. This is an excellent proposal. But in what spirit should we attend? Will we first have defined the framework of our action and our objectives?

It is not the debate that has been going on since yesterday that will afford us much enlightenment. We are rather let down by the atmosphere in which we are meeting compared with the nature of these historic events. One has only to look at the empty government benches and the press gallery to realise how few are the people we interest. Believe me, this is a very good measure of how much importance is attached to institutions or politicians. So we must take a second look at ourselves and today we have an opportunity of doing so.

The Europe of the Twelve can no longer be what we thought it could be a few years ago. For one thing Germany will inevitably carry greater weight, and for another the ways in which the East European countries will be associated with this Europe of the Twelve are bound to be different, flexible and sometimes incompatible with our own methods and commitments.

This explains the need for and importance of an institution such as WEU – alongside a deepened and enlarged EEC – to be the hard core of the Europe of tomorrow, particularly since this Europe will be in the presence of an

inevitably different Atlantic Alliance because a large part of its doctrine will have been left behind by events.

There is still talk, with overmuch insistence, about the “graduated response”. What graduated response? Is such a response possible in this new Europe?

We ourselves have removed the basic rung for moving up the graduated response. In which case what European statesman will be able to give the order to attack or, in the event of aggression, the order to fire on countries which may yesterday have been our adversaries but are now our friends, and particularly nice to know?

So the forward strategy concept is badly lamed. Furthermore, the refusal of some countries of NATO to modernise certain nuclear theatre weapons, perhaps for their own good reasons, makes a large part of NATO doctrine obsolete. We must have the courage to say so.

In this situation WEU has an important part to play; we have to keep on saying this, not only because it has to be an input to the discussion on European doctrine but because there are specific missions for us to perform.

First, as has been stated, there is this new idea of an institute of strategic studies in Europe for the strategic thinking that we do not at present have; this is clear if we analyse all the speeches that have been made in this chamber over the years. I look in vain for the basis of a veritable European school of strategic thinking.

Secondly, we can play a useful rôle in the verification and control of arms limitation.

Thirdly, as the French Minister of Defence said yesterday, we can help to develop an extremely useful radar and infra-red satellite agency.

In these conditions, it is essential to realise a very important fact which has not so far been mentioned, namely the increasing emergence of a collective perception in the West which no longer sees the threat on the same scale as it did a few years ago.

If our society no longer has any exact perception of its security, this will inevitably have a vastly demobilising effect on our vigilance which will tend to raise doubts about the need for an alliance, and for the existence of WEU. We can already see this happening in the United States, Germany and several other countries. In fact, as one of Mr. Gorbachev’s advisers said smilingly to an American minister: “We have just done you the worst disservice, we have robbed you of your enemy”.

In such a situation, WEU is more necessary than ever. We simply have to try to define its objectives and its new responsibilities. I hope that the extraordinary meeting of WEU in

Mr. Baumel (continued)

Luxembourg will not confine itself to listening to what a number of eastern leaders have to say, but will enable us to define its objectives.

In closing, Mr. President, I should like to quote an outstanding passage from your remarkable speech which sums up the matter very well:

“WEU will probably appear to be the hard core of a Western Europe anxious not to allow its security to be compromised. For a long time to come, its rôle will be to maintain the conditions necessary for Europe to be able to play its rôle at the side of the United States in a defence system which will remain western and allow the European members of the Atlantic Alliance to play their full rôle in the process of détente and arms limitation, at least where conventional weapons are concerned. Since disarmament may well lead to a rebalancing of the respective shares of the Europeans and Americans...”

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Baumel, will you please conclude.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – “... it is by no means out of the question that the welcome evolution of our relations with the Soviet Union and its allies gives WEU an essential rôle with Europe which will have to organise its security on new bases.”

I congratulate you, Mr. President, on this excellent passage in your speech.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is adjourned.

6. Change in the order of business

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In view of the small number of speakers and amendments, and at the request of the Defence Committee, it is proposed to change the order of business for tomorrow in two respects:

1. The debate on the amendments and the vote on the draft recommendation on Cocom will be held at 10 a.m.
2. Immediately afterwards, we will start the debate on the report by the Defence Com-

mittee on the situation in China. The vote will be taken after the address by the Italian Secretary of State and not in the afternoon as initially foreseen.

7. Change in the membership of a committee

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The United Kingdom Delegation proposes Mr. Parry as an alternate member of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Are there any objections?...

This is agreed to.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Coëme, Minister of Defence of Belgium.
2. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe (Resumed debate and vote on the draft order of the Political Committee, Document 1212 and amendment).
3. Force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) – reply to the annual report of the Council (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1204 and amendment).
4. Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom) (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Document 1207).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.).

ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 6th December 1989

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by Mr. Coëme, Minister of Defence of Belgium.
Replies by Mr. Coëme to questions put by: Mr. Pécriaux, Mr. De Decker, Mr. Caro, Mr. Jessel and Mr. Eicher.
4. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe (*Resumed debate and vote on the draft order of the Political Committee, Doc. 1212 and amendment.*)
Speakers: The President, Mr. Ward, Mr. Stegagnini, Mr. Wilkinson, Mrs. Francese, Mrs. Luuk, Mr. Ewing, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. De Decker, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (Vice-Chairman of the committee).
5. Force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) – reply to the annual report of the Council (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1204 and amendment.*)
Speakers: The President, Mr. Steiner (Rapporteur), Mr. Speed, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Steiner (Rapporteur), Sir Dudley Smith (Chairman of the committee).
6. Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom) (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Doc. 1207.*)
Speakers: The President, Mr. Atkinson (Rapporteur), Mr. Lagorce, Mr. Klejdzinski.
7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT. – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Coëme, Minister of Defence of Belgium

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The first order of the day is the address by Mr. Coëme, Minister of Defence of Belgium.

On behalf of all the representatives, I welcome you to our Assembly and invite you to come to the rostrum.

Mr. COËME (*Minister of Defence of Belgium*) (Translation). – Mr. President, your excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, 1989, like 1789, will pass into world history. It will be the year of freedoms regained. Recently Mr. Helmut Schmidt, former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, wrote: “We are coming to the end of a century marked by unparalleled catastrophes: two world wars, the holocaust, Hiroshima, Hitler, Stalin...”.

We are living through remarkable revolutions that are gathering pace at whirlwind speed. This has been clearly understood by the democratic opposition in Czechoslovakia and spelt out in one of its slogans: “Poland ten years, Hungary ten months, the German Democratic Republic ten weeks, Czechoslovakia ten days”.

Under the impact of past certainties and future uncertainties all our debates help to define the guidelines, the options, and to throw light on questions to which every European government must find an answer in order to put an end to the present turmoil.

The threat from a monolithic totalitarian bloc dominated by the Soviet Union and possessing clear military superiority formed the backdrop to the construction of European security. This backdrop is no longer there. Although the military imbalance has far from disappeared, it is reasonable to hope that an agreement will be signed next year in Vienna that will lead us

1. See page 35.

Mr. Coëme (continued)

towards a balance in several major weapon systems.

Furthermore, President Gorbachev has now become, according to certain opinion polls, the most popular politician in our own countries. And, within the Warsaw Pact, discussions about relations between Moscow and the other member countries are no longer taboo.

There are also signs that lead us to believe that for the first time military production may be slowing down in the Soviet Union and most of the Warsaw Pact countries.

There is another piece on the chess board that is in the process of changing. Because of the scale of the post-war threat and the economic chaos prevailing in Europe, the leadership of the West quite naturally fell to the United States.

Subsequently Western Europe has regained its economic strength and as a result, relatively speaking of course, the pre-eminence of the United States has lessened.

Thus there is now a feeling that – like all the great powers since the nineteenth century – Europe must acquire the attributes needed for self-determination. The recent European summit in Paris is the latest and most striking example of this search for a European identity.

Because the changes in the East and the strengthening of Europe's identity are taking place at the same time, Europe is faced with the most complex task it has ever known: namely, how to combine European integration with the transition to a policy of co-operation rather than confrontation, in relation to the whole continent of Europe.

I do not need to tell you that the building of Europe has never been a continuous and regular process. There have been high points such as the year 1951, when the treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community was signed; the year 1957, with the signature of the treaty establishing the Community; the 1960s, when General de Gaulle's "Europe des patries" generated an in-depth debate on the future direction of Western Europe; the years 1969 and 1970, with the hesitant beginnings of European political co-operation. Between these great years, there were periods of calm which sometimes gave the impression that Europe was stagnating. These high points in European history obliged the governments of Europe to ask themselves time after time whether the policy they were pursuing was the one that best suited the developments and changes Europe was undergoing.

Thus, Franco-German integration brought an end to the long drawn-out hostilities between

these two countries; General de Gaulle's policy, and in particular his relations with the Warsaw Pact countries, helped to lay the foundations of the policy of détente; European political co-operation has gradually brought out the fact that European interests are not always identical with those of North America.

Will our epoch set its imprint on the construction of Europe? I am convinced of it, although, as one of you wrote, we only have "a vague picture of the future structure". I am convinced that the fundamental debate will centre on the relationship between increasing political and economic integration, on the one hand, and the development of co-operation with the so-called East European countries, on the other.

I take as an example the question whether the European Community should have a "defence" dimension. The subject is not on the agenda and cannot at present be resolved, but this debate, this idea, is in all our minds. We cannot avoid this question, because it will have very serious consequences for Europe, for relations within Europe and for the transatlantic debate.

At present, most of the governments of Western Europe are working on the road that should lead us to "complete" political union: economic integration, political unification, including common defence and foreign policies. I share this idea.

A Community equipped with a military potential would then form the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. As long as this has not happened in practice, Western European Union should act as a spur towards a European identity.

However, my presence at this rostrum would be meaningless if I could not stir up some ideas, which is the very purpose of your gatherings. So I note that in the light of events in Eastern Europe some people are wondering whether Western Europe should in fact possess this autonomous defence capability. Though they feel that economic and political integration should go ahead without delay, they would prefer the European Community to remain "open" in some way to closer co-operation with the neutral and non-aligned countries and, perhaps in the longer term, with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Consequently – and these are two diverging themes that will soon be debated – they would consider it inopportune to provide Western Europe with a military defence system, which remains the exclusive province of NATO. In this case, Western European Union would be the perfect instrument for Europeanising the Atlantic Alliance.

This then is the problem. I agree with those who consider that it should be approached in

Mr. Coëme (continued)

full consultation with our North American allies.

Indeed, following very extensive contacts within the North Atlantic Alliance and Western Europe, my feeling is that this move towards a greater European identity and greater awareness among Europeans of the need to guarantee the security of their own citizens, is irreversible. And, in view of the current ferment, it seems obvious to me that if a concerted effort is not organised within the alliance, so as to convince our North American allies that this development is irreversible, we shall suffer a number of setbacks in the future.

Consequently, in each of the assemblies and in all the forums where I participate, I plead the case for concerted planning between Europeans and North Americans. I think the Atlantic Alliance is certainly the most appropriate place to do this. And Western European Union, as well as NATO's Eurogroup, are clearly institutions that have to convey the European message as regards a European identity and European security.

In the face of developments whose outcome is usually uncertain, those who assume political and above all military responsibility must at all costs remain cautious. We can never repeat this too often: our countries' security cannot be reduced in the coming years, although we should be prepared to look at new ideas and new opportunities, even if, at the start, they may strike us as over-bold.

Military caution and political boldness are needed in order not to squander any chances that may arise from the exciting developments now taking place on our continent. Without some boldness on both sides the Vienna conventional negotiations would never have aroused as much hope as they do today. The key to a more harmonious development of Europe is the elimination of any feeling of insecurity, and hence of any instability in Europe.

A few weeks ago, the fourth session of the CFE negotiations opened in Vienna. A certain rapprochement between the participants was noted on several major points such as the weapons concerned, the level of residual forces, verification and so on. Several points, however, still remain at issue, particularly the handling of stockpiled weapons and the question of geographical distribution.

However, I think there is every hope that these obstacles can be overcome, and you will probably have noticed that all the experts and all the politicians have for some months been talking about the Vienna Agreement and the consequences of the Vienna Agreement, as if it

were a foregone conclusion that this would inevitably come about next year. This is a remarkable change of climate between the two superpowers, the two blocs, the two alliances.

Do we realise the major impact that such an agreement will have? If a conventional balance can be obtained in Europe, every component of our defence effort will be changed accordingly.

The achievement of parity in the weapon systems under discussion will allay in Western Europe the fears stemming from the military situation. Parity will facilitate the review of the rôle of nuclear weapons on the continent of Europe and in any event will open the way to negotiations on these weapons systems.

This is a debate that has already been forgotten, and yet it is a topic that made the headlines as regards security matters right up to the alliance summit at the end of May. The question of the modernisation of these short-range nuclear weapons, or at least the negotiations on such weapons, has been deferred until 1992. However, now is the time to remember how critical this debate is for us Europeans.

Parity will also oblige the small countries to think about specialisation and greater integration within NATO.

I was in the United States barely two months ago. Next to the term "burden-sharing" the word that struck us most was "specialisation". This word was on the lips of all the people we spoke to, both in the Pentagon, the State Department and the White House; I think that in the future, after a first Vienna Agreement, we shall not be able to escape specialisation; we should all be considering it.

Above all, parity will make it possible to work out a specifically European security policy in a relaxed international atmosphere.

An appropriate defence policy is one element of security policy, but the technological facilities, namely, the weapon systems available, are subject to other, more important aspects of international relations.

It is in that framework that we should assess the Vienna negotiations, which are most unlikely to end with the first phase. Already, in several countries, such as Federal Germany and also the United States, people are beginning to quote figures and percentages which could be the subject of a second Vienna treaty.

If this is the case, it will no doubt become essential to review the key elements of our weaponry and our operational concepts. But what direction should this review take? Should we move towards a more mobile, or, conversely, a more static defence?

Everyone agrees that the two alliances should become clearly defensive and some do not

Mr. Coëme (continued)

hesitate to use the expression "defensive defence". So far I have not detected any very precise ideas underlying these terms, but we certainly cannot reject them.

To what level should we reduce our forces in the future? Would this approach mean not only the withdrawal and removal of offensive weapons, but also the removal of the whole military infrastructure required to support an offensive capability? There are so many questions for us to answer.

We, as politicians, have direct questions put to us by the military leaders. Many of them tell us that in the present remarkably turbulent times they are waiting for clarifications and directives that can only come from the political leaders.

These questions cannot, then, remain unanswered, but they must be answered jointly. The criteria for defining stability in Europe, and particularly after the signature of the first Vienna Agreement, must be on the agenda of military contacts between East and West. In this connection, there are also plans to hold a seminar in Vienna on military doctrine with the thirty-five nations participating in the Helsinki process. Such an exchange of views will be valuable. However, it will probably not be enough. I am convinced that much ground can be cleared in exploratory bilateral discussions with the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, so as to speed up discussions between the two alliances, and among the thirty-five countries in Vienna.

To sum up, I think an assessment of what is defensive will depend on a combination of three factors: the level of residual forces, a deployment that will make preventive operations increasingly difficult – and hence the crossing of neighbouring frontiers – and, finally, binding verification measures.

As regards verification, there is a question that may arise some time in the future. There will be tasks that stem from the verification of a conventional agreement, President Bush's open skies proposal, security and confidence-building measures, and a possible European centre for the reduction of military risks. Will all these tasks one day require a convergence of human, technological and financial resources in one permanent agency created by the thirty-five European and American nations?

As a long-term project, I can very well imagine such an agency forming part of a structure for continuous consultation at the level of the continent of Europe – a concept that the former Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Pierre Harmel, has referred to in various circumstances. Is this not, in fact, the real aim of our efforts as a whole? In this connection I cannot resist com-

paring two excerpts from texts that clearly express convergent intentions.

A short time ago, reading your order of business which indicated that I was to speak to your Assembly, I noted Mr. Steiner's report, and particularly the following passage:

"Our common aim is an economically strong Europe in which internal conflicts will be settled in a peaceful and civil manner and resources will be devoted to settling the world's humanitarian problems. Demilitarisation of the East-West conflict is a major prior condition for attaining a new degree of world civilisation in which economic relations and interdependent relationships are creating and must continue to create, increasingly close solidarity so as to circumscribe and avert danger."

I should like to compare Mr. Steiner's text with the political objective of the Atlantic Alliance as described in the Harmel report: "To achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees."

From a recent trip to Hungary I brought back the same message, profoundly felt by all the political leaders in Budapest seeking to create a new concept for Europe: above all, we must avoid recreating a new artificial economic and social division between the countries of the "West" and those of the "East".

So much evidence of convergence on European security and peace!

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, over the years your Assembly has produced an impressive number of studies, debates and recommendations on European security. What is remarkable about your work is that it shows great consistency and great vision, although it is the fruit of debates argued among parliamentarians from different parties, different countries with different traditions and languages but all elected by universal and secret ballot. It is this work, done in complete freedom, like the work of the other European assemblies, that stands today before the people of Central Europe as an example to follow and encourages them to chant, day after day, the words "democracy" and "freedom".

May we all reflect on this success achieved by the Europe you represent, and on the even greater responsibility that will be yours in the future.

As I said a moment ago, Western European Union should have a considerable rôle to play on the road to European security. Referring to Western European Union, I have used the word "spur", and may I now add that your Assembly should also act as a spur within Western European Union.

Mr. Coëme (continued)

Your Assembly plays a major rôle, because it is a unifying force within Europe, a continent which is in very great need of clarification and convergence. In the context of a Europe that is finally finding its identity again, Belgium has for some months occupied the presidency of Western European Union and is determined to work vigorously towards the development of a European awareness in international affairs. In particular, I am certain that your work will make a powerful contribution to the achievement of that objective.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

Would you be prepared to reply to questions from members of our Assembly?

(The Minister indicated his willingness)

I call Mr. Pécriaux.

Mr. PÉCRIAUX (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I should like to thank the Minister, who is Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, for his address, which I would describe as “highly topical”, and, I might add, very optimistic. It is an address which is very much in consonance with the political circumstances we are living through at present.

One sentence struck me in the Minister’s speech, namely “some people like to talk about a defensive alliance”. May I ask him to spell out this idea and tell us how he sees the development of the alliances in the present context?

Another sentence, about Hungary, which the Minister has visited, caught my attention. Could he give us some details about this visit and what results can be expected from it?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COËME (*Minister of Defence of Belgium*) (Translation). – With regard to the evolution of the alliances, I have not heard any discordant voices recently. Everyone clearly thinks in both East and West, and specifically at the Malta summit, that the alliances have a major part to play in the present turbulent situation: there is a determination to preserve stability, i.e., security in the military sphere, whilst keeping control of these elements of change. However, in saying that – and since these alliances must be maintained – I think they should also be able to develop.

It seems obvious, at least as regards our Atlantic Alliance, that it should be able to adapt to changing circumstances, to the emergence of a considerably reduced threat which, unless there is a reversal of the trend, will continue to recede. What I am trying to say is that the pacts will need to be converted and adapted to foster rap-

prochement and co-operation between the two sides of Europe; it would not be right if they were used as a pretext for maintaining the division of Europe.

However, to express my full opinion, I would add that this adjustment of the pacts towards a more defensive posture than at present, with a review of some of the weaponry and strategies, is subject to the fulfilment, as a priority, of two conditions.

Firstly, the process of democratisation, which is vigorously under way in the East, must become an effective reality.

Secondly, we must achieve genuine stability, that is parity, at least at the conventional level. This would be possible only in the wake of an agreement which will probably be concluded next year in Vienna. European security could then be based much more on the establishment of networks of political and military guarantees capable of expansion, or even enlargement to include other partners.

In any event, any adaptation of our NATO alliance should take place with a better awareness of what Europe will represent as regards security matters in future. In other words, at any event as a first phase, the European pillar of NATO must become a reality and we must all work towards its creation.

That is my reply to Mr. Pécriaux’s first question.

The second concerns my trip to Hungary a month ago. I can quickly summarise the aim and outcome of this trip.

The aim is in conformity with the declaration of investiture of the Belgian Government which I represent, namely, as one of the small countries in the Atlantic Alliance, to foster rapprochement with other small countries in the Warsaw Pact.

As I said in my preliminary address, we believe that the establishment of multinational relations would be no hindrance to a dialogue between countries which exists, in any case, between the United States and the Soviet Union. My colleague, Mr. Chevènement went to the Soviet Union a short time ago and laid down the basis for a protocol of understanding. This is what we have done on our side. We think we can contribute to international détente by means of various kinds of efforts. So in Hungary we signed a protocol of understanding which, whilst it may not contain any very concrete elements, at least on paper, does lay the foundations for a structured military dialogue between Hungary and Belgium. In Hungary’s present circumstances, we felt that this was extremely positive, and we intend to continue along these lines.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I should like to thank you, Minister, for your speech and for your full and very up-to-date analysis, as Mr. Péciaux has just said.

I should like to ask you to spell out your thoughts on two matters. You said quite rightly that 1989 would certainly be the year of freedoms regained, at least in Eastern Europe, and, taking your analysis further, you said that Europe must acquire the attributes needed for self-determination; and you pointed out that, so far, the leadership of the western world had really been in the hands of the United States. You thus move towards a choice between two attitudes, stating that for the time being a European defence policy is not on the agenda.

You said there were two options: either to speed up the process of building Europe, which implies adapting an interim defence phase to the political construction; or to develop a European defence dimension, to allow Europe to be opened up to other countries which are on their way to democracy.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium said in his analysis yesterday that we were faced with a choice: did we want to go down a path where, in fact, if Europe did not take on its complete political and military dimensions, we would be moving towards a sort of European condominium controlled by the United States, on the one hand, and the USSR on the other?

Can you tell us, Minister, what your option is in this connection? It is important for us to know, and it would clarify the debate. When he met Mr. Honecker in Berlin Mr. Gorbachev said that when you have a date with history within reach, if you do not grasp it, it may slip through your hands. I think that Europe today is at the crossroads, facing these fundamental choices. What is Europe's strategy in this field?

My second question relates to nuclear deterrence. In your speech you said: "Parity will facilitate the review of the rôle of nuclear weapons on the continent of Europe and in any event will open the way to negotiations on these weapons systems". Over and above the problem of the modernisation of short-range nuclear weapons comes the question of the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe as such.

To some extent, the events taking place in Eastern Europe are perhaps also the result of a rather belated analysis of the consequence of having nuclear weapons and the nuclear deterrent, namely that thanks to nuclear weapons war between the countries possessing them has become impossible. What do you mean by that? Is a nuclear-free Europe conceivable? If you take the other option, what will be the future rôle of the nuclear deterrent, of the American nuclear umbrella in Europe, of French

nuclear weapons, or of a possible European nuclear deterrent based on collaboration between France and Great Britain?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – May I remind you that questions should be kept as short as possible so that all members who wish to question the Minister can do so.

I call the Minister.

Mr. COËME (*Minister of Defence of Belgium*) (Translation). – To comply with the Assembly's wishes, I too shall be brief.

I did indeed say that 1989 would be seen as the year of freedoms. I do not think anyone here doubts this, and it seemed useful to make a comparison with another year, whose bicentenary we have just celebrated.

In reply to Mr. De Decker's first question, the Single European Act, in any event, has finally opened the door – after so many studies, carried out in particular by one of our predecessors, Mr. Tindemans, in the course of the seventies – to political and economic deliberations on European security within the European Community. It is a debate that cannot be avoided for long – and we are avoiding it – which does not worry me too much at the moment, except for the fact that within Western European Union we are constrained to move in this direction because, as stipulated in The Hague platform, it is one of WEU's specific missions. However, I can well believe that this awakening to the need, as Europeans, to take security problems in hand, will quite simply be the consequence of social and economic developments and, in any event, of the help we shall be able to give to Central Europe, which I hope will be effective enough.

Mr. De Decker's second question relates to my position vis-à-vis the problem of the two options I outlined. I think Mr. De Decker has understood me perfectly. The reply was contained in my address. I clearly said which option I preferred.

His third question relates to the nuclear deterrent. I simply referred to this issue because for a good many months, at least from November of last year up to May this year, the time of the summit, it was the most delicate problem within NATO. The question has been provisionally settled by the Atlantic Alliance summit. We are waiting for 1992, but the issue will come up again and will continue to develop as the meetings of the NATO defence planning group continue. We must therefore bear it in mind, but so far this question has been examined principally in the light of the remarkable disparity in conventional weapons between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. It goes without saying that one day parity will produce a different result, though at present I cannot go so far as to draw political conclusions along the lines indicated by Mr. De Decker.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – May I congratulate you, Minister, on your remarkable speech which, though concise, was highly pertinent. It would certainly justify a longer debate than our agenda permits.

I entirely agree with you about the rôle that you foresee for WEU in the present situation and, above all, in the efforts to reshape institutions, in particular those of the Atlantic community. With regard to the European objectives that we are all pursuing, I should like to say, in the words of our guiding spirit Jean Monnet, after all the setbacks of the past, nothing is as useful as institutions. Disregarding all the pacts, agreements, or political networks that you have mentioned and which are available to us, in the present state of affairs, and to use your own words, so long as there is no political union at the defence level, Western European Union will remain as an institution. Therefore, we must work as a team with the Community. We will remain the spur – your own presence here, Minister, is thanks to the spur of the Assembly – and I hope that at the same time we shall be the secular arm of European public opinion in building our defence in readiness for its integration, at the appropriate time, into the community of European union and into the framework of a renewed Atlantic Alliance.

That said, and let there be no misunderstanding with the European Community, with which we must advance in harmony, at the same speed, towards the same objectives, although no doubt with different means – as a union of states on the one hand, and a Community on the other – do you not think, Minister, that the Community should now accept the candidature of Austria to secure the opening towards the East which you so powerfully evoked?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COËME (*Minister of Defence of Belgium*) (Translation). – I thank Mr. Caro for his remarks about my speech.

The question he has raised is an extremely delicate one, and a matter of great topicality. But the situation fluctuates so much and we are working in institutions of such variable geometry that we must take every opportunity, in every assembly to advance the European idea.

The issue of Austria's accession to the Community has now been overtaken by events. It was a burning issue in the spring. I am convinced that what has happened in many countries in the East will mean that this issue will come back in a completely different guise and will involve, not just one neutral country, but a whole series of other countries. It is a huge

question, which should be the subject of a major debate which you will certainly be able to hold.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Jessel.

Mr. JESSEL (*United Kingdom*). – The Defence Minister has given a most interesting and original address, and I enjoyed listening to it very much. You, Mr. President, asked for short questions, so I shall ask the Minister only whether he will confirm definitely and clearly to this Assembly, in his capacity as Belgium's Minister of Defence, that he puts the idea of defence first and the idea of Europe second.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COËME (*Minister of Defence of Belgium*) (Translation). – Perhaps I fail to see the implications of your question. Personally, I make no distinction. Of course things can be seen differently according to the chronology of events, but my convictions are European. Europe must take shape. It must take shape politically, step by step, economically, monetarily and socially; and I think one day it will need to be equipped with a defence dimension. I am not concerned with which of these aspects should come first. Europe is certainly a concept and security is a means. The concept must one day have the means.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eicher, the last speaker on the list.

Mr. EICHER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I have listened to your speech, Minister, with close attention. On two occasions you touched upon a subject without going into any detail, hence my question: what is your view on the possibility, which is frequently mentioned, but always denied, of the withdrawal – albeit partial – of American troops from Europe?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. COËME (*Minister of Defence of Belgium*) (Translation). – I have to give my reply in two stages.

As regards President Bush's proposal in May at the Atlantic Alliance summit, we have not yet been able in NATO to assess its consequences. We think that they will be minimal, but so far the allies have been unable to agree on whether they should compensate for, or reduce in the same ratio as has been indicated, the very partial withdrawal of United States troops. This may now go a stage further because, according to rumours from Washington, troop withdrawals are contemplated in the coming years, in the light of the burden-sharing problem which, we cannot repeat too often, concerns not only Europe but perhaps principally the Pacific and South East Asia.

Mr. Coëme (continued)

But to return to Europe, last week at the meeting of the Defence Planning Committee we heard an address on this subject by our colleague Dick Cheney who, whilst perhaps not providing us with all the clarifications we expected, nevertheless made it clear that if there were to be a greater withdrawal in future, it would in any event be only partial and would take place in consultation with member countries of the alliance, because it was clear that United States troops would remain as long as the Europeans wanted them to. This was confirmed by President Bush at the Malta summit.

If there were to be a move in this direction – and it is a big “if” – it goes without saying that it would have serious effects on the presence of troops from other countries at present stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. But all this should be seen in the context of détente and disarmament. If in the future there were to be a second Vienna agreement with, as already forecast, withdrawals of about 30% to 50%, this of course would allow us to see the problem in quite a different way from the way we can see it at present.

There must of course be consultation on this issue. One can only see it happening in the medium or long term, but it would give Europe a remarkable opportunity because it would then really be faced with the duty of giving priority to guaranteeing the security of the citizens of Europe. If Europe has to face its responsibilities, in the long term, and under the conditions I have outlined, I have to admit that this would not displease me, as a European.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We have now come to the end of this interesting discussion and I should like to thank you, Minister.

I should also like to thank you for the excellent relations between our Assembly and the chairmanship-in-office of the Council, which your country holds until the middle of next year. Finally, I should like to thank you for your presence here and look forward to seeing you again.

4. Establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe

(Resumed debate and vote on the draft order of the Political Committee, Doc. 1212 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe and vote on the draft order of the Political Committee, Document 1212 and amendment.

I call Mr. Ward.

Mr. WARD (*United Kingdom*). – It seems not long ago that the world was hailing the photograph of the then President Reagan and President Gorbachev standing together in Red Square, Moscow. Many of us never thought that we should live to see that happen. However, things are moving, as we have been reminded by speaker after speaker, at a rapid rate, and it seems right that we should discuss this emergency motion today.

I hope, Mr. President, that on behalf of the whole Assembly, you will issue a statement today saying that we have discussed those matters, to show that we are at least aware of the urgency of what is taking place throughout Europe.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg referred to the stability that NATO and the Warsaw Pact have provided – a form of stability based on the promise of mutual destruction if either side should overstep the mark. We now have a much more difficult task of building stability based on mutual respect and co-operation, and it is during that interim period of obvious instability that the world will be a much more dangerous place.

As many of my colleagues have said, I believe that in disarmament we should make haste slowly. We should not dismantle the defences that have largely brought about the position where East and West can agree that the possession of excessive quantities of armaments is counterproductive.

We should not drop our guard. The path of multilateral disarmament, which has already contributed to the exciting events in Europe, must remain the policy of the western alliance.

Recently I had the opportunity to discuss with some of our Polish friends what they require from the West. One thing that they made clear is that time is not on their side. While they need help on all matters technical and matters of production, and can be seen to produce the material goods, they are also seeking help from the western democracies in introducing a democratic system, which they have not experienced for more than fifty years. They emphasised to us that, if they are to succeed, they must travel at their own pace and we must react to their requests and not try to impose what we think they should do.

Last Saturday I attended a meeting with Lech Walesa in London. That great man said that there is a contribution to be made by everybody, in politics and in material things. Journalists and many others can help the march towards democracy in the East. It is for each one of us to decide what form our help can take.

As well as discussing increasingly with colleagues elsewhere how we can advance the cause of peace, we in WEU might also look at the

Mr. Ward (continued)

reports that our colleagues Mr. Caro and Mr. Atkinson will present during this session. There are some good ideas in them of how we in WEU could react to the rapidly changing situation, not least, in their call for better communication between the Council and the Assembly at this time.

I look forward to an extraordinary session in which we in WEU can demonstrate once more that, until the EEC has a wider defence rôle, it is WEU that will provide the forum for such discussions.

In conclusion, events over the past few months have shown that, ultimately, humanity will triumph. One cannot for all time repress freedom and people's natural desire to control their own affairs. There is a lesson for Eastern Europe, for the western alliance and for the world. Let us express from this forum the hope that that lesson and that message will be heard in China as well as in Europe.

(Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I was very happy to support the draft order tabled by Mr. Ahrens since the recent events in the East European countries – and especially in Berlin and the German Democratic Republic – constitute a truly peaceful revolution without precedent in Europe's recent history.

Those who, like us, have fought for years to ensure that the principles of democracy, the values of freedom and the rights of man win through in the communist world can only be delighted at the swift and inspiring triumph of those ideals – a triumph that must surely be followed by the self-determination of the peoples of the countries concerned in line with the principles agreed in the Helsinki final act. This self-determination must be based not only on the assertion of human rights and the values of freedom and democracy but also on a political and institutional model in accordance with those principles.

The free movement of ideas, information and human beings can only further the process and will give the peoples of Eastern Europe – too long separated from and ignorant of the realities of the West – the opportunity for practical contact with the standard of living and spirit of freedom prevailing in our democracies, as a model to be followed in place of those offered by "real" socialism.

What rôle should Europe play to sustain this intricate and difficult process? First and

foremost, it must uphold Atlantic solidarity with its American allies whose presence in Europe remains essential to the successful outcome of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and in other ways, a fact recently acknowledged even by Mr. Gorbachev himself.

Secondly, we feel we need to accelerate the pace of European unification, which ought increasingly to act as a pole of attraction and point of reference for the political, economic and co-operative forces in Eastern Europe including the Soviet Union. If the present process of change in Eastern Europe continues at the sustained pace it has so far attained, the same celerity will have to be shown in the European community in overcoming the opposition and difficulties which are holding up the final definitive steps towards unification.

I am convinced that the problems of East Germany are not the exclusive province of the Federal Republic and the superpowers but concern the whole of Europe considered here as one political unit in the fields of security and economic and international policy. The times through which we are living should stimulate our initiative and creative ability so that Europe does not forfeit its essential rôle with regard to the other countries of the East which the cold war and Europe's division into political blocs has prevented it from playing over the last forty years.

We therefore support the proposal in the draft order for an extraordinary session or conference in 1990 which will enable WEU as the prime European repository of responsibility for security and defence policies to contribute effectively to the planning of a new order of peace, security and co-operation in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – In spite of the rhetoric about the revivification of WEU, and despite the welcome enlargement of WEU to comprise nine members, the organisation will die on its feet if it does not rise to the challenge that confronts it today. For thirty-five years we defended the status quo in Europe, a framework which encompassed the division of our continent. It was a reassuring framework, but it was morally flawed. It owed nothing to the free will of the people of Central and Eastern Europe and everything to the imposition by the force of the Soviet army of a system which was totally alien to the history and culture of the essentially free-spirited nations of Central and Eastern Europe. We now have to transform ourselves into a motor for change and an originator of new and exciting ideas to enable a continued momentum for change in Eastern Europe within acceptable bounds and within a prudent framework.

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

In short, our central mission should be a grand strategy based on three elements. First, we need a political element to put firmly the newly democratising countries of Central and Eastern Europe within our common European heritage and home – that is the rôle of the Council of Europe. Secondly, we need an economic element to affiliate more closely and to assist more accurately the newly emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe – the rôle of the European Community. Last but not least, we need to create a European security framework to take us through the period of transition away from the period of the blocs and a divided Europe into a Europe of common heritage and home. As the two systems converge, our security should become greater and arms control will be not a panacea but the system whereby those changes in the social system become a means of establishing security at a lower level of force.

We shall need to reduce United States and Soviet forces to 275 000 each side and then perhaps to halve that. Then one can envisage there being none at all on either side. The greatest challenge of all will come after that when we no longer rely on United States troops on the ground nor will the other side rely on Soviet troops on the ground to keep in place a social system that is alien in Eastern and Central Europe. As for defence, there will be a premium on manoeuvre and reinforcement instead of in-place forces – on flexibility, firepower and reserves.

It is a supreme challenge for us all, and, when it is brought about, the new security system should be more soundly based because its heart will no longer be the division of our continent and the competition between two social systems but the creation of a more harmonious Europe. We have a vital part to play in that. Let us rise to the challenge, do our work and show that WEU is not moribund but an active force for change, and above all for enduring peace in our continent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Francese.

Mrs. FRANCESE (*Italy*) (Translation). – Madam President, I support the draft order we are discussing because, as all the previous speakers have said, in the events of every hour and every day in the countries of Eastern Europe we are witnesses to a historic upheaval of extraordinary magnitude. In a few years time I believe that we shall all be able to tell our children in their history lessons “I was there...”.

Driven forward by peaceful and determined popular movements, that part of the world is at last changing. Those who, like us, have for years

past been condemning the régimes in those countries and societies and hoping and striving for democracy to prevail as a universal principle can now only rejoice. But the free and democratic choice of government and economic system they are to live under belongs to the peoples of the East European countries themselves.

Our rôle is to discuss the outlook opened up for Europe as a whole in terms of peace and security.

It also has to be said that events are happening at a pace outstripping our wildest imagination. That is why it is important that we should be ready with our response to the changes taking place by the hour, and it is in this context that WEU can play a significant rôle.

Clearly, as the defence function of the two blocs declines, WEU can increasingly become a centre for the construction of peace and security in Europe.

I therefore believe that WEU must make its contribution to the construction of a united Europe by acting as the kingpin of a policy of co-operation in both the defence and the economic spheres. A first opportunity is the changeover of industry from armaments to civil activities which will yield benefits not only to the countries of the East but also to all the others in Europe. At all events, everything is changing, and perhaps WEU, the European Community, the military blocs and the national states are all changing too.

We therefore have to be prepared: as individuals, as parties and as institutions. We have to throw off our old convictions and ideologies. In all the media, and in academic and political circles, the thinking is that this is the age when convictions and ideologies are becoming a thing of the past. I believe that my generation, the post-war generation, and a fortiori previous generations can now for the first time believe that peace without arms is really possible.

It has been said that this is a revolution: not just a political, economic and institutional revolution but a revolution of common sense. Some argue that it is not realistic suddenly to think of an unarmed peace. Last week in Rome President Gorbachev received a warm welcome from all, adults and children alike and I asked myself how he could be so popular even with the general public, and I found an answer. Perhaps it is because he does extraordinary things but with extreme realism. And so perhaps we may say that WEU too could dare to do bolder things – with great realism.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Luuk.

Mrs. LUUK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Madam President, ladies and

Mrs. Luuk (continued)

gentlemen, the dramatic developments in Eastern Europe and especially in the German Democratic Republic have created a situation in which politicians are forced to run along behind historic developments which have encompassed in a matter of days achievements that once took years. We have often talked about these developments and prospects, hoping that they would happen, and yet we are not sufficiently prepared for them.

The debate so far has also shown that we must proceed with caution in order not to jeopardise anything that has happened to date. It is undoubtedly inconceivable – as a previous speaker said – that the German Democratic Republic might one day be seen as part of NATO. No, we must take it upon ourselves to work on our joint security together with our European neighbours and with other goals in mind. But we must not hesitate to offer our unconditional assistance and co-operation to the countries of Eastern Europe, particularly in the economic sphere.

I should like to make a special reference to the situation that has developed in the German Democratic Republic, because I have witnessed it at very close range. It is really moving to see how people have shed their fears. This freedom from fear allows them to speak their minds freely, to get organised and to deal with their former leaders. I feel Mr. Gorbachev's popularity, not only in the German Democratic Republic and as we have just heard, in Italy, but everywhere is partly due to the fact that Soviet troops, which are also stationed in the German Democratic Republic, of course, can no longer be deployed to suppress freedom movements, and people know this. In other words, there is, thank God, no more fear in the German Democratic Republic, the people have at last shaken off the feeling of fear and patronage, they speak freely, express opinions, organise themselves and are able to take to the streets without coming up against tanks. That is the essential change that Mr. Gorbachev's new thinking has brought to European politics, and the main reason for our gratitude.

We must also appreciate that Germans in the two parts of the country are particularly united in their joy at being able to meet again. The feeling of emergence is arousing emotions in both Germanys. What all Germans have in common is their delight that this has come about.

I am one of the Berlin representatives in the Bundestag and used to be a member of the Berlin parliament. I have children in Berlin. I live less than a kilometre from the Berlin wall. I was in Berlin on 9th November and witnessed what went on in the streets. My own children

did not stay at home, they too were dancing in the streets, climbing on the wall and, when the night was over, bringing home exhausted visitors from the other part of the city who did not know where to sleep. Neither I nor any other Berliners or Germans at the moment can be expected to remain detached from these events. Although politicians must always try to take a detached view, I admit I have been unable to do so in this case. On 14th August 1961, when the wall was built, I was standing in the Postdamer Platz with my fellow students, unable to understand what was happening. Standing beside me was a friend from East Berlin who had been to the cinema and was on her way back to East Berlin. She now had to make a decision: shall I stay here or go back? All these feelings well up again, not only in me of course, but in everyone in Berlin.

But what impressed me most was that it was not only people of my own age, and with my memories, or relatives, friends and acquaintances, but also people who, like my children, were born after the wall was built who rejoiced, hugged each other, laughed and cried, along with people who were born and grew up in the German Democratic Republic after the wall was built. This desire to belong together, to see oneself in a new rôle – that is what I cannot forget, and it is this that has made a political impact and must be taken into account in our future policies.

Berlin is growing together more quickly than one would have believed possible. I do not just mean the sports clubs, which are already playing each other, nor just that East Berlin children have been enrolled at special schools in West Berlin, but also the long overdue co-operation on environmental protection. It was a joke that the smog alarm used to be sounded in one part of the city but not in the other, because quite different limits applied there. And underground trains that used to run straight through the eastern part of the city now stop there again to let people on and off.

In West Berlin we have an infrastructure designed for two million people, but recently there have been four million people in West Berlin. We have a great deal to do and must act quickly to enable the city to function as a city of four million people as well, and to enable them to live side by side without the many stresses and problems that still exist.

I am very glad to say that the governing mayor of West Berlin and the mayor of East Berlin yesterday set up something like joint commissions, to discuss everything that concerns the city as a whole. This will also enable the two halves of the city to grow together more quickly.

The people of East Berlin and the German Democratic Republic have been able to come to

Mrs. Luuk (continued)

our part of the city since 9th November. From January of next year people from our part of Berlin and Germany will be able to travel to the German Democratic Republic and East Berlin without being forced to change money at a rate of DM 25 per person per day. Nor shall we have to go through the bureaucratic business of applying for visitors' permits. We shall be able to visit friends or cycle around as we please.

I feel this gives the city of Berlin, which I represent here, the first prospect of a genuine future for both sides. I should like to be involved in a development that helps to ensure the security of the European house. The policy of one step at a time must also be mentioned in this context, because it has kept people together.

In the debate so far, many of our neighbours and allies have discussed the idea of Germany's unification and professed their support for the Germans' right to self-determination and unity. But fears have also arisen as events have moved on since 9th November, and there are doubts about the Germans' loyalty to the treaty. But I feel that both the Ostpolitik and the policy of renouncing the use of force are based on our loyalty to the alliance. The central tenet of this policy remains unchanged: we shall aspire to nothing that our neighbours would not be able to accept. Minister of State Schäfer said as much here two days ago and I should like to emphasise the point.

We know we must not give the German Democratic Republic any advice, because it has launched a revolution by its own efforts and is in the process of establishing a viable state. To us the right to self-determination means waiting to see what the seventeen million inhabitants of the German Democratic Republic decide, not the sixty million people of the Federal Republic. We will not vote them down, we will join with our friends in Europe and the people of the German Democratic Republic in shaping our future progressively and in conjunction with the European processes.

I am grateful for the understanding I have heard here in the statements of the other speakers. As someone who comes from Berlin, I hope that one day we shall overcome all the difficulties that exist, especially in the security and social spheres, and achieve the unity this city so urgently needs in order to be viable. This is, of course, most likely to come with the unification of Germany in a united Europe and in a process involving Europe. I am very grateful for the understanding that I have found in many of the statements made here.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ewing.

Mr. EWING (*United Kingdom*). – It is an honour to follow Mrs. Luuk and to hear the experiences that she has gained at first hand over the past few eventful weeks.

One of the most dangerous things that can happen when people shout for help is that no one listens. I am delighted that the debate is taking place today as a demonstration that the Assembly is listening to the pleas of Eastern European countries. It will continue to listen and to show that we are prepared to discuss with our friends in Eastern Europe what form and shape the future of the new Europe should take.

I am delighted that we are to have a special session in Luxembourg, where we can continue to listen, to discuss and to think with, and not for, our friends in Eastern Europe to bring about the new form and shape that we have been debating today.

Sir Geoffrey, in an admirable introduction this morning, said that only one thing is certain – that nothing is certain. On reflection, he may agree that it is certain that the changes that have now begun cannot, will not and should not be stopped.

The final day of the 1980s will fall three weeks on Sunday. If anyone had told the Assembly at the beginning of the 1980s that in the last week of the 1980s we would be debating the issues that we have been debating today, those of us who are ardent, seasoned politicians would have laughed in their face. We would have been wrong. Changes are taking place and will continue to do so, but as we enter the 1990s no one can guess what route they will take or what turn events will take. As John Wilkinson rightly said, one thing is certain – that we must be prepared to respond, to react and to co-operate to ensure that those changes continue.

Two issues will dominate the 1990s. The first is the continuing pace of change in Eastern Europe. As Keith Speed said, it is in not only our interests but in those of mankind throughout the world that we preserve the position of President Gorbachev. Economically, we must deal with the problem of the non-convertible nature of Eastern European currencies. It is not a mammoth task, but we must do it and, materially, we must fill the shelves of the shops. That may not seem important to those who are used to seeing well-filled shelves in shops, but it is a major issue for a young mother who cannot find the food to feed her children.

The second issue that will dominate the 1990s is the unification of Germany. I use the word "unification" rather than "reunification", because reunification has a connotation about which we should be careful. It conveys the

Mr. Ewing (continued)

impression of the 1938-39 borders, which would have implications for Poland and Czechoslovakia that would not be acceptable to them. When we discuss the future of Germany we should talk not of its reunification but of its unification.

The Federal Republic is arguably the strongest economic and industrial nation in Europe. How much stronger will a united Germany be?

A united Germany would – in economic, industrial, military and political terms – dominate Europe. That is why it is essential that we attract a united Germany into the institutions of our Europe, including Western European Union and the Council of Europe. I never dreamt that I would hear myself say what I am about to say – that we should also endeavour to lock a united Germany into the EEC. Like it or lump it, even those of us who are not enamoured of the EEC must accept that it assumes a greater and more meaningful rôle in the world against the background of recent events.

Some people may say: “But Germany may not become united”. I say in reply that not one of the states that was a signatory to the 1954 convention, the United States, France and Britain, has the power to resist the will of the people, and nor should it. There will be further events in the 1990s, and Western European Union has a useful rôle to play.

I promised that I would conclude with a quote from Scotland’s national poet, Robert Burns, whose anniversary will be celebrated next month. At the time of the French revolution, he wrote about the rights of man:

“All men shall brothers be
And share this earth together to live in
harmony.
Enlightened youth in virtue trained
Shall love each fellow creature
And years to come shall prove the truth
That man is good by nature.
Let us pray that three times three
The age of peace and liberty.”

Peace and liberty are at the doorstep of the 1990s, and it is our responsibility not to slam the door in their face.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Lentz-Cornette.

Mrs. LENTZ-CORNETTE (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, several speakers at this rostrum have already stressed the fact that this session of our Assembly is being held at a particularly important time in our continent’s history, which heightens my pleasure in taking the floor here for the first time.

The news reaching us from the East tells us of striking new developments every day in the structures of the régimes of these countries.

Except in one country, the vast majority of former leaders have had to go. The communist parties which were the pillars of the socialist régimes are in a state of crisis or even bankruptcy. Thousands of people have abandoned a fairly secure existence to go out in search of freedom. Hundreds of thousands of demonstrators have become a customary sight. Politics are being conducted in the streets.

Where and when, one may ask, is this explosion of feeling, this thirst for freedom going to end? At the time when the agenda for our session was being prepared no one could have foreseen these dramatic developments and we must be grateful to Mr. Ahrens – who unfortunately is not here – for having submitted the draft order under discussion.

We should feel genuine satisfaction when we hear what is going on in Eastern Europe, for it surely confirms the justice and strength of western ideas.

There is no doubt that the great changes taking place at present in the east of Europe would never have happened, had it not been for the stable western institutions capable of attracting the public in that part of our continent. There is not a shadow of doubt that the Atlantic Alliance, Western European Union, and the European Community have played a decisive part here.

Surely, what is happening to our eastern neighbours is the realisation of those ideals in the spheres of human rights and fundamental freedoms that the West has striven to propagate in recent years. Since western solidarity has proved itself so clearly, every effort should be made to maintain or even strengthen it. The events in question have created an atmosphere of euphoria on both sides, yet the problems posed by these radical changes in socialist régimes are far from being solved.

The old institutions in these countries are crumbling, to be sure, but the new ones have not yet been established. There are extremely encouraging projects under way in Eastern Europe as regards the application of the principles of Baskets I and III of the Helsinki final act and everything possible should be done to help the people to persevere down this road. There have been concrete results in the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces, to be sure, but there is still a long way to go before complete agreement can be reached.

Our aim should thus be twofold: to help socialist régimes to carry out the necessary structural reforms in accordance with the common principles to which we have subscribed, but at the same time to maintain and intensify the co-operation entered into by western countries in the respective forums, and in particular

Mrs. Lentz-Cornette (continued)

within the Atlantic Alliance, Western European Union and the European Community.

This co-operation has produced excellent results, as we have just witnessed. But, I repeat, the problems are far from being resolved. We must be vigilant, as Mr. Chevènement said yesterday. We must be open and, I would add, also firm about the principles of democracy and human rights.

May I just thank Sir Geoffrey Finsberg for proposing that the extraordinary session of our Assembly should be held next spring in Luxembourg? I thank him on behalf of all Luxembourgers here present.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate Karl Ahrens – an old soldier for democracy – on his part in preparing this Assembly's first response to the wondrous events in the East. I say also how sorry I am that illness has kept him away from this debate, but I hope that he will be better soon. I obviously mean no offence to Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, who stepped so ably into the breach.

We ought to salute at this time those people throughout the communist empire who thought, spoke and wrote about, and kept safe, freedom when the climate was harsh, cold and difficult. Many people, such as Imre Nagy, died. Others, like Dubcek, survived to see joy unrestrained in Wenceslas Square. Some, like Walesa, passed through martial law to power and saw at last the Berlin wall burst open.

I am sure that the changes in the German Democratic Republic affected Karl Ahrens with special poignancy. The same goes for me. Berlin is not a city that I know as well as Frau Luuk but I understood her emotion. I have often visited Berlin since spending a year there as a British soldier from 1958 to 1959. I have good friends in that city and I share in their excitement and happiness. We are glad and we rejoice, but what should we do?

In the short time that I have, I can say only three things. The first is on our military preparedness and the disarmament process. Sir Geoffrey said that we must make haste slowly. I should rather say that we must make haste with prudence but determination, and there is more than a nuance of difference. Instability creates dangers, as Keith Speed rightly said, but the current situation presents opportunities unimagined since the war, and that is where I put my emphasis.

For example, we know that the Vienna talks are going well, so this should not be the time to take up fixed historical positions, for example

light tanks on the NATO side or tactical aircraft on the Warsaw Pact side. Nor should we forget that the Warsaw Pact as conceived no longer exists. Disarmament will take time anyway, but, given that verification and asymmetry are now accepted by the Soviet Union, we should press on as far forward as we can.

Secondly, liberals whether in the United Kingdom or Germany, such as Hans-Dietrich Genscher, support strongly the drive of President Mitterrand and Jacques Delors to accelerate the political and economic union of the European Community. We regret Mrs. Thatcher's position. This week's summit at Strasbourg is profoundly relevant to all that is happening in the East. Those who resist what President Bush the other day called the intensification of integration are profoundly misguided. It must be achieved to provide the essential anchor of stability for all of Europe and, in time, the natural home of the whole German polity.

Finally, the most important matter of all is the position of Mr. Gorbachev himself and of the Soviet Union. I am taking it as read that we shall provide aid to the satellite countries – Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. However, what is the best response in economic terms to Soviet difficulties? That is a most important question. The dangers in the Soviet Union are not primarily those of nationalism, as in the Baltic states, or religion, as in Azerbaijan, although they are significant, but hyper-inflation, famine and potential widespread public disorder. That could wrest the levers of power from the enlightened Mr. Gorbachev and give control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal to some unpredictable demagogue.

It has been calculated that it might cost \$25 billion in each of the next two years simply to stabilise the Soviet economic system. That is a vast sum – it is twice the annual disbursement of the World Bank. However, it should also be compared with the United States' defence budget of \$300 billion, to make no mention of the rest of NATO.

The price of helping Russia to change must be balanced against the cost of defending ourselves against her. We are at a critical time in world affairs. It is a time when I believe that boldness, not timidity, must be our friend.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. De Decker.

Mr. DE DECKER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – I also welcome the initiative taken by Mr. Ahrens in proposing an urgent debate on this draft order. The Minister of Defence of Belgium has just said that 1989 was the "year of freedoms". It is no doubt true, but in addition to being the year of freedoms it is perhaps also the year when history begins again, in the sense that, in a way,

Mr. De Decker (continued)

history stopped after the second world war, except perhaps for 1957, when the European Community was established and prior to that, of course, 1948 with the WEU summit, although the signature of the Brussels Treaty could logically be included in the end of the second world war.

History has in fact begun again because we are witnessing the welcome death of Soviet totalitarianism and the victory of freedom and truth. At the reception given yesterday by the President of the Assembly I asked a Soviet diplomat what had motivated such radical changes in the USSR. He replied that it was because they could not keep on lying.

What we are living through is the end of an era of great lies and the end and failure of communism on the economic level. Moreover, it is clear that in this respect the attractiveness of the economic power of the Common Market and its economic success have played a decisive part.

Another great victory by our countries has been to achieve the third basket of the Helsinki agreement, the introduction of human rights, and to see the winds of respect for these rights blowing from West to East in all the years that have gone by.

Lastly, it is also a victory for the security and defence policy of the Atlantic Alliance and, it must be acknowledged – let us be modest – thanks to the participation of the United States.

As for the arms race, it was Mr. Reagan, in particular, who made the USSR realise that it could never win and that it was time to put away the weapons and begin on strictly political discussions.

However, one should never forget that the Soviet Union is a superpower and that whatever changes may occur in that country it is, and will remain, a superpower, with superpower strategy. It seems quite clear to me that everything that is, and has been, happening in Eastern Europe is certainly a victory for the peoples; but it has also been willed or accepted by the Soviet leaders otherwise these events would not have taken place. They have accepted these events because in some degree they coincided with the interests of the Soviet superpower. We should therefore remain cautious.

We must remain cautious firstly on the military level, although we must, of course, commit ourselves firmly to a process of disarmament and a balance of forces at the lowest possible level.

But we must also remain cautious at the political level by maintaining our alliance and actively pursuing the policy of that Atlantic

Alliance. This also means that we should waste no time in strengthening Europe, not set a date on the process of political integration but make security policy an integral part of Europe's overall policy.

Mr. Delors has put forward several solutions to meet the present situation. He has launched the idea of concentric circles. WEU could be the most intense, the hardest, the firmest, the surest of these circles within the construction of Europe. We should follow this path and therefore strengthen our structures and activities. It is through this strengthening of Europe based on the framework of the alliances, that we can and should best respond to the call from Eastern Europe.

After listening to Mrs. Luuk's very moving speech, I wonder if we could not go a step beyond Sir Geoffrey Finsberg's welcome proposal to hold an extraordinary session of our Assembly in Luxembourg by proposing that we hold it in Berlin.

I do not know whether such a proposal has already been made. In any case, I think it is worth considering along with the proposal for a meeting in Luxembourg. You are aware of all the friendship I feel towards your country, Mr. President: but looking beyond my friendship and fraternal feelings, as a Belgian, for the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, in the present circumstances the Presidential Committee should also seriously examine my proposal to hold this extraordinary session of the Assembly at the place where freedom is victorious and the lies have ended – Berlin, where on 9th November the wall came tumbling down.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I shall do my best to sum up what has been a helpful and interesting debate. Let me make it clear that my proposal about Luxembourg was made in a personal capacity and nothing is prejudged. One hopes perhaps that the Luxembourg authorities will make generous financial provision. I am sure that Mr. De Decker overlooked the fact that there are problems that might make WEU meetings in Berlin impossible on this occasion, but that does not mean it cannot be considered in future.

Mr. Niegel regretted that a report was not ready for discussion at this meeting, but I think that that was for the best because whatever had been written in the report would have been outdated by the time we came to discuss it. He talked about the reunification of Germany. I am sure that we all accept that the Germany of today is a wholly different place from the Germany of 1933-45. It is essential that that is

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

looked at in terms of timing and stage by stage, so that we find the best possible way forward. An incautious proposal could well jeopardise very much more.

Mr. Speed reinforced my view that caution was needed, and I can say now that his amendment will be wholly acceptable.

Mr. Lord made the point that we need to reassess the rôle of WEU in these changed circumstances. He made several propositions, not all of which would command total support. Nonetheless they should be examined.

Sir Dudley Smith gave a graphic description of his recent visit to Berlin and pointed to the phenomenon of Mr. Gorbachev, contrasting Mr. Gorbachev's popularity externally with that internally. Frequently world statesmen are much less popular in their own country than they are abroad. In answer to Sir Russell Johnston, perhaps that explains why Mrs. Thatcher's policies are supported by 60% of the British electorate although they do not command Mr. Delors's support.

Mr. Eicher was absolutely right to stress the Helsinki third basket. It is almost certain that without the Helsinki third basket much of what is now developing would never have happened. That allowed for the examination of human rights and started the ball rolling. Mr. Eicher spoke about the political and ideological problems in eastern Central Europe and said that he was not sure whether the communist system had been rejected. It is interesting that many of those in the forefront of the demonstrations are students and young professionals – people who have been indoctrinated for a decade or more, yet clearly do not want communism.

Mr. Baumel made the vital point that, whatever we do, we need to prepare the ground well. I agree that a badly prepared session or colloquy would do much more harm than good.

Mr. Ward said that we need a statement covering this debate. That is extremely important and I hope that the President will accept the wish and will of the Assembly that he issue a statement along those lines. Otherwise we shall have had a debate with little or no publicity. It is most important that we make a good, clear statement for the world's press to see.

Mr. Stegagnini said that we need to retain American interest and support, otherwise the Americans may become uneasy. We have to find the right way to keep them in step with us because, as President Bush said, they are part of the entire movement.

Mr. Wilkinson called for the Assembly to bring itself up to the 1990s. That is absolutely right, but it will require full liaison with the Council and some adaptation of some of the Council's work so that progress is not hamstrung by the eternal need for some very low-placed bureaucrats – way below deputy ambassadors – to achieve unanimity. In some cases those bureaucrats are scared of agreeing anything without referring it up six layers, and that frequently causes the delays that we have all mentioned. I know that ministers are trying to overcome that – I am sure with the help of ambassadors. Some change is needed.

Signora Francese rightly told us that each nation should choose its own economic policy, but within a framework of pluralist democracy.

I can understand the deep emotion expressed by Frau Luuk about Berlin. I can close my eyes and imagine what a Frenchman would have thought had a wall been built across Place de la Concorde, or what an Englishman would have thought had a wall been built across Piccadilly Circus. I have visited Berlin many times, and I can imagine the joy when that hated symbol came down. Certainly we all rejoice with Frau Luuk. She was right to say that one of the great advantages of what is happening is that fear is being removed from many nations in eastern Central Europe. If we are to be courteous to those nations, it is important that we do not talk of Eastern Europe. People there are unhappy that we ignore the geographical fact that it is eastern Central Europe. We should bear that in mind.

Mr. Ewing pointed out that the future could be hopeful and that we have to be in the forefront of change. He quoted the national poet of Scotland and for one moment I thought that he would say that as we left the room each one of us would have a portion of haggis. That is a treat that not everyone has enjoyed. However, it was a very moving speech, which contributed to the feelings of the Assembly throughout the debate.

Madame Lentz-Cornette said that our institution had been a mirror for East and Central Europe, and we have to ensure that that image turns it into acceptable reality so that we do not disappoint people in East and Central Europe.

I accept Sir Russell Johnston's reinterpretation of "festina lente", and I am perfectly happy to talk about prudence. There is nothing between us on that. I dealt earlier with his other remarks.

This has been a very valuable debate. It is very much like a serial. On all our television channels we have serials, soap operas and serious classical stories, which run and run. This issue will run and run for the foreseeable future. Today we have had only episode one.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

I hope that we can persuade the Political Committee – I shall do my best – to propose to the Presidential Committee that this sort of current affairs debate should become a regular feature of our twice-yearly assemblies. We have done that successfully at the Council of Europe, and if we had not found a mechanism to do it on this occasion we should have been accused, rightly, of failing to understand history. I wish to ensure that we do not even have the chance of failing in the future, so that proposition will come forward in due course.

I commend the order to the Assembly, and it will help us to save a lot of time if I say that I am happy to accept Mr. Speed's amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now proceed to the vote on the draft order contained in Document 1212.

I have been informed of Amendment 1 tabled by Mr. Speed and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, which reads as follows:

1. In paragraph 2 of the draft order, before "peaceful" insert "just,".

Do the proposers of the amendment wish to speak?...

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-Chairman of the committee and Rapporteur, has already given the committee's opinion.

I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to unanimously.

We shall now proceed to vote on the amended draft order.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The amended draft order is agreed to unanimously¹.

5. Force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) – reply to the annual report of the Council

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1204 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee on force comparisons (NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential) – reply to the annual report of the Council, and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1204 and amendment.

I call Mr. Steiner, Rapporteur of the Defence Committee.

Mr. STEINER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I am pleased to be able to submit to the Assembly today a report on NATO and Warsaw Pact military potential and the pertinent draft recommendation on behalf of the Defence Committee. I found it very interesting to draw up the report at a time of radical change in East-West relations.

We have all witnessed an upheaval in the German Democratic Republic and throughout Europe, which none of us foresaw or could foresee happening on this scale. The positively breathtaking pace of reform in Eastern Europe will have fresh and – I am convinced – favourable implications for the continued development of East-West relations. And this is a good thing because East-West relations are still the key to efforts to achieve worldwide security and stability. But security and stability in this context must not be confined to the military sphere, as often appears to be the case in the public debate. I feel that security and stability must be seen as part of an overall policy, because human rights and other important social themes are of primary importance here. It is here that things are on the move. A careful assessment must therefore be made of the implications for security and stability of the developments in the German Democratic Republic and the other Warsaw Pact countries.

On the one hand, there are major opportunities, particularly with respect to disarmament, which I feel must be seized without delay. On the other hand, we need to respond with joint aid to the increasingly obvious economic and social problems facing the people in these countries. From the previous debate it is clear that we are all prepared to grant aid as far as we are able.

As regards disarmament, it is surely agreed that on the basis of an initiative by the

1. See page 36.

Mr. Steiner (continued)

American President, the NATO summit meeting in Brussels at the end of May provided an impulse of outstanding quality, that gave a new and crucial boost to the CFE negotiations in Vienna. The decisions taken by NATO in Brussels have led to further significant proposals from both delegations to the negotiations, and as things stand, it is possible to say that next year we shall have a first agreement on the reduction of personnel and weapons in the conventional sphere.

I wanted to go on assimilating a development that is extremely interesting for my report and the assessment of the data it contains for as long as possible so as to be able to present an up-to-date account to the Assembly. Given the rapid pace of events, I would not claim that I have entirely succeeded, but I have made a very serious effort. I will take this opportunity to thank those who have helped and advised me in my endeavours to compile an up-to-date and complete report. I am particularly grateful to Mr. Cameron, who did an excellent job of organising the necessary interviews so that they were all very successful.

Ladies and gentlemen, topical data obtained from reliable sources lead me to conclude in my report that disparities exist, and are likely to do so for some time to come, in the conventional and nuclear spheres between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. If the negotiations in Vienna produce the result we all expect and want next year, the disparities in conventional weapons systems and troop strengths will be largely – and verifiably – eliminated.

A cautious assessment of this process leads to the following conclusion: this first agreement will substantially reduce the Soviet Union's present conventional military potential and so further improve European security. The Soviet Union will no longer be in a position to pose a massive threat to Western Europe with conventional forces or to dominate the Warsaw Pact as it has in the past. The CFE agreement will also multiply and reinforce the political effects of current developments in Eastern Europe, which will help to improve co-operation within the framework of the CSCE. The aim in the next stages of the CFE negotiations must be to reduce the conventional potential of both alliances to an even lower level, because this will further constrain the attack options and, in conjunction with an optimised defensive structure of armed forces, the degree of military threat will progressively decrease.

We note with satisfaction that a seminar is to be held in Vienna early next year for senior officers and high-ranking scientists from both alliances, with the aim of adjusting military doc-

trines and tactics to the changed situation and new political objectives of both sides. I see this as a fascinating prospect, if the inertia of the military can be overcome and the military textbooks adjusted in the near future. I believe it would have been on the whole more logical to embark on a disarmament process via a change in military doctrines. As we all know, circumstances and the distrust prevalent on both sides for many years have unfortunately not allowed this to happen. Now we are sitting back to front, on a horse that is, thank God, going in the right direction. If this enables us to adjust the military doctrines to the results or even the objectives of the negotiations, we should be satisfied.

Although the outcome of the NATO summit found general approval in the West, the situation in the nuclear sphere is still a cause for concern. As we all know, the NATO summit meeting in May produced, after some considerable wrangling, an agreement to postpone the decision on the modernisation of short-range missiles and to try to arrange negotiations on a reduction in short-range missiles, but without a zero option. But there is no saying when it will be possible to begin these negotiations.

The CFE negotiations in Vienna and the implementation of the first agreement they produce have a key rôle to play, because the United States, in consultation with all its NATO partners, is prepared to enter into negotiations on a partial reduction of short-range nuclear weapons only when a start has been made on the implementation of such an agreement.

Although the wording of the declaration issued after the NATO summit takes account of German interests, it indicates that an early start on negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons will not be possible. The advocates of early negotiations on these weapons systems insist that a global concept is virtually out of the question unless the nuclear component is taken into account.

They go on to say: if we wait until the first results produced by the CFE negotiations are being implemented, a great deal of time will be lost, because we reckon this will take a year or two, or not more than five. They also take the view that there is no longer any justification for waiting so long and that the massive concentration of nuclear artillery or short-range nuclear weapons in Central Europe can no longer be ascribed to the need for deterrence. This, they say, is particularly true of the Soviet Union, which, according to the available figures, has a superiority for which there is absolutely no justification.

The compromise formula adopted in Brussels also means, in fact, that Mr. Gorbachev's offer of concrete negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons is being evaded. The advocates of these

Mr. Steiner (continued)

negotiations refer to the Soviet General Secretary's speech before the Council of Europe in July of this year, when he said, on the question of short-range nuclear weapons:

"If it becomes clear that NATO countries are ready to join us in negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons, we could, naturally, after consulting our allies, carry out without delay further unilateral reductions in tactical nuclear missiles in Europe."

That is what Mr. Gorbachev said to the Council of Europe on 7th July 1989. Many of us attended this sitting and heard the speech.

According to responsible advocates of negotiations, Mr. Gorbachev's offer should be used with a view to ending the Warsaw Pact's current massive superiority in short-range nuclear weapons as soon as possible.

But at present reservations about negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons carry more weight. The alliance therefore believes that, to achieve the still valid goal of preventing war by means of deterrence, a suitable and effective combination of nuclear and conventional weapons will be needed for the foreseeable future.

Short-range nuclear weapons fall into this category. The alliance argues that land-based short-range weapons must therefore be retained if the NATO strategy of flexible response is to be effective. Reference is also made to examples in history which have shown that conventional weapons have never deterred an assailant, whereas nuclear weapons have succeeded in maintaining peace in Europe for almost forty-five years. From this it is also inferred that a combination of conventional and nuclear weapons will still be needed when conventional forces are balanced at a relatively low level. To relinquish nuclear weapons would conflict with the goal of making war impossible.

I do not claim to be able to settle the difference of opinion on the correct assessment of the situation by putting forward new proposals. But I am convinced that one of the weaknesses of this endless debate is that excessive fears are accompanied by a lack of clear concepts. I feel an objective analysis might be of some assistance, might help to fill the gaps that exist.

In my report I have therefore made the proposal which I gladly reiterate, that this subject should be considered in depth in a separate report, with a view to finding specific and plausible answers to the relevant questions, for the benefit of our future work. I do not believe we will make any more progress down the stony, thorny path to greater security and stability if both alliances constantly claim to be willing in

principle to reduce the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and yet, for various, hardly comprehensible reasons, raise the hurdles of conditions to be satisfied before negotiations may begin so high as to make them insurmountable.

I refer once again to the massive concentration, described in my report, of nuclear artillery and short-range nuclear missiles in Central Europe, which can no longer be ascribed to the need for deterrence. This is particularly true of the Soviet Union, which, as I have already said, has considerable superiority in this sphere, according to the figures available to us. Actually I feel superiority is a mild word, given the real situation.

To conclude, I should like to say a few words about European security. We want to strengthen the European pillar, but we also know that we Europeans must co-ordinate our joint security efforts better than we have done in the past. That was the main point made by the Belgian Minister of Defence in his address to us this afternoon. But this can only be done within the overall context of NATO – still NATO, for the time being – and, therefore, in agreement with our transatlantic allies. The Soviet Union, too, explicitly accepts the United States' co-responsibility and its presence in Europe on behalf of European security. President Gorbachev explicitly confirmed this in his speech to the Council of Europe.

The aim now must be to pool western European security interests and to introduce them into the dialogue on general strategy, which will certainly be no easy task.

My recommendations, which will be put to the vote today and which I recommend you to adopt, are intended to strengthen our joint efforts to achieve close political and military co-operation and the basic concept of common security.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – I begin by welcoming Mr. Steiner and congratulating him on an admirable report. It serves as an excellent starting point of reference in the ongoing debate, and it clearly demonstrates the current imbalance, which is being addressed in the CFE talks and in other proposals. Certainly I support Mr. Steiner's recommendations.

I want to pick up on Mr. Steiner's closing comments on remarks made both by the Belgian and the French Defence Ministers, and to examine briefly how we should be shaping our future defence in the light of current force comparisons.

Mr. Speed (continued)

Clearly, there are to be changes in the forces and doctrines of the Western European Union countries over the months and years ahead. No doubt our respective defence ministers are all considering at this minute what those changes might or might not be. Apart from the disarmament talks, we must consider the changes in Eastern Europe that we debated earlier this afternoon, as well as the financial pressures on our countries' respective budgets, which force upon us a re-examination of our doctrines.

Whatever happens, the world will continue to be a dangerous place. Even if the détente and rapprochement that we are seeking in Europe come about – and I believe that they will – many other problems will face us in the years ahead. Some may emanate from the third world. I call in aid as an example the Gulf war, in which WEU was engaged in the provision of defensive measures vital to the freedom of commerce and of navigation – not only for Europe but for Japan, the United States and many other countries.

The Assembly does not need me to remind it of the constant threat of terrorism under which we all live. That is certainly true of my own country, the Federal Republic of Germany in recent days, Spain and France. No country in the world is immune from terrorism, be it on an individual or small-scale basis, or be it sponsored on a large scale by a particular state.

I agree with the view expressed by Mr. Steiner this afternoon, and which Mr. Chevènement spelt out clearly yesterday, that for the foreseeable future there will be a place for nuclear weapons – albeit at a level that is only just sufficient. One cannot uninvent nuclear weapons. One cannot kill all the scientists who have the knowledge to make those weapons. One would have to kill all the sixth formers and undergraduates in many of our schools and universities who are studying science, such is the comparatively unsophisticated level now of the technology involved in manufacturing nuclear weapons.

I would not wish to see the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, retaining nuclear weapons and Brazil, Pakistan, India, South Africa and the Argentine either in possession of nuclear weapons or with a nuclear capacity, and no European power sharing the same capability. For the foreseeable future, France and the United Kingdom should retain their nuclear weapons at a level that is just sufficient. Within the framework of WEU, there is room for joint development of new tactical nuclear weapons where they are required. When I put that idea to Mr. Chevènement yesterday, he did not throw it out. If anything, he encouraged it.

As the troop cutbacks are made in Central Europe, and as increasingly the forces of the United States, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and the BAOR are withdrawn from Germany, and as the Soviet and other Eastern European forces are withdrawn from East Germany, we shall see our land forces in WEU develop in a way that is different from the comparatively static form of defence that has traditionally been NATO's response across the central plains of Germany. The key words will be flexibility, mobility and reserves. I am particularly attracted by the French concept, already in existence and well advanced, of the force *d'action rapide*. If the CFE talks are as successful as we hope, the number of tanks available both to the NATO and to the Warsaw Pact powers will be substantially reduced. I believe that our forces must make increasing use of battlefield helicopters and transport helicopters to provide flexibility and mobility.

It would be extremely useful if we in WEU and in Europe could make up our minds precisely what helicopters we need, and then get on with producing them. At present, within our respective countries, governments and armed forces, there is a great deal of muddle and misunderstanding. Unless we get our acts together, helicopters that are vital to the future of our defence forces will come from the United States, not Europe – which would be a great pity.

I do not of course totally dismiss a requirement for armour or artillery, because that would be stupid. However, the whole thrust must be for much more mobility along the lines that the French have already acknowledged. Coupled with that, I see a need for a growing maritime strategy. WEU countries including the United Kingdom, France, Netherlands and Italy, have the expertise and the capability to develop a maritime strategy, and we have within Europe worldwide interests and responsibilities. Like it or not, we have territorial interests in various parts of the world, not least, as a great trading bloc, in seeing that the sea lines of communication are kept open and are not closed by powers that would seek to cut off our supplies of essential raw materials, be they oil, ore or timber, or our essential escorts in the Pacific rim, to Australasia, South America, or whatever other part of the world it may be.

I have already mentioned the stranglehold that the Gulf war could have imposed upon Europe if we had not, through WEU, sent out our own mine countermeasures force to ensure that that important international navigation way was kept clear. Therefore, I hope that in the future we might increasingly work more positively in WEU along those lines. We should aim at more flexibility and mobility, with our land-based forces working together and we should also work together on a maritime basis.

Mr. Speed (continued)

We have heard from defence ministers and the Secretary-General that a dormant command structure has now been set up under WEU, following the lessons learnt from the Gulf war. Looking to the future, and following Mr. Steiner's excellent report, I wonder whether it is stretching the imagination too far to think that we might firm up on that and set up a proper command, communication, control and intelligence structure, under the auspices of WEU, to incorporate not least the verification, monitoring and satellites that are mentioned in the report, so that Europe plays its full part in the exciting developments that lie ahead over the next decade.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the report presented is excellent and is in my view timely and relevant to the current debate. After the attention which we have paid today to developments in Berlin and the German Democratic Republic, and in the knowledge – as the International Herald Tribune wrote yesterday – of the importance of the political, economic and social process of moves towards democratisation, we now have a report containing sober figures on destructive potential. Who could have known that the explosive force of a Lance missile is equivalent to several times that of the Hiroshima bomb! And in Central Europe we have deployed thousands of nuclear warheads.

This report is very precise on the facts and sets out the essential principles relevant to the security considerations which we have to work out. Its recommendations to the Council are motivated by the practical purpose of urging a change in the priorities of the alliance, as agreed in June 1987 in Reykjavik.

I also wish to make emphatic reference to a point which, though it is not included in the draft recommendation, has been very clearly stressed once more by Mr. Steiner in his report, that is to say the demand for the elimination of battlefield weapons. Nuclear battlefield weapons, which have a range of up to 32 km, are a threat to the population concerned. Anybody considering nuclear weapons primarily as political arms would have to deploy them at a relatively early stage, not at the point at which it is necessary to consider whether the conventional forces are so weak that a nuclear response is required. It also follows that these weapons would even have to be used against one's own civilian population. I must state quite clearly that this is not a military scenario which I could visualise. In my view neither my own people nor

other Europeans can, as a matter of principle, be expected to call this a possible response.

The closest attention should be paid to the proposal made by the French Prime Minister on 7th September 1989, according to which a special programme providing for immediate collaboration in the field of verification and disarmament should be introduced for WEU. I refer here specifically to a reconnaissance satellite for verification and disarmament control, together with the necessary ground organisation for processing the mass of incoming data. Unfiltered analytical data would enable us to establish realistic early warning times in case – and I emphasise, “in case” – the present phase of détente should change again – which I sincerely hope it will not.

In conclusion, Mr. Coëme, the Minister of Defence of Belgium, today praised Mr. Steiner's report and quoted a number of passages as showing the way forward. I support this view, and hope that this report will make a major contribution to détente and to ensuring peace in the world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – This is a most interesting, extremely relevant and informative report. I congratulate Mr. Steiner, the Rapporteur.

In the previous debate we heard several comments of real significance about the pace and challenge of change within the political climate and character of Eastern Europe. That change means that the report, valuable though it is, must be seen as part of what may be a necessary pattern of continuing analysis and assessment. The quality of the report is such that I should be happy if Mr. Steiner undertook the responsibility to act as rapporteur on those future occasions.

It is significant that, in the draft recommendation, the words “verified”, “verifiable” and “verification” appear about half a dozen times, but in much of the report itself the word or the approach is implicit. It is verification so that there shall be the maintenance and assurance of material and national security that is important. That could be an important part of the future rôle of this organisation, if it is to continue to be meaningful. I trust that it will.

I agree with the view that was expressed in the previous debate that we need stability in structure within Europe. That structural stability will continue to be necessary as a means of providing the essential organisation in the achievement of balanced arms reduction. I believe that NATO and the Warsaw Pact need each other at this stage.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

The need for a stable structure should not mean that, in order to avoid risk or imbalance, we accept an inadequate rate of progress in the achievement of balanced and verifiable force reduction. Agreement on reduction should continue at a brisk pace which is now attainable and which, to some extent, has been attained in recent months. I should add that I entirely accept the essential point made in the report that we must insist and accept that progress shall be on a step-by-step basis. The only point that I would make is that I hope that not too great a time elapses between each step.

Yesterday I asked the French Defence Minister about chemical weapons. He may not have fully appreciated the point I was making which needs to be repeated now. There is not adequate urgency in Geneva on the international approach to chemical weapons. It may be that by now there are nearly thirty countries with chemical weapons capability. It would help to provide a real assurance of long-term co-operation and balance if there were more positive accord between East and West in securing not merely the discarding of chemical weapons by European powers, but an acceptance that diplomatic initiative and effort should be undertaken jointly by eastern and western powers to achieve the international agreement that is required. I particularly commend paragraphs 1 (b) and 7 in the draft recommendation, which are useful in projecting that argument.

I compliment the Rapporteur on paragraphs 7 and 8, on CFE. The hopes embodied in those parts of the draft recommendation need to be achieved so that we can then pursue the necessary negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons. The CFE process should be approached with the determination to maintain an adequate balance in security, and the necessary progress if the negotiations on short-range weapons are to proceed without excessive delay.

Finally, the report is an essential and relevant contribution to the debate. It provides the pointer to the future of the Assembly, but in view of the pace of historic change, we shall need a similar opportunity, or a series of similar opportunities, to maintain the necessary assessment if security and stability are to be achieved. I congratulate Mr. Steiner on his report and I hope that it will be carried as it stands when the Assembly comes to take a decision.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Steiner, the Rapporteur.

Mr. STEINER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should first like to thank the three speakers for their kind remarks about my report.

Mr. Speed has rightly indicated that there are co-ordination problems in Western European Union in some areas. Helicopters are quoted as an example. That is a subject which we shall certainly have to deal with and keep a close watch on in our further consultations.

The naval forces he referred to were not covered by my report as they have already been considered at length in another report. I do think, however, that the present situation is such as to justify a follow-up report on this subject.

Mr. Klejdzinski raised the elimination of nuclear battlefield weapons as a subject for debate – in my opinion very rightly. I said in my own report that we should definitely concern ourselves with this subject and its future implications. The matter needs to be followed up, and a comprehensive disarmament scheme not covering this area is simply inconceivable. I am sure the committee will shortly give instructions for the preparation of a report which may well answer the questions on which there are still differences of view: what strategic and political functions on behalf of Western European defence are performed by the United States, French and British nuclear weapons? What are their essential and non-essential functions? What nuclear weapons are needed to perform these functions? Is it conceivable, desirable and politically feasible to dispense completely with land-based systems on the territory of foreign states? All these are questions which recur in this connection. I believe that these are really important issues and that we shall shortly have to address this subject.

Mr. Hardy is also right to be concerned that the intervals between the disarmament stages should not be too long, as this would lose a great deal of time which we could more sensibly use for other activities.

In the field of chemical weapons we should at least endeavour to use the new initiative stemming from President Bush's United Nations speech to make a joint statement that we are behind this initiative. We should do this, notwithstanding the efforts now perceptibly being made by the two superpowers to get rid of a large proportion of these weapons – there is talk of about 98% – if success could be achieved in arriving at a worldwide prohibition.

We are admittedly all aware of the problems associated with a worldwide prohibition, as the necessary ratification procedure would take up a great deal of time. Hence my suggestion that we should at least try to arrive at a total renunciations

Mr. Steiner (continued)

ation and prohibition of chemical weapons in the area in which we can exert an influence.

Mr. President, perhaps it would be appropriate for me to refer briefly to a proposed amendment at this point. I have had a look at this proposal, which was handed to me today, and do not consider the suggested amendment to be drastic. It merely asks for a limitation which I did not embody in my draft recommendation. This limitation is that the recommendation should relate only to the two superpowers. When I was formulating the draft recommendation I was consciously thinking of the WEU member states as well, and endeavoured to arrive at a general formula. There is no obligation to adhere to this formulation if there are sound overriding reasons for not sticking to the recommendation as it stands. I do think, however, that there should be at least some moral pressure behind the recommendation, requiring that it be taken into account in the light of present developments.

I should be pleased if the original wording of the recommendation could be confirmed, though, should the amendment be accepted, I would not be prepared to relinquish the whole passage. However, I ask you to agree to the original wording.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – We have had a short but interesting debate. The Defence Committee approves unanimously of the report by Mr. Steiner, who put a great deal of effort and work into preparing it. It draws attention to a number of relevant and topical issues. It is a very timely report that tackles the vital task of force comparison and it will be a very good base for the future work of the committee and the Assembly.

Several of those who have spoken in the debate emphasised stability, which is an extremely important issue. In its perambulations in the past few months, the Defence Committee has been privileged to see some of the work that is currently taking place, and it is most impressive. In regard to the progress in the conventional arms talks, we were in Vienna and can report that so far the talks have been extremely good. The atmosphere is cordial and workmanlike. We observed that for ourselves just before the wall came tumbling down and great changes occurred in other parts of Eastern Europe. We were amazed by what was happening then and we do not cease to be amazed by what has occurred since. It has been a very good precursor for talks with ambassadors from some of the eastern and central countries. They were extremely frank and helpful in their comments to us.

Mr. Steiner's suggestion of a special report on nuclear weapons has serious merit and should be considered by our committee in due course. Perhaps that can be arranged.

Mr. Speed was right to say that the reduction in defence spending is very much in the minds of all our countries. But, as others have said in previous debates, we must make haste slowly. It is one thing to talk about force comparisons and spending but, as Mr. Steiner's report recognises, force comparisons must be used carefully. For instance, it is hard to make sensible comparisons between levels of military expenditure because the true level of Soviet expenditure is difficult to determine, not least because of the non-convertibility of the currency. It is more important to consider the capability that can be produced by the money spent. We shall have to assess those points more closely as the months, if not the years, go by.

Mr. Speed was right to emphasise terrorism. As a politician, I believe that terrorism could become a greater threat to the maintenance of a free and open society than the nuclear war that we were always promised but which did not take place. We allowed terrorism to spread, and it could wholly undermine our very civilisation. It is important to bear that in mind in the future operations of organisations for defence and freedom such as WEU.

Mr. Klejdzinski talked about the importance of reconnaissance and arms reduction moves. Mr. Hardy said, rightly, that verification will be an important part of the future remit of WEU. I support his point about chemical weapons. We must make better progress towards scrapping all chemical weapons.

This is a useful report. It may not be glamorous, but it contains material that is vital for the future. We congratulate the Rapporteur on his hard work and thank the Defence Committee for the support that he has received. We also thank the Assembly in anticipation of its passing the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now proceed to the vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1204.

I have been informed of Amendment 1 to this draft recommendation tabled by Mr. De Decker and Mr. Noerens, which reads as follows:

1. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, insert "by the two superpowers".

I call Mr. De Decker or Mr. Noerens to support this amendment?

Does anyone wish to support the amendment?...

The amendment is not moved.

The President (continued)

I now put the draft recommendation contained in Document 1204 to the vote.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

6. Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom)

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Doc. 1207)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee on the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom), Document 1207.

I call Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Right from the start I wish to assure my colleagues in the Assembly and the alliance of which we are members that I am not about to recommend that we give away our defence secrets. Nor do I suggest that we should dismantle the means by which we have, for forty years, sought to protect our advances in technology that have resulted in the superiority in defence which has ensured peace and is contributing to the end of the cold war. My committee would not have adopted the report unanimously if that were the case.

The report asks that WEU should accept a number of realities in the light of current events which have immediate consequences for the Cocom rules that control the trade in our technologies. It suggests that the basis of those rules – the state of Soviet technology – needs to be reassessed. It suggests that the enforcement of those rules, in the light of performance, needs to be critically examined. It further suggests that the opportunities for trade in technology between East and West should be discussed more openly than before in a forum that already exists – the CSCE – while still accepting that both sides have secrets to protect in the interests of their own security.

As my report reminds us, the previous occasion on which WEU commented on Cocom was six years ago, when it adopted my report on economic relations with the Soviet Union. That debate took place against a background very different from that of today. The alliance had recently experienced one of its most serious disagreements over the use of trade as a weapon of diplomacy. The United States of America was applying sanctions against those of its partners who supplied technologies for the construction of the Siberian pipeline. Among its recommendations, the report called for better consultation among the allies. In its response the Council of Ministers said that the WEU member states considered that their security interests were best served by stable economic and political relations with the Soviet Union which “must remain consistent with broad allied concerns”, which included “avoiding contributing to Soviet military capabilities”.

The recommendations before us today seek to keep within those bounds. The second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation confirms the need to protect our advanced western defence technology through Cocom until arms control and reduction, confidence-building and enhanced security over a reasonable period justify that need being reviewed. Moreover, as the preamble goes on to suggest, it must also be relevant to remind ourselves that Cocom's existing rules and controls have not prevented a serious transfer of technology to the Soviet bloc at the expense of our own security. The list of Cocom violations reads like a horror story.

Illegal exports of American precision ball-bearing grinding machines now enable the Soviet Union to manufacture more accurate guidance systems for missiles trained on western targets. Western technology which manufactures drill bits for the Soviet oil industry enables the Soviets to produce new armour-piercing projectiles.

Our western oceanographic technology enables the Soviet Union to locate our submarines with greater accuracy. Probably the most publicised violation was the illegal sale of lathes and numerically controlled machine tools to the Soviet Union, for which Toshiba paid a considerable price by being outlawed from United States markets.

The theft from last year's Farnborough air show of the technology behind the Agile Eye helmet, which allows fighter pilots to aim missiles at targets simply by looking at them, should remind us that there is no let-up. What the Soviet Union cannot obtain by fair means, it will seek to obtain by espionage, subterfuge and outright theft.

It is understood that the foreign intelligence section of the KGB and the GRU Soviet mil-

1. See page 37.

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

itary intelligence remains as strong and committed as ever in engaging its officers on missions of scientific and technological espionage, which is why, for as long as the Soviet Union undertakes such operations, it must always expect its spies to be expelled when they are found out. It cannot have it both ways – glasnost and espionage.

I appreciate that that may sound like outdated cold war rhetoric to some, but it is vitally important that we in WEU remind ourselves of those facts, which is why I am urging on the Assembly, in my third recommendation, controls and enforcement procedures that are more effective, more efficient, common to all Cocom member states and transparent and predictable, as, clearly, they have not been in the past.

In view of that, why are we calling for a review of Cocom rules, with a view to relaxation and liberalisation? It is because there is evidence, which is borne out by the widespread research that I have undertaken in preparing this report – I pay tribute to the secretary, Mr. De Gou, for his untiring work and to those with whom I had discussions, as listed in my report – that the Cocom rules are being inappropriately applied because our assessment of the state of Soviet technology does not stand up to analysis. For example, as will be seen in paragraph 51 of the report, it was understood that the Soviets were well ahead in ground-based laser technology that would knock out satellites and incoming missiles, but when American congressmen visited the facility at Sary Shagan it was concluded that America's own technology, which was being developed at White Sands, was further advanced and greatly superior, and that the Pentagon had presented a "worst case" assessment to boost SDI and to enhance Cocom.

That is not the only example. Last month, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee accused the United States Government of defence statements that are "outdated at best and absolutely false at worst".

To the United States of America's credit, on its initiative, Cocom members have recently established security and technology meetings – STEM – to assess the state of technology for East and West, but, as I point out in paragraph 59, those assessments are not being reported to Cocom but are being left to national governments to interpret for themselves. Nor have they said much about the state of Soviet technology.

The result is that we are being restricted unnecessarily in responding to President Gorbachev's appeal for help and for western technology to make perestroika succeed, which we all agree is in our interests. It is preventing

western companies from taking advantage of valuable trade with the Soviet bloc, when other countries, including Ireland and those in the Far East, are not so constrained.

I urge in my principal two recommendations a fundamental reassessment of the current state of Soviet technology and a complete review of the Cocom list in the light of that reassessment.

All of us here no doubt were present when President Gorbachev appealed to the Council of Europe to rescind the Cocom rules, to which our immediate response may have been: "He would say that, wouldn't he!" He has, of course, no intention of sharing all his defence secrets with us, and our Secretary-General told us on Monday that he doubted whether there was much that we could offer that would be of help to him.

However, none of us here would wish to ignore President Gorbachev's appeals, which were repeated again to President Bush at Malta, for western technology to support the restructuring of his economy for the betterment of his people. That need not be a one-way street. Last month, the Soviet Deputy Premier, Dr. Abalkin, said in Brussels in urging more technological co-operation between his country and the European Community: "The Soviet Union has something it can offer, several lines of technology that have not yet been developed in the West. This has become clear since we lifted the lid of secrecy from our defence and space programmes. We want to act as partners on the basis of equality".

I believe that the time is ripe to respond positively to those new Soviet appeals for the sharing of technology to our mutual benefit, and the remaining recommendations of my report suggest how that might be done. Where on-site verification procedures for the transfer of sensitive technologies would be appropriate, which satisfy Cocom member states, let the list be liberalised accordingly. Where an opportunity is already forthcoming for European-wide economic co-operation to be discussed, let it be used unhesitatingly to discuss trade in technology. That opportunity will come as soon as next March in Bonn, with the Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe within the CSCE process. It provides exactly the right forum for trade in technology to be discussed, involving all those Cocom member states and the states it proscribes that belong to Europe, and it is underpinned by the Helsinki principles of security and co-operation, of human rights and confidence-building, which were so recently renewed at Vienna.

Already there is an impressive list of possible collaborative projects building up, most notably in space, which a strict application of Cocom rules would prevent, and from which Europe

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

would be the loser. They range from the technologies of manufacturing and distribution, which could transform the standard of living of the Russian consumer to participation in Eureka projects, to the joint Anglo-American and Soviet project for a supersonic business jet. Is there not scope for America, Britain, France, Germany and the Soviet Union to combine their resources and technology to produce the "space plane", which it is the ambition of each country to build, as a symbolic end to the scandal of costly competition and duplication in space?

Should there remain areas of mutual suspicion and mistrust, based on false assessments of the state of each side's technology I recommend that a committee of experts be established within the CSCE framework to make recommendations on the way forward in the sharing of technologies between East and West, which will clarify the no-go areas for each side and confirm areas for mutual and maximum co-operation, upon which future binding commitments can be entered into with confidence by both sides.

I hope that my report, and these recommendations, will be greeted by the Assembly as responsible, as realistic and as reflecting the mood of the historic times in which we live, and that we are now at last moving forward to a new world in which mankind can share and pool its vast technological achievements for the benefit of all without fear that it is abandoning its security.

I hope that in passing the recommendations tomorrow, we shall be able to carry our ally, the United States, with us. It is essential that we do so, for it produces not all but most of that technological superiority under the protection of which we have enjoyed unparalleled peace. I hope that it will accept that we are not seeking to abandon our secrets, our advantages or our security, but that President Gorbachev's approach, to use President Bush's words just after Malta, "now absolutely mandates new thinking on the part of America".

I have pleasure in presenting the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Lagorce.

Mr. LAGORCE (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, in spite of the relevance of the conclusions reached in Mr. Atkinson's report – on which I congratulate him – there are still so many question marks about the future of Cocom that the matter must be raised here in a few short sentences.

In the long term, how can we preserve the validity of Cocom's initial objective, which was to maintain western technological superiority, in

the light of the unprecedented changes in Eastern Europe, which may well call into question the international order resulting from Yalta and Potsdam?

It is in the framework of this changing international environment that I shall examine in turn the concepts of the western camp and those of technological superiority, before tackling the problems inherent in the way that Cocom operates, before concluding with a fresh vision of the mechanism.

The concept of a western camp can only be justified in relation to a common identification of a threat born out of the existence of another camp, seen as an intractable military and ideological adversary. In Mr. Atkinson's report it is stated that, generally speaking, the threat from the East is seen to be receding daily. Starting from this principle, it is thus necessary to question the future of the two camps.

The recent fundamental changes in the East, and the relative decline of the Soviet and American empires, jeopardise the perpetuation of the political and military alliances which fell within clearly-defined geographical limits. If the system of camps is going to disappear, it is hard to see how Cocom, which was conceived out of the logic of blocs, could in the long term retain its legitimacy and *raison d'être*.

Mr. Atkinson's report stresses the need to intensify East-West technological co-operation, so as to avoid any sudden disintegration of the East, which in turn would threaten western security. This co-operative effort should initially be negotiated and then carried out under the supervision of a Cocom whose method of operation would be revised.

Though the idea looks extremely positive in the immediate future, it is hard to imagine that the Soviet Union, which so far has managed to do without the West in developing highly sophisticated military equipment, would not manage to take advantage of an increase in the transfers of dual-purpose technologies essential to its modernisation, in order to achieve parity with the most advanced western technologies, or even overtake them.

So it is the initial purpose of Cocom that will be directly compromised in the long term.

If we envisage a situation of increased interdependence between the countries of East and West it is difficult to imagine that Cocom, already handicapped by its well-known operating problems, will be able to supervise a system of technological exchanges rendered increasingly complex by the fact that frontiers between East and West may well become increasingly permeable and today's partners turn into tomorrow's economic competitors.

Mr. Lagorce (continued)

A new concept of Cocom is therefore needed: it is still an essential control instrument in this transitional phase. Its psychological dimension is also very important, inasmuch as it confirms the solidarity of the western partners and their desire to negotiate the problems of technological transfers together, in line with the specific evolution of the general situation in Eastern Europe.

But in the long term, the prospects of conquering new markets and the erosion of an immediate military threat will encourage the western allied powers to engage themselves in ferocious economic competition, thus reducing the effectiveness of Cocom day by day.

In an environment destabilised by the disintegration of common security interests, only an agreement within the framework of the European Community, between its members and with the other western parties, could make Cocom a more effective control instrument.

In conclusion, however, it must be said that Cocom would certainly lose all its effectiveness and *raison d'être* if the countries of Eastern Europe were to be more closely integrated within the EEC. However, although events are moving very quickly indeed, at present we can say that this point has not yet been reached.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Europe is now changing at breathtaking speed. We take great pleasure in observing the process of political, economic and social transformation in the Warsaw Pact states. We cannot, and do not wish to be mere onlookers, but have an obligation to support every step conducive to greater liberalisation and to the upholding of human rights and liberties.

We know – it is an established fact – that political support for the forces favouring democratic reform must be accompanied by economic backup. Technological support is a suitable means of stabilising social reorientation in the area of influence of the Warsaw Pact. Anybody assessing sophisticated Soviet weapons technology can only come to the conclusion that the technological gap between the western alliance and the USSR has been much reduced in recent years.

However, the point also has to be made that the concentration of scientific potential and the means of production to the exclusive advantage of the arms race has created serious deficiencies in the supply of goods to the Soviet civilian population. In certain areas, the states economically

linked to the USSR are still more adversely affected.

In their process of liberalisation, Hungary, Poland and the German Democratic Republic require help from the West. In the final analysis, our help is a contribution to self-help. In making this point I am aware that it is still necessary to protect the relevant technologies – I repeat, the relevant technologies – which ensure and underpin our defence capacity. We are not naïve: words are not enough, they must be followed by deeds. Mutual arms control, reduction of armouries and confidence-building measures are the key words.

That is one side of the coin. The other side is that what is needed for the development of a viable consumer goods industry is not financial assistance but modern mechanical engineering technology. The problem lies in the fact that a range of technologies is both highly important in the civilian context and has potential defence applications.

Rather than express my views on the occasional use of the Cocom list to undermine or even in some cases sabotage the export efforts of European countries, I wish to give my emphatic support to the fundamental reappraisal of the present Cocom lists. The purpose of this review must be to place trade on a broad basis and not merely reassess leading-edge and sunrise technologies with reference to their possible impact on military applications. On the contrary, they must be assessed in terms of technological progress, with a view to their implications for the changing environment, for the natural world and for the living conditions of human beings.

I support Paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation, relating to the introduction of on-site verification procedures as a confidence-building measure, if this overcomes major reservations in the way of a thorough liberalisation of the Cocom list.

However, in all our thoughts on this subject there is one thing that must not happen – we must not allow even the merest hint of it – we must not find one day that we have to accept responsibility for the failure in a number of Warsaw Pact countries of the process of democratisation which we have so greatly welcomed, because we did not make the desired contribution in matters of technology transfer and technological support.

One final remark: independently of the knowledge that a modern process computer prepares traffic management technology for the railway and, if programmed to do so, can supply an evaluation of consequences for a possible mutual arms assessment and hit rate, these are the problems which currently confront us.

I should like to end with this observation, and with the simple plea to those who have great

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

influence on the composition of the Cocom list, that they give genuine consideration to the following questions: what is needed to protect certain process technologies, and what must be released, so that, through trade, we can make a decisive contribution to safeguarding peace?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is adjourned.

**7. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 7th December, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom) (Resumed debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1207 and amendment).

2. Western European security: defence implications of the People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Defence Committee, Document 1203 and amendments).
3. Address by Mr. Vitalone, Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
4. Western European security: defence implications of the People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation (Resumed debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1203 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.)

TWELFTH SITTING

Thursday, 7th December 1989

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom) (*Resumed debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1207 and amendment*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Caccia, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Atkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Stegagnini (*Chairman of the committee*), Mr. Rathbone, Mr. Stegagnini.
4. Western European security: defence implications of the People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation (*Presentation of the report of the Defence Committee, Doc. 1203 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Cox (*Rapporteur*).
5. Address by Mr. Vitalone, Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
Replies by Mr. Vitalone to questions put by: Mr. Tummers, Mr. Stegagnini and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.
6. Western European security: defence implications of the People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation (*Debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1203 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Mr. Fassino, Sir Dudley Smith (*point of order*), Mr. Cox (*Rapporteur*), Sir Dudley Smith (*Chairman of the committee*), Mrs. Luuk, Mr. Cox, Mr. Pontillon, Sir Dudley Smith.
7. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.
Speaker (point of order): Mr. Pontillon.

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom)

(Resumed debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1207 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the resumed debate on the report of the Technological and Aerospace Com-

mittee on the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom) and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1207 and amendment.

I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I am extremely pleased to be the first speaker in the resumption of the debate that started yesterday on the all-important question of Cocom. I start by commending the report both on its detailed analysis and on its breadth of vision. I heartily endorse the recommendation flowing from the conclusion in the last paragraph, number 187, urging negotiations to establish conditions under which certain Cocom export restrictions might be lifted. But even at the risk of confusing further the already somewhat confused operation of Cocom, I question whether Cocom is entirely correctly directed and I shall suggest some new conditions for relaxation of its rules.

My reference point for this is in paragraph 13 of the explanatory memorandum, which talks about the identification of "potential adversaries". Cocom grew up in terms of identifying nations, and some nations remain potential adversaries, but perhaps less and less so. Groups of nations were also identified as potential adversaries, and it may be even more of a problem to identify them now as the groupings break up and pacts are questioned.

1. See page 41.

Mr. Rathbone (continued)

As my colleague, Keith Speed, said in the debate yesterday, there is a growing adversarial threat from groups within nations – in some instances called terrorists and in others called freedom fighters. Unfortunately, sometimes they are encouraged by national governments. In that context, one must mention the Libyan and Syrian Governments. They are sometimes condoned by national governments – recently in China and too frequently in African states. Sometimes they operate illegally, as with the IRA in my country, the Baader-Meinhof, the Mafia, the Basque terrorists and the Narco terrorists in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia.

The Assembly will wish to extend its condolences to the people in Colombia who suffered the tragedy of the Narco terrorist bombing the other day, which was reported in the French newspapers and on French television this morning. The Narco terrorists spread from their base in Latin America throughout the world. Sometimes terrorist groups are an extension of national governments in the form of paramilitary forces or security agencies. In that context, unfortunately, one must mention South Africa, Israel and Panama.

Members of Cocom are far from blameless, and they should control trade in armaments and goods with military applications to such violent groups. The United States supports Israel with specific military aid of \$1.8 billion a year, as well as in countless other ways. Israel exacerbates the problem of flashpoints in the Middle East, of which Lebanon is the most tragic, and exports arms to the so-called security forces in South Africa. Indeed, it is reputed to be South Africa's largest supplier, and co-operates with it on rocket development and, perhaps, in the development of nuclear arms. A missile project is likely, involving technology from Israel's Jericho 2B missile, which is an intermediate-range weapon like those that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to eliminate.

Even with that going on, the United States has co-operative agreements with Israel known as the Arrow programme, which is advanced technology for anti-missile use. As with many of Cocom's controls, it has dual uses and is adaptable for defensive purposes.

Armaments and technical equipment from West European countries get into the hands of terrorist groups in South America, the Middle East and in Europe itself. I have in mind such things as rocketry, surveillance, communications and remote control equipment, and much else besides.

The USSR and Eastern and Central European countries supply terrorist groups in Western

Europe and elsewhere. It would be true to say that the Kalashnikov rifle is synonymous with terrorist weaponry. In addition, Semtex explosive comes from Czechoslovakia.

To pick an example from a far corner of the world, China is a considerable arms manufacturer and for many years has supplied African territories such as Mozambique and Zanzibar. It may now be a supplier to other countries.

In identifying such sub-groups called terrorists or what you will, who pose at least as great an adversarial threat as any nation or group of nations, cognisance of that threat should be part of the thinking and planning of Cocom's future rôle. Perhaps reconsideration of Cocom should cover a spectrum broader than that outlined in paragraph 11 of the explanatory memorandum. Just as some countries in the Soviet bloc or Warsaw Pact may be considered for more relaxed treatment or perhaps de-proscription, should not the list of proscribed countries be expanded to include countries that supply terrorist groups such as those that I have mentioned, particularly Libya?

How can pressure be brought to bear on Cocom countries that do not enforce controls strictly enough to improve their enforcement procedures, particularly with regard to exports to proscribed countries, which in turn are suppliers to terrorist groups elsewhere?

As Cocom countries consider whether it is possible to lift certain restrictions on the export of sensitive materials or technology, should there not be a tightening of internationally-agreed controls on that half of the present industrial list categorised as special cases, which are determined at national discretion, especially insofar as those items are of greater relevance to terrorist organisations than they may be to proscribed organisations? Should not part of the quid pro quo for Cocom relaxation be a requirement for Warsaw Pact countries to sign the Council of Europe's convention against terrorism and the United Nations convention on narcotics control? Terrorism and narcotics are a worldwide threat and the world should be encouraged to face up to it more comprehensively, especially as the threat of international aggression is likely to recede.

Is there not an opportunity for representatives of Cocom countries and the KGB, the GRU or the Soviet and eastern countries' trade and scientific organisations involved in the arms trade to co-operate in the war against terrorism? Paragraph 131 of the report points out that more joint ventures might be encouraged across the Cocom Warsaw Pact divide, but should that not be done in exchange for tighter USSR and eastern bloc controls of military exports to third nations from which terrorists operate, just as we encourage the trend identified in paragraph 142,

Mr. Rathbone (continued)

of removing the wall separating military and civil production, which we wish to encourage in the USSR?

Better relations must be matched by greater mutual co-operation in the international war against terrorist organisations, because terrorism is a threat to every country. To the question posed in the first paragraph of the conclusion – what is the current assessment of what is traditionally called the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies? – should be added the question: what is the threat posed by national and international terrorist organisations?

I believe Cocom has a rôle to play in future in coming to grips with the growth of that new threat. I look forward to moving later this morning the amendment in my name and in the names of Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Pontillon and Mr. Sarti, to draw the attention of the outside world to that growing problem. Our amendment does not imply any criticism of the report – it is just a vitally important extension of it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caccia.

Mr. CACCIA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Atkinson's report described a new rôle for Cocom, an agency we have seen in action for the last forty years. After the statements made in recent days we are now – given the concrete action that is being taken – at the point of taking the first steps towards breaking down the accumulated fears and misgivings stemming from concrete concerns; above all we were influenced by industrial and technological interests. Clearly the road will be long and slow, but the philosophy we need to apply in the use of this instrument will have to change. Up to today, or tomorrow morning in fact, Cocom has been the long arm of defence policy, and there were profound reasons for that. With effect from the day after tomorrow it will become the long arm of the foreign and economic policy of the western nations, and in this rôle it will be of interest not only to the two parties engaged in the new East-West dialogue but increasingly to the nations within the Atlantic Alliance itself. This will mean a change in the philosophy governing the use of the instrument because its influence will no longer be brought to bear on the military challenge but on economic competition.

Moreover we have to remember and reaffirm that technology is an instrument in its own right so that both its use and its trade need to be studied, whereas our strength is not based on technology but on the law of democracy, freedom and pluralism which is our true defence

against an open confrontation between East and West and which has proved it can prevail. Without losing the logic of our defence nor our values, which are now beginning to flower in the East and are our true strength, we must continue along the road of maintaining peace with determination and care. We need to be alert but not closed in on ourselves, motivated not by the fear generated by the way things used to be but by the concern that we might not be equipped to meet tomorrow's challenge, presented by the earnest desire of young people in both the West and the East to live without the menace of war.

It follows that today's document must serve the future and be a first step towards a new attitude. How can we tell our children they cannot have the technology to prevent another Chernobyl or close the breach in the ozone layer? What could we say faced with this style of living? To prepare ourselves we have to think of two lines of action: first how do we devise, initiate and operate controls which will prevent the abuse, in terms of military potential, of technology transfer and at the same time arrange for the careful use and monitoring of technology so as to generate more confidence in our conduct and actions and overcome by political logic the behavior patterns we have built up over forty years of cold war; second, we have to help the peoples of Eastern Europe because, after the dismantling of the iron curtain in a wave of euphoria, we shall have to tell the countries that have opened the door to democracy that the choice of freedom will initially pose problems – arising, for example, from the drive for greater prosperity which the people of these countries increasingly see as the rule in the West. Let us remember that, as in Czechoslovakia, people can carry on, painfully and with difficulty, for twenty years before gaining a little freedom but will not endure more than ten days without food before they rebel. This is the new problem facing the countries of the East and Russia and Mr. Gorbachev and it is in this field that we need to understand the problem very quickly and open the door to trade. This will no doubt be a lengthy process, but we must be prepared to help these countries in their race against time and against all the backward looking and vested interests that the communist system has created in its "nomenclature" and in certain habits of the Marxist bureaucracy. It is a race against time and against the negative forces and opposition to reforms and it is the benefits of economic and social as well as political freedom that will nourish those reforms.

In this respect too Cocom will therefore have to change. We must also be on our guard against the problems implicit in the industrial policy of individual countries. Once the fear generated by the opposing blocs has gone, the financial and industrial interests of individual members may cause the Cocom instrument to be used not for

Mr. Caccia (continued)

military prevention but as a means of selecting and advantaging particular national industries under various kinds of cover to the detriment of the small businesses or nations, thus putting individual interests in the place of greater and more noble aims.

This is the reason why this instrument is small in the context of our overall active strategic policy but large when looked at from the standpoint of the industrial sector, particularly the small and medium firms, and the real interests which exist within our economy. Cocom in its new rôle can be a symbol of our political will to achieve intensified and balanced disarmament down to the lowest possible level. It can be one of the many ways of assigning their true value to defence and the armed forces and a means of causing those who wish to manipulate their population to think again.

Ladies and gentlemen, here we need to make suggestions, not compile lists. That is for others. However, we want the others to hear what we have to say before they decide. We must therefore move quickly without losing touch with reality but having before us a vision of the new path that history, without any forewarning, has now taken.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Russell Johnston.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – I want only to make some brief remarks in warm support of Mr. Atkinson's thoughtful, informed and forward-looking report. Most happily glasnost is now showing two faces – not like Janus, facing in different directions, but side by side, looking the same way. What has happened in the communist world has certainly provoked a real response in the West.

I know that Mr. Atkinson will not be offended – he will probably be very pleased – if I tell the Assembly that in British terms, he is miles away from being a socialist or a trendy lefty. He is not even a soft centrist liberal like me. Rather, he is from the astringent right of the conservative party. Nevertheless, he has produced a most constructive report.

In our debate yesterday morning and afternoon on the establishment of a peaceful and secure order in Europe, many speakers, myself included, remarked that we must reassess the whole gamut of our attitudes towards the East. As many also said, that must be done carefully and in relation to what happens in Vienna, Malta or elsewhere. The report's first two recommendations, which Mr. Atkinson rightly stresses are at its heart, call for "a fundamental reassessment of the current state of Soviet technology" and "a complete review of the Cocom

lists in the light of this reassessment, with a view to encouraging maximum opportunities for trade". That second phrase is central to the issue of helping the countries of the East change from their existing system to a free market system – though that will be very difficult.

I refer also to Mr. Atkinson's speech on space travel, which can be taken in conjunction with recommendation 6, which calls for "the sharing of high-technology between East and West". Certainly co-operation in space travel is symbolic. Many other things need to be done to improve the lot of the citizen in the East, and if Mr. Atkinson's report is accepted and acted upon, they could be achieved. In any event, the report is certainly good, and the liberal position is that it should be supported.

Mr. Rathbone's amendment is also eminently sensible. In our current state of euphoria – and I plead guilty to being euphoric myself – it is timely to remind ourselves that, even if NATO and the Soviet Union became allies, defence would still be necessary. There are other countries in the world, and not only China. Like Mr. Rathbone, I have always been a little puzzled by the Cocom list. I would have thought that Yugoslavia, for example, which is not on the list, represented in the past at least a more dangerous conduit than Albania for feeding high tech to the East. Mr. Rathbone mentioned China's rôle in arms sales specifically, but not China's major rôle in arming both Iran and Iraq for war – in a wholly immoral way – almost equally, and thereby making a major contribution to keeping both countries' war machines going.

Mr. Rathbone's main argument was about terrorism, terrorists and looking for ways of preventing them from getting their hands on high-technology weapons, which they have managed to do successfully in the past. The countries that were known to have helped them were Iran and Iraq again, Syria and Libya. I agree very much with everything that he said. If a vote is required – I hope not – I shall vote for his amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call Mr. Atkinson, Rapporteur of the Technological and Aerospace Committee.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I thank my colleagues who have contributed to the debate, particularly because they all supported my report and what I am seeking in my recommendations.

Yesterday evening Mr. Lagorce found it difficult to justify Cocom in the long term, in the light of current events, but appreciated its continuing existence at present. He was right to say that the Soviet Union will develop its own technology if it cannot obtain what it needs from the West. It will take only a matter of time.

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

Mr. Klejdzinski supported my recommendation for a reassessment of the Cocom list and warned that the democratic process in Eastern Europe should not be allowed to fail for want of support, including technology, from the West.

My colleague, Mr. Rathbone, reminded us this morning that Cocom member states have not been immune from supplying strategic sensitive technologies to third countries other than those that Cocom proscribes, and that have ended up in terrorist hands or in the hands of régimes of which we do not approve. He suggested that we should reconsider the list of countries that Cocom proscribes, perhaps lift the restrictions from emerging Eastern European countries such as Poland and Hungary, which are fast becoming democratic and becoming our friends, and perhaps consider proscribing countries known to be involved in supporting international terrorism, such as Syria, Libya and Iran. He is shortly to propose his amendment calling for Cocom's brief to be widened to encourage worldwide co-operation in controlling the supply of technology to terrorist groups.

Mr. Caccia called for a new attitude towards Cocom, arguing that it should be used not as a negative instrument of a cold war, but as a positive catalyst towards encouraging economic co-operation with the emerging democracies. Finally, my colleague, Sir Russell Johnston, accurately interpreted my personal politics as not being trendy left, or soggy centre, but sensible right. He emphasised my point that today there is so much potential for East and West to come together to share their technologies – not just in space – for the betterment of mankind, avoiding costly duplication and competition in so doing and without putting national security at risk.

The principal point of my report is that we should now adopt a new attitude towards that instrument of the past – Cocom – which has served us so well for forty years in contributing to peace in Europe. We are not seeking to dismantle the controls that protect our security, but they can be used to advantage in the sharing of technology for the betterment of all Europe. I hope that my report, with its recommendations, will receive unanimous support from the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the report on Cocom which our committee has today presented to the WEU Assembly is extremely timely, and I wish at this juncture to thank the Rapporteur, Mr. Atkinson, for the comprehensive nature of his work and for his unstinting efforts to provide us with

up-to-date information. I would remind you that Mr. Atkinson even went to the Soviet Union for a personal consultation with that country's authorities, partly in response to the wishes expressed by Mr. Gorbachev himself. I say timely not only because WEU has never concerned itself with Cocom's activities before within the framework of a specific report and has confined its interest in its problems and activities within the context of other matters considered by this Assembly, but also because it is highly relevant at this time to the debate on the new relations between the West and the Soviet bloc.

In my view this report should be considered against the backdrop of the reduced degree of political and military confrontation between East and West and could well mark a significant advance in political and, more particularly, economic co-operation, especially with the Soviet Union.

Just recently, and this includes President Gorbachev's visit to Italy and the Malta summit, requests have been voiced for a change of heart in the West towards the transfer of modern technologies to the USSR as the western countries' contribution to Mr. Gorbachev's perestroika.

The conclusions of Mr. Atkinson's report also go to meet the requests of western industries, which need increased exports to the East European countries in order to generate the resources necessary to undertake new programmes and activities. It should be remembered here that, whereas in the USSR design, research and development are solely the province of government bodies and laboratories, in the West they are largely the concern of mainly private sector high-tech companies and industries.

What is needed, therefore, is a considerable pruning of the list of restricted products and technologies. It should be confined to those that are truly of strategic significance guaranteeing western supremacy. Obsolete products or even highly advanced products which are now "mature" technologies in the western world should be deleted.

The additional point must be made here that, as the application of the Cocom embargoes is left to the legislation and regulations of the individual member states and there is therefore no unified control, the result is that, as has already happened in the recent past, breaches by individual countries are now possible.

If on the other hand the schedule were limited to a number of genuinely strategic products or sectors, this would facilitate effective control and uniform treatment by the bodies responsible for applying the Cocom regulations in the member states.

Mr. Stegagnini (continued)

Turning now to the problem of the changeover of the Soviet arms industry to civil activities – referred to by a number of speakers – which has been announced by Mr. Gorbachev and will receive closer study and discussion by our committee in the near future, I believe that the West could assist the process by adopting a less rigid attitude towards technology transfer than in the past. For one thing, it is inconceivable that, in the course of its conversion to civil activities, the USSR would be prepared to lower the technological level achieved by the defence industry.

I also believe that a more open policy in the area of technology transfer would weaken the Soviet argument in the Vienna negotiations on the balance of military forces and capabilities to the effect that quantitative superiority is needed in conventional weapons to offset the technology gap and the ability of the NATO countries to equip themselves quickly with sophisticated armaments.

Our committee, while restating the rôle and importance of Cocom as a means of safeguarding the West's technological lead as an essential guarantee of our industrial capacity in strategic sectors, is also endeavouring to define those adjustments which, as the East-West political situation evolves, will help to end the cold war and further the transition to economic, and perhaps even political, co-operation.

We can also imagine in the near future the formulation of new agreements and regulations in the West, subject to Cocom co-ordination, for a unified attitude towards technology transfer to the East European countries. This would, in the future, make the updating of agreed restrictions possible and at the same time enable criteria to be adopted so that updates of the list of products subject to the restrictions can be introduced more quickly.

Mr. President, on behalf of the committee I would like to thank all the speakers and the Rapporteur, and I hope that the report will be approved by a large majority.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now proceed to the vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1207.

Amendment 1 has been tabled by Mr. Rathbone and others. It reads:

1. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert “and for worldwide co-operation in controlling the supply of munitions and of industrial goods with military applications to terrorist groups”.

I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – I seek briefly to move an oral amendment to my amendment as there has been some difficulty in achieving clarity between the English and French texts. I propose that the word “controlling” should be replaced by “preventing”, and in the French text instead of the word “maîtrisant” to substitute “empêchant”. That strengthens and clarifies the amendment.

I moved the amendment for the reasons I outlined in my short speech and to place responsibility for prevention squarely on the shoulders of governments, who should ensure that their exports go only to the destinations that are allowed. Administrative and financial difficulties should not interfere with that responsibility because internal and external security are the prime task of government.

I am grateful for the support voiced by many speakers in the debate. I am grateful to my co-signatories for supporting the amendment and I hope that the Assembly will endorse it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – This correction is acceptable because it is purely a drafting change. That would not have been the case had it been a change of substance. The amendment was tabled within the time-limit. There are precedents for this, so I see no reason not to accept it.

Does anybody wish to speak against the amendment?...

That is not the case.

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, that is acceptable to the committee, including the drafting amendment proposed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The amendment to the amendment is agreed to.

I now put Amendment 1 as amended to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

Amendment 1, as amended, is agreed to.

We shall now proceed to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(*A vote was then taken by show of hands*)

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously*¹.

1. See page 42.

**4. Western European security:
defence implications of the People's Republic
of China's evolving geopolitical situation**

*(Presentation of the report of the Defence Committee,
Doc. 1203 and amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Defence Committee on Western European security: defence implications of the People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation, Document 1203 and amendments.

I call Mr. Cox, Rapporteur of the Defence Committee.

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – It is my pleasure to present the report on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. However, I do so with some sadness. The committee arrived in Beijing on 11th May when the student protests had started. As we travelled around China, in Beijing and Shanghai and other cities, we saw those young people. We spoke to them and heard about their hopes for their country and for the people of China. While we were there, there was hope that the authorities would listen and respond to the views that were expressed by those people. But we know what happened. Those of us who visited China often wonder what happened to many of those young men and women whom we met. That is why for many of us here today there is a degree of sadness.

I thank the authorities in China and their embassies in Europe for their help and advice before and during our stay in China. We were the guests of the Chinese Government, but I should point out that each delegation paid all its expenses involved in travelling to China and all our air fares, hotels and travelling expenses within the country.

The report begins by expressing our thanks to the many people we met during our visit. Ours was not the first visit that members of WEU had made to China. Those of us who had been to China before had seen the major change that had taken place over the years – certainly in economic development – and the standard of living of the Chinese people, which had started to improve. But while economic changes had been made, sadly they did not extend to political change. Without doubt that was the cause of the events that took place in China in May and June this year.

As many of us are aware, some Chinese politicians had attempted to introduce reforms. Sadly, those attempts were opposed. Although we saw economic change, modernisation and an opening of the country to outside economic pressures and influences, the Chinese culture has no democratic tradition. We believed that a

democratic system of government would come along with the economic changes, albeit slowly.

The lack of progress on such a major issue undoubtedly led to the actions of the students in Tiananmen Square. Those young men and women showed no indication that their actions were anti-communist, but they were certainly anti the lack of dialogue and any change being introduced by the Chinese authorities. The events in Tiananmen Square and later throughout China will lead, and have no doubt already led, to major changes in military policy and in the People's Liberation Army. China's defence budget had been decreasing, and there had been manpower reductions in the services. Tiananmen Square and the other events will lead to the reorganisation of the People's Liberation Army to support the authority of the communist party.

During our visit we were told about the four modernisations to which the Chinese authorities attach priority: agriculture, industry, science and technology, and the military, which had the lowest priority. The military modernisation was to be based on renovation of the old system, rationalisation, reorganisation and raising the general level of morale in the services. As members will see – no doubt they have all read the report with interest – all those points have been outlined by the committee.

One can pay tribute to the efforts of China on arms control and disarmament. Once such policies were denounced and played no part in the rôle that China saw for itself. Now there is support for the Geneva disarmament conference and for banning and destroying all chemical weapons. Although so far it has been only verbal support, it is welcome because it shows a great deal of new thinking by the Chinese authorities. We hope sincerely that China will participate with the superpowers in arms control and disarmament, certainly as regards its nuclear weapons capability. That is why we seek a dialogue with the Chinese authorities.

Mr. Gorbachev visited China at the same time as our delegation. That was a sign of the reconciliation between the two countries. All members will be aware of the long history of differences between the Soviet Union and China, which at times caused deep worries about a possible conflict. The improvements should be welcomed by all countries and we want them to continue. Another international issue in which we look for progress is China's relationship with the United States of America. Until the events of Tiananmen Square, that relationship was improving, and all members will share the committee's hope that it will recommence quickly.

The report comments on the Chinese arms trade. It was, and perhaps still is, the fifth largest

Mr. Cox (continued)

arms exporter. Low production costs in China have been a great help to the Chinese in selling their arms abroad. Many of those exports go to third world countries. Many members must question that policy in view of the economic background of many of the countries to which the arms are sold. Indeed, China was supplying both sides in the bloody conflict between Iran and Iraq.

From what we saw and the discussions that we had in China, there was no evidence of China seeking, through military power or territorial expansion, to extend its pressures or powers outside China. But the report criticises some areas of Chinese involvement.

I have covered several aspects of the report in this presentation, and before I come to our recommendations I must say that as we prepared to visit China we had no idea of the brutal crushing of the student protests that would take place. Since then we have seen the changes in Eastern Europe – thankfully without such bloodshed. If only the Chinese Government could have listened to the calls for change in their country.

The committee discussed its recommendations in great detail, and various points of view were expressed. Amendments were moved and accepted, and the recommendations have its unanimous support. We have sought to make a balanced judgment on China and its future based on what we saw and heard and on the events before the crushing of the student protest. But the events of early this year, which were condemned throughout the world, cannot be allowed to pass without the severest criticism in this debate.

Despite world condemnation of what happened, it would appear that the rights of men and women are still attacked in China today. A press report in *The Independent* of 16th November, headed “Protesters to be tried for ‘treason’”, states: “More than forty leaders of Peking’s student-led democracy movement that was crushed by the People’s Liberation Army in June are to go on trial for counter-revolutionary crimes, China’s most serious political charge, Chinese sources said yesterday.”

In our report and in my speech this morning, we have tried to outline our respect and praise for the Chinese Government in contributing to peaceful international relations.

We support the development of interests between Europe and China, such as arms control and economic development, but, as I say in the report, during our visit members of the Assembly and all who watched on television saw the brutal crushing of the expression for change and the demand for the opportunity to be heard.

I am sure that we all express our views for or against our governments or the parties to which we belong, but we must condemn that oppression. As the report points out, we must express deep concern about issues such as the independence of Cambodia, the future rights of the citizens of Hong Kong and the occupation of Tibet. We cannot close our eyes to those events.

The report is the property of this Assembly. It has been presented today with the unanimous support of members of the committee. Against that background, I must deeply condemn the attempts by representatives of the Chinese Government in Paris to try to have parts of it withdrawn because they did not like it. I say to them that, sadly, they seem to understand little about the rights of discussion or about democracy. Until they do, they will find friendships with the nations of the world hard to find or to keep. Members of the Defence Committee and, I am sure, all the other members of the Assembly want that friendship but the Chinese Government, by their actions, must show us whether they want such friendship.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate will be opened after the address by Mr. Vitalone, Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

5. Address by Mr. Vitalone, Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Vitalone, Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

On behalf of the whole Assembly, Mr. Vitalone, welcome to our proceedings. Would you please come to the rostrum.

Mr. VITALONE (*Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we are now coming to the end of an extraordinary year which has profoundly affected the fabric of international relations, raising not only intense emotions and great hopes but also, in some cases, bitter disappointments.

Not all the events which we have lived through and are still witnessing bear the uniform stamp of gradual progress towards freedom and human rights. The unforgettable memory of Tiananmen Square, the persistence of widespread regional tension and conflict, the resurgence of cruel inter-racial quarrels and the difficulties generated by the very process of democratic renewal confirm that the path which we have to follow to ensure that peace – single and indivisible – reigns supreme in a world freed of the inheritance of hate and enmity,

Mr. Vitalone (continued)

inequality and discrimination, is still arduous and long.

However, seen against the stagnation which has for many years characterised the state of international relations, it is difficult to deny that future prospects now present far more highlights than shadows.

It seems that the rigid pattern of opposing blocs in which the balance of the European continent has been clamped since the second world war has now finally broken down. In the accelerated spread of the various phenomena (which is the chief characteristic of the changes in progress full of extraordinary opportunities as well as many risks) the general but clear trend seems to be for the factors favouring integration to predominate over the tendencies towards disintegration.

Notwithstanding the uncertainties of a situation developing according to dynamics which are not always easy to read, the prospects for security seem to open onto exceptionally interesting developments which need to be pursued and encouraged in the knowledge that the success or otherwise of the great process of reform initiated in the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries will largely depend, at least in the short term, on the adequacy of the western world's response to the changing state of affairs.

While understandably still full of ambiguities and contradictions, this change is plainly discernible in the momentum of the profound transformations enabling the members of the Warsaw Pact, for the first time in its thirty year history, to voice widely divergent and varied views. Supporters of the status quo stand alongside others with diametrically opposite political and cultural careers, all of them ready and able to repudiate the Suslov philosophy of "limited sovereignty" and to condemn the crackdown on the "Prague spring" as an "interference in the internal affairs of the Czechoslovak nation".

It is perhaps fair not to forget that "if we look through the cracks in the Berlin wall we can still detect the presence of 390 000 Soviet soldiers", and that the process of reform in the Soviet Union is lagging behind the libertarian aspirations which have marked and lit up the history of the ex-satellite states in recent years. But a reasonable measure of caution cannot disguise the fact that without the great scheme of renewal, without the courageous decisions taken in the Soviet Union's policy of perestroika no walls would have come down in Eastern Europe and we might today still be in the position of having to decipher the uncertain pages of a calendar of international relations rigidly linked to

the logic of confrontation, the ethics of distrust and the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It is right to say that the situations where attitudes today are still obstinately linked to the models of the old form of communism and to the vocabulary and methods of Stalinism and are apparently untouched by the winds of renewal, are precisely those which are most distant from the influence of Moscow.

In response to this scenario of transition from old to new without any intermediate stage and at a pace unknown in political processes, and to the decline of dispositions which have provided a model of peace and stability for over forty years, Western Europe is now called upon to undertake a task which can only be described, without any overstatement, as historic in scale.

To perform this task our countries will have to make a determined effort calling for creativity and initiative, clarity of purpose and trust in order to facilitate the changeover to new European structures within a framework of stability and growing and constructive collaboration.

In the view of the Italian Government, Western Europe will need an organic, courageous and consistent plan, including economic aid for those Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union, which have taken the road of reform so that the expectations and hopes of their populations may be fulfilled. Failure in the reform effort could reverse the trend and trigger regressive reactions with unpredictable outcome and incalculable risks. Western Europe must show that it is capable of assuming responsibilities equal to those enabling the break-up of the communist system to be set in motion, a process which everyone can see today but which no one dared hope for only a few months ago.

We are now at an especially delicate and difficult juncture where the aggravation of economic difficulties in an already terminal situation is liable to add support to the incorrect view that the outcome of the choice of freedom and renewal could not be worse. We have to counter the risk of error by new and original models of co-operation designed – not only in terms of solidarity but also in political terms – to permit the full development of the momentum in the reorganisation of economic structures and the consolidation of the institutions of democracy.

Entirely new prospects are now opening up for the reinforcement of security conditions in Europe and our duty is to focus our attention on them. The greater our ability to formulate generously conceived objectives aimed at progress and integration and discarding the ignoble motives of profit and incidental gain, the more

Mr. Vitalone (continued)

irreversible will the present trends become. Mr. Genscher has very rightly described what is happening in Eastern Europe, and in the German Democratic Republic especially, as the result of the fascination exerted by the "Europe of freedom" on its neighbouring states.

Poland, Hungary and the other countries which have set foot on the path of reform are well aware that the assistance and co-operation of Western Europe is essential for economic recovery and the consolidation of political independence.

In Italy, the conviction that there is a need for an active, courageous and generous initiative on the part of Western Europe combined with the ability to seize the opportunities currently on offer has been enhanced by President Gorbachev's recent visit to our country.

Direct contact with the top Soviet leaders has reinforced our view that, while pursuing the gradual overcoming of the divisions imposed on Europe by the second world war and promoting the regeneration of our continent on the basis of the political and cultural values and ideals upheld in the West, we must be careful to avoid any destabilisation of the existing political and military equilibria.

In essence, the Italian view is that every possible effort likely to facilitate the progress of the movement towards democracy and to speed up the processes of socio-economic development in Eastern Europe is not merely justified but vital. But we have to look for a scenario that will reconcile freedom with security and combine the balanced protection of everyone's rights with the need to encourage the innovative processes transforming the continent of Europe in a single, harmonious plan.

At the political level we must pursue a gradual changeover which does not suddenly upset structures based on proven alliances but at the same time does not obstruct the ameliorations imposed or prompted by the changed climate in international relations – that changed climate which now permits fruitful negotiations whereby the movements towards European détente and integration can gather strength in a stable context.

At a time of quickening pace in political innovation – which is now – we have to do all we can to achieve fast and concrete results in the field of disarmament so as to provide a framework of confidence and security as the institutional situation changes.

In this context the primary and essential aim must be the conclusion of a first agreement on conventional forces in Europe bringing about a drastic reduction in the more obviously offensive military capabilities and imbalances

which for decades have built up tensions and mutual distrust.

A ban on chemical weapons and an agreement between the United States and the USSR on the reduction of their strategic arsenals is also urgently needed, and would also have a favourable effect on the security situation in Europe.

The future dispositions will ensure the security of all only if the way that the political situation develops is based on balanced defence structures and a subsequent drastic arms reduction down to the point where all offensive capabilities are eliminated and in a climate of solid relations governed by mutual trust. In that connection the hopefully rapid conclusion of a first CFE agreement on conventional forces needs to be followed by more ambitious objectives matching the hopes already expressed by the Atlantic summit at the end of May.

The WEU member countries also need to respond to this plan; they have to be able to meet the request of their American allies – because of their present budgetary difficulties – that the Europeans should now take more responsibility for the defence of Europe.

In this situation, Italy considers that WEU is an essential forum for developing co-operation among the member states in the field of security and defence and for making further decisive progress along the road to integration. Italy takes the view that the construction of an integrated Europe can only take place within a balanced framework of security and in a system of political relationships basically hinging on the Helsinki accords and the CSCE process as the control centre for co-operation agreements. Italy stresses the need for a vigorous reactivation of WEU which, though it cannot take the place of the Community or function as its military dimension, can nonetheless play an increasingly important rôle in defining a European security policy along the lines of The Hague platform, as was pointed out yesterday by Mr. Chevènement.

With regard to the longer-term outlook Italy believes that, as the age of bipolarism draws to a close, it is possible to identify a coherent framework for an organic plan to enhance the rôle of Europe.

The first initiative must be applied to speeding up and intensifying the process of integration so as to increase the power of attraction of the European pole, multiply the possibilities of co-operation with Eastern Europe and facilitate the overcoming of the division of the continent in a context of overall stability.

The link between the process of Community integration and that of Eastern and Western Europe is quite obvious. It is in everyone's

Mr. Vitalone (continued)

interest that the logic of integration and reform should prevail over that of disintegration. The outcome will depend on the combined action and intensity of effort that we are all able to perform in pursuing the right alternative.

As perceptions of the threat wane and weaken, a second requirement will be to uphold the essential link between Western Europe and the United States. We have to avoid any feeling of growing apart between the United States and Europe. The functions of NATO need to be updated and every opportunity taken to consolidate the foundations of the transatlantic community and to proclaim – in the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act – that the United States and Canada are also Europe.

A third line of action will be to promote ever wider and more varied forms of inter-European co-operation on progressive and flexible models and giving encouragement and support to the countries of Eastern Europe in their reacquisition of democratic freedoms. With regard to WEU, in the coming months the Italian Government will be stressing five questions that it considers to be of prime importance.

The first of these relates to the development of co-operation in the conduct of the verification of the disarmament agreements. The discussions already in progress on the practical forms which this co-operation should take need to be brought to an early conclusion.

The second is space observation for the verification of the agreements themselves and for overseeing possible political or ecological crisis situations.

Here the need is to bring the preparatory and research stage to a rapid conclusion and to give full momentum to the development of the advanced technologies that Europe will need in order to perform a rôle measuring up to the demands of the hour and to the great changes taking place on the political scene. Here I feel that a tribute should be paid to the parliamentary Assembly's valuable contribution in the debate on Mr. Malfatti's report which constitutes a rounded and comprehensive review of the topic accompanied by proposals eliciting unanimous support.

Another important factor in increasing the significance of WEU's rôle will be to set up an automatic, informal and non-institutionalised mechanism to provide a link between the work of European political co-operation and our organisation.

Here again it is right to go back to ideas already expressed by the authoritative representatives in this Assembly. But in every institutional forum, in order to give greater support for

the process of European integration, Italy will insist on the need to translate this plan into concrete and operative initiatives.

With regard to the institute, the Italian Government has always been firmly in favour of its creation but not in a scaled-down form. The structure approved by the Ministerial Council at its meeting on 13th November will, we are sure, enable the centre to fulfil the ambitious tasks of stimulation and research which have been assigned to it. It will be an instrument for providing valuable back-up for the work of the Assembly itself.

For the head of the centre we have already nominated an Italian candidate whom we now confirm, our understanding being that – as implied by the two other official nominations – the choice will go to a person of undoubted repute, prestige and ability.

The Italian Government's respect for the rôle of the Assembly is now enshrined in WEU history. We are well aware of the efforts you have made and the great dignity with which you have discharged your demanding functions as representatives despite the really difficult conditions. We are sincerely pleased at the decision to hold an extraordinary session on the prospects opened up by events in Eastern Europe. It is our wish that the Assembly of WEU, the only parliamentary organ in Europe authorised by the treaties to discuss all aspects of security and defence, should continue to extend its rôle and realise its great potential as a forum for consultation and agreement at a time when, with the desired prospect of European union in sight, there is a need for a clear and united stance enabling the organisation to take up the great challenges of our time. For all that you have undertaken to do you have our renewed thanks.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister. Would you be kind enough to answer questions from the members?

(The Secretary of State indicated his assent)

I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I want to refer to the terminology Minister Vitalone has used. On the one hand, he talked about perestroika, which as we know is the restructuring of developments in the USSR and the countries which have adopted the same system for their governments. On the other hand, the Minister referred to the "collapse of communism". Mr. President, how can a wise and intelligent man show so little understanding of political history as to speak of the "collapse of communism"? Communism is being restructured, and communism is part of Europe's cultural heritage. When we see elements of this heritage collapsing, it has always been our custom

Mr. Tummers (continued)

to reconstruct them. We have done this with cathedrals, palaces and even prisons. I do not think that talk of "collapse" demonstrates a just and wise understanding of political history. In fact, it borders on *schadenfreude*, which is, of course, the least suitable motive for forming an opinion on political developments. Mayakovsky, Tatlin and Malevitch produced works of art which were all concerned with the revolution in 1917. These works are kept in our museums, where they rightly attract great interest and are studied by people with an interest in these topics. These works are part of communism. Mr. President, communism is not collapsing, but we can see how it is being restructured. I feel that political speakers should not be so ready to use such expressions as "Ha ha, we are seeing the collapse of communism".

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. VITALONE (*Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I could reply by saying that the facts are there for all to see. It is difficult to imagine that what is happening in the Soviet Union and in many Eastern European countries is part of a dynamic of events with no impact on the essence of those facts which we have for so long used symbols to describe employing terms like Soviet integralism, the iron curtain, the policy of power blocs and the cold war. I do not know if there exists any such system for measuring the whole process of ideological collapse given the brief space of time involved and the rapid pace of change in these processes of transformation. By the collapse of communism, I mean the crisis of a system and the emergence of in some ways perhaps embryonic forms of representation and democratic institutions that are the unquestionable signs of an entirely new process.

Nobody imagines that this process is now complete and I am sorry if my words have somehow given that impression. However, I also think it would be wrong to deny the evidence of a state of affairs prompting hopes which we have to welcome and encourage. I think that this is the real challenge of our time.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stegagnini.

Mr. STEGAGNINI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Secretary of State, I would like to talk about the Mediterranean, a subject never given enough attention in this Assembly. Recently there have been signs of greater stability in the Mediterranean area with the end of the war in Chad, the resumption of relations between Libya and Egypt and the advent of the Maghreb union with a decline in the climate of conflict previously

characterising North Africa and the southern shores of the Mediterranean.

What is the Italian Government's assessment of this political situation, and what political and diplomatic actions has it taken to encourage this very necessary process given the possibility raised in Malta of the early withdrawal of the fleets of the superpowers? I should also like to hear your opinion on the possible future rôle of WEU that is now going to become more "Mediterranean" than in the past once Spain joins our organisation as it is shortly going to do.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. VITALONE (*Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – I feel that concern about the rôle which WEU can play is apparent in the setting up of the special working group. We shall be very interested in the views voiced by this group, but the question asked does give me an opportunity once again to give some detail of one of the fundamental planks of Italian foreign policy. We consider the Mediterranean to be the third geographical priority of the Europe of the EEC after the countries of East and then Central Europe. In the Mediterranean our commitment is based essentially on two pillars. The first is the use of negotiations to reach the political solutions which need to be found to the two issues that have the Middle East in flames and are tearing the area apart, namely, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the situation in Lebanon. We are also concerned by the need to bring the Iran-Iraq process to a conclusion. In my view we should go by the Mubarak plan. What we need now is to regain the momentum that found its expression some ten years ago in the European Community's Venice declaration while trying realistically and within the limits of the possible to involve ourselves in the consultative mechanism in the talks between the Arab states and Mr. Mubarak, Egypt and the United States, the United States and Israel and so forth. I think we have to act in order to overcome the procedural hold-ups that are preventing the start of negotiations and are partly due to the Israeli attitude towards the make-up of the team that the United States would like to see on the other side of the table to represent exclusively the views of the resident population.

The second pillar of Italian policy consists in stronger ties of integration with the countries on the southern coast of the Mediterranean, whether this be with Italy or the European Community. This is an initiative that we intend to launch and pursue for a two-fold purpose: first to reduce the dangers of a fundamentalist explosion, which we view with great concern, and second to prevent an uncontrolled flood of migration. Both can be successfully managed only if we succeed in greatly strengthening our

Mr. Vitalone (continued)

relations of integration and co-operation – especially the Maghreb region.

This is why we are specially interested in integration and in the future development of the Maghreb union and also in the relationship initiated in recent months.

Finally, relations which often draw criticism and disapproval are those with Libya, a reaction somewhat heightened by attendance which the Italian Government thought to be necessary at certain important celebrations in that country. We see the considerable change in recent months in the relations between Libya and its neighbours and we have noted, too, the end of the war in Chad, the resumption of relations with Egypt and the integration of the Maghreb union, all of which must inevitably require resolute and committed diplomatic action which is what we have taken and will continue to take.

We also consider that current developments in Algeria are important and that relations with Tunisia, which are good already, can be further improved. We have a working programme aimed in that direction under the heading of co-operation. We also have to strengthen our initiatives with Egypt, a traditional partner and the key to the solution of a number of regional situations.

There is a problem in political and economic integration of Egypt with Europe, one which has been neglected to some extent in recent years because Egypt's traditional tie with Europe was with the United Kingdom. This bond was severed in 1956 and then, for reasons connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict, Egypt's main link was with the United States, though confined to a single subject. But Egypt feels a need for greater integration with Europe, and Italy, not acting alone but within the context of Community initiatives, plans to develop a suitable policy of co-operation and support for that country.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir GEOFFREY FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – May I ask the Minister a brief question which will require an even briefer answer? Given what he said to us about the expansion and integration of Europe, and given his comments about WEU, does he confirm that there is nothing in the Single European Act that affects the modified Brussels Treaty which gives sole competence on defence matters to WEU?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. VITALONE (*Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – A single sentence is perhaps not sufficient to encapsulate an idea or a complete thought.

I think I have clearly stated – albeit synoptically – what we see as WEU's future rôle. We see these two processes growing side by side in complementary fashion. We are committed, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, to relaunching and reinforcing the system of supranational institutions which have facilitated the growth and advance of a system of political co-operation over a period of fifty years.

In this context the very special vocation of WEU clearly has to be enhanced. I said that WEU could not take over tasks of the European Economic Community or be its military arm. But WEU provides a most important forum for consultation and agreement. We are living at a time when it is vital to clarify the guidelines which political initiatives will have to follow, within the framework of the Community, on the road towards the achievement of the great European union and its identification as a political entity.

All the paths leading to this result – first and foremost WEU – must, in the Italian view, be utilised to be full.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That brings us to the end of a very interesting discussion. Thank you, Minister, on behalf of our members.

6. Western European security: defence implications of the People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation

(Debate on the report of the Defence Committee and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1203 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the debate on the report of the Defence Committee on Western European security: defence implications of the People's Republic of China's evolving geopolitical situation, and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1203 and amendments.

The debate is open.

I call Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the Rapporteur has given us a good account of the essence of his report. The Defence Committee at that time went to China to discuss the defence methods and the security policy of the People's Republic of China in relation to WEU's security policy. But I have to make a big effort to recall seeing any military equipment or exercises in China. I do remember that – with great interest – we saw some troops climbing up walls, a naval unit and some perfectly executed target practice. But, as I said, I have think very hard to remember this.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman (continued)

I remember rather more about the discussions, because some of them were really interesting. Although an attempt was generally made to divert our attention from the subject, we, the members of the Defence Committee, also tried to have discussions on political developments then under way in China. We found this very difficult. For the most part the answers we were given were evasive, but from time to time we received an answer which gave us the impression that the Chinese authorities would not use force against the students, who were demonstrating peacefully.

Mr. President, I well remember the demonstrations I was privileged to see with my own eyes in Beijing, for it was a privilege for us to be able to witness this very important event. Those who were willing and brave enough went to the Square of Heavenly Peace, where they could both see and speak to the students, most of whom spoke very good English. They asked us to take back to the West the message that in their view, to put it very simply, things could not go on as they were in the People's Republic of China. Just after our return from China we heard how all their illusions – and many of ours – had been destroyed on the night of 3rd to 4th June.

In the West German newspaper *Die Welt* of 20th November 1989, I read an interesting interview with the Chinese Prime Minister, Li Peng. It was revealing that, so many months after the events on Tiananmen Square, he showed absolutely no regret. He did not say: we should perhaps have acted differently, or: perhaps we ought to have talked. All he said was that the authorities had acted with patience and restraint. He also constantly insisted that, if the authorities had acted differently, the country would have been plunged into chaos.

Mr. President, there is one thing that still concerns me: the Chinese authorities told us again and again that they would have talks with the demonstrators and permit a certain degree of democracy in China. Were they deliberately lying to us? Or did only a few of them know what was actually about to happen to the movement for democracy in the People's Republic of China? My inclination is always to believe people until I am proved wrong, but I have yet to find answers to these questions.

Mr. President, in recent months we have seen western and other countries re-establishing relations with the People's Republic of China on commercial grounds. There is obviously a renewed inclination to seek material advantage without making it a condition that something be done about the restoration of human rights in the People's Republic of China before normal relations can be resumed.

The Assembly expects, especially if some of the amendments are adopted, that, before normal economic and political relations are resumed, more will be done for democracy and respect for human rights in China than the interview with Li Peng suggests.

Mr. President, I have absolutely no interest in creating a new enemy or cultivating a hostile image, as was done in the past with the Soviet Union. Until recently, we accused the Soviet Union of not respecting human rights. We must be consistent and do exactly the same where the People's Republic of China is concerned. We must insist on that country's respecting the most fundamental human rights. If it does so, I hope we can then resume normal relations. If relations with the People's Republic of China can be normalised – with due regard for the conditions imposed – far from having an enemy, we shall know for sure that things are looking a little better in the world as a whole.

(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman.

The next speaker is Mr. Fassino.

Mr. FASSINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have been listening carefully and I have reread Mr. Cox's report which, including the amendments adopted by the committee, has – let me say immediately – my full support.

One point especially has my agreement. It seems to me to be absolutely vital, in spite of everything, that we should not break off cultural, political or diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

I certainly have to say that – like my colleagues who also went to China – I still have a vivid picture in my mind of Tiananmen Square and of the incredible reply that those young people received to their demands for freedom. I also have to say that these things cannot fail to be in the minds of those who, like us, have lived through difficult times when we thirsted after freedom in the West.

However, history and politics are governed by laws which are often cruel and which reassert themselves as soon as passions have cooled.

China, though governed by a political class which did not hesitate to order the massacre, cannot however be identified with that political class. China is an immense country, rich in potential which could be inhibited by a punitive or closed-door attitude on the part of the West. If there is still any hope for democracy in China, this will largely depend on the West extending to that country the hand of economic co-operation and cultural exchange as a means of imparting

Mr. Fassino (continued)

to the Chinese our traditions of democracy and tolerance, and we must do everything of that kind we can.

In China there is – or at least there was – a tendency correctly described by Mr. Cox to reduce the level of aggressiveness exhibited by communism towards the outside world. As the Rapporteur puts it: “There is no reason why China should modify its external policy which, for elementary reasons of internal stability and because of its economy, is a peaceful one”.

Despite Tiananmen Square, China has in essence accepted, at least in recent times, a strategy of international policy based on rapprochement with both the West and the Soviet Union. This process of modernisation and economic liberalisation will inevitably lead China towards more co-operation with the West in general, and Europe in particular. Nor, to my mind, could it be otherwise; the process is inevitable because, if the Chinese ruling class wishes to develop the private sector and liberalise the purchase of consumer goods – and let us hope it will – it can only do so by collaborating with the western economies.

I therefore think the Rapporteur’s analysis of modern Chinese strategy is right.

The old idea of a people’s war in which a possible enemy would be swallowed up within the boundless expanse of China and then overcome by guerrilla action has been replaced – even after the unsatisfactory campaign of 1979 – by a more modern concept of the art of war, in spite of the fact that the events of last May do not at all confirm what I say. The immense task of modernising an army of 3 200 000 men – the largest, numerically at least, in the world – is now under way, albeit with delays and inconsistencies. In my opinion, this modernisation will call not only for the acquisition of technologically new and more efficient matériel but also, and especially, for an in-depth campaign to “de-ideologise” the command staff.

The reintroduction of military tanks, for instance, which previously did not exist, familiarisation with the new technologies and the abandonment of the revolutionary concept of a prolonged people’s war have been significant steps in the “westernisation” of Chinese military strategy which has gone into reverse. This must surely lead to greater exchanges with Europe in the fields both of military technology and the exchange of specific vocational experience and training.

But if there is a factor contributing to détente, it is the combination of trade and cultural relations. We have to say, however, that in spite of the renewed freeze in international political rela-

tions, trade and cultural links are likely to grow because oriental pragmatism – which is still there despite the crisis in political ideology – invariably succeeds in keeping the problem of internal democracy skilfully separate from that of international co-operation.

Nobody in the West is really willing to shrug off the rich Chinese market, a fact that explains Li Peng’s statement after the events in Tiananmen Square that: “Trade and business is more rational than some political personalities”.

That is why I am convinced, as the Rapporteur says, that there is no new Chinese military problem following the crackdown on the students and the turning of the ideological and political screw in recent years in China.

The collapse of ideology – extremely rapid in Eastern Europe and slower in China – should further the process of détente even though China is located in a highly unstable continental area and therefore likely in the short term to be exposed to and have to cope with a large number of defence pressures. However, the current restructuring of the Chinese armed forces should help them to handle these tensions.

In conclusion, I consider that Europe is not immediately affected for the time being by the political and institutional changes in China given the extreme remoteness of the Far Eastern theatre and the rationality of the Chinese who are endeavouring to reduce the aftermath of Tiananmen Square to an essentially domestic matter, and given also the great desirability of technology transfers and trade between the continent of Europe and the Chinese sub-continent. Then there is the fact that Europe at the moment has to apply its mind to its own equilibrium. Until yesterday the balance was held by two opposing blocs – one imposed and the other freely formed – and that balance will now have to change if the countries of Eastern Europe are granted the same right of self-determination that the free countries of the West have always had. As the representative of the Italian Government has said and many delegates have repeated, it is here that WEU’s position will gain its full importance.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, if it is true that political democracy almost always follows on the heels of economic development, we may reasonably hope that China is not entirely lost to our western ideals of tolerance, freedom and respect for human rights, even though the blood shed in Tiananmen Square can never be forgotten by free and democratic peoples.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Fassino. That completes the list of speakers.

The President (continued)

The Defence Committee has tabled a draft recommendation, to which four amendments have been tabled. They will be considered in the order in which they relate to the text of the draft recommendation – 2, 3, 4 and 1.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Is the committee not to have the right to comment on the report, or shall we do so after we have dealt with the amendments?

The PRESIDENT. – Sir Dudley, the way that we proceed is that I announce the amendments and then call the Rapporteur and Chairman. Does the Rapporteur wish to speak at this stage?

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be brief. By their contributions, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and Mr. Fassino have enhanced the report presented by the committee. I am sure that the Chairman of the committee endorses everything that they said.

Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman confirmed my comments about the continuing oppression of the Chinese authorities by quoting a report published in the German press in October, in which, sadly, no regrets or second thoughts were expressed for the brutal aggression that took place.

Mr. Fassino said that human rights must be of paramount importance to us in WEU. Mention was made of the opportunities that exist in China, which has the largest population in the world. I am sure that we in the West should like to help with China's development. Earlier, I welcomed the changes in Chinese foreign policy and reinforced the recommendations of the committee that, although we want friendship with the Chinese Government and most certainly its people, it must show to the world that it is honouring certain standards before we can offer the commercial and economic development that it so obviously needs. We certainly do not want to lose our relationship, but the Chinese must follow fundamental rules if they want it to be maintained.

I take this opportunity to refer the Assembly to the introductory note of the report, in the last paragraph of which we pay a warm tribute for the help we received from Mr. Colin Cameron, the Defence Counsellor in the Assembly and Secretary of the committee. Not only did we receive enormous help from Mr. Cameron in preparing for our trip but outstanding assistance and advice during our visit. That should be publicly stated. I want to include in my gratitude the members of his staff who did not have the opportunity to visit China with us, but who nevertheless played a major rôle in the preparation both of our visit and the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you very much, Mr. Cox.

I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I intervened earlier because I mistakenly thought that the debate was coming to a conclusion and I did not want the moment to pass by without congratulating my colleague, Mr. Cox, on the excellence of his report. It is realistic and robust, and very thoughtful.

Perhaps I may abuse my position as Chairman of the committee by saying how much I regretted that, following the rousing and worthwhile speech by Mr. Cox, our proceedings were summarily interrupted for a ministerial intervention that lasted for nearly an hour, causing the whole theme of the debate to be dissipated. The Assembly needs to programme itself somewhat better, but that matter can be discussed on another occasion. I have heard Mr. Cox speak on many occasions and, with great respect to him, that speech was one of the best that he has ever made. It was most unfortunate, therefore, that the proceedings were stopped and other matters proceeded with.

The report is very realistic. To those who criticise us for being unfair to the Chinese authorities, I refer them to paragraph 7 of Mr. Cox's explanatory memorandum:

“In the present report, your Rapporteur has tried to be as objective as possible, in spite of the natural emotion which has accompanied recent events. He trusts that the reader, both in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and in the Assembly generally, but more particularly those readers whose country is the subject of the report, will accept what is intended as constructive criticism and will continue the Sino-WEU dialogue in the future.”

And so say all of us. That is an extremely important point.

I am sure that Mr. Cox will not mind me saying that he is an old China hand. He has been to China several times, so the visit was not his first naïve introduction to the country. He has studied it before. I had the advantage of visiting it once before and I was amazed by the economic progress that had been made. Alas – if only it had been matched by an advancement in human rights and a move towards democracy.

Mr. Cox's report stresses that China's external policy is a peaceful one, and the committee underlines that fact. China does not seem to have any military expansionist ideas, but we should not overlook its willingness to use military means to back up its position, especially in respect of frontier positions. China's outward military concept is peaceful, but as my col-

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

league, Mr. Cox, said, there has been the brutal overreaction in Tiananmen Square.

I believed, as did my colleagues who were fortunate enough to pay that historic visit, that the position was developing all the time. If action had been taken earlier to save face, and even if it had been fairly tough action, the final precipitation of violence that shocked the world could have been stopped. However, that was not to be. As Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman remarked, the authorities were seemingly co-operative in respect of the demonstrators, and we were faced with no hindrance in seeing them and trying to talk to them. Our reaction in Beijing and in other parts of the country – notably Shanghai – was that the demonstrations were essentially good-natured and that although they were growing all the time, the authorities were fairly relaxed about them. We presumed that they would react peaceably.

I think that practically every member of the delegation was asked before leaving for China whether they would be safe, and whether there was not a danger of shooting because of all the demonstrations. I remember telephoning my wife from Beijing and telling her: "It is all very peaceful. The locals are going out and having the students freed. The police and the army are very relaxed. Everything is happening in a friendly atmosphere and there is no problem." My goodness! If we had stayed another seven days, we might have been involved in the hail of bullets and with the tanks. All of us went to Tiananmen Square and all of us saw exactly what was going on in Shanghai.

Mr. Fassino stressed that China cannot exist without the West's co-operation in economic matters, and that is an important key to the future. We all recognise that the Chinese authorities must come to terms with that aspect. I have heard it said in the last few days, and in certain representations from the Chinese authorities, that we are interfering with internal matters that are not our concern. My reply as a democrat and as a member of this Assembly is that world opinion cannot be thwarted by anyone and that the Chinese leaders will come to realise the ghastly mistake that they made in Tiananmen Square.

The fact that we want China to return to the path of genuine reform comes out in the report. We do not want to isolate China. Mr. Cox is positive, not negative. He is critical, but he reveals some essential facts that must be taken to heart by the Chinese authorities.

China must be encouraged to return to the right path, and it must follow the trend that is sweeping Eastern and Central Europe if it is to win back the friendship and respect of the democracies. China is one of the world's oldest

and greatest countries but it cannot ignore world opinion. It cannot ignore either, the legitimate aspirations of its own people.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Sir Dudley. Your comments about debates being interrupted for ministerial speeches fell on sympathetic ears because something similar happened to me earlier in this session. Perhaps the matter can be raised at the Presidential Committee later today.

I understand that at least three of the four amendments that have been tabled are wholly acceptable to the Rapporteur, so brief speeches will be welcome and in order.

The first amendment is Amendment 2 which reads as follows:

2. At the end of paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert "and pointing out that all member states of the United Nations, by their membership of that organisation, have solemnly committed themselves before the international community to respect in the conduct of their internal affairs the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights".

I call Mrs. Luuk to move the amendment.

Mrs. LUUK (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, following on the remarks of Mrs. Baarveld and the Rapporteur, it is clear that China as a member of the United Nations and accordingly of the international community should be called upon to become party to the human rights treaties and to conform to the requirement that human rights be respected in China too. After recent events I consider it desirable that the report should repeat the point that this demand must be made. This relates to Amendments 2 and 4. I think the Rapporteur has indicated that these two amendments can be adopted.

I would like to make a comment on Amendment 3. It is, I think, thanks to the philosophy of a politician concerned with development that we here are focusing less on security aspects and are stating that development and economic policy can only evolve and be brought to fruition if civil and political human rights are also respected. Movement in ecological and development policy can be achieved only if there is participation and freedom of action in the political field and a minimum of human rights are upheld. This applies not only to China but to any country, to Central America, for instance. This is the point that those tabling Amendment 3 wish to emphasise.

I undertook to speak to the amendments, and request you to incorporate these three amendments in the report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mrs. Luuk for helping us by making a speech that covers all three amendments. However, I must put them separately.

Does anybody wish to oppose Amendment 2?...

That is not the case.

May we have the view of the Rapporteur?

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – We accept and welcome Amendment 2.

The PRESIDENT. – I shall now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 3 which reads as follows:

3. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert the following new paragraph:

“(iv) Considering that the essential aim of the Chinese Government to promote the country’s economic and social development can be achieved only if civil and political rights are developed to the same extent;”

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

May we have the view of the Rapporteur?

Mr. COX (*United Kingdom*). – The amendment was discussed by our committee, but we oppose it because we do not believe that it adds to our report. However well-meaning the amendment is, it does not state what happens in reality. As the Assembly will see from the wording of the amendment, it suggests that “the country’s economic and social development can be achieved only if civil and political rights are developed to the same extent”. We wish that that were true, but, sadly, that is not what is happening in China or in other countries.

Therefore, specifically on that ground, but also because we do not believe that the amendment adds to the report, it is with some regret that we reject it.

The PRESIDENT. – I shall put Amendment 3 to the vote, having heard the committee’s opinion.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 3 is negated.

We come now to Amendment 4 which reads as follows:

4. At the beginning of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph:

“1. Request the Chinese Government to accede to the two Human Rights Covenants of

the United Nations, i.e. the International Covenant on Civic and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;”

and renumber the following paragraphs accordingly.

Does anyone wish to oppose the amendment?...

I shall put the amendment to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

We now come to Amendment 1 which reads as follows:

1. At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add “in accordance with the objectives fixed at the time of the Paris conference in August 1989”.

I call Mr. Pontillon to move the amendment.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – Amendment 1 is self-explanatory and I have no special comments to make. I simply hope it will have the approval of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Pontillon, for such explicit brevity.

Does anyone wish to speak against Amendment 1?...

May we have the opinion of the committee?

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – In favour, sir.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Sir Dudley – even briefer.

I shall put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We shall now vote on the amended draft recommendation.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

I am delighted to say that the draft recommendation, as amended, is agreed to unanimously. I trust that that fact will be noted by those who tried to interfere in our proceedings.

The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

1. See page 43.

**7. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 2 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Western European Union's information policy (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Document 1205 and amendment).
2. Western European Union (draft of a new booklet) (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Document 1206).

I call Mr. Pontillon on a point of order.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – I understand the constraints and the many demands on the presidency and have no doubt of your comprehension, Mr. President. But I must once again protest on behalf of my committee at the way in which business is organised and in particular at the fact that such important problems as the information policy of the

Assembly, i.e. the way in which the Assembly is projected to the world, and the policy of parliamentary relations, i.e. the way in which we report on our activities to our respective parliaments, are relegated to the end of the sitting. In other words, these problems are condemned to be discussed in an empty chamber which is all the more regrettable in that the quality of Sir William Shelton's report and the hard work put in by Mr. Tummers deserve a much better fate.

The PRESIDENT. – I fully agree with you, Mr. Pontillon. Again, that is a matter for the Presidential Committee in organising the proceedings. We shall have to be much firmer in the way in which we project ourselves and in arranging the order of business. You will have my full support if you raise the matter this afternoon with the Presidential Committee.

Are there any objections to the orders of the day?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.15 p.m.)

THIRTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 7th December 1989

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Western European Union's information policy (*Presentation of the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1205 and amendment*).
Speakers: The President, Sir William Shelton (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Pontillon (*Chairman of the committee*); (point of order): Mr. Pontillon, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.
3. Western European Union (draft of a new booklet) (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1206*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Tummers (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Caro, Mr. Pontillon (*Chairman of the committee*), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (explanation of vote).
4. Adoption of the minutes.
5. Close of the session.

The sitting was opened at 2 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings ¹.

2. Western European Union's information policy

(Presentation of the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1205 and amendment)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on Western European Union's information policy and vote on the draft order, Document 1205 and amendment.

I call the Rapporteur, Sir William Shelton.

Sir William SHELTON (*United Kingdom*). – It is with great pleasure that I introduce the report on Western European Union's information policy. I start by thanking the committee – we studied the report in Lisbon recently – and the secretariat, which as always was most helpful.

¹. See page 45.

The report is in five sections: the draft order, to which I shall return later; then a short introduction, an analysis of the problem, some practical proposals, and two appendices. The first relates to various opinion polls on public awareness of WEU and defence matters and the second is a résumé of the WEU seminar in London in March 1989.

I shall start with a few words about the introduction. Colleagues will know that some five years ago the Rome declaration was announced, with the decision to reactivate WEU, but its aim is far from being realised. Perhaps that is of even greater concern, given the recent changes in Eastern and Central Europe of which we are all aware. In the next year or two those changes may create the need for a new definition of European security.

I remind colleagues that in Recommendation 472 of June 1989 the Assembly urged the Council to promote a more active information policy, and when the Council replied to the various points in September 1989 it did not even refer to a more active information policy.

The analysis of the problem is divided into three parts: how the public sees us; the Council and its public relations; the London seminar and some problems specific to the Assembly. The opinion polls show what colleagues may have suspected in their most pessimistic moments. Very few people in France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom consider themselves to be well informed about defence. In France, Germany and Italy the figure was 1% and in the

Sir William Shelton (continued)

United Kingdom, where people are obviously more confident, although the opinion polls show that that confidence is not justified, the figure is 3%. All the people polled in those countries obtained their information from the press and the media and the political authority ranked lowest in the dissemination of information.

The opinion polls then asked about knowledge of WEU and I am ashamed to say that in the United Kingdom 72% had never heard of WEU. In France the figure was 65%, in Italy it was 64% and I suppose that we must congratulate the Germans as only 32% of respondents there had not heard of WEU.

Another opinion poll in nine countries within the EEC showed that more than half those questioned thought that the European Community should be responsible for security and defence.

The conclusion in paragraph 7 was not very favourable. Both polls show how WEU's ambitions for improving public awareness of security matters and its rôle are still far from being achieved. These ambitions are set out in the conclusion of the document entitled "WEU and public awareness", which was adopted by the Council in 1985:

"Success in achieving the objectives of the Rome declaration will depend on many factors, a major one of which will be the stimulation of public interest in WEU and the generation of greater public awareness of policies which WEU members follow."

At this stage, one must ask whether there has been a genuine political will to achieve those objectives. Colleagues may have reached the same conclusions as I have – that such is not the case.

I move on to the Council and its public relations, which are not entirely satisfactory. I understand that the Council gives press briefings only twice a year at the end of ministerial meetings. The problem with the Gulf war was an exception – frequent briefings were given by the Council during that period. In 1988, a member of the German Defence Ministry said: "It is not enough to make the press responsible for reminding public opinion about WEU once every six months on the occasion of ministerial meetings." We must agree with that.

When considering the past few years, one is driven to the conclusion that the Council always avoids – or gives the impression of avoiding – giving any clear views or stating a clear attitude about almost anything. For instance, the Assembly recommended that the Council should reply, in the name of WEU, to Mr. Gorbachev's call for a pan-European summit on conventional arms. The Council did nothing. In paragraphs

11 to 14 and onwards, the answers to parliamentary questions in national parliaments will show varying views, most of them pretty ambiguous, given by governments in answer to questions about WEU. Few of them are in line with The Hague platform.

It has been drawn to my attention that a job description was given in an advertisement for the job of assistant to the public relations officer of WEU in London. Almost all the activities were concerned with internal administrative matters rather than contacting the press or television. Perhaps as a consequence, the previous Secretary-General and the present one seem to have been developing their own public relations effort, which we must applaud. Perhaps they believe it necessary because of the lack of a public relations effort by WEU.

My conclusion is that I must query the Council's view that no additional expenditure can be involved. If we and the Council believe that WEU should be known and its objectives understood by the countries represented in it, and that is not being achieved – as it clearly is not – surely the money spent on public relations should be increased substantially. I do not know what percentage of money is spent on public relations compared with the total cost of WEU. I should imagine that it is very small – perhaps 0.5%, 1%, or 2%. The total cost of running WEU must be enormous. If one of its objectives is to carry its message to the public, and it is not doing so, one should query whether WEU should continue to exist or whether it should spend more money on achieving one of its objectives. That seems to me to be logical. It is like having a car and refusing to spend money on gasoline. What is the point of having a car if it cannot run because it has no fuel?

We must query the views of governments about the rôle of WEU. Are they holding firm to their intention of reactivation which they declared some years ago?

But it is not all bad news. For the first time, in March, during the presidency of the United Kingdom, we had a WEU seminar in London which I and some of my colleagues were able to attend. It related to changes in public perception of European defence, and its deliberations are summarised in Appendix II. Ministers noted this and asked the Permanent Council how the public relations effort could be improved, and I understand that the Secretary-General is responding to that.

I move on to the public relations problems of the Assembly. We see from the opinion polls that we are well-nigh unknown in many countries. Strenuous efforts have been made to strengthen the impact of the Assembly's work in national parliaments. They have not been entirely unsuccessful, and we owe a debt of grat-

Sir William Shelton (continued)

itude to those colleagues who have done this in their national parliaments. Paragraphs 29 to 52 of the report detail the efforts by colleagues.

An example of that was brought to my attention today. On Tuesday, Mr. Chevènement spoke at WEU. Unfortunately, I was detained in London. I have before me a report in *Le Figaro* of yesterday which mentions Mr. Chevènement and what he said but does not mention where he said it. It does not say that he spoke in WEU. Something must be wrong somewhere. I find it extraordinary that the place where he spoke was not mentioned in the report.

The 1990 public relations budget will be 500 000 French francs, which is an increase of 90 000 French francs over the 1989 revised budget. But before we are overcome by this increase of 90 000 French francs, I should tell members that in 1990 the Bundestag will spend 7.5 million Deutschmarks on public relations, plus another three million Deutschmarks for information arrangements. If the budget is approved, as I hope it will be, it will allow the purchase of another computer for the press service and it will pay for a logo – a word that I have never much liked. It is a corporate identity. A new letter from the Assembly was drawn up by the press department, which I congratulate. The first one was issued in January 1989 and it goes out four times a year to a range of opinion-formers.

What should we do to improve the public impact of our work? I suggest that four criteria must be met, the first of which is that the Council and the Assembly must give due weight to the political importance of public awareness of Western European security.

I understood that the Council gives press briefings only twice a year at the end of ministerial meetings.

The fact that so few colleagues are present has nothing to do with the importance of this matter but more to do with the fact that we are having a debate on a Thursday afternoon. That shows the lack of weight that is given to the importance of the matter, which is essential to the proper working of WEU. The objectives of WEU and the Council's activities must be clearly defined and publicised. I am not sure that we have not deviated from the reactivation declaration, which should be redefined. The commitment to the modified Brussels Treaty should be reaffirmed.

Given the changes in Central and Eastern Europe, what is our rôle? Is it the building of Europe or the Atlantic Alliance? The fast moving East-West relations must be defined.

Does the public understand, or even care, when our rôle is described in an information letter from the Secretary-General for April-May 1989 as being to:

“Confirm and carry forward the vital process of a joint reflection and concertation on security problems...;

Give concrete expression to the principles concerning the security of its member states...;

Provide the necessary political impetus in order that in the much wider fora... European co-operation in the field of armaments can progress...;

Clarify the politically concerted and technically co-ordinated approach... to problems outside the Brussels Treaty area...”?

Reading that, I should not be sure to what it was referring or what was the rôle of WEU. We must seek to clarify our rôle, and I remind colleagues that the Council of Europe has adopted the excellent report by Peter Büchner which clarifies the use of language, and we should do the same here. That must cost money.

The Council must put information policy on its agenda as a matter of urgency. At the Lancaster conference, a public relations committee was suggested consisting of representatives of the Assembly and the Council. I think that would be an excellent thing to set up.

The Assembly must seek more publicity. When committees meet in member countries they should hold a press conference. Some do not do so, but they all should.

The Assembly should seek to promote any reports and recommendations in member parliaments and should use simple language. We must modernise and simplify our reports and recommendations, like the Council of Europe.

In committee in Lisbon an annual award for journalists was suggested by our colleague, Mr. Tummers. It should be given by WEU to a journalist who writes the most outstanding report or article about WEU in the national press. The nomination could be announced in June and an award made in December, thereby offering two opportunities for publicity. I understand that the Council of Europe has a similar award, not for journalists but for museums. It is rather like the cinema Oscar, because the person who receives it has his name printed on it and the following year he hands it on. The cost is minimal once the cup or whatever it is has been bought. I commend that idea to the Assembly. I agree with my friend, Mr. Tummers, that it would cost little but would have a good effect.

I shall deal with the draft order and the instructions that we are proposing to the Presidential Committee. The committee should ask

Sir William Shelton (continued)

the Council how it intends to improve the organisation's public relations effort, and request that the Council inform the Assembly of the proposals of the Secretary-General, which resulted from the London conference.

The committee asked the Council to place the problems of WEU's information policy on its agenda, to issue press guidelines after meetings of the Permanent Council, to publicise understandable basic information documents and to have a WEU periodical in the official language of all member countries. That may not be expensive, because it could carry advertising – there are always ways of getting round these things. It asked the Council to establish WEU information officers in member countries. I am not suggesting that funds should be found to set up offices, but it must be possible to negotiate with national governments so that they can at least put at our disposal one or two people in the press information department of the Foreign Office.

The committee asked the Council to encourage member governments to publish more information about WEU, to define the conditions for the organisation of opinion polls at European level – we all know how bad they are, but perhaps they will improve if that is done – increase co-operation for existing private groups, promote co-operation and debates with industrial organisations and seek to get more on television. We are all aware of the power of television.

Finally, the committee asked the Council to grant the financial means needed. It is all very well saying that we need not spend much money on information, which may be true in many cases, but we must decide whether WEU is doing its job, as it is virtually unknown. If we decide that it is not, why continue to spend money on it but fail to complete the job by making it better known? That seems illogical. That decision is one that must be made by us or by the Council of Ministers. The Council must be reminded also that the Assembly is always ready to discuss with it ways and means of co-operating in public relations activities. That returns us to the suggestion of the committee that was raised at the London seminar.

In general, we have not done terribly well, and we can do much better. I commend the report to my colleagues.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Nobody has asked to speak. I therefore call the Chairman of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the main points have already been dealt with, and very well, too, I should

simply like to add that all the speeches by ministers that we have heard during the last few days agree in attributing a new rôle to our institution and in giving it increased responsibilities.

However, if our rôle is to be enlarged, so must our contacts with the media, in order to disseminate information on our activities and responsibilities more effectively and more widely.

Sir William Shelton's report contains several specific proposals for discharging these new tasks. The French philosopher Gaston Berger said that beyond a certain level, quantitative problems become qualitative ones. I therefore ask the Assembly to encourage us to increase both the efficiency and the quality of our effort. Sir William Shelton's report will be of great assistance in this endeavour. I thank him, and hope the Assembly will approve it unanimously.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We now come to the vote on the draft order contained in Document 1205.

Amendment 1 has been tabled in the name of Mr. Eisma. It reads as follows:

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft order, add a new paragraph:

“(v) Noting that the seats of the Assembly and the Council of WEU are not in the same location as the press agencies specialising in defence matters;”

Mr. Eisma does not seem to be in the chamber.

Does anyone wish to move the amendment?...

The amendment is not moved.

We will now vote on the draft order contained in Document 1205.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – I would like to speak.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee for a point of order.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – At this stage of the debate I am at something of a loss and I turn to our expert on procedure, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, to ask him if it would not be possible to give this recommendation more weight in view of developments in the remit of our committee, and to change the draft order into a recommendation, so that the Council of Ministers would have to consider it.

We are competent to do this now, since the remit of our committee has been enlarged and is now greater than when the report was drawn up.

May I ask Sir Geoffrey if that could be done?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does the Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges wish to speak?

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Without notice of that question, I doubt whether it is possible to do that. In my judgment, it would require an amendment to the document that is before the Assembly. The time for that has passed. An opportunity has been missed, sadly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I believe that matters are now clear. The document in question would have had to be amended.

We shall now vote on the draft order contained in Document 1205.

Under Rule 33 of the rules of procedure, if ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft order.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft order is agreed to unanimously¹.

3. Western European Union (draft of a new booklet)

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1206)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on Western European Union (draft of a new booklet) and vote on the draft order, Document 1206.

I call Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur of the committee.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I want to begin with a few comments on the fact that this debate is taking place now, so that these comments will be recorded. I was asked yesterday morning if I would present the report this morning. I was asked this officially, by the Secretary of the committee. I was not told subsequently that this would not be possible. It was then rumoured that this afternoon would be free, but later it was said that there would be no time in the afternoon. Then we were told that we would proceed at 2 p.m., as we have now done, and that has meant postponing appointments made during the lunch break. I feel bound to mention this

confusion so that things can be done differently in the future.

Mr. President, this is the tenth time I have been here and had the pleasure of reporting on relations with the parliaments and the public. You may disagree with me, but I feel that, given the substance of the report, this subject should be dealt with at the end of the part-session. The difficulty in this case is that not many members are present. We cannot solve this problem by putting the subject higher up on the agenda. That would not be the right way. Some method must be found of showing that relations with the parliaments are important. After all, we have this dual mandate and the opportunity of taking initiatives here. We are able to discuss various matters here with ministers and representatives of the authorities whose subjects we are addressing. We have another opportunity to discuss them at home. I therefore think that relations with parliaments and parliamentary work need to be underlined. Members should therefore be present at this time. Mr. President, I do not want all the members here in order to have a large audience. If that were what I wanted, I would have to choose a different theatre.

The report I have to present is mainly concerned with the need to update the little orange book and to improve its presentation. The previous edition is not all that old, but a great deal has changed, and changing circumstances call for fresh information and a fresh approach to the public. Think of all the things mentioned in Mr. Caro's report. They call for a fresh look at relations with the public. Spain and Portugal are joining us, and there too, the little orange book will have to be used to tell people what WEU is. This must be done in the spirit in which WEU was originally established, as I have said on many occasions. WEU is different from all other organisations and treaties that we know of. It is not an annex to NATO but a separate entity, which must not be confused with the strategies and policy being developed within NATO as a whole. As parliamentarians we must stick to the treaties as closely as possible. These treaties must not be weakened, and they must be interpreted clearly and correctly.

It was remarkable that, when a few people from the Supreme Soviet came here and discussed WEU, they were able to give a very precise analysis of the difference between WEU and NATO. It was interesting to see that people outside are sometimes able to give a more accurate account of what we represent than we can ourselves.

Another point that must always be emphasised in the booklet is the question of relations with the Council of Europe. After all, it is proposed that special delegations should be sent to WEU, not ones consisting of people who

1. See page 46.

Mr. Tummers (continued)

are also members of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, but the specific feature of our organisations is that we seek out aspects likely to promote peace and security throughout the whole social fabric. We are concerned not only with defence but with the whole range of socio-economic and socio-cultural structures in the various European co-operative groupings. The people best placed for this task are those who are already absorbed in these interests as a result of the work they do in the Council of Europe. I feel it would be a good idea to make this clear to the public.

I now return to a long-running question. A detailed report was drawn up on the first ten years of WEU. It might even be called a scholarly publication. The same was done for WEU's second decade, but we have neglected our own history where the third decade is concerned. I have put down questions on this, and I have collected signatures for a motion on the subject. There has been correspondence with Mr. Caro and with you, Mr. President. Why are we so dilatory in taking an interest in ourselves? Why do we not seize every opportunity to arouse the interest of others? Mr. President, it cannot be just a question of money. Reports have been drawn up in the past, and the same must be done today, otherwise we will fall behind and leave a gap in our own history. Among other things, I am thinking of the reactivation of WEU.

Mr. President, the little orange book needs a facelift. The typography needs to be made more easily accessible. The new logo must be prominent, and we must try to word the text in such a way that it can be included in a series of similar publications. It should not be just a booklet to be left about on a table, at some conference or other, or in this building, to which the public does not have access. There is a French series entitled "Que sais-je?", which deals with such international institutions as UNESCO and the United Nations, but once again, WEU is conspicuous by its absence. I recommend that, together with the Chairman of our committee and the press service, an attempt be made to have WEU included in this series. Once that has been done, it will also be easier to have translations published in other countries.

Mr. President, in the Tour de France the man who brings up the rear carries the red lamp, as it were. The public wait to give him a special round of applause. That is all good fun in a competition. As I said earlier, I do not need applause. If I wanted applause I would have to go to a different theatre. Be that as it may, I now take pleasure in handing the red lamp back to you.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In reply to your introductory remarks, may I point out that only the draft order of business adopted by the Assembly on the first day of this part-session holds good. Nevertheless, under the Rules of Procedure it is possible to amend this draft order of business in the light of the progress of our work. Therefore, what you see as confusion is not confusion because, I repeat, only the draft order of business holds good, until it is amended by the Assembly.

I trust too that you will understand that the President has to enter into consultations if the Chairman or Rapporteur of a committee wishes the draft order of business to be amended. That is why these consultations were entered into, but no consensus was reached. Therefore I did not myself introduce a proposal to amend the order of business.

Nobody else has asked to speak...

I call Mr. Caro.

Mr. CARO (*France*) (Translation). – That is true, Mr. President, but I am bound to say that on behalf of most of our colleagues I support the efforts of our friend Mr. Tummers. I also hope that the wishes he expressed will be fulfilled. There is no doubt that publication of the "little orange book", as he calls it, provides a basis for updating and improving public awareness of our Assembly. But all these efforts should be directed at improving, indeed widening public awareness of Western European Union. Of course, what is important is the substance, and everything depends on the quality of our debates and on the way in which we succeed in making public opinion aware of current political realities in Europe. Once we have got round to that, this booklet will enable the media to publish more about us and what we are doing.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – I thank Mr. Caro for his apposite remarks. The Rapporteur made a point of his distaste for applause, but I suggest that the Assembly, even though few in numbers, should warmly applaud Mr. Tummers for the hard work he has done. It was a well thought-out and well-presented contribution on a document which should in the future become a kind of bible of our organisation, and which I hope will enjoy as much success as another little book of a different colour did in the past.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now vote on the draft order contained in Document 1206.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft order.

The President (continued)

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case. We shall therefore vote by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

*The draft order is agreed to unanimously*¹.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. May I explain my vote? I voted in favour, but there are two problems. First, there is the problem of this business being last on the agenda. Something always has to be last, but if it was a different committee's report, that committee might complain.

Much more important is the thinness of the ranks in the chamber. That is partly because of the way in which we run our affairs. Time and again, speakers put their name down on the list and do not turn up, which throws the timetable out. Amendments are tabled and people do not turn up to defend them, which also puts the timetable out. Time and again we plan to meet on the Thursday afternoon, but then there are changes and people are messed around. In future we must be firm. If we propose to sit on the Thursday afternoon, we should not try to change it. I suggest, Mr. President, that you write to the delegation leaders asking them to tell all their members that we know the dates six months ahead and members must keep clear those four days to give priority to the business here. Otherwise what has happened until now will continue to happen.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have listened to your suggestions, but I would remind the Assembly that nobody prevents its members from attending the last sitting.

1. See page 47.

4. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The minutes of the previous sitting have just been distributed. I have not had time to read them, but I wish to inform the Assembly of this fact. The Presidential Committee may adopt them later on.

5. Close of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, we have now reached the end of the session.

Before formally declaring the session closed I should like to congratulate and thank the members of our Assembly for their hard work and for the quality of their speeches.

I believe I speak for all members of the Assembly in expressing our warmest thanks to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council, to the Ministers and to the Secretary-General who have spoken from this rostrum and have answered our questions with good grace.

I would also thank all the representatives of the press who have been present at our discussions and have reported them for readers in their respective countries.

Finally I should like to express our sincere appreciation of all the permanent and temporary staff, particularly our interpreters, who have worked with their usual efficiency to give us excellent support in our debates.

May I give you all, a little prematurely, my best wishes for Christmas and the New Year and look forward to a new session in 1990, which I trust will prove as fruitful as the preceding ones.

I declare the thirty-fifth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union closed.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 2.50 p.m.)

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