

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

PROCEEDINGS

THIRTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION

FIRST PART

June 1988

II

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

WEU

PARIS

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The proceedings of the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes:

Volume I: Assembly documents.

Volume II: Orders of the day and minutes of proceedings, official report of debates, general index.

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LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

BELGIUM

Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	SP
BIEFNOT Yvon	PS
DERYCKE Erik	SP
PÉCRIAUX Nestor	PS
Mrs. STAELS-DOMPAS Nora	CVP
MM. STEVERLYNCK Antoon	CVP
VREVEN Alfred	PVV

Substitutes

MM. DE BONDT Ferdinand	CVP
DE DECKER Armand	PRL
EICHER Bernard-J.	PS
MONFILS Philippe-J.F.	PRL
NOERENS René	PVV
VAN DER BIEST Alain	PS
VAN HECKE Johan	CVP

FRANCE

Representatives

MM. BASSINET Philippe	Socialist
BAUMEL Jacques	RPR
CARO Jean-Marie	UDF-CDS
de CHAMBRUN Charles	National Front
COLLETTE Henri	RPR
CROZE Pierre	Ind. Rep
FOURRÉ Jean-Pierre	Socialist
GALLEY Robert	RPR
GREMETZ Maxime	Communist
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDP
KOEHL Emile	UDF
Mrs. LALUMIÈRE Catherine	Socialist
MM. MATRAJA Pierre	Socialist
OEHLER Jean	Socialist
PORTIER Henri	RPR
SEITLINGER Jean	UDF-CDS
VALLEIX Jean	RPR

Substitutes

MM. ALLONCLE Michel	RPR
ANDRÉ René	RPR
BICHET Jacques	UDF
BOHL André	UCDP
BORDU Gérard	Communist
CHARTRON Jacques	RPR
CHÉNARD Alain	Socialist

MM. DHAILLE Paul	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	RPR
HUNAUULT Xavier	UDF (App.)
LACOUR Pierre	UCDP
MONTASTRUC Pierre	UDF
PONTILLON Robert	Socialist
PRAT Henri	Socialist
RUET Roland	Ind. Rep.
SIRGUE Pierre	National Front
SOUVET Louis	RPR
Mrs. TRAUTMANN Catherine	Socialist

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ANTRETTNER Robert	SPD
BÖHM Wilfried	CDU/CSU
BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
HITSCHLER Walter	FDP
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
IRMER Ulrich	FDP
KITTELMANN Peter	CDU/CSU
Mrs. LUUK Dagmar	SPD
MM. MECHTERSHEIMER Alfred	Die Grünen
MÜLLER Günther	CDU/CSU
NIEGEL Lorenz	CDU/CSU
REDDEMANN Gerhard	CDU/CSU
SCHEER Hermann	SPD
SCHMITZ Hans Peter	CDU/CSU
von SCHMUDE Michael	CDU/CSU
SOELL Hartmut	SPD
UNLAND Hermann Josef	CDU/CSU

Substitutes

Mr. ABELEIN Manfred	CDU/CSU
Mrs. BEER Angelika	Die Grünen
Mrs. BLUNCK Lieselott	SPD
MM. BÜHLER Klaus	CDU/CSU
DUVE Freimut	SPD
FELDMANN Olaf	FPD
Mrs. FISCHER Leni	CDU/CSU
MM. GLOTZ Peter	SPD
KLEJDZINSKI Karl-Heinz	SPD
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU/CSU
LENZER Christian	CDU/CSU
Mrs. PACK Doris	CDU/CSU
MM. SCHMIDT Manfred	SPD
STEINER Heinz-Alfred	SPD
Mrs. TIMM Helga	SPD
MM. WULFF Otto	CDU/CSU
ZIERER Benno	CDU/CSU
ZYWIETZ Werner	FDP

ITALY

Representatives

MM. CACCIA Paolo	Chr. Dem.
FILETTI Cristoforo	MSI-DN
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
GABBUZZIANI Elio	Communist
INTINI Ugo	Socialist
KESSLER Bruno	Chr. Dem.
MALFATTI Franco Maria	Chr. Dem.
MARTINO Guido	Republican
NATALI Antonio	Socialist
PARISI Francesco	Chr. Dem.
PECCHIOLI Ugo	Communist
PIERALLI Piero	Communist
RODOTA Stefano	Ind. Left
RUBBI Antonio	Communist
SALVI Franco	Chr. Dem.
SARTI Adolfo	Chr. Dem.
SINESIO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
TARAMELLI Antonio	Communist

Substitutes

MM. ANDREIS Sergio	Verdi
CANNATA Giuseppe	Communist
CAPANNA Mario	Prol. Dem.
CARIGLIA Antonio	PSDI
FASSINO Giuseppe	Liberal
FIANDROTTI Filippo	Socialist
FOSCHI Franco	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. FRANCESE Angela	Communist
MM. GIAGU DEMARTINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
GRECO Francesco	Communist
MANZOLINI Giovanni	PSDI
PANNELLA Marco	Radical
PASQUINO Gianfranco	Ind. Left
RAUTI Giuseppe	MSI-DN
RUBNER Hans	SVP
SPITELLA Giorgio	Chr. Dem.
STEGAGNINI Bruno	Chr. Dem.
TRIGLIA Riccardo	Chr. Dem.

LUXEMBOURG

Representatives

MM. BURGER René	Soc. Chr.
GOERENS Charles	Dem.
LINSTER Roger	Soc. Workers

Substitutes

Mr. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
Mrs. HENNICOT-SCHOEPGES Erna	Soc. Chr.
Mr. KONEN René	Dem.

NETHERLANDS

Representatives

MM. AARTS Harry	CDA
de JONG Frans	CDA
de KWAADSTENIET Willem	CDA
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
TUMMERS Nicolas	Labour
van der WERFF Ymenus	Liberal
WORRELL Joop	Labour

Substitutes

Mrs. BAARVELD-SCHLAMAN Elisabeth	Labour
MM. de BEER Leopold	Liberal
DE HOOP SCHEFFER Jakob	CDA
EISMA Doeke	D66
Mrs. HERFKENS Eveline	Labour
MM. MARIS Pieter	CDA
van der SANDEN Piet	CDA

UNITED KINGDOM

Representatives

MM. COLEMAN Donald	Labour
COX Thomas	Labour
EWING Harry	Labour
Dame Peggy FENNER	Conservative
Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG	Conservative
MM. GARRETT Edward	Labour
HARDY Peter	Labour
HILL James	Conservative
JESSEL Toby	Conservative
Sir Russell JOHNSTON	Liberal
Earl of KINNOULL	Conservative
MM. MORRIS Michael	Conservative
PARRY Robert	Labour
SHELTON William	Conservative
Sir Dudley SMITH	Conservative
MM. SPEED Keith	Conservative
STOKES John	Conservative
WILKINSON John	Conservative

Substitutes

MM. ATKINSON David	Conservative
BOWDEN Andrew	Conservative
FAULDS Andrew	Labour
GALE Roger	Conservative
HOWELL Ralph	Conservative
HUNT John	Conservative
Lord KIRKHILL	Labour
MM. LAMBIE David	Labour
LITHERLAND Robert	Labour
LORD Michael	Conservative
Lord MACKIE	Liberal
Lord NEWALL	Conservative
MM. RATHBONE Tim	Conservative
REDMOND Martin	Labour
Lord RODNEY	Conservative
Ms. RUDDOCK Joan	Labour
MM. STEWART Allan	Conservative
THOMPSON John	Labour

I
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 6th June 1988

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the thirty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Election of the President of the Assembly.
4. Address by the President of the Assembly.
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session (Doc. 1130).
7. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1143).
8. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
9. Address by Mr. Serra, Minister of Defence of Spain and Chairman of the Independent European Programme Group.
10. European co-operation in armaments research and development – guidelines drawn from the colloquy (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 1141 and amendments).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Jung, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, the Provisional President declared open the thirty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

3. Examination of credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letter from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe informing the Assembly that the credentials of the representatives and substitutes listed in Notice No. 1 had been ratified by that Assembly.

4. Address by the Provisional President

The Provisional President addressed the Assembly.

5. Election of the President of the Assembly

Only one candidate was proposed for the post of President, namely Mr. Goerens.

In accordance with Rule 10 (4) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the President by acclamation.

Mr. Goerens was elected President by acclamation.

At the invitation of the Provisional President, Mr. Goerens took the Chair.

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The President addressed the Assembly.

7. Observers

The President welcomed the observers from Denmark, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.

8. Election of four Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Four candidates had been proposed for posts of Vice-President, namely, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Péciaux, Mr. Sarti and Mr. Soell.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Pécriaux, Mr. Sarti and Mr. Soell were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

9. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session

(Doc. 1130)

The President proposed the adoption of the draft order of business.

Speakers: MM. Stoffelen, Kittelmann, Reddemann, Stoffelen, Linster, Martino.

The Assembly agreed to the proposal of MM. Stoffelen and Kittelmann to apply, in accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure, urgent procedure for the report on disarmament which was expected to be adopted by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on Tuesday, 7th June.

Subject to these observations, the Assembly adopted the draft order of business for the first part of the session.

10. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1143)

The report of the Presidential Committee was presented by Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly.

Speaker: Mr. Inan (Observer from Turkey).

The Assembly took note of the report of the Presidential Committee.

11. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU

Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU addressed the Assembly.

12. Address by Mr. Serra, Minister of Defence of Spain and Chairman of the Independent European Programme Group

Mr. Serra, Minister of Defence of Spain and Chairman of the Independent European Programme Group, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Serra answered a question put by Mr. van der Werff.

13. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees:

1. COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS

	<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. De Decker Derycke Steverlyncx	MM. Pécriaux Vreven Van Hecke

2. GENERAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

<i>Belgium:</i>	Mr. Pécriaux Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Van der Biest	MM. Adriaensens De Decker
<i>Federal Republic of Germany:</i>	Mr. Hitschler (in place of Mr. Rumpf)	Mr. Zywiets
<i>United Kingdom:</i>		Mr. Stokes (in place of Lady Jill Knight)

3. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND AEROSPACE QUESTIONS

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Adriaensens De Bondt	Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Noerens
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4. COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY AFFAIRS AND ADMINISTRATION

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Biefnot Noerens	MM. Steverlynck Monfils
<i>United Kingdom:</i>		Mr. Lord (in place of Mr. Stokes)

5. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRIVILEGES

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. Derycke Eicher	MM. De Decker Van Hecke
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6. COMMITTEE FOR PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

<i>Belgium:</i>	MM. De Bondt Vreven	Mrs. Staels-Dompas Mr. Van der Biest
<i>United Kingdom:</i>	MM. Ewing (in place of Mr. Faulds) Hunt (in place of Lady Jill Knight)	Mr. Faulds (in place of Mr. Coleman)

**14. European co-operation in armaments research
and development – guidelines drawn
from the colloquy**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report
of the Committee on Scientific,
Technological and Aerospace Questions,
Doc. 1141 and amendments)*

The report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Müller and Klejdzinski.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: Sir Dudley Smith, MM. Lambie, Coleman and Ewing.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

15. Guest speakers

*(Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure,
Doc. 1146)*

The President announced that a motion for an order on guest speakers had been tabled by Mr. Linster with a request for urgent procedure.

In accordance with Rule 43 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly would examine this request at the beginning of its morning sitting on Tuesday, 7th June.

**16. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 7th June, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.35 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	United Kingdom
MM. <i>Noerens</i> (Adriaensens) <i>Derycke</i> <i>Eicher</i> (Pécriaux)	MM. <i>Caccia</i> <i>Rauti</i> (Filetti) <i>Triglia</i> (Fioret)	MM. <i>Coleman</i> <i>Lambie</i> (Cox) <i>Ewing</i>
Mrs. <i>Staels-Dompas</i>	<i>Malfatti</i> <i>Martino</i> <i>Greco</i> (Pecchioli)	Dame <i>Peggy Fenner</i> Lord <i>Rodney</i> (Sir Geoffrey <i>Finsberg</i>)
France	<i>Pieralli</i> <i>Sarti</i> <i>Sinesio</i> <i>Taramelli</i>	MM. <i>Garrett</i> <i>Hardy</i> <i>Hill</i> <i>Stewart</i> (Jessel)
MM. <i>Bassinot</i> <i>Jung</i> <i>Pontillon</i> (Matraja)	Luxembourg	Lord <i>Mackie</i> (Sir Russell <i>Johnston</i>)
Federal Republic of Germany	MM. <i>Burger</i> <i>Konen</i> (Goerens) <i>Linster</i>	Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of <i>Kinnoull</i>)
MM. <i>Ahrens</i> <i>Antretter</i> <i>Lenzer</i> (Böhm) <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) <i>Kittelmann</i>	Netherlands	MM. <i>Rathbone</i> (Morris) <i>Parry</i> <i>Shelton</i> Sir <i>Dudley Smith</i>
Mrs. <i>Luuk</i>	MM. <i>Aarts</i> <i>De Hoop Scheffer</i> (de Jong)	MM. <i>Speed</i> <i>Stokes</i> <i>Wilkinson</i>
MM. <i>Müller</i> <i>Niegel</i> <i>Reddemann</i>	<i>de Kwaadsteniet</i> <i>Stoffelen</i> <i>Tummers</i> <i>van der Werff</i> <i>Worrell</i>	
Mrs. <i>Blunck</i> (Scheer)		
MM. <i>Zierer</i> (Schmitz) von <i>Schmude</i> <i>Soell</i> <i>Bühler</i> (Unland)		

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. <i>Galley</i> <i>Gremetz</i> <i>Jeambrun</i> <i>Koehl</i>	MM. <i>Irmer</i> <i>Mechtersheimer</i>
MM. <i>Biefnot</i> <i>Steverynck</i> <i>Vreven</i>	Mrs. <i>Lalumière</i> MM. <i>Oehler</i> <i>Portier</i> <i>Seitlinger</i> <i>Valleix</i>	Italy
France	Federal Republic of Germany	MM. <i>Gabbuggiani</i> <i>Intini</i> <i>Kessler</i> <i>Natali</i> <i>Parisi</i> <i>Rodotà</i> <i>Rubbi</i> <i>Salvi</i>
MM. <i>Baumel</i> <i>Caro</i> <i>de Chambrun</i> <i>Collette</i> <i>Croze</i> <i>Fourré</i>	MM. <i>Büchner</i> <i>Hitschler</i>	

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 7th June 1988

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Guest speakers (*Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1146).
2. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.
3. European co-operation in armaments research and development – guidelines drawn from the colloquy (*Vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1141 and amendments).
4. Threat assessment (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the revised draft recommendation*, Doc. 1115 addendum).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.15 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Guest speakers

(Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1146)

In accordance with Rule 43 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the motion for an order on guest speakers.

Speakers: Mr. Soell and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the request for urgent procedure.

The request for urgent procedure was agreed to.

4. Structure of the Office of the Clerk

(Motion for an order, Doc. 1145)

Mr. Linster presented the motion for an order tabled by Mr. Sinesio and others.

In accordance with Rule 16 (3) of the Rules of

Procedure, the motion for an order was referred to the Presidential Committee.

5. Threat assessment

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1115 addendum)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Mr. Hardy and Dame Peggy Fenner.

The debate was adjourned.

6. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands

Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. van Eekelen answered questions put by MM. Eicher, Hardy and Wilkinson.

7. European co-operation in armaments research and development – guidelines drawn from the colloquy

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1141 and amendments)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

The President recalled that Amendment 2 had been withdrawn.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski:

6. Leave out paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Recognising the importance of maintaining a defence industrial base within the member nations of WEU based on an economic division of work and adapted to the relevant threat;”

Speakers: MM. Klejdzinski and Wilkinson.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mrs. Francese and others:

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Concerned by the increase in clandestine sales of arms to belligerent countries,”

Speakers: MM. Pieralli and Wilkinson.

The amendment was agreed to.

Speakers (points of order): MM. Wilkinson, Stoffelen, Wilkinson, Büchner and Klejdzinski.

On the proposal of Mr. Wilkinson, the Assembly decided to vote by roll-call on Amendments 4, 7, 5, 8 and 9.

An amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Hardy and others:

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “research agency” insert “concerned with conventional capacities”.

Speakers: MM. Hardy and Wilkinson.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 4) was tabled by Mr. Hardy and others:

4. Leave out paragraph 3 (b) of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers: MM. Hardy, Garrett and Wilkinson.

Amendment 4 was negated on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 22 votes to 22 with 2 abstentions; 11 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote.

Speakers (points of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Coleman and Ewing.

An amendment (No. 7) was tabled by Mrs. Francese and others:

7. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers: MM. Pieralli, Wilkinson, Pieralli and Wilkinson.

Mr. Wilkinson withdrew his request for a vote by roll-call.

The amendment was negated.

An amendment (No. 5) was tabled by Mr. Hardy and others:

5. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, at the end, add “but without effecting any reduction in research and development for non-military purposes”.

Speakers: MM. Hardy and Wilkinson.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 8) was tabled by Mrs. Francese and others:

8. Leave out paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper.

Speakers: MM. Pieralli and Wilkinson.

The amendment was negated.

An amendment (No. 9) was tabled by Mrs. Francese and others:

9. Insert a new paragraph at the end of the draft recommendation proper as follows:

“To take measures, co-ordinated between members of WEU and with the various international organisations and groups of countries, to put an end to clandestine sales of arms to belligerent countries, in particular Iran and Iraq, and to countries on which the United Nations has imposed an embargo.”

Speaker: Mr. Wilkinson.

The amendment was negated.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 455)¹.

8. Threat assessment

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1115 addendum)

The debate was resumed.

Speaker: Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Litherland and Atkinson.

The debate was adjourned.

9. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

Two candidates had been proposed for the two remaining posts of Vice-President, namely, Mr. van der Werff and Mr. Valleix.

1. See page 21.

The Assembly decided unanimously not to have a secret ballot but to elect the Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

Mr. van der Werff and Mr. Valleix were elected Vice-Presidents by acclamation.

The President informed the Assembly that the order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents according to age was as follows: Mr. van der Werff, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Sarti, Mr. Soell and Mr. Pécriaux.

*10. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting*

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.

APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance¹:

Belgium	Italy	Netherlands
MM. <i>Noerens</i> (Adriaensens) Derycke <i>Eicher</i> (Péciaux)	MM. Caccia <i>Rauti</i> (Filetti) <i>Fassino</i> (Fioret) <i>Rubner</i> (Kessler)	MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen Tummers van der Werff Worrell
Mrs. Staels-Dompas	Malfatti Martino <i>Greco</i> (Pecchioli)	
France	Pieralli Rubbi <i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Salvi)	United Kingdom
MM. <i>Pontillon</i> (Matraja)	Sarti Sinesio Taramelli	MM. Coleman <i>Litherland</i> (Cox) Ewing Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. Garrett Hardy <i>Atkinson</i> (Hill) <i>Stewart</i> (Jessel) Sir Russell Johnston Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull)
Federal Republic of Germany		MM. Morris Parry Shelton Sir Dudley Smith MM. Speed Stokes Wilkinson
MM. Ahrens Antretter Büchner <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) Kittelmann	Luxembourg	
Mrs. Luuk MM. Müller Reddemann Steiner Zierer Soell Bühler	MM. Burger <i>Konen</i> (Goerens) Linster	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Gremetz Jeambrun Jung Koehl	MM. Mechttersheimer Niegel von Schmude
MM. Biefnot Steverynck Vreven	Mrs. Lalumière MM. Oehler Portier Seitlinger Valleix	Italy
France		MM. Gabbuggiani Intini Natali Parisi Rodotà
MM. Bassinet Baumel Caro de Chambrun Collette Croze Fourré Galley	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
	MM. Böhm Hitschler Irmer	Mr. de Jong

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 1 by roll-call on Amendment 4 to the draft recommendation on European co-operation in armaments research and development – guidelines drawn from the colloquy (Doc. 1141)¹:

Ayes	22
Noes	22
Abstentions	2

Ayes:

MM. Ahrens	MM. <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz)	MM. Soell
Antretter	Linster	Speed
Büchner	Mrs. Luuk	Stoffelen
Coleman	MM. Parry	Taramelli
<i>Litherland</i> (Cox)	<i>Greco</i> (Pecchioli)	Tummers
Derycke	<i>Eicher</i> (Pécriaux)	Worrell
Ewing	Pieralli	
Hardy	<i>Steiner</i> (Scheer)	

Noes:

Mr. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts)	Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull)	MM. Sarti
Dame Peggy Fenner		Shelton
Mr. <i>Rauti</i> (Filetti)	MM. Kittelmann	Sir Dudley Smith
Sir Geoffrey Finsberg	Malfatti	MM. Stokes
MM. <i>Fassino</i> (Fioret)	Martino	<i>Bühler</i> (Unland)
<i>Konen</i> (Goerens)	Morris	van der Werff
<i>Atkinson</i> (Hill)	Reddemann	Wilkinson
<i>Stewart</i> (Jessel)	<i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Salvi)	

Abstentions:

MM. Garrett
de Kwaadsteniet

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 455***on European co-operation in armaments research and development –
guidelines drawn from the colloquy***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recognising the importance of maintaining a defence industrial base within the member nations of WEU based on an economic division of work and adapted to the relevant threat;
- (ii) Conscious that the budgetary allocations for defence are not likely to grow as much as the cost of new defence equipment in real terms, and that therefore better use needs to be made within Western Europe of existing financial provisions for defence;
- (iii) Aware that new technologies offer improved solutions to some of the security problems facing the western alliance;
- (iv) Believing that the IEPG has proved itself an effective instrument for harmonising the operational requirements and re-equipment timescales of the armed forces of Western Europe and that, without detracting from the political responsibilities of the WEU Council of Ministers and Assembly, it is now ready to be assigned a greater rôle in promoting joint military research;
- (v) Concerned that in spite of numerous successful collaborative equipment projects, governments in Western Europe have proved themselves unsuccessful as yet in organising a unified military research effort to eliminate the wastefulness of duplicated national research programmes;
- (vi) Hopeful that a more rational utilisation can be achieved of national armaments research, testing, trials and development establishments by opening them to use by the armed forces and armaments companies of other countries,
- (vii) Concerned by the increase in clandestine sales of arms to belligerent countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments:

1. To fulfil their rôle, repeatedly emphasised by the Council, as members of WEU to provide political impetus to bodies concerned with arms co-operation by taking decisive action to accelerate the formulation of a common policy in IEPG for military research and more cost-effective armaments development in Western Europe;
2. To establish a European advanced defence research agency concerned with conventional capacities funded from a common budget initially provided by WEU nations and later by other European NATO member countries as well;
3. To help the IEPG to meet its goals more rapidly by:
 - (a) affording the IEPG better political support through a regular institutionalised dialogue with the Assembly of WEU;
 - (b) granting it a small permanent international specialist secretariat as recommended in the EDIS report "Towards a stronger Europe";
4. To encourage individual countries to collaborate in the use of each other's armaments research, testing, trials and development establishments;
5. To mobilise more effectively the work of the universities and of the civilian research community for defence research with a corresponding mechanism to permit civilian industry to benefit commercially from the results of military research but without effecting any reduction in research and development for non-military purposes;
6. To involve defence manufacturers much more closely in the formulation of operational requirements both on a national and European basis.

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 7th June 1988

ORDERS OF THE DAY

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Address by Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom. | <i>on the revised draft recommendation, Doc. 1115 addendum).</i> |
| 2. Threat assessment (<i>Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote</i> | 3. Naval aviation (<i>Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1139).</i> |

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in Appendix I.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Mellor answered questions put by MM Hardy, Linster, Ahrens, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Rathbone, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Caccia.

4. Threat assessment

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the revised draft recommendation, Doc. 1115 addendum)

The debate was resumed.

Speaker: Mr. Steiner.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Reddemann and Rubbi.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur, and Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

Speaker (point of order): Mr. Hardy.

At the request of Mr. Stoffelen and four other members, the Assembly decided to vote by roll-call on the revised draft recommendation.

The revised draft recommendation was not agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 24 votes to 21 with 0 abstentions; 4 representatives who had signed the register of attendance did not take part in the vote.

Speakers (points of order): Sir Dudley Smith and Mr. Hardy.

5. Disarmament

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1147)

The President announced that a motion for a recommendation on disarmament had been tabled by Mr. Kittelmann on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments with a request for urgent procedure.

In accordance with Rule 43 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly would examine this request after the vote on the draft recommendation on naval aviation.

6. Naval aviation

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1139)

The report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM Hardy, Klejdzinski and Speed.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 456)¹.

7. Disarmament

*(Motion for a recommendation
with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1147)*

In accordance with Rule 43 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider

the request for urgent procedure on the motion for a recommendation on disarmament.

Speaker: Mr. Kittelmann.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the request for urgent procedure.

The request for urgent procedure was agreed to unanimously.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 8th June, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 5.40 p.m.

1. See page 26.

APPENDIX I

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. Stoffelen Tummers van der Werff Worrell
MM. Derycke <i>Eicher (Péciaux)</i>	MM. Caccia <i>Fassino (Fioret)</i> <i>Rubner (Kessler)</i> Malfatti <i>Greco (Pecchioli)</i> Pieralli Rubbi <i>Giagu Demartini (Salvi)</i> Sarti Taramelli	United Kingdom
France		MM. Coleman <i>Litherland (Cox)</i> Ewing Dame Peggy Fenner MM. <i>Hill (Sir Geoffrey Finsberg)</i> <i>Thompson (Garrett)</i> Hardy <i>Atkinson (Hill)</i> <i>Stewart (Jessel)</i> Sir Russell Johnston Earl of Kinnoull MM. Morris Parry Shelton Sir Dudley Smith MM. Speed Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Antretter Mrs. <i>Timm (Büchner)</i> MM. <i>Klejdzinski (Holtz)</i> Kittelmann Mrs. Luuk MM. Reddemann <i>Duve (Schmitz)</i> Soell <i>Bühler (Unland)</i>	Mrs. <i>Hennicot-Schoepges (Burger)</i> MM. <i>Konen (Goerens)</i> Linster	
	Netherlands	
	MM. <i>van der Sanden (Aarts)</i> de Kwadsteniet	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Jeambrun Jung Koehl Mrs. Lalumière MM. Matraja Oehler Portier Valleix	Italy
MM. Adriaensens Biefnot Mrs. Staels-Dompas MM. Steverlynck Vreven		MM. Filetti Gabbuggiani Intini Martino Natali Parisi Rodotà Sinesio
France	Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands
MM. Bassinet Baumel Caro <i>de Chambrun</i> Collette Croze Fourré Galley Gremetz	MM. Böhm Hitschler Irmer Mechtersheimer Müller <i>Nitzel</i> Scheer von Schmude	Mr. de Jong
		United Kingdom
		Mr. Stokes

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in italics.

APPENDIX II

Vote No. 2 by roll-call on the revised draft recommendation on threat assessment (Doc. 1115 addendum) ¹:

Ayes	21
Noes	24
Abstentions	0

Ayes:

Mrs. <i>Hennicot-Schoepges</i> (Burger)	MM. Kittelmann de Kwaadsteniet	MM. <i>Bohl</i> (Seitlinger) Shelton
Dame Peggy Fenner	Malfatti	Sir Dudley Smith
MM. <i>Hill</i> (Sir Geoffrey Finsberg)	Morris	MM. Speed
<i>Atkinson</i> (Hill)	Reddemann	Stokes
<i>Stewart</i> (Jessel)	<i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Salvi)	<i>Bühler</i> (Unland)
Earl of Kinnoull	Sarti	Wilkinson
		<i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts)

Noes:

MM. Ahrens	MM. Hardy	MM. Pieralli
Antretter	<i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz)	Rubbi
Mrs. <i>Timm</i> (Büchner)	Sir Russell Johnston	<i>Duve</i> (Schmitz)
MM. Coleman	Mr. Linster	Soell
<i>Litherland</i> (Cox)	Mrs. Luuk	Stoffelen
Derycke	MM. Parry	Taramelli
Ewing	<i>Greco</i> (Pecchioli)	Tummers
<i>Thompson</i> (Garrett)	<i>Eicher</i> (Pécriaux)	Worrell

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 456***on naval aviation***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that the security of the highly-industrialised countries of Western Europe depends on access to overseas markets and sources of raw materials;
- (ii) Conscious that the defences of Western Europe and of North America are interdependent and that the coalition defence of Western Europe provided through the NATO alliance depends on the maintenance of secure lines of communication across the North Atlantic for the essential process of reinforcement and resupply from Canada and the United States, for which SACLANT's Striking Fleet Atlantic with its naval air and anti-submarine assets plays a key rôle;
- (iii) Noting that both recent events in the Gulf and experience in other previous conflicts have demonstrated the importance of seapower generally and of organic naval air power in particular, and not only lead to the recognition of the strategic and economic necessity for Western Europe to retain possession and availability of national merchant fleets of adequate size, but justify the suggestion that developments in the structure and ownership of international merchant shipping merits serious consideration;
- (iv) Recognising that the strong growth and development of the Soviet navy since the early 1960s into a formidable bluewater instrument of long-range projection of power and political influence is one of the most significant strategic developments of recent years;
- (v) Approving warmly the construction of new aircraft-carrying vessels by France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, to operate a variety of air defence, attack and STOVL aircraft as well as anti-submarine, assault and AEW helicopters;
- (vi) Welcoming the enhancement of naval and maritime aviation being undertaken by the navies and air forces of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom;
- (vii) Anxious that the remarkable sophistication and impressive operational capability, as well as the large numbers of Soviet submarines should not be allowed to affect adversely the balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact;
- (viii) Believing that the current superiority in naval aviation and especially in strike carriers enjoyed by NATO is a strong factor in favour of effective deterrence and the preservation of peace which ought to be maintained, unless and until a multilateral and verifiable agreement with the USSR to reduce this capacity is secured;
- (ix) Appreciating the inherent flexibility, speed of response and freedom of operation without the constraints of fixed land bases which endow naval aviation with a uniquely important rôle in exerting political influence in crisis management and limiting the escalation of conflict;
- (x) Understanding that war at sea or hostilities outside the NATO area, such as the war between Iran and Iraq, could precipitate wider conflict unless controlled by the appropriate application of external political pressure and, if necessary, force, and that consequently the western alliance must retain assets such as naval aviation which are as relevant to operating outside the NATO area as within it and to limited conflict as to all-out war,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Urge Western European nations to maintain their significant naval force improvement plans:
 - (a) by encouraging France to pursue its aircraft carrier construction programme through the entry-into-service of two CHARLES DE GAULLE-class ships;
 - (b) by encouraging the United Kingdom to put into service at least one aviation support ship to complement the aviation training ship RFA ARGUS and thereby to retain a capability for heliborne amphibious assault, and to proceed as soon as possible to upgrade Sea Harrier aircraft to FRS 2 standards;
 - (c) by encouraging Italy to procure STOVL aircraft, preferably with an air defence capability, to supplement the ASW helicopters presently embarked in the aircraft-carrying cruiser, GARIBALDI;

- (d) by encouraging the entry-into-service on the part of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal of new, or new versions of existing maritime patrol aircraft;
2. Persuade at least the member countries with naval forces currently in the Gulf to work together to create a European standing naval force with organic naval aviation including air defence, airborne early warning, attack, anti-submarine and heliborne assault assets for deployment under single command and unified control to areas outside the NATO theatre where Western Europe's security interests are at stake in emergency or war;
3. Affirm its support for naval collaborative equipment programmes such as the EH-101 and NH-90 helicopters, the T-45 Goshawk and AV-8B aircraft, and the NFR-90 anti-submarine frigate, and related weapon systems;
4. Discuss with NATO governments ways of ensuring that priorities between purely air force and maritime air missions are so organised that:
- (a) naval commanders have a sufficiency of air assets under their direct control which cannot be diverted elsewhere by national air forces;
- (b) the procurement of new air force maritime attack aircraft such as a replacement for the Buccaneer and the A-7 Corsair in Royal Air Force and Portuguese Air Force service respectively receive the priority which from the naval point of view they deserve;
5. Explore with the governments of the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom and possibly Italy, the feasibility of co-operation in the field of Harrier pilot training on the lines of the tri-national Tornado training establishment (TTTE).

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 8th June 1988

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Organisation of European security; Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988 (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*, Docs. 1138 and amendments and 1142).
2. Second part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*, Doc. 1140).
3. Organisation of European security; Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988 (*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*, Docs. 1138 and amendments and 1142).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Organisation of European security

Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988

(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Docs. 1138 and amendments and 1142)

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur.

The report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Morris, Rapporteur.

The joint debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Hardy, Hill, Thompson and Wilkinson.

The joint debate was adjourned.

4. Second part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council

(Presentation by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1140)

The second part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council to the Assembly was presented by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den Broek answered questions put by MM. Inan (*Observer from Turkey*), Ahrens, Linster, Wilkinson, Mechttersheimer, Soell, Ahrens and van der Sanden.

5. Changes in the membership of committees

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of committees proposed by the French Delegation:

Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations

- Mr. Pontillon as a titular member in place of Mr. Seitlinger;
- Mr. Seitlinger as an alternate member in place of Mr. Chénard.

General Affairs Committee

- Mr. Chénard as a titular member in place of Mr. Pontillon;
- Mr. Pontillon as an alternate member in place of Mr. Chénard.

6. Organisation of European security

Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988

(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Docs. 1138 and amendments and 1142)

The joint debate was resumed.

Speaker: Mr. Baumel.

Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Malfatti, Rauti, Antretter and Burger.

The joint debate was closed.

7. Change in the order of business

The Assembly agreed to add at the end of the orders of the day for the morning sitting on Thursday, 9th June, all the orders of the day previously set down for the afternoon sitting on that day, namely: Disarmament (Resumed debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1147); Impact of the WEU Assembly's activities on parliaments and public opinion (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1135).

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen Tummers van der Werff Worrell
MM. Derycke <i>Eicher (Pécriaux)</i>	MM. Caccia <i>Rauti (Filetti)</i> <i>Fassino (Fioret)</i> <i>Rubner (Kessler)</i> Malfatti Martino <i>Greco (Pecchioli)</i> Pieralli <i>Giagu Demartini (Salvi)</i> Sarti Sinesio	
France		United Kingdom
MM. Baumel <i>Pontillon (Matraja)</i> <i>Bohl (Seitlinger)</i> <i>Lacour (Valleix)</i>		MM. Coleman Ewing Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Thompson (Garrett)</i> Hardy Hill <i>Stewart (Jessel)</i> Sir Russell Johnston Earl of Kinnoull MM. Morris <i>Hunt (Sir Dudley Smith)</i> Speed Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
MM. Ahrens Antretter Mrs. <i>Timm (Büchner)</i> MM. <i>Klejdzinski (Holtz)</i> Kittelmann Mechtersheimer <i>Zierer (Niegel)</i> Reddemann Soell	MM. Burger Linster	
	Netherlands	
	MM. <i>van der Sanden (Aarts)</i> de Jong	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Jeambrun Jung Koehl Mrs. Lalumière MM. Oehler Portier	Italy
MM. Adriaensens Biefnot Mrs. Staels-Dompas MM. Steverlynck Vreven		MM. Gabbuggiani Intini Natali Parisi Rodotà Rubbi Taramelli
France	Federal Republic of Germany	
MM. Bassinet Caro de Chambrun Collette Croze Fourré Galley Gremetz	MM. Böhm Hitschler Irmer Mrs. Luuk MM. Müller Scheer Schmitz von Schmude Unland	United Kingdom
		MM. Cox Parry Shelton Stokes

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 8th June 1988

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Address by Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany. *the draft recommendations, Docs. 1138 and amendments and 1142).*
2. Organisation of European security; Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988 (*Votes on*
3. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1137 and amendments).*

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Change in the membership of a committee

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following change in the membership of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations proposed by the Italian Delegation: Mr. Stegagnini as a titular member in place of Mr. Salvi.

4. Address by Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Schäfer answered questions put by Mr. Martino, Mrs. Timm, MM. Ahrens, Schmidt, van der Sanden, Klejdzinski and Sir Russell Johnston.

5. Organisation of European security

Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988

*(Votes on the draft recommendations,
Docs. 1138 and amendments and 1142)*

Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Ahrens, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, Mr. Morris, Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, and Mr. Linster, Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation on the organisation of European security.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Pieralli:

2. Add the following new text at the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper:

“and take action to facilitate the accession to WEU of all the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance who wish to join and who commit themselves in advance to the same conditions as governed the Portuguese and Spanish cases;”

Speakers: MM Pieralli and Ahrens.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation on the organisation of European security.

The amended draft recommendation was

agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 457) ¹.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft recommendation on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988.

The draft recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This recommendation will be published as No. 458) ².

Speaker (explanation of vote): Mr. Ahrens.

**6. Co-operation between Europe
and the United States
and Canada in security matters**

*(Presentation of and debate on the report of the
General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1137 and amendments)*

The report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur.

Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: MM. Hill, Wilkinson, Pieralli and Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Speakers: Mr. Martino, Lord Mackie of Benshie and Mr. Burger.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Pontillon, Rapporteur, and Mr. Ahrens, Chairman, replied to the speakers.

7. Changes in the membership of a committee

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation: Mr. Shelton as a titular member in place of Mr. Hunt; Mr. Hunt as an alternate member in place of Mr. Shelton.

**8. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting**

The orders of the day for the next sitting were agreed to.

The next sitting was fixed for Thursday, 9th June, at 10 a.m.

The sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.

1. See page 34.

2. See page 35.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. Stoffelen <i>Maris</i> (van der Werff) Worrell
Mr. <i>Eicher</i> (Péciaux)	MM. Caccia <i>Fassino</i> (Fioret) <i>Rubner</i> (Kessler) Malfatti Martino <i>Greco</i> (Pecchioli) Pieralli <i>Giagu Demartini</i> (Salvi) Sarti	United Kingdom
France		MM. Coleman Cox Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Thompson</i> (Garrett) Hardy Hill Jessel Sir Russell Johnston Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) MM. Morris Shelton <i>Hunt</i> (Sir Dudley Smith) Speed <i>Stewart</i> (Stokes) Wilkinson
Federal Republic of Germany	Luxembourg	
Mr. Ahrens Mrs. <i>Timm</i> (Büchner) MM. Hitschler <i>Klejdzinski</i> (Holtz) Kittelmann Mechtersheimer Müller Reddemann <i>Schmidt</i> (Unland)	MM. Burger Linster	
	Netherlands	
	MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) de Jong de Kwaadsteniet	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	MM. Jeambrun Jung Koehl Mrs. Lalumière MM. Oehler Portier Seitlinger Valleix	Italy
MM. Adriaensens Biefnot Derycke Mrs. Staels-Dompas MM. Steverlynck Vreven		MM. Filetti Gabbuggiani Intini Natali Parisi Rodotà Rubbi Sinesio Taramelli
France	Federal Republic of Germany	
MM. Bassinet Baumel Caro de Chambrun Collette Croze Fourré Galley Gremetz	MM. Antretter Böhm Irmer Mrs. Luuk MM. Niegel Scheer Schmitz von Schmude Unland	Netherlands
		Mr. Tummers
		United Kingdom
		MM. Ewing Parry

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 457*on the organisation of European security*

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the progress made towards the reactivation of WEU under Netherlands presidency, in particular the adoption of the platform on 27th October 1987, the co-ordinated action of member countries to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the invitation to Portugal and Spain to join WEU;
- (ii) Regretting, however, that the WEU ministerial organs have not yet been collocated and that their restructuring has not been completed;
- (iii) Also regretting the impossible position of the Assembly because of the tardy communication of the annual report of the Council to the Assembly, deploring the Council's reluctance to inform the Assembly of its activities through the channels provided for in the treaty and the Charter of the Assembly and, finally, insisting that ministers see to it that their officials comply with the time-scale agreed with the Council;
- (iv) Noting that international public opinion is still hardly aware that WEU is being reactivated;
- (v) Considering that reactivation implies not only increased intergovernmental activity but also a redefinition of the specific rôle of the organisation's permanent structures;
- (vi) Noting that the number of budgetary posts still vacant in the WEU ministerial organs would allow the Assembly's requirements to be met without waiting for the restructuring of the WEU ministerial organs to be completed;
- (vii) Also noting the petition addressed to the Assembly on 22nd March 1988 by Mr. Hintermann, former Assistant Secretary-General of WEU,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue to study the various implications of the platform adopted in The Hague and transmit the results to the Assembly;
2. Ensure the maintenance of a co-ordinated naval presence of its members in the Gulf as long as freedom of navigation is not guaranteed and, at the same time, take new steps to promote the application of Resolution 598 of the Security Council;
3. Inform international public opinion more adequately of the nature and scale of its operations in that area;
4. Pursue urgently the negotiations on the accession of Portugal and Spain to the modified Brussels Treaty and their effective participation in the Western European security system and take action to facilitate the accession to WEU of all the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance who wish to join and who commit themselves in advance to the same conditions as governed the Portuguese and Spanish cases;
5. Specify how it intends to implement the political impetus it decided to give, in the Rome declaration, to co-operation in armaments matters;
6. Define an active rôle for the Secretariat-General in the procedure for consultations between member countries that it has just introduced and in the regular communication of information to the Assembly and the public on its activities, including the transmission on time of the annual report of the Council;
7. Describe forthwith the status and tasks of the WEU agency and transmit to the Assembly the text of the studies it has undertaken to communicate to it;
8. Start or pursue, in the appropriate framework and with the possible assistance of the agency, consultations on burden-sharing in the alliance, disarmament or the verified limitation of armaments and problems facing Western Europe's security because of measures taken by its allies which might modify the deployment of NATO forces and, finally, inform the Assembly of the results of these consultations;
9. Accord the Assembly here and now the wherewithal to restructure the Office of the Clerk in accordance with its 1987 memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION 458***on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union
for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988***

The Assembly,

- (i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1987 (revised) and 1988, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter;
- (ii) Recognising that:
 - (a) future development of the budgets is stymied whilst there is no positive decision on timing and place for collocation;
 - (b) the Council has thankfully removed pension payments outside the expenditure of the Assembly, thereby enabling the Assembly to prepare realistic budgets;
- (iii) Nevertheless noting that:
 - (a) the budgets of the ministerial organs, based on the former organograms of the Secretariat-General and the Paris agencies, take no account of the many posts that have become vacant in recent years;
 - (b) consequently, estimates for "Personnel costs" in the budgets of the ministerial organs are excessive and lead to the build-up of a reserve that can be used subsequently for other purposes, as was the case in 1987;
 - (c) for the budget of the Paris agencies alone, the Council has decided to block a sum of F 4 926 000 (corresponding to six posts already vacant in 1987 and seven others which will become vacant in 1988), thereby making this sum unavailable for other requirements such as the creation of four new posts in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly;
 - (d) the Council has also reserved the right to consider the Assembly's request for these four posts in the general context of the collocation of the ministerial organs and their restructuring, although no political decision on this point seems imminent;
 - (e) application of the zero growth criterion is meaningless when related to budgets which do not reflect the true financial implications of the activities of the organs concerned or, in general, their requirements,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Without further delay, follow up the decision taken by the Council of Ministers in The Hague on 27th April 1987 to collocate the ministerial organs of WEU and give them a new organogram with new terms of reference and new tasks;
2. Decide consequently:
 - (a) to have a general revision made of the budget of the ministerial organs for 1988 to take account of this new integrated single agency situation;
 - (b) to separate the pensions budget of the ministerial organs from the operating budget;
 - (c) to ensure greater clarity in the budget of the ministerial organs and prevent sums earmarked for staff salaries and allowances being used for other purposes;
3. In the meantime, give urgent consideration to the Assembly's proposal to create four new posts in the Office of the Clerk;
4. Agree to study the problem of twin-grading at every level of the hierarchy in order to determine the conditions for possible promotions so as to improve the staff's career prospects;
5. Above all, recognise that the reactivation and credibility of WEU is dependent on these decisions.

SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 9th June 1988

ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1137 and amendments*).
2. Disarmament (The prospects for Western Europe after the Moscow summit) (*Presentation of, debate and vote on the draft recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1147 and amendment*).
3. Address by Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
4. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Doc. 1133*).
5. Impact of the WEU Assembly's activities on parliaments and public opinion (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1135*).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

1. Attendance register

The names of the representatives and substitutes who signed the register of attendance are given in the appendix.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting were agreed to.

3. Tribute

The President paid tribute to the late Mr. Georges Housiaux, former President of the Assembly.

The Assembly observed a minute's silence in memory of Mr. Housiaux.

4. Change in the membership of a committee

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly agreed to the following change in the membership of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges proposed by the Italian Delegation: Mr. Salvi as an alternate member in place of Mr. Stegagnini.

5. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1137 and amendments)

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Pontillon:

2. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Noting with satisfaction that the United States and Canadian Governments do not intend to call in question their conventional and nuclear military commitment in Europe;”

Speakers: MM Pontillon and Ahrens.

The amendment was agreed to.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Soell.

1. Leave out paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Convinced that the negotiations on security and co-operation in Europe, disarmament and the limitation of armaments should help to strengthen the basis of joint defence;”

Speakers: MM. Ahrens and Pontillon, who proposed inserting “which it trusts can be started in 1988 and lead to positive results” after “limitation of armaments”.

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

Amendments (Nos. 3, 4 and 5) were tabled by Mr. Pontillon:

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, before "American" add "North".

4. At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, add "and Canada".

5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "the United States" and insert "North America".

The amendments were agreed to.

An amendment (No. 6) was tabled by Mr. Pontillon:

6. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "deployed" and insert "earmarked for deployment".

Speaker: Mr. Pontillon.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 459¹).

6. Disarmament *(The prospects for Western Europe after the Moscow summit)*

*(Presentation of, debate and vote
on the draft recommendation
of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments,
Doc. 1147 and amendment)*

The draft recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speakers: Sir Geoffrey Finsberg and Mr. Hardy.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair.

Speakers: MM. Tummers, de Kwaadsteniet, Reddemann and Mrs. Timm.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft recommendation.

An amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Kittelmann and others:

1. See page 40.

1. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

"Continue to press for the earliest opening of negotiations on conventional stability concentrating on asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals and for progress on all three baskets of the CSCE, particularly the one on human rights, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and understanding;"

Speaker: Mr. Kittelmann.

The amendment was agreed to.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

The amended draft recommendation was agreed to. (This recommendation will be published as No. 460)¹.

The sitting was suspended at 11 a.m. and resumed at 11.05 a.m.

7. Address by Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy

Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.

Mr. Manzolini answered a question put by Mr. Martino.

8. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure

*(Presentation of the report
of the Committee on Rules of Procedure
and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Doc. 1133)*

The report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was presented by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur.

On behalf of the Presidential Committee, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg reported that the motion for an order on guest speakers tabled by Mr. Soell and others had been referred to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft decision.

The draft decision was agreed to unanimously. (This decision will be published as No. 2)².

1. See page 42.

2. See page 43.

**9. Impact of the WEU Assembly's activities
on parliaments and public opinion**

*(Presentation of and debate
on the report of the Committee
for Parliamentary and Public Relations
and vote on the draft order,
Doc. 1135)*

The report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations was presented by Mr. Hardy on behalf of Mr. Chénard, Rapporteur.

The debate was opened.

Speaker: Mr. Tummers.

The debate was closed.

Mr. Hardy and Mr. Pontillon, Chairman, replied to the speaker.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft order.

The draft order was agreed to unanimously. (This order will be published as No. 71)¹.

10. Adjournment of the session

The President adjourned the thirty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly.

The sitting was closed at 12.05 p.m.

1. See page 44.

APPENDIX

Names of representatives or substitutes who signed the register of attendance ¹:

Belgium	Italy	MM. Tummers <i>Maris</i> (van der Werff)
Mr. <i>Eicher</i> (Pécriaux)	MM. Caccia <i>Rubner</i> (Kessler) Martino <i>Greco</i> (Pecchioli) Pieralli Sarti	United Kingdom
France		MM. Cox <i>Lambie</i> (Ewing) Dame Peggy Fenner Sir Geoffrey Finsberg MM. <i>Thompson</i> (Garrett) Hardy Hill Lord <i>Rodney</i> (Jessel) Sir Russell Johnston Lord <i>Newall</i> (Earl of Kinnoull) MM. <i>Stewart</i> (Morris) Shelton Sir Dudley Smith MM. Speed <i>Hunt</i> (Stokes) Wilkinson
Mr. <i>Pontillon</i> (Matraja)	Luxembourg	
	Mr. Burger	
Federal Republic of Germany	Netherlands	
MM. Ahrens Antretter Mrs. <i>Fischer</i> (Böhm) Mrs. Timm (Büchner) MM. Hitschler <i>Steiner</i> (Holtz) Kittelmann Mechtersheimer Reddemann	MM. <i>van der Sanden</i> (Aarts) de Jong de Kwaadsteniet Stoffelen	

The following representatives apologised for their absence:

Belgium	Mrs. Lalumière MM. Oehler Portier Seitlinger Valleix	MM. Intini Malfatti Natali Parisi Rodotà Rubbi Salvi Sinesio Taramelli
MM. Adriaensens Biefnot Derycke Mrs. Staels-Dompas MM. Steverlynck Vreven	Federal Republic of Germany	
	Mr. Irmer Mrs. Luuk MM. Müller Niegel Scheer Schmitz von Schmude Soell Unland	Luxembourg
France		Mr. Linster
MM. Bassinet Baumel Caro de Chambrun Collette Croze Fourré Galley Gremetz Jeambrun Jung Koehl	Italy	Netherlands
	MM. Filetti Fioret Gabbugiani	Mr. Worrell
		United Kingdom
		MM. Coleman Parry

1. The names of substitutes replacing representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

RECOMMENDATION 459***on co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada
in security matters***

The Assembly,

- (i) Considering that the determination of the WEU member countries to contribute, by reactivating the organisation, to the building of Europe means tightening links between Europe and its American allies, as stated in the platform adopted in The Hague;
- (ii) Welcoming the confirmation of a consensus in this respect between the two sides of the Atlantic, as testified by the President of the United States' public approval of the reactivation of WEU and the platform adopted in The Hague;
- (iii) Convinced that the maintenance of a large American force on the territory of Western Europe is a factor of deterrence essential to the security of all the members of the Atlantic Alliance;
- (iv) Noting with satisfaction that the United States and Canadian Governments do not intend to call in question their conventional and nuclear military commitment in Europe;
- (v) Aware of the need to show the authorities and public opinion in the member countries of the alliance that the existence of a European pillar is necessary for strong, balanced transatlantic co-operation;
- (vi) Reaffirming the need for equitable burden-sharing accompanied by a better sharing of political responsibilities in the Atlantic Alliance and in any event underlining the need for regular political consultations and a real European-American partnership;
- (vii) Convinced that the negotiations on security and co-operation in Europe, disarmament and the limitation of armaments, which it trusts can be started in 1988 and lead to positive results, should help to strengthen the basis of joint defence;
- (viii) – Also convinced that European co-operation in security matters and the interests of the alliance mean taking account of the risks that might arise from events outside the North Atlantic Treaty area;
 - Welcoming the mutual understanding regarding operations undertaken by various countries to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf;
 - Noting that these operations demonstrate the need for continuous and close co-operation between the member nations;
- (ix) Wishing to develop, increase the regularity of and institutionalise its exchanges with the United States Congress and Canadian Parliament,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Keep the governments and parliaments of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance regularly informed of its activities;
2. Provide adequate information on a regular basis to the North American media and public regarding the nature, scope and aims of the reactivation of WEU, the specific constraints of the WEU countries in security matters and European co-operation in that area;
3. With the assistance of the WEU agency, study views on the future of the Atlantic Alliance published in the United States and Canada;
4. Include burden-sharing in the agenda of its forthcoming meetings, taking account of the concerns and contradictory analyses being presented in North America and in Europe on this question;
5. Instruct the agency to prepare a study of every factor to be taken into account in assessing the burdens incumbent upon each member of the alliance for ensuring joint security and communicate this study to the Assembly before the end of 1988;
6. Examine the consequences for the security of Western Europe as a whole of Canada's decision to transfer to the Federal Republic the brigade now earmarked for deployment in Norway;
7. Continue to study the implications of the platform of 27th October 1987 with a view to defining the disarmament and arms control aspects of European security requirements:

- (i)* in particular, specify the importance for Western European security of conventional disarmament establishing a balance at the lowest level in that field without which any agreement to reduce short-range weapons would worsen the consequences of the present imbalance;
 - (ii)* urge the early conclusion of a fully satisfactory agreement on chemical disarmament, i.e. providing for stringent verification procedure;
 - (iii)* urge the United States Government not to reduce the levels of American troops stationed in Europe without a satisfactory agreement on duly-verified conventional disarmament;
8. Regularly exchange information as necessary with the United States Government on the aims and action of forces of member countries and the United States in the Gulf;
 9. Extend its own exchanges of views to include all threats to international peace.

RECOMMENDATION 460***on disarmament***

The Assembly,

- (i) Welcoming the recent summit meeting in Moscow between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union as a further step towards arms limitation;
- (ii) Welcoming the ratification of the INF treaty by the Senate of the United States (as recommended in Resolution 77 adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1987) and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR;
- (iii) Disappointed that a bilateral agreement on reductions in strategic weapons systems was not ready in time for the summit meeting, but convinced nevertheless that there is a firm basis for such an agreement, incorporating effective means of verification, and that this should be seen as of paramount importance;
- (iv) Recalling and approving the Council statement in The Hague, that Western European Union will pursue an active arms control and disarmament policy exploiting "all opportunities to make further progress towards arms reductions, compatible with our security and with our priorities";
- (v) Convinced that the European nations and particularly Western European Union members should contribute substantially to the process of arms control,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Continue to press for the earliest opening of negotiations on conventional stability concentrating on asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals and for progress on all three baskets of the CSCE, particularly the one on human rights, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and understanding;
2. Express full support for a properly verifiable bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union which would provide for at least a 50% reduction in strategic missile forces;
3. Apply the principles defined in The Hague platform to determine and uphold European security interests in the context of negotiations on disarmament and the control of armaments;
4. Press member governments to initiate urgent research into verification technology so that Western Europe is ready to contribute practically to conventional arms control agreements;
5. Associate the WEU Agency closely with its reflection and work on disarmament and arms control, ensuring that the considerable expertise and experience acquired by the Agency for the control of armaments is not neglected and dissipated at the very moment that considerations such as verification are assuming paramount importance, and instruct the Agency *inter alia* to:
 - (a) study conditions for conventional disarmament respecting European security requirements;
 - (b) study methods of verifying conventional and chemical disarmament.

DECISION 2

on the revision of Rules 33, 34, 40, 48 and 51 of the Rules of Procedure

The Assembly

DECIDES

To amend Rules 33, 34, 40, 48 and 51 as follows:

1. *Rule 33*

At the beginning of paragraph 1, leave out “ The Assembly shall vote by sitting and standing ” and insert “ The Assembly shall vote by show of hands ”.

2. *Rule 34*

Replace sub-paragraph (a) by the following text:

“ on the one hand, for the adoption of amendments to the Charter, for the adoption of a motion to disagree to the annual report or to any part of the report or for the adoption of a request for urgent procedure without prior reference to committee and, on the other hand, for acceptance of a draft budget that does not conform with the Council’s opinion: a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the Assembly. ”

3. *Rule 40*

At the end of paragraph 4 (b), add:

“ However, even if this quorum is not obtained, the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges may vote on a report as a whole provided all the national delegations are represented and there is no opposition when the vote is taken. ”

4. *Rule 48*

At the end of paragraph 3, add “ which shall express a prior opinion ”.

Add the following new paragraphs after paragraph 3:

“ 4. When the prior opinion of the Council includes reductions in appropriations, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration may, in consultation with the Presidential Committee, present a draft budget to the Assembly which does not conform with the prior opinion of the Council. Acceptance of such a draft budget shall require the votes of a number of representatives or substitutes equal to more than half the number of representatives to the Assembly.

5. If the Council refuses to adopt the draft budget accepted by the Assembly in these conditions, the Presidential Committee shall be responsible for settling the dispute with the Council and ask for a joint meeting to this end. The Presidential Committee shall report to the Assembly on the results of any such meeting and, if necessary, propose that it ratify whatever action it had had to take, including acceptance of the budget as amended by the Council. ”

Renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

5. *Rule 51*

Insert a new paragraph 1:

“ The Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges may at any time consider the expediency of revising the Rules of Procedure. At its request, the Presidential Committee shall include in the agenda of the Assembly a report by the committee on the revision of the Rules of Procedure. ”

Former paragraph 1 becomes paragraph 2, the first sentence being drafted as follows:

“ Furthermore, motions for decisions to amend the Rules of Procedure may be tabled by ten or more representatives. ”

Renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly.

ORDER 71***on the impact of the WEU Assembly's activities
on parliaments and public opinion***

The Assembly,

- (i) Recalling Order 44 and Resolution 78;
- (ii) Welcoming the special information action taken by the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations in all member parliaments;
- (iii) Concerned, however, at the persisting difficulty of adequately following up the work of the Assembly in member countries, even at a time when the importance of WEU is growing,

INSTRUCTS ITS COMMITTEE FOR PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC RELATIONS

1. By establishing contact with national delegations, to ensure that national parliamentary committees responsible for matters handled by the Assembly accord greater attention to its reports;
2. In permanent co-operation with national delegations, to encourage more representatives to speak in their parliaments on the basis of texts adopted;

INVITES ALL ITS COMMITTEES

1. To apply scrupulously Rule 39(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly by examining action taken on texts adopted on the basis of their reports;
2. To draft their reports so that they may be easily used in debates at national level.

II

OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES

FIRST SITTING

Monday, 6th June 1988

SUMMARY

1. Opening of the session.
2. Attendance register.
3. Examination of credentials.
4. Address by the Provisional President.
5. Election of the President of the Assembly.
6. Address by the President of the Assembly.
7. Observers.
8. Election of four Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
9. Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session (Doc. 1130).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Kittelmann, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Linster, Mr. Martino.
10. Action by the Presidential Committee (*Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee*, Doc. 1143).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Sarti (*Vice-President of the Assembly*), Mr. Inan (*Observer from Turkey*).
11. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU.
12. Address by Mr. Serra, Minister of Defence of Spain and Chairman of the Independent European Programme Group.
Reply by Mr. Serra to a question put by: Mr. van der Werff.
13. Changes in the membership of committees.
14. European co-operation in armaments research and development – guidelines drawn from the colloquy (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 1141 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Wilkinson (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Müller, Mr. Klejdzinski, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Lambie, Mr. Coleman, Mr. Ewing, Mr. Wilkinson (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
15. Guest speakers (*Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1146).
16. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Jung, Provisional President, in the Chair.

1. Opening of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

In accordance with Article III (a) of the Charter and Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of Procedure, I declare open the thirty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

2. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

¹. See page 15.

3. Examination of credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the examination of the credentials of the new representatives and substitutes nominated since our Assembly's last session whose names have been published in Notice No. 1.

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, these credentials have been attested by a statement of ratification from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

I welcome our new parliamentary colleagues.

4. Address by the Provisional President

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, there is no mistake, it is not my office as President of the Parliamentary Assembly of

The President (continued)

the Council of Europe that entitles me to speak – merely the privilege of age. That very personal right allows me to offer a few thoughts so I hope you will not object to my claiming your attention for a few moments.

I have been a member of this Assembly for nearly twenty years and I have always been conscious of the importance of its mission. However, to be completely honest, I have never felt wholly at ease because I had to preach the gospel of common defence, co-operation and effectiveness in spite of the fact that France had left NATO – a decision I contested at the time and which I still think was a mistake. I had to speak out for European solidarity when France's defence was centred on national considerations and first and foremost the problem of Germany. All this was not in every case very convincing.

Happily, times have changed. The general trend in East-West relations is towards a lowering of tension, witness the meeting that Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev have just held in Moscow. This turn of events seems to me to be due to two things: President Reagan's firmness in the pursuit of his objectives, including his defence of human rights, and General Secretary Gorbachev's determined efforts to overcome resistance to change in his country.

We have to be glad that this meeting was possible, even if results so far do not appear to be very great. However, the first withdrawals of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the prospects of agreement that seem to be emerging in Cambodia and Angola, the hope that perestroika will bring greater freedom of expression in the Soviet Union and the beginnings of some relaxation in the centralised system and state capitalism prevailing in most countries where the communist party holds sway are so many signs to prompt the thought that the idea of freedom is beginning to break through the icy grip in which so many nations are held.

It is up to the leaders in the western camp to encourage this trend and to take advantage of it by strengthening their unity and not allowing the sometimes very tough commercial competition in which our countries are engaged to weaken our resolve to build a common defence.

Before western solidarity can become established, Europe has to exist as an entity. With no place at summit meetings, Europe has to have some other way to make its voice heard on the fundamental problems of war and peace, disarmament and world economic order and it has the strength – in population, economic potential and technology – to do this.

All it has to do to make its voice heard is to be united.

As the world's number one trading power, Europe is a force to be reckoned with in trade negotiations because there, through the European Economic Community, it speaks with a single voice. But the construction of Europe needs to extend to other fields: foreign policy through European political co-operation, currency through the European monetary system and security through WEU. For that is the rôle of WEU – to give the union of Europe the security dimension essential for the establishment of a full European identity.

The objections of those who fear that Europe's concern for the problems of its own security could harm the Atlantic Alliance need to be allayed. The Atlantic Alliance is a Euro-American alliance. Without a strong Europe, the alliance is unbalanced.

That is why WEU needs to be both strengthened and enlarged. It must grow stronger by equipping itself with the institutions it needs to be effective. It is vital that the Council decide at long last to give the ministerial organs the structure and resources they need to carry out their mission.

WEU needs to be enlarged to include countries which are prepared to commit themselves to the provisions of the treaty and to apply the principles of the platform adopted at The Hague. Spain and Portugal have said they are ready to honour the obligations that every member of WEU has to assume. The preparatory discussions on their accession should therefore come to a satisfactory conclusion in the near future.

The strengthening of Europe will enable the dialogue between the two sides of the Atlantic to be carried further. That dialogue is vitally important because the effectiveness of the alliance, the credibility of deterrence and the maintenance of peace depends on the understanding between Europe and America. We therefore have to ensure that economic rivalry or squabbles about burden-sharing do not imperil our countries' fulfilment of their reciprocal obligations and the friendship between our peoples. The unification of Europe needs to be accompanied by a tightening of our transatlantic links.

Ladies and gentlemen, today we celebrate the anniversary of the allied landings in Normandy. On behalf of you all, and as an ex-serviceman, I would like today to renew my thanks to all those who brought back freedom and democracy to our European countries.

I know that this is the spirit in which the reports listed in the agenda address the problems presented by a changing and more complicated international situation.

I hope that this session will be crowned with success and that the recommendations we are about to present will be acted upon. Thank you.

5. Election of the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of the President of the Assembly.

Rule 7(1) of the Rules of Procedure lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

In addition, Rule 10(2) and (10) of the Rules of Procedure states that no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of Vice-President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives and representatives who are members of governments may not be members of the Bureau.

I have received only one nomination, that of Mr. Goerens. The nomination has been properly made and is in the form prescribed by the rules. If there is no objection, I may declare Mr. Goerens elected by acclamation.

Is there any opposition to the sole nominee?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I proclaim Mr. Goerens President of the Assembly of Western European Union. I congratulate him and invite him to take the Chair.

(Mr. Goerens then took the Chair)

6. Address by the President of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ministers, your excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, allow me first to thank you for the confidence you have shown in me by re-electing me President of your Assembly. I value this confidence particularly now that, new life having been injected into WEU's political activities, relations between the Council and the Assembly have to be redefined in response to realities that are very different from what they were heretofore.

The Netherlands presidency, which corresponded with the WEU parliamentary year, has been particularly active and remarkably effective since, on 27th October 1987, it resulted in fairly divergent views being sufficiently harmonised to allow the adoption of the platform on European security interests, which is a new definition of WEU's rôle in Europe and the Atlantic Alliance.

By 20th August, the Netherlands Presidency had already convened the first of the meetings designed to organise the presence of WEU warships in the Gulf. Since then, our countries' action in that region has been confirmed. There has been no lack of results on the spot and in our relations with our American allies who have

come to see the European undertaking as part of the more equitable burden-sharing that they want in the alliance.

A third success of the Netherlands presidency was the decision taken on 20th April to invite Spain and Portugal to examine, with representatives of member countries, the conditions for joining WEU.

These three events have not already become historical facts; they are merely the beginning of a transformation of WEU which should at last give meaning to the words "European pillar" of the Atlantic Alliance which were still very vague. They should also allow WEU to perform better than in the past the rôle assigned to it by the preamble of the modified Brussels Treaty in which it undertakes "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe".

The question facing the Assembly is not one of approving the Council's decisions. These three initiatives correspond so closely to what we have been asking it to do for so long that there cannot be the slightest doubt about the Assembly's attitude. But the Council's communications to the Assembly relating to action taken or to be taken on them leave room for too much uncertainty and ambiguity for us to consider these chapters closed.

In fact, the Council is offering us a programme of work for the coming months and, in the case of the platform, for the coming years. The Assembly must follow the various stages of its implementation while continuing to give the political impetus necessary for its success.

In the coming months, I believe the Assembly should give priority in its work to the enlargement of WEU, not only through the normal channels of the reports it will be preparing for the second part of its session but also by showing its firm support for the candidatures of Spain and Portugal. We can but welcome the results obtained by the Presidential Committee's visit to Portugal. It did much to convince public opinion in that country of the importance of the commitments involved in acceding to the Brussels Treaty and the platform adopted in The Hague. However, it also helped to show the WEU countries what Portugal has done to fulfil the obligations to which it is prepared to subscribe. A similar approach must now be made to Spain.

The enlargement of WEU, expected in the coming year, should facilitate progress towards the construction of the European pillar since WEU will be in a position to ascertain the views on security matters of a larger section of Europe, express itself with greater authority in the alliance and advance towards a European union of which WEU is the start in security matters. I saw that the American press took due note of the

The President (continued)

presence of Portuguese observers in our delegation in Washington and realised the significance.

It is indeed vital for the meaning of the reactivation of WEU to be well understood by all, and above all by our American allies. In this area, too, the Assembly has started to develop a dialogue with our partners in the Atlantic Alliance.

Much remains to be done, however, to convince our American allies of the importance of such exchanges. They are certainly not opposed to them. But it was clear to all who took part in the visit of the Presidential Committee and General Affairs Committee that they did not give them the priority we feel they deserve.

You may be sure that I will continue, during the new session, to do my utmost to increase contacts with the United States administration and Congress and in particular to convince all concerned that our Assembly can offer them a useful platform for conveying their views to European public opinion. I have no doubt that the attachment constantly demonstrated by the United States to a concept of the alliance that is not limited to intergovernmental agreements but involves the participation of nations in joint security will eventually allow us to institutionalise this dialogue, which we consider essential.

If we wish to develop European thinking on the basis of a detailed knowledge of how problems are perceived in the United States, we must organise exchanges on as regular a basis as possible, not only with the United States administration but also with Congress and associations whose task is to consider security matters. The report to be presented to us by Senator Pontillon on behalf of the General Affairs Committee provided such an opportunity. It will most probably help to make European public opinion more aware of the importance the United States now attaches to a more equitable sharing of the burden of joint security, just as it explained to the Americans we met Europe's reactions to the idea of a different breakdown of the United States defence appropriations.

By conveying to you our allies' concerns, we can rightfully cherish the hope that they will listen to us and take account of our own security interests.

Among the problems raised by transatlantic co-operation, the most important are probably those raised by the progress of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on disarmament. At our December 1987 session, we voted unanimously in favour of ratification of the INF agreement by the United States Senate. Our vote did not pass unheeded. It was a

great help in convincing the Republican administration, which, in 1985, did not wish WEU to give its views on disarmament, that the existence of a European pillar of the alliance could help it to pursue a policy that it considered both reasonable and in accordance with United States interests.

Now that the Moscow summit meeting has just allowed considerable progress to be made towards an agreement between the two great powers on strategic nuclear weapons and the extension of the process of détente to cover increasingly vast areas, our Assembly must express its views once more.

It was obviously difficult for the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to adopt a report on disarmament in fluctuating circumstances, but the summit meeting should allow it to present a draft text during this part-session so that we can debate and continue what we started in December, i.e. to express here and now the voice of European public opinion on a matter that is essential for our future security.

This will in no way prevent our Assembly from pursuing consideration of developments in the various disarmament-related negotiations in order, at the appropriate time, to hold debates on reports reflecting Europeans' concerns so as to allow Europe to break with the past, when it was too content to react to decisions already taken, and to make its views known before the two great powers reach agreement on texts which can then no longer be amended.

Nor must the delay in defining a mandate for negotiations on conventional disarmament allow us to forget that, in this area, the Western European countries will play a direct part in the decisions. It is high time to work out our aims and the means of attaining them. Here, WEU has long experience acquired by the Agency for the Control of Armaments in more than thirty years' work. Our Assembly will have to examine how this experience can be used for new tasks which, because of the need for careful verification of the application of future agreements, Europe will have to undertake if it wishes to play a full part in the undertaking.

Our concern to allow Europe to make itself heard on détente and disarmament matters will certainly lead us in the coming years to continue to develop our relations with other countries which are playing an active part in current negotiations. The more frequent and well-organised our dialogue with our allies, in particular the United States, the easier it will be for us to converse with others without fear of being misunderstood.

But the Assembly can do nothing if the Council is not an active partner.

The President (continued)

The Netherlands presidency, following those of the Federal Republic, Italy and Luxembourg, has managed to maintain and develop the informal aspects of the dialogue between the Council and certain Assembly bodies. The presence and intervention of Sir Geoffrey Howe, who is take over the chairmanship-in-office in a few weeks' time, at the last of these meetings augurs well for the continuation of the habit of the presidency of the Council always being ready for the now customary exchanges with the Assembly.

This satisfactory development brings out even more clearly the inadequacy of statutory relations between the two WEU organs. Transmission of the annual report to the Assembly is an obligation imposed on the Council under the modified Brussels Treaty and is the legal basis for the Assembly's powers. Once again, its tardy arrival presented us with an unacceptable choice: not to debate the Council's activities or to do so on the basis of piecemeal, unreliable documents. Each of the two committees most concerned chose the solution it considered appropriate knowing that it was hardly satisfactory. Moreover, those of us who have been able to read the Council's annual report now that it has arrived will have seen how little it tells of the activities of an organisation which claims to have been strongly reactivated.

I will not dwell on the matter, but I must emphasise firmly that if the Council wishes to be convincing about its revival it must provide official, public information about what it is doing. The purpose is not to find procedure allowing the hasty adoption of a document that is not really binding on the governments. The governments must demonstrate the necessary political will to agree within reasonable time-limits on a text that gives an effective account of their activities, just as it is essential for there to be a final communiqué to show public opinion the purpose of ministerial meetings.

It is in its own organisation, however, that the Council has fallen short the most scandalously. Let there be no mistake: the question of the seat of the ministerial organs is a secondary one and there is nothing abnormal in the difficulties the Council is having in solving it. What is abnormal is that the Council is allowing itself to be paralysed by such a matter. It is in any event unacceptable that these delays and this shilly-shallying should have prevented the Assembly from recruiting staff it urgently needs.

This throws dark shadows on what at first sight might have seemed a sunny picture of WEU's activities. Thus, the forthcoming United Kingdom presidency will also be facing an important task. It can rely on the Assembly's unhesitating support in accomplishing it.

It is unacceptable, too, that the Council is still not fulfilling some of its obligations such as the one it set itself of giving political impetus to armaments co-operation. Once again, it is the Assembly, in particular through the colloquy it organised in London last March, from which Mr. Wilkinson's report draws the political conclusions, that had to compensate for this failing.

Yet for both economic and technical reasons the joint production of armaments has become an urgent necessity for Western Europe since none of our countries alone can afford a competitive armaments industry and the completion of the vast European market in 1992 should make it impossible to continue the protectionist practices that still dominate this sector of industry.

The reactivation of WEU cannot be separated from what is being done in other frameworks to achieve the European union that was the sole aim set by the signatories of both the Rome and the Brussels Treaties. WEU's place in this great undertaking was recalled in the single European act and in the platform adopted in The Hague and also in the Council's message announcing the invitation to Spain and Portugal. We must now try to define the rôle it should play in Europe once its restructuring is complete and its enlargement a fact and the single market has been established.

This is the aim of the colloquy on the future of European security that the General Affairs Committee is organising in Florence in March 1989. It should demonstrate our wholehearted participation in deliberations being held by the European Parliament in its own sphere and be an important stage in a dialogue that our Assembly has always wanted to establish with it.

The thirty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly is therefore being opened at a particularly important time in the history of WEU. Our committees have made careful preparations for it and most topical events in the area for which we are responsible are on the agenda of this part-session or, in the case of disarmament and the Gulf war, included in the register of the Assembly for more detailed debate in December. There is thus no point in my holding up our debates any longer.

7. Observers

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, I welcome the observers from Denmark, Spain, Portugal and Turkey who pay us the honour of attending our proceedings.

I also welcome the members of the Permanent Council attending this part-session.

8. *Election of four Vice-Presidents of the Assembly*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the election of Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.

Rule 7(1) of the Rules of Procedure lays down that substitutes may not be elected to the Bureau of the Assembly.

In addition, Rule 10(2) and (10) of the Rules of Procedure states that no representative may stand as a candidate for the office of Vice-President unless a proposal for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by three or more representatives and representatives who are members of governments may not be members of the Bureau.

Four nominations have been submitted in the prescribed form.

The candidates are, in alphabetical order, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Pécriaux, Mr. Sarti and Mr. Soell.

The other seats will be filled later.

If there are no objections, I propose that these four Vice-Presidents be elected by acclamation.

Is there any objection?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

I therefore declare Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Pécriaux, Mr. Sarti and Mr. Soell elected as Vice-Presidents of the Assembly, and congratulate them.

9. *Adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session*

(Doc. 1130)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the adoption of the draft order of business for the first part of the session, Document 1130.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – On behalf of the Socialist Group I must object to the inclusion in the agenda of the report of Mr. Kittelmann on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, for the simple reason that there is no report by a rapporteur of that committee. The bare minimum for the preparation of discussions in this Assembly is that its members should have reports in their possession and be able to read, study and if possible discuss them with colleagues in political groups. Secondly, members should have reports in advance, in accordance with Rule 26.

I therefore protest at this inclusion in the agenda. Does this mean that there can be no debate on an urgent problem? Of course, we

have in our rules a procedure for a debate on an urgent subject; if, for instance, the Defence Committee wants, tomorrow or at any time, to formulate a request for urgent procedure, that is in order. But we cannot and should not include in our agenda a non-existent report, which is why I object.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The facts are these, Mr. Stoffelen. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments failed to adopt its report in time. It will be meeting tomorrow at 9 a.m. It would like, under paragraph 4 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Procedure, to have the presentation of and debate on this report put on the order of business for the Thursday morning sitting and the vote to be taken in the afternoon.

You base your point of order on the same paragraph 4 of Rule 41 which I shall now read out: "...A report not adopted in time shall be withdrawn from the agenda. However", and this I think is important, "the Assembly may decide, at the request of the committee, to place the report on its agenda unless twenty representatives are opposed. Such a decision should be taken before the order of business is adopted (Rule 18). After adopting within the prescribed time-limit a report placed before it, the committee may, after that time-limit, prepare a supplementary report to take account of current events."

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. You propose to include in the agenda a debate on a non-existent report. Something that does not exist cannot be discussed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly has the right to include a report not yet approved in the draft order of business. The fact that the committee may meet tomorrow morning does not contradict my interpretation of the Rules of Procedure.

If you wish to object to this item on the agenda, you must have at least twenty votes.

I call Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we have a taxing agenda before us, with many controversial items on it. I shall not be doing anything to cause controversy in the Assembly's voting.

What I have to say is this: the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments intended to discuss disarmament questions during this part-session. The report drawn up and proposed for this purpose has been withdrawn by the Rapporteur from the agenda for this part-session. This was the simplest way of ensuring a

Mr. Kittelmann (continued)

co-operative atmosphere and solidarity in the committee. So the report will be taken in December.

This meant that we did not have an opportunity of discussing the summit that has just taken place. I therefore made myself personally responsible for drawing up a report and submitting it to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments tomorrow, if the committee agrees to discuss and possibly adopt this report.

This was done in the expectation and hope that Western European Union would insist on having a chance to discuss the event that took place a few days ago. Some risk and some thinking ahead were involved in assuming that – if the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments gives its approval tomorrow – this is in the interests of us all. One way might be to put it on the agenda today and let the committee decide tomorrow. But as I see that the Socialist Group does not agree to this because it has reservations on formal grounds, and that you, Mr. Stoffelen, are saying: “We are not going to do that here, it should be settled by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments tomorrow”, I request that this motion be removed from the agenda and not put to the vote today – the socialists would not like to vote against it here – and that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments be allowed to decide tomorrow whether or not we should agree to the urgent procedure.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, when the President of the United States of America and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have reached at least partial agreement, we should not be arguing about our Assembly's agenda. I fully understand the objections raised by Mr. Stoffelen. We have all objected on many occasions to having reports thrown at us at the last minute, making it impossible for normal discussions to be held within the political groups or within the national delegations.

On the other hand, we must realise that a report which may be submitted to this Assembly at the December part-session will be one of those modern antiques, especially as the two statesmen will very probably have had a further summit meeting in the meantime.

I therefore feel the Bureau should find a way to put down a debate under the urgent procedure for the time on Thursday when the report that has now been withdrawn was to have been discussed. The members of the Assembly can then

make their comments on the events in Moscow, without our having to take a vote, which would probably be premature at this time.

I therefore urge you, Mr. President, to give us the opportunity for discussion. I believe this might be a compromise which our socialist friends would also endorse.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Stoffelen.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – We have proof that there can be complete agreement between the two largest groups in the Assembly. It was I who suggested the urgent procedure solution. It is clear that we should not avoid a debate for procedural reasons. If any group wishes to discuss disarmament it is that to which I belong. Please let us organise our debate in a simple and logical way and on a text so that members can at least read it and discuss it with others before a compromise is agreed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – As yet we have no request for urgent procedure. I would ask anyone who wants to present such a request to do so in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43.

Can we now be agreed on this point?...

Do you wish to speak on a different point, Mr. Linster?

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Yes, a different point, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Linster.

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I do not want to challenge what has become a tradition during these last few years but yet again we have six ministers listed among the speakers on the order of business. We have no doubt, of course, that all of their speeches will be most valuable. We are wholly in favour of dialogue with the representatives of the Council.

However, we find that these six speeches, in addition to that of the Secretary-General, could well interrupt our proceedings and hence the thread of our order of business in at least three cases.

We are well aware, Mr. President, that the Presidential Committee has not invited anybody from outside to this meeting, but we also know that if members of the Council wish to address the Assembly you are required to allow them to do so.

To solve this problem, my group feels that it would be useful if the Council of Ministers could exercise some self-discipline and cool the ardour of its own members and if the Council itself could, by its own efforts, restrict the number of speakers at any given part of the Assembly's pro-

Mr. Linster (continued)

ceedings. That was the object of the motion for an order that we have tabled inviting the Presidential Committee to agree with the Council of Ministers on limiting the number of guest speakers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I understand the difficulties caused by the large number of guest speakers but I think we have to appeal to the Council's sense of self-restraint. I therefore await the tabling of a motion which I shall deal with as provided in the Rules of Procedure.

Still with regard to the order of business, I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I shall be very brief because I basically agree with your proposal to use the urgent procedure for the matter in dispute.

May I remind you that I served as rapporteur for an extremely delicate subject relating to events involving much loss of blood. The subject was Lebanon; it was quickly added to the agenda for the General Affairs Committee in the morning and discussed in the afternoon and the resolution was adopted the same evening by the Assembly. If the political will is there any subject can be discussed, including very important issues such as the one now before us and this can be done in a single day; it can be included in the order of business straight away.

I agree with your proposal, Mr. President, and call on members of the Assembly to discuss a matter which will lose a great deal of its political significance if it is put off until December.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Can I take it that there is no objection to the draft order of business?...

The draft order of business is adopted.

10. Action by the Presidential Committee

(Presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee, Doc. 1143)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of the report of the Presidential Committee on action by the Presidential Committee, Document 1143.

I call Mr. Sarti, Rapporteur of the Presidential Committee.

Mr. SARTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as you will see, the report on action by the Presidential Committee comprises forty short paragraphs together with a number of letters from you, Mr. President, to Mr. van den Broek, who has been Chairman of the WEU Council for the last six months.

We also take a very positive view of the efforts of our President as expressed by his unanimous re-election as head of the Assembly a few moments ago and the somewhat critical comments we make on the delicate subject of relations between the Council and the Assembly are certainly not directed against the Chairman-in-Office who has shown himself to be remarkable in all respects. Credit is due to him for the excellent dialogue he has developed with the Assembly, for having applied Article VIII of the treaty in connection with the Gulf problem and for his positive attitude to the accession of the two Iberian countries to WEU.

These were the main political requests of the Assembly which once again this year committed its Presidential Committee to fresh affirmation of its long-standing aims namely, the reactivation of WEU as a political entity, the creation of a European union with responsibility for security and defence matters and the strengthening of relations with the United States without ever forgetting our European identity. Ladies and gentlemen, the idea of being the European pillar of the alliance has become almost a commonplace, but commonplaces, like obvious facts, have their historical and political significance; it does not mean forgetting or ignoring the fact that Europeans must be expected to play their part in the security of all.

Although the visit to the United States by the Presidential Committee and the General Affairs Committee and the contacts they had with the Secretary of State and Congress may not at times have been too encouraging from the standpoint of a constructive and friendly dialogue – and I have to say this – they did serve to dissipate the “transatlantic misunderstanding” dating from the time when talk was first heard of the reactivation of WEU. Let us say that we are moving in the right direction and that the problem will have to be taken further with the new administration in the United States after the November elections. We must seek to remove any doubts by establishing relations between Europe and America on a genuinely institutional basis.

In the report I am presenting to the Assembly I make due reference to the contacts with the Soviet Union. The reasons for them are a realistic assessment of the changes which have taken place in recent months, and the pursuit of peace which is an inalienable part of our duty as an institution responsible for security; they are certainly based on a philosophy very different from that governing our relations with America but also different from that which informs relations with the Soviet world and the eastern countries in the other assembly of which we are all members – the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. They are also necessary because the United States has bilateral relations at the highest level with the Soviet Union at

Mr. Sarti (continued)

summit meetings and through the far-reaching military and political spin-off from those meetings. This is a source of great satisfaction to us.

The European pillar is therefore consolidating its political vocation and its identity. After the Moscow summit and with the continuation of the tensions which affect European security, there are now fresh opportunities for co-operation between Europe and America and for action by the Council of Western European Union. The base of the pillar must be widened and this Assembly has been instrumental in furthering the accession of Spain and Portugal.

There are now no open political differences between the Council and the Assembly; they may still have questions to answer about the future of the union and its identity. Their questions and answers may not be the same but nobody in the Council or the Assembly – or setting the Council against the Assembly – now disputes the ambitious but realistic platform worked out at The Hague which in 1987 set the best possible guidelines for our future activity.

But there are differences about structure and organisation or as General de Gaulle would have said about “management”. The risk, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, is that if these differences are not resolved they may quickly become political disputes as time passes, starting perhaps with what is probably not a real problem, namely, the final choice of a location for this Assembly.

It would therefore be ridiculous and, if I may use the term, stupid to maintain a dispute about organisation. A more effective and better organised assembly equipped with everything it needs to pursue its own aims and handle its own requirements is in the first instance in the interests of the Council of Ministers, of the permanent agencies and of the member governments of the union.

A number of very important reports are to be presented at this session and two are of particular significance for our subject. Mr. Morris and Mr. van der Sanden have prepared and presented excellent reports which I hope will be well debated and will provide the clarification which we all need more than anything else. They criticise in clear terms the inadequacy of the union's structure, its underestablishment and its failure to solve the problem of location, not to mention the fact that the terms of reference of the single agency are still only defined in the most general terms.

We, in the Assembly, are all aware of the very disturbing aspects of the deadlock resulting from the underestablishment of the Office of the Clerk. This is a small problem but it could be

symptomatic of further problems and become part of an approach which I fear. If problems of organisation are not resolved they become political problems with what could be irreparable consequences for the identity of Western European Union and subsequently for what its political rôle should still be.

I cite many instances in my report and I would call your attention to the summary I have given. I would, however, refer to three documents not mentioned in the written report which have however revived our discussions to some extent. I would like them to be regarded as a part of my report; they are the report on the future of NATO drafted by a working party of the North Atlantic parliamentary assembly, an article by a leading diplomat and politician – Ambassador Iannuzzi who is currently responsible for co-ordinating the new political secretariat of the EEC – which appeared in an Italian magazine and deals with the subject of security and its possible addition to the present and future attributes of the European Parliament and the EEC itself and lastly, the most interesting document produced by the European Institute of Public Administration under the title “The security of Western Europe in a changing world”. This most interesting document covers everything from the reactivation of WEU to the single European act.

I am summarising the gist of these three important publications not only because of their intellectual content which the Assembly will certainly appreciate but also from a political standpoint because, although they take a very different line, they all define the rôle of WEU without mentioning it specifically.

The failure to reactivate WEU is throwing NATO into crisis. The great institutional responsibilities which the European Economic Community will have after the 1989 elections and the customs union of the mythical 1992 will not cover the problem of common defence if Europe does not take the necessary steps, which are at the moment the sole responsibility of WEU, to find the way to integrated defence.

Europe must be given the necessary means to achieve its ends and the “future vigour” which the great French poet Rimbaud prophesied for his own dreams. But for this vigour to be forthcoming our future must be clearly identifiable and understood. The modest report which I have the honour to submit to the Assembly seeks at least to bring the matter back to the minds of all of us.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Inan.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I asked to speak because Mr. Sarti referred to the enlargement of Western European Union. Thank you for giving me the floor.

Whilst we are pleased at the decision taken by the Council of Ministers on 19th April at The Hague with regard to the enlargement of WEU to include Spain and Portugal, we are also compelled to voice and emphasise our dissatisfaction since Turkey also applied for membership on 13th April 1987.

All of you here have been witnesses to Turkey's wholehearted participation for the last thirty-six years in the defence of the Atlantic Alliance as regards both the integrated military system and nuclear forces. I would stress that, with 800 000 men, we have the second largest army in the Atlantic Alliance after the United States, that we defend 37% of the common frontier with the Warsaw Pact countries and that we cannot see how the defence of Europe is possible without Turkish participation.

I asked to speak, Mr. President, to urge your Assembly to support Turkey's application for membership with the various governments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

The Assembly no doubt wishes to endorse the action of the committee.

Are there any objections?...

It is so decided.

11. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, whom I invite to come to the rostrum.

Mr. CAHEN (*Secretary-General of WEU*) (Translation). – Mr. President, allow me first to congratulate you on your re-election.

During the year which has just gone by the security identity of Europe has been in very good hands – your hands. We are all delighted, Mr. President, that these vital problems should remain in those hands for the year to come. We congratulate you and are greatly pleased to be keeping you at the head of the Assembly.

Mr. President, members of the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union, in the last half year I have had the honour to be associated with your activities on several occasions. I have addressed your Presidential Committee and the General Affairs Committee and I have also

spoken at the remarkable colloquy on "European co-operation in armaments research and development" organised by your Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions chaired by Mr. Wilkinson.

I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate Mr. Wilkinson on the remarkable quality of the two reports he has tabled at this session of the Assembly.

May I say how grateful I am to you then for offering me this privileged relationship with the Assembly, the only body in Europe formally competent to deal with European security problems. It is this situation which enables me, for the sixth time, to speak from the rostrum of this plenary session of your institution in order to report on the state of WEU, and for this I am most grateful.

It is now about three years since the reactivation of Western European Union actually began. These three years have virtually coincided with major changes in international relations – particularly as regards East-West relations – whilst the state of transatlantic relations – so well analysed in Mr. Robert Pontillon's report – increasingly attracts our attention.

In the light of these changing East-West relations and an Atlantic relationship which is undergoing a period of transition, our European states must together reflect, concert and, more than ever, act in a co-ordinated manner. With this prospect in view, the rôle of WEU appears to be of prime importance.

Is WEU carrying out this rôle?

Once more, at the risk of being charged with being an impenitent optimist – I do not see Mr. Baumel in the chamber but that is perhaps what he will accuse me of tomorrow – I shall reply in the affirmative. This affirmative is, however, qualified by the fact that, at the level of the construction of Europe, which was started over forty years ago, the reactivated WEU is only at the beginning of its new existence. In the circumstances, it is surely not surprising that everything is not yet finished and that there is still very much to do. This is especially so – and you, as long-serving Europeans, are more aware of it than anyone – the building of Europe is a continuous process whose completion is by no means yet in sight nor yet foreseeable.

However, there is no denying the fact that:

First the organisation has set up the framework for continuous dialogue among the member states on the problems of European security within the context of joint Atlantic security. I am not referring here to administrative structures but to those of a political nature which bring together those people in the member states who carry responsibility and exercise authority on the subject.

Mr. Cahen (continued)

Second, this dialogue goes on and is gaining in effectiveness.

Third, it is leading to convergent or even joint European positions on the numerous security problems confronting us today. The first and striking example of these arose following the Reykjavik summit on 10th October 1986 between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. This has since been continuously repeated, particularly with regard to questions arising from the change in East-West relations – notably arms control – and to the requirements of our security.

Fourth, on the basis of these consultations on current problems in this area further progress was possible leading to a platform which defined our long-term security interests and related options. The platform adopted under the Netherlands presidency, has at last given us a European security identity.

Fifth, on the basis of political consultation among the Seven, five of our countries are co-ordinating their activities in the Gulf – here again tribute has to be paid to the Netherlands presidency which took the initiative and followed it up thereafter – and the two others, not present in the Gulf, have displayed what I would call “WEU solidarity” with their partners in a concrete fashion.

Sixth, on 26th May in The Hague, and again under the Netherlands presidency, talks began with Portugal and Spain concerning the enlargement of our organisation to include these two states.

These are real and substantial achievements which have moreover been clearly perceived by you as shown in the reports to this plenary session and in particular the detailed and finely analysed report of Mr. van der Sanden.

And yet I feel that some aspects of this reality have not been fully apprehended by this Assembly as a whole and with your permission, and to dispel any ambiguity, I should like to give you a little more information.

By definition our organisation is an intergovernmental one. Hence it is only by increasing the detailed consultations between those who – in the context of our governments – have power and authority, that it will be able to achieve the definition and implementation, by its members, of convergent or common positions on security.

What is important in the event is that this consultation should take place within the framework of our organisation, in the context of the guidelines provided by its “acquis” i.e. modified Brussels Treaty, Rome declaration, platform on

European security interests – and within the regularly formalised “WEU structures” – obviously political structures – such as, in addition to our Ministerial Council, the Permanent Council, the enlarged Council and the meetings of political directors, the Special Working Group and the groups of experts as well as ad hoc meetings such as those concerning the Gulf problem or those negotiating the enlargement of the organisation to include Portugal and Spain.

In reality, these are the structures which constitute the vital centre of the organisation. They centre on the Permanent Council which is the co-ordinating body. It meets at least every two weeks, sometimes every week, and deals both with problems affecting the day-to-day running of the organisation and fundamental issues affecting our countries’ security. All the other groups depend on the Council, report to it and follow its directives. I think this is an important point to make.

In this context, the Secretariat-General, which chairs, serves and interprets the wishes of the Permanent Council and which is also the symbol and guarantee of WEU’s continuity, plays an essential rôle and with the presidency – at present held by the Netherlands – provides the necessary impetus for the work. It should be remembered that the Secretary-General or his deputy chairs all the structures to which I have referred except those of an ad hoc nature which are directed by the representative of the country holding the presidency of the organisation. Nor should it be forgotten that not only the Secretary-General but his colleagues and assistants attend all these meetings and are responsible for preparing them and ensuring that they are properly conducted and followed up. In this connection I can assure Mr. van der Sanden that the fears he refers to in paragraphs 10 and 50 of his report are without justification although as head of the Secretariat-General I am concerned at these fears and am grateful to him for having expressed them.

May I also – to avoid any misunderstanding – point out to Mr. van der Sanden and the Assembly as a whole that no working group has been specifically set up within WEU to concern itself with the deployment of forces, disarmament and the sharing of the burden of the common Atlantic defence. In fact it is the special working group that has been mandated to deal with these, among other, problems – which it does and, to my mind, does well.

Similarly, may I also point out that the Standing Armaments Committee was set up in 1955 in circumstances totally different from those prevailing today.

Consequently, its mission and situation no longer befit the outstanding rôle that our member states have given to WEU in the sphere

Mr. Cahen (continued)

of armaments co-operation which is to provide a political impetus in wider forums such as the Independent European Programme Group and the European Communities.

I wonder therefore whether the group of defence ministers' representatives – one of the new intergovernmental structures of our organisation – would not, through its vocation and level of members, be better suited to carrying out this rôle. My opinion, as Secretary-General, is that the Standing Armaments Committee should be replaced by this group of defence ministers' representatives and that its still-active working groups should be placed under the latter's authority.

I should like to add that the Standing Armaments Committee, in the same way as the group of defence ministers' representatives, is an intergovernmental organ and that, in this respect, nothing would be changed, as far as the character of this part of our organisation is concerned, if my suggestion were to be taken up.

I was also taken aback by Mr. van der Sanden's expression of regret in his report at the lack of international recognition for our organisation. With respect I should like to register my surprise on this point because, if there is one field where WEU has made striking progress, it is certainly that one.

It is true that three years ago – when the reactivation of WEU began to take effect – the organisation was still virtually unknown to political and public opinion in our own member states as well as those outside Western European Union. Today, however, one has only to read or listen to the international media to realise that this stage is past.

Moreover, there is an increasing demand on the Secretariat-General for articles, brochures or talks on the organisation. My colleagues and staff are stepping up their efforts under this heading and I am endeavouring to do the same.

Finally, for our American ally we have surely become "the voice of Europe". To save time, let me give you just one of the illustrations that abound. When Mr. Taft, the United States Deputy Defence Secretary, recently visited the "Old Continent" to speak about defence burden-sharing, he naturally wished to see government representatives. But he also wanted to talk to Mr. van den Broek and Mr. van Eekelen – Chairmen-in-Office of our Council – not only in their capacity as Netherlands ministers but also as representatives of WEU and, when in London, he asked to see me too as Secretary-General of the organisation.

We are accorded similar recognition by such eminent institutions as the North Atlantic Assembly, in the Atlantic area – Mr. Sarti referred a moment ago to the report in which many references are made to WEU – and the European Communities in the area of European construction. Mr. Delors has frequently and publicly indicated that he sees WEU as the European element in security.

In this connection, I am of course very grateful to Mr. Chénard for having said in his excellent report that "the impressive public relations activities of the Secretary-General personally should also be acknowledged". I also entirely agree with him when he adds that "however, he cannot assume entire responsibility for this task himself" and that "a more open Council information policy should be worked out for implementation by member governments". You may be sure that the Council will play the greatest heed to this suggestion.

That said, I know that I owe Mr. van der Sanden a reply on three precise points. In order not to take up too much of the Assembly's time, may I suggest that I provide these replies orally or in writing – as he wishes – outside this session.

More generally, I would have very much liked to respond in more detail to all the aspects of the excellent reports which are before you, but time unfortunately prevents me from doing so. I can however assure you that the Permanent Council has taken very good note of the recommendations contained in them.

I should also like to say again that I am at the disposal of both the Assembly and its committees to testify before them whenever they so wish.

The generally positive picture I have just painted of WEU's activities does not of course hide the fact that much still remains to be done as is borne out by most of the reports submitted to this Assembly session. No one denies this, least of all myself.

First, it is true that the Council of Ministers has so far failed to solve the problems of collocating and restructuring the ministerial organs of Western European Union. At their last meeting on 18th and 19th April 1988, ministers asked me to put forward proposals to the member states. I submitted these proposals to the governments concerned on 3rd May.

It is of course desirable that an agreement should be reached very soon on these key issues to enable me to make the administration of Western European Union the effective instrument which the increasing quantity and importance of the organisation's activities demand. At the same time, as the President said a moment ago, posts could be released which

Mr. Cahen (continued)

might usefully be placed at the Assembly's disposal with a view to strengthening the Office of the Clerk.

When that was done, a more coherent approach to the organisation's administrative and budgetary problems – to which Mr. Morris's detailed report refers – could be defined and implemented.

Also regrettable, I admit Mr. van der Sanden, is the fact that the Council's annual report did not reach the Assembly with more time to spare before its current session and, in particular, before the last meeting of its General Affairs Committee. I have had an opportunity to explain myself before this committee.

I accept the responsibility which several members of the Assembly, and the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee in particular, feel should be borne by the Secretary-General, namely that of making sure, as one of his permanent tasks, that the various Council bodies keep your institution properly informed in accordance with Article IX of the treaty. I can assure you that I have discussed the matter in the Council and that this time we shall take steps to ensure your justified request is met.

The adoption of the platform on European security interests was a key moment in the reactivation of our organisation and in the shaping of a European security identity. The task before us now is to give practical expression to the principles it lays down regarding the defence of Europe as seen in the perspective of the common Atlantic defence.

This is the task now being addressed by the special working group, urged on by the Permanent Council. The group should be ready to place a substantive report on the subject before ministers at their next meeting in November 1988. At the same time, it will submit a further report on disarmament questions and the security requirements of our states.

Both reports, if approved by the Ministerial Council, will constitute important formulations of a European position on the various facets of Europe's security at a time when the American presidential election will put the development of East-West relations and the transatlantic relationship in a different light and when it will be more important than ever for our countries to speak with one voice on the subject.

Finally, I take due note of the Assembly's suggestions that the Secretary-General should take over much of the administrative work currently handled by the Council, prepare a regular bulletin for the Assembly on the activities of the Council and of the groups working under the

Council's direction. I can assure you that the Permanent Council will pay the greatest heed to these suggestions.

I should like to conclude, Mr. President, members of the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union, by saying that there is no question of me or the Permanent Council of which I am both member and servant denying the shortcomings which still exist in connection with the reactivation of the organisation.

But I would not want the existence of these shortcomings – which must be rectified – to obscure the infinitely greater successes that have been achieved over the last three years.

When the Secretary-General says that the reactivation of the organisation is now a reality it is not just propaganda. It is the plain and simple truth. This is recognised both in our member states and elsewhere, and by governments, public opinion and the media. It is acknowledged by other prominent international institutions actively concerned with European construction or the Atlantic Alliance. Would it not be a shame if the only forum to question or at least belittle this achievement was the one in which so much has been done to make reactivation of WEU a reality?

Let us, together, recognise that the reactivation of Western European Union is now a fact and that it has borne fruit, but at the same time let us admit that the task is far from completed and that the work has to go on and the effort increased.

With that prospect before us, the spur of your criticisms and the essential voicing of your concerns and misgivings will have an even greater force with the member governments for the greater good of the organisation and, beyond the organisation, that European edifice to whose construction we are all jointly committed.

12. Address by Mr. Serra, Minister of Defence of Spain and Chairman of the Independent European Programme Group

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Serra, Minister of Defence of Spain and Chairman of the Independent European Programme Group.

I should point out that this is the first time for our Assembly to be visited by a representative of the government of a state that is not a member of WEU. This address therefore presents special importance, but when Spain is a full member of WEU, representatives of the Spanish Government will be attending regularly.

It was also in his capacity as Chairman of the Independent European Programme Group that Mr. Serra kindly accepted the invitation to take

The President (continued)

part in our work. His statement fits logically into our consideration of Mr. Wilkinson's report on European co-operation in armaments research and development, which is why, Mr. Minister, we shall be very interested to hear your viewpoint.

I know you have agreed to reply to any questions after your address. I would be grateful, ladies and gentlemen, if you will give me a note of these during the Minister's speech.

Would you please come to the rostrum, Minister.

Mr. SERRA (*Minister of Defence of Spain and Chairman of the Independent European Programme Group*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, allow me first to thank the President of the Assembly of Western European Union for inviting me, in my capacity as Chairman of the IEPG, to attend the thirty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly.

This is my first appearance before a WEU body and for me it is a twofold source of satisfaction. For one thing it shows the interest that both the WEU Assembly and IEPG take in co-ordinating our efforts in this field of armaments co-operation which, as I shall point out later, is an essential factor in the process of European integration. For another, my presence here today coincides with the beginning of the conversations between the Spanish Government and the seven WEU member states on Spain's future membership which will, to my mind, signify another important step towards this great goal of European unity to which we are all committed.

Before beginning my address, I would like to congratulate Mr. Wilkinson and all the members of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on their brilliant report on European co-operation in armaments research and development. I would also like to say that my participation in this debate makes no claim to provide a solution to the problems which have been raised but is simply intended to help in finding appropriate ways of furthering this activity among the European countries.

Ladies and gentlemen, we all know that industrial capacity has always been one of the indicators for measuring a country's growth and development. This is still true today to some extent but in the fairly recent past a country's industrial power was more or less synonymous with its political strength and capacity. Furthermore, defence industry policy during the period before and to some extent after the second world war as well as aimed at self-sufficiency as a guarantee of national security.

By the early 1960s, however, the growing interdependence between nations had already brought into being a number of conditions for security industry policy which became more sharply defined as time went by and which may be described as follows.

First, there is the definition of a model of international society based on interdependence, second, the inherent need of countries, convinced of the fact that an efficient division of labour reduces costs in the long term, to co-operate with each other, third, the idea in certain specific sectors of international society – and very definitely in the case of Western Europe – that having the same objectives and values must lead to models of regional integration in which defence industry co-operation can play a very significant part and fourth, arising out of all this, the urgent need to frame a series of integrated policies in the various fields of co-operation.

As a politician, I would add a fifth heading: awareness of our industry's need to survive. No European country can embark on the technical development of a new weapons system on its own and all European countries need to co-operate if they wish to possess a leading-edge industry in the advanced technology sector. It is this awareness of the need for co-operation in order to survive as advanced technology countries that makes me optimistic about the future.

Shortly after the second world war, Europe became increasingly aware that economies of scale allowing the development of an industry capable of competing on more integrated markets cannot be introduced in a fragmented market divided into watertight compartments. If Europe had continued to act individually, with a nationalistic attitude to its industries and had persisted in seeing the national interest in terms of sectoral independence it would have been irretrievably condemned to see its industries absorbed by those in other, better equipped countries and designed for large-scale economies.

Faced with that kind of scenario it was more than obvious that European countries had no alternative but to co-operate in their defence industry. But what form was this co-operation to take?

Given that subdivision in Europe constituted a factor of weakness, a strategic model had to be chosen for the kind of industrial integration necessary to bring co-operation within Europe into being. However, this apparently simple plan is complicated by determinants or limitations which have to be overcome.

The first of these determinants has to do with the pace of new technology which means that weapons systems have to be long-lived and

Mr. Serra (continued)

capable of adapting to an evolving threat and therefore calls for more imaginative and intuitive skills on the part of our technicians and operators when specifying or defining such systems.

The second determinant is the problem facing the strategy planners. There is a close link between strategy and weapon design. The big problem to be solved by armament planning on the European scale, in whatever form, is precisely this harmonisation of operational specifications.

Third, it has to be recognised that, when the time comes to take decisions, each country has its own ideas of foreign policy and its own approach to financial and economic planning.

Fourth, each country has its own military staff, generally in search of the ideal model when it comes to defining the specifications of a system. This attitude places a further difficulty in the way of co-operation which always demands a realistic and pragmatic basis.

Fifth, there are the national markets whose present configuration is steadily eroding Europe's technological foundations because of the divided market and the independent national policies. One of the reasons why the Independent European Programme Group was set up – and which also explains, I am sure, why we are meeting here today – is to respond to the need for this policy of integration.

The construction of European defence calls for the unification and integration of all our efforts. It cannot be properly understood without close links with economic and technological Europe.

In 1975, Léo Tindemans stressed the need for a joint armaments policy and made the point that European economic and political union would be incomplete without a common defence policy. The same line was taken in the Greenwood report which proposed a European action programme for the manufacture of conventional armaments under the umbrella of a common industrial policy. In response to these needs, the IEPG, the Independent European Programme Group, was set up on 2nd February 1976.

Work began with all the caution that the first steps in any project require. The group focused its main attention on two areas which dominated the first eight years of its existence: the harmonisation of operating conditions and co-operation in teams.

The ministers of IEPG met for the first time only four years ago, in 1984, to mark the birth of the "revitalised" IEPG which renewed the commitment of its members to increase their co-operation particularly in technological

research and development. The main aim at this stage is to guide all the teams towards the principal field covered in the programmes, namely research and technology.

This Independent European Programme Group, now being completely "renovated", finds itself on the same road as a Western European Union also involved in a process of revitalisation and enlargement, bringing the two together. The meeting could not have been more fortunate, nor could the occasion either because this simultaneous reinvigoration of the two bodies simply proves that Europe is summoning up its strength again and marching resolutely forward.

Alongside this problem for Europe of the revitalisation of both WEU and IEPG there is another: the need to give a global dimension to their manner of looking at problems. There is no doubt today that we are working in too many directions at once and that there is too much dispersal, even of initiatives and objectives. But I do not for all that think that the present plurality of institutions is a bad thing. Yes, of course we ought to invent a system for co-ordinating the action of different institutions with similar ends. Some work is already being done in that direction, I believe. My presence here is perhaps modest evidence of this.

A series of decisions taken by the IEPG Ministers in Seville last year stems from the recommendations put together in the report "Towards a stronger Europe" which the IEPG ministerial meeting had called for in 1984. The first measures recommended in this document were to do with trade and aimed mainly at the removal of obstacles to free trade and industrial co-operation. Next, the report recommended the adoption of measures for organising research, based on the creation of a common research fund. Lastly, the report proposed a number of policy guidelines: fuller use to be made of the potential of the less developed industrial countries, more flexibility and a more understanding attitude in interpreting the "fair return" principle, and the acceptance of technology transfers to correct any undesirable effects of free competition.

The same report also concluded that an IEPG secretariat was essential in order to achieve the objectives set. The guidelines in the report met with general approval and now provide the basis for IEPG's future activities.

In order to achieve the objectives set at our meeting in Seville, where the IEPG Ministers considered the report that I have just summarised, we decided that it would be necessary to draw up a plan of action to be tabled at the next interministerial meeting for approval and implementation. For various reasons that interministerial meeting could not be held this

Mr. Serra (continued)

spring. The IEPG Ministers decided to hold an informal meeting in September to discuss the plan of action under no constraint and then to hold a formal meeting in November in Luxembourg. We are well ahead with drafting the plan of action. The directives given were to concentrate not only on large-scale competitiveness within Europe and the formation of consortia, but also on the fair return principle and technology transfer, these being two ways of tempering the effects that pure competition could have in countries with a less-developed defence industry (LDDI) where the need is to enhance the technological potential. If we concern ourselves solely with the principle of free competition in order to correct the technological imbalances between Europe and our transatlantic allies and Japan, such free competition might, in the case of our group, tend in certain cases to increase existing imbalances in technology and in European industrial capacity. Fair return and technology transfer are two instruments that should, in the short or medium term, act to mitigate existing imbalances and therefore make a positive contribution to the creation of this European market of defence industries that we would all like to see.

Let me put the same thought another way. Whilst recognising the benefits which undoubtedly flow from free competition in the commercial world of today, we must remember that the structures of co-operation in so sensitive an area as that of armaments cannot obey the same norms as those governing the marketplace. A system based solely on free competition would inevitably end by increasing the imbalance and favouring the strongest. In such circumstances we would be back with national losers again and the losers would always be tempted to opt out of a system of co-operation unfairly relegating them to a buyer-only rôle. This danger of imbalance between the strong industries and those of the less-developed countries that would be put out of the race is more tangible in countries with less-developed defence industries (LDDI), but not only in those countries. If we cannot find a balanced system of co-operation we shall run the risk, as Sir Donald Hall said at a colloquy organised by this Assembly in London last March, of seeing the big companies – the potential winners in this industrial competition – growing into European monopolies and the development of monopolies is just the opposite to what IEPG wants.

But we have to realise that regulating instruments must not go to the extent of preserving situations that could lead to a duplication of effort. I can but share the opinion of my colleague, George Younger, when he said in his statement last March that competition and collaboration need not be mutually exclusive. Though at first

sight opposites, the two may in some ways be complementary. That complementarity needs to be ensured by one and the same system which, on the one hand, makes it easier for the strongest and best prepared companies to win and at the same time compensates the other members of the system through a guarantee mechanism that nowadays we call the fair return. The more developed, better equipped and financially stronger companies, with more technological resources and more industrial experience need a unified European market as the final outlet for their products – but a European market, we should not forget, made up of varyingly developed countries all members of a joint system of co-operation. Such a system can be productive for all only if it is based on balanced development because, if we want a stable solution, all those taking part have to be able to derive benefit from it.

There have been recent criticisms to the effect that, without the sharing of knowledge and technology, there can be no joint research and that without joint research there can be no projects that are really shared.

So far IEPG has set itself priority objectives which, for the moment, are the best guarantee of progress. We need to continue with the launching of co-operative technology projects (CTP). But I believe that we should also think about the advantages that might come from a joint European research programme under which an advanced technology base would be created for industry, as proposed by Mr. Wilkinson in his report. I also think we should look at possible financing schemes leading the way to co-operation in the field of research and technology.

From a brief analysis of the report "Towards a stronger Europe" commissioned in 1984 and presented at the interministerial IEPG meeting in Seville it is possible to pick out three basic points.

The first relates to the need to create a healthy climate for free trade, competition and the removal of obstacles to industrial trade. This is quite clearly the long-term objective of most potential advantage to companies in the highly industrialised countries. Next, the report presented in Seville saw the need to share technological knowledge freely as an essential condition for progress. In this way, research and technology appeared as a joint feature that the highly-industrialised countries could claim to strengthen their competitive position and the weaker countries could demand by way of fair return or benefit. This, therefore, was a postulate for two-way balance.

The third and last condition that the EDIS report saw as essential for progress was "greater acceptance of the fair return principle and a

Mr. Serra (continued)

more favourable attitude in that regard". Here we have what I call the "corrective element" to put right the imbalance caused by the first postulate – free competition – and not corrected by the second postulate alone – technology transfer.

The object is not to create a market operating under the classic rules. We have to make the effort of inventing these norms so that all IEPG members can benefit. Otherwise, the same thing could happen to us as happened to Molière's doctors who thought it was far more honourable to fail but stick to the rules than to succeed by means of some innovation.

To end my address I would like to highlight the issues that the proposed united Europe, and therefore Western European Union and the Independent European Programme Group, will have to face in the near future.

To begin, let me express my complete conviction that WEU will be called upon to play a vital rôle in European security and defence policies. The invitation to new members, that is to say to my own country and our Portuguese neighbours, is the surest proof that member countries intend to make their voice heard more clearly and in a more European fashion, largely by developing the political will in WEU enabling them to concentrate their efforts to achieve unification in the field of defence.

We must not forget, however, that the implementation of a security policy also depends on the better utilisation of the resources allocated to defence and therefore on improved co-operation among the countries of Western Europe. Clearly, the closer that co-operation, the stronger the bastion of security policy.

That is the challenge to which IEPG has to respond. As I have said, our activity in the immediate future will focus on the creation, in the long term, of a European armaments market and on the development of a systematic approach to collaboration in research and technological development and to finding realistic ways of including in the group's common task the potential of countries which, because of their size or lower degree of industrial development, find it difficult to join in the project.

Implementing the plan of action, which I hope we shall be approving in November, will call for a number of structural and operational modifications in IEPG which we shall need to study at the same time. In particular, we shall need to take account of the fact that IEPG will have to require a commitment from its members at all levels of its activity and operation. That means that we have to guarantee that all countries will, within a reasonable space of time, have access to the presidency. For that, decisions will have to be taken

on arrangements whereby a rotating presidency, with a reasonable term of office, could operate without breaks.

At the same time, the structures designed in the flexible and pragmatic spirit that has always characterised IEPG and which have been in existence for nearly ten years in the form of stable special working groups or panels will need to be adapted to our future work with a similar kind of rotating presidency.

It is under this heading that I would like to make a few brief comments on the draft recommendation arising out of the colloquy on European co-operation in armaments research and development presented by Mr. Wilkinson because, by and large, this recommendation matches those we are studying in IEPG.

In research and development, we are currently studying the advisability of creating a body specifically concerned with these activities to which we attach the utmost importance. It is development under this heading that will determine whether the foundations are sufficiently strong to support the construction of the European technological and industrial base that we seek to build. Some other matters, relating to finance, which may facilitate collaboration in the technological projects cannot be excluded from our work.

Another objective, complementary to this, is to derive maximum joint advantage from existing research and test centres and to set up joint centres in countries where industry is less developed. This objective could be looked into by the new body whose creation we shall be considering at our next meeting.

A permanent central secretariat, which I hope will be set up shortly, could be another item on our agenda. In the opinion of several member countries, the purpose of this secretariat would be to help the working units of IEPG which are essential for setting up the plan of action. It would give a certain continuity to our group, facilitate the transition when the presidency changes over and provide its support to every member including those lacking the necessary human and economic resources to occupy the presidency.

I have tried in my address, ladies and gentlemen, to show that co-operation in defence and security policy on the one hand and in the creation of a European pillar of the alliance and armaments co-operation on the other are complementary and should go hand in hand. The weapons systems resulting from European co-operation must be made to a model in which the essential features of a joint defence policy have already been taken into account. We cannot treat the subject of co-operation in the European defence industry as a separate question running parallel to the process of building the European

Mr. Serra (continued)

defence pillar, an objective that we shall be able to further through progress in industrial co-operation.

I have to confess that my view of the situation tends towards optimism. In the end, co-operation among all of us will win the day. The survival of the European defence industry depends upon it. The sooner we reach agreement, the stronger and more credible will the joint European industry become.

As President of IEPG, I am particularly pleased to see that this Assembly keeps in very close touch with progress in our work and activities. The debates and recommendations of European parliamentarians, wherever they meet, always have a major impact in government bodies and influence their decisions.

We live at a time when Europeans are beginning to realise that they must strengthen their industrial and technological defence base. The more competitive and effective that base, the greater Europe's capacity to defend itself. And that, in the end, will help to consolidate the defence of the free world in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – On behalf of the Assembly, I thank you, Mr. Serra, for your address.

The Minister has kindly agreed to answer questions.

I call Mr. van der Werff.

Mr. van der WERFF (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I too should like to compliment the Minister on his detailed statement, which principally concerned the post-INF period. It is very pleasing to hear the Minister, who is also the Chairman of the IEPG, describing Western European Union as an extremely important body. To what extent does he think the IEPG and WEU might join forces? Is this one of the aspects the IEPG is considering, or is the possibility of co-operation a distant prospect?

In the IEPG account will have to be taken at the post-INF stage of two very important aspects, in line with Western European Union's platform. These are military assistance beyond national frontiers and the acceptance of nuclear armaments as an essential aspect of defence at that stage. Are these factors appreciated in the IEPG?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SERRA (*Minister of Defence of Spain and Chairman of the Independent European Programme Group*) (Translation). – If I have cor-

rectly understood the interpretation, the member is asking whether the work of IEPG includes nuclear problems and the need for a joint effort beyond our frontiers.

These are not the concerns of IEPG. Its purpose is to co-ordinate our efforts in the field of co-operation with the sole object of producing common conventional armaments. We are running several research and development projects including, for example, a new anti-tank missile and participation in a new European frigate but, as I say, we are working in the field of conventional armaments. Strictly speaking, our only objective is co-operation in the research and development and coproduction of weapons systems developed on a joint basis.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Do any other members have a question to ask?...

That brings us to the end of this discussion. Thank you, Mr. Serra, for answering the question.

13. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 38(6) of the Rules of Procedure, I ask the Assembly to agree to the changes in the membership of committees contained in Notice No. 1 which has already been distributed.

Are there any objections?...

The changes are agreed to.

I have also been informed that the British Delegation proposes that in the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations Mr. Ewing be a titular member in place of Mr. Faulds and that Mr. Faulds be an alternate member in place of Mr. Coleman.

Are there any objections?...

The changes are agreed to.

14. European co-operation in armaments research and development – guidelines drawn from the colloquy

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 1141 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on European co-operation in armaments research and development – guidelines drawn from the colloquy, Document 1141 and amendments.

I call Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – It is a great privilege for me to present this report on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions which summarises the guidelines – in English I prefer to use the word “lessons” – to be drawn from the symposium held in London on European co-operation in armaments research and development.

At the outset, I should like to pay tribute to the Clerk of the committee and all those within the service of the Assembly and in the British Government who combined to make the event such an outstanding success.

There is a tendency to underrate the importance for Europe's future of patient, pragmatic and practical progress in what are regarded merely as technical matters. Of course, big schemes, grand strategy and lofty objectives for European construction, grandiloquently expounded, generate much more political emotion and capture more column inches in the press. They probably also inspire more television producers. Yet Europe's greatest founding fathers understood the importance of underpinning their far-sighted vision of Europe's unity with the foundations of specific, concrete achievable goals – the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, Eurocontrol, the European Space Agency and, above all, the Common Market.

Similarly, in the domain of European defence, the failure of the European Defence Community exemplified the dangers of going too far too fast. By contrast, if the revivification of WEU is held to have failed because its member countries and Ministerial Council cannot decide where its component parts should be located, or because some people think that it has not developed a sufficiently prominent rôle, that would be a misjudgement. The WEU Assembly has consistently been the harbinger of new developments that subsequently have been endorsed by the Ministerial Council and member governments and then proudly proclaimed as their own. That is their prerogative. As government representatives we cannot begrudge them that.

The co-ordination of security forces to safeguard Western Europe's common interests outside the NATO area is one example of the Assembly's farsightedness. The enlargement of WEU to include Spain and Portugal will, we hope, shortly prove to be a second example. The strategic importance of a major European space programme is without doubt a third.

In this forward-looking spirit the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions since its formation has always championed the cause of European co-operation in aerospace and armaments. Its series of symposia paved the way for progress by bringing together in a unique way ministers, members of national

and NATO military staffs, civil servants and diplomats, industrialists, politicians and defence academics. The European space programme, the collaborative industrial arrangements for joint European manufacture of armaments and now military research and development in Europe have all benefited from objective interdisciplinary analysis at WEU symposia.

European defence equipment collaboration has matured greatly over the past twenty to twenty-five years. It started with ad hoc industrial arrangements which brought to successful fruition such first-generation programmes as the Jaguar offensive support aircraft, Transall transport, the Atlantique maritime patrol aeroplane, the Alpha-jet trainer, the family of Anglo-French helicopters – Lynx, Puma and Gazelle – and the Milan and HOT anti-tank guided weapons. Industrial partnership in defence throughout Europe is now the norm and no longer the exception. The Euromissile Dynamics Group, Eurofighter, Panavia, EHI, Turbo Union and other famous names have a genuine corporate identity. They are not paper letterheads or brass doorplates alone.

The harmonisation of operational requirements and re-equipment time-scales is increasingly routine through the Independent European Programme Group. The importance of its work is recognised by us in WEU and by national parliamentarians, although we learn officially from direct sources all too little about its work. Even so, clear deficiencies remain in the integration of Europe's defence effort within the alliance. The fat years, when a 3% increase in defence expenditure in real terms was accepted in principle, were in practice always superseded by lean years in which our joint efforts for defence were diminishing in real terms while the cost of new weapons continued to grow at about 5% above the inflation rate.

Our thoughts could become so focused on arms control, so preoccupied with the political initiatives opened up by the enhanced opportunities for dialogue with the USSR, that we forget the need for Europe, on the one hand, to redress the military imbalance that continues to exist with the USSR and, on the other hand, to assume a bigger share of the common burden of western defence. In short, Europe has come of age and it must come to terms with the responsibilities that its maturity confers. Economically, we are at least the equal of the United States.

The London symposium addressed these problems directly and its conclusions are unambiguously plain. First, it said that WEU must reinforce its rôle as the promoter of progress within the IEPG towards the formulation of a common European research policy and a definition of a more cost-effective joint weapons programme. Secondly, the symposium proposed the execution through a common research agency of

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

a policy for research formulated by the IEPG. This recommendation accords with that of paragraph 61 of Mr. Vredeling's report "Towards a stronger Europe". Thirdly, it would help if this Assembly – the only parliamentary body competent through treaty to form a European-wide constituency in favour of European arms collaboration – were kept regularly and officially informed of the IEPG's work. An annual declassified report to the Assembly of WEU is not too much to ask. I was heartened by the admirable speech of Minister Serra, who fully appreciated the importance of collaboration with WEU.

Furthermore, the creation of a small permanent secretariat of the IEPG, as proposed in paragraphs 70 to 74 of Mr. Vredeling's report, would give the IEPG the personal continuity of expertise that is essential, since the gestation of new collaborative programmes can take many years. The permanent head of the IEPG secretariat would have to be a man of stature, and a mechanism for involving industry more closely in the formulation of operational requirements would have to be more effective.

The excellent contributions to the symposium made by many speakers reminded us of the need to make more rational use of the existing research, testing and trials establishments in the individual member countries of WEU. We must ensure that civilian industry and the universities benefit from Europe's common military research programme.

I earnestly hope that the Assembly will find the recommendations timely and relevant to our work in this Assembly and to Europe's defence needs. I have tried to reflect faithfully the views of our expert contributors and to them on our committee's behalf I owe a heartfelt vote of thanks.

(Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should first like to express my very sincere thanks to Mr. Wilkinson for giving us such a clear description of the findings of the colloquy. I believe this colloquy and Mr. Wilkinson's report will be a great help in making decisive progress in the current phase of efforts to achieve European unification in a field which is extremely important to both industry and defence.

When we discuss this subject, I believe we should begin by placing the emphasis on three principles.

First, there is the general political situation. We know that relations between the two world powers have improved, and we know that changes are also being made in the Soviet Union itself. In the western countries, as we know from opinion polls, many people are, to my mind, deluding themselves about the scale of these changes. The INF agreement that has been signed and ratified, and further efforts that may be made in the sphere of disarmament, cannot conceal the fact that the question of the security of the European countries must still be viewed against the background of the high military potential of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. Particularly where the INF agreement is concerned, it is significant that the conventional component of armament is assuming far more importance than in the past. So conventional aspects will continue to play an important rôle in the future. A general feeling of euphoria about disarmament is very unlikely to result in these factors playing a less important rôle.

The second problem is that in some of the WEU and NATO countries we now see and will continue to see in the next few years, growing controversy about the maintenance of the presence of defence forces, simply because of the trend in the birth rate – the structure of the population. The result is that the pressure exerted on defence efforts by way of personnel policy, if I may call it that, may have to be eased through the development and deployment of appropriate weapons, particularly in the conventional sphere.

The third problem that arises in this context is the question of the defence budgets of the various WEU member states. We know that for a wide variety of reasons some member countries' budgets are under extreme pressure. The population trend, pension payments and similar factors will also have an effect in the long term. This means that, given the added pressure of public opinion, we must economise severely and rationalise drastically in our defence budgets. This means – as the colloquy also reveals – that in research requirements must be identified with particular reference to operational aspects for the defence forces. So the question is, what needs to be done to maintain defence security, and what weapons, weapons systems and other elements are needed and must be developed. In other words, this research must be conducted jointly, because the budgetary aspects I have already mentioned certainly indicate the wisdom of joint, supranational efforts on behalf of rationalisation.

In this context it will also be important in the long term to consider how far weapons systems can be standardised so that they may be used by all the armed forces in the western alliance.

Mr. Müller (continued)

My fourth and final point concerns not only research and development but also the joint production of the weapons or weapons systems developed in this way. We know, ladies and gentlemen, that Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome makes quite special provisos about the military sphere, or military research, and the sector of industry concerned. But we also know that these provisos are not necessarily reflected in practice. I might point out that in the last few days Mr. Narjes, a Vice-President of the EEC Commission, has announced that a Community aircraft research programme is to be developed, on the grounds that, with lead times of fifteen years in this sector, such research is now too expensive for individual member states. In the justification for this Community initiative, Vice-President Narjes points out that at least 90% of what will initially be a civil research programme for aircraft development will also have a military component. This in itself indicates, ladies and gentlemen, that the links between purely military research and the civil sector are, of course, very, very close and that Article 223 of the EEC treaty, which I have already quoted, need not necessarily be interpreted so narrowly.

We are all convinced that the second pillar of NATO, the European component, needs to be strengthened. For this joint research, joint development and joint production of the weapons concerned will play a vital rôle.

I should also like to place particular emphasis on the statement in the draft recommendation that the WEU Assembly is the right partner for a dialogue with the IEPG and that the discussions they have should be institutionalised so that there may be a regular exchange of views between the parliamentary elements of our countries and their counterparts. The establishment of a permanent secretariat is, of course, another commendable idea and should be supported, so that this policy may continue in a co-ordinated and rational way for a long time to come.

I believe that Mr. Wilkinson's report is a very important stimulus for the development of a common European security policy. Security policy does not just mean something that should be discussed in philosophical terms, as if it were floating somewhere in space: security policy is also based on hard facts. In the defence field it undoubtedly includes joint research and development and also joint production. We should make every effort to advance along this road.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Wilkinson has presented a report which is outstanding both for the

sharpness that is typical of his reports and for its great professionalism. In his report Mr. Wilkinson draws a number of conclusions, and the recommendations he proposes can certainly expect to find broad support in the Assembly.

Without repeating too much of what Mr. Müller has said, I will confine myself to two essential points. I am particularly interested in what you said about the Western European governments having so far failed, despite many successes with joint armament projects, to eliminate duplication of effort due to different national research programmes, by joining forces in military research. One can only agree and re-emphasise your point.

I should like to take up another of your statements, because I do not believe that it should be allowed to pass without comment. The maintenance of a defence industry base is undoubtedly important to us. But I ask you: must it necessarily be a strong one? And also in this context: must it be an economic and strategic goal that constructs and shapes this base? Or should the defence industry base not be subject to political opinion-forming and the political will?

The danger of your rather simplistic view is surely that the military technology industry is increasingly determining research and technology in Europe in the long term, that research and technology simply cannot escape from this vicious circle, of which you give a very sound description, and that there is no going back. I think it is important to refer to this danger. The political environment must be right. We must be guided in our deliberations by the political environment in question.

The socialists have tabled an amendment to the recommendation. I will comment on this straight away, then I will not need to do so later. The amendment reads:

“Recognising the importance of maintaining a defence industrial base within the member nations of WEU based on an economic division of work and adapted to the relevant threat.”

That is it. Nothing more. Delete the rest.

The English translation does not, in my opinion, correspond exactly to the German text. I feel it should read: “adapted according to the relevant threat”. The word “according” is very important, because the sense is not otherwise fully conveyed.

I should also like to consider the commentaries which you, Mr. Wilkinson, have presented on the colloquy in London. In them you criticise the Federal Republic and Italy for not spending enough money. Mr. Wilkinson, you were probably referring to calculations which show

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

national expenditure on armament research relative to gross national product and are compared with national expenditure on military and civil research.

I know it is difficult to draw up an inventory of comparable data because of the considerable overlapping of civil and military technologies. You should know that, because you are an expert. Many critical technologies – like new materials, microelectronics, optronics, artificial intelligence, lasers and production processes – can be developed for both civil and military uses, a fact to which, as I understand it, Vice-President Narjes referred during the colloquy. The emphasis differs, depending on the country concerned.

But one can draw the following picture, in which I should like to include other partners. According to surveys carried out by the OECD and other agencies, defence technology programmes account for the following proportions of total government spending on research and development: United States 69%, United Kingdom 52%, France 31%, Federal Republic of Germany 12%, Italy 11%, Denmark 7%, Netherlands 3%, Belgium 2%, Greece 3%, and Europe as a whole 26%. If NASA's security-related costs are included, the proportion in the United States is about 80%. The figure for the United Kingdom also includes expenditure on government military research and development establishments where testing is carried out.

I know, for example – and we must be allowed to rectify this in a technically based report like this one – that a substantial reduction in defence spending as a proportion of total government spending on research and development is being considered in Britain. The target is about 33% over five to eight years. The reason for this, I must stress, is the limited spin-off for civil programmes from defence findings. I consider this a very important point of view.

In Germany and Italy research and development in the field of defence technology account for about 10% of total government spending in this sector. If the funds raised by the private sector in these countries for research and development are included, less than 5% of the relevant total expenditure in these countries goes to research and development work in the area of defence technology. This shows that 95% of the money spent on research and development in both these countries is devoted to civil projects and that defence projects are combined with the civil findings as add-on programmes. This means that benefit is derived from civil research for defence technology – the spin-off problem – and not, as in other countries, vice versa. The spin-off problem begins on precisely the opposite side.

In the other European countries defence technology accounts for an even smaller proportion of government spending on research and development. But we do know that several countries – the Netherlands, Belgium and Turkey, for instance – want to increase their expenditure on research and development in the field of defence technology so as to improve their ability to co-operate on armament projects.

I am sorry to have to quote so many figures, but I think it is necessary to introduce them at this stage.

Related to gross domestic product, total spending by the public and private sectors on research, technology and development can be broken down as follows: United States 2.8%, private sector 1.49%; United Kingdom 2.2%, private sector 1.1%; France 2.3%, private sector 0.99%; Federal Republic of Germany 2.8%, private sector 1.68%.

Government spending on research and development can then be further broken down into civil and defence spending. This shows that government research and development spending in the United States amounts to 1.31%, of which 0.41% is the civil, and 0.9% the defence share; in the United Kingdom 1.1%, civil share 0.53%, defence 0.57%; in France 1.31%, civil share 0.91%, defence 0.4%; in the Federal Republic of Germany 1.12%, civil share 0.99%, defence 0.13%. Excluded from these calculations, of course, is work on the SDI, strategic systems, ABC weapons, and areas of applied research in the Federal Republic.

If we examine expenditure on research and development relating to our conventional defence capability – a base we want to broaden in Europe, of course – we find that research, development and procurement account for 11.4% in the United States, 9.3% in the United Kingdom, 12.6% in France and 8.3% in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Development and procurement – this is an interesting scale too, Mr. Wilkinson – account for 21.4% in the United States, 28.1% in the United Kingdom, 18.4% in France and 14.7% in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The most important partners and competitors in the alliance market prepare their procurement programmes with an average of over 30% of funds for research, technology and development, the figure for the Federal Republic being only about 23%.

All I can say, Mr. Wilkinson, is that my figures can be checked. Your statement that Britain and France spend a far larger proportion of their gross national product on armament research than the Federal Republic and Italy – and I refer to the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* of 9th March 1988 – is so simplistic in the way it comes across in print that I do not consider it acceptable.

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

Ladies and gentlemen, I apologise for quoting so many figures to you. I know this should not be done too often. But I simply felt it necessary to introduce them at this stage to set the record straight.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I intervene only briefly to record the appreciation of the Western European Union Assembly of my British colleague, Mr. John Wilkinson, who, although he introduced his report with characteristic modesty, was the focal point, the fulcrum, of this particular colloquy or conference. It was one of the best, if not the best, that I have attended in the time that I have been a member of WEU. It was one which, by the very calibre of the people taking part, and the contributions that they made, was a red-letter day in the history of this Assembly.

When I say that one could hardly get a seat on the first day, and that subsequently during the rest of the colloquy the same applied, there are a few lessons there for members of this Assembly. Looking round I can see, as is often the case, a yawning number of empty places. We should be grateful to Mr. Wilkinson, whose brainchild this was. He pressed this forward confidently and well, and at the end of the day made an excellent contribution to the forward thinking of WEU.

There is no more important subject than defence rationalisation and harmonisation, which has for too long been an overriding problem for Europe. It has not been tackled successfully by NATO countries, WEU countries and all the countries that are responsible for the defence of liberty in this part of the world. It is not too much to say that rationalisation and harmonisation have been the Achilles heel of western defence. We all know only too well that the Warsaw Pact countries are fully complementary in their approach. One can admire them, although one knows from what that stems, but none the less, being faced with an adversary who has gained complementary rationalisation of defence puts us at a disadvantage.

There are just a couple of points that I wish to mention about Mr. Wilkinson's speech. First, the idea of the common research programme on advanced defence has much to commend it. I hope that, as a result of what was said at the colloquy and what has been said here this afternoon, the various defence ministers and chiefs will look at this closely with an idea of trying to bring about its implementation.

Secondly, and in some ways this is perhaps the most important point made in various speeches, Mr. Wilkinson referred to the lean years and the diminishing supporting effort from some of the nations of Europe. In a way, we are all guilty of not spending enough on defence and not sufficiently co-ordinating our efforts.

The year that one forgets to pay the insurance payment is the year when the house burns down. That is the situation in which we find ourselves. We should be fully aware, and so should the people whom we represent, that the defence costs that we incur are the insurance programmes for our nations. We need to consider this even more closely and to bear in mind that we shall have a new president of the United States at the end of this year.

When I go to the United States I always sense a continuing and keen interest in reducing defence costs, particularly in Europe. There is a growing pressure for that reduction to come about through the greater efforts of Europe to shoulder the burden.

I sense that with a new president of the United States, whoever he may be, that will become even more pertinent in the immediate future. We would do well to remember that, as time goes by, we might find ourselves in the difficult position of being wholly underfunded – quite apart from the issues of harmonisation and the depletion of the forces that we can put into the field in the defence of Europe. If Mr. Wilkinson's report has done something to emphasise that, and if he has put forward ideas that can be taken up by the defence chiefs of our various countries, his report and the colloquy will have been well worth while. I give my support to what he said in this debate, and before it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Lambie.

Mr. LAMBIE (*United Kingdom*). – I speak today as a member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions that is presenting the report, and as one who attended the colloquy in London. I have no argument with the details of the report; it is a fair summary of what took place in the colloquy and I have no criticism of that.

My criticism is of the recommendation in the report. Unlike my colleague Sir Dudley Smith, I was not impressed by the colloquy in London; in fact, it frightened me. I have never seen so many retired military personnel and arms manufacturers under one roof. The background to discussion on the report was prepared by a recently sacked non-elected American politician of the type that we are getting more and more of as this American administration comes to an end. Non-elected American politicians come to Europe to tell us what we Europeans should be doing to

Mr. Lambie (continued)

defend the free world, in an attempt to continue what I thought had gone for ever – the philosophy of the cold war.

As Europeans, we should follow the example given by Jesus Christ 2 000 years ago, when he threw the money-lenders out of the temple – we should throw the arms manufacturers out of the WEU Assembly. If we do that, we shall have struck a blow for peace.

The report's recommendations are much changed from the original version. I pay tribute to my colleague John Wilkinson, who was prepared to listen to arguments, and on many occasions completely to change the recommendations and wording of the report. He compromised a great deal and that is to his credit, but, after all the discussions and amendments, I still believe that we must do something that we failed to do in the committee: we must change some of the recommendations of the report, and that will strengthen it.

We need co-operation in defence expenditure if we are to have efficiency and the best possible value for money; but to achieve that, we do not need the second recommendation: "to establish a European advanced defence research agency". We have too many such agencies at present, especially in the Common Market. More and more agencies are being built up throughout the world, and all they are doing is providing good, well-paid jobs for international civil servants and retired politicians.

Nor do we need the report's third recommendation, that we should set up "a small permanent international specialist secretariat". That would be yet another group of international civil servants.

My colleagues John Wilkinson and Sir Dudley Smith say in the House of Commons that we have too many civil servants in Britain and that we should support the Prime Minister's policy of reducing their numbers. I oppose such cut-backs in Britain, but I come here only to discover that my conservative friends say that we need more and more international civil servants. That leaves me in the unfortunate position of saying that, contrary to what we say in the United Kingdom Parliament, we have too many international well-paid civil servants. We do not need a new specialist secretariat.

Today, when the committee met for its final discussion of the report, Mr. Wilkinson said that we needed continuity of civil servants. But we do not have continuity of politicians or members of parliament. Certainly, many of my French colleagues after yesterday's elections will not enjoy such continuity, because they have lost their seats. We should not have continuity of civil servants but not of politicians. Politicians are the

bosses. We need continuity of politicians, and cannot have it; and I will not hand over power to a group of international civil servants. That is the last thing I would do in the United Kingdom or in Europe after having experienced the bureaucracy of the Common Market. I had better not make a speech against the Common Market, but we have suffered from its bureaucracy.

I remind colleagues of the BBC television programme "Yes, Minister". This is another example of the background to that programme. John Wilkinson wants international civil servants with continuity that will enable them to manipulate affairs and, perhaps, give more power to the arms manufacturers who, if they do not frighten him, certainly frighten me.

This is a good report; it is an exact statement of what took place in the colloquy, but let us delete recommendations 2 and 3 (b). Then I would support the report, and I ask John Wilkinson to accept what I ask in a spirit of co-operation. He has compromised in the past; let him do so in this final stage. In that way we shall go forward united. The only people who will be unhappy will be the international civil servants who will have lost their jobs.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – After this very committed speech. I call Mr. Coleman.

Mr. COLEMAN (*United Kingdom*). – I do not intend to detain the Assembly long. There is no doubt that this is a faithful report of the colloquy in London. Like my colleague David Lambie, I am alarmed by the presence of arms manufacturers and the influence that they seem to wield in that colloquy. It worries me greatly that people who have such a vested interest should find themselves in such an influential position.

If I have a reservation, it is about the draft recommendations. There seem to be many words. Indeed, there are many words – the very point made by David Lambie – that allow civil servants, whether national, international or European, to get away with murder. I should like the draft recommendation to be specific.

Paragraph (i) of the preamble states: "Recognising the importance of maintaining a strong defence industrial base within the member nations of WEU." I do not like the word "strong". What does it mean? It takes no account of the changing atmosphere in international relations. The draft phraseology should be amended, perhaps by using these words: "Recognising the importance of maintaining an efficient defence industrial base within the member nations of WEU." In the past this may not have been justified – there was too much concentration on looking to a threat from the East. International relations are now improving and an understanding between East and West will lead, if the momentum continues, to a diminution in the tensions that have existed for so long.

Mr. Coleman (continued)

I remind the Assembly that a potential threat to the security and safety of the world could come from not only within the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc; I look to the position in the Middle East. In talking about an "efficient" rather than a "strong" defence industrial base, we should look to something that can respond to a danger arising in that part of the world. I urge colleagues to refrain from using language that is perhaps somewhat arrogant.

In the draft recommendation we talk about "Western Europe". WEU is not Western Europe. There are other parts of Western Europe outside WEU. I urge colleagues to approach this matter in a spirit of collaboration. I urge the Rapporteur to accept amendments to the draft recommendation. Like others, I commend him on his faithfulness in producing a report of what took place in the colloquy and in introducing this subject. I urge him to accept changes to the draft recommendation that will make this report that much more acceptable and effective.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ewing.

Mr. EWING (*United Kingdom*). – I join those who have congratulated John Wilkinson on his production of the report, but my comments may seem to be a contradiction of those congratulations. When I came here this afternoon, I intended to persuade the Assembly – although it is almost empty now – to refuse to accept this document. However, as so often happens, the speech introducing the document was much better and more acceptable than the document itself.

I know John Wilkinson to be a reasonable man with powers of persuasion. Colleagues may not be aware that a new political disease has broken out in the United Kingdom, with politicians quoting scripture – I call it the battle of the Bible. Mrs. Thatcher and Neil Kinnock exchange quotes almost daily. I must hand John Wilkinson the credit for making my colleague David Lambie quote the Bible for the first time in the thirty years I have known him. For that, if for no other reason, I shall not oppose the document. Rather than vote in favour, I shall abstain.

I should like to explain my reservations about the document. During my short time as a member of WEU and the Council of Europe I have noticed a tendency for explanatory memoranda to documents to bear no relation to draft recommendations or, to put it another way, for draft recommendations to bear no relation to explanatory memoranda. That applies to this document.

Paragraph 6 of the explanatory memorandum states: "The weapons procured for the democratic nations of Western Europe have to match

the evolving security of the members of the NATO alliance." The next few words are important: "This requires a clear assessment of the strategic and geopolitical developments of the next few decades." Nowhere is there a clear assessment, yet we must consider draft recommendations from an explanatory memorandum that says that we should have "a clear assessment of the strategic and geopolitical developments of the next few decades". I hope that no one would argue that an assessment exists in the form of Mr. Stokes's report, which we shall debate later this week. There is also none of the political and foreign policy imput that paragraph 6 says is necessary to consider the proposals put before us in the recommendations. We are faced with a series of recommendations based on non-existent reports.

The explanatory memorandum is a factual account of what took place at the colloquy in London, which I could not attend but which was attended by many experts from the defence manufacturing industry. I am deeply worried about the language used. It is almost as though there has been no progress along the path to peace and as though everything has stood still and the threat from the Soviet Union was as great today as some may have considered it to be in the past. Surely those who believed that there was a threat – I am not sure that I accept that there ever was one – must accept that it has greatly diminished. One of the main reasons, as paragraph 67 of the explanatory memorandum shows, is that the political climate is not favourable for an increase in defence expenditure. People do not believe that a threat exists. This document fails to take account of that fact.

A number of bland statements are made in the document. That is not the best basis on which to proceed along the lines suggested in the recommendations that we are asked to approve.

Referring to the future risks involved, paragraph 7 of the document says: "These might be limited but specifically targeted attacks by Soviet forces, designed to isolate the victims of aggression and to deny them the security guarantee of NATO's common response." Where is the evidence for that? We cannot proceed with such important measures on bland statements like that.

Paragraph 8 says: "Given the wide range of possible conflicts for which NATO needs to prepare in the coming decades." What wide range of possible conflicts are we talking about? We cannot have such bland statements made and then be asked to make important decisions for the future of Western Europe in terms of its defence and armaments industry.

When I came to the Assembly this afternoon, I was minded to ask representatives to reject this document based on the simple fact that the

Mr. Ewing (continued)

recommendations do not flow from the explanatory memorandum. I do not know where they come from. I suspect that they came from the remarks that were made, privately or publicly, by those who run our defence industries.

With respect to my colleagues, and especially to the Rapporteur, John Wilkinson, I find the whole approach rather depressing. When we went to the United States to meet the people there and our colleagues in Canada, I said that one of the significant aspects of that visit was the way in which the United States administration – and I suspect that this is true of many people in the United States – is having the greatest difficulty in coming to terms with the changes that are taking place in the Soviet Union.

In my view, public opinion in the United States is far ahead of the politicians or the administration in terms of adjusting to the changes taking place in the Soviet Union. It would be the tragedy of all tragedies if this great democratic organisation, WEU, were to fall into that same trap, that same abyss, as the United States and fail to adjust to the changes taking place in the Soviet Union.

I finish with one final depressing quotation from the explanatory memorandum. It says – and I paraphrase – that an empire in decline would be as great a threat, if not a greater threat, to its neighbours as an empire that was virile and active. There is no evidence to support that either.

I see the rôle of WEU in the years to come – and only time will prove whether I am right or wrong – as helping to stabilise the progress that has been made in the Soviet Union and encouraging its further development so that the generations who follow us into this building will not need to have the kind of discussion that we are having today. I hope that they will talk about peace, not building armaments, and a world in which we can all live happy and contented lives.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Briefly, I should like to respond.

Mr. Günther Müller was right to put the report in its international context. I admired the lucidity of his speech. He warned us about the dangers of a preoccupation with disarmament. He reminded us that the Warsaw Pact military preponderance still existed in Europe, and said that it was necessary to redress the conventional imbalance in particular. He was perspicacious in saying that we would have increasing budgetary problems and that we must rationalise our efforts to get better value for money. In this rationalisation process he saw much merit in studying

Commissioner Narjes's remarks, and what he said about the impact of civil research programmes on the military is something for us to consider carefully.

I do not agree with Mr. Klejdzinski that this report over-emphasises the importance of the defence industrial base for Europe's security. We must adapt to whatever the relevant threat may be. That was the whole purport of paragraphs 6 and 7 of the explanatory memorandum, to which Mr. Ewing so wisely referred. We should like to see a fair division of labour – a *juste retour*.

Paragraphs 61 and 62 of Mr. Vredeling's report state that the common research fund would be modest initially: 100 million ecu per year at the start, rising automatically to a maximum of 500 million ecu per year after five years. No one should think that that is an excessively ambitious plan. In paragraph 62 Mr. Vredeling's report calls attention to the model of the European Space Agency, which is a flexible model, using the respective technical capacities of European countries. Furthermore, Mr. Vredeling's report bears study for its remarks about involving the less-developed countries in the defence industry.

In a typically generous and magnanimous speech which benefited from his long experience both in the Assembly and as a former minister for the army in the United Kingdom, Sir Dudley Smith compared the standardisation of the Warsaw Pact with the disparate efforts of NATO. I am pleased that he supported a common research programme. He reminded us that there will be a new United States president at the beginning of next year and that pressures within the United States for a reduction on defence spending in Europe will grow.

David Lambie was in good Bible-thumping form and generous in his comments on the report. He was frightened by the large number of retired military men and arms manufacturers gathered together under one roof. They did not alarm me as much as they alarmed him. We would not be doing our work if we did not involve the arms manufacturers in the formulation of Europe's security policy.

I shall seek, in plenary as in committee, to adapt the recommendations to the wishes of the members, but I cannot promise to do it completely as David Lambie would wish. He said that Jesus Christ threw the money-lenders out of the temple – and indeed he did – but I have never noticed socialist governments being too keen to get rid of the money-lenders.

I was amused by Mr. Lambie's remarks about international civil servants. I sympathise with his motivation, but Mr. Vredeling's report called for no more than twenty international civil servants on the permanent secretariat. I do not

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

think that I can accept that, particularly if it means a reduction in the number of national civil servants.

Mr. Coleman kindly said that the report was faithful to the proceedings of the colloquy. He said that those who attended had a vested interest in providing an effective and cost-effective defence for Europe. Of course we had. He said that the report contained too many words. That is a danger in the preparation of all such political documents. I do not believe that the report fails to take note of the changing atmosphere. Mr. Coleman said that its language was arrogant. I hope that it is not. I shall, of course, be able to accept some amendments, but probably not all of them.

In an eloquent and warm-hearted speech, Mr. Ewing said that my speech was better and more acceptable than the document itself. That is praise indeed. He went on to make some comments that caused me disquiet. He said that the report revealed that almost no progress had been made along the path to peace. I hope that that is not so. The Soviets are not diminishing their military preparedness or effort, in spite of the undoubtedly better atmosphere between the superpowers. That being so, I do not think that we should act differently at this stage.

Who could have foretold years ago that events would necessitate naval forces in the Gulf to ensure our oil supply? Who could have foretold that we would be involved in armed conflict in the Falkland Islands in 1982? Who could have foretold that the French would be involved in armed conflict in Chad or, in the spring of 1968, that the Soviets would be involved by that September in an armed invasion of Czechoslovakia only twelve years after their intervention in Hungary?

We have to be prepared and to adapt to circumstances as they evolve. I do not wish to be inflexible and I hope that members of the Assembly will accept the report as a fair, accurate and truthful account of the colloquy and of the general guidelines and lessons to be drawn from it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

15. Guest speakers

(Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1146)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have received from Mr. Linster and others a motion for an order on guest speakers with a request for urgent procedure, Document 1146.

The request has been posted up and the relevant motion has been distributed.

The Assembly will have to vote on the request for urgent procedure at the opening of tomorrow morning's sitting.

16. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday, 7th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Guest speakers (Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure, Document 1146).
2. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.
3. European co-operation in armaments research and development – guidelines drawn from the colloquy (Vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1141 and amendments).
4. Threat assessment (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the revised draft recommendation, Document 1115 addendum).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.35 p.m.)

SECOND SITTING

Tuesday, 7th June 1988

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Guest speakers (*Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 1146).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Soell, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.
4. Structure of the Office of the Clerk (*Motion for an order*, Doc. 1145).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Linster.
5. Threat assessment (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 1115 addendum).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Stokes (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Hardy, Dame Peggy Fenner.
6. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.
Replies by Mr. van Eekelen to questions put by: Mr. Eicher, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Wilkinson.
7. European co-operation in armaments research and development – guidelines drawn from the colloquy (*Vote on the draft recommendation*, Doc. 1141 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Wilkinson; (points of order): Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Stoffelen, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Büchner, Mr. Klejdzinski; Mr. Hardy, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Garrett, Mr. Wilkinson; (points of order): Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Coleman, Mr. Ewing; Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Wilkinson.
8. Threat assessment (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 1115 addendum).
Speakers: The President, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Litherland, Mr. Atkinson.
9. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly.
10. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Jung, Provisional President, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Guest speakers

(Motion for an order with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1146)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the request for a debate under the urgent procedure on the motion for an order on guest speakers tabled by Mr. Soell and others, Document 1146, and a vote on this request.

I call Mr. Soell to speak to this request for urgent procedure.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we and all those who have signed the motion have at various times in the Assembly and in the Presidential Committee repeatedly suggested that we should limit the number of government spokesmen if we do not want the Assembly's work to be constantly disrupted, because it must be made very clear that our work in the Assembly vis-à-vis the other organs of Western European Union is continuous, and that the Assembly is not a forum where members of governments can try to put across their own views.

1. See page 19.

Mr. Soell (continued)

We do not want in any way to restrict the right of governments to take the floor as allowed by the Rules of Procedure and the treaty, but we want agreement between the Presidential Committee and the Assembly that we should actually be able to do our work here. The number of ministers appearing this week greatly exceeds the informal arrangements we have made in recent years, and that is why we have tabled this motion.

I call on the Assembly to adopt the motion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against?...

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on behalf of the Presidential Committee.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I suggest that it is not true that the Assembly has decided that it does not want more speakers. One or two members have made loud and vehement speeches on the subject but we have never voted on it.

As you say, Mr. President, we should remit this motion to the Presidential Committee for consideration, bearing in mind the important points that have been made and the need to make certain that the work of the Assembly is not disrupted. It would be better to do things that way than to commit ourselves in advance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The Assembly has no objection to referring this question to the Presidential Committee as it has already considered the problem.

We shall now proceed to vote on the request for urgent procedure.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by sitting and standing.

I put to the vote the request for urgent procedure.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The request for urgent procedure is agreed to.

I propose, under paragraph 5 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure, that the Assembly debate the substance of an oral report by the Presidential Committee at a later date during the current part-session.

4. Structure of the Office of the Clerk

(Motion for an order, Doc. 1145)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We now have the motion for an order on the structure of the Office of the Clerk, Document 1145, tabled by Mr. Sinesio and others.

Under paragraph 4 of Rule 28 of our Rules of Procedure, I call Mr. Linster to speak to this motion for an order followed by the Chairman of the committee concerned.

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – The members of the Assembly know that, for several years now, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Assembly, too, have constantly been trying to obtain four additional posts that we still do not have.

You yourself asked for these posts in a memorandum to the Council on 4th November. Our object in this situation, to which we shall incidentally return tomorrow, is to instruct the Presidential Committee to take the necessary steps so that the Council finally replies – and favourably – to the Assembly's request.

If we do not get satisfaction by the time the Netherlands presidency comes to an end, we shall ask for a joint meeting.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the motion?...

Under paragraph 3 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Procedure, this document will be referred to the Presidential Committee.

5. Threat assessment

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1115 addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on threat assessment, Document 1115 addendum.

I call Mr. Stokes, Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Mr. STOKES (*United Kingdom*). – As members will know, the report on threat assessment has evoked a great deal of interest since being adopted almost unanimously by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in November last year. Indeed, the report has attracted so much interest – perhaps more than any other issued by our Assembly in recent years – that it has had to be extensively reprinted.

I want again to thank all who helped me compose the report, including, in recent months, our new Clerk, Mr. Colin Cameron. A great deal

Mr. Stokes (continued)

of constructive comment on the report was made during the brief time that the Assembly was able to devote to it in the December session, since when various developments have led me to revise the draft recommendation considerably and elaborate the report a little by way of an addendum.

The original report was the first in a series of such reports over the past six months and the first to bring into the open the sort of considerations that are now being applied generally by those who are trying to assess the threat. They are quality as well as quantity, the age of the material, population and demographic trends, behaviour, objectives and intentions vis-à-vis capabilities.

I have cited two such reports in the addendum including Senator Carl Levin's report, "Beyond the bean count - realistically assessing the conventional balance in Europe", which was published at the beginning of the year and which will be of immense use in the preparation of our committee's follow-up report on threat assessment.

The second report is an update of the 1984 NATO document, "NATO and the Warsaw Pact: force comparisons", issued by the Federal German Press and Information Office at the end of last year and from which I have quoted particularly the paragraphs and tables relating to tanks and artillery, because those weapons provoked a great deal of comment when my original report was published.

Since the addendum was printed, two further documents have arrived which contribute in particular ways to the debate on threat assessment: the British Government's "Statement on the defence estimates 1988" and the United States annual publication, "Soviet military power", which for the first time has as its subtitle "An assessment of the threat".

It is obvious that the East-West situation is in constant evolution. The dynamism which is now present in the various arms control forums means that it is increasingly important to have a firm base on which to build agreements for conventional arms reductions.

I think that it may help members to consider the difficulties inherent in generating figures of force levels if I rehearse some of the problems involved. They include how to decide which forces to count. The most obvious approach might be to count each side's total forces worldwide. But a realistic global balance would be not only extremely difficult to draw up, but largely irrelevant to our main interests. For, short of a full-scale strategic nuclear exchange between the superpowers, any East-West conflict would be fought in Europe - the area that in any

event most directly affects our own security. The aim, therefore, is to focus as far as possible on the forces that concern us, covering not only the forces on the central front, which would probably be involved immediately in any European conflict, but forces in the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, which could be deployed quickly to the central front, or which could be involved early in any fighting on the northern and southern flanks.

The next problem is how to count accurately. Over the years the Warsaw Pact has maintained tight secrecy about all aspects of its military forces. For example, it has consistently refused to discuss its own force levels in MBFR negotiations over the last fifteen years and only last year admitted for the first time to having a chemical warfare capability. Counting its forces cannot, therefore, be an exact science. Large items such as ships are easy to count; smaller ones, such as tanks and artillery pieces, less so; while others, such as anti-tank guided weapons, are almost impossible to count accurately. Similarly, it can be relatively easy to identify missile launchers, but not the number of spare missiles available.

Where do we draw the line? Arbitrary lines have to be drawn between, say, frigates and patrol boats, or tanks and scout cars. Putting a border-line case into one category rather than another could have a significant effect on the resulting balance. Similar problems may be caused by differing interpretations of the readiness states of certain units on both sides, and by uncertainties about where specific units are normally based.

There is obvious scope for assessments to differ, either because different counting rules have been applied or because interpretations of the available evidence vary. Nevertheless, the figures produced by the most reputable independent bodies - on which the report is based - present broadly the same picture of Warsaw Pact numerical superiority, even if details may differ.

In passing, it is worth mentioning that when the Chairman of the SPD, Mr. Hans-Jochen Vogel, was visiting Moscow in the middle of May, he was handed a graph by the Soviet chief of the general staff and it was published in *Der Spiegel* of 23rd May. The graph shows the Soviet view of the conventional force comparison in Europe for the first time in any detail. Interestingly, Moscow admits a slight superiority in personnel and a considerable superiority in tanks and artillery.

There is as yet no sign that their superiority is on the wane. There is no military glasnost as yet: quite the reverse, indeed. No matter what Mr. Gorbachev wants the West to believe, his Defence Minister is reported to have written recently that it would be impossible to destroy an

Mr. Stokes (continued)

aggressor, seen as NATO, through an effective defence and that Soviet forces must be capable of conducting "decisive offensive operations". A wide gap exists between Soviet rhetoric and reality and one can never be certain about Mr. Gorbachev's tenure. He may remain in office for twenty-five years or more, or he may be ousted by a combination of hostile elements in a few months.

Probably the most significant improvement in Soviet ground forces in this decade has been the modernisation of fire-power in armoured and infantry divisions. Today, for example, self-propelled guns have replaced towed pieces and the number of guns in both types of division has risen. The Soviets waited a long time before they began fielding self-propelled guns, but in the past eight years they have done a thorough job. We Western Europeans face 122 mm and 152 mm howitzers and 240 mm mortars. They have a 203 mm gun that could land a nuclear or high-explosive round on targets deep behind an enemy's lines.

The newer T-80, T-72 and T-54 are now taking over as the main Soviet battle tanks, although none is as modern as the United States M-1. However, a new design, derived from the T-72, with greater fire-power and mobility is now being delivered.

Not only have the Soviets increased their ammunition stocks for the forces facing the West but they have made extensive improvements in storage facilities. The capacity for ammunition storage has doubled and construction continues. Concern over logistics has led to improvement of the transport systems in Warsaw Pact countries through which Soviet troops and supplies would pass to a front in Germany. In addition, larger amounts of bridging equipment and rail, road and airfield repair materials have been stored at strategic points behind the front.

I should like to say a few words about the revised draft recommendation. Members will see that it has been considerably revised since the original report, and I have been glad to receive a number of amendments from all parts of the political spectrum – the majority of which I have been happy to include. The preamble takes account of recent developments, especially the withdrawal from Afghanistan, which is a major step in the right direction.

Recent moves towards greater openness in the Soviet Union are also welcome, although there is still a long way to go. The recent monthly figures for those allowed to leave the Soviet Union are rising encouragingly but these numbers are today only a quarter of those current in the 1970s, and we are told how liberal Mr. Gorbachev is compared with Mr. Brezhnev.

Other reports being considered during this part of the session reinforce the conclusions of the report on threat assessment: Mr. Pontillon – Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters; Mr. van der Sanden – Organisation of European security; Mr. Kittelmann – Disarmament; Mr. Wilkinson – Naval aviation.

Two forthcoming reports from the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments – Mr. Fourré on verification and Mr. Steiner on threat assessment – will further explore many of the aspects now recognised as fundamental to any appreciation of the balance of forces.

It would appear that the present report has already proved instrumental in convincing NATO to update and reissue its 1984 force comparison document, which is long overdue and which will be vital in preparing proposals on conventional disarmament in Europe.

All in all, I hope you will now agree with me that this exercise in threat assessment has been one of the most worthwhile ever conducted by our Assembly and that you will have no hesitation in adopting the recommendations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – It would be appropriate for me to offer the normal felicitations to the Rapporteur, and I do so gladly. Mr. Stokes has had this report around his neck for a long time. It has been a period of difficulty, since he would have liked the report to be considered and accepted by the Assembly a year or eighteen months ago. A year or eighteen months ago it might well have gone through the Assembly with much less criticism and reserve than it may now experience.

I pay tribute to Mr. Stokes for his work and the courteous approach that he has always revealed. He has most courteously accepted a host of amendments and referred to that in his introduction. The report has been substantially amended. Unfortunately, the main amendments that some of us wish to see were not accepted. Because he is an honest man, Mr. Stokes would not dream of denying that several amendments that we have sought vigorously to effect have been rejected. Therefore, and because of our misgivings, I do not believe that it would be wise for the Assembly to accept the report.

The misgivings are due to the constant evolution and the present dynamism to which Mr. Stokes referred. This report is pre-glasnost. It takes little account of last week's summit. It takes no account of the new hope that Mrs. Thatcher recognised only last week just after the gathering in the Guildhall in London.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

An amendment has been accepted about the removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, but the Assembly will recognise, if it examines the third paragraph of the preamble, that it presents a hard line. Is it not odd that at this time of hope, of glasnost, of perestroika, we suddenly find ourselves concerned about the position of the Baltic states? I have been in this Assembly a long time and do not recall the Baltic states being mentioned in a debate in this hemicycle, yet now, with the prospect of change within the Soviet Union, a new era of peace, a dynamic political realignment, we are to demand that before any further progress is made the Russians remove themselves from not only Afghanistan but the Baltic states. It is not appropriate for the report to be accepted in the present context of history.

I am not denying that there should be a genuine regard for human rights in the Soviet Union. I am not denying that we should have a realistic and asymmetric reduction of nuclear and conventional forces by careful and verifiable agreements. But to include in the European agenda a report that contains the words that we find in recommendation 2 (c) "to encourage the Soviet Government to follow up its newly-declared attitudes towards openness and the reduction in international tension by matching words with further deeds" smacks of a very hard line.

I hope that we can make our contribution to glasnost and to the future by looking to the future instead of to the past. If we do that, I am sorry to say that Mr. Stokes will find that the long gestation of this report – the considerable burden that he has had to shoulder over a long period – will be confounded. If we accepted the report, we should be kicking history into touch. We should be failing to recognise the dynamism and evolution to which Mr. Stokes referred. We should be underlining a hopelessness and a political bitterness that would not be appropriate. I hope that the Assembly will express sympathy for Mr. Stokes in the disappointment that history suggests he must experience.

If the report is accepted, it will mean a souring of hope and an embarrassment to the progress that Europe and the world saw last week. Against that sort of stake Mr. Stokes's report must be rejected. If it is not, the Assembly will be regarded as an anachronism. That would not be a fate that Western Europe should feel necessary at this moment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Dame Peggy Fenner.

Dame Peggy FENNER (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to compliment my colleague John Stokes on an excellent report. As the report and

addendum were produced before last week's considerable summit, it might well have been understood to have presented a realistic view of the threat and the prospects of détente and disarmament. But even after last week its conclusions can be seen to be well-founded.

My right honourable friend the Prime Minister said after meeting Mr. Gorbachev: "This is a man with whom I believe that we can do business." Subsequent events have confirmed her optimism. We wish Mr. Gorbachev well in his tremendous twin tasks of glasnost and perestroika, but, even if the Soviets have no immediate plans for aggression – that is not a sound basis for allied defence planning – we must give appropriate recognition to the Warsaw Pact's military capability.

Although the report rightly points to the Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority in conventional forces, it suggests, in paragraph 5.20, that, to be fair and to make non-exaggerated comparisons, qualitative factors – which the report admits may be difficult to measure – may mean that the overall balance will be less unfavourable.

We should set against that factors that militate against an acceptance of this sort of balance. First, the Warsaw Pact can effect massive land-based reinforcements across relatively short distances, whereas many NATO reinforcements have to travel the Atlantic.

Secondly, NATO is an alliance of free sovereign states, and that complicates the decision-making process. We all know, in the democracies in which we live and serve as members, that democracy is wonderful, but it takes a long time. It also means that NATO, because it consists of free sovereign states, has a wide range of equipment that is not interoperable.

Thirdly – and this is a very important factor in the balance – we are committed not to be the first to use force, thus eschewing the undoubted military advantage in that. Therefore, if qualitative factors are to be considered, they must include all the factors.

I spoke on the report at the last session and pointed to the litmus paper test of Afghanistan and human rights. I accept what my opposition colleague, Mr. Hardy, has just said about the fact that some demonstration of intention in respect of human rights in the USSR has been taking place. Mr. Stokes has referred to the happier news that we have about Afghanistan. I believe that tenuously and slowly there is some hope of gradual improvement in human rights.

One can but hope and pray that the objectives of glasnost and perestroika will be achieved, but the defence of Western Europe cannot rely only on hope and prayer, even with optimism. In this

Dame Peggy Fenner (continued)

I disagree with Mr. Hardy, who would have presented a soft line eighteen months ago before any of these advances took place.

It is clear that the resolution of the West to be strong in its defence – indeed, its very insistence that it will not allow its defensive mechanisms to become outdated and left behind those of the Warsaw Pact countries – has been a vital factor in securing the willingness of the USSR to talk about disarmament and to agree sound verification procedures. Whilst being prepared to embrace and, indeed, to welcome all the expressions of change in the Warsaw Pact bloc, the West should not forget that the price of liberty is our eternal vigilance.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We will now adjourn this debate and resume it after the vote on Mr. Wilkinson's draft recommendation.

**6. Address by Mr. van Eekelen,
Minister of Defence of the Netherlands**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. van Eekelen, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.

Minister, would you please come to the rostrum.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*). – Mr. President, members of the Assembly, it is a great pleasure for me to be among you again and to meet former colleagues and old friends.

In the wake of the recent Moscow summit it is important to realise how fast the international political climate has been changing. A year ago, the tide already seemed to be turning, but we were still wondering whether the 1986 Reykjavik summit was actually in the interest of Europe's security. Some of us had serious doubts whether a double-zero outcome of the INF negotiations would really make Europe a safer place to live in.

Last year brought us the INF agreement, a now ratified treaty, the first fully-fledged arms control agreement since the SALT agreement of 1972. Furthermore, at the Moscow summit two agreements were signed on nuclear testing. Steady progress is being made in the START negotiations, which, by their very nature, are much more complex than INF talks. At the same time, there is hope that later this year, in Vienna, actual negotiations can begin on conventional stability in Europe. An agreement on a worldwide ban on chemical weapons next year remains a distinct possibility.

The ambivalent and uncertain situation of a year ago has been superseded by promising developments in arms control. These could inaugurate a genuinely new era in East-West relations. Of course, much depends upon the evolution of the political situation in the Soviet Union. Perestroika and glasnost are to be welcomed. However, we should not speculate too much on the developments in the Soviet Union itself and Mr. Gorbachev's position in particular. We must use every opportunity to negotiate equitable agreements with the Soviet Union, provided they meet our conditions. It is to be hoped that progress can be made both in arms control and in finding solutions to the political problems dividing East and West.

Having said that, I should like to add some words of caution. Recent accomplishments in arms control may have changed the overall framework of East-West security for the better, but they complicate the security debate. Arms control, unfortunately, is not a panacea that solves all problems. More than ever, we face the need to define our minimum defence requirements on which a responsible arms control policy should be based. For instance, the INF treaty leaves unanswered a number of important questions about the nuclear posture of the alliance. The implementation of the 1983 Montebello decisions is still on the table. We do not need to answer all relevant questions in this context at short notice, but we should try to reach agreement on some basic starting points. In this respect we could think of a combination of a further substantial reduction of the number of warheads in Western Europe on the one hand and extending the range of the relevant nuclear systems on the other. On the basis of such a guiding principle a sound policy could be developed with regard to NATO's future nuclear posture in Europe. By implication, the INF treaty not only changes the nuclear component of deterrence, but also requires a thorough review of the conventional equation, a topic to which I will return.

I should like to emphasise that progress in arms control, however important, does not relieve the alliance of the need to deal with a number of strategic questions. Whatever the fate may be of the strategic defence initiative, the fundamental issue of the relationship between offensive and defensive capabilities, including its implications for Europe, will remain on the agenda.

It is of the utmost importance that the member states of Western European Union make their contribution both to arms control negotiations and to the solution of the crucial problems of defence requirements. In the tradition of the Harmel report, the Hague platform on European security interests gives us a solid basis for such a

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

balanced approach. The platform states clearly our adherence to the western strategy of war prevention based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces. Furthermore, it underlines that the presence of United States conventional and nuclear forces embodies the American commitment to the defence of Europe. These are not the articles of a faith that has outlived its usefulness. The platform can be the basis of an essentially forward-looking policy of European security. In this respect, I would refer to the provisions in the platform on Europe's responsibilities in the field of western defence. They constitute an important challenge to our governments, and indeed to all politicians dealing with European security. We should, however, not underestimate the problems and differences of opinion still existing among Western European governments. In fact, the European security identity is still not a unified one. At the same time, much more progress has been made than would have been thought possible a couple of years ago.

The present debate on European security interests is of particular political importance for two reasons. In the first place, it helps us to counter comments that stress the marginality of Europe. After the INF treaty, so the argument runs, Europe's active rôle in East-West relations will diminish. The superpowers will negotiate bilaterally issues that have important implications for Europe, but without consulting it. In my view, however, the development of a European security policy, for which Western European Union is an important vehicle, should enable us to become and to remain a valuable partner in the transatlantic dialogue and in East-West relations. Any suggestions that Europe's playing-time is over are out of place. In fact, we are just starting.

In the second place, European security co-operation is a crucial factor in the debate on allied burden-sharing. A fortnight ago the Eurogroup ministerial meeting in Brussels issued a strongly worded statement on Europe's contribution to the common defence. Ministers pointed at the steady progress that has been made in the last twenty years, during which the European financial contribution to the allied defence effort has risen by more than one-third in real terms. The European allies maintain more than 3.5 million men and women on active duty. Of the alliance's combat-ready forces Europe provides the vast majority of divisions, manpower, tanks, artillery, combat aircraft and more than half of the major warships. Besides, Europe also shares in a very real sense the burdens and risks of nuclear deterrence. Under my chairmanship of the Eurogroup we issued a booklet outlining the contribution of the European allies

to the common defence. I hope that it will provide useful support to those who engage in the transatlantic dialogue, including the members of this Assembly.

It would, however, be ill-advised to disregard the opinions on Europe's contribution to the allied defence which are currently being expressed in the United States Congress and among the American public at large. These opinions are indeed to be taken seriously and will remain a political fact after the coming presidential elections. On the other hand, Western Europe should face the burden-sharing challenge with a certain equanimity. After all, the facts and figures which I have just mentioned provide the basis for European self-confidence and resolve. It is my impression that the report of Mr. Pontillon on co-operation between Europe and the United States is written in the same spirit.

The burden-sharing debate should concentrate on the fair share which American and European NATO members bear with respect to the risks, rôles and responsibilities in defending the West. In the words of American Defence Secretary Carlucci: "Burden-sharing ought not to be a budgetary exercise; it should be an exercise to *strengthen* the alliance."

Therefore, not only defence expenditure should be discussed, but also political, operational, and defence-industrial factors, as well as infrastructural and manpower inputs and out-of-area contributions. I am not going to elaborate now on all of these burden-sharing aspects. I just want to stress the significance of European out-of-area contributions.

Our maritime presence in the Gulf area has had a very positive political impact in the United States, in particular in the American Congress. I am very pleased that WEU has been playing such an important rôle with respect to consultations on the Gulf and the co-ordination of our national maritime activities in the region. In the past year, the Netherlands presidency of WEU has devoted much attention to this endeavour. We initiated consultations at both maritime and political levels.

Therefore, I am very happy that, last Friday, the Belgian Government decided to extend the presence of the Belgian mine-hunter *Crocus* in the Gulf until at least the end of this year. My government will soon confirm the continuation of our presence. But it is not only continuation of efforts we are talking about. We as presidency are also enhancing the European dimension of our maritime presence in the Gulf. In the next few days the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom will establish comprehensive arrangements with respect to the joint operational control of their mine-hunting activities entering into force on 1st July.

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

In this way, the political significance of the European contribution is emphasised, a contribution that consists of the collective effort of United Kingdom, French, Italian, Belgian and Netherlands maritime forces. Western European Union has proved able to provide an effective vehicle for consultation and co-ordination in this respect. I am convinced that it will continue to do so.

We should be aware of the danger that a burden-sharing exercise could have adverse consequences for NATO. First, the cohesion of the alliance could be at stake if in the course of the debate in Western Europe too many doubts were raised about the American commitment to Europe. This would be a harmful development. Secondly, NATO should not embark upon a burden-sharing exercise which could only result in a shift of effort from the United States to its allies, while at the same time diminishing the overall defence efforts of the alliance. For, if Europe assumes a larger share in the financing of allied programmes, such as the commonly-funded infrastructure programme, this could be to the detriment of other investments, most of which are of equal importance. In this context it would be superfluous to add that a substantial growth in the defence expenditure of the European allies is improbable. And again in this context I welcomed Secretary Carlucci's statement that "all of us have to do more".

The burden-sharing discussion should focus upon long-term developments of defence expenditure and other relevant indicators. Only in that way can a balanced picture of the respective efforts be gained. Moreover, given the level of defence expenditures, efforts should concentrate on getting more value for our money. NATO as a whole should critically assess the output of its collective efforts in order to discuss improvements and possibly to adapt the rôles of individual allies. For geographical and economic reasons, the WEU countries bear a special responsibility to ensure efficient resource management and the control of defence costs. Measures to that end should not be limited to the national context. We should explore opportunities for bilateral and regional co-operation in resource management. In that respect I remind members that the Hague platform of WEU explicitly states the objective of aiming at a more effective use of existing resources. If successful, this endeavour would result in a better European contribution to the common defence of the West. It is, therefore, important that each country, in deciding upon its planning and operational priorities, pays greater attention to similar activities of its neighbours and allies.

In the burden-sharing discussion, much depends upon the ability of Western European

nations themselves to find ways and means of discussing and solving specific defence problems in which certain European partners are involved. Western European Union, together with other European forums, can make an important contribution in this respect. European defence co-operation should also take into account the relationship with NATO partners such as Portugal, Greece and Turkey, which could result in alleviating American burdens there.

In conclusion, Europe should approach the burden-sharing discussion in a self-confident and constructive way. If that is the case, I wonder whether NATO's Secretary-General Lord Carrington, whom I admire greatly, is right in comparing the burden-sharing issue with a "continuously smouldering volcano", as he did a couple of days ago. The real threat we are facing is not the volcano in the West, but the military capabilities in the East. In this connection I value the attention that the Assembly is devoting to the assessment of the threat, a subject on which Mr. Stokes is its Rapporteur. Some critics tell us that NATO systematically overestimates the military strength of the Warsaw Pact forces. Therefore, it is important to discuss force comparisons in a non-biased way.

I should like to make a few observations on this issue, which is raised with great expertise in Mr. Stokes's report and also in Senator Levin's report. The simple, numerical method of making force comparisons of manpower and weapon categories makes us feel a little uneasy. A number of relevant factors are ignored in that way. On the other hand, force comparisons that try to take fully into account all relevant numerical and qualitative factors lead to ambiguities and sometimes subjective judgments.

Numerical comparisons, in any case, should be complemented by analyses of Warsaw Pact intentions and the semi-occupying rôle of the Soviet forces, which could have important implications for morale and reliability of the Warsaw Pact forces as a whole. Furthermore, the structure and location of forces influence their effectiveness in combat. Another factor is the quality and age of military equipment. As regards the latter, it is important to realise that the location of modern equipment largely determines the capacity for a surprise attack or large-scale offensive actions. All the factors mentioned should be studied and taken into account. But I warn against overestimating their weight. In my view, the most important single qualitative factor influencing force comparisons remains geography. Effective reinforcement is, therefore, decisive for the defence of Europe.

So I prefer the development of a dynamic force comparison to static comparisons of numerical variables. A dynamic approach takes into account a judgment of relative military strength in the event of a surprise attack and the evo-

Mr. van Eekelen (continued)

lution of military strength in time, depending on reinforcement and mobilisation. Furthermore, geographical advantages or disadvantages and, last but not least, military strategy are important variables. If we look at the static comparisons the conclusion can only be that of the report of the North Atlantic Assembly entitled: "NATO in the nineties", which is in line with the conclusions of Mr. Stokes's report:

"Even with the most optimistic assessments taken into account, there is a conventional force imbalance and Warsaw Pact forces still appear to exceed reasonable defensive needs..."

Looking at the dynamic equation, NATO's position is probably a bit more comfortable, provided that the reinforcement capability is given all the attention it deserves.

The most reassuring contribution by the Warsaw Pact, of course, would be the withdrawal of a substantial number of Soviet divisions from the German Democratic Republic. That would be the only way to convince the West that the Warsaw Pact did not have offensive intentions and therefore needed no capability for surprise attack.

WEU and its Assembly are making a valuable contribution to the public discussion on the military threat facing the West. WEU has to play a rôle in defining Europe's position in the burden-sharing debate. One of the ways in which Europe can do so is by showing that it is able to improve the output of its defence efforts. Unfortunately, the answers of the European governments are not always unequivocal and clear. That cannot be said of the task ahead of us.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

Would you be prepared to answer questions from members of the Assembly?

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). – With pleasure, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Eicher.

Mr. EICHER (*Belgium*) (Translation). – Minister, four member countries of WEU are involved in the INF agreement. I would like to know whether these four countries agree the line they will take in the unlikely but nevertheless possible event of failure to apply the agreement and in particular its verification clauses.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*) (Translation). – For several years now, the member countries of the alliance with

missiles on their territory have held a five-sided meeting with the United States before the meeting of the so-called high level group. At that meeting, all aspects of both the deployment and the inspection of weapons and of the negotiations under way are discussed. These discussions have become less intensive but the possibility is still there. The institution of these meetings represented a logical approach because the problem concerned not only European countries but, of course, the United States as well.

I think the procedure will continue to be followed in the future. That having been said, should a problem of primary concern to the European countries arise it would always be possible to hold a meeting of the Europeans alone before tackling the problem with the United States.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister made a happy reference to the co-operation of Western European countries in maintaining a military patrol in the Gulf. Has that patrol and commitment resulted in adequate mine-sweeping capacity to meet the minimum requirements for European coastal waters?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*). – Yes. We must respond to the question of whether we have sufficient mine-sweeping capability in the Gulf. All countries have reduced their capability there to a reasonable minimum. In the beginning the British, Italian, Belgian and Netherlands forces were larger than they will be for the remainder of this year. That reduction has taken place in close consultation. However, if the need arises, it will take a long time to send additional forces to the Gulf. It takes mine-sweepers and mine-hunters about five or six weeks to get there so it is essential to have a small force there.

Let us examine the number of ships available in the Gulf. There are three British ships, one Belgian vessel and one Dutch ship. There are many more mine-sweeping and mine-hunting ships in the North Sea and Channel commands. Out of the fifteen Dutch mine-hunters available to NATO one has been sent to the Gulf. We still have a squadron of mine-sweepers that will not go to the Gulf. Other countries have similar assets.

In addition, the Federal Republic of Germany and Norway promise that any gaps in our contribution to NATO will be filled by them temporarily. The Federal Republic has assigned mine-sweepers to the Mediterranean, Norway and the Channel. Such measures are intended to underline political solidarity but operationally, too, they are welcome.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – As usual, we are impressed by the Minister's address. One aspect of his speech was especially relevant. He said that we should have better value for money from our common input into our common defence. Traditionally, we have regarded arms procurement as the most obvious way to achieve that. Another way was suggested – enhanced rôle specialisation within the alliance. I hold that theme dear. I wonder what the Minister has in mind?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. van EEKELEN (*Minister of Defence of the Netherlands*). – Mr. Wilkinson draws attention to an important problem that has been close to the hearts of all my predecessors in the Netherlands. One of our problems is that our advocacy of burden-sharing was interpreted as meaning that we wanted to do less while others did more. Such an attitude would be negative and destructive.

I have new hope. The words "burden-sharing" have been replaced by "R-cubed" – the three Rs, which are rôles, risks and responsibilities. The word "rôles" figures prominently. That is appropriate because for the smaller members of the alliance it is impossible to do everything. For instance, the Belgian navy concentrates on mine warfare. Some countries have chosen the F-16 – an aircraft with specific capabilities and therefore specific rôles.

Whenever we have to decide about specific weapon procurement we must decide whether we want to continue a particular rôle and, if we do, whether we want to continue it in the same manner.

Rôle specialisation is important. The Eurogroup has decided that that question will be a standing item on the agenda as well as in the regular bilateral talks. We must encourage rôle specialisation, not in terms of doing less but of doing more within limited resources. I hope that in that way the effectiveness of our common defence will be enhanced so that each country continues so play its proper part in the defence effort.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Since no one else has asked to speak, all that remains is for me to thank Mr. van Eekelen for his address and for answering the many questions he has been asked.

I wish you every success, Minister, in your post and I do so in the interest of Western European Union which has made enormous progress at the political level under the Netherlands presidency even though it has still some way to go as regards its restructuring.

7. *European co-operation in armaments research and development – guidelines drawn from the colloquy*

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1141 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, as we decided this morning, we shall now proceed to the vote on the draft recommendation on European co-operation in armaments research and development – guidelines drawn from the colloquy, Document 1141 and amendments.

The debate was closed yesterday evening.

I have eight amendments to this text which will be taken in the following order: Amendment 6 tabled by Mr. Klejdzinski, Amendment 1 by Mrs. Francese, Amendment 3 by Mr. Hardy, Amendment 4 by Mr. Hardy, Amendment 7 by Mrs. Francese, Amendment 5 by Mr. Hardy (which would have no point if Amendment 7 were to be adopted), Amendment 8 by Mrs. Francese and Amendment 9 by Mrs. Francese.

Amendment 2 has been withdrawn by its proposers.

Mr. Klejdzinski has tabled Amendment 6 which reads as follows:

6. Leave out paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

"Recognising the importance of maintaining a defence industrial base within the member nations of WEU based on an economic division of work and adapted to the relevant threat."

I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJDZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I have tabled this amendment because the wording proposed by Mr. Wilkinson at least admits of the conclusion that the defence industry is, if you like, represented and established as an end in itself, with the result that in this military technology complex we politicians could be forced into an action which is incompatible with our specific political intentions. The report takes pains to indicate that it should be a political, economic and strategic objective to create a strong defence industrial base in the member countries of WEU.

On behalf of the socialists I therefore propose that we change the wording to read as follows:

"Recognising the importance of maintaining a defence industrial base within the member nations of WEU based on an economic division of work and adapted to the relevant threat."

I prefer this wording, because I feel it should at least be conceivable and possible – if the level of détente and peace we achieve for Europe warrant

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

this – for us to run down the defence industrial base. In other words, we should not be forced to produce more and more weapons simply because the problems of the economy are so serious that we are no longer free in our political actions, and can no longer say that we want a reduction in the defence industrial base. There would then be no going back.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – The committee is against the amendment. First, we believe that the wording is far more vague than the wording of the original text. One of the earlier speakers in the debate yesterday afternoon criticised the objective of maintaining a strong defence industrial base. We believe that it is essential for military security, but also for employment considerations. Furthermore, the text of the explanatory memorandum says quite clearly in paragraph 6:

“The weapons procured for the democratic nations of Western Europe have to match the evolving security of the members of the NATO alliance. This requires a clear assessment of the strategic and geopolitical developments of the next few decades.”

Already the report makes it paramountly plain that our military procurement should be adapted to the relevant threat and the division of labour is advocated throughout the report. We suggest a *juste retour* and an equitable division of labour throughout the report so there is no reason why the wording that has already been agreed by our committee should be changed to meet the amendment. Therefore, I ask that the amendment be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 6 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 6 is agreed to.

Mrs. Francese, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Pecchioli and Mr. Rubbi have tabled Amendment 1 which reads as follows:

1. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as follows:

“Concerned by the increase in clandestine sales of arms to belligerent countries.”

I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I should like to speak to Amendments 1 and 9 because they relate to exactly the same

problem. Amendment 1 raises the issue of clandestine sales of arms to belligerent countries while Amendment 9 calls for measures to put an end to such sales.

Mr. Wilkinson's report does not look at the problem of arms sales although there is a section on trade in arms with third countries. The problem is getting worse and worse in our countries and elsewhere, particularly in the cases of Iran and Iraq because we now have to meet the cost of sending a fleet to those countries not merely to protect freedom of navigation but also to show that we are supporting United Nations action aimed at putting an end to the hostilities there.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Although you have spoken to both amendments, separate votes have to be taken.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – The committee is quite clearly against this amendment. As Rapporteur, it was my duty faithfully to report the conclusions of the colloquy as a whole and to seek to draw lessons from it. At no stage during the colloquy did this issue come up. Furthermore, it is normal with our reports for preambles to recommendations to have relevance to the recommendations proper. This proposed amendment does not have such relevance in any sense whatsoever. Therefore, it would be doubly wrong for the Assembly as a whole to adopt this amendment, and I ask that it be rejected.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 1 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

I call the Rapporteur on a point of order.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Am I in order in asking for a roll-call vote if I have the support of the requisite number of members of the Assembly?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Wilkinson's request for a vote by roll-call requires the support of ten members.

I call Mr. Stoffelen on a point of order.

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. The vote has taken place, so it is impossible to repeat the vote.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. I was suggesting that there should be a roll-call vote for subsequent votes, not for the two that have already taken place.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Wilkinson, are you asking for a roll-call vote on the amendment tabled by Mr. Hardy which follows?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. From now on, if I have the requisite ten supporters, I should like roll-call votes.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

I call Mr. Büchner.

Mr. BÜCHNER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, surely we should first know what the roll-call vote is intended to cover. Which amendments are we talking about, and which are being put forward? Are we talking about all future amendments?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I asked leave of the Assembly to move that a roll-call vote take place on all subsequent votes related to the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That is to say all the amendments we still have to vote on?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). – Exactly, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We cannot go back on the votes that have been taken but there is nothing to stop anyone asking for a vote by roll-call for those that are still to come.

Mr. Hardy and others have tabled Amendment 3 which reads as follows:

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after “research agency” insert “concerned with conventional capacities”.

I call Mr. Hardy to speak to Amendment 3 for which a vote by roll-call has been requested with the support of ten members.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – We are approaching a desperate situation. After the delays of yesterday when a minister spoke for forty minutes – there are five more ministers, so heaven knows how far down the agenda we shall manage to get by the end of the sitting – it behoves all of us to ensure that progress is made without the lengthy delays that experience in the past twenty minutes suggests are possible. I hope that I shall not delay the Assembly and I trust that this contribution will be remarkably helpful in getting us back on course and giving the Assembly the prospect of completing its business properly.

Amendment 3 is a virtuous and excellent amendment which speaks for itself. Its quality stands out and in an intelligent Assembly I need not emphasise that point. I am making a generous gesture to Mr. Wilkinson. I take it that he will accept the amendment because, for a conservative, he is a relatively sensible man and I shall not need, therefore, to advance powerful arguments to persuade him to accept the amendment. If the amendment is accepted, we shall demonstrate that progress can be made swiftly. I hope that progress can be made.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I am happy to accept the amendment. It clarifies the purpose of the defence research agency whose work is related to conventional arms only. It is no problem for me on the committee's behalf to welcome and accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – You accept the amendment and maintain your request for a vote by roll-call.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I accept this amendment, so there is no need for a vote on this question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We have to be clear on this because a few moments ago you asked for all the remaining amendments to be voted on by roll-call whereas now...

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). – I agree.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – So that we may be completely clear, you are not asking for a vote by roll-call on Amendment 3. Do you maintain your request for a vote by roll-call on the other amendments?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). – Yes, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

Mr. Hardy and others have tabled Amendment 4 which reads as follows:

4. Leave out paragraph 3 (b) of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Hardy to speak to Amendment 4 for which, I would remind you, a vote by roll-call has been requested.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I shall be amazed if Mr. Wilkinson takes a different view from our amendment. Paragraph 3 (b) calls for an additional secretariat. The report refers to “a

Mr. Hardy (continued)

small permanent international specialist secretariat" but British members will be well aware of Parkinson's law whereby secretariats start small but quickly begin to breed and swiftly become large. I commend the speech last night by my British colleague, David Lambie. We should like to avoid the establishment of a larger international civil service and to prevent international tension. When British members demand a reduction in the ever-increasing size of our national administration it is strange that we should want an extension of the international civil service. To avoid that inconsistency, British labour members in particular would like paragraph 3 (b) to be deleted.

I believe that we may have sufficient staff in establishment now to serve the purpose, to avoid international extravagance and the extension of the Parkinsonian approach, which we in Britain well know, to international organisations. Therefore, we need this paragraph to be deleted.

I am grateful to Mr. Wilkinson for accepting Amendment 3. I hope that he will be prepared to accept Amendment 4. If not, I trust that he will not demand a roll-call vote, which could take an unconscionable time and cause the Assembly considerable difficulty.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Garrett.

Mr. GARRETT (*United Kingdom*). — I regret having to disagree with my colleague, Mr. Hardy. However, I should like to think that this committee, of which I am a member and about which the Chairman has spoken or will speak, is a specialist committee. Indeed, the very name of the committee implies a high degree of specialisation. Therefore, it is imperative that we look at obtaining specialists not on political grounds but seriously to advance the work of the committee. The quality of the reports and the research must be carried out by a properly-qualified secretariat or list of advisers.

If there is any prospect of defeat, may I ask whether it is possible for us to have a reference back so that the staff can consider the size of secretariat that we should have? It may have to be referred to another committee. Let us not be too impetuous about rejecting the committee's recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). — The committee is grateful for the intervention of my friend and colleague, Ted Garrett, who is one of the more respected members of a specialist com-

mittee which endeavours to carry out serious work on behalf of the Assembly. That may seem a cause for merriment on the part of Mr. Klejdzinski, but it is so.

Your Rapporteur has tried to reach conclusions that truly accord with the sense of an extremely important colloquy attended by people of the highest quality from all over Europe. To emasculate the committee's recommendations for party political or other purposes would be highly irresponsible.

All I will say in asking the Assembly to reject the amendment is that it is clearly in line with the recommendations of the socialist Defence Minister of Netherlands, Mr. Vredeling, who, in his report "Towards a Stronger Europe", said: "We recommend therefore that a small international secretariat be created for the IEPG and that it be limited to a maximum of twenty persons."

We are not proposing an excessively bureaucratic institution. We are proposing a degree of continuity and specialist expertise that will ensure the smooth bringing to fruition of important international programmes that will enhance Europe's security and bring good value for money to the member countries of our alliance. I hope, therefore, that the Assembly will reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — As a vote by roll-call has been requested, I now read to you the relevant provisions contained in Rule 33, paragraph 3:

"The roll shall be called in alphabetical order, beginning with the name of a representative drawn by lot. Voting shall be by word of mouth and shall be expressed by "Yes", "No", or "I abstain". Only affirmative and negative votes shall count in calculating the number of votes cast. The President shall be responsible for the counting of votes and shall announce the result. The votes shall be recorded in the minutes of proceedings of the sitting in the alphabetical order of representatives' names."

We shall now proceed to a vote by roll-call.

The voting is open.

(*A vote by roll-call was then taken*)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows¹:

Number of votes cast	46
Ayes	22
Noes	22
Abstentions	2

Amendment 4 is negatived.

1. See page 20.

The President (continued)

Let me explain why this amendment is rejected. We had a precedent in 1971, reading as follows: "The division which results in an equality of votes is equivalent to the rejection of the proposal before the Assembly."

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg on a point of order.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Although I am pleased with the result, since I voted against the amendment, I do not believe that the staff have counted the votes correctly. I believe that the figures should be different.

In the United Kingdom parliament six hundred people might vote and the result is returned in about twelve minutes. We cannot continue this way. Our system in the Assembly is hopelessly antiquated. In future roll-call votes the sheets should be marked by two members of the Assembly – one who is for the motion and one who is against it. That might be quicker and less inaccurate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Coleman.

Mr. COLEMAN (*United Kingdom*). – Further to that point of order, Mr. President. I have experience in the House of Commons of conducting votes and I confirm that we can push through a division lobby about seven hundred members in fifteen minutes at the most. Rarely does a mistake occur. In this building we could easily follow the lobby system operated in the House of Commons and the House of Lords. Perhaps the committee that deals with rules and procedure can deal with the problem.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ewing.

Mr. EWING (*United Kingdom*). – Further to the point of order, Mr. President. Sir Geoffrey Finsberg is a very experienced parliamentarian. He has made a serious allegation that the vote-counting was inaccurate. I should accept the vote, if it were accurate, even if my view were not reflected in it. However, a democratic assembly cannot accept an inaccurate vote. Sir Geoffrey is much respected and experienced. He would not make such an allegation without strong grounds. The vote should be taken again.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I would point out that the President applies the Rules of Procedure currently in force. If any member of the Assembly wishes to amend the rules I would ask him to do so in the prescribed manner and to request the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to submit a report together with a motion to this end. That is not our concern today. I repeat that, at the moment, we have to apply the current rules of procedure.

Mrs. Francese, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Pecchioli and Mr. Rubbi have tabled Amendment 7 which reads as follows:

7. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Amendment 7 is concerned with the relationship between military and university research. Our amendment calls for the deletion of this paragraph for two reasons: the first is that military research in both the West and the East has already been carried far enough without involving the universities. Our second reason is that military and university research are incompatible; military research is secret – and if it were not, I wonder what military research would be – while the historical tradition of the universities right from the Middle Ages to the present day is one of free research made public.

That is why we propose the deletion of the paragraph in question.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – The committee is prepared to accept Amendment 5, tabled by Mr. Hardy and his colleagues. This amendment would add at the end of the paragraph "but without effecting any reduction in research and development for non-military purposes." To some extent that meets the anxiety expressed by our communist colleague from Italy. If he is prepared to withdraw Amendment 7 the committee will be prepared to accept Amendment 5. We must oppose Amendment 7 because in our judgment the universities have a rôle in research that is relevant to our security in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Pieralli, do you maintain your amendment?

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – I too will vote in favour of Amendment 5 if Amendment 7 falls. I would point out, however, that they concern two different questions. Where government funds go to is one thing and the traditional incompatibility between university research and military research is another. I therefore maintain Amendment 7.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does the Rapporteur maintain his request for a vote by roll-call?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). – If Mr. Pieralli wishes to pursue his amendment, notwithstanding my accepting

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

Amendment 5, I must ask the Assembly to reject Amendment 7, because I believe that universities have a rôle.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – By sitting and standing?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). – By roll-call.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Your request has to have the backing of ten members of the Assembly.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). – I would then ask for a vote by sitting and standing but please, Mr. President, count them very carefully.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That is what we shall try to do and I think we shall succeed.

I therefore put Amendment 7 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 7 is negatived.

Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Hardy and others have tabled Amendment 5 which reads as follows:

5. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, at the end, add “but without effecting any reduction in research and development for non-military purposes”.

I call Mr. Hardy to speak to this amendment.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I do not need to make a long speech, because Mr. Wilkinson has already said that he will accept Amendment 5, and I am most grateful for that. I hope that the Assembly is grateful as well, because if we were to have another roll-call vote, heaven knows whether the blood pressure of some members might not rise dangerously high, especially if we were to have again the ridiculous situation that we have just had. I am happy to move the amendment in the knowledge that Mr. Wilkinson will accept it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Yes, I am in favour of the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 5 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is agreed to.

Mrs. Francese, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Pecchioli and Mr. Rubbi have tabled Amendment 8 which reads as follows:

8. Leave out paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper.

I call Mr. Pieralli to support his amendment.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the disadvantage of the paragraph as worded is that people with oversight over military orders would include manufacturers who should themselves be subject to control. That is why we propose that the paragraph be deleted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – We are against the amendment. It was clearly the view of the experts on our symposium that it would save Western European countries money if the industrialists who have to manufacture the weapons required by our armed forces were involved in the process at the earliest stage, namely, in the statement of requirement. They can at that stage make clear whether those requirements are feasible within reasonable cost limits and time-scales. Therefore, it is in the interests of everybody who wishes to save the money of the taxpayers of Europe to reject Amendment 8. I ask the Assembly to reject it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 8 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 8 is negatived.

Mrs. Francese, Mr. Pieralli, Mr. Pecchioli and Mr. Rubbi have tabled Amendment 9 which reads as follows:

9. Insert a new paragraph at the end of the draft recommendation proper as follows:

“To take measures, co-ordinated between members of WEU and with the various international organisations and groups of countries, to put an end to clandestine sales of arms to belligerent countries, in particular Iran and Iraq, and to countries on which the United Nations has imposed an embargo.”

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the opinion of the committee?

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – This is important. As a committee, we tried to examine closely the conclusions of the colloquy and as the Rapporteur I had to draw these together in the form of specific recommenda-

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

tions to the Council of Ministers. As I said in the earlier short debate we had on the additional paragraphs to the preamble, these matters about clandestine arms sales to belligerent countries did not come up in the colloquy. Therefore, it would be wrong, without an appropriate debate in the context of the colloquy itself, to seek to put this into our recommendations. Therefore, I urge that this be rejected by the Assembly as a whole, particularly as it is not a matter to put to the Council of Ministers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 9 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 9 is negatived.

We shall now proceed to vote on the amended draft recommendation.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not. The vote will be taken by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

8. Threat assessment

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1115 addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now resume our debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on threat assessment, Document 1115 addendum.

In the debate I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – In making a short speech in support of Mr. Stokes's report I must say how badly I think this Assembly is run. We started a debate that we all agree to be important, no matter what our views on it are. We were then interrupted by a minister making a formal speech and answering questions. We then proceeded to a vote on Mr. Wilkinson's report and had a row about how we should or should not vote. Now, we come back

to this. There is no continuity. We have lost the theme entirely from when Mr. Stokes started this morning and my two British colleagues spoke. It is important that this Assembly begins to get its act together for otherwise I am sure that interest will drop away among the representatives.

We have been over this territory before. In welcoming Mr. Stokes's report and his robust contribution this morning, I make it clear that I believe that if there is ever to be a third world war, and of course we all sincerely hope that there will not be, it will be a conventional war. I have always thought that such a war would begin on a conventional basis and finally escalate into a nuclear conflict.

There are various views about that, but there is the view that a conventional war might proceed as a conventional war, particularly if the forces of the East succeeded and were able to push forward and there was procrastination on the part of NATO forces about whether there should be a nuclear rejoinder.

I pose the question: what if it were to remain a conventional war? This is the question that we have to face. The alliance defence planning must be based on an assessment of the Warsaw Pact's military capability. Despite all the actions over the past six months or so, it behoves all of us to keep up our guard as events unfold and progress is made.

The evolution of Mr. Gorbachev and present thinking in the Soviet hierarchy are extremely important and fascinating to anyone interested in power politics. The attitudes being struck at the moment were unthinkable two years ago. I doubted the ultimate sincerity of Mr. Gorbachev, but I have changed my mind. I believe that he is a sincere and determined man. I think that his actions recently, particularly during the summit which has just taken place and in his negotiations with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom not so long ago, have underlined that he is a serious and important man – probably the most relevant and important man of the twentieth century. We all welcome the current nuclear arms reductions.

At the same time as welcoming the approval of Mr. Gorbachev and applauding his serious efforts, we must not underestimate two significant factors. He has a mammoth task on hand. He represents a country which, under the Soviet communist system, has been an evil, vicious régime that has lasted for eighty years. Millions of people have died or been tortured at its hands. Mr. Gorbachev is now seeking to change that. But old habits die hard and his gargantuan task will take a significantly long time.

Added to that are the dangers to Mr. Gorbachev. There is the danger of the old guard resurrecting itself. People who have enjoyed

1. See page 21.

Sir Dudley Smith (continued)

power in the KGB and the army may wish to come back again and say: "Enough is enough. No further do you go." In those circumstances, all the enormous advances of the past few months could be cast aside.

The Soviet communist system has left a large stain on the progress of mankind. That can now be reversed leading to an unprecedented situation where we can not only enjoy peace for the next 40 years, as we have for the past 40 years, but for the next 100 years without the threat, the anxiety and the ghastly cost of modern weaponry that we have all known during the past 40 years.

It is important that we, as an organisation, as friends of democratic Europe and of NATO, remain very much on our guard and approach the situation realistically and sensibly while giving our full support to all the measures being taken by the leaders of our nations in co-operation with the Soviet hierarchy. I well remember seeing in the control room of a large ship a rather laconic notice saying: "When things seem to be going well, you have obviously overlooked something." That is a good message for us today. When things seem to be going well, we need constantly to revise our procedures and our defence mechanisms and to remain on our guard.

Mr. Stokes's report, made with his characteristic vigour and intensity, rightly emphasises that the Warsaw Pact's numerical superiority in conventional weaponry is very much a fact of life. He referred to tanks and artillery in large quantities in the East. I imagine that many members have seen reports recently of a brand new sophisticated Russian tank that apparently is more efficient than anything else in service and probably streets ahead of anything envisaged by the West. At the moment the Russians have far more active tanks than we could put into the field from NATO countries.

There are three other considerations that we need constantly to bear in mind when appraising the threat against us. The first is the flexibility of the Warsaw Pact countries. They work together as a team. They can effect reinforcements very quickly. Many of NATO's reinforcements, in the event of a crisis, have to be shipped across the Atlantic. That is a significant drawback.

Secondly, the free sovereign nations come under the NATO command structure, and that can never be as efficient to begin with as the Warsaw Pact countries in their command structure. My friend Dame Peggy Fenner referred to the flexibility of our equipment – the fact that non-compatibility of so much of it, compared with Warsaw Pact countries' equipment, puts us at a distinct disadvantage.

The third consideration, which hardly needs mentioning – but sometimes those who oppose the kind of things for which I stand do not seem to appreciate it – is the tremendous advantage for an attacker. The attacker chooses his own time and makes his plans accordingly. The defender must therefore always be in some difficulty. The West will never be the attacker; it will always be the defender. That being so, I believe that we should continue constantly to assess the threat, to keep our own countries on their guard and to make our equipment and weaponry as efficient and compatible as possible with all the friendly nations.

Any sane man or woman must hope and pray that the current progress will be maintained and enhanced. We should all co-operate to the full, but we should be foolish indeed if we did not constantly take note of the threat and, above all, be ready to combat it.

(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Litherland.

Mr. LITHERLAND (*United Kingdom*). – I should like to support the rejection of the report. It is out of date, and not just after the Reykjavik, Washington or Moscow summits: it was out of date many years before those events.

In this day and age and in the present climate of negotiations on nuclear weapons the report inserts terminology referring to the Soviet leaders seeking to force the West to behave well and to yield to intimidation and blackmail. The report refers to Russian expansionism, the ultimate victory of communism and says that Soviet leaders continue to improve the Soviet capability for attack. Those are just a few of the many outmoded, hackneyed phrases that should be dispensed with if WEU is to have any credibility. I can well remember when the former NATO commander, General Rogers, talked about conventional weapons and said that if there were a conventional war and we were losing on European soil he would revert to nuclear weapons. Therefore, we cannot divorce the two – traditional and nuclear weapons.

The subject of life or death for this planet Earth is the most important issue facing humankind and, without agreements to rid the world of nuclear weapons that could destroy all human life, the threat of annihilation remains. The existence of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world is the real threat and it must be the overriding aim of organisations such as Western European Union to seek eradication of this dreadful threat. However, we must offer positive observations and recommendations that can be constructive in future deliberations on this subject of paramount importance.

Mr. Litherland (continued)

The recent visit of President Reagan to the Soviet Union, if not filling us with renewed hope for the obliteration of nuclear weapons by the superpowers, did at least achieve something. There was more understanding and a realisation and a change of attitude. Gone was talk of evil empires; introduced was a new vocabulary claiming understanding and friendship. Here was the President of the United States with Mr. Gorbachev in the very heart of the country that he had always regarded as the focus of evil expressing friendship and establishing a strengthening of superpower relationship. The President was allowed to comment most forcefully on what he considered were the failings of Soviet society, referring to human rights issues, meeting with refuseniks and announcing his support for religious beliefs and the freedom to carry out acts of worship. This showed to the world a wind of change in the attitude of the Soviet Union and its new General Secretary, a change to which we must positively react. We must differentiate between the myth and the reality because, regrettably, we tend to believe our propaganda.

A few short years ago, the American nuclear bases were established on British soil. We were told that they were essentially there for our security and that our island was now a safer place in which to live. After the installation of these weapons, I, along with other members of parliament, visited the Academy of Science in Moscow. There we were told of the numerous false alarms that had occurred indicating that a nuclear attack had been launched. However, the warnings could be analysed and found to be false alarms. With the proliferation of nuclear weapons moving even closer to the Russian border, the time factor required to analyse whether the alarm was real or false was diminishing, and one day the Soviets may not have the luxury of that time and would have to strike in retaliation. A scientist informed us that he was "not a religious person, but should this happen, God help us" – two varying views on the deployment of nuclear weapons.

Under the new INF treaty, we no longer need these missiles in Britain. Were they there for security or did they endanger our security? Why this sudden change in such a short space of time? What is the myth? What is the reality? What is a threat? It appears to be dependent upon which side is making the statement. Freedom fighters are viewed as terrorists by the other side. While we rely on a blinkered approach based on propaganda, we will always have a polarised position. Only by dialogue and understanding can solutions be found to the most profound issue facing the world today, that of nuclear disarmament and world peace.

The fourth superpower summit, according to Mr. Gorbachev, was a move up a rung or two on the ladder towards the aims and objectives of agreement towards nuclear disarmament. According to President Reagan, in the discussions great strides were made towards world security. Let us hope that that is reality.

On his visit to London, Mr. Reagan informed the nation that that policy was beginning to bear fruit and he envisaged a lasting change. These momentous, albeit inconclusive, events have led to a broad understanding of how much the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union have in common, by openly acknowledging and accepting change.

Vast and detailed technical problems have still to be faced before we achieve our final aim of a world free of nuclear weapons – if that is our intention. Even while the present treaty was being negotiated we were informed that the United States and the Soviet Union had increased their combined strategic arsenal. The spectre of star wars, the implications behind the development of earth and outer space anti-ballistic missiles, and the effect that that will have on the proliferation of nuclear weapons are now part of the nuclear weapon scene. The process of debate was recently described by the churches' nuclear freeze campaign in Britain as walking down an upward-moving escalator. The escalator can be stopped, and I submit that WEU can play a major rôle, not through negative reports such as the one we are considering today, but by providing the positive political will to encourage meaningful discussion of world disarmament.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Atkinson.

Mr. ATKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Perhaps last December's reference back of Mr. Stokes's report has been useful in as much as it has produced an even better assessment of the threat that the alliance faces from the Soviet Union. As a result of the first paragraph of Mr. Stokes's preamble, we are even better informed.

In arriving at our resolution today we may take into account the truly dramatic events that have occurred in East-West relations even since we first debated Mr. Stokes's report just six months ago.

Last week in Moscow President Reagan gave a remarkable personal endorsement of the policies of Mr. Gorbachev with his retraction of his description of the evil empire. We must hope that history will not prove the President wrong and that the cold war that has been waged for more than forty years is now ending.

It is true that the summit failed to produce any new breakthrough on arms control, but then it was never expected to. Indeed, we in WEU

Mr. Atkinson (continued)

would have been worried if it had, because not enough consideration has been given to what the next step should be and we in WEU have yet to be consulted about it. What took place in Moscow last week undoubtedly contributed to a reduction in tension, and a building of trust, confidence and better communication, which will lead to further progress in the peace process. For that we must give both leaders full credit. As the recommendation before us rightly points out, there must be further deeds to match the words of the Soviet Government before we do more business with them.

One area that is not difficult to quantify is Soviet performance on human rights. President Reagan showed immense courage by making human rights one of the principal issues of last week. He gave Mr. Gorbachev the credit for what has been achieved, which is considerable compared with the position of only a few years ago. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe will be reviewing in detail the progress that has been made in freedom of religion in the Soviet Union since glasnost at its next session in October in Strasbourg.

President Reagan was right to emphasise that there is still a long way to go before the sort of freedoms that we all take for granted and which are the hallmarks of a civilised society – for example, the free movement of people – are respected and practised by the Kremlin. We look for new Soviet concessions to end the current stalemate at the CSCE conference in Vienna on human rights.

Mr. Stokes's amended preamble rightly welcomes the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. There must be many who took part in last December's debate on his report who would only have believed such an unprecedented retreat when they saw it happen – and I was certainly one of them. Now it is happening and we give Mr. Gorbachev credit for that. We must hope that it proves to be irreversible and that Mr. Najibollah's régime will be swept away.

The same withdrawal of Soviet hegemony elsewhere in the world must take place from Angola, Eritrea, and Cambodia, and from wherever the Soviet Union is involved either with its own generals or advisers or through influence over its client states. Those are the initiatives for which the report calls.

Even more meaningful will be the Soviet attitude and performance towards the captive peoples of Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union can make no greater contribution at this time to building free European and free world confidence in itself and to reducing suspicion and fear of its real intentions than to allow true self-determination for Eastern Europe; to allow the

economic reforms that their governments know must be applied; to allow the political reforms that public opinion in those countries demands; and to allow those countries to pursue neutrality and non-alignment if that is their wish or to join the Council of Europe by qualification if that is their wish.

This applies equally to the Baltic states. I applaud Mr. Stokes for insisting on keeping his reference to those states in his recommendation and Mr. Hardy should be reminded that the Assembly has frequently been referred to the fate of the Baltic states by no less a person than our former colleague, Sir Frederic Bennett. All that would represent the end of the iron curtain. The demolition of the Berlin wall would be the most significant gesture of all.

In the meantime, WEU should wholeheartedly accept the recommendation. By all means let us be encouraged by glasnost but let us recognise that so far it represents just a crack in the face of totalitarianism. By all means let us welcome perestroika, but we must recognise that it is only an attempt to reform a stagnant economy without violating a one-party state.

Above all, let us remain wholly realistic in our assessment of Soviet policy and of its military capability and not give an inch until we can be sure that its ambitions are solely for its own people and for no others.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now adjourn the debate and the three remaining speakers, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Reddemann and Mr. Rubbi, will speak this afternoon.

9. Election of two Vice-Presidents of the Assembly

The PRESIDENT. – I have to tell the Assembly that I have received the nominations of Mr. van der Werff and Mr. Valleix for the two vacant vice-presidential places.

The nominations have been properly made and in the form prescribed by the rules.

If there is no objection, I propose that the election of Mr. van der Werff and Mr. Valleix should be by acclamation in accordance with Rule 10(6).

Are there any objections?...

There are not.

I therefore declare Mr. van der Werff and Mr. Valleix elected Vice-Presidents.

The order of precedence of the Vice-Presidents according to age is as follows: Mr. van der Werff, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Valleix, Mr. Sarti, Mr. Soell and Mr. Pécriaux.

***10. Date, time and orders of the day
of the next sitting***

The PRESIDENT. – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
2. Threat assessment (Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the revised draft recommendation, Document 1115 addendum).

3. Naval aviation (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1139).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.)

THIRD SITTING

Tuesday, 7th June 1988

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Address by Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.
Replies by Mr. Mellor to questions put by: Mr. Hardy, Mr. Linster, Mr. Ahrens, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Rathbone, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Caccia.
4. Threat assessment (*Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the revised draft recommendation, Doc. 1115 addendum*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Steiner, Mr. Reddemann, Mr. Rubbi, Mr. Stokes (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Kittelmann
5. Disarmament (*Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1147*).
(Chairman); (points of order): Mr. Hardy, Sir Dudley Smith, Mr. Hardy.
6. Naval aviation (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1139*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Klejdzinski, Mr. Speed, Mr. Wilkinson (*Rapporteur*).
7. Disarmament (*Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1147*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Kittelmann.
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.10 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Address by Mr. Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. David Mellor, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

Please come to the rostrum, Minister.

Mr. MELLOR (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I am conscious of the honour that you have done me by asking me to come back a second time. As my mother always said, anyone can be invited somewhere once, but to be invited back is always the test. However, I am also conscious that the number of visiting speakers, even though they are made welcome by the Assembly, is a major intrusion into the time that it has for its own debates. So I want to use the time that you have kindly given me profitably and not to outstay my welcome, and I hope to put before the Assembly remarks that are worth hearing.

In the six months since last I was here there have been some dramatic changes in European security. If I had suggested last December that a senior – albeit disgraced – Soviet official would publicly call for the resignation of Mr. Gorbachev's most senior colleague in 1988, some of you would have wondered whether I had partaken too much of Parisian hospitality the previous night. You would have had your suspicions confirmed if I had also predicted that Mr. Gorbachev would try to limit his tenure of office, and that of his successors, to two five-year periods. If I had said that by the time of my next visit the Soviet Union would have begun to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, your verdict would have been clear.

But perhaps I do you all an injustice, because there are many wise and experienced heads in this room and it would be foolish to neglect or

1. See page 24.

Mr. Mellor (continued)

underestimate your expertise. So I congratulate those of you who saw it all coming.

There is no doubt that we live in extraordinary times. The torrent of ideas, of debates and of political and human drama pouring out of Moscow constantly prods us all into a re-examination of the Soviet Union – of what it is, where it is going and what that means for us in the West. How should we react to these developments? What should our policies be? There is no more important task for the governments of the free democratic West or for parliamentarians in our western democracies. We must grind away at the mass of evidence and information – sometimes startling in its novelty, sometimes contradictory, sometimes invigorating, sometimes depressing. All this evidence pouring out of the Soviet Union must be studied to try to obtain that clarity of vision about the East-West relationship that alone can guide us over the months and years to come.

We must recognise the full extent of the changes that Mr. Gorbachev has set in train. We must also be realistic enough to see areas in which change has not taken place – at least, not yet. The Soviet military machine continues inexorably to grind out massive increases in weaponry. The KGB continues exactly as before.

This is where all of us, as democratically-elected politicians, come in. How is public opinion, finding old stereotypes exploding before its eyes and intrigued and even beguiled by the exciting and reassuring presence of the General Secretary, to make sense of this changing world? What lead should we give? We must consider these things together. Even if we do not have all the answers, surely we can at least define the right approach. Thoughtfulness, patient exposition and a commitment to try to present the issues of the day as they really are – those are what we need, and nothing less will do. So we in the United Kingdom look forward with keen anticipation to working with the Assembly during our presidency. We expect a lively dialogue: the serious issues of the day deserve nothing less.

We want to be sure that we keep you up to date and well informed by delivering reports and trying to ensure that the bureaucracy works to give you the best opportunity of making the fullest use of these valuable sessions together. And you will know where to find us if things go wrong, as I am sure from time to time they will.

WEU will never be what we want it to be unless the Assembly is fully involved and it will be the central task of our presidency to ensure that it is. Of course, our presidency does not face an easy task. The best way to start any venture is

to succeed a failure, but the converse is, alas, also true and the Dutch presidency has been very successful, with the adoption of the platform and the first steps toward a larger WEU. So we are conscious that we have a hard act to follow.

The platform that we have adopted is just that – a beginning, not an end. The United Kingdom sent platforms out into the North Sea to drill for hidden riches. I hope that the platform that the Netherlands has launched will prove equally profitable. That means that we must follow up. We must implement practical measures based on the commitments that the platform sets out so clearly. We must strive for a satisfactory conclusion to the enlargement negotiations. Those are two major British goals for our presidency.

We must also monitor carefully efforts by our defence ministries through WEU to pool resources, develop technology, save money and co-operate over logistics and training. Our emphasis will be on the concrete and the specific. The autumn ministerial meeting will want to review progress and if there is no progress we shall certainly want to know why.

Enlargement and the negotiations with Spain and Portugal will of course throw into sharp relief the obligations of the platform. Enlargement is not a foregone conclusion. WEU membership is not an easy option for anyone. We will of course welcome Spain and Portugal, but on the same terms as we all accept. We look to them for the commitments that all of us here have already accepted.

We also hope that our presidency will be marked by plain speaking. WEU is uniquely placed to act as a pressure group within NATO. To do that job well it, and the special working group, must be infused by the spirit of glasnost. We want a forum for new ideas and a place for frank discussion.

A “yes” to glasnost in WEU and, I hope a “yes” to perestroika too. The need for collocation and for good housekeeping within the organisation will not go away. The views of the British Government on all that are well known. We believe that Brussels, as the headquarters of both the European Economic Community and NATO, would be the right choice for a collocated WEU. It is equally well known that others have different views. But we do not have a reputation for letting go and inertia has not got the better of us yet. That said, the issue must not become all-important. The club rules and the club premises must not become the *raison d'être* for the club's existence. It must not overshadow the vital work that we all have to do.

When I spoke here last December the headlines were full of the INF treaty. I am sure that we are all delighted that the treaty has now been finalised and ratified by both sides. We can never repeat too often a basic truth: the treaty repre-

Mr. Mellor (continued)

sents a triumph for western strength and solidarity. It is an achievement of which we can all be proud. But the spotlight now moves to other subjects. There are several that I could identify but I do not want to outstay my welcome. The Assembly has other business, but I want to raise one matter in sufficient detail without over-staying my welcome. I refer to burden-sharing – an issue that is always with us but is particularly to the fore at present.

Let me first define the term as I understand it, I mean the debate about what is the fair and effective apportionment of the political and economic responsibilities that each member of the alliance needs to assume to ensure our collective military security.

I provide that rather ponderous definition to try to make it clear that this is not simply a matter of some Americans looking at the bottom line for European defence spending and liking or not liking what they see. It is much more. It is about asking whether all European members of the alliance are playing their proper rôle, what political contribution the allies could and should make to the common defence effort and how all the allies can play a full part in maintaining the nuclear as well as the conventional deterrent. Before we make those judgments and try to chart our course for the future, we need some of the clear-sightedness that I mentioned earlier. We cannot risk the reckless optimism of the unworldly visionary or the jaded pessimism of the world-weary cynic. Ronald Reagan returned from Moscow with renewed hope for a safer, more humane world. But in his speech in London a few days ago, which I was privileged to hear, he was as clear about the risks as he was about the opportunities – and rightly so.

We must not be carried away by the promise of a better world, exciting though that is. We cannot afford to ignore the stark realities that sometimes tell a different story from the crisp one-liners of the new Gorky Street public relations régime. The headlines talk of a new era of disarmament and we have worked for and welcomed each new step towards arms control and will continue to do so. But some of the facts tell a different story.

There is no sign of any rollback in Soviet defence spending. The Warsaw Pact continued to outnumber NATO 3 to 1 in tanks and artillery and 2 to 1 in tactical aircraft. Soviet production rates of key weaponry are still high. The Soviets are wheeling out eight tanks, six new artillery pieces and two aircraft a day. They had 3 400 new tanks in 1987 and 700 more combat aircraft. In addition there is a new nuclear submarine every thirty-seven days; three new aircraft types – Fulcrum, Flanker and Foxhound – have recently been introduced. Ten years ago the

Warsaw Pact had few attack helicopters. Now it has 1 600 and NATO is outnumbered 2 to 1. If that is restructuring, perhaps some of the old structures were not so unattractive.

Despite Mr. Gorbachev's professed dislike of nuclear weapons and his seductive arguments for a nuclear-free Europe, there is no sign of a scaling down of his own nuclear forces.

NATO's Montebello programme has produced reductions of 2 400 warheads over the last few years. That downward trend is continuing. I wish that there were a Soviet Montebelski. There is nothing of the sort. The Frog missile is even now being replaced with the more accurate SS-21 with no reduction in numbers. That is despite the 14 to 1 Soviet superiority in short-range missile launchers. The Soviets have in service five different types of nuclear-capable air-to-surface missiles and they are bringing into their inventory a new long-range air-launched cruise missile and a new submarine-launched cruise missile. The whole of the Russian strategic nuclear force in place today will have been replaced by the middle of the next decade. It will be replaced and renewed, not removed.

All that is in addition to the Soviet possession of the world's biggest and most up-to-date stockpile of chemical weapons. I recall the words of a wise and experienced Soviet commentator who said: "Nothing works well in the Soviet Union except the military, and that works very well indeed." We should never underestimate the Soviets. It gives me no pleasure to say that. I should like to say something very different, but none of us has an interest in being negative about what are otherwise exciting developments. It is no part of our job here to deny the facts. The threat exists. It is unmistakable and growing. For the foreseeable future, we must buckle down and continue to meet it.

As defence costs rise exponentially, defence budgets come under even greater strain. Burden-sharing, in all its aspects, takes on an even greater significance. We need to bring to bear on this issue the same imagination and the same rigorous analysis that we require when approaching the "new thinking" of Soviet foreign and domestic policy.

In many quarters, I believe, we are succeeding. The commitment with which the alliance is pursuing the vital policy of modernisation is one example. The calm judgment of the United States administration, despite a sometimes frenetic and ill-informed public debate about burden-sharing in the United States, is another. That was well personified by William Taft on his recent tour of European capitals. It is a pity that the hard-headed good sense of Deputy Secretary Taft is not shared by all the participants in the burden-sharing debate in the United States.

Mr. Mellor (continued)

Of course we all recognise and pay tribute to the indispensable contribution that the United States makes to the security of Western Europe, but the United States is not, as some Americans seem to believe, a Hercules standing alone, supporting the western world on its shoulders, simply out of altruism and generosity. Of course we recognise and again pay tribute to the fact that Europeans benefit from the presence in Europe of 325 000 United States servicemen, the United States reinforcement commitments and the United States nuclear guarantee.

Let us be clear about this: Europe is politically, economically and militarily vital to the United States as well, not just to us. It stakes out the United States first line of defence several thousand miles from Washington. It is one of the keys to the maintenance of the world economy based on free market principles. The prospect of continuing political stability in Europe is one of the strongest foundations for democracy worldwide.

The proper way to look at the transatlantic relationship is to see it as a bargain from which both sides benefit equally. Then we must turn to our contribution. I do not want to place too much reliance on the statistics: the debate is not just a numbers game – bean counting, as some dismissibly call it. But figures have their place. They undoubtedly demonstrate much that is good and welcome about the European effort.

In conventional forces in Europe, we Europeans provide 90% of the manpower, 85% of the tanks and 80% of the combat aircraft. We defend western interests outside Europe. The United Kingdom gives military assistance and training to more than sixty countries. France has an extensive military presence outside Europe. The burden that we all share is not just the burden of military expenditure. We share the burden of political persuasion, which is vital. Europe, as a commercial bloc, is a major power for democracy and freedom in the world. Perhaps because Europe is not a superpower it enjoys widespread good relations throughout the world. In many parts of the world we are a flagship of western values of freedom and democracy.

Europe makes a major contribution in aid to the developing world, bilaterally and through collective European institutions. Moreover, it is often forgotten in the midst of American complaints that there is a European naval presence in the Gulf, in the shape of the British Armilla patrol, which has been there since 1980. Five European navies are present in the Gulf, making a significant contribution to defending western interests. Other members of WEU are involved. The Federal German navy is contributing by substituting in the Mediterranean for some of the ships deployed to the Gulf. Luxembourg pro-

vides financial help. All WEU members thus contribute to the European effort there, and WEU was the crucial forum for discussion in Europe before deployment decisions were taken. All that is well and good.

Europe makes other, less visible, but equally important contributions to burden-sharing. Large quantities of valuable real estate are made available to visiting forces, both European and American. Some countries maintain conscription, and the Federal Republic of Germany has been prepared recently to lengthen the conscription period – a difficult but brave and welcome decision.

I could go on, but I have said enough to show that we are not freeloaders. We Europeans have much of which to be proud. Just as, on the other side of the Atlantic, the Americans do not always see the reality of the European defence effort, we, too, must be rigorous, honest and self-critical about our rôle. We must remain alert to those occasions when our vision is blurred, when expediency, short-term economic pressures or sheer political and military myopia cause us to pursue policies and take decisions that can only cause profound satisfaction in the capitals of the Warsaw Pact.

We all have to live with economic and political pressures. They are with us all the time, as are the blandishments on our public of the Soviet propaganda machine. That propaganda machine is all the more alluring when presented by that “ nice ” Mr. Gorbachev rather than some of his forbiddingly slab-faced predecessors. We need to be clear about the challenges and our shortcomings. We must not duck difficult issues. Although discussion and analysis are essential, they must be a prelude to action, not a substitute for it. It is, as the Bible says, by their deeds that we shall know them.

I believe that Britain does well. I would say that, would I not? But the facts support the claim. We have 67 000 men in the Federal Republic, defending our security where it counts, at the Elbe. Our defence expenditure has increased by 20% in real terms since 1979 – not so difficult perhaps in the light of our recent economic achievements. But when we started this process in darker times, when unemployment was rising, not falling, and when we were trying to turn around a weak and struggling economy, difficult and controversial decisions were required in our country. Our defence expenditure now stands at 4.7% of our GDP; the WEU average is 3.1%. One is never too good to be better, and we are ready to listen to criticisms of past United Kingdom mistakes and get advice from this forum or elsewhere about future decisions. That is the sort of plain speaking WEU is all about.

As I am advocating plain speaking, let me do a little more. In the spirit of constructive debate,

Mr. Mellor (continued)

let me pose this question: is each of our countries doing enough? If each were weighed in the balance, would we be found wanting? If the recording angel stood before us, could we all answer the difficult questions? As I have said before, it is actions that count, not words.

Some uncomfortable facts must be faced. Italy's defence expenditure is 2.1% of GDP, way below even the low WEU average. I hope that Italy's new enlarged ten-year defence programme will get approval from the Italian Parliament this year. Similarly, there is the admirable enthusiasm of the prosperous Grand Duchy of Luxembourg for multilateral diplomacy and for WEU. We should like that matched by a similar enthusiasm for security when Luxembourg's defence expenditure amounts to just 1.3% of GDP.

I am a frequent visitor to Brussels, a city that I very much enjoy, but it is saddening that Belgium, which has contributed so much to European integration, has been unable – apparently because the cost is too high – to maintain the common European air defence system.

I do not imagine that that decision was taken lightly by the Belgian Government, but how can it be reconciled with the calls that the Belgian Government have made, like all of us in WEU, for greater European defence co-operation?

Outside WEU other important members of NATO could do more. Denmark is a prosperous and well-managed country that has one of the highest per capita incomes in Europe. I am afraid that its contribution to the common defence does not remotely approach its wealth or capabilities. Its performance is an open invitation to our critics across the Atlantic. Similarly, we must be disappointed about the enforced withdrawal of the United States 401st tactical fighter wing from Spain. What sort of signal is that to our American critics? Does it help Europe's friends in the United States administration and outside to fight our corner? The future of the 401st is a test case for NATO's clarity of vision, its ability to distinguish its central long-term interests. I hope that we shall pass that test – a confidence that is enhanced by press reports that the Italian cabinet gave unanimous approval over the weekend to relocation in Italy. I hope that the Italian Parliament will follow that lead.

I want to be clear about one thing: levels of defence expenditure are not the be-all and end-all; it is vital also to get value for money. Output is as important as input. But only so much can be squeezed out of a limited contribution. That is the truth of it. In the end there is no substitute for spending, no alternative for francs, pounds, marks, lire, and so on. I must hope that countries spending markedly below the WEU average will look hard for ways to increase

their effort, not because we are engaged in an international virility contest, but because it is individual countries, each with a strong defence, that provide the basis for the strength of the alliance. Strength is the foundation of a successful arms control policy. Who imagines now that the INF treaty would have been possible without cruise and Pershing deployment? We would not have got it unless the Soviets felt that there was something that they needed to bargain for. Without the security that comes from strength, what hopes are there for a prosperous future for all our citizens?

In conclusion, European defence institutions can never be, as Geoffrey Howe said not so long ago, the tidy product of "an accountant's mind". WEU does not have a perfectly formed slot, nor a neat, self-contained agenda. But in the last four years WEU has achieved something. It has begun to shine once again with a life of its own. It has real achievements, such as the platform, to its credit. Its views carry increasing authority. We have made a start towards developing within the alliance a common defence identity, and our task now is to build on that together. In the year of the British presidency, we will certainly work assiduously at the task of helping WEU to contribute as much as possible to a stronger Europe and a safer world.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Mellor. Your comments will no doubt prompt a number of questions.

Would you be prepared to answer questions from members of our Assembly?

(The Minister of State agreed to do so)

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – The Minister referred to the happier relationship between the Council of Ministers and this Assembly. Will he look at the report of Mr. van der Sanden, which will be before the Assembly tomorrow, which points to some serious deficiencies in that relationship? May we have his assurance that those deficiencies will be remedied immediately?

The Minister suggested that the actual achievements in the INF treaty and as a consequence the potential achievements following last week's summit seemed to him to be entirely the result of triumphant western diplomacy. He described Mr. Gorbachev as "nice". Is he not prepared to give Mr. Gorbachev just a little of the credit?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELLOR (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I think that Mr. Gorbachev deserves a great deal of the credit. One needs a

Mr. Mellor (continued)

negotiating partner. The changes that Mr. Gorbachev is seeking to bring about internally within the Soviet Union are fundamental and welcome. What troubles all of us is the impact of Mr. Gorbachev on the Soviet military machine and the workings of the Soviet security system. How far will he be able to assert control over institutions in which, one cannot help feeling, under Mr. Brezhnev and the interregnum subsequent to Mr. Brezhnev, political control seemed increasingly to be lost?

I think that Mr. Gorbachev is someone with whom, in the British Prime Minister's phrase, we can do business. I hope that we can do business with him increasingly over the years. I believe that the best framework within which we can do business with him is to ensure that the Soviets appreciate that the only way that they will achieve what they would like – the ability to opt out of the increasingly expensive arms race and the ability to reflect on some of the more negative aspects of Soviet foreign policy – is the spur of our determination to maintain our security, if we have to, by renewing our weaponry, whilst recognising that in the end weaponry is an inadequate way of ensuring security in the long term. The best way of ensuring long-term security is by understanding and friendship across international boundaries.

We can be encouraged by the fact that in Western Europe, as this organisation and others have shown so well, ancient enmities within a span of only a few decades have been buried for ever. It is inconceivable that war would break out between France and Germany, France and Britain or Britain and Germany. We are looking for a balanced approach: the vision to feel that we can work with a Soviet leader who wants to be different – and there is no doubt about that – and the realism that we must show the same determination in defence of our interests as the Soviet Union will show in defence of its interests. We have to look for evidence, which is not yet available, of more genuine movement towards a reduction in tension by the Soviet military machine before we can be convinced that what Mr. Gorbachev has in hand is a fundamental and lasting rejection of the Soviet way of doing things in the past. There has been reform before, and it has failed. We must not be left naked if this new reform process in the Soviet Union fails and is reversed by some successors.

On relations between the Council and the Assembly, I was trying to say not that everything is perfect, because manifestly it is not – I have also looked at Mr. van der Sanden's report – but that we accept the report as a spur to try to sort out the problems. I was really giving a pledge to

try to ensure better and more harmonious working between the Council and the Assembly, recognising that in the end it comes down not to rhetorical aspirations but to getting the practical bureaucracy right. That is why I said you will know where to find us – certainly you will know where to find me – and I am sure that you will complain loud and long if we do not get it right.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – There are five more questions to be taken. I would ask speakers to restrict themselves to questions and avoid comments.

I call Mr. Linster.

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have some difficulty in following your request for no comments. I just want to say that some weeks ago, in your company, I met Mrs. Pat Schroeder, the American champion of burden-sharing, and at the end of a fact-finding mission in Luxembourg and elsewhere in Europe she expressed great satisfaction at my country's past and present contribution to the alliance. I was therefore greatly surprised – offended even – at the Minister's glib sarcasm about Luxembourg's efforts on behalf of our joint security. His tone is quite out of place, and to draw a sarcastic parallel between "the admirable enthusiasm of Luxembourg for WEU" and the 1.3% of its GNP which Luxembourg spends on defence is to display crass ignorance of its efforts in other directions. I mention only the extension of our airport beyond our economic and tourist needs as an expression of our wish to fulfil our host nation support rôle to the full. I could also mention AWACS, military camps and go on to devote a whole speech to the subject!

However, to comply with the President's request, I ask only this question: how can a comparison be made between the contribution in terms of gross national product of a country which has no defence industry and makes no weapons and that of a country which does have defence industries and a consequent feed-back of military expenditure into the rest of the economy? You cannot compare chalk with cheese! Luxembourg's 1.3% contribution is expenditure which goes entirely abroad and is not cycled back into its economy.

And finally: does the Minister consider that cheap sarcasm of this kind is likely to improve the internal cohesion of WEU?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELLOR (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – That is an interesting and eloquent speech for the defence. Let me just make one or two general points and then I will come to the specific point. Let us be clear about this. Burden-sharing is going to be a debate that we shall have

Mr. Mellor (continued)

to carry on rigorously, here and in other parts of the western alliance, because it is not going to go away. Those of you who have read Paul Kennedy's book about the rise and fall of the great powers will know what his thesis is and how that thesis has been taken within the United States. A number of people are wondering whether the United States is beginning to over-reach itself. The comparisons of its economic performance with ours are not going to go away. This United States administration, as I have said, has responded with considerable good sense, wisdom and moderation to some of the congressional pressures, but who can say what some future president might feel constrained to do, faced with the United States' budgetary difficulties?

So we have always to be rigorous in our analysis of whether the balance between Europe and the United States is right. We cannot avoid that. One of the reasons why we have WEU is so that some of the key players in European defence can discuss together, frankly and candidly, what the European pillar should be contributing and also what we should each of us contribute to make that European pillar strong.

We have to do more than just respond as if every time a query is raised about a national contribution one has been slapped around the face. It is not like that. We must be more mature in our response. If Luxembourg cannot do any better and its contribution has reached the state of perfection, no one would be more delighted than me. I hope that that is true. I can only say to you, looking at the raw figures of 1.3% of GDP, that anyone who compares it with what some others are spending is bound to ask, in the atmosphere of frankness and friendship that we have: "Is it enough?" That question has to be responded to not with prickliness, because it is not put in a prickly way, but in a practical way.

It is clear that if one does not contribute enough, others must contribute more. Until we see a scaling down in the Soviet defence effort, we must keep our guard up. One thing is certain: pressure from the United States on these issues is going to grow and not diminish. There is no earthly chance of its diminishing, so we must get used to conducting these discussions. I throw out that suggestion because it is self-evident. The answer will have to be considered. I hope that it will be as good as you have given. I will not be the only one to worry that a contribution as low as that will not satisfy those who want to look with rigour at what we are trying to do.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I have two questions on burden-

sharing to put to the Minister. I am assuming that the defence of the central theatre in Europe is not possible without the help of our allies from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands. The presence of these troops in my country means another half million allied soldiers in addition to the half million German soldiers there.

My first question to the Minister is this: when we speak of burden-sharing, should we not also consider the burdens incurred by the German people and by Germany itself thanks to these half million allied soldiers? There are, for example, the burdens imposed on people who live near military training areas, and the burdens arising from the fact that beautiful countryside which is constantly used for exercises cannot be appropriately developed because not many people want to relax amid the dust and noise of tanks.

So my question is should we not go beyond percentages of gross national product and make far more subtle distinctions when discussing the problems connected with burden-sharing?

This brings me to my second question. As the Minister knows, the member states of the alliance include countries with armies consisting entirely of professional soldiers, and others with conscripted armies, where young men are required to interrupt their work or education for up to two years to do their national service for pocket money. Should the additional contribution made by these young men in my country, for example – not in the United States or in the United Kingdom – not be taken into account when we are discussing burden-sharing? Does this contribution not give the lie to percentage calculations, simple and handy though they made be?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELLOR (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I was slightly surprised that the questioner put his question as though I would disagree, because I said it all in my speech. I am sorry if it did not come across in translation. It is there in English. I spoke about the amount of valuable real estate that is affected, to quote the exact words. We are all aware – I am certainly aware from a recent visit to the Federal Republic – of the inevitable problems that we are trying to keep, and are succeeding in keeping, to a minimum, of having large numbers of troops, which inevitably have an impact on the local neighbourhood, and of training. I congratulated the Federal Republic and said it was a brave move to increase conscription. I trust that he was not thinking anything I said was contrary to what he said, because it was not.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate my ministerial colleague on his excellent address, and on his characteristically refreshing lack of cant in his speech and in his answers. What I want to ask follows on from what he has been saying, but it concerns the very important point of the European defence spending responsibility. Knowing as we do as politicians, whatever side we are on, how unattractive electorally this is – there are no bonuses in advocating extra defence expenditure – does he not agree that, after some years of worrying about this in Europe, and agonising and trying to encourage and cajole member countries to come up to the standard, with the new president of the United States in January, whoever he may be, we may well have a different approach from the United States, which would bring us right up against the whole problem of the extra finance that we might have to contribute?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELLOR (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I completely agree. Here we are in June 1988; come January 1989 there will be a new American administration. Who of us could say now what the defence policy of that new administration will be? I believe that there is still a consensus within the United States for a defence policy based on a strong commitment to Europe and that that is the way in which things will shape up. But none of us can be certain what view the next American president – or the one after that – will take about key issues such as the number of troops, the commitment of aircraft and ships and all the other parts of the military machine that protects us.

Whatever an American president might want to do, as we all know what he wants to do and what his economy will allow him to do may well be two quite different things. It is clear that the next American president and, one assumes, his successor, will have to make difficult decisions about the budget. Indeed, this American President has had to do so. We cannot be certain that the next one will attach the same priority to preserving defence expenditure as this one. So in the end we are best off, particularly as Western Europe grows. After all, we are creating a single market in 1992 which will make our prosperous countries even more prosperous. We must recognise that as that prosperity grows there will be more and more pressure from across the Atlantic to contribute more to our own security.

I return to the question I was asked by Mr. Linster. We should not regard these individual

contributions as somehow in bad taste – like swearing at a vicarage tea party. We must recognise that these issues are at the heart of what organisations such as this are all about. Somehow or other we must find the ability – the creative tension, perhaps – to discuss among ourselves what we should be doing in a spirit that allows us to see constructive criticism for what it is – a spur to greater effort, not an attempt to exchange criticism for the sake of causing bad blood.

Burden-sharing will not go away; the pressures on us will intensify. The more of this time that we use to get the right answers, the better we shall feel in a year or two from now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rathbone.

Mr. RATHBONE (*United Kingdom*). – May I humbly add my congratulations to my ministerial colleague, both on what he said and on the manner in which he said it? Will he sketch in the background to the other side of the issue? What are his expectations of the third United Nations special session on disarmament?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELLOR (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – It is timely that we should be considering that. The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, is in New York now, and will address the session. I imagine that a number of other ministers from member states of WEU will also speak at it. I hope that the third United Nations special session on disarmament will mark a more mature approach to this topic than was evidenced in the previous two.

Before, and again as another form of escapism, discussion was concentrated on nuclear issues because only five of the 129 participating nations in the third special session acknowledge that they are nuclear weapon states. So it is easy to pitch the argument at weapons that only five countries allegedly possess. However, we know that as well as growth in the arms race between East and West there are regional arms races that need to be addressed. Conventional and chemical weapons are eating up a wholly disproportionate amount of the budgets of many third world states. That proportion is growing, not diminishing, in several parts of the world and there is grave anxiety about the proliferation of missile technology and chemical weapons. So it will be a test of the maturity of the international community if people are prepared to examine their own regional positions and not just become involved in easy rhetoric about nuclear weapons.

We who are involved in the East-West issue can go before this session with some confidence.

Mr. Mellor (continued)

After all, we now have an agenda for arms control in our region. We are part way there. We have the INF treaty and we are trying to negotiate a START treaty and we hope that talks on conventional arms reductions will begin before the end of the year. Where else in the world is there such an agenda? There is none, notwithstanding the growth in weaponry in some key regions. People must address that issue seriously.

I also hope that the special session will recognise that in the end progress in arms control is a practical matter. It is about security and how it can be achieved. If we have a lot of propagandist statements in grand documents with high-flown ideals about disarmament, unattached to the bedrock of reality – the sort of things that made the 1982 second session so unsuccessful – we shall get nowhere. I hope that in the intervening years people have found a new maturity on this topic. In common with all the countries represented here, we will be putting this case in the hope that it is accepted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I want to put a couple of domestic points clearly on the record. The Minister said that the Council accepted Mr. van der Sanden's report. May I assume that that means that instructions will be given by the Council of Ministers to its deputies and to the desks in the respective foreign offices that the deadline for reports must be met?

Secondly, the Minister may remember that on the last occasion anxiety was expressed because we did not feel that the reasonings behind our budget requests always reached a minister. Will the Minister repeat that as Britain takes over the presidency, if a final impasse is reached he would be prepared to see the Presidential Committee so that it could put the issues directly to him as a minister?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELLOR (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I shall certainly answer yes to both questions.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Caccia.

Mr. CACCIA (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, perhaps you will allow me a few minutes because I do not think that words can affect defence budgets. I should like to begin by thanking the British Government representative for his remarks on relations with the Soviet Union during the first part of his speech.

As regards the force relationships he quoted we should remember that the Soviet people are hoping even more than we are for internal changes in their country. As regards relations between national governments and WEU, I share the opinion expressed here that this international organisation should be strengthened and put in a position to state a considered view more quickly so that it can play a more incisive rôle in relation to the national governments. We must not have the feeling that we are simply rubber-stamping something which happened six or seven months earlier without any chance of exerting any influence on current political problems which evolve so quickly that they cease to have any immediacy within three or four months.

Turning to the expenditure criteria set out by the United Kingdom speaker I would observe that the figures are not accounting facts when defence questions are involved, particularly having regard to the political situation of the individual countries. I think that such figures should be seen against the changes which are taking place in the world and in Europe, with special attention to the commitments of the various countries. For example, Italy's defence budget – running at 2.7% of gross domestic product – is largely devoted to funding commitments within the Atlantic Alliance.

The Italian Government has fulfilled the agreement reached with NATO to hold the increase on the defence budget within 3% of real expenditure as has been repeated by all the ministers responsible. Consequently, what Italy is doing at the moment should not be passed over in silence – the action of our 18th naval group in the Persian Gulf and the action which has been continuing for almost seven years in the Red Sea following the Camp David agreements are often forgotten. We must give a political interpretation to events and must not judge what is being done too strictly and too absolutely in terms of figures; otherwise, we might obstruct the developments taking place on the frontiers of the West.

I will conclude by saying that the changes taking place in the non-western countries closely resemble the natural phenomenon of water filtering slowly into rock and gradually breaking it down. Unfortunately, the final effect is only seen when the whole thing collapses.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MELLOR (*Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom*). – I sympathise with a great deal of what my colleague has said. We are all aware of the contribution that Italy makes in all the areas that he mentioned. I very much welcome the discussions about an enhanced ten-year pro-

Mr. Mellor (continued)

gramme. I appreciate of course that in all our countries we must consider a steady build-up; these things cannot be done overnight. It requires a great expenditure of political will to achieve them. As I said, I do not believe that these comparisons are an accountancy exercise. It is what comes out at the other end in terms of value for money, not merely the input, that matters. But there comes a point at which one must recognise that if a budget seems markedly below that which other countries are contributing, the hard question why that should be so must be asked. Is there a good reason for it? If it merely reflects a lack of willingness to do more plainly there must be re-evaluation.

I was grateful for the positive comments about my speech. We must address the issue on its merits so that in friendship and at gatherings such as this we can talk about what each of us has to do to evaluate the threat, evaluate the pressure from across the Atlantic and to weigh up our own contribution. We weigh in the balance the money involved, the contribution in terms of being the host nation, the range of activities in relation to strategic positions, and try for a fair result that goes beyond the rhetoric and enables us to ensure that in building for the future that we all want for our countries we do not neglect the one guarantee for our future – our ability, if it comes to the crunch, to defend our freedom effectively.

I hope that by addressing the problems frankly WEU will enable us to return to our parliaments and governments with a renewed vigour to try to make all that happen.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister for having been good enough to answer the numerous questions. May I wish you great success as Chairman-in-Office of the Council when you take over in a few weeks' time.

4. Threat assessment

(Resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the revised draft recommendation, Doc. 1115 addendum)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now resume the debate on the report presented by Mr. Stokes on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and take the vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1115 addendum.

In the resumed debate I call Mr. Steiner.

Mr. STEINER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, since our first debate on Mr. Stokes's important report, in which he has undoubtedly invested a great deal of time and labour, not only

have two other reports on this subject been published, quite independently of one another, but the treaty between the United States and the USSR on the elimination of land-based medium-range nuclear missiles has also been ratified. So what many of us hoped, but hardly considered possible a few months ago, has happened. The two leading countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact have not only agreed to scrap weapons systems, but even put the seal on this agreement in a treaty signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev last week, a truly historic step, which should be duly appreciated by Western European Union, a step which shows that arsenals can be reduced, notwithstanding major social differences between East and West.

In relation to our debate on Mr. Stokes's report, this also means that it has become possible to sign a disarmament agreement under which the number of missiles to be scrapped is not the same on both sides, because the Soviet Union will have to scrap by far the larger proportion of these weapons. What has been achieved in this sphere of force comparisons should also be seen by the member states of WEU as an encouraging sign. But, without lapsing into euphoria over disarmament, we should work to ensure that further negotiations are held, with a view to improving our security with as few weapons as possible.

This does not make threat assessments and force comparisons superfluous or deprive them of value. No, in all our deliberations and efforts to increase security we always need an up-to-date and reliable basis. Consequently, both the comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces referred to by Mr. Stokes this morning and published by the Government of the Federal Republic, and the report drawn up in January 1988 by Senator Carl Levin on the conventional military balance in Europe, are important documents for the assessment of the current security situation. They are at least as important as the report by Mr. Stokes that we are now considering.

All these reports provide the data we need, as Western European Union parliamentarians, to assess the security situation. As I am in the process of drawing up a report to supplement this report by Mr. Stokes, I am aware of the problems posed by data-gathering. But assessment of the available data poses an even greater problem, because there neither are nor can be any common criteria for such assessment. I cannot therefore give my approval to the part of the draft recommendation which calls on the governments of the NATO allies to draw consistently on the agreed NATO force comparisons alone in their public statements.

Nor do I agree with all the recommendations Mr. Stokes has included in his report. I am

Mr. Steiner (continued)

opposed, for example, to the reference to the military repression of various countries by the Soviet Union, with Afghanistan and the Baltic states mentioned as examples in one breath. I do not think this can be left as it is, making no distinctions, in Western European Union's recommendation. Mr. Klejdzinski made pertinent comments to this effect during the Assembly's last part-session, but unfortunately they were not fully appreciated by the Rapporteur.

Nor does the draft recommendation make anything like adequate reference to the dynamic processes of recent development in the Soviet Union and the successes achieved in the disarmament negotiations. Surely, political impulses are supposed to emanate from the recommendations we adopt here. If we want to be taken seriously, we must therefore mention the link between the actual conduct of Soviet policy and the prospects it offers.

Mr. Stokes rightly pointed out in this context this morning that the chairman of my political group in the German Bundestag, Hans-Jochen Vogel, was given a graph during his last visit to Moscow – by the Soviet Chief of General Staff, if I am rightly informed – admitting Soviet superiority in certain conventional weapons systems. This was certainly no accident. We must seize this opportunity, not dismiss it with a wave of the hand, interpret it as a chance occurrence or link it with assumptions or speculations. No, I feel we should really attack these points and gauge what they actually signify.

Nor can we dismiss developments in the Soviet Union by claiming that, purely and simply on economic grounds, the Soviet Union has to reach a standstill agreement on arms spending. I believe we would be making things too easy for ourselves by merely advancing such a counter-argument. We would then have to accept a connection being made on the other side between the huge budget deficit and spending on defence and armaments in America, and the resulting monetary fluctuations, which have not exactly filled us with joy.

I feel we might have seized the opportunity to phrase our recommendation in something better than platitudes or expressions of old, inherited prejudices. We should at least have had the self-confidence to adjust it constructively to actual developments. Specifically, we should have given a sign of encouragement to negotiations on land-based short-range missiles which are a real threat to us Western Europeans, especially the Federal Republic. There would also have been room in the draft recommendation for a reference to the negotiations on chemical weapons.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, as all attempts so far to make appropriate additions to this draft recommendation and to bring it up to date have failed, I regret to say that I am unable to give the report and draft recommendation my approval.

(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to thank the Rapporteur and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I believe the report contains a wealth of information for use by anyone who would rather base his efforts to preserve peace on facts than on rosy dreams.

The report was submitted to the Assembly last autumn, when it was referred back to committee by a majority of those voting – not necessarily a majority of the members of the Assembly – because of the fear that a number of critical passages on Soviet policy might cause a stir in Moscow. Before I came back from our part-session the script of a broadcast by the Soviet propaganda station "Peace and Progress" was already on my desk. It revealed that the Soviets had found this report, which many of us did not want to accept, positively praiseworthy because the figures it contained were very close to those published by the Soviet Union on its own armament.

Two weeks ago we read in the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* that the excessive Soviet arms build-up and imperialistic behaviour in the past twelve years had forced the West to demonstrate greater willingness to defend itself than would normally have been the case. If I compare this with what I have heard said about threat assessment in the Assembly today and some remarks made yesterday, I almost have the impression that the Soviets are more willing to admit their mistakes than many of those who always preferred to see the cause of impending disaster in the West rather than make the correct and necessary assessment of the Soviet threat.

In a debate such as this we should realise that perestroika is not Russian for "peace in our time" but means restructuring, in other words an attempt by the Soviet leadership to put a completely reactionary system back into a semblance of order, because otherwise the race for the future in the Soviet Union could not be won by the Soviet Government, by the communist party. I am grateful to Mr. Mellor for reminding us that this is not the first attempt at perestroika we have witnessed. In 1964 one of the present General Secretary's predecessors, the then General Secretary Nikita Sergevich Khrushchev,

Mr. Reddemann (continued)

failed in his attempt at perestroika because of the reaction from the cadres, who were concerned that the restructuring of the Soviet Union might deprive them of their rights in favour of the majority of the people in the Soviet Union.

Ladies and gentlemen, we nevertheless welcome perestroika in the hope that this attempt to grant at least a little more freedom, strictly controlled though it is, will lead to the emergence of real freedom. Greater freedom for people in the Soviet Union would prevent quite a few problems in East-West relations from arising in the first place, and even if it did not immediately solve some of the problems we have been struggling with for decades, it might at least make them easier to deal with.

If we are going to discuss the current threat, we should be happy and grateful, despite the scepticism in some quarters, that the INF treaty has not only been signed but is now also ratified and therefore put into effect. We all remember the long debate we had in this Assembly on the elimination of medium-range missiles in connection with NATO's arms build-up, and the majority of the Assembly took the view that the arms build-up would make a reduction in the total number of medium-range missiles far easier. A minority thought differently. It should be realised that this minority is again determined to march in a different direction from those who were right in the past. I would ask them at least to consider whether their gullibility possibly prevented then what we have achieved today.

Another positive remark I want to make concerns the willingness of the United States and the Soviet Union to speed up their negotiations on a 50% reduction in intercontinental missiles. Anyone who has followed the laborious negotiations of recent years in this particular area will know that, while this decision does not mark the breakthrough, it does at least leave room for the hope of eventual release from the threat of intercontinental missiles and the emergence of a fresh opportunity for peaceful development.

But, ladies and gentlemen, we would be neglecting the security of the European democracies if we did not demand clarification of a number of issues that are vital to us before the START negotiations are concluded. Above all, there are the mobile intercontinental missiles, and the deployment of air- and seaborne cruise missiles, and here I am specifically thinking of the Soviet SS-24s and SS-25s, because anyone who knows anything about the subject knows that thanks to the nature of their mobility, these missiles could easily replace the medium-range missiles that have just been eliminated by the INF treaty. I do not think that can be in our interests, or in the interests of peace.

May I conclude by repeating what I have said here on several occasions: the most urgent task facing the countries of Western European Union is conventional disarmament. We must realise from the most recent figures and even from the Soviet concessions that the Soviet Union's overwhelming superiority in the conventional sector unfortunately still obtains. It still has enough tanks and artillery for an invasion. The standard of armament and unchanged military doctrine similarly fail to indicate that state of peace that some members here have already conjured up, with more faith than understanding. As I see it, our task is not only to take note of the fine and gratifying words issuing from Moscow, but most of all to ensure that these fine words are followed by appropriate deeds.

In this connection I should like to thank the Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, Mr. van Eekelen, one of our number for so many years, for voicing the demand that the Soviet Union withdraw its extremely large armies from the German Democratic Republic. I should also like to thank our British colleague, Mr. Atkinson, for reminding us that the wall is still standing in Berlin and that it is not only a wall of stone but a wall that constantly revives distrust of communist declarations of peace and friendship.

We undoubtedly all feel uplifted by last week's events. By voting for the report by our friend and colleague, Mr. Stokes, I would simply ask you to show that our wish is to create peace very carefully, step by step, and that we are not relying on generalised hopes or fine speeches, but only on evidence of real facts. I therefore call on you to vote for the report and for the committee's draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Rubbi.

Mr. RUBBI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, it may seem ungenerous to criticise Mr. Stokes's report particularly because of the hard work it has involved and the mass of data and arguments he has put before the Assembly. We are glad to pay tribute to his hard work but we cannot endorse his assessments and proposals as summarised in the draft recommendation.

Briefly, I would say that we are dealing with an out-of-date report. If it had been produced in the late seventies or early eighties or when the United States and the Soviet Union and NATO and the Warsaw Pact were at daggers drawn and the arms race and the militarisation of international relations were proceeding at breakneck speed, a report of this kind would have had an objective basis. Now, however, it is the American President himself who declared after the recent Moscow summit with Mr. Gorbachev that this is the start of "a new era between the USA and the USSR".

Mr. Rubbi (continued)

So, looking at what has already changed and the more far-reaching changes that the two sides have promised to make, is it reasonable or useful to take the same old political and military line in assessing the threat? May it not be necessary to change ideas and actions on this very delicate subject?

Authoritative voices in the West are already asking the question. The Italian socialist leader, Bettino Craxi, has said that "nobody is threatening peace in Europe today and no one must be able to threaten it in the future".

Even Mr. Strauss has recently said that there is no threat to Western Europe from the Soviet Union or from the Warsaw Pact.

These significant statements do not seem to have been made off the cuff but are rather reasoned conclusions based on a close examination of the realities of the new direction taken by Soviet foreign and military policy.

Mr. Stokes's warning that Soviet intentions may change can however be accepted. But is it not in the interests of Western Europe to back up those intentions, not to let them weaken but rather to seek their logical development?

If, as we believe, this is the right line to take we in this Assembly must have the courage to change out-of-date ideas on security and defence, to give political factors priority over military and to take more decisive action to promote mutual trust and controlled balanced disarmament by measures which will also include conventional weapons.

In my opinion it is no longer enough to give estimated figures for the two military potentials. These figures and the imbalances on the various types of weapons are now known.

On the contrary what are needed are new ideas and proposals aimed at starting fresh negotiations on conventional weapons in order to achieve security guaranteed by a balance of forces at the lowest possible level, a system of defence based on sufficiency alone, on military doctrines and structures based on defence requirements alone and on a system of relationships between the two blocs which will rule out surprise attacks and are strengthened by measures of mutual trust.

Any assessment of the threat depends on the kind of answer we give to the question raised by a completely new state of affairs and on the options we wish to take.

Today, ladies and gentlemen, we have a real opportunity to build a future for Europe free from fear and threats. Let us seize this opportunity with the greatest determination and without delay.

The PRESIDENT. – That closes the debate.

Does the Rapporteur wish to reply?

Mr. STOKES (*United Kingdom*). – We have had an interesting debate. As we know, the subject was debated for some time here and at great length on many occasions in committee. I do not intend now to speak for more than a few moments.

I must say that I was sorry that my compatriot Mr. Hardy chose to make that contribution. He will remember that during the long hours of the committee I agreed to many of his amendments in the spirit of co-operation, and I expected something better than his utter rejection of my report today. I know that colleagues will not mind my mentioning that I am one of the very few members here who served throughout the whole of the last war in the armed services, and was wounded in so doing. Therefore, I am the last person in the hall not to want further arms agreements with the Soviets, but we must still keep up our guard in the West and look for deeds as well as words from Mr. Gorbachev.

I was most impressed with the speech of the Dutch Foreign Minister; how lucky we were to have his contribution this morning when he came here to address us!

We in this Assembly are on trial this afternoon. Our debate on this report, unlike our debates on some other occasions, will be widely reported in the press of Europe. It would be an appalling blow if the report were not passed by this Assembly – a blow to the whole defence of the West. Therefore, I confidently expect that the report will be passed.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Kittelmann.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments spent several lengthy and controversial meetings discussing this report and then approved it by a large majority. On the committee's behalf I ask you to vote for this report.

I am hopeful, because those who would have liked some parts of the report to be different have not tabled any amendments, thus showing that a democrat who can, in the main, give his consent, must take the rough with the smooth as regards individual points, though had he been in the majority he would have done things differently.

We of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments feel it is still up to us to tell our governments that in our view we would continue to be armed for the contingency that none of us wants – for war. We all hope that future talks between the Soviet Union and the United States

Mr. Kittelmann (continued)

– and Europe, given its growing importance – will persuade the Soviet Union to disarm so that something like equality is achieved. We also hope we can use this disarmament as a basis for much of the joint action we want to take.

Despite what the communist speaker said just now, it is not true that we should take more account of political than of military factors. As long as the other side, the eastern bloc, produces the military factors, we must, in my view, take them into account politically and together strive to change the situation.

Meanwhile, the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments asks the Assembly to approve this report by Mr. Stokes whom, on behalf of the members of the committee, I should like to thank most sincerely for all his work.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. In order that we should have an accurate record, I point out that, although the Chairman said that the report was adopted by a great majority, the majority was nine to five, with one abstention.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you for that information, Mr. Hardy, which probably confirmed “a great majority”.

We shall now vote on the revised draft recommendation contained in Document 1115 addendum.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

Mr. STOFFELEN (*Netherlands*). – On behalf of my group, I ask for a roll-call vote for two reasons. This morning the Assembly spent a terrible time organising roll-call votes on unimportant texts. This text is important. Therefore, it would be illogical and inconsistent not to have a roll-call vote.

Secondly, a number of my group expressed serious objections to the text, which in our view is unbalanced, outdated and might damage good East-West relations. Therefore, we want to see who really wants to take responsibility for this draft recommendation. I ask for a roll-call vote.

The PRESIDENT. – I assume that four other people will stand to support Mr. Stoffelen. I see that he has that support. There will be a roll-call vote.

Under Rules 33 and 34, the vote on a draft recommendation considered as a whole shall be taken by roll-call, the majority required being a majority of the votes cast.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Ahrens.

The voting is open.

(A vote by roll-call was then taken)

Does any other representative wish to vote?...

The voting is closed.

The results of the vote is as follows ¹:

Number of votes cast	45
Ayes	21
Noes	24
Abstentions	0

The revised draft recommendation is not adopted.

I call Sir Dudley Smith.

Sir Dudley SMITH (*United Kingdom*). – On a point of order, Mr. President. Now there are more people in the chamber, I wish to repeat that many of us were displeased that today's important debate was interrupted. First we had a ministerial intervention followed by a wrangle about the vote. The British Minister of State then made his speech and we finally heard the concluding speeches.

There is a good case for the urgent consideration of our procedures either by the Presidential Committee or by the committee which deals with rules and procedures. Such an important debate should be conducted without interruption. We should be able to concentrate on the arguments, to listen to the rapporteur's proposals and the chairman's comments. Fragmented debate makes a nonsense of our procedures and reduces them to a farce. It is time that the Assembly gave the matter its consideration.

The PRESIDENT. – I can save wasting further time. The Presidential Committee has accepted my proposal that the matter should be considered by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – In view of your announcement, Mr. President, I shall not labour my point, but you will be aware, perhaps more clearly than most members of the Assembly, how much I welcome Sir Dudley Smith's conversion. For the last three years I have argued that the situation is intolerable. I trust that the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges will pay careful attention to the duty that has been placed upon it, so that the farce of today will not occur again.

¹. See page 25.

5. Disarmament

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1147)

The PRESIDENT. – I have to inform the Assembly that I have received a request from Mr. Kittelmann on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments for a debate to be held under the urgent procedure as provided in Rule 43. The text is in the form of a draft recommendation on disarmament, Document 1147.

The text will be posted up and distributed.

I propose that the Assembly should decide on the question of urgency after all have had a chance to read it.

6. Naval aviation

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1139)

The PRESIDENT. – The orders of the day now provide for the presentation of the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on naval aviation with debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1139.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – It is an honour to present this report on naval aviation. The report was passed by thirteen votes to one by the committee and there was one abstention. After all the unexpected dramas that attended the approval of the recommendation in my report that the IEPG be endowed with a small permanent secretariat, I hope that this report will prove to be far less controversial. I hope that no members are lurking hoping to torpedo it. The report's subject matter is important to Europe's security.

I pay tribute to the newly appointed Clerk to the committee, Colin Cameron. He was thrown in at the deep end. Having to sink or swim is a predicament with which politicians and naval personnel are familiar. But of course, he was admirably qualified to swim rather than sink after a long and successful career in the Royal Navy. He has brought to his task three especially relevant attributes "S cubed" in Minister van Eekelen's terminology: an appreciation of the importance of strategy, of sea power and of scholarship. I am grateful to him for his wise advice.

The other tribute I want to pay is to all the distinguished experts who gave me the benefit of their unstinted personal advice – from Minister van Eekelen himself to Allied Supreme Commander Atlantic Admiral Baggett, to the former C-in-C Channel, Admiral Hunt, and to C-in-C

North, General Howlett, not to mention many others. This should make quite clear the value of the Assembly of WEU; I do not believe that there is any other forum, national or international, in which a parliamentary rapporteur could visit no fewer than eleven NATO countries and be briefed personally by eighty of the foremost experts. I sometimes wish that member governments would appreciate the incomparable political contribution to European defence made by the carefully-researched and well-informed reports of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU. I am sure that serious students of defence policy and naval matters will welcome the wealth of detail in this report on the potential of ships and naval weapons systems.

The preamble, the recommendation and the body of the report show, as do so many other reports, the essentially collective nature of the security system of the western alliance.

We are a maritime alliance whose mutual security as a community of free and prosperous nations depends on the control of the sea, which can only be a joint endeavour. The reinforcement of Western Europe from the United States and Canada upon which our defence is predicated depends on maintaining secure lines of communication across the North Atlantic in the face of a highly modern Soviet fleet, whose submarine component is the largest and most sophisticated in the world. As paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 of the explanatory memorandum point out:

"95% by weight of our entire trade is carried in ships. Western Europe could not survive without a minimum of 1 000 ship loads every month of essential foods and critical raw materials. On any one day there are more than 300 ocean-going merchant ships and a further 400 smaller vessels loading or discharging their cargoes in ports on our coast.

Freedom to use the seas for the peaceful purpose of trading is therefore vital to us".

I interject to observe that that is the very reason why naval vessels from five member countries of our organisation are now deployed in the Arabian Gulf:

"not only to our economic trading position and prosperity, but in the case of our imports of food and minerals (oil especially) to our very survival."

Although the "first cracks in the ice of the cold war" to use the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former United States national security adviser, in his article in *The Times* today, are perceptible, the fact is that, as he continues:

"the cold war continues. The clash of philosophy and geostrategy has not been terminated. The issues that precipitated the post-World War II collision have not been resolved."

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

He continues:

“New theatres of rivalry and conflict have since opened in the Middle East/Gulf region and increasingly in Central America.”

We hope and earnestly pray that these tensions can be resolved with the additional good will that exists between the superpowers. But we must bear in mind that since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the transformation of the Soviet fleet, first under Admiral Gorshkov and latterly under Admiral Chernavin, into a blue water instrument of global power and influence has been one of the foremost strategic developments of our generation. While the biggest concentration of Soviet naval power is the northern fleet based at Murmansk, two of the Soviets' three other fleets are based in the European theatre – in the Baltic and the Black Sea. Furthermore, the significant increase in the capability of the Soviet Far East fleet based at Vladivostok must heighten United States and Canadian preoccupation with the security of the Pacific Ocean.

Were deterrence to fail at any time and the ultimate horror of conflict to occur, American naval planners could easily call, as did United States Admiral King during the height of the battle of the Atlantic during world war two, for more United States naval assets to be deployed in the Pacific. It is therefore imperative that West Europeans have a sufficiency of naval assets, and, in particular, of the dominant element of naval aircraft at their own disposition.

Naval aviation has a speed of reaction, flexibility, ability to transcend political obstacles of base rights and over-flying rights that make it invaluable in crisis management and damping down incipient conflict.

To summarise: the report incorporates five draft recommendations for the Council. In summary, they are: to encourage Western European nations to maintain, at least for the foreseeable future, significant naval force improvement plans. These will greatly improve the employment prospects of many under-resourced areas of unemployment in our countries. These plans should include the construction of Charles de Gaulle class carriers by the French, the provision of STOL aircraft of the Harrier variety for the Italian vessel Garibaldi and the entry into service of at least one aviation support ship by the United Kingdom. We ought to persuade at least the WEU members with naval forces now in the Gulf to work together to create a European standing naval force with organic naval air elements. The reason for that is that the rules of engagement, the political guidelines, the command structure and all issues of co-operation with other allies such as the Amer-

icans should be worked out in advance rather than in an ad hoc way, as they had to be during the Gulf crisis.

We ought to ensure that NATO governments make certain that priorities as between purely air force and maritime air tasks are so regulated as to enable naval commanders to have sufficient air assets under their control, so that they are not diverted. Based on the excellent experience of the German navy with the operation of the Tornado in Schleswig-Holstein there is a case for the modernisation of the Royal Air Force's maritime attack component, which is equipped with the Buccaneer, and for that of the Portuguese air force, which is now equipped with the A7 Corsair.

Last, but not least, as we are in the business of working together for peace, we could follow the example of the trinational Tornado training establishment in which crews from Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom train together on the Tornado, to extend the principle probably first to Harrier pilot training and ultimately, perhaps, to helicopter pilot training with the EH-101 and other programmes. I hope that members of the Assembly will regard this report as relevant and useful and give it their endorsement with approval this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Wilkinson, for a model brief introduction.

The debate is open.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – Mr. Wilkinson offered the hope that the report would be accepted by the Assembly. As you said, Mr. President, he presented a model introduction, which was well-informed in substance and elegant in character. I join Mr. Wilkinson in offering a tribute and welcome to Mr. Cameron, the new Clerk of the committee. I think that the Assembly will be satisfied with the single rejection of a report today and that it will not gainsay Mr. Wilkinson's hope. I do not think that the Assembly will reject his report because, as I have implied, he has presented it sensibly and in a well-informed manner.

Mr. Wilkinson accepted in the committee a point which I made and which is embodied in paragraph (iii) of the preamble, and this is the only serious point that I wish to make. It is all very well, and Mr. Wilkinson is right to do this, to pursue the case for the retention or creation of an adequate naval aviation resource. Western Europe's lines of communication are long and vital and it is right that naval aviation capacity should be such as to serve our Western European interests. As Mr. Wilkinson said, on any single day in the year at least 700 ships will be in

Mr. Hardy (continued)

Western European ports, either taking the goods that we export or bringing in essential material from abroad.

There is one broad and necessary strategic consideration that will inevitably arise from any consideration of Mr. Wilkinson's report, and I am glad that he does not dissent from that view. It is right to protect our lines of communication to ensure that the essential mercantile traffic between Europe and other continents is protected, but we have seen in recent decades an astonishing decline in the European merchant fleet. Twenty or thirty years ago, and more, the goods being brought to Europe and Europe's exports were often carried on European ships. Today that traffic is not dependent upon nationally-flagged vessels. Today the ships carrying the food and materials that we need are not crewed by European nationals.

It may be that we do not have an adequate capacity to protect our strategic interests from the change in the character of merchant shipping. We may well soon have to go further than referring to the matter in the preamble to a recommendation. Mr. Wilkinson recognises the case that I hope I have advanced and has accepted the reference in that paragraph of the preamble. If we are to protect our interests and are to have an adequate naval aviation capacity – I do not in any way dissent from that view – we must obviously consider the other strategic considerations that arise. The decline in the European and British merchant fleet is not in our national or European interests.

I am glad that Mr. Wilkinson has presented a report that has allowed that point to be made. I hope that the report will be accepted and that people will take note of the recommendations and the paragraph in the preamble which I am glad to have had the opportunity to amend.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I do not really want to be the one who tears to pieces every report presented by Mr. Wilkinson, until there is nothing left. I feel he has raised some very important points in this report, but I still have a few comments to make.

You have spoken only of naval aviation. The whole system, consisting of both ships and aircraft, ought really to be discussed. It also embraces what the previous speaker rightly referred to, the availability of ships as a fundamental guarantee that we will receive supplies, especially since the protection of the Atlantic sea routes is one of the prime necessities – as we all know – if there should ever be conflict in Europe, particularly as regards bringing up reserves.

To my mind, you have placed too much emphasis on the British aircraft industry in one respect by recommending the Italians to select only one, quite specific type, whereas I am sure that if one reads the technical literature one would find equally good types on the market. I do not mean to criticise you, because you undoubtedly base what you say on your personal knowledge.

But what I do find a little disappointing – perhaps you could say something about this in your final statement – is that your report does not stress the highly crucial rôle of the defence of shipping against aircraft, and particularly close-range defence, as well as defence in general. I should have been glad if you had discussed anti-radar missile systems. To anticipate your response, the British are armed with Alarm missiles. You are doubtless right to point out that the German Tornados are armed with Kormorans. But I might point out that armed reconnaissance – particularly by Tornados armed with Harms and Kormorans – is an important system, because you must accept that there is no protection against approaching projectiles unless ships' radar systems are equipped both to perform the function of an electronic defense system and to be capable of destroying the approaching projectiles.

I admit that this cannot easily be included under the heading of "naval aviation", but I would have liked to see it discussed in an overall survey. I accept that you have fulfilled your mandate as far as naval aviation is concerned, but this associated area would have interested me, because the real problem, that is, not only the dearth of ships but the whole issue of radar equipment and its defence capability, is extremely important. There is a major gap here and a great deal more for us all to do in the common interest.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Speed.

Mr. SPEED (*United Kingdom*). – I congratulate Mr. Wilkinson on an excellent report. Unlike Mr. Klejdzinski, I am glad that he did not go into electronic counter-measures, anti-aircraft warfare, jamming, radar and all the other matters. If he had done so, the report would have taken at least another year and been immense. It would have been a report on the Royal Navy, the Federal Republic of Germany navy, the United States navy and every other navy and would not have just covered naval aviation. Mr. Wilkinson sensibly confined himself to naval aviation and did not allow himself to be seduced into considering those matters which, no doubt, are interesting and could form the basis of another report but which are not directly relevant to naval aviation.

The report, which contains a great deal of useful information, should be essential reading for every NATO defence minister and every

Mr. Speed (continued)

NATO parliamentary defence committee. There is a great misunderstanding about the use and flexibility of maritime air power.

This is a particularly appropriate report from the WEU point of view because three WEU countries – France, the United Kingdom and Italy – have carriers capable of operating fixed-wing aircraft and a fourth European country with such a carrier – Spain – will felicitously be joining our ranks in the near future. I hope that in the near future it will be possible for the Italian Parliament to equip the *Garibaldi* with the fixed-wing aircraft that she needs. After all, she already has a ski-jump, so she could have a VSTOL aircraft which would significantly enhance the capability of the Italian navy, WEU and NATO in the Mediterranean.

Mr. Hardy referred to the crisis – that is the word that I would use – of allied merchant fleets, which have dramatically diminished in numbers over the past ten or fifteen years. Many of the ships that we think we might be able to use in a crisis would be scattered in different parts of the world. They would not be available in the Atlantic for the reinforcement and resupply rôle. There is a link between naval aviation and merchant shipping. I believe that comparatively small countries, with not large defence budgets, could get into seaborne naval aviation via the merchant ship route.

I remind the Assembly that only a year or two years ago a Royal Navy Sea Harrier got into difficulties. I think that it was running out of fuel. It made an emergency landing on the container of a Spanish freighter in mid-Atlantic and duly sailed into a Spanish port. Recently, an aviation support ship has been commissioned into the Royal Navy – the royal fleet auxiliary *Argus*. It started life as an Italian container ship. It was converted for about £60 million, which in these days, as warships go, is very cheap. She is a support ship. She does not have all the command, control and communications systems of a major carrier, but she can carry a considerable number of helicopters and VSTOL aircraft. This might be the way for a number of European countries to go, with ships that can carry a certain amount of cargo, fuel, and aircraft as well. There is nothing new about this. There were such ships – cam-ships – in world war two.

I have said that I hoped that Italy would have some kind of VSTOL aircraft which, unless she goes to the Soviet Union, would have to be the sea Harrier or the AV-8B. I also hope that the EH-101 naval anti-submarine helicopter, being jointly developed by Italy and the United Kingdom, will replace many of the existing anti-submarine Sea King helicopters in the navies not only of WEU but of other countries. That would

enhance the capability of our anti-submarine forces – again rightly mentioned by Mr. Wilkinson and Mr. Hardy – in the 1990s. It will be the most advanced anti-submarine helicopter in the world. In the context of European co-operation, perhaps our navies could get together and operate European helicopters for a change instead of having to get them from the United States.

I suspect that recommendation 2 in the report would not altogether commend itself to many of our governments, because they will read into it something which I do not believe the Rapporteur intended. We have all applauded the naval initiative in the Gulf. Indeed, Mr. Mellor joined in that praise. Those ships sailed out there and worked together fairly well, after a fashion, not least because mine counter-measures vessels on the European side had been working quite well in the Channel and the North Sea for some time. However, the command, control and communications operational set-up has only recently been sorted out, as we heard this morning from the Dutch Minister of Defence. However, those ships have been there for a year now. That is not good enough.

The various maritime aircraft carriers or ships operating helicopters in WEU should carry out more training together. We need not have a full-time standing naval force. However, whenever there was any kind of incident or time of tension out of area – for example, Western European interests might be threatened by some outside source that might not necessarily be threatening the United States, or something might occur in the Middle East, as now – we would have worked out a CCC plan with proper training and operational working methods in advance, and it would not have to be done when we got there very much later in the day.

It is important for mine-sweepers, which travel at only 12 to 15 knots and have crews of 20 to 40 or 50. However, it is much more important for carriers, frigates or destroyers operating helicopters, with crews of hundreds, if not thousands, dealing with higher speeds of ships and obviously higher speeds of aircraft, whether fixed or rotary wing. This suggestion is very important. It should not work on the basis that if we need to get our naval maritime air assets together at some stage because there is an out-of-area problem, it will be all right on the night. It will not. I believe that France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain could already be getting their act together, along the lines of recommendation 2.

Finally, we have heard a great deal today from the British Minister, the Dutch Minister and many speakers in this Assembly about burden-sharing. Some of us believe that the United States has legitimate concerns; others believe that those legitimate concerns have been mag-

Mr. Speed (continued)

nified. The development of European naval aviation along the lines of this excellent report would give flexibility of working within area, providing an essential component in the protection of reinforcement and resupply from North America to Europe in times of tension, should there be any conflict or possible conflict with Warsaw Pact powers. It would also provide the possibility of an important fourth force that could be used out-of-area to protect and safeguard Europe's vital interests. This is a form of enhanced burden-sharing that we could embark upon. It would be in Europe's interests and carry a great deal of weight within the NATO alliance as a whole.

I think that the report very much points the way. I commend the report to the Assembly. I again congratulate Mr. Wilkinson and all those who have helped in making it a first-class report.

The PRESIDENT. – Thank you, Mr. Speed. I thank you also for using only one “finally”.

The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I regret that the masterly intervention of my friend and colleague, Keith Speed, had to come at the end of a long and tiring day when there are not many members present to hear it. Mr. Speed brings to the Assembly experience, which is second to none, in carrier operations in the Korean war, as a reserve officer after he left the regular navy and as a former navy minister. He said that the report was essential reading. That is praise indeed from someone who wrote a classic book on seapower.

All I can say as an aviator with less actual practical knowledge of maritime operations than he has is that I greatly welcome all that he had to say.

Of course, what I tried to bring out was the merit of collaborative programmes as such. The EH-101 and the NH-90 are examples, and I hope that the new frigate for the 1990s will be constructed so as to be compatible with helicopters, and that hangars will be big enough to operate them both. Mr. Speed was innovative in his thinking in suggesting that we ought to look more closely at the potential of merchant shipping in the operations of naval aircraft, and undoubtedly the training ship *Argos* is a forerunner of a number of support ships that offer great potential for the future.

Last but not least, I very much take to heart what he said about out-of-area operations and the need to work together in exercising the necessary command and control communications and operational procedures that will be involved. I feel that the Standing Naval Force Channel and the Standing Naval Force Atlantic are excellent

examples of what can be done. However, this kind of standing European naval force with out-of-area operations is easier to organise than would be a Franco-German army brigade: that is a personal view.

I come now to the speech of Mr. Klejdzinski. As usual he was forward-looking in his remarks, and I welcome the great attention that he paid to the aspect of close defence of ships. The vulnerability of surface vessels to sea-skimming missile attack is something that we are all addressing in our respective navies and that has brought home to us the importance of developing electronics and other counter-measures.

He referred to the multiplicity of weapons available for the Tornado, and to the anti-radar missiles – the Harm and the Alarm. He knows as well as I do that the Royal Air Force has opted for the Alarm whereas the Luftwaffe has opted for Harm, which is in service with the United States air force as well. From the operational point of view, I would welcome a greater degree of standardisation, but I am not involved in the procurement decisions. They are for governments. I can tell my friend and colleague Mr. Klejdzinski that the British House of Commons Select Committee on Defence is looking into the procurement of the Harm missile for the Royal Air Force.

Like Keith Speed, I believe that electronic warfare and counter-measures of an electronic kind are the sort of aspects that are worthy of another report. The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, in the visit that it hopes to make to the United States in March, will be examining such new technologies.

I am sorry to go in reverse order of speakers, but I am sure that Peter Hardy will bear with me. I think that he did this Assembly and his party proud – one has to be generous in these matters – in concentrating the main burden of his remarks on the importance to our alliance and to us as Europeans of maintaining an adequate merchant fleet. For our long-term prosperity, strategic interests and ultimate security, I am sure that he is right.

I should have liked to go further than merely accepting his amendment by including a paragraph to the preamble, but if I was going to be faithful to the specific terms of this report I had to be restrictive in the recommendations. He is wholly correct in putting down a marker that this is a field for future potential investigation by our Assembly, I welcome his remarks.

I should like to thank once more the Clerk of the committee, Colin Cameron, and the Chairman, Peter Kittelmann, for their unfailing support of the work done in the preparation of this report, which I trust will be endorsed by the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – We shall now vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1139.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on a draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

7. Disarmament

(Motion for a recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 1147)

The PRESIDENT. – The Assembly must now decide on the request for a debate under the urgent procedure on the draft recommendation on disarmament, Document 1147, submitted by Mr. Kittelmann, Rapporteur on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. The request is in order under Rule 43 which prescribes that the request may be made by a committee, which it was.

In support of the request, I call Mr. Kittelmann for five minutes.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I will be very brief. Numerous tributes have been paid to the outcome of the summit meeting in Moscow. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments felt that we should have the opportunity of a short debate on this during this particular part-session. It has therefore approved a draft recommendation for debate on the summit, on its implications and on the hopes associated with it.

As the summit took place only last week, it was not possible to include this item in the agenda. On behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments I therefore request the application of the urgent procedure.

The PRESIDENT. – Does a member of the Bureau wish to speak on its behalf?...

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, if ten or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on the proposal.

1. See page 26.

Does any member wish to vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The request for urgent procedure is agreed to unanimously.

I propose that the debate be placed on the orders of the day for Thursday, 9th June, after the vote on the draft decision on revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure.

That is agreed.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 8th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Organisation of European security; Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988 (Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Documents 1138 and amendments and 1142).
2. Second part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council (Presentation by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Document 1140).
3. Organisation of European security; Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988 (Resumed joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Documents 1138 and amendments and 1142).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 5.40 p.m.)

FOURTH SITTING

Wednesday, 8th June 1988

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.

2. Adoption of the minutes.

3. Organisation of European security; Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988 (*Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*, Docs. 1138 and amendments and 1142).

Speakers: The President, Mr. van der Sanden (*Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee*), Mr. Morris (*Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*), Mr. Hardy, Mr. Hill, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Wilkinson.

4. Second part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council (*Presentation by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*, Doc. 1140).

Replies by Mr. van den Broek to questions put by: Mr. Inan (*Observer from Turkey*), Mr. Ahrens, Mr. Linster, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Mechttersheimer, Mr. Soell, Mr. Ahrens, Mr. van der Sanden.

5. Changes in the membership of committees.

6. Organisation of European security; Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988 (*Resumed joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration*, Docs. 1138 and amendments and 1142).

Speakers: The President, Mr. Baumel, Mr. Malfatti, Mr. Rauti, Mr. Antretter, Mr. Burger.

7. Change in the order of business.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Organisation of European security

Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988

(Presentation of and joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Docs. 1138 and amendments and 1142)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and joint debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee on the organisation of European security, Document 1138 and amendments, and the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988, Document 1142.

I call Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee, on the organisation of European security.

1. See page 30.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, the title of the report which I am presenting to the Assembly on behalf of the General Affairs Committee differs from the one I used in committee during the preparatory period. It is standard practice for the annual report of the Council of Ministers to be presented at this part-session of the Assembly. The annual report had not arrived by 9th May, the latest date on which the committee could vote on my report. The Assembly is now used to this annual report arriving late, often too late, but for it to arrive so late that your Rapporteur can no longer respond to it is an exceptional situation which should not be allowed. According to my information, the report was completed earlier, but was left lying on the desks of various civil servants, awaiting their approval. Where they are and who they are I do not know, nor do I wish to know. The Assembly can in fact enter into discussion only with the ministers responsible and more specifically with the presidency. On behalf of the Assembly's General Affairs Committee I therefore ask the Council to explain the delay in the submission of this report, that is to say, the report on the period ending 31st December 1987.

Mr. President, the report I have the honour of presenting today rightly praises the Netherlands presidency for the progress that has been made in the past year in the reactivation of WEU. The outstanding feature has been the establishment of the platform. I reported on this at length during the Assembly's part-session in December 1987. The application – for the first time in WEU's history – of Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the Brussels Treaty can also be regarded as a milestone during this Netherlands presidency. Moreover, the Council has taken decisions on the restructuring of WEU, with the dismantling of the agencies, and collocation. Finally, for the first time since the Assembly took the relevant initiative, there was an effective and positive response to the possible enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain.

Mr. President, this summary – I shall be reverting to parts of it, of course – reflects the success of the Netherlands presidency. To put it another way, with the decisions taken in the past year the need to make WEU into the "European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance" has been given a solid basis on which we can build. The critical remarks I have just made about the delay in the submission of the annual report do not alter the fact that the Assembly is highly appreciative of it.

Now that the title of my report has been changed to "Organisation of European security", I shall, of course, be looking more deeply into the subjects that I have just touched on in my résumé.

In the light of recent developments at world level, such as the ratification of the INF treaty by the two superpowers and the continuation of the discussions between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan in Moscow, the trend towards further détente and disarmament must be able to continue. This means that the position of democratic Europe will become more dominant in terms of its external security. The platform – and the annual report, which has now arrived, also emphasises this point – repeatedly refers to growing European unification as the goal of a joint effort by the WEU and other countries. The European pillar – and to avoid any misunderstanding in the Assembly from the outset, I would add: within the indivisible Atlantic treaty organisation – must be given substance and shape on the basis of this platform. This is, after all, in line with the decision taken by the Council of Ministers, and with the statement made by the Assembly in December 1987. It is also recognised and appreciated by the United States, as statements by President Reagan have shown. The establishment of a European pillar within NATO can and must therefore serve the common objectives of peace and arms control in the wide area of joint security.

Consequently, we anxiously await the developments with respect to burden-sharing to be instigated by the working group that has now been set up at NATO level and will be reporting in December. In the draft recommendation which the General Affairs Committee is submitting to this Assembly today – and I refer specifically to paragraph 8 – this burden-sharing is not seen as an isolated factor but placed in the much wider context of European security. I want to emphasise very strongly this morning that, as the WEU Assembly, we do not see a reduction in Atlantic forces in Western European territory as an isolated measure, but as a possibility which can and must accord with agreements reached at world level. I therefore want to repeat today what the President Reagan said on 4th November 1987, when he welcomed the establishment of the platform and added that he "emphasised the unshakeable nature of the United States commitment to the alliance and to European security". Seen in this light, WEU faces an extremely important task. There must be no doubt that in the light of growing European unity – I am thinking of 1992 – giving shape and substance to NATO's Western European pillar will make heavy demands on the Council of Ministers, not only in terms of political will but also in terms of organisation.

The Assembly cannot therefore understand why the establishment of the organisational foundations on which political activities can flourish should be such a laborious process. Decisions have been taken as regards a single agency, but they have still to be implemented. A decision has been taken on collocation, but four

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

capitals are in contention and the Council has so far been unable to cut the knot. Mr. President, it must surely be possible for a body which has to take important policy decisions affecting the security of the West to achieve a meeting of minds at least where organisation is concerned. The ministers surely realise that, if they decide on collocation, their decision must also be implemented. I hope the Chairman-in-Office of the Council can throw more light on this for the Assembly today. Let me put it another way: the unanimity rule is, of course, conducive to close political co-operation, but the implementation of a decision that has been taken surely cannot be blocked by one country if the other six have reached agreement.

There is another major reason for this. The Secretary-General, Mr. Cahen, is, as the annual report also reveals, very busy with public relations activities. But they are a drop in the ocean, given the need to make a much wider public aware of WEU and its importance to western security, and to gain public sympathy and support for its work.

On Monday the Secretary-General said he was surprised that my report said WEU's work was not sufficiently recognised at international level. This must be due to a misunderstanding. It goes without saying that the governments of the United States and Canada and of other NATO countries are very interested in developments within WEU. But that was not what I was getting at. Nor was I referring simply to international recognition of WEU as an organisation, but far more to awareness of what WEU does. For the first time, for example, a communiqué was not issued after the ministerial meeting in The Hague on 19th April. And the Secretary-General knows this, too!

Mr. President, after the reactivation decisions taken in October 1984, WEU, now thirty-three years old, ought to have become a living concept for the public. But I have the impression that the term "WEU" is almost unknown outside the limited circle of specialists and government agencies. One might also expect it to be more generally known from the activities undertaken in the Gulf under Article VIII, paragraph 3. I do not need to go into this again in detail this morning. In my report I have quoted almost the whole of a letter which I received from the Secretary-General and for which I should like to thank him once again. His letter describes recent developments and also the political importance of this co-operation within WEU. The letter of 28th April to you, Mr. President, from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers on the conference held in The Hague on 27th April underlines this once again. The Assembly can assume that the presidency will continue to provide early information on further developments.

I would add once again that the great success of the Dutch presidency in the service of WEU, as a reactivated instrument for maintaining our security and as the embodiment of the European pillar within NATO, has not been recognised by the general public in our seven countries. That, Mr. Secretary-General, was the background to my remarks on this subject in the report.

Mr. President, the enlargement of WEU has been under discussion in the Assembly and – I assume – in the Council of Ministers too, since October 1984. In particular, Portugal's willingness to accede has prompted the Assembly to respond very positively on a number of occasions. But the Council has always deferred a decision on enlargement, on the grounds that the restructuring must be completed first. We of the Assembly have made our views clear on this point, and we are therefore very happy that the Council has now decided to open negotiations on accession with both Portugal and Spain. A few years ago the General Affairs Committee visited Lisbon and was able to see that a large majority in the Portuguese Parliament is in favour of accession. The same cannot be said of Spain. The reports reaching us are fairly inconsistent. The Assembly has always assumed that new members of WEU would have to subscribe to the platform. As I say in my report, this must also apply – obviously, I feel – to the obligations set out in the Brussels Treaty and reiterated in the platform, where it says: "Ensure that our determination to defend any member country at its borders is made clearly manifest by means of appropriate arrangements". And then there is the passage in part II of the platform, which says that defence must be based on "an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk".

Mr. President, the Assembly must assume that what is required of the present member states is equally required of countries wanting to accede. It would be interesting in this context to hear from the presidency how the Council views Norway's position at the moment. The issue here is both the importance of this country to European defence on the northern flank, and the importance of the efforts being made to strengthen European unity and so to further European unification.

It will be clear from the report I am presenting to the Assembly on behalf of the General Affairs Committee that the position of a country like Norway is seen as being completely different from that of the Mediterranean countries of Europe, which are in the process of resolving their differences. If the idea of the European pillar within NATO is to come to life for these countries as well, they will first have to settle their fundamental differences.

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

Mr. President, to conclude, I have proposed in the report that the Chairman-in-Office should from now on participate in the Assembly's debate on the annual report, rather than the Council's confining itself to issuing a statement on which the members of the Assembly can put questions. The delay in the forwarding of the annual report and the often very rapid, major developments in international politics make it essential for the Council to be able to exchange views with the Assembly quickly and effectively. This is a direct reference to the relationship between the Council and the Assembly, but it would also help to improve the flow of information to the citizens of free Europe. And we of the Assembly have fought as hard for those citizens and the maintenance of their freedom as the Council of Ministers has done in the past year.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We come now to the presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988, Document 1142.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Morris.

Mr. MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). – This year's debate on the opinion on the budget of the ministerial organs of WEU for 1987 (revised) and for 1988 is probably more poignant than ever. I need not remind you, Mr. President, of the fundamental changes that are occurring. First, we believe and hope that WEU is in a reactivation phase. Secondly, WEU is seriously considering expansion; and, thirdly, WEU has agreed in principle to collocation, which has enormous implications for efficiency, effectiveness and value for money.

However, the budgetary process is in an impasse. It is stymied because there is no decision on either the timing or place of collocation. It is not just that the financial budgets are in difficulty because they are suspended or stymied, but because from those budgets flow the resources to implement the strategy which at present is in suspension.

One pleasing change is that in the treatment of the pension budget. In budgetary terms we now have the basis for a realistic process. Pension payments are unpredictable because several senior people might retire in one year while no one will retire in another. Taking those payments out of the Assembly's budget has helped us to prepare a realistic budget.

The situation as it applies to ministerial organs is different. The Budgetary Committee analysed the budget for the ministerial organs. We found that the budgets were still based on the former

organograms of the Secretariat-General and that the Paris agencies had taken no account of the many posts that had become vacant in recent years. Consequently, the estimates within their budgets for personnel costs were excessive and led to a build-up of reserves that could be used for any other purpose that they chose. That was what happened in 1987.

The Council has decided to block a sum of nearly 5 million French francs from the Paris agencies' budget. That was for the six vacant posts that existed in 1987 and the further seven that will become vacant in 1988. A total of thirteen posts are held in abeyance. We contrast that with our own modest request, which was highlighted yesterday, for four new posts as part of our modest plans for advancement in WEU.

The Council of Ministers has also reserved the right to consider our request for those four posts until such time as collocation is decided upon and the restructuring that flows from it. The committee believes that the application of zero budget criteria is meaningless when there are thirteen floating posts with consequent resources. We have no idea what happens to that money. The committee believes that we should recommend to the Council of Ministers that without further delay we follow up the decision by the Council of Ministers at The Hague in April last year that not only does it get on with the collocation but, regardless of where it decides that should be, there should be a new organogram with new terms of reference and new tasks.

The committee makes three recommendations: first, that there should be a general revision of the budget of the ministerial organs for 1988 to take account of the new integrated single agency. That is the key recommendation. If we are to go forward as a revitalised organisation, we should act on the basis of a single integrated agency. Secondly, we believe that since it has been decided to take pensions out of our budget, the same should be done with the budget of the ministerial organs. That would create uniformity.

Thirdly, we recommend that there should be greater clarity in the budget of the ministerial organs so that sums earmarked for staff salaries cannot be used for other purposes. It is fundamental that we remember that our member countries have agreed, not without argument, to provide resources for certain objectives. When they agree to allocate funds to WEU, that ensures WEU's development. The money is not made available on the basis of significant numbers of staff posts remaining open and the money being used for other purposes.

Whilst the discussions are taking place – they have been going on for some time – we urge the ministers to consider our request urgently and to create four new posts in the Office of the Clerk.

Mr. Morris (continued)

We have made one other secondary recommendation – to request the Council of Ministers to understand that the relatively small establishment of WEU officers creates a problem in terms of grading. We ask that a study be undertaken on twin-grading at every level of the hierarchy to determine the conditions for possible promotions to improve staff career prospects.

Above all, we need to recognise that the reactivation and credibility of WEU are dependent upon a positive response to the recommendations of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. I need not remind any colleague of the Rome declaration in October 1984, which was followed by communiqués at Bonn in 1985, Venice in 1986 and Luxembourg in 1987 and the platform at The Hague earlier this year.

The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration submits that now is the time for no further communiqués, platforms or declarations. Now is the time for action and implementation on the budget proposals.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The joint debate is open.

I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I have never heard a budget described as “poignant” before. That was a novel reference, but it attracted attention, and attention needs to be given to the speeches of both rapporteurs and the reports that they presented. I congratulate Mr. van der Sanden on the diligent thoroughness with which he has approached his task and the solid work of his report. I congratulate Mr. Morris on drawing the Assembly’s attention to a serious and disturbing situation.

I do not propose to make a long speech but wish to make three points in increasing order of importance. First, the word “platform” has been used several times this week in committees and the Assembly. Mr. van der Sanden and Mr. Morris referred several times to the Hague platform. I do not like the use of the word “platform” in political matters. It is appropriate at elections, when one is putting forward views and making promises to the electors but, by and large, a platform is a place at which trains stand to load or unload passengers. Unfortunately, the WEU train has been standing at a platform for a long time. Unless the Council of Ministers takes the point that Mr. Morris has made, the train will probably start to rust, as well as remain immobile.

We are told that there will be growth, but growth without nutrition creates disabilities, and they will be intensified unless action is quickly taken. The word “platform” may not be a particularly wise word for the Council of Ministers to use or for this Assembly to regurgitate.

My second point concerns collocation. I suppose that I can speak from the comfort of opposition in my parliament, but we should view collocation with hesitation. I know that there are people in France who would like us to collocate in Paris. It would certainly be singularly inappropriate for any decision to collocate to be made while the visa problem remains. I accept that it would not apply to any member state now involved or likely to be involved in WEU, but it would be inappropriate for internationalisation to be intensified while the visa condition remains.

I am not fond of London. It is certainly not my favourite city; indeed, I do not like cities very much at all. But London does not accommodate many international organisations. It has the WEU office and the office of the International Maritime Organisation on the south bank, quite close to the Houses of Parliament. It would not be unreasonable for British taxpayers to say: “We have paid more than our share in sustaining international organisations and we should have some international presence in London”, even though I sympathise with those who live there.

I do not believe that we can guarantee an all-party committee to support collocation if collocation is outside London. The present administration in Britain has an obligation to maintain that presence in our country. It may be a little chauvinistic but chauvinism still remains a fairly common experience, otherwise I do not think that we would find governments competing for that international headquarters.

My most serious point is about the relationship with the Council of Ministers. I am delighted that Mr. van der Sanden has made the point clearly in the report. I emphasise and strongly endorse the attitude displayed in the preamble. The relationship with the Council of Ministers is not good and I was, therefore, relieved when, in a competent speech and effective responses to questions, the British Minister yesterday gave a clear undertaking about the approach of the British Government during their presidency. We shall observe the British Government during their presidency to ensure that the relationship, which is grossly unsatisfactory, is improved.

We do not need to emphasise one point, which I have repeated several times in the Assembly over the past four years and which has been demonstrated as justified this week. This Assembly does not exist to be a tame instrument and a passive audience for any minister who wishes to have a jaunt to Paris. The Assembly does not exist for members to sit here and listen for three quarters of an hour to ministers seeking to instruct us on our duty. We certainly do not exist, as we have in the past, to provide an audience for ministers – important though they

Mr. Hardy (continued)

may be – to come here, deliver a speech and then extricate themselves from the Assembly without answering questions. That happened several times in 1987.

If WEU is to adapt, grow and be realistic, it must continue to supply a parliamentary assembly that acts like a parliament, that is there to question and, if necessary criticise the executive, that must have an opportunity to question the executive and that will not be prepared simply to serve as a tame instrument for those currently in office. That is why we should be careful in future before we allow our debates to be interrupted by ministers, especially if they abuse their position by going on at great length, then refuse to answer questions and simply see themselves as enjoying an opportunity to tell us what to do.

My mind goes back to the occasion when an American general came to the Assembly. He was obviously a very brave man because he seemed to have at least four or five dozen medal ribbons, and I salute his courage, but he did not need much courage to come here and tell us what our duty was. He said that our duty was to return to our countries and advise and instruct our voters to pay increased taxes so that the generals would have more resources, and then he left. That was not a particularly mature or intelligent way of approaching matters but, unfortunately, it is a way with which we have become all too familiar. I hope that as WEU changes – no matter where the location may be – we shall see this Assembly acting like a parliamentary assembly rather than as a passive group providing a tame audience for whoever feels like a trip to Paris.

I congratulate the rapporteurs. I hope that their reports, which deserve support and attention, will receive attention in the Council of Ministers and bring about the changes that are urgently needed.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – Following Mr. Hardy, one wonders about all the criticism yesterday during our voting procedures. Should not restructuring start at the parliamentary end of this Assembly? It would appear that, experienced parliamentarians that we are, we have quite a bit of chaos.

Our attendance figures are nothing to glorify. Some of our most important documents receive scant attention simply because there is no quorum or voting to get them through and thoroughly examined. We should not turn our heavy guns only on the Council of Ministers, though it is easy to do that. Back-benchers have a constant battle with ministers. However, I congratulate Mr. van der Sanden on putting forward several points of great importance.

My vision of WEU is that it is like a glacier: it is slowly but surely moving forward – certainly at a snail's pace. Since Mr. Genscher made his statement in Rome almost four years ago – that he was looking forward to a new reactivation of the European pillar – the pillar has hardly moved anywhere. As I said, I liken it to a glacier approach.

One of the most difficult problems is that this Assembly is virtually unknown. I had an adjournment debate in the House of Commons not so long ago on this very matter. Back-bench members of parliament have very few facilities, but I managed to obtain an adjournment debate at the end of a very long day. The house ceased its work at eight o'clock in the morning and I went on with my adjournment debate at 8.01 a.m. One can imagine the numbers present. I think it was just the Minister, David Mellor, and myself. There were certainly no opposition members to give the debate a balance. I went through all the points.

I congratulate whoever draws up the documents on parliamentary and public relations. At this time, for the first time that I have noticed, the collected texts on all the questions asked throughout the seven parliaments, plus some of the speeches made – even a question asked in the House of Lords – are recorded for tomorrow's debate on parliamentary and public relations.

International public opinion must be aroused. Consider the facilities for the press in this place. Can one imagine journalists of any calibre wishing to operate or work from this building? The accommodation for the press, the staff and back-benchers is deplorable. Until that is changed, international public opinion – which can only come through the media – will not make any progress.

We have an international public opinion problem. Even more, we have collocation. I think that problem will rumble on for many years. We know that the internal structure is poor. We have only to look around and see the difficulties that we get into here without the rest of our administration and structure being examined.

I regret that there are these vacant budgetary posts. However, I ask my close friend, Mr. Morris: what is the good of filling thirteen vacant posts if we do not have a good structure for them to fit into? I see the wisdom of the Council of Ministers – very seldom, but I see it in this instance – of making some of the major decisions before building up the staff of this organisation.

I have often said that collocation is a problem. Mr. Hardy said that he does not like London and is not too fond of Paris. He would rather have the organisation in the midlands in England. I

Mr. Hill (continued)

believe that there are three choices: London, Paris or Brussels. It is for us to put pressure on our ministers for a decision.

I have asked several questions in the House of Commons about enlargement. That is probably the key to the whole situation. If we have applicants, if we know that talks are taking place between Spain and Portugal and WEU and if we get extra members coming here, the budget will have to be revised. Indeed, the whole Assembly will have to be revised. The key is the amount of enlargement. Shall we stop at Spain and Portugal? Are we to pay attention to Mr. Inan, the observer from Turkey, who in a speech on the first day said that Turkey would like to come into WEU? Does that mean that Greece would want to follow? I am sure that it would. How far would enlargement go? We may find that at the end of the day it is not just the European pillar, but the flank of the Mediterranean. With our present exercises outside the NATO area, could we not take on a more important rôle? Could we not make the Gulf exercise the first of such exercises? Could there not be other occasions on which we would need to get together and provide a policing force outside the NATO area?

The difficulty with major institutions is their slowness in taking up new ideas. They prefer the old ways. We have the fortieth anniversary of WEU and the Council of Europe next year. They have changed very little in the last decade. They are hardly likely to change at all unless we enlarge WEU in particular and unless our budgets are sufficient to sustain the structure that we want.

It is up to us to put own house in order. It is up to us to make sure that the Council of Ministers knows that our reports are thoroughly examined. The reports are conclusive and can be argued through any court of which I know.

WEU is reactivated. I do not like to hear dismal people saying that it is not reactivated. The change in WEU since I have been coming here is perceptible, but it has not overwhelmingly changed. We must look thoroughly at every part of the institution, including the name. We shall then truly become the European pillar and be able to run almost side by side with NATO in decisions on European defence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Thompson.

Mr. THOMPSON (*United Kingdom*). — As a fairly new member of WEU, like many of my colleagues in this august body, when I first came to join, I found it difficult to identify the rôle of the organisation and its relationship, in Europe, with other European bodies and the varying policies of countries involved in the North Atlantic

Treaty Organisation, the indirect links with the European Economic Community and defence issues outside Europe itself.

However, among all of the sometimes useful and sometimes confusing information so readily available to me, I have found that this report submitted by Mr. van der Sanden as Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee the most enlightening and most informative, and it is refreshing in its forthright presentation. It explains issues clearly and Mr. van der Sanden has faithfully identified both the progress made and the lack of progress made in the reactivation of WEU. Its recommendations to the Assembly and the Council have shown serious concern about the lack of developments in certain areas of the Assembly's organisation and activity.

I sense that both Mr. van der Sanden and the committee have underlined their recommendation by the use of words and expressions that are rarely found in British parliamentary documents, such as in paragraph (iii) of the preamble: "tardy communication of the annual report of the Council to the Assembly" and also the reference to the Council's reluctance to inform. The metaphorical swish of the cat-o'-nine-tails comes in the last two lines: "insisting that ministers see to it that their officials comply with the time-scale agreed with the Council." Those are strong words.

This recommendation, couched in such eloquent words, must jolt someone into a response, even if only to defend himself, and I listened with interest to the British Minister, Mr. David Mellor, responding yesterday to a question on the same subject from Mr. Peter Hardy. I am a little more pessimistic than he about the Minister's assurances that this problem would be overcome. I can only say that we shall have to wait and see.

I would support the recommendations to the Assembly about the inadequate opportunities to inform international public opinion of both the reactivation of WEU and its work. The current interest in defence and in disarmament issues highlighted by the Moscow talks and the INF agreement offer an ideal time to stimulate public awareness of the Assembly, its rôle in Europe and the well thought-out and fully debated recommendations that it produces.

The recommendation that the Assembly note the issue should be strengthened by some encouraging attitude to the expanding publicity about the Assembly. I am sure that we are all aware that the EEC takes every opportunity to publicise its activities and, although this is not a major criticism, I hope that we do not continue to hide our light under a bushel, as we say in England. WEU's involvement in the Gulf crisis

Mr. Thompson (continued)

is a proven example of the potential influence of this Assembly and should set a standard for the future.

The sense of frustration and urgency is also evident in the recommendations to the Council, which, almost without exception, include language designed to apply just sufficient pressure to challenge the Council to take seriously the real opportunities to set the Assembly on the right road as a valuable platform for political debate and closer co-operation upon European defence issues.

I assume that the recommendations are not in order of priority. However, if they are, may I venture to suggest that greater prominence be given to recommendations 6 and 9 as, from the urgent implementation of both, the work of this body would be enhanced and its influence expanded.

Mr. Morris's report on the budget endorses the arguments presented by Mr. van der Sanden and confirms in financial terms the serious situation faced by the Assembly, for he also emphasises the urgency of decision-making by the Council of Ministers, which seems to be a vehicle with an engine capable of moving us forward, but suffering from lack of fuel and brakes that bind the wheels of progress. Mr. van der Sanden and Mr. Morris deserve our congratulations on their report and the explanatory memorandum. I endorse the full implementation of both reports.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – In speaking to both these excellent reports from Mr. van der Sanden and Mr. Morris I should like to concentrate most on Mr. van der Sanden's report, which was extremely frank, well-researched and timely. He is absolutely right to make the stricture that it is unacceptable for our organisation as a whole not to be able to cut the gordian knot of collocation. That real substantial progress should be stymied because we cannot find a place for the Council and the Agency to meet together is too silly.

In his speech to the Assembly yesterday, the British Minister, Mr. David Mellor, quoted Sir Geoffrey Howe, our Foreign Secretary, as saying that European defence institutions could never be the tidy product of an accountant's mind. That is no excuse for letting our organisation continue to be an accountant's nightmare by being so irrationally organised.

If the organisation is to be rationally based, surely it makes sense for collocation to take place either at Paris, where the Agency sits at present

with the Assembly, or in London, where the seat of the Council is located. I know that there is a fashion for everything to be aggregated in Brussels, but that desire manifests an ambivalence and a lack of clarity about the purpose of WEU.

When such people talk of collocation in Brussels, they do not mean bringing the Assembly there as well, because they know that the parliamentarians prefer to meet in Paris and will not be forced to meet in Brussels because they are free to meet where they will. That has always been the case throughout history. When they speak of collocation in Brussels, they mean the agency and the Ministerial Council. They say that because they wish to be closer to the EEC and to NATO. In expressing that wish, they come up against a fundamental view of France, which is that our organisation can never be merely an extension of NATO because there are security interests of our member countries that relate properly and solely to Europe as a whole and do not necessarily encompass the American dimension of our common defence, which is what is inherent in the NATO organisation.

Therefore, if we are to save administrative costs the sensible thing is to have all three organisations – the Assembly, the Council and the agency – in one place, either London or Paris. I have said that it should be County Hall in London, but I make no special plea for that. I am sure that members of the Assembly would prefer Paris, and I do not go against their desire. For the future, our organisation cannot be a travelling circus. There is merit in having a council established in one place where the ministerial council should meet. I do not think that we ought necessarily to follow the principle of European political co-operation that we follow the location of the presidency. In other words, the chairmanship-in-office should not mean that the Council met in the country of that chairmanship. There is an ambiguity, too, about our European security criteria. I refer to paragraph 27 of the report which, describing the platform, I am sure must contain either a misprint or a deliberate obfuscation:

“ To be credible and effective, the strategy of deterrence and defence must continue to be based on an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces, only the nuclear element of which can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk. ”

Surely the draft meant an appropriate mix of adequate nuclear and conventional forces. The French text is significantly different:

“ Pour être crédible et efficace, la stratégie de dissuasion et de défense doit continuer à se fonder sur une combinaison appropriée de forces nucléaires et conventionnelles. ”

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

That contains no mention of adequacy or sufficiency. For the more flexible response to work, we must have conventional forces that, at a low level of conflict, can confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk. That is important for Europe after the signing of the INF agreement. I hope that our organisation, which has made great progress under the Dutch presidency, will get its act together rather more in the future, and will no longer be the accountant's nightmare that it undoubtedly remains.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now adjourn the joint debate, which will be resumed after the speech by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

4. Second part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council

*(Presentation by Mr. van den Broek,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands,
Chairman-in-Office of the Council, Doc. 1140)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation by Mr. van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, of the second part of the thirty-third annual report of the Council, Document 1140.

Minister and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, I welcome you to this Assembly.

Over WEU's working year which has just ended we have often spoken together and I can only confirm, as I said in my opening address, that these talks were of a completely frank nature.

I now ask you to present the second part of the annual report.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – May I begin, Mr. President, by congratulating you on the renewal of your mandate? It is a great pleasure once again to address this Assembly which is taking such an active part in the reactivation of Western European Union, encouraging the Council along the road, and sparing neither praise nor criticism.

You will expect me to report on the latest developments and, as the Netherlands' presidency is drawing to a close, to take stock of what has been achieved. You yourself, Mr. President, already mentioned three main items: the platform, the co-ordination on the Gulf and the prospective enlargement. I shall not, however, confine myself to the period behind us but shall also try to take a look at some of the tasks before us.

Europe is facing both old realities and new perspectives. East-West relations have taken a welcome turn for the better and the internal reforms in the Soviet Union offer some hopeful signs, even though their outcome is as yet uncertain. In arms control a breakthrough was achieved with the INF treaty. Not only is that agreement of great significance in itself, but I should like to regard it also as a promise of agreement to come in other negotiations.

At the same time, however, Europe remains a divided continent. And we are still waiting for any significant lessening of the military effort that the Soviet Union has sustained over the years, despite its increasing economic problems. In geostrategic terms, Western Europe remains a rimland vulnerable to superior nuclear and conventional forces, not to mention chemical weapons. Under these conditions the security of Western European countries can be maintained only in close association with their North American partners, with the continued presence of conventional and nuclear United States forces on European soil.

Such has been the case for more than four decades. That is not to say that transatlantic relations have not undergone changes over time. They have, and probably more so on the European than on the American side. The most remarkable development is of course the process of European integration, especially economically. By 1992 we expect to form one single market of about the same size as that of the United States.

European co-operation in foreign policy is also growing, though it will certainly have to be strengthened further. With regard to security, however, the process of European unification has lagged behind. I am convinced that the time is now ripe to start catching up in this field. The European union that we are pledged to build will not be complete without the security dimension. WEU has an important rôle to play in this respect. If we want to take an active part in shaping our changing security landscape Europe will have to get its act together.

The great merit, as I see it, of the platform we adopted in The Hague is that it clearly sets out the two basic tasks of the reactivated WEU: to contribute to the process of European unification and to strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. These two goals do not contradict each other. They address two vital complementary aspects of European security and in so doing they make for a stronger Europe and for a stronger alliance.

The philosophy that underlies the platform has full relevance for the much debated issue of burden-sharing or, as I would prefer to call it, responsibility-sharing. A stronger and more coherent European contribution to NATO will enhance the European rôle in the alliance and

Mr. van den Broek (continued)

ensure a more balanced partnership. Thus it is clear that burden-sharing and responsibility-sharing are closely linked.

In this connection, in speaking about East-West relations, I should like to express my appreciation of your efforts, Mr. President, to establish more regular contacts between the Assembly and the United States Congress as a means of promoting a convergence of views across the Atlantic.

At this point I should also like to associate myself with a remark made earlier by Mr. van der Sanden. Our aim is indeed to build a stronger European pillar within NATO, not outside it. Our platform leaves no doubt about this. A united Europe would have just as little reason to place itself outside the alliance as the individual European allies would have.

One of the more specific tasks of WEU is to consider current security and arms control issues and to harmonise our views. I think I can say without exaggeration that an almost continuous process of consultation of positions has been developing within WEU. This is taking place in the various expert groups which are now at work in the Permanent Council which is regularly reinforced from capitals and, of course, in the semi-annual ministerials. The discussions with your Assembly very much serve that same purpose.

Of course the Secretary-General and his staff are fully involved. Moreover, we now see more and more contacts developing between officials from the capitals. This adds to the vitality of our organisation and fosters more concrete results. The introduction of a modern dedicated communications system on which we agreed a few months ago greatly facilitates this process.

As you know, we are at present engaged in two major clusters of studies, which were decided upon by the ministerial in The Hague last April and which have a direct relevance for WEU and its objectives.

The first of these studies concerns arms control and defence requirements in the post-INF era. This includes consideration from a European angle of the overall objectives and mandate for the conventional arms control talks, which are being discussed in Vienna. Clearly, these are negotiations in which Europeans have a special interest and an important contribution to make to the common allied position. We are also looking further into the respective rôles of nuclear and conventional forces in European security, proceeding from the premise contained in the platform that in present circumstances as far as we can foresee there is no alternative to a strategy of deterrence based on an adequate mix of conventional and nuclear forces. This

reflection should enable us to articulate our views more clearly and thus contribute to the elaboration within the alliance of common positions. The formulation of a so-called comprehensive concept for arms control and defence within NATO is a case in point. During our presidency we also encouraged discussion of the issue of short-range nuclear weapons. Consideration of this matter within WEU should serve as a first step towards the broader allied consensus that will ultimately be needed.

The second major study concerns the elaboration of a number of specific commitments contained in the platform. I refer to the six co-called "indents" or "tires" in section III(a)4. These include the commitment to make our determination to defend any member at its border "clearly manifest", which is basic to the solidarity of member states. Another point is the improvement of co-ordination in defence and security matters. And no less important is the commitment to make "a more effective use of existing resources" through closer co-operation. The budgetary constraints that we are all experiencing and the burden-sharing lend added urgency to this point.

Our aim thereby is to enhance the commitments of member states to our common security. Since not all of us have the same position towards the alliance, the practical implementation of these objectives may vary. For instance, our determination to defend any member country at its borders will take different forms, depending on whether the member state in question belongs to the integrated structure of the alliance. In other areas of our endeavours this aspect will not exist. Promoting better resource management is an example. More generally speaking, WEU has a task where the alliance, for whatever reason, cannot act.

Out-of-area is such a case. That is the subject of the so-called sixth "indent" of our platform, in which WEU members commit themselves to concert their policies on crises outside Europe affecting their security interests. The situation in the Persian Gulf as it had developed by the middle of last year clearly required that the Europeans took action. As the EPC focused on the political and diplomatic aspects of the crisis, there was a clear need for a European forum to deal with the naval aspects. The political significance of the fact that all WEU members have been contributing, either directly or indirectly, to ensuring the freedom of navigation in the Gulf cannot, I think, be overestimated. Europeans were willing and able to assume in a concerted way responsibilities outside their own region. And since out-of-area matters have been one of the focal points of the burden-sharing issue, as seen from the United States, it helped clear the air in this respect.

Mr. van den Broek (continued)

The naval presence in the Gulf led to a regular pattern of consultations and co-ordination between WEU members, both politically and technically. Noteworthy in this respect was the confirmation, of which I informed the Assembly last month, that WEU members maintaining naval forces in the Gulf will provide assistance to each other's merchant shipping in distress. Finally on this point, I should like to mention – and welcome – the decision taken last week by the new Belgian Government to prolong the presence of a Belgian mine-sweeper within an integrated structure with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

Many speakers, including yourself, have welcomed the formal opening in The Hague last month of discussions with Portugal and Spain on their accession to Western European Union. It is for the first time since 1954 that talks on enlargement are being conducted and the event was therefore, we feel, quite significant. The interest shown by the two countries in joining our organisation reflects their dedication to the common ideals of peace in freedom, European unification and Atlantic partnership. Both Portugal and Spain have stated their willingness to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty, to accept unreservedly and in their entirety the Rome declaration as well as the platform and their preparedness to participate fully in their implementation. This is an important commitment on which to base our discussions and it should facilitate a successful conclusion of the negotiations. We will shortly be discussing with Portugal and Spain the obligations that these documents entail and we will be considering with them how they envisage in concrete terms their contribution to European security and the implementation of the platform. Clearly, a Western European Union strengthened by the addition of Portugal and Spain would find itself in a better position to meet the many tasks ahead of us.

I think that we have made progress on quite important issues. There is, however, one area where a solution has eluded us – much to my regret. In October of last year we agreed that the agencies would be merged into one entity which would be collocated with the Secretariat-General. Agreement on where to locate the restructured ministerial organs could not, until now, be reached. Let me assure you that this has not been for lack of interest by members. A majority of the members are in favour of regrouping all ministerial organs in Brussels, which would be in line with what we tend to call the “finalité européenne” of WEU. Other compromise solutions have also been considered and many blueprints and time schedules have been drawn up. We were also prepared to agree on the Per-

manent Council being composed of high representatives specially assigned to the WEU by the capitals.

I therefore fully agree with the recommendation of your Rapporteur, Mr. van der Sanden, that an early, if only provisional, solution to the problem of collocation be found, and a decision taken as regards the agencies: either abolish them or reorganise them in such a way that they can operate efficiently on the basis of a clear-cut mandate.

Having said that, I am somewhat more optimistic about the proposition put forth by yourself, Mr. President, and by Mr. van der Sanden that the institutional problems are leading to “political paralysis” of WEU. I think that, notwithstanding the lack of progress on institutional matters, none of us will dispute that important progress has been made on a number of substantive issues.

It is an old wish of your Assembly, Mr. President, that the Office of the Clerk should be strengthened by two A grade and two B grade posts. In fact you, as well as some other members of this Assembly, have made known in no uncertain terms your feelings about the Council's handling of this request. Since I knew that you would sorely take me to task, I recently begged my colleagues not to let me stand alone and I am most happy to be able to report that, thanks to their understanding, it has been decided that we should not wait for the restructuring of the agencies, but should accede without further delay to your justified request.

There remains another desire of your Assembly which you and Mr. van der Sanden have stressed. That is – however useful informal contacts may be – the importance of formal communications between the Council and the Assembly. As you may have noticed, we have made efforts to speed up the answers to Assembly recommendations and here, too, the dedicated communications system which we recently established has proven most useful. But at the same time I have to plead for your indulgence. Formal statements require formal approval. As we are getting more and more into the real issues, which are by definition sensitive, it can take time to reach consensus. This explanation and call for your indulgence does not relate to the fact that you received the semi-annual report at much too late a date, for which we owe you an apology. As usual, the culprit, as we say in Dutch, lies in the graveyard.

It will not be long before Minister van Eekelen and I hand over the presidency. It was a British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, who initiated the Brussels Treaty forty years ago. Again, it was a British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, who in 1954 took the initiative to create Western European Union as we know it today. So this

Mr. van den Broek (continued)

augurs well for my able colleague Geoffrey Howe when he takes over the presidency, together with Defence Secretary George Younger, as from the first of next month. I am confident that they will carry forward with vigour our common endeavour to develop a clearer European identity in security, in the double perspective of uniting Europe and strengthening NATO.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. van den Broek.

I am sure you will be ready to answer questions from members of the Assembly.

I call Mr. Inan.

Mr. INAN (*Observer from Turkey*). – I listened with great interest to the Minister's statement. There were two essential points, one of which concerned enlargement. A happier moment came when the Minister said that it was a matter not of dividing NATO but of having more co-operation among European members of the alliance. That is a clear definition. If I understand correctly, it means that the European pillar framework will be based on European members of the alliance.

There is a contradiction, which concerns enlargement. Four applications were on the table of the Council of Ministers when they met in The Hague on 19th April. The Council retained only two – those from Portugal and Spain – and we are happy about that. No one in Europe knows on what criteria only two were retained while two others were put aside, including the Turkish application. What is the Council's policy on enlargement? There is ambiguity in discouraging other European members, such as Norway and Denmark. We do not know what the Council wants to do.

I read articles in American newspapers about European defence organisations. Each time, the final remark is that, once again, the organisation will fail and will go nowhere. It is sad to have to read those remarks. Europe should say what Europe wants to do and what will be the framework of Europe.

Shall we divide Europe once again and have a few members of the alliance in one organisation and a few others put aside? What kind of pillar for North America and Europe do we plan to create? What is the Assembly's policy on the Turkish application?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – The question by the distinguished observer from Turkey, Mr. Inan, is pertinent and I fully understand it. The Assembly has often

urged the Council to speak out on enlargement. Indeed, it has been even more specific on this issue: it has underlined the interest of Portugal being the only non-member to have filed a formal application for membership.

The Council has adopted the position that the revitalisation of WEU should proceed sufficiently to create a stable base before we can consider enlargement. On the basis of our development, we have made progress in revitalising WEU, but the process is not yet ended. Nevertheless, the Council has deemed it fit to honour the expressed interest notably of Portugal, followed later by Spain, by inviting them to open discussions on possible accession. That does not mean that with this enlargement WEU has reached its final shape or composition. We should await further developments within WEU before new enlargement is considered.

What do we envisage in the longer term and what do we see as the task of WEU? It is written in the acte unique of the European Community. In the other words, it is concerned with our common aim of further European integration in our common endeavour to achieve European union, which will never be complete without a security dimension. That means that we must direct our attention to the interests of other members of the European Community in defence matters as they are treated in WEU.

Does that mean that the north and south flanks, with their valuable contribution to the common western security, drop out of the framework automatically? As far as I am concerned, not automatically. But priority should be given to the European construction as we foresee it in the acte unique as such. Furthermore, any enlargement should be considered in the context of the common endeavour of creating a forum that shows clear cohesion and as such contributes to the common European policy.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I should like to thank the Minister for what he has said about the old request from the Assembly concerning the creation of new posts. I now have the written version of your statement and I see that we can count on your promise being kept "without further delay". Can you be rather more precise about the date? I do not want to sound as if I mistrust you, Minister, but we would like to be absolutely certain.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – It is suggested that the undertakings are dated. I am prepared to be more spe-

Mr. van den Broek (continued)

cific. I understand from consultation with my colleagues that the Council is prepared to make the necessary credits available at the shortest possible notice. That means that we would invite the Assembly to start its solicitation procedure for the four candidates. By the time that they are available – say, from 1st July onwards – the Council will be prepared to provide the credits. However, that means that the Assembly will have to present an additional budget, which is a formality. I see it as a short-term affair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Linster.

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I wanted to ask the Chairman-in-Office of the Council the same question. As Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, I have nonetheless taken the floor to express my thanks to the Netherlands presidency. The Assembly has given its spontaneous applause, and the information just supplied by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council will enable us after our next committee meeting to present a supplementary budget.

Once more, we are highly gratified at an offer aimed at rounding off the restructuring process. I have nothing to add to Mr. Ahrens's question. Thank you, Mr. van den Broek.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – That was more a comment than a question. Do you wish to reply, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – On behalf of the Council, I am pleased by that reaction. It is not quite a surprise, but it is none the less welcome.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – One of the outstanding achievements of the Dutch presidency has been with regard to joint naval activities in the Gulf – not just political consultation about free navigation, but naval co-ordination among capitals and on the spot among fleets.

In your speech today, Mr. van den Broek, you said that WEU countries in the Gulf would be prepared to provide assistance to each other's merchant shipping in distress. That is normal and natural between seafaring nations, and even between countries that are not allies.

In an earlier statement on 19th April, in the face of the mining threat, the Council said that such activities could call for measures of self-defence. Is it not important to forge a system of formulating common rules of engagement? Our

naval vessels face a common threat. Do we not need a joint response and, if appropriate, joint retaliation in case of attack? Is not the principle of the Brussels Treaty, which should apply both in and out of area, that an attack on one should be regarded as an attack on all? If we could set that precedent clearly in our naval operations in the Gulf, would it not be useful for any other common operations that we have to undertake out of area under the aegis of WEU?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I make no secret of the fact that this suggestion sounds very appealing to me, but I have to speak in a personal capacity for two reasons. First, I cannot respond on behalf of WEU as a whole because it is a political, not a military, organisation. Secondly, I am not a minister of defence, to whom such matters should primarily be addressed.

That being said, one can read the Netherlands' position from the fact that the further integration of the naval activities of the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands will shortly be more or less completed. There will be an integrated operation under one single command for the three nations. We believe that that is a very clear expression of what we see as participation in the Gulf with more than a mere national interest. In terms of international law, it will remain a national operation for the defence of national interests. As a seafaring nation we hope that it will prove to be an example in the longer term of what Europeans can do, under a European flag entre parenthèses, symbolising that Europe has its own responsibilities when vital interests are being jeopardised.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – Thank you. That is very encouraging.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Mechttersheimer.

Mr. MECHTERSHEIMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – In accordance with the platform, the Minister has pointed out that a mix of conventional and nuclear weapons is needed for the maintenance of deterrence. Will this position remain valid for the future, if it can be seen that the Soviet Union is prepared to reduce its conventional superiority? And must not the previous justification of nuclear weapons then be called in question? The public in our countries was told that NATO needed nuclear weapons because of the Soviet Union's conventional superiority. If this conventional superiority should cease to exist in the foreseeable future, how will NATO justify the need for nuclear weapons?

Mr. Mechtersheimer (continued)

In a recent survey in the Federal Republic, to the question: are nuclear weapons needed to maintain peace in Europe?, 68% answered no, 31% yes. Do you not see in this mood, which is undoubtedly to be found in other countries of Western Europe without nuclear weapons, a danger of disavowal of the legitimacy of the old security policy, and also of Western European Union?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – That is an interesting and intriguing question. Let me start by saying that the European platform of WEU is clear in this respect, in that it says that as far as we can see, or for the foreseeable future, we shall have to rely on an adequate mix of conventional and nuclear forces to provide a credible deterrent. It does not say what happens after the foreseeable future. So, your question has not been concretely answered by the platform. One simply says that for the time being we have to include the nuclear component. There is no other way of providing a credible deterrent.

Let me give you my personal view of what will happen at a later stage. I know that views among the members of WEU may be more or less nuancé on this subject, just as in the greater framework of the alliance. My impression is that it remains doubtful whether, even in circumstances of what I would call conventional parity – when the conventional imbalance between East and West has been corrected – our security would be optimally served without any nuclear component in the deterrent.

We shall always be faced with the geographical components and the geostrategic disadvantages that Western Europe will always have with conventional parity. Secondly, it is hard to foresee that the superpowers would do away entirely with their nuclear arsenals, and given that those Soviet nuclear arsenals are meant for deterrence of the United States, that means that the nuclear weapons are also usable against Europe. I am not saying, and we are not foreseeing let alone expecting, that this would happen, but, given the military strategy of deterrence, that question remains.

Should we alarm our populations by saying that we shall have nuclear weapons for ever? We should not put it that way, but on the other hand we should try to forgo illusions. A much stronger and more convincing approach is that we make clear to our publics that nuclear weapons are political weapons in the first place, that we are not devising strategies to fight wars with nuclear weapons, and that they have merely a deterrent function and that we remain fully committed to

continue working in a dedicated way to see to it that nuclear arsenals on both sides are reduced to the lowest possible level. Within that context and against that background, one should also see the endeavours that the allies have made, together with the principal negotiator of the United States, to arrive at an INF agreement. That is why the alliance is supporting further negotiations towards a START agreement, and that is why we are seeing what we can do on the European territory about the problem of SNF and the battlefield nuclear weapons, which we consider to be a difficult and also a political problem.

We remain fully committed to addressing the nuclear issue to bring it down to the lowest possible level, but we should be careful about lofty concepts of a nuclear-free world, or what I consider to be the lofty concept of a denuclearised Europe. We shall keep underlining that what we are doing on defence issues should add to stability and security. As soon as that comes into question, we have to reconsider our position carefully.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – We certainly cannot solve all the problems connected with nuclear strategy today. But, following on from Mr. Mechtersheimer's question, I should like to make one brief comment and then put a related question.

If the dogma according to which the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe has played a crucial part in preventing war is correct, why do the world's nuclear powers not try to supply nuclear weapons to the warring parties in those regions of the world where conflict is particularly prevalent? The conflict would then surely be resolved. In other words, this argument is not as logical as all that. It has obviously been the relatively rational nature of the countries in the two European camps, with their painful memories, and not the existence of nuclear weapons, that has done most to prevent war since 1945. Do you agree?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – One can also turn around the thesis as presented here and ask oneself how came it that, of the hundreds of conflicts that have erupted since World War II, none was fought in Europe. Had that anything to do with nuclear deterrence and the conviction that any outbreak of conflict that would escalate in the nuclear direction would mean complete annihilation?

Mr. van den Broek (continued)

Another question on which it is interesting to reflect is why is it that Mr. Gorbachev – we welcome his endeavours in perestroika and glasnost – is so keen to try to convince the West that denuclearisation of Europe in the first place and a nuclear-free Europe in the second place would be such a benefit for the world as a whole and for our security.

In his interesting book “Perestroika” Mr. Gorbachev says in effect that nuclear weapons are useless because no longer can any war be won. In other words, he dissociates himself from the Clausewitz doctrine and says that it is no longer true that armed conflict is the continuation of politics by other means – military means. Is that not intriguing? If the Soviet doctrine changes and the Soviets say that war is no longer winnable because of the existence of nuclear weapons – that is why Gorbachev wants to do away with them – my thesis would be that he is convinced that as long as nuclear weapons are present one cannot fight a war. That explains the character of deterrence.

Again, let us not think in too easy terms about the nuclear problem – I am not prepared to do so. I come from a country that is deeply and closely committed to everything to do with arms control, but also from a country that is prepared to go far not only to defend our freedom but to deter a conflict of any type – not only nuclear. Everyone knows that an outbreak of conventional conflict in these times would produce a devastation of our continent that would approach annihilation. So there must be no conflict; everyone must be deterred.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Soell.

Mr. SOELL (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – How does the Minister explain the fact that, at the summit in Moscow a few days ago, the Americans were not prepared to agree to a communiqué stating that in the future conflicts were not only not to be resolved by nuclear weapons; they were not to be resolved by any kind of military force, any kind of weapons at all?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I should be extremely surprised if the American administration resisted a clause in a communiqué that said that disputes between states must be resolved by peaceful means. That is what you are suggesting. If one resisted such a terminology one would have to say that we must explicitly keep open the option of seeking military solutions. How do we reconcile that with

the philosophy of the alliance, which proclaims time and again that it is a defensive, not an offensive, alliance, and that it is prepared to take up its weapons only in response to attack? In that case I would agree with you that it would not be wise to refuse such clausal terminology, but I am not aware that that has been the position of the American President or his officials.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I have a brief question for the Minister. We have rather more than two hundred nuclear power stations in Europe. We have thousands of chemical firms manufacturing unthinkably poisonous, appallingly toxic products. Does the Minister agree that any military conflict in Europe, even one restricted to conventional weapons, would have the same effects as a chemical or a nuclear war? We have all seen the effects on Western Europe of the accident in Chernobyl, and that is about two thousand kilometres away. Is it possible to envisage a war in Europe in which nuclear power stations and chemical firms would not be attacked? Does the Minister agree that a war fought with conventional weapons in Europe would lead to the same results as a war with nuclear or chemical weapons? Should awareness of this fact not spur all Europeans on to even greater efforts to preserve peace?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I realise full well that this is a problem to which no ready-made quick-fix answer is possible. I am not an expert in this subject but I remember that when a nuclear power plant under construction in Iraq was attacked by Israel there was an international outcry calling for conventions to prohibit any attack on nuclear power stations. Even if there were such a convention it would never guarantee that such an attack would not be repeated in a military conflict. If we are aware of the unacceptable dangers of such attacks, what is the reply – that we must do away entirely with dangerous chemical plants or nuclear power plants? I do not know the answer. The only solid reply that I can give is that this is yet another element that underscores the need to prevent armed conflict. Our only preoccupation is with how we secure our security and keep our continent free from conflict.

Apart from the nuclear issue, I am readily persuaded along with many of you that an armed conflict even with today's conventional equipment would be an absolute disaster for mankind. Preventing every conflict should be our task.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van der Sanden.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I want to ask a question about the Minister's statement this morning, combining two associated issues. The Minister referred to burden-sharing, although he preferred the term "responsibility-sharing". But he also said that Western European Union had a task that at certain times went further than NATO's. This task for the WEU countries is also set out in a platform, with which we are, of course, familiar.

Mr. President, my question is this: a few weeks ago NATO decided to set up a working group to report on the question of burden-sharing by the end of the year. Is it likely, or has the presidency already taken the relevant initiatives, so that, given WEU's specific task, the WEU countries can also contribute a joint view on burden-sharing to this working group?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman-in-Office of the Council.

Mr. van den BROEK (*Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Chairman-in-Office of the Council*). – I am trying to think fast. The work of this expert group consists also of input from the minister of defence and his colleagues. In the framework of the alliance you know that we have the Ministerial Council of NATO, which in the coming days in Madrid will consider the issue of burden-sharing, which is coming up for discussion more and more, and most of the NATO capitals have received the United States mission under the leadership of Under-Secretary Taft to talk about burden-sharing. I consider it of the utmost importance that within the framework of WEU there be further harmonising on burden-sharing in order to give a political impulse to the other forums that deal with these issues. For instance, the IEPG discusses these sorts of military defence co-operation matters. A number of interesting ideas about further integrating and strengthening this co-operation can emerge from WEU.

Let us talk about Europe for a minute. When we speak of the single market in 1992 the question immediately pops up of whether there should also be a single military-industrial market for public procurement. That is an intriguing question and it would be interesting to discuss it in WEU circles. It will not arise so easily in NATO; it may do in the IEPG, but there are nuances of difference.

Our aim should be to increase our output without being forced substantially to increase our financial input. We must look each other in the eye and acknowledge that significant increases across the line and beyond the present defence expenditure levels, at least for a number of countries, are impossible in present circumstances.

Some countries might make an additional effort but others will not find that possible. Let us try to rationalise, be more efficient and get more out of the available finances.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Mr. Chairman, I thank you warmly for your remarks and express our deep satisfaction at the creation of the four posts. At last we have a constructive solution to a dispute.

I express once more my gratitude for all the progress you have made possible during your chairmanship.

I hope and trust that you will find it in yourself to continue to be the inspiration of Western European Union when your term as Chairman-in-Office of the Council expires at the end of this month.

5. Changes in the membership of committees

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The French Delegation has notified me of the following changes in committee membership.

On the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations it is proposed that Mr. Pontillon should replace Mr. Seitlinger as a titular member and that Mr. Seitlinger should replace Mr. Chénard as an alternate member.

On the General Affairs Committee it is proposed that Mr. Chénard should replace Mr. Pontillon as a titular member and that Mr. Pontillon should replace Mr. Chénard as an alternate member.

Are there any objections?...

The changes are agreed to.

6. Organisation of European security

Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988

(Resumed joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, Docs. 1138 and amendments and 1142)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now resume the joint debate on the reports of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the organisation of European security and on the opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988, Documents 1138 and amendments and 1142.

In the resumed debate I call Mr. Baumel.

Mr. BAUMEL (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to say a few words about Mr. van der Sanden's excellent report on the organisation of European security. He has properly pointed out that the essential foundation of this organisation is the revitalisation of WEU and the deep solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance.

The reactivation of WEU was launched in January 1984 on French initiative, as you are all well aware. It was prompted by considerations of two kinds.

The first is linked to the construction of Europe, and among WEU's seven partners there appears to be a consensus that such European construction would be incomplete if it did not also cover the question of security.

The second is the direct product of the international situation and of the uncertainties created by some recent developments like the INF treaty, the Reagan-Gorbachev summit and America's new strategic concepts which require the Europeans to involve themselves rather more fully in their own security problems.

France has been a driving force in the main stages of this revitalisation. I want to make this point as one of the few French parliamentarians present at this session, for obvious reasons.

The sequence was initiated by the Rome declaration, which called for more concerted European action on problems of security, disarmament and weapons co-operation, the adaptation of the technical agencies in Paris, which were to extend their domain to the study of parliamentary problems, and a strengthened rôle for the WEU Assembly.

The relaunching of WEU also involves the extremely important implications for European security of the famous platform adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987. In this connection we may ask what has really been done to implement the principles of European security formulated at that time.

Lastly, a third major step is the possible enlargement of WEU by the admission of Spain and Portugal, and the all-clear given very recently in The Hague on 18th and 19th April 1988. This enlargement, to which France attaches special importance is a highly significant step we should try to take despite much hesitancy by one WEU member – the United Kingdom.

Progress, achieved by close co-operation between the member states bringing together representatives of the ministries for foreign affairs and defence, has now extended to a number of particularly critical areas. I join others in welcoming the possibility of joint action in the Persian Gulf and the deployment of special security units in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf area.

Furthermore WEU must concern itself increasingly with the problems of the Mediterranean and the Near East, and I was very interested to hear Mr. Inan's contribution to the debate a short time ago.

A great deal has already been achieved but the base of this new and increased co-operation must be enlarged and extended.

The unanimity of the Seven has been called in question by criticisms in some quarters of bilateral European co-operative efforts and other initiatives which, according to one member of our union, are liable to create subgroups weakening NATO and threatening the transatlantic link. We touch here on an essential element of WEU's rôle in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.

Some, for special and often ill-explained reasons, fear that the strengthening of WEU will adversely affect that of NATO. This is complete fantasy. Quite the contrary, we wish to strengthen NATO, but to do so it is not enough to utter a few pious words and then take the soft option of security underwritten by the Americans. The Europeans really must play their modest part and not place their whole faith in Europe's 300 000 GIs.

This brings us to a very delicate point, because, while some countries naturally wish to belong to NATO, they want minimum involvement in a purely European defence framework. We have a long way to go here. I can understand the views of both sides and the misgivings about, say, maintaining nuclear arms in Europe, some echoes of which were discernible just now in this forum.

It also seems that such hesitancy reflects an ideological standpoint rather than a strictly strategic assessment. This was made clear by the previous speaker, who in my opinion well described why, today and for some time to come, nuclear weapons in Europe provide a necessary back-up and guarantee for the balance of forces. I think it absolutely essential that WEU should play this rôle in the security and defence of Europe.

This at any rate is the French position, and I have no problem in defending it, since, as you know, the opposition and the majority are in full agreement on this issue. Though this is rather unusual in Europe, the consensus is not at all affected by internal political events.

In this situation, account must be taken of a genuine analysis of political and strategic problems as they arise. WEU can make a useful contribution during this session, and I have read with great interest the reports now under discussion.

This session is taking place in the immediate aftermath of the Moscow summit, which was very impressive in terms of the psychological

Mr. Baumel (continued)

changes between the two superpowers but rather disappointing as regards any real progress towards arms limitation.

After the Reagan-Gorbachev summit it is more than ever necessary that WEU should clearly express its determination to contribute to the security of our continent, not by attempting to dissociate the forces of the alliance, but by discharging its function as a solid European pillar of the NATO framework.

A strong Europe in a strong Atlantic Alliance is the best guarantee of our security. This is the basic principle on which we should place the greatest value, and it is of course in these terms that I approve Mr. van der Sanden's report, for which I very willingly give my vote.

(Mr. Soell, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Malfatti.

Mr. MALFATTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I should like to comment briefly on Mr. van der Sanden's report which I can approve. It is absolutely true to say that WEU is now in a somewhat ambiguous situation. On the one hand since the "relaunch" of 1984 many steps forward have undoubtedly been taken in the right direction. This is demonstrated by the Hague platform, co-ordinated action in the Gulf and the move to admit Spain and Portugal. Against this, however, the everlasting shortcomings are still with us; first and foremost among these is the late transmission of the Council's annual report to the Assembly. Then, there are the doubts about institutions and the hold-up on reorganisation and collocation. Regarding this last problem we must not allow what is really only a minor issue to paralyse the life of WEU. It can reasonably be argued that, in order to prevent WEU from being paralysed by this problem, questions on which no agreement has yet been reached – such as the location of the headquarters – should be put to one side. On the other hand, as Mr. van den Broek suggested a short time ago, the problem of bringing staffs up to strength can be solved quickly so that WEU can then be reactivated without delay.

Moreover, our Rapporteur is quite right when he quotes Rousseau's "general will" and stresses the need to strengthen WEU as such and hence all the agencies it comprises. But over and above the problems of organisation which must be cleared up and resolved, the delays which must be made up, the necessary strengthening of the organisation and the uncertainties and doubts about institutions which must be overcome – here I am thinking of problems concerning internal bodies such as the permanent committees, the special working group and so on –

there are the underlying political problems which remain unresolved and must be dealt with promptly.

In this context, the Assembly's present session falls at an interim stage and to some extent has an inevitably provisional character. With the identity of Europe in defence matters defined by the Hague platform – not without unresolved problems as the Minister of Defence, Mr. van Eekelen, recalled yesterday – the next step is to turn it into reality as quickly as possible against the background of a rapidly changing international situation. The agreement reached on intermediate-range nuclear forces and the atmosphere created by the recent meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow have undoubtedly aroused what we consider to be legitimate expectations of better and more constructive relations between East and West. We must remain on our guard but we must not disappoint these hopes.

Outstanding problems include the negotiations for the reduction of conventional weapons, for the total elimination of chemical weapons and for the reduction of nuclear, strategic and short-range weapons; others relate to the updating of western strategy to take account of any new balance of forces at a lower level, burden-sharing, modernisation and constant efforts to inform and guide public opinion in our countries which are also of fundamental importance but in my opinion are seriously lacking in both NATO and WEU.

We certainly welcome the efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff to provide more information. Personally, I have to thank him for the brilliant and detailed lecture which he recently gave on WEU in Rome. We should not be telling the truth, however, if we argued that this was enough to provide the public with all the information it should have. I think that this is a fundamental question and that the responsibility lies with each of our governments and also our organisations because information has so far been wholly lacking.

Inevitably, this stage of our work is of an interim nature. The special working group set up by the Permanent Council will not submit a report to ministers for the implementation of the Hague platform until November. Another report will also have to be submitted, as the Foreign Minister, Mr. van den Broek, recalled a short time ago, on the fundamental question of disarmament and our countries' need for complete security. We shall therefore have to wait until then in the hope that the timetable will be met and that the Assembly will be kept regularly informed sufficiently in advance for it to take part as of right in this vital debate. But this timetable, which we have in any case to respect, itself highlights the shortcomings which we must remedy as quickly as possible.

Mr. Malfatti (continued)

Briefly, they are of two kinds. Firstly, our work and institutions must be reorganised wherever appropriate and possible, with the addition if necessary of new means of action as and when expedient. No one denies the difficulties we shall encounter in dealing with these problems. For example, an effective defence policy must be combined with foreign policy. But the furthest we Europeans have so far gone towards a common foreign policy, most recently with the single act, is political co-operation, involving twelve representatives in a context where only the political and economic aspects of security problems can be discussed – and I emphasise security rather than defence – by virtue of Article 30 of the single act of which we are all aware.

On the other hand, when defence problems as such are discussed in another institution like WEU they are dealt with by seven representatives and we hope by nine in the near future. Undoubtedly, however, we shall come up against a number of difficulties in dealing with such problems. Furthermore, there must be clear division of tasks, without overlapping or duplication, and suitable arrangements for co-ordination and the exchange of information must be worked out between the various institutions concerned with defence problems.

It is significant that the special report of the North Atlantic Assembly on NATO for the nineties mentions, in addition to WEU, the studies, co-operation and consultations taking place within the European Community, political co-operation, the European Parliament, the Independent European Programme Group and the Eurogroup, which are making an important contribution to the development of greater European cohesion within the alliance. Quite clearly, these problems of co-ordination between institutions are fundamental.

Secondly, another group of problems relates to ways of solving the organisational rather than political problem of creating a full capacity to act and react at the right time. In other words, the timetable for our work to which I referred earlier – first the fresh start in Rome in 1984 and then the Hague platform of 1987 and now the reports by the special working group to be presented in November this year – fits in with our schedule but not with a rapidly changing international situation which could result in Europe's being left out or brought in too late, without the weight its needs demand. The problem which Europe has to resolve in its various forms and institutions is that of acquiring the means and the will to act and react at the right time as an entity on its way towards unity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Rauti.

Mr. RAUTI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. van der Sanden's report is certainly to be approved for its detailed analysis of the problems associated with a delicate and difficult stage in the existence of WEU. In particular, it deserves our approval for the more positive action proposed in the draft recommendation to the Council of Ministers particularly in the call for action to ensure the maintenance of a European naval presence in the Persian Gulf which is quite correctly described as a co-ordinated presence of the members of WEU in this vital area. And again in the call for urgent action to bring in Spain and Portugal and for a more detailed description of the way in which the specialised WEU agency is to be involved in problems relating to controlled arms limitation and anything which clearly might be liable "to modify the deployment of NATO forces" as a result of any measures taken by the allies.

Nor is there any doubt, ladies and gentlemen, that a great deal of disappointment and discouragement is now being felt concerning the overall organisation of European security, a feeling which is now becoming a realisation of a definite fact; the so-called reactivation of WEU is not taking place and WEU has not been relaunched; there has been a great deal of talk about it but we are obliged here to discuss a number of boring and unimportant details about organisation while around us and around Europe forces balances and power relationships are being made and unmade and new realities and demands are emerging but are still unanswered. By this I mean there is no co-ordinated or planned European reply, no reply at the right time as Mr. Malfatti said a short time ago.

As regards the restructuring of WEU, we have come to a complete stop as our Rapporteur recognises courageously and frankly. What is meant, as the report goes on to say, when we talk about WEU? This is the basic issue and the problem at the source of the disappointment and discouragement I mentioned earlier. WEU can be, as it is continuing to become, the venue for more or less successful meetings between the representatives of our seven countries, but it is not succeeding in becoming an international organisation – here again, I quote from Chapter I of the report – which should have its own personality separate as it were from the action of each of its member governments. It should have and represent a kind of general will of the most considerable and important part of our Europe but, as has been said, it is true that we are going in the opposite direction to some extent. Since the Rome declaration of October 1984, the rôle of WEU as a structure and organisation has been weakened and reduced in relation to intergovernmental activities. I am referring not only to what is stated precisely and in stark terms in the first eleven sections of the report but more widely to

Mr. Rauti (continued)

the idea of WEU as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance which everyone accepted as a platform in The Hague.

Mr. Sarti said that strengthening of this pillar has become a commonplace but that this does not mean that its relevance should be forgotten. But does this pillar really exist? Or is this a commonplace which is repeated uncritically without ever moving on to any analysis of the facts? Before saying that we must strengthen it and that this must not impair, harm or damage relations between Europe and the United States and NATO, we should ask ourselves whether the pillar exists as such. To find our answer, we simply have to consider how our substantial naval forces arrived in the Persian Gulf. They were brought together there by individual decisions and not as a result of a joint decision. They have been co-ordinated on the spot but more for essential technical and operational reasons than as a matter of deliberate policy which, indeed, has been carefully avoided and even rejected when the occasion would have been very significant and of symbolic importance if combined action had been taken.

I shall conclude by asking whether, faced by the continuing tragedy of the Palestinians in the occupied territories, of the hundreds of the Palestinians who have died and the thousands who have been arrested, was it not the moral and political duty of WEU to take a combined initiative on the problem or even to have intervened? It is not therefore a matter of abandoning the government shilly-shallying which is to some extent breaking up WEU, or of seeking to breathe fresh life internally by the umpteenth attempt to reactivate one agency or the other, particularly with reference to the co-ordination of European armaments. The problem is political and a problem of political will and what we want is a clear, decisive and courageous political will to match the efforts of WEU to real events and the problems which they are increasingly creating sometimes with dramatic urgency. The problem, as the Rapporteur said a short time ago, is to make WEU the bastion of European security but the time has come to turn words into action and to make the presence of WEU felt where the problems exist and are growing in the Mediterranean and the Middle East because of the Palestinian tragedy. Otherwise, words will be nothing more than words and we shall continue to produce no more than documents to gather dust in the archives.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Antretter.

Mr. ANTRETTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, we are currently experiencing a phase in international politics in which it is more essential, but perhaps

more difficult than ever before, to define Europe's position on security and defence and to draw the logical conclusions.

Never since the East-West conflict first began has the internal situation at the top in the communist world been in such a state of flux, and it is impossible to tell what will eventually happen. Never has the West had such difficulty in maintaining its cohesion in the face of the unprecedented mobility and dynamism of Soviet foreign policy under General Secretary Gorbachev.

The uncertainty about the future foreign policy of a new American president does not exactly make it easier to conduct the vital transatlantic dialogue on the future concept of the alliance and the solution of the many problems affecting European-American co-operation, particularly in security matters.

These aspects of the overall situation underline more than anything else the importance of the subject explored by Mr. van der Sanden in his report on the organisation of European security.

As the adoption of the platform on European security interests and the Council's activities since 1987 show, WEU now seems to be on the right road towards drawing the necessary conclusions from the changed world situation and from the commitments its member countries have entered into under the modified Brussels Treaty.

I should just like to pick out a few of the many problem areas of European security policy that are discussed in the report.

At the current stage we must attach even greater importance to improving the partnership between the Council and the Assembly. Although there have been certain improvements in the last few years, I do not think we can yet talk about a genuine interplay. The intensification of confidential contacts can only ever benefit a small minority of members. The annual report, the formal communication to the Assembly, still arrives too late and contains too little information of substance.

I believe WEU's two main organs, the Council and the Assembly, must both make far more effort to overcome the putative obstacles – most of them are putative obstacles – to more successful co-operation. The widespread concern of government bureaucracies – by no means always of the actual members of governments – that complicated aspects of security and defence policy should not be discussed in public, constantly results in an excessively restrictive information policy.

On the other hand, I feel we parliamentarians should also appreciate a willingness to offer information. I am sure this willingness exists in principle among the WEU parliamentarians. But

Mr. Antretter (continued)

from time to time government representatives can be heard to say that the parliamentarians are not all that interested in information. I therefore think it important for both sides to drop preconceived ideas or even hostile attitudes, some of which have become almost traditional.

I have another, very topical, comment on this subject. At the beginning of every part-session we are regularly obliged to discuss the number of speeches which should appropriately be made by ministers. This certainly does not help to improve the working climate between the Council and the Assembly. I therefore think it is advisable and important for both the Presidential Committee, in agreement with the Council, and the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges to find a solution to this problem.

I also consider the development of the structures of the WEU organs in the near future to be vital to future co-operation between the Council and the Assembly. In this context I should like to quote a sentence from the statement made by Mr. Schäfer, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, who is coming here today, to the German Delegation to the WEU Assembly on 18th May. He said: "On the whole, WEU is increasingly working along the same lines as EPC, that is, through representatives from the capitals." Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. President, this is an interesting development and one which raises the question of the future rôle of the WEU institutions proper, and in particular the Permanent Council, the Secretariat-General and the agency in Paris.

If the emphasis of the Council's activities increasingly shifts to the capitals – and in parenthesis, though everyone may think his own capital particularly beautiful, I can say that Bonn certainly is a capital where meetings can be held and decisions taken; Bonn can be a beautiful capital – there will, of course, also be implications for the location of the focal point of the dialogue with the Assembly.

As a German parliamentarian I can say that I warmly welcome the initiative taken by our Federal Government to inform the German Delegation to the WEU Assembly on WEU's activities at a special meeting on two additional occasions each year. We must make greater use of our national channels in order to add even more weight to the matters we raise with the WEU Council. But we should not forget that we are a European assembly. We must make sure that the Council's obligation under the treaty to keep us informed does not increasingly degenerate into a mere formality.

Now a few words on reorganisation. I think it is unacceptable that the Assembly should have learned nothing about the mission and activities

of the body that has emerged from the combination of the three former security agencies. According to the Federal Government's recent half-yearly report, the planned amalgamation of this body as an independent unit, with the Secretariat-General taking responsibility under the Secretary-General, is contingent on collocation.

It is interesting in this context that the Luxembourg Government has put forward the idea that the amalgamated agency might take on the rôle of a European institute for defence research, as proposed by the Assembly at the extraordinary part-session in Luxembourg. It would be important to know what the Council thinks of this idea. We must, by the way, thank Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges for bringing the idea to our notice. I believe she has also tabled a question on the subject in the Luxembourg Parliament.

What is going to happen in the further time that will elapse before the Council agrees on WEU's future seat? Whatever happens, it is irresponsible to perpetuate the present state of limbo until Portugal and Spain have joined. Where the accession of these two countries is concerned, we agree with the Rapporteur that the Council should make every effort to bring the negotiations to the earliest possible conclusion.

I should like to finish by thanking Mr. van der Sanden, because the content and style of his report is commensurate with a global political situation where, despite all the tendencies to the contrary, the superpowers are manifestly more aware than before of their responsibility for peace. Much will depend on whether mutual antipathies can be steadily reduced and mutual trust developed.

Perhaps I may speak for us all in saying that the Dutch presidency, and your report, Mr. van der Sanden, have made an important contribution to this goal.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, if WEU is today accepted in Europe, North America and Canada as a political forum for European security, it is because the reactivation theoretically approved in Rome in 1984 has gradually been transmuted into effective revitalisation under the presidencies of Luxembourg and the Netherlands. However, the process was certainly boosted by Jacques Chirac's statement in this Assembly voicing the need for a European security charter without thereby giving up the Atlantic Alliance.

The fact that we have been living in peace for over forty years is due to NATO's military potential and nuclear deterrence.

Mr. Burger (continued)

Our young people, who naturally prefer love to war and who are unable to understand spending on defence, should be better informed about European and world history to help them understand what happened at the Munich "peace conference" just before the Nazi invasion. They might then appreciate more readily the collapse of countries unprepared for war, six of which now belong to WEU. Our young people must understand that there is no guarantee of peace without a genuine defence capacity and that there is no peace without freedom in accordance with the rights of man. The media have a great rôle to play here, especially television programmes of the "for and against" type.

The point must also be made that the North-South imbalance, with unacceptable living standards in the south, must be quickly and effectively corrected if the peace of our planet is to be guaranteed.

Mr. van der Sanden's report is very realistic. His country's tenure of the presidency has imposed few reservations or restrictions. My congratulations go to the Rapporteur and the Netherlands presidency, whose efforts for reactivation had an important bearing on the Hague platform and on co-ordinating and concerting the policy adopted by WEU countries in the Gulf.

While attention continues to be focused on the imbalance in conventional weapons, the fundamental points may be summarised as follows. In Brussels, NATO accepted the strengthening of the European pillar as conceived by WEU. The strategy of deterrence by a suitable combination of nuclear and conventional forces is maintained. The presence in Europe of United States nuclear and conventional forces is important to our security.

According to the Rapporteur, a working group set up by the Council is examining the application of the platform, and studies on our frontier defences are under way.

When the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom insists that France should again place its forces and its territory under integrated NATO command as a precondition to any good Franco-British co-operation, it must be countered that France is showing increasing willingness to co-operate with its allies on matters of European security.

The Rapporteur also stresses the danger of two categories of member countries – the smaller ones being obliged to accept the bilateral agreements of the larger members.

Finally, while NATO has shown broad understanding for the problems of WEU and Mr. Reagan has shown his interest in European

security, we must ask whether the prospect of the INF treaty did not have something to do with this.

Hitherto Europe has not been entitled to sit down at the negotiating table with the super-powers. At most, it has been invited to take an after-dinner drink or coffee with Mr. Shultz! Only a strong and united Europe can exert the pressure to see that this changes in future.

As freedom of navigation in the Gulf was being threatened by the conflict between Iran and Iraq, the Netherlands presidency invited its partners to The Hague on 20th August 1987 for political consultations which finally produced a phased concertation of policy. The member countries thereby demonstrated their solidarity in supporting the freedom of the seas while acting in the interests of the Atlantic Alliance outside the NATO area.

While, in general terms, the Rapporteur criticises excessively frequent intergovernmental activities liable to interfere with the cohesion of WEU, the example of the Gulf is the exception which proves the rule.

Successes in the restructuring of WEU have been less marked under the Netherlands presidency; this is linked to the recently mentioned problem of the collocation of the ministerial organs, which has curbed every effort at restructuring. I do not think that this collocation problem is directly related to NATO or to the question of whether there should be independence or a close link between WEU and NATO. Could it be just a pretext for the two camps with Paris really equalling independence and Brussels a close link? However that may be, I am not aware of any preference on the part of our Luxembourg Government.

When the United Kingdom takes over the presidency on 1st July, it will have its work cut out to cope with a range of problems relating to reactivation, restructuring and enlargement.

As far as reactivation is concerned, it was not the Council which supplied the political drive for European armaments co-operation in line with Part III of the Rome declaration. The credit for setting up the London colloquy goes to two Assembly committees.

The Council has been very miserly with information for the Assembly. Though I believe a small country's press takes greater interest in our organisation – as was demonstrated in the Grand Duchy when the extraordinary session of the Assembly was held there – the available press extracts should be regularly distributed to Assembly members.

Turning to restructuring and leaving aside the collocation problem already mentioned, the following proposals by the Rapporteur should be considered by the United Kingdom presidency:

Mr. Burger (continued)

closer association of officials responsible for WEU with the work of the Permanent Council through the use of modern means of communication; the Secretary-General should be made responsible for and given greater autonomy in the administration of the ministerial organs and keeping the Assembly and the public informed of the political activities of WEU; action should be taken on the Council's decision to give political impetus to the production of armaments; a statute and specific tasks should be assigned to the agencies, which must inform the Assembly of the studies in progress; lastly, the Council should make a serious effort to keep the press better informed about its decisions, as the media play a decisive rôle in determining the life or death, the success or failure of our organisation.

I ask you: should we have to look at graffiti on walls and anti-NATO-WEU propaganda to find out whether our organisation is alive, or can we handle our own publicity? The creation of a monthly newsletter suggested by the Rapporteur requires finance, of course, but let us see that the money is made available, if at all possible!

On the subject of enlargement, it is a fact that the next government to hold the presidency has lately not been delighted at the prospect of Mediterranean countries joining WEU, but we must hope that this has now changed. There is probably no major problem in the case of Portugal.

With regard to Spain we must bear in mind that seventy-nine F-16 fighter-bombers of 401 Squadron of the United States Air Force have had to leave that country. By accepting these aircraft on its soil, Italy has improved NATO's position by establishing on Europe's southern flank a marked superiority over the Warsaw Pact countries. If it wants to join WEU, Spain is not entitled to question the close coupling of Europe and our transatlantic allies.

I will end by quoting the French author Maurice Druon, who has said that WEU is a shrine to Europe's mental reservations. I should prefer it to become the central forum for our European security aspirations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The joint debate is closed.

Does the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee wish to speak?

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – I should prefer to speak this afternoon at 3 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I expect that is also the wish of the other rapporteurs and committee chairmen.

Is there any objection?...

It is so agreed.

7. Change in the order of business

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In view of the progress we have made, I propose that we should take tomorrow morning the two orders of the day set down for the afternoon namely: Disarmament, resumed debate and vote on the draft recommendation; and Impact of the WEU Assembly's activities on parliaments and public opinion, presentation of and debate on the report and vote on the draft order.

Are there any objections?...

It is so decided.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Address by Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
2. Organisation of European security; Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988 (Votes on the draft recommendations, Documents 1138 and amendments and 1142).
3. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters (Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 1137 and amendments).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.55 p.m.)

FIFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 8th June 1988

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Change in the membership of a committee.
4. Address by Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Replies by Mr. Schafer to questions put by: Mr. Martino, Mrs. Timm, Mr. Ahrens, M. Schmidt, Mr. van der Sanden, Mr. Klejdzinski, Sir Russell Johnston.
5. Organisation of European security; Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988 (*Votes on the draft recommendations*, Docs. 1138 and amendments and 1142).
6. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 1137 and amendments).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Pontillon (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Hill, Mr. Wilkinson, Mr. Pieralli, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Martino, Lord Mackie of Benshie, Mr. Burger, Mr. Pontillon (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Ahrens (*Chairman*).
7. Changes in the membership of a committee.
8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting.

The sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

3. Change in the membership of a committee

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have been informed by the Italian Delegation of the following change in the membership of the Com-

mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations: that Mr. Stegagnini be a titular member in place of Mr. Salvi.

In accordance with Rule 38, paragraph 6, of the Rules of Procedure, this change must be ratified by the Assembly.

Is there any opposition?...

This change is agreed to.

4. Address by Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Schäfer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. Schäfer, would you please come to the rostrum.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, may I first extend to the President my warm congratulations on his re-election to his important office and express the deep satisfaction that this has occasioned nationally and for me personally.

1. See page 33.

Mr. Schäfer (continued)

I am particularly happy to have this opportunity of addressing you for the first time a few days after the successful Moscow summit, when the question arises as to what specific contribution we Europeans can make in future to the preservation of our security and the development of our relations with the East, and what rôle WEU should play in this context.

I first wish to say that the twice-yearly meetings of WEU ministers held since 1984, and attended by the ministers of defence and external affairs of the member states, have proved most useful. They have provided an occasion for a confidential exchange of views on all security issues which cannot yet be discussed within the EPC. These consultations range over the whole spectrum of security policy, from defence policy and strategic questions, via disarmament and verification problems, to confidence-building and co-operation between East and West in all fields.

It is no exaggeration to say that this process has produced a consensus on security policy which took the form of political commitment when the platform was adopted in October 1987. This platform contains clear definitions of the principles of our common security policy. The statements on the strategy for the prevention of war, the Atlantic partnership, the overall disarmament and arms control concept and the CSCE process were so convincing that many of them were also incorporated in the declarations following the NATO summit on 3rd March 1988.

The framework for security policy consultations set up in WEU was also the premise on which some member states decided at national level to send naval units to defend freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. While a peaceful political solution of the conflict between Iraq and Iran within the United Nations is still the priority, collaboration in WEU has led to burden-sharing and the safeguarding of our legitimate interests even outside Europe.

Co-operation in WEU in recent years has made it clear to France, too, that a European security policy is not possible unless France plays an active rôle, taking her full share of responsibility and burdens.

WEU has developed into an instrument enabling the countries of Western Europe to incorporate a security dimension into their policy of co-operation in a way which has hitherto been impossible in the context of the Twelve. It was therefore appropriate and consistent that we should agree to the request of Portugal and Spain and begin joint discussions on 26th May this year with these two partners in the Community on their accession to WEU.

Since the adoption of the platform, Spain and Portugal are fully aware that they will not merely be joining a defence alliance committing them to unconditional support, but will be participating in one aspect of European integration. Their accession to WEU will be an encouragement to all who welcome European union and a source of great satisfaction to the Federal Government, which has long supported their entry.

After initial hesitancy in 1984, the development of WEU has since convinced our North American allies that increasing European support for WEU by Europeans is a real factor in finally transforming the much-invoked concept of the European pillar of the alliance into reality. The development of WEU has demonstrated that far from dividing, it reinforces the alliance. All American governments since the war have pursued a policy of fostering European amalgamation, in security policy as elsewhere, since this offers the best chance of creating a balanced and therefore durable Atlantic partnership. Burden-sharing is one aspect of this policy.

The reaction of the Soviet Union and the other member states of the Warsaw Pact towards the progress of European integration is ambivalent. At the invitation of the Supreme Soviet, the Assembly's Presidential Committee did, however, visit Moscow, although developments in the area of security policy evoked a mixed reaction. Negotiations over many years between the European Community and Comecon are now nearing a successful conclusion.

The WEU platform confirms that dialogue and co-operation are crucial elements of our security policy. This is further evidence that Western Europe is not satisfied with political amalgamation alone, but is moving its co-operation into the broader area of a policy whose goal is a just and lasting peaceful order for the whole of Europe. We are convinced that the integration of Western Europe provides the best basis for partnership in the establishment of a peaceful order in Europe.

Ladies and gentlemen, when the platform and the NATO summit communiqué confirmed the goal of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, this was not a mere figure of speech. It is in fact a description of the aims towards which the whole of our security policy, and every step we take within that policy, are directed.

Our task is not, therefore, to preserve peace by measures aimed at preventing war. It is to shape peace constructively, gradually eradicating the causes which have generated and continue to generate tensions in Europe. The essential source of these tensions is the division of our continent, and the platform therefore states that we owe it to our people to overcome this situation and to exploit every opportunity which may present itself for further improvements in the interests of all Europeans.

Mr. Schäfer (continued)

The platform and the summit communiqué also described the means by which we intend to attain this objective. Political solidarity and adequate military strength within the Atlantic Alliance continue to be essential elements. Although there can scarcely be any doubt that the Soviet Union is in a process of change, a balance throughout the world and in Europe can only be maintained in the longer term by a healthy Atlantic Alliance. This means that Europeans and Americans must bear their fair share of the burdens and risks involved in the alliance.

For the prevention of war in the foreseeable future the alliance will continue to need a suitable mix of effective and appropriate nuclear and conventional forces.

Disarmament and arms control are integral components of our security policy, but they cannot be an alternative to defence potential. They should lead to verifiable agreements establishing a stable and secure balance of forces at a lower level.

However, genuine peace will not be ensured either by defence efforts or by arms control alone. They must be backed up by co-operation and dialogue, and an increasingly close identification of mutual interests leading to confidence-building. The CSCE process points the way in this direction and will lead to lasting, stable and constructive relations between countries of the West and East, as well as to closer contacts between peoples and individuals throughout Europe. Let us now take a look at the present environment for a European policy of this kind, anchored in the Atlantic Alliance.

There is no doubt that the recent Moscow summit has brought the United States and the Soviet Union closer together. The INF treaty has now come into force. Soviet troops have begun to withdraw from Afghanistan. Other regional conflicts have to some extent been settled by agreement. Human rights issues have already been addressed, and not only in the case of prominent individuals. For example, whereas only 460 people of German origin were able to leave the Soviet Union in 1985, the number last year had risen to 14 488, and the figure for this year shows a further increase. The increase in the number of Jewish emigrants is also notable.

The development of East-West relations is not confined to the superpowers. I have already referred to the negotiations between the European Community and Comecon, and the successful Stockholm conference on confidence-building and disarmament in Europe has created a basis on which we can now build at the follow-on conference in Vienna. We regret that this conference has dragged on for so long, but

we now see a good chance of its early conclusion and with it the start of negotiations on conventional stability and disarmament in the autumn this year.

When we seek the causes of this development, we find them in the West's persistent adherence to its political aims. Staying power, combined with a readiness to accept a balance of interests, have paid off. Western ideas on transparency and verification won the day in Stockholm and assisted the negotiations on the INF treaty as well as the START talks and the negotiations for a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. There is also no doubt that the new Soviet leadership under General Secretary Gorbachev, with its courageous and self-critical attitude and conduct, as well as its reforms and readiness to negotiate, have made an equally important contribution.

General Secretary Gorbachev has correctly described the developments now taking place in the Soviet Union as revolutionary. Without euphoria, and in a spirit of sober assessment, we must recognise that the Soviet Union is opening up both internally and externally in its determination to make its economy and its society more effective. In the process it is becoming a better and more dependable partner in East-West co-operation. We should not underestimate the prospects offered by all this development. We have a chance to bring about a fundamental improvement in East-West relations, and we must take it.

The All-Union Conference of the Soviet Communist Party which is to take place at the end of June will provide a further pointer to the future course of this exciting development in the Soviet Union.

The new buoyancy in East-West relations has also affected policy-makers in the United States. This is manifested in the START negotiations, where a new definition of strategic stability is being sought. The widening of the dialogue between the superpowers beyond the subject of Afghanistan is one of the essential elements for success in dealing with other crisis areas. The agreement on Security Council Resolution 598 has created a basis on which efforts to resolve the Iran-Iraq conflict can be pursued.

A rapprochement between the viewpoints of the two superpowers is also discernible in discussions on Southern Africa, the Near East, Central America and Cambodia. Both sides clearly have an interest in the limitation of regional conflicts.

In this situation both countries are also adjusting their global commitments to their available resources, and this will be the aim of any future president in Washington. This development is of fundamental significance to us, as America's main allies. The shifts in the economic centre of gravity throughout the world over the

Mr. Schäfer (continued)

last decades, and during the last few years in particular, also have implications for security policy. If the Atlantic Alliance is to have a healthy future, its European pillar must of necessity be strengthened.

What is at issue, then, is a realignment of responsibilities within the alliance. The burdens and risks both inside and outside the alliance area must be assigned according to the strength of the partners and the degree to which their interests are involved. We Europeans firmly believe that common responsibility for alliance policy justifies our having a say in the determination of that policy.

Our peoples will support the alliance all the more readily, the more clearly they see that their interests are also being considered. It is vital at this time that the orientation of the alliance towards the prevention of war and the constructive shaping of peace should extend to the definition of our defence commitments.

This is the goal of the continued development of the comprehensive concept as envisaged by the alliance. The purpose of this concept is to reinforce confidence in the alliance's well-proven, fully defined security policy.

We must also answer the question as to which nuclear and conventional forces we really need for credible deterrence. In so doing we shall also have to answer the question as to what function the nuclear forces of the European nuclear powers perform in ensuring Europe's common security.

The comprehensive concept must also define our aims with regard to arms control and disarmament, not excluding any type of armament. We also have an arms control plan, which must first be further developed and then energetically advocated.

In the negotiations on stability in conventional weaponry, which I hope will begin shortly, the central question of European security is at issue. What is required is not merely a numerical balance but equilibrium at a quantitatively lower level of armaments. The aim is to eliminate the capability of surprise attack or territory-gaining offensives. As agreement has now been reached that the Vienna negotiations will deal only with conventional and not with nuclear weapons, I think we should shortly be able to agree on our negotiating mandate.

Western proposals regarding a worldwide prohibition of chemical weapons are on the table, and a conclusion should shortly be reached in this area. As regards nuclear weapons, the interests of European security demand that the arms control process should not cease with the INF treaty and the START agreement which is

now in prospect. Our security is also jeopardised by a major imbalance in other areas and specifically as regards short-range missiles with a range of less than 500 km.

WEU has important tasks to perform in the formulation of this total concept. The European security field is in a state of dynamic development. We have to define what the rather abstract principles of security policy embodied in the platform mean in concrete terms and how we should apply them together. In our consultations and in preparing our discussions with the United States of America, we shall therefore concentrate on the following topics: the specifically European interests in the negotiations on conventional stability; the possible consequences for Europe of the START negotiations; the rôle of the nuclear and conventional components of deterrence; burden-sharing in the alliance and possible European initiatives to ensure balanced transatlantic relations.

The achievement of a European consensus on these important issues can make a vital contribution to the further development of the West's comprehensive concept.

The Federal Government takes the view that qualitative steps towards the further integration of European security policy are the best means of enhancing Europe's contribution to the preservation and constructive shaping of peace.

The integration of the French armed forces into our common defence potential is of crucial importance to our policies of defence and arms control. It will improve our defensive capacity at our frontiers and ensure the absence of any differentiated security areas divisive to Western Europe's security policy.

It is also important that better use be made of our limited resources. Political impetus in favour of a free, unified weapons market and an armaments planning system avoiding duplication and meeting military requirements will be of assistance here.

We must address ourselves to these practical and complex tasks. WEU is an important instrument, complementary to the activities of EPC and the European Community.

The Federal Government relies on the support of this Assembly and its members. Your work in this forum and at home in your national parliaments creates an additional democratic foundation for the efforts of your governments. Our national parliaments, which have not had direct access to European issues since the introduction of direct election to the European Parliament, need your European experience, ladies and gentlemen. They need your commitment and your critical appraisal, and in providing these you perform a major rôle in overcoming national egotism.

Mr. Schäfer (continued)

I shall therefore be grateful if you will continue to keep under your critical appraisal the often difficult task of governments in developing security policy as a dimension of European integration and contribute through your understanding and commitment to the success of our common cause.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister.

You told me you would be ready to answer questions and I now invite Mr. Martino to put the first.

I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Minister, there is, on the one hand, a German question and, on the other, a slow but inexorable process of European integration. My question is simple but I imagine it could be very big. How do you see the German question and the process of European integration in relation to one another, particularly as far as the reactivation and enlargement of WEU is concerned?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – The German question can only be solved in the European context. If you are aware of the Federal Government's past statements on this subject, you will know that we have always said that the German question can only be solved within a European peace process or within a peace order at European level.

I believe that WEU, as one of the European forums, naturally has its own contribution to make to a peace order of this kind, although we cannot yet know what form it will take. However, I believe you may be reassured that even in the present state of relations between East and West there is no prospect of the German question being solved in isolation. It can only be resolved in consensus with you, with our Western European partners. Such a solution is of course also conditional on the creation of a new, commonsense relationship between East and West.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mrs. Timm.

Mrs. TIMM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Minister, this morning we had a thorough discussion on the problems of the organisation of European security and its relationship to the organs of WEU, the Council and the Assembly. If I correctly remember the talk we had in Bonn in May, you mentioned that there seemed to be some

advance in the forms of co-operation, such as European political co-operation, especially in our capital cities, but less movement – if I understood you correctly – towards the strengthening of the multilateral organisation of WEU.

Today you also spoke very warmly of the significance of the consultations and the twice-yearly intergovernmental meetings at ministerial level, and you said that it was really possible to work and talk together there more confidentially than within the framework of European co-operation.

May I ask how you see this matter? I think it would be highly relevant to our debate this morning with regard to the future form of integrated European security. What forms are to be developed? Where should the emphasis be placed – on the organisation or on the development arising from political consultations in our capital cities? This question also affects the budget. I am fairly new to these bodies, but over the last few days I have become aware of the great significance of this whole area.

Perhaps, Mr. President, I may be allowed to ask a second question on a quite different subject? Minister, we have discussed here at great length, and you yourself have mentioned, how developments in the Soviet Union can and should be assessed after the summit meeting and the successful signing of the treaties. If I understand you rightly, you see a chance of improved collaboration, with a better and more predictable partner. That is very interesting, and I would like you – if you can and will – to expand on it in more detail. It seems to me that the drive behind this development is the very thing which is worrying a large number of our conservative colleagues, although I for my part must confess to less concern. I would like to hear your own assessment. If the situation is more predictable, the present dynamism should offer us a better opportunity than the anxieties which are still being so heavily stressed by our conservative colleagues here.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mrs. Timm, it is very difficult for me, as a government representative, to say anything definite about the future organisation of WEU. In my speech I wanted to make it clear in the presence of German parliamentarians that it is necessary for us to be better informed than in the past. By this I mean, in national terms, that governments should establish closer contacts with their respective parliamentarians on the spot, in our capital cities, and should provide information more quickly. That has been a long-standing demand of the members of this Assembly.

Mr. Schäfer (continued)

Naturally, we cannot speak for other governments here. We have tried, and I hope that efforts will now continue. Having heard the views of a number of delegates here today, I feel, Mr. President, that we should be considering how direct information to the members of this parliamentary assembly on the meetings and discussions at ministerial level could be improved, i.e. how information and texts could be made available more quickly so that they would be more usefully involved in this consultation process and consequently able to respond sooner, both at home and in this forum. This is certainly an important question.

Your question, Mrs. Timm, concerned the rôle to be played by this organisation in the future. When the two superpowers are increasingly trying to reach understanding on many issues with all speed, the European interest must be to hold its own and make sure that its ideas receive greater attention, to avoid creating the feeling that we are being passed over by the two superpowers on a whole series of issues. I am not implying that this is so, because the American President is always stressing that he does consult. But Europe has its own specific interests, and where they relate to security policy I believe that WEU is the place where they should be clearly formulated and expressed. That would reinforce our rôle in a process which is unmistakably already under way.

Your second question, Mrs. Timm, concerned further developments in the Soviet Union. The Germans are sometimes – foolishly, I think – accused of being the ones most sympathetic to this trend and even of succumbing to a kind of euphoria. I do not think this accusation is justified, but perhaps we are able to break down hostile attitudes – I hope I may say this here – rather more quickly than others.

Moreover, located as we are on the frontier of the East-West system, we do naturally try to follow the course of events, without waiting for ultimate proof that the outcome will be a total success. Our preference is to do everything possible to help the developments on their way. In my opinion we should not lean back and say: "Let's wait and see whether Gorbachev succeeds or fails." On the contrary, we should do all we can at an early stage to prevent failure, even if only in our own interests. This can of course be done through dialogue and the CSCE. It can also be done by tough negotiation over human rights and disarmament with the Soviets, while at the same time not forgetting the possibility of better economic co-operation, which is also conducive to this process of development.

Although we do not know how this process will end, there is no reason why we should hang

back until it is concluded. The trend should be made use of now, with great prudence, and not in a spirit of euphoria, but realistically.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, I would like to ask you a question which, as a German delegate, I have been repeatedly asked in this Assembly in recent months. What is the significance of the strengthening of Franco-German collaboration reflected in the Joint Defence Council and, even more spectacularly, in the setting up of a joint Franco-German brigade?

I cannot conceal the fact that this question alone occasionally arises from a feeling of irritation, and that the increased collaboration has also aroused some disquiet in delegates from other countries. Would you mind explaining the view of the Federal German Government?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Your question has already been put to me repeatedly by delegates of this Assembly in discussions in Bonn. It is always rather difficult to describe this kind of operation in detail. The first thing to be said is that Franco-German co-operation is working very well and in the interests of the whole. There is neither a special Russo-German understanding, as suspected by those who are not particularly well-disposed towards us, nor is there a special Franco-German understanding either, against or alongside Europe. There can only be Franco-German co-operation which strengthens Europe.

In view of current military conditions, of France's relationship to NATO and other systems and of the special rôle played by France, I believe that it is very good for Europe that positions should be made somewhat more flexible by a joint Franco-German initiative. I have followed the reaction of the French public to this development with great interest. Opinion polls have established that a large majority approve of it and are aware that the defence of France cannot start at the Rhine but must be moved further east, in line with modern strategy. The purpose of our efforts in France is to see France, together with our own forces, combining in the joint concept of the defence of Europe as a whole and not just a part of it. If you are satisfied with this answer, I will say no more.

There is another point which I should like to mention. The question also arose in connection with the French brigade as to whether the French may perhaps feed their soldiers better than the Germans do.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Schmidt.

Mr. SCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, at the start of your speech you paid WEU the somewhat doubtful compliment of saying that it was a place for the discussion of questions which could “not yet” be aired in EPC, and I quote your words. Should I infer from the expression “not yet” that it is the Federal Government’s wish to place defence questions within the terms of reference of EPC and therefore within the realm of the European Community? If so, is the Federal Government conscious of the attendant legal and political difficulties?

Finally, what advantage is there in transferring defence questions from this organisation, where they belong, to EPC?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – You have inferred far too much from my words, Mr. Schmidt. Their meaning was not, of course, what you suggest. We are fully aware of the difficulties and of the legal situation, and that is why we set such high value on WEU. But neither we nor anyone else here can rule out the possibility of a development in the European Community leading, as we all hope, to a political union in which one day – that was what the words “not yet” referred to – defence issues will also be considered. WEU might then become superfluous, but you can be sure that that stage is a long way off and we have no intention of substituting EPC for WEU within the foreseeable future. For the time being we are backing WEU and its enlargement, and we believe that it has a quite decisive contribution to make to the formulation of a European security policy compatible with our obligations in the alliance.

EPC continues, and in many, many instances – I refer to regional conflicts in particular – we have enjoyed an excellent working relationship. In very many cases resolutions were much more easily reached, sometimes more easily than in the case of certain agricultural problems. I take the view that the words “not yet” apply to the long term, and that a development of this kind should not be ruled out. But we have no intention of declaring WEU obsolete as quickly as possible and replacing it by EPC.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. van der Sanden.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I will quote from a statement the Minister of State made at the Venusberg Hotel on 18th May:

“Ships, especially mine-sweepers, of five WEU member states are still deployed in the Gulf. To fill the gaps, we have dispatched Federal Navy ships to the Mediterranean.”

Was the Council of Ministers of Western European Union consulted on this? I would be interested to hear the answer to this question because, if it is affirmative, we shall have come a little closer to unity under Article VIII of the Brussels Treaty.

Have ships which have been transferred from the Mediterranean to the Gulf been replaced with German ships? Were they American ships or ships belonging to countries which do not come under the integrated NATO command?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Consultations within WEU naturally also influenced the German decision on deployment of ships in the Mediterranean. That much is obvious, Mr. van der Sanden.

I am clearly unable to state here and now the nationalities of the ships which were replaced. I assumed that they were ships belonging to NATO units. We always look on the alliance as an entity rather than as a group of national units. So I would say that, despite the criticisms of some opposition members, we deployed our ships in the Mediterranean as the Federal German contribution to the entire operation.

However, we also asked our allies to understand that we cannot move “out of area”, as that would raise constitutional problems, of which you are aware. It is not a question of cowardice. I should be appalled to use the expression “cowardice in the face of the enemy” – a concept which we are nowadays reluctant to use in Germany. That was not the reason.

Our standpoint is that we shall, of course, have to shoulder responsibilities in the Mediterranean as and when these arise, and we shall do so after consultations, not only in NATO, but also in WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Klejdzinski.

Mr. KLEJZINSKI (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Minister, I would like to follow up Mr. Ahrens’s question. With regard to Franco-German collaboration you mentioned earlier on that you were very concerned that the defence of the Federal Republic of Germany should not start at the Rhine, but further east. But, if I have interpreted the WEU treaty rightly, it imposes an automatic obligation of support, and this provision would preclude deferring the defence of the Federal Republic of Germany until the Rhine was reached.

Mr. Klejdzinski (continued)

My question is whether the emphasis on Franco-German co-operation allows sufficient appreciation for the efforts of other WEU states. I would refer to the deployment and duties of the British Army of the Rhine in the Federal Republic of Germany. This is a permanent operation which has lasted for many years, and we in the Federal Republic should acknowledge it. I therefore ask you whether the stress on Franco-German co-operation is not perhaps a little overdone, tending to neglect the contributions made by others.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – You would be entirely right, Mr. Klejdzinski, if the impression had been made that emphasis on Franco-German co-operation in Europe, in whatever area, had provoked feelings unhelpful to Europe. I should regret that deeply, and I would warn anyone against giving prominence to Franco-German co-operation in such a way that this impression could be created. Franco-German co-operation is, I believe, regarded as very useful and positive by all the Western European states, including the members of WEU. It is an important, not to say essential, element in European unification, but it must not be regarded as a separate initiative.

As I would have liked to point out to my friend David Mellor yesterday, I expressly emphasise here that we by no means overlook or think less of the efforts of other states which have maintained a military presence on German territory for years under the terms of the NATO treaty. That applies especially to the British Army of the Rhine, but naturally also to units from Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands and elsewhere. We are fully conscious of their contribution.

Please also do not impute our special concern with France to that country's particular position. We believe that this special Franco-German co-operation within NATO, and also within WEU, ultimately serves the cause of European defence, as well as the interests of France and of the Federal Republic of Germany – as regards our political co-operation – outside NATO in military terms, but in a relationship that is not directed against NATO. And I must specifically emphasise once more that it is not directed against any other member of WEU or against any of our NATO allies.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Russell Johnston to ask the last question.

Sir Russell JOHNSTON (*United Kingdom*). – It is a great pleasure for me to see the Minister, who is an old political colleague, making his contribution. My question is about the Assembly's

reaction to the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, about which we had an animated discussion yesterday morning in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. The view was put that the Assembly should back off from too close a linkage between human rights issues and disarmament issues. It was said, to quote the words used by one socialist member, that Mr. Reagan had gone as far as was intelligent in pressing the human rights issues when he was in Moscow. What does the Minister think about that?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. SCHÄFER (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – It was of course obvious that human rights would be discussed in Moscow, and President Reagan did so persistently, arousing a great variety of reactions. However, the open discussion of human rights in the Soviet Union is without doubt unprecedented, and we should not overlook that fact. American press reports also clearly reflected the common view that the kind of things that happened during Mr. Reagan's visit were something quite new for the Soviet Union.

But I think we must revert to what I said in my speech at the opening of the last CSCE round in February this year. The process is like a troika, which is also, I believe, a Russian vehicle. It is impossible to drive one horse, in other words human rights, disarmament or economic co-operation, forward on its own. As far as possible, all three horses must move together. I said as much from the presidential chair, on behalf of the European Community. The implication is that we should not attempt to turn a conference like the one in Vienna into either a human rights court or a disarmament round pure and simple. Both must make headway, but I believe that human rights, like disarmament, call for a step-by-step approach. What is not achieved now can be brought up at the next conference. At all events we should not make the hurdles too high to jump so that negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe are delayed as a result. That cannot possibly be in the interests of Western Europe.

The Federal Republic of Germany therefore appeals for moderation in our proceedings, so that we can secure in Vienna advances on human rights which extend in substance beyond the Berne agreement, and so that we can make progress on disarmament and also secure the mandate.

All of us in Western Europe must naturally ask ourselves to what extent we are prepared to examine more seriously the idea of improved economic co-operation. For the Soviet Union this is a major issue and one which we ourselves cannot completely brush aside. After all, it is also in line with the Helsinki accord.

Mr. Schäfer (continued)

Progress is therefore needed in three areas, but sensible progress, which is not precipitate but is achieved gradually over a long period.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Minister, for your address and for answering the Assembly's many questions.

5. Organisation of European security

Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988

(Votes on the draft recommendations, Docs. 1138 and amendments and 1142)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendations on the organisation of European security contained in Document 1138 and amendments and on the draft recommendation on the opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial year 1987 (revised) and 1988 contained in Document 1142.

The joint debate was closed this morning.

I call the Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. van der SANDEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I will begin by thanking the Assembly most sincerely for the wide measure of support it gave the report of the General Affairs Committee this morning. I must say I was surprised to hear many speakers stressing that they were pleased with the frank words that had been used in the report and in my introduction. I am surprised that anyone was surprised, because I feel a parliamentarian should not always say the first thing that comes into his head, but if he has reason to, he should speak his mind. In this Assembly's discussions with the Council of Ministers this attitude may produce results. We face a task together. We must help each other to succeed. These are words we have heard earlier on today, from the Council of Ministers and others.

Mr. Hardy made one comment on the word "platform". It reminded him of a railway station, where you transfer from one train to another. I can quite appreciate this. There is a good English saying: "What's in a name?" We must place the emphasis on the political meaning of the word "platform". All in all, we of the Assembly are very pleased with the outcome of the platform.

Mr. Wilkinson also talked about the platform. He compared the English and French texts. I have both in front of me. This morning Mr. van

den Broek quoted the same text as I have referred to in the report. It concerned an "adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces". Paragraph (ii) of the French text reads:

"La défense doit continuer à se fonder sur une combinaison appropriée de forces nucléaires et conventionnelles."

"Une combinaison" may be translated as "an adequate mix of appropriate nuclear and conventional forces". Comparing the English and French texts, I do not conclude that the interpretations differ.

Various members have referred to collocation. I shall not join in Mr. Hardy's assessment of London. Nor shall I go into the descriptions of other capitals, where it would undoubtedly be pleasant to meet and the surroundings are very attractive. I agree with what Mr. Hill said. His reaction this morning was that the ministers should take the decision. I think that is the right attitude. It would be better if the Assembly did not express its views on the subject. The Council of Ministers has said that collocation must come. So it is up to the Council to take a decision. It is for the ministers to settle the matter quickly. The Assembly looks forward to hearing what the decision is.

Mr. Antretter has said that we should not wait until Spain and Portugal have acceded. Something needs to be done before then. The Assembly has no control over this. On behalf of the General Affairs Committee I still say that it is up to the Council of Ministers. There is every chance that a decision which seven member states have difficulty in taking will be even more difficult if nine member states are involved. I recommend the Council of Ministers to settle the matter quickly, before a decision is taken on the accession of Spain and Portugal.

A great deal was said this morning about relations with the Council of Ministers. Mr. Hardy said that these relations were not good. Mr. Malfatti and Mr. Antretter also discussed this. Mr. Antretter said that there must be better interplay between the Council and the Assembly. I believe I have made myself clear on this in the report. I also commented on it this morning. So I do not think it necessary to underline what has been said in this regard. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council apologised this morning for the delay in the submission of the annual report. We accept his apology and hope the Council will mend its ways in this respect.

I do not need to say any more about WEU's enlargement. The decisions have been taken. The Chairman-in-Office of the Council has said that both Spain and Portugal have accepted the whole of the platform. The first negotiations will be starting in The Hague in a fortnight. We look forward to them with confidence.

Mr. van der Sanden (continued)

A great deal of interest has been taken in the comments I made about the influence exerted on and the information supplied to the 250 million citizens of Western Europe. All the democracies in Western Europe are concerned about the future of our freedom and security. I am pleased to see there was a wide measure of agreement in what Mr. Hill, Mr. Malfatti and Mr. Baumel said about this this morning.

Restructuring was discussed chiefly by Mr. Rauti and Mr. Antretter. I cannot add a great deal to what I have already said about this. It is perhaps going somewhat too far to say that the organisation as such has been just about paralysed. I can appreciate that the Chairman-in-Office of the Council found this phrase rather too strong. We see that the seven WEU countries have the political will really to make something of WEU's reactivation. So it should be possible for mature politicians holding government posts to take a decision on restructuring. All that needs to be done is what the ministers have already decided should be done.

Finally, let me refer to something Mr. Antretter said this morning. He made a few comments on the transfer of WEU's decision-making to the capitals. My report includes a passage on this. In it I refer to a strengthening of the inter-governmental nature of WEU. On Monday the Secretary-General impressed on us that WEU is an intergovernmental organisation. I will not, of course, dispute this. But I would remind you that our organisation is called Western European Union. So it is a union and not a collection of seven countries. "Union" means that we are trying to achieve a meeting of the minds about ensuring Western European security within the Atlantic Alliance. My concern is that the centralised know-how in an agency amalgamated with a Secretariat-General will spread out into the seven capitals and then move with the chairmanship. The concentrated know-how, which may also be vital to the continuity of policy in relations with the Assembly, will then be overly dispersed, to the detriment of unity of policy, to the detriment of satisfactory consultations between the Assembly and the Council of Ministers. We need restructuring to be completed quickly. The know-how must be concentrated in the secretariat. It must not be spread among the seven capitals: they may have extremely proficient civil servants, but these people come and go. I thank Mr. Antretter for drawing attention to this important point in my report once again this morning.

Mr. President, I hope the Assembly is prepared to accept my report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. van der Sanden has already summarised the debate and I can therefore make my remarks very brief.

My sincere thanks to Mr. van der Sanden and the secretariat for preparing this report. The task was again made more difficult by the fact that the Council's report reached us too late. We were therefore obliged to alter the title of this report, which now reads simply "Organisation of European security", the sub-title "Reply to the report of the Council" having been deleted.

I very much hope that, in line with some promises we have received today, we shall in future not be so short of time, and that the Council's reply will reach us at the right time.

As I said, I thank Mr. van der Sanden for a very clear report, which has been thoroughly discussed in committee, and received unanimous approval there. I shall therefore be grateful, ladies and gentlemen, if the Assembly will also approve the report unanimously, or by a large majority.

We are already looking forward with great interest to the continuation of the report at our next part-session. Once again – and I should like to thank him now in anticipation – the Rapporteur will be Mr. van der Sanden.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

Mr. MORRIS (*United Kingdom*). – I thank colleagues for their support of the report that I submitted this morning. That support was almost unanimous. The only mild criticism came from my British colleague, Mr. Hill, who said that he did not understand nor see the logic of posts being filled when the strategy was not agreed. The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration understand that point of view, but we think that that money should either be frozen or transferred across from the ministerial organs to the Assembly. It should not be spent on other projects, which is what happens at the moment.

Like other colleagues, I wish to thank the Minister from the Netherlands, Mr. van den Broek, for agreeing with the proposition for an extra four posts – in his words, without further delay. In response to a question from Mr. Ahrens, he said that that meant by 1st July, which is only a few days away. We now have that firmly on record. I see this decision as a start. I hope that the other recommendations in our opinion will be followed up, because they are in essence saying that there should be some degree of reality in the budget of the ministerial organs.

Our friend from Holland referred to the rôle of the former labour Foreign Minister Ernie Bevin, who signed the original treaty, and the impetus

Mr. Morris (continued)

was given to that by another Englishman, Sir Anthony Eden, which basically set up WEU as we know it. I place this on record not out of any nationalistic pride but because it represents a challenge to my colleague the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, when he takes over the presidency in a few weeks' time.

We are very much at a watershed. It is four years since Rome and a great deal of water has gone under the bridge since then. We have had a small advance today in terms of the Assembly, and I hope that the British presidency will build on the very good foundations laid and the high level set by our Dutch colleagues. I hope that not only do we take up that challenge but that we shall take it further in the next six months.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration wish to speak?

Mr. LINSTER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I do, and I thank all the speakers who have contributed to the discussion on budgetary problems and Mr. Sarti, who very effectively prepared the ground with his report on the action of the Presidential Committee.

Reading Mr. van der Sanden's report it is clear that budgetary issues are always in the background and very often come to the fore. I agree with Mr. van der Sanden that, while there is no longer any overt conflict between the Council and the Assembly, the waters between us are not yet entirely calm, and this state of affairs also prevails with regard to budget problems. I can assure our Rapporteur, Mr. Morris, that the British Chairman-in-Office will continue to have a demanding task.

I also wish to thank him on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration for his excellent work, and I add my personal congratulations and thanks.

It is certain there will still be work to do even after today's excellent news from the Minister and Chairman-in-Office of the Council, as there are still things to put in order as regards both the budgets of the ministerial organs and the effects on our own financial situation. I particularly wish to congratulate Mr. Morris on having clearly separated the two elements of this twin approach. You, Mr. President, and all our colleagues will agree that we are legitimately proud of the clear separation between the budget of the parliamentary Assembly and those of the ministerial organs. We are very jealous of this separation and I am pleased that you have been careful to maintain the difference.

Turning to the budget of the ministerial organs themselves, I emphasise again that Mr. Morris has rightly drawn our attention to its lack of

clarity. He has pointed out that the creation of artificial financial reserves is against the budgetary rules. As a number of speakers have mentioned, we have here credits frozen for the payment of salaries assigned to vacant posts. There is a contradiction in this double operation, as we know that these artificial reserves are being used – in our view improperly, as Mr. Morris has made clear – to effect credit transfers for the payment of expenditures not connected with staff salaries.

In the past, Mr. President, the ministerial organs and more particularly the financial experts have always disallowed such credit transfers by the Assembly's budget authorities.

In paragraph 2 (c) of his draft recommendation, Mr. Morris quite rightly draws the attention of the Council and the Assembly to this practice and reasonably calls for a revision to throw light on the irregularities in the 1988 budget, the other budgets and the other ministerial organs.

One of the reasons for creating these artificial reserves is that the pensions budget of the ministerial organs has not yet been separated from the operating budget. To meet running costs impinging on pensions and vice versa the creation of such reserves is virtually unavoidable.

It is therefore logical for Mr. Morris and the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to ask that the pensions and operating budgets of the ministerial organs should also be separated.

On the question of clarity, I have a question to ask about recruitment policy. If it is the case that all the authorised posts have not been filled, it seems that some unauthorised ones have been. I should like to know whether vacancies are advertised prior to recruitment. I understand that there was no such advertisement of the public relations post which was filled recently.

I should like to say a word about the effect of the budget of the ministerial organs on that of the Assembly. As Mr. Morris has pointed out and I myself have said, in spite of the formal promise that for the restructuring of the Office of the Clerk two Grade A and two Grade B officials would be recruited – and the procedure can be set in motion as from 1st June – everything is not yet settled.

With regard to staff, Mr. President, there is a problem which should be brought up by the Presidential Committee. This concerns twin-grading at every level of the hierarchy in order to improve promotion and career prospects. Mr. Morris rightly referred to this, and it would be an act of elementary justice for a number of officials whose career in this organisation is blocked by the modest size of the establishment. Twin-grading is a matter for urgent action.

Mr. Linster (continued)

Mr. Morris was also right to emphasise that the real financial problems of the parliamentary Assembly will not be resolved as long as the ministerial organs, who actually control our resources, cling to the rule that our budget should be governed by the rigid principle of zero growth.

It is this principle which prevents us from undertaking activities on the scale required for the reactivation of the WEU Assembly. We need to expand. We need to embark on new and broader political activities, and we must be prepared to pay the price. It is not enough that year after year since Rome ministers come here to sing our praises and say how wonderful it is to have us as the cutting edge for WEU renewal when at the same time they cut our funds by imposing zero growth. Mr. President, since Luxembourg with the separation of pensions, and from today with the possibility of recruiting four members of staff for the restructured Office of the Clerk, we have certainly made some progress, but we must have done with this pestilential zero growth.

Today we have heard a great deal about enlargement, but what is this forum to become when we are joined by the Portuguese and the Spanish? Our facilities are obsolete, inconvenient and inadequate. We must give this Assembly a financial, human and material infrastructure worthy of a parliamentary assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now consider the draft recommendation on the organisation of European security contained in Document 1138.

As Amendment 1 has been withdrawn by its proposer, we shall move on to Amendment 2 tabled by Mr. Pieralli which reads as follows:

2. Add the following new text at the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper:

“and take action to facilitate the accession to WEU of all the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance who wish to join and who commit themselves in advance to the same conditions as governed the Portuguese and Spanish cases;”

I call Mr. Pieralli to move the Amendment.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – The support of this amendment demands no more than a reading of its text. The General Affairs Committee approved it with a very large majority because it is reasonable and to give my friend Mr. Wilkinson here a nice surprise.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

What is the committee's opinion?

I call Mr. Ahrens.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Amendment 2, which you have before you and which, as has now been explained, was tabled by Mr. Pieralli alone, has been agreed by a majority of the committee. I wish to add that the Rapporteur opposed this amendment, on the grounds that only the accession of Portugal and Spain is currently being negotiated. Nor does the accompanying report make any reference to further arrangements. Despite the Rapporteur's vote, a majority of the committee nevertheless decided in favour of Amendment 2.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation contained in Document 1138, as amended.

In accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously¹.

We shall now proceed to vote on the draft recommendation on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988, Document 1142.

In accordance with Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We shall therefore vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously².

I call Mr. Ahrens.

1. See page 34.

2. See page 35.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I wish to give an explanation of vote.

You will have noticed that I abstained from voting on the amendment tabled by Mr. Pieralli. In fact, I share Mr. van der Sanden's objections, but considered it proper not to vote against the majority of the committee of which I am the Chairman.

6. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 1137 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report tabled by Mr. Pontillon on behalf of the General Affairs Committee on co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters, Document 1137 and amendments.

I call the Rapporteur, Mr. Pontillon.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General, ladies and gentlemen, the transatlantic relationship is at the core of Western Europe's security system. It symbolises its solidarity and provides a measure of its effectiveness. It also has to adapt as the system takes on new forms especially in response to inevitable changes in the shifting pattern of international realities. East-West relations are the first such reality.

A new phase in international relations is now starting. Fresh attitudes are mounting a challenge to forty years of bipolarity and confrontation between two more or less monolithic blocs. The strategic scene is changing with differences of emphasis here and there: for the United States the changes include the shift from East to West of trade and activities, denoting a more global concept of that strategy, with a changed view of Europe's place; for the Soviet Union there is a new foreign policy after decades of ultra-conservatism; and Europe must speak out in the clearest terms.

We have no control over the dynamics of the present changes in East-West relations, still largely bilateral, but we must have the intellectual capacity to react to and even anticipate the developments taking place. To achieve this, we must see that Europe is able to speak as a single entity in the East-West debate, and we must therefore strive to avoid incoherence, uncertainty and doubt.

These questions are not merely intellectual speculation but are directly associated with the process of reactivation WEU has embarked on.

Reactivating the alliance means defining or redefining the shares borne by Europe and the United States in the burden and responsibilities of western security.

For all of us, the construction of the European pillar must in the long run mean strengthening the transatlantic link. The interchanges between the two sides of the Atlantic must therefore be stepped up, and confrontations and misunderstandings concerning what Europeans are willing to do and the genuineness and sincerity of American intentions must be avoided.

This means that the two sides must move closer together. The Europeans on their side must be ready to discuss burden-sharing in the alliance with the Americans. Not, of course, simply to accept their partners' demands but to conduct an open debate and assume more effective responsibility for their security. The Americans must show greater commitment to consulting their European allies before taking decisions affecting the security of all, whether these relate to alliance strategy, measures aimed at maintaining peace outside the NATO area or disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The report and recommendation I am presenting on behalf of the General Affairs Committee are not the product of a personal analysis or a subjective approach to the subject. They are based on what we learned and the information we were given when the General Affairs Committee visited the United States and Canada last April.

Even if the circumstances were not conducive to exchanges constituting an absolute commitment for the future, I mention the following points as indicative of the present administration's attitude. The administration is pleased that the reactivation of WEU enabled the Europeans to take naval action in the Gulf. The administration is glad that the Assembly and governments clearly stated their approval of the ratification of the INF treaty by the American Senate. The administration wants a dialogue to be developed between Europe and America on burden-sharing within the alliance, involving governments, parliaments and the general public alike.

Against this, we had the impression that the American administration was a little worried that the enlargement of WEU might in the long run create problems with the European members of the alliance not asked to join, so that the reactivated WEU might divide the alliance.

The report also looks at a number of questions about which the American administration was more reticent but which in our opinion may be of decisive importance in the near future.

The defence budget proposed by the American Government for 1988 was cut by 12% by Congress and that for the 1989 budget year by 11%.

Mr. Pontillon (continued)

The United States' economic and financial situation and the need to restore order to the international monetary system suggest that these reductions will persist over the next few years whatever the result of the American election. Although the cuts made so far have basically concerned SDI, nuclear missiles and the navy, they will inevitably extend to the American forces stationed in Europe. A colloquy on this subject was held last week in Washington.

Some members may be surprised at the amount of space given to the report on discriminate deterrence published last January, and the American administration did indeed emphasise that this was not an official document. However, that report does contain a number of ideas which have in recent years become widely held in American Government circles and we feel that it is a fair reflection of the concerns shared by the authorities and much of the public at large. The report also has the merit of summarising these ideas logically and therefore seemed to us to warrant close attention.

The basic points are firstly that America is giving undue priority to the European theatre in its security policy and the deployment of its forces and secondly that it has linked its security too closely to strategic nuclear weapons, and should be prepared for the possibility of other forms of warfare.

These two conclusions naturally arouse concern in Europe, which cannot accept a reduction of deterrence in favour of the opposite concept implying acceptance of a limited war in Europe. Europe must be worried about any redeployment of American forces making it appear to be a second priority in the American defence system with a consequent weakening of the deterrent effect of the American military presence in Europe.

American opinion attaches considerable importance to the development of Soviet-American relations and to lowering the level of nuclear forces on both sides. The Moscow summit, even if it did not lead to the adoption of important texts, did mark a further step in the spectacular development of exchanges between the two countries. Europe can only welcome the progress of détente, but we must realise that for the American public the wish to reach agreement with the USSR may take precedence over other objectives which we consider to be vital to Europe's security.

As the negotiations on the various disarmament issues go ahead, Europe must speak out and press the following points: First, that conventional and chemical disarmament should go hand in hand with nuclear disarmament, so that maximum security can be ensured at the lowest

possible level of all types of armament; second, that progress comparable to that achieved on disarmament should be sought in every area contributing to détente; third, that effective verification procedures should be developed with European participation in those relating to agreements to which it is a signatory.

In these circumstances, Western Europe must do nothing liable to trigger or accelerate the withdrawal of American forces from Europe. It must not give the impression that it is prepared to do without them, though it should prepare for the, probably inevitable, withdrawal of some of these forces. The first step is for Europe to ask its allies to link any redeployment of the American forces stationed in Europe to withdrawals of Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe. These withdrawals should be asymmetrical if a genuine and satisfactory balance is to be achieved. Secondly, Europe should increase its political cohesion and develop its military co-operation in order to optimise its defence efforts. Lastly, the achievement of these two, at first glance contradictory, aims demands the speedy implementation of the Hague platform and the establishment of more permanent dialogue between Europe and the United States.

With your permission, I should like to add a brief word on the Canadian dimension. In Ottawa your committee noted Canada's present efforts to increase its participation in western defence by stepping up the defence of its own territory and the surrounding seas and by regrouping its forces deployed in Europe to render them more effective. However, this regrouping poses serious problems for the defence of the northern flank of the alliance in Norway, where the Canadian brigade to be redeployed in Germany will have to be replaced.

My last word takes the form of a suggestion. One of the few certainties we brought back from the United States is that America, the Americans and the American administration are not well informed about Europe and its realities, constraints and problems, and you can imagine how true this is of WEU and its reactivation!

It is up to us to bridge this gap, and we are faced by the huge task of providing the information and conducting the exchanges and the dialogue necessary to this end.

Though I speak only for myself, I wonder if we should not ask the Council for a special allocation to set up a WEU information office in the United States and should not at the same time adopt a systematic policy of inviting our colleagues from the North American parliaments.

I am convinced of the importance of channels of communication and information between allies and of the need to institutionalise the procedures as far as possible to make them normal and permanent.

Mr. Pontillon (continued)

This effort will not release us from a further obligation. It seems to me that we can no longer resign ourselves to complacent acceptance or ill-tempered contention. Instead we must clearly define our aims for the negotiations which must take place with our North American partners.

All here are agreed that it is up to the Europeans to redefine Europe's rôle in the real international world as the century approaches its close. We know that security is one of the areas which will test our ability to establish Europe as a specific international entity. When we consider defence and transatlantic relations, it is the knowledge of what is at stake which requires us to go to the root of the problems, however difficult they may be.

I hope this report and the debate on it will make some positive contribution in this direction.

(Mr. Sarti, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Hill.

Mr. HILL (*United Kingdom*). – I accompanied the Rapporteur on his visit to Washington. I am afraid that I was in poor health and could not continue on to Ottawa. The main thrust of the report is based on United States and European relations. The Rapporteur makes the point that there is a need for constant exchanges of views. He even wants to institutionalise those exchanges, and I support him. Too infrequently, members of the United States Congress or of the Canadian Parliament visit us in Paris and it is rare for committees of this Assembly to visit America and Canada. This is a good point to press.

One difficulty to come out of the present rapport between the President of the United States and Mr. Gorbachev is that the consensus is switched to a European pillar capable of supporting itself more sturdily than in the past and the Americans are taking a serious view of burden-sharing in conventional terms.

We made the point in Washington to an active subcommittee on burden-sharing that it was a matter not just of the amount of finance injected into European defence but of co-operation on air bases and manoeuvre grounds for the various forces, in West Germany in particular and in other parts of Europe. We said clearly that most of us were bearing our full burden.

An increasing sore in the United States Congress is the fact that some Americans feel that they are doing too much in Europe and that we are doing too little. Therefore, exchanges of

views must consider burden-sharing. Such exchanges must include regular political consultations. We must have, at long last, a rapport across the seas with the United States and Canada. I know that there is a tremendous rapport in NATO, but we are not always aware – certainly in this Assembly – of the most up-to-date movements in co-operation between the two sides of the Atlantic. The problem of keeping all member countries regularly informed will be very difficult for WEU.

The Rapporteur calls upon the agency to prepare a study of each factor in assessing the burdens incumbent upon each member. I have asked the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in England whether the views of the Council of Ministers on burden-sharing could be directed almost in their entirety to the Assembly of WEU. It is entirely for the Council to decide whether we get these assessments. If we are to have a rapport with the United States of America and Canada, we must have a greater rapport with the Council of Ministers on the more detailed financial aspects of its assessment. With such a delicate subject as burden-sharing we must be conscious of the position almost week by week.

The Rapporteur mentioned the transfer of the Canadian brigade, now deployed in Norway, to the Federal Republic of Germany. I cannot remember the subject coming up in the dialogue, but some of my colleagues may remember it. At no time must we be taken by surprise by any deployments that may have been agreed, certainly between the countries associated with NATO and WEU.

We can see that the report has been written by a Frenchman. It is written from an individualistic point of view. Indeed, the Rapporteur was very strong in some of the views that he expressed to Congress – certainly to the congressmen that we met. That is the right attitude. It is a matter not just of Western European security or, indeed, dialogue on conventional, chemical or nuclear weapons. We must trust each other. We must have a degree of rapport. We must visit each other. The Americans and the Canadians must visit Paris and come to this Assembly. We must have their views on some of the exercises that we are undertaking, such as the deployment of ships in the Gulf. Those on the other side of the Atlantic were pleased that we took that decision, and it was a decision taken by WEU. There may be other occasions on which we shall need to converse with the Americans and the Canadians before events, so to speak, in order that we may be fully conscious of whether our moves would be acceptable to them.

There will be a terrible threat to international peace if we do not have such rapport with each other. Mr. Gorbachev is moving us to a different plateau of defence thinking. If President Reagan

Mr. Hill (continued)

is as determined as I think he is, he will want another heads of state meeting in Washington before the end of the year.

Our visit was not well-timed, because we did not seem to meet the top echelons in the State Department and the Pentagon. We arrived in the middle of the presidential elections. We were perhaps a bit awkward as a committee at a time when everyone else there was thinking of something other than Western European defence.

This subject will not disappear. We must ensure that our structure is right. We must try to encompass other people's views at all levels in what we are trying to do in Paris.

The Rapporteur should be praised for his forthright document and for the way in which he has put forcefully not just the views of the seven nations, but a French overtone, which is very desirable in defence matters.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Wilkinson.

Mr. WILKINSON (*United Kingdom*). – I warmly congratulate Senator Pontillon on his admirable report, the conclusions of which I largely agree with, but for one small exception to which I shall call attention.

The writing really is on the wall for Europe's ability to maintain its cosy post-war security relationship with the United States. In the face of the decline of United States power, Europe must address itself to the consequences by assuming political and military responsibilities fully commensurate with its growing economic strength vis-à-vis the United States.

We can divide the post-war era into four periods. The first was the immediate post-war period when the new world was invoked by the old to redress its military, political and economic imbalances. We had Marshall Aid, the Berlin airlift, and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Then came the era of massive retaliation, the tripwire, the Eisenhower years, when the alliance system – not just NATO, but the Central Treaty Organisation and the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation – assured peace for the free world.

In the late 1960s, the 1970s and the early 1980s we had the time of nuclear parity. Following the Harmel report in 1967, we had to have flexible response.

Lastly, we have the era that we are now in – the uncertain era of Euromissiles – from 1983, the period of their deployment, and from this year, the period of their withdrawal and the uncertainties which ensue. Having specifically asked our American friends, following the twin-

track decision of 1979, to be ready to deploy modernised intermediate-range nuclear forces on our behalf on the continent of Europe, as they did, it would be difficult, now that those missiles are being withdrawn, to ask them to repeat the exercise and to modernise their nuclear forces in Europe on our behalf. That should mean that it is more important than ever for the Europeans to do everything that they can to enhance the linkage between this continent and North America, and that must mean greater consultation, which is suggested by Senator Pontillon, backed by my friend and colleague Mr. Hill. It also requires that, until there is a genuine reduction of Soviet offensive power in this continent, we should try to make the Americans feel less vulnerable if they have to intervene and exercise their guarantee on our behalf. Therefore, we ought to encourage a move towards the anti-ballistic missile defence being pursued by the United States.

I take issue with what Senator Pontillon says in paragraph 7 of the explanatory memorandum about the strategic defence initiative. The idea of these researches is not to give the United States a defensive shield making its security independent of the forces deployed abroad. Nor is the United States wrong to refuse to allow SDI to be taken into account in negotiations with the Soviet Union on disarmament. The President of the United States is not simply interested in protecting American territory. We shall need defence systems against the offensive capacity of the Soviet Union even after the SS-20s are fully dismantled. For example, the mobile SS-24 and SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile systems can easily be adapted for a theatre rôle against European targets.

I suggest three simple measures that the Europeans can take to allay American fears and to prepare ourselves for the period after the next presidential election when a new United States administration will be facing unpleasant choices and considering defence policies. First, we should modernise the French and British strategic and tactical nuclear deterrents. The INF accord enhances, not reduces, the importance of the European component of the overall nuclear deterrence. Secondly, we must improve the capacity of the seapower available to the alliance, and especially its European components. That means that if we can secure the line of communication across the Atlantic, our American friends will be better able to reinforce us. I spoke about that when presenting my report yesterday.

Thirdly, but by no means least, we should recognise that the threats to our continent are not confined to the central zone. Therefore, we ought to seek means to replace the Canadian air-sea transportable brigade, which has been withdrawn in its commitment to the northern flank. My country could play a part in that, as we

Mr. Wilkinson (continued)

could in the replacement of the two Canadian air squadrons that are to be withdrawn from the northern flank as well.

The writing is on the wall and if people do not believe that, they should turn to paragraph 21 of Mr. Pontillon's excellent report, in which he shows how the American balance of payments deficit, which has grown inexorably and steadily since 1982, must translate into different dispositions. We have to address ourselves to the problems of burden-sharing earnestly and urgently. Therefore, I wholly support Mr. Pontillon's report, which is both timely and extremely constructive for the work of the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Pieralli.

Mr. PIERALLI (*Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. President, before I give my opinion on Mr. Pontillon's report I would like to thank members who voted for my amendment and in particular Sir Geoffrey Finsberg for the compromise he put forward in the General Affairs Committee as a solution to the problem though the issue is still open.

With regard to Mr. Pontillon's report I would like to give a brief explanation for the way I intend to vote. In committee, thirteen members voted in favour of the report and only one, myself, abstained. When I described my vote as a positive abstention, some members asked me what I meant. The explanation of my attitude in committee is that I could well have voted differently if certain changes were made to the recommendation, which in essence I agree with. I shall therefore vote for Mr. Pontillon's report in contrast to what I did in committee. I shall be doing so because the part of the report that seemed to me least up to date – I refer to the section concerning conflicts outside the NATO area – has been changed in the right direction. In particular it now mentions the agreement reached on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan although there is no mention of the fact that the withdrawal has already begun.

I must say I find it rather strange that there is not one document presented for consideration by this Assembly in which satisfaction is expressed at the withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan which our countries have long declared to be one of their objectives.

Mr. Pontillon's report rightly makes the point that both the United States and the Soviet Union recognise that certain regional conflicts are slipping out of their hands. I would go further and say that they are beginning to realise that they have a common interest in resolving certain conflicts. In Afghanistan, the issue is still open as regards finding a solution for governing the

country. The guerrilla forces are known to be divided. If the Islamic fundamentalists drawing their inspiration from Ayatollah Khomeini were to come out on top the consequences in the way of contagion would certainly be serious for the Soviet Union but they would also have an extremely negative impact on the defence of western interests in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

More generally, I find it rather strange that not a single Assembly document gives the proper weight to the profound and positive turn that Soviet-United States relations have taken and this includes Mr. Kittelmann's draft recommendation which is nevertheless, in general, a good text.

It looks as though seeing President Reagan talking about human rights to the students in Moscow university and telling them they are living at the most exciting time in Russian history or hearing him announce that the "evil empire" no longer exists does not affect everyone the same way.

The events may have been part of the emotive climate in which the Moscow meeting took place but there was nothing emotive when President Reagan repeated in London his firm intention to found not only his only policy but that of his successor on this new stage in Soviet-American relations.

We shall be meeting again after the presidential elections in the United States and we shall then need to update whatever we vote on today regarding co-operation between Europe and the United States.

I hope that we shall then also have an opportunity to debate a full report on the new trends in world politics, as this is the context in which WEU is required to operate.

To conclude, I repeat that I shall be voting for Mr. Pontillon's report and I thank its author for having provided an extremely full and well thought-out document.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I compliment Senator Pontillon on an extremely sound and well-reasoned report.

I want first to speak about Canada, whose position is interesting. According to public opinion pollsters, the political situation there looks somewhat fluid, but public opinion pollsters seem to have come rather unstuck here in France. I give little credence to public opinion pollsters because they never put the right question: they cannot. The question "How do you intend to vote if there were an election today?" is wholly different from how someone will vote if there actually is an election today.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

I say to those who employ public opinion pollsters that a growing number of people deliberately give the wrong answer to pollsters to get rid of them. I warmly encourage that trend.

We had some interesting talks with the political parties in Canada. The Canadian part of our journey was exceptionally well organised and the New Democratic Party had some unusual and interesting things to say. Like many other parties, it may be unhappy at times with certain commitments into which it has entered and which it now feels may not be as correct as it thought when it started. I do not believe – I choose my words carefully – that were the New Democrats to have a share in a future government in Canada, they would necessarily wish to carry out a pledge that they once gave to withdraw from NATO. I believe that there have been wise second thoughts.

All too often political representatives who go to North America fail to go to Canada, or go there at the end as an afterthought. That is a great mistake. I am very glad that we specifically planned a visit. I hope that the regularity that is mentioned will result in a regular visit to North America and that we shall see, as we did on this occasion, Canadian politicians of all parties – and some of those who advise them. Perhaps on the next occasion we shall go first to Canada and then on to America just to get the balance right. Regularity is important.

One of the threads running through Senator Pontillon's excellent report is a worry that was reinforced by what my colleague John Wilkinson said: that the American economy may – or, as Mr. Wilkinson said, "must" – make the American physical, and hence economic, contribution to Europe less certain.

We must try to weigh up the factors operating in America. There are three. The American administration understands clearly what the Europeans are doing and paying for in their own defence. We have had no need to try to persuade the United States that Europe is not merely a reliable partner, but a partner that is already taking its fair share of the burden.

The second factor is Congress. It is unfortunate – I am sure that we shall not let it happen again – that we had no opportunity on this occasion, because of the imminence of the elections, to talk to some of the senators in America. As we all know the upper house in America plays a much greater rôle in defence and foreign affairs than does the lower house. Next time we must strike a better balance. Congress, like all other such chambers, must at least publicly reflect an interest in the economy and in dealing with worries that have been expressed by its members' constituents. We understand that.

The third factor is much more interesting and dangerous. It runs throughout the free world – not only in North America or in the seven nations of WEU. It is public opinion. What is that? Is it the views expressed by the tens of thousands of our constituents? Is it the views of the people on whose doors we knock and with whom we talk? Or is it the view of a journalist which is put into a newspaper, given publicity and then fed upon by more journalists who draw on the original? All of us know that if an article containing an error appears about any one of us, unless that error is corrected it will be perpetuated because the next journalist will go to the file, take out the article and repeat the mistake. So we had to analyse what public opinion was in North America. I am by no means convinced that public opinion is what was represented to us in the views of the press and the media. We must be very careful about this.

One of the reasons why WEU is held in such poor public esteem is that we do precious little about the problem. There has been a distinct improvement over the past two years, for two reasons. First, we have had something to talk about – the platform and the Gulf; secondly, the growing efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff in London to try to get news out have played a part. But I still believe that the task must be done more professionally and regularly. I am not attacking anyone, but I do not think that what we are sending out is what the press wants. These days, the press does not want two and a half pages of fascinating material. It wants two or three paragraphs sent out frequently, so that it always has something from WEU.

If we can do that, particularly in North America, we shall begin to get across, not to the administration but to the people – that mystic public opinion – what WEU is all about.

The importance of the Iklé report, to which reference is made in Mr. Pontillon's report, is slightly overemphasised. It involved a group of wise men but much of that collective wisdom was burnished a decade or more ago. That report is not as current as it should be. The quotation in paragraph 37 can be read two ways and it is important that we do not read it in the wrong way. The paragraph states: "A Pentagon official told the committee that the United States Government had paid \$1.8 million for this document to be prepared, which shows the value it attached to this work." However, the beginning of the preceding paragraph explains that a former American secretary of defence set up the committee. If one sets something up one must foot the bill, whatever it is. The cost does not reflect value in this case. We should not believe that \$1.8 million is an expression of the worth of the document.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

The report brings out clearly, as did the setting up of NATO and WEU, the complete inter-linking between North America and Europe in mutual defence. One cannot exist without the other. Of course we warmly welcome the success of the discussions between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. Some extremely good results have emerged. I recall some remarks made in this chamber over the last few years which could hardly be called flattering to Mr. Reagan. I hope that those who made such remarks are now eating their words. Immense progress has been made and we shall still be linked until such time as we can achieve a reduction in conventional forces.

It is at that stage that the real opportunity will come for reducing the number of American troops in Europe, for the Warsaw Pact to reduce its troop numbers and for the United Kingdom to reduce its troops in Germany.

I have one suggestion. We talk about the need to go to North America and to ask Congress to send a delegation here to listen and take part in our discussions. We should have a closer relationship with the North Atlantic Assembly. The bureaux of the WEU and North Atlantic Assemblies should officially be invited to each other's annual meetings so that we can exchange views and listen to debates. That, in conjunction with the suggestion by Mr. Pontillon to regularise visits to North America, will provide us with an insight into each other's interests.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. President. I would first like to congratulate and thank Mr. Pontillon for his work in drafting the report presented on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. I support the draft recommendation based on the report in every respect, including both the preamble and the nine points of the actual recommendation to the Council.

I asked to speak, Mr. President, to make a point that does not seem to me to come out clearly from the thoughtful report produced by Mr. Pontillon. It is fairly obvious to say that the western world today is paying very close attention to the Soviet Union and the countries of East Europe because of the changes brought about there by Mr. Gorbachev's policy and his contacts with Mr. Reagan. Alongside measures of no great weight inside the country there are clearly peripheral events of perhaps greater potential in the satellite countries. But what I also wanted to stress, Mr. President, is the impression that the same kind of close attention

is not being paid to the changes taking place in North American society and in the more differentiated society of Europe in the light of the favourable outcome of the negotiations between the Soviets and the Americans.

Whereas a superficial shiver seems to be running over the skin of the Soviet Union and its satellites obviously raised by the winds of freedom blowing from the West, in the western world, our world, the always latent and widespread popular hope for peace seems to be fulfilled by the events and achievements at diplomatic level. As a result, I am sure you will agree Mr. President, there is a certain lowering of tension, if you will allow me the word, more or less everywhere in the western world, both in Europe and in America, where budgetary concerns raise their head coupled with reciprocal misunderstandings that only full knowledge of the real issues and of the political solutions that have been found can overcome, bringing about a new understanding of the facts among the general public.

It is this, Mr. President, that I wanted to commend to members' attention. Perhaps the trip to the United States and Canada came at a time of electoral pressure, which is still the case, and perhaps some replies to our questions on budgetary problems were distorted by the particular phase the United States of America and Canada were passing through, but we ought not to fail to recognise this lowering of tension throughout the whole of the western world as the result of the goals that have been reached.

It is for this reason, Mr. President, that whilst fully supporting the recommendation, I would like to repeat the invitation extended to us from across the water. In our contacts with the members of the American Congress and the Canadian Parliament we received requests for a direct, more immediate, closer and friendlier relationship because so many links that have been weakened by time and by the disappearance of the men we used to know, need now to be renewed in order to build a better future.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Lord Mackie.

Lord MACKIE (*United Kingdom*). – This has been an interesting debate and, like others, I congratulate Mr. Pontillon on his report. It involved a terrifying amount of work and I am glad that I was not the rapporteur.

I was glad that we arranged the visit to the United States and Canada. As Sir Geoffrey Finsberg said, Canada is often forgotten. It was interesting to see a country like Canada become conscious of the changes occurring and its place within them. I got the impression that Canada was terrified that the reactivation of WEU would leave Canada out in the cold, that Europe would

Lord Mackie (continued)

act as one and be a great influence on its big neighbour, and Canada would be left as the little adjunct in the north. Canada's interest in patrolling its northern waters and the vital area around the north pole shows that it has the old feeling of a small country next to a big monolithic structure.

I felt that the people I met in Washington wondered whether they had encouraged the reactivation of WEU too much and thought that it would be a European body not susceptible to influence in the same way as other countries have been. They felt that they would raise something up that would be a nuisance to any implementation of American policy. These people did not say that in an unfriendly way, but they wanted to be sure of European commitment to NATO.

I do not think that overall, in the United States and Canada, there was any question but that everyone was committed to the alliance. People realised that the forty years of peace had been due to the co-operation and firm stand of the West in these matters.

I am not afraid of defence co-operation with the United States. The United States realises – this is driven home within the administration – that defence is a matter of one world and that, whatever trouble the United States is in, it will endeavour to co-operate and to alleviate burdens connected with troops in Europe. The Americans believe that we should co-operate with them and prepare good cases on not only the amount spent but the numbers of troops on the ground and the part played in Europe. I am sure that burden-sharing will not mean any breaking point with the United States in the firm alliance that has kept the peace in Europe for so long.

I am more afraid that, because of our fears for the past, our desire to remain united and our suspicion of the Soviet monolith, we will not be able to grasp the opportunities presented. These opportunities do not arise from a great kindness or democratic change of heart in the Soviet system. Mr. Gorbachev's success and ability to hold his position are due to the fact that even the conservatives in the Soviet Union realise that they are not doing well and that something must be done. Mr. Gorbachev has this opportunity. The dangers that lie before us are not in defence but are in the undoubted co-operation that we shall achieve between the two monolithic powers, the United States and the USSR. This is both an opportunity for peace and an opportunity for trouble.

Public opinion in the United States swings rapidly. The Soviet Union used to be an evil empire, but has suddenly become capable of being a friend of the United States. This is enor-

mously hopeful. We in Europe – this is where WEU must come in – understand the dangers facing Mr. Gorbachev much more than people in the United States probably do. Mr. Gorbachev is concerned with the whole of Eastern Europe. There will be excitement there and he must watch out so that he does not have an explosion there. If there is an explosion, he will have a terrible choice to make.

We in Europe must be able to help. We must be able to understand what is going on and, if possible, urge conservative action – as a liberal, I say that in horror – on the government and people in the Eastern European states. They will undoubtedly profit from the great explosion of hope that has taken place there. We hope that the explosion does not go too far, so that the great reactionary forces in Russia again take control and push the advocates of progress out. That could happen again.

Our knowledge of Eastern Europe is needed. Mr. Pontillon's report, which concentrates on security and defence, goes further in advocating genuine co-operation and the need to know the minds of the American people and Congress much more. This can be achieved by getting the Americans over here. Washington is always full of suppliants from everywhere, but when we go over there we may be regarded as just another bunch of Europeans with a begging bowl. We must get congressmen and senators over here, especially to Paris. London is not a bad place, but Paris can be even better. Here we can put over the European view on home ground. That is important.

Peace and the opportunities in peace are important. We in Europe should have a say. The alliance will hold firm, but with the dangers ahead we need a European voice.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the final speaker, Mr. Burger.

Mr. BURGER (*Luxembourg*) (Translation). – I congratulate Mr. Pontillon on his report, which is so detailed that it is impossible to offer an opinion on all its contents. I shall therefore concentrate my remarks on what we heard in various quarters when we visited America and Canada.

I shall first quote Mrs. Ridgway, who asked us to free our minds of three myths: firstly, that the INF treaty might appreciably reduce the Soviet threat – which would be an illusion; secondly, that America would cut back the number of its troops in Europe – which it would not; and thirdly that Europe would have to shoulder its own defence – which was not true either. The problem was burden-sharing, and the Rapporteur has discussed this in his report.

Mrs. Ridgway made the following suggestions: we should of course increase our defence budgets; we should improve the education of our

Mr. Burger (continued)

young people and bring home to them just what the past has cost us – a subject we talked about this morning; and we should revive the friendships made between individuals and parliaments in Europe and America after the second world war. Mrs. Ridgway also said the INF treaty should not blunt our awareness. Too much confidence in success often sowed doubt.

Lastly, the Soviet Union was still a communist country which was currently seeking to win victories not by war but by political and diplomatic means.

The Department of State was always ready to listen to WEU on the security of the United States and Western Europe.

The second spokesman told us that the United States supported Europe in the political, economic and military fields.

In future the United States wanted to be better informed of the views and wishes of Europe and Western European Union. There were misconceptions in Washington, in Congress and among the American public. A few moments ago, Mr. Pontillon suggested an information office should be set up, and I support this idea, which I consider to be very practical.

Relations between East and West continued to be those of opposing forces, and the Atlantic Alliance needed to be better understood by the general public in both the United States and Europe.

Western European Union was recognised as making a positive contribution to the Atlantic Alliance. At the same time, better use should be made of the available financial resources by improved collaboration at every level of the Atlantic Alliance in both the United States and Europe. Such improved co-operation was desired by both sides.

The Franco-German brigade was a joint defence effort which in no way conflicted with the Atlantic Alliance.

The spokesman told us that Mr. Carlucci, the new Secretary of State for Defence, might be well disposed towards us, and in newspaper articles Mr. Carlucci did indeed confirm his support.

With regard to Mr. Reagan, it might be said that his legacy is a policy of peace through strength, placing a curb on Russian expansionism and furthering western standards of liberty. Mrs. Thatcher is the best trustee of the ideas of the outgoing President who relies on her to carry on his policy in future.

The new American president will have to conclude an agreement on a 50% reduction in strategic arsenals. However, disarmament must be accompanied by successes on human rights.

Thanks to the actions of the democratic countries of the alliance, a new era in history can now begin, if Mr. Gorbachev is successful in his reforms.

While East-West relations are now characterised by greater maturity, we must remain vigilant and strong. The USSR is clearly seeking an atmosphere of détente after its unsuccessful adventures in Afghanistan and Africa, especially in Angola. After the START agreement, we must go on to eliminate chemical weapons and agree on the asymmetrical reduction of conventional weapons.

In future the Atlantic Alliance must pursue two goals: dialogue with the Warsaw Pact countries seeking a gradual all-round arms reduction – without neglecting the alliance's own defences in Europe, the United States and Canada.

While the INF treaty has reduced the importance of the flexible response, there should be no more than cautious optimism about arms control. Verification is difficult, especially in the case of cruise missiles, space defence and underground nuclear tests.

The modernisation of short-range nuclear weapons will no doubt have to be put "on ice" for the time being.

The problem of chemical weapons is complicated by the fact that other countries like Iran possess them, and this makes the Soviet Union reluctant to sign an agreement.

Because of the budgetary constraints in the United States, there should be better burden-sharing and a joint search for effective, practical solutions. The American army in Europe is a vital link between Europe and the United States within the Atlantic Alliance.

It should be pointed out that the Soviet defence budget has not changed and that the sword of Damocles is still suspended over our heads.

While the American Congress recognises WEU as a worthy partner it also acknowledges the importance of the Franco-German brigade and favours the enlargement of WEU which might well make some suggestions for reinforcing the Atlantic Alliance.

Research and co-operation on arms are investments likely to prove profitable in the long term.

Finally, two major issues were mentioned by Mrs. Pat Schroeder. One, on the positive side, was WEU's help in the Gulf, the other, more negative, was burden-sharing which is considered in detail in Mr. Pontillon's report.

As a yardstick, percentages of gross national product seem to me to be misleading. Nor did we learn what proportion of the American defence budget is allocated to NATO. However, bearing

Mr. Burger (continued)

in mind the sometimes infantile mentality of our American allies, I would like all our governments to make some effort to reduce complaints on this subject from our friends across the Atlantic.

Even in Canada security is expensive. For Canadian parliamentarians, WEU is the political forum and the Atlantic Alliance the military forum for the security and defence of their territory. Their defence budget equals only 1.8% of their gross national product, but they cannot do much more. We know they face many difficulties to which some members have already referred. They are also mentioned in Mr. Pontillon's report.

In conclusion, I will quote Mr. Ahrens, the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee, who said in Canada: "Europe cannot bear another war. Arms must be neither nuclear nor conventional, but political".

Thank you for your attention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, let me start by doing something I should have done when presenting the report – by thanking the administration to which I am deeply indebted for the quality of the report to which many speakers have kindly alluded.

I also take pleasure in thanking my colleagues for their general approval of the presentation of the document. Everyone is familiar with the philosophy behind our efforts. We are at the start of a process which involves asserting the European identity in the alliance, reinforcing the transatlantic bastion by effectively building the European pillar and making the members of WEU more aware of the new strategic realities reflected in the new East-West relations and in the future burden-sharing negotiations, about which I shall say only that I prefer the definition used this morning by Mr. van den Broek when he spoke of a "commitment to make more efficient use of the available resources".

It is my hope that the Assembly's endorsement of our organisational and procedural suggestions will be repeated by the Council of Ministers so that we can then finalise them in the General Affairs Committee and they can be implemented.

In the various observations which have been made I noted no points of real controversy.

Mr. Hill spoke of burden-sharing in terms which, though different from mine, expressed the same concerns. He follows us in stressing the need for regular political consultations. This is

indeed one of the aims we must pursue in future. I particularly appreciate Mr. Hill's flattering reference to gallic outspokenness!

Mr. Wilkinson developed very much the same lines of thought. Having referred to the four ages of Europe, he like the report, stressed the need to reinforce transatlantic co-operation.

I see no difference between what we say on SDI in paragraph 7 and the idea he expressed. The text is worded differently, but the substance is the same in both cases. We wished to stress the interest of the Canadian position which, as the report says, meets one of the worries expressed by Mr. Wilkinson, and that was why I thought part of our report should refer to it. To repeat a point made by several members, we have every reason to thank our Canadian colleagues and the Canadian authorities for the exceptionally intelligent, kind, friendly and warm reception they gave us. This, I might say a little unkindly, made us all the more aware of our lightweight reception in Washington.

Mr. Pieralli opted to vote for the report instead of abiding by his courteously expressed abstention. I thank him. It duly acknowledges the efforts we made in the final wording of the report to meet a number of comments made in committee. If we failed to refer more explicitly to Afghanistan, that was because the Soviet withdrawal had not yet begun when the report was finalised, otherwise we should certainly have recorded the event as a positive and encouraging development.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, with his usual courtesy, made kind reference to the Rapporteur, which is naturally appreciated. I share Sir Geoffrey's views on Canada. Despite the fact that in the Canadian Parliament members of the government majority and the NDP members expressed clearly differing views I did not feel that the attitude signalled any possibility of a future Canadian withdrawal from NATO. Inside the New Democratic Party, as in certain political groups well-known to Sir Geoffrey in his own country, discussions have been started which, it is to be hoped, will ultimately enable all Europeans to agree on an identical position, apart from a few minor differences.

Sir Geoffrey laid great stress on what he called "Ariadne's thread" running through the report, in other words the economic situation. We certainly believe that this accounts for some of the American emphasis on burden-sharing. I am very close to Sir Geoffrey's view of that mythical and ultimately mysterious creature known as public opinion. For me, it provides an added argument for bringing more effective and tangible influence to bear on public opinion, whatever its nature and subtlety, so that it can ultimately be harnessed to our individual plans.

Mr. Pontillon (continued)

Sir Geoffrey says we have exaggerated the importance of the Iklé report. I believe I said a short time ago that the Iklé-Wohlstetter report was cited only as illustrating a state of mind of which Europeans must take account if only because of the exceptional eminence of the members of the committee responsible for the report whom we are bound to find opposite us in the American administration at some time in the future.

We took the view that we should refer to the report and that we should know more about it. I agree with Sir Geoffrey – and it is a suggestion we should have made ourselves – that our relations with the North American countries should be broadened and extended to our colleagues in the NATO assembly. I am fully prepared to take up this proposal personally and to put it to the General Affairs Committee in order to encourage the link and stimulate cross-fertilisation between the bureaux of the two assemblies.

Mr. Martino wished to go beyond the matters mentioned in the report. Rightly so. We were unable to take account of the subtle but predictable shift in public opinion, which will ultimately determine tomorrow's geopolitics and geostrategy. These are facts we must try to identify and understand better. We perceive events only at superficial level, and we must be given means to penetrate their innermost nature. This is difficult, but our discussions cannot be broadened or deepened without allowing for this aspect to which Mr. Martino has very rightly drawn attention.

I am in full agreement with Lord Mackie's observations. We must take account of the misgivings of the Canadians when they express some fear of being excluded from Atlantic solidarity by the new dialogue between the United States and Europe. We must see to it that the Canadians do not feel shut out. They in no way deserve this, and the extent of the efforts they are now making shows how greatly we can count on them.

It is true that in Washington we gained the impression that the American authorities have some fears that they may have allowed themselves to be led into encouraging the very modest and qualified emancipation of the Europeans through the reactivation of WEU. This is a risk I am ready to accept, and I would like to see further affirmation of this autonomy within the necessary framework of solidarity. Surely, that is what we mean by "reactivation".

If there is a danger, Lord Mackie, that a Soviet-American economic condominium may be established as a result of the new relationship now beginning to take shape, it will be because Europe has failed to do what it should. It is up to Europe – not the Europe of WEU but the

broader Europe of the European Economic Community – to make the necessary effort to play its full part in this reshaping of international economic relations which must inevitably follow the new deal of the strategic and political cards.

My friend Mr. Burger – epitomising the present intervention and the whole debate – made timely reference to the concerns we heard voiced in the United States during the committee's trip. By recalling the committee's meetings, interviews and discussions he filled out, in retrospect, a report whose only purpose was to recount what the committee learned during its American journey.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Rapporteur.

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I wish to start by thanking our Rapporteur, Mr. Pontillon, not only for preparing this report, but also for the pertinent and informed questions with which he frequently enhanced the discussions held during our visit to the United States and Canada.

We discussed this report in committee, the draft recommendation twice and the explanatory memorandum only once, because of the time available. At the suggestion of our colleagues the report was enlarged and amended in committee.

During the visit to the United States by the committee and the Presidential Committee, we pursued the dialogue with our two transatlantic allies. Personally, I am constantly surprised, not to say taken aback, by the number of problems one encounters in discussion with representatives of the American superpower. I suppose it is unavoidable in the circumstances that misunderstandings arise in the assessment of developments in the most disparate parts of the world, and also in evaluating the situation in Europe. One occasionally still hears the view that a reinforcement of WEU might lead to the uncoupling of Europe and hence to a split in the alliance.

In our talks we endeavoured to dispel such misunderstandings and to break down distrust, and we pointed out that a chain is always only as strong as its weakest link. This is just the kind of distrust that I referred to this afternoon when talking to Mr. Schäfer, and which also arose in this Assembly when delegates heard reports of increased Franco-German co-operation.

There continues to be a great diversity of opinion on burden-sharing, and we must try to explain why it is not sufficient to assess the contributions made by our countries on the basis of percentages alone. For me, ladies and gentlemen, the numbers game is as absurd here as it is in so many other contexts.

Mr. Ahrens (continued)

There is no doubt that we need to establish permanent contact with the two houses of the United States Congress. I am well aware of the difficulties that stand in the way, including the constant electoral pressures on our colleagues in the House of Representatives and the disinclination of some senators to deal and converse with European politicians on the same level. The fact remains that permanent contact of this sort with the two houses of the United States Congress is the only way of avoiding future misunderstandings.

Mr. President, Sir Geoffrey has just recommended that we should have a closer relationship with our colleagues in the North Atlantic Assembly. I would like to make another proposal. As you know, we meet colleagues from the United States Congress and the Canadian Parliament once a year in the Council of Europe in Strasbourg to discuss the OECD report. Why should it not be possible to invite the competent members of both parliaments to Paris, so that we could discuss common defence and security issues with them, either in committee or in the plenary sittings themselves? We should at least try this out. I am convinced that, if properly prepared, such a meeting would be profitable.

There is no doubt that we need improved contact with public opinion and opinion-makers in North America. We must ensure that reports on our work, our problems and our proposals for their solution find their way across the Atlantic more often than in the past.

On our last visit I felt once again how at home one was in Canada after the United States, almost like being in Europe.

This was apparent in the particularly cordial reception given us by our colleagues in the Canadian parliament, and the feeling was reinforced by the fact that Canada, like the countries of Western Europe, is not a superpower, so that our problems and their possible solutions are largely compatible, or at least run on similar lines.

I share the view expressed in this debate that we should on no account forget about Canada, and I shall suggest that on our next trip we travel to Washington via Ottawa.

Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you on my own behalf and on behalf of the committee for your contributions this afternoon. I shall be most grateful if you will vote in favour of this report tomorrow.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Thank you, Mr. Ahrens. I wish to inform the Assembly that I am trying to make arrangements for observers from the American Senate and House of Representatives to attend the Assembly.

In view of the time, the vote on the draft recommendation will be taken tomorrow morning.

7. Changes in the membership of a committee

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have been informed by the United Kingdom Delegation of the following changes in the membership of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations: that Mr. Shelton be a titular member in place of Mr. Hunt and that Mr. Hunt be an alternate member in place of Mr. Shelton.

In accordance with Rule 38, paragraph 6, of the Rules of Procedure, these changes must be ratified by the Assembly.

Is there any opposition?...

These changes are agreed to.

8. Date, time and orders of the day of the next sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I propose that the Assembly hold its next public sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 9th June, at 10 a.m. with the following orders of the day:

1. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters (Vote on the draft recommendation, Document 1137 and amendments).
2. Disarmament (The prospects for Western Europe after the Moscow summit) (Presentation of, debate and vote on the draft recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 1147 and amendment).
3. Address by Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
4. Revision and interpretation of the rules of Procedure (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Document 1133).
5. Impact of the WEU Assembly's activities on parliaments and public opinion (Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Document 1135).

Are there any objections?...

The orders of the day of the next sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.)

SIXTH SITTING

Thursday, 9th June 1988

SUMMARY

1. Attendance register.
2. Adoption of the minutes.
3. Tribute.
4. Change in the membership of a committee.
5. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters (*Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1137 and amendments*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Pontillon (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Ahrens (*Chairman*).
6. Disarmament (The prospects for Western Europe after the Moscow summit) (*Presentation of, debate and vote on the draft recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 1147 and amendment*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Kittelmann (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Tummers, Mr. de Kwaadsteniet, Mr. Reddemann, Mrs. Timm, Mr. Kittelmann (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
7. Address by Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.
Reply by Mr. Manzolini to a question put by: Mr. Martino.
8. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure (*Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Doc. 1133*).
Speakers: The President, Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (*Chairman and Rapporteur*).
9. Impact of the WEU Assembly's activities on parliaments and public opinion (*Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1135*).
Speakers: The President, Mr. Hardy (*on behalf of Mr. Chénard, Rapporteur*), Mr. Tummers, Mr. Hardy, Mr. Pontillon (*Chairman*).
10. Adjournment of the session.

The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The sitting is open.

1. Attendance register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The names of the substitutes attending this sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of representatives appended to the minutes of proceedings¹.

2. Adoption of the minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the minutes of proceedings of the previous sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

The minutes are agreed to.

1. See page 39.

3. Tribute

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, we have learned with great sadness of the death of Georges Housiaux, three times President of the Assembly.

Georges Housiaux was born on 15th January 1914 at Tihange in Belgium. He was a member of the Socialist Group. He studied law at Brussels University. He was a lawyer, President of the Socialist Students of UFB from 1933 to 1935, national President of Socialist Students from 1935 to 1936 and Director-General of Radio-Leopoldville and of the Belgian Radio-Congo from 1942 to 1945.

Georges Housiaux was a member of the Chamber of Representatives from 1946 to 1961. He was elected to the Senate on 28th March 1961, and was Chairman of the Cultural Affairs Committee and a member of the Foreign Affairs and Justice Committees; he was Chairman of the Socialist Party's African Affairs Committee from 1954 onwards and rapporteur to the Chamber and the Senate on many questions concerning the Congo.

The President (continued)

He was a substitute member of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe as from September 1961 and was appointed representative to the Assembly in September 1965. He became a member of the WEU Assembly in 1961 and was a member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and also of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

He was elected President of the Assembly on 17th June 1969 and was re-elected on 2nd June 1970 and 15th June 1971.

To his family and his friends I extend our deepest sympathy and I would ask the Assembly to stand a moment in silent tribute to the memory of a distinguished former colleague.

(The representatives stood and observed one minute's silence)

4. Change in the membership of a committee

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I have to inform the Assembly that I have been notified of a change in the Italian Delegation. On the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, Mr. Salvi replaces Mr. Stegagnini as an alternate member.

In accordance with Rule 38 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, this change must be ratified by the Assembly.

Is there any opposition?...

This change is agreed to.

5. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters

(Vote on the draft recommendation, Doc. 1137 and amendments)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The first order of the day is the vote on the draft recommendation on co-operation between Europe and the United States and Canada in security matters, Document 1137 and amendments.

Yesterday afternoon the debate was closed.

Six amendments have been tabled to the draft recommendation. They will be considered in the following order: Amendment 2 by Mr. Pontillon, Amendment 1 by Mr. Soell and Amendments 3, 4, 5 and 6 by Mr. Pontillon.

Mr. Pontillon has tabled Amendment 2 which reads as follows:

2. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Noting with satisfaction that the United States and Canadian Governments do not intend to call in question their conventional and nuclear military commitment in Europe;”

I call Mr. Pontillon.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – The purpose of this amendment is simply to ensure that the dual nature of North American society is recognised. It expresses and reflects an attitude that reflects, as was found in Ottawa, a deep-rooted political reality and a genuine wish. When we think “North America” we want it to be explicitly understood that we are referring to the United States plus Canada.

This explanation also applies to Amendments 3, 4 and 5.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I call Mr. Ahrens, Chairman of the committee.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I can be very brief. At its meeting on Tuesday morning the committee unanimously approved all the amendments which have been tabled to Mr. Pontillon's report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put Amendment 2 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 2 is agreed to.

Mr. Soell has tabled Amendment 1 which reads as follows:

1. Leave out paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert:

“Convinced that the negotiations on security and co-operation in Europe, disarmament and the limitation of armaments should help to strengthen the basis of joint defence;”

Since Mr. Soell is not here does anyone else wish to speak to the amendment?...

I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, Mr. Soell has had to leave this sitting early to attend a meeting of a German Bundestag committee of inquiry of which he is a member. I accept his Amendment 1, which – as I have just said – was unanimously approved in committee. It seeks to phrase the statement made in the draft in more positive terms. I call on the Assembly to give its approval.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – I also support this amendment for the very good reason that Mr. Ahrens has just explained, namely that it takes a more positive line than the original. However, I am concerned at the disappearance of the phrase regarding negotiations, which the General Affairs Committee wishes to keep: "...which it trusts can be started in 1988 and lead to positive results".

If the Assembly agreed – and I do not think I am betraying Mr. Soell's intentions – we could make this addition to the amendment we are discussing.

Mr. AHRENS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – I have no objections.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I now put to the vote Amendment 1, as amended.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 1, as amended, is agreed to.

Mr. Pontillon has tabled Amendment 3 which reads as follows:

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, before "American" add "North".

Mr. Pontillon has already supported this amendment.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I now put Amendment 3 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 3 is agreed to.

Mr. Pontillon has tabled Amendment 4 which reads as follows:

4. At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, add "and Canada".

This amendment has already been supported.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I now put Amendment 4 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 4 is agreed to.

Mr. Pontillon has tabled Amendment 5 which reads as follows:

5. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "the United States" and insert "North America".

Mr. Pontillon has already supported this amendment.

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I now put Amendment 5 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 5 is agreed to.

Mr. Pontillon has tabled Amendment 6 which reads as follows:

6. In paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "deployed" and insert "ear-marked for deployment".

I call Mr. Pontillon.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – This is a matter of matching the text to the actual facts. The Canadian brigade referred to is not yet deployed; it is going to be. The amendment we have tabled is closer to the truth.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I now put Amendment 6 to the vote.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

Amendment 6 is agreed to.

We shall now proceed to vote on the amended draft recommendation contained in Document 1137.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless five representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there five members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not.

The vote will be taken by sitting and standing.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

6. Disarmament **(The prospects for Western Europe** **after the Moscow summit)**

*(Presentation of, debate and vote
on the draft recommendation of the Committee
on Defence Questions and Armaments,
Doc. 1147 and amendment)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of, debate and vote on the draft recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-

¹. See page 40.

The President (continued)

ments on disarmament (the prospects for Western Europe after the Moscow summit), Document 1147 and amendment.

I call Mr. Kittelmann, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, the ratification of the INF treaty is a great event, which may have historic implications as we proceed towards worldwide disarmament.

The recent summit meeting in Moscow between the political leaders of the United States and the USSR, the fourth such meeting in thirty months, is a further step towards arms limitation, although, in all, only a small part of the agenda for this summit meeting in Moscow was devoted to arms control.

At a time when confidence-building measures in Vienna and Geneva are considered to be almost as important as the actual disarmament procedures, regular meetings of the leaders of the two superpowers are rightly described as the confidence-building measure par excellence. It must always be ensured, however, that the euphoria which usually accompanies meetings of this nature does not lead to decisions that fail to take due account of the allies' security interests. Of the western side it is generally true to say that consultations, briefings and oral reports are regular and detailed and that the alliance on the whole supports attempts by the United States and the USSR to reach bilateral agreements on various issues. This is also true of the INF treaty, and it will also be true of a possible bilateral agreement limiting strategic missiles.

Nonetheless, it was disappointing that an agreement on a 50% reduction in the strategic systems of the United States and the USSR could not be completed in time for the summit, because a treaty of this kind would have eliminated many thousands of nuclear weapons and yet left the alliance's deterrent strength intact.

It is important that the accurately defined requirements to be satisfied by an agreement which can be properly verified should not be sacrificed to excessive haste. Arms control should not become an end in itself. We must endeavour to forge a link between the goals of our arms control policy and our general security requirements. The statement issued after the NATO summit in March 1988 echoed WEU's Hague platform of October 1987, which raised this very point and confirmed the progress made towards a comprehensive arms control concept.

Ladies and gentlemen, what is essential is that Europe should not allow its own vital regional interests to be brushed aside by global considera-

tions. In particular, we must continue to ensure that an agreement on a 50% reduction in the United States' and Soviet Union's strategic missiles does not entail any restrictions for the Western European countries' armed forces.

This example of Western European reservations is symptomatic of the greater dilemma in which we find ourselves and which the western alliance will face if the INF has "after-effects" and perhaps with START as well. This problem is due to the obvious absence of a general alliance concept for the rôle to be played by nuclear weapons.

Ladies and gentlemen, in the last twenty years there have been many changes in Europe, the United States, the USSR and throughout the world. Political, military, economic, technological, social and demographic changes have produced a world which looks quite different from the world for which the alliance originally adopted its nuclear stance and doctrine. The range of subjects discussed at the last summit meeting was in itself clear proof of the trend in East-West relations. We must now take stock of the nuclear situation to ensure that East-West relations remain stable and balanced. Hence the proposal – which I hope we will be discussing shortly – that a "nuclear Harmel report" should be drawn up, reaffirming the initial principles by reviewing the fundamental rôle of the nuclear forces of the alliance and also examining the specific systems, the doctrine we want to see adopted and the capacities needed to ensure western deterrence in the long term.

An essential component of this report would be an examination of the many and varied arms control initiatives now under discussion, from the 50% reduction in strategic offensive potential to negotiations on reductions in conventional forces and weapons and the implications for alliance policy and doctrine.

As regards Western European priorities, the negotiations it is envisaged the twenty-three NATO and Warsaw Pact countries will have with a view to achieving greater stability in conventional forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals are, as it says in our report, extremely important, given the present imbalance in the Eastern bloc's favour.

We know that one of the main reasons for instability is the Soviet Union's superior military presence in Europe and its ability to launch a surprise attack and to occupy western territory. It is to be hoped that the INF treaty has set an example that will help to ensure asymmetrical reductions. It is to be hoped that the Soviet Union will support a similar line in the reduction of conventional forces and armaments.

The alliance's next priority is a complete ban on chemical weapons, a subject we have discussed here in depth on several occasions.

Mr. Kittelmann (continued)

Ladies and gentlemen, what form should WEU's practical contribution to the arms control process take? Firstly, it must be said that barely more than about a hundred people in Europe are now engaged in research into verification technology, an area that is even now vital to the success of any arms control agreement and will be even more important in the conventional sector. The governments of the WEU member states should waste no time in launching an emergency programme of research into verification technology so that Western Europe is ready to make a practical contribution to conventional arms control agreements when the time comes.

Ladies and gentlemen, to summarise, it can be said that the Moscow summit has changed the prospects for disarmament in Western Europe. It has provided an opportunity to take stock and examine the specific rôle Western Europe might play in the future. We must not allow this opportunity to pass.

The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments asks you, ladies and gentlemen, to approve this draft recommendation. We shall continue the debate at the December part-session on the basis of detailed reports which will then be available. The years ahead will also be a test for Western European Union. It will be for us to determine how we participate as equal partners in the superpowers' process of détente and disarmament and what weight we carry.

We must bear in mind that the successes so far achieved have been due to the consistency of the stand taken by the western allies – as with the NATO twofold decision – and that it is thanks to the United States that the human rights problem will be a permanent feature of future disarmament talks. We have made some progress. We appeal to the Council of Ministers of Western European Union to co-operate closely with the Assembly in tackling the impending problems constructively in the interests of Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – I compliment Peter Kittelmann on his helpful initiative. It might have been considered odd that the WEU parliamentary Assembly should have met in June and made no reference to the momentous happenings in Moscow a week or so ago. We look forward hopefully to developments.

When the Presidential Committee went to Washington, there was uncertainty about whether the INF treaty would be ratified by the Senate and particularly about whether it would be ratified in time for the instruments to be

exchanged and all the documentation completed in time for President Reagan to act with Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow. It is fair to say that one of the anxieties of some senators was about the view of Europe. It is not unfair to suggest that the strong views contained in our resolution and conveyed in person when we were there, through people such as Ambassador Ridgway and Mr. Taft, may have been of some influence in dispelling any lingering doubts in the minds of some senators. As we know, the ratification came with an overwhelming majority and all of us were delighted by that.

For a decade or more the major problem in any negotiation between East and West has been the problem of verification in one form or another. None of us was prepared to be completely certain that a guarantee given by one side would be sufficiently watertight to persuade the other side that all was well.

For a decade or more, NATO and the West have been saying that verification has to be verification on the spot. For a decade or more previous leaders of the Soviet Union were not willing to accept that. We should pay tribute to Mr. Gorbachev because he has accepted what has been put to Russia for ten years by the West – that it is possible to have a form of verification that does not infringe national pride. A start has been made. We saw television pictures of the cutting up of some of the SS-20s. One might say it was the modern equivalent of swords being made into ploughshares. But we have to go much further, because it will be more difficult to deal with verification of sea-launched missiles and conventional weapons. However, we must find a way.

There is a variety of measures – many of them contained in the original Helsinki agreement – that will begin to build up confidence. If we see advances in human rights, that will tend to give the West confidence that the East is playing the game, and that will make its own contribution to a verification agreement. Therefore, I welcome the ideas contained in Peter Kittelmann's document.

I want to say a few more words about human rights, because it is an issue that fits firmly into this. It is part of the jigsaw puzzle. One cannot complete a jigsaw puzzle unless all the pieces fit into place. Therefore, we have to see more respect given to human rights, whether they be religious human rights – the Baptist who is persecuted for carrying on his religion, the Jew who is refused permission to have certain dietary foods, Bibles, or the right to join a family – or whether they relate to a poet who wishes to publish a poem that is less friendly to the government than the government might wish. All these things are part of human rights, as are the rights of the Baltic states to decide their stance.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg (continued)

This is all part of confidence-building, which will help to get the verification that we all want. I emphasise again that a substantial volume of praise is due to Mr. Gorbachev for picking up this idea, which has been waiting to be picked up by a Soviet leader.

Recommendation 5 of Peter Kittelmann's report talks about the WEU agency. I want to try to get the right word here, because permanent members are present and I do not want them to get the wrong impression. I am not certain that those who have been competent during past years to count tanks and shells are necessarily sufficiently competent to write documents or to work out verification of something much more complex. The Secretary-General must tell the ministers that he wants a different form of staffing for the agency. No longer should there be a job until retirement age for ex-generals or ex-civil servants. Contracts should be given to study a particular task for two or three years, and when that task is finished, so should that person's job be finished. We can make a different set of contracts each time. That will remove the difficulties of growing pensions, because they will be built into the three-year period. I hope that will be the way forward – to use the agency, but not necessarily the existing staff. It may be that someone is highly competent to study conditions for conventional disarmament and someone may be highly competent to study methods of verifying chemical armaments. I doubt it, but such people are available to be hired by WEU. That is what I suggest we do.

Other than that, the document is to be welcomed and the Assembly would do well to endorse it without dissent.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call Mr. Hardy.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – I shall not take very long. I am grateful to Mr. Kittelmann and to the committee for giving the Assembly the opportunity to refer to disarmament. As Sir Geoffrey Finsberg pointed out, it would be ridiculous for the Assembly not to consider this subject. The report provides us with an opportunity, which I hope will be seized unanimously, for our view to be expressed as an endorsement of last week's achievements. They may be potential rather than real achievements, but they give us an opportunity to look ahead to the 1990s as a decade of security and peace.

Western Europe's rôle must be one in which we express not merely hopes or calls, but our insistence that the world leadership will strive to secure asymmetric and verifiable agreements to reduce armaments, nuclear and otherwise. I stress the view of my colleagues that those agreements shall be asymmetric and must be verified.

In that regard, the last part of my British colleague's speech about paragraph 5 causes me some anxiety. My colleague may be absolutely right to suggest that a contractual approach towards verification be adopted, but I still think that the generals will find a way to ensure that they are appointed to supervise the contractors. If the contractors do their job, I have no objection to the military supervision of the task.

I was delighted to have the explanation about human rights. None of us on my side of the political spectrum is unconcerned by or unmoved about the problem of human rights. We also understand that there has to be a sensitivity in the timing of our expressions in this matter, and I rather suspect, and not all the other members of the Assembly may agree, that last week in Moscow human rights loomed as large, or perhaps rather larger, than may have been intelligent.

I say that without traducing my belief in our commitment to human rights. We have to understand that Mr. Gorbachev may have enormous power as the principal citizen in the Soviet Union, but there are obviously those who are less enthusiastic about glasnost or any of the other changes that Mr. Gorbachev desires, and it would be idiotic of the West to make his task more difficult. We need him to succeed, and we ought not to seek to skittle him in his resolve by insensitive or unintelligent insistence on every other possible public comment.

I know that in committee savage comments were made. There were those who suggested that the Soviet Union was the most repressive régime that the world has known and it was compared unfavourably with South Africa. That sort of comment is not wise, sensitive, intelligent or helpful and we need to be all those things at this time if the 1990s is to be the decade of peace and security that we need. I stress the word "security". That is why I am delighted that Mr. Kittelmann has proposed, with the support of other members of considerable importance in this Assembly, an amendment that will, I hope, make this report completely and unanimously welcome.

I am grateful to Mr. Kittelmann for adopting my suggestion that we insert the words "at least" in the second recommendation in reference to 50%. Although 50% would be a substantial step forward, I do not believe that the processes of balance and peace should stop at that level. If we can go higher than 50%, in an asymmetric and verifiable way, by all means let us do so. We have enough capacity for Armageddon even with a reduction of that proportion. Let us both hope and call for genuine advance. Let Western Europe play a critical rôle – as it should – in ensuring that that advance is achieved and properly supervised. I am glad that we have this opportunity to make these comments.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

I am grateful to Mr. Kittelmann for providing the vehicle for an expression of common sense from Western Europe today. I trust that that expression will be unanimously adopted at the end of this debate.

(Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair)

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, It is indeed important that we discuss this subject. I will not repeat what Peter Hardy has said, and I hope that what I add will underline the passage in his speech about our rôle in everything that has happened since the latest summit meeting and, in fact, since Reykjavik.

Concern about this has long been expressed in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. At various meetings the committee agreed that, as this part-session would more or less coincide with the Moscow summit meeting, account should, of course, be taken of what happened there. The change that has been occurring in the general political climate since Reykjavik has been discussed. This change is apparent at various levels. I will mention only two. There is a change in the concept of deterrence in that, given the concessions now being considered in the Soviet Union, the continuation of deterrence is something of a carnival gesture. The image of the enemy is also changing. It is curious to see so many people now regretting, as it were, that the enemy will no longer be so much of an enemy. They are wondering how on earth to find another enemy on the international scene so that they can go on thinking as before.

The significance of what is happening at the moment, the significance of the destruction of weapons is – and I am not speaking in clichés – historic in that never before in history have weapons been destroyed for the sake of humanity. This is another reason why we need to keep a very careful check and to consider the matter very seriously. The quality of our reactions must satisfy this requirement. It is as Peter Hardy said: the thinking we do in this context, the rôle we play must not be confined to counting what can be expressed in figures.

Everything that is being discussed in the Soviet Union was carefully enumerated by the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee at the December part-session. He said that it was not just history since 1917 that needed to be rewritten in the Soviet Union but the last 250 years of history, with which this country is now wrestling and on which light now needs to be shed. When the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee said this in December, there was no objection.

The ideas which the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has developed on this document have sadly been blocked. It has proved impossible to submit them to the Assembly. So what we have before us is a statement which is something of a cliché put together in rather a rush. This is a pity. It is not worthy of us. It does not deal clearly enough or in sufficient depth with the changes in East-West relations since Reykjavik. Surely we owe it to ourselves to do better than this. Are we standing here as an elected *avant garde* or not? If we really have a rôle to play as elected pioneers, we must ensure that the quality of our work is better than that of the President of the United States of America.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mr. de Kwaadsteniet.

Mr. de KWAADSTENIET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I have just a few words to add to the debate on the recommendation.

East-West relations are looking better, thanks to the steps recently taken by the Soviet Union and the United States. This was borne out by the Gorbachev-Reagan summit meeting last week. We have good reason to feel pleased with this development. It can and must be said that there is still a long way to go before real security and justice are achieved, but that should not be allowed to detract from the satisfaction we feel at the breakthrough that has occurred in arms control with the INF treaty. This breakthrough and the discussions before and during the summit hold out a promise of agreements being reached in other negotiations, the START negotiations, for example, and also the various discussions on conventional armaments and short-range tactical nuclear weapons. An early agreement also needs to be reached on chemical weapons. That is essential. The first step in the normalisation of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States – a historic aspect of the summit meeting – makes further steps forward possible.

The WEU member states must join in encouraging the satisfactory developments currently under way. They must not look on from the sidelines. They must do what they can. Our thoughts and actions must be geared to this in the current, post-INF period.

Besides economic co-operation, the promotion of human rights remains an important aspect. It must occupy a very prominent position. None of the discussions on security will produce satisfactory results unless further steps are taken to achieve justice. Our human and, therefore, our political efforts must be geared to peace as the outcome of justice in the service of society. It is not only everyone's national duty but also the

Mr. de Kwaadsteniet (continued)

international duty of all of us to ensure that substantial progress is made in gaining respect for human rights.

The PRESIDENT. – As there are only two more speakers and one amendment, I shall decide on behalf of the Assembly that we shall continue and take the vote before a speech by a minister.

I now call Mr. Reddemann.

Mr. REDDEMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, time being so short, I just have four thank-yous to say and one comment to make.

My thanks first of all to the Rapporteur, Mr. Kittelmann. It was he who had the idea of responding so quickly to what happened in Moscow, and he persevered with this idea despite considerable initial opposition in the Assembly.

My thanks, secondly, to Mr. Stoffelen, whose rapid compromise solution, which we literally found on this bench, made it possible for the discussion to continue, thus enabling us not only to have a debate on the subject today but also to reach a wide measure of agreement.

Thirdly, I want to thank all those members who were prepared to join with me yesterday in reinstating the words "human rights" in the recommendation after a few members had felt the whole thing should be replaced with far too weak a reference to the three baskets of the Helsinki conference. I believe, my friends, that we should always discuss human rights, and on this I disagree with Peter Hardy, something I rarely do. He felt we should be careful about where human rights are discussed. I am sure Mr. Gorbachev and his group will not lose the struggle for perestroika because the Assembly of Western European Union calls on the Soviet Union to accept and respect human rights. But I am equally convinced that the withdrawal of this demand for respect for human rights would be misunderstood by the reactionary members of the Soviet leadership.

Fourthly, Mr. President, my thanks to you, not for the way you have conducted the proceedings but for what you have just said here. You have taken up something I have long suggested, that the agency be staffed with constantly alternating experts in such a way that they are really capable of doing their work. We should not have people who have been pensioned once, staying on at the agency until they can be pensioned off a second time. I believe we of the Assembly should propose a model for the agency and put it to the ministers.

To conclude, Mr. President, I referred in the debate the day before yesterday to an article in

the *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. The author of this article, Professor Darichev, appeared in the Soviet embassy in Bonn at precisely the same time yesterday and said that Lenin's old dictum that socialist countries could have no more than limited sovereignty and were, in the final analysis, subordinate to the Soviet Union was, for the moment at least, not accepted by the Soviet leadership.

This means we shall very shortly be witnessing major, new, changed situations – including a new dynamic process – and in our work at least we too should therefore be undertaking perestroika, or restructuring. We should take the time to consider a topical subject at each of our part-sessions and not just debate reports most of which are already out of date before they reach us here in the Assembly.

The PRESIDENT. – I call Mrs. Timm.

Mrs. TIMM (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I too am happy that we are able to have this debate today at the end of the part-session. What has prompted this urgent debate is, of course, the conclusion of the INF treaty. I am very glad the committee set about drawing up a text that would have the approval of all its members. We are all likely to be able to vote for it.

Nonetheless – this may have something to do with the fact that I am fairly new to the Assembly and rather uninhibited – I find the text really deficient in certain respects, especially the first paragraph, which says that the Assembly welcomes the fact that a further step has been taken towards arms limitation. I feel that what happened in Moscow with the signing of the treaty was qualitatively something new and something different.

For the first time in the forty years since the war some of these instruments of the devil – as President Reagan called them – are after all being scrapped which is a start. This is real disarmament, and that is new. I should very much like to have seen the text place greater emphasis on this specific new aspect, which gives us all so much hope and encouragement to keep going. But perhaps we can say this is what is meant. I expect so after all that has been said on the subject this morning. It is different in qualitative terms.

What is important – and I am happy about this – is that we have a text at all and that we are putting pressure on the governments. I feel we should be putting even more pressure on them. I should also like to have seen something rather stronger than "we recommend the governments". But perhaps it is enough if we agree that as WEU's Assembly we have a special duty to say with urgency on behalf of the many, many people who are our constituents: this is what we want now for the sake of greater European

Mrs. Timm (continued)

security. Because I believe more and more people are becoming very uneasy at the thought that security is simply talked about and the thinking then turns to the need to create more and better arsenals.

It is quite unnatural that more weapons may mean more insecurity. We must do some rethinking. I therefore believe this debate should go a great deal further during the next few part-sessions. But with the arsenals that have accumulated on both sides security can surely be guaranteed only if each side is willing and able to recognise the other's security interests. This is a different line of thought.

When we talk about human rights, I feel we must beware of forging a blackmailer's link between this important subject and disarmament. All the various aspects belong together. Yesterday or the day before the Dutch Foreign Minister made it clear to us once again that we are talking about the troika: if confidence gradually increases, disarmament, economic relations and human rights will stand side by side. So we should be considering not the interdependence of the various factors but the overall complex if we want to develop a really sound line in our thinking about security.

I am very grateful that we have this somewhat modified text to emphasise this rather dangerous linkage. I think my interpretation can also be derived from the text now before us.

Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. President, I feel WEU and particularly its Assembly have a special rôle to play. I am thankful that we are playing this rôle today, and I hope we find the strength to develop a fresh impetus from the momentum of the qualitative change in what has happened in Moscow and to play our rôle in Europe with a view to pressing ahead with real disarmament. None of our constituents would believe us if we said that this overkill, which actually exists on both sides, is strategically important and necessary for the preservation of peace. We must go on discussing these matters with one another.

The PRESIDENT. – That completes the list of speakers. Does the Rapporteur wish to respond?

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – All I can do is offer my sincere thanks to the members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and those who have taken part in the debate. As we shall be continuing this debate, I do not think I need now go into what they said in detail. I fully endorse Mr. Reddemann's statement, with which Mr. Stoffelen and the Assembly, I believe, agree, that in the future we should try to discuss a topical event at each part-session. For making

this possible today I should like to thank the Bureau, the members of the Assembly and the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. I must also thank the secretariat and Mr. Cameron for helping so magnificently with the preparations.

The PRESIDENT. – If I may say so, Mr. Kittelmann is a model rapporteur.

I call Mr. Kittelmann to support Amendment 1 which reads as follows:

1. Leave out paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:

“Continue to press for the earliest opening of negotiations on conventional stability concentrating on asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals and for progress on all three baskets of the CSCE, particularly the one on human rights, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and understanding;”

Mr. KITTELMANN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). – Unlike Mrs. Timm, I do not think the first version was dangerous. The present version makes things clearer and includes everything that the first version said. I therefore ask the Assembly to approve it.

The PRESIDENT. – Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment?...

I now put to the vote Amendment 1.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

Amendment 1 is agreed to.

We shall now proceed to vote on the amended draft recommendation in Document 1147.

Under Rule 33 of the Rules of Procedure, if five or more representatives or substitutes present in the chamber so desire, the Assembly shall vote by roll-call on the draft recommendation.

Does any member wish to propose a vote by roll-call?...

That is not the case.

We shall therefore vote by standing and sitting.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

The amended draft recommendation is adopted¹.

(*The sitting was suspended at 11 a.m. and resumed at 11.05 a.m.*)

¹. See page 42.

7. Address by Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy

The PRESIDENT. – The next order of the day is the address by Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

It is my pleasure to welcome Mr. Manzolini who, I trust, has had a good journey from Rome to Paris.

Mr. MANZOLINI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – I would like to open these brief comments by referring to the current international situation which, in a way, forms the backdrop to this important session of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU.

The present stage in East-West relations – vitally important as they are for European security – is unquestionably marked by a strong element of change. Both the transformations in the USSR – about whose reality I do not think there can be much doubt – and the developments in the international situation seem to me to have opened up particularly interesting prospects. In that context, the Soviet-American summit in Moscow, over and above the concrete results that have been obtained, certainly had considerable significance in the political implications arising out of it.

The content and tone of the final declarations adopted in Moscow are evidence of further progress towards more stable Soviet-American relations.

In this connection, the closing of the gap between the two sides' positions on a number of decisive aspects of the negotiations for the reduction of strategic weapons must be regarded as particularly important and in line with the European interests of the Italian Government. It is our belief that some reduction in the over-abundant strategic arsenal would appreciably reduce the threat to Europe and therefore the vulnerability of our continent.

Other positive aspects are the finalisation of agreements on verification regarding the limitation of nuclear explosions and the joint expression of a firm will to promote the speedy conclusion of negotiations for a ban on chemical weapons, an essential condition for the solution of the complex problems still on the negotiating table in Geneva.

However, the central problem for European security is still, undoubtedly, that of the downward adjustment of the balance of power in conventional forces and the removal of unmistakably offensive capabilities presenting a particular risk for the stability of our continent.

What remains in this sector is to verify Soviet readiness to make progress towards a fundamental change in the situation.

Thus, over and above the promising results of the last Soviet-American summit, we Europeans need to involve ourselves more and more actively in the dialogue with East Europe at this particularly crucial juncture in international relations.

It is a phase in which new prospects and new challenges are emerging because, among other things, of the stage reached in transatlantic relations, with the re-emergence of the problem of the equal sharing of burdens and risks, the current debate on the concept of disarmament, security and strategy, and the definition of a joint stance vis-à-vis East Europe that will promote peaceful policies and a spirit of openness whilst safeguarding our fundamental security interests.

Italy believes that, in this overall context with its rapid movement and continually changing prospects, Europe must make the best possible use of the instruments of consultation available to it in order to define a more clear-cut European identity in the field of security and defence. Italy also believes it to be just as important that, in promoting the development of a specific European rôle, every effort should be made not to cause problems in our vital relations with the United States and to maintain intact – in this difficult transitional phase characterised by the United States' financial difficulties – the effectiveness and scale of the American presence in defence of Europe.

We are also convinced that precisely in order to strengthen Europe's rôle and function in the field of security, WEU can and should make a decisive contribution. WEU's rôle in the definition of a European security policy is now widely recognised. It is part and parcel of the objective of building a Europe that is politically as well as economically integrated and in which security would constitute one of the essential dimensions.

Europe of the twelve, whilst potentially the most appropriate framework for the development of a European foreign policy, has its shortcomings in practical terms because there is no consensus on the framing of a common foreign policy including security, at present going beyond the terms of the single European act, or in other words beyond consideration of the political and economic aspects of security. Our responsibilities on this subject within the framework of WEU are consequently increased.

We are therefore convinced of the need to carry further our study, in WEU, of the problems of joint security and of the prospects of wider co-operation in the field of defence. In fact we would like to bring about closer links between countries united by a substantial community of interest and opinion in this changing phase of the overall framework of East-West relations in order to identify Western Europe's specific

Mr. Manzolini (continued)

security interests and therefore protect them more clearly. This needs to be done in such a way as not to create any misunderstandings about the vital need for the partnership with the United States, in full recognition of the irreplaceable rôle of the Atlantic Alliance and with the precise object of strengthening the European pillar of that alliance.

I have noted the thinly-veiled criticisms by Mr. Mellor, the United Kingdom Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, about Italy's share in the burden of joint defence. Here I think it essential to look at a number of points that should give a better picture of the facts of the problem and clarify for this Assembly, in a constructive and positive spirit, a number of aspects of Italy's contribution to the joint defence of Europe. I do not know what burden Mr. Mellor was referring to, but given the responsible position he has in the Foreign Office I imagine that he had in mind more than just those burdens to which a figure can be put and about which, even so, I would like to give you some information.

With regard to the aspect of burden-sharing that is most significant both for the alliance and from the general political viewpoint, I would like to recall that in 1979, with its decision regarding the deployment of cruise missiles on Italian territory, Italy made a decisive contribution and in fact gave the lead for similar decisions by other European governments, to a commitment that proved ultimately to be essential for the very credibility of the NATO defence commitment. Similarly significant to my mind, in this connection, is the recent decision by the Italian Government, now due to go before parliament, to have the flight of F-16s from the Spanish base stationed at Torrejon on Italian soil.

Referring more specifically to the problem of putting a figure to our financial contribution I have to tell you that recently, at the meeting of the Defence Planning Committee on 26th to 27th May, Mr. Zanone, our Minister of Defence, announced that the Italian Government had approved and submitted to parliament a ten-year programme for the execution of the new tasks falling to Italy under the programme for strengthening the conventional sector adopted by the Atlantic Alliance – the so-called CDI programme.

Again, Italy has fulfilled the undertaking, also entered into within the framework of NATO, for an annual 3% increase in real terms in the defence budget itself, admittedly with some fluctuations from year to year.

Lastly, I would like to point out how difficult it is to compare the defence budgets of nuclear countries with those of countries that have

decided not to have nuclear weapons and have freely signed the non-proliferation treaty. It seems obvious that an important part of the British defence budget must necessarily be earmarked for modernisation of the British nuclear arsenal, a part of which – it is worth noting – is not included in the integrated joint defence system.

The Italian Government welcomed the decision taken by the Ministerial Council in The Hague to invite Portugal and Spain to open negotiations for their accession to WEU. This decision would seem calculated to strengthen the organisation and responds to the hopes and needs of two countries that are now involved in the process of European construction. From the outset, Italy had made it clear that it was fully prepared to endorse the accession of the two Iberian countries to WEU and remains convinced that their participation in the organisation set up by the modified Brussels Treaty will usefully contribute firstly to a more precise definition of a European security identity and secondly to the more direct involvement of these two countries in Europe's defence and security.

Another reason for special satisfaction, for a country like Italy, with its traditional feeling for the rôle of the parliamentary Assembly of WEU, is to note that, with this decision, the Council has responded positively to the frequent urgings of this Assembly. We therefore hope that the consultations, already under way, that are to work out the conditions for the two Iberian countries' accession to WEU will be open and constructive and will quickly lead to success.

The reactivation of WEU was born of the recognised need to harmonise our viewpoints on the specific conditions of European security and on the contribution that our countries are required to make towards strengthening the security of the West as a whole. The essential objectives of this reactivation can therefore be summed up as an attempt to identify a genuinely European dimension of security, consistent with our commitments under the Atlantic Alliance and its reinforcement, and to involve public opinion more closely in the debate on subjects relating to European security by way of WEU's special institution, its parliamentary Assembly.

Overall, the Italian Government regards the results so far achieved in the reactivation of WEU as positive. Unquestionably, the adoption of the "platform on European security interests" represents a major achievement as part of the reactivation of the organisation and of the on-going discussion of the specific interests of European security.

With its partners, Italy is taking an active part in implementing this platform – to which the last meeting of the Ministerial Council has given a

Mr. Manzolini (continued)

substantial impetus – and, in particular, those provisions which set out a programme for the future. It is taking all appropriate action to ensure that, by its next session, the Ministerial Council has been supplied with well thought-out material on the most significant aspects of joint defence.

As is known, Italy's views on the extension of Europe's rôle and co-operation among Europeans in the field of joint defence are firmly based on the objective of European integration – with the gradual pooling of defence systems – and the maintenance and consolidation of a vigorous Atlantic Alliance. This is also at the root of our conviction that WEU should perform the essential function of welding together the various initiatives in this specific sector – to avoid their fragmentation as well as anything else – and providing the drive towards a gradual broadening of forms of collaboration among the Seven.

These basic considerations were of course also borne in mind during the recent Italian-German summit which defined the conditions for intensified dialogue between Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany and for the search for forms of growing agreement and co-operation, in the field of security as well as elsewhere, fully consistent with Italy's belief that European security must be global and indivisible.

On the Italian side it is felt that the seven-nation discussions should also include – precisely for the effective enlargement of forms of defence co-operation among Europeans – research on possible synergies between existing strategic doctrines, to ensure that the real amount of each country's contribution to implementing the undertaking, set out in the platform, to “defend each allied country at its borders” brings a better return.

In our view, considerable importance also attaches to the consultation within WEU on the situation in the Persian Gulf – the first ever application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty which provides that member countries shall consult in the event of a threat to peace even in situations not falling within the geographical application of the treaty. This type of collaboration has proved to be particularly useful in connection with the presence in the region of the naval forces of a number of member states sent there by autonomous decision of the respective governments, but with some useful co-ordination of their operations, partly through the mechanisms for ad hoc consultation available in WEU. So some major steps have been taken on the road towards the effective reactivation of WEU. On the other hand, we cannot hide the fact that a lot still has to be done.

For one thing its structures need to be adapted to match the objectives that have been set. It is not therefore an accident that institutional questions should now have more importance and have become the subject of in-depth debate within the organisation.

When the decision to initiate the reactivation of WEU was taken in Rome in 1984 it was decided to use an existing organisation as the instrument of intensified collaboration between European countries on security matters although it had been designed for different purposes.

Now WEU is faced with greater tasks and increasing hopes are placed on it in a situation in which the international frame of reference is changing rapidly – I am thinking primarily of East-West relations – and in which renewed interest is being taken in the issues of European security.

It is perfectly normal, therefore, that we should now be asking questions about the suitability of the institutions and arrangements that are still basically those of the modified Brussels Treaty to perform WEU's new tasks.

Without any doubt, the first and most obvious requirement is to bring the ministerial organs together at one and the same headquarters. This is all too clearly necessary for the organisation to work properly and, what is more, is the principle already agreed by the Ministerial Council. Unfortunately – but probably precisely because the process of WEU reactivation has not yet gone far enough – it has not yet been possible to reach a consensus on collocation.

In the present circumstances, therefore, our main concern must be to ensure the effective operation of the organisation in the transitional period before the hoped-for decision is taken to bring the two headquarters together.

To our way of thinking, we need to push ahead with rationalisation measures which can be introduced as part of a gradual advance towards WEU's final organisation even in the absence of a decision on collocation. In this context in addition to the strengthening of the secretariat and the offices of the Assembly, we need to put into effect the decision of principle adopted by the Ministerial Council in November 1987 on the unification of the three agencies located in Paris. I am sure that a positive decision on these measures would unquestionably help to improve the work of the organisation overall and make it more effective.

In the framework of WEU reactivation, the Italian Government feels that the parliamentary Assembly's stimulating and monitoring rôle needs to be further enhanced. Italy is wholly convinced of the importance of the part that the WEU parliamentary Assembly can and should play in making the general public and national parliaments more aware of European positions

Mr. Manzolini (continued)

on security and has therefore always sought to improve relations between the Council and the Assembly and make them more fruitful.

It seems to us essential for the rôle of the Assembly to be strengthened if we really want reactivated WEU to be the framework in which, firstly, the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance can be built up and, secondly, the phased process of integrating the other aspects of the political plan of unifying Europe may be advanced, and a common system in defence gradually brought into being.

(Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Kindly forgive me, Minister, for not having heard the whole of your address. The press conference I was giving happened to clash with your speech.

Would you agree, Minister, to answer questions from members of our Assembly?...

(The Minister indicated his assent)

I call Mr. Martino.

Mr. MARTINO (*Italy*) (Translation). – Minister, the Brussels Treaty was modified by our countries now members of this Assembly in the desire, among other things, to work together for their “collective self-defence”. I quote from the preamble to the treaty. The first paragraph of Article VIII reads: “For the purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe”, etc.

It is precisely for this purpose that I put to you the same question that I have asked other ministers in this Assembly: Mr. Genscher, Mr. Poos, Mr. Spadolini, Mr. Chirac and our own minister, Mr. Andreotti. From all of them I received bland and ineffective answers.

I am hoping for something better in the future. I have always wondered how the institutional purposes of WEU could be given practical effect and I have studied carefully what the general public considers to be serious threats to security and to the real strength of a country's economy in the face of the natural disasters and accidental events that have hit the headlines in the past. They have all, I feel, been fully reported in the media and in the literature, the latest examples being the disasters at Chernobyl, the pollution of the Rhine and the earthquakes affecting several European countries.

On the occasions I referred to – I have given you the names of the ministers that I asked – my question was: would it not be possible to set up a joint emergency force, under single command, to take action in peacetime and to safeguard peace?

I was told that the idea was a good one but did not fall within the terms of reference of the treaty. To this day we have not been able to reach a practical conclusion that would constitute the nucleus of a convincing solution that all the nations could accept from every viewpoint, including that of finance.

What is your answer, Minister?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Minister.

Mr. MANZOLINI (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy*) (Translation). – Mr. Martino, let me say how much I agree with you on the fact that public opinion in our countries is growing up and that there is growing awareness of the kinds of subject that you have raised, which demand effective action from us as part of our parliamentary and government responsibilities. Allow me also to associate myself – I hope that this has no negative connotations in your eyes – with the other colleagues in responsible positions who have answered you before. Your question is real and is the result of the prompting of public opinion but it has to be seen in the light of the facts as they unfortunately are; they should not be accepted but they cannot be confused with what we would like them to be.

As things stand, I believe the road to take is that of political initiative, in other words the approach that involves stressing and strengthening the rôle of our parliamentary Assembly which must not confine itself to acting as a sounding box but should also act by making concrete proposals on subjects for which it is entitled to offer guidance to parliaments and national governments and, if I may say so, even bring pressure to bear on them.

In the present state of affairs, whilst not ruling out the possibility of setting up a joint civil emergency force to act in case of natural disasters in peacetime, we should simply do what we can to ensure that this is brought about by decisions taken by the individual European governments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone else wish to ask a question?...

Since that is not the case, I thank you, Minister, for your address and for having been kind enough to answer Mr. Martino's question.

8. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure

(Presentation of the report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges and vote on the draft decision, Doc. 1133)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Rules of Pro-

The President (continued)

cedure and Privileges on the revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure and vote on the draft decision, Document 1133.

I call Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Sir Geoffrey FINSBERG (*United Kingdom*). – Members will have had Document 1133 for some time. It contains a variety of amendments which are all designed to tidy up matters or to take forward ideas that have been proposed. I shall speak briefly about them and then be delighted to listen to the debate.

The first amendment, dealing with Rule 33, is designed to excise from our rule book the nonsensical words “sitting and standing”. You will have noticed that you have been voting by holding up your cards, and I am sure you will appreciate that the saving of wear and tear on your trouser-seats has been helpful to you.

The points that were raised by Mr. Pannella and others about Rules 34 and 48 were designed to try to give the Assembly a more important rôle and the final say on the budget. As most members know, that is impossible because in the end we are not the masters of our budget. We are given what our governments decide, and the only way of changing that is by members putting pressure on their own governments. However, we were able to make a helpful advance based on Mr. Pannella's idea. If a disagreement emerges in the normal process of dealing with the budget, the Presidential Committee shall have the right to have a joint meeting with the Council. You will have heard David Mellor say earlier this week that if we were still unhappy at that point, a minister would meet the Presidential Committee so that we would know that our ideas were getting through to the political leadership. That is not in this document. It cannot be put in it, but the undertaking was given and remains on the record, and it represents a helpful advance.

Mr. Pannella and others also made a suggestion about Rule 37, namely, to form a non-inscribed group. As you will see, there is a variety of objections to that, not least that the funds of existing groups would have to be reduced to provide funds for the new group. I imagine that that would not be popular. Also, it is not possible for such a disparate group to put forward views that could ensure, as we say in paragraph 7, either co-ordination or representation. However, paragraph 8 will be welcome to members who have raised this issue. It provides that when the Presidential Committee takes a decision about the Assembly it should consult appropriate representatives, who may or may not belong to a political group. In the light of that, the President would make certain that such consultations included those who were not members of existing groups.

Rule 51 removes what appears to me to be an anomaly – it also appeared thus to my committee – which means that the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges cannot consider ideas unless they are referred to it by the Presidential Committee. We now have the right to examine the rules in a particular way to help make the organisation more flexible.

If I may discharge one duty on behalf of the Presidential Committee, I refer now to the urgency motion about limiting the number of speakers. I formally report that the Presidential Committee has referred the matter to the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. We shall be examining it in good time for our report to go to the Presidential Committee before the December meeting of the Assembly. I hope that members will agree that that deals adequately with the idea that wisely emerged from the Assembly.

I come lastly to Rule 40. Colleagues will know that, having, as they do, to come from six countries to a seventh, it is not always easy to get a quorum for such highly interesting committee meetings as those of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges or the Budget Committee – although it is much easier to get one for the General Affairs Committee or the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Because the Rules Committee does not make policy, and because its proposals must come to the full Assembly, we propose a different quorum for it. Instead of needing eleven members as it does now, we suggest the amendment to Rule 40. It means that provided each national delegation is represented – which means seven, not eleven members – and provided that the recommendations are unanimous, the Rules Committee quorum will be seven, not eleven members. I am convinced that that is the right way to proceed because no action of the Rules Committee can commit the Assembly until it has accepted what comes from the Rules Committee, so no policy matter is involved. With that explanation, I hope that colleagues will find these proposals acceptable.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Does anyone wish to speak in the debate?...

That is not the case.

We shall therefore proceed to vote on the draft decision contained in Document 1133.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by sitting and standing unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?

There are not.

The vote will be taken by sitting and standing.

The President (continued)

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The draft decision is agreed to unanimously¹.

9. Impact of the WEU Assembly's activities on parliaments and public opinion

(Presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations and vote on the draft order, Doc. 1135)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The next order of the day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations on the impact of the WEU Assembly's activities on parliaments and public opinion and vote on the draft order, Document 1135.

I call Mr. Hardy, on behalf of Mr. Chénard, Rapporteur.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – It is a particular privilege to have the opportunity to present this report. It would have been presented by the newly-elected Vice-Chairman of the committee, Mr. Ewing, but he has been called back to Scotland. He offers his profound apologies. My colleague regrets that he cannot be here. He intended to present the report on behalf of Mr. Chénard who also offers his apologies. Mr. Chénard is involved in the current political contests in France. I am in the same political group as my French colleague, but, given the nature of the report, it would be inappropriate for me to say that the Assembly sends its good wishes. We all understand the reason for his absence.

I pay tribute to the work of Mr. Tummers, who was Vice-Chairman and was very helpful in ensuring that the report was made available to the Assembly. I also thank the Clerk of the committee for his work. At this time the work of WEU is of particular importance. It has become physically more significant as a result of the international events in recent weeks and because of the Council's recent activities. We must ensure that the Assembly's voice is heard, not merely in our national parliaments, but by the think-tanks, the decision makers and the defence and security groups throughout Europe.

The purpose of Mr. Chénard's report, which I have the honour to present, is to examine the conditions in which the work of WEU can be included in parliamentary activities in member countries. To that end a questionnaire was sent to national delegations. The study conducted on

the basis of the answers received shows that the Assembly faces persistent difficulty in propagating its work widely at national level. The WEU lobby in national parliamentary committees responsible for the matters handled by the Assembly is clearly not strong enough in most parliaments. That might be related to the composition of delegations. However, in the majority of member countries reports adopted by committees or the Assembly are distributed to parliamentarians who are not members of the Assembly only on request. Consequently, in practice our documents go little further than the delegations themselves since interest in the documents outside the organisation is not widespread.

It is difficult, if not impossible, for the Belgian, German, Italian and Netherlands Delegations to work on the documents because they are only partly translated into the official languages of those countries.

At the last meeting of the Committee on Parliamentary and Public Relations several members suggested that the relevant national services be encouraged to translate more Assembly documents into the languages of their countries. Despite the appeal by the President of the Assembly after each session to the heads of all member parliaments to ensure that the texts be the subject of interventions or suggestions, they remain a dead letter. In only three member parliaments are there procedures for informing parliamentarians of the President's appeal. Since most national delegations publish regular information reports on their activities during a session and since the documents are widely circulated in the parliaments involved, it is suggested that a paragraph be included in the reports notifying readers of the specific texts adopted and of the content of the letter by which after each session the President of the Assembly transmits the texts selected to the presidents of member parliaments.

It is encouraging to note that in recent months a number of members of the Assembly, particularly from Luxembourg, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, have endeavoured to conduct a debate with governments on the basis of the adopted recommendations. Given the significance of some of the recommendations that we have made this week such a development is to be profoundly welcomed.

Furthermore, the committee's most recent meetings, organised in The Hague and Brussels, were a success thanks to the interest shown by parliamentarians and the media. Journalists were invited to briefings about WEU's current activities.

It is essential for national debates on the basis of our work in Paris to be intensified in more parliaments to oblige our governments to

¹. See page 43.

Mr. Hardy (continued)

improve the process of answering our recommendations. We must ensure – indeed, demand – that the Council follow up our recommendations.

In regard to the public relation activities of the Council and the Secretariat-General, I note with interest a recently-published booklet giving information on the various stages in the reactivation of WEU. Although it only reproduces statements issued since 1984, the initiative is to be welcomed in that it could be seen as a first step towards a more open information policy by the Council. The publication of a regular bulletin, for instance, might be a useful means of informing the public about the rôle of Europe and WEU in security and defence matters. Our debates this week emphasise the importance of such an approach.

I am delighted to have the opportunity to present the report. I have paid appropriate tributes to the individuals involved in our work. I am privileged to present the report to the Assembly and I trust that it will be adopted.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is open.

I call Mr. Tummers.

Mr. TUMMERS (*Netherlands*) (Translation). – Mr. President, I surely do not need to say that I am sorry to be the only speaker.

Mr. President, the rôle of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations is, of course, an extremely important one. The question which the committee itself raises is whether its activities can and do reflect this importance. We again see that the interest shown by our colleagues is far from overwhelming. I have not been so silly as to check if the members who were talking about public opinion earlier on are here now. I believe it was the Chairman of our committee who referred to “that mystical idea of public opinion”. Clearly, not everyone who has spoken about public opinion also feels an obligation to make a creative contribution to this committee’s work during the debate.

This is particularly true of the “hottest” subject we have considered today, the subject introduced by Mr. Kittelmann: the consequences of a summit meeting like that held in Moscow. What do the public actually know about what happened there and, more specifically, about what is important for their everyday lives? We read about arms reductions. In very many countries it will immediately be said: that means a lower defence budget, so there can be larger social and cultural budgets, which are often cut. But that is not the way it is. The public do not realise that arms control costs almost as much as what can be saved through arms control. A great

deal of thought is still being given to the relationship between these two types of costs. The newspapers do not know enough about this either. The Spanish newspapers contain numerous articles on WEU membership, but if you read them, it is obvious that they hardly appreciate how accurately defined the situation under the WEU treaty is. It is all too easily compared to the North Atlantic Treaty.

There are innumerable aspects like this. The publications we issue ourselves do not give the impression that this Assembly pays much attention to them. Every three years, when this subject comes up for debate, I point out that WEU is incapable of publishing the history of its third decade. The history of the first and second decades has been published, but there has been no publication on the third, which includes the period of WEU’s reactivation. I had a very long exchange of letters with President Caro on this, but this history has yet to be published. So it looks as if we are just making poor excuses, as if we are busy telling ourselves that it is so good and so important. We ourselves are doing too little to inform the public.

While on the subject, I just want to add that I quite understand the Rapporteur saying that the meeting in The Hague and Brussels was a success. But was it really a success? Did we really achieve our objective there, or did we miss the mark? The discussions we had there were all with people from this Assembly. There were far too few other parliamentarians to talk to.

I have therefore proposed to the new Chairman of our committee this morning that henceforth the parliaments should be sent not only the recommendations but also the reports of the debates so that the parliamentarians have something that interests them, so that they can see how views were exchanged before the conclusion set out in the recommendation was reached. Ministers must have recommendations because they have to implement them, or not as the case may be, but parliamentarians must know what political opinions were put forward and what the relative strengths of the two sides were. If we are to arouse their interest in this, we must send them the report of our debates. We do not need to flatter ourselves by saying that we are very successful. No, we are not successful enough with this committee. I can only hope that our new Chairman will set about making of this committee what it really ought to be at this stage of WEU’s development.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – The debate is closed.

I call the substitute Rapporteur.

Mr. HARDY (*United Kingdom*). – It would be churlish not to reply to Mr. Tummers, as he has clearly recognised the difficulties. His brief but telling speech described the difficulties and real-

Mr. Hardy (continued)

ities, referring to the Assembly's problems in extending perception of its work and of the problems it has grasped. The perception that Mr. Tummers revealed should lead the Assembly and the organisation as a whole to feel motivated to ensure that the report's recommendations are put into effect.

I should go a little further, and I hope that Mr. Tummers accepts this suggestion. In addition to implementing the report, the committee in particular will have to monitor the effect of the report and then to take such further action as is needed to ensure that there is wider awareness of the Assembly's work. If necessary, further steps may need to be taken. The report takes us some way along a necessary road, and I trust that those steps will receive the Assembly's approval.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – I call the Chairman of the committee.

Mr. PONTILLON (*France*) (Translation). – Mr. President, it would be both unwise and almost improper on my part, having only taken office this morning, to add any comments to what has already been so excellently put by Mr. Hardy and Mr. Tummers.

I would like to thank them both, Mr. Hardy for having been the voice of our friend Mr. Chénard, at the moment busy with other "sports", and Mr. Tummers for his emphasis on what the committee now has to do.

Information and public relations are a kind of modern-day rock of Sisyphus. We know very well that nowadays, in all our countries, information is often more important than political events themselves and that "savoir faire" sometimes has to take second place to "faire savoir".

I hope, Mr. President, that, thanks to our joint efforts, this new dimension of WEU's responsibility towards not only the specialised but also the general public will tomorrow become a real feature of our work.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – We shall now proceed to vote on the draft order in Document 1135, taking due account of the amendments to the Rules of Procedure which have just been adopted since they take effect immediately.

Under Rule 33, the Assembly votes by show of hands unless ten representatives or substitutes present in the chamber request a vote by roll-call.

Are there ten members requesting a vote by roll-call?...

There are not.

The vote will therefore be taken by show of hands.

(A vote was then taken by show of hands)

The draft order is agreed to unanimously¹.

10. Ajournement of the session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). – Ladies and gentlemen, we have now reached the end of this part-session.

Before closing the sitting, I wish to thank Assembly members for their attendance and the quality of their speeches, the Secretary-General and ministers who have taken part in our proceedings, and the press representatives who have reported on our work.

Lastly, on behalf of the Assembly as a whole, I wish to thank all the permanent and temporary staff, including especially our interpreters who have enabled us to hold particularly fruitful debates in spite of language barriers.

I now declare the thirty-fourth ordinary session of the Assembly of Western European Union adjourned.

The sitting is closed.

(The sitting was closed at 12.05 p.m.)

1. See page 44.

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