Fostering European Identity in an Enlarged European Union:
Analysis and Perspective

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The European Union is entering a new era with a proposed enlargement from its current fifteen states to twenty-five by 2004. This is both an enormous and ambitious undertaking for the European Union and for the individual acceding states. One of the socio-cultural issues associated with the enlargement is emerging European identity. This paper will examine the need for fostering European identity as a way to bring stability and viability to the Union, and the various problems associated with the forging of pan-European identity. Additionally, there is a need to reinforce an argument for duality in fostering European identity – in addition, and based on various national and cultural identities of the peoples of the European Union. On the other hand, fostering European identity cannot be achieved without citizen comprehension of main unifying characteristics, which keep serve as a basis for their new identity. Furthermore, in light of the heightened sense of national sovereignty among several Member States, efforts of some Eurocrats to foster this identity may become futile. New accession states may become a proving ground for the identity in the future, if the rise in ethno-nationalism there is countered by an increased level of educational campaigning by the EU and national governments.

To begin this analysis, one should closely examine the definition of the notion of identity, a fluid and hard to define concept. Lord Bhikhu Parekh, former Professor of Political Theory at the University of Hull, clearly identifies the four most common ways in which the term 'identity' is used in literature:

First, some equate identity with difference, and argue that to explore a polity's identity is to explore what makes it distinct and distinguishable from others.

Secondly, some equate identity with self-understanding, with what the polity understands itself to be, and argue that explore or ascertain the identity of a polity is to explore its self-conception or self-understanding.

Thirdly, some writers equate identity with deeply cherished values, goals and commitments, and argue that to ascertain the identity of a polity is to ask what it stands for, what is central goals or values are, what projects define it and evoke its undivided loyalty and commitment.

Fourthly, for some writers identity refers to the inner constitution, the central organising principles, the constitutive characteristics, that make a polity the kind of polity it is. For them to inquire into the identity of a polity is to uncover its organising principles,
its deepest tendencies, impulses, ideals, values, beliefs, dispositions, characteristic ways of thought, etc.¹

The author also rightly indicates that "[t]here is hardly a country in the world today, in which national identity is not a subject of agonised public debate."² This is understandable, considering that Europe is currently in the process of transforming from a mere status of an international organisation, to possibly something that will possess the qualities of a federal state. One also must address the question of what it is to be a European. The BBV Foundation argues that:

To be European will mean being part of a rich diversity through which alone the 'all-European' identity exists, and whose components are mutually accepted and recognised as equal. One would be a European through being German, Italian, Danish etc. or also: a Sicilian, a Bavarian, a French Corsican, a British Indian, or a Russian Jew.³

To understand the issue of an emerging European identity one must also examine the unifying characteristics for such an identity to exist. One such characteristic for other national identities has been belonging to a particular state. What is Europe now and how does it affect the sense of European identity? What drives people to accept or reject the new identity? Do they have to accept the European identity instead of their current national one? Is the European identity a threat to the established and deeply engraved British, Danish, Spanish identities, or is it a complementary one? This analysis will explore some of these issues.

To discuss whether one can talk about belonging to the EU as a state, let us examine the current status of the European Union. The question of the legal status and legitimacy of the Union on the world stage has been raised frequently of late. The functions and characteristics of the EU do not give a clear and affirmative indication that it is a state in the traditional sense of the word. Or to be exact, it is not one yet. Among some characteristics of a state that the Union has are the defined borders, common interest vested in the controlling sovereign authority

² Ibid.
(including various branches of such), and finally the new notion of EU citizenship. Some argue that an emerging European identity is also signalling the European Union’s shift towards statehood.

Although few dispute the legitimacy of this unique body of nations, establishing its legitimacy still does not answer a pivotal question of whether the European Union is a state or whether it is moving toward acquiring more characteristics of statehood (having defined borders, population, etc.). The Union does have definite borders. In fact, the Schengen Agreement provides for elimination of internal border controls among participating European states, whereas external borders have become de facto borders of the Agreement. Note, however, that not all Member States of the European Union are signatories to the Schengen Agreement (most notably, the United Kingdom is not). And although this does not preclude the states, which opted-out originally, from joining in the future, this limitation must be mentioned. At the same time, the Schengen Agreement adds some weight to the argument that it specifies the borders of the European Union. Furthermore, all candidate states are required to join the Agreement as part of accession to the European Union just as they are required to accept EU’s acquis communautaire. Even if one puts the Agreement aside, few if any would argue against the fact that the Union consists of specified member states, each one of which has legally defined, and de jure recognised, international borders.

The second characteristic of a state mentioned above, is that of sovereign authority. The hierarchy of the EU’s government structure has been the subject of much criticism, particularly for its oversized bureaucracy. Most of these critics base their claims on personal perception, and not on any empirical evidence. Indeed, to some it seems unjustifiable to spend large sums of money to provide simultaneous translations services for all meetings and publicised materials, to satisfy the political correctness of recognising all languages of the Member States as official languages of the Union’s business. It is not within the scope of this paper to analyse EU budgetary spending. Note, however, that through an effective policy of on-
the-spot implementation of EU decisions by the Member States, the Union has effectively avoided an overblown bureaucracy. As Andrew Moravcsik notes, "The EU employs fewer people than a modest European city. They total about one-fortieth of the number of comparable civilian federal employees even in the United States, a jurisdiction of comparable size but noted in cross-national perspective for the small size of its national government workforce."⁴

Despite the relatively small size of bureaucracy, the Union succeeded in establishing itself as an authority. There are arguments that the sovereign authority of the Union is illegitimate, thus creating a "democratic deficit." Andrew Moravcsik effectively proves the opposite, citing that it is understandable that as an "organization of continental scope," and as a multinational body, which "lacks the grounding in a common history, culture, discourse and symbolism on which most individual polities can draw," it may appear distant from the individual European.⁵ Yet, he asserts, this does not disqualify the EU from being a legitimate body. Moreover, he adds, that "constitutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control via national governments, and the increasing powers of the European Parliament are sufficient to ensure that EU policy-making is, in nearly all cases, clean, transparent, effective and politically responsive to the demands of European citizens."⁶

This authority in the European Union is relatively small, yet extensive. From the democratically elected Parliament (which some argue still lacks proper characteristics of one, although it has lately also acquired more power) to a very powerful European Court of Justice and the Council of Ministers, whose decisions and directives are binding on the Member States. The States do not have a right to opt out of these decisions, and must implement them within the time frame set out in Brussels. Moreover, they face sanctions of various kinds should they fail to implement these decisions. Is this voluntary submission of sovereignty to a supra-

⁵ Ibid., p. 604.
⁶ Ibid., p. 605.
national body not an indication of recognition of supremacy of this body? In fact, it is. The idea of reaching and expanding the objectives of the Union, which seems to be growing with every new Treaty, is indeed an indication of the supremacy of the EU, albeit in areas outlined by the Treaties. Many of the Council's decisions and directives already implemented would have been implemented by states in the past, which also serves as an indication of the EU acquiring similar state-like characteristics.

Finally, the last characteristic of a state mentioned earlier, that of citizenship. One must note that there are instances in literature of use of the words 'citizenship' and 'nationality' interchangeably. In fact, this is applicable not only to the literature on the subject, but to some national legislation as well. This contradicts legally accepted definitions of the two subjects. A citizen is a person, who has a permanent legal connection to a state along with rights, duties and opportunities that define one's place and conduct in a society. This is indeed different from nationality – owing a permanent allegiance to a state. Some would argue that the difference between the two is quite minute and it is more a matter of verbal analyses. Yet, it is important to recognise that one can be a national of a state without being its citizen. For example, inhabitants of American Samoa and Swains Island retain the status of "non-citizen nationals." In fact, the U.S. Code Title 8 § 1101 (a)(22) clearly acknowledges the difference when identifying "the nationals of the United States" as both U.S. citizens and non-citizens who owe permanent allegiance to the United States."

The current Treaty on the European Union (Article 2) indicates that one the objectives of the organisation is "to strengthen the protection of rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union." It is unclear whether this was somewhat sloppy drafting, merely a desire to avoid duplication of terms, or a deliberate distinction of the two terms. In the former case, it would appear that the drafters of the treaty

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have followed the trend of modern literature on citizenship, which uses the terms interchangeably. In the latter case, was this an attempt on behalf of the Union to confer citizenship to all people who have permanent allegiance to Member States, including those who possess no citizenship of such, for instance legalised permanent residents, both third-country nationals and stateless? Although a plausible undertaking, there is an obvious difficulty in determining whether these permanent residents do indeed have allegiance to the state or not. Besides, it would be impossible to imagine who would be able to make a final determination of the case one way or another. Not all states, indeed, make this distinction in their domestic legislation, more often than not referring to citizens alone. Notably, there was an extensive debate in the UK Parliament in the summer of 2002 on this very subject.\(^8\)

Yet, there are indications that the pervasive trend of using the terms 'citizenship' and 'nationality' interchangeably influenced the European Union in drafting the current version of the Treaty. Recently adopted by national referendum in Ireland the Treaty of Nice, which came into force on 1 February 2003, does not bring any clarity to the issue. Even the Second Report of the European Commission on the Citizenship of the Union makes no distinction and uses the terms interchangeably:

Citizenship of the Union conferred on nationals of all Member States by the Maastricht Treaty is meant to make the process of European integration more relevant to individual citizens by increasing their participation, strengthening the protection of their rights and promoting the idea of an European identity. The practical benefits that it engenders are clearly additional to those arising from national citizenship as Union citizenship cannot be acquired or for that matter lost without the acquisition or the loss of the nationality of a Member State.\(^9\) [emphasis added]

Whether the notion of similarities in definitions of these two terms is a justification of their interchangeable use is beyond the scope of this analysis. Yet, if the idea of using such terms interchangeably is indeed a valid one, it becomes troublesome due to the apparent exclusion of permanent residents of Member States, both third-country nationals and particularly the


stateless, from the scope of many rights protection documents of the Union. To avoid any further confusion between "citizenship" and "nationality" this analysis will try to avoid using the latter term, or use the two terms interchangeably.

Thus, based on the above, the European Union has (especially over the past ten years) acquired some characteristics which before could be attributed only to a nation-state. Yet, the Union lacks very important statehood characteristics. For instance with a few exceptions (most notably the Value Added Tax), the Union does not include "taxation and the setting of fiscal priorities" within its agenda. Neither is it currently burdened with "social welfare provision, defence, and police powers, education policy, cultural policy, non-economic civil litigation," common defence, and other areas.\textsuperscript{10} At the same time, throughout the latest set of Treaties, one can see an attempt by the Member States to transfer some of their sovereign powers to the Union. How long it will take, and how the fervent supporters of individual states' sovereignty will be addressed remains to be seen.

Another state characteristic mentioned above is that of national identity. Undoubtedly, when one refers to the notion of national identity, there is an underlying sense of belonging to a particular nation and/or state. In states which encompass one ethnic group this statement is more evident than in those, which house several ethnic groups. Multiethnic states normally strive to create a sense of national identity throughout their population. This is the case, for example, with the United States – historically, a country of immigrants, who upon coming to the US and naturalising as citizens, more often than not describe themselves as Americans, although with knowledge of having historical roots elsewhere in the world. It is not uncommon for many Americans to refer to themselves as Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans, and so on. At the same time, the US succeeded in creating a notion of American national identity, with the general population acting as Americans in national unity. Other multi-ethnic countries are

similarly successful in fostering a (somewhat artificial) sense of national identity. Yet, there are others, Canada for example, which have struggled to create a meaningful national identity for various reasons.

How does this all apply to the European Union? Well, the European Union is often thought of as a "melting pot," comprised of very ethnically diverse states, both mono-national and multi-ethnic.\textsuperscript{11} Preserving cultural and ethnic diversity has been an issue promoted by both the Eurocrats in Brussels and the individual Member States' governments. Is European identity possible in a Union of such diverse states? Unquestionably, it is a complicated and sensitive task. Some argue that this new emerging European identity must eventually substitute for the current national identities of Member States. Yet, Peter van Ham argues that "this developing 'identity beyond the state' can only be based on a solid base of multiculturalism," clarifying and asserting, that multiculturalism is not an obstacle to the unified European identity.\textsuperscript{12} This is subject to not only empirical evaluation, but also to the test of time. For now, it appears that duality implied by Dr van Ham is indeed a desirable mode for European and national identities. Yet, there is not enough evidence to prove anything one way or another for the moment, and one can only analyse the current state of things, and possibly suggest some policy solutions.

Within the realm of possible policy, one must also note that any notion of identity is complex, and doesn't have indisputably correct principles for application. This stems from the sense of identity being fostered not only from within (vertically in either direction), but also being subject to external pressures. The latter is especially true in the current age of globalisation and internationalisation. The uniqueness of the European Union in an international legalistic sense adds a new dimension to the issue of national identity in general, and fostering a European one in particular.


As was established earlier, the European Union in its current form is not a state. Yet, it is no longer merely an international organisation either. There is no set timetable, nor definitive desire (as some say) for the European Union to complete transformation into some sort of a federal state. Thus, should one discuss fostering European identity at this time, one must also realise that this new identity will likely also enter a transitional phase subject to further correlation with the path chosen by the European Union. In other words, it is doubtful that the European identity can be successfully fostered at this time to its final desirable sense. Yet, when discussing European identity and the European Union, one might observe a paradoxical situation similar to the well-known question of what came first – a chicken or an egg. Speaking in terms of the current analysis, what should and/or will appear first – the more federalist Union or the European identity? Furthermore, in this tandem Union-identity, are both issues equally important for each other, and is there a need for one to help in the emergence of the other?

As earlier identified, there are several elements to the sources of European identity formation. One source can be found within the peoples of Europe. Do they want to have this new identity, one that will encompass hundreds of millions of people with various cultural, historical, and ethnic traditions? What do they think of the notion of the European identity? Do people see it as a threat to their own tested-by-time national identities? Is this threat spilling over to the general admiration to state's sovereignty in the Member States?

Almost all of these questions are being asked regularly in polls conducted by various research groups throughout Europe, from the Eurobarometer, to small-scale local organisations. Thus, to find empirical evidence for some conclusion is not a hard task. The more important thing question is what idea people of Europe have about the European identity, i.e. what does it entail. Unfortunately, there seems to be a difference in views between scholars and ordinary people in defining identity in general, and European identity in particular. The majority of Europeans see the emergence of the pan-European identity as an impediment to their own national identities and sovereignty of their states. It is not clear whether this attitude comes
from a general sense of fear or protectionism, or whether people lack a clear picture of what European identity is all about. On the latter point, some might debate about who is it at fault, and if there is anything that can be done about it.

One way or another, it is humanly natural for people to jump to the defence of their values, and to be protective of something they have grown to love and appreciate. National identity is one such value, one which involves a variety of attributes as discussed above. To simplify some things for the purpose of this analysis, one may identify important bases for feeling a sense of national identities. One, and often the most important one, is the base acquired by birth, i.e. citizenship. This is often accompanied by sense of cultural identity, which is passed down from parents and from surrounding society.

As mentioned, European identity is both different and unique. There is no discussion about a particular state for now. Additionally, national identities take generations to develop fully. At the same time with the new institution of European citizenship, one can speculate and draw parallels of what this complementary and derivative status can do for the creation and fostering of a new European identity parallel to the already established national identities.

The next set of sources of European identity stems from the overall notion that national identity works also from the top-down. Granting citizenship, which was discussed earlier, is a top-down policy. Yet, in the case of citizenship, it is one of the bases, where it is difficult to restrict it to a single category. Brigid Laffan has suggested three dimensions of the EU’s top-down policies designed to embellish Europe’s identity:

1. The development of rights and citizenship;
2. The politics of “belonging” and symbols;
3. The development and support for cross-national networks and cooperation.

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13 Unquestionably, citizenship is not always acquired by birth. For instance, the fact that a child born in one state to parents with a citizenship of another state, yet granted citizenship of the state of birth (\textit{ius soli}), doesn’t mean that that child will grow up with a sense of national identity of the state of birth. Most likely, this child will develop the sense of identity of the state to which he/she will belong through citizenship of his/her parents, especially if foreign birth was due to temporary place of residence outside of the regular domicile.

Let us examine these three dimensions a bit more closely. The development of rights and citizenship has been somewhat slow to start off, but lately has become one of the top priorities for the European Union. Presumably Brigid Laffan in her description refers not only to rights guaranteed by citizenship status, but human rights as well. The EU is well-known for its avid support for human rights. It incorporated human rights clauses in the Treaty of the European Union, and has included similar clauses in various bilateral treaties with third states. There is also discussion about including the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the text of the emerging European constitution.

Dr Laffan also undoubtedly includes rights guaranteed as a result of attaining European citizenship status. This issue must be examined more closely, for it is not without controversy because many thousands of stateless permanent residents of the Member States, as a result, will not be considered citizens of the Union. This will result in depriving them of certain rights, which have been guaranteed for the citizens of the Member States, and derivatively of the Union. Some believe that denying rights to permanent residents of the Member States who are not third-country nationals will inevitably lead to difficulties in any attempts to create a viable European identity.

Union citizenship is a unique institution, and requires further analysis. This citizenship in fact has very little to do with the overall traditional notion of citizenship on the basis that one cannot naturalise and become a European citizen without going through the process of acquiring national citizenship of a Member State. Besides, there is no such thing as a European passport. Yet, based on the current situation, it has one thing in common with the traditional definition of citizenship: it can effectively disenfranchise people, and divide the rights between those who hold Union citizenship and those who do not. What is bothersome is that the people who are indeed disenfranchised on a pan-European scale have no way of bringing about any change, with the exception of naturalising as one of the Member States' citizens.
Unfortunately, this is not always as easy or accessible as it probably should be. There are states that will not allow third-country nationals or the stateless to naturalise\textsuperscript{15}. Even if they do, it is a complicated process, which takes considerable effort on the part of those desiring naturalisation (learning the state language or complying with other domestic requirements), to simple bureaucratic backlog. For instance, in one of the acceding states, the Republic of Latvia, the last seven years of naturalisation decreased the number of eligible non-citizens by less than ten per cent.\textsuperscript{16} Of course, there are some additional complications to this issue in various locales, but describing them here would go beyond the scope of this paper. Why is this a problem? Stephen Castles writes "... refusal of citizenship and rights to settlers, and rejection of cultural diversity may lead to formation of ethnic minorities, whose presence is widely regarded as undesirable and divisive. ..., immigrants are excluded and marginalised, so that they live on the fringes of a society which is determined to preserve myths of a static culture and a homogeneous identity".\textsuperscript{17} The underlying argument is that if the European Union does not recognise as citizens all of its permanent residents, it will further marginalise those who are eligible for neither national nor EU citizenship, and may create further problems.

In his discourse on Union citizenship Marco Martinello claims that it is not "a major concern of the constructors of a more integrated Europe".\textsuperscript{18} Admittedly Martinello wrote this in mid-1990s, and things have evolved significantly since then, so one may give the author a benefit of a doubt. One can see things in different light. Yes, the EU citizenship is unique and not "substantial" citizenship as opposed to a "functional" one.\textsuperscript{19} But one cannot underestimate

\textsuperscript{15} France, Germany, Latvia, Estonia to name a few.

\textsuperscript{16} Since beginning of naturalisation proceedings on 1 January 1996, only 55,439 non-citizens have become citizens. At the beginning of this year, 523,000 people remained "non-citizens." "Non-citizen" is a unique status in Latvia, given to the citizens of the former USSR, who as a result of very exclusive Law on Citizenship were not granted an automatic right to the Latvian citizenship. This status defined the de facto stateless as "non-citizens," thus trying to avoid the issue of a large number of stateless (Meyers 2002).


\textsuperscript{18} Maurice Roche and Rik van Berkel, "European Citizenship and Social Exclusion," p. 36.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 37.
the changes that the European Union has gone through and that are still on tap for it. The author himself admits that changes are in prospect for the future.\textsuperscript{20} When Martinello debated the issue, the EU constitution was in the minds of only a handful of admirers of the Union. Additionally, there is more weight being given to the notion of EU citizenship in the new documents produced by the Union, notably, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Finally, when Martinello discussed the historical background of the EU citizenship, very few believed that Central and Eastern European states, let alone ten of them at the same time, would be invited to join the body as early as 2004.

Based on this, exclusion of what Martinello calls "extra-communitarian citizens," referring to those permanently residing in the Member States who are third-country nationals and stateless (even though the stateless aren’t really citizens of any other state by definition), from enjoying full rights along with EU citizens is, of course, not an acceptable vision. In the time when the European Union is working hard towards the creation of a European identity, marginalisation of permanent residents of the Union will only complicate creation of such identity. As discussed, the identity in question is quite far from its completion, and there is no certainty that the envisioned goal will even be achieved, considering the perpetual differences among the peoples who founded the European Union. From many perspectives, it is strange that Union citizenship has not been designed to be extended to all permanent residents of the Union. Going along with the egalitarian principles of fundamental human rights, and considering the emergent differences in rights of citizens and non-citizens of EU, it is particularly troubling.

Despite a fair share of issues and concerns, citizenship of the European Union is indeed an important and a valid idea for the future of the Union. It also can serve as an example of two co-existing statuses within the institution of citizenship. "The European Union’s recent formal recognition of a 'European citizenship' that supplements the national citizenships of its member states illustrates not only the importance often attached to citizenship, at least as a symbolic

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 44.
marker of a polity's collective identity, but also how distinct forms of citizenship may coexist.\textsuperscript{21} In discussing European identity, it can be argued that a similar co-existence is possible between the two identities, national and European.

Secondly, as Dr Laffan argues, there is a need for "the politics of 'belongings' and symbols." It is therefore suggested that the Eurocrats in Brussels are to come up with a set of unifying characteristics for the Europeans, which in turn would help foster European identity. This aspect of the EU top-down policy is very interesting due to its sensitive nature. It is sensitive because there is always potential for accusation that some of these symbols are being artificially created or the existing ones are stretched to fit the goal of achieving sensible common identity for the Europeans. The question then arises whether there are indeed some "'belongings' and symbols," which can serve as base for identity unification.

It is not easy to briefly answer this question. Going into too many details of possible existence of these unifying characteristics and discussion of their perceived effect on the European population would go far beyond the scope of this paper. At the same time, some need to be identified.

The introduction into circulation of the Euro in 2002 not only established a new currency and outdated national currencies, it also produced a new dimension in the progression of European identity. From the beginning, the Euro was hotly debated, contested, and even spurned by various countries. It was naïvely optimistic to think that twelve nations would come together and abolish their national currencies and begin to move towards a more solidified European identity. However, as information campaigns took places and the facts were disseminated into the local populations, the Euro not only began to succeed, it even began to foster some European identity.

National currency has long been a sign of national sovereignty. In a national sense, it was the people's money, and it not only highlighted the obvious economic difference between nations, but it also highlighted distinct differences between the socio-cultural aspects as well. A common currency tends to have a shared culture within the boundaries and the people seem to naturally have an affinity towards their currency and it becomes iconographic. The rejection of Sweden, Denmark, and particularly the United Kingdom illustrate this in part by their refusal to adopt the Euro as their single currency.

Identity and money have in a sense a symbiotic relationship through the course of modern history. The availability and widespread use of a single unit of exchange has strengthened nations and cultural identity. With this in mind the EC and EU have been able to foster some European identity in recent times. In most countries, the coins and notes tend to have a symbolic nature to them – national heroes, past leaders, national flags or monuments. The EU wanted to create its own identity. When the EU hired Robert Kalina to design the Euro, they gave him strict rules: "No portraits of historical figures or designs attributed to any particular monument in any single country." From this, European architecture from seven periods was used: Classical, Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque, Iron, and Modern. To avoid using any particular place or monument, Mr Kalina scanned pictures of bridges from art history books, and used imaging software to take parts of different bridges to create virtual designs representing the various styles. In the end, each of the bank notes had the EU flag with 12 stars set on a map of Europe. Other symbols on the banknotes include windows and doors which symbolise the new and the open continent.

Before the Euro came into use, the Eurobarometer took surveys and polls to get an understanding of the people and their attitudes towards the new currency. Early polls showed fear, anxiety, and quite a bit of misunderstanding. This impacted the ability of Europeans to have a positive outlook on the European identity with the advent of the euro. In March 2001, only 46 per cent of polled Europeans felt the use of the Euro, instead of their national
currencies, would make them feel more European. However, as information was disseminated by nationally-run campaigns the figure went up. Just two months later, the figure was up to 49 per cent and by October 2002, the figure had reached an impressive 60 per cent (with only three countries with less than 50 per cent favourable attitudes).

To have the Euro in one's hand and to use it each day is a powerful tangible sign that unification is real. Daily usage of the euro provides a constant reminder to the twelve states currently using the Euro that they are bound together not only by treaty, but by the very coins and notes in their pockets. The introduction of a single monetary unit is not a discreet plan by the European Union to trap the citizens into a strong sense of identity. The people know the purpose for the Euro and they even accept it and react positively to it. Already the Eurobarometer has shown the closeness that a single currency brings. One Portuguese asserted, "I feel myself to be closer. We are Portuguese, but our currency is everywhere in Europe, it's the same as theirs. At least as far as the currency is concerned, we are all alike, there are no differences." However, this is not the same for all. For example Greece and other peripheral states feel they are far from the centre of Europe and thus the currency makes them feel more alienated before.

Overall the Euro has brought, and will continue to bring, member states closer together in identity and citizenry. As the new candidate nations come into the EU and begin to merge their identity with the rest of Europe, the Euro can be counted on as the foundation for such solidarity. The common currency is one of the foundation blocks for the building of a European identity. The monetary expression of a united Europe is a very powerful image and has proven itself as a symbol of European unification. As the economy of Europe continues to strengthen, European identity will do likewise. However, this will not be a process that occurs in one year, five years, or even ten years. It will take time. Sceptics will continue to criticise and protestors will continue to demonstrate, but the identity will forge on.

Among other symbols already in place, one may note those attributes that already identify the European Union as a political entity: the flag, the anthem, and Europe Day. Since 1986 the flag adopted by the Council of Europe has been used as the European Union flag. It consists of a circle of twelve gold stars on a blue background (twelve being a number that represents perfection and completeness). The European Union anthem is the Ode to Joy from Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, a masterpiece familiar even to novices in classical music. Europe Day is 9 May, commemorating the declaration by Robert Schumans in 1950 which is regarded as marking the creation of the European Union. Few Europeans would not recognise the flag of the EU, as it flies next to national flags on all government buildings in the Member States, and is also noticeable on their missions abroad. Europe Day celebrations also take place in various parts of Europe, including those states desiring accession. In some areas it coincides with celebration of Victory in Europe festivities marking the end of World War II in Europe – a war that in some way gave rise to accelerated integration rhetoric on intergovernmental levels immediately after the defeat of Nazism.

In regards to the third dimension, “the development and support for cross-national networks and cooperation,” brought up by Dr Laffan, there are key components that can be identified. First is the development of extensive transportation and telecommunication partnerships. Examples of these can be the current construction of roads such as those supported by funds from the ISPA and PHARE programmes Via Baltica, which when completed will connect major cities on the shores of the Baltic Sea, including Helsinki, Tallinn, and others. There are also plans in existence to develop an integrated high-speed railroad grid, rightly dubbed Rail Baltica. GSM networks are continuously being built throughout Europe to accommodate an ever growing number of mobile telephone users. Interest groups, such as GSM Europe, set out codes of conduct for setting international roaming prices. To avoid getting into too many technical details of this component, it suffices to say that there are actions done

http://europa.eu.int/abc/symbols/index_en.htm
on a national level with pan-European co-ordination, which not only ease lives of ordinary citizens, but also enable them to travel and communicate faster and more efficiently. This, coupled with elimination of any visa barriers throughout the Schengen Agreement area and beyond, in turn increases the overall contacts between the various peoples of Europe. It can be argued that this results in an increase in people feeling European, though mindful of the duality of them technically remaining nationals of their own state.

The second aspect of Dr Laffan’s third dimension is education. There has been a lot of talk lately about the need to harmonise educational policies within the European Union. Such calls were met oftentimes with harsh opposition, even in countries which support deeper European integration, like Germany. Currently the EU has decided not to harmonise education policy. Current thinking is that this is best dealt with on the national level. To go into the reasoning for such decision and explain the roots for opposition would distract from the scope of this analysis. Steps have been taken, however, to ease the life of ordinary European students. The educational process in Europe is being made much more accessible to all EU nationals. The EU has developed “Socrates,” a programme designed to improve the quality and the European dimension of higher education. This includes universities and “extra-university” institutions. Included in this program is a European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) programme, for the transferring of credit from institutions across Europe more easily, and it, “supports and encourages exchanges of students and teachers, the launching of joint study programmes or intensive courses, pan-European thematic networks and other measures aiming at the development of a European dimension in higher education.”

Some other measures have also been undertaken. Currently institutions across Europe make bursaries and scholarships available to all EU nationals which are placed on the same level as nationals of the state-host country. Tuition is also set for only two categories: EU nationals and overseas students. This continual progressiveness and openness towards all EU

24 http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/higher.html
nationals continues to make Europeans one people and gives the appearance of one educational system. While different colleges and universities will obviously remain more desirable to attend, the levelling of educational institutions in academic fees and transfer systems will bring more Europeans together.

The ability to put the best and brightest minds from Europe together in universities that had previously been too expensive or too difficult to arrange academic exchanges with is a major step in fostering European identification. Now students from Portugal, and soon from Poland, can study side by side with British or German students and pay the same rate and have the same opportunities to receive financial aid as well. Both of these examples (scholarships and tuition levels) can effectively be experienced on a daily basis by many Europeans, and psychologically break the barriers of pure national association, striving for something supplemental on a European level. This can be supported by the Eurobarometer 57 opinion survey which took place between 29 March and 1 May 2002, and officially publicised on 21 October 2002, indicating that “[t]he demographic analyses show that more than 7 in 10 respondents who are still studying, who left full-time education by the age of 20 or older (73% each) ... feel to some extent European.” On the other side, “[r]espondents who completed their full-time education before reaching age 16 (51%) ... are most likely to identify with their own nationality.” This can be explained not only by Europeanisation of education and an overall increase in level of all-around knowledge by the first group in the analysis, but also by the fact that those who pursue higher education (past age 16) are more likely to experience the benefits of their Member State’s membership in the European Union.

It is understandable, that in attempting to foster European identity in an enlarged European Union, the proponents of such “identity beyond the state” will encounter fierce opposition from many sides. Fostering such an identity may be complicated within the societies,

which fostered their own national identities for years. Eurobarometer 57 confirms this analysis in the question of to what extent people feel nationals of own state, European, or both.

The trend compared to the previous Eurobarometer poll in autumn 2001 shows that “[t]he largest increases in the proportion of the population that feels to some extent European have been recorded in Italy (+12), Greece (+11), followed by Spain (+9), the UK (+8), Portugal and Ireland (+7 each). Luxembourg and Sweden are the only countries where people are now significantly more likely to identify with their own nationality (+4).”

Another interesting variable addressed by the Eurobarometer for the last three surveys conducted was whether the Europeans felt “very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be European.” The results were quite hopeful, with more than 60 per cent of those surveyed feeling either very or fairly proud to be European. Yet, such results are still not at the
point that, presumably, the Eurocrats in Brussels would like to see them at. Furthermore, there is an obvious trend appearing from poll to poll, with little change, which is not statistically significant.

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<td>Very proud</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fairly proud</td>
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<td>Not very proud</td>
<td>48%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not at all proud</td>
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The idea of duality may not be understood for a period of time, and may be perceived as a threat to national identity in those states. Yet, at a time of an unprecedented enlargement of the Union to twenty-five states, there is an opportunity to start planting the seeds of European identity in the acceding states. This may become troublesome as well, and one cannot disregard the current situation there. Most of these states have been under imposed regimes for a period of about half a century. This has crushed identities of many, and one could observe resurgence in affirmation for national identities in these states over the last fifteen years. Yet, as Dr Laffan observes, “[t]he collapse of communism led to a revival of ethno-nationalism with all its inherent dangers in the eastern part of the continent.”

Nationalism as a “political principle, doctrine, or programme aimed at promotion of the identity, independence, and influence of one’s nation” in itself is not dangerous. Yet, the dangers of blind nationalism can become more apparent, when such doctrine is used to justify the policy of an individual state at expense of an ethnic or linguistic minority which resides within the boundaries of that state. This trend of ethno-nationalism, as observed by Dr Laffan, was and still is particularly prominent in the Baltic States, especially in Latvia and Estonia. Despite

27 Kjell Goldmann, “Transforming the European Nation-state: Dynamics of Internationalization,” p. 43.
some differences between these two states, overall their histories are very much alike. Settlements in places of current cities were founded as early as eight centuries ago. Throughout their history, the settlements were overrun by German, Swedish, Polish, and Russian conquest. It wasn’t until 1918, when both states declared their independence for the first time, that they found themselves involved in the bitter dispute for the European domination at the beginning of World War II between the two hegemons.

When the short-lived history of socialism in Europe entered its final stages, the momentum built was effectively used by nationalistic forces in all three Baltic States late in the 1980s. One may observe that although these trends have subsided a great deal in Lithuania (supported by claims of a relatively stable homogeneity of the population – there are more than 80 per cent of the population who claim Lithuanian roots), support for ethno-nationalism is alive and well in Latvia and Estonia, which have about 40 per cent of their population who are ethnic and/or linguistic minorities (predominantly Russian). This continues to hold “inherent dangers,” as rightly pointed out by Dr Laffan. The nationalistic forces may use the chance to sway public opinion away from the EU for several reasons: from the bias that the newly independent states will come under some authoritative control again following fifty years if Soviet control, to the bias that the European Commission will force the accession states (with particular application to the situation in Latvia and Estonia) to make adjustments to their domestic legislation concerning citizenship and treatment of ethnic minorities.

Such statements undoubtedly may present problems for integration of the acceding “Laeken states” into the European Union. Indeed reasserting Peter van Ham’s argument that “[t]his developing ‘identity beyond the state’ can only be based on a solid base of multiculturalism.” The ethno-nationalistic statements also give some room for doubt that referenda being held within the acceding states this year will give an overwhelming green light to such accession. At the same time, both the European Union and the governments of the accession states do surprisingly little to educate the local population about the concept of duality
when it comes to culture and identity. The former Socialist camp states can become a proper proving ground for fostering European identity, as these nations often feel an urge to ‘return to Europe.’ Therefore, more educational campaigns should take place in these states, explaining to the population the benefits of the European Union, including the unique principle of duality of identities. The trends observed by Eurobarometer in the first poll in the candidate countries taken place between 2 September and 16 October 2002, depicts the current situation of lack of public education about the EU.\textsuperscript{28}

![Knowledge about the EU chart](chart.png)

Furthermore, analysing the latest poll data, including that from Eurobarometer, one sees that there is not much aspiration for European identity within the already established EU Member States. It also appears that there is a feeling of disconnection between the Eurocrats

in Brussels and ordinary population when it comes to essential policies. Issues like the current Convention on the Future of the European Union should involve larger masses of people for its debate. Otherwise, there is a risk that any attempts to further integration processes within the EU will be met with resentment. Steps in the right direction have been undertaken, by developing the Europa - the European Union On-Line portal into an area where an ordinary European can exchange ideas, make suggestions, and learn about the policies at stake. Yet, it is also apparent, that it is not enough.

Creation of European 'identity beyond the state' is an ambitious and complicated task, comparable to that of the Union's enlargement to twenty-five states in 2004. The apparent European Union policy of duality of identities is not clearly perceived by citizens of the Union, and thus needs to be addressed more through educational campaigns by both the EU and individual Member States. This is particularly applicable to the acceding states of the Laeken Group, especially the Baltic States. There is also a need for some sort of containment of aggressive ethno-nationalism in some areas by providing information about the benefits of the European Union in general, and European identity in particular. Furthermore, the opportunity to plant seeds of European identity in the acceding states now, even before the accession takes place, should be acted upon. Finally, concerns with citizenship of the Union (i.e. not providing that status to third-country nationals as to stateless permanent residents of Member States) must be addressed to avoid further marginalisation of a large part of European population. All of these issues are important to bring stability and viability to the European Union.