

Paul Luif
The similarities and differences of the
EU and US foreign policies:
Empirical indicators from the UN General Assembly

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Paul Luif has been Senior Visiting Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, February/March 2003, and is member of the scientific staff at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Vienna

PaulLuif@compuserve.com

1. Introduction

The relations of the United States with (Western) Europe, in particular with the member states of the European Union (EU) have been close, constructive and beneficial for both sides — but this has not implied that they were always free of conflict. The “chicken wars” and the WTO controversies are only a case in point.

In recent years, political divergences have again come to the forefront, culminating in the fierce debate on Iraq and how to deal with Saddam Hussein. These debates degenerated into a clash between the Bush administration and the “old” Europe. Perhaps it is time to take a step back and look at the long-term development of the political relations between the US and the EU.

This paper tries to illustrate EU-US relations with the help of an empirical-quantitative analysis of the voting behavior of the EU member states and the US in the General Assembly of the United Nations. There exists a large amount of data, which was analyzed in the 1950s and 1960s, at the height of the behavioralist school in US political science, but has been rarely used since then.¹ A reason for that could be the “stagnation” and finally the “decline” of

1 Exceptions are Soo Yeon Kim/Bruce Russett, *The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the General Assembly*, in: Bruce Russett (ed.), *The Once and Future Security Council*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997, pp. 29–57, and Miguel Marín-Bosch, *Votes in the UN General Assembly*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998 (= Nijhoff Law Specials, Vol. 35).

the UN General Assembly. It has been less and less able to satisfy its members. The Third World countries have become disillusioned. The United States have even become hostile.² In addition, one should not forget that the General Assembly can only pass recommendations and not legally binding texts. The “irrelevance” of the General Assembly makes its decision-making processes part of “low politics”. It is the task of the specialists and diplomatic “technicians” in New York to negotiate and find solutions. Rarely the member state capitals are involved in the decision-making. Therefore, the voting in the UN General Assembly can be regarded as a “routine” presentation of the interests of the member states. The results of the present study thus cannot be directly exploited for more dramatic and politically sensitive situations.

The methods used to analyze the voting behavior in the UN General Assembly have often included advanced mathematical models, like factor analysis. With these models, underlying issue dimensions of the debates and votes in the General Assembly as well as voting alignments have been studied.³ The analysis proposed here is not as complex. There is no need to extract voting alignments, since I want basically compare the voting of one group of countries, the EU member states, with another country, the United States. The basic issue dimensions needed in the analysis here can be relatively easily extracted by going through the texts of the resolutions.

As I have done in another study,⁴ I calculate “distances” and a “distance index” in the voting behavior among the EU states as well as between the EU and other states over time (since 1979) and across issues of international politics discussed in the UN General Assembly (like the Middle East question, international security and human rights).

The results show that the EU has succeeded over time to speak more and more with “one voice”, but without attaining full consensus. In the consensus vote of the EU on Middle East questions, the distance between the US and the EU has been pretty large, whereas for the problems concerning international security voted in the UN (nuclear armament, disarmament etc.)

2 Marie-Claude Smouts, *The General Assembly: Grandeur and Decadence*, in: Paul Taylor/A.J.R. Groom (eds.), *The United Nations at the Millennium. The Principle Organs*, London - New York: Continuum, 2000, pp. 21–60, here p. 46.

3 See e.g. Kim/Russett, note 1.

4 Paul Luif, *On the Road to Brussels: The Political Dimension of Austria's, Finland's and Sweden's Accession to the European Union*, Vienna: Braumüller, 1995 (= Laxenburg Papers, No. 11).

the distance between the EU consensus position and the US has been smaller. This pattern is valid for practically the whole time period.

2. The method used here

Data on voting in the General Assembly of the UN is readily available, although not always in machine-readable format. It has been utilized in empirical-quantitative research in a number of ways. One could take all resolutions and decisions in the General Assembly and see how they were passed, but this would artificially increase the agreement among member states because each year many resolutions and decisions are passed without a vote in the General Assembly. Only some 20 to 30 percent of the resolutions each year are passed by a "recorded vote" where each member state votes openly with "yes", "no" or "abstaining". This voting behavior is then published, nowadays also on the Internet.⁵

These published records only give the results of votes on resolutions passed. But a few resolutions proposed are rejected by a majority. Sometimes parts of resolutions are voted on: there could be separate votes on some words, whole preambular paragraphs or operative paragraphs. It can happen that before a resolution is passed by consensus, parts of it are passed by recorded votes. Then there are also recorded votes on motions in the General Assembly, like a motion to not vote on a resolution. Finally, each year a few decisions are passed by recorded votes.⁶ The data on these recorded votes are not easily available. One has to read through the verbatim records of all the sessions of the General Assembly to find those votes. The voting behavior of each state analyzed has then to be typed into a database to enable a computerized analysis.⁷ Because of these difficulties, the data described here is usually excluded from the quantitative analyses of UN voting behavior.⁸

5 There are several ways to get to the recorded vote on UN resolutions. One way is to use the UNBisnet site (<http://unbisnet.un.org/webpac-bin/wgbroker?new+-access+top.vote>).

6 Decisions are on similar subjects as resolutions, only a "decision" has less political weight than a "resolution". One should not forget that both, resolutions and decisions are only recommendations and have not binding force.

7 For the 56th and 57th General Assembly, I was assisted in this task by Linda Lucinio and Tom Dolby, interns at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris.

8 See e.g. the analysis by Marín-Bosch, note 1.

The votes are included here because they provide a “qualitative” element to the analysis (although their compilation is a rather cumbersome task). The wordings of resolutions which have been particularly controversial and thus have been the subject of several recorded votings will be generally considered of greater importance than resolutions passed by one recorded vote only. At the 51st General Assembly, about 23 percent of all recorded votes were votes on parts of resolutions etc. At the 54th General Assembly, the share was 30 percent, at the 57th General Assembly (until December 31, 2002), the share was 33 percent of all recorded votes. The details are given in List 1 (Annex II on page 24).

Table 11 on page 25 (Annex II) shows the amount of votes that were recorded in the General Assemblies since 1979. During the “Second Cold War” in the 1980s the number of recorded votes was rather high, reaching a peak in 1985 with 203 recorded votes. After the end of the East-West conflict, the disputed votes declined sharply in the UN General Assembly. In Table 11 the amount of votes are given for several issue areas (topics) which are debated regularly in the General Assembly. Middle East questions (concerning Israel, the Palestine territory and the adjacent areas like the Lebanon and Syria) have played a prominent part in the discussions in the General Assembly, almost from its beginnings. Another hot debated and voted on topic in the Assembly has been international security. Here the General Assembly has regularly dealt with various aspects of nuclear weapons and their proliferation, with other proliferation questions, disarmament problems and questions concerning anti-personnel mines, small arms, dual-use goods etc. Questions of security dealing with the Middle East have been included in the Middle East category.

Still debated, but of little importance compared to the 1950s and 1960s are a few decolonization questions (non-self-governing territories, right of self-determination) The resolutions on the “economic, commercial and financial embargo” imposed by the US against Cuba (e.g. Resolution 57/011) have been put here as well. In particular in 2002, the recorded votes on human rights have significantly increased. The votes include general problems like “[g]lobalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights” (Resolution 57/205), but also specific issues as “[e]xtrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions” (Resolution 57/214) as well as the situation in several countries, like the Sudan and Iraq. Here again votes dealing with human rights issues in the Middle East have been included in the latter category. Questions

of racism and racial discrimination have been included in the decolonization category. But where resolutions dealt explicitly with human rights (like Resolution 57/196 on the “[u]se of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination”), the resolution was put into human rights category. The categorization of resolutions can never be perfect, but it should help finding general trends in various issue areas voted on in the UN General Assembly.

After the votes have been selected, the positions of various countries and groups of countries (here in particular the EU, the EU member states and the United States) toward each other can be calculated. For the controversial votes we are looking at, basically three different ways of voting exist in the General Assembly — in favor, against, or abstaining. Countries or groups of countries can be in complete agreement, when they all vote the same way, or in partial (dis-)agreement, when one of them votes yes (or no) and the other abstains, or in complete disagreement, when one votes yes and the other no. The difficult part for arriving at a quantitative index is to “measure” the partial agreement. It lies somewhere between full agreement and complete disagreement — but where exactly? For most researchers it seemed reasonable to credit a partial agreement with half the weight of a complete agreement. This procedure will be used here in calculating the distance between (groups of) states.

In mathematical terms, for each full disagreement between pairs of countries, a value of “1” is given; each partial disagreement gets a value of “0.5”, a full agreement gets “0”. These values are added for all the votes under consideration. At the same time, the “maximum” disagreement for each pair of countries is calculated. This would be the value when both countries would vote as differently as possible in each recorded vote. The actual value calculated is compared with the “maximum” value possible. How high the actual value is in comparison with the “maximum” value possible is given in percentages in the tables that will be discussed here. This means that the *maximum distance* a country (or a group of countries) can have from another country is always 100, the *minimum distance* is always 0, independently of how many votes are analyzed. So one can make a comparison over time and over issue areas, although there will be practically always different amounts of votes studied. To remind the reader that these calculations are based on

various assumptions, only the whole numbers are given for this “distance index”.⁹

There is one additional problem when calculating the “distance” among countries. Sometimes countries are “absent”, they do not cast a vote. Some researchers simply throw out all the (pair of) votes that include a country which is absent. This would make the analysis presented here tremendously complicated. Since there are relatively few instances of “absenteeism” with the countries analyzed here, the distances for “absent” are calculated as for “abstaining”. The country is regarded as not knowing how to vote, it is “in-between” a pro and a contra vote; it is therefore regarded as a “partial disagreement” if confronted with a “yes” or “no” vote and given a value of “0.5”. We have here an instance where quantitative analysis works with possibly problematic assumptions. A small precaution has been taken though: if a country is absent in more than a third of the recorded votes analyzed, no distance will be calculated (notified by “n/a” in the tables). A prolonged absence of a country does not allow to give any clear distance index. A special case for the EU is the UN General Assembly in 1996. In the voting at this General Assembly, the Greek representative was absent most of the time. Thus, only 14 EU countries have been used in calculating the different indices, for the 1996 data Greece was completely eliminated from the computations.

3. The results

3.1. The EU member states and the various issue areas debated in the UN General Assembly

The EU does not act as a single state in the UN General Assembly. In fact, it is only the European Community (EC) which has a legal personality. The EC Treaty is part of the EU's supranational “First Pillar” and gives it extended competences in economic matters, in particular in external economic affairs. The EC has been admitted as “observer” in the General Assembly where it is represented by the EU Commission and the Presidency (the country heading the EU Council). The topics of the General Assembly are regarded as mostly matters of the EU's “Second Pillar”, the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU Commission can take part in the meetings of the CFSP, but the decision-making in the Second Pillar is

⁹ For further details see Luif, note 4, pp. 282–284.

dominated by the EU member states. In addition, in the plenary of the General Assembly only the member states have a right to speak and to vote. The country holding the Presidency speaks on behalf of the EU member states (as long as they have agreed on a common statement). The EU does not always speak (or vote) with “one voice” in the General Assembly. Therefore, a few tables following here describe (quantitatively) how far the consensus reaches and where the differences are.

3.1.1. The consensus among the EU member states

Table 1 on page 14 (Annex I) shows how the consensus (voting identically) among the EU member states has developed since 1979. The consensus had reached almost 60 percent of all recorded votes in the UN General Assembly in 1979, but it then declined quite steeply, because of the new Cold War, but in particular because the new PASOK government in Greece made its own foreign policy, without regard to the other member states (cf. below Table 2 on page 15). But it slowly adjusted to the mainstream of the EU. Since the early 1990s, possibly in connection with the introduction of the CFSP by the Maastricht Treaty, the consensus among the EU member states had steadily grown until 1998. After a decline in 1999 and 2000, the consensus has increased again, to stagnate around 75 percent of the recorded votes in the General Assembly.

There are two issue areas in Table 1 on page 14 where there has always been a consensus above the EU average: Middle East and human rights questions. In security and decolonization matters, the consensus has been (sometimes dramatically) below average. One has to add that decolonization questions are of minor importance in General Assembly voting (see Table 11 on page 25, Annex II).

3.1.2. The distance from the EU majority

Table 2 on page 15 gives the distance indices from the EU majority for all recorded votes. Each vote in the UN General Assembly is checked for a clear majority opinion among the EU member states. This is usually the case, but there are some votes when of the 15 member states e.g. 2 vote against, 7 vote for a resolution and the rest abstains. Here is no clear (absolute) majority

among the EU countries and the distance is not calculated. With 15 member states, one would need at least 8 EU states casting an identical vote.¹⁰

Table 2 clearly shows the converging trend among the EU countries, which one could already see in Table 1 on page 14. Since the mid-1990s, only two EU member states have had a clearly different voting behavior from the EU “mainstream”, France and the United Kingdom. Neutral/non-aligned Ireland, Sweden and Austria have also almost consistently voted in a slightly different way from the EU majority. Table 3 on page 16 gives the expected small or non-existent distance among EU member states in Middle East affairs. Table 4 on page 17 shows a rather different picture for security matters. France and the United Kingdom have a rather consistent distance from the other EU member states. In particular on questions concerning nuclear weapons, they demonstrate clearly different attitudes from the EU mainstream. The same situation can be found in decolonization matters, where the former colonial powers France and the UK vote differently from the other EU states. For human rights questions, the differences among all EU countries are small (tables for the last two topics are not given here).

3.2. The distance of the United States from the EU

After having dealt with the preliminary question of how the EU countries vote in the UN General Assembly, I will now present the distance of the United States from the EU. The data for one country (the US) and EU in one year will not be too convincing. So there will again be tables which compare results over time and across countries.

3.2.1. The distance of the US from the EU consensus

Table 5 on page 18 (Annex I) gives the data for the distance between the EU consensus and the United States since 1979. In 1979 the distance from the EU consensus was smaller for the US than with most other countries. This changed already in the 1980s. In 1987, 1989, 1990 (together with Israel), 1992 (together with Israel) and again in 2002, the United States had the greatest distance from the EU consensus of all countries of Table 5. In this Table one can also distinguish between two groups of countries. The formerly

¹⁰ The majority is always calculated from the current number of member states; when there were 12 EU member states, the (absolute) majority would be 7, with 10 member states 6 etc.

communist countries have drastically reduced their distance to the EU consensus, like the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; also Russia has come somewhat closer to the EU consensus. Another group of countries did barely change its distance to the EU consensus over the last 23 years. Among them, Canada and Japan have remained rather close to the EU consensus; Turkey has also remained relatively near the EU consensus. Other countries, like non-aligned Egypt and India have always had a rather big distance from the EU consensus. This has also been the case with Israel, but obviously for other reasons.

Table 6 on page 19 shows the distance of the US and other countries from the EU consensus in Middle East questions. Here, one clearly sees the special position of the US (and Israel) on this issue. Since the early 1980s, the EU consensus and the other countries in Table 6 are rather close. In (international) security questions, the picture is rather different. The US and the EU consensus used to be much closer as compared to Middle East issues, as Table 7 on page 20 demonstrates. Only in the late 1980s, the US had a very distinct position vis-à-vis the EU consensus. During most years of the Clinton administration, the attitudes of the US and the EU consensus in security matters converged again. But in 2001 and 2002, after George W. Bush became US president, the distance has increased once more. The US is not the most distant country from the EU consensus: In 2002, China, Egypt and India as well as Israel are even more detached from the EU consensus.

In the relatively unimportant decolonization issues, the US is quite removed from the US consensus (data not given here, cf. Table 9 on page 22). In the increasingly more important issues of human rights, the US has increased its distance from the EU consensus. According to Table 8 on page 21, in 2001 and 2002 the distance from the EU consensus grew, whereas between 1995 and 2000, the US and the EU consensus had been relatively close, as compared to their average distance. Still, the positions of Russia, China, Egypt and India are even more removed from the EU consensus.

3.2.2. The distance of the US from the EU member states

One can also look at the data the other way round, taking the US position and then calculate the distance to the EU member states. This is done in the final two tables. The advantage of this perspective is that it takes into account all

recorded votes in the UN General Assembly. As already mentioned, the EU consensus votes represented only some 75 percent of all recorded votes in 2002.

Table 9 on page 22 shows the calculations of the distance index between each EU country and the US at the 57th General Assembly in 2002 (recorded votes until December 31, 2002). The EU country closest to the US is, not surprisingly, the United Kingdom. Still, with an index of 45, the UK is quite far from the US position. A little more surprising, in view of the Iraq turmoil, is the position of France, which is the EU country second closest to the US. Table 9 clearly shows the reason: In international security matters, the US, the UK and France are rather close to each other, compared with the other EU member states. The same holds true for decolonization matters.

In Middle East matters, the US is very far from the positions of all EU member states, as already indicated in Table 7 on page 20. Security and human rights issues find the US and the EU member states in somewhat closer positions. The EU country with the largest distance from the EU is Ireland, followed by Sweden and Austria — three of the four EU neutral/non-aligned. The reason for that gap can be seen in their positions in international security matters.

Looking at other countries, it is no surprise that Israel has the smallest distance to the US (Table 10 on page 23). All other countries have a distance of more than 50 index points. China, India, Mexico, Nigeria and also Russia have remarkably large distances from the US. Once again, “Western” countries are closer to the US in security and human rights matters compared to all votes taken together.

4. Conclusions

The data presented here show that the United States and the countries of the EU have distinct positions in the voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. The US is in a rather isolated position, the EU (here taken as the consensus position among the EU member states) is closer to the US than the non-aligned countries of the Third World as well as China and Russia. Still, the gap between the US and the EU has been rather big and has been increasing since 2000.

The one big issue where the distance between the US and all the EU member states has been always glaringly large is the Middle East. Recently, the previously smaller distances in international security and human rights matters have been increasing as well. I regard these changes as an indicator for a growing "gap" in transatlantic relations.

In the UN General Assembly, the US is also institutionally in an isolated position; it does not belong to any group. Only for election purposes the US is part of the "West European and Other Group" (WEOG) which basically consists of the EU member states and Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

But even here, the US has troubles to get its "voice" heard. When in 2001 three seats were open in the UN Commission on Human Rights (based in Geneva) for WEOG countries, there were four candidates. When the votes were counted, the results were as follows: France, 52 votes; Austria, 41; Sweden 32. With only 29 votes, the US lost its seat.¹¹ Thus in 2002, the US was not member of the Commission on Human Rights. This absurd situation was rectified when the US got a seat again for 2003.

On January 20, 2003, Ms. Najat Al-Hajjaji of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was elected by secret ballot as Chairperson for the Commission on Human Rights for 2003.¹² Chairpersons are usually elected by acclamation, but the vote was requested by the United States; 33 states voted in favor and 3 opposed, with 17 abstaining among the Commission's 53 member countries. The US, Canada and Guatemala were the countries voting against the election of the Libyan representative, the seven member states of the EU abstained.¹³

These examples from the UN Commission on Human Rights highlight the problems of transatlantic relations. The in-between-position of the EU at the UN (between the US and the non-aligned countries) sometimes makes for strange compromises. The isolated position of the US brings unusual and

11 Felice D. Gaer, Human Rights, in: Diana Ayton-Shenker/John Tessitore (eds.), *A Global Agenda. Issues Before the 56th General Assembly of the United Nations*, Lanham etc.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002, pp. 151–189, here p. 152.

12 See the information on the Website of the Commission on Human Rights [<http://193.194.138.190/hurricane/hurricane.nsf/newsroom>].

13 This behavior of the EU countries has been sharply criticized in an editorial of the French journal *L'Express*; see Denis Jeambar, *Un choix munichois*, in: *L'Express*, No. 2691, 30.1.2003, p. 5.

unnecessary difficulties and setbacks for the only "superpower", thus increasing its frustrations and disappointment with the world body.

When the dust of the Iraq crisis settles, there will be a lot of homework to do on both sides of the Atlantic. Fostering freedom, democracy and peace in the world has to be a duty for the all Western countries. Short-term advantages (in domestic popular opinion) on the one hand and overwhelming military power on the other hand alone will not suffice for this immense task.

Annex I

Notes for all Tables:

- * 1996 EU without Greece;
- ** until 31 December 2002;
- n/a absent in more than one third of the votes.

Table 1

Percentage of Recorded Votes in the UN General Assembly with Consensus among EU Member States

	1979	1981	1983	1985	1987	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996 *	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 **
All Votes	58.9	42.4	27.1	37.4	47.5	45.5	41.8	52.8	61.4	59.7	65.1	70.1	75.0	80.0	82.1	76.8	72.3	73.9	75.5
Middle East	74.2	40.0	46.5	51.0	56.8	56.8	71.0	76.5	82.4	80.0	86.4	90.5	95.8	92.0	100	100	100	84.0	95.5
Security etc.	56.5	34.4	20.8	27.8	31.7	31.1	18.8	25.0	35.0	50.0	53.5	70.2	66.7	76.9	76.2	61.0	52.9	68.4	59.0
Decolonization												37.5	70.0	45.5	55.6	50.0	50.0	45.5	45.5
Human Rights												72.7	92.3	87.5	90.0	88.9	92.3	92.9	90.3

Note: No data calculated for Decolonization and Human Rights between 1979 and 1994.

Table 4

Distance from the EU Majority: Security, Disarmament
(Maximum Distance from the EU Majority = 100, Minimum = 0)

	1979	1981	1983	1985	1987	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996 *	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 **
Austria	13	34	47	39	39	42	33	26	6	12	10	2	10	8	3	4	3	1	4
Finland	25	50	54	44	38	39	29	15	6	9	0	0	3	4	1	3	2	1	3
Sweden	15	32	46	41	39	41	35	18	6	12	8	2	11	8	4	8	5	7	8
Spain	10	8	19	14	11	13	6	3	0	0	3	2	1	0	1	1	2	1	3
Portugal	5	6	5	5	0	1	4	12	3	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	3
Greece	8	28	48	43	34	31	12	15	6	3	0	2	n/a	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ireland	13	30	46	34	34	37	29	24	9	12	7	2	11	10	4	9	6	9	10
Denmark	3	18	28	16	23	21	17	9	3	0	0	0	3	4	1	0	0	0	0
UK	10	10	13	9	15	14	31	18	32	18	17	13	8	6	13	14	11	13	15
France	15	6	8	18	25	18	37	18	9	12	18	10	10	7	14	24	23	14	15
Italy	3	2	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	1
Germany, FR	0	2	1	1	2	3	0	3	0	0	0	2	3	1	0	0	2	1	3
Netherlands	3	4	5	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 5

Distance of the United States and Other Selected Countries from the EU Consensus: All votes
(Maximum Distance from the EU Consensus = 100, Minimum = 0)

	1979	1981	1983	1985	1987	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996 *	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 **
USA	17	35	39	40	43	52	46	39	47	34	31	27	35	31	37	34	45	43	52
USSR/Russia	70	47	41	56	35	33	23	18	14	13	18	16	14	15	15	24	19	20	25
China	41	27	14	36	31	34	28	30	33	42	38	47	33	37	34	42	35	34	40
Canada	6	2	4	3	2	4	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	3	1	1	4	3	1
Mexico	39	27	12	38	28	28	27	26	24	24	27	28	22	27	30	34	27	29	17
Czechosl./Cz. R.	69	47	42	56	34	34	4	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	69	47	44	55	34	19	3	1	2	4	1	2	1	2	0	0	0	3	1
Poland	66	45	41	56	34	29	5	0	1	2	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Turkey	29	18	11	21	17	14	12	8	11	10	9	7	15	17	10	16	9	12	9
Israel	22	38	46	35	31	37	46	45	47	30	28	35	40	40	46	39	50	45	48
Egypt	38	25	12	36	30	34	24	28	24	33	29	38	27	33	31	39	39	36	40
India	45	29	19	45	37	38	29	29	28	37	40	53	44	47	44	48	40	44	38
Australia	9	3	6	6	5	5	4	0	1	4	4	13	5	2	1	1	4	5	3
Japan	14	5	6	6	5	5	3	1	1	1	4	6	5	5	6	4	4	4	5

Table 7

Distance of the United States and Other Selected Countries from the EU Consensus: Security, Disarmament
(Maximum Distance from the EU Consensus = 100, Minimum = 0)

	1979	1981	1983	1985	1987	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996 *	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 **
USA	14	24	11	28	50	44	45	10	15	21	20	10	12	4	7	6	9	22	23
USSR/Russia	62	59	67	48	18	12	9	20	0	11	5	15	10	14	15	11	12	14	11
China	19	6	22	24	23	16	9	40	31	32	40	48	32	34	38	34	41	31	30
Canada	5	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	5	0	0	5	0	0	0	2	0
Mexico	19	29	28	32	32	12	18	40	31	42	43	39	28	36	41	38	35	32	23
Czechosl./Cz. R.	62	59	78	48	18	12	0	0	0	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	62	59	78	48	18	12	0	0	8	5	3	0	2	4	0	0	0	4	2
Poland	62	59	78	48	18	12	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Turkey	5	6	6	4	5	4	0	0	0	5	5	0	4	7	3	4	0	2	2
Israel	10	6	0	0	9	4	0	0	0	5	13	24	16	16	21	26	18	22	25
Egypt	24	24	22	28	32	24	18	40	31	32	40	46	26	36	39	40	56	39	32
India	19	35	56	52	45	36	27	50	54	53	53	64	54	54	54	55	47	49	43
Australia	0	0	6	4	0	0	0	0	0	11	10	24	10	2	0	0	0	2	0
Japan	0	6	6	4	5	0	0	0	0	5	3	10	8	13	13	13	12	8	7

Table 8

**Distance of the United States and Other Selected Countries
from the EU *Consensus*: Human Rights**
(Maximum Distance from the EU Consensus = 100, Minimum = 0)

	1995	1996 *	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002 **
USA	0	14	8	13	17	13	25	41
Russia	0	43	36	44	45	57	54	56
China	94	81	80	69	72	70	75	74
Canada	0	5	0	0	0	0	4	2
Mexico	6	29	32	38	28	43	46	20
Czech Republic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Poland	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Turkey	6	33	32	19	17	26	25	13
Israel	0	10	8	0	3	4	13	26
Egypt	50	52	48	50	45	70	67	67
India	88	81	76	81	62	74	71	48
Australia	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	6
Japan	0	5	0	0	0	0	4	4

Table 9

Distance of the EU Member States from the United States
57th General Assembly, 2002
 (Maximum Distance from the US = 100, Minimum = 0)

	All Votes	Middle East	Security etc.	Decolo- nization	Human Rights
Austria	55	83	42	75	39
Belgium	53	80	38	70	39
Denmark	54	83	38	75	39
Finland	54	83	41	70	39
France	46	83	22	55	39
Germany	53	83	35	70	40
Greece	54	83	38	75	40
Ireland	57	83	45	75	40
Italy	53	83	36	70	39
Luxembourg	54	83	38	75	39
Netherlands	53	83	38	65	37
Portugal	53	83	38	n/a	40
Spain	53	83	35	75	40
Sweden	56	83	43	75	39
UK	45	83	22	45	39
Number of Recorded Votes	106	22	39	11	31

Note: Votes included until December 31, 2002.

Table 10

Distance of Selected States from the United States
57th General Assembly, 2002
 (Maximum Distance from the US = 100, Minimum = 0)

	All Votes	Middle East	Security etc.	Decolo- nization	Human Rights
Australia	51	80	39	70	32
Canada	53	80	42	70	35
China	78	95	67	100	77
Czech Republic	54	83	38	75	39
Hungary	53	83	36	70	39
India	71	93	62	100	68
Israel	19	10	20	5	26
Japan	54	83	48	75	32
Latvia	53	83	36	65	42
Lithuania	54	83	38	70	40
Mexico	73	95	67	100	60
Nigeria	74	95	65	100	68
Poland	53	83	36	75	37
Romania	54	83	38	70	40
Russia	64	85	36	75	73
Number of Recorded Votes	106	22	39	11	31

Note: Votes included until December 31, 2002.

Annex II

List 1: Statistics on Recorded Votes in the UN General Assembly

51st General Assembly 1996/97: Recorded votes on 74 resolutions passed, in addition, 22 recorded votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on decisions and motions; in sum 96 recorded votes.

52nd General Assembly 1997/98: Recorded votes on 69 resolutions passed, in addition, 21 recorded votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on decisions and motions; in sum 90 recorded votes.

53rd General Assembly 1998/99: Recorded votes on 61 resolutions (1 in 1999) passed, in addition, 23 recorded votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on decisions and motions; in sum 84 recorded votes.

54th General Assembly 1999/2000: Recorded votes on 69 resolutions (1 in 2000) passed, in addition, 30 recorded votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on decisions and motions; in sum 99 recorded votes.

55th General Assembly 2000/01: Recorded votes on 66 resolutions (1 in 2001) passed, in addition, 17 recorded votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on decisions and motions; in sum 83 recorded votes.

56th General Assembly 2001/2002: Recorded votes on 67 resolutions (2 in 2001) passed, in addition, 21 recorded votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on decisions and motions; in sum 88 recorded votes.

57th General Assembly 2002/2003 (data until December 31, 2002): Recorded votes on 72 resolutions passed, in addition, 34 recorded votes on rejected resolutions, parts of resolutions, on decisions and motions; in sum 106 recorded votes.

Table 11

Amount of Recorded Votes in the UN General Assembly
(Total and According to Topics)

	1979	1981	1983	1985	1987	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Number of all Recorded Votes	96	151	170	203	177	143	103	89	88	77	92	97	96	90	84	99	83	88	106
Middle East	31	35	43	51	44	37	31	34	34	20	22	21	24	25	24	22	25	25	22
Security etc.	23	32	53	54	41	45	32	20	20	22	43	47	42	39	42	41	34	38	39
Decolonization												8	10	11	9	8	10	11	11
Human Rights												11	13	16	10	18	13	14	31

Note: No data calculated for Decolonization and Human Rights between 1979 and 1994.