

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

TWENTY-FIRST ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1975

IV

Minutes

Official Report of Debates

W E U

PARIS



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**The Proceedings of the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :**

**Volume III : Assembly Documents.**

**Volume IV : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates, General Index.**



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## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
DEQUAE André	Chr. Soc.
KEMPINAIRE André	PLP
LEYNEN Hubert	Chr. Soc.
SCHUGENS Willy	Socialist
de STEXHE Paul	Chr. Soc.
TANGHE Francis	Chr. Soc.

#### Substitutes

MM. BREYNE Gustave	Socialist
de BRUYNE Hektor	Volkunie
DUVIEUSART Etienne	FDF-RW
Mrs. GODINACHE-LAMBERT Marie-Thérèse	PLP
MM. HULPIAU Raphaël	Chr. Soc.
PLASMAN Marcel	Chr. Soc.
VAN HOEYLANDT D. Bernard	Socialist

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

MM. BOUCHENY Serge	Communist
BOULLOCHE André	Socialist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
BURCKEL Jean-Claude	UDR
CERNEAU Marcel	Centre Union
DELORME Claude	Socialist
GRANGIER Edouard	Dem. Left
KAUFFMANN Michel	UCDP
LEGARET Jean	Ind. Rep.
de MONTESQUIOU Pierre	Soc. Dem. Ref.
NESSLER Edmond	UDR
President of the Assembly	
PÉRIDIÉ Jean	Socialist
RADIUS René	UDR
RIVIÈRE Paul	UDR
ROGER Émile	Communist
SCHMITT Robert	UDR (App.)
VALLEIX Jean	UDR
VITTER Pierre	Ind. Rep.

#### Substitutes

MM. BEAUGUITTE André	Ind. Rep.
BELIN Gilbert	Socialist
BIZET Émile	UDR (App.)
BOURGEOIS Georges	UDR
CERMOLACCE Paul	Communist
DAILLET Jean-Marie	Soc. Dem. Ref.
DEPIETRI César	Communist
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
GRUSSENMEYER François	UDR
JEAMBRUN Pierre	Dem. Left
LA COMBE René	UDR

MM. du LUART Ladislas
MÉNARD Jacques
PIGNION Lucien
SCHLEITER François
SOUSTELLE Jacques
VADEPIED Raoul
WEBER Pierre

RIAS
Ind. Rep.
Socialist
Ind. Rep.
Non-party
UCDP
Ind. Rep. (App.)

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ALBER Siegbert	CDU
AMREHN Franz	CDU
DREGGER Alfred	CDU
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GESSNER Manfred	SPD
KEMPFER Friedrich	CDU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
MATTICK Kurt	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU
RICHTER Klaus	SPD
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
SCHWENCKE Olaf	SPD
SIEGLERSCHMIDT Hellmut	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP
Mrs. WOLF Erika	CDU

#### Substitutes

Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
CARSTENS Karl	CDU
GÖLTER Georg	CDU
HAASE Horst	SPD
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU
KLIESING Georg	CDU
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU
LENZER Christian	CDU
OPITZ Rudolf	FDP
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
SCHÄUBLE Wolfgang	CDU
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
WALTHER Rudi	SPD
WENDE Manfred	SPD
WÖRNER Manfred	CDU
WURBS Richard	FDP

## ITALY

## Representatives

MM. AVERARDI Giuseppe	Socialist
BETTIOL Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
BOLOGNA Giacomo	Chr. Dem.
COPPOLA Mattia	Chr. Dem.
FIORET Mario	Chr. Dem.
LAFORGIA Antonio	Chr. Dem.
LEGGIERI Vincenzo	Chr. Dem.
MAMMI Oscar	Republican
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
Mrs. MIOTTI CARLI Amalia	Chr. Dem.
MM. PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
PICA Domenico	Chr. Dem.
PRETI Luigi	Socialist
QUILLERI Fausto Samuele	Liberal
TALAMONA Augusto	Socialist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.
VEDOVATO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
ZAFFANELLA Renzo	Socialist

## Substitutes

MM. ARFÈ Gaetano	Socialist
ARTALI Mario	Socialist
BONALDI Umberto	Liberal
CASTELLUCCI Albertino	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. CATTANEO-PETRINI Giannina	Chr. Dem.
MM. CAVEZZALI Paolo	Socialist
FARABEGOLI Furio	Chr. Dem.
LA ROSA Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
MAGLIANO Terenzio	Socialist
MANCINI Antonio	Chr. Dem.
MONETTI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
NEGRARI Andrea	Chr. Dem.
PACINI Arturo	Chr. Dem.
PREARO Roberto	Chr. Dem.
PUMILIA Calogero	Chr. Dem.
REALE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
SANTALCO Carmelo	Chr. Dem.
SPORA Ettore	Chr. Dem.

## LUXEMBOURG

## Representatives

MM. ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
MARGUE Georges	Chr. Soc.
MART René	Dem.

## Substitutes

MM. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
KONEN René	Dem.
SPAUTZ Jean	Chr. Soc.

## NETHERLANDS

## Representatives

MM. CORNELISSEN Pam	Pop. Cath.
DANKERT Pieter	Labour
de NIET Maarten	Labour
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
REIJNEN Johannes	Pop. Cath.
SCHOLTEN Jan Nico	Antirevolution.
VOOGD Joop	Labour

## Substitutes

MM. de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
van OOIJEN David	Labour
PEIJNENBURG Marinus	Pop. Cath.
PIKET Frederik	Chr. Hist.
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
WALTMANS Henk	Radical

## UNITED KINGDOM

## Representatives

MM. Ronald BROWN	Labour
Paul CHANNON	Conservative
Stanley COHEN	Labour
Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Raymond FLETCHER	Labour
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
Peter HARDY	Labour
John HUNT	Conservative
Dr. J. Dickson MABON	Labour
MM. John MENDELSON	Labour
John PAGE	Conservative
Lord PEDDIE	Labour
Mr. Tom PENDRY	Labour
Sir John RODGERS	Conservative
MM. John ROPER	Labour
David STEEL	Liberal
Thomas URWIN	Labour

## Substitutes

Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Antony BUCK	Conservative
Raymond CARTER	Labour
John CORDLE	Conservative
Lord DARLING of HILLSBOROUGH	Labour
MM. John FARR	Conservative
Andrew FAULDS	Labour
Sir Harwood HARRISON	Conservative
MM. Jim LESTER	Conservative
Arthur LEWIS	Labour
Hilary MILLER	Conservative
Baroness PHILLIPS	Labour
Lord SELSDON	Conservative
Mr. Peter SNAPE	Labour
Lord WALLACE of COSLANY	Labour
MM. Kenneth WARREN	Conservative
Phillip WHITEHEAD	Labour



**MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS**

# EIGHTH SITTING

Monday, 1st December 1975

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Opening of the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly.
2. Examination of Credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session (Doc. 676).
5. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee (Doc. 679).
6. Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance — consideration of current problems (*Presentation of the Report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 680).
7. Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO.
8. Address by Mr. Dalvit, Secretary of State for Defence of Italy.
9. Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance — consideration of current problems (*Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 680).
10. Changes in the membership of Committees.

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### 1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes

The President announced the resumption of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

The Minutes of Proceedings of the Seventh Sitting on Thursday, 29th May 1975, were agreed to.

### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

### 3. Examination of Credentials

In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly took note of the letters from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stating that that Assembly had ratified the credentials of :

- Mr. Burekel as a representative of France in place of Mr. Krieg ;

- Mr. Vohrer as a Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany in place of Mrs. Schuchardt ;

- Mr. Opitz as a Substitute of the Federal Republic of Germany in place of Mr. Vohrer ;

- Mr. Reijnen as a Representative of the Netherlands in place of Mr. Letschert ;

- Mr. Buck and Lord Wallace of Coslany as Substitutes of the United Kingdom in place of Mr. Wall and Lord Walston.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, and subject to ratification by the Council of Europe, the Assembly unanimously ratified the credentials of :

- Mr. Hardy as a Representative of the United Kingdom in place of Mr. Prescott.

### 4. Observers

The President welcomed to the Second Part of the Session as parliamentary observers :

- Mr. Isabelle and Mr. Molgat from Canada ;
- Mr. Hartling and Mr. Folke from Denmark ;

- Mr. Apostolatos and Mr. Sechiotis from Greece ;
- Mr. Vikan and Mr. Utsi from Norway ;
- Mr. Moss from the United States.

#### **5. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The President addressed the Assembly.

#### **6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session**

(Doc. 676)

The Assembly adopted the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session.

#### **7. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee**

(Doc. 679)

In accordance with Rule 14 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the adoption by the Presidential Committee, on 11th September 1975, of the resolution on European unity and the defence of Europe, Doc. 679. (This Resolution will be published as No. 55) <sup>1</sup>.

#### **8. Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance — consideration of current problems**

(Presentation of the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 680 and Amendment)

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Leynen, Rapporteur.

#### **9. Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO**

Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Luns replied to questions put by MM. Leynen, de Montesquiou, Valleix, Lord Duncan-Sandys, MM. Sieglerschmidt, Critchley, Sir John Rodgers, MM. de Niet, Steel.

1. See page 16.

#### **10. Address by Mr. Dalvit, Secretary of State for Defence of Italy**

Mr. Dalvit, Secretary of State for Defence of Italy, addressed the Assembly.

#### **11. Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975**

(Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 692)

The President announced that a Motion for a Recommendation on the resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975 had been tabled by Mr. Radius and others with a request for urgent procedure in accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure.

The request for urgent procedure had been posted up and the text of the Motion for a Recommendation circulated.

The Assembly would decide on the request at its next Sitting.

*Speaker* : Mr. Amrehn.

#### **12. Address by Mr. Dalvit, Secretary of State for Defence of Italy**

(Replies to questions)

Mr. Dalvit replied to questions put by MM. Radius, Magliano.

#### **13. Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance — consideration of current problems**

(Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 680 and Amendment)

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : Mr. Voogd, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, MM. Radius, Boucheny, de Niet.

Mr. Leynen, Rapporteur, and Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The votes on the Amendment and on the draft Recommendation were deferred until the next Sitting.

**14. Changes in the membership of Committees**

In accordance with Rule 8 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly ratified the following changes in the membership of Committees made provisionally by the Presidential Committee :

*Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments**Federal Republic of Germany :*

Mr. Haase as a member to fill a vacant seat.

*United Kingdom :*

Mr. Buck as a member in place of Mr. Wall.

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, on the proposal of the French, German and Netherlands Delegations, the Assembly agreed to the following changes in the membership of Committees :

*Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments**Netherlands :*

Mr. Scholten as a member to fill a vacant seat.

*General Affairs Committee**France :*

Mr. Burekel as an alternate in place of Mr. Krieg.

*Federal Republic of Germany :*

Mr. Schäuble as an alternate to fill a vacant seat.

*Netherlands :*

Mr. Reijnen as an alternate to fill a vacant seat.

*Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges**France :*

Mr. Burekel as a member in place of Mr. Krieg.

*Netherlands :*

Mr. Scholten as a member to fill a vacant seat.

**15. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for Tuesday, 2nd December, at 10 a.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

The names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance <sup>1</sup>:

MM. Abens	MM. Gessner	MM. Périquier
Adriaensens	<i>Farr</i> (Grieve)	<i>Moneti</i> (Pica)
Ahrens	Hardy	<i>Piket</i> (Porthoine)
Alber	Hunt	<i>Magliano</i> (Preti)
Amrehn	Kauffman	Radius
<i>Reale</i> (Averardi)	<i>Lenzer</i> (Kempfler)	<i>Peijnenburg</i> (Reijnen)
Bettioli	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	Richter
Bologna	(Kempinaire)	Sir John Rodgers
Boucheny	MM. <i>Mancini</i> (Laforgia)	MM. Roger
Bouloche	<i>Ménard</i> (Legaret)	<i>Carter</i> (Roper)
<i>Faulds</i> (Brown)	Lemmrich	Schugens
Brugnon	Leynen	Sieglerschmidt
Channon	Margue	Steel
Cohen	Mart	de Stexhe
Cornelissen	Mende	Tanghe
Critchley	Lord <i>Wallace of Coslany</i>	Treu
Dankert	(Mendelson)	Urwin
Delorme	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Valleix
Dequae	MM. de Montesquiou	Vedovato
Lord Duncan-Sandys	Müller	<i>Schleier</i> (Vitter)
MM. Enders	de Niet	Voogd
Fioret	Pecoraro	<i>Pumilia</i> (Zaffanella)
<i>Lewis</i> (Fletcher)	Lord Peddie	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Burckel	MM. Mammi	MM. Schmidt
Cerneau	Marquardt	Schmitt
Coppola	Mattick	Scholten
Dregger	Minnocci	Schwencke
Grangier	Page	Talamona
Leggieri	Pendry	Vohrer
Mabon	Quilleri	Mrs. Wolf
	Rivière	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RESOLUTION 55*****on European union and the defence of Europe***

The Assembly of WEU,

Stressing the fact that it is the only European parliamentary assembly with competence in the defence field and that this competence stems from Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, signed by seven of the nine member States of the European Community ;

Noting that in its report on European union the Commission recalls that " matters relating specifically to defence are dealt with at NATO and in Western European Union " ;

Recalling the fact that in accordance with Article XI the modified Brussels Treaty is open to accession by all democratic States, including the two member States of the EEC which are not parties to the treaty ;

Anxious to ensure that the undertakings entered into in the modified Brussels Treaty are respected and the means of action maintained as long as defence matters are only a field of " potential " competence for the European union ;

Agreeing with the abovementioned report that the creation of the union might be facilitated by " periodic discussions on defence problems... in a truly European framework with the participation of all the member States " and that " another major step forward would be the development of a common policy on arms and equipment, possibly involving the setting up of a 'European Arms Agency' ",

**URGES THE PRIME MINISTER OF BELGIUM, Mr. LÉO TINDEMANS, RESPONSIBLE FOR SUBMITTING A REPORT ON EUROPEAN UNION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL**

I. When considering defence, to take account of the fundamental provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and its Protocols, i.e. :

- the guarantee of "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power" by the WEU member countries in the event of any of them being the object of an armed attack in Europe (Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty) ;
- the undertakings entered into by the member countries concerning their forces and armaments (Protocols Nos. II, III and IV), these undertakings being a model of freely-accepted discipline ;
- the existence of the WEU Council "organised so as to be able to exercise its functions continuously" and able to "be immediately convened in order to permit the High Contracting Parties to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise" (Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty) ;
- the existence of the Standing Armaments Committee which is in a position to make a major contribution to the preparation of a joint European policy in the field of armaments and equipment and thus to pave the way for the creation of a "European Arms Agency" ;
- the parliamentary supervision exercised by the WEU Assembly of the activities of the Council and thus more generally of measures taken to ensure the security of Western Europe (Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty) ;

II. To consider carefully the possibilities now offered by the modified Brussels Treaty until such time as the European union shall have the necessary powers and means of action for exercising responsibility in the defence field ;

III. To facilitate the exercise by the WEU Assembly of its responsibilities in the defence field by recommending that the European Council seek its opinion on any plans it may draw up for the defence of Europe.

# NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd December 1975

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 683*).
2. Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance — consideration of current problems (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 680 and Amendment*).
3. Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975 (*Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 692*).
4. Address by Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
5. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Doc. 687*).

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

### 3. Change in the membership of a Committee

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, on the proposal of the United Kingdom Delegation, the Assembly agreed to the following change in the membership of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments :

Mr. Hardy as a member in place of Mr. Prescott.

### 4. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 683)*

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mrs. von Bothmer, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Vedovato, Mende, Bettiol.

The Debate was adjourned.

### 5. Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance — consideration of current problems

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 680 and Amendment)*

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation contained in Document 680.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Van Hoeylandt :

At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft Recommendation proper, add the words : "but excluding nuclear forces".

*Speakers* : MM. Van Hoeylandt, Leynen.

The Amendment was negatived.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 37 votes to 15 with 10 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 273) <sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 21.

**6. Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975**

*(Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 692)*

In accordance with Rule 43 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Assembly proceeded to consider the request for urgent procedure on the Motion for a Recommendation tabled by Mr. Radius and others.

*Speakers* : MM. Radius, Sieglerschmidt.

The Assembly agreed to adopt the urgent procedure.

The Motion for a Recommendation was referred to the General Affairs Committee.

The Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee would be held at 5 p.m. on Thursday 4th December.

**7. Address by Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany**

Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Moersch replied to questions put by MM. Schwenneke, de Bruyne, Amrehn, Sieglerschmidt.

**8. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe**

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 683)*

The Debate was resumed.

*Speakers* : MM. Müller, Cermolacce, Schwenneke.

*Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler.*

*Speakers* : MM. Amrehn, Enders, Pumilia.

The Debate was adjourned.

**9. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.*

## APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup> :

MM. <i>Hengel</i> (Abens)	MM. Hardy	MM. <i>Carter</i> (Pendry)
Adriaensens	Hunt	<i>Moneti</i> (Pica)
Ahrens	Kauffmann	<i>Peijnenburg</i> (Portheine)
Alber	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	<i>Magliano</i> (Preti)
Amrehn	(Kempinaire)	Radius
<i>Reale</i> (Averardi)	MM. <i>Negrari</i> (Laforgia)	Reijnen
Bettiol	<i>Ménard</i> (Legaret)	Richter
Bologna	Mrs. <i>Cattaneo-Petrini</i> (Leggieri)	Sir John Rodgers
Brown	MM. Lemmrich	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
Brugnon	Leynen	Roper
Channon	Margue	<i>Vadepied</i> (Schmitt)
Cohen	<i>Haase</i> (Marquardt)	Scholten
Cornelissen	Mart	Schugens
Critchley	Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Mattick)	Schweneke
Dankert	Mr. Mende	Sieglerschmidt
Delorme	Lord <i>Wallace of Coslany</i>	Steel
Dequae	(Mendelson)	de Stexhe
<i>Lenzer</i> (Dregger)	Mrs. Miotti Carli	<i>Pumilia</i> (Talamona)
Lord Duncan-Sandys	MM. de Montesquiou	Tanghe
MM. Enders	Müller	Urwin
Fioret	de Niet	Valleix
<i>Lewis</i> (Fletcher)	<i>Cordle</i> (Page)	Vedovato
Gessner	Pecoraro	Vohrer
<i>Farr</i> (Grieve)	Lord Peddie	<i>Mancini</i> (Zaffanella)

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Boucheny	MM. Kempfler	MM. Rivière
Bouilloche	Mabon	Schmidt
Burckel	Mammi	Treu
Cerneau	Minnocci	Vitter
Coppola	Péridier	Voogd
Grangier	Quilléri	Mrs. Wolf

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## APPENDIX II

Vote No. 9 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance — consideration of current problems (Doc. 680) :

Ayes .....	37
Noes .....	15
Abstentions .....	10

*Ayes :*

MM. <i>Hengel</i> (Abens)	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i> (Kempinaire)	MM. Pecoraro
Amrehn	MM. <i>Negrari</i> (Laforgia)	<i>Moneti</i> (Pica)
<i>Reale</i> (Averardi)	<i>Ménard</i> (Legaret)	Radius
Bettiol	Mrs. <i>Cattaneo-Petrini</i> (Leggieri)	Sir John Rodgers
Bologna	MM. Leynen	MM. Sieglerschmidt
Channon	Margue	Steel
Critchley	Mart	de Stexhe
Dequae	Mende	Tanghe
<i>Lenzer</i> (Dregger)	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Valleix
Lord Duncan-Sandys	MM. de Montesquiou	Vedovato
MM. Fioret	Müller	Vohrer
<i>Farr</i> (Grieve)	<i>Cordle</i> (Page)	<i>Mancini</i> (Zaffanella)
Hunt		

*Noes :*

MM. Brown	Lord <i>Wallace of Coslany</i> (Mendelson)	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
Brugnon	Mr. de Niet	Roper
Dankert	Lord Peddie	Scholten
Delorme	Mr. <i>Carter</i> (Pendry)	Schugens
<i>Lewis</i> (Fletcher)		Urwin
Hardy		

*Abstentions :*

MM. Ahrens	Mr. <i>Haase</i> (Marquardt)	MM. Reijnen
Cornelissen	Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Mattick)	Richter
Enders	Mr. <i>Peijnenburg</i> (Porthoine)	Schwencke
Gessner		

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 273*****on Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance  
— consideration of current problems***

The Assembly,

Considering that, however Europe's defence may be organised, the Atlantic Alliance remains the essential guarantee of European security ;

Noting with interest the views expressed by the Commission of the European Communities in its report on European union of 26th June 1975 concerning the defence responsibilities of the European union ;

Recalling that the WEU Assembly is the only European parliamentary assembly with defence responsibilities ;

Underlining that accession to the modified Brussels Treaty is still open in particular to any country called upon to take part in a European union ;

Noting that "the Council meeting at the level of Permanent Representatives is fully empowered to exercise the rights and duties ascribed to it in the treaty" and that "the Council are at present discussing the possibility that Western European Union might undertake additional work connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe" (Reply to Recommendation 266) ;

Considering the Council's refusal to reply to questions put by members of the Assembly on nuclear strategy and NATO defence plans to be contrary to normal parliamentary democratic procedure and consequently unacceptable (Written Questions 158 and 159),

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Implement in the framework of its responsibilities the principles defined in Resolution 55 of the Assembly, and in particular :
  - (a) ensure that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are applied in full until such time as the European union has the necessary powers and means of action to exercise defence responsibilities ;
  - (b) maintain all its activities as long as they have not been attributed by treaty to the institutions of the union ;
2. Ensure that no member country enters into any international undertaking liable to limit its participation in a European union with responsibilities covering external policy and defence matters ;
3. Explore and implement here and now the possibilities afforded by the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly in the field of arms policy ;
4. Consider forthwith how to make truly European bodies responsible for preparing a defence policy to be implemented by the forces of the member States ;
5. Invite the European Council, as an organ of the EEC, to consult the WEU Assembly on any plans it may draw up concerning the defence of Europe.

## TENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd December 1975

### ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976 (Doc. 678); Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1974 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Doc. 677 and Addendum) (*Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts*, Docs. 678 and 677 and Addendum).
2. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution*, Doc. 687).
3. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe *Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 683 and Amendments).
4. Second-generation nuclear reactors (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 686).
5. The International Institute for the Management of Technology (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 685 and Amendment).

### MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Bettiol, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

#### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

#### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

#### 3. Change in the membership of a Committee

In accordance with Rule 39 (6) of the Rules of Procedure, on the proposal of the United Kingdom Delegation, the Assembly agreed to the following change in the membership of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration :

Lord Wallace of Coslany as an alternate in place of Lord Walston.

#### 4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976

(Doc. 678)

#### Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1974 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts

(Doc. 677 and Addendum)

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 678 and 677 and Addendum)*

The Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration was presented by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Alber, Dequae, Lord Selsdon.

The Debate was closed.

The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year

1976 contained in Document 678 was agreed to unanimously.

The Motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1974 contained in the Addendum to Document 677 was agreed to unanimously.

### **5. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 687)*

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. de Montesquiou, Chairman and Rapporteur.

Mr. Moss (Observer from the United States) addressed the Assembly.

*Speaker* : Mr. de Montesquiou.

Mr. Moss replied to questions put by MM. Richter, Cornelissen, Brown, Lewis, Lord Peddie.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Cornelissen, Lenzer.

*Sir John Rodgers, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Bettiol.*

*Speakers* : MM. Brown, de Bruyne, Lord Peddie.

Mr. de Montesquiou, Chairman and Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

*Speakers* (on a point of order) : MM. Brown, de Montesquiou.

The votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution were deferred until 5.30 p.m. on Thursday 4th December.

### **6. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe**

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Votes on the Amendments to the draft Recommendation, Doc. 683)*

The Debate was resumed.

Mrs. von Bothmer, Rapporteur, and Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation contained in Document 683.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. de Montesquiou :

1. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft Recommendation and insert :

“Underlining the need to achieve a progressive reduction in the level of forces throughout Europe ;”

2. After the fourth paragraph, insert :

“Considering that such a reduction should not result only from a compromise between the United States and the Soviet Union but must take account of the interests of all the European countries ;”

3. In line 1 of the fifth paragraph of the preamble, leave out “nevertheless” and insert “further”.

4. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft Recommendation proper, add : “and the creation of further imbalance in that area ;”.

*Speakers* : Mr. de Montesquiou, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

*Speakers* (on a point of order) : MM. Sieglerschmidt, Roper, de Montesquiou.

Part 1 was negatived.

Part 2 was agreed to.

Part 3 was agreed to.

Part 4 was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Vedovato :

In paragraph 4 of the draft Recommendation proper, replace the word “sovereignty” by “sovereign equality”.

*Speakers* : MM. Vedovato, Sieglerschmidt.

The Amendment was agreed to.

The vote on the amended draft Recommendation was deferred until 5.30 p.m. on Thursday 4th December.

**7. Second-generation nuclear reactors**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 686)*

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speaker* : Mr. Cornelissen.

The Debate was adjourned.

**8. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for Wednesday, 3rd December, at 10 a.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup>:

MM. Alber	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	MM. <i>Peijnenburg</i> (Portheine)
<i>Reale</i> (Averardi)	(Kempinaire)	Radius
Bettiol	Mr. <i>Negrari</i> (Laforgia)	Reijnen
Bologna	Mrs. <i>Cattaneo-Petrini</i> (Leggieri)	Richter
<i>Pignion</i> (Boulloche)	MM. Lemmrich	Rivière
Brown	Leynen	Sir John Rodgers
Brugnon	<i>Faulds</i> (Mabon)	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
Channon	Margue	Roper
Coppola	Mart	<i>Vadepied</i> (Schmitt)
Cornelissen	Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Mattick)	Scholten
Critchley	Mr. Mende	Schugens
Dankert	Lord <i>Wallace of Coslany</i>	Schwencke
Dequae	(Mendelson)	Sieglerschmidt
<i>Lenzer</i> (Dregger)	Mr. <i>Castellucci</i> (Minnocci)	Steel
Enders	Mrs. Miotti Carli	de Stexhe
Fioret	MM. de Montesquiou	Tanghe
<i>Lewis</i> (Fletcher)	de Niet	Urwin
<i>Farr</i> (Grieve)	Lord <i>Selsdon</i> (Page)	Valleix
Hardy	Mr. Pecoraro	Vedovato
<i>Buck</i> (Hunt)	Lord Peddie	Mrs. Wolf
Kauffmann	MM. Périquier	Mr. <i>Mancini</i> (Zaffanella)
	<i>Moneti</i> (Pica)	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Abens	Lord Duncan-Sandys	MM. Preti
Adriaensens	MM. Gessner	Quilléri
Ahrens	Grangier	Schmidt
Amrehn	Kempfer	Talamona
Boucheny	Legaret	Treu
Burckel	Mammi	Vitter
Cerneau	Marquardt	Vohrer
Cohen	Müller	Voogd
Delorme	Pendry	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

# ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd December 1975

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Second-generation nuclear reactors (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 686*).
2. Address by Mr. Rodgers, Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.
3. The International Institute for the Management of Technology (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 685 and Amendment*).
4. Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 682 and Amendments*).

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

### 3. Second-generation nuclear reactors

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 686)*

The Debate was resumed.

*Speakers* : MM. Brown, Cermolacce, Richter.

Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The vote on the draft Recommendation was deferred until 5.30 p.m. on Thursday 4th December.

### 4. The International Institute for the Management of Technology

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the Amendment to the draft Recommendation, Doc. 685)*

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Richter.

The Debate was opened.

*Speaker* : Mr. Farr.

Mr. Richter, Rapporteur, replied to the speaker.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation contained in Document 685.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by MM. Vedovato, Treu and Pecoraro :

1. In line 1 of the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft Recommendation, leave out "failure" and insert "situation", and in line 1 of the second paragraph of the preamble leave out "failure" and insert "situation".

2. At the end of the third paragraph of the preamble, add "and that Austria, which is not a member of the European Council, has signed it,".

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out from "study" to the end and

insert: "to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and, finally, to the European Council for implementation".

*Speaker* : Mr. Vedovato.

Part 1 was agreed to.

Part 2 was agreed to.

In part 3, Mr. Vedovato proposed deleting "finally" and inserting "eventually".

Part 3, thus amended, was agreed to.

The vote on the amended draft Recommendation was deferred until 5.30 p.m. on Thursday 4th December.

#### **5. Address by Mr. Rodgers, Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom**

Mr. Rodgers, Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, addressed the Assembly.

Mr. Rodgers replied to questions put by Lord Duncan-Sandys, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM.

Roper, Miller, Critchley, Richter, Lewis, Leynen, Buck.

#### **6. Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 682 and Amendments)*

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Bettiol, Cordle, Pignion.

The Debate was adjourned.

#### **7. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3. p.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance <sup>1</sup> :

MM. Abens	Mr. Kempfler	MM. <i>Piket</i> (Portheine)
Alber	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	<i>Magliano</i> (Preti)
<i>Reale</i> (Averardi)	(Kempinaire)	Radius
Bettiol	MM. <i>Laforgia</i>	Reijnen
<i>Pignion</i> (Bouulloche)	<i>Ménard</i> (Legaret)	Richter
Brown	Mrs. <i>Cattaneo-Petrini</i> (Leggieri)	Rivière
Brugnon	MM. Leynen	Sir John Rodgers
Channon	<i>Buck</i> (Mabon)	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
Cohen	Margue	Roper
Coppola	Mart	<i>Vadepied</i> (Schmitt)
<i>Peijnenburg</i> (Cornelissen)	Mrs. <i>von Bothmer</i> (Mattick)	Scholten
Critchley	MM. Mende	Schugens
Delorme	<i>Lewis</i> (Mendelson)	Schwencke
<i>Breyne</i> (Dequae)	<i>Castellucci</i> (Minnocci)	Sieglerschmidt
<i>Lenzer</i> (Dregger)	Mrs. <i>Miotti Carli</i>	Steel
Lord Duncan-Sandys	MM. de Montesquiou	<i>Plasman</i> (de Stexhe)
MM. Enders	Müller	Tanghe
Fioret	de Niet	<i>Negrari</i> (Treu)
Fletcher	<i>Faulds</i> (Page)	Urwin
<i>Büchner</i> (Gessner)	Pecoraro	Valleix
<i>Farr</i> (Grieve)	Lord Peddie	Vedovato
Hardy	MM. <i>Cordle</i> (Pendry)	Vohrer
Hunt	Péridier	Voogd
Kauffmann	<i>Moneti</i> (Pica)	Mrs. Wolf

## The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Adriaensens	MM. Cerneau	MM. Quilleri
Ahrens	Dankert	Schmidt
Amrehn	Grangier	Talamona
Bologna	Lemmrigh	Vitter
Boucheny	Mammi	Zaffanella
Burckel	Marquardt	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

# TWELFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd December 1975

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 682, Addendum and Amendments*).
2. Northern European countries and the prospect of European political union (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 684*).
3. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 681*).

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

### 3. Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the Amendments to the draft Recommendation, Doc. 682 and Addendum)*

The Debate was resumed.

*Speakers* : Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Roper, Piket, Channon, Reale, Pecoraro, Sieglerschmidt.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation contained in Document 682.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Sir John Rodgers and others :

1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft Recommendation, leave out from "Community" to the end of the paragraph and insert :

"rests upon the freely-expressed support of the peoples of their member States ;"

2. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble and insert :

"(iv) Stressing the importance that it attaches to Portugal's contribution to the defence of Europe as a member of NATO and wishing to further the development in Portugal of a truly democratic system of government ;"

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (b) and insert :

"(b) that financial, economic and technical help is provided for Portugal with a view to encouraging progress towards a truly democratic pluralistic parliamentary system of government ;"

*Speakers* : Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Critchley.

Part 1 was withdrawn.

Part 2 was withdrawn.

Part 3 was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 3) was tabled by Mr. Critchley and Mr. Roper :

In line 1 of paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft Recommendation, after the word "Portugal" insert the words "as a first step towards a fully-democratic government".

The Amendment was agreed to.

An Amendment (No. 2) was tabled by Mr. Scholten and others :

In line 3 of paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft Recommendation, after the word "would" insert "be in contradiction with the aims of NATO and".

*Speakers* : MM. Scholten, Critchley, Miller, Voogd, Sieglerschmidt (on a point of order), Channon.

The Amendment was negatived.

The votes on the amended draft Recommendation and the draft Resolution were deferred until 5.30 p.m. on Thursday 4th December.

#### **4. Northern European countries and the prospect of European political union**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 684)*

*Speaker* (on a point of order) : Mr. Steel.

Mr. Oftedal, Observer from Norway, addressed the Assembly.

The Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Mr. Steel, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. Hartling (Observer from Denmark), de Bruyne.

Mr. Steel, Rapporteur, and Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The vote on the draft Recommendation was deferred until 5.30 p.m. on Thursday 4th December.

#### **5. Relations with Parliaments**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 681)*

The Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments was presented by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speaker* : Mr. Roper.

Mrs. Miotti Carli, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speaker.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly took note of the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

#### **6. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for Thursday, 4th December, at 10 a.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 5.50 p.m.*

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance<sup>1</sup>:

MM. <i>Schänble</i> (Amrehn)	Mr. Kempfler	MM. Radius
<i>Reale</i> (Averardi)	Mrs. <i>Godinache-Lambert</i>	Reijnen
Bologna	(Kempinaire)	Richter
Channon	Mrs. <i>Cattaneo-Petrini</i> (Leggieri)	Sir John Rodgers
Coppola	MM. Leynen	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
Cornelissen	Margue	Roper
Critchley	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	Scholten
<i>Piket</i> (Dankert)	Mende	Schugens
Delorme	<i>Lewis</i> (Mendelson)	Sieglerschmidt
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	<i>Castellucci</i> (Minnocci)	Steel
<i>Müller</i> (Lord Duncan-Sandys)	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Talamona
Enders	Mr. de Montesquiou	<i>Negrari</i> (Treu)
Fioret	Sir <i>Frederic Bennett</i> (Page)	Valleix
<i>Büchner</i> (Gessner)	Mr. Pecoraro	Voogd
<i>Warren</i> (Grieve)	Lord Peddie	Mrs. Wolf
Hardy	MM. <i>Moneti</i> (Pica)	Mr. <i>Mancini</i> (Zaffanella)
Kauffmann	<i>Peijnenburg</i> (Portheine)	

## The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Abens	MM. Fletcher	MM. Périquier
Adriaensens	Grangier	Preti
Ahrens	Hunt	Quillier
Alber	Laforgia	Rivière
Bettioli	Legaret	Schmidt
Boucheny	Lemmrich	Schmitt
Bouloche	Mabon	Schwencke
Brown	Mammi	de Stexhe
Brugnon	Marquardt	Tanghe
Burckel	Mattick	Urwin
Cerneau	Müller	Vedovato
Cohen	de Niet	Vitter
Dregger	Pendry	Vohrer

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

# THIRTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 4th December 1975

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. The European aeronautical industry (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Doc. 691 and Amendment*).
2. European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 689 and Amendment*).

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in the Appendix.

### 3. The European aeronautical industry

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Doc. 691 and Amendment)*

The Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions was presented by Mr. Warren, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Richter, Miller, Lenzer, Roper.

Mr. Warren, Rapporteur, and Mr. de Montesquiou, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation contained in Document 691.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Valleix :

At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft Recommendation proper, add : "on which the Standing Armaments Committee is also based ;".

*Speakers* : MM. de Montesquiou, de Bruyne.

The Amendment was agreed to.

*Speaker* : Mr. Roper.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 274) <sup>1</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Resolution.

The draft Resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This Resolution will be published as No. 56) <sup>2</sup>.

### 4. European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 689 and Amendment)*

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Lemmrich, Rapporteur.

1. See page 35.

2. See page 36.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Piket, Rivière.

Mr. Lemmrich, Rapporteur, and Mr. Critchley, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The votes on the draft Recommendation and Amendment were deferred until 3 p.m. the same day.

**5. Date and time of the next Sitting**

The next Sitting was fixed for the same day at 3 p.m.

*The Sitting was closed at 12 noon.*

## APPENDIX

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance <sup>1</sup> :

MM. Adriaensens	MM. <i>Vadepied</i> (Kauffmann)	MM. <i>Carter</i> (Pendry)
Ahrens	Kempfler	<i>Castellucci</i> (Pica)
Alber	Laforgia	<i>Piket</i> (Portheine)
<i>Schäuble</i> (Amrehn)	Mrs. <i>Cattaneo-Petrini</i> (Leggieri)	Radius
<i>Reale</i> (Averardi)	MM. Lemmrich	Reijnen
<i>Pignion</i> (Boulloche)	Leynen	Richter
Channon	Margue	Rivière
Cohen	Marquardt	Sir John Rodgers
Coppola	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	MM. Roper
Critchley	Mattick	Scholten
Delorme	Mende	Schugens
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	Lord <i>Wallace of Coslany</i>	Schwencke
<i>Lenzer</i> (Dregger)	(Mendelson)	Sieglerschmidt
<i>Miller</i> (Lord Duncan-Sandys)	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Enders	MM. de Montesquiou	MM. <i>Hulpiau</i> (Tanghe)
<i>Lewis</i> (Fletcher)	Müller	<i>Negrari</i> (Treu)
<i>Haase</i> (Gessner)	de Niet	Urwin
<i>Warren</i> (Grieve)	Page	Valleix
Hardy	Pecoraro	<i>La Combe</i> (Vitter)
Hunt	Lord Peddie	Vohrer
		Mrs. Wolf

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Abens	MM. Fioret	MM. Roger
Bettiol	Grangier	Schmidt
Bologna	Kempinaire	Schmitt
Boucheny	Legaret	de Stexhe
Brown	Mabon	Talamona
Brugnon	Mammi	Vedovato
Burckel	Minnocci	Voogd
Cerneau	Péridier	Zaffanella
Cornelissen	Preti	Dankert
	Quillieri	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 274**  
***on the European aeronautical industry***

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The Assembly,

Welcoming the action programme for the European aeronautical sector submitted by the Commission of the European Communities to the Council of Ministers ;

Likewise welcoming the activities of the European Civil Aviation Conference, the association of European airlines and the Association Européenne des Constructeurs de Matériel Aérospatial ;

Aware of the formation of the Group of Six by the main European aircraft manufacturers ;

Regretting that the range of Eurocontrol's activities is being diminished,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Call upon member countries to recognise :

1. That it is essential to ensure the unified civil and military aerospace manufacturing and user market without which divergent national policies will continue to prevail ;
2. That a European military aircraft procurement agency as proposed by the Assembly and later by the Commission requires the juridical basis of the modified Brussels Treaty on which the Standing Armaments Committee is also based ;
3. That the weakening of Eurocontrol would be detrimental to Europe and that the organisation should be developed in accordance with its Charter and that there is no point in defining European air space if a European organisation which is working effectively is downgraded to the task of co-ordinating national air traffic services.

**RESOLUTION 56*****on a colloquy on the formulation  
of a civil and military aeronautical policy for Europe***

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The Assembly,

Considering that the development of European co-operation in the field of civil and military aviation remains one of its main concerns ;

Considering that the future of the European aeronautical industry may be jeopardised if a concerted policy providing a broad basis for co-operation between governments, manufacturers and airlines is not agreed upon ;

Considering the positive results of the colloquy held in Paris on 17th and 18th September 1973,

INSTRUCTS its Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions to organise a colloquy on aeronautical questions in 1976 on the same basis as the one it organised in 1973.

# FOURTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 4th December 1975

## ORDERS OF THE DAY

1. European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 689 and Amendment*).
2. Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975 (*Presentation of and Debate on the oral Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 693 and Amendment*).
3. Air forces on the central front (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 690*).
4. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology (*Votes on the draft Recommendation and on the draft Resolution, Doc. 687*).
5. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 683*).
6. Second-generation nuclear reactors (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 686*).
7. Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance (*Votes on the amended draft Recommendation and on the draft Resolution, Doc. 682 and Addendum*).
8. The International Institute for the Management of Technology (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 685*).
9. Northern European countries and the prospect of European political union (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 684*).

## MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

*The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting were agreed to.

### 2. Attendance Register

The names of Representatives and Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance are given in Appendix I.

### 3. European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 689 and Amendment)*

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation contained in Document 689.

An Amendment (No. 1) was proposed by Mr. Rivière :

In paragraph 1 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out : "establish, in the face of the continuously increasing armaments of the War-

saw Pact, the balance of forces which is" and insert : "maintain the forces which are".

*Speakers* : MM. Rivière, Lemmrich.

The Amendment was negatived.

The vote on the draft Recommendation was deferred until 5.30 p.m.

### 4. Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975

*(Presentation of and Debate on the oral Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 693 and Amendment)*

The oral Report of the General Affairs Committee was presented by Sir John Rodgers, Rapporteur.

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Fletcher, Radius, Richter, Sieglerschmidt, Cermolacce.

The Debate was closed.

The Assembly proceeded to consider the draft Recommendation contained in Document 693.

An Amendment (No. 1) was tabled by Mr. Faulds and others :

1. At the end of the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft Recommendation, insert a paragraph as follows :

“Noting that Israel has consistently failed to comply with UN resolutions requiring her to abandon occupied Arab territories ;”

2. Leave out the second and third paragraphs of the preamble to the draft Recommendation.

3. In paragraph 1 of the draft Recommendation proper, leave out from “without prejudice” to the end of the paragraph and insert :

“and through contacts with the Council of Europe and the EEC find means of conveying to the Israeli Government the necessity both of withdrawal to the 1967 borders in compliance with UN resolutions and the ending of attacks by its armed forces on the territory and people of Lebanon ;”

*Speakers* : MM. Urwin, Piket.

The Amendment was withdrawn.

The vote on the draft Recommendation was deferred until 5.30 p.m.

### **5. Air forces on the central front**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 690)*

The Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments was presented by Mr. Roper, Rapporteur.

*Sir John Rodgers, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler.*

*Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair.*

The Debate was opened.

*Speakers* : MM. Warren, de Montesquiou.

Mr. Roper, Rapporteur, and Mr. Critchley, Chairman of the Committee, replied to the speakers.

The Debate was closed.

The vote on the draft Recommendation was deferred until 5.30 p.m.

*The Sitting was suspended at 4.35 p.m. and resumed at 5.20 p.m.*

### **6. Message from the Greek observers**

The President delivered to the Assembly a message from the Greek observers.

### **7. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology**

*(Votes on the draft Recommendation and on the draft Resolution, Doc. 687)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix II) by 55 votes to 4 with 2 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 275) <sup>1</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Resolution.

The draft Resolution was agreed to unanimously. (This Resolution will be published as No. 57) <sup>2</sup>.

### **8. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe**

*(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 683)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 276) <sup>3</sup>.

### **9. Second-generation nuclear reactors**

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 686)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

1. See page 46.

2. See page 47.

3. See page 48.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix III) by 58 votes to 1 with 2 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 277) <sup>1</sup>.

### **10. Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance**

*(Votes on the amended draft Recommendation and on the draft Resolution, Doc. 682 and Addendum)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

*Speakers* (explanation of vote) : MM. Valleix, de Montesquiou.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix IV) by 46 votes to 8 with 5 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 278) <sup>2</sup>.

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Resolution.

The draft Resolution was agreed to. (This Resolution will be published as No. 58) <sup>3</sup>.

### **11. The International Institute for the Management of Technology**

*(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 685)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the amended draft Recommendation.

The amended draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 279) <sup>4</sup>.

### **12. Northern European countries and the prospect of European political union**

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 684)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

*Speaker* (explanation of vote) : Mr. Cermolacce.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously with one abstention. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 280) <sup>5</sup>.

1. See page 49.

2. See page 50.

3. See page 51.

4. See page 52.

5. See page 53.

### **13. European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments**

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 689)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

*Speaker* (explanation of vote) : Mr. Rivière.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix V) by 43 votes to 11 with 5 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 281) <sup>1</sup>.

### **14. Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975**

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 693)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

*Speakers* (explanation of vote) : Mr. Cermolacce, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, (on a point of order) : Mr. Roper.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to unanimously with two abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 282) <sup>2</sup>.

### **15. Air forces on the central front**

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 690)*

The Assembly proceeded to vote on the draft Recommendation.

The draft Recommendation was agreed to on a vote by roll-call (see Appendix VI) by 46 votes to 1 with 10 abstentions. (This Recommendation will be published as No. 283) <sup>3</sup>.

### **16. Close of the Session**

The President declared the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly closed.

*The Sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m.*

1. See page 54.

2. See page 56.

3. See page 57.

## APPENDIX I

Names of Representatives or Substitutes who signed the Register of Attendance <sup>1</sup>:

MM. Adriaensens	MM. Hunt	MM. <i>Cordle</i> (Pendry)
Ahrens	<i>Vadepied</i> (Kauffmann)	<i>Castellucci</i> (Pica)
Alber	<i>Breyne</i> (Kempinaire)	<i>Piket</i> (Portheine)
<i>Schäuble</i> (Amrehn)	<i>Mancini</i> (Laforgia)	Radius
<i>Reale</i> (Averardi)	<i>du Luart</i> (Legaret)	Reijnen
Bettiol	Mrs. <i>Cattaneo-Petrini</i> (Leggieri)	Richter
Bologna	MM. Lemmrich	Rivière
<i>Pignon</i> (Bouulloche)	Leynen	Sir John Rodgers
Brugnon	<i>Lewis</i> (Mabon)	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
Burckel	Margue	Roper
<i>Daillet</i> (Cerneau)	Marquardt	<i>Bizet</i> (Schmitt)
Channon	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	Scholten
Cohen	Mattick	Schugens
Coppola	Mende	Sieglerschmidt
<i>Schlingemann</i> (Cornelissen)	Lord <i>Wallace of Coslany</i>	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Critchley	(Mendelson)	MM. <i>Hulpiau</i> (Tanghe)
Delorme	Mrs. Miotti Carli	<i>Negrari</i> (Treu)
<i>de Bruyne</i> (Dequae)	MM. de Montesquiou	Urwin
<i>Miller</i> (Lord Duncan-Sandys)	<i>La Combe</i> (Nessler)	Valleix
Enders	de Niet	Vedovato
Fletcher	Page	<i>Bourgeois</i> (Vitter)
<i>Warren</i> (Grieve)	Pecoraro	Mrs. Wolf
Hardy	Lord Peddie	

The following Representatives apologised for their absence :

MM. Abens	MM. Grangier	MM. Schmidt
Boucheny	Kempfler	Schwencke
Brown	Mammi	de Stexhe
Dankert	Minnocci	Talamona
Dregger	Müller	Vohrer
Fioret	Péridier	Voogd
Gessner	Prete	Zaffanella
	Quilleri	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## APPENDIX II

Vote No. 10 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology (Doc. 687)<sup>1</sup>:

Ayes .....	55
Noes .....	4
Abstentions .....	2

*Ayes :*

MM. Adriaensens	MM. <i>Vadepied</i> (Kauffmann)	Lord Peddie
Ahrens	Kempfer	MM. <i>Cordle</i> (Pendry)
Alber	<i>Breyne</i> (Kempinaire)	<i>Castellucci</i> (Pica)
<i>Schiuble</i> (Amrehn)	<i>Mancini</i> (Laforgia)	<i>Piket</i> (Porthoine)
<i>Reale</i> (Averardi)	<i>du Luart</i> (Legaret)	Radius
Bettiol	Mrs. <i>Cattaneo-Petrini</i> (Leggieri)	Richter
Bologna	MM. Lemmrich	Rivière
<i>Pignon</i> (Boulloche)	Leynen	Sir John Rodgers
Brugnon	Margue	MM. <i>Bizet</i> (Schmitt)
Burckel	Marquardt	Scholten
Channon	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	Schugens
<i>Schlingemann</i> (Cornelissen)	Mattick	Sieglerschmidt
Critchley	Mende	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Delorme	Mrs. Miotti Carli	MM. <i>Hulpiau</i> (Tanghe)
<i>Miller</i> (Lord Duncan-Sandys)	MM. de Montesquiou	<i>Negrari</i> (Treu)
Enders	<i>La Combe</i> (Nessler)	Valleix
Fletcher	Page	Vedovato
<i>Warren</i> (Grieve)	Pecoraro	Mrs. Wolf
Hunt		

*Noes :*

Mr. Hardy	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
Lord <i>Wallace of Coslang</i> (Mendelson)	Urwin

*Abstentions :*

MM. de Niet Roper
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1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## APPENDIX III

Vote No. 11 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on second-generation nuclear reactors (Doc. 686)<sup>1</sup>:

Ayes .....	58
Noes .....	1
Abstentions .....	2

*Ayes :*

MM. Adriaensens	MM. <i>Breyne</i> (Kempinaire)	MM. <i>Castellucci</i> (Pica)
Ahrens	<i>Mancini</i> (Laforgia)	<i>Piket</i> (Porthoine)
Alber	<i>du Luart</i> (Legaret)	Radius
<i>Schüuble</i> (Amrehn)	Mrs. <i>Cattaneo-Petrini</i> (Leggieri)	Richter
<i>Reale</i> (Averardi)	MM. Lemmrich	Rivière
Bettiol	Leynen	Sir John Rodgers
Bologna	Margue	MM. Roper
Burekel	Marquardt	<i>Bizet</i> (Schmitt)
<i>Daillet</i> (Cerneau)	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	Scholten
Channon	Mattick	Schugens
<i>Schlingemann</i> (Cornelissen)	Mende	Sieglerschmidt
Critchley	Lord <i>Wallace of Coslany</i>	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Delorme	(Mendelson)	MM. <i>Hulpiau</i> (Tanghe)
<i>Miller</i> (Lord Duncan-Sandys)	Mrs. Miotti Carli	<i>Negrari</i> (Treu)
Enders	MM. de Montesquiou	Urwin
Fletcher	<i>La Combe</i> (Nessler)	Valleix
<i>Warren</i> (Grieve)	de Niet	Vedovato
Hardy	Page	<i>Bourgeois</i> (Vitter)
Hunt	Pecoraro	Mrs. Wolf
<i>Vadepied</i> (Kauffmann)	<i>Cordle</i> (Pendry)	

*Noes :*

Mr. *Cermolacce* (Roger)

*Abstentions :*

MM. *Pignion* (Boulloche)  
Brugnon

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## APPENDIX IV

Vote No. 12 by roll-call on the amended draft Recommendation on developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance (Doc. 682) <sup>1</sup> :

Ayes .....	46
Noes .....	8
Abstentions .....	5

*Ayes :*

MM. Adriaensens	MM. <i>Breyne</i> (Kempinaire)	Lord Peddie
Ahrens	<i>Mancini</i> (Laforgia)	MM. <i>Cordle</i> (Pendry)
Alber	Mrs. <i>Cattaneo-Petrini</i> (Leggieri)	<i>Castellucci</i> (Pica)
<i>Schäuble</i> (Amrehn)	MM. Lemmrich	<i>Piket</i> (Portheine)
<i>Reale</i> (Averardi)	Leynen	Richter
Bettiol	Margue	Sir John Rodgers
Bologna	Marquardt	MM. Roper
<i>Daillet</i> (Cerneau)	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	Scholten
Channon	Mattick	Schugens
<i>Schlingemann</i> (Cornelissen)	Mende	Sieglerschmidt
Critchley	Lord <i>Wallace of Coslany</i>	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
<i>Miller</i> (Lord Duncan-Sandys)	(Mendelson)	MM. <i>Hulpiau</i> (Tanghe)
Enders	Mrs. Miotti Carli	<i>Negrari</i> (Treu)
<i>Warren</i> (Grieve)	MM. de Niet	Urwin
Hardy	Page	Vedovato
Hunt	Pecoraro	

*Noes :*

MM. Burckel	MM. <i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)
<i>La Combe</i> (Nessler)	<i>Bizet</i> (Schmitt)
Radius	Valleix
Rivière	<i>Bourgeois</i> (Vitter)

*Abstentions :*

MM. Brugnon	MM. <i>du Luart</i> (Legaret)
Delorme	de Montesquiou
<i>Vadepied</i> (Kauffmann)	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## APPENDIX V

Vote No. 13 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments (Doc. 689) <sup>1</sup>:

Ayes .....	43
Noes .....	11
Abstentions .....	5

*Ayes :*

MM. Adriaensens	Mr. <i>Mancini</i> (Laforgia)	Lord Peddie
Ahrens	Mrs. <i>Cattaneo-Petrini</i> (Leggieri)	MM. <i>Cordle</i> (Pendry)
Alber	MM. Lemmrich	<i>Castellucci</i> (Pica)
<i>Schäuble</i> (Amrehn)	Leynen	<i>Piket</i> (Portheine)
<i>Reale</i> (Averardi)	Margue	Richter
Bettiol	Marquardt	Sir John Rodgers
Bologna	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	MM. Roper
Channon	Mattick	Schugens
Critchley	Mende	Sieglerschmidt
<i>Miller</i> (Lord Duncan-Sandys)	Lord <i>Wallace of Coslany</i>	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Enders	(Mendelson)	MM. <i>Hulpien</i> (Tanghe)
<i>Warren</i> (Grieve)	Mrs. Miotti Carli	<i>Negrari</i> (Treu)
Hardy	MM. de Niet	Urwin
Hunt	Page	Vedovato
<i>Breyne</i> (Kempinaire)	Pecoraro	

*Noes :*

MM. Burekel	MM. <i>La Combe</i> (Nessler)	MM. <i>Bizet</i> (Schmitt)
<i>Vadepied</i> (Kauffmann)	Radius	Valleix
<i>du Luart</i> (Legaret)	Rivière	<i>Bourgeois</i> (Vitter)
de Montesquiou	<i>Cermolacce</i> (Roger)	

*Abstentions :*

MM. Brugnon	MM. Delorme
<i>Daillet</i> (Cerneau)	Scholten
<i>Schlingemann</i> (Cornelissen)	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

## APPENDIX VI

Vote No. 14 by roll-call on the draft Recommendation on air forces on the central front (Doc. 690)<sup>1</sup>:

Ayes .....	46
Noes .....	1
Abstentions .....	10

*Ayes :*

MM. Adriaensens	MM. <i>Breyne</i> (Kempinaire)	Mr. Pecoraro
Ahrens	<i>Mancini</i> (Laforgia)	Lord Peddie
Alber	<i>du Luart</i> (Legaret)	MM. <i>Cordle</i> (Pendry)
<i>Schüuble</i> (Amrehn)	Mrs. <i>Cattaneo-Petrini</i> (Leggieri)	<i>Piket</i> (Portheine)
<i>Reale</i> (Averardi)	MM. Lemmrich	Richter
Bettiol	Leynen	Sir John Rodgers
Bologna	Margue	MM. Roper
Channon	Marquardt	Scholten
<i>Schlingemann</i> (Cornelissen)	<i>Konen</i> (Mart)	Schugens
Critchley	Mattick	Sieglerschmidt
<i>Miller</i> (Lord Duncan-Sandys)	Mende	Lord <i>Beaumont of Whitley</i> (Steel)
Enders	Lord <i>Wallace of Coslany</i>	MM. <i>Hulpiau</i> (Tanghe)
Fletcher	(Mendelson)	<i>Negrari</i> (Treu)
<i>Warren</i> (Grieve)	Mrs. Miotti Carli	Urwin
Hardy	MM. de Niet	Vedovato
Hunt	Page	

*Noes :*

Mr. *Cermolacce* (Roger)

*Abstentions :*

MM. Brugnon	MM. <i>Vadepied</i> (Kauffmann)	MM. Rivière
Burckel	de Montesquiou	Valleix
Delorme	<i>La Combe</i> (Nessler)	<i>Bourgeois</i> (Vitter)
	Radius	

1. The names of Substitutes replacing Representatives absent are printed in italics, the names of the latter being given in brackets.

**RECOMMENDATION 275*****on United States-European co-operation  
in advanced technology***

The Assembly,

Aware of the political and technological necessity for Western Europe and the United States to co-operate in such fields of advanced technology as space, nuclear energy, oceanography, computers and electronics ;

Conscious of the fact that the Soviet Union has a highly-developed industry for civil and military products of advanced technology which makes it the greatest power on the Eurasian continent ;

Satisfied that joint European-American space ventures undertaken to date have been successful and that the Spacelab project is progressing smoothly ;

Fearing that the space shuttle flight will constitute the end of the European Space Agency's participation in the Spacelab programme ;

Fearing, further, that in the absence of new major space programmes in the United States or Europe there will be no further activities for this association ;

Considering the budgetary restrictions in both the United States and Western Europe ;

Regretting that in many other fields of advanced technology Western Europe has not organised itself so well as in space matters and that co-operation with the United States has therefore proved to be far more complicated,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. After reviewing the present policies and varying approaches of member countries, promote and develop an overall European policy in advanced technology in order to guarantee Western Europe's place in the world and foster fruitful co-operation with the United States ;
2. Give active consideration to Europe's need for an oceanographic authority of its own and arrange for such a body to be formed in the framework of an existing European organisation ;
3. In liaison with the European Space Agency, join the United States Government in working out an advanced space programme for future joint payload development for the Spacelab and the shuttle.

**RESOLUTION 57*****on setting up a European technology assessment body***

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The Assembly,

Considering the setting up of an Office of Technology Assessment by the United States Congress to provide effective means of helping its members to assess the impact and shortcomings of technological programmes put forward by the Administration ;

Considering also the initial tasks of that office which were related to oceans, transportation, energy, materials, food and health ;

Realising the high cost of such an office, but convinced that in a European framework it would be extremely useful in assisting a European parliamentary contribution,

**INVITES THE GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES**

To study the possibility of setting up a European technology assessment body accessible to all European parliamentarians so that they may form a considered opinion on political decisions taken in the field of advanced technology.

**RECOMMENDATION 276*****on the conference on security and co-operation in Europe***

The Assembly,

Hoping that the Final Act of the Helsinki conference may lead to considerable progress in détente, understanding and co-operation between Eastern and Western Europe ;

Noting furthermore that the principles set out in that text concern relations as a whole between all the signatory countries ;

Deploring that the positions adopted by the Soviet Union and other member countries of the Warsaw Pact in the months following the conference indicate an excessively restrictive interpretation of certain principles laid down in the Final Act ;

Underlining the need to reach early agreement on a substantial and balanced reduction in the level of forces of the two alliances in Central Europe ;

Considering that such a reduction should not result only from a compromise between the United States and the Soviet Union but must take account of the interests of all the European countries ;

Considering further that the balance of military forces remains the principal guarantee of security and peace in Europe for the foreseeable future,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Ensure the maintenance of continuing consultations between its members on all matters raised by the application of the Final Act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe ;
2. Ensure furthermore that any negotiations on force reductions do not lead to a weakening of Western European security and the creation of further imbalance in that area ;
3. Ask member governments to define, for instance in the framework of nine-power consultations, a joint position for its members on matters raised by the third basket of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe ;
4. In no event accept any principle contrary to that of the sovereign equality of States defined in the Final Act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe ;
5. Ensure that the quadripartite agreement on Berlin is strictly applied.

**RECOMMENDATION 277**  
***on second-generation nuclear reactors***

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The Assembly,

Considering the need to continue research and development for peaceful purposes in respect of advanced nuclear reactors ;

Aware of the tremendous financial outlay required for the successful conclusion of this research and development ;

Recognising the vast industrial complex required for the construction of these nuclear reactors and power plants ;

Conscious of the political and economic advantages deriving from the installation of multinational regional nuclear fuel centres ;

Aware of the advantages of such installations for better guaranteeing peace, security and control in respect of nuclear materials,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the member governments

1. To formulate a long-term common nuclear energy policy, act immediately on decisions already taken in the Community and the OECD, and define the extent of co-operation with the United States ;
2. To promote the further development of the European nuclear power industry to meet the increased requirements for nuclear power plants on the world market ;
3. To make known in national parliaments and European assemblies their opinions on the United States proposal for multinational regional nuclear fuel centres.

**RECOMMENDATION 278*****on developments in the Iberian peninsula  
and the Atlantic Alliance***

The Assembly,

- (i) Aware that the undiminished military capability of the Warsaw Pact countries, in particular the continued modernisation and world-wide operations of the Soviet fleet, call for an adequate defence effort based on a viable economy ;
- (ii) Believing that NATO and the European Community are the twin institutions through which the countries of WEU, by pooling their resources, can retain their freedom and secure decent living standards for their people ;
- (iii) Believing further that the strength of NATO and the European Community lies in the freely-expressed support of the peoples of the exclusively pluralist democracies that compose them, and that membership of countries with totalitarian régimes should not be tolerated in the future ;
- (iv) Expressing its support for the present government in Portugal as a first step towards a fully democratic government, stressing the importance of Portugal's membership of NATO and its contribution to the defence of Europe, and expressing the hope that close links can now be established between Portugal and the European Community ;
- (v) Welcoming the growing public expression of demands for political freedoms in Spain, and believing that the Spanish people must shortly take their place in NATO and the European Community, to both of which they can make a valuable contribution ;
- (vi) Recognising that formal defence agreements between NATO or the member countries and Spain could provide ephemeral practical advantages, but believing that any such agreements concluded before the emergence of democracy in Spain would so alienate public opinion both in the NATO countries and in Spain that the very existence of the Alliance and any possibility of lasting future agreement with Spain would be jeopardised,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. State clearly that although, unlike the Soviet Union, the western democracies will never intervene by force to change the internal régimes in any country, it is of importance to them that democracy should flourish in all countries that are naturally part of Western Europe ;
2. Urge member countries to ensure through their representatives in the European Community and in NATO :
  - (a) that no formal agreements are concluded with totalitarian régimes in Western Europe ;
  - (b) that financial, economic and technical help is provided for Portugal with a view to encouraging progress towards a truly democratic pluralistic parliamentary system of government ;
  - (c) that an examination of the problems of the Alliance's naval forces command structure in the IBERLANT and NAVSOUTH areas be made ;
  - (d) that diplomatic advice be provided from the NATO international staff for NATO commanders.

**RESOLUTION 58*****on developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance***

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The Assembly,

Noting the accession of H.M. King Juan Carlos of Spain,

Draws his attention to Recommendation 278.

**RECOMMENDATION 279*****on the International Institute for the Management of Technology***

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The Assembly,

Noting with regret the situation of the International Institute for the Management of Technology which was established in Milan in 1971 ;

Considering this situation as a step back on the path of European collaboration and wishing to rescue as much as possible of this joint venture ;

Conscious of the fact that Belgium, Denmark and Ireland have not signed the convention setting up the International Institute for the Management of Technology but participate in the European Council and that Austria, which is not a member of the European Council, has signed it,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Study, together with all the governments concerned, the possibility of using the institute's premises and other assets in Milan for alternative purposes in the interests of Europe ;
2. Submit the findings of its study to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and eventually to the European Council for implementation.

**RECOMMENDATION 280*****on Northern European countries and the prospect  
of European political union***

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The Assembly,

Considering that by their civilisation, culture and political, economic and social system, the Scandinavian countries belong to Western Europe ;

Noting that economic, political and military factors imposed by the situation of Northern Europe now prevent these countries taking their place in a European union with responsibilities which include foreign policy and defence matters ;

Considering that the European Community (which includes Denmark) cannot wait for these countries to be in a position to take part in the undertaking before forming a union,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Consider, in the framework of its study on "the possibility that Western European Union might undertake additional work connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe", how countries of Northern Europe might be associated with this undertaking both in the Atlantic Alliance and in WEU ;
2. Invite the Scandinavian countries to send observers to an *ad hoc* meeting to study any project for the joint production of armaments.

**RECOMMENDATION 281*****on European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments***

The Assembly,

- (i) Having considered the present situation of research, development and production in the field of armaments in the light of the report by its Defence Committee ;
- (ii) Informed of the important statements made to it in Paris on 5th December 1974 by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, on a joint European armaments policy ;
- (iii) Aware that, despite progress made in this field in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, for instance the principles on co-operation in the field of armaments laid down by Eurogroup on 23rd May 1972, new concrete possibilities exist, particularly among the member countries of WEU, for a decisive improvement in co-operation where the active collaboration of France would be a great advantage ;
- (iv) Noting that the serious economic situation affecting most member countries of the Alliance and the ensuing budgetary difficulties have repercussions on the defence potential ;
- (v) Underlining consequently the urgent need to rationalise the defence effort of all the member countries in order to avoid waste due to the multiplication of projects for weapons or weapons systems and the wide diversity of models produced for one and the same defence task ;
- (vi) Aware that, in view of the geographical situation of Europe, deterrence, if it is to be credible, also requires conventional forces and that national armed forces should be able to operate jointly to achieve a strong defence potential with chances of success ;
- (vii) Considering that a growing awareness is developing among governments, parliaments, public opinion and national and international groups and that a flow of ideas is developing which should allow the necessary measures to be taken in the framework of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance ;
- (viii) Aware of national interests in the field of armaments and their importance for security of employment, but convinced that they do not preclude either bilateral or multilateral co-operation and, on the contrary, make it appear far more rational ;
- (ix) Noting the initiatives and suggestions from across the Atlantic seeking to establish new means of co-operation between the United States and the countries of Western Europe in the field of armaments ;
- (x) Noting also the proposals made by the Commission of the European Communities in its report on European union dated 26th June 1975 ;
- (xi) Aware of the agreement in principle reached by the Defence Ministers of the European countries on 5th November 1975 to establish a European defence procurement secretariat open to all European members of the Alliance,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Recognise that the aims which member countries are committed to pursue in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance on a basis of equal rights and obligations are :
  - (a) to strengthen the defence potential of the Alliance as a whole, especially in Europe, so as to establish, in the face of the continuously increasing armaments of the Warsaw Pact, the balance of forces which is essential to the security of free Europe and the progress of East-West relations ;
  - (b) to maintain a technical potential in the countries of Western Europe and develop a competitive European armaments industry with sufficient means for research and production ;
  - (c) to seek a better balance between the means available on both sides of the Atlantic and establish reciprocity in respect of the procurement and production of armaments ;

- (d) to promote a European identity and the idea of European union by implementing effective and lasting co-operation in the fields of research, development, production and logistics which are still a national responsibility and hence require governments to take decisions based on defence requirements and the joint interest of the Western European countries ;
2. Welcome the decision of the North Atlantic Council that, at its spring meeting, a special meeting should be held at ministerial level to study Atlantic and European co-operation in the field of armaments, and give it its full support ;
3. (a) Take up on behalf of WEU the declaration on principles of equipment co-operation adopted on 27th May 1972 by the Ministers of Defence of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom ;
- (b) Organise the development of new weapons allowing a high return to be ensured and economic solutions to be found ;
- (c) Establish within the Atlantic Alliance detailed political guidelines covering the following fields and take a decision on them :
- harmonisation of military tactical concepts ;
  - definition of military requirements of the Alliance ;
  - alignment of equipment, calibres, fuel, etc., in order to ensure the interoperability of arms and equipment and improve logistics in the armed forces of the Alliance ;
  - the standardisation of future armaments and equipment programmes ;
- (d) Pay particular attention to the problem of destandardisation of armaments due to the proliferation of projects in each country and above all to the creation of new weapons systems accompanied by the use of older systems ;
- (e) Examine the means of reactivating the Standing Armaments Committee ;
4. Urge member governments :
- (a) with regard to research, development and production, to endorse fully the measures necessary for carrying out joint undertakings with as many partners as possible ;
- (b) to seek means to avoid the economy of a country being affected by giving up an armaments programme in favour of a joint undertaking ; to this end, consideration might be given to setting up a burden-sharing body ; this should be decided with other appropriate bodies ;
- (c) to draw up a list of programmes for armaments which might be procured jointly both by European countries and by the North American allies ; WEU should launch this idea and the decision should be taken with the Atlantic Alliance ;
- (d) to give active consideration to the practical possibilities in Western Europe of establishing in the long term a two-way transatlantic flow of trade in armaments, ensuring that this becomes possible only when the countries of Western Europe co-operate in the development and production of armaments as real partners carrying the same weight as the United States ;
- (e) to pay particular attention to the export of armaments to non-member countries of the Atlantic Alliance and endeavour to ensure an early settlement of outstanding questions ;
5. Report to the Assembly on the results of its study on the possibility of giving WEU additional tasks connected with the standardisation of armaments in Europe ;
6. Give absolute priority at political level to problems of co-operation in the field of armaments and the standardisation of armaments and not become discouraged in the short or long term by the difficulties involved ;
7. Transmit the present recommendation to the North Atlantic Council.

**RECOMMENDATION 282*****on the resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly  
on 10th November 1975***

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The Assembly,

Underlining the importance for European security of maintaining peace throughout the Mediterranean basin ;

Alarmed by the threats to peace arising from the recent increase in hostilities in the Middle East between various national and religious communities ;

Noting that the resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975 can but contribute to the deterioration of the situation in that area,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Ensure that its members consult each other in the framework of WEU, without prejudice to their action in the framework of the European Community or the Council of Europe, in order to define a joint policy in the United Nations and prevent any sectarian use of the second decade for action to combat racism ;
2. Promote the development of economic, cultural and political co-operation between Western Europe and all the Eastern Mediterranean countries with a view to helping these countries progressively to terminate their division into opposing blocs.

**RECOMMENDATION 283**  
***on air forces on the central front***

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The Assembly,

Aware that both organisational shortcomings and the lack of interoperability in equipment still prevent the aircraft now available to allied commanders on the central front from being used to optimum effect ;

Welcoming, however, the establishment of the new command Allied Air Forces Central Europe which has already resulted in some organisational improvement,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments, through their representatives on the North Atlantic Council :

1. To recall the provisions of the resolution to implement the Final Act of the London Conference, adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 22nd October 1954, which "confirms that the powers exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in peacetime, extend not only to the organisation into an effective integrated force of the forces placed under him but also to their training ;" to ensure that this resolution is effectively applied, in respect of both training and command integration, especially to ensure that the decision of the Defence Planning Committee of 14th June 1974 to establish a new air force command structure headed by Commander AAFCE is applied at all levels ;
2. To foster arrangements, bilateral if necessary, to make all appropriate airfields available to assigned and earmarked central front air forces ;
3. To call for substantial improvement in the interoperability of assigned and earmarked air forces on the central front, the further development of common tactical concepts and, in the longer term, the establishment of an integrated logistics system ;
4. To give urgent consideration to the multilateral financing of improved communications and appropriate early warning systems.



**II**

**OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES**

## EIGHTH SITTING

Monday, 1st December 1975

### SUMMARY

1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Examination of Credentials.
4. Observers.
5. Address by the President of the Assembly.
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session (Doc. 676).
7. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee (Doc. 679).
8. Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance — consideration of current problems (*Presentation of the Report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 680 and Amendment).  
*Speakers* : The President, Mr. Leynen (*Rapporteur*).
9. Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO.  
*Speakers* : The President, Mr. Luns.  
*Replies by Mr. Luns to questions put by* : Mr. Leynen, Mr. de Montesquiou, Mr. Valleix, Lord Duncan-Sandys, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Critchley, Sir John Rodgers, Mr. de Niet, Mr. Steel.
10. Address by Mr. Dalvit, Secretary of State for Defence of Italy.  
*Speakers* : The President, Mr. Dalvit.
11. Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975 (*Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 692).  
*Speakers* : The President, Mr. Amrehn.
12. Address by Mr. Dalvit, Secretary of State for Defence of Italy.  
*Replies by Mr. Dalvit to questions put by* : Mr. Radius, Mr. Magliano.
13. Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance — consideration of current problems (*Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 680 and Amendment).  
*Speakers* : The President, Mr. Voogd, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, Mr. Radius, Mr. Boucheny, Mr. de Niet, Mr. Leynen (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Sieglerschmidt (*Chairman of the Committee*).
14. Changes in the membership of Committees.
15. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

### 1. Resumption of the Session and adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

I declare resumed the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union, which was adjourned on Thursday, 29th May 1975, at the conclusion of the Seventh Sitting.

In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the Seventh Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which

have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 3. Examination of Credentials

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the examination of credentials of new Representatives and Substitutes.

The list of new Representatives and Substitutes appointed since the first part of the session has been published in Notice No. 8. The credentials of these new members were ratified by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe or its Standing Committee on 3rd July, 1st October and 27th November 1975. In accordance with Rule 6 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, these ratifications have been attested by state-

1. See page 15.

*The President (continued)*

ments of the ratification of credentials communicated by the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Only the credentials of Mr. Hardy, who has just been appointed a Representative of the United Kingdom in place of Mr. Prescott, who has resigned, have not been examined by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

In accordance with Rule 6 (2) of our Rules of Procedure, it falls to our Assembly to examine his credentials.

No objection has been raised to these credentials, and they are certified by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom.

If the Assembly is unanimous, they can be ratified without prior reference to a Credentials Committee.

Are there any objections to the ratification of Mr. Hardy's credentials?...

Mr. Hardy's credentials are ratified, subject to their subsequent examination by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Mr. Hardy may therefore take his seat in the Assembly of Western European Union as a Representative of the United Kingdom. I extend a hearty welcome to him.

**4. Observers**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I also extend a hearty welcome to the parliamentary observers who are participating in our proceedings: Mr. Isabelle, member, and Mr. Molgat, Senator, from Canada; Mr. Hartling and Mr. Folke, members of the Danish Folketing; Mr. Apostolatos and Mr. Sechiotis, members of the Greek Chamber of Deputies; Mr. Vikan and Mr. Utsi, members of the Norwegian Storting and Mr. Moss, a member of the Senate of the United States of America.

If they wish to speak on any of the problems included in our Orders of the Day, we shall listen to them with the greatest interest.

**5. Address by the President of the Assembly**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, we should constantly remind

ourselves that our Assembly is the only one which, under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty, is competent in the field of European defence. That bestows upon it the perilous honour of discussing problems which put our liberties and our very existence at stake. Discussions of this kind are necessarily to be taken seriously, but such divergences as may remain are limited by the fact that we are all in one and the same camp, which is that of freedom. Our Alliance brings together democratic countries which harbour no aggressive intentions, but which appreciate the value of what they have to defend and will face together any threat that may arise.

Defence policy is consequently endowed with a highly symbolic aspect. It is the visible proof of an identity which must be reflected in political and military decisions which will be assuming tangible shape before the end of the seventies.

It is also the expression of our twofold solidarity — Atlantic and European. Our Atlantic solidarity is expressed in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which commits us to assist the party attacked by such action as each of our governments deems necessary, including the use of armed force; our European solidarity is to be seen in the still more binding commitment to afford military assistance, assumed under Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. There can be no doubt that this twofold solidarity would be immediately translated into action if a serious and clear-cut threat were to arise. It is more difficult to act accordingly when the problems which demand our attention are manifold and complex. There are spheres in which our interests sometimes seem to conflict, but how minor the divergences would prove to be if put to the test! For that reason it is, contrary to appearances, in the realm of defence that Europe can most easily be built.

To follow this policy obviously requires that there shall be the political will to achieve political union; this would carry a stage further the efforts being made by the Communities in the economic field.

Unfortunately, many of the paths we might have taken on the morrow of the last war are today strewn with obstacles. The passions unleashed in the United Nations have distorted its functioning, and its authority and prestige have been seriously compromised by ill-considered moves.

The areas of tension caused by clashes between communities in Northern Ireland, in Cyprus and

*The President (continued)*

in the Lebanon, and by the difficulties of decolonisation in Angola, show how fragile peace remains.

On our own doorstep, the future of democracy in the Iberian peninsula continues to be uncertain. But we may reasonably cherish the hope that Portugal will regain its balance and that Spain, whose contribution to the prosperity and security of Europe could be outstanding, will slough off an outdated régime.

For Europe cannot accept a purely passive attitude. It cannot confine itself to hoping that the tensions and conflicts which it sees developing in the world will not damage the material and moral interests which history has placed upon it.

Today our creative faculties are still intact. All the factors necessary for our preservation are present. All we have to do is to mobilise them. We cannot abandon our aviation, aerospace or electronics industries. Still less can we forgo the maintenance on our continent of an armaments industry which will be in the forefront of technological progress. Any other attitude would be an abdication, with consequences that would be irreparable not only from the standpoint of our influence in the world but also from the economic and social point of view.

Undoubtedly, each national effort forms the basis of prosperity for all, but only political resolve can render each of these efforts truly effective.

How can anyone fail to perceive that, until European union comes into being, as it is meant to do by 1980, WEU foreshadows it, inasmuch as WEU is already responsible for security on the economic, political and military planes. We might, without undue presumptuousness claim that the attitudes of governments towards WEU are the very touchstone of their will to build Europe.

Many thinking people consider that WEU has already played its part now that it has enabled Germany to be brought back into the community of democratic nations, facilitated the settlement of the Saar problem and served as a liaison body between Great Britain and the European Communities before their enlargement.

In the troubled world which surrounds us, WEU is a long way from having completed its

task. At present, it alone keeps alive contractual obligations between France, which does not belong to NATO, and its six partners who do.

Atlantic solidarity in any case calls for a strong Europe. The Alliance does not place any State in the position of a vassal. The United States needs not satellites, but partners worthy of respect who fully assume the defence of their own interests. The recent Rambouillet talks showed how attentively the Americans paid heed to Europeans conscious of their responsibilities. Until a European identity emerges from the current negotiations, interim measures can be taken to keep Europe in the technological race and to safeguard its armament industries.

WEU still offers a suitable institutional framework. It is based on a treaty that will remain in force for the next twenty-five years. That is solid ground on which the partners can move forward in full confidence.

Proposals which have recently been presented with a view to establishing European co-operation in the field of armaments, and still other proposals which may perhaps be thought up, should be examined in the light of one criterion: to what extent do they avoid Europe being relegated to the subordinate position of a subcontractor, and do they exclude the possibility that its efforts in the realms of research, invention and production at the highest level would be abandoned?

We must be quite clear that it is Europe's will to survive that is at stake today. Gone are the days when technical measures, adopted without an overall policy to guide us, made it possible to resolve empirically the problems that arose. Henceforward, the decisions of our governments must be taken with an eye to the European union which we have to build up, and of which the Brussels Treaty constitutes one of the most solid foundations.

For the task of building Europe is indivisible. An agreement concluded in the fiscal or monetary field may encourage governments to concert their diplomatic moves or to co-operate in economic matters but it does not lead to the harmonious construction of a Europe that will be the arbiter of its own destiny. What is important is its will to exist, and if need be to defend itself — in other words, to survive as Europe.

Since all of us here are imbued with the democratic ideal, we declare that the defence of a united Europe cannot be successfully con-

*The President (continued)*

ducted without the whole-hearted support of the peoples which constitute it and without the drive and supervision of the elected representatives, to whom they have duly entrusted this task. An effective defence cannot be the concern of a few. It is the business of every one of us.

Recognition of this fact cannot but encourage our WEU Assembly to carry through the task entrusted to it and our governments should see in it an invitation to pursue with the Assembly a dialogue that is sincere and therefore constructive. (*Applause*)

### **6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Session**

(*Doc. 676*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the adoption of the draft Order of Business for the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly.

The draft Order of Business is contained in Document 676 dated 28th November 1975 and was adopted this morning by the Presidential Committee.

This version modifies three points in the previous version dated 13th November, which was circulated to all members of the Assembly :

1. At this afternoon's sitting, the Assembly will hear Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO, and Mr. Dalvit, Secretary of State for Defence of Italy.

2. At the afternoon sitting of tomorrow, Tuesday, the two financial questions which had been placed at the end of the Orders of the Day have been put forward to become the first items in those Orders.

3. At Wednesday morning's sitting, the address by Mr. Rodgers, Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, will be delivered at 11.15 a.m. instead of at 11 o'clock.

Before consulting the Assembly on the whole draft Order of Business, I would draw your attention to the item in the Orders of the Day for the sitting of Thursday afternoon which provides that at 5.30 p.m. votes will be taken on draft recommendations on which the Assembly has not yet reached decisions.

The Presidential Committee considered that it should be possible to bring together at 5.30 p.m.

on Thursday the maximum number of members of the Assembly for the votes on any outstanding texts. I would therefore address an urgent appeal to each delegation.

Are there any objections to the draft Order of Business contained in Document 676 ?...

The Order of Business for the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session is agreed to.

### **7. Ratification of action by the Presidential Committee**

(*Doc. 679*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the ratification of the decisions of the Presidential Committee.

Under the terms of Rule 14 (2) of the Rules of Procedure, the Presidential Committee is authorised, subject to subsequent ratification by the Assembly, to take all such measures as it considers necessary for the activities of the Assembly to be properly carried on between sessions or part-sessions.

I would recall that in December 1974 the European Heads of State or Government called upon Mr. Tindemans, the Prime Minister of Belgium, to present before the end of 1975 a report on the future European union.

On 26th June 1975, the President of the Commission of the Community, Mr. Ortoli, transmitted to the President of the European Council a report on European union, which defines the viewpoint of the Commission, dealing in particular with the place of foreign policy and defence in the future European union.

This question lies at the centre of WEU's areas of competence and of the interests of its Assembly, which is the only European assembly competent in defence questions.

The Presidential Committee, which met on 11th September last, considered it desirable that Mr. Tindemans should be informed of the views of our Assembly on the problems involved in applying the modified Brussels Treaty when European union is being worked out — and that this should be done before the resumption of our session.

For that reason, it unanimously adopted Resolution 55 on European union and the defence of Europe, which is the subject of Document 679

*The President (continued)*

and which is now submitted to the Assembly for ratification.

I now consult the Assembly on the ratification of Resolution 55 adopted by the Presidential Committee and contained in Document 679.

Are there any objections to ratification?...

Resolution 55 on European union and the defence of Europe is ratified<sup>1</sup>.

### **8. Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance — consideration of current problems**

*(Presentation of the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 680 and Amendment)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee on Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance — consideration of current problems, Document 680.

I would point out immediately that we shall be interrupting the debate on the report when I call upon Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO, who is here and must leave during the afternoon, to address the Assembly.

I call Mr. Leynen, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — The report submitted to you was not unanimously adopted by the General Affairs Committee. No less than eight members abstained, not because they were opposed to the terms of the recommendation, but because they could not agree to certain lines developed by your Rapporteur.

You will notice that some of the reservations expressed in Chapter VI, where the chief objections are set out, were diametrically opposed to one and other. They will no doubt be put more fully from this rostrum. Some reproached me for being too Atlantic, while others expressed a fear that my insistence on the need for Europe to look after its own defence might dilute or weaken the Alliance. This is a risk run by a

Rapporteur who refuses to depict events in terms of black and of white, but tries to bring out shades of meaning, while clinging to a number of firm principles.

That being so, I think that I can best open the debate by confining myself to basic concepts and trying to see the wood rather than the trees.

The first concept is also an important question; has not the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance brought us to the threshold of a third — post-Helsinki — phase, that of entente following on the first phase of cold war and the second phase of détente?

As an advocate of a world-wide order based on justice and peace, I look longingly for this entente, but I am not sufficiently ingenuous to believe that it can result from a unilateral weakening of our defence effort in the West. I think that the MBFR negotiations in Vienna constitute the acid test. A first substantial and balanced reduction of military forces on both sides of the iron curtain may be the signal for a gradual withdrawal and put an end to the division of Europe into two military camps occupied by the superpowers. In concrete terms, that is what I understand by transcending the era of two blocs so as to enable a geographical area that has not yet been clearly delimited to find its European personality which, in my opinion, springs mainly from a pattern of civilisation, from its attachment to unchanging values such as liberty and respect for human beings, and from the organisation of human society under a system of parliamentary democracy, with due respect for the immense wealth and diversity of characteristics to be found in our peoples.

Second concept: since the dawn of this entente is not yet lightening the horizon of the northern hemisphere, political realism and the instinctive search for security force us to keep in being the defensive Atlantic Alliance which has given us peace and security for three decades. Throughout history all human communities have maintained their existence and security by forming a nut which it would be hard to crack.

So long as the communist camp led by the Soviet giant constitutes a military threat on our doorstep, the Atlantic Alliance alone is capable of guaranteeing our security, for both geopolitical and military reasons, and a European defence, which I will deal with later, cannot suffice.

1. See page 16.

*Mr. Leynen (continued)*

Without going into strategic considerations, I shall put forward only three arguments: first, the Europe of the Nine, from Sicily to the Shetlands — not to mention Greenland — is too far-flung geographically and is lacking in depth; second, central Europe cannot be effectively defended without the parts of the northern and southern flanks covered by NATO; and third, the Anglo-French nuclear weapon does not have the weight of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.

That being so, my fidelity to the Atlantic Alliance is dictated by the indispensable support from the rear provided by the United States. Our foremost concern should be not to weaken this Alliance.

Third concept: the Europe we have conceived — although the period of gestation will undoubtedly be very long — must assert itself in the world as a great force for economic and social progress and a powerful factor for justice and peace... an adult Europe! But what Europe? And with what geographical limits?

There are already four Europes: that of the Communities, the Nine, in which I include the Europe of WEU, which I hope will soon be able to identify itself with that of the Nine; the second is that of the Council of Europe, confined to the frontiers of liberty and human rights; the third is that of my schooldays, the one General de Gaulle defined as stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals; the fourth and most recent is that of Helsinki or of the CSCE, running from Alaska through the Greenwich meridian to Vladivostok and including practically the whole northern area of the globe.

The Europe on which I have set my heart since I have been going to Strasbourg for the last twenty-five years is, of course, that of the Council of Europe. I reaffirmed this recently at the last meeting of the Assembly on the banks of the Rhine.

In a dream, like Luther King, I can before I die glimpse the possibility of a wide European confederation made up of a wonderful mosaic of States, peoples, languages, customs and peculiarities, all united by the same type of civilisation and the same respect for human rights and a democratic system.

But realism tells us to base all our hopes on the firm nucleus of the Community of the Nine,

which cannot repudiate its federative mission as it moves resolutely forward from the economic stage to political status, in other words, to a union with a single, joint decision-making centre.

I know that national sovereignties, foreign policy, monetary union and above all European defence are explosive themes which give rise to national, if not nationalistic, reactions in our respective parliaments.

At the same time I wonder whether our national governments, our diplomats, the defence chiefs and those who surround our sovereigns and presidents are fully aware of the consequences of the European commitment provisionally limited to the geographical boundaries of the Nine. Let us be clear about this. In the long run we must break the iron constraints of sovereignty, not to abandon it but to exercise it jointly, extending it with the support of 250 million citizens identifying themselves with Europe while belonging to more restricted communities of one people or one language.

I believe that this process is irreversible, no matter how slowly it is developing.

Fourth concept: this European union must have its own defence organisation, though this does not prevent it belonging to a wider defensive alliance. Living in a world where the only guarantee of the right to exist is a force that suffices to assert and maintain this elementary right, our old continent of Europe, "unioned" — if I may coin a word — at last, will find in its unity the strength to make its voice heard in the concert not of the nations but of the major galaxies which have been or are being formed.

This European defence must be constituted gradually, beginning with a joint armaments and equipment policy and, in the final stage, having its own deterrent weapon.

Please allow me to develop this point further, since Chapter III of my report was the chief stumbling-block.

Nobody is more horrified by the nuclear weapon than I, who have lived through two world wars. From the depths of my being I share the reactions of all our peoples to the awful destructive power of these weapons, which humanity ought to be able to outlaw for ever. But such a hope is fondly utopian. It would be a great success for mankind if the superpowers could limit the production of these arms and

*Mr. Leynen (continued)*

if the non-proliferation club could be extended to embrace the whole world.

The advisability of creating a European nuclear potential or the need to do so will necessarily depend on mankind's ability to restrict the use of nuclear energy for military purposes.

But while awaiting this more peaceful future, of which I can as yet see no sign, we are confronted with reality — a world with at least six nuclear powers, two of which are countries belonging to the Europe of the Nine.

That being so, I would put two specific questions, and it is on a clear answer to both that the final conclusion depends :

1. Is it even conceivable that the United Kingdom and France, which already possess the deterrent, will give it up in order to enter naked into a European union ?

2. Is it any more conceivable that the seven other countries of the future European defence union will agree that the two major countries should retain, at any rate in the final phase, exclusive control of the nuclear weapon ?

If, as I presume, the reply to these two questions is negative, it logically follows that a European defence system including the nuclear weapon will be essential.

Within the Atlantic Alliance, this European potential, more modest than that of the two superpowers, will probably remain a complement to the nuclear forces of the United States.

Leaving aside the Atlantic Alliance, which will not last for ever, an autonomous European nuclear arsenal would achieve three important objectives : first, the future political Europe would undoubtedly be made more independent ; second, nuclear forces at world level would be better balanced ; and third, Europe — and this seems to me the most positive effect — would be able to exert a more beneficial influence on the use of nuclear energy for military purposes.

When the subject was discussed in Committee, certain members disputed the doctrine of massive retaliation and considered it to be in contradiction with a certain increase in conventional forces. I do not share this point of view.

In my opinion at least, the effect of rejecting the concept of massive retaliation would be to

make possible a war, limited on a world scale but of course total on the Western European scale ; for the massive use of conventional weapons or any use of tactical nuclear weapons would result in the almost complete destruction of Western Europe without either of the two superpowers coming to any great harm as a result.

Nevertheless it is obvious that Europe needs conventional forces, so that it shall not be deprived of the possibility of intervening outside European territory proper, or faced with the terrible decision of either capitulating before a limited aggression or of using the nuclear weapon. But such a precaution does not mean that we must have a strict balance of conventional forces between European countries and the Warsaw Pact.

The difference caused by geography between the outlook for Europe and the outlook for America in the field of defence requires that Western Europe should have the means needed to make strategical decisions possible.

Even if it is not possible to achieve a European defence union for several years, it is apparent that Western Europe must not compromise its ability to provide itself with its own means of defence. This implies that it should : first, continue to develop its armament industries in all fields, including the nuclear field ; second, jealously preserve the only truly European treaty of alliance — the modified Brussels Treaty, the WEU Treaty, and the organisation resulting from it — till such time as a European defence union has been set up ; third, establish as soon as possible a European organisation for working out a strategy appropriate to Europe's own requirements.

To be sure, it is most desirable that the powers of the European Parliament should be increased and that it should be elected by universal suffrage. But the effect of making any progress towards European union conditional on progress in this direction would be to delay and finally to jeopardise that union, if agreement on a real European parliament were not reached rapidly.

Since my report was adopted, a new event directly affecting WEU and the future European union has occurred. This was the ministerial meeting of Eurogroup which was held at The Hague on 5th November. The Defence Ministers then decided : "to explore further the potential for extending co-operation in European arma-

*Mr. Leynen (continued)*

ments collaboration in an independent forum open to all European members of the Alliance," to establish a "European defence procurement secretariat", and to invite defence ministry armaments directors of member countries to look "into the tasks which a European defence procurement organisation might undertake".

I lay particular emphasis on the word "procurement". It would appear difficult not to mention this proposal in presenting a report dealing with European union and Atlantic defence problems. However, we do not know what will be the attitude of the French Government, which is invited to take its place in this independent body, although I read on page 2 of this morning's *Figaro* that the French Government did not intend to reject the proposal. However, everything would appear to show that the word "independent" was employed purposely so as to make it easier for the French Government to participate in this scheme.

In any case, it should be stressed that this proposal does not directly concern WEU, since it is primarily a reply to the American offer to increase trade in armaments between Europe and the United States.

It is not the intention of the Standing Armaments Committee to organise trade in armaments; its aim is to develop joint production. It is as well, however, to ensure that such joint production is not governed by considerations of trade in armaments. True, an increase in trade between Europe and the United States may well be desirable from an economic and commercial point of view, but it can never provide the industrial basis for a European defence policy. On the contrary, such an increase — if not accompanied by a parallel increase in European armaments production — would result in jeopardising the proposals of the European Commission on the joint production of armaments.

For even if the United States were to purchase weapons in Europe, it is important that Europe should remain capable of producing the armaments it needs if it wants one day to take over responsibility for its own defence. What we have to do, therefore, is neither to advocate nor to reject Eurogroup's proposals, but to see that they in no way affect the need for joint armaments production.

If we wait for the eighties — here I am echoing a leading politician — and if by that time we have not taken the measures to concert defence and to safeguard the European armaments and advanced technology industries which are recommended in the Brussels Commission's report, from 1980 on there will no longer be anything with which to establish a European defence.

There will no longer be any industry or valid infrastructure to back up such a defence, and there would be no European strategic thinking as such. Europe would then be either Atlantic and standardised, which would not be acceptable to real Europeans, or perhaps Finlandised — in any case not master of its destiny in the Atlantic Alliance.

My final remarks concern Chapter V of my report, particularly the need to make full use of the resources of WEU and all its bodies during the intermediate period, which I agree must be very long, before a European union fully competent for defence can come into being.

These are the ideas I put to you :

First, this treaty is binding on seven of the nine States of the future union. In my opinion, the treaty should remain open to the two other countries. But the lack of geographical identity with the Nine is not a disadvantage, since the Seven of WEU happen to be the chief producers and consumers of armaments.

Second — and here I am making an appeal to my socialist colleagues — this treaty must please internationalists, since it is the only one in the world to incorporate a moral factor: voluntary self-discipline on the part of member countries regarding the control of armaments, an unprecedented fact for sovereign countries. I wonder whether some people are not losing sight of this feature.

Third, this treaty is flexible, an ultra-light instrument with a parliamentary assembly which, with all its defects, is nevertheless an excellent instrument for communicating with public opinion and obtaining its agreement.

Fourth, this treaty is based on a community concept of Europe and has a European starting point rather than being of extra-community origin like that other concept which is not a treaty — I refer to the NATO Eurogroup.

I do not have any strong feelings either for or against this *ad hoc* group set up within NATO

*Mr. Leynen (continued)*

to compensate as much as possible for the lack of European cohesion in defence. I think it is of positive value. I merely note that Eurogroup is not an official organisation, that the report of the Brussels Commission makes no mention of it, that France is not part of it — which is certainly a serious handicap — that it was organised from outside the Community, that it is composed of very heterogeneous elements and that in any case this Eurogroup cannot constitute a sound basis for the implementation of a European defence policy once there is a European union.

I will not go as far as certain people — and they are not all French — who suspect the Americans and certain Europeans who are not very enthusiastic about the idea of a European defence, of setting even Eurogroup against European unification within the geographical frontiers of the Nine and above all against WEU, which they suspect of being a real basis for launching a European union.

My aim in making this unduly long speech was simply to express certain European convictions — which, I fondly believe, could obtain a wide measure of support, at least for their essentials — and at the same time to provide food for thought to this parliamentary assembly which, we are proud to say, is the only one in Europe that can debate such subjects. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Leynen.

The debate will take place later during the sitting, together with the vote on the draft recommendation.

### **9. Address by Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We are now going to hear Mr. Luns, the Secretary-General of NATO.

I wish to welcome you personally, Mr. Luns. We have known you for a long time, you have been an eminent statesman, you are a convinced European, and if today the high office vested in you causes you to approach problems of concern to both our organisations from a slightly different angle, the fact remains nonetheless that

the whole of this Assembly will be of one mind in listening to what you have to say with rapt attention and the highest appreciation. I give you the floor. (*Applause*)

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*) (Translation). — First of all, Mr. President, allow me to thank you warmly for the kind words which you have been good enough to address to me and by which I am very touched.

It enhances my pleasure to find myself back among you on the occasion of this twenty-first session of the Assembly of Western European Union, and thus to be able to make my contribution to your discussions on Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance.

If you have chosen this topic, it is because you consider that the Alliance must go on evolving and that Western Europe has a positive rôle to play in that process. I was happy to hear the previous speaker eloquently affirm the same principles. Mutual relations between Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance are of the highest importance, and I am particularly glad to be able to talk about them with you, not only because I have devoted a large part of my own political life to building up Europe — as you were good enough to recall just now — but also because it is perhaps a good thing to view the question again from the Atlantic standpoint.

I have attentively — and I would even say most attentively — read the General Affairs Committee's very interesting report on this question. I will not tell you that I approve of all the terms it uses — and I note, moreover, that divergences of view exist even within the Committee — but I can only express my gratification at the emphasis in the report on the fact that the Atlantic Alliance retains its full importance, and that European unity must develop in a way that strengthens the Alliance instead of weakening it.

I scarcely need to remind this Assembly that, despite its name, the North Atlantic Treaty was given birth within a purely European body. The Brussels Treaty was a European initiative, and its signatories countries of Europe. Without this initial demonstration of European cohesion, there might not have been any Alliance and, conversely, without the NATO shield, there could have been no progress towards European unification.

*Mr. Luns (continued)*

That is a lesson which the members of the Alliance have never forgotten. They have all constantly and unreservedly lent their support to the movement to promote closer European co-operation and unity, which they have seen — and rightly so, in my view — as an essential condition for strengthening the Alliance. Indeed, they have been at one in desiring a still more ambitious step towards European unification to be taken, in both the political and the economic sphere.

The development of one vital component in an organisation is bound to have repercussions on such relations with the others and on the shape of the whole. Nobody has ever disputed the fact that the development of the European Community — a development made possible by the existence of the NATO shield — would necessarily entail adjustments within the Alliance.

It is, however, essential that the basic concept which lies at the root of this movement towards European unity should be compatible with what is the very essence of the Alliance. What is, then, the essence of our Alliance? It is, I believe, above all an affirmation that the political independence and freedom of the Atlantic area, as well as its territorial integrity, must be safeguarded and, secondly, the principle that the defence of that independence, freedom and integrity can rest only on the idea of collective security, and that it must be governed by one single strategy and one single coherent set of deliberative and executive bodies. When I speak of strategy, I am not only thinking of the military aspect for, in the last analysis, deterrence in all its forms is both military and political, and an alliance politically divided or obedient to several strategies could not survive. I shall have occasion, from the vantage point I am taking here, of referring again to our military strategy.

The dream of European unification is one that is centuries old. It is praiseworthy and, in our day and age, imperative that western civilisation in Europe should seek political unity in order to preserve and strengthen its ethical bases, its free institutions and its way of life. There are, however, several schools of thought as to what should form the basis of such European unity, and I will mention two in particular. Some have thought, and still think, that Europe should

become a third power, independent of the two superpowers; others believe it can only be forged in antagonism towards other powers. It might have been expected that such antagonism would be directed against the East, given the threat wielded by the Soviet war machine. Now, oddly enough, voices are being raised calling for such antagonism to be directed not against the East, but against the United States.

We should emphatically and unhesitatingly reject the idea that antagonism towards the United States would act as a catalyst in European unification. For we should all of us remember, before everything else, Europe's profound and solid links with North America, its descendant in nearly all respects. Although I attach extreme importance to this reason alone, I shall add another consideration, which I think even more fundamental, and which stems from the current reality of military and political power.

It is a fact that an independent European defence is currently unattainable. Europe's political unity, so sorely needed, does not exist, any more than the Europeans have the will to make the necessary financial sacrifices or a credible European nuclear force capable of going it alone. Moreover, the mere idea of such a force is rejected by a sizable sector of public opinion in several European countries.

In a word, Western Europe will not, in the foreseeable future, by itself have the means of deterring a possible aggressor or of successfully defending itself in the event of attack, which, in the final analysis, amounts to saying that when it comes to the point, it is incapable of pursuing an independent foreign policy. So long as this is the case, the United States will have an essential, I would even say a paramount, rôle to play in upholding European and Atlantic security. It was the realisation of this fundamental truth that transformed the Brussels Treaty, concluded amongst European States, into a North Atlantic Treaty under the terms of which the United States and Canada undertook to share the defence of Western Europe. And that truth is every bit as real today.

What does this mean for the members of the Alliance? It clearly means first of all that defence is to be regarded as a collective task, with a common strategy and common procedures for its implementation. An alliance which professes several strategies is, I would repeat, a contradiction in terms. Politically, it means that

*Mr. Luns (continued)*

recognition of the close interdependence of the Alliance's members is the foremost consideration that should govern all the allied governments in drawing up their policies. It means that, even when the Western European members give priority to their own interests and problems, they have to admit that it is absolutely essential to assure the overall security of the Alliance on the basis of the Alliance in its entirety.

From this, I should like to draw another lesson. The fact that the United States makes a vital contribution to the security of the entire Atlantic area, far from rendering it less imperative, enhances the need for the European members of the Alliance to shoulder their fair share of the burden of collective defence. It was the obvious determination of the Western European countries to do their utmost to ensure their own defence that first induced the United States to form the Atlantic Alliance. And it remains just as necessary today for the Western Europeans to show tangible evidence of their total commitment to collective defence if they are to obtain in return and on a continuing basis the same commitment on the part of the United States.

Such, then, are some of the main principles which should govern relations between Western Europe and the Alliance. But — I see no reason to conceal the fact — there is also an organisational problem. I shall endeavour to speak about this in terms that are as concrete as possible. We are faced by a plurality of organisations differing from one another in composition and areas of competence. What we have to find out therefore, from the standpoint of the Alliance, is how best to channel the surplus of vitality and energy generated by these other organisations into that main artery constituted by the Alliance's work of co-ordination in the defence and political fields. I believe the answer is twofold.

First, each institution should concentrate all its efforts on its own specific activities. The central task of the Alliance is obviously that of co-ordinating the political and military effort necessary to assure the indivisible defence of the Atlantic area, and hence of the European theatre. These topics — the problems of political and military security — are and should continue to be debated and dealt with essentially within NATO.

Secondly, wherever functions overlap, as is inevitable, it is up to all of us to make a genuine

and constant effort towards co-ordination. To be effective, such co-ordination must begin as early as possible, before positions are liable to become frozen. There should be no question of putting forward any idea whatsoever in a spirit of intransigence. Some countries have the advantage of being able to raise matters in other forums. But in NATO everyone must show the same flexibility and take into account the interests expressed by his partners.

*(The speaker continued in English)*

Let me give you some actual recent examples of how this can work. First, let us consider the Final Act adopted by the Helsinki summit of the CSCE. I would suggest that those who see Helsinki as the beginning of a new era in East-West relations which will lead to the disbandment of the two military blocs — a possibility referred to in the report before us — are being somewhat premature, to say the least.

But, on a more modest if perhaps more realistic plane, it is true that, despite all its imperfections, the Final Act contains principles and provisions of importance, not only to the East but to the West. These provisions were won by the western side only after a long and hard negotiating struggle. The decisive factor was the very impressive cohesion among all western participants. This was achieved by a painstaking process of co-ordination which took place mainly in three groups — NATO, the Nine and a full Western European group, including the neutrals. This progression of co-ordination worked remarkably smoothly. A concentric approach happened to suit the particular subject matter of the CSCE negotiations which to a large extent were political, economic and humanitarian.

The subject matter of the MBFR talks is very different. It concerns the military security of members of the Alliance. It is inevitable, therefore, that the Alliance should play the leading and predominant rôle in co-ordination. This it has done, and is doing, most successfully. The instructions of the western negotiators in Vienna are drawn up in NATO headquarters in Brussels.

We know that the Warsaw Pact negotiators are impressed by the high degree of cohesion achieved by the West and that this is a factor they keep very much in mind. It is a praiseworthy achievement and I would like to pay tribute to those engaged in it. As you know, it is a most complicated and highly technical task. I realise that there are some European aspects of

*Mr. Luns (continued)*

the MBFR negotiations which the Nine may wish to discuss among themselves and they are doing so. But experience has amply demonstrated that the overall strategy and tactics of the negotiations are the business of NATO and that NATO performs that business very efficiently.

I turn now to a different aspect of military security. I have already mentioned the need for Western European members to pull their fair weight in contributing towards the common defence of the Alliance. This seems not always to be easy at a time when misunderstanding about the nature of détente can lead to pressures to reduce defence budgets. Furthermore, the current economic difficulties which countries are undergoing also have unfortunately negative effects on defence budgets.

We must note, however, that economic considerations in no way affect the continuing growth and modernisation of the Warsaw Pact forces, whether they be strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear or conventional, on land, on and under the seas and in the air. To be credible our deterrent posture must not be looked at in isolation, but, rather, in relation to the military might of the Warsaw Pact.

Judged against this background, there is room for improvement in the present performance, both of Western Europe as a whole and of individual Western European countries. For among the Europeans themselves there are some who do more and some who do less. It would seem to me that Western European Union is an excellent forum to assess whether its member countries equitably contribute to the collective Atlantic security and to reflect what more they can do within the Alliance. I know you have this already very much in your minds.

But let me say that there should be no unilateral cuts in force levels outside the context of an agreement with the Warsaw Pact on the MBFR.

In saying this, I am not advocating vast increases in defence expenditure by the West. What I am advocating is the continuing resolve to provide the resources needed to maintain an adequate contribution to western defence — adequate in relation to the kind of military threat we can see and evaluate, and adequate too in relation to our economic capabilities.

As I have hinted, there is a great disparity even among the governments of the Western

European Union members in the proportion of their national resources they are prepared to allot to defence. May I remark in passing that if only our members would spend, in terms of percentage of the GNP, the same as they did ten years ago, there would be no problem at all.

Moreover, we must try to find ways of using our resources more effectively, such as through rationalisation and standardisation. In recent months there has grown up a much greater realisation of the need to make progress in these fields, as well as in others which are a national responsibility, such as logistics. It is now about a year since this awareness has grown up.

But if the national forces made available to NATO are to be able effectively to operate together and support each other, expressions of good will alone will not suffice. Political will must be translated into action. When national decisions are taken to equip their forces with one system or another, the question of its compatibility with the equipment of other NATO allies must be uppermost in the decision-makers' minds. Nor can such considerations be left to the last moment. Consultation and co-operation must begin at the earliest stage and continue throughout the research, development and procurement phases.

These problems are not new to you. Indeed, valuable substantive reports on these subjects have appeared on your agenda in the past and have given rise to resolutions and recommendations which have been solidly based and have been given the closest attention by NATO. I would most earnestly encourage you as Europeans to continue to play your part in your parliaments and to press on your governments for NATO standardisation and rational co-operation in all equipment matters.

You are well aware of the proposal whereby the research, development and procurement of equipment should give rise to a two-way street between Western Europe and North America. But the necessary premise for achieving such a two-way street is for Europeans to organise themselves accordingly. We shall not achieve a smooth traffic flow in both directions through the two-way street unless we eliminate jostling and jockeying for position in the European lane. This is probably the major task which faces both WEU and Eurogroup today.

But here I return to my central theme. It is understandable that the European members of the Alliance discuss together matters of parti-

*Mr. Luns (continued)*

cular concern to their governments. But the overall strategy must be an Alliance strategy. In the military field this means the much misunderstood and misinterpreted strategy of flexible response. In overall terms it means that NATO must retain the leading rôle in evolving Alliance-wide policies.

NATO's deliberations will be all the richer for the ideas emanating from the separate discussions held between Europeans. But there must be sufficient flexibility all round to ensure that each member of the Alliance has the fullest opportunity to contribute to the elaboration of decisions affecting all countries of the Alliance.

I hope that these practical examples will have illustrated my central concern. Moves towards European unity are in themselves not a disruptive force within the Alliance. The growing cohesion of European members should, rather, be a source of strength for the Alliance. It will bring difficulties ; adaptations will be necessary. But what is required is a sensible, logical division of labour and a persevering effort of co-ordination — in other words, political sensitivity and good sense.

Above all, members of the Alliance must continue to remember that both pillars of the arch, the European and the North American, depend on each other. United we shall certainly stand : divided — but, happily, I need not complete the well-known tag. For I am sure that the essential need for Alliance unity will continue to guide the politics of all member governments and parliamentarians on either side of the Atlantic. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General has done us the honour of expressing his willingness to answer any questions which might be put to him by members of the Assembly.

I would point out, at the outset, that I do mean questions and not speeches, which you will, after all, have an opportunity of making when the reports are discussed. I shall, therefore, set you a little rhetorical exercise, which will consist in requiring you to put your questions in the interrogative form ; and, owing to the short time at our disposal, I apologise in advance for the

severity with which I shall apply the Rules of Procedure. In other words, let me say again that speakers are invited to ask questions and confine themselves to that.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

I call Mr. Leynen.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have before me excerpts from half-a-dozen British newspapers in which the question is raised of a possible reduction in the British Army of the Rhine.

Does the Secretary-General of NATO not think that this reduction, if it were really to take place, would weaken the Alliance and damage the will to common defence ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Secretary-General, do you wish to answer question by question? *(The Secretary-General agreed)*

I give you the floor.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*) (Translation). — Mr. Senator, if Britain were to proceed to carry out reductions in the Rhine army without offsetting them in other fields, that would obviously weaken the shield deployed in the great Germanic plain. Until now, however, as you yourself said, we have only had press reports, and also, until now, the United Kingdom Government has always consulted its allies about its plans in good time.

I therefore venture to hope that if the United Kingdom was really intending to make reductions of whatever kind, it would consult the Alliance. The matter would be referred in the first instance to the Military Committee, the Commander-in-Chief, Europe, would give his opinion and then the question would have to be discussed in the Defence Planning Committee — in fact, the Council without France and now also without Greece. Then we should see what happened, but I wish to stress the great importance of the United Kingdom contribution to the Alliance's common defence.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Montesquiou.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — Has the Secretary-General of NATO been informed of the reservations expressed

*Mr. de Montesquiou (continued)*

about the Ottawa declaration by members of the Atlantic Alliance ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Luns.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*) (Translation). — If I understand aright, the honourable Deputy is alluding to reservations on the part of one of the countries in the Alliance as regards the atomic option. All that I know about the matter is that any such reservations have not been translated into action by this government, and I have firm hopes that it will remain the expression of a general attitude.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — Does the Secretary-General consider that the independent forum for the standardisation of armament production, proposed by the Eurogroup of NATO on 5th November last, would be viable if France were not to join it ?

A further question : can you, in addition, inform us of your view on the proposal made by the Defence Ministers of Eurogroup, and would not a body of this kind be in danger of duplicating the work of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Luns.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*) (Translation). — Against my inclination, I have to show a certain degree of caution in my reply, since I must stress that this initiative taken by the Nine was as little expected by the Secretary-General of NATO as by certain sections of the public. I would venture to add that, if the honourable Deputy would be good enough to re-read what I have just said, he would realise that the Secretary-General has expressed certain reservations about this development. (*Laughter*)

With regard to the second question that you asked, I can only give my personal opinion. It seems to me logical that if France does not participate in one body or another, that would mean a great loss of effectiveness, especially in the

armaments field, where France holds a position that is so important and so much in the forefront. It seems to me, in any case, that the other members of Eurogroup also feel the same way ; but, I would repeat, Eurogroup is not NATO.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you.

I call Lord Duncan-Sandys.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). — Following the point already raised, will the Secretary-General tell us what practical measures are being taken to accelerate the standardisation of armaments, which alone offers the means of increasing NATO's strength without any corresponding increase in expenditure ? I would, in particular, like to know whether NATO has worked out any precise procedure for reaching agreement upon a joint procurement programme since without an agreed procedure for settling differences we shall make no progress.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you.

I call Mr. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*). — The noble lord, Lord Duncan-Sandys, has asked some very important questions which are very much in the minds of both the NATO Secretary-General and — more importantly — the governments. I can tell him that during the past year a lot of most efficient spade-work has been done. The United States Government, in particular, has now seen the necessity of proceeding along the two-way street to which I referred earlier, and there have been some examples of the United States practising what it preaches. For instance, its army will be equipped with the highly efficient French anti-tank weapon, and its government has just placed a large order in Belgium for machine-guns. It is not excluded that the main German battle tank will become the NATO tank.

So, although, on an overall basis, no full standardisation has been achieved, there are some very encouraging signs. A common project exists between France — which initiated it — Belgium, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany to build a mine counter-measure hunter.

I am very happy that the noble lord has talked about the problem in a general way. I hope that

*Mr. Luns (continued)*

the various governments will show that the initiative taken by Her Majesty's Government in possibly being associated with this project can be followed. I have the impression that some of the other European governments, for some mysterious reason, are somewhat less eager than the United Kingdom Government. The procedures to be applied are being worked out and are now nearly complete. I expect a lively and positive exchange of views next week when the Ministers of Defence of the Alliance meet in Brussels.

May I say finally, as you give me opportunity to do so, that great interest is being shown on the part of France in the harmonisation of weapons systems and the like. Although the French Government are not committed to military integration the French President and Government have within limits co-operated in a very satisfactory manner with France's allies. This goes also to the question which another honourable member has just asked me, in that it does not exclude the possibility that ways may be found to associate France with this very important aspect of Alliance activities.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — The question of nuclear forces in a future European union, or — if I may put it this way — the question whether a future European union should, could or must have nuclear forces, has a part to play in our discussion. I should like to ask the Secretary-General whether he — in his personal capacity, of course — has any ideas as to how this question of nuclear forces in a future European union should be regarded in view of the fact that nuclear forces of this kind do, as we know, exist in two States that would be members of such a union, i.e. in France and Britain?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Luns.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*) (Translation). — I would like to point out that this question of the possible introduction of nuclear forces into a European defence organisation has been under discussion since I took

up my present office, but I must repeat that it is hardly realistic at the present time.

As you will know, the countries of Europe are already having enough trouble in keeping their conventional armaments up to scratch. There is, further, one inescapable problem — I am perhaps being rather tactless, but it might be a good thing if I touch on the subject — and that is the position of the Federal Republic of Germany. We are all greatly obliged to the Federal Republic for the attitude of restraint it has adopted, for never having said "We're in on this too". But the problem does come to the fore when a European nuclear defence force is considered.

You know, Germany's contribution within NATO is extremely important. Taking an overall look at the past few years, I would say that Germany's defence contribution has had a highly positive influence on the defence of Europe as a whole. I also believe that this is the reason why America has reinforced its troops in the central area during the past few years. But how things will go at nuclear level is, of course, an open question.

I should, further, like to repeat what I have just said — there are some European countries that do not want any nuclear rôle at all. True, this may change, but I would, if I may, repeat that this question is at the moment not very realistic. However, we must of course always be able to talk about it, and I have done so.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Critchley.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — If the Secretary-General were obliged to answer yes to a third series of proposed unilateral reductions in defence expenditure on the part of the British Government, where would he be least unhappy for those cuts to fall — on the central front or, on the other hand, if they were to mean a reduction of allied naval forces in the Eastern Atlantic?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Luns.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*). — I have a great temptation to reply because I have the illusion that I know something about military problems. Most people, however, do not share my illusions, for they argue that naval experience as recently as about forty years ago as a yeoman

*Mr. Luns (continued)*

of signals is not a sufficient basis on which to claim to be an expert. Quite apart from that joke, however, I cannot prejudge what the Military Committee would reply. I have a good idea, and I suspect that the honourable member also has a good idea. But let us leave it at that, if the honourable member does not mind.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Sir John Rodgers.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — I am sure the Secretary-General welcomes, as we all do, the continued membership in NATO of Portugal and the contribution made by that country to European defence. Following the recent events in Spain, does the Secretary-General believe that the initiative taken by the United States will be reopened on the possibility of Spain being invited to join NATO?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Luns.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*). — I will repeat what the honourable member probably knows — that all fifteen members of the Alliance have recognised the valuable contribution which Spain, through its bilateral agreement with the United States of America, makes to the defence of Europe. That is a fact which has never been contradicted. In the past it was not realistic to talk about the direct participation of Spain in the Alliance. Now things may change. One or two governments have already expressed their view that Spain should join the Alliance. But we must give all governments of the Alliance time for reflection and time to come to a decision because, as honourable members know, it must be a unanimous decision.

I share with honourable members a certain satisfaction in the way things have been going in Portugal in these last days. For reasons that the honourable member knows, the military contribution of Portugal, in the sense of ships and aircraft, has not been very great in the last ten years, but her geographical contribution, if I may use that term, has been extremely valuable. I am thinking particularly of the Azores islands, which have been extremely valuable. The armed forces of Portugal have not been notably more efficient in this last year but we believe there

is some possibility of improvement. We all hope for that and then we shall see what Portugal can do to assist NATO, apart from the contribution of her geographical position.

For Portugal, if Spain participated that would of course be of prime importance, but I do not want to prejudge that problem.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Niet.

Mr. de NIET (*Netherlands*). — I have two questions. First, is it possible for the Secretary-General to give us an explanation of the seemingly extreme inactivity of NATO in the whole of the Cyprus crisis, especially in the relationship between two NATO members? Secondly, does NATO still see the relevance of continuing those activities that are known as the "new dimension"?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Luns.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*). — When one talks about relations between Greece and Turkey and about the Cyprus crisis, it is not, as the honourable member has indicated in his question, the most happy part of NATO activities, the more so as the Secretary-General was given, years ago, by a unanimous vote of the Alliance, a watching brief on Greek-Turkish relations. In the past crisis — not this one — these obligations were fulfilled in a very satisfactory way and my predecessor, Mr. Brosio, made a very valuable contribution to defuse the then crisis.

But the honourable member knows that NATO is not a supranational organisation. The Secretary-General can do no more than what in fact the members allow him to do. It is a sad fact that of the two main countries which are at odds about Cyprus and about the whole situation in the Aegean, Greece and Turkey, there is only one — Turkey — which recognises this watching brief.

Every year I make a report on the activities of the Secretary-General, usually of four to five pages. I regret that the Secretary-General and the NATO Council have been given little scope. The south-eastern flank is one of the very sore points in the Alliance posture, if I may so remind you. We are all rather apprehensive of what may yet be in store, and how the Secretary-General can effectively intervene is very difficult to see.

*Mr. Luns (continued)*

I turn to the second question. Always in the past the reproach was made to NATO that it was mainly a military operation — and also a political one — and that NATO did not bother about such peaceful pursuits as the challenges of modern society and that kind of problem. When, on the initiative of President Nixon, NATO started to deal with these problems, it was clearly understood and always adhered to, that these activities would in no way intrude upon the activities of other organisations.

I am happy to repeat here that the activities of the special directorate which occupies itself with the challenges of modern society are highly valued not only by the members of the organisation but by many countries outside the organisation and even by the countries of the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union.

We have always been extremely ready to give to the countries interested all the reports which were made on the basis of pilot projects. Every year we get more interest in that activity. The honourable member seems to suggest that we would be better to cut it out. I beg not to agree with him. I think they are excellent activities and we should go on pursuing these activities, which are not controversial, certainly outside the Alliance. Therefore, in that respect, I have to assure him that for the time being we shall continue them. Of course, if the Alliance, which is not a supranational body, came to another decision, we would have to cut out these activities. I would regret that.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Steel.

Mr. STEEL (*United Kingdom*). — There have been suggestions that the NATO codification of weapons and of pacts has become available to the Government of South Africa. Could the Secretary-General comment on this and on whether he feels that it would be wise for NATO to be involved in the potentially difficult situation in that part of the world so far away from what is supposed to be our sphere of influence?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Luns.

Mr. LUNS (*Secretary-General of NATO*). — I entirely agree with the honourable member,

and that is why NATO is not involved in any sort of contact with South Africa whatsoever about weapons, about defence of the southern sea route or anything similar.

The honourable member will remember the sad fate of a certain general who went to South Africa and whose trip to South Africa gave rise to misunderstanding. I am sorry to say that he is no longer a general. He was a very efficient general.

We do not engage in any such activities. I say again that there are no "NATO" weapons. There are some weapons which we call NATO weapons because they were developed by three, four, five or even ten nations of the Alliance. When one talks of NATO weapons, one must remember that they are being produced, and bought by and are completely under the control of, national governments. Hitherto, no weapons which were, let us say in the French army in Germany or whatever the case may be, have been diverted to South Africa.

As to what the individual governments do in their relations with South Africa, the Secretary-General of NATO has no power to intervene. In the NATO Council, where all the ministers are present, or the ambassadors, from time to time governments give their opinions on this sort of activity. However, I entirely agree with the honourable member.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I take the liberty of thanking the Secretary-General of NATO, on behalf of the Assembly, for the frankness and courtesy with which he has replied to the large number of questions which were put to him and which are evidence of the interest taken in his speech.

I would add that other members had applied to put questions, but in view of the next Order of the Day and the fact that we shall now be hearing the Secretary of State for Defence of the Italian Republic, I have taken it upon myself to close this discussion which, nevertheless, has been of outstanding quality. (*Applause*)

#### **10. Address by Mr. Dalvit, Secretary of State for Defence of Italy**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the address by Mr. Dalvit, Secretary of State for Defence of Italy.

(*The President continued in Italian*)

*The President (continued)*

Mr. Secretary of State, it is a personal pleasure for me to bid you welcome to this Assembly at a time when Mediterranean problems are assuming such importance and we may accordingly look to the Italian Secretary of State for Defence to give us some particularly valuable information. Once again, thank you.

Mr. DALVIT (*Secretary of State for Defence of Italy*) (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. President, for your warm introduction to my speech. I also feel impelled to convey my sincere congratulations to Mr. Leynen on the high standard of his report and the spirit with which it is imbued.

Mr. President, I have noted with keen satisfaction Dr. Luns's thorough survey of the Atlantic Alliance, for which he has earned our thanks.

For my part I wish to dwell in particular on one or two special aspects which in the Mediterranean context more closely reflect Italian requirements and aspirations at the present time.

The Mediterranean theatre, or rather what is commonly referred to as the southern flank of the Alliance, in which Italy occupies geographically one of the chief pivotal positions, has undergone in recent times a series of changes which have directly affected one of the most sensitive areas of deployment of the Atlantic forces.

The consolidation of stability in Central Europe has indeed been weakened by increased vulnerability on the flanks, due to the steady build-up of the Soviet naval strength and the redimensioning of the NATO military set-up.

This situation, already serious and dangerous in itself, is on the southern flank exacerbated by the political threat embodied in a certain instability in some of the countries in this theatre and in what have become chronic disputes rooted in political, religious, economic and social grievances, never put right.

This has come about through a series of happenings both inside and outside NATO.

It goes to show that détente can only yield tangible fruit where there is an at any rate approximate balance of forces. While the climate it generates is producing stabilising effects in Central Europe, the same cannot be said of the

Mediterranean theatre where there has set in a dynamic process liable to be attended by parlous political developments. The possibility of reaching an understanding in this region becomes daily more difficult, adding to the dangerous nature of the situation whose threshold of sensitivity is all the higher by reason of the presence of sources of energy which have given the Arab peoples a major voice in the chapter. Among NATO's internal vicissitudes are to be noted the implications of the Cyprus problem, Greece's withdrawal from the NATO military organisation, the Turkish question and United Kingdom disengagement.

Should the hopes of bringing Greece back into the Alliance come to grief, the ensuing fracturing of NATO forces would jeopardise the reliability of their defensive position on the southern flank, particularly in respect of: integrated area defence, which would lose territorial continuity; the functioning of the long-range monitoring system, whose early-warning capability would be diminished; the resupply routes for the Eastern Mediterranean, whose security would become exceedingly precarious; the consequent breach of continuity in the entire telecommunications system for the area.

Nor should we underestimate the consequences of the stance of the United States Congress concerning military assistance to Ankara, which directly impinge upon the operational capability of the Turkish forces.

The United Kingdom's decision on disengagement rouses justified misgivings by its attendant political, psychological and military implications.

On the narrowly operational plane, the United Kingdom's decision to reduce its participation in NATO activities in the Mediterranean creates other difficulties for the life of the on-call naval force, NAVOCFORMED, rendering problematic the creation of the standing naval force, STANAVFORMED, that was to take its place in the future.

The dissolution of these forces would leave the Soviet naval units alone in their possibility of paying periodical visits to ports of the unaligned countries in the Mediterranean basin, so that the absence of multinational NATO flags would instil in these countries' minds the dangerous notion that the European countries of the Alliance took small interest in their doings.

*Mr. Dalvit (continued)*

We must however record with satisfaction France's renewed interest in the Mediterranean; indeed Paris has sent out some big units, including the aircraft carriers Clémenceau and Foch, the cruiser Colbert and two rocket-launching frigates.

Besides these developments within the Alliance, we should take note of the situation that obtains in the Mediterranean area outside the Atlantic Treaty zone of interest: namely the conflict in the Middle East, the consequences of reopening the Suez Canal and the effects of the stance adopted by the oil-producing countries.

The Sadat-Rabin agreement does not settle the Arab-Israeli dispute insofar as directly dependent on a solution being found to the Palestine problem. To perpetuate the state of conflict would, besides fomenting instability in that region, have weighty consequences for the security of energy resupply vital both to industry and operational defence capability.

The reopening of the Suez Canal has, as against the economic benefits accruing to the Mediterranean countries, given Russia substantial advantages in respect of military strategy through the greater possibility of deploying its own ships in support of its policy of expansion in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and down the East African coastline.

This prospect, taken together with Russia's outstanding ability to ensconce itself wherever there may exist a power vacuum, gives that country the further benefit of monitoring from close at hand the energy sources of the Middle East, with all the implications that would ensue in the event of conflict.

The stance of the oil-producing countries helps to deteriorate the situation in this theatre even further.

Their discovery of oil as a weapon, additional to the possibility of bringing heavy economic pressure to bear, has made them aware of their ability to soften up the western world, economically and hence militarily as well, by cutting off energy supplies. This is of particular importance for the European countries in that, whatever turn political, military and economic events in the Middle East and North Africa may take, they are bound to have direct political, military and economic repercussions on the countries of

Southern Europe, and through these on the Alliance as a whole.

The picture I have given so far would be incomplete did it not take into account the uncertain political, social and institutional framework of the Mediterranean countries.

It would not be possible to examine the plight of each; let me simply focus the attention of the Assembly on the question-marks raised in particular by the ongoing crisis in the Iberian peninsula (Portugal-Spain), the problem of Tito's succession and the Greco-Turkish dispute already alluded to.

In this connection we deem it advisable to remind the allied countries of the importance to them of defence problems in this theatre, convinced as we are that a further worsening of the present crisis in sensitive areas (Iberian peninsula, Balkans and Middle East) would finally throw our defence system out of joint and leave devoid of any control whatsoever the complex of shipping lanes which have, with the reopening of the Suez Canal, regained first-rank importance.

Mindful as we are that Italy could play a vital rôle of go-between for the countries of Western Europe and those bordering on the Mediterranean, we are ready to examine and take part in any initiative in support of such a function; to the extent that Italy, at one with the countries of the southern region, contributes to restoring the political equilibria now evolving in the Mediterranean, it will win the European basis for dealing with peace problems that ought, at all costs, to be maintained in this sector. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Secretary of State is ready to answer any questions put by members of the Assembly. I shall, of course follow the same procedure as for the Secretary-General of NATO.

**11. Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975**

*(Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 692)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I have received from Mr. Radius and others a motion for a recommendation on the resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General

*The President (continued)*

Assembly on 10th November 1975, with a request for urgent procedure.

The motion for a recommendation is contained in Document 692.

In accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules of Procedure, the request will be posted up and the text circulated.

The Assembly will be asked to decide on the request for urgent procedure tomorrow morning.

Mr. AMREHN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the matter you have just announced is entirely new to me, as it is likely to be to many of my colleagues.

We now have a chance to read the text through, but we are already to vote on it tomorrow. My question to you is — as otherwise there will be no time left — whether I can under the Rules of Procedure ask for this proposal to be referred to the General Affairs Committee for further consideration, to see whether perhaps the text should still be changed there in one direction or another.

I feel that there is all the more reason for asking this since, before the resolution was put to the vote at the United Nations, great and powerful States announced that its adoption would mean their withdrawal from the United Nations, but afterwards no further value was attached to these declarations. I should like to avoid our making in this Assembly sudden and urgent declarations and passing resolutions without their having been thoroughly discussed in Committee beforehand. This is the purpose of my taking the floor at this moment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Amrehn, I have allowed you to mention the problem as a favour but it will be debated tomorrow when you take a decision on the urgent procedure.

**12. Address by Mr. Dalvit Secretary of State for Defence of Italy**

*(Replies to questions)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Radius to put a question to the Secretary of State.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — I address the Secretary of State as a member of the WEU Council. How does he explain that the Council has not yet replied to Question 160 of 11th May of this year, asking whether the French and British nuclear forces play a rôle in western defence when, as the Secretary-General of NATO has just stated, all the member countries have accepted without reservation the Ottawa declaration, which states clearly that they do contribute?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Secretary of State.

Mr. DALVIT (*Secretary of State for Defence of Italy*) (Translation). — The truth is I voiced misgivings about the particular, specific policy and situation in the Mediterranean, more especially as regards Britain. As to the particular question asked of me by Mr. Radius, I am not at the moment in a position to answer it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Magliano.

Mr. MAGLIANO (*Italy*) (Translation). — I should like to ask our colleague the Secretary of State for Defence whether the Italian Government has ever considered the possibility of there coming into the sphere of government affairs, in the near future or at a more remote date precisely within the scope of cabinet responsibility, of political deployments of force which serve purposes nearer to the informing principles of the Warsaw Pact than to those with which NATO is imbued.

The PRESIDENT (Translation) — I call Mr. Dalvit.

Mr. DALVIT (*Secretary of State for Defence of Italy*) (Translation). — Of course, this question cannot be put to the representative of a government in office having a mind of its own in respect of foreign policy and having taken very precise postures and stands. What I can do is express the conviction of the present majority from which the government is formed, which is unlikely to entertain prospects of a similar kind to those hypothesised by Mr. Magliano as being more unfavourable to WEU.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I would once again express the thanks of the Assembly

*The President (continued)*

to the Secretary of State for the high quality of his address, which will be recorded in the archives of the Assembly.

### **13. Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance — consideration of current problems**

*(Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 680 and Amendment)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now take the debate on Mr. Leynen's report.

I call Mr. Voogd.

Mr. VOOGD (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the report from our colleague Mr. Leynen is, as always, a useful document. It is well worth giving thought to, and so it is a thankless task to have to speak against a Rapporteur who shows so much devotion and perseverance and, as we have seen this afternoon, idealism. Yet at the present moment one cannot help doing so.

A letter from the Dutch Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sent to the Dutch Parliament on 27th October 1975 said :

"The Government rejects most firmly any nuclear rôle of its own for Western Europe, or the forming of a European nuclear force. Its main reason for doing so is that this would harm the cause of peace and security."

One may wonder whether this quotation has any direct connection with the Leynen report. For me — and for others as well — there is such a link. What is the report trying to achieve ? I will not quote from it, because I assume that members of the Assembly will have read the text.

First of all, the report envisages the coming into being of a European union — not unity, but union. Secondly, this union must be very closely linked with the European Communities, if not, indeed, form part of them. And thirdly, the report points very clearly towards a European defence community.

There are at least two major objections to this, Mr. President. I would point out that there is still no question of there being a proper parliament that could keep an eye on, and control

over, this process of union, desirable though the process may be. This still applies to the EEC, to WEU and to the Council of Europe. The assemblies of these three bodies complain that they are not taken seriously enough by their Councils of Ministers. So these assemblies are — some more than others — deprived of any real power.

A second objection is that there would be the risk of a European defence community growing into a European nuclear force. And it is here, Mr. President, that you see the tie-up with the passage I have quoted. The Dutch Government rejects the creation of a European nuclear force, and European union as it is proposed in the Leynen report — the outlines given for it are still very vague — presents the danger of gradually moving towards a European nuclear force. The Rapporteur is aware of this, and it is commendable that he is very forthright about it. We read, in paragraph 36 of the report, that :

"A European union fully competent in defence matters cannot exclude the possibility of having its own strategic and tactical nuclear arms, at least in the long run."

Against this, Mr. President, I would quote two further passages from the letter from the Dutch Government I mentioned a moment ago :

"The government subscribes to the view that in the future, too, security must be provided for within NATO, and not within or through a European union."

Later in the same letter, the Dutch Government says :

"The government considers, besides, that European integration can be developed a great deal further than it has been so far in many areas, including that of foreign policy, without it being necessary to take the path towards a military union or a European nuclear force."

This need not mean, Mr. President, that NATO — in its present form and mode of operation — should be universally acclaimed. This is certainly not the case ; but then this is not what we are talking about. What we are talking about is the view that a European nuclear force can only increase the tensions and dangers of nuclear conflict.

The fear that Mr. Leynen's report might, via some still vague union, lead on to a European nuclear force, is well-founded. Then — however

*Mr. Voogd (continued)*

good the intentions might be — things get out of hand. The sorcerer's apprentices will be incapable of keeping control of their instruments. This, Mr. President, is why a number of members of this Assembly will be unable, despite their support for Mr. Van Hoeylandt's amendment, to vote for this draft recommendation. The second paragraph of the recommendation, for example, is open to serious objections, and the recommendation is of course based on the report. For this reason, the members I have mentioned will not be supporting this draft recommendation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Lord Beaumont.

Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I would like to speak briefly to welcome this report whole-heartedly and to speak against the amendment which has been tabled by Mr. Van Hoeylandt in the name of the Socialist Group. It seems to me that the duty of the democratic West is in so many cases to work for the best that can occur but to insure against the worst — or, to put it rather more crudely, in old-fashioned terms, to work for peace but to prepare for war.

I feel certain that that is the right general approach to East-West problems. We must spare no effort to try to achieve détente because only in serious détente is there long-term hope for the world and in particular for the western world. In the meantime, though, we must realise that détente may or may not be happening and that we cannot put all our faith in it, and we must insure by making certain that our defence is as strong as it possibly can be.

The same basic principle applies in the whole position of Western European Union. There are a great many of us here, probably a majority, who have the feeling, as I have — and as has my colleague, Mr. David Steel, who spoke on this subject at the last meeting of this Assembly — that we rather hope that Western European Union will come to an end soon. We hope that it will come to an end because it is no longer necessary, because its functions have been taken over by a wider and let us say a more effective grouping. But until that happens it is important that Western European Union continues as strong as it can be, and continues with its task

of prodding governments and ministers and trying to ensure that defence matters are not brushed under the carpet and are properly dealt with.

My reason for opposing the amendment in the name of Mr. Van Hoeylandt also applies to a consideration of nuclear weapons. Of course we hope that the NATO Alliance will continue. There is no reason why it should not and it would be a disaster if it did not. Of course we are pleased and grateful for the American nuclear and defence umbrella. Nevertheless, it seems to me that we must be quite clear that Europe is responsible in the last resort for its own defence, that there may come a time when we cannot ask the Americans to risk their own country and their own cities in our defence.

The logical corollary of this is that there should be some massive deterrent, a nuclear deterrent, in the hands of Europe. Certainly, it would be far better that it should be in the hands of Europe than the pseudo deterrent in the hands of Britain and of France. We must face up to this need, however expensive and difficult it may be. This is something which we must reluctantly keep on bearing in mind. The two possible objections are that it is politically impossible with our electorates and that it is economically impossible. I believe that if it is politically impossible then we have lost the will to defend ourselves and it does not much matter what happens anyway.

In the present state of the economies of Western Europe it is not economically possible but once we had brought our economics into some state of sense and order and were able to deploy the immense potential and immense resources which Western Europe commands, I believe we would find that we could afford this.

This is a good report because it is a tough report, because it follows the line that I outlined at the very beginning, in that it looks towards trying to get a much better situation where these things will not be necessary. But it is absolutely certain that we must not give up our insurance against the worst, because that would be fatal. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the debate on European union is at

*Mr. Radius (continued)*

present the major concern of all Europeans. As Mr. Leynen rightly emphasises, it is of fundamental importance to the future of Europe and of the Atlantic Alliance.

Building a European union means, to take over a definition given by President Pompidou, "erecting, on the basis of what already exists, a confederation of States determined to harmonise their policies and integrate their economies".

In order to accomplish this task, which is both realistic and ambitious, we must free ourselves from the limitations imposed on us by a unification of Europe that has for too long been conceived in purely economic terms. We must strive to make a clear draft of a society which will match the scale of our continent, and we must seek out the means of affirming Europe's presence in the world more effectively.

All this will be unattainable if we fail to agree on the means by which we can ensure our security. The emergence of values and principles shared by all Europeans in fact presupposes that Europeans are ready to defend them.

Moreover, the spread of Europe's influence in the world will be endangered if our continent has no military means at its disposal to make its voice heard.

It thus becomes clearly apparent that thinking on European union necessarily leads to a confrontation of our ideas on strategy and armaments production. WEU has, therefore, an essential rôle to play in building up European union.

In the first place, for legal reasons: indeed, the modified Brussels Treaty alone provides a legal basis for the unification of European defence efforts.

For political reasons too: WEU is based on co-operation among States. Now, only this mutual understanding among States will enable us to progress in the realm of defence. It would be ridiculous to claim that a supranational organisation could take the place of our States in dealing with matters as fundamental to people's lives as defence. As things are at present, such a supranational organisation would lack any sort of legitimacy in the eyes of Europeans. Today, the States alone are legitimate, and that situation will evolve only very slowly. It would be mistaken to believe that election of

the European Parliament by universal suffrage will rapidly lead to the emergence of European authorities, to which the peoples of our continent can entrust the means of ensuring their security.

WEU therefore constitutes a structure that is particularly well adapted to the extension of European union to matters connected with defence. For that reason, I give my support to the proposals contained in the draft recommendation presented by Mr. Leynen.

Mr. Leynen asks that the Brussels Treaty should be applied in all its parts. He invites the European Council to heed the opinion of our Assembly on any projects the latter may draw up for the defence of Europe. All this tallies with our endeavour to provide European defence with a solid basis — that of deep-seated agreement amongst our States.

Mr. Leynen further calls upon the European countries not to enter into any international commitment which would conflict with their future union. That ties in with a basic preoccupation that my friends and I have often had occasion to express. The European countries must give clear expression to their resolve to achieve union and to their ability to reject vetoes from without, whatever their origin.

This European resolve is all the more necessary, since we are witnessing the beginnings of a direct understanding between the United States and the USSR. If that understanding develops, are we going to let the security of Europe depend upon the state of relations between the great powers? The only way to avoid this is to give Europe the means, particularly the military means, to assert its presence in the world independently.

With regard to armaments policy, I find myself here again in full agreement with Mr. Leynen. This policy, which is so necessary to Europe from the economic point of view, will, when set in train, constitute the pledge for our common will to attain an independent European defence.

Despite my profound agreement with the recommendation presented by Mr. Leynen, I shall nevertheless voice a number of reservations regarding the explanatory memorandum which accompanies it. There is a reference to the future integration of European military forces, including nuclear forces. That prospect seems to me rather unrealistic, at least for the present. Apart from the fact that it would necessitate a revision

*Mr. Radies (continued)*

of the whole international legal order, and specifically of the modified Brussels Treaty, it presupposes that the French and British peoples would agree, in the near future, to the deterrent forces being handed over to a supranational authority. By its very nature the nuclear weapon, upon which the survival of a nation literally depends, cannot be removed from the competence of that nation.

My reservations on this point do not, however, prevent me from expressing the fervent hope of seeing a closer identity in the strategic ideas of the various European countries, which might possibly lead to the establishment of military dispositions conceived on a common basis. It must not be forgotten that the modified Brussels Treaty involves far-reaching agreement among the European States on strategic issues. Indeed, it provides that the nuclear powers shall afford assistance by all the means in their power to any member State which may fall victim to an attack.

We must draw all the necessary conclusions from this treaty, which could constitute an essential adjunct to the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, the European countries will, as Mr. Leynen desires, be able to work out a strategy within the framework of WEU, which will tally well with their interests and will not lead to our continent being transformed into a battlefield through the use of both conventional weapons and tactical nuclear weapons. For unless Europe, acting on its own account and showing a minimum of cohesion, expresses its own ideas on the subject of defence, we will be deluding ourselves if we think that the Americans will take Europe's viewpoint into account and, in consequence, revise NATO strategy. Revision of that strategy, however, is still essential. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Boucheny.

Mr. BOUCHENY (*France*) (Translation). — "The only strategy to suit Europe is one based on massive retaliation." That is what we are told in the report on which this discussion is based, and in my view it is quite mad.

One could smile at the futility of the debates in this Assembly, which appears to have difficulty in accepting détente, regrets the days of

the cold war and has gone on playing at anti-Soviet warfare for twenty years.

This is in 1975 an up-dated version of a plan which collapsed in 1954 at the height of the cold war. We might indeed smile, were we not dealing with a matter of capital importance for the people — in other words, peace. The address by Mr. Luns, which incidentally was aggressive and full of thew and sinew, cannot change our opinions.

We communists declare that the only proper strategy for Europe is to do everything which will bring us a system of collective security and a peace based on sound and durable foundations, provide us with a broad basis of European understanding and lead to the strict application of the Helsinki agreements, to measures of disarmament, or at least to the limitation of armaments.

Moreover, the author of the report admits that he is obliged to use terms which we communists have long been denouncing. Europe is subject to the hegemony of the United States of America. Recent developments and interventions, not only in the military but also in the economic and monetary fields have confirmed this, particularly on the occasion of the Rambouillet summit, which provides the most perfect illustration of the enfeoffment of Europe to the United States of America — an enfeoffment which is gathering speed and spreading to all fields. What the American leaders in 1973 presented as the year of Europe and which aimed at the formation of a new bloc under American control, has in fact been achieved.

In a recent interview, Mr. Kissinger found cause for satisfaction in the progress which had been achieved in this field. Was this a lack of will on the part of Europe? Surely not. It was much more a common will by the imperialist countries to close their ranks against the democratic movement of the workers and to come jointly to grips with the crisis facing their system.

As a French evening paper put it, the leaders of little Europe are inspired by the fear of political change. It is also worth noting a sentence in the report which says "...relations between France and its partners in defence matters have been organised on a new basis". This is the sort of talk which confirms what the French communists say — that France has in practice rejoined the NATO structure, for

*Mr. Boucheny (continued)*

increased co-ordination with NATO, systematic participation in manoeuvres, and the intensification of French military representation in NATO structures. It bears witness to the hypocrisy of the Giscard government, which speaks of the independence of its defence at the very moment when it is pursuing its reintegration into the Atlantic bloc.

For those who have the slightest illusion about the independent nature of the French strike force, Mr. Leynen's report provides a scathing denial. In a recent interview on French television Mr. Giscard d'Estaing spoke hopefully of the framework for a defence of Europe and said — I quote — "It is unthinkable that the nuclear armaments which the European union will inherit would remain under the exclusive control of the French and British".

That is clear, and it demonstrates the fallacious nature of the theories hitherto held regarding the French strike force; and it is dangerous, for — let us speak plainly — what country in the Europe of today is making a more insistent claim to leadership than the German Federal Republic, where further attacks on freedom have just opened up with the law on disqualification for certain posts? We are worried by the attitude of the SPD during the struggles waged by democratic movements in Portugal, Spain, Finland and Italy, particularly as the CDU and the CSU appear to be ready to follow in the SPD's footsteps, thus demonstrating the permanence of the threat offered by German imperialism with its voracious appetite. In our opinion it would be irresponsible to give it a say in the control of a European army in the near future, and I shall conclude by calling on all democratic forces to struggle for peace and for the implementation of the Helsinki agreements.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Niet.

Mr. de NIET (*Netherlands*). — I should have preferred to say my few words tomorrow morning, after we had digested what has been said today, but apparently, Mr. President, you intend that we should not close the debate before six o'clock. I will therefore try to improvise my remarks in the hope that I can still give an impression of the objections that I and many others have to the draft report.

First, it is premature, because it deals mainly with European union, which has not been fully discussed in any parliamentary body. The Prime Minister of Belgium, Mr. Tindemans, has done all he can to proceed with a report on the reactions of the countries of Europe to this draft report. Publication has been delayed; his report will not appear in December and may not appear until early 1976. So it is premature to deal optimistically with the consequences of European union in a report by this small organisation of only seven members.

The draft report is also too ambitious. It claims that WEU can do more by recommendations and putting pressure on governments than the Common Market and other European organisations. That is an illusion, because exactly the same parliamentarians, parliaments and ministers deal with Benelux, the Common Market, WEU and so on. So if the political will is not in one place, it is at no other place either.

It is welcome to hear Mr. Leynen and other colleagues say that we should start with European union. We take the same view in the Netherlands, but as politicians we must be realistic and should not believe that claims alone will achieve our objective.

The draft report is also ambiguous. I congratulate Mr. Leynen on a fair summing-up of the criticisms in the Committee. The Commission states, in paragraph 76, that for a European defence policy to be considered and accepted by the peoples of the union:

"... the European institutions will have to be recognised as authoritative and representative of a sufficiently high degree of solidarity between those peoples."

Of course, but the report claims that there is one European institution for defence and states in paragraph 30 that defence has to be considered in the context of the Alliance.

The Rapporteur says that this will afford protection from disagreeable surprises through the process of progressive integration. That is much the same as the Rapporteur said in his speech, when he talked about fidelity to the Atlantic Alliance — as it was translated in English — "for the time being". In a monogamous marriage, if you say that you will be faithful to your wife for the time being, that suggests that you are making preparation for a time of trouble when you will be unfaithful —

*Mr. de Niet (continued)*

and half of what you are striving for, if not more, will have gone already.

We find various ambiguities in certain sections of the report, but I believe that the report was not intended to be ambiguous. It seeks to urge that certain courses should be taken, but taking the report in total our objections remain valid.

There is one final item to which I should like to draw attention. There is not one word in the report itself about the rôle of parliament — and yet here we are in WEU, which of course is a parliamentary assembly. Although the report urges governments to do various things, nowhere is there a reference to the important consideration of urging France to come back fully into NATO activities in command terms in the Mediterranean. We believe that the report amounts to dangerous optimism and certainly leads to ambiguity in the situation.

The report refers to an explanatory memorandum, but we shall vote not on the memorandum but on the recommendation. If we do not vote against it, we can do no more than abstain, as we did in Committee. That decision has not yet been made.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur. I would ask him, if possible, to be brief because of the obligations we have to fulfil. I shall then call the Chairman of the Committee, and afterwards I shall declare the sitting closed, the votes on the amendment and draft recommendation being deferred until tomorrow morning.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, with your permission I shall speak in my mother tongue, which is Dutch.

*(The speaker continued in Dutch)*

Mr. President, there have been five speeches, and I have jotted down a plus or a minus sign against each of these. Two I have marked with a plus — those of Lord Beaumont of Whitley and Mr. Radius, whom I would like to thank for the helpful contributions they have made.

I mention Mr. Radius's speech only to say that I do not entirely agree with his view that the Brussels Treaty will need to be revised if the European union should assume defence

capabilities involving nuclear weapons. So far as I know there is appended to the Brussels Treaty a declaration from the Federal Republic of Germany, in which that country voluntarily renounced the manufacture of atomic weapons. It seems to me, therefore, that the future European union does, without any amending of the treaty being necessary, have the power to equip itself with nuclear weapons.

Now, Mr. President, to the three speeches with minus signs. Two of these I will discuss together, those by my two very good Dutch-speaking friends Mr. Voogd and Mr. de Niet. What they have said is wholly in keeping with what they said in Committee. Mr. Voogd and Mr. de Niet know that in the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium we have the habit of keeping a very close watch on what our Dutch neighbours are doing. We know the objections that both the Labour Party, to which these speakers belong, and the Dutch Government have. I would say to them, however, that one must follow a certain line of reasoning logically. My reasoning is this: there is, in fact, an American nuclear power, whose protection we are happy to accept. There is also the reality of Russian nuclear power and Chinese nuclear power. And India, too, is making ready to become a nuclear power. So in a future European union we would be completely naked in a world armed to the teeth. From that moment on, Europe would be not a third-rate, but a fourth- or fifth-rate power.

In my introductory remarks I said that I am always heart and soul behind those who hate nuclear weapons and would like to see them banned from the face of the earth. But I acknowledge the fact of life that these nuclear weapons exist. Faced with this reality, a Europe that has heavy responsibilities to carry in the world cannot opt out in this sphere. As I said during my introduction, there is another reason as well: if the future European union is a member of the nuclear club it will be possible, with the peace-loving and pacifist viewpoint that there is among our peoples, to make a greater contribution towards having nuclear weapons as much as possible excluded from military defence.

Which brings me, Mr. President, back briefly to the speech by Mr. de Niet, who used several adjectives he had already used in Committee, such as too ambitious, premature, unrealistic and ambiguous. I answered him in Committee by reading from a number of agencies which had commented on this report and which took the

*Mr. Leynen (continued)*

opposite view, that I had dealt with the problem very clearly. But after all it is in the nature of a parliamentary assembly to listen to everybody's opinion. And it is essential that in an assembly like this we should hear voices putting a different point of view. I am, therefore, sympathetic, but I must contradict Mr. de Niet on one point. He said this was not within our competence. It seems to me that this Assembly is in fact the only one among all the international bodies that has the competence to discuss defence affairs and put forward views. I do not believe we are being ambitious when we seek to have our voice heard on this issue.

*(The speaker continued in French)*

To Mr. Boucheny, who spoke of the revival of the cold war, I would reply that he should have referred to Chapter V, in which I discuss the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance and in which I have expressed the hope that after the cold war, the first stage, and after détente, the second stage, we may reach the third stage, that of *entente*.

Unfortunately, if this *entente* has not yet been achieved, that is not the fault of the West.

Furthermore, when you observe that I use the term American hegemony, I must say in reply that I have never ceased to affirm that in Europe a stronger affirmation of separate identity was necessary. I can refer to several of my speeches and reports heard by this Assembly; and it has always been my opinion that Europe must have its own political stature and not depend all the time on the United States.

Here briefly are my replies to the different speeches. I would thank all my colleagues, even those who have criticised me, and I hope that today's debate will not have been without its usefulness in the cause which we all of us serve: peace in the world, but above all in Western Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Rapporteur.

I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. As Chairman of the Com-

mittee, I should first of all like to join all those who have spoken before me in thanking our colleague Mr. Leynen for his excellent report.

During the discussion, my friend Mr. de Niet said that the report was premature. This seems to me to be a very important point on which I, as Chairman of the Committee, should like to state my position. I consider the timing of the report to be exactly right. It is right precisely because early next year we shall have the Tindemans report and shall then discuss, as the European Council will eventually also have to do, what conclusions are to be drawn from that report. I should like to remind you that paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation quite consistently runs as follows:

“Invite the European Council, as an organ of the EEC, to consult the WEU Assembly on any plans it may draw up concerning the defence of Europe.”

I should also like to stress once again that it is precisely this Assembly and the Council of Ministers of Western European Union that are competent to make this contribution to the work of the European Council when defence components of the future European union are being discussed. For this reason, with all respect to Mr. de Niet, I also do not regard the report as too ambitious.

I should like briefly to make one further comment on the other point raised by Mr. de Niet. I am, as he will see, paying particular attention to his criticisms because he has been into the report more deeply than anyone else and for this reason I should like to take the matter up with him, in all friendship. I do not believe that the Rapporteur can be accused of ambiguity. I should like, Mr. President, to pursue my friend Mr. de Niet's allegory of marriage. I advise all young women to complete their vocational training, since you never can tell what will eventually happen in a marriage. This, too, is how I should like to see Mr. Leynen's comments assessed. The whole report, Ladies and Gentlemen, is forward-looking, i.e. it considers what needs to be done in a European union in the defence field, within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Hence, it can be no more than a glimpse of what may be in the future, if I may put it that way. It does not deal primarily with the position as it is today.

This — and this will be my last comment — has a bearing on the question of nuclear forces,

*Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)*

too. Here I fully and firmly share the view put forward by the NATO Secretary-General, Mr. Luns. This is a matter in which practical achievement is in many respects still far removed from reality. However, as he said in conclusion, it is something we must be able to discuss.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

#### **14. Changes in the membership of Committees**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the changes in the membership of Committees.

During the adjournment the Presidential Committee provisionally appointed members of Committees to fill the seats that became vacant.

These provisional appointments were published as an appendix to Notice No. 8. They are submitted to the Assembly for ratification in accordance with Rule 8 (3) of the Rules of Procedure.

Are there any objections to the ratification of these provisional appointments ?...

The provisional appointments are ratified.

Furthermore, the Assembly must also vote on new proposals for changes presented by some delegations. These are likewise published in the appendix to Notice No. 8.

In addition, the Netherlands Delegation proposes the candidature of Mr. Scholten as a titular member of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges (vacant seat).

These new proposals are submitted to the Assembly in accordance with Rule 8 (3).

Are there any objections to the ratification of these proposals ?...

The proposed changes are agreed to.

#### **15. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Tuesday 2nd December, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 683).
2. Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance — consideration of current problems (Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 680 and Amendment).
3. Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975 (Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Document 692).
4. Address by Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.
5. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Document 687).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 6.05 p.m.)*

# NINTH SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd December 1975

## SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Change in the membership of a Committee.
4. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 683).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mrs. von Bothmer (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Vedovato, Mr. Mende, Mr. Bettiol.
5. Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance — consideration of current problems (*Vote on the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 680 and Amendment).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Van Hoeylandt, Mr. Leynen.
6. Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975 (*Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure*, Doc. 692).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Radius, Mr. Siegler-schmidt (*Chairman of the General Affairs Committee*).
7. Address by Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Moersch.  
*Replies by Mr. Moersch to questions put by*: Mr. Schwencke, Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Amrehn, Mr. Siegler-schmidt.
8. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee*, Doc. 683).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Müller, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Schwencke, Mr. Amrehn, Mr. Enders, Mr. Pumilia.
9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 19.

### 3. Change in the membership of a Committee

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The United Kingdom Delegation proposes the candidature of Mr. Hardy as a titular member of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments in place of Mr. Prescott.

Are there any objections ?...

The candidature is approved.

### 4. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 683)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of the report of the General Affairs Committee on the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, debate and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 683.

I call Mrs. von Bothmer, the Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this report on the conference on security and co-operation will of course be evaluated in different ways, as the discussions in Committee have shown. This is only to be expected, as the conference was approached right from the start with mistrust and misgiving by many Europeans, who consequently were unable to see the Final Act at Helsinki, either, in a positive light.

The majority of the Committee, however, are amongst those Europeans who remember the scarcely encouraging circumstances in which the conference was called and quite soberly consider as a success the mere fact that it took place at all. None of the world's dangerous situations can be brought closer to a satisfactory issue unless people are prepared to sit down together at the conference table. It is just when pacification is being sought, when a balanced distribution of forces is being aimed at, that we must talk if we are to reach compromises.

The report briefly indicates the political factors and the conditions that led to the conference. If we recall the conditions under which the conference on security and co-operation took place — the large number of participants, the differences between their individual approaches, their expectations and their aims ; if we consider that, from the outset, the conference was not intended to be some kind of peace negotiation that could have led to a binding treaty, but was on the contrary regarded as no more than an opportunity for arriving at a general compromise on which further developments could be based ; that it was to change nothing — whether frontiers or defence forces or existing treaties — and that it was to impose no commitments ; if it is realised that existing ideological tensions can in no way be removed by a conference, we can see why most members of the Committee see some measure of progress.

First of all, no participant had to give up any substantial interest. Secondly, agreement on a joint Final Act was made possible by the urgent desire to guarantee one another a certain measure of mutual security, and by the realisation that the future of all Europe depended on co-existence, on a certain amount of co-operation. This Final Act of the conference must be regarded as a prelude, for it sets standards that must now be adhered to, and lays down principles that must be developed.

The majority of the Committee felt able to associate itself with the Rapporteur's realistic view that this could constitute a positive spring-board for the future ; the result could well have been a complete fiasco, and a hardening of attitudes. But this is just what did not arise in the course of discussion. Within the Committee, the majority quite objectively regarded this as a positive point.

As we were told in the Committee, the Federal Republic had in the years prior to 1969 reached a dangerous state of isolation, which appeared to make it increasingly impossible for it to evolve an independent foreign policy. The incipient new relationship between the superpowers certainly provided a favourable situation in which to revive initiatives that had got bogged down. Chancellor Brandt introduced his *Ostpolitik*, and this in turn stimulated general efforts to establish a political balance in the world. For different reasons, both superpowers showed more flexibility. The desire for security agreements binding on all was becoming, as I have said, more and more evident.

Consequently preparations were begun in November 1972, in Helsinki, for the conference which lasted from September 1973 up to this summer. The Soviet leaders in particular wanted a speedy conclusion to the conference, as they obviously wanted results to put before their Party Congress in the winter of 1976.

On 1st August 1975, the definitive text of the conference was unanimously adopted. It must be remembered that it is not a treaty, and so not a peace treaty. It makes no binding changes and imposes no commitments, so that it can be said to be an extraordinary agreement. This point will be examined more fully before I close.

Chapter II of the report deals with the aims of those who took part in the conference. It goes without saying that virtually all countries came to the conference table with differing hopes and differing aims. There was some divergence of opinion even within the two blocs.

From the start, it was difficult to treat the special situation of the two States in Germany in the general context. This point, however, shows clearly the keenness with which all participants were searching for security guarantees, since a war in this area would mean the utter devastation of Europe if tactical nuclear weapons were used. In these weapons both sides possess a deterrent that in fact precludes any thought of war. Out of self-interest, both the Soviet Union and

*Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)*

the United States displayed a keen desire for reaching a balance.

It is probably correct to assume that the Soviet Union needs a *détente* in Europe so as to devote its attention to China. It must, further, have been anxious, within the general context of the conference, to make its dominant status less sharply felt by its own allies. One of the points involved is that the territorial changes following the second world war should no longer be called in question, in other words the *status quo* should be recognised in the text setting out the principle of the inviolability of frontiers.

The smaller countries of Eastern Europe, and the non-aligned States, hoped that easing of the tension between East and West would increase their own freedom of action and that by co-operating in multilateral institutions outside the bloc system they would in future be able to play a greater political rôle in Europe.

The United States was in fact only indirectly interested in the conference being held, as it is not itself immediately concerned. However, the development of bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and its own interest in *détente* in Europe and the Middle East induced it to participate more actively, particularly in consultations with its allies in Europe. This, of course, was mainly in connection with common defence problems within NATO.

It is significant that no far-reaching differences arose amongst the Western European countries. On the contrary, they displayed remarkable unity in their efforts to seize every opportunity to make progress and not to obstruct the integration of the European Community countries at economic, political and military level. Not infrequently, one of these countries would speak on behalf of them all. Anyone who stops to think of the babel otherwise usual in Europe will be able to appreciate this fact. It was, in any event, looked on as a positive step by most of the Committee — and quite rightly, in my opinion.

Chapter III contains a brief appraisal of the various baskets. In the first basket, agreement had to be laboriously reached on ten principles by which the peaceful development of mutual relations between States was to be established and put into practice. These are more or less moral considerations in accordance with which the individual governments must now feel they

are invited to act. They may well be compelled to do so through pressure from their own peoples.

It is of course already apparent that these principles are subject to differences of interpretation. This tendency is already apparent in the question of whether the principles and the Helsinki agreement are binding or not.

A further important element in the first basket is made up of so-called confidence-building measures relating to the field of defence. The mutual notification of manoeuvres is certainly not of such importance militarily as to have needed hard bargaining. From the political point of view, however, great importance was attached to it by the Western European countries.

Of greater importance, undoubtedly, is the declaration on the efforts to reduce military confrontation and to promote disarmament, as this is intended to increase political *détente* in Europe and strengthen its security.

I do not wish here to enter into all the details of the report, but must turn briefly to the treaty of friendship that has subsequently been concluded — at the end of October — between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic.

This treaty could well be a model for other bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and its East European allies which will evidently be concluded as a consequence of the conference on security and co-operation. It does, however, appear to contain a wilful interpretation which is not in the spirit of Helsinki as we understand it. In this treaty, the inviolability of frontiers by common accord is confirmed in a way that purposely omits their peaceful alteration in accordance with international law, as mentioned at Helsinki.

In connection with the different approaches to interpretation, it is perhaps worth pointing to the statement by President Giscard d'Estaing who, on his visit to the Soviet Union, described the ideological war as something that could be overcome.

The second basket is concerned with trade and economic co-operation. Negotiations in this connection were generally not so difficult, even though the Soviet request that the group of most favoured nations be expanded to include all participants had to be refused, as this would have undermined the European Community. It became evident that, particularly at the present

*Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)*

time of economic crisis, commercial exchanges can have a stabilising influence.

Very difficult, on the other hand, were the negotiations in the third basket, which were intended to provide humanitarian relief. The freedom of movement of individuals — including journalists — was under discussion. Different views were taken on the question of what was meant by peaceful coexistence. Here it became quite clear that the ideological tension between a free society and a communist society is not to be resolved.

In the fourth basket, finally, the conference discussed what was to happen after it closed. The western countries were very reluctant to establish a follow-up organisation, as they rightly feared that anything of this kind would interfere with the work of the Western European organisations that already existed. They also wished to avoid setting up a permanent, so-called consultative body that would be doomed never to arrive at any conclusive agreements. On a Danish proposal, a compromise was agreed. In two years' time a check is to be made as to what has become of the various agreements. As however it is already becoming clear how variously the agreements are being interpreted, I find it hard to believe that we will be able to manage without smaller *ad hoc* working parties which will review each particular agreement as to its scope, its applicability, and the way in which it is being implemented. The working parties will have to go through the text of the Final Act and see — from the technical angle and the political — what the situation then is. Otherwise, the conference that will be meeting in two years' time will hardly have at its disposal the means that would permit it to do useful work. It would certainly be possible in two years to distinguish the broad lines, but since the whole is made up of many important details, it seems that, if true coexistence in security is not to be jeopardised, a fairly close check in the course of these two years would perhaps not be unwise. A further argument in favour of this is the fact that all four baskets are to be considered as on a par with each other and that no detail of the agreement should become separated.

In view of the fact that the conference on security and co-operation in Europe has produced a large number of compromises into which some life must now be injected in order to maintain the balance, a careful follow-up is important.

Chapter IV, finally, lists conclusions to be drawn from the conference. It may be said that, through the Final Act of the conference, the industrialised countries of the northern hemisphere have jointly defined a code of international behaviour, and we must hope that the rules in it will be observed by all. But this must in no case be taken to mean that these countries have made some kind of pact to the detriment or exclusion of the countries of the southern hemisphere. On the contrary, the pact should result in a more open attitude towards the technical, political and economic problems of the third world, one which would see the desired co-operation as a kind of complementary activity. Moreover, there was a real need, so many years after the end of World War II, to arrive at mutual security agreements. These were as necessary for the countries of Western Europe as for those of Eastern Europe.

Reference must be made at this point to Berlin, which because of its special position must be brought into and kept within the general agreements with particular care. Military balance between the two camps must be the goal. The recognition of inviolable frontiers indeed involves, or shows to be a necessary consequence, full incorporation of the results of the negotiations on multilateral and balanced force reductions and the acceptance and observance by all sides of the non-proliferation treaty.

Dissolution of the two military blocs, about which the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Luns, spoke yesterday, apparently with reference to this report, is not of course intended, nor is it mentioned in the report. That would be decidedly premature.

Some guarantee that the agreements will be adhered to is afforded by the obvious desire of the Soviet Union to expand its commercial relations. This means that the Western European countries, too, must recognise the extent to which commercial exchanges with countries of the eastern bloc can contribute to their own stability. They offer both sides possibilities of development, and reciprocal guarantees are necessary. Europe has no alternative to peaceful coexistence, and this requires a certain measure of security.

Since it was, in fact, a shared desire for security that brought the conference together, it would be illogical to doubt the sincerity of this desire now that the conference has ended. Our first care need not perhaps be to see how far the other parties are, or may appear to be, in

*Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)*

breach of the agreements. It will be at least as important for each country to keep to the agreements, and a healthy measure of distrust should at least be compensated by an equal measure of goodwill. After all, the conference on security and co-operation has produced a minimum of agreements. The task now can only be to expand them as far as possible and to make use of the freedom of manoeuvre that they offer.

The Final Act calls on all participants in the conference, in view of all the difficulties, to seek out and accord one another as much by way of détente and security as is humanly possible. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you Mrs. von Bothmer.

In the debate, I call Mr. Vedovato.

Mr. VEDOVATO (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the draft recommendation in Document 683, which I approve, and Mrs. von Bothmer's admirable presentation, impel me to direct our attention once more to the significance of the conference which a few months ago gathered together at Helsinki Heads of State and of Government almost like the *parterre de rois* assembled at Erfurt under the auspices of Napoleon and Czar Alexander ; in 1805 it was the West that was trying to rule the roost by force ; today it is the East.

It is up to us in WEU to realise the true scope of that conference, and have the courage to assess its real importance in its consequences for the security of Europe and of the world.

For twenty years Soviet diplomacy had constantly favoured negotiation leading, by dint of an abuse of power by its military forces and its own peculiar political system, to recognition of the *status quo*. The West had always refused to admit such military and political subterfuge on the grounds that it denied not only precise agreements but fundamental human rights. At Yalta nobody had surrendered Eastern Europe to Russia and international communism. It was Stalin who betrayed, while the ink was still wet on it, the signature given at the palace of the Czars by imposing, in breach of the "declaration of the liberated peoples", minority régimes backed by Soviet divisions. Later on there followed the Prague coup, repression in Berlin,

Poland and Hungary and, lastly, armed invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Certainly it is idle now to wonder whether there was any necessity to concede to Russia *de jure* recognition of its absolute dominion east of the Elbe. But one flagrant error deserves to be denounced : the conferring of legitimacy upon systematic violence. Western diplomacy, no longer clinging to the traditions of authentic international co-operation, hopes, by giving way on the principles, to usher in an "era of negotiation" instead of confrontation. It is thought that Moscow can be induced to subscribe to a series of agreements calculated to "gulliverise" Russia by entangling it, in the name of a higher interest, in the risk inherent in expansion of power.

Nevertheless the western leaders have sought an immediate set-off by creating what was to be established as a proper test bed in the form of the third basket concerning the liberalisation of human relations. Well, this is where everything seems to fall apart, because the Soviets have at all levels loudly and intransigently proclaimed that nothing of what was signed at Helsinki implied renunciation of competitive coexistence, i.e. the objective of defeating capitalism and imposing the communist system anywhere and everywhere. Helsinki is rather another step forward in the march towards world supremacy, since on the one hand it renders the forward defences beyond the Elbe impregnable and on the other it softens up the enemy internally.

WEU needs to pose the problem of what is going on behind its own defence lines. The main western communist parties have since the Berlinguer-Marchais get-together become even more active than previously ; they follow a soft tactic that nonetheless abandons not one iota of the Kremlin's final strategic aims. Maybe in Portugal Moscow thought it could force the pace, but the "permanent state of conflict" introduced in Italy since autumn 1968 is not so very different from what has been going on inside Portugal. And infiltration of the police and armed forces is an aim common to all Western European countries. The resort to violence is always potentially, if not actually, present, and the net result is a cancellation of freedom.

WEU should view the problem of the consequences of Helsinki in terms of security. Moscow's intention is to turn the western defences from the inside. Détente and the Russian interpretation of Helsinki are a means of winning in each country acceptance of communism as a

*Mr. Vedovato (continued)*

legitimate partner and democratic interlocutor while still enabling it to engage in every activity to sap the foundations of freedom. Unfortunately, the communist party in the West is and remains the Trojan horse of Soviet Russian military power. Were it not so, it would no longer be communist. Wherever this process was allowed to reach the point of surreptitiously altering agreements and understandings by communists entering the government or else with the backing of some kind of coalition, NATO would, albeit accepted by the communists, automatically fall apart "by unwilling contradiction". WEU is bound to acknowledge the truth of this.

A communist action is now in hand, co-ordinated by clever diplomacy on the part of Moscow, to try and forge links between western economic interests and Soviet power. At the same time the undermining of the western democratic State is continued by bringing about the collapse of the economic system founded on private enterprise. Also capillary action is promoted in the pseudo-cultural field through the academic mass media.

The defences of NATO, indispensable to European security, are still intact, and we trust that nothing will be conceded in SALT to the overt Russian attempt to topple the existing nuclear balance. The link between Europe and America continues to be the cornerstone of our security and our freedom. But there is equally needed a detailed survey that will in the aftermath of Helsinki co-ordinate the defence of liberty, now even more shackled beyond the Elbe, but dangerously imperilled inside every country of Western Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Mende.

Mr. MENDE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, while fully appreciating the excellent and exhaustive recital of the facts, I did not find it possible in the General Affairs Committee to vote for the report and the recommendations. I believe that the hopes and expectations expressed in the report are already proving, in the eyes of many people, to be a delusion and a disappointment, particularly where the third basket of the Final Act at Helsinki is concerned. Let us remember that this was to produce greater freedom of movement for ideas, information and

persons. What is the real situation six months after the effective date of the Final Act?

First, the jamming of radio broadcasts from the West continues. There have been protests and attacks against transmission by, for example, the *Deutsche Welle*, by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in Munich, and there are undoubtedly similar moves against other items broadcast here in the West for listeners in the communist bloc. At the Geneva Wavelengths Conference we had bitter struggles by the communists to obtain the best possible frequencies and attempts to restrict transmitters.

Secondly, there is no question of an exchange of newspapers and information. It is nothing short of grotesque that in Spain, which is the target of much merited criticism, it is easier to obtain information and to buy more newspapers — including foreign ones — than in any country within the communist fold.

Thirdly, there are no signs at all of a liberal approach being adopted to travelling abroad; the case of the Nobel prizewinner, Sakharov, is only one of several outstanding instances.

Fourthly, bureaucratic complications still hamper families wishing to be united. Recently a link has even been introduced between exit visas and cash payments. After Helsinki, it is certainly no cause for praise that some thousand million is having to be paid for 120,000 to 125,000 Germans to leave the People's Republic of Poland.

Fifthly, while it is universally accepted — I have Amnesty International in mind — that an amnesty includes political prisoners, large sums are being paid for political prisoners in a new kind of slave-trading. There was a time in the sixties when it was necessary to pay cash sums for the release of political prisoners; I myself argued for that ten years ago. After the Basic Treaty, however, after the accession, for example, of communist East Germany to the United Nations, and after Helsinki, slave-trading of this kind, paying 100 million German Marks for 2,000 prisoners, is simply macabre.

Sixthly, and here I should like the representative of the French Communist Party, Mr. Cermolacce, who will in fact be one of the first speakers to follow me, to listen. We have always had barriers along the internal borders of Germany, but these barriers remain despite the Basic Treaty, which as we know is intended to create "good-neighbourly relations" between the

*Mr. Mende (continued)*

two German States, and despite Helsinki. With nearly a million mines laid, we in Germany in the middle of peacetime have the largest mine-field in history. We have nearly 1,000 kilometres of wire-mesh fencing with automatic killing devices, which must be regarded as a crime against humanity and an infringement of the United Nations Charter of Human Rights. I would like to ask Mr. Cermolacce what he would say if Spain had erected such a brutally inhuman killing ground along the border with France. This death zone through the middle of Germany is, must be, an affront to the free world and is all the worse after Helsinki.

As a member of the German Parliament it is in fact my duty to represent the area along the border between Hesse and Thuringia, where the Upper Meissen, the Werra and the Fulda are the limits to the west, and Eisenach and Weimar, the city of Goethe, the limits on the other side of this death zone. For those who live on the other side it is simply inconceivable how the western world can remain silent on this death strip and on these killing devices but is prepared at the same time to hail Helsinki as some kind of dawn of détente.

I am glad that the report includes the statement by Georgi Arbatov, and we cannot over-emphasise that this is the official opinion of the Soviet Government. With the President's permission, I should like to repeat the passage :

"The Soviet Union and the socialist countries, in recommending the principles adopted in Helsinki, have not undertaken to maintain the *status quo* throughout the world nor to halt the process of class struggles and national liberation stemming from the objective laws of historical development."

Well, the campaigns of liberation in South Vietnam, in Laos and Cambodia, and what is happening in Angola under the slogan of liberation are surely horrifying examples of what is meant in this context by national liberation and class struggle in the pursuit of communism throughout the world.

The French President, Giscard d'Estaing, recently obtained proof from Brezhnev of how the communist camp intends to interpret détente including that at an ideological level, and the Federal German President, who was also in Moscow, was unable, on the Berlin question, to extract any assurance, in whatever form of words,

as to the continued existence of the western part of that city.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this is why I share the fear of many in the West that Helsinki in 1975 may one day rank in history with Munich in 1938 — only the timescale and the dimensions being different. After Munich, too, we were soothed, believing that it meant peace in our time. Today, we in the free world are already tending to doze off and, even in our community, defence efforts are being neglected. We should therefore pay some attention to these concerns as well, and not only to the hopes and expectations which, I would repeat, have already, scarcely six months after Helsinki, proved to be a delusion and a disappointment. (*Scattered applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Bettiol.

Mr. BETTIOL (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, our distinguished Rapporteur's report is unquestionably moderate, responsible and fair-minded ; both in form and in substance it attains the highest standard set by the best of the reports presented here. It is still my duty, however, to express some doubts and I have some substantive comments on the actual content of the report, the letter of which is acceptable but the spirit, in the historical situation in which we find ourselves, is not.

My distinguished colleague Mr. Vedovato was already saying a few moments ago that, during and since the said conference, Russia — the Soviet Empire — has tried to whittle away, from within, every structure and infrastructure, destroying the will to resist of our economic and political systems, and sought to impose its own will. For the time being there will, in my opinion, be no total head-on clash. The United States is short of oil and Russia short of grain. Russia's economic situation is catastrophic ; America is tugged in several directions at once. Yesterday it looked to Berlin and then to the Middle East, then it looked to Moscow and today to Peking ; and fails to notice that the Russians are now sitting in Uganda with missiles capable of striking Brasilia, São Paulo, Buenos Aires, and now another spot on the globe that was thought to be safe is insecure.

The problem of our systems' internal security is really serious. We should not, however, suppose the situation to have improved since the conference, but to have worsened. And in fact the

*Mr. Bettiol (continued)*

security conference has through all its vicissitudes since it was first announced at Budapest in 1969 and throughout the various phases at Geneva and Helsinki, always been an attempt on the Soviet side to rob the West of its will to resist and try and drive a wedge between Europe and America, the Europe-America axis being from the military standpoint a bulwark difficult to overcome. Separating the United States and Europe means leaving the latter at the mercy of the eastern bloc's military and political forces; indeed we found ourselves attending a conference at which the United States did not play a leading rôle, was not a dominating power, but almost passively knuckled under to other countries' initiatives, especially those of the East. It was done in such a way that on the international plane no other possibility was thinkable than that conference to restore order where it had itself sown fresh seeds of misgiving and disorder.

In saying that frontiers are not contiguous we may think we are speaking out for peace, but in fact we are shoring up a makeshift system, not guaranteed by any peace treaty, that divides Europe into two, divides Germany into two against all natural right to unity, and turns Berlin, from one of the world's big capitals, into a village lost in the back of beyond. Who still talks about Berlin as a focal point in the world situation, a centre of gravity of global political problems? Few, alas, or none.

This is another fruit of the security conference, which seeks at all costs to maintain the *status quo* in relations between East and West. The Russians wanted to prove how powerful their empire is as far as the political direction of their satellite States is concerned. Undoubtedly the treaty between East Germany and Russia, to which the Rapporteur has alluded, demonstrates how Russians now treat, and will do so again tomorrow, their satellites as having been colonised, having no political will of their own and no autonomous centre of political decision-making.

Certainly, it is in such a situation difficult to talk about security. More than difficult, I should say: the issue of security does not correspond to any new reality created by the conference, which corroborated the Soviet will for supremacy not only in Europe, but sought to give them a propaganda weapon and to give Brezhnev a position of personal prestige in the Plenum of his party at a time when, as is still the case, it was genuinely threatened.

In these conditions, it is very hard to approve a report which, however distinguished and high-minded, brings grist to the mill of the policy of peaceful coexistence in the framework of a security which is not what it purports to be. Especially so, if we take a look at what has been and is the Russian attitude towards the obligations of the third basket in respect of humanitarian problems. These very days we read how much psychological and political resistance inside Russia by eminent people like Sakharov, Sakharova, Solzhenitsyn (rather shabbily treated in the report) has to tell us about the treatment reserved in that country for so-called opponents of the régime. We need only think of anti-Zionism, which is tantamount to anti-Israel racial policy, that ought to be denounced. We here are under obligation to denounce such infringements of the third basket, because it started and continued a prolonged discussion on the subject; and Russia had professed itself ready to accept all the implications and obligations of the third basket, but as we say in Naples and Southern Italy: "*Passata la festa, gabbato lo santo*" (when you've got what you want, promises go by the board).

We are in the same psychological climate as we were before. But what I like least about this conference is its implications for the future. I mean, Russia would like to institutionalise the conference findings by setting up a number of committees and bilateral (East-West) bodies with a view to periodically monitoring the implementation of the rules of the three or four baskets, so as to use this as a feint to get past our policy guard and create an atmosphere favourable to a fresh step forward. In fact there has never been any contact with the eastern bloc that did not cause a step backward by the West, in the sense that every East-West conference has resulted in the West running away backwards. We have always lost our battles, and the Russians have always scored a point.

This is why, faced by the situation created by the Helsinki conference, while I do not envisage a direct confrontation as the Chinese do — I read in today's *Figaro* that at the meeting between Ford and the Chinese, the No. 3 of Chinese policy said at the final banquet that nowadays the country that preaches détente with greatest fervour is the most dangerous warmonger — while I do not come to the same conclusion, the dicta of Chinese wisdom have throughout history always had a kernel of truth. I therefore say straight away that I shall abstain from voting on the draft report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Before calling the speakers whose names are on the list in this debate, I shall ask the Assembly to vote on the amendment and on the draft recommendation presented by the General Affairs Committee in Document 680. We shall then go on to consider the request for urgent procedure in respect of the motion for a recommendation tabled by Mr. Radius. Afterwards, we shall listen with pleasure to the address by Mr. Moersch, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, on Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance.

**5. Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance — consideration of current problems**

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 680 and Amendment)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the vote on the amendment and then on the draft recommendation as a whole presented by the General Affairs Committee in its report on Western Europe and the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance, Document 680 and Amendment. I would remind you that the debate was closed at the end of yesterday afternoon's sitting.

An amendment to the draft recommendation has been tabled by Mr. Van Hoeylandt on behalf of the Socialist Group. I will read it out :

At the end of paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, add the words : "but excluding nuclear forces".

I call Mr. Van Hoeylandt.

Mr. Van HOEYLANDT (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, a majority of the Socialist Group has decided to put forward an amendment to paragraph 4 of the recommendation in Mr. Leynen's report. Paragraph 4 runs as follows :

"Consider forthwith how to make truly European bodies responsible for preparing a defence policy to be implemented by the forces of the member States ;"

Our amendment seeks to add to this the words : "but excluding nuclear forces".

What reasons lie behind this amendment ? My colleagues and I are convinced that raising a united Europe to the rank of a nuclear power

would fundamentally upset the equilibrium that exists between the present nuclear powers and the political will, as it appears in Mr. Leynen's report, not to destroy this balance. The result would be a fresh escalation of nuclear armaments. Such a policy would beyond any doubt seriously disturb world peace, and bring a real danger of nuclear war. The report leaves no doubt that in the Rapporteur's mind the unification of Europe must at once, or certainly in the final stage, raise the united States of Europe to the status of a nuclear power. Paragraph 37 of the report leaves not the slightest doubt of this ; I quote :

"A political confederation which included these two countries and which inherited French and British nuclear weapons would automatically become a nuclear power."

The intention is thus indeed to make united Europe a nuclear power which — I repeat — would fundamentally upset the equilibrium among the nuclear powers.

Such an attitude is certainly at variance with the spirit and the policy pursued at the present time not only in WEU, but also in the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and other European institutions.

If, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are really trying to bring about unity in Europe, then we should, I feel, undertake nothing that is going, from the very outset, to divide Europe. Yesterday the NATO Secretary-General, Mr. Luns, confirmed that Europe is already divided on the question of a nuclear force. Mr. Luns said that opinions were divided not only among the peoples of Europe but even among the governments on the matter of a European nuclear force. It is not only what Mr. Luns has told us, and the policy being followed today for achieving a united Europe, that emphasise the danger of a nuclear force that could jeopardise European unity ; I would even argue that the text of Mr. Leynen's report is in conflict with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 1st July 1968. I appreciate that this treaty related only to passive nuclear energy, and not the active energy of nuclear weapons : I would underline, however, that the text of this treaty, approved by the United Kingdom, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy

*Mr. Van Hoeylandt (continued)*

Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency, contains in its preamble the following words :

“Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 1st July 1968. Agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency, in application of paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article III of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear arms, signed at Brussels on 5th April 1973.

Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

In conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,”

I believe, therefore, that on this point the intention of Mr. Leynen's report clashes head-on with what is said in this treaty ; and so I ask this Assembly to vote in favour of my amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — What is the Committee's opinion ?

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I cannot of course be spokesman for the Committee's feelings, because while the Committee did discuss this specific point it did not offer any opinion. But as Rapporteur I must ask the Assembly to reject Mr. Van Hoeylandt's amendment. To save time, I would refer members to my speech yesterday, in particular the answer I gave then to the two Dutch speakers Mr. Voogd and Mr. de Niet. In a few words, my answer was that : firstly, an empty-handed Europe would be more likely to attract danger, and secondly, a Europe that is a member of the nuclear club and that, as we know, is peacefully

inclined, will be able to exert a greater influence on the limiting of nuclear weaponry.

These were the two arguments I offered yesterday, Mr. President. I feel that Mr. Van Hoeylandt's amendment is in fact unrealistic, and I would ask the Assembly not to adopt it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anyone else wish to speak ?...

I put the amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The amendment is not adopted.*

The Assembly now has to vote on the draft recommendation.

Rule 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation contained in Document 680 ?...

There are objections.

The vote will therefore be by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Vohrer.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows <sup>1</sup> :

Number of votes cast . . . .	62
Ayes . . . . .	37
Noes . . . . .	15
Abstentions . . . . .	10

*The draft recommendation is adopted* <sup>2</sup>.

1. See page 20.

2. See page 21.

**6. Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975**

*(Motion for a Recommendation with a request for urgent procedure, Doc. 692)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the decision on the request for urgent procedure in respect of the motion for a recommendation tabled by Mr. Radius and others on the resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975, Document 692.

I would remind you that in accordance with Rule 43 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the debate on the request for urgent procedure cannot enter into the substance of the question. Only one speaker for the request, one speaker against and the Chairman of the Committee concerned and a Representative of the Bureau are entitled to be heard.

I call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — It is owing to recent events in the Middle East that my colleagues and I have been led to table the present motion for a recommendation.

Despite the apparent stabilisation of the situation in the region and a few successes scored by Dr. Kissinger with his policy of small steps towards peace and despite the recent conclusion of a disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel, the Middle East remains an area where war may flare up. It seems essential that our Assembly — in view of the deadlock existing in the negotiations between Syria and Israel, after the breakdown in the fragile balance upon which civil harmony rested in Lebanon, after the absurd vote at the United Nations which can only encourage the extremists in the Arab and Israeli camps — should as a matter of urgency make known its viewpoint on such aid as Europe might be able to extend to peoples with whom we are united by manifold economic and cultural bonds and who, after so many years of warfare and tension, are longing for a just and lasting peace.

By including here and now the question of the Middle East in the agenda for our debates, we shall be bearing witness both to the concern felt by Europe in a peaceful solution of the problems affecting the Eastern Mediterranean, and also to the ability of our Assembly to pro-

pose to the European governments joint steps which are essential to the preservation of our security.

If we are asking for urgent procedure, it is because the problems of the Eastern Mediterranean vitally affect European security, and because the representatives of the peoples of Europe are in duty bound to discuss them.

The bulk of our oil supplies comes from the Middle East. Our trade with the countries of this region is constantly expanding. The European Economic Community has already concluded or is endeavouring to conclude a series of agreements with these countries. Any aggravation of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean, which might culminate in war, could drag Europe towards economic catastrophe. This is undoubtedly a very real menace to our security.

Furthermore, the Middle East is an area which, from the mere fact of its geographical position, is of considerable importance for our continent from the strategic point of view. We cannot therefore stand idly by and watch the situation in this region deteriorate. It is urgent for our governments to act in concert in order to ward off the threats which hang over peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, and so over the security of our continent. Our Assembly has a duty, in the prevailing circumstances, to reaffirm the need for an active European presence in the Middle East. It must make proposals to the European governments for the co-ordination of their efforts, with a view to finding a just and lasting solution to the problems of the region.

It was to that end that my colleagues and I decided to table a motion for an urgent debate on the problems of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I have noted with interest the motion that my friends have tabled. I wonder, however, whether it would be wise for the Assembly to begin a debate on it straight away. While I am in complete agreement with the basic intention of the recommendation, there are nevertheless one or two things that could perhaps be better or more clearly expressed or that some members of the Assembly may want to formulate differently.

*Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)*

In short, Mr. President, I feel it might be preferable if, before the Assembly votes on it, an opportunity were found for the General Affairs Committee to give some further thought to the text and agree on a text to be submitted to the Assembly provided of course the proposers agree.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Sieglerschmidt, if the Assembly decided to adopt urgent procedure, a reference to the General Affairs Committee would be necessary *de jure*, and you would in fact have an opportunity to discuss this question.

I would ask the Assembly to vote, by sitting and standing, on the adoption of urgent procedure.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

Urgent procedure is agreed to.

If the Assembly is agreed on referring the motion for a recommendation to the General Affairs Committee, I propose that the debate on the substance of the oral or written report of the Committee should be held at the sitting on Thursday, 4th December, at 5 p.m.

Are there any objections to referring the motion for a recommendation to the General Affairs Committee?...

The reference to Committee is agreed to.

Are there any objections to fixing the date for the debate on the substance of the motion for Thursday, 4th December, at 5 p.m. ?...

It is so decided.

**7. Address by Mr. Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the address by Mr. Karl Moersch, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

I would ask you, Mr. Moersch, kindly to come to the rostrum.

I have the honour, Mr. Minister, of bidding you welcome to this platform. I would recall that you have often spoken in this Assembly and for that I am acting as the Assembly's spokesman

in expressing our thanks to you. Although we always listen to your speeches and to the remarks you make with the keenest interest, that is attributable not only to your own personality but also to the important place which the Federal Republic of Germany fills in our thoughts and in our activities.

Mr. Minister, I invite you to address us.

Mr. MOERSCH (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am glad to have this opportunity of putting some thoughts to the Assembly on the topics that you are discussing here, having already had the benefit of our valuable debate at your anniversary meeting in Bonn last May.

Since that time we have seen some important and, I believe, decisive developments in European and world politics. The positive outcome of the British referendum on EEC membership has certainly relieved the European Community of a burden, of an uncertainty that had weighed appreciably on it during the preceding months and impeded its progress.

You have already discussed the ending, for the time being, of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe after two years of intensive negotiations in Helsinki and Geneva. With the adoption of the Final Act on 1st August last, this has provided both East and West with a basic document which will enable us, while continuing our search for a responsible policy of détente coupled, I would feel, with a constant analysis of developments, to gain a better insight than before into the real degree of détente achieved and to adjust our policies accordingly.

The seventh special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations — which must also be mentioned in this context — succeeded in avoiding the threatened clash between the various stands taken by the participants. And it managed to improve understanding of the interdependence and common interests that link the industrialised nations and the third world.

Then in Rambouillet the Heads of State or Government of leading industrialised nations and democracies have agreed on broad lines of policy that may very well point the way out of the world's worst economic crisis for many a year.

While we are meeting here today in Paris, in Rome the Heads of State or Government and

*Mr. Moersch (continued)*

Foreign Ministers of the nine EEC countries are discussing in the European Council the economic and political conclusions that the Community must draw from the present situation.

Finally, there is the conference between the producers of raw materials and the industrialised countries which, although at first a matter of discussion, is to be held before this year is out. Its aim will be to correct cleavages between the States which might lead to explosions and to open up constructive opportunities for future co-operation.

In this connection, I should like to read out a section from the speech by the West German Foreign Minister, Mr. Genscher, to the United Nations General Assembly this year. The German Foreign Minister said, I quote :

"In an interdependent world the inevitable outcome of confrontation and selfish unilateral action is that in the end *all* will be the losers... Therefore, today and in the future, co-operation must be the basis of human coexistence.

The most helpful aspect of the current situation is that, unlike in 1930, governments are aware of these implications. This has been amply proved by the unbroken succession of international discussions and conferences on economic affairs over the past two years. Economics have moved to the forefront of international diplomacy. The reconciliation of conflicting economic interests has become the test of statesmanship in foreign affairs."

I should like to add that this world-wide concern for responsible, globally-effective economic growth is — particularly from the European point of view — based on recognition of the great extent to which our security and the existence of our free democratic society depend on our success in getting a grip once more on the factors that affect the economic set-up and in keeping them under control in our day-to-day work.

After this look at the general situation in which our political decisions are to be carried out and into which the Second Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the WEU Assembly is fitted, I should like to make a few comments on the topics to be dealt with by the Assembly, as seen through German eyes. You will know the great importance the Federal Government attaches to the work of this Assem-

bly. In the present situation, it considers the WEU Assembly as irreplaceable, since it is the sole body of parliamentarians in Europe that is competent in defence matters. The Federal Government is also conscious of the important rôle that the parliamentarians here in this Assembly play in swinging opinion in their national parliaments behind a policy of ensuring a strong defence, which is a prerequisite for security and détente. This rôle is supported and reinforced by the well-informed reports and discussions of your members, for whom these half-yearly meetings constitute a forum of prime importance.

It is, furthermore, specially to the credit of this Assembly that it keeps on reminding the governments in the various countries of the requirements of the Atlantic Alliance and of the commitments involved, which there can be no question of ignoring or setting aside, however tight the budget may be stretched. We must assume that in the future, too, this will still be one of the major tasks of this Assembly. The Federal Government further expects that this Assembly will continue its efforts in support of security policy in general and of co-operation in the field of armaments ; it is sure that this Assembly will continue to shoulder the responsibility for keeping the public awake to the absolute need for security and the defence effort.

With regard to Resolution 55 adopted by the WEU Assembly's Presidential Committee, I would stress that the Federal Government is conscious of the great importance of world-wide security problems for the situation in Europe and for relative strategic strengths and the strategic equilibrium. The Federal Government knows that even the European union which is coming into being is faced with the problems of security and defence in their relation to general policy, and that in this matter it cannot renounce any element of European security of which the modified Brussels Treaty is one.

At a time of world economic crisis and of growing doubts about the traditional ideas of progress inherited from the last century, the maintenance of security in our free society has become a psychological problem. It is widely but wrongly held that social dissatisfaction and the symptoms of economic crisis can be cured by freeing or even scrapping items in our defence expenditure. I should like to sound a warning against this misconception, even if I cannot help feeling sympathy for the idealistic principles on which it is based. I would be less than a liberal

*Mr. Moersch (continued)*

if I did not regard the thousands of millions now devoted to military expenditure as a painful sacrifice, and if I did not share the yearning for a more ideal situation, one in which our external security would be anchored in a crisis-proof international system with binding mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of differences and in which a high proportion of defence expenditure could be used for the elimination of need and want throughout the world — a move which could also, no doubt, contribute appreciably to our security.

These ideal objectives should continue to be our lodestar, but our policies must be in time with the harsh realities. Foremost among these is the need for a balanced level of forces throughout the world, and especially, in Europe, that between East and West. The balance particularly needed on our small continent is guaranteed us by the Atlantic Alliance with, as its cornerstone, the political and military commitment of the United States. That the possibility of armed conflict in Europe has now receded into the far distance is surely the most lasting achievement of this Alliance.

The need for the continued existence of an efficient and operational Atlantic Alliance will continue to be a constant in the system of co-ordinates of western security. Anything else would be a delusion. This applies equally to the assumption that a politically-united Europe with a common defence policy would form a new, independent "third force" that could see to its own security. I believe that we need only take a quick glance at the arsenal of the two superpowers to be put right on that score.

This cannot and must not mean, however, that we should cease our efforts to arrive at closer European co-operation in the field of security and defence. It simply means that European defence can only be conceived as the European pillar within the Alliance. This, too, may not seem very real today, but a politically-united Europe, of the kind we are trying to build in the European Community, will not in the end be able to ignore security and defence. A host of individual problems and material difficulties already exists — and here I need think only of the questions of equipment and standardisation, which have also been and are still being dealt with by the Assembly; they make pragmatic collaboration between the Western Europeans unavoidably and urgently necessary. In this area the WEU Assem-

bly should continue, as in the past, to play its part by being an insistent warning voice.

The maintenance of a balanced level of forces between the alliances of East and West depends not only on the United States commitment, but also on the Europeans' own will to defend themselves. Let us not deceive ourselves — in the long run, no country can successfully help to defend another country that has lost the will to stand up for itself. For this reason, then, it would be a serious mistake if cuts were looked for in defence expenditure in order to make things easier in the economic and social fields. We Europeans must not make the mistake, in a fit of introverted narcissism, of relaxing our defence efforts by pointing to all manner of objective yardsticks such as proportion of GNP, per capita expenditure, etc. We must, I am sorry to say, adjust ourselves to whatever is required for the maintenance of the existing balance of forces. The Federal Republic of Germany, as the most exposed of the member States of Western European Union and of NATO, has here to adopt the rôle of Cassandra more often than it cares to do.

In this context we note with a certain regret that, despite the natural restraint and at times even contrary tendency on the part of the western allies, the Warsaw Pact countries are still stepping up their defence efforts year after year. We regret this, since any increase of this kind in arms potential by the Warsaw Pact must be considered, at a time when the motto is a policy of détente aimed at increasing mutual trust, as politically serious, militarily unnecessary, and economically hardly sensible. It must be discussed as part of the East-West dialogue, and this we are doing. Upsetting the balance in Europe would, after all, really be in nobody's interest. One reason why we regret the increase of armaments in the East is that it forces us to keep pace with it.

Balance, on which we must rely in the absence of anything better, is intended by us — contrary to one current formula — to be anything but a balance of terror. It is, rather, the basis on which détente was begun and can be further developed; it is by building on it that we would like to give substance to our hopes for a future, more peaceful world free from risk.

The same applies to the related military concept of deterrence, which is so often attacked, particularly in the mass media of the Warsaw Pact. For what we are doing is not meant to

*Mr. Moersch (continued)*

threaten, to intimidate or to spread fear in the world, but merely to maintain the credibility on the basis of which negotiations can be conducted between the blocs on an equal footing, negotiations on which stability, co-operation and the growth of mutual trust may be founded. Agreed, the French word *dissuasion* rings better than the German word *Abschreckung* (literally : frightening off) ; but I think the governments of the Warsaw Pact are sufficiently well informed to interpret the German term *Abschreckung* correctly if they really want to.

It is our duty therefore to keep the Alliance in good heart politically, militarily and psychologically. To this, the parliamentarians of the WEU Assembly can make an essential contribution. Though it has become almost fashionable to talk about alleged signs of crisis in the Alliance, I should on the contrary like to confirm that the hard core of the Alliance — the relationship between Western Europe and America — is intact and its hallmarks are solidarity and trust. We must make a constant effort to ensure that this remains so, for the Alliance is indeed confronted, particularly on its southern flank, with a range of problems which, if they were to persist, could become a real drag on the Alliance, and even weaken it.

True, it is largely beyond our countries' powers to influence the developments on our southern flank, but it is my opinion that the peoples of Western Europe, if they follow a policy of solidarity amongst allies, will nonetheless be able to help stabilise the situation, wherever they are called upon to help and thus in this area as well. This applies primarily to the long drawn-out process of internal political maturation in Portugal, which, we have reason to hope, will eventually result in a resurgent Portugal that will be a staunch member of the Alliance, a country in which internal stability will be guaranteed by the concord between popular will and government ; but at the present time an ally for whom we feel special concern because of the perils threatening its chances of recovery and their unhappy effects on the population.

The same is true of the political or economic aid that might be given by Western Europe that could lead to a rapprochement between the partners concerned in the Cyprus conflict. The allies' policy towards Greece and Turkey must be based on recognition of the idea that both

countries are indispensable to the defence of the southern flank. This is easy enough to say in words, but the situation is in fact very difficult, so I hope that American-Turkish relations will also improve further and that in the current negotiations on Greece's position in NATO the eventual outcome will, despite everything, be one that safeguards the essential interests of the Alliance.

It is still too early to assess Spain's future rôle in the Western European community of nations. Economic conditions in that country are in fact more favourable than those in its western neighbour, Portugal. It seems to us that there are definite possibilities for a cautious policy of reform aiming at gradual democratisation. The strategic importance of Spain in protecting the European flank is obvious. Much will depend on member States of the Alliance finding the right tone and the right approach in dealings with a resurgent Spain, if the attempt is now made — and, after all, a Spanish representative has hinted at this recently — to bring that country closer to us and if we are to help it secure its future in line with the basic principles of the West.

Despite all the disadvantages of economic pressures on the defence budget, there is one advantage — they compel a more intensive effort at co-operation on armaments at both intra-European and transatlantic level. Here the Federal Republic of Germany, quite logically, gives priority to intra-European co-operation. Only if this works, if Europe can produce useable weapons at economic prices, can the dialogue with the United States really acquire meaning, since without our own production potential we cannot be a true partner.

WEU's Standing Armaments Committee plays a useful part in the field of intra-European armaments co-operation. Co-operation on armaments is, however, being discussed in more than one body. We have never made a secret of it — and I last mentioned this in May at your anniversary meeting in Bonn — that within Europe we attach special importance to Eurogroup for such co-operation. I would stress, however, that this is not an article of faith. We are open to new organisational forms for European co-operation on armaments, particularly if this facilitates effective co-operation with France. The most cogent proof here is the special conference of Eurogroup in The Hague at the beginning of November where it was suggested that an independent working party, i.e. independent

*Mr. Moersch (continued)*

of Eurogroup — be set up, open to all European States in the Alliance, to study the opportunities for European co-operation in the procurement of armaments and to prepare the ground for dialogue with the United States. The Federal Government hopes that the deliberations of this working party will lead to European armaments co-operation being placed in the hands of an effective body acceptable to all European members of the Alliance.

All I would say at the present time concerning transatlantic co-operation on armaments is this — as a basic rule the projects brought into the two-way traffic should be joint European ones. If each country tried to put forward its own projects, nothing would be gained. Moreover traffic on this two-way street must abide by the rules of fair competition. It should be axiomatic that the best and most economic project should win the contract. We must however make sure in such cases that Europe's really important technological potential in the armaments field remains intact. European preferences may therefore be justified in exceptional cases — but exceptional cases they must remain. The whole concept of rationalisation and standardisation would otherwise be at risk, notably in relation to cost-effectiveness, if we were to lay down specific priorities without regard to economic considerations.

Another basic condition for a policy of détente in Europe is — as I have already pointed out today — military and political equilibrium. The conference on security and co-operation in Europe is part of the attempt to break away from the sterile era of confrontation in Europe and to move into a new era of co-operation. The principal aim of the States participating in the conference was to endow the concept of détente with solid content. This attempt was all the more important in that the concept of détente is itself equivocal and is frequently misused by the East to achieve unilateral furtherance of its foreign policy aims. The sequence of events, starting back in the 1950s, that led to this conference coming about shows, however, how far it has been possible to change the substance of policy as the result of the reactions and initiatives of the West.

This policy could not be expected to surmount the power-political, social and ideological differences that exist between East and West, as many optimists believed. Such an endeavour

would have been unrealistic and doomed to failure. The aim was rather to agree on the definition and extension — in full awareness of the differences that existed — of the principles on which co-operation was based in all areas, including those of security, the economy, and humanitarian and other questions.

When we look at the outcome of the security conference, we can see today that we have succeeded in our attempt to a far greater degree than many sceptics had expected or, perhaps, even wanted when the conference began. A number of circumstances have contributed to this. First and foremost I would cite the western partners' solidarity and cohesion within the framework of European political co-operation and of NATO. This cohesion and co-ordination of policy was not relaxed during the multilateral negotiations at the conference, as had often been feared; on the contrary, they were strengthened by the actual attitudes adopted and aims pursued at the negotiations. To this must be added the positive rôle of WEU; its various organs followed the security conference negotiations attentively and, by means of resolutions, supported the stands taken by the West.

Not least significant is the fact that the non-aligned, the neutral countries, and the countries of the Western Alliance were conscious during the negotiations that, at least in many areas — confidence-building in the military sector, economic co-operation, and humanitarian questions — they were defending the same ideals and fighting the same causes, whether they were members of an alliance or not. To have helped towards strengthening this awareness is, quite apart from the actual results achieved at the conference, an important side-effect whose contribution to progress in Europe has still been too little recognised — as, I might add, every meeting of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in recent years has clearly shown.

Implementing the resolutions of the CSCE will — and we must be clear about this — present us with problems no less great, and perhaps even greater, than those encountered in formulating and negotiating the conference texts themselves. Now the real work begins, the difficult work of getting down to detail, and this will be a long and wearisome process.

We know that in this work we cannot expect sensational improvements overnight, as the critics would sometimes like, and by the absence of

*Mr. Moersch (continued)*

which they seek to judge us. Yet, every small step in the direction laid down in the Final Act leads away from the present confrontation and towards increased co-operation. We can only hope that at the same time the East, too, is realising more fully that this course is in no way detrimental to the security of the East as a whole. For the outcome of the security conference is not intended to freeze the existing situation, but to put relations between peoples and persons in Europe on a more fruitful and secure footing.

The outcome of the security conference cannot, and will not, delude us into thinking that it has changed the fundamentals of our security. On the contrary, the balance of power and, consequently, the NATO Alliance are prerequisites for the further progress of détente. For us Europeans it is important that the Final Act of the conference has not put up any barriers to the further progress of European integration. And, I would add, the conference has changed neither the pattern of power in the world nor — and this is important — the way in which the balance of power is distributed in Europe. It has given the States of Europe a chance — a chance, and nothing more at the moment — of greater security, of a greater degree of confidence and contact, and of closer co-operation. At the same time it does not rule out the possibility of people clinging to entrenched political positions fraught with the germs of conflict. This, too, in my opinion, must belong in a realistic appraisal of the outcome. It provides the framework for a policy that we must elaborate in each individual case. One benefit from this conference, anyhow, has been the fact that all sides were forced to make a thorough analysis of the situation and, perhaps, to give up many prejudices which had been firmly held in the past.

We all of us know that the CSCE resolutions, which are oriented to the future, are still far removed from present realities of the situation in Europe. As I have said, a start has been made — nothing more, but also nothing less. The outcome opens a way in which conflicts of interests may be reduced and common interests may be discovered and utilised. Yardsticks have been created for the continued process of détente, against which all those participating at the conference must eventually let themselves be measured. Precisely because of this, we see the conclusion of the security conference agreements as an important milestone in the process of inter-

national détente. Precisely because of this, it is vital to us that the Western European democracies and their two North American allies impose respect for their common convictions, as they have done in the very recent past.

It is a by no means negligible success of this conference that — although the fact was not stated openly — the United States and Canada are considered even by the Eastern European participants to be, in the context of European security, a factor with equal rights and of equal weight — a fact which the eastern countries had tried for twenty long years to argue right out of this world but which in our opinion could not be argued away.

With all this, Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, we must not give up parliamentary debate in this Assembly, which is particularly well acquainted with the relationship between military equilibrium and political détente. I am most grateful to this Assembly for having devoted time to this great theme. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Sir, for your excellent speech. The applause which greeted your conclusions bears witness to the interest with which the Assembly has once again listened to you.

You have indicated your willingness to reply to any questions put by members.

I call Mr. Schwencke.

Mr. SCHWENCKE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to put a question to the Minister of State on a point that he touched on at the start, a question to which this Assembly will undoubtedly want to have a precise answer.

Our thanks are due to the Minister for touching, in the great scenario of world politics that he has given us, on the problem of the impending raw materials conference. I would like to know what he, what the Germans expect from having a joint spokesman for the nine Community States at this conference.

As we know, while we are having our discussions here today, the concrete preparations for this conference are going ahead, and there are two points that would certainly interest us all. First, what are the chances of Britain fitting in with the general run of interests of the other eight States; and secondly, could the Minister

*Mr. Schwencke (continued)*

give us some indication of why the Federal Government, as representative of one of the participating Community States, is so interested in Britain being jointly represented at this conference by the Nine ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does the Minister wish to reply to each question individually or take them all together ?

Mr. MOERSCH (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Individually.

*(The speaker continued in German)*

Mr. President, I can answer the question put here only on behalf of the Federal Government. I am sure Mr. Schwencke will forgive me if, in view of the talks going on in Rome, I wish to refrain from entering into the realm of speculation.

The Federal Government believes that it would be in the interests of the European position as a whole if the nine States of the Community could put forward a common policy on all matters at this conference. How far interests can and should be co-ordinated with one another is a question that must be answered by each government individually. The question is therefore essentially not one for the Federal Government but for the British Government.

I do not, however, wish to hide my personal opinion here. It is that — despite the many public discussions in which there is the clash of views even among the various parties in Europe — if the situation is carefully examined, there are no divergent interests at all within the overall European attitude, even if it is claimed from time to time that national or regional interests exist. This view is not of course put forward as a criticism of just one member of the Nine ; I feel that it is equally applicable to all of them, and that they all fail at times to appreciate it sufficiently.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Sir.

I call Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to ask Mr. Moersch

a question about a passage in his speech which I thought very important. He called, as he did in Bonn, for more co-ordination and cohesion in armaments policy.

In this connection he spoke of a meeting in The Hague, held in November, at which an attempt was made to develop a fresh initiative alongside Eurogroup, so as to involve France in co-operation on the groundwork for a European arms industry.

I do not think that the results from this are clear, Mr. President, but the Minister did say that a certain effectiveness would be achieved. My question is, what are the prospects for this new initiative, one which I applaud and which has already been referred to by Mr. Van Elslande ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Moersch.

Mr. MOERSCH (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I am sure it will be understood that I, as a politician, do not venture into the realm of prophecy, but would simply say that if the criterion of common sense is strictly applied, such co-operation will be possible in the future, since it is best suited to serve the interests of all European States concerned.

If the member believes in common sense, as I do, he will share my view that the objective we have set ourselves can be reached. However, we should not speculate on when common sense will prevail.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Sir.

I call Mr. Amrehn.

Mr. AMREHN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, while expressing my thanks to the Minister for stressing the rôle that he accords this Assembly on questions concerning the defence of Europe, and while expressing my thanks for his opinion that Europe cannot be built without our specifically including defence in this context, I should nevertheless like to put the following question to him, if I may turn again to the first point and dwell on it a little.

Is the positive effect of the British referendum that he has particularly stressed not in the end

*Mr. Amrehn (continued)*

cancelled out by the possibility that Great Britain may not speak through the spokesman of the Community at the raw materials conference, but wishes to be independently represented; and is the positive effect not also diminished by the fact that Great Britain gives the impression that, for budgetary reasons, it will cut back its defence effort, on its own behalf and on behalf of Europe as a whole?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Moersch.

Mr. MOERSCH (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. Amrehn's question is really one that primarily concerns the European Parliament. Nevertheless I shall try and go a little further into this topic.

I believe that the significance of the referendum cannot be compared with the present problem of representation at the raw materials conference. Irrespective of the difficulties that exist, or are said to exist, at the present time as regards such participation, the fact that the majority of the population of the United Kingdom has opted for membership of the European Community is, in my view, a decision of historic magnitude.

It would hardly be doing justice to the significance of this fact if we were now to take a single aspect (which in any event was not closely defined in the treaty, namely energy policy) as a yardstick for British policy as a whole. My friend will know, as I do, that in politics there are decisions of principle that continue to be effective even if differences arise on points of detail. I should really like to ask that — however important we consider the raw materials conference to be — when we assess British policy we proceed on the basis of patience and of equity rather than using current events as a criterion for definitive judgments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — The Minister has stressed the need for standardisation in the field of armaments in Western Europe. As he has also stressed the rôle of this Assembly, I should like

to ask him in this context whether he considers that this Assembly would be taking a useful initiative in bringing together the politicians concerned and the European experts for talks on these matters.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Minister.

Mr. MOERSCH (*Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — The answer is "Yes". And it would be better still if all my friends in this Assembly found it possible to make their own, right-thinking views felt in their national parliaments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anybody else wish to put a question to the Minister of State?...

I thank the Minister both for his speech and for the excellent replies he made to the questions.

## **8. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe**

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 633)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We now resume the debate on the report of the General Affairs Committee.

The next speaker is Mr. Müller.

Mr. MÜLLER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, when we come to study Mrs. von Bothmer's report, we are swayed first one way and then the other by the various points to be found in it. There are things in it that we can underline vigorously — in some cases even in a way that was surely never quite intended.

I should, however, like to offer a few corrections which I feel are absolutely necessary if the Helsinki conference and its consequences are to be judged in individual detail.

As a start we must, I believe, note that the Soviet Union's demand that such a European security conference should be held goes back even further than the Bucharest declaration. It was not, however, until the results of the 1969 elections and the forming of a new government in the Federal Republic produced a new situation

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

that the conference had any real chance of getting off the ground. There was no question of the Federal Republic being isolated — it was rather the Federal Republic itself which showed that it was a driving force, a point which has of course been repeatedly recalled in laudatory tones — led by the Federal Government itself, if I may be allowed to say so.

It is interesting to note that when the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, visited Western Germany shortly before the Final Act was adopted at Helsinki, his reply to the warning given by members of our opposition that he should not be too credulous where Helsinki was concerned was that he did not need to be told this by the Germans; the Americans, he said, had always been very sceptical and the support for the conference was to be found in Europe, particularly in Western Germany. And this tallies with the actual developments, as the first international commitment on the European security conference was, as we know, the famous point 10 of what is known as the Bahr memorandum of 1970, in which the West German Government promised to support the plea for a security conference of this kind.

The plan was to prove extraordinarily worthwhile for the Soviet Union. I underline what Mrs. von Bothmer says in one place in her report, that with the adoption of the Final Act this conference gave the top people in the Kremlin a major foreign policy success. I would also underline what she says a little later on, namely that this conference was also a success for the Soviet Union from the angle of the Brezhnev doctrine. This, it is true, was never mentioned in the actual text, but its spirit has nonetheless found a place in the Final Act. It is rather tempting — but I will not give way to the temptation here — to discuss this Brezhnev doctrine fully in relation to the reproach of the security risk involved for the special position of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Rapporteur correctly points out — this too, is a point I would underline — that what was adopted in Helsinki were declarations of intent, and she further writes in her report that with the aid of these declarations a measure of moral pressure to abide by them can in fact be exercised on politicians by public opinion. Mrs. von Bothmer is perfectly right. What has not been said is that moral pressure of this kind by

public opinion can exist in truly effective form only where public opinion and the publication of opinions is free. This means that the moral pressure element can certainly always be applied by interested parties or by the communist fellow-travellers in the countries of the West, but hardly in those of the East.

In the few weeks since the ending of the Helsinki conference we have learnt from experience how these declarations of intent have already been evaded in particular cases. This applies of course especially to the third basket, but it applies even to questions of European security. Think only of the attempts that have been made to avoid notifying manoeuvres. While in this matter the West has kept, I may say, strictly to both the spirit and the letter of the Helsinki Final Act, this has not been the case on the other side.

It would be going too far to deal in detail with the third basket, particularly since a number of speakers have already given their views on this point. I should, however, just like to make a further specific mention of the Amnesty International report on the position of political prisoners in the Soviet Union, especially as Amnesty International is an organisation that is generally above suspicion and because it is an interesting fact that the Soviet Union is the third country to which a special investigation report has been devoted, the first two countries having been Chile and Spain. I would recommend anyone interested in the question to have a look at the report on the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union and the other member States of the Warsaw Pact are trying to shield themselves against the requirements of the third basket, as far as the free exchange of ideas is concerned, behind arguments which here and there do sound very far-fetched. One danger that is mentioned amongst others, for example, is that pornography could penetrate the Warsaw Pact States from the West. This argument has of course been heard since the days of the Third Reich when — I would only recall the exhibition of “degenerate art” — concepts such as pornography and the like were also used as an excuse to restrict the free exchange of ideas.

It is true, as our colleague Mrs. von Bothmer also says in her report, that the Soviet Union acts on the assumption that the objective laws of dialectical materialism — the terms used by the Soviet Union itself — will continue to operate and that within the various countries the evolu-

*Mr. Müller (continued)*

tion of society cannot be checked. That however is, as we all know, a one-way street. Here we feel ourselves continually reminded of the world of Greek myth of Troy and of the Greeks who besieged it, of the famous story of the Trojan horse, which today in fact crops up quite officially in communist documents; we need only recall the document that refers specifically to the seventh Comintern conference of 1935 and in which Portugal is used as an example to show that the Trojan horse strategy decided at that time by the Communist International — it is there in so many words — has already proved successful.

Mrs. von Bohmer's report contains one sentence, however, that made me prick up my ears and gives me cause to make at least one blunt comment. Towards the end the report states that while the western countries reproach the Soviet Union for wishing to maintain its political, economic and social régime and impose it on the Eastern European countries, they must not in the name of European security hold up all economic and social developments on their own territory.

What does this last sentence in fact mean, Ladies and Gentlemen? If I interpret it correctly, it implies that in the western countries there is no opportunity for — let us use the term for once — “changing the system” because such a change of system would be prevented and suppressed in exactly the same way as happens in the East.

This cannot match the facts, for in a free democracy the position is that the voter can, with his ballot form, put emphasis on those elements of policy that are to be decisive. I can well remember how the former Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt expressly stressed in his first government statement that a new slant had been introduced and that the new policy elements would now have a part to play. And that is right; this is the case, and it is no doubt just the same in the other western countries. The position is not as our colleague, Mr. Boucheny, stated yesterday, when he said that there was a new imperialism in the Federal Republic and that what he called the occupational disqualifications would restrict freedom. Anyone can follow any calling in the Federal Republic, even if he is a communist; even Maoists can follow their calling in the Federal Republic, which is more than

they can in the Soviet Union. All that they cannot do is to become civil servants, which is quite natural, since our Basic Law provides that a civil servant must protect and not overthrow the constitution.

I would make one final comment.

The Helsinki agreement once again confirms my experience that paper is patient about what is written on it. For what was agreed in Helsinki has long been a component of documents such as the United Nations Charter, the Declaration on Human Rights, and other international treaties. Experience has shown that we must be sober, that we must be vigilant, lest we have the same unhappy experience as we have had with other declarations of this kind in the past. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, what came out of the conference on security and co-operation constitutes in our opinion a major event and a success for the cause of peace. Contrary to what was said here yesterday by a certain Rapporteur — that the strategy for Europe was one of massive military retaliation — the conference is a useful base from which the forces of peace and progress can pursue the struggle for détente and peaceful coexistence.

The Final Act of the conference is of remarkable value, not only because it takes into consideration the reasonable demands which so many States with their different preoccupations and conditions have made on each other, but even more because it deals with problems which are fundamental for our peoples and for our time.

That is what the western powers have been forced to admit when they recognised that the principles of peaceful coexistence should be the basis of relations between States. And it is on this note that the report concludes, when it states that “There is no alternative to coexistence”.

Might I point out to the Rapporteur that it is at least over-hasty to credit the so-called democratic societies alone with the move to détente.

Who can really forget that the capitalist countries, with the United States in the van, have ever since the immediate post-war period refused to recognise even the existence of the socialist world? Their Schuman plan, Atlantic Pact and iron curtain are just so many plans

*Mr. Cermolacce (continued)*

introduced with the intention of liquidating and suppressing socialism ; today they are doomed to failure.

The attitude of the socialist camp and of the forces for peace in Europe and throughout the world has been very different. Since 1954 the Soviet Union has been suggesting that a European conference should be held. This proposal, which was again put forward in 1968-69, was rejected by the so-called democratic societies. Though it was finally imposed by the action of the forces for peace, everything was done to impede the work and diminish the scope of the final document.

Today, contrary to the undertakings given at Helsinki the French Government for one has circulated this document only confidentially, although it is of outstanding importance and shows that work on an impressive scale has been achieved.

The declaration of principles is of supreme importance. It might be said that it is both a political consecration of the second world war and an application of the principle of peaceful coexistence to present-day European conditions.

In particular, it means that thirty-five States have proclaimed in the most solemn terms that they consider the frontiers of all the signatories and those of all the States of Europe inviolable and that they will abstain both now and in the future from any attack against these frontiers.

It also means that all these principles are to be applied equally and unreservedly, each being interpreted with reference to the others, and that they thus constitute a veritable code of peaceful coexistence.

It is a fact that much remains to be done to inform public opinion on the importance of the results achieved in Helsinki. On occasion these have given rise to somewhat over-simplified judgments, certain people even advancing the theory that the Western States have capitulated.

These people picture Helsinki as having sanctioned a sort of partition of the world and therefore think they are justified in extending the territorial concept of the *status quo* to include the political and social struggle.

This is an imperialist distortion of peaceful coexistence, unlike the Final Act of the confer-

ence, which emphasised the sovereign right of each people freely to choose its destiny — a point repeatedly made in the declaration.

The purpose of such talk is to make us forget the very real examples of interference by the United States, NATO and the EEC in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy with the aim of maintaining the class domination of the capitalists. They show that the imperialists do not intend to allow any democratic changes to occur in the area under their control. It is therefore fallacious, to say the least, to make claims regarding ideological détente, as does Mr. Giscard d'Estaing.

The same, incidentally, applies to the third basket questions relating to the movement of persons, information and ideas.

Particular attention was given to these problems. We are in no way underestimating the importance of his question if we recall that the cause of the world wars was not the inadequacy of human relations — and on the responsibility for this there is much which could be said — but territorial claims and acts of aggression undertaken to satisfy them.

Moreover, nothing has been said, even in relation to this third basket, regarding all that was achieved on cultural and educational problems.

In the face of commitments on such a scale, to try to isolate just one item in the third basket and turn it into an argument against the socialist world can only be described as a deliberate attempt to minimise the importance of the conference.

A perusal of the documents shows that the conference achieved considerable results in the field of human exchanges. They have been facilitated by the progress achieved on the problems of security. These results will in turn favour fresh developments, and will at the same time benefit further from the easing of tension and the progress in détente made possible by implementation of the decisions taken at the conference.

While Helsinki was an initial success, the maintenance and consolidation of everything which was achieved and of further successes in peaceful coexistence — which has nothing to do with an idyllic "convergence" — make it necessary to pursue and intensify what has been started. Whether some people like it or not, Helsinki is not Munich — that Munich which was welcomed

*Mr. Cermolacce (continued)*

at the time by the same people who today oppose Helsinki.

The success of Helsinki calls, therefore, for further efforts ; we shall undertake these, using the achievements of Helsinki as a springboard in pursuing these efforts for the well-being of our people, of Europe and of mankind.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Schwencke.

Mr. SCHWENCKE (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to hazard a reply to the questions which our Rapporteur has raised concerning the assessment of the security conference, by answering three questions — what is Europe ? What could Europe be and what is Europe going to be ?

What is Europe ? Certainly not WEU, since that is one small, special part of Europe, not only geographically, but also as regards its political objectives.

The European Community of the Nine is a bit more, but hardly Europe either.

The Council of Europe with its eighteen democratic members is again something more, but still not Europe.

Since the end of our terrible war, it is only at the Helsinki conference that a comprehensive attempt has been made to define and set out Europe as a whole — with the exception of Albania — and thanks to the presence of the Soviet Union, the United States and Canada, to give Europe a clearer political profile that will distinguish it from other parts of the world. I believe we cannot value too highly what was achieved at this conference after much painstaking effort — namely, to have found a formula to fit this Europe and certain of its essential interests into a Final Act, a document of fundamental importance. We should not underestimate this Europe — and its possibilities — as it appears in this document ; nor should we overestimate it.

What could Europe be, on the basis of this document ? Certainly more than is thought by the habitual doubters and critics, who — in Western Germany at least — can be identified with those who have fought Willy Brandt's

*Ostpolitik* since 1969. This conference and the opportunities offered by this document must be analysed far more thoroughly. This will not of course be done with the aid of the habitual German denigrators, of those who cannot see further than their own noses ; for they would have to take into account a number of facts that are undoubtedly regarded in a far more positive light in other countries, even by conservative parliamentarians. It is not naïve thinking, nor boundless optimism but, I believe, not unrealistic to look on this document as really being a helpful attempt progressively to give mankind a better deal than can actually be shown at the end of this first half year.

I think that, if we take all the baskets together, our Rapporteur was right in saying that the two essential points of this conference — co-operation and security — open up between them prospects which have still to be filled out politically by bilateral and multilateral action. As far as the Federal Republic of Germany is concerned, I see the impending conclusion of the new treaty with Poland, which is being very actively discussed, as a first important step. In the broad field of co-operation and security this treaty will undoubtedly have its *raison d'être* and its political importance for Western Europe as well.

What is Europe going to be, Mr. President ? Europe will be whatever governments and in particular assemblies like ours and other European parliamentary bodies make of the Final Act of Helsinki. The citizens of East and West have a vital interest in implementing the undertakings set out and signed together in this document. I regard it as no small thing that, for example, the figures for traffic between Western and Eastern Germany have been distinctly better in the months following Helsinki than previously — a fact which, though not staggering, must not be swept under the carpet, because it exists as a consequence of CSCE negotiations in Helsinki.

On what we call the follow-up, set out in the fourth basket, we should, I feel, bring both more imagination and more precision to bear, so that western demands are kept on the table — whatever means a reduction in confrontation, what is known as control of armaments and, finally, anything to do with the norms of ethical behaviour which are to be found in the third basket and which were published with the conference documents in the eastern bloc States. Anyone who in the Soviet Union or in Eastern Germany or in other States invokes them will be entitled not only to our attention but also to our

*Mr. Schwencke (continued)*

support in pressing, in bilateral discussions, for these requirements to be implemented. I would not be so short-sighted as to sniff at this possibility.

In conclusion, I would say that our world will not, thanks to the Final Act at Helsinki, immediately appear more humane to its citizens in Europe, but the chances of pushing through improvements in the lot of mankind are, at least, now better than ever before for those concerned — in the broadest sense.

We have no choice but to continue along this path, for in the long run there is no alternative to coexistence. By taking the offensive in the way we use this document, particularly the important third basket, without of course dissociating it from the others, we shall I think always have to choose, when torn between hope and doubt, the line by which we can be of practical assistance to those in bondage. On the basis of this document, they again have a little more hope. (*Applause*)

(*Mr. Tanghe, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Amrehn.

Mr. AMREHN (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, a policy without an alternative is always a bad policy, and a policy exclusively based on coexistence in the way the word is being used here, that is, in the sense in which the Russians use it, is a policy that more or less bows to the dictates of the Soviet Union. I should like to contradict formally what has just been said.

Secondly, I do not believe that the sight of all Europe around one conference table can be a political aim. The only possible political aim for Europeans must be to safeguard freedom wherever it exists and to give those in Europe who lack freedom more hope for freedom in the future.

In this sense, the Helsinki conference has had one effect which not only does not appear in black and white as a result of the conference but had not even been foreseen — namely that at least the Nine closed ranks to present the Soviet bloc with a common front. On this point, I should like to emphasise Mr. Moersch's words,

when he said that the effect of Helsinki has been greater political cohesion amongst the Europeans themselves. This is indeed a major and politically important effect of the conference.

For the rest, however, the gap between the aspirations, hopes and expectations and the propaganda texts of the conference, on the one hand, and what has happened subsequently, on the other, has been growing steadily wider. No one will claim that hope for the further easing of human burdens has become any the greater since the ending of Helsinki. Quite the contrary! Here I would quote in support the Lord Mayor of Berlin, who a few days ago stated publicly that the *Ostpolitik* has been stagnating for half a year. We are getting nowhere. Not one step forward has been taken since the texts of the treaties between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany were drafted three years ago, because no agreement can be reached on the Berlin clauses.

The stagnation set in just about when this so-called security conference ended. The conference certainly achieved something for the Soviet Union. After twenty-one years during which it had been constantly pressing for such a conference, the Soviet Union has received from the Europeans the concession of inviolability of frontiers and, consequently, the legitimization of its post-war boundaries in Europe. That is the decisive political result of the conference. The Soviet Union has thus won a new forward base for its "coexistence" in an aggressive sense, while we are again on the defensive.

The real failing at the time the conference ended, and afterwards, is that the West Europeans relinquished the link they themselves had been demanding between the ending of the security conference in Helsinki and a fruitful outcome to the MBFR talks. Chancellor Brandt once said that we could not conclude any conference on security without success having been obtained in the field of security proper, namely in the matter of armaments and disarmament. It is a fact that although the MBFR conference has been going on for years and years, not one millimetre of progress has been achieved. Not one single agreement has been arrived at. If you consider, Mr. Schwencke, how the West originally associated the security conference with the MBFR conference, you will have to admit that we have allowed this association to melt away, that the Soviet side have pushed their demands through and that the western call for disarmament has no prospect whatever of success. The upshot is,

*Mr. Amrehn (continued)*

rather, that in Europe and throughout the world the Soviet Union is further arming itself to a quite unsuspected degree and that we ourselves are hardly keeping up.

Politically, this situation has given rise to a further hardening in the eastern bloc's attitude towards the West. There is no time for me to give you detailed examples; a few have already been mentioned to you. I would, however, like to say just this: despite everything that we have accomplished in the second basket as regards commercial exchanges, we are giving the Soviet Union what it wants. We are even undermining the agreements of the Nine, by which future trade arrangements were to be made only on a Community basis, by concluding bilateral agreements on economic co-operation with individual Eastern States. The Soviet Union is thus obtaining anyway what we intended to give it only if it, for its part, fulfilled the conditions of the third basket. No one here can claim that even one point of any importance in the third basket has so far been complied with. Improvements in travel to Berlin or between the two parts of Germany are not of course anything to do with the security conference, but are the result of the earlier treaties. We must not separate cause and effect.

Let me say this in conclusion. The contradictions between the hopes and expectations and the actual facts are also reflected in the report. Throughout the report, the hopes and expectations predominate and outweigh the rest. In the text of the recommendation, however, the facts prevail, and much more sober wording comes to the fore. This stems from the circumstances.

We shall do well not to conjure up out of the words found in treaties new visions or even illusions, as I suspect the previous speaker has done: we must look future developments squarely in the face, on the basis of the facts, recognising that we must expect new challenges, that we must probably endure new tests of our resolve, and that it will be worth preparing ourselves inwardly so as to have the strength, both spiritual and otherwise, to cope with them. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Enders.

Mr. ENDERS (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, if one listened to what some of the

previous speakers on the security conference have said, one could get the impression that the party-political debates in the German Parliament were being continued here. Members of the opposition have scraped the bottom of the barrel for arguments to justify their negative vote in the Bundestag. Critical words have been uttered about the third basket of the Helsinki agreements, in particular, the one that contains that part of the agreements which concerns liberalisation of the exchange of information, the increase of human contacts, and the improvement of human relations.

This morning, a member said that there were still no signs of détente since Helsinki, and that the death strip between the two parts of Germany had become even more lethal. Now, I have known the situation on the border between the two parts of Germany since the days of my youth, and I can assure you no one wishes to gloss over the inhuman barriers there. On the contrary, we are driven by the desire to reduce and remove them. One thing is clear, however — the death strip through the heart of Germany is neither the result of the policies of the socialist-liberal government nor the outcome of the Helsinki conference, but the result of the criminal policy of Adolf Hitler. That is where we have to find the roots of the division of Germany, and we must accept the fact.

This morning, the member I refer to said that the Helsinki conference could be compared with the 1938 Munich agreement. This is hopelessly wide of the mark, for it is comparing conditions which are simply not comparable. Or would my friend go so far as to say that, at Helsinki, some politician or other took over the part played at Munich by Adolf Hitler or Mussolini? On that occasion, two fascist politicians dragooned the world, so as to be able to carry out annexations of territory. In Helsinki, on the other hand, we saw thirty-five States, including the United States and Canada, striving to find opportunities to improve security and co-operation.

When I look back at the first few years following World War II, Ladies and Gentlemen, I ask myself whether the policies followed in Western Germany at that time in fact led to a more secure peace. The answer is "no", for the death strip was reinforced on the eastern side by more and more inhuman measures. We used to talk about power politics, the policy of cold war, the politics of frozen blocs. We had to get beyond this, and we may be glad that thanks to the

*Mr. Enders (continued)*

socialist-liberal policy some degree of normalisation, a rapprochement, has been reached between the two German States.

The socialist-liberal coalition can put the positive results of the *Ostpolitik* on the table. Even Mr. Amrehn has said that road access to Berlin has been made easier since the checks are no longer made as they were in earlier years.

I can point to the fact that since the signing of the treaties with the East, millions of people from both parts of Germany have been able to meet, and family circumstances have been taken into consideration in granting visitors' permits; why, there have even been two cases where brides from the GDR have been able to marry young men from my constituency and have been given exit permits. Visiting in the border area has now been possible for over two years. A million people have been able to visit relatives in the border areas of the other part of Germany, and the lot of a million human beings has thereby been eased. This is progress compared with the days before the Basic Treaty became effective, when these visitors' passes did not exist. At that time, traffic in the border areas was nil; so an easing of the human problems has been achieved since 1969.

Mention was also made of a trade in people being a consequence of the Helsinki conference, with the Federal Republic paying out thousands of millions for the emigration of 120,000 people wishing to leave the East. Now, this is confusing three separate things, Mr. President. Firstly, a line of credit opened for Poland, much of which will flow back into German industry. Secondly, a pensions agreement to which the Federal Republic was committed on moral and humanitarian grounds. It is dictated by charity and justice towards those who suffered inhumane treatment during the Hitler period or those who had already acquired rights to an old-age pension or an improvement on their old-age pension. The emigration of 120,000 Germans is in no way a once-for-all settlement, but a figure that may easily be increased at some later date. For we must remember, too, that the Polish State has to consider how much loss of skilled labour and of people it can bear at the present time. Nor can we be certain whether those who are willing to emigrate now will in the long run want to stay as emigrants in a new country.

The Helsinki conference on security and co-operation has made an important contribution

to ending dangerous confrontation, to the maintenance of peaceful coexistence and to securing peace. It lies along the road first trodden by the socialist-liberal government of the Federal Republic when it concluded the treaties on the renunciation of force and the Basic Treaty with Eastern Germany. Since then remarkable progress has been made, and we can see that conditions in Central Europe have become more normal, reconciliation has come nearer, and peace is more secure. In the same way that we in the Federal Republic have advanced step by step with our Eastern European neighbours in securing peace, I consider, indeed I am firmly convinced, that this will be the case with all the States of Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Pumilia, the last speaker on the list.

Mr. PUMILIA (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I should like to add a few comments to the debate on the report presented by Mrs. von Bothmer. I am above all convinced that the Helsinki conference represents a milestone on the path to détente, peace and international co-operation within Europe's territory. I am equally sure that several of this morning's speakers have left the impression that national governments and parliaments having authorised signature of the Helsinki treaty somehow yielded ground, without any counterpart gain, to political systems differing from those prevailing in Western Europe. I believe this to be a basic error that needs to be put right, just as we should avoid any authentic cold war talk in our Assembly, even in respect of the aspects of the conference left unresolved or the necessity of Western Europe remaining constantly vigilant in furthering the relationship of détente with the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist bloc. True, the Helsinki conference did not resolve all the problems that have faced or still face Europe, but at all events it marked the end of the aftermath of World War II, put an end to the sequels of the cold war which has for so many years divided the peoples and countries of Europe into two impenetrable blocs, and ushered in a difficult third phase in which détente should gradually give way to integration of peoples and countries. However this may be, the Helsinki conference took note of the *de facto* reality emerging from the war: precisely, as said by the previous speaker, from the war of aggression waged by fascism in the Europe of 1939-40.

*Mr. Pumilia (continued)*

There are, as things are, a fact we should be extremely mindful of, legitimate governments of Eastern Europe which on the basis of their own legitimacy may have succeeded in securing in 1944, 1945 and 1946 particular conditions, for example the permanent occupation by Russian troops of some Eastern European countries. Over the years therefore these governments have operated under régimes unlike our own and not shared by us, and have found legitimisation by seeking perpetuation of the frontiers drawn after World War II. Nor may we delude ourselves that these frontiers can ever be redrawn; they could only be redrawn by letting loose another terrible war, of nuclear dimensions. I am also convinced that the value of détente is gradually, and with extreme difficulty, even in socialist countries and the Soviet Union, broadening the internal scope of dissension, giving it a voice that is winning an ever bigger audience even though it may be persecuted; just as détente widens inside the western world the sphere of civil liberties and improves the lot of the have-nots.

The Soviet Union has assuredly not renounced ideological opposition to the capitalist system, just as the true western democracies have not regarded the superiority of the values of pluralism and freedom compared with those expressed by the eastern socialist bloc, as being a thing of the past. I wish to emphasise, too, the importance of the declarations of principle, which I support, regarding the third basket of the Helsinki conference. These have recently often also been given the lie by statements of the leading political figures of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, but undoubtedly form an important milestone, and in years to come successive objectives may be won towards acceptance of the statements of principle in the third basket. When referring to other problems of the presence of communist parties in Western Europe, we should certainly not consider that the options taken and recently publicised in joint statements by the national secretary of the Italian Communist Party and his opposite number in France represent strategic theory opinions for which the two parties had to discard values accepted and consolidated by Marxist-Leninism. But we cannot ignore the importance attached to certain statements, or at any rate ignore the fact that the lasting worth of pluralism and freedom within which the two communist party leaders have been operating have made them think that to win a tactical advance in their battles they must

officially and publicly declare that they accept the principles of pluralism and freedoms.

In conclusion, our Assembly which ought primarily to concern itself with defence matters, and therefore the balance of forces, for peace in Europe to be assured, should also have an eye to détente and the exchange of ideas in favour of the integration of nations. This is the path we should tread without undue fears which might be interpreted as signs of weakness, and without any inferiority complex, but with imagination and creative thinking, in order to continue a process, undoubtedly long and difficult, towards durable peace and an ever more united Europe through the gradual lowering of ideological barriers.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — There are no further speakers on the list. This afternoon, we shall hear the replies of the Rapporteur and of the Chairman of the Committee, before considering and voting on the two amendments tabled and the draft recommendation as a whole.

### **9. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976 (Document 678); Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1974 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Document 677 and Addendum) (Presentation of and Debate on the Reports of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Documents 678 and 677 and Addendum).
2. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Document 687).
3. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe (Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote

*The President (continued)*

on the draft Recommendation, Document 683 and Amendments).

4. Second-generation nuclear reactors (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 686).
5. The International Institute for the Management of Technology (Presentation of and

Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 685 and Amendment).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 1.05 p.m.)*

# TENTH SITTING

Tuesday, 2nd December 1975

## SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Change in the membership of a Committee.
4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976 (Doc. 678); Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1974 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts (Doc. 677 and Addendum) (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts*, Docs. 678 and 677 and Addendum).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Dequae (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Alber, Mr. Dequae, Lord Selsdon.
5. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 687).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. de Montesquiou (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Moss (*Observer from the United States*), Mr. de Montesquiou.  
*Replies by Mr. Moss to questions put by*: Mr. Richter, Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. Brown, Mr. Lewis, Lord Peddie.
6. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Votes on the Amendments to the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 683).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mrs. von Bothmer (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Sieglerschmidt (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. de Montesquiou, Mrs. von Bothmer, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. de Montesquiou.  
*On a point of order*: Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Mr. Roper, Mr. de Montesquiou.  
*Speakers*: Mr. Vedovato, Mr. Sieglerschmidt.
7. Second-generation nuclear reactors (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 686).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Lenzer (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Cornelissen.
8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Bettiol, Vice-President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ? ...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will

be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 3. Change in the membership of a Committee

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The United Kingdom Delegation proposes the candidature of Lord Wallace of Coslany as a member of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration in place of Lord Walston.

Are there any objections ? ...

This candidature is approved.

We will now go on immediately to the Orders of the Day.

1. See page 25.

**4. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976**

(Doc. 678)

**Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1974 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts**

(Doc. 677 and Addendum)

**(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and Votes on the draft texts, Docs. 678 and 677 and Addendum)**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of the report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration on the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976, Document 678, and the accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1974 — the Auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts, Document 677 and Addendum.

I call Mr. Dequae, the Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. DEQUAE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, in order to simplify our work and to speak only once, I am going to give you a brief review of the budgetary position and hence of the report covering the financial year 1976. I shall also say a few words about the accounts of expenditure for the financial year 1974. These accounts now need to be closed.

I should like to begin by drawing the Assembly's attention to the fact that, for the first time, the new budgetary method has been applied. That has enabled us to avoid the last-minute change we had last year, which left this Assembly with rather a disagreeable impression. We were, as a matter of fact, placed in an extremely difficult position last year, owing to the fact that the Council had to some extent made changes in certain budgetary figures on the very day the budget was discussed. We got together and now our timing makes it possible to avoid these surprises. This year, the draft budget of the Assembly for 1976 was considered by the Budget Committee as early as 18th September. When dealing with this draft, which had been practically completed by about mid-July, the Committee stressed the need to combat ris-

ing prices by endeavouring to cut down expenditure.

I have noted — and this redounds greatly to the honour of your Committee — the efforts made in that direction by our Assembly and the Budget Committee. The latter considered that additional savings could be made and proposed some reductions in the estimates, albeit of very limited scope, which we had no difficulty in accepting. We hope that we shall be able to keep within the sums that will be voted. I will refer to them briefly.

Under Head III, Sub-Head 5, Capital equipment, re-equipment was a fairly urgent matter. But the replacement of equipment has been divided up so as to spread it over two years. I believe that this is acceptable, so long as the old machines do not break down.

Under Head IV, the estimates have been reduced from 130,000 to 125,000 French francs. This sum is earmarked for paper, stationery and office supplies, which have not witnessed the same price rises as occurred in 1974. In this case, too, we think that the reduction is acceptable.

Finally, there is a reduction in the figure for official journeys by members of the Office of the Clerk from 137,000 to 125,000 francs. That will perhaps be rather more difficult to accept, but I do think that with a little effort we can remain within the limits desired by the Council.

These changes mean that the estimates, originally put at 6,637,000, have been brought down to 6,559,000 French francs.

Subject to these changes, the Budget Committee has decided to recommend that the Council give a favourable opinion on the Assembly's budget for 1976.

Under the procedure for approving the Assembly's budget, which is described in document A/WEU/BA (75) 6, it is now for the Council to give its opinion on the budget, either agreeing to it or proposing further changes, which is unlikely in this instance, since these have already been made. I believe, moreover, that at its last meeting the Council agreed provisionally to the budget that is submitted to you for approval.

It is therefore this budget, which we believe to be final, that is submitted to you.

*Mr. Dequae (continued)*

The draft budget for the financial year 1976 amounts to 6,559,000 francs, or an increase of 8.15 % compared with the current financial year. This increase is relatively modest if rising prices are taken into account. Some factors have, however, worked in our favour, in particular the fact that the special expenditure caused by the Assembly meeting in Bonn will not recur.

It is thus, in fact, a simple renewal of the 1975 budget as regards the scale of the activities covered, with the deduction, as I have just mentioned, of expenditure connected with the Assembly's session held at Bonn and with due allowance for increases attributable to the higher cost of living.

With regard to the accounts for 1974, the balance — and that means a favourable balance — amounts to 161,748 francs, or 3.19 % of the total budget.

The Auditor's report and the President's explanatory memorandum are attached to the document in your hands.

I think the Assembly can welcome the care which the Presidential Committee has exercised when authorising certain expenditure, and also the extremely conscientious work of our staff dealing with the budget. We consequently finished the year with a small unexpended balance, and within the budgetary limits.

In conclusion, I would venture to ask for the Assembly's agreement both to the 1976 budget and to the 1974 accounts. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Alber.

Mr. ALBER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, a budget that goes up by only 8.15 %, i.e. that can rise only that much because there is no further money available, really does not merit any further comment, considering its modest rate of increase. This rate, which is below the general level of inflation, suffices in itself to show that absolutely nothing further can be done in the way of any extra tasks and additional measures that might be needed. The budget, and the difficulties experienced by our Rapporteur, Mr. Dequae, in fact remind me of

the battle of Marengo, when Napoleon's chef had to prepare a meal and had nothing but a chicken yet, as we all know, managed to get an acceptable meal out of it. We are in the same position here. My thanks therefore go to Mr. Dequae and to all his colleagues who have managed to produce a very adequate budget out of this small sum of money. I have already mentioned that the rate of increase of 8.15 % is less than would be necessary to offset the rate of inflation.

I intend to touch on three points only. We must consider how we can improve our work here in the long term. When, back home, we are asked what WEU is, or if somewhere or other we have to talk about Western European Union, we find that in fact no one really knows what it is. People know vaguely about the European Parliament and the Commission in Brussels, and yes, they have heard something about the Council of Europe; but Western European Union is virtually unknown to the man in the street. In view of the importance of our work, I think that this is not good enough. Sooner or later, we must budget for public relations and press work, so as to make people aware of the important work we are doing.

And now my second point. The budget serves merely to cover meetings of the Assembly. Not one franc is provided for additional work at conferences and for symposia and meetings with experts. To me, it is a disadvantage if we cannot give our work the benefit of a scientific basis and so appreciably extend our range.

Finally, a third point, one which I am extremely sorry not to see covered by the budget. This concerns the pensions of those who work for Western European Union. It is a problem with which the other European organisations are also faced. If we are serious about tackling the social problems which, as we know, come up again and again in the discussions of general policy which occur in every parliament, we should of course really do something one day in this sector too. It just will not do that those who work with us should have to retire without a pension. I think that this is an important matter. It behoves us all to find a solution to these financial problems in our own house. I should therefore like to urge that the very important question of pensions for the staff be speedily settled.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. DEQUAE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would remind the Assembly that, if the percentage increase seems abnormally low in relation to the inflation which our countries are experiencing, that is because the costs we have incurred this year for the Bonn session will not recur in the coming year. The increase does in fact reflect fairly accurately the increase in the cost of living. I make a point of saying this, because I do not want to accuse the Council of applying impossible methods.

As regards our publicity to the outside world, I would point out to the Assembly, and in particular to the honourable member, that despite our rather limited resources we have published Paul Borcier's brochure on the Assembly of Western European Union. This brochure is well done. What I am afraid of is that the number of copies of this publication that have been distributed is perhaps too restricted, and its impact insufficient. Perhaps an extra effort could be made in this realm?

I was going to say a word about pensions, but I see that Lord Selsdon, who makes this problem his very special concern, has just arrived, so that there is no need for me to do so. I should simply like to add that we have, in spite of everything, got out of the impossible situation we were in. We have a few additional guarantees, but the basic problem of pensions has not yet been finally settled.

As I announced to you, Lord Selsdon is sure to review this problem for us in what will undoubtedly be a clearer and more specific manner.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Lord Selsdon.

Lord SELSDON (*United Kingdom*). — I feel rather ashamed that on almost all the occasions I come to speak on matters of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration, we come back to this business of pensions. I think we are faced with the usual problem that confronts parliamentarians and bureaucracy — that the wish of parliamentarians is often thwarted by bureaucracy. This is a problem that we have at the moment.

As the Assembly will know, for some years it has been agreed that a pension scheme should be introduced for European civil servants. The

parliamentarians as a whole support this. We have reason to believe that national governments support this. We are faced simply with a tiny problem of co-ordination and implementation. However, because of the changing world in which we live, with the rate of inflation which we are required to endure, the continual changes in exchange rates and innumerable other variable factors, it seems impossible for the bureaucrats who are involved with implementation of the pension scheme ever to reach an agreement.

We are faced with three basic elements in this. One concerns salaries. The second concerns pensions. The third concerns the provision for those who can no longer protect themselves, namely, those who have already retired.

On the first element — the question of salaries — no one would dispute that the salaries awarded to members of the European civil service, and in particular WEU, at the moment are acceptable or that the new system of reviewing salaries every two years, and taking a look at them from an inflation point of view every six months, is very fair and very acceptable.

When we come to the question of pensions and the provident fund, we all know that the provident fund system did not work, or could not work, in an inflationary situation. It was agreed that people should be awarded pensions. A co-ordinating committee was appointed to look into that problem. There is often conflict between parliamentarians and bureaucrats or civil servants in these areas. We have, however, a co-ordinating committee which is perhaps not by design but by fact too bureaucratic in that it cannot agree decisions in the time involved.

On account of that, we are faced still with doubt over the implementation of a pension scheme and in particular over the problems of those people who have entered retirement. There are, I understand, some thirty former members of WEU who have retired and, in order to cope with the expenses of retirement, have withdrawn their portion of the provident fund to which they are entitled. In normal circumstances, with a normal, acceptable rate of inflation, it is probable that amounts drawn from the provident fund could provide a standard of living which might be acceptable in the current world. But when we have this inflationary situation the effect is different. With the promise or expectation of a pension, we have the situation in which a minority of people, having withdrawn their

*Lord Selsdon (continued)*

provident fund, are unable to live on the net after-tax income which this provident fund can generate but are frightened about reducing the value of their provident fund since in due course they must convert it into a pension scheme. They are suffering quite severely. There are others who, reluctant to suffer, are spending their provident fund with the terrible knowledge that when the time comes for them to participate in the pension scheme, the amount of the provident fund which they can recontribute has fallen so much that they are no longer entitled to the full pension which was their just desert.

These problems we know exist, but what people do not realise perhaps is that it has been some three years since the idea and the concept of the pension scheme was proposed. Although there have been some agreements reached, the biggest problem lies with the ability of the Co-ordinating Committee to co-ordinate without taking undue time and to attain agreement from national governments and, in particular, from the different co-ordinated organisations.

I raise all this to put the case as it stands at the moment and also to ask whether members of the Assembly could do what it is in their power to do — which is to urge national governments and members of the co-ordinated organisations to bring about some form of harmony, but above all, implementation.

In the next few weeks it is probable that the Secretaries-General of all the co-ordinated organisations will meet to discuss matters of common interest. What I hope is that the subject of pensions, which is in the common interests of all their employees, will be raised and discussed clearly and that some decision will be made and some implementation agreed on recommendations which have been made by this Assembly and by other assemblies in co-ordinated organisations over the period of the past three years.

Could we please have some action and not too much bureaucracy? (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is closed.

The Assembly will vote first on the draft budget for the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976 and

then on the motion to approve the final accounts for the financial year 1974.

No amendment has been tabled to the draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976 contained in Document 678.

If the Assembly is not unanimous, the vote on the draft budget as a whole will be taken by roll-call.

Are there any objections to the draft budget?...

Are there any abstentions?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for 1976 is adopted unanimously.*

We now come to the motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1974 contained in the addendum to Document 677.

Are there any objections?...

Are there any abstentions?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The motion is adopted unanimously.*

##### **5. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology**

**(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 687)**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology and votes on the draft recommendation and draft resolution, Document 687.

I call Mr. de Montesquiou, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very glad, as Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, that I am for once the first to speak in this debate, whereas on other occasions we have always been the last, and although we aim

*Mr. de Montesquiou (continued)*

to fly very high, we have been obliged to "hedge-hop". I would like to thank the President for giving us the opportunity of speaking first this time.

When the Committee of which I am Chairman visited the United States from 17th to 21st March at the invitation of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences of the United States Senate, we had two meetings with that committee.

We are particularly glad that Senator Frank Moss has been authorised by the President of the American Senate to come to Paris. His presence among us proves that the initiative taken by the Senate committee is bearing fruit, since it is now giving us the opportunity of continuing discussions with our American colleagues through Mr. Moss.

I am sure that you all know who Mr. Moss is. He is a Senator who has played a considerable part in the aeronautical and space field in the United States Senate. He is Chairman of a most important committee, and it was thanks to him that the Americans were first to set foot on the moon before the representatives of any other country in the world. His career began in 1933. He is known as a very great jurist. I will spare you an account of all his academic qualifications. During the second world war he fought courageously and obtained, in addition to his decorations, the rank of colonel. He has been senator for Utah since 1958, having been re-elected in 1964 and 1970, and I do not think there is any problem about his future re-election.

What is important for us Europeans is that he heads a committee which is particularly concerned with technology and everything which concerns aeronautical and space developments in America. The hospitality with which he and all the members of his committee received us last year shows that in the United States there are people who ask and hope for just one thing: understanding with the Europeans.

Among other things, he has just proposed that NASA should engage in a research and development programme to produce a new generation of aircraft with maximum fuel economy. Without wishing to give away any secrets, I think he will help us to obtain landing rights in New York for a European aircraft which you all know and whose name is Concorde.

On the occasion of our Committee's visit I pointed out that one of the fundamental difficulties in political relations between the United States and Europe resides in the fact that Western Europe is not yet unified and so has not reached the stage where it has one administration, one government.

The other day I pointed out in my National Assembly that it is at present very difficult to say exactly what form will be taken by European political co-operation and, consequently, by co-operation in the field of aeronautics and other advanced technologies.

Only in the space field has Europe managed to provide itself with an organisation, the European Space Agency, in which all European activities have or will have a place. All the same, this is a good sign, since we in Europe have begun by discovering a means of agreement high above our heads in space, and it is to be hoped that later we shall come down to earth and deal with more pedestrian problems and their solution.

I am increasingly convinced that Europe can collaborate effectively with the Americans only if we first have a truly European organisation. It would seem that this has begun to take shape in Rome, and there are grounds for hope that a European parliament will be elected by universal suffrage in all the countries of Europe.

In my report I studied the ways in which Europe is approaching co-operation with the United States. This close examination reveals that none of these ways is comparable with the European Space Agency.

One approach is through the Community, particularly Euratom. Co-operation with the United States began in 1958, and it was hoped that this would prove fruitful. Today, however, the results are seen to be somewhat disappointing. From the outset the Euratom countries suffered from two handicaps. First, there was the fact that neither the United States nor the Europeans could accept the authority of Euratom in connection with the storage of uranium 235 — the United States for military reasons and the European countries for industrial reasons. The result has been that the Euratom treaty has frequently remained a dead letter, although certain supranational elements have been set up under its provisions. National interests were too strong to yield to those of the Community.

*Mr. de Montesquiou (continued)*

A second approach is through the Atlantic Alliance, in which European countries co-operate with America. Here collaboration was successful as long as European countries accepted the hegemony of the United States. Various schemes designed to balance accounts between the two continents were undertaken, for example, by the European "Three Wise Men" in 1956 and later by President Kennedy. If the Europeans had had an organisation of their own before entering the Atlantic Alliance, establishment of a balance would have been easier to achieve, but for historical reasons this was not the case, and the result was lack of balance — on the one hand a superpower and on the other the medium-sized powers of Europe. Nevertheless, the aim of the Alliance in the military field — to prevent war — has so far been achieved.

In the civil field, the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society has done excellent work in the following sectors: coastal water pollution, advanced health care, advanced waste water treatment, urban transport, disposal of hazardous wastes, solar energy, the rational use of energy and pollution of the atmosphere. After its military rôle, NATO is taking an interest in the civil problems of humanity.

I now come to the third approach, through OECD, where much research is being devoted to the possibility of a common energy policy. I would point out that, in his May 1973 report, a sort of forerunner of nuclear policy in Europe, Mr. Kahn-Ackermann, now Secretary-General of the Council of Europe and at that time a member of our Committee, suggested formulating a common energy policy on a basis of equality between Europe and the United States. This is just what Mr. Kissinger, regrettably, would not accept. Co-operation through OECD is valuable and advantageous owing to the studies on research and the technological policies in member countries which are made by this organisation; and we should not forget that this is a meeting place not only for the United States and the countries of free Europe but also for Japan, Australia and Canada.

I now come to the chapter entitled "Co-operation in specific fields". Space provides a good example of the division of labour and of co-operation. The new Space Agency has given Europeans the opportunity of collaborating with the Americans in the post-Apollo programme.

Mr. Moss's Senate committee fully agrees with us in hoping that in this co-operation there will be really complementary activities, the Americans producing the space shuttle and the Europeans the space laboratory, which together will make a major contribution to the pursuit of space research. But provision must also be made for major long-term American and European space programmes to take over from the post-Apollo programme. It should not be forgotten that the shuttle and Spacelab are vehicles whose worth must be assessed on the basis of what they carry. If there is no satellite application programme, for example for aerial communications, maritime communications, earth and maritime resources research satellites and scientific satellite programmes, the space shuttle and Spacelab will not give the results expected of them.

This is why I emphasised, in the third paragraph of the recommendation, the need to work out a long-term European space policy and draw up, with the United States, an advanced space programme for future joint payload development for the Spacelab and the shuttle. I hope that the Senate committee will wish to move in the direction I have just indicated.

In oceanography, Europe must be better organised than it has been so far, and it might be well if our Committee made a careful study of the opportunities available in this field. This is why our Committee has now named Mr. Carter, a man of talent, as the person who will be our future Rapporteur.

France is the only country where oceanographic activities are organised in a rational way which will allow of international co-operation. In the United States, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Bureau co-ordinates all work in these fields. It is regrettable that Europe, which devotes large sums to oceanography, has not managed to achieve greater co-ordination.

In the second paragraph of the recommendation I therefore ask the Council to "give active consideration to Europe's need for an oceanographic authority of its own... in the framework of an existing European organisation".

The disinclination of our governments to create new organisations is well known, and that is why I use the words "framework of an existing European organisation".

I shall be rather brief on the subject of the other fields of advanced technology in which

*Mr. de Montesquiou (continued)*

we collaborate with the Americans. To be sure, they are very important. For example, the Committee has for years been studying the difficulties encountered in Europe in drawing up a programme for informatics. Here, as everyone knows, the predominance of IBM is a matter for concern, particularly since it appears impossible to set up even one major European computer grouping. The difficulties are many, and it is first and foremost the European Community which should play a leading part in the harmonious development of the industry.

The same applies to electronics, except that the power of the States is in this field wider than in informatics.

On armaments production, it was laid down in 1956 that WEU should play a co-ordinating rôle. We should not forget this. Unfortunately, a lack of political will on the part of member governments has prevented WEU from fulfilling this task. It is clear that, under the Atlantic Alliance, all European countries are expected to co-operate with the United States, whereas the United States is not subject to a similar obligation. A two-way traffic has never been established.

However, the enormous cost of new weapons systems in the aeronautics field might encourage a trend towards joint United States-European production. For example, the Airbus is already fitted with General Electric engines, SNECMA is working on a ten-ton engine with the same firm, Concorde can also be fitted with American engines, but the Americans are so determined to retain the leadership that it is extremely difficult to achieve a form of co-operation serving the western world as a whole. Mr. Moss will not hold it against me for being so frank and perhaps even offending him, for I know that a man of his stature will agree that the Europeans, whom I am for once temporarily representing today, can tell him what they think. The European aeronautics industry is too important to become a mere producer under American licence. I understand perfectly well that in America, where there is extensive unemployment in the aerospace industry, there is little inclination to collaborate with the Europeans, but in the long run such collaboration will be vital for the western world and for its defence.

I would also like to point out that the economic situation in Europe is fundamentally different

from that in the United States, the Soviet Union or China since, apart from coal, Europe has to import all its raw materials and energy resources. It is not by exporting bicycles, textiles or perfume that the necessary funds can be raised for importing the raw materials and minerals which are essential to it.

In the recommendation which I am submitting to the members of WEU, therefore, it is proposed that an overall European policy in advanced technology should be developed in order to guarantee Western Europe's place in the world and foster fruitful co-operation with the United States.

Last of all I come to the draft resolution dealing with parliamentary collaboration on setting up a European technology assessment body. I think that the resolution is sufficiently explicit.

We are grateful to the American Congress for having shown us the way and so helping us parliamentarians, poorly equipped and not yet sufficiently developed on the technological plane, to assess the highly technical and complicated problems submitted to us by our governments. Without this assessment body how could we judge the political consequences of the problems to which advanced technology gives rise and analyse the probable consequences of the options selected? Obviously, such an organisation would be too expensive for each of our countries individually, but it must be possible to set it up on a European basis if this should prove necessary.

I hope that the Assembly will approve both the recommendation and the resolution I am submitting. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you Mr. de Montesquiou, for giving us your views.

I now call Mr. Moss, Senator and Chairman of the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences of the United States Senate.

It gives me great pleasure to see you with us here in this Assembly, where we have always co-operated in a spirit of great friendship with you and with your country. We are very glad to welcome you as the representative of a nation which has given considerable proof of its attachment to the cause of security, mutual friendship and peace.

You have the floor. (*Applause*)

Mr. MOSS (*Observer from the United States*). — Mr. President, it is a high privilege for me to participate in these proceedings and a singular honour to address this Assembly. I thank your President, Mr. Nessler, for inviting a member of the United States Senate to attend this session of your Assembly. I am grateful to Mr. Pierre de Montesquiou for urging me to attend.

My association with this Assembly began last spring. At that time some members of your Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, led by Chairman de Montesquiou, visited the United States. They met with the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences of which I am Chairman. Our discussions covered a wide range of topics on which your Committee has reported.

Today, I have been asked to speak on United States-European co-operation in space. In so doing, I hope to convey to you the importance with which my country regards co-operation with Europe. We believe that co-operation in space means sharing in the development of important new materials, new medical discoveries, new energy sources, better use of our limited resources, better communications, and much more.

During the early exciting and spectacular years of space, the technology was being developed to put satellites into orbit for communications and meteorology, send men to the moon, and begin the exploration of the planets and the stars. At the same time, the United States began its programme of international co-operation.

The 1958 law that created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) authorised it to engage in a programme of international co-operation. Indeed, it was the intention of the Congress that NASA vigorously pursue international co-operation in its programmes.

NASA began implementing its international programme immediately, and, less than a year later, reached an initial understanding with the United Kingdom to launch three Ariel satellites. This agreement set a pattern of co-operation that has continued to this day.

The United States has been or is partner to 380 international space agreements with Western Europe; 277 with the countries represented in this Assembly. These co-operative programmes

with Europe are not only undertaken for the sake of co-operation, but are an important part of the United States space programme. Examples are: the German Helios satellite, a co-operative programme with the United States, which is examining space near the sun, a region not available to any other satellite; Spacelab, which will play such an important rôle in the productive use and further exploration of space during the 1980s; and Aerosat, which will soon be needed by the international airlines for communication and traffic control.

When space exploration first began, not so many years ago, the primary motives were adventure, scientific investigation and national prestige, the realities of that time.

And so we cannot ignore the realities of these times.

Man has come to understand that he has achieved the frightening capability during the last twenty or thirty years of changing the natural environment of his planet. No longer can he ignore the pollution of the land, water and atmosphere. He recognises that natural resources, and particularly energy resources, are becoming scarce. He sees his cities deteriorating from unwise management and battered by natural forces such as floods, storms and earthquakes; he is concerned that food shortages threaten famine for millions. So it is inevitable that today our space programmes both in the United States and Western Europe, are heavily oriented to "problem solving".

Meteorological satellites are adding a new dimension to our understanding of the weather and giving better warning of storms. Continued improvement will lead to an understanding of the subtle effects that make the difference between good and bad weather. Then, perhaps relatively small inputs of energy at the precise time and place in the atmosphere could permit some control over the weather.

Communications satellites have tied the earth's countries together and are now appearing in domestic use. They will soon carry the majority of the world's radio, telephone, television, and data transmissions. Navigation and traffic control for vehicles on the land, sea and air will increasingly rely on space systems.

Earth resource satellites print out an image of the earth's surface every few weeks throughout the year. They are giving us the ability

*Mr. Moss (continued)*

better to manage our farm lands and natural resources, locate new sources of water, minerals and energy, aid in land use and urban planning, and help keep a watchful eye on the environment.

The technology for remote sensing of the earth by satellites, even in this experimental stage, has exceeded expectations in providing practical benefits. The earth technology satellites — Landsat 1 and Landsat 2 — have demonstrated that the data they provide — properly analysed — can assist in the solution of both national and international problems. Recently it was proposed on the floor of the United States Senate that the United States, in co-operation with the other countries of the world, develop a worldwide ability to monitor crops with a satellite system in order to provide timely and accurate inventories of the world's agricultural production.

The value of Landsat data has been quickly recognised by governments and scientists throughout the world. Now more than forty-five nations and five international organisations are co-operating on earth resources projects of mutual interest. Six nations — Brazil, Canada, Chile, Iran, Italy and Zaire — have agreements with the United States to establish ground stations to acquire and process Landsat data at their expense. These stations will provide coverage of South America and almost all of Western Europe, Africa and Western Asia.

All of these agreements are based upon observing the United States policy of open dissemination of information and of the partners assisting other nations with training in the analysis and use of Landsat data.

All of the processed Landsat data today are available at minimum cost from the United States Geological Survey Centre at Sioux Falls, South Dakota. United States policy on open sharing of this data is based upon our national law and treaty commitments.

In particular the 1967 treaty on principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies provides for open dissemination of information. United States international commitments are consistent with this treaty.

Notwithstanding the benefits of Landsat 1 and Landsat 2 resting on a firm foundation of tech-

nology and law, some restrictive legal proposals were made in the United Nations. These would have the effect of limiting benefits that could be derived from the acquisition and dissemination of remote sensing data. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space strongly endorsed the May 1975 report of its Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee. This report calls for "dissemination of all data and information to all countries on an equal and non-discriminatory basis". Also, this report recognises the potential of remote sensing for benefiting the international community as a whole, the importance of co-ordination and exchange of data between regional centres, and the possibility of developing a global centre to handle all the data. Fortunately this report will be considered by the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space when it considers draft proposals on remote sensing during its meeting in May 1976.

It is important to note that the 1967 treaty on outer space, United States policy on the management of data from remote sensing, and the trend in the United Nations are all in harmony. Consequently, this is not the time to enter into legal or institutional agreements that will impede the progress of space technology. It is my hope that the countries of Europe will continue to support, with the United States, the policy of openness.

This policy will be further tested with the advent of the space shuttle and Spacelab. Early in this decade the United States decided to develop the space shuttle. An important part of that system is Europe's Spacelab.

The space shuttle consists of four large elements clustered together. These are a large expendable fuel tank, large twin recoverable solid rocket boosters and the manned orbiter vehicle. It will be a reusable space vehicle operated as a transportation system between earth and near space, carrying scientific and application payloads of all kinds that weigh up to about 29,000 kilograms or 65,000 pounds. It is being designed to fly at least 100 missions without major overhaul. On returning to earth the orbiter will land on a conventional runway very much like current winged aircraft. The crew of the space shuttle will travel in a shirt-sleeve environment and undergo a maximum stress of only three times the force of gravity.

The programme is on schedule for the first shuttle flights in 1980. Development and operating costs are within projected limits.

*Mr. Moss (continued)*

The United States Congress has strongly supported the space shuttle programme and I believe that it will continue to do so. The space shuttle will make access to the environment of space routine.

Of enormous importance to the use of space in the 1980s is Europe's Spacelab. It will provide the capability necessary to realise the true potential of the shuttle. As a versatile laboratory and observatory, Spacelab will substantially reduce the cost of space experimentation and observation. More importantly, it will reduce the time necessary to prepare space experiments and equipment. Most important of all, it will provide for a truly international space programme.

Under the terms of the joint agreement, the United States will procure from the European Space Agency any additional Spacelab units of the same basic design needed for United States programmes and the United States will not develop any unit of its own which would substantially duplicate the design and capabilities of Spacelab. The schedule calls for the first operational space flight of Spacelab to be a very early mission of the space shuttle in 1980.

The United States is pleased with the European performance on Spacelab. Substantial issues have had to be worked out, as expected, and they have been worked out very well in our view. We can expect further difficult interfaces on so complex an undertaking, but I am confident that ESA and NASA will work them out.

Europe's Spacelab will be a unique place for carrying out experiments. To understand this, we must look at space as a new environment free of gravity, free of earth's vibrations, an almost perfect vacuum with very low or very high temperatures. All of this will be available directly for man's use in Spacelab.

This means that the payloads must be planned with a whole new approach to their design, construction and operation. Indeed NASA and ESA are now doing that in their joint planning of the first Spacelab payload.

Space is a place for discoveries in science and technology. For example, in providing an environment free from the masking effects of gravity, previously hidden characteristics of materials will be revealed. Therefore, Spacelab

will give us a new understanding of the physical properties of materials.

Such research will impact whole industries. Without the interference of gravity, it will be possible to create entirely new metal alloys. As they become economically attractive, we can expect that the relative value of metals may shift.

Flawless crystals have already been grown in the weightless, vibration-free environment of space. I do not doubt that there will be an industry devoted to growing such large crystals in space and sending them down to earth for use by the electronics and electric power industry.

It is expected that vaccines of extraordinary high purity can be produced in space by a technique known as electrophoresis. While this technique has been used on earth, the vibration and convection currents present in earthbound fluids prevent separation of the vaccine from impurities.

For the scientific and engineering resources of this coming age to be routinely available, preparation must begin now. Such planning should be taken up in the scientific and technical communities of Europe and the United States and of other nations who wish to utilise the shuttle system.

To enhance this planning process at the grass roots level of science and engineering, I recently wrote the Administrator of NASA, Dr. James C. Fletcher, requesting that the agency secure the maximum involvement of the scientific and engineering communities, of the United States and from abroad. Their involvement is necessary to determine how the space environment can best be used to solve problems that plague us here on earth, and how this new capability should best be used to advance science and technology. To accomplish this task, NASA will consult a broad spectrum of scientists and engineers. I hope that the scientists and engineers from Western Europe will play a substantial rôle in this effort.

Such joint planning is already taking place. Let me give you an example. In the United States there is great concern that some chemicals — principally chlorofluorocarbons and nitrous oxide — being released into the atmosphere are slowly diffusing up into the stratosphere and there, through complicated photochemical processes, are causing the ozone in the stratosphere to be depleted. The depletion of stratospheric

*Mr. Moss (continued)*

ozone is of concern because ozone filters out most of the ultraviolet radiation that is harmful to life on earth.

Consequently, the Congress directed NASA to carry out a research programme with the domestic and international scientific and engineering communities. To do this, NASA formed an advisory committee to give it advice on how to proceed with such a programme. A few weeks ago, that advisory committee met, and sitting with it were three prominent European scientists. Professor Nicolet of Belgium, Professor Blamont of France and Professor Haughton of the United Kingdom.

But the engineers and scientists will do more than just determine how the environment of space will be used. They also will go into space on board the space shuttle as researchers. That is, they will ride the shuttle into space and carry out their experiments in Spacelab. Just about anyone in good health with very little training should be able to do so.

I predict that Spacelab will be a most significant accomplishment for space science and technology. Clearly it will be the forerunner of much larger and more permanent space stations.

Tentative thinking about the terms and conditions for the use of the space shuttle system should be of interest. In accordance with the President's statement of October 1972, its use will be on a non-discriminatory basis with priority for those countries contributing to its development. In determining the cost to users, the United States will seek recovery of direct and indirect operating costs only, excluding research and development expenses. Such a policy would take into account payload weight, volume and the services required without regard to the presence or absence of other payloads carried on the same mission.

It is anticipated that the policy will allow users paying their way to retain proprietary rights to inventions and discoveries in order to encourage commercial use of space.

NASA, of course, will have to know enough about the mission to satisfy our international commitments and policies with regard to the peaceful purposes of use and to ensure flight safety.

Most of what I have said has dealt with the applications of space technology. While I believe that is where the major emphasis will be during the next fifteen years, the space shuttle, and particularly Spacelab, will provide enormous opportunities for the scientific community to use the space environment for scientific investigations. This is important, because if our joint space effort is to succeed, it must also provide for the needs of the human spirit. The challenge of science is to comprehend the universe and to find man's place within it.

I would expect that space science, or, more accurately, the practice of science in space, will continue to play a substantial rôle in our space programme. And I would hope that Europe and the United States, while of necessity having to concentrate on applications projects to meet contemporary needs, will not abandon space science or lose the vision and imagination that have been so important to our achievements to date.

Science and technology are not worlds apart. Consequently in many space applications science plays a strong rôle — for example, the development of new energy sources.

With the fossil fuels and uranium heading for depletion, our governments are giving serious attention to solar energy to meet long-range energy needs. Terrestrial solar energy will have a place in supplying these needs, but solar energy will be much more useful as an energy source if it can be collected constantly and in large amounts. This is impossible to do on the earth's surface because of the atmosphere, the day-night cycle and the requirement of vast open uninhabited, pollution-free land. None of these restrictions is found in space. Large solar arrays could be positioned in orbits so that they are continually above the same points on the earth's surface. From these positions they could beam energy at microwave frequencies to collecting stations on the earth's surface. Several such space solar power systems have already been defined and analysed.

Space solar power systems may not be the total answer to our energy needs, but they should be considered. I would like to see Europe and the United States work jointly on such a programme. If we had placed the same emphasis years ago on solar energy that we have put into the development of a nuclear generating capability, we might be well along the road to solving our energy shortages.

*Mr. Moss (continued)*

A review of joint United States-European space activities would not be complete without mentioning the continued availability of the United States space launching capability. Let me assure you — pending the development of your own independent launching capability — that you are welcome to utilise the United States launch capability. The policy of the United States is to provide launch assistance on a fully reimbursable, non-profit basis, to other countries and organisations where the spacecraft are to be used for peaceful purposes.

With respect to this availability of United States launch vehicles and services, let me make several points. First, there has never been an occasion when a European nation or any of its international organisations has been denied launch services by the United States. Second, the United States experience in providing the Europeans with launch vehicles has been excellent. The launch vehicle policy as implemented to date has enjoyed wide acceptance. Third, the United States Congress has never insisted on any restriction other than that we meet our international commitments to use space for peaceful purposes and that there be fair and equitable reimbursement. Fourth, the President of the United States had declared that the capability of the United States is available to all nations on a non-discriminatory and reimbursable basis to launch spacecraft for peaceful purposes.

In making this statement, the President included a series of conditions. These conditions relate solely to international communications satellite systems separate from Intelsat. The conditions do not apply to domestic communications or to military communications systems. Even in the case of these conditions, there are provisions for the United States to agree to provide launch services for systems competing with Intelsat. I cannot foresee any situation in which so serious a problem would arise between Europe and the United States wherein the United States would not provide Europe with a space launching capability.

In all the previous discussion, a matter of overriding importance is the availability of funds to carry out the programme. For fiscal year 1976 the Congress has provided \$3,543 million for the NASA programme. Although this is only \$4 million less than was requested by

the President, it is clear that space funding has decreased substantially during the last ten years. Not only has the amount of dollars decreased, but inflation has eaten greatly into its value. In terms of buying power, the United States space programme today is only one-third as big as it was ten years ago.

The economy and the effects of inflation, recession, and unemployment experienced in the United States during the past five years and continuing today are the prime concern of every member of Congress just as they are here in Western Europe. While United States and European inflation rates are somewhere near the same during 1975, our unemployment rate is substantially higher. Our federal deficit this year will exceed \$70,000 million.

Not only is the debt structure of the United States — Federal, State and corporate — enormous, but the capital needed for America to continue to grow is even more astounding. The estimate is that the United States will need the incredible sum of \$4.5 billion in new capital funds during the next ten years. That capital for the most part will have to come from the savings of the people and the profits of business.

Two things are clear to me. One is that, while economists might understand economics, they do not understand arithmetic. A few days ago one political wit noted that even the economy is doing better than the economists. The second thing that is clear is that we as political leaders must find the ways and means to bring about a more stable economy. Most important for the United States is to reduce unemployment to below 5%. But running a close second is the necessity to stop the inflation.

What does this have to do with the exploration and use of space? The answer is that our space programmes create new commercial activity, new wealth and new jobs. Let me give a small example, using communications. Only seventeen years ago, in December 1958, we heard the first transmittal of the human voice from space. Only ten years ago the first commercial communication satellite was launched and provided 240 circuits. Yet, during that brief period — less than a generation — an entire new communications industry has come into being with a worldwide capital investment that now exceeds \$1,000 million and provides jobs for thousands of people.

*Mr. Moss (continued)*

Today 91 countries are members of Intelsat. The system supports hundreds of communication links girdling the earth with eight satellites in orbit and 92 earth stations in 65 countries, including the Soviet Union and China. Under the best conditions, the system now has 16,000 circuits to provide telephone, television, data and facsimile service. With the new satellites, like Intelsat IVA, now being launched, this capability will be doubled. Not only has this system made communication easier between the peoples and governments of the world, but it has permitted user costs to be reduced by more than 50 %.

Another benefit, not often noticed, is the reduced use of important materials. A communications satellite that provides thousands of telephone circuits over the Atlantic Ocean uses a few kilograms of copper. A cable system providing a fraction of that capability would use thousands of tons. Yet this is only the beginning of the use of satellites for communications purposes. Domestic satellite communication systems are being established all over the globe. A new system, Aerosat, to provide communications for transatlantic airline flights, is under development by your European Space Agency and the Comsat Corporation of the United States. Similarly, both Europe and the United States are developing maritime communications satellite systems — an area where more co-operation is needed between us.

It has been estimated that in fifteen years there will be 100 million people at any moment using some kind of satellite communications. These communications systems could generate revenues of \$10,000 million a year. This activity would require thousands of millions of dollars in capital investment, create millions of jobs and be of enormous benefit to society — a single example of what can be expected from our space programmes. Clearly our space programmes are essential to our growth.

Mr. President, you and the honourable members of this Assembly have been most kind and generous with your time in permitting me to address you on the important subject of our joint co-operative efforts in space. That joint space effort is broad, aggressive and growing. It is well supported in the United States and I know that is so in your countries as well. For our people and the rest of mankind to continue

to receive the benefits of this magnificent undertaking, politicians like ourselves must support it. I hope we shall give it the support it needs. Thank you. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — On behalf of the Assembly and myself, I have to thank you again, Senator Moss, for your excellent address. Thank you with all my heart and I hope we may see you here in Paris again, working together with our Assembly, for it is only joint labour among the nations, and especially between America and Europe, that can really bring about an improved situation for the countries of the whole world. Thank you once more, Senator.

I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — It is only right that I, as Chairman of the Committee, should express my very sincere thanks and feelings of gratitude to Mr. Moss.

I do not want to go into the details of his statement, but there is one first matter that gratifies all of us, whatever our opinions may be, whatever religious beliefs we may hold and wherever our loyalties may lie: it is to tell Mr. Moss, who represents America, that thanks to communications satellites, all peoples of the world understand one another better and are able to exchange among themselves and as a result of détente, all that is dear to them, humanly speaking. That is the first tribute I wished to pay you, and I think it is a feeling shared by us all.

Next, I wanted to pay tribute to you for what you said about energy sources, solar or geothermal, for you have sensed the deep anxiety of all Europe's inhabitants about the energy crisis. I believe that if we can obtain energy through satellites using solar power and by the harnessing of geothermal forces at ground level, we might weather the crisis we all fear.

I think you are going to be asked questions possibly far more delicate, for you know that our bird, the European aircraft, Concorde, gives employment to hundreds of thousands of workers in Europe — one hundred thousand in France, two hundred thousand in Britain and two hundred thousand in Europe. They expect the United States to authorise Concorde to land. These are questions that are certainly

*Mr. de Montesquiou (continued)*

going to be asked from the floor of the Assembly, for we are very worried, myself in particular, as the representative of a department which forms part of Gascony, about the future of all these workers.

I know that America, which has always set an example by the Marshall plan and in general, in humane feelings and mutual aid, cannot leave Europe, with all its workers, in poverty and anxiety. Thank you, Mr. Moss.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We now come to the questions for Mr. Moss.

I call Mr. Richter, whom I beg to be brief, for a lot of people have put their names down to speak.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. Moss has addressed us here with great cordiality, cordiality of a kind that we have encountered so frequently not only in this Assembly but also on our visits to the United States. He knows with what wonderment Europe has always regarded the United States' futuristic technology. He knows that we have done important pioneering work in the past, in the space research field, too, an area to which he is particularly committed. The second world war and the years that followed it and the rather unhappy episode of ELDO have held us back a little.

The Senator has given us a highly optimistic assessment today on the chances of co-operation and was so kind as to praise the level of European achievement — in connection with Spacelab, for example.

I have two questions to put to him. One of these of course relates to Spacelab. It was this Assembly that urged the setting-up of the European Space Agency, the co-ordination of all European efforts, so as to become a partner with the United States of America. The result is a coherent European space programme, in which Spacelab plays as important a rôle as Ariane or Marots or other projects which we are able to cope with at the European level. Senator Moss is the Chairman of such an important committee that he is able both to control the timing and to appreciate the quality of European work. My question to him is this — is he very optimistic that a programme which makes

such exacting demands on everyone — it includes docking manoeuvres that are even more complicated than the Apollo manoeuvres — will be successful in 1980 ?

And I have a second question that he may perhaps not wish to answer — but this Assembly is of course particularly interested in the military aspects. Are there, in this sphere of space technology, interests that are of importance from the military point of view ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Moss.

Mr. MOSS (*Observer from the United States*). — In reply to Mr. Richter's questions, I am optimistic about our being able to co-ordinate space work and Spacelabs so that they will be properly interfaced and so that we shall be able to launch projects on time. As I said in my earlier remarks, we are on time with the space shuttle and we have every reason to believe that it will be ready on time. We are working closely with the European Space Agency on the Spacelab and we have every hope and every reason to believe that we shall be able to complete the interfacing and that the Spacelab will be able to fly on time.

We do not see any serious problems lying ahead, although that is not to say that there will be no problems. There are always problems in technological developments such as this one. When one is developing two pieces of equipment separately which are to be interfaced, there are bound to be difficult times, but we do not see any difficulty that we shall not be able to overcome. We have every reason to believe that the European Space Agency is carrying out its duty fully and vigorously and we have every hope of success. Certainly I feel optimistic.

Mr. Richter's second question was devoted to the question whether there was any military connotation, use or fallout of any sort associated with the shuttle programme. I must answer in the negative. Not only is NASA directed in our law to work towards peaceful uses of space, but we are also forbidden to co-operate with any other body or group in any way unless the use of space is to be for peaceful purposes. The Spacelab is an excellent example of activity in which we wish to be sure that any experimentation to be carried out is not military in purpose but is for the peaceful uses of space. The only part of the programme that might

*Mr. Moss (continued)*

involve restraint of use in the shuttle might arise if we felt, after examining the programme, that any experiment or use had a military connotation and might be devoted to some aggressive or defensive factor.

For this reason our space programme is more separate than is the case in the Soviet Union where there is no distinction between civilian and military operations. I believe that if our whole space programme had been put together in the United States, in some sense it might have gone ahead more rapidly, but we maintain the distinction between the military and civilian aspects. I speak only for NASA. I do not speak at all for the military side of activities.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cornelissen.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*). — It has again been a great pleasure not only to see but to listen to Mr. Moss. Can he tell us when we may expect the results of the important study on the possible harmful effects of supersonic flight on the ozone layer which is essential for our life on earth? Could he give us some idea of the feelings of Republicans and Democrats about the possible introduction of commercial supersonic air traffic to and from the United States? Would it not be logical to delay a decision on these flights until we are sure that there is no reason for serious concern about their effect on the ozone layer?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Moss.

Mr. MOSS (*Observer from the United States*). — I cannot give a definite date when our monitoring will be complete and a final answer on the effect on the ozone layer will be available. We are actively pursuing this point now by means of satellites which we have in orbit. We are carefully monitoring the ozone layer and trying to measure the effect on it on a periodic basis. As soon as we can accumulate enough data, we shall issue a report but we have insufficient information at this stage.

The whole question of supersonic transport is not a political one at all. The objections to it are being raised by pressure groups who are very concerned about environmental factors, and

these groups cut across all party lines. A sizeable degree of concern is being expressed, and many people will go to any length to ensure that no damage is done to the atmosphere.

My own opinion is that there is no real threat from supersonic air transport. Military aircraft have flown at supersonic speeds over the United States to the extent, it is reported, of half a million hours, and it seems a little silly to me to work up such a lather about the landing of a few commercial aircraft which, after all, have dropped below supersonic speed by the time they come in to land. For this reason, I hope that we can take this experiment in our stride. I see the Concorde as the next step in aeronautics. There will be later generations of it, but this is the current one and we ought to use it during its lifetime and until further developments come along.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). — With regard to what Mr. Moss believes to be the importance for the future of satellites, I remember many years ago discussions with our American friends on the possibility of ridding ourselves of one of the most expensive elements of satellite work, the ground stations which boost the signal, since the energy source within satellites is a solar one. We discussed the importance of fitting some nuclear device which would give a much stronger power source and which would allow us to do away with the ground stations completely.

One of the objections at that time was that if we did that, by a simple adjustment to the ordinary television receivers in our countries we could receive a transmission from anywhere without let or hindrance. Years have gone by since those discussions and nothing has happened. Do I understand that America has dropped the concept of an alternative power source for the satellites? Has there ever been in America a nuclear device in a satellite for peaceful use and for the purpose I describe, or is there any intention of having such a device?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Moss.

Mr. MOSS (*Observer from the United States*). — We have done a good deal of development

*Mr. Moss (continued)*

to make more power available in satellites. For instance, the ATS-6, which uses solar power but nevertheless carries sufficient power up there so that the ground station can be a relatively simple antenna made of some chicken wire and a small receiver. The power is not on the ground but is coming down from the satellite itself. We have not abandoned the idea of using nuclear power sources and some of our spacecraft do have them. For example, Pioneers 10 and 11 that flew by Jupiter used nuclear isotope power sources because their journeys took them too far from the sun to use solar power.

I would observe, however, that we have been continuing our work in the solar field. I referred to it here because we have done so well with solar power. We are now ready for extensive research on the collection of large amounts of solar power to be channelled down to earth. This seems to me to be the next development. I have no particular aversion to nuclear power, but I do not think that it is necessary up there where the sun's rays are never blocked off.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — Like all of us here this afternoon, I was truly fascinated by Senator Moss's marvellous and extraordinary explanation of the work on satellite solar energy developments. Mr. Moss emphasised that the whole of his and his committee's activity was for peaceful purposes, otherwise they could not continue with the work they were doing. He rightly pointed out that if we could develop this system of energy internationally it would benefit all mankind and might well solve all our energy problems.

Although originally the Americans and the Russians did not co-operate in space travel, eventually they did. Have the Senator and his committee therefore considered co-operation with the Russians in solar energy development? If there is none now, is it likely to occur? After all, it could be a means of helping the Russians and the rest of the world and a way of tying us together to help prevent military conflict.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Moss.

Mr. MOSS (*Observer from the United States*). — Thank you, Mr. Lewis. As far as I am aware we do not at the present time have an agreement with the Russians dealing with solar power. However, we remain in contact with the Soviet Union and are trying to identify problems in which we can co-operate. I can say that our Apollo-Soyuz link-up was thoroughly successful and that after a hard start we finally got total co-operation from the Russians. We felt fully satisfied with that experiment, and apparently they did, too.

My personal feeling is that we may well have future co-operation with the Russians. I am thinking particularly of the situation since we developed the technique of being able to bring vehicles together. We are looking towards space stations which might be put together in modules, possibly with the Russians doing part. If we do that with both of us occupying a space station for peaceful purposes, then we shall have taken a great step forward in dealing with the Soviet Union.

I liken it to what has gone on in Antarctica. It will be remembered that during Geophysical Year, some years ago, we had a five-year agreement on non-military equipments on that continent, on exchange of information, and so on. I had a chance to visit that area, and the agreement worked beautifully. Russians were in our station and we were in theirs with Japanese, Argentinians, British, New Zealanders and many others. There was complete open access.

I just hope that now we are moving towards a space station which will be available not only to the Soviet Union and to the United States but to everyone else. As a layman I can talk about doing these things and leave it to the scientists to get them done. If we can get a solar experiment working, this may be the place for our first arrangement of this kind, on a space station.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Lord Peddie.

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — I would thank Mr. Moss for his vivid and interesting account of technological development in the United States. I am particularly appreciative of his statement to my colleagues that that policy is based upon the open dissemination of information and open sharing of results. That

*Lord Peddie (continued)*

is a most significant statement. I would ask Mr. Moss whether he would explain the formula upon which it is based, because I am conscious of the vast sums of money that the United States must of necessity spend upon technological development. How do they reconcile that expenditure with the policy of open dissemination? What is the particular policy that determines the extent, nature and character of that open policy?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Moss.

Mr. MOSS (*Observer from the United States*). — The policy of the United States at this time, which I am sure will continue, is that she is willing to bear the research and development costs of satellite systems. From there on, when they are used, we expect reimbursement. For example, in launching a satellite for Britain, France or anyone else, we would expect reimbursement of the direct and indirect cost of the launch but not reimbursement to cover any of the research and development expenses up to that point.

It is the same with our Landsat read-outs that we keep at Sioux Falls, South Dakota. They are available to anyone who wants to be able to read out there at what is a nominal price because we are charging only for the operation of the station that is now receiving them and the materials that go into it. We do not charge for the research and development to put up the satellite in the first place. In that sense we have absorbed part of the cost, but since we undertook this for other purposes as well as serving our neighbours, we feel that that expenditure properly belongs to us and we can absorb it. We have done so and will do so, and we shall not try to charge the cost of research and development.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Moss, let me say to you just five words in English: I thank you very much! (*Applause*)

I am going to call those whose names are down to speak in the debate.

I call Mr. Cornelissen to speak for ten minutes.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — It is a special pleasure for me, Mr. President, to congratulate Mr. de Montesquiou on his outstanding report on our Committee's visit to the United States between 17th and 21st March last, and in particular on the talks we had while over there with a number of American Senators. It is a privilege for us to have Senator Moss here with us today.

You will not be surprised that I endorse the idea expressed here that Europe, as Europe, should seek co-operation with the United States. It is plain that if we deal with the United States as individual nations we are virtually always in a difficult position, because the United States is not a country in the European sense of the word, but a whole continent. It is, moreover, a continent where an enormous amount of knowledge and skill has been amassed in all sorts of fields. It is true that in the field of the aircraft industry, for instance, America has learned a great deal from Europe, but it is equally true that this happened more than forty years ago, and since then American industry and the American scientific world have gone ahead on their own, and have applied the knowledge gained on a vast industrial scale.

Nowadays the situation is such that individual European countries are very often trying to negotiate a special contract with America, without consulting their partners in the Community or in other groupings. Is it not, for example, significant that the *Economist* of 29th November, writing about British economy cuts in the defence budget and, in this connection, about cutbacks in the purchasing of the MRCA, suggests blandly that in this case the F-15 should be bought? There was not even a mention of consultation with other MRCA partners such as Germany and Italy.

Not a word, either, about consultation with France, which is known to be thinking about building a new aircraft for its air force. Nor was anything said about the desperate plight the British aircraft industry would then be in.

I am sorry the Committee's Chairman and Rapporteur has not gone into this rather more deeply. In paragraph 12 and the following paragraphs, he talks about the energy problems that need to be solved, together with America, within the OECD framework. He does not, however, say that France, by refusing to be a member of the International Energy Agency, is making

*Mr. Cornelissen (continued)*

consultation in this OECD framework extremely difficult.

Another point open to criticism is the paragraph that refers to computers. The Rapporteur deplores the fact that it has not been possible to set up a European computer centre. But he leaves out of account the fact that Unidata did exist, and included the French Government company CII, Philips and Siemens. The French Government however — as far as I understand it — forced CII to enter into a contract with Honeywell Bull, an American firm, and let Unidata drop, with the potential result of several thousand people becoming unemployed, in the Netherlands for example. It is clear that so long as the Europeans cannot bring themselves to consult with their immediate European partners first of all, before they turn to America, it is no good talking about an independent Europe.

I am sorry, too, that the Rapporteur has not made clear his views about the financial and economic consultations that West Germany, France, Britain and Italy had at Rambouillet last month with, among others, the United States and Japan. I feel the Rapporteur has missed his chance of condemning in round terms this "get-together" among the big powers from which the smaller EEC countries were excluded. Perhaps he can do so in his reply; it would certainly lend more credibility to his report.

I agree with the Chairman and Rapporteur that things are better arranged in the field of space research. Here at least the countries have realised that contacts with America need to be in collaboration with the new European Space Agency.

I am very glad to see the third paragraph of the draft recommendation, which calls for a long-term plan so that in the 1980s the best possible use can be made of the Spacelab and shuttle.

I think it was a sound idea, Mr. President, to give a special place in the report to oceanography, to which I think the Committee must pay more attention. This is another point on which Europe is very divided, and there is no really effective organisation to deal with it. I would call especially on Britain and Italy to change their hesitant attitude to this subject.

Next year will see the world conference on the law of the sea, which is of great importance for our western security and economy. I would mention the problems between Britain and Iceland, and the difficulties the Norwegians are having with the Soviet Union. We must try, at this conference, to take a common line; if we do not manage to do so, things in oceanography will go the same way as with computers.

The great merit of this report lies in the fact that these matters have at last been set out clearly. Here I would like, Mr. President, to look at what is written in paragraphs 42 and 43 about the way that means of communication can intrude into the private life of the citizen. We discussed this already in Canada, and the outcome of that discussion can be found in the report from my fellow-countryman Mr. van Ooijen, Document 649.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to say a few words about the draft resolution on a European office to help members of parliament form an opinion about the consequences that certain measures in the technological sphere that are proposed by our governments could have for the ordinary voters they represent. It would be interesting if such an office could one day check on the likely results of the proposal put forward in Mr. Lenzer's report, that we should hasten to build second- and third-generation nuclear reactors in our countries. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Lenzer.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to take up just one small aspect of the highly informative report by our Committee Chairman, Mr. de Montesquiou. This is the problem of what the English call technology assessment, which lies behind the draft resolution on the third page.

I should say that the problem is bound to crop up time and again in our national parliaments in the future, since we must assume that research and technology policy will increasingly influence national policies, and that as new growth industries spring up others will lose their previously dominant traditional rôles — a development that will drastically affect structural policy in every country.

It might be well if we devoted some thought to why the State should have a research and

*Mr. Lenzer (continued)*

development policy at all, and in this case a research and technology policy. A distinction can be made here. First of all, we have fundamental research which — now with the exception of industrial activities — is financed almost exclusively by the State, as it serves more or less to expand our scientific knowledge without aiming at any direct commercial application, without any specific market orientation, without the kind of market orientation to be found in the other sector, namely in project research or in applied research. This is carried out chiefly through industry — with the support of the State — and in the sort of major State-financed research centres that are to be found in all member States.

Why then have a State research policy? Why State backing for research? And this leads on to the question of technology assessment, to the question of evaluating technological developments. First, because all these projects require a substantial injection of capital; secondly, because these projects involve long-term capital investment: and lastly, because there can be absolutely no expectation of profit in the foreseeable future — and profit is of course always very important for commercial activities. This means that no projects can be started up, even if they might be of great value to the community, unless the State gives a helping hand. It may be said, therefore, that the State encourages research and technology in places where the risks for private industry are such that nothing would happen without the State, no matter how great the social need.

And now we come to the question whether parliaments, whether parliamentarians, whether anyone amongst us is in a position to evaluate such projects on the basis of his own knowledge of the subject? In other words, is our knowledge of the subject sufficient for us to undertake a genuine assessment of technological developments?

Let me try to define technology assessment. In very simple terms, we could say that it is the evaluation of all the positive and negative consequences, direct and indirect, which a project may have on social progress. And I should like to say at this point that in this matter the legislature — the parliaments — is far from being a match for the executive. We are in fact concerned here with constitutional problems at

two levels. What is involved on the plane of pure constitutional law is, if I may say so, the relationship between executive and legislature; most initiatives come, as we know, from governments. When we come to the practical application of the constitution, the problem becomes more or less one of the relationship between the government plus the parliamentary majority on the one hand and the opposition on the other.

I should like to draw on my own parliament, the German Bundestag, for an example illustrating how an expert committee there discusses a project of this kind. Let us say that the Federal Government comes forward with a proposal in the Bundestag. This is then referred by the parliament as a whole to the expert committee, and here the Federal Government again takes part, more or less as referee in its own case. I doubt if in these circumstances it is still possible to talk of separation of powers. One wonders whether it is still possible to talk at all of parliament controlling the government, whether the committee has not become more or less a rubber stamp for the government in office — and that irrespective of the latter's composition.

This problem is not peculiar to any one country, but is general to the way these matters are handled in the parliaments of present-day industrialised societies.

Consequently the same topic came up for discussion at the Council of Europe's Parliamentary and Scientific Conference on 12th-14th November 1975. I would just like to draw your attention to a number of recommendations that were put forward there in this connection. May I briefly quote from the paper? Referring to the strengthening of the decision-making powers of the parliaments in relation to those of the executives, it recommends:

“That parliaments should have access through common European facilities to modern information and analytical systems in order that they may exercise their functions of scrutiny and control in a more effective manner at national and European levels;

Furthermore, that these facilities should be so developed as to make possible the creation of a long-term technology forecasting and assessment instrument to serve European parliaments, so that parliamentarians can have access through common facilities to objective information.”

*Mr. Lenzer (continued)*

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am sure we shall meet this subject again on more than one occasion in the future. There was, for instance, a motion by my own party, the Christian Democrats/Christian Socialists, in the German Bundestag, which unfortunately failed to get the necessary parliamentary majority two weeks ago. But it will perhaps be possible by discussing this topic in connection with Mr. de Montequiou's report today to encourage the national parliaments to devote more time to the problem in the future.

*(Sir John Rodgers, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Bettiol)*

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Lenzer.

I now call Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). — I, too, congratulate Senator Moss on his excellent presentation. It was a particular joy to me. I first met Mr. Moss many years ago in his home town in Utah, when he was trying to grapple with the problem of why 5,000 sheep had died. I was able to help him a little. I will try later to explain to my good friend Mr. Lenzer the connection between those sheep and water reactors.

Although I accept the need to push our governments to do more — obviously they must reorganise themselves to achieve objectives — the report fails to identify the work already done. As we keep calling for more action to be taken, we run the risk of never taking stock of what we have achieved.

Paragraph 2 calls for a new authority. There is already a group of nineteen Western European countries working on the establishment of a European network of ocean stations. We already have the EEC Committee on Scientific and Technological Research, which is studying areas of research and development, starting with the calibration of oceanography equipment. The United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Japan and Russia are investigating international ocean drilling. So, generally, EEC countries are closely watching the need for international bodies to formulate set rules for such activities in the ocean. Next year's law of the sea conference will undoubtedly make pronouncements on international requirements.

Paragraph 1 goes further along the road to establishing another authority. I wonder whe-

ther that will achieve anything. Past experience suggests that it will not. The European Space Agency has many years of work available to it. The flight of Spacelab is projected for 1980 and there are agreements between European governments and the ESA on providing for the continuing examination of its work after the end of the present development programme. After the flight, ESA, with the approval of governments, will start studying the further development of Spacelab. So the paper is a little pessimistic on this aspect. I hope that we shall start to press ahead with what we already have under way and stimulate the enthusiasm of our governments, rather than ask them to make commitments before that is necessary.

I have many reservations about the proposal to set up a European technology assessment body. I do not disagree that, as parliamentarians, we require much more information on technology in a wider setting so as to make our judgments on decisions by our governments, but the interesting reference in the report is to the United States' experience. They set up an Office of Technology Assessment in 1973, with great enthusiasm. Politicians looked upon it as one of the tablets from Mount Sinai, but in the last two years they have discovered that such inquiries are costly if they are to produce useful results. Second, and more important, it is difficult to find out what one wants to know. The difficulty for the Office of Technology Assessment is in selecting areas of examination and then funding the studies. I am advised that every study it undertook cost about £250,000.

In many ways, therefore, this recommendation should be considered more carefully.

The final problem is that as parliamentarians we want the answers rapidly. We do not want to have to wait too long for studies. Governments are not in the habit of waiting for parliamentarians to make their observations. By the time the information became available it would be too late to take action. If the words "to study the possibility" mean what I think they mean, I am prepared to accept the report, so long as it is understood that any commitment is much too early and that the American experience should be considered a little longer before we commit ourselves.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Brown, for those queries and reservations, which I am sure are very valuable.

I now call Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I want, Mr. President, to emphasise the importance of one part of Mr. de Montesquiou's report — that entitled (v) Armaments production, from paragraph 44 to 50. This text sets out in succinct and down-to-earth terms just what the difficulties are in bringing about effective co-operation between the United States and the countries of Western Europe in the area of armaments production. I would recommend those of my colleagues who are not members of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, and who have perhaps not had time to examine Mr. de Montesquiou's report, to read these seven paragraphs. Reference should, of course, be made to what Minister Van Elslande said on this and associated topics at the Assembly's meeting in Bonn. The WEU Council of Ministers was, we heard from the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, ready to take quite far-reaching initiatives towards achieving greater European unity in the field of weapons manufacture.

I was very pleased to hear Mr. Moersch repeat this morning what he had already said in Bonn on this subject. What he told us was wholly in line with Mr. Van Elslande's comments, and he went even further in expressing a so far unfulfilled wish that there should be a body set up to improve the way the European weapons industry is organised. His answer to my question this morning might have been more precise about future timing, but the matter is still live. This issue goes beyond the terms of reference of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions; but our Committee does have a rôle to play in it. This debate gives me the opportunity to urge my view that we should examine the desirability of an institutional framework for a joint European arms industry. We would then inevitably have to decide where and how the Eurogroup and/or another, new group should do its work. Developments in recent days prove how difficult it is to make progress in this area. So we are fooling ourselves if we think that something as tricky as European and European-American co-operation on arms manufacture is going to come about spontaneously and of its own accord, without any initiatives of a structural nature.

This cannot be said so explicitly in the draft recommendation and resolution we are now discussing, because Mr. de Montesquiou's report has a wider remit; yet it does contain the arguments that support my case.

Finally, to follow a different line of thought I would ask this Assembly not to underestimate the importance of certain initiatives, such as a move by Europe towards greater activity in the field of oceanography, featured in the second paragraph of the recommendation. It seems to me that this proposal must in normal circumstances lead to co-operating with the United States on oceanographic research. I would, for the rest, go along with the remarks made by Mr. Cornelissen.

At a time when Western European Union is having difficulty in affirming its *raison d'être*, it is proposals like these on European collaboration that can counteract the decline of WEU. It has been found, time and time again, that from this viewpoint the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions makes an outstanding contribution to the vitality of this institution of ours.

(*The speaker continued in French*)

I therefore find cause for satisfaction, Mr. President, in the fact that the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions occupies its rightful place in the agenda of the present WEU session. The promise made to us in Bonn by Mr. Nessler, at a time when we were less satisfied, has been kept. We thank the Chair and hope that our Committee will continue to fulfil its irreplaceable task in the future activities of the Assembly. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — I wish to thank Mr. de Bruyne for that valuable contribution.

The last speaker on my list is my colleague and friend, Lord Peddie, who has asked to speak for five minutes.

Lord PEDDIE (*United Kingdom*). — I shall not keep the Assembly long.

I read the report with interest and I did not intend to intervene until I heard Mr. de Montesquiou's remarks in presenting his report. I thought that his presentation was somewhat apologetic and that he did less than justice to developments that have taken place in Europe.

I agreed with his view that industry in Europe must find means of stimulating its own development and must not be an offshoot of American development. However, I felt that the presentation of the report contained one or two almost pathetic inadequacies in dealing with

*Lord Peddie (continued)*

certain subjects. That certainly applies to the subject of technology assessment — an area of activity offering enormous scope for profitable treatment, but one in which effort has been most disappointing. I could instance many cases in Europe in the past twenty years where there have been considerable co-operative developments that should have been recorded in the report.

One important development is an idea that originated in France twenty years ago envisaging the establishment of *agrément* boards in testing and certification procedures as applied to new materials and processes in the construction industry. That was a recognised method of assessment and the idea was extended to the United Kingdom. There are at present throughout Europe a number of *agrément* boards, and I have the honour to be the Chairman of the Government-sponsored *agrément* board in Britain. I thought that the report would have referred to that activity since it gives promise of much other development in varying areas of activity. However, the report contains nothing of this work and apparently fails to recognise the efforts being made in other European fields. I hope that this deficiency will be remedied in the near future.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you very much, Lord Peddie.

I appeal to all speakers to confine themselves to short speeches of a duration of possibly five minutes only. In calling Mr. de Montesquiou to reply to the debate, I hope that he will set a good example by keeping his remarks brief.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (*Translation*). — I would like to thank members for their very apt comments and reply to them briefly.

Mr. Cornelissen referred to the Rambouillet summit. This was not the subject, and I understand very well his regret at the absence from that conference of States smaller than the super-powers.

Mr. Lenzer agrees with the report on the necessity for setting up an Office of Technology Assessment. I agree with him and with another speaker that this would be a wonderful project but a very difficult one to carry out. That is why we asked the American Senator who insti-

gated it in his country to tell us about the difficulties he encountered.

I did not know that Mr. Brown was such a jack-of-all-trades and occupied himself not only with technology but also with healing sick sheep. This makes him a most valuable person to have around, because of his universal competence, and I take off my hat to him.

I quite agree with Lord Peddie that we ought to have emphasised European achievements, but as this was a comparison between Europe and the United States — we are naturally modest in WEU, I think all parliamentarians are — it was very difficult to draw up an exact balance sheet of what had been done.

But Senator Moss paid tribute to European technology, and has given it a boost simply by being here and by what he has said. I think that, in doing so, he has answered Lord Peddie much more to the point.

To conclude, I would like to say a friendly word to Mr. de Bruyne, who is a very active member of the Committee and a true European, a partner in our enterprise. This is why I praise him, publicly and personally.

I hope the report will be adopted, thanks mainly to Mr. Moss's contribution. This will make it certain that Europe will march in step with the United States of America. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. de Montesquiou, for a very brief and very clear reply.

The debate is now closed and we shall vote on the draft recommendation and the draft resolution.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Is there any opposition to the draft recommendation contained in Document 687 ?...

I see there is an objection from Mr. Roper.

If the Assembly is not unanimous, then the voting must be by roll-call, and since there is not a quorum present, the voting will have to be

*The President (continued)*

postponed until Thursday afternoon at 5 p.m. Is that your will, Mr. Roper ?

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Yes, Sir.

The PRESIDENT. — Very well. I am sorry, Mr. de Montesquiou, that the vote will have to be postponed until Thursday afternoon.

The Assembly will now vote on the draft resolution contained in Document 687.

I will put the question by sitting and standing.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order, I asked the Rapporteur whether he thought the words contained in the resolution meant the same as my interpretation of them. He will recall that I felt that the words "study the possibility" would have to mean just that, since, if he felt that some form of commitment was entailed, I would have to abstain, if not to vote against that particular resolution.

The PRESIDENT. — May I suggest that, since we are not voting until Thursday, you have a word with the Chairman of the Committee and resolve this point before the vote is taken ?

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). — But it is in the resolution.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — We are at the study stage. I therefore quite agree with what Mr. Brown has said and with his interpretation.

As there is no objection, I take it that everybody is in agreement.

The PRESIDENT. — I am sorry, there is one objector and therefore we must postpone the vote until Thursday at 5 o'clock. If the Assembly were unanimous, we could take the vote right now. We shall postpone the voting.

## **6. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe**

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee and Votes on the Amendments to the draft Recommendation, Doc. 683)*

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the replies to the debate on the report

from the General Affairs Committee on the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and the vote on the draft recommendation, Document 683.

I call Mrs. von Bothmer to reply to the debate and I hope that she will do it very briefly.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first like to express my thanks to all who took part in this debate, and for the fact that there is general agreement, despite all the criticism, that our approach is a realistic one.

I must say that the assertion — I am dealing now with the individual speeches — that Helsinki has created freedom of manoeuvre for action and agitation by the communist parties of Western Europe is simply not true. I believe that Mr. Vedovato knows quite well that this is certainly not the case in Italy.

If we are to talk of disappointments, I must ask whether we have forgotten to whom we — by this I mean the Western European countries — were talking, and what our expectations were. Anyone who feels disappointed must have pitched his hopes too high.

I am sure that no one in Western Europe will let himself be lulled to sleep by the results of the Helsinki conference. Nor is this what the report says. From no country have I heard that signs of the defence effort being neglected are anywhere to be seen. In fact, our Committee, on its last visit to the Scandinavian countries, gained the conviction that the contrary was true. I can say the same about my own country, too.

It is a fact that the Christian Democrats in the Federal Republic used the same arguments in their warnings against the German *Ostpolitik* ; so it is only logical that they should now make their voices heard in this Assembly to the same effect. I believe, however, that if the word realistic is to apply to this approach, it applies just as surely to that of the Rapporteur. For we must surely know that it was impossible for Geneva to produce results in the form of decisive improvements. Periods of stagnation have already occurred several times in the *Ostpolitik* — we in West Germany are well aware of this. But I would ask — is this a reason for giving up ? If hopes have been set too high, it is understandable there should be talk of disappointment. But we keep firmly to the facts and

*Mrs. von Bothmer (continued)*

remember that the security conference was never intended to create new circumstances and situations, if we remember that it was intended to create the basis for new opportunities, that a specific framework had to be found for this, and if we are capable also of registering positive facts such as, for example, that journalists now do have greater freedom of movement in the USSR and that the USSR has decided on a motion for the Twenty-fourth Party Congress to the effect that the policy of détente should be continued, then we ought not to give up hope so easily. On the contrary, we must firmly and patiently cling to the few positive elements, which I have as you know set out in the report, and use them to develop our position.

The assertion that the report confirms that the Kremlin has achieved a significant success at our expense is also based on a misunderstanding. I think my friend Mr. Müller has been putting words into my mouth, to use me as evidence against my own report.

Paragraph 44, which he analyses, has certainly been wrongly interpreted. Obviously no one thinks that evolution in the Western European countries could not be on a democratic basis.

And now a word on the agreement between the Federal Republic and Poland. This is not trading in people; a lump sum is being paid to settle the pensions and social insurance claims acquired in our country by Polish workers.

I can really reply to the doubts and criticisms about the conference on security and co-operation and, consequently, about the report, only by asking whether members would rather that the conference had not taken place? Would they have preferred the talks between East and West — despite the admittedly frequent misunderstandings on both sides — never to have taken place? Could they hope for better chances for the future if both sides refused to budge an inch? Perhaps I may digress briefly in philosophic vein. I would quote Goethe, a famous compatriot of mine, who once said that conversation is our greatest treasure. I feel this may well apply to the conference and also no doubt to our debate in this Assembly. Let us for heaven's sake, talk and argue about what we have in common!

The Committee believed almost unanimously that, whatever doubts one may have, the con-

ference on security and co-operation was a step forward in that new criteria have been laid down, in that criteria have been laid down at all, by which each country must now let itself be judged.

With this fact in mind, Mr. President, I would ask members to support the Committee and the recommendation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mrs. von Bothmer, for replying so clearly and so briefly.

Mr. Sieglerschmidt, the Chairman of the Committee, wishes to speak.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, after first heartily thanking the Rapporteur, as others have already done before me, for her truly instructive and extraordinarily interesting report, I should like to begin by making four comments on various items of the report.

First of all, on paragraph 4 of the report, where the conditions on which the conference on security and co-operation was held are dealt with. It should be noted in this connection that one condition on which the western side insisted was that the Berlin agreement should be signed, sealed and delivered before decisive steps towards setting up the security conference were taken. Contrary to what Mr. Amrehn told us this morning, there is therefore a direct link between the successes achieved in the Berlin agreement and the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

Secondly, paragraph 9(i) (b) states that, when all is said and done, the whole security conference follows the line of the Brezhnev doctrine. I think this must be taken as primarily expressing the views and expectations of the Soviet side alone and not even of the eastern bloc as a whole: the western side at the security conference of course considered it very important that the Brezhnev doctrine should not become a component part of the Final Act and that this doctrine should be quite decisively countered by the stress laid on the principle of sovereignty and non-interference, which was in fact also supported by the other eastern bloc States.

Thirdly: paragraphs 17 and 18 deal with the treaty between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic. In this context it should

*Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)*

also be stressed that there are two points of interest to the Assembly. These are firstly that — I was talking about the Brezhnev doctrine a moment ago — in this new treaty between the Soviet Union and East Germany the doctrine becomes part of the text: and secondly, the Berlin agreement I have also just referred to is dealt with in an entirely one-sided way. The treaty in fact states merely that West Berlin is not an integral part of the Federal Republic, without mentioning the other and equally important aspect of the four-power agreement, namely that the links between Berlin and the Federal Republic can be maintained and developed.

Let me try to sum up the debate. Hardly anyone in this chamber or amongst the speakers takes the view that the Helsinki Final Act should not have been signed. I expressly exclude from this my CDU/CSU colleagues from Germany who, as we know in the Bundestag, opposed the signing of the Final Act.

This is why I would like to say one further word on the accusation that the West behaved at Helsinki like people did at Munich. This assertion carries with it the reproach of naïvety and lack of insight into the perils and the realities.

I really would suggest, Mr. President, that it is highly unlikely that all thirty-five governments — including, incidentally, the Vatican — were so naïve as not to have noticed what game was being played. It is of course theoretically possible to say, as we do in German, that everyone in the squad is out of step except Private Müller; but you all know, Ladies and Gentlemen, what that quip is intended to convey.

Then, secondly, I think this Assembly is agreed that we must do all we can to ensure that during the two years before the follow-up conference in Belgrade a careful note is kept of whether all participants are really acting in a way consonant with the will for détente written into the Final Act at Helsinki. I think that everyone — whatever they may think of the conference otherwise — agrees that this must be done.

Thirdly, I think everyone also agrees that the outcome of the conference should not give rise to over-optimistic expectations. Views obviously differ as to what positive effects can be

expected, and what hopes should be linked to the outcome of the conference. Quite a few members of this Assembly fear it will bring nothing but trouble. One sometimes gets the impression that on both extreme wings of the Assembly there are people only too keen to see confirmation of the expectations they themselves nourish and the assessments that they have made, and so, of course they find facts to confirm these. I think we should keep the realities quite soberly in view. We shall then find we have far more in common.

And finally, three comments on particular points. My friend Mr. Bettiol asked who still talks about Berlin today? True, Ladies and Gentlemen, I am speaking here today as Chairman of the Committee, but the President will forgive me if on this point I speak also as a German member of parliament from Berlin. Who still talks about Berlin today? Well, this Assembly for one, in the draft recommendation we are just going to vote on. We are glad that our friends on the western side are very much aware that the behaviour of the East in Berlin and on Berlin is and will remain the touchstone of its desire for détente. So I do not think one can ask the question in the way Mr. Bettiol has put it.

A second comment, on what the Rapporteur Mrs. von Bothmer said on the agreement signed by the Federal Republic. It must be clearly understood on this point that the Federal Government was guided, quite apart from all the concrete, objective considerations, by the fact that in those terrible days the citizens of that country were almost as badly treated as the Jews. We are deeply aware of the special obligations this puts on us, and we wish to express this awareness fittingly in the way we handle matters.

One last comment. Mr. Müller said that the Federal Government has been a driving force behind the holding of the security conference. I do not wish to go into further discussion here as to who supplied most of the drive. It was certainly not the Federal Government alone. But even if this had been the case, would it really be so surprising? All of us in this chamber know that putting an end to the partition of Germany will be possible, will even be conceivable, only if we achieve some measure of success in putting an end to the partition of Europe. Anyone who, therefore, as a German thinks of ending the partition of his country

*Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)*

must try to take a first step towards the ending of the partition of Europe. And an undertaking such as the conference on security and co-operation in Europe certainly constitutes this first step. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, for replying to the debate on the excellent report by Mrs. von Bothmer.

The debate is now closed.

Two amendments have been tabled. I think we may be able to dispose of these amendments now. However, I would ask people now, since it is very nearly 6 o'clock, and I know that many have another engagement afterwards, whether they would be brief in moving their amendments or speaking to them.

After we have disposed of the amendments, I shall propose to the Assembly that the vote on the draft recommendation in Document 683 be postponed until Thursday afternoon at about 5.30 p.m.

I call Mr. de Montesquiou to move his amendment.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (*Translation*). — Mr. President, if the debate is protracted, it will not be my fault. I think we have been so dazzled by the speech of the Chairman of the Committee that you will be very indulgent if I go beyond the few minutes you have allotted me.

The purpose of this amendment is to modify slightly Mrs. von Bothmer's highly optimistic appreciation of the MBFR talks.

France has expressed a number of reservations regarding these talks, which are directed towards creating in the centre of the continent a zone of armed forces limitation monitored from the outside, that would be liable to introduce an extra factor of division among the countries of Western Europe and make them even more dependent on the great powers.

That is why France is not participating in the MBFR negotiations whose aim is, in fact, to make Central Europe a region with a special status.

A genuine negotiation on disarmament in Europe can be a factor for peace only if it

associates on an equal footing all the countries interested in the establishment of a system of security ruling out the observance of zones of influence.

This is the concept to which the amendment I am submitting to the Assembly refers. By adopting this amendment our Assembly would emphasise that genuine disarmament is inconceivable without true equality of all the parties concerned.

You have this amendment before you. I wanted it to be taken as a single whole. Here it is :

1. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :

"Underlining the need to achieve a progressive reduction in the level of forces throughout Europe ;"

After the fourth paragraph, insert :

"Considering that such a reduction should not result only from a compromise between the United States and the Soviet Union but must take account of the interests of all the European countries ;"

I think that the Assembly would agree to indicating clearly that zones of influence must be avoided, as was seen in the Rapporteur's report and recommendations.

In line 1 of the fifth paragraph of the preamble, leave out "nevertheless" and insert "further".

I think it is merely a question of form.

Lastly,

2. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add : "and the creation of further imbalance in that area ;".

I think that the modest contribution I have made to the Rapporteur's excellent report and recommendations might suit her and be endorsed by the whole Assembly.

The Rapporteur cannot accept the part of the amendment on the MBFR negotiations, to which she attaches considerable importance ; on the other hand, she is prepared to accept the remainder.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. de Montesquiou.

*The President (continued)*

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ? ...

I call Mrs. von Bothmer to reply.

Mrs. von BOTHMER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I could agree to Mr. de Montesquiou's draft amendment but for the fact that under the text proposed by him I fear that MBFR will lose importance. I feel that MBFR must come first and that of course the whole of Europe must then take part in disarmament. I am therefore in favour of the original wording being retained.

I would agree to item 2 of Mr. de Montesquiou's draft amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — I presume that that is the reply of the Committee, or do you wish to make a brief intervention, Mr. Sieglerschmidt ?

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I cannot speak on behalf of the Committee, but I have followed the discussions through the Committee and feel I can say that the wording cannot be regarded as over-optimistic ; it really comes down to the well-known argument as to what priority should be given to the MBFR negotiations. The view of many in this chamber on this point is known and this view has led to the present wording, which I should consequently like to see retained.

Like the Rapporteur, I have no objection to the word "nevertheless" being replaced by the word "further", nor to accepting item 2 of the draft amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you.

The first part of the amendment is not accepted by the Committee but the second is, so there is nothing for it but to put the amendment to the vote, unless Mr. de Montesquiou wishes not to have a vote and to withdraw his amendment.

Mr. de Montesquiou, do you want a vote or do you want to withdraw what has not been accepted ?

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — The Committee rejects the first part

of my amendment but accepts the second. It is therefore up to the Assembly to decide.

In any case I abide by my amendment.

The PRESIDENT. — There is only one option left to me. The time is getting on — that is my worry for all of you, not for myself.

There are four issues. There is the first proposal, to leave out paragraph 4 of the preamble of the draft recommendation and to insert the words on the order paper. We must vote on that separately. Then we come to the second and third parts of the amendment. We must vote on all three. The fourth part has been accepted, so we need not vote on it.

We shall now vote on the first part of the amendment.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The amendment is negatived by 14 votes to 11.*

We come now to the second part of the amendment — after paragraph 4, to insert the words set out on the order paper.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*That is agreed to by 23 votes to 1.*

The third part of the amendment is, in the fifth paragraph of the preamble, line 1, leave out the word "nevertheless" and insert "further".

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, some people have obviously been mistaken as to the voting. I understood it correctly and remained seated, but I get the impression that a number of others sitting near me thought that item 2 of the draft was being voted on.

I should be grateful, Mr. President, if despite the lateness of the hour you could repeat the vote, since there were obviously some errors, and if in each case you could make it clear what we are voting on by reading the first few words of the text. I assume that you now wish to have a vote on the section from "After paragraph 4" down to "reduction"; this comes from the part that both the Rapporteur and I said should be rejected.

The PRESIDENT. — I am sorry, Mr. Siegler-schmidt, but I read it correctly. Perhaps you did not listen. I would have to read it all over again if you did not, and I do not think that the Assembly would like that. I must leave the matter as it stands.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Further to that point of order, I think that there was some confusion in the Assembly, partly because of the translation and partly because the order paper divided Amendment No. 1 into several parts. Those not following the proceedings in English were probably confused and I believe that the vote should be taken again.

The PRESIDENT. — I am willing to do so. Is that the wish of the Assembly ?

MEMBERS. — Yes.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — I do not understand how the President's authority can be flouted in this way. He was quite specific, the votes were taken, and I am astonished that we should be going back on them.

The PRESIDENT. — Since there seems to be some confusion, I will take the vote over again. I am sorry about this, but it is not my fault. I hope that members will listen very carefully this time.

The first proposal on which you are asked to vote is the first part of Amendment No. 1, tabled by Mr. de Montesquiou, which is to leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :

“Underlining the need to achieve a progressive reduction in the level of forces throughout Europe ;”

That is what is before the Assembly now.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*That section of the amendment is negatived.*

The second section of Amendment No. 1 is, after the fourth paragraph, insert :

“Considering that such a reduction should not result only from a compromise between the United States and the Soviet Union but must

take account of the interests of all the European countries ;”

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*That section of the amendment is agreed to by 15 votes to 11.*

The third part of Amendment No. 1 is, in line 1 of the fifth paragraph of the preamble, leave out “nevertheless” and insert “further”.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*That section of the amendment is agreed to unanimously.*

The fourth part of Amendment No. 1 was agreed anyway because it was accepted by Mrs. von Bothmer.

We now come to Amendment No. 2 tabled by Mr. Vedovato. I would appeal to him to be very brief in moving his amendment.

Mr. VEDOVATO (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, my amendment is motivated by a political consideration and a legal one. The text of the Final Act of the Helsinki conference, in the third basket which talks about human relations, reads : “Convinced that this co-operation should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating States as set forth...”. The principles which are set out in the explanatory memorandum on page 2 of the official document state : “The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in... sovereignty”. It follows that if in the text of a resolution we adopt some other word than the one used, i.e. sovereignty, we are taking a very serious political risk. As the Assembly knows, I attend a great many international conferences and know what attention the Russians pay to these documents. As an academic devoting my lectures at the University of Rome this year to the Final Act of Helsinki, I can assert that every word used in this document is widely used by the Russians. Now throughout the recent debate on certain cases, the USSR invariably took refuge in the concept of its own sovereignty. I therefore suggest on grounds of legal terminology and political expediency, that instead of the word sovereignty in paragraph 4 we use the precise phrasing of the Final Act of Helsinki, that is “sovereign equality of States”.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Vedovato. Mr. Vedovato has tabled this amendment :

In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, replace the word "sovereignty" by "sovereign equality".

Does anyone wish to speak against the amendment ? ...

If not, does the Chairman of the Committee have any objection ? ...

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I think I can say on my own behalf — and, to expedite matters, also on that of the Rapporteur — that after hearing what our friend Mr. Vedovato had to say, neither of us has any objection to the draft amendment being adopted.

The PRESIDENT. — I will now put Mr. Vedovato's amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The amendment is agreed to unanimously.*

We have now disposed of all these amendments. I propose to the Assembly that voting on the draft recommendation in Document 683 should, as I have said, be postponed until Thursday at about 5.30 p.m.

### **7. Second-generation nuclear reactors**

(*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 686*)

The PRESIDENT. — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on second-generation nuclear reactors and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 686.

I call Mr. Lenzer, Rapporteur of the Committee, briefly to report.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, a glance at the clock warns me that my life would be in danger if I were to tax your patience much longer. I am assuming, Mr. President — if I may begin my address with some levity — that all members of this Assembly

are able to read and write, and have the report available in written form.

First of all, a brief word about the report. The Assembly's concern with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy has already become a tradition and is now a permanent feature of the work in this Committee ; I would refer in this connection to the work of my friends, Mr. Kahn-Ackermann, Mr. Osborn and Mr. Small.

Secondly, in this Committee we support the principle of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while fully accepting the element of risk involved. As with all new technologies, there are of course risks involved in the peaceful utilisation of nuclear energy, but we know from the experience gained in years of operating nuclear reactors and in work on research and development, that as conscientious politicians we can recommend technology to our citizens — in other words, that we can look on it as something that can be kept under control.

Thirdly, we are conscious of the fact that nuclear energy cannot be utilised and carried to success without a broad measure of popular consent. We must consequently take steps to ensure that the public is better informed. There was, for instance — as you will certainly have read in the papers — an accident at a nuclear power station in West Germany just a few days ago, which the press then immediately presented as if it were a nuclear accident. What in fact happened — I think the matter must be looked at in the context of the problem we are discussing — was that in the course of repair work a sliding valve under steam pressure opened up, but at least this possibility cannot be excluded — because of inattention or negligence. In the event, two members of the maintenance staff were fatally scalded by steam at 280 degrees. So this was not a radiation accident, but an accident that could have happened with any steam boiler, in any kind of high-pressure or high-temperature installation.

Now, Mr. President, to the report itself. An introductory chapter deals with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conjunction with the general debate on the security of energy supplies ; it attempts to show that nuclear energy can be used to help secure energy supplies, particularly in those countries that are not too well endowed with raw materials.

Chapter A then deals with the industrial aspects. The peaceful use of nuclear energy can

*Mr. Lenzer (continued)*

of course be successful only if the appropriate industrial infrastructure exists in the countries concerned; you will find details of the various activities in the individual member States of this Assembly, as described in this chapter.

This is followed by two chapters dealing with the subject of this report, namely with what are known as second-generation nuclear reactors; this means, basically, the high-temperature reactor on the one hand and the fast-breeder reactor on the other. Here, again, I would refer you, in view of the lateness of the hour, to the activities in the various States as described in the text. I should point out that there are two additional statistical tables at the end of the report which show you how things stand, in both Europe and the world as a whole, with regard to these two types of reactor.

A further chapter is devoted to nuclear fusion, though in order to avoid any misunderstanding I must from the outset point out that this is not an energy source we shall be able to tap in any near future. However interesting it might seem to us as regards its future prospects, all the experts tell us that if — ever — we succeed in applying the technical possibilities of nuclear fusion over any length of time, let alone in actually building a commercially viable fusion reactor, it will certainly not be in this century.

Finally, Chapter F takes up a proposal made at the United Nations General Assembly by the American Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, on 22nd September 1975; it contains a recommendation that thought be given to how we should approach this proposal for the formation of regional nuclear fuel centres. I think that we are faced here primarily with the problem of — to use the English technical term — physical protection, that is, the protection of nuclear plant and of reprocessing and enrichment facilities from external forces, a subject of particular relevance against the background of discussions on the problem of terrorism. The conclusion then surveys once more the essential features of all these problems.

I would add one further point. Anyone speaking about the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must, to draw attention to the tremendous potential of nuclear energy for developing our industrialised societies, quote just one example that

needs no further comment. The energy contained in one kilo of uranium 235, that is, of the fissile material, is roughly equivalent to the energy obtained by burning 2,400 tonnes of coal (with all that that would mean for the environment). You will gather from this that, in the medium and long term, we have no alternative to the peaceful utilisation of nuclear energy.

And now just a word, perhaps, on the proposed draft recommendation. First, it assumes a number of premises, such as acceptance in principle of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It points to the tremendous financial outlay needed for research and development in this field. It then mentions the industrial complex required and deals with the American proposal to set up regional centres. It concludes with three recommendations that are being put to this Assembly. First, it is recommended that the governments of the member countries should formulate a common policy. Communitarity here means co-operation and division of labour; no national State will find it possible to pursue single-handed its own developments in this field, as its financial and research resources will simply not be sufficient.

Special importance is also attached in this context to co-operation with the United States, since not even the combined strength of Europe will suffice. Only in conjunction with what is being done on the other side of the Atlantic, in the United States, will it be possible to achieve satisfactory results on the particular problems of reprocessing and interim or final storage.

On the further development of the European nuclear power industry — this is the second point in the recommendation — it can be said that the problems involved are, though not so acute, much the same as those of the aeronautical and space industry. We need joint projects within which the work will be shared out and so give European industry a chance to compete on the world market. I would point out that there are real prospects for this. There is, for instance, the contract made between some West German firms and Brazil.

In the third point of the recommendation, the national parliaments are again called upon to discuss the American proposal and to form an opinion on this decision as soon as possible.

This, then, Ladies and Gentlemen, is what I wished to say by way of a brief introduction to this report. There will of course be opportunity

*Mr. Lenzer (continued)*

during the debate for you to express views on any part of it. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Lenzer.

Four members wish to speak in this debate — Mr. Cornelissen, Mr. Brown, Mr. Cermolacce and Mr. Richter. Since it is now twenty minutes past six, and I propose to close this debate at 6.30, we have time for only one speaker. As Mr. Cornelissen will not be here tomorrow, I will give him the floor tonight.

Mr. CORNELISSEN (*Netherlands*). — Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your co-operation.

*(The speaker continued in Dutch)*

(Translation). — During the Assembly's meeting in Bonn, Mr. President, we adopted the report from our past colleague Mr. Small. This dealt with problems of safety connected with the use of nuclear sources of energy. The result — or the result to which that report was perhaps one contribution — was that the Italian and Federal German Governments ratified the Paris convention of 1960. This convention, which came into force in 1968, has now been ratified by twelve countries. I am sorry to have to say that the Netherlands does not as yet appear in this list, although I shall, Mr. President, do my best in my own parliament to encourage ratification.

I was very happy to lend my support to the Small report; but I am far less enthusiastic about the report from our colleague Mr. Lenzer that we are now debating. The tone of the report is a paean of praise for second- and third-generation nuclear power-stations. I am still not so sure whether we should join in this. Surely the position is rather that we still just do not know whether the dangers inherent in second- and third-generation reactors can be overcome? These are not just technical dangers, but political and military ones as well. It is surely clear that when these power stations — after they have first been built in Europe and America — are sold all over the world, the countries buying them are going to have the potential to manufacture nuclear weapons. International inspection would definitely not be enough here.

Mr. Lenzer himself has felt this, for in the third paragraph of the draft recommendation

he puts in a plea for multinational regional nuclear fuel centres. It is evident, from Mr. Kissinger's speech on 22nd September 1975, that the United States is well aware of the problems. The dangers are even greater with countries who have not signed the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. So I would urge most strongly that there should be a proper degree of caution.

Turning to more specific points, I would comment that while Mr. Lenzer does, in paragraph 28, mention OECD's Dragon reactor at Winfrith, he does not say that the host country Great Britain is planning substantially to restrict its contribution to this.

Now this, Mr. President, is wholly contrary to the United Kingdom's undertakings in respect of this project, and I should be glad to hear the Rapporteur's views on this.

The paragraphs on the fast-breeder reactor and nuclear fusion energy prompt me to recall the statement that Mr. Lubbers, the Netherlands Minister for Economic Affairs, made to the Committee on 28th October last in The Hague. He said then that in his opinion the fast-breeder reactor would probably not be taken into service by the electricity generating companies until the late 1990s, or even into the next century. According to Mr. Lubbers, fusion energy would not be ready for commercial use until some fifteen to twenty years after that. This leaves us plenty of time to study what the problems and risks are with these second- and third-generation reactors.

We — and I am speaking particularly for my Christian Democrat colleagues — feel that these safety aspects are so important that there ought to be a step-by-step development, with the transition to each successive stage dependent on whether safety, in the widest sense of the word, can be adequately guaranteed. We do not, alas, find this approach taken in the report. Even the draft recommendation, in our opinion, lays too much stress on the haste that is said to be needed in developing nuclear reactors. It will be clear, from what I have just been saying, that we cannot see the necessity for this haste; we favour a step-by-step approach, with a constant close watch on developments. I must say, therefore, that we are finding a great deal of difficulty with the draft recommendation as it is worded at present. You may be sure that, since I shall unfortunately not be able to attend the meeting tomorrow because of a long-standing

*Mr. Cornelissen (continued)*

engagement, my Christian Democrat colleagues from Holland will be listening with great attention to the Rapporteur's reply. If they do not get a satisfactory reply, we shall, I am sorry to say, have to withhold our support for the draft recommendation.

The PRESIDENT. — Thank you, Mr. Cornelissen, for that contribution, the last one today because I think that it would be convenient to the Assembly if we were to interrupt this debate now and to resume it tomorrow morning.

I accordingly declare the debate adjourned.

### **8. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT. — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Wednesday, 3rd December, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Second-generation nuclear reactors (Resumed Debate on the Report of the Com-

mittee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 686).

2. Address by Mr. Rodgers, Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.
3. The International Institute for the Management of Technology (Presentation and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 685 and Amendment).
4. Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 682 and Amendments).

Are there any objections ? ...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ? ...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 6.30 p.m.)*

# ELEVENTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd December 1975

## SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Second-generation nuclear reactors (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions*, Doc. 686).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Brown, Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Richter, Mr. Lenzer (*Rapporteur*).
4. The International Institute for the Management of Technology (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the Amendment to the draft Recommendation*, Doc. 685).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Richter (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Farr, Mr. Richter, Mr. Vedovato.
5. Address by Mr. Rodgers, Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Rodgers.  
*Replies by Mr. Rodgers to questions put by*: Lord Duncan-Sandys, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Roper, Mr. Miller, Mr. Critchley, Mr. Richter, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Leynen, Mr. Buck.
6. Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments*, Doc. 682 and Amendments).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Critchley (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Mr. Bettiol, Mr. Cordle, Mr. Pignion.
7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

1. See page 28.

### 3. Second-generation nuclear reactors

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Doc. 686)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the resumed debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on second-generation nuclear reactors, Document 686.

In the resumed debate, I call Mr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to congratulate Mr. Lenzer on the production of this report, but there are some factors in it of which I am critical and perhaps he will forgive me if I voice them.

First, I draw the attention of the Assembly to what, in my view, is the frightening figure which appears in paragraph 16 of the English text. There we read that there is 122,000 million kWh of installed power of American water reactors. Honourable members will know that I have had a lot to say about these reactors and their safety factors. There is nothing in this report that identifies for us the many unresolved doubts on the safety of these reactors, and I cannot understand why this Assembly does not have a

*Mr. Brown (continued)*

report which identifies the wide range of unsolved problems that are related to the American light-water reactors.

It seems to me that we tend to be working on the principle that the more American light-water reactors we have, the less we can do about them. I have many times identified the dangers related to the energy core cooling system, which is still not right. We still have not found a safe system. The pressure vessels are still suspect. We are still not satisfied about the security of the pressure vessels themselves.

There is one other major error, in that paragraph 16 still does not identify to the Assembly that the majority of these light-water reactors are downrated. They are downrated because of the safety problems. If they are downrated, quite clearly the economics of running them are very different, and the American light-water reactor ceases to be economic when we take the actual downrating being forced upon them.

I understand from advice given to me that the downrating is taking place in almost every country that has these reactors. Perhaps, therefore, Mr. Lenzer will tell me whether the figures that he has put in paragraph 16 are the actual downrated figures or the installed figures. The Assembly ought to know because it seems to me that we as parliamentarians ought to cease being propagandists for this particular type of reactor. We ought to obtain assurances of the safety of these reactors on behalf of the people of our countries.

In another debate yesterday I referred briefly to the time when I met Senator Moss in his home town in Utah, when we had a discussion on the 5,000 sheep that were found dead on the plains of Utah. The Senator yesterday recalled this well, though it was ten years ago. At that time I asked him: "Why have you 5,000 dead sheep?" He said: "I do not know. It may be something to do with the grass or the feedstock. We are not quite sure." I said: "I will tell you what is wrong." Not far away experiments were being conducted on nerve gas. Many assurances were given that there could be no leaks in any direction and that the whole operation was secure, with no problems. At the end of the day the Senator found that this problem had arisen because there had been leaks from the nerve gas experiments. That was why 5,000 sheep died in Utah.

We are being given assurance after assurance by the manufacturers of American light-water reactors that they are safe. Bless my soul! One could not expect them to say anything else, for they are selling and we are buying. No assurances whatever acceptable to me have been given that the manufacturers have been able to show that American light-water reactors are safe enough to be placed in areas of our conurbations. I would not mind the Germans being prepared to place their light-water reactors in a position in Germany which would worry only them, but if anything happens due to the reactors in Germany, it will happen also in Britain because these installations have no boundaries if they go wrong. Therefore, I beg of my colleagues to consider the worth of the assurances that are given. Are we satisfied that they are of any great value?

Secondly, I draw the attention of Mr. Lenzer to the need for consistency on units. From paragraph 16 onwards in the report Mr. Lenzer will see the various changes in units used. I happen to understand them, but I have some reason in that it was my vocation at one time to teach this subject. Looking at the units used, we start off with millions kWh. We go on to MWe, and then MW. In paragraph 26 one finds MWth. I do not know what the members of the Assembly make of all this when they try to assess comparability. Obviously much of this determines the size of the installation. I have reasonable doubt whether many people are understanding these various terminologies.

I urge Rapporteurs to take note of my comments. These documents are for the assimilation of members of parliament, who are busy people. They do not want to have to turn to researchers to find out the difference between 204,473 MWe and 4,000 MW. I therefore believe that we should have some consistency in the terminology and in the units used.

On paragraph 34, I become a little nationalistic and chauvinistic. I do not believe that paragraph 34 is an accurate representation in any way. I have no idea how good, how bad or how indifferent the French project is. All I know is that to argue that in some odd way the British project is not so experienced as the French is a little nonsensical.

I draw attention, in Appendix II, to the column relating to the United Kingdom fast-breeder reactor. It quotes the coming into service at Dounreay as 1975. Bless my soul, we have

*Mr. Brown (continued)*

had one there for years! This is the second time round. To show that a French variant was due in 1973 is, if I may say so, taking a bit of a liberty with the truth. Therefore, I can only ask the Rapporteur to try to get his advisers to look again at that aspect of the column regarding the United Kingdom. I believe there is a great deal missing which might redress the picture slightly in terms of information for members of the Assembly.

I turn next to my concern regarding paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation :

“To promote the further development of the European nuclear power industry to meet the increased requirements for nuclear power plants on the world market ;”

I was one of those who took rather a dim view of the attempt of the Germans to sell the nuclear package to Brazil, amongst others, because there are no safeguards. In Section F, Regional nuclear fuel centres, I note that a great deal of work has been done by the Rapporteur calling attention to the dangers of proliferation and the importance of controls. I do not know what controls the Germans think they have if they sell a whole package of nuclear facilities to Brazil and other countries. Therefore, the suggestion of the Rapporteur in paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation that all we have to do is to promote the sales of nuclear power plants to the world market leaves me a little worried. First, I am concerned about which type. I suspected that the Germans were selling the American light-water reactor again. Once again, we are proliferating this dangerous beast around the world.

I therefore tell the Rapporteur frankly that I do not accept paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation at all. What is stated there cannot possibly represent the views I have held. There will need to be many more reservations in terms of security before I can accept that statement as it stands.

I come to paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation which in my view re-states something which is already available to us. This is one of the dangers of reports to the Assembly nowadays. We keep asking for what is already there. It is within everyone's knowledge that the International Atomic Energy Agency has already commissioned a study on this matter. The siting

of multinational regional nuclear fuel centres is a very complex issue. It involves many problems. It cannot simply be agreed. It has to be discussed and thought through. The IAEA has already commissioned a study. The Americans are carrying that study out. It is expected that it will be eighteen months to two years before the report is available. I see no purpose in this Assembly going on record asking for something which has already been done. We can certainly congratulate the IAEA on doing it, but I see no point in making our opinions known now when we are waiting for the report in order to assess its value before our opinions are made known.

I am therefore bound to say to Mr. Lenzer that I feel that the report does not add much to our knowledge. Certainly I think his conclusions are very weak. All of us to a large extent are subject to the experts on nuclear reactors. This is one of the most serious issues facing our countries for the future. While the experts can advise us, in the final analysis we as parliamentarians are responsible for the decisions.

I therefore believe that we must make sure that we do not sacrifice the safety and the well-being of our people on the altar of expediency. Reading the report, I sometimes suspected that that may be what the Rapporteur is tending to do. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, under the pretext of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and of avoiding Europe, already almost completely dependent upon extraneous sources of energy, being subjected to outside pressures, the draft recommendation declares itself in favour of installing multinational regional nuclear fuel centres and of exporting European nuclear technology, whatever the recipient country may be. In that respect, it might conflict with Mr. Kissinger's own statements in the speech he delivered last September. He said :

“But the spreading of nuclear power poses starkly the danger of proliferating nuclear weapons capabilities and the related risks of the theft of nuclear materials, blackmail by terrorists, accidents, or the injection of the nuclear threat into regional political conflicts.”

But the contradiction is only apparent when we know of the nuclear co-operation agreement

*Mr. Cermolacce (continued)*

that already exists between Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany, which also has another of the same kind with the South African Government.

This prompts a few thoughts which do not solely concern the foreign policy of Federal Germany. The authority controlling the French monopolies cultivates, in parallel, if not in concert, in its external relations policy the same special friendships with the pro-imperialist dictatorship of Brazil and the racist government of South Africa.

Under the terms of the agreement, the Federal Republic of Germany will, over the next fifteen years, build eight nuclear power plants, a fuel re-cycling and plutonium extraction plant and another for enriching uranium. In return, Brazil will supply Germany with uranium ore.

Of course it is officially a nuclear agreement "for peaceful purposes". We could not expect an announcement, either from the two governments concerned or from the German firms of Siemens and AEG, which produce nuclear reactors under licence from Westinghouse, thus enabling the United States to remain the masters of development strategy and profits on the international market, that some day Brazil will be manufacturing the atom bomb.

We are not the only ones to feel worried about this possibility. The Brazilian Physics Society has also voiced its serious concern and, in particular, reiterated its opposition to the use of nuclear technology for military purposes. For, as the same source further reports, the conditions of safeguard against such warlike use are confined to the conventions drawn up by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is not very reassuring, in that, by means of the plants for re-cycling spent nuclear fuel and the plutonium recovered in this way, this raw material can be used to produce nuclear weapons.

Given the political and social régime of Brazil, and the army's preponderant influence in the Brazilian Government, this should give us food for thought.

It is, moreover, important to note that Brazil, which imperialism expects to play the policeman in Latin America, has hitherto refused to sign the non-proliferation treaty.

But Brazil is not only country which, by an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, stands to acquire nuclear weapons. A number of recent facts lead to the belief that South Africa, as well, is going to receive substantial help from the Federal Republic of Germany, to build a uranium enrichment plant, the first stage towards mastering nuclear technology for military purposes.

The agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Brazil, and the development of co-operation between West Germany and South Africa in the nuclear area, pose serious problems. The initiatives recently taken by the Federal Republic of Germany in the export of nuclear technologies reveal an immediate danger: the possession of atomic weapons by Brazil and South Africa, with all the threats to peace inherent in such a situation. But, in the longer prospect, an equally disquieting eventuality looms: the co-operation which is being established between the Federal Republic of Germany, Brazil and South Africa may enable the Federal Republic quite naturally to circumvent the ban on its undertaking nuclear research for military purposes.

It is this other eventuality which reveals what a mockery the system of controls established by the Germano-Brazilian nuclear agreement may prove.

The safety clauses may finally be transitory only, and at best can only delay access to military technology. By that very fact, they thus assist the armaments race, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the dangers that this carries with it.

Another policy is necessary: one that will serve the basic interests of the peoples, their will to independence and security requirements, it is the policy of general and controlled disarmament. It also carries a demand for international solidarity.

To act on these lines, is to press governments to associate themselves with the agreements already signed, and in particular to respect the terms of the Helsinki agreements, proclaiming the necessity of measures that will constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The recommendation tabled deviates dangerously from this necessity.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, may I first speak a few words in praise of our friend, Christian Lenzer, who has so ably succeeded in his attempt not only to tackle so complex a technical matter but also to evaluate it politically. I believe that Christian Lenzer's report requires no further explanation and I assume that his draft recommendation will be accepted by this Assembly.

The comments made by the previous speaker call for an immediate reply from me. I must point out that the agreement with Brazil regarding co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy will include all the security provisions required by the non-proliferation treaty. That these will be observed is guaranteed absolutely. The Federal Republic has in addition received more far-reaching assurances from its Brazilian partner. I think that we should count it a success that a State that up till now has not subscribed to the non-proliferation treaty, but which is without doubt on the point of becoming a nuclear power, should have acknowledged the obligations set out in that treaty. These assurances have been given quite unambiguously by the Brazilian side.

I should in this connection also point out that in bidding for the Brazilian contract we were, after all, competing with the Americans. On 4th June 1975 the State Department spokesman stated that the consultations between the West German Government and the American Government had been most useful, and that the Americans welcomed the fact that the Federal Republic had required additional security measures from Brazil. The Americans have also stated quite categorically that we have gone well beyond the internationally binding provisions.

I should further like to impress on the last speaker that it is generally accepted that the non-proliferation-treaty is no obstacle to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. If he still wants to criticise us on this score, I can only recommend that he should re-read the treaties. None of the world's industrialised countries can be shackled in the way that he has demanded. Of course, we can be sure that the firms implementing the contract — these are European firms, German, Dutch and possibly French — are bound by the conditions imposed on suppliers. I must say that I cannot accept what he has just suggested. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is very difficult, as Rapporteur, to answer in detail all the contributions to the debate. I would be tempted to give my views on the matters which have been raised here but which — and I would stress this at once — are definitely not part of the report I have submitted. The various contributions to the debate were undoubtedly made with the best of intentions, and were probably also made in the belief that critical comment was being contributed on the one or other point. They ranged, however, far beyond the field that this report is intended to cover: its purpose was not to spell out the general problems attending the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; that would have been quite impossible in a report of this size; several tomes would evidently have been needed, several voluminous reports, and even then we would no doubt have laid ourselves open to the accusation that we had scamped the job.

Consequently, the report had from the start to be limited to the two families of reactor, high-temperature reactors and fast-breeder reactors, in other words, those that go by the name of second-generation nuclear reactors.

That the whole thing had to be fitted into a certain setting is obvious, and it was in this setting that the general nuclear energy situation in the world had to be examined. There had to be an indication of the installed capacity and, of course, of the kilowatt-hour output achieved so far.

I should now like to turn to the individual contributions. Mr. Cornelissen yesterday raised a whole string of queries in this Assembly on behalf of various Dutch colleagues. I would have welcomed it had he raised these questions earlier in Committee, especially as he is a member of it. First, we could have reduced the length of the debate, and secondly, matters could have been shortened in Committee — all these points are more or less questions for information — by a quite succinct reply on each of the points.

He mentioned ratification of the liability convention. This question has nothing at all to do with the present subject but concerns the nuclear powered ship *Otto Hahn* and general limits of cover for nuclear plants, a problem that has no direct bearing whatever on this report.

*Mr. Lenzer (continued)*

He then raised the problem of plutonium. This, too, has nothing whatever to do with this report, if we stick to the actual subject. Every nuclear reactor produces plutonium during the fission process. A light-water reactor with an effective output of around 1200 MWe produces some 240 to 250 kg of plutonium a year. This problem therefore arises wherever nuclear reactors are operated, be they light- or heavy-water reactors.

I would point out in this connection — and it might have been mentioned in his criticism — that India for one has been capable of producing a nuclear weapon as it has been supplied by Canada with a natural uranium reactor in the Candu series. Again in this connection, there are further agreements between Canada and such countries as Pakistan and South Korea. This is a problem that I would ask him not to raise in connection with this report. I must ask him not to inject into the appreciation of this report extraneous and strictly political questions.

Mr. Cornelissen then spoke of the Dutch Economic Minister's address during a meeting recently held by our Committee in The Hague. There we were given the Dutch Government's view on the Benelux project for a sodium-cooled fast-breeder reactor, the 300 SNR, a prototype of which is being built at Kalkar on the lower Rhine. According to my information — and I must go by that — the convention still applies, and all governments that are party to the convention have declared themselves ready to stand fully by the commitments they accepted in signing it. This of course includes the Dutch Government.

Mr. Cornelissen has deplored the — alleged — withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the joint Dragon high-temperature reactor project, which has been discussed in the press. All this is pure speculation. The United Kingdom government has so far said nothing that would justify this fear.

I now come to the statements made by Mr. Brown. Thanks to his trenchant contributions to the discussions in Committee, Mr. Brown has become known as a confirmed sceptic where light-water reactors are concerned. I should, however, like him to set aside his scepticism just for once and to bear in mind that while light-water reactors are, it is true, the most important factor today in the peaceful application of nuclear

energy, they are not covered by this report. In no single sentence of the draft recommendation, in not one paragraph of the report, not even in one footnote, is any reference made to the safety of light-water reactors or to the problems they present. I would therefore urge Mr. Brown not to transfer his objections to light-water reactors to this report, which deals with something quite different.

He has, further, criticised the statistics quoted, and the various units of measurement in particular. I must say on this point that there is no chance of avoiding this perhaps rather confusing juggling with figures. The installed capacity of nuclear power output is, as it happens, measured in megawatts, or MW. This can be looked at in two different ways, either taking the thermal output, which is indicated by adding a "th", or taking the electrical output, the amount of electricity actually produced. The electrical output is indicated by adding "e", in exactly the same way as we write, for instance, "mph" for "miles per hour". As far as the production of electrical power from a nuclear reactor is concerned, however, we speak of kilowatt-hours. This is done for a reason. Kilowatt-hours will mean something to virtually every housewife who reads her domestic meter. I must ask you to excuse me if, at first sight, it seemed a little confusing. In fact, it is much simpler than it appears.

Mr. Brown referred to paragraph 34 and objected that, on comparing British and French activity in the fast-breeder reactor field, mention was made of French development being somewhat more advanced. He said that this was probably not justified, and referred to the statistical appendix. I must tell Mr. Brown that, unfortunately, the position is as stated; it must be said. But there is nothing to worry about — it arises simply from the difference in date of construction. The French Phénix at Marcoule was already at full output, at full power, at the beginning of 1974. On the other hand, the British PFR — the prototype fast reactor — is to be brought on to full output, so the engineers there say, only in the course of 1975. There is, therefore, something of a time-lag in this case.

A word on the Brazilian contract. I can keep this quite short and refer to what Mr. Richter said with such clarity when answering, among others, the comments made by Mr. Cermolacce. He has explained the kind of security conditions attached to this deal, so there is no point in saying anything more.

Mr. Lenzer (*continued*)

It of course goes without saying, Mr. Brown should note, that this contract concerns light-water reactors, since light-water reactors of both families, the boiling-water reactor and the pressurised-water reactor, happen to be what not only the United States but also France and Western Germany have developed for export. This reactor has matured sufficiently for it to deserve this decision. You cannot, of course, as yet sell anyone a fast-breeder or a high-temperature reactor on the export market. Development has, quite simply, not progressed far enough yet for this to be done.

Mr. Brown is worried about the second and third paragraphs of the draft recommendation. Here, too, I would urge that he withdraw his objections, since they are not specifically connected with this report. This gives me the opportunity to talk about the recommendation itself. Paragraph 1 in the recommendation is concerned merely with our having to achieve co-operation and division of labour on an international basis, since only in this way will success, including commercial success, be possible. This means that State promotion of research can then be throttled back and the money spent on other important research projects. This paragraph is therefore concerned only with the formulation of a common policy, which will protect us from dissipation of effort.

Paragraph 2 is concerned with supporting the creation of a European industrial structure. This problem is not specific to the nuclear energy scene. In other debates too, such as that on the aeronautical industry, this Assembly has again and again had to wrestle with the problem of how an industrial base can be created that will be competitive on the world market as well.

Paragraph 3 also fits naturally into the draft recommendation. There is of course a whole host of security problems, and this has not been denied. The proposal to set up these regional centres, however, arose against the background of discussions on the physical protection problem. We are here faced with the question of how to prevent the theft of fissile material, and how to protect fuel cycle installations. It is in any case not all that easy to reach places where damage can be done to a nuclear reactor, and if anyone does get that far, he will have to pay dearly for it. He will probably then no longer be able to do what he wants to do, and will probably not

be noticing much of anything anyhow. What concerns us, therefore, is how installations can be protected against action from without. I do not think we are going too far when we suggest, in the third paragraph of the draft recommendation, that the member governments and national parliaments of Western European Union should decide what they think of the American proposal.

On what our friend Mr. Cermolacce has said, I can again be quite brief. The "Brazil-cum-non-proliferation treaty" business has already been dealt with by Mr. Richter, and I agree entirely with what Mr. Richter has said on this point.

I should just like to make one more thing clear. Mr. Cermolacce has given the impression that there is an agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of South Africa in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This is not so. There are contacts between firms, contacts brought about, for example, by the South African Government putting a nuclear power station project out to public tender. It is not just a German firm, the *Kraftwerksunion*, which builds nuclear power stations, that has put in a tender; so have a whole series of other firms. I believe they also include Westinghouse, the American firm.

Mr. Richter has already given a clear account of this matter. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty, an agreement to prevent the proliferation of atomic weapons, must not be allowed to lead in addition to economic discrimination between the nuclear powers and the — to use a blunt term — the nuclear have-nots. On the contrary, economic discrimination is entirely excluded.

I would further point out that an agreement has also been concluded between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany, or more exactly a German power-generating undertaking, the *Rheinisch-Westfälische Elektrizitätswerke AG* (RWE), for the supply of enriched uranium. I did not hear Mr. Cermolacce direct any criticism against this agreement in his speech.

That, then, Ladies and Gentlemen, is the substance of the various points raised in the discussion. In conclusion, I should like to ask you once more to check very carefully how far your objections really fall within the context of this report and the recommendation. If you judge them on the criterion that what we have here is not a report on security problems — which should be discussed elsewhere — nor a report on light-water reactors, but a report on the development of high-

*Mr. Lenzer (continued)*

temperature and fast-breeder reactors, i.e. second-generation reactors, then I believe — and I ask you to do so — that you can drop your objections and approve the draft recommendation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is closed.

The Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions has submitted a draft recommendation in Document 686 on which no amendment has been tabled.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole will be taken tomorrow, Thursday, at 5.30 p.m.

The Presidential Committee has decided that votes shall be grouped so far as possible, to allow everybody to be present in the Assembly Hall.

#### **4. The International Institute for the Management of Technology**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Vote on the Amendment to the draft Recommendation, Doc. 685)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on the International Institute for the Management of Technology.

I call Mr. Richter, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, this Assembly has supported the OECD's efforts to establish an international institute for the management of technology. Our expectations were high and we hoped that with the aid of such an institute we could make up some of our lost ground in industrial management.

The institute was thus set up in Milan, but the initial situation and working conditions were very poor. I should like to make four points in this connection.

First, the demands made on the institute and the expectations placed in it by the governing

board and the General Council were divergent and changeable; nor was there any permanent monitoring of its progress by either body.

Secondly, there were considerable delays by member States in ratifying the agreement. For instance Italy, the host country, was the very last to ratify the agreement, and so added still further to the uncertainty of the outcome.

Thirdly, there were at first no buildings to house the institute. Some time later, the city of Milan and the Italian Government took steps to convert a former orphanage into premises for the institute. I can confirm that this was done most handsomely and admirably; Italian architects are, as we know, past masters, with a style of their own. The building now entirely comes up to the original conceptions.

Fourthly, there was also a great deal of difficulty in recruiting suitable staff. In the estimation of industry and even of some of the governments, the institute failed to produce a work programme that was convincing as to its content and structure. It was confronted by a new range of tasks, so initially some experimentation was called for. Very soon the institute's members were making conflicting demands; for example France asked for long courses, while the other members wanted in each case to shorten the project. Although there were only twelve members of the faculty, too many different specialisations were catered for. In addition, some courses proved disappointing, even to the participants, because of the discrepancy between the hopes nurtured and what was actually offered in respect of content and quality of teaching.

Something must also be said about the institute's financial situation. As early as spring 1974 a deficit of 450,000 units of account was announced. This deficit was due to an over-optimistic estimate of income from course fees and member States' contributions for 1974. When income dropped, expenditure was not trimmed to a corresponding extent. To this must, of course, be added the usual wage and price increases in Milan; the deficit for 1974 probably already reached 700,000 units of account.

The amount of the 1975 budget was then discussed at length. Certainly the general view was that savings could be made, but it proved impossible to reach agreement on the extent of these economies. Britain, the Netherlands and Italy believed that the institute could make do

*Mr. Richter (continued)*

on a budget of 1.75 million units of account, France at that time thought it should be kept within a ceiling of 1.5 million units of account, while the Federal Republic of Germany was prepared, in order to give the institute a fair chance, to go beyond these ceilings for a transitional period.

The situation was then aggravated by the threat of withdrawals from a large proportion of the industrial members, some of whom did in fact withdraw.

There was also a great deal to be criticised in the organisation, management and administration of the institute. For a long time, for instance, there was no clear hierarchy. Staff recruitment policy was not clear, and posts were not advertised. The absence of a satisfactory working atmosphere was the result of the staff selection, the lack of an overall plan of work, and inadequate motivation.

When I visited the institute in Milan a few weeks ago with the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Gerhard Huigens, the position seemed thoroughly gloomy. Management was being carried out on an interim basis by the former administrative director, Mr. Nisbet. The building was deserted; a handful of staff were looking after maintenance of the infrastructure. Mr. Nisbet described to me the situation as set out in my report. I personally regret that Mr. Nisbet had not been director-general of the institute from the outset, instead of the German scientist appointed.

If the overall results of the institute were to be appraised on economic criteria alone, there could only be one course open to our governments — the institute would have to be closed down as quickly as possible subject to observance of contractual provisions. But this could not match the interests of European parliamentarians. In Document 685, which is before you, I have enumerated in Part II, Future prospects, possibilities for continuing the institute in a different organisational form. My impression is that Italy and the city of Milan have earned a fair chance. I have many friends in the Italian Senate and Parliament and I believe I have been very tactful in preparing this report. I would like to reach the same conclusion in respect of the impression I gained from discussions in our Committee. Our colleagues Mr. Treu and Mr. Pecoraro were present, and they, too, would be

hard put to arrive at any other conclusion. But the decision should be the outcome of our deliberations today. If we do eventually find a solution for Milan, what I demand and call for is that it should be a European solution in the interests of Europe. This is what we are appealing for in the recommendation, and I hope that our governments will prove responsive. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I thank the Rapporteur.

I call Mr. Farr.

Mr. FARR (*United Kingdom*). — I have read with great interest Mr. Richter's report and the draft recommendation. I certainly agree that there is no future for the institute in its present rôle. In my view, it is in any event now operating only on a care and maintenance basis. I feel that even if we were unwise enough to rejuvenate the institute with more funds for this specific purpose, to endeavour to improve European technology at the institute in Milan we would be continuing to operate with an institute which is already identified with failure, and any further finance would merely go down the drain.

On the other hand, I believe that the original 1971 convention which established this institute was good thinking at that time, and I wonder whether possibly some of the facilities which already exist at Milan and which have obviously not been utilised for the purpose for which they were originally provided could not be put to some other useful European use. Perhaps Mr. Vedovato and his colleagues would give us a little clue to a useful line of thought in this respect. At the end of Amendment No. 1 they suggest that in paragraph 2 of the recommendation, after the words "European Council", there should be inserted: "or to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe".

In Mr. Richter's report there are some very interesting alternative ideas in paragraph 24. I suppose the idea which concerns Western European Union most is that in paragraph 24 (*iii*) for establishing a centre on the standardisation of European weapon production techniques. If this could be made to work, even if the centre were in Milan and not near NATO headquarters in Brussels, I suppose the annual savings to our national exchequers and in our national defence expenditures would be hundreds of millions of pounds. The possible saving would be so large that there may well be a case for

*Mr. Farr (continued)*

endeavouring to establish a centre there on the standardisation of European weapons output. Even though the chance of its success might be very slim, the possible prize would be very great.

I have said that I hope that the recommendations are submitted to the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe in line with Mr. Vedovato's Amendment No. 1 because this study which has been recommended might find a European use not in the defence field, not in the field of high technology, but where it possibly would meet with the wide support of all the eighteen or nineteen nations of the Council of Europe which a defence use would not. It occurs to me that with the Food and Agriculture Organisation centred in Rome and doing such a vital job for the whole world in food and agricultural production improvements, perhaps a centre for passing to developing countries knowledge in the agricultural and chemical fields related to agricultural production might be a useful use for this centre. In other words, I am suggesting an institute to help the third world to feed itself — a centre which would be useful for disseminating the expertise that we in the West possess in crop production and the prevention of animal disease and our ability now to feed two mouths from land which formerly fed one. Western European Governments could and would pass to such a centre for immediate dissemination the latest advances in agricultural chemistry and animal husbandry. I feel that such a use would deserve our universal support. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — No one else has asked to speak.

Mr. Richter ?...

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I accept Mr. Farr's suggestion with the greatest pleasure — particularly with regard to the FAO. This is a very good idea.

As we are already well ahead in our proceedings and in order to lighten somewhat the task of the Chair, let me say straight away, Mr. President, that I greatly welcome Mr. Vedovato's amendments and would ask the Assembly to approve them.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is closed.

An amendment has been tabled by MM. Vedovato, Treu and Pecoraro to the draft recommendation submitted by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, Document 685.

This amendment is in three parts. I shall present them for discussion and vote one after the other. I will read them :

1. In line 1 of the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "failure" and insert "situation", and in line 1 of the second paragraph of the preamble leave out "failure" and insert "situation".

2. At the end of the third paragraph of the preamble, add "and that Austria, which is not a member of the European Council, has signed it,".

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "study" to the end and insert: "to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and, finally, to the European Council for implementation".

I call Mr. Vedovato to speak on the first part of the amendment which concerns the first and second paragraphs of the preamble.

Mr. VEDOVATO (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I could, if given the opportunity, rapidly illustrate all three amendments. Meanwhile I would ask the Assembly to bear in mind the revised version of the amendment, for I get the impression that Mr. Farr, whom I thank for his intervention, had in front of him the unrevised version.

As regards the first amendment, it is simply a matter of not stating in a public document that the institute has failed, which is why I proposed, instead of the word "failure", to put "situation", and in the second paragraph of the preamble to substitute "this situation" for "this failure".

As regards the second amendment I believe it to be most helpful to mention in the text of the recommendation that yet another non-member country of WEU, Austria, had acceded to the agreement because it was open to the participation of non-member countries of both WEU and the EEC. It is simply a matter of recording a fact that ought also to be referred to because of the conclusions that may be drawn from it.

The third point, the main one, provides simply and solely for the issue to be referred, after its discussion in the Council of Ministers of WEU,

*Mr. Vedovato (continued)*

to the Council of Europe. We take the view — and I thank the previous speaker and the Rapporteur and Chairman of the Committee who professed themselves willing to accept the amendment — that it is necessary to take a first preliminary step by way of consulting the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which as an enlarged European forum also includes countries that have not yet acceded to the convention, or have done so like Austria, and which could work out some acceptable solution so as to allow this institute to play a rôle that could also be a different one from that indicated in the conclusions. But the Rapporteur and Mr. Farr envisaged the hypothesis that before having once again come up against the impossibility of any improvement, recourse should be had in the last resort to the European Council. From the formal standpoint, for I believe this draft revised amendment to have won general acceptance, I in fact proposed that, in paragraph 2 of the recommendation proper, the sentence from “its study” to the end be replaced by “to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and, finally, to the European Council”.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does one of the other signatories of the amendment wish to speak ?...

I shall take a vote on the amendment as submitted, in three parts.

I put the first part of the amendment, asking that the word “failure” should be replaced by “situation”, to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The first part of the amendment is adopted.*

I put the second part of the amendment to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The second part is adopted.*

I put the third part of the amendment, in its final version proposed by Mr. Vedovato, to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The third part is adopted.*

The vote on the amended draft recommendation as a whole will be taken tomorrow, Thursday, at 5.15 p.m., in accordance with the general rule we have adopted in order to ensure a full attendance at the time of voting.

### **5. Address by Mr. Rodgers, Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the address by Mr. William Rodgers, Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom.

The Chair and the Assembly have always taken the greatest interest in listening to statements by the Representative of the United Kingdom.

I am particularly glad to receive you here and welcome you in person. I call on you to speak before an audience which is already very interested in what you are about to say.

Please come to the rostrum, Sir. You have the floor.

Mr. RODGERS (*Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — Mr. President, my pleasure in being with you today is the greater for my own experience of WEU as leader of the United Kingdom parliamentary delegation to the Assembly eight years ago. The period of my association at that time was short but I have since tried to follow, even at a distance, what WEU has been doing. But, had I defaulted in this respect, my own parliamentary colleagues would have been active in reminding me. Many of them have found the WEU Assembly a very rewarding forum for study and debate. They have not been slow in drawing its rôle to the attention of successive British Governments, as Mr. Wall did in the House of Commons a few weeks ago.

The area of my own address today is very familiar within WEU. I want to talk about the complex of related problems associated with the procurement of equipment — weapons, armaments, whatever you choose to call them — for defence purposes. The policies which governments adopt in this respect have far-reaching consequences. The way we — I mean here the members not only of WEU but of the Western Alliance as a whole — conduct ourselves, together and apart, could be the touchstone of our conduct in wider spheres.

*Mr. Rodgers (continued)*

In the first place, and most obviously, there is the need to ensure that our armed forces are properly equipped to provide an adequate defence for our individual countries. Secondly, there is the need to get value for money in defence spending, especially when all national budgets are under strain due to world economic conditions. Thirdly, for countries with defence industries of their own, there are the industrial and employment consequences of decisions to buy abroad rather than from domestic sources, not forgetting that this may also involve a loss of export opportunities. Fourthly, there is the extent to which decisions on defence procurement have direct consequences in fields of civil technology. As Mr. Warren in his paper points out, the aircraft industry is an obvious example of this. Fifthly — and I think this follows — there are the international consequences of these decisions both for the unity of Western Europe and for the relationships between Western Europe and the United States.

My conclusion is that the policies of governments in defence procurement are inevitably highly political, not in the narrow sense, but in that they require a degree of vision and the exercise of well-considered judgment. I welcome WEU as a forum for discussion on defence procurement in that it provides an opportunity for politicians to examine these matters together, considering their full international as well as their national implications.

In the United Kingdom, the Procurement Executive was set up in 1971 to bring all defence procurement matters under the direct control of the Ministry of Defence. It replaced the previous arrangements whereby the procurement of naval equipment and ground systems was the responsibility of Defence Ministers whilst aircraft and guided weapons remained the responsibility of successive Ministers of Aviation and Technology. Defence procurement is now controlled for the most part by two specialist committees which report to me as the responsible Minister and through me to the Secretary of State as required. The Operational Requirements Committee vets all staff targets drawn up by each of the three services and its formal endorsement is necessary before such a target can be accepted as a staff requirement on which research and development can commence.

At this stage the project is monitored through research, development and production by the

Defence Equipment Policy Committee chaired by our Chief Scientific Adviser.

The essential characteristics of these two committees are, first, that each of the services is compelled to discuss its requirements with the other two and, second, that military projects are closely scrutinised by civilian staff responsible for scientific, financial, contractual and production matters.

Let me mention a few facts about the United Kingdom's current programme of defence procurement. At the present time some 35 % of the United Kingdom's defence budget is spent on equipment and on present forecasts this percentage is expected to rise to 40 % by 1979-80. Within our total procurement expenditure, production accounts for some 70 % and research and development for about 30 % and the relationship seems likely to remain fairly static. On present forecasts, the total United Kingdom defence budget is expected to remain roughly constant in real terms over the next ten years, but I would expect this relationship of spending on equipment to the total budget to vary little whatever the overall level of defence spending.

The reasons for this increase in our equipment programme are already familiar to you. The starting point is the increasing sophistication of modern military equipment. To give a few examples from our own inventory, a Chieftain tank now costs, in real terms, twice as much as its immediate predecessor, the Centurion; the Jaguar aircraft, on the same basis, is four times as expensive as the Hunter; and the Rapier low-level defence system costs eight times as much as the Bofors gun. These are reflections of the greater complexity of present-day warfare and the longer time scales involved in developing and producing up-to-date military equipment. To go a good deal further back into history, we should remind ourselves that the first Dreadnought was laid down in 1906 and entered into service only one year later while a modern warship can take anything up to ten years from initial design to in-service date.

This increasing complexity partly reflects what we can do but it is equally a function of what the Warsaw Pact can do — for we have to match, and if possible surpass, the best the prospective opposition can produce. Indeed, one of the lessons of the recent United Kingdom defence review was the paramount need to maintain high-quality equipment as an answer to the superior quantity which, as Mr. Lemmrich has

*Mr. Rodgers (continued)*

rightly pointed out, is currently deployed by the Warsaw Pact.

Despite this, there are now serious doubts how far we can count on technological superiority. In the last five years the Russians have improved their forces faster than in any comparable period hitherto. Some estimates put their spending on research and development as high as 30 % of their overall defence expenditure. Although this is a difficult figure to prove, there is no doubt that research and development is the fastest growing element in the Soviet defence budget. All this points to an alarming increase in the qualitative threat with which we shall be hard put to keep up. This is why we have to increase our spending on equipment even at the cost of additional savings elsewhere.

About 10 % of our equipment expenditure in Britain is on purchases from overseas. These overseas purchases are predominantly in the high technology field, where we have discovered over the years that it is sometimes more economical to buy a foreign weapons system off the shelf, even at considerable disadvantage to our balance of payments, than to attempt to develop the whole range of sophisticated equipment for ourselves.

Until recently this usually meant purchase from the United States. The Polaris deal, Phantoms for the RAF and the Royal Navy and the C-130 Hercules, were obvious examples. These have been followed more recently by Lance for the British army; and the Mark 46 torpedo and — if the terms are right — Sub-Harpoon, a guided weapons system, for the Royal Navy. It is, however, a mark of the growing competitive ability of the European defence industries and of our interdependence as part of the European industrial base that we have recently been able to purchase the Exocet ship-to-ship missile from the French and, again if the terms are right, we hope to follow this by adopting the Franco-German medium-range anti-tank weapon, Milan.

At the same time, the United Kingdom is involved in a number of joint development and joint production projects. About 15 % of our total development expenditure is devoted to joint projects at present. In the last decade our collaborative ventures have centred on partnership with the French for aircraft projects, and the Germans for ground systems. The Jaguar aircraft and the helicopter package, which com-

prised the Gazelle, Puma and Lynx, are examples of the first; the FH-70 and SP-70 — together with the Italians and the Germans — of the second. More recently, European collaboration has been dominated by the MRCA — again with the Italians as well as the Germans — which represents a significant advance on previous arrangements for management and contractual relations for an international project of this kind. Looking ahead, we hope to further this collaborative spirit through the joint development with the Germans of the future main battle tank.

The growth of collaboration on a European-wide basis undoubtedly foreshadows the end of national self-sufficiency in military matters which many nations represented here adhered to in the 1950s and 1960s, not so much because we feared that we might one day have to fight alone, but for more immediate economic reasons — to safeguard our balance of payments and to preserve employment in our own defence industries. Today most of us recognise that we could not hope to fight alone and, under pressure of economic recession and attendant pressure on defence budgets throughout the West, we have also come to realise that there are gains from economies of scale in military matters no less than in the civil.

On the other hand, we have still a long way to go before we begin to see the true benefits from interdependence emerge. There is no clear pattern in the various collaborative projects which I have described. For the United Kingdom they form a series of overlapping bilateral and trilateral deals with different partners framed to suit each particular project as it arose. More fundamentally, while considerable steps have been taken amongst the major industrial nations of Europe in Anglo-French collaboration, Franco-German collaboration and Anglo-German collaboration, as the Callaghan report points out, we have not yet succeeded in agreeing on any major project which harnesses the combined resources of France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

This brings me, squarely, to the question of standardisation, the extent to and manner in which an increasing number of countries can reach agreement on commonality in defence equipment. I want to say something about the United Kingdom's attitude to the principle of standardisation and then to the means of bringing it about.

*Mr. Rodgers (continued)*

But may I first refer back to what I said earlier about decisions in defence procurement requiring the judgment and vision that politicians should bring to public affairs. The temptation, let us face it bluntly, is to say one thing in international gatherings of this sort and then to prevaricate at home. Here in WEU, and similarly in ministerial gatherings, it is easy to pay lip-service to standardisation, to recognise its virtues and to endorse rapid progress towards its wider achievement. The real test is whether Ministers continue to speak to their Chiefs-of-Staff in such unequivocal terms and whether members of parliament do the same with industrialists and trade union leaders.

It will rarely be the case that a standardised item of equipment is equally acceptable to the armed forces of all those countries who are candidates to buy it. For some it will be second best, or worse than that. Ministers must be prepared to say that if the sum total of benefit to the Alliance or to a group of countries is greater than any alternative purchase or purchases, the services must accept a decision in the common good. But equally, if standardisation is to contribute to value for money at a time when defence budgets are under pressure, the total quantity of defence work, whether in development or production, will be less than if each country went its separate way. This is why parliamentarians must be prepared to stand up to those who say that the maintenance of domestic defence industries must always take precedence. We must speak frankly to our electorates.

So, seen from the United Kingdom, what are our aims in standardisation, what is the prospect, and what are the means? In common with other members of the Alliance, the United Kingdom hopes to gain both military and economic advantages from greater standardisation or, where this cannot be achieved, greater interoperability of equipment. It is a well-known fact that NATO suffers, by comparison with the Warsaw Pact, from the diversity of equipment it employs. With increasing pressure on defence budgets throughout the West, this is a luxury we can no longer afford. We must put greater impetus behind the tentative moves we have so far made towards standardisation in order to achieve greater commonality in equipment, together with the advantages in training, support and maintenance that will follow from this, and also to

secure greater value for money through longer production runs and the consequent economies of scale.

The difficulties should not be underrated. There have been notable failures in the past which commenced with just such good intentions. We are all familiar with the obstacles of differing time scales for replacement, the differing military tactical concepts adopted by individual national staffs and the differing industrial imperatives which concern us all at home.

However, in certain respects the prospects for standardisation are now better than ever before. For our part, the final withdrawal from most of our worldwide responsibilities outside NATO removes one further reason for the United Kingdom insisting on different equipment from its continental allies. At the same time, there appears to be a new spirit abroad in the United States, clearly indicated by the terms of the Culver-Nunn amendment, the memorandum of understanding we have ourselves concluded with the United States Government and the positive response we have obtained from the Americans to the concept of a two-way street. It is most important that we in Europe should take advantage of these developments at every level.

The objective is clear. Europe must so harmonise its requirements and co-operate as a co-ordinated industrial unit as to form, in equipment terms, an effective counterweight to the power of the United States. In encouraging a genuine two-way trade across the Atlantic, we must get away from the traditional concept of offset within one project, which has too often resulted in inefficiencies of work-sharing and divided management responsibility, and move towards a more liberal balance between different projects over a period of years. This should be to the mutual advantage of both parties.

The best means to this end are not so clear. Mr. Lemmrich has described the recent activities of Eurogroup in some detail in his report. As is well known, this was originally set up, on the initiative of Mr. Denis Healey, the then United Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, as an informal grouping of European Defence Ministers with the object of framing a specifically European identity within the Alliance and ensuring that European views on a wide range of NATO questions were properly co-ordinated and represented vis-à-vis the United States. A

*Mr. Rodgers (continued)*

number of useful exercises and studies were undertaken, all conducted on a relatively informal basis.

More recently, Mr. Roy Mason, during his year as Chairman of Eurogroup, has made a special effort to develop the concept of a two-way street through which the Europeans, by co-ordinating their own programmes more effectively, can try to do business with the Americans on a more equitable basis.

Similarly WEU has undertaken valuable work in this field and I have noted the remarks made by Mr. Rivière in his explanatory memorandum on how this work might be reinforced through the Standing Armaments Committee. However, many may feel that neither Eurogroup nor WEU have the necessary executive authority to translate these aspirations into more practical industrial arrangements and, in view of the importance of this task, a number of alternative suggestions have been put forward. I have been reminded of the recommendation endorsed by both the North Atlantic Assembly and the Assembly of Western European Union for a European armaments agency, and Mr. Lemmrich in his paper says that the creation of arms procurement agencies has been proposed or is being discussed within NATO, Eurogroup and the EEC.

There is therefore no lack of alternative suggestions. The difficulty lies in selecting an organisational solution which commands the widest possible support throughout Europe and holds out the best hope of achieving practical results at the earliest opportunity.

This is why, at their meeting on 5th November, the Eurogroup Ministers, after discussing the inter-related questions of standardisation, European equipment collaboration and European-North American co-operation in defence procurement, agreed on the need to improve the organisational arrangements for European defence procurement. They therefore proposed new and independent European arrangements to strengthen intra-European collaboration, described as "an independent forum open to all European members of the Alliance". This is a very recent development and it is carefully worded with the deliberate aim of avoiding any organisational links with existing machinery. Discussions on it are still proceeding within the governments concerned. It is the United Kingdom's hope that

a forum of this kind will enable us to harness the industrial potential of Europe.

I mentioned earlier the international implications of defence procurement. May I explain what I have in mind? I hope that I may be allowed to do so by drawing on my personal approach to Britain's international relations over the period, now almost fourteen years, of my own parliamentary life and career.

I was elected, like you, Mr. President, to parliament in 1962 and made my maiden speech in favour of Britain's membership of the European Economic Community at the time of my country's first application to join. When I was last here at WEU in 1967-68, I was supporting Britain's second application to join. Then, in 1971, I voted in parliament, as a member of the opposition, to endorse the terms negotiated by the then government for Britain's entry to the Community. Finally, I played some part earlier this year in seeking the endorsement of the British people, through the referendum, for Britain's continued membership.

I say this in order to establish my credentials as "a good European". I do so for two reasons. First, I believe that standardisation in defence procurement is vital for the industrial unity of Europe which in turn is essential if we in Europe are to retain important technologies and grow in economic strength. Secondly, in defence procurement as in other spheres, the emphasis on closer European co-operation should rest on its merits rather than on any attempt to weaken transatlantic ties. On the contrary, standardisation on a purely European basis would never go far enough and could be destructive within NATO.

Our aim must be a European defence industry that can join with the United States in a two-way street in defence procurement in the expectation of genuine reciprocity. To put it another way, without closer collaboration than hitherto, the European defence industries could become in time no more than subcontractors to the United States. This would be unacceptable but it would be equally unacceptable if Europe were not prepared to buy from the United States and sell to it competitively.

I am aware, Mr. President, that in a single address I could not do justice even to the one aspect of defence policy which I have chosen to discuss today. Equally, there will be cynics who will say that these problems of defence procurement have been with us for thirty years and

*Mr. Rodgers (continued)*

will be with us for thirty years more. I am more hopeful. Such are the costs today of an adequate defence that there is now an impelling motive to make progress. The western democracies are more vulnerable than the countries of the Warsaw Pact to pressures to reduce defence spending in order to maintain and increase social programmes. The long period of peace in Europe since 1945 and the atmosphere of détente of which Helsinki was a symbol also encourages a belief that defence deserves a lower priority than hitherto.

We can understand these sentiments and all of us here must wish that more of our nations' resources could be devoted to peaceful purposes. So we shall maintain the effectiveness of our defence the more we get together to solve the problems of procurement. It follows that we shall neglect these problems at our peril. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you. We have listened with the greatest interest to all your comments and proposals which we think particularly constructive.

Mr. William Rodgers has agreed to reply to any questions which members of the Assembly may wish to put.

I remind you for the sake of good order, you are being invited to ask questions and not to make speeches.

I call Lord Duncan-Sandys.

Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS (*United Kingdom*). — While very warmly welcoming the emphasis placed by the Minister on the pressing need for greater standardisation in weapon procurement and on the importance of maintaining the highest priority for defence, may we assume from this that there is no question of any reduction in Britain's contribution, in equipment or manpower, to the military strength of NATO?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does the Minister wish to reply to each question individually or take them all together?

Mr. RODGERS (*Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — It is probably better if I answer questions one by one. As Lord Duncan-Sandys knows from his very long experience, it is always a mistake in politics to draw assumptions too readily. If he were

seeking to obtain from me an assurance that at all times in the future present levels of defence expenditure would be maintained, I could not give that assurance any more than any Minister can give any such assurance at any time. If, however, Lord Duncan-Sandys were asking whether this government, as others, remains fully committed to NATO and would continue to provide the means to make that commitment effective, the answer to that question is certainly "yes".

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Mr. Rodgers laid stress on standardisation as being a way forward in which we could maintain our defence posture without large extra costs. That was the theme of his whole speech. In view of the undoubted fact, which I believe he mentioned, that the Warsaw Pact powers are all greatly increasing not only standardisation but their effective strength in manpower and weaponry, does he believe that it is only through standardisation, without an extra contribution of manpower and weaponry, that we can hope to hold even the present precarious balance vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact countries, in view of the fact that those powers are steadily increasing their resources, while we are steadily decreasing ours?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Rodgers.

Mr. RODGERS (*Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — I do not think that I or any other responsible Minister would say that defence procurement is the only means of being certain that over the years the West provides a sufficient defence against the Warsaw Pact powers. It is only one of the instruments at our disposal. But it has to be recognised, as I tried to say at the end of my address, that whether we individually like it or not, and whether any one of our governments may over a short or longer period be able to increase its level of defence spending, the pressures in democracies on all public expenditure and on priorities within public expenditure are much different from those faced by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. In other words, governments in a democracy are bound to take note of the pressure of public opinion both for growing private consumption and for growing public expenditure on social programmes.

*Mr. Rodgers (continued)*

I do not wish to say what the level in any one country may be at any one time but I would argue — and this is the answer I would give to Sir Frederic — that, given these pressures, we have to look for every possible means of getting value for money out of the funds we spend. The plain fact is that at the moment we are not getting value for money in procurement. This is an obvious area in which there is a common interest in all countries of the West. Given good sense, we can make effective progress within the expenditure limits in real terms which all our countries face.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Will the Minister accept that the Assembly heard with great interest and in many places with great pleasure what he said on the need for European standardisation and co-operation, and in particular his reference to the meeting of Eurogroup, which took place on 5th November, and his quotation from paragraph 5 of its communiqué referring to the creation of an open forum, open to all European members of the Alliance. Would he comment on recent press statements about the positive response to that invitation which has come from the French Government?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Rodgers.

Mr. RODGERS (*Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — As Mr. Roper knows, Ministers are always reluctant to comment on press reports of any kind. Therefore, even if I had seen them, I would be tempted to add nothing further at this stage. Nevertheless, if there has been a positive response to the idea of an open forum in which these matters can be discussed, I very greatly welcome it. Obviously, steps of this kind may occasionally be cautious, but if we can look forward to fuller and wider co-operation in procurement than hitherto — and this is the response to the initiative taken on 5th November by Ministers — that is a larger step forward than we have seen for some years on the path which many of us wish to tread.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — Would the Minister accept from a political opponent a

tribute to the courageous manner in which he has always said the same things both at home and abroad? Would he, going on from that, be courageous enough to talk to us a little about the specialisation of rôles in defence? Is not this one way in which a greater measure of standardisation of equipment and the obtaining of better value might be secured?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Rodgers.

Mr. RODGERS (*Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — I much appreciate Mr. Miller's kind remarks. It is possible, but of course within the Nine there is already a degree of specialisation, quite often based on our traditional areas of responsibility and interest. It is true to say that the United Kingdom has a specialised rôle in the eastern Atlantic which stems uniquely from her geographical position and probably her naval tradition, too.

I am not quite sure about the degree of specialisation that we could expect beyond these broad areas. My own view is that if we make progress in standardisation, that probably is the most important leap forward that we could have made in recent years, but if Mr. Miller has any more precise thought in his mind, I should be glad to comment upon it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Critchley.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — As Mr. Roper has asked so clearly the first question I intended to put, I will not now ask it. The second point I wished to make was that as a start it is a good thing to debate procurement at national assemblies but we have not yet had a debate in the House of Commons on it. Would Mr. Rodgers use his good offices to persuade the leader of the House of Commons to give us time to debate this important subject?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Rodgers.

Mr. RODGERS (*Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — I am sure that it would be inappropriate for petty domestic matters of this kind to be discussed in this distinguished Assembly, but I know Mr. Critchley well enough to appreciate that he makes a very serious point. I personally wish that my own parliament had more time for debates of this kind. I can only confess that such is the dereliction of duty from which my colleagues occasionally suffer that if we did so I would not expect

*Mr. Rodgers (continued)*

it to be as well attended as this occasion has been attended today.

To return to the theme of my address, a theme familiar to Mr. Critchley and others, governments have sometimes failed to take the opportunity of putting squarely before their own parliaments the industrial implications of the kind of decision we are discussing today. My government made a decision earlier this year, to which I referred in my address, on the purchase of three new major weapon systems, two from Europe, one of them the Milan, and another from the United States, Sub-Harpoon. This was a difficult decision because inevitably it had consequences — not perhaps in the short run but possibly in the long run — for our own industries. Representations were made very vigorously, before those decisions were announced, that we should not buy foreign.

There are, as I say, occasions on which those who pay lip service to standardisation find it more difficult to say at home that one can have standardisation only on the basis of reciprocity. There are those who believe that every country should export its weapon systems on condition that it does not have to buy in exchange. We cannot all be winners. Reciprocity is essential. If within our own sovereign parliaments we could make that clear, it would be an important step in making it easier for governments to make the sort of decision which standardisation requires.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the Minister has spoken on the one hand of decisions in the armaments sector being highly political: on the other hand, he has not glossed over the pressures that all of us have to withstand in our own countries when it comes to budget matters and defence.

My question concerns a specific trilateral project, namely the MRCA, a joint German-Italian-British effort. As we see it, we are now coming to a decision of the utmost importance, that of proceeding from the prototype towards the production and procurement stages. Can the Minister tell us how strongly the United Kingdom is backing this project?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Rodgers.

Mr. RODGERS (*Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — I hope that I understood the question.

We are as committed to the MRCA as are the German and Italian Governments. We have found it a remarkably successful project in collaboration, considering the complexity of what is involved.

Although I am constantly under pressure to announce that the cost of the aircraft has greatly increased over original expectations, in practice, given changes in exchange rates and discounting the effect of inflation, we have found that the original assumptions about the unit cost of the aircraft have not been greatly changed by the passage of time. In other words, this project has remained under better financial control than many single-nation military projects of a less complex kind.

The plane is now flying. It has been very successful indeed, although there are problems. There are always problems at this stage. There have been problems, with which we are very familiar, with its engine. But it is making excellent progress. I am very glad to know that the commitment which we have to it is shared by the German and Italian Governments.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS (*United Kingdom*). — I wish to ask a question resulting from the Minister's address and his reply to the first question from Lord Duncan-Sandys.

It is, of course, essential to have defence and it is essential to have all the modern appliances and weapons. However, when Britain is in economic difficulties and hundreds of thousands of people, organisations, newspapers and, indeed, political parties are calling for cuts in government expenditure, if, to quote an English expression, we bite off more than we can chew and cause economic difficulties, industrial unrest, unemployment, poverty, and misery, does not the Minister agree that even universality of armaments will not greatly help our defence and the defence of the people?

Therefore, is it not a case of trying to bite off more than one can chew? Must not the British Government try to find the right balance, even if that may mean upsetting some of those who feel that expenditures on armaments and the military machine are sacrosanct and should never ever be cut?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Rodgers.

Mr. RODGERS (*Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — I agree certainly with the point Mr. Lewis makes — if I may put it a different way — that every country should seek an adequate but not an extravagant defence.

I would also say that it is very much the task of Ministers, with their training, not to seek to become technically expert but to apply their scepticism to proposals which are made to them. I would not quarrel with Mr. Lewis when he suggests that Ministers, in particular, must be sceptical and exercise their judgment when presented with the inevitable demands — and rightly — of their Chiefs-of-Staff.

Lord Duncan-Sandys had a very good record of being a man who, as a Minister, was prepared to stand up to advisers when he believed that the advice was wrong. I very much agree that that is important. Is it not right for governments or for politicians to assume that the Chiefs-of-Staff, when they make their demands, are telling the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

Although I would be wrong to suggest that this is axiomatic of a successful defence policy, it could be argued — and it would be indiscreet for me to put it higher — that a successful Defence Minister always loses one of his Chiefs-of-Staff through resignation during the course of his period in office.

Therefore, to return to what Mr. Lewis implied, of course it is true that if one goes for an extravagant defence, and if one does so at a time when a country is under severe economic and social pressure, in the end one is self-defeating. If one weakens the economic and social fabric of the nation, however well-equipped one is to defend it against outside enemies, one finds oneself with new and unforeseen political problems at home.

It is therefore a question of keeping a balance and keeping the priorities very clearly in mind at all times. I certainly could not argue, at a time when public expenditure as a whole is under pressure and other social programmes are being required to accept very large savings, that the defence department can as a matter of rule claim to be exempt. We must accept the same scrutiny — though, equally, those of us who believe that defence is very important indeed must say so loudly and clearly because, as Mr.

Lewis says, there will be many other voices, for different reasons, saying that defence does not matter at all.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Leynen.

Mr. LEYNEN (*Belgium*) (Translation). — I have here half a dozen clippings from British newspapers claiming that the United Kingdom is going to reduce the Rhine army.

Can the Minister tell us whether these reports are true, false or premature?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Rodgers.

Mr. RODGERS (*Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — It is certainly premature. I would expect it to be altogether wrong.

It is the case that, as part of the annual review of all public expenditure at the present time the government is scrutinising defence expenditure — not in the current year or the next financial year but from 1977-78 onwards. This, as I say, is an annual scrutiny which bears fruit in a White Paper published by the government in the spring and setting out the forecasts for expenditure over a five-year period.

This review is taking place and must inevitably involve reviewing defence expenditure as well. However, no decisions of any kind have been made on any of our programmes for defence or social policy. I cannot believe that any decisions will in any way weaken our commitment to the Rhine army.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Buck.

Mr. BUCK (*United Kingdom*). — As an Ex-Minister of Defence, I greatly welcomed the Minister of State's address. Would he not agree that it is important for all of us to continue to emphasise our rejection of the doctrine of self-sufficiency? In defence terms today, self-sufficiency can surely be described as being like an ostrich carrying his own bucket of sand around with him. I was glad that the Minister of State rejected that doctrine in such a forthright way.

Can he say a little more specifically where we go from here? Where does he see the next major initiative coming from? Does he see it coming through Eurogroup? Does he see the British Government mounting a further initiative

*Mr. Buck (continued)*

here? If there is to be a further initiative, would he not agree that it should not be confined to NATO countries? Should we not think in terms of standardisation covering other allies — for example, Australia, New Zealand, Iran and other allies throughout the world?

Would the Minister of State also say something about the possibility of further progress in standardisation of training — a matter dealt with in his own White Paper and an area in which many of us feel there is room for further progress?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Rodgers.

Mr. RODGERS (*Minister of State for Defence of the United Kingdom*). — I am grateful to Mr. Buck for his kind endorsement of my remarks. Reciprocally, I can endorse his.

He asked first about the next initiative. My own view is that the important thing now is to digest the results of the most recent initiative — that taken by Ministers on 5th November last, to which we hope and believe there is a helpful response. As I said earlier, this would be a large step forward. We should have the position confirmed before we can be sure of the direction in which we should move.

Mr. Buck is bold in suggesting that standardisation can be extended outside NATO, at least in the near future. It must be recognised that NATO is a treaty signed twenty-five years ago with political implications and it cannot be taken for granted that the interests of our individual countries outside the NATO area are always equal and the same. Therefore, although there may be prospects for standardisation, I do not think that we should collectively seek them at the present time — although, obviously, if we could achieve more standardisation within Western Europe, that would wash off inevitably on those other countries which are at present customers for arms from Western Europe. That may well happen whether it is willed or not.

I have nothing to add to what our White Paper said about training. Clearly there is scope for greater standardisation in training. This itself will grow as we find that we are training on similar or standardised weapons. But, for the moment, I have nothing further constructive to say than that I have noted Mr. Buck's remarks in this respect.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Does anyone else wish to put a question to the Minister?...

Thank you once more, Sir, for your courtesy and forbearance. (*Applause*)

## **6. Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 682 and Amendments)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance, Document 682 and Amendments.

I call Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — Only the welcome arrival of luncheon can save you from a short speech from me commending to you the paper on developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance. I shall not speak for very long but hope to take advantage of your good nature in replying, after lunch, to some of the points which will be raised in this debate.

The theme of this paper is a cautious optimism. It appears that at long last we are moving away from a period in which the countries of Iberia have suffered from dictatorships of the left or the right. This is the first opportunity that any international assembly has had to debate and to welcome the prospect of the return of Spain, a European country, to the mainstream of liberal democracy. I am confident that the debate will be without rancour and recrimination. I will divide my remarks into two, dealing first with Portugal and then with Spain.

With a little luck, Portugal may yet be able to provide history with the rare example of a revolution which gave birth to liberal democracy. Azevedo has won a pledge of military support and is at the moment engaged in the purge and imprisonment of many of the extreme left-wing members of the Armed Forces Movement. In the last eighteen months, other ideas in Portugal have been tried and appear to have failed. The confused hopes for a new kind of revolutionary military government — a sort of African socialism — seem to have failed in recent weeks.

*Mr. Critchley (continued)*

If the new left seems to have failed in Portugal, so, too, apparently, has the old left. A Stalinist communist party, an alien transplant from Eastern Europe, lacking nothing save the presence of the Red Army in Portugal, seems to have suffered in recent days a major defeat in the context of Portuguese politics. The extraordinary spectacle of a party — the communist party — fomenting opposition to a government of which it was itself a member can only be described as an immoral absurdity which should serve finally to discredit that party.

It therefore appears — again, one talks always in cautious terms — that the Soviet and African solutions in Portugal have failed. Thus the sixth provisional government is not just the best Portuguese Government that we have ; its recent successes in establishing its authority could well be the prerequisite for the emergence of a genuine and welcome liberal democracy in Portugal.

Spain is not Portugal. Spain unconsciously has collective memories of that dreadful civil war. Its army, unlike the Portuguese, is uncorroded by defeat in a colonial war. Spain has a large and prosperous middle-class with a stake in stability. The Portuguese example is likely to make the Spanish people, of whatever political complexion, very cautious in any changes in the Spanish political system, and a change of leadership in Spain, however significant and however welcome, is not as dramatic as a revolution, which was the case in Portugal on 18th April 1974. There are vivid differences between the Spanish and the Portuguese situation. It is my belief and that of the Defence Committee, which has agreed to this report, that Juan Carlos should be given a fair wind by Europe. It is our opinion that we should now do precisely that.

The new King of Spain has indicated that he favours reform. He has declared, in part at least, an amnesty for political prisoners. He has appointed a new man to head the Cortes, Mr. Miranda, who is not, despite his past support of the régime, regarded as an extremist in Spanish political terms. But the important thing now is to wait and see which of the more moderate centrist leaders, such as the former Ambassador in London, Manuel Fraga, will be chosen as the Prime Minister to counterbalance the first choice of Miranda as President of the Cortes. At this

stage of the debate we should suspend judgment and be cautious.

Clearly, the overwhelming majority of Spaniards want nothing more than a speedy but safe progress towards reform and liberal democracy. This Assembly should not be censorious, especially in the case of Spain. Censure from outside as an act of politics is frequently enjoyable, but in the Spanish case it has had little or no effect on Spain itself, and whatever effect it has had has been usually in the wrong direction. Therefore, I emphasise that we should not be censorious, but we must watch and encourage developments in Spain.

We should also as an Assembly avoid, if possible, expressing value judgments as to which of the two governments, Spanish or Portuguese, falls the furthest short of the kind of ideal government to which we subscribed when we read politics at university and which since has probably been diluted by a degree of necessary cynicism.

In conclusion, there are real signs of improvement in the situation in Portugal. Therefore, there is a need for Europe and for this Assembly to support, with economic help and with some political support, the policies of the sixth provisional government.

On Spain we welcome the end of an era and the opportunity at long last to witness the re-entry of Spain into Europe. This Assembly should be cautious but charitable. I believe that we shall be both if I can persuade the Assembly to support the report which it has been my honour to advocate on behalf of the Defence Committee.

I should like to mention one final point. The Defence Committee met this morning and adopted unanimously this draft resolution : The Assembly, noting the accession of H.M. King Juan Carlos of Spain, draws his attention to the very cautious recommendations included in this document.

We also agreed at a meeting of our Committee that there should be a further report in June to chart progress, or lack of it, towards a liberal democracy in both Spain and Portugal, so that this Assembly will keep a watching brief. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Bettiol to speak in the debate.

Mr. BETTIOL (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, it is most interesting and essential to discuss, however briefly, the problem of the Iberian peninsula. However, the topic has an entirely geographical content inasmuch as the current situation assumes a different aspect in Portugal from the one it bears in Spain, and, psychologically speaking, the two peoples are as much poles apart as South Africans and the inhabitants of Greenland. They are nations that do not understand one another, do not like one another and are afraid of one another: Portugal, more especially, has throughout history always feared a Spanish invasion. Therefore to discuss the Portuguese and Spanish questions simultaneously is, in my view, given the gulf that yawns between, both a methodological and a historical error.

On Spain I will merely say a couple of words, to the effect that we should emphasise the broad interpretation of the King's amnesty of political prisoners, of whom many more than had hoped to do so have latterly been given their freedom. This is undoubtedly a notable step forward, which we trust will be followed by others towards establishment of a democratic monarchy, so that Spain can, as it wishes, finally secure a place in the political, military and defence system of Western Europe.

For Portugal the problem is different, because the first question we have to ask is: is it truly European, or in some way different from Europe? To be sure, Portugal has for almost three or four centuries been bound in a treaty of friendship with Britain, but I am not sure whether this treaty is still an operative and constructive reality, or whether it is not simply now a matter of past history. The fact is that the Portuguese do not have a continental but an oceanic mentality. Portugal has always looked out across the seas and for long generations past has acquired a universalising mentality, near-Roman in the sense of an *imperium* going far beyond the narrow strip of Europe's territory, turning its face towards Brazil, Oceania, India, China. Even today, for example, in Ceylon, over half the inhabitants' names are of Portuguese origin, which means that Portugal's presence has had a powerful influence in far-distant lands, helping to mould people's mentality and so the formation of a Portuguese-Indian, Portuguese-Chinese, or Portuguese-Oceanian, Portuguese-Brazilian, Portuguese-African civilisation.

Certainly the Portuguese empire was a world-wide one, universal, one that carried weighty influence in the stability of world political affairs. Spain, in contrast, even when lordling it over South America, was predominantly a European State, so much so that for three centuries we Italians were ruled by Spaniards, who had also moulded our mental attitudes, that still persist, and characteristics, especially in Southern Italy and even a little in Lombardy. Then Portugal became European, or at any rate lived through a fortunate Europeanising moment of history under Pombal, the first great Portuguese Minister to open up his country in 1700 to the concrete and formative ideas of the French and European enlightenment. Then Portugal was the first European State to really break with the tradition of absolutism and the inward-turning ideas of the *ancien régime*, and open itself to the modern world. Then there were the Napoleonic wars, which brought Portugal to Brazil, whereupon it became a Brazilian State.

Today we have talked a lot about Brazil, but let us not forget what a large term this is, what a big psychological and political unit, thanks to the Portuguese spirit which permeated all the inhabitants of Brazil from Manaos to Rio Grande do Sul, and even the dialectal nuances of Portuguese-Brazilian idiom. Brazil forms a huge unit of a hundred million inhabitants, including Germans, Italians and Spaniards too, a unit of Portuguese spirit, and the only one to have had any importance in the formation of that big European State that will in twenty years' time be one of the giants of the modern world.

Now, following upon the collapse that no one expected — because even three years ago when I visited Angola and Mozambique I found these countries living at peace and in full growth with complete economic take-off, and nobody could imagine there would ever be such a sudden collapse of the whole colonial empire — following this collapse, which came about for reasons on which I will refrain from dwelling, Portugal has now shrunk to the tiny strip of Western Europe where political and military importance depends upon a possible Soviet encirclement of the positions of Europe's heartland. And this is what has come to pass; a communist — and therefore Russian — attempt at the encirclement of Western Europe. It has been a time, such as has left its mark on the last few months, when all the countries of Central Europe quaked in their shoes. Today the problem seems to have been overcome, but we ought not to

*Mr. Bettiol (continued)*

forget that Portugal is dominated not by a civilian political caste but a military one. Even Salazar — let us face it — was a university professor of economics from Coimbra, never a dictator. We called him that, but he never was one. The ruler was the military General Staff, who wanted Salazar to fill that post. And so, throughout the Salazar period, it was, then as now, the military who ran the country; the military tribes or clans which, from the days of the monarchy on, had always had the biggest say in Portugal's political developments.

By joining in World War I, Portugal became somewhat Europeanised so as to safeguard American positions; in World War II it remained neutral because the presence of United States forces in the Azores was a sufficient guarantee. Latterly, it maintained a markedly pro-western attitude as a member of NATO and had made a modest but vital contribution to its defence. Now what counts is that as Europeans we should be convinced that Portugal has now dwindled to an extreme outer edge of Europe, one that has on the other continents no impact other than historical, psychological or commercial, no longer even military; from the military standpoint, however, it is still essential to the defences of Western Europe, especially now that Russia is trying to effect through the Arabs an outflanking movement in Africa in order to turn the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance and get a stranglehold on Europe, and trample it under. Therefore to have a friendly and democratic Portugal is to make an essential contribution to the defence of the West. Unless the problem lies here: is Portugal a democratic country today? I have already said that the military establishment has been and remains the ruler of Portugal. It is almost as if it were a country of the third world rather than of Western Europe, where the military form part of the government administration and obey the politicians. There the military order about the politicians, and the political class wields no power; they are only four professors arguing, mocked at by public opinion and held in little esteem by the military themselves. At all events, the military have succeeded in blocking the offensive of the left, and Portugal seems to be moving towards a situation in the political centre, which may help to consolidate a democratic régime run by civilians. But until Portugal has a civilian government in which responsibility is

given to civilian political parties, we have to be mistrustful of it; this is a hard fact. Indeed, knowing what its history has been, that of a pawn in the internecine struggles of military clans, no sure political stability is thinkable with the country in military hands.

This is why we should at the present juncture congratulate ourselves on Portugal's step towards averting the many perils it was rushing towards a few months back. But we should certainly not put aside certain qualms, lest tomorrow we run into fresh dangers; we have to be cautious in our judgment, until the situation has simmered down, become democratised and civilised, meaning that civilians take over power, through the political parties.

As regards the parties, I am bound to protest once again in this Assembly against the exclusion of certain political formations like my own from the number of those admitted to the interplay of national politics. In Portugal the Christian Democrats have been banned, which is a denial of a valid democratic principle; and so, as the party is banned, we shall be quite unable to work up any enthusiasm for relations with Portugal or any attempt to give it any political, economic or military aid that it may ask for, seeing that the folly of the military has in a few months squandered all that Salazar built up in forty years of toil.

Consequently, I contend we should go carefully, for we are still in a transitional phase. I am not in favour of sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation, where it says: "that full support is provided for the present government in Portugal". I am against the term "full support" because it implies political support, and from that angle we are quite unable to lend full political support. We can assist Portugal in restoring normal conditions, but so long as there remains any tincture of authoritarianism we cannot give support. What is more, so long as the military remain in power, a democratic assembly like ours may not offer such support. For the rest, my hope is that Portugal may find its way home and even in its now unduly reduced dimensions — unduly reduced because I speak as a European and see the concept of Europe reduced to its simplest geographical terms — even so, I say, may continue to be if not a determining force at any rate one of importance for Europe's defence and the solution of the fundamental vital issues at stake.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cordle.

Mr. CORDLE (*United Kingdom*). — The views expressed in the report are the views of the Committee and provide a wide range of interesting facts which cover the internal political life of Spain. One hesitates to comment without making quite certain that nothing is said which could be interpreted as being of an interfering nature. After all, who are we to criticise a country which has provided a way of life to its people, which has given to them a sure measure of peace and a fair measure of plenty over so many years? It is perhaps expedient for us now, as Spain changes its leadership, to set before it our hopes and fears in Western European Union, so that a clear and unblurred expression of our attitude can be provided in a unanimous resolution passed today by this Assembly.

The strategic position of the Iberian peninsula, so geographically integrated into Europe, calls out loudly and clearly for a close and full defence relationship with NATO and, in Spain's own good time, a reassessment of its defence agreements with those it chooses to help to safeguard its shores and trade routes. With the United States defence agreements expiring this year, there can be, if Spain so chooses, such an opportunity for it to survey the whole spectrum and to provide itself with a wider scope of security and strength than it has known for many years. It may well be that a decision along the lines I should like to propose would lead to a new integration of our countries and break through the barriers of exclusion and isolation which at present bedevil the military situation.

Obviously, certain changes within the political structure are bound to replace the old régime and no doubt such political reformation as Spain will adopt will be the outcome of a democratic election, so readily welcomed by the present leadership of both Church and State. It is therefore on this crucial point that the future relationship between us must depend and I am sure that the new King of Spain must soon decide, with those he is at present appointing, when an election is to take place.

In the explanatory memorandum before us, much of which I believe is right, special attention is drawn to the proposals for Spain to take part in routine discussions, and under which Spanish forces should have access to modern training methods. I for one would welcome

participation at all levels, and with Spain as a member of NATO, it would give us all a great uplift to have its military cadets going through our academies with regular intakes into Sandhurst, Dartmouth and Cranwell in the United Kingdom.

Again, what greater inspiration could we ask in these serious days of economic difficulties than to welcome Spain into the European Economic Community, to the Council of Europe and to this excellent Assembly? It is surely for us now to hold out the right hand of fellowship to our Spanish friends and to do all we can to welcome them, to trade with them and together to defend the free world against the common enemy. With the ever-increasing threat to the Mediterranean by the presence there of the Soviet fleet, it is to me profoundly important that Spain knows now what the attitude of Western European Union is to it and that we are ready for discussions to begin. But of course this must be at its request, following the changes to which I much look forward.

In conclusion, a brief word about the present situation in Portugal. Here, regrettably, we find an extremely tenuous problem between conflicting groups, in short, a situation of flux which can only delay and hinder union with us here. We can be encouraged by the events particularly of this last week, for at least progress is being made towards a more democratic system, and the possibility of civil war seems now to be receding. But, like Spain, Portugal has a long way to go. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Pignion.

Mr. PIGNION (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I shall be brief, for it is getting on for lunch time.

I heard the Rapporteur, Mr. Critchley, say just now at the end of his speech that he hoped we should be able to adopt his report, and I would like to say we all share his cautious optimism; but in my own case, that is as far as I can go.

In a situation as fluctuating and shifting as the one we see in the Iberian peninsula, more strikingly in the case of Portugal, but also perhaps in that of Spain, while I share the Rapporteur's cautious optimism, I cannot go beyond it in passing judgment.

Besides, you said yourself that we must suspend our judgment, though not quite in the

*Mr. Pignion (continued)*

sense I use the phrase, but it is true that we must do so for, I repeat, we must not let ourselves be taken in by appearances, and we can sense this from the comments by previous speakers, which almost compel me to modify what I intended to say, since there is such a lot of wishful thinking about what is going on.

When we are called upon to give Portugal our "full support", it is in a certain political context, and the phrase has to be qualified in the light of the very latest developments. Therefore I say we should not only suspend our judgment but examine the situation with sufficient caution not to endanger the good name of our Assembly.

The hope of seeing a genuine form of democracy come into being in both these States is one we all share. But the advisability of taking a decision at our level does not appear to me to be sufficiently well founded for us to go as far as that. For what would we do if, having adopted this draft recommendation, events were to prove us wrong?

The Rapporteur hopes that a head of government, a prime minister if you like, chosen from the centre, will be appointed in Spain. May I remind him that the King will have a list of three names, drawn up by the Council of State, to choose from. Knowing what his political entourage is still, the choice seems terribly limited.

I therefore ask the Assembly not to take refuge in cautious silence but to adopt towards the Rapporteur's comments not an attitude of expectancy, but one of letting ourselves be guided by events, so that we do not have to go back on a decision tomorrow.

I am not finding fault with the quality of the report. It is the draft recommendation which I feel it is inadvisable to adopt at this time. The

situation is too fluid, too shifting for us to be able to adopt the recommendation with safety and with an easy conscience. I am of course speaking for myself.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Clearly, the issues raised are of the highest interest to the Assembly. But we still have a lot of other speakers to hear. I shall therefore suspend the sitting.

### **7. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day :

1. Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance (Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 682, Addendum and Amendments).
2. Northern European countries and the prospect of European political union (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Document 684).
3. Relations with Parliaments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 681).

Are there any objections ?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 12.40 p.m.)*

## TWELFTH SITTING

Wednesday, 3rd December 1975

### SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance (*Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the Amendments to the draft Recommendation, Doc. 682 and Addendum*),  
*Speakers*: The President, Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Roper, Mr. Piket, Mr. Channon, Mr. Reale, Mr. Pecoraro, Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Critchley (*Chairman and Rapporteur*), Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Scholten, Mr. Critchley, Mr. Miller, Mr. Voogd, Mr. Sieglerschmidt (*on a point of order*), Mr. Channon.
4. Northern European countries and the prospect of European political union (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 684*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Steel (*on a point of order*), Mr. Oftedal (*Observer from Norway*), Mr. Steel (*Rapporteur*), Sir Frederic Bennett, Mr. Hartling (*Observer from Denmark*), Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. Steel (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Sieglerschmidt (*Chairman of the Committee*).
5. Relations with Parliaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 681*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Delorme (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Roper, Mrs. Miotti Carli (*Chairman of the Committee*).
6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 3. Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance

*(Resumed Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Votes on the Amendments to the draft Recommendation, Doc. 682 and Addendum)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the resumed debate on the

report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance, Document 682, Addendum and Amendments.

In the resumed debate, I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). — Although I have requested your agreement, Mr. President, to ten minutes, I can say in much less time what I regard as relevant and what has not already been said.

Of all the reports that I have read in WEU, the one that Mr. Critchley presented this morning is one of the most informative and objective. However, I disagree fundamentally on one point which is dealt with twice in the preamble and the recommendations. I do not see how we can express our unqualified support for the present Portuguese Government.

I see no reason to regret what I said in this Assembly almost exactly a year ago, when many were cheering the revolution in Portugal — that there was a danger of counting our chickens before they were hatched over the replacement of the former authoritarian right-wing régime by parliamentary democracy. Sadly, events have shown that that warning was not careless foreboding.

I am no more ready to express support for the present Portuguese Government than I am for

1. See page 31.

*Sir Frederic Bennett (continued)*

the present Spanish Government. In both cases, it would be premature.

We are concentrating at the moment — whether in the recommendation or in the amendments — on saying that this organisation should represent not authoritarian States, left or right, but plural democracies. At the moment, the sixth government since the Portuguese revolution in no way fits that description. It is militarily dominated and two of the principal political parties — the Liberals and the Christian Democrats — were prevented from taking part in the last elections. The government does not even represent the results of those elections.

Having received barely 16 % of the votes — few would question that in another election the total would be reduced to 4 % or 5 % — the Communist Party claims the right to be in the cabinet while at the same time conducting a policy of sabotage, from outside, of the government in which it serves. Only by a hair's breadth the other day did we escape the even worse horror of a total communist-dominated autocracy in its most totalitarian sense being inflicted on the Portuguese people.

I believe that it is generally accepted that there are more political prisoners in Portugal today than at the height — or the depths, depending on how one views it — of the Salazar régime. The genuine opportunities for expression of opinion are no greater.

I would infinitely prefer that we contented ourselves with expressing the hope that the first tentative steps towards genuine democracy were being taken — just as I hope equally devoutly that the present tentative steps in Spain towards genuine democracy will be fulfilled. Until then, it is inconceivable that an Assembly such as this, which over the years has placed so much emphasis on its membership being parliamentary and democratic, should express support for any government which can make no pretence to such achievements.

If the Portuguese Government were a military government of the right in which the dominant party, although it had received only a handful of votes, occupied as of declared right a significant position in the cabinet, this Assembly would unanimously turn down that government as not being representative in any democratic form.

None of us in those circumstances would regard it as worthy of our support.

I do not express support for either the Spanish or Portuguese Governments of today. In both cases I regard both countries as having taken some steps forward towards the kinds of parliament, government and institutions which I shall wish to support in the future.

However, I cannot today join in the popular sport that is now so prevalent in international institutions — namely, the adoption of double standards. I have said this over and again. We are living in an era of double standards. Other debates which we shall have during this Assembly may throw up some of the double standards that prevail today. I have no hesitation in expressing my determination that, when it comes to a vote, I shall not condemn steps taken in either Portugal or Spain, but I wish to see several more steps taken along the road to parliamentary democracy before I find it possible to give unqualified support to governments in either country.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I join Sir Frederic Bennett in the view that this is a most valuable report. It provides a balanced and objective account of difficult times in both countries in the Iberian peninsula. I agree with Mr. Bettiol that it is difficult for us in this debate to consider in the same context two countries which are so different. Inevitably, people tend to apply formulae to two countries which in essence are extremely different. Inevitably again, there are political differences that influence one's attitude to those countries.

Although I accept the broad tenor of the recommendation, there are some paragraphs in the explanatory memorandum on which I wish slightly to differ. I was in Portugal this summer. I hasten to add that I was there on holiday, but it was impossible for anybody there to ignore the political developments within that country. Having discussed the situation with many people in Portugal, I have since followed events with great interest.

It is ridiculous to suggest that Portugal is a totalitarian country. Portugal is attempting to evolve towards an acceptable form of liberal democracy, but the process of moving from thirty or so years of authoritarian rule towards a form of well-balanced parliamentary democracy is not

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

easy. It is as though a tram driver were asked to convert to driving a motor bus. Obviously in the process of transformation mistakes are made, and there have been excesses that we all regret. What surprises me is that there have not been more mistakes in Portugal in the last few months. It is remarkable that so few lives have been lost in the Iberian peninsula since the events of May last year.

There is no easy transition to a solution of the problems in the peninsula, but alternative views are being heard. We have seen clearly in the last week that the majorities who have banded together after the elections are not prepared to tolerate excesses for ever. Binding decisions have been taken by the Portuguese Government in the last few weeks, with clear guidance as to how they intend to proceed. We read in today's newspapers that the President of Portugal is attempting to bring the armed forces back into a more useful and effective rôle in the Alliance of which, it must be remembered, Portugal is still a member.

We are asked in the recommendation — and I emphasise that there was not a single vote against the recommendation in the Defence Committee — to do no more than Ministers in our own countries have done — namely, to express support for the Government of Portugal. Of course that will not be unqualified support. Indeed, one might have difficulty in giving unqualified support to any government outside our own countries — and sometimes it is difficult to give unqualified support to governments within our own countries, even when they are composed of members of our own parties.

In broad terms we support the Government in Portugal, since they are moving in a direction that we find encouraging for the future of Europe. I hope that we shall support the Defence Committee's recommendation, which, I emphasise, was adopted in the Committee without a dissentient voice.

I agree with Mr. Bettiol that it may be necessary to amend paragraph 2(b) of the second part of the recommendation as suggested by Sir John Rodgers and other colleagues, but certainly in regard to paragraph (iv) of the preamble WEU should express, as has the Council of the Nine, its support for the present Portuguese Government.

I was fascinated to hear the interesting historical analysis given by Mr. Bettiol. He sought to set out the position of Portugal in the world as a whole and, by implication, questioned its relationship with Europe. We were told of Portugal's links with the Indies, China, South America and Africa. I was reminded of another European country with many world links. I refer to the United Kingdom which, despite a long history of links outside Europe, is now very much a European country. This argument also applies to the Netherlands. Therefore, I hope that Mr. Bettiol will think again on that part of his argument.

Mr. Critchley, in presenting the report, discussed the situation in Spain. Both Mr. Critchley and his Committee decided that it was right to give the benefit of the doubt to present developments in Spain. Once again the Spanish people face the difficult problem of a transition from dictatorship towards democracy. One can take either a pessimistic or an optimistic view about the appointment of Mr. Miranda as head of the Cortes. There were many people in Madrid yesterday — not merely of the left, or the centre but of the moderate right — who were not particularly excited about that appointment, although, as Mr. Pignion said earlier, there were few alternatives open to Juan Carlos in choosing one of the three names put forward to him.

But perhaps, as Mr. Critchley said, this is part of the difficult balancing exercise that Juan Carlos has to follow: he has to appoint a President of the Cortes of the medium right so that he can, in turn, appoint a Prime Minister who is perhaps more progressive in his outlook. I shall wait and see. I hope that Mr. Critchley is right to be optimistic.

However, we have to vote on the situation as it is at the moment, and so for both Portugal and Spain the recommendation which has been prepared in Committee achieves the right balance. I do not believe that we are expressing double standards here but are taking into account the situation as it exists. I hope that we shall continue to maintain the view which is essential in our own countries that neither NATO nor the European Community can be open to totalitarian régimes. The basis on which I was able to defend membership of the European Community to my constituency during the referendum was that it stood for essential democratic values. The basis on which I can justify our membership of NATO is that it defends these same values.

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

The reference therefore in the preamble to the fact that membership by countries with totalitarian régimes will not be tolerated in future is an essential part of any recommendation we make in this Assembly of democratic parliaments. In paragraph (iv) of the preamble we should do more, and not less, than the Ministers of the Nine have done and express our general support for developments in Portugal.

When it comes to the operative part, paragraph 2 (b), as Mr. Bettiol suggested this morning, perhaps the wording in the draft could be improved. Here the proposal from Sir John Rodgers and his friends may well provide a basis for amendment. But we must keep the balance right and therefore the preamble should be left as it is.

This is a difficult subject, one on which we have to make a decision at a time when events are moving very fast. However, I am encouraged by what I have seen in Portugal, particularly by what has happened in the last few months, and also by what I begin to see happening in Spain. I look forward to the day — not far off — when we can welcome our parliamentary colleagues from both Spain and Portugal, if not in this Assembly then certainly in that of the Council of Europe. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Before calling the next speaker, I should like, on behalf of the whole Assembly, to greet the presence of two observers representing the Norwegian Storting, one of whom is Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. We bid them welcome here. (*Applause*)

I call Mr. Piket.

Mr. PIKET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I would like to congratulate the Rapporteur, Mr. President. I admire his courage in writing a report, within so short a time, on developments in the Iberian peninsula and their effects on the Atlantic Alliance. The Rapporteur is unable to offer us any certainty about either aspect, so the premises for his report are inevitably ambiguous. The Rapporteur hopes that the Iberian countries will lend their support to the policies and defence of the WEU countries and the Atlantic Alliance, but can go no further than this because political developments have so far made such support impossible. What political developments will come in Spain is anything but

certain, although the presence of leading European personalities at the investiture of the new King was evidence of goodwill despite doubts. Nor must it be forgotten that that country is still a long way from being able to sign the declaration on human rights, as is needed for membership of the Council of Europe: but this is the outcome of a totally different character and structure, of different habits and customs — one has only to think of bullfights, looked on there as something normal and everyday — and a history and culture with roots quite different from ours.

These are the factors that give the Spaniard a different outlook on a variety of problems, and make him approach them from a different angle. The Spaniard of the older generation, moreover, still thinks back with horror, anxiety and grief to the civil war of the 1930s, while the younger generation wants to avoid anything that will bring back such a ghastly state of affairs. The situation so far, and the present-day position in Portugal where democracy is far from being assured, evoke a nightmarish picture for the Spaniards.

The first paragraph of the draft recommendation, which says that parliamentary democracy — on our own model? — must flourish in Spain, proceeds from the premise that this is achievable from one day to the next. This is, of course, not possible. It is being childishly naïve to expect a country where, because of the factors I have mentioned, there has been a totally different pattern of development, to change overnight. Such a change can of course only come about gradually — there is no getting away from this fact. Those who would have things otherwise will either produce chaos like there has been in Portugal or else spark off a reaction from the whole of the proud Spanish people, and by doing so end up with the very opposite of what they seek to achieve. A man who has always lived in a certain way, and thought in a certain way, is not going to be changed overnight into a man with a totally different mode of thought, not even by psychoanalysis. It is no different for a nation.

I will not say much about the situation in Portugal, since on Monday the NATO Secretary-General, Mr. Luns, when asked about the military and political reasons why Portugal had to stay a member of NATO, gave no other reason than that the Azores were in a geographically favourable position. I would suggest, however, that if

*Mr. Piket (continued)*

we are to apply strict criteria to Spain, the same should be made to apply to Portugal. If we do this, then democracy is a long way off, to judge by the Portuguese we see on television and in news photos fighting, killing and destroying each other. I am deeply sorry that this is so.

As to the second part of the recommendation, I would offer a comment on paragraph 2 (*d*), where the Rapporteur asks that political advisers be appointed to the various NATO commands. Did he think this proposal out carefully? The Atlantic Alliance is, after all, an alliance of fifteen sovereign countries, each with its own political aims. The Secretary-General himself has often said that it is extremely difficult to bring these political aims down to a common denominator. How are these political advisers attached to the NATO commanders to be able to do anything useful, in these circumstances? I am even afraid that appointing this kind of political official would make the work of the NATO staffs more difficult, rather than easier. This is certainly not what the Rapporteur intends. For these reasons, I would move that we delete paragraph 2 (*d*). Although the contents of the report are the responsibility of our British Rapporteur, it will be evident that I am not happy with what he says in paragraphs 40 and 42. I think it is most dangerous to talk now about setting up NATO commands in Gibraltar. This would be an unnecessary irritant to the Spanish government, especially when one remembers that during every long hot summer in Southern Spain the Gibraltar question comes to boiling-point.

Finally, Mr. President, it is not clear to me why Mr. Critchley goes into the internal situation in Spain so extensively. I do not believe that there is much to be sensibly said on this by non-Spanish politicians. It is already a job for us to assess the strength of the political parties and their following in our own countries, let alone to provide a description of the power of political parties that are not officially allowed to exist in Spain. It is a very common fault, among the Western Europeans, to lay down standards for other countries, based on our own ideas; but who would dare say whether even in countries from where parliamentarians come here today political conditions are identical to those in surrounding countries? If we do seriously aim at welcoming Spain as a member of our organisation — and I am assuming unconditionally that we do — then we must try to find the way towards

what we call democracy not from our own attitudes and system of ideas, but from theirs. We really must take the trouble to do this: if we do not, then any attempt is doomed. I hope we shall be granted the wisdom, the strength and the intelligence we need. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Channon.

Mr. CHANNON (*United Kingdom*). — I agree with a great deal of what Mr. Piket has said. One of the striking features of this debate has been the very few genuine differences that have occurred between members who have spoken. I would have hoped, if it were at all possible, that we might be able eventually to arrive at some common solution that would allow us to adopt a unanimous resolution. That may or may not be possible, but I hope it may be so, because the differences between us are very small.

I was very impressed by the Rapporteur's report and in particular by his speech to us this morning. He made one comment which must guide our general discussions this afternoon and the conclusions to which we come. That was when he said we should suspend judgment about both the régime in Spain and that in Portugal, and that we, as Western European Union, should attempt to give both these régimes a fair wind.

Can we not all agree this afternoon that in the long-term interests of WEU we want to see achieved a stable domestic democratic régime in both Spain and Portugal? That must be our joint aim. Whether or not we shall have any influence over that must remain a matter of opinion, but, as the Rapporteur pointed out we are probably the first international conference to make some comment about the changing scene in Spain and Portugal, and in particular about the changing scene in Spain since the death of General Franco. Therefore, if we are able to come to a unanimous decision it becomes all the more important.

Later this afternoon we are to be asked to discuss the problems of the northern flank of the Western Alliance. I do not wish to anticipate that discussion but I am sure that we shall be told by some of those engaged in the debate about the very great problems confronting the West in that area. There are equally great problems on the south-western flank of the Iberian peninsula, and therefore we must do our utmost to try to work jointly in both these countries for a democratic solution, one which will encourage them

*Mr. Channon (continued)*

both to work within the scope of a western framework of defence.

My starting-point, therefore, for this debate is to give the benefit of the doubt and to give as much goodwill as possible to both the Spanish and the Portuguese régimes at the present time. I am personally sympathetic to the amendments and, while I do not want to anticipate a later debate, I agree very strongly with the suggestion that we should offer both economic and financial support to the régime in Portugal. But I certainly feel — and I hope the Assembly agrees with me — that it would be quite wrong for us as an Assembly to bind ourselves to the view that the present régime in Portugal is the ideal long-term solution for the people of Portugal. Surely, we have a long way to go. We have seen in particular in recent days that events in Portugal, from the view of the vast majority of us here, have probably taken a great turn for the better. The forces of the extreme left have suffered a serious defeat in Portugal. But I contend that this means merely that a battle has been won and that the war is not yet over.

I suggest to the Assembly, therefore, that we must show our goodwill to the evolving, and possible future, régimes in Spain and Portugal but must also show our encouragement to them both to work in the medium and long term towards the advancement of democratic institutions. That is why I personally regret the wording of the recommendation which says that we should express our support for the present government in Portugal. I am perfectly prepared to grant that the present government of Portugal is a great deal better than anyone could have hoped or expected a few months ago, but it must be wrong for the Assembly of WEU to express its support for the present government in Portugal when that government has not yet advanced towards a democratic resolution of its problems.

We must give Portugal the help it needs but we must also encourage Portugal in the terms of our resolution to work further towards getting democratic government in that country. Precisely the same argument applies to Spain. I do not believe that it would be responsible for this Assembly this afternoon to pass a resolution expressing our support for the present government in Portugal when we all of us know that that government was elected, if indeed it was elected at all, after having excluded two of the

major political parties from taking part in the elections that preceded the formation of the government.

Surely, if WEU believes, as it states, and as the Defence Committee states, in other parts of its resolution, that we should support democratic institutions, we must be working in Portugal, as in Spain, to create a situation in which all political parties can stand in freedom at free elections, and the result of those elections should determine what the government should be in both Spain and Portugal.

Until that situation has been arrived at, I do not think it would be right for this Assembly to express its support of either the government in Portugal or, indeed, the government in Spain.

Indeed, I go further perhaps than some members of the Assembly would go. If we are democrats we should believe that it ought not only to be the right of the christian democrats and liberals to stand for election wherever they like, but equally it should be the right of the communists to stand for election. Even if fascists want to stand, we as democrats should not be frightened to fight and meet them on that battle ground. We should not be frightened of democratic elections in Europe. We should allow people of any political view to stand and to take the democratic consequences of having stood in the election.

That is why I hope that the Rapporteur, when he replies to the debate, will come to the conclusion that the amendments — which I think, with respect, are extremely moderately worded — are deserving of the support of the Assembly.

Speaking for myself, and not for the other signatories of the amendments, if the Assembly were to come to the conclusion that it could support the second and third parts of Amendment No. 1 and come to a unanimous resolution about those, I would then be prepared to let the first part of Amendment No. 1 drop. Above all, it would be better for us to come to a unanimous resolution if we are able to do so.

In this crucial stage of developments, we ought, in the Iberian peninsula, to give a fair wind to both the government in Spain and the government in Portugal. They have both arrived at a turning point in their history through totally different events. They may or may not progress towards full parliamentary democracy. We ought to support them economically. We ought to give them the encouragement to think that in due

*Mr. Channon (continued)*

course they can play a full part in the defence of Europe. We ought to give them every possible encouragement.

However, we must not give them the impression that they can have that full encouragement and support if they are not seen to be working in due course to getting full free democratic institutions.

I therefore hope that this extremely impressive report and the very impressive speech of the Rapporteur will allow us to move to the conclusion of coming to a generally agreed point of view in the Assembly that we give them our support in so far as it goes, but only in so far as the régimes in both Portugal and Spain can clearly be seen to be moving over a measurable space of time to full free democratic institutions. That must be our long-term aim. I believe that the recommendation and resolution are likely to be read more in Spain and Portugal among official circles than anywhere else in Europe. Therefore, it is all the more important that we should give that impression when we pass the resolution this afternoon.

I very much hope that the Rapporteur will feel free to accept at least the second and third proposals and allow that freely expressed view of the Assembly to have its effect in the official circles in both Portugal and Spain. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Reale.

Mr. REALE (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, willingness to admit Portugal and Spain to full membership of NATO is certainly one of the purposes of the western military commands and their governments. It would resolve by one stroke some of the problems of our defence arrangements in respect of security, but above all we think that if the shoe were on the other foot and it was a matter of interest, in similar circumstances, to Moscow, the decision would have been taken long ago!

Why do some of us in the West have misgivings, while others are firmly opposed to it, at whatever risk and on whatever grounds? NATO is by definition a defensive security set-up: but what are we defending? The answer comes pat: defending our territories. Mr. Cermolacce asserted yesterday, about the third basket of the Helsinki document, that wars are always waged

to win territories. By implication he agreed that even if Moscow fails to observe the principles and values expressed in the third part of the paper, no one would go to war for it. In fact, territories are not at issue, the principle of recognition of existing frontiers having been established in Europe. We therefore, having decided to devote a certain proportion of our national budgets to joint security in NATO, are defending our territories. Is this all? Are we solely defending territories? An army that has for decades been solely concerned with defending itself is by definition doomed to perish. Life is conquest, an upward striving that is certainly economic but especially idealistic, and a particular kind of civilisation. So then, we are defending, on our territories, with our armies, with the economic and social forces we have at our disposal and in our power to invent, a particular kind of civilisation expressed in the sovereignty and therefore the pluralistic freedom of our nations.

It is a defence system, but its underlying reason is conquest, idealistic conquest. If we admit Spain to full membership of NATO we should be acting as the Kremlin would in similar circumstances; if such were the case, what would be the use of going on, seeing that, as we all recognise, none of the member States of NATO is set on annexation of territories in the East? Is there anyone who has set his sights on annexing Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland? That is what the fascists did, but the democracies never will. Democracy, as we understand it in the West, cannot accept governments that do not express the suffrage of the nations, and while, admittedly, our democratic conquests look towards our eastern frontiers, the struggle is nonetheless also engaged in western territories too, in Portugal and Spain.

The situation in Portugal has certainly reached a more advanced stage. The Portuguese people has spoken freely, even if the government is not yet the expression of its wishes; a military or mainly military government may represent a transitional phase, it is no final solution. Hence, I am unable to agree to paragraph 2 (b) of the recommendation calling for full support for the present government in Portugal. It is not possible to talk about "full support". Moreover the Rapporteur himself, in paragraph 29 of his concise and accurate report, says that it is important that the government should receive all possible moral and economic support from the European Community and NATO countries to deal with the internal problems it faces, i.e. moral and

*Mr. Reale (continued)*

economic, but not "full", support. Paragraph 2 (b) is also inconsistent with what the report says.

Spain is quite another kind of problem. For forty years it has identified itself with Franco : but Spain is not Franco. We pity a man who was always pitiless ; while he is the West's only dictator to have been lucky enough to die in bed, as no other has done, equally surely he was unable to claim the right to die. Spain is not Franco, even if his sociological dictatorship cost it a million dead. Juan Carlos declares that the Spaniards are Europeans and in saying so is stating a fact. The obvious consequences are to be drawn. While for example the Council of Europe will have to prepare even more reports and conduct further debates for the Spaniards to become more and more Europeanised, i.e. more democratic, we, so far as we are concerned, are ready to prepare a hundred other reports, call for a hundred more debates, give a hearing to hundreds of friends, as we shall be doing in a few weeks' time at the Committee on European non-member countries here in Paris. The internal contradictions of the Spanish situation must be exploded — caught between the suffocating gag clamped down by the Franco régime, not yet over and done with, and the democratic will of the majority, so many of whose members have known the garrotte, the firing squad, torture, exile, incarceration in the prison of Carabanchel or the no less harsh one of Zamora.

The Spanish Foreign Minister is right to say that his country should not, will not, get into NATO through the backdoor. Nor do we want them to. Spain should come in with full honours, but those of democracy, a pluralistic democracy such as we want to see, even, that is, putting up with the presence of the communist party.

We in Italy stand on one of the most fiercely contested frontiers of the confrontation with the communist party ; we are engaged to the hilt, to ensure that it may not prevail so long as it bears the stamp, never abjured, of its imperialistic tendencies. Confrontation, i.e. dialogue, the possibility of making a choice, is the proper method of an authentic democracy. And that is what we want the Spain of today to be. We know we are running risks. They lie in the view taken of military strategy, in the Iberian peninsula ; we are aware that this is so, but if we suddenly admit both these governments to NATO, where would the difference be between the countries

of the East and those of the West ? In short, what difference would there be between two different concepts of the State in our two civilisations ? We are not inclined to sweeping statements, because we acknowledge that in our countries and systems there are deficiencies, injustices, that we ought to put right ; this we shall do by confrontation, the democratic struggle inside each country and in relations with the East, but we cannot turn back by giving way to force. Giving way to force has never made any country's fortune, still less any continent's. Nobody is turning back. We may not betray the onward march of history. Therefore our purpose is to set as a fundamental precondition for further progress a democratic step forward in Portugal and Spain. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Pecoraro.

Mr. PECORARO (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, even though it is tabled by the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, this report does of course touch upon political matters, so that once again we may recall and underline the fact that military and political problems are so enmeshed by their nature as to become, at a given point, mutually interdependent.

On the whole, I mean to lend my support to the case argued by the Rapporteur, Chairman of the Defence Committee, to whom I wish to express my deep appreciation for the paper he has presented.

In many people's view, shared by our distinguished colleague, recent events in Portugal have demonstrated the possibly inevitably stalinist background looming behind the behaviour of the communist party. We rejoice that the *pronunciamento* of the extreme left during the last few days has not carried the field, and that the demand for and primacy given to freedom have won the suffrage of the vast majority of the Portuguese Government and people. We hope that this situation may also be finally consolidated by the emergence of a democratic constitution and election of a parliament likely to ensure liberty and democracy, so that Portugal may very soon be able to be welcomed into the fold of Western European democratic countries.

As for Spain, we are called upon not to express a decision that might constitute interference in Spain's internal affairs, but to take an honest

*Mr. Pecoraro (continued)*

and responsible stance having regard also to the consequences that may flow from it.

I shall begin by asking myself a question : is it democratic Europe's wish or interest that the current Spanish régime be changed through evolution or revolution ? I believe we shall all be agreed that we should opt for the evolutionary rather than the revolutionary path. Well now, I venture to assert that the bigger of the countries of the Iberian peninsula set out years ago along the democratic path, probably in contempt of General Franco's pet ideas, for certainly in the past the agreements with the United States, the inclusion in the Spanish Government of members of Opus Dei, the vigorous technical and industrial transformation of the Spanish economy over the last ten years, the Spanish Government's repeated overtures to various European bodies, are symptomatic of this attitude, which, I repeat, has in my view come about by forcing General Franco's hand. This is to say that long since the Franco régime has ceased to be the exemplar and model, the fabric of society and State, desired by the Spanish people, and that, together with those who have openly, often heroically, acted, fought and suffered and sometimes laid down their lives for directly and openly challenging dictatorship, there is a broad sector, possibly a silent majority, who have gone on working in substantial opposition to the essential and original tenets of pro-Franco doctrine. Church, university and the intelligentsia, youth, organised labour, have, even though not openly opposing Franco, certainly acted in such a way as not to identify themselves with Falangist government.

Now, bearing all this in mind, we democratic States should set ourselves to achieve two objectives : first, giving encouragement to this latent opposition, second, helping to establish a link between the latter and those openly professing democracy. In all likelihood this will enable an authentically democratic régime to be introduced in Spain.

I have expounded these few considerations to emphasise the political as well as military interest democratic Europe has in winning Spain over to the democracy and liberty of the free world. If therefore, while exercising due circumspection and gradualness, Europe is seen to show goodwill towards the renovated Spanish régime, the new Head of State, the healthy and democratic forces of various origin and source who seek a fresh model of State and society for

Spain, I believe it will fit itself to render possibly invaluable yeoman service to freedom and democracy throughout the world. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Sieglerschmidt has asked me for the floor in order to make a brief statement which, coming before that of the Rapporteur, will be useful when we come to deal with the different amendments proposed.

I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me first of all, like previous speakers but very much more briefly, to thank the Rapporteur for his excellent, instructive and above all well-balanced report.

He said, mainly with reference to Spain, that the Assembly should guard against passing judgments. I should like to apply this remark of his to the particular situation in Portugal, precisely in view of the trend the debate on this topic has taken this afternoon. Who are we, after all, to presume, in this extraordinarily difficult and complicated situation in Portugal, where men and women are endeavouring at the risk of their personal freedom and perhaps also of their lives to blaze a trail towards development of a democracy, to take it upon ourselves to say : "But you are not democratic enough yet, you have still to do this and that before we can give you our full support." This is, Mr. President, a piece of hypocrisy in which I am not prepared to have any part.

I should like to say quite clearly to my esteemed friend Sir Frederic Bennett, who knows that I value his friendship greatly, that I can in no way associate myself with his comment that this government is not worthy of our support — at least, that is how it came over in the German interpretation. This I must reject, most forcefully.

I would also protest against the parallel that has been drawn here between the situation in Portugal and that of Spain. I am objecting not because I apply different yardsticks to the left and the right — anyone who knows me will know that I do not do that — but because the conditions are fundamentally different. In the one country, the process which is unfolding is that which I have just described, in which the first steps have really been taken at great risk. In the other, it may well be that many of the persons currently responsible for government in Spain, especially King Juan Carlos, are men of

*Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)*

goodwill, but all we can see are the first faltering moves in the direction of democracy. I very much support the Rapporteur's view that we should give Juan Carlos a fair chance. I also feel that the Assembly must bear in mind that a sudden upheaval might create a situation of which nobody here can say whether it would not possibly be worse than that in Portugal. We must, therefore, I agree, tread rather carefully; but we should clearly realise that at least after a time we should keep up our pressure for truly democratic conditions to be gradually introduced in Spain, as elsewhere.

Now a word about participation by the two countries of the Iberian peninsula in Atlantic defence. In the case of Spain, I would in this context like to avoid talk about the defence of freedom as one speaker in the debate has done, for in that country freedom will first have to be created before it can be defended. It is also undeniable however, and let us face it, that without the Iberian peninsula the Atlantic defence would be dangerously breached. We must draw our own consequences.

May I, Mr. President, now make a final comment on the proposed amendments? In view of what has been said, I would plainly rather have the recommendation remain the way it is. But I share my friend Mr. Channon's view that we must try and achieve a broad consensus on it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Sieglerschmidt, the discussion on the amendments has not yet been opened. I should therefore prefer you to conclude your remarks. We shall then discuss Sir John Rodgers' amendment, paragraph by paragraph.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — I will conclude by earnestly entreating the Assembly not to tamper with any of the material points of this recommendation, particularly the one where we note that NATO now, to our great satisfaction, no longer includes any members having a totalitarian system of government. They are, at least as far as one member, Portugal, is concerned, on the road to democracy. According to the draft recommendation, a doctrine should be formulated whereby in the future such States should no longer be members of NATO. This point, whatever happens, must be retained in the recommendation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We now turn to discussion of the amendments to the draft recommendation contained in Document 682.

Sir John Rodgers and others have tabled Amendment No. 1.

The amendment is in three parts, which we will debate and vote successively.

I call Sir John Rodgers to speak to his amendment.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — I beg to move :

1. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out from "Community" to the end of the paragraph and insert :

"rests upon the freely-expressed support of the peoples of their member States ;"

2. Leave out paragraph (iv) of the preamble and insert :

"(iv) Stressing the importance that it attaches to Portugal's contribution to the defence of Europe as a member of NATO and wishing to further the development in Portugal of a truly democratic system of government ;"

3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (b) and insert :

"(b) that financial, economic and technical help is provided for Portugal with a view to encouraging progress towards a truly democratic pluralistic parliamentary system of government ;"

I wish to offer my warm congratulations to Mr. Critchley, the Rapporteur and Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, on an excellent report. In most difficult circumstances the Rapporteur has attempted to chart the shifting sands of Iberia, which is no mean task. As Mr. Critchley said in introducing his admirable paper, it is extremely difficult to comment on a situation so subject to change as that of the Iberian peninsula. Throughout the Assembly there are widespread hopes that political and economic reforms will take place in both Spain and Portugal — reforms that will allow us to have ever-closer contacts with those countries. Surely on cultural, economic and geographical grounds both Spain and Portugal belong especially to Europe and have much to contribute to Europe's well-being. Europe would be stronger in defence terms if conditions were such that Spain could advance sufficiently on the path towards a more liberal

*Sir John Rodgers (continued)*

and democratic form of government so that Spain might be invited to join NATO, to sign the Brussels Treaty and eventually, one hopes, to join the Assembly of Western European Union. Spain already contributes greatly to the defence of the West because of the existence of its bases and of various defence agreements.

Fortunately successive Portuguese governments have confirmed Portugal's continued respect for international obligations and treaties, including the North Atlantic Alliance.

Particularly since Helsinki, none of us has either the desire or the right to intervene in the internal affairs of Spain or Portugal, but there is a widespread hope that, in their own way and in their own time, both countries will make liberal advances, so that the will of the people is recognised as a source of power and so that the armed forces' rôle will be to support and sustain the civil government duly empowered by free, universal elections.

We all recognise that, if the old régime of Dr. Caetano were to be overthrown, it was both inevitable and necessary that the armed forces should take charge. We must not, however, fail to be concerned when the Armed Forces Movement in Portugal announces that it will retain power, whatever the elections may show, for at least three to five years. However, we are all greatly heartened by the events of the last week or two.

I and some of my colleagues have tabled an amendment in three parts to the preamble and one to the recommendation. I understand that some of my colleagues are worried about my proposal to delete the phrase that "totalitarian régimes should not be tolerated" and feel that this should be allowed to stand. We all agree that totalitarian governments are anathema to us, but I believe that the text of my amendment makes it clear that progress towards ever-closer ties lies in the formation of a truly democratic, pluralistic, parliamentary system of government.

Party political polemics should have no part in our discussion today on this most important topic. While great progress has been made in Portugal, democracy is still not greatly in evidence. Under the present régime, power lies exclusively with the armed forces and there is no true parliament in the western sense. Ministers are appointed by the armed forces and are

removed by them. Ministers are not accountable to the recently elected Assembly.

Furthermore, that Assembly does not include representatives of certain parties, since neither the liberals nor the christian democrats were allowed to present candidates at the elections.

This is why I suggest that the phrase "that full support is provided for the present government in Portugal" should be changed. There have been six successive governments in the space of a year or so. We can only hope that the financial, economic and technical aid being provided to Portugal will encourage its people to move towards a truly democratic, pluralistic and parliamentary system of government. I am truly delighted that my own country, like most of the others in Western Europe, has offered whatever material support is possible to this Portuguese Government. The British Government — and I am sure others, too — welcome Portugal's links with the European Community, and we all welcome the massive help which is being given to Portugal.

I hope, therefore, that my amendment will commend itself to the Assembly. There is no difference between delegates — no matter what our political affiliations — in our deep desire to hold out the hand of friendship and assistance not only to Portugal but to Spain, too. Obviously it rests with each country's leaders how far and at what pace they advance along the liberal, democratic path and become full members of the western world.

Because I share the underlying philosophy of my friend, Mr. Channon, because it would be of enormous importance if this Assembly could pass an agreed resolution, which would have great influence in Portugal and Spain, and because I should like to bring harmony to our gathering, I should be happy to withdraw the first part of my amendment to the preamble and move only the second part of the amendment to the preamble and that part of the amendment to the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — What is the Committee's opinion on the amendment?

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — We have had an excellent debate and before I respond directly to Sir John Rodgers I would like to make one or two comments on points which have been raised during the course of it.

Mr. Cordle gave the impression that the report was advocating a closer military relationship

*Mr. Critchley (continued)*

between NATO and Spain. This was inadvertent. What, in fact, we did was to ask the Spanish authorities in September what they would like to see happen and then just to report factually the Spanish point of view. It was not the point of view either of the Committee or of the report itself.

Sir Frederic Bennett said that the events of the past year had only served to strengthen his profound disquiet about Portugal. I would suggest that the events of the last fortnight — long overdue — should have served to make him marginally more cheerful. What has happened in the last week or two will be welcomed by practically every member of this Assembly.

Sir Frederic and Mr. Channon mentioned the prohibition of liberal and christian democrat candidates in the Portuguese elections. This, of course, is outrageous, and condemnation of it was included in the body of the report although not in the recommendation as such. Quite clearly the task of any future report by the Defence Committee — and there is to be one for next June which will follow events in Iberia — will be, among other things, to focus on any progress made towards democracy in Portugal.

Mr. Piket referred to our suggestion that each NATO command should have a political adviser. Most of them do, but we were rather surprised to find that the American admiral in IBERLANT had no political adviser whatever. Much as I admire admirals and generals, I think there is a case to be made for political advice of some kind. This is why this was mentioned.

As for Gibraltar, I see no solution to this problem until and unless Spain joins NATO. When that happens, the problem will at least be eased if not of itself solved.

Mr. Piket also said that sensible things cannot be said about Spain by non-Spaniards. He may be right but I am not going to accept that. Nor, I think, will the Assembly. We could not afford to accept such a doctrine. We live on our prejudices and do not necessarily restrict them to our own countries.

As for the amendment, I am delighted that Sir John Rodgers, in the spirit of compromise so ably foreshadowed by Mr. Channon in his speech, is prepared to drop the first part of the amendment, that to the preamble. I, in turn, would accept the amendment that he and others suggest to the recommendation in paragraph

2 (b), so we have come a long way in merging our views. But I, together with John Roper, in a curious cross-alliance which may never happen again, propose an amendment to the second of the three parts of the amendment which we have agreed. We have, I hope, agreed the third part of the amendment and it is now a question of the second part of the amendment.

It may be that the amendment which we have proposed on behalf, as it were, of the Defence Committee — both the christian democrat and social democrat sides of it — will prove to be acceptable to Sir John Rodgers, his friends and others. We have proposed — and I hope this has been circulated — in paragraph (iv) of the draft recommendation, after the first sentence expressing support for the government of Portugal, to add this very important sentence :

“as a first step towards a fully-democratic government”.

I hope that this will meet the natural apprehensions of so many members of the Assembly this afternoon.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — If I have understood you correctly, Sir John, you are withdrawing the first part of your amendment.

Would you care to clarify your position ?

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — I am a man of peace, a man of compromise, a man who has no axe to grind whatever. I only want to improve things in the world. Although I do not believe that the amendment to the second part of my amendment to the preamble meets the situation, I am willing to accept it to provide peace, harmony and understanding among us all.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put to the vote the compromise amendment presented by Mr. Critchley and Mr. Roper, which reads as follows :

In line 1 of paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after the word “Portugal” insert the words “as a first step towards a fully-democratic government”.

This amendment is accepted by the Chairman and Rapporteur of the Committee, and represents a substantive addition to the report and recommendation.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)

*The amendment is agreed to.*

*The President (continued)*

I now put to the vote the third part of Sir John Rodgers' amendment.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The third part of the amendment is agreed to.*

We will now consider Amendment No. 2, tabled by Mr. Scholten and others.

I will read it out :

In line 3 of paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after the word "would" insert "be in contradiction with the aims of NATO and".

You have the floor, Mr. Scholten, to defend your amendment.

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — The strength of the free western world, Mr. President, lies in its democratic values, and these include the freedom of expression and the freedom to organise oneself in political parties and trade unions ; these occupy a central place here. The Treaty of Rome, and the European Convention on Human Rights, are quite clear on the matter.

Spain offends against the Rome Treaty in many respects, and although we all hope that the post-Franco era will bring freedom for the Spanish people this is still by no means sure. We shall have to wait and see, and meanwhile lend our support to the forces of democracy in Spain.

Mr. Critchley expresses satisfaction in his report — on which I would like to compliment him — that NATO is now made up wholly of democratic countries. It must stay that way, Mr. President.

The precondition that must be imposed on Spain before it can become a member of NATO or the EEC or the Council of Europe is that it makes at least a start towards pluralistic democracy. There is, alas, no trace of any such precondition in the draft recommendation.

Paragraph (v) of the preamble says that it would be good for the Spanish people soon to take their place in NATO and the EEC, while in paragraph (vi) it is said that formal agreements between NATO and Spain would alienate public opinion both in our countries and in Spain, so that these should be avoided while there is still no democracy in Spain.

This is perfectly correct, Mr. President, but it is incomplete. Not only because, fortunately, it

goes against public feelings in our countries, but mainly because it would clash with the objective of NATO itself, it is impossible that Spain should become a member before it has at least the beginnings of pluralistic democracy. You cannot credibly defend freedom with the help of undemocratic powers. It is to make this patently clear to ourselves, to public opinion and to the Spanish régime, and to strengthen the hand of democratic forces in that country, that I have put forward an amendment to paragraph (vi) of the preamble.

It might be argued against this amendment that under paragraph 2 (a) of the substantive part of the draft recommendation it is stated that no formal agreements should be concluded with totalitarian régimes in Western Europe, that paragraph (iii) of the preamble says that totalitarian régimes should not be tolerated in the future as members, and that the amendment is therefore superfluous.

This is not so, Mr. President, because paragraph (v) of the preamble talks so sympathetically about an early accession of Spain to NATO that it at the very least gives the impression that paragraph (iii) of the preamble and paragraph 2 (a) of the recommendation do not really apply to Spain. This impression is reinforced by the fact that in paragraph (vi) a formal agreement between NATO and Spain is rejected solely on the grounds of public opinion. So this is incomplete, as I have already said. Precisely because of our high ideals about democracy, we cannot be content with this alone.

I call on the Assembly, therefore, to adopt the amendment, which is signed by both socialists and christian democrats from the Netherlands. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — What is the opinion of the Rapporteur ?

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I ask Mr. Scholten and others whether they would be willing to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. Scholten has made an excellent case, but certainly the bulk of the case he has made in my view is met in paragraph (iii) of the preamble. I think it is right that WEU take the opportunity of the accident, as it were, that at the moment there are no totalitarian régimes or no fully totalitarian régimes represented within NATO. That was the point of paragraph (iii).

In a spirit of goodwill, Christmas and the New Year, I ask Mr. Scholten whether he would

*Mr. Critchley (continued)*

follow the example of Sir John Rodgers, withdraw his amendment and let us move to the next item on the agenda.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Do you maintain your amendment, Mr. Scholten?

Mr. SCHOLTEN (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have been asked to withdraw the amendment, reference being made to paragraph (iii) of the preamble. Yet I have already said that paragraph (iii) is perfectly right, but that the marked sympathy shown in paragraph (v) towards a speedy accession of Spain to NATO, among other bodies, gives at least the impression of weakening paragraph (iii).

It will be more in keeping with our ideals about democracy in Western Europe if Spain's joining NATO is refused not only because of public opinion, but because it runs counter to our own personal convictions. This is something that must be translated into facts. I, too, have every feeling for the arguments that have been put forward about the spirit of Christmas, Santa Claus and the need for harmony. They should be equally able to bring the Rapporteur to accept the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Critchley.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I would resist the amendment. It is quite untrue to claim that the burden of the report suggests that we introduce Spain into NATO. I do not think the honourable member has read the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — I am well aware of the difficulties in front of our Netherlands colleagues in view of the long history they have not enjoyed with Spain.

However, whilst pointing out that none of Mr. Scholten's colleagues raised this point in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments either today or on Monday, I ask Mr. Scholten to refer to paragraph (vi) which recognises that formal agreements between NATO and member countries and Spain should not be concluded before the emergence of democracy in Spain and that they would, in fact, jeopardise the existence of the Alliance and any possibility of lasting future agreement.

I consider that this matter has been most carefully gone over in the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and in a most balanced manner, with the participation of members of all political groups.

We are all concerned here this afternoon to present a unanimous recommendation to the governments of Spain and Portugal in order to preserve the very necessary balance in these matters.

I consider that the matter has been dealt with in a very even-handed manner in the preamble, in the recommendation and in the body of the report. I therefore ask Mr. Scholten and his colleagues to read further into the body of the report than perhaps they have read in paragraphs (v) and (vi) and to reconsider whether they wish to press their amendment. They have stated their case, to which all of us must be very sensible in the Committee in view of their well-known feelings and the past history with which we all sympathise and in which we have shared to a greater or less extent. Whereas they may have had wars in the low countries, we have had the armada in our country. We are therefore equally sufferers in some respects. However, equally, we are trying to build the new Europe.

In that spirit I ask Mr. Scholten to read a little further and a little deeper and to consider whether his case has not been adequately met in the deliberations of the Committee which, I repeat, approved the report unanimously. May I add that I had the honour also to vote in that Committee.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Voogd.

Mr. VOOGD (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — Mr. President, it is precisely because I have a great deal of esteem for the report and the way the Rapporteur has introduced and explained it, and because I have great esteem for Sir John Rodgers and his desire for harmony, that I want to make it clear why it is through sheer obstinacy that I support Mr. Scholten's amendment.

True, the preamble says that non-democratic régimes will not be welcome in WEU, the Communities and the Council of Europe. However, the wording used in paragraph (vi) — and especially the words "would so alienate public opinion" — makes an ambiguous impression, which is definitely not the intention of a man of principle like our Rapporteur. This can be read as meaning that, if public opinion were

*Mr. Voogd (continued)*

more favourable, it would be quite all right to have agreements with Spain.

That is an opportunist attitude, Mr. President, and one that is at variance with the basic principles followed by the Rapporteur. If we believe NATO to be an instrument for keeping the peace, then the admission of Spain is a matter of principle, not one of opportunism. The struggle of the forces of democracy in Spain will, as Mr. Scholten has pointed out, be best served by speaking out clearly and not in a way that — however good the intentions — can be interpreted differently.

This is why I see Mr. Scholten's amendment as strengthening the agreement. This is why it has been moved, and why I shall be supporting it.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt on a point of order.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, we have discussed at great length in this Assembly a topic whose importance I do not underestimate. On the other hand, we have an important debate ahead, that concerning the northern flank, and we have with us today a guest from Norway, whom you have already welcomed to our midst, Mr. President, and who has been waiting for over an hour and a half for the debate to commence. I therefore move the debate be closed and a vote taken.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Mr. Channon is the last speaker on the list. As a matter of courtesy, I do not wish to interrupt the debate. I would ask Mr. Channon to be very brief, and we will then proceed to the vote.

Mr. CHANNON (*United Kingdom*). — It may be necessary to have a vote, but in that case it would be better to have it quickly. But I would ask our Dutch colleagues whether they think that a vote is necessary. After all, paragraph (iii) says :

"...that membership of countries with totalitarian régimes should not be tolerated in the future ;"

Recommendation 2 (a) is :

"that no formal agreements are concluded with totalitarian régimes in Western Europe ;"

All their points are therefore covered. It would be much better if we could have unani-

mous agreement. I should have thought that the differences between us were very small.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Ladies and Gentlemen, we have said all there is to say about this amendment. Your minds are made up. Let us take a vote on it ; that is the best way to bring this discussion to an end.

I therefore put to the vote the amendment tabled by Mr. Scholten and others.

(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)

The amendment is negatived.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole and all the other recommendations, will be taken tomorrow afternoon at 5.30 p.m., in accordance with the arrangements made by the Presidential Committee and the Bureau, to avoid any difficulty and ensure that the Assembly's support is sufficiently clear-cut not to be challenged.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — You are holding the addendum over until tomorrow ?

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Yes.

#### **4. Northern European countries and the prospect of European political union**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 684)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report submitted by Mr. Steel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee on Northern European countries and the prospect of European political union, Document 684.

Before I call the Rapporteur, we will, at their request, hear a statement by our friends from the Norwegian Storting who are here among us today and have had the patience to sit through a debate of no concern to them.

I call Mr. Oftedal, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Storting, the Norwegian Parliament.

Mr. STEEL (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order. I thought that I would be presenting my report and that our guests from Norway and Denmark would intervene later in the debate.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — That is not the procedure to follow at the present juncture.

Mr. OFTEDAL (*Observer from Norway*). — I am grateful for this opportunity to tell you how much we appreciated the venue of your General Affairs Committee to Norway a month ago. I have studied with interest the report before you and would like to congratulate Mr. Steel of the United Kingdom on his report, particularly the conclusions.

The visit of your Committee has given our Minister for Foreign Affairs, the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and other official spokesmen an occasion to explain Norway's view. As reflected in the report, the members of your Committee now have a better understanding of some defence problems in the Northern area and also a better understanding of the Norwegian view about Spitzbergen. This also gave us the opportunity to explain again our special problems inside NATO, particularly our reservations about foreign forces and nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory in peacetime.

I believe that your Committee gained an understanding of the importance of the fishing industry in the Norwegian economy and its importance for the geographical distribution of the Norwegian population. Norway is confronted with very difficult problems in extending its reserved fishing area. For a large part of the coastal population, particularly in Northern Norway, fishing is important for their standard of living and their whole economic and social life. Irrespective of the view taken by various countries, we are grateful to be given this opportunity to explain how vital these problems are for us.

The same goes for the Norwegian oil policy. I think that the members of your group understand better why our philosophy is *festina lente* in oil exploitation. Norwegian society is small and a too rapid economic expansion might destroy our traditional social and cultural system and lead to new social problems which could be difficult to overcome. In short, we do not want Norway to become a Nordic sheikhdom, based mainly on oil and totally dependent on that special resource.

Visits such as that of your Committee have also enabled us to explain better Norway's special relationship to the EEC. The negative result of the Norwegian referendum does not mean that we are not interested in European affairs. On the contrary, one of the main aims of Norwegian foreign policy is contact with Western Europe

and our friends there. A large part of the Norwegian population, however, partly because of historical traditions — because Norway is a relatively young independent country — take a reserved attitude towards institutional ties with Europe. But this does not mean that in practical policy we cannot have the right co-operation with Europe. But this does not mean that in practical co-operation has taken place within recent years in many international organisations and conferences — for example, the close co-operation between Norway and the members of the EEC at the conference on security and co-operation in Europe.

We are therefore very pleased to read the conclusions in Mr. Steel's report. He proposes a flexible attitude by the Community which will enable the countries of Northern Europe to take part in European co-operation even if they are unable at the moment to accept certain treaty obligations. Particularly the last part of the conclusion, in which Mr. Steel proposes a so-called *à la carte* participation, seems very interesting to Norway.

May I again express my gratitude for this opportunity to have direct contact with the work of your Assembly? We in Norway follow the work of WEU with great interest and sympathy. We want to develop wide contact with the work that your organisation is doing at both parliamentary and government levels. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you for this very interesting contribution as a preface to Mr. Steel's report on relations with Northern European countries and the prospect of European political union.

I call Mr. Steel, Rapporteur of the General Affairs Committee.

Mr. STEEL (*United Kingdom*). — My report contains principally a factual description of the Scandinavian countries and records our sincere appreciation of discussions conducted by the General Affairs Committee with the Foreign and Defence Ministers, officials and parliamentary committees of both Norway and Denmark.

I hope that the publication of the report among members of the Assembly will lead to a greater understanding of the peculiar difficulties of northern countries and to an appreciation of the essential rôle in defence of freedom carried out by those two small States on behalf of all our interests, involving conscription in both countries.

*Mr. Steel (continued)*

We welcome to this Assembly not only Mr. Tor Oftedal, the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Storting, but his two colleagues, Mr. Vikan and Mr. Utsi. We also welcome from the Danish Folketing Mr. Hartling and Mr. Folke. I know that Mr. Hartling hopes to intervene in this debate a little later.

The highlight of the visit of the General Affairs Committee was the briefing we received from the Northern Command of NATO at its headquarters in Kolsaas. I have tried to spell out in the report some idea of the imbalance of forces in the North between East and West. Perhaps I could add one or two figures to those contained in the report. If we look at the build-up of forces by the Soviet Union in the Arctic Ocean, we find that on the Arctic coast they have stationed about 170 submarines, 50 % of them nuclear, and 325 surface vessels. In the Baltic Sea the Soviet fleet is so large that the manpower involved is 173,000. The State of Denmark is most assiduous in its control over the straits and exits and entrances of Soviet vessels to and from the Baltic Sea.

On land there has been a large build-up in the Kola peninsula in regard to Soviet military manoeuvres, personnel, and the development of airfields. There are twice as many forces on the Soviet side of the northern flank as there are available to NATO. We must record appreciation of the Norwegian armed forces in the difficult training that they undertake in the north of that territory.

My report attempts to describe briefly the different political and defence postures of the Scandinavian countries, and the fact that we have a complete mixture of forces, with Norway and Denmark both members of NATO and with only Denmark as an EEC country. Sweden is neutral, but maintains considerable defence forces. Finland also is neutral but depends on the 1948 treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union.

Against this background, talk of organising the whole of Europe into one tidy defence community is unrealistic. I am fond of teasing my conservative colleagues in the United Kingdom over the definition of the difference between a conservative and a progressive conservative. A conservative is somebody who believes that nothing can be changed for the better. A progressive conservative believes that it can — but not now. Therefore, in the matter of European

defence we should all be progressive conservatives. It would be nice to live to the day when there will be a tidy European defence community, but that is not a practicable proposition in the immediate future.

For that reason my report proposes a system of *à la carte* participation by the Scandinavian countries, as they wish, in the development towards European political union. In a sense this has already happened in the development of trade agreements between Norway, Sweden and the EEC. But in particular I hope that the Assembly will agree to encourage co-operation in weapon procurement.

This takes us back to the subject of this morning's discussion. I wish to emphasise what Mr. William Rodgers said this morning about the significance of the ministerial meetings of the Eurogroup at The Hague on 5th November when Ministers discussed standardisation of European equipment, collaboration and co-operation with North America in defence procurement. I very much hope that this will lead to the exploration of further moves to bring about co-operation in defence procurement and a study of the possibility of joint projects where common requirements appear to exist and possibly to prepare the basis for a dialogue with our American and Canadian partners.

The communiqué following that meeting referred to an independent forum that would be open to all European members of the Alliance. Norway and Denmark as members of the Alliance will pay heed to that invitation, but it leaves Sweden out of account. I attempted to say in paragraph 14 that in limiting arms sales in small neutral countries, we should try to draw Sweden into such discussions concerning weapons procurement without compromising its political neutrality.

There are two new defence problems to which I should like to draw attention in connection with the discovery and exploitation of North Sea oil. In paragraph 24 I mention in passing the vulnerability of oil rigs and platforms in the North Sea to attack, not so much by a hostile power as by international terrorist groups.

Our Committee noted that the military authorities of Norway took the view that such installations were virtually undefendable unless a political decision were taken to have them permanently manned. Neither the Government of Norway nor the United Kingdom Government

*Mr. Steel (continued)*

has taken such a decision. Norway has provided a couple of coastguard vessels to patrol the entire sea. Similarly, the United Kingdom Government has provided only two fishery protection vessels, one of which is the oldest serving ship in the Royal Navy, although I understand that steps are being taken to replace them.

This matter merits more serious attention. There are nearly 4,000 people employed at any one time in the United Kingdom sector of the North Sea. I have no comparable figure for the Norwegian sector, but it may be over 2,000. A figure of 6,000 people represents more than the population of several of the towns in my constituency.

Platforms over 100 miles off the Scottish coast come under the protection of the Chief Constable of Aberdeen. I mean no disrespect to the excellent police force in that area, but I doubt whether a combination of a distant shore-based police and a couple of vessels provides anything like adequate protection for those of any nationality working in the North Sea against premeditated attacks by a small group determined to hi-jack a drilling installation.

The second problem that arises from exploitation of North Sea oil relates to Spitzbergen and the fact that as yet there is no agreement on territorial exploitation rights between nation States north of the sixty-second parallel. There is as yet no agreement between Norway and the Soviet Union as to the dividing lines in the Barents Sea, although talks to try to establish a definition began in Oslo ten days ago.

Judging from the way in which WEU members have taken a growing interest in defence questions in Central Europe, I know that we all look forward with anticipation to the Tindemans report and that we shall go on for many years to talk about the future defence rôle of European States. But it would be foolish for us to ignore, in so doing, the political situation of the Scandinavian countries, and if this report reminds us of that fact and of the debt that we owe to these northern countries, it will have served its purpose. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In the debate, I call Sir Frederic Bennett.

Sir Frederic BENNETT (*United Kingdom*). I do not think that anyone could find anything with which to quarrel in the report which has just been put before us by Mr. Steel. I rise

to speak only because I was a member of the same team which went recently to Norway and Denmark and thus would like to add one or two things to what my colleague has already said.

Until I went to Norway, in particular, I had not realised the enormous political and military pressure from the Soviet Union on this small member country of NATO. I learned that there were more Soviet submarines in the one base just to the north of Norway than Adolf Hitler had at his disposal at the beginning of the last war. The consequent pressure on the smaller Scandinavian countries must indeed be great. It would be a pity if, on an occasion such as this, no one were to pay tribute to their steadfastness, on behalf of their allies, in the cause of freedom. I was so impressed by their contribution that I came away feeling a little ashamed that my own country and other, larger members of NATO were not playing a more significant rôle in that context.

Without derogating from the British standing in any negotiations, I feel that, because of the much wider issues involved, my country and other larger powers should accept the overriding rôle played by the fishing industry in the economies of western Scandinavian countries and that they should arrange their policies in accord with that realisation.

Paragraph 2 of the recommendation says that Scandinavian countries should be invited "to send observers to an *ad hoc* meeting to study any project for the joint production of armaments". We all recognise that whereas in the future Norway and Denmark may see their way to join WEU and to strengthen their defence links with the rest of Europe, it is no good our pushing them to do it when they are having difficulty in maintaining even the posture which they have already adopted. However, this does not mean that we should lose any opportunity to strengthen our links with, and our understanding of, one another. Just because I think members of that team learned a great deal, I feel it is a pity that we cannot arrange *ad hoc* meetings, not just to discuss that one narrow subject but to talk about other aspects of possible co-operation between us, in the spirit of collaboration which was so evident in our talks in Scandinavia.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I now have the honour to call Mr. Hartling, member of the Danish Folketing.

Mr. HARTLING (*Observer from Denmark*). — I would like to say how much I appreciate this opportunity to attend as an observer this session of the Assembly of Western European Union. The WEU is a body which for many years has been a focal point for the expression of thoughts, ideas and proposals on problems which are crucial to Europe and to the world. Although this is my first visit, the proceedings of the Assembly have already demonstrated to me in a most convincing manner the vitality of the organisation.

It is a most pleasant duty for me as a representative — although in a personal capacity and speaking only for myself — of one of the countries dealt with in the report to compliment the Rapporteur on the way in which he has carried out his task. The facets of the political and economic structure of the Nordic countries are by no means easy to explain in depth to the outside world but they have been ably and clearly put forward in this report. It was especially pleasing to note that the Rapporteur, at the very beginning of his report, stated that the Northern European countries definitely belong to the western and European community. Indeed they all do, and this fact should always be kept very firmly in mind by our friends.

I appreciated the report's positive remarks — as I read them — about Danish defence, which also included mention of the important volunteer element in the Danish defence effort. When the Rapporteur states "that the Danish army appears better adapted to meeting a limited attack effectively and rapidly than to taking its place in a vast interallied framework", I would like to point out that it is this ability which is precisely of the greatest importance to the allied defence effort and to the defence of vital European areas.

As to the remarks about Denmark's possible attitude to an eventual integrated European defence system, we consider the NATO Alliance not only as an organisation providing Denmark with military reassurance but also as one which has proved eminently well suited to securing co-operation with our American and Canadian friends, thus reaffirming the indispensable North Atlantic ties and the co-operation with countries at present outside the European political framework. Denmark must therefore be most hesitant towards any step which might tend to loosen these ties and to lessen collective security.

When discussing political problems, the Rapporteur states that the Nordic countries "apparently find the present situation in Europe and the West fairly satisfactory precisely because it allows them to choose the membership that suits them". All generalisations must be taken with a pinch of salt but this, by and large, is a fairly respectable one. However, when the Rapporteur goes on to state that these countries are probably not wholly satisfied because they often feel that their points of view do not receive due attention from their partners, and uses the MBFR negotiations in Vienna as an example, I think that I must make a reservation as far as Denmark is concerned.

Denmark is not a direct participant in the MBFR negotiations. Nevertheless, it is a source of satisfaction to us that the Danish Delegation to the MBFR talks, which is present in Vienna with special status, is able to take full part in the deliberations of the western delegations as openly and as extensively as the delegations representing the directly negotiating powers.

Addressing myself now to what the report has to say about Denmark's membership of the EEC, I was glad to see that it points out that there is, in fact, a degree of economic and social community in Scandinavia whose links with the EEC are assured by Denmark.

Let me add here that the political, social and economic co-operation between the northern countries takes place not only within the framework of the Nordic Council, which is merely an advisory body. There is co-operation in many ways between ministries, local governments and organisations of various kinds in cultural, educational and social welfare fields and others. The position of Denmark as a link between the Nordic and European families will remain an important side of our EEC membership and a constructive contribution to European co-operation.

I cannot deny, however, that I feel less happy about what the report says on the Danish attitude to political consultation in the European Council, which I feel might give rise to misunderstandings. Denmark is wholeheartedly, not hesitantly, taking part in European political consultations on the basis of the Luxembourg and Copenhagen reports. We consider these consultations most valuable. Nobody can foretell what developments might lie ahead and what proposals might be made, but I must in all frankness state that I personally consider speculation about another possible Danish referendum in a situation which

*Mr. Hartling (continued)*

we do not know, and in which we shall share problems with a number of other countries, to be premature and unfruitful.

While I feel that the conclusions of the report are correct in stating that it is impossible to consider forming a Europe which leaves out the Scandinavian world, on the other hand I am much less happy with the point of view that progress towards European integration at a level acceptable to the Scandinavian countries would mean progressing towards practically nothing. I can assure this Assembly that that is a long way from giving a picture of the Danish attitude. On the contrary, it must be stressed that Denmark supports the idea of European union as decided at the summit meeting in Paris in October 1972.

What we see as the most urgent task is an intensification of co-operation in the EEC on the pressing economic problems. That would be a contribution by the EEC towards more satisfactory economic development, thus paving the way for progress also, in other fields. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We revert to the debate on Mr. Steel's report.

In the debate, I call Mr. de Bruyne.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the report from Mr. Steel contains a lot of important military and political information. It is, therefore, a fascinating document that can contribute to a better knowledge of a part of Europe that Western European Union may have somewhat lost sight of in the past. When I read the text of the draft recommendation, I was however a little taken aback at its scope. I still believe that the text will be acceptable to this Assembly. I will admit that I, as a member of the Committee, should have put these arguments earlier. But let us consider whether we are not being rather premature in putting paragraph 2 to the WEU Council of Ministers, without any prior contact with the Swedish authorities. In this paragraph we ask for the Scandinavian governments to be invited to send observers to a study group — defined no more closely than that — looking into the question of joint production of armaments. In his verbal introduction, the Rapporteur, Mr. Steel, was more precise, and told us this was a group the setting up of which was discussed during a meeting of Eurogroup at The Hague last November.

Repeatedly during our debates yesterday and today mention has been made of this possible *ad hoc* group. This is undoubtedly a very important initiative and I hope it will succeed; but for the time being it remains an hypothesis, one that we do not know will be fulfilled. The fuller details given by Mr. Steel do nothing to dispel my doubts. I think it would be best, Mr. President, first of all to find out, in all the Scandinavian countries, whether the conditions exist for putting our recommendation to the WEU Council of Ministers into practical effect. I do ask the Assembly to think this over again calmly.

I can feel rather happier with paragraph 1 of the recommendation, where circumspect and reasonable choice of wording is concerned. In this we ask merely that the Council of Ministers look at the question of how and in what framework the Scandinavian countries might be involved in the study of a policy of arms standardisation. I shall be curious to see what the Council's reply to our recommendation will be. One could offer some objection to the terminology used in the first paragraph of the preamble, where it is said that Scandinavia belongs to Western Europe. I understand what is meant, and agree with it, but there might well be something to say from the geographical and historical viewpoint.

Scandinavia is a world with features of its own; the West will not always get on well there with ready-made turns of phrase borrowed from the administrative vocabulary of trendy Eurotechnocrats — and I do not, of course, count our excellent Rapporteur as one of these.

I will close by hoping that the General Affairs Committee will continue to study the military policy of Scandinavia. The report is a first and meritworthy attempt at this, and I offer the Rapporteur my congratulations.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. STEEL (*United Kingdom*). — I will take just two minutes to thank Mr. Hartling for his remarks and to say in reply that I well understand and appreciate his position, since we are fellow liberals. We sometimes find that our countrymen do not always share our enthusiasms for a rate of progress such as he has outlined on behalf of Denmark, which I would like to see in the United Kingdom. Sadly, both of us are on occasion disappointed.

I have tried faithfully — I am sorry if I got it wrong — to reflect in the report the situation as we found it and the opinions that we were

*Mr. Steel (continued)*

given by others when we were in Denmark. It is perhaps rather more pessimistic in tone than Mr. Hartling would wish. I hope that he is correct and that I shall be proved to have been too pessimistic in the writing of the report.

I thank Mr. de Bruyne for his remarks. I share entirely his curiosity to see what the Council will do with the recommendations because, of course, the whole point of the report was simply to draw the Council's attention also to a perhaps rather neglected aspect of European co-operation in defence.

I am glad that Sir Frederic Bennett did not press his view to an amendment. I would have accepted it had he done so, but if there is to be such a meeting, it could range wider than the subject of defence procurement. We shall have to wait and see, as the Assembly always patiently waits to see, what the Council does with the report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the ire of all present would be heaped on my head if I were now to speak for longer than two minutes; but as Chairman of the Committee and a liberal, if not one with a capital L — if I may put it that way after what my friend Mr. Steel has said — I should like once again to convey my thanks and those of the General Affairs Committee to our friends Mr. Oftedal and Mr. Hartling. I hope that the report will have increased the Assembly's awareness that there are highly important issues at stake in Northern Europe that may not be overlooked including, especially, the sensitive equilibrium in defence matters in the area extending from Denmark and Norway across Sweden to Finland. I do not think I need labour the point any further.

I feel it is also very clear from the report — and I emphasise this once again — what problems arise from the fact that Norway is a member of NATO but not of the European Community, while Denmark is a member of the EEC, but neither country is a member of Western European Union, while both work together on the Nordic Council. This problem cannot be solved by stringent rules and regulations but only very pragmatically doing step by step what is necessary to achieve greater European unity

in this area too. Thank you very much, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is closed.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole is postponed until tomorrow, Thursday, at 5.30 p.m., in accordance with the procedure adopted.

## 5. Relations with Parliaments

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Doc. 681)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the information report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments, Document 681.

I call Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. DELORME (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the report I have to submit to you should not, I think, arouse much excitement. It is an account of what you have managed to do in your own parliaments and of the replies given to questions put by members of the Assembly. I tried in the report to cover the period since last May and the action taken in various parliaments of WEU member countries, as published in Collected Texts 22.

I should also mention that during our session in Bonn on 29th May 1975, the Committee selected, in accordance with Rule 42 *bis* of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, the texts adopted by the Assembly which it considered should be debated in your respective parliaments.

We selected Recommendations 266 on the political activities of the Council, 269 on the state of European security, 270 on European union and WEU and 272 on the European aeronautical industry and civil aviation.

These four recommendations were transmitted officially to the Presidents of the parliaments of member countries, and the Committee for Relations with Parliaments drew the attention of the seven parliaments to the texts which it considered likely to arouse their interest and be discussed.

Apart from this written report which you have all had, every one of you should bear in mind that besides your activities here, you have another extremely important task of making those activities known, and it is precisely the

*Mr. Delorme (continued)*

Committee under the chairmanship of Mrs. Miotti Carli which is intended to provide, so to say, the element of publicity and public relations, and also of propaganda for the idea we stand for. Obviously, the mission assigned to each member of the Assembly has been fulfilled more or less effectively. I would even say that some who have accomplished what was asked of them deserve a special mention.

First of all I would thank our Italian colleagues — honour where honour is due — who have, like Mr. Minnocci, asked questions in parliament. Document 681 gives the replies that might have been given. Mr. Minnocci was unlucky and got no reply. Others were more successful.

My own delegation made an effort. A number of French senators and deputies such as Mr. Valleix, Mr. Radius and Mr. Legaret and myself, carried out the mission. For the moment — and I regret there is no representative of my own government on the government benches — I shall repeat as Rapporteur what I said in my question : that it would have been useful to have a reply before this session to a resolution which we had particularly recommended : Resolution 55. Need I remind you that I asked our Minister for Foreign Affairs to convey his government's opinion on the resolution, requesting Mr. Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, charged with submitting to the European Council a report on European union, to bear in mind in his thoughts on defence the basic provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty, to explore the possibilities afforded by that treaty until such time as European union was given defence powers of its own and to recommend the European Council to canvass the opinion of our Assembly in all projects concerning the defence of Europe? Excuse me for getting a little worked up on this subject, but I think it is a good thing at the present juncture to try and stir up public opinion when we put to our respective parliaments the question : what is Europe for? But what is Western European Union for and what exactly is it?

I think that in connection with a report like the one I am defending we should, whenever we can, first inform our colleagues in our national assemblies. I shall not repeat what I said here a few months ago — that we ought to ask the members of our own parliaments what Western European Union represents, how it came into being and what use can be made of this Assem-

bly. This would at least be an essential lesson in civics which would enhance the reputation of our Assembly.

Please excuse me for wandering from my report, but we often try to find formulae, assemblies or conferences, to settle a defence problem whereas there is one body ideally placed for examining and solving such problems — WEU. Each of our governments ought to start re-reading the Brussels Treaty in the spirit of those who created this Assembly where we meet and which must — forgive me for repeating what the President said — stop being a talking shop and get out of the rut of always meeting in Paris. We have had the immense good fortune of convening in Bonn, and were delighted to do so. We thank our German colleagues who made the necessary arrangements, as I shall have occasion to say in a moment. While the Committee whose Rapporteur I am has no major problems of strategy and armaments to study, it does have a mission : the same one your Rapporteur has been assigned and we have to carry out : making it known that Europe has turned its thoughts to defence long ago and has to its hand an instrument that asks nothing better than to flourish and be developed and used as an institutional framework which there is no need to seek elsewhere.

When our international conferences are at a loss for a solution, it might already have been found in this Assembly of the seven nations most European of all — I am saying this for our English friends — in this WEU Assembly which has certainly done its bit to advance the European idea.

From the speeches made in the Assembly by members who, whether conservative or labour, are united by the same desire to speak as Europeans, we know that WEU provides an extremely advantageous terrain, one fertile for us to cultivate this idea.

I would like to revert for a moment to the session of the Assembly in Bonn. This session had an impact on German public opinion. We saw, as you will read in my report, a tremendous number of German and foreign journalists who had come to Bonn at the invitation of our President and our press service — which I would like to congratulate on the matter — and were able by broadcasts and articles to tell the public about our Assembly.

Prior to the session, the Press Counsellor met, in addition to journalists who had asked for an

*Mr. Delorme (continued)*

interview, all the key members of the German press. He also met all the leading reporters specialising in international and military affairs, and I think it was an experiment to be repeated and followed up.

The results were most satisfactory. In Germany they now know what our Assembly is achieving. Our initials, WEU, are now familiar. After this meeting, they are beginning to know what our Assembly is.

That being so, we must, as I proposed in my report, start travelling around. The seat of our Assembly is in Paris, but — I am addressing the President's Office, the Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms and the Office of the Clerk — we should repeat the Bonn experiment, which was highly interesting and fruitful.

Our Committee, therefore, is unanimous in suggesting to the Assembly and its Presidential Committee that a session like the one in Bonn should be held, say, every two years.

I now come to the appendices to the report which, obviously, merely record what you have been able to accomplish. With certain countries, I have to admit, you achieved more in 1975 than in 1974. I thank the ones which followed our directives.

To conclude, I would like to renew the appeal I have repeatedly made before, particularly in Bonn: what each of us has in fact to do is to ensure that a representative of the WEU delegation in each of your parliaments is given the task of preparing an information report, as was done in the French Parliament — and I regret to say in only two others.

I can tell you a secret which has nothing to do with national defence, of the Defence Committee of the French National Assembly. When I commented to this Committee on Mr. Valleix's report, I was glad to note that, while there was ignorance as to what we do here, a number of members were very interested in what we had to tell them and that several had already applied to the Office of the Sergeant-at-Arms or the Office of the Clerk for our publications. Only the day before yesterday I had the satisfaction of seeing that the report by one of our members, Document 650, had been lengthily commented on. That is a real indication of the soundness of our work. This report is about the conditions of service in the armed forces in each of our

countries. This is a topical question for both regulars and conscripts. In any case, Document 650 provided very important information, statistics and data which could not have been found elsewhere.

Such, Ladies and Gentlemen is the broad outline of the report I have to submit to you.

I come back to what I was saying before. We must not leave unanswered the question: "Europe, what for, and WEU, what is it?"

WEU is a living assembly, an assembly with a mission. It is able to fulfil that mission. *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I warn the Assembly that in exactly ten minutes I shall be obliged to close the sitting, as we are expected at the Hôtel de Ville.

In any case, as the Rapporteur said, this debate is not one to arouse heated discussion although it is of interest to us.

To sum up in a nutshell how much we have made our presence felt in high places, the only president of a European assembly to have been invited to meet Mr. Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, was the President of our Assembly. Somehow or other, and by paths which are not always very spectacular, we arrive at our ends.

I call Mr. Roper, to speak for three minutes.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I shall try to cover as much as I can in that time.

It is important that someone who is not a member of the Committee should pay a tribute to Mr. Delorme and his Committee for the tremendous efforts that they are making. This debate often comes at the end of our sessions and unless we make known what is done, we might as well not have these meetings. We are often concerned about the way in which the press treat us. Sometimes they ignore us, but even when they do not, they are often inaccurate. I have here the well-known and distinguished journal *Le Monde* of tomorrow's date:

*(The speaker continued in French)*

(Translation). — "None of this information is likely to allay the fears of a great many members of the Western European Union Assembly, which is now holding its twenty-first session in Paris with a French UDR deputy, Mr. Nessler, in the Chair. It seems to them, indeed, that France is finally abandoning WEU."

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

That is what *Le Monde* says. We have to bear in mind this kind of comment in our proceedings here and in relations with our national parliaments. This extract demonstrates the importance of our Assembly, but also that of the activities of the Committee which has Mrs. Miotti Carli as Chairman and Mr. Delorme as Rapporteur. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mrs. Miotti Carli.

Mrs. MIOTTI CARLI (*Italy*) (Translation). — Mr. President, in warmly thanking the Rapporteur for his estimable and thorough report, I want to underscore the efforts expended by some delegations in bringing the tale of WEU activities to the notice of their respective national parliaments. Thus, in France, in two debates, one in the National Assembly and one in the Senate, with in either case an intervention by the Prime Minister, Mr. Chirac, or in the Federal Republic of Germany, in the Bundestag, or in Italy too, where for the first time we have had an opportunity of presenting the report on the activities of WEU to the Committee for Foreign Affairs and the initiative has been taken, as mentioned by the Rapporteur, Mr. Delorme, of publishing the report itself in a booklet bearing the significant title of "Europe, the Last Hope".

I am therefore confident, Mr. President, that so far as Italy is concerned we shall again be able to discuss in the Foreign Affairs Committee the inherent problem of the activity of the European bodies, including WEU, in the same way as will be done during the next few days in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in the case of the activities of the Interparliamentary Union, to which Senator Vedovato, the Chairman of the Italian group of the Interparliamentary Union, will be reporting on its activity.

I also wish to dwell on another matter worthy of note, namely, a constantly greater and more capillary dissemination through the public opinion mass media: press, television, radio, for, as Mr. Roper said just now, we are too often overlooked by public opinion precisely because of being ignored by the media. In this respect I am happy to note how much evidence the Rapporteur has already found of the success achieved on the occasion of the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of WEU during the session in Bonn this May, precisely in the prominence given to it by the accredited journalists and press.

Lastly, I would direct your attention, however briefly, to the importance, in my view, of the visits by our Committee to regional parliaments. Many years on from the Berlin meeting in 1967 whose significance was mainly political, and following the successful experiment in Florence in September 1972, subsequent visits have been made to *Land* Bavaria and the regional parliament of Sicily. I think visits like these are to be repeated because, while in one way they serve to enable the Committee to gain greater insight into the various systems of territorial decentralisation — for instance, what we learned during our last visit to The Hague, in the hospitable Netherlands, was exceedingly interesting — in another, more especially by directly impinging on public opinion — also stressed by the Rapporteur — in off-centre areas of the different member countries and not always the capitals, we manage to bear witness to the importance of WEU and the purposes it serves through its own political action.

Thank you, Mr. President. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is closed. The Assembly takes note of the information report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

## 6. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting tomorrow morning, Thursday, 4th December, at 10 a.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. The European aeronautical industry (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Document 691 and Amendment).
2. European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Document 689 and Amendment).

Are there any objections?...

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak?...

The Sitting is closed.

(*The Sitting was closed at 5.50 p.m.*)

# THIRTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 4th December 1975

## SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.

2. Attendance Register.

3. The European aeronautical industry (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Doc. 691 and Amendment*).

*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Warren (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Richter, Mr. Miller, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Roper. Mr. Warren (*Rapporteur*), Mr. de Montesquiou (*Chairman*

*of the Committee*), Mr. de Bruyne, Mr. de Montesquiou, Mr. Roper.

4. European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 689 and Amendment*).

*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Lemmrich (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Piket, Mr. Rivière, Mr. Lemmrich (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Critchley (*Chairman of the Committee*).

5. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting.

*The Sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 3. The European aeronautical industry

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and Votes on the draft Recommendation and draft Resolution, Doc. 691 and Amendment)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation by Mr. Warren of the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions on

the European aeronautical industry, debate and votes on the draft recommendation and draft resolution, Document 691 and Amendment.

I call Mr. Warren, the Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — It is with pleasure that I present the report before you. It is not one which contains any dramatic new revelations or wonderful new proposals, and that gives me more pleasure than if it were entirely new because it means that the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions has found, over the eighteen months since it presented the first report on this subject to you, that its recommendations have been justified by time.

However, it is with some sadness that I have to record that, although we are proud that our recommendations have been found correct, little if anything has been done by members in their national States or by the respective national governments to carry them out. Perhaps it is too much to ask Europe to act with the speed at which aircraft have to move, but it does seem to me that we are not alone in expecting our governments to move ahead. The European Commission's recent report on aviation in Europe endorses every one of the recommendations which we made at the beginning of 1974 although, regrettably, it does not pay tribute to the lead given by WEU. However, it is nice to know that the European Commission is so strongly in line with our feelings.

1. See page 34.

*Mr. Warren (continued)*

The basic problem of the European aerospace manufacturing industry is the lack of a unified market which one would have expected to be not only acceptable but relatively easy to produce in the face of such willingness to collaborate in the member States. The boundaries of Europe may take many different forms, whether they be WEU, the EEC, EFTA or the Council of Europe, but the nature of an industry such as the aerospace industry is that it has to have a broad domestic market in order to be able to export to the world and, above all, to compete with the Americans operating from their own very large, unified domestic market. Without this unification, the industry and Europe will always be open to penetration by good American salesmen selling good American products.

The industry itself does not mind the competition. What it objects to is its inability to be allowed to compete in the same way as the Americans are able to compete in Europe. For instance, I know of no nation in WEU which in any way imposes customs tariffs on the import of American airliners for the use of its national airline, and yet if we try to sell aircraft from Europe — the Airbus, Concorde or any other aircraft now on the production line — it has to be charged a tariff before it can get into the United States. This shows the kind of quite unnecessary burden which we impose on the industry. It is one which ought to have been removed long ago.

With regard to the control of air space, the air above Europe does not carry in it some magic definition of national boundaries. When you are in an aeroplane you cannot tell whether you are over Belgium, Luxembourg, France or Germany. But on the ground there is a definition of air space and you are handed from one national control system to another, with all the attendant problems which stem from duplication of facilities and different styles of handling. It would be wrong of me not to point out that the reason for the control of air space is the consideration for human safety. I do not like to see artificial and invisible barriers to the passengers — artificial barriers built up in the air space of Europe. Surely it ought to be possible for us to unify our control of air space.

At the moment, we have what is called upper air space control, which is what Eurocontrol has been working on. Lower air space control has been left to national authorities. It would be

beneficial to have a vertical rather than a horizontal control system so that people operating over one country would know that they were in the hands of only one controller. Perhaps this could then be expanded to take in the unification of control systems between one country and another.

At the moment we seem to have the worst of all worlds and although the technical solution is relatively simple, the political will seems to be lacking. I regret the danger that that which has been built up in Eurocontrol could easily collapse because of divergent, individual, national opinions about the way in which this kind of control should operate.

The third point about unification is probably the most serious of all. I refer to military procurement. Both NATO and this Assembly have called for common military purchasing policies, but we find that we end up with a multitude of different weapons, many of them not interchangeable, and all the confusion that goes with commissioning a large number of different projects in different countries.

Some nations have tried to overcome this problem by multinational collaboration such as that we have seen on the multi-rôle combat aircraft and the Jaguar. Others have pursued a national policy, presumably because they want to maintain their own national defence systems but certainly because they are not happy with what has been involved in international collaboration so far. Here again I would like to give an illustration of the kind of problem that we incur because of our unwillingness to collaborate in the way in which we always say we are willing to collaborate.

In Brussels at the moment there is a NATO sub-committee studying the purchase for Europe of some thirty aircraft for airborne early-warning work. This is a new concept under which it should be possible from the sky to control the defence of Western Europe rather than do it solely through ground radar equipment. To evaluate an airborne early-warning system this sub-committee, founded in NATO, is studying the problem. What is most peculiar about the approach to this problem is that the sub-committee is studying only one solution — and that one solution is not a European but an American solution.

If Americans have the best equipment, or perhaps the only equipment, and it is considered essential that we have this kind of system, then I am quite happy that we should go ahead and

*Mr. Warren (continued)*

make rapid progress towards equipping ourselves for our own defence safety. But we know that there could be other solutions. For instance, in Britain there is an aircraft available, but it is precluded from the study because the sub-committee has decided that it will study only one aircraft, and that made by Boeing. We have a situation where a very small group of military men, meeting in Brussels, are making a major industrial decision which will affect the future work opportunities of tens of thousands of people in Europe, without the kind of political control that WEU should be exerting over these very large procurements.

It may be said that thirty aircraft are not very many but if I tell the Assembly that the price of each of these is about \$50 million it will be seen that a decision is being made by a small group of people involving expenditure by Europe of \$1,500 million, much of which will never appear or be reported in the newspapers because it does not make news. But the political effect of this decision is enormous. When we ask at national government levels: "What will your government do about it?" we hear repeatedly from across Europe and from members of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions: "There is no way of controlling this kind of decision." This is an extraordinary situation.

I have discussed this matter with the European Commission in Brussels, which has no way of influencing decisions made by a small sub-committee of NATO, and its members are very much aware of the industrial impact of this kind of decision. When we look at WEU we find that it has no means of exercising control over such decisions, and yet as parliamentarians of EEC and WEU we shall be expected to vote these moneys when eventually they appear in our national budgets. By then it will be too late. The decision will have been made.

In Europe, as WEU well knows, a group has been formed called Eurogroup, which I am delighted to know is at present under the chairmanship of a British Minister of Defence. This group is trying to rationalise the problems of military procurement in Europe, but these decisions are still slipping by and they involve a lot of money and many job opportunities.

The most revealing aspect of the discussion I had in Brussels was that it was felt unofficially

that there might be an initiative which could be exercised by WEU to become the political base where these decisions could and should be examined. I hope that by these illustrations I have shown, first of all, that the problems are easy to understand; secondly, that they are not difficult to solve; and thirdly, that their magnitude should capture our attention — and not just the magnitude of the moneys but the magnitude of the industrial impact on the economies of Western Europe. I hope that behind this report members will identify not only national interests but the interests of the whole of Western Europe, its defence and its industry, linked together.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I thank the Rapporteur.

In the debate, I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first like to say how happy I am that the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions is again concerning itself with the state of the aeronautical industry in Europe. We are chiefly indebted for this to the Chairman, Mr. de Montequiou, and to his dogged tenacity.

We know that we have here taken on a task of vital significance to the industrial development of Europe. I share the view taken by the Rapporteur, Mr. Warren, in his report and oral remarks, that the current image of the European aeronautical industry seems as precarious as ever. I cannot but see a parallel with the talks that we had a few days ago with the American Senator, Mr. Moss, on space questions. Mr. Moss said that Europe has become a partner to America, that it has a coherent space programme, a programme dovetailed to that of the United States besides also mounting a few programmes entirely off its own bat.

Looking at the situation in the space sector, I would remind you once again of what the Secretary-General of ESA had to say a few days ago at a symposium in Florence. He said he believed that it was thanks to the insistence of European parliamentarians that this agency was created.

In the aeronautical industry, the picture is an unbalanced one. Now, as always, there is a multiplicity of programmes in Europe; I shall mention only a few of them. On the military side, we have the Jaguar, MRCA, and Alphajet programmes. But these are national, or bilateral, or trilateral programmes. All are more or less

*Mr. Richter (continued)*

afflicted with the same disease in that the market for them is too small. We have indeed experienced, for instance, with the recent decision regarding the so-called contract of the century, the kind of difficulties that arise if we really have to fight for a market.

I should further like to draw the Assembly's attention to a colloquy with the European aeronautical industry, to be held on 2nd and 3rd February in Toulouse. It is, I think, worth noting that only at the level of a WEU technical committee is there any opportunity at all in Europe for industrialists, engineers and managers to harmonise their specialised interests with parliamentarians. We held a conference of this kind in Paris two years ago, when industry gratefully seized the opportunity of expressing and concerting views.

The aim of the Committee is clear and unequivocal. We want, in the rather longer term, to achieve in the aviation industry the same co-ordination as has proved possible in the space industry. I may perhaps express my particular pleasure that the colloquy is to be held in Toulouse, since an important part of the French aircraft industry is established in that district.

A few words perhaps are also called for on the Airbus. The Committee has always been concerned about developing the civil programme, so we now learn with particular pleasure that the obstacles that seemed to stand in the way of sales of the Airbus have faded. I know that at the present time, for example, three aircraft are being fitted out for Lufthansa. The first Airbus in service with Lufthansa will shortly be flying on the Frankfurt-Paris route, and as a parliamentarian, I shall, since I travel this way to WEU meetings, now be in a position to admire and benefit from this result of all our efforts, one we have long looked forward to.

Finally, I should like to thank Kenneth Warren for the report he has presented. He is one of the pioneers amongst the politicians of Europe. As we know, he knows this field from the inside, and has always championed the interests of the industry in the political arena. I am fully in agreement with his report. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER (*United Kingdom*). — I wish briefly to support my colleague, Mr. Warren,

and Mr. Richter in what has been said on the subject of this very valuable report. I do so as a member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

I think we should state at the outset that it is impossible to divorce consideration of civil from military aircraft. Therefore, I hope there will be no objections to the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions considering military aircraft.

I wish to stress two aspects in particular as well as to comment on a few minor points. My comments stem from my own experience and that of my constituency which is heavily engaged in the manufacture of components for the aircraft industry and in particular of high technology items in the Concorde and the Harrier aircraft, for example.

One of the lessons I think we must take to heart and must ensure that our governments understand concerns the long period needed and the difficulty involved in building up design teams for manufacturing aircraft of this complexity. If we are to abandon projects when they are only at a half-way stage, it is not just the loss in material but the loss in lead time that is so important. For instance, in the case of the Harrier, the decision that the United States of America should have to take over a development of this aircraft in its more advanced versions has led to the disbandment of the design teams in Great Britain. This is a great set-back to the whole future of the aircraft building capability for the future.

I wish also to stress the component aspects. It has been well said by many speakers in previous debates that we are in danger of becoming mere component manufacturers for the United States. I wish to emphasise the fear that this development causes me. We read only today in the French papers that French-American talks are proceeding. The point that we must all understand is that the European market is large enough of itself to sustain a viable aircraft industry, but if we are to break it down into our component countries, then we cannot sustain such an industry. To a large extent we have understood this message in space technology in the development of Eurospace. Why can we not bring this down to earth and explain it to our people in terms that they can understand and accept on a day-to-day basis?

*Mr. Miller (continued)*

That is why I was so interested in the remarks of Mr. Warren on the subject of the aircraft market and in particular the point that passenger fares inside Europe should be regulated on a cabotage basis not subject to IATA control as are international flights. Either we are Europe or we are not. If we are Europe, let us behave like Europeans. Where we have such an advantage, let us take advantage of it. Let us therefore bring the cost of travel down for our people, assure a market for our aircraft manufacturers and keep foreign competition out.

This is where I join Mr. Warren in his remarks on the airborne early-warning system. To my mind, it is quite incomprehensible that the European countries should award this contract to an American manufacturer without even considering a European solution, let alone going on to press forward with the necessary design studies. We do not deserve a European future unless we are willing to seize the opportunities which are before us every day in so many ways.

We have understood on the military side that the costs are now becoming almost insupportable in our democracies when we have to consider so many social expenditures, yet how can we fail to realise that the only hope of reducing those costs is to go forward on the basis of European equipment?

Finally, members will be aware that the British Government have introduced a bill to nationalise the aircraft industry in Great Britain. I do not propose this morning to engage in discussing the politics of that decision. However, I fear interference by governments in the purchase and design of aircraft often for considerations that are not necessarily European.

When the Rapporteur replies, I would like him, with particular reference to paragraph 17, to define the pressures that he mentions because we have seen that some government decisions regarding aircraft purchase and design have not been very happy.

I for one regret, together with Mr. Richter and others, that more consideration has not been given to the Airbus and also to the developments to which I have already referred in co-operation on a bilateral basis between single European countries and the United States.

Therefore, I give a warm welcome to the report, but I urge on all members the need to back it up in our own parliaments with a united and

strong voice saying that we shall insist on the European future of our aircraft industry and that we intend to make it meaningful and to bring home to our people in a concrete way that they may travel in Europe in a European aircraft subject to European air space control at a European fare. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Lenzer.

Mr. LENZER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me first of all thank my friend and colleague Kenneth Warren most sincerely for the informative report that he has submitted to us. What this report does is to set out the complex strands of interdependence and correlation that link political questions, economic questions and research and development matters as a result of the nature of the subject matter. I would therefore enthusiastically support the objectives of the report, just as the two previous speakers, Mr. Richter and Mr. Miller, have done. We must accept that in questions of this kind no distinction can be drawn between the military and civil spheres, just as none can be drawn between aviation and space spheres.

I would like, if I may, to add a few comments of basic principle in support of the report's objectives. I would first of all ask what technological and economic grounds make domestic and even European activity in the aerospace sector necessary at all. In times of financial stringency in public budgets, asking this question is of great importance for defining the conditions for any sort of public support for the space industry. The taxpayer will agree to such support only if we can convince him of the technological and economic importance of these activities.

Now how can such usefulness to the economy generally, which I am quite sure there exists, best be outlined?

First, aviation and space activity contributes directly and indirectly to the technical lead of a highly-developed industrialised country and consequently to securing future export markets.

Second, aviation and space activity produces a high net product and, by comparison with other sectors, offers employment to a relatively large proportion of highly-qualified manpower. This aspect is especially important to highly-developed industrialised countries, as we are now beginning to see a tendency for the simpler levels of production to be moved to low-wage countries. This is, incidentally, being done not only for reasons

*Mr. Lenzer (continued)*

of cost accounting, but is also regarded as a sound principle of active development aid.

Third, aviation and space activity supplies goods and services for air transport, for the utilisation of space research for terrestrial purposes, and for particularly important aspects of defence. Apart from this, the solution of the problems of aviation and space engineering has led to a host of by-products. Examples that may be mentioned are the development of the gas ultracentrifuge to enrich uranium, of systems and components for oceanography, and systems and components for suburban transport.

Fourth, one of the specific properties of products developed in these sectors of industry is that they are subject to particularly stringent requirements as regards reliability, serviceability and economy, yet must weigh little, use a minimum of energy and take up a minimum of space. These properties can be put to use in many sectors of industrial activity, and produce a whole range of efficient products.

If, Mr. President, I may say a word on competition with the United States in this field, I would like to ask whether there is any point in competing, whether there is even any hope of competing, with the United States. My answer to this question, despite the many problems associated with it, is basically yes. Within the framework of a number of national and more particularly of European programmes, competing with the United States now appears to be thoroughly successful when certain prerequisites are fulfilled.

It would seem that the prospects are particularly good for penetrating gaps in the market, gaps from which expansion can then take place, in other words, through which a successful product can be followed up by the offer of so-called product families.

Prospects for competition with the United States of America should also be good in the countries of the third world, which, as we know, are particularly anxious to become independent of the two superpowers. This presents us at European level with a host of chances. By way of example, one might mention the monopoly that the United States has held so far in information satellite systems. In this field it has been shown that European products are already fully competitive, and they may even be technolo-

gically superior. An example I could quote is the joint German-French Symphonie project.

Since this report is concerned chiefly with aviation, what should be the main thrust of future space programmes? These should continue to include both pure and applied research programmes, with the emphasis clearly shifting towards applications. Here, applications satellites will be in the forefront. Participation in setting up world-wide communications systems offers good technological and business opportunities. Other significant projects for the future will be concerned with the establishment of world-wide information systems, for instance in meteorology, or for applying space techniques to the utilisation of extra-terrestrial resources, such as the harnessing of solar energy.

A prerequisite for all these activities, for the effective application of these measures, is a research and development plan not only at national but also at European level. The premises for this must be developed from general economic and industrial policies. A substantial component of such a plan is to lay down the priorities which alone will make possible a concentration of the available resources on research targets that are looked upon as politically and economically reasonable and, at the same time, attainable. And it will have to be realised that for large research-intensive sectors of European industry to be competitive, a national approach to research will no longer, in view of the problem of scale so often referred to, be good enough.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, while I have touched on a number of points which go beyond the report itself, my intention has been to support the principles underlying the recommendation; in doing so, I have assumed that we cannot separate aeronautical research from space research or the military sector from the civil sector.

Thank you for your attention. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — Like Mr. Miller, I serve on the Defence Committee. There is an important interrelationship between this report and those which we have been discussing in our Committee and what we shall discuss later today. I would not want to trespass on the area with which Mr. Lemmrich will be dealing later in his important report, but in military aircraft procurement there is a close relationship between this report and his.

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

I should like to ask Mr. Warren, therefore, what is meant in the second paragraph of his draft recommendation — to which Mr. Valleix has an amendment — which says :

“That a European military aircraft procurement agency as proposed by the Assembly and later by the Commission requires the juridical basis of the modified Brussels Treaty.”

Does that mean that such an agency would be limited to the seven members of WEU or that we should have to extend Western European Union, which would be very difficult, for political and economic reasons, if we wanted to extend procurement to other countries? This is a strange reference which seems to go in a slightly different direction from that which we have taken in other respects.

On the AWACS procurement programme, Mr. Warren suggested that decisions were being made by a small group in Brussels and Mr. Miller said that a European decision had been made in favour of an American aircraft. Let us be clear what is happening. Would it be cheaper to start from scratch or even from the stage where Nimrod has reached and build a European alternative? We are, of course, procuring not for Europe but for NATO. It is clear that if we want the American contribution to our defence we should accept that these procurement decisions should be NATO decisions. If the American contributions to previous NATO common procurement programmes were followed, the United States would be paying 20 % or \$450 million of the cost, so we must be careful when we talk about a European airborne early-warning system.

It would be overflying parts of Europe but we must remember that as well as being members of this Assembly and Eurogroup we are also members of the Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, on some matters it would be better to procure on that basis although preserving, as was so clearly stated yesterday by Mr. William Rodgers, the concept of a two-way street.

In regard to the AWACS aircraft, it is important to remember that it is a NATO rather than a European procurement, although it will operate over European air space. The recent study by the International Defence Review shows the case for this in detail. No doubt Mr. Warren has read sections of my report

dealing with the costs of the project and the decision-making process.

Perhaps in future, before two separate committees in this Assembly produce reports discussing the same problem, it would be better to set up a sub-committee so that we should not in separate committees face in different directions.

The small group in Brussels to which Mr. Warren referred is a technical assessment committee. It must not be confused with the decision-making at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council next May. It was originally hoped that it would have been made in December this year, but clearly that will not now happen. These decisions are enormous. The purchase by NATO of thirty-six AWACS aircraft would involve expenditure equivalent to one year's defence budget for the Netherlands. The whole Netherlands defence expenditure for 1974 was equivalent to the costs of the AWACS project. Although the cost would be divided among countries, it is worth remembering that that expenditure would be concentrated over a few years. There would not normally be a long programme of research and development because that has already been undertaken. It would merely be a matter of procurement costs.

I shall not now enter into military aspects of the problem because we shall be dealing with those a little later. Despite the fact that some American authorities have estimated that the AWACS aircraft would develop the effectiveness of tactical aircraft and air forces in Europe, I suspect that when the NATO Council — not the technical group but the Defence and Foreign Ministers — meet next year, they will look sceptically at the project.

I agree with Mr. Warren that it is important for us as parliamentarians to be informed of such a major decision and that we should at least know whether the Nimrod option is viable. It might have been better if the work undertaken in 1970 had been continued. Unfortunately that did not happen. Even so, the Nimrod option should be assessed. I do not want to disagree with Mr. Warren's views on this matter. I merely wish to re-emphasise the importance of this procurement decision and the need for parliamentarians in all our countries to be very much on guard when such large procurement decisions are made without parliamentary discussion.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — There are no more speakers on the list.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — The value of debate lies in seeing whether there are divergent opinions. Obviously in this debate the lack of divergent opinions is pleasant to hear, but I hope that in our votes and resolutions we shall do a good deal more to further our views outside this Assembly.

I wish now to deal with the individual comments made in the debate. Mr. Richter, in discussing developments in European air space, reminded me of the comments made by Mr. Moss about Concorde. Mr. Moss said :

“Military aircraft have flown at supersonic speeds over the United States to the extent, it is reported, of half a million hours, and it seems a little silly to me to work up such a lather about the landing of a few commercial aircraft which, after all, have dropped below supersonic speed by the time they come in to land.”

It was interesting to see the acceptance by the Americans of a European project not just because it was a European project, when there has been so much emotion on this issue, but because they appreciate the viability of a project such as Concorde. It was welcome to see a man of Mr. Moss's stature showing some leadership.

Referring to the Airbus and Concorde, Mr. Richter led us to remember that in Europe we have two unusually successful aircraft developments with which we should press ahead. Mr. Miller mentioned paragraph 17 of the report in regard to putting pressure on airlines. It may appear to be something of a *volte face* but I do not believe that the airlines should be made to buy their own national products just because they are there. There has been a history of that kind in Europe too often without the airlines necessarily ending with competitive equipment. Therefore, I emphasise that what I am suggesting is that national governments should make it attractive for their national airlines to purchase equipment by offering good financial terms and, secondly, by giving the kind of customs protection to European products against American projects in the same way as happens in the United States against our own products. We should ensure a competitive opportunity for our own domestic output.

Mr. Miller referred to the vertical integration in industry. It is not just a matter of making aircraft and supplying engines and equipment. I was interested to hear Mr. Miller's comments

about a European air fare, and perhaps some system of cabotage should be allowed in Europe.

Reference was made to a number of figures relating to the airborne warning and control system, which for short is called AWACS. My concern on that score is that the premise on which the examination of the project has been made has provided for terms of reference that preclude any other examination. In science and technology it is out of order to confine oneself in any study to only one option. One does not know what options will be open in a study. Therefore, to preclude all other options when so much money has been expended and so many industries are affected by a decision seems to be a totally unacceptable state of affairs in procurement matters.

Mr. Roper mentioned action taken by the seven nations and the rôle of the European Commission. He could see no basis for establishing the kind of procurement policy that we all agree we need, and he thought that WEU was at least the only visible starting point. I would not dream of restricting activities only to WEU. Mr. Roper was right to refer to NATO because we need to start somewhere. What we must avoid is an inability to start anywhere.

In terms of the European option on Nimrod, we are not starting from scratch, because eight aircraft are already available. It is the problem of the vulnerability of AWACS that troubles me. It may be an acceptable defence system for the Americans and Russians. The Russians already have a system operating, but not a system that would give the form of defence that Western Europe requires. The system fulfils three rôles : first, a deep look into what could be hostile territories ; secondly, the need to cover low-level penetration problems ; thirdly, maritime surveillance of northern and western approaches to Europe. But the limitation of the terms of reference is totally unacceptable. I hope that they will be a little further explored in Mr. Roper's own debate.

Our proposal for a colloquy at Toulouse in the near future will give us the opportunity of bringing together the people whose advice we greatly value and welcome, the aircraft manufacturers and operators of Western Europe. We had a very successful colloquy in Paris in 1973 and we look forward to a further successful meeting in Toulouse, a place where so much has been done for the development of European aviation. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I thank the Rapporteur.

I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I have not a great deal to add to the report or to the comments of our excellent Rapporteur, Mr. Warren. We have the good fortune, as Mr. Richter said just now, of having a specialist on the Committee, a man who has aeronautical matters at his fingertips. His report supplements that of Mr. Valleix and I can only congratulate him on the whole of it. I am sure everybody is impressed by the quality of the arguments marshalled by Mr. Warren and that the report will be adopted unanimously.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Committee is submitting a draft recommendation on the European aeronautical industry and a draft resolution on a colloquy on the formulation of a civil and military aeronautical policy for Europe.

An amendment has been tabled by Mr. Valleix to the draft recommendation submitted by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions in Document 691. It is worded as follows :

At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add : "on which the Standing Armaments Committee is also based ;".

In the absence of Mr. Valleix, I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — This amendment, which Mr. Valleix apologises for being unable to defend in person, does not affect the substance. It concerns paragraph 2 of the recommendation. It is perfectly natural that the sponsor of this amendment, referring to the legal bases of the Brussels Treaty, should wish to include among them the Standing Armaments Committee, which has its part to play, given the high qualifications of its Secretary-General, Ambassador Plantey. I believe that such association with the agency that has been set up can only strengthen paragraph 2 of the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Bruyne, to speak on the amendment.

Mr. de BRUYNE (*Belgium*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity of endorsing Mr. Valleix's amendment. I feel that this would, indeed, be an improvement to the draft recommendation.

It does, however, seem that there has been a misunderstanding in the second paragraph of the recommendation and the practical implementation, within the WEU framework, of the suggestions set out in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the otherwise excellent report from Mr. Warren.

Mr. Roper can occasionally be tough or tiresome in this Assembly, but I think what he had to say about the second paragraph of the recommendation was quite right. The amendment from Mr. Valleix does not entirely clarify WEU's position in this matter. Where WEU is concerned, it seems to come down to saying we would like to, but are unable to.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — I agree with the Rapporteur in thinking that there is no difficulty about adopting Mr. Valleix's amendment, which is a useful addition to the recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Committee therefore accepts the amendment.

I put Amendment No. 1, tabled by Mr. Valleix, to the vote.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The amendment is agreed to.*

Before I put the whole draft recommendation to the vote, I call Mr. Roper to explain his vote.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am most grateful for the opportunity of explaining my views. I gave them in my intervention, namely that paragraph 2, which refers to the juridical basis of the modified Brussels Treaty, suggests that we are going backwards in using this as a basis for co-operation. I believe that this Assembly is looking forward to co-operation in the developed form of the Eurogroup, a co-operation which has been so fruitful in the response we have had from the initiative of the meeting in The Hague. I was therefore unable to vote in favour of a recommendation which looked backwards to the concept of the modified Brussels Treaty, which would limit procurement to the seven countries of this Assembly.

For that reason I am unable to take part in the vote on this recommendation.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We take note of your explanation.

I put the recommendation, as amended, to the vote.

*The President (continued)*

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation or resolution taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The amended draft recommendation is agreed to unanimously*<sup>1</sup>.

I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution on a colloquy on the formulation of a civil and military aeronautical policy for Europe.

Are there any objections ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The draft resolution is agreed to unanimously*<sup>2</sup>.

#### **4. European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 689 and Amendment)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments, Document 689 and Amendment.

I call Mr. Lemmrich, the Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. LEMMRICH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, the WEU Assembly has always been concerned with achieving better co-operation in the armaments field. The problem has become the more urgent in view of changes in the military position in Europe and as a result of recent economic developments. This was brought out in the speech on a joint European arma-

ments policy which the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Van Elslande, delivered to the WEU Assembly here in Paris a year ago. It was also brought out in the Callaghan report of August 1974 on American-European economic co-operation, which Mr. Callaghan prepared for the American Department of State and Department of Defence. And it was spelled out by the special meeting of the NATO Eurogroup on 5th November 1975 at The Hague, where it was decided to set up a European secretariat for arms procurement questions, to be quite separate from Eurogroup and open to all European States of the Atlantic Alliance. Nor must we overlook the proposals on a common armaments industry put forward by the EEC Commission on 26th June 1975.

The outstanding feature of the military position in Europe is the major Soviet armaments effort. The Soviet Union will this year be spending 15 % of its gross national product on armaments — more than twice as much as the United States, which will be devoting 6.2 % of its GNP to armaments.

The reinforcement of Soviet forces in Central Europe also gives us grounds for concern. For a year and a half a Soviet tank army has been being built up in Czechoslovakia, and at the present time it boasts more than 1,700 combat vehicles. The Warsaw Pact still has in Central Europe the world's strongest concentration of land and air forces. The ratio of Warsaw Pact forces to NATO troops is 3 to 1, perhaps even 4 to 1. One wonders, in this connection, what the Soviet Union is aiming at with this tremendous strengthening of its arms and its forces.

Up till now, the surest guarantee of peace in Europe has been a credible deterrent and the overall balance of military forces. A credible deterrent, however, does not just mean nuclear weapons; credibility depends also on conventionally armed forces. Their importance has been underlined in an interview given on 12th November to *Le Figaro* by the French President, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing. What he said was, and I quote :

“What has been achieved in the field of rocket-carrying submarines, of missiles on the Albion Plateau, and of our strategic system generally, is truly remarkable when we consider the technological and financial resources of France.

On the other hand, as a result of the position in the conventional sector I have noticed an

1. See page 35.

2. See page 36.

*Mr. Lemmrich (continued)*

appreciable weakening in the will to defend ourselves. No one will imagine that France could be satisfied with a stockpile of a few rockets and a few nuclear bombs. Remember Tolstoy and his study of the Russian campaign: without the will to defend oneself, all else is pointless... That, then, is why we are making efforts in conventional armaments, particularly in the aircraft and transport sectors."

While Soviet armament continues uninterrupted, the Western European States find themselves confronted with substantial financial problems. Material prosperity and the security of society are important aspects of western policy, and must be given their due as much as external security, even though peace and freedom rank particularly high with us.

A significant factor in this respect is that in a technological age military effectiveness is dependent on our ability to keep military equipment fully abreast of technological advances. This is expensive, and we must wonder whether our armies can keep up with the headlong pace of technical progress.

The East may well have the same problems, but totalitarian régimes arm themselves without regard to economic and social pressures, if the communist *raison d'état* so requires. The substantially lower standard of living in the communist camp is proof enough of this.

Is there any way of reducing the discrepancy between military needs and economic opportunity within the Alliance? The standardisation of arms, and their joint development and production, offer the possibility of achieving for the same money substantially greater efficiency in defence.

What is the position within the Western Alliance with regard to co-operation on armaments? Despite the impressive achievements of earlier years, the Atlantic Alliance has for the past few years been in practice pursuing, in many areas, virtually the reverse of standardisation. The multiplicity of weapons in the arsenals of the Alliance has been growing apace. This jeopardises operational interchangeability, and everything becomes more expensive.

One obvious example of the trend away from standardisation is provided by our anti-tank weapons. The arsenals hold no less than thirty-one different types, while a military analysis

has shown that about five would be the optimum figure. But this is not all: at one and the same time eighteen new and improved types are being developed.

Another example is NATO's mobile force, which consists of troops from seven member States. Each national element has its own equipment and its own back-up supplies that it has to take with it. If standardisation were introduced here, the amount to be transported by air would be halved.

These are only two examples among many. The American Defence Department has assessed the sum squandered by the whole of the Atlantic Alliance at six to seven thousand million dollars a year.

In addition to this, the lack of standardisation and interchangeability means a 30% drop in fighting efficiency. What we need is not just that each army should have the most highly perfected weapons system, but that we should have weapons that are good and standardised too. There are many examples of military perfectionism having led *de facto* to a destandardisation of the common systems. All this needs to be changed.

What can we do about it? There are important national interests in the armaments field both of a political and of a military and economic kind; they cannot be denied. A knowledge of the industrial structure of the various countries is necessary if we are to assess these interests properly. Within the Alliance, we shall have to organise both the development of new weapons and their production, and to this end, ideas on military tactics must be harmonised — they form the basis. The military requirements within the Alliance must be defined — equipment, calibres, fuels and new weapons systems must be standardised so as to facilitate interchangeability of weapons and equipment, to improve logistics and to make longer production runs possible and manufacture consequently more rational.

An exchange of weapons from one side of our Alliance to the other will remain an illusion unless the European arms industry succeeds in becoming a partner with American industry on an equal footing. Because of its vast home market and the size of its industry, the United States predominates in arms production. It supplies 70% of the Alliance's conventional equipment. Europe must therefore combine its forces and achieve a two-way transatlantic trade.

*Mr. Lemmrich (continued)*

The medium-term aim of the European States in the Alliance is to co-operate in hammering out a European identity in the security field in the important sectors of research, development and armaments production. The security of Western Europe demands a viable and efficient European armaments industry.

Two problems arise in this connection. First, there is the need to compensate States, firms or consortia whose weapons development has not been accepted, if we assume that development will be organised in such a way that there is not just one development project but two or three.

The second problem is the sharing-out of production. This gives rise to the question of the institutions needed for co-operation. The Belgian Minister, Mr. Van Elslande, in the speech he made to our Assembly on 5th December 1974 stressed this aspect, which is surely the most difficult of all, as it has important political consequences. France, one of the leading weapons manufacturers not only in Europe but in the world, does not belong to Eurogroup and merely sends observers to its meetings. On the other hand, France does participate fully in the Conference of National Armaments Directors of the Atlantic Alliance. The institutions of WEU and, at technical level, the Standing Armaments Committee can here — as in the past — play the useful and important rôle of intermediary.

Such measures cannot, however, solve without further ado the problem of cohesion between the European members of the Atlantic Alliance, on the one hand, and the American partner, on the other. Unfortunately, what we must have is a co-ordinating body in the European area that can at the same time act as an equal partner with the United States in connection with the so-called two-way street — which at present is still largely one-way.

This is necessary because marked imbalance tilted against European countries has long been a feature of European-American trade in military material. The proposal put forward by the Defence Ministers in Eurogroup for an armaments secretariat open to all European States of the Alliance, and quite separate from Eurogroup, could be one way of solving the problem.

The aim should be to bring reciprocal trade across the Atlantic in the armaments field back to something approaching balance. For this

purpose, a number of principles must be laid down. The allocation of tasks must not lead to specialisation in a way that will leave Western Europe supplying products of a lower level of technology while it has to buy advanced-technology products. We must ensure, too, that production will be economic, a point which would affect both the arrangements for development projects and those for production of armaments.

There is also the problem of exports, as this enables longer runs to be produced. We must develop common principles and guidelines on this point soon.

The Assembly's Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments dealt with the theme of European and Atlantic armaments co-operation at three of its meetings. During these, the problems themselves were discussed, as were the strategic aspects of Western European security. Of six amendments proposed by our French friend, Mr. Rivière, five were incorporated in the draft recommendation. I am sorry that this was not enough for Mr. Rivière. The Committee adopted the draft text by 17 votes to 2. The result of the vote shows that the report contains not only my personal view — as Mr. Rivière asserts in his minority report accompanying the main report — but accords with the view of the large majority of the Committee.

I must also note that neither Mr. Rivière nor the other representative of the French Government majority parties, at the meetings of the Committee, asked the Rapporteur to include their divergent opinions in the report. Mr. Rivière unfortunately did not convey substantial parts of his opinion, now submitted to you in writing, to members of the Committee during discussions, nor did he bring them to our attention.

As to the subject matter of Mr. Rivière's statement, I have dealt with much of this in a number of the points I have already made. I must, however, categorically reject the assertion that this report is anti-European. Precisely if we are to give weight to the realities of Europe, we should vote in favour of the recommendation. Everyone knows, though, how important it is that every European State in the Alliance should be willing to co-operate and that France, in particular, is an extremely important partner. Our "European-ness" cannot be measured by the extent of our confrontation with the United States, only by the degree of readiness to co-operate with all Western European States. We Europeans are all dependent on each other.

*Mr. Lemmrich (continued)*

I would conclude by saying that co-operation on armaments is a complex problem. It requires tenacity and stamina if success is to be achieved. The words of the French President Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, "without the will to defend oneself, all else is pointless" apply in this case too. If this will is strong enough, the right way will be found to make our defence efforts more efficient. The West must gather its strength together if it is, in the future, to maintain the defence of peace and freedom. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I thank the Rapporteur.

I call Mr. Piket.

Mr. PIKET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — First of all I want to congratulate Mr. Lemmrich very heartily on his outstanding report and his exceptionally interesting introduction a few moments ago.

One of the advantages we, as parliamentarians, have, Mr. President, is that we can make proposals that anticipate the plans of our governments, and that we can offer opinions which, without tying the hands of the governments, do show what is realistic for the future. This was, in fact, the thought that went through my head when I re-read Mr. Lemmrich's report. I wonder whether the clashes of opinion that have come to light during our discussion of this report do not actually reflect standpoints that belong to the past. The speech yesterday by the Minister, Mr. Rodgers, strengthens me in this view; he told us then that we must look for new ways of welding European defence into a coherent whole. The conflicts between European defence, Atlantic defence, and WEU and Eurogroup, were emphasised when General de Gaulle decided to pull out of the Atlantic Alliance organisation so as to be free of the trammels of integration.

These conflicts are fast disappearing, without actually being settled, because the factors on which they were based are fast disappearing. A lot has been said, written and discussed in the meantime on the subject of integration: my feeling is that this whole business is past history. It is significant that Mr. Rodgers, while saying that Denis Healey had fathered Eurogroup, gave the impression of talking about something that was over and done with.

The new generation of Heads of Government in Western Europe have, therefore, decided to bypass this quarrel and to look for ways —

within the general framework of NATO, obviously — of safeguarding our arms industries and consolidating Europe's position in the world as a supplier of armaments.

The Foreign Ministers, when they meet in Brussels on 11th and 12th December, will probably be taking the political decision to set up an *ad hoc* committee to map out, within a period of six months, the broad outlines for a policy of co-operation in arms manufacturing, joint weapons production and standardisation. The policy is thus being evolved outside the NATO context, and outside WEU or any other existing body. It seems logical that in any proposals that are worked out the European Council of the Heads of State or Government will be the final arbiter.

Possibly the Economic Affairs Ministers and Finance Ministers of the Nine will also have a hand. This possibility has already been hinted at by the Dutch Minister of Defence; when he addressed our Assembly last year, he stressed the need for allowing these Ministers to be involved, inside or outside the Communities.

So the political passions that were raised during discussions of the Lemmrich report in Committee — which were of course confidential — must equally be seen as the expression of a political disagreement that has been overtaken by events.

I would like to draw our French and British colleagues' attention to the fact that in future co-operation is going to be called for more than competition, especially since there are major interests at stake, including those of employment. Over recent years the cost of weapons systems has risen by ten to a hundredfold. No European country is still able, on its own, to cope with developing this modern technology. So I would like to point out, as well, that since Western Europe has to import all its raw materials and all its mineral requirements — except perhaps for coal — it must consequently export high-quality products to be able to pay for the imports. Last year Britain and France each exported some \$350 million worth of weapons systems: this export trade would shrink to nothing if the technology needed to make the goods were to dwindle.

I said in Committee — and I will repeat it unconditionally here — that I shall be voting for Mr. Lemmrich's report.

Finally, I want to say this. European and Atlantic co-operation on armaments will not be

*Mr. Piket (continued)*

possible unless Western Europe acts as one. I think that all democratically-minded members of parliament must take this to heart. Otherwise, the communist agitators will sneak in while we are busy discussing and debating; and the result then could be the end to any free discussion, for good and all. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Rivière.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, my purpose in speaking today is to express the minority opinion on Mr. Lemmrich's report.

The recommendation submitted by Mr. Lemmrich was drafted as a compromise and in a spirit of co-operation, and I am particularly grateful that this is so.

However, a few points of difference remain. I chiefly disagree with the strategic concepts underlying Mr. Lemmrich's proposals on armaments policy; he thinks we ought to increase our defensive potential, both conventional and nuclear, to the level attained by the Warsaw Pact forces. In his own words, we should try to re-establish the balance of forces on the continent.

If we followed Mr. Lemmrich's advice, we would have to embark on a very expensive production programme; the inevitable result would be an armaments race, the West would have to almost treble the number of tanks deployed in Central Europe and double the number of aircraft. What country would bear such an inordinate charge?

We cannot hope for American aid on such a scale at a time when the United States is pursuing the direct SALT negotiations with the Soviets with the aim of reducing armament costs. And are European countries in a position to make such an effort, even if their production is standardised so as to eliminate duplication and waste? I think not.

Even if we decided to increase our forces to a level comparable with those of the Warsaw Pact, we should not have the means of developing both our conventional or tactical nuclear armaments and our strategic armaments at the same time. We should therefore be obliged to confine ourselves, under the shade of the American nuclear umbrella, to the production of tactical weapons. We should be exhausting

our strength, jeopardising détente and forfeiting our independence.

Our armaments policy, therefore, must be based on other strategic concepts. Instead of accumulating the means of making war we should take action to avert war by deterrence. Instead of striving for a quantitative balance of forces in Europe we should build up a defensive system based on the strategic nuclear weapon and capable of deterring any possible aggressor. No need to achieve strategic parity with the USSR, it will be enough if we have a second strike nuclear force capable of inflicting such damage on the Soviet Union that it would no longer have any interest in conquering Europe.

It is comparatively easy to constitute such a nuclear force. The French and British deterrents are already sufficiently developed to guarantee their territories against any serious threat. Europe's major armaments effort should therefore be aimed at deterrence and strategic nuclear forces. Strategy based on deterrence compels Europe to retain full control over its defence and not rely unduly on the United States.

The fact is that the threat of massive retaliation in the event of attack by the USSR on Europe can only be credible if the European countries are themselves capable of unleashing the nuclear weapon. It is by no means certain that the United States would risk a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union if Europe were invaded.

The official doctrine of the United States, particularly since the Vladivostok agreement, rules out automatic massive retaliation by the United States in the event of Europe's becoming the victim of aggression.

The military independence of Europe should not be confined to nuclear armaments; it should also extend to all advanced technology equipment upon which the effectiveness of modern, light-weight conventional weapons, which are the essential complement to any nuclear defence, depends.

It is therefore vital for Europe that there should be armaments co-operation within a truly European context, and that it should be aimed at safeguarding European armaments industry and advanced technologies. Commercial considerations must be relegated to second place in the development of our armaments industries. Some degree of protection for European industry against American competition is necessary. To forgo such protection would condemn us to

*Mr. Rivière (continued)*

producing only equipment of a low technological content because of the lead American industry has already taken.

WEU and its Standing Armaments Committee, which must be reactivated, appear a particularly appropriate structure for the pooling of European armaments production we all demand. They form an established legal framework within which European countries could design their armaments quite independently on the basis of strategic options freely taken.

Within Eurogroup, in contrast, we could successfully achieve some degree of standardisation of armaments only if we conformed to tactical concepts and military requirements as defined by the United States. In any case, to institutionalise Eurogroup would be tantamount to asking France, in a roundabout way, to rejoin the integrated military organisation which it voluntarily left. My friends and I are not plugging a concept of European co-operation characterised by any hostility towards the United States. But, I have to say that Europe will only truly become a second pillar of the Atlantic Alliance when it has acquired the means of making itself independent. To do so, it appears necessary for European countries to agree on a common strategy and jointly develop on this basis the industrial and technological capability essential for the production of the armaments they require.

Thus, by providing itself with the means of attaining true independence, Europe will make it possible to supersede the division of the world into two blocs, which was hallowed by Yalta and which General de Gaulle never ceased to denounce.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — There are no further speakers.

I call Mr. Lemmrich, Rapporteur.

Mr. LEMMRICH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should like to thank Mr. Picket and Mr. Rivière for their comments. I can fully agree with what Mr. Picket said, particularly his observation that the Heads of State or Government in Europe today wish to strengthen Europe's position in the world in the armaments sector too. It is a fact that there is still much going on in the institutions that he mentioned — the European Communities, WEU, and also

NATO's Eurogroup. This clearly shows that we are on the way to achieving an objective.

I can also agree with his comment that we shall only carry weight compared with the United States in the armaments area if Europe forms a united front. That has been the theme of our discussion in the Assembly today and I am very grateful to my friend Mr. Picket for having supported me in such an impressive way.

I was also pleased with Mr. Rivière's comments inasmuch as he acknowledged that the Committee had shown its goodwill in accepting his proposals. I repeat, of his six concrete proposals, we incorporated five in the draft recommendation.

The purpose of this report is not, after all, to give an exposition of the strategic concepts of the Western Alliance. I am aware of the differing views as to whether the nuclear threshold should be high or low. On this point, military opinions and concepts differ; proceeding on the assumption that the whole range of nuclear weaponry should not be applied immediately, the idea was consequently mooted that conventional strike forces should be strengthened. The consideration that nuclear weapons would not be used in any event because of the frightful consequences of a nuclear war was also relevant.

I only wanted to mention this briefly. It would be necessary to produce a report on it. The theme of Europe and nuclear weapons was treated in a remarkable article by Richard Shearer in the last NATO Review, No. 6 of 1975.

I gather from what Mr. Rivière has said that we are agreed that for our security we need both nuclear and conventional forces. We must, however, remain dubious whether Britain and France can protect us all with their nuclear weapons; I underline "us all". At all events, France's nuclear missiles do not reach beyond Moscow, and further East corresponding military forces are stationed capable of destroying everything in Europe in one counterstroke. Mr. Rivière said that Britain and France are able to protect their sovereign territories. The question then of course arises — what about other peoples' sovereign territory? There are misgivings in my country about French Pluton missiles being stationed in Alsace lined up on target areas in the Federal Republic.

I consequently consider it necessary for the Western Alliance to remain fully effective. I do think, however, that it is just as much in

*Mr. Lemmrich (continued)*

France's interest, even if she does not participate in the military integration. We always want to make a clear distinction: the Atlantic Alliance and military integration are two quite different things.

Power relationships being what they are in the world, and they are defined by military strength, there is no possibility at the present time of a European superpower interposed between the United States and the Soviet Union. If we wish to carry greater weight, we shall have to make greater efforts to that end. We are, I would remind Mr. Rivière, concerned with acquiring greater weight, more importance, through co-operation in Europe in the armaments field. This concerns all of us. I am pleased to note that we all agree on the principle.

The WEU Standing Armaments Committee should be reactivated. We have included this in the draft recommendation. I have the impression that all member States are interested in it. But the problem is still that of clarifying relations with the United States and the Alliance as a whole. The military component of WEU has, indeed, been delegated to NATO. That is a matter of fact. We are talking about some kind of institution which is certainly necessary, but at the same time we all realise that the NATO Eurogroup cannot be institutionalised for armaments purposes. This, of course, is why the proposal was made in The Hague for forming a secretariat accessible to all. It will be necessary to clarify with France whether she will take part and how it can be organised. It is, at any rate, our concern that Europe be given more weight in the armaments field. An armaments industry is of the first importance to us for political reasons. But there are economic reasons, too. We have only to think of the many people to whom it gives jobs to recognise that an armaments industry is vital to us. All our considerations and proposals, however incomplete, are in the final analysis directed towards moving closer to this goal. We are of course aiming at the same time to trim costs. The funds we allocate to military purposes should be related to greater cost-effectiveness.

These then are my replies to what our two colleagues have said. In conclusion, let me ask you again to give your approval to the draft recommendation that has been tabled. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — On behalf of the Defence Committee I would like to thank Mr. Lemmrich for his hard work and for his very thorough and intelligent report.

The whole matter of standardisation through specialisation and rationalisation has leapt into public awareness over the last twelve months. This has come about through a combination of circumstances: only one-third of everybody's defence budget can be spent upon arms, each new weapons system is far more expensive than the last, and all democratic governments in the West are under pressure to reduce the proportion of their GNP spent on defence.

All this suggests that, unless we are prepared to take standardisation seriously, we shall find that the West will have disarmed itself through inflation. If one were to advocate a policy of unilateral disarmament and have it accepted, this, at least, would be very much more preferable to what might well happen if the West is not prepared to look at the standardisation of its arms.

All this is easy to say. Everyone has been saying it for years. At long last in our countries, through speeches and through the media, this simple truth is beginning to dawn on our electorates — that the problem is not simply one of making our armed forces 30% more effective by spending approximately the same amount of money but of achieving this desirable objective of standardisation through specialisation and rationalisation.

Broadly there are three channels which one might examine. The first is through WEU. We all remember the great days when Mr. Jobert would come to Western European Union and flirt outrageously with us, but those days are past. When one reads very carefully the view of the French Government today, all mention of Western European Union as a possibility seems to have disappeared. The days of Jobert are over. I doubt therefore whether there is very much to be gained at this moment by stressing the first of these choices.

A second choice would be to take up the 5th November initiative from The Hague and the Ministers of Defence of the Thirteen who have offered a secretariat and also a second and unspecified group or body which we hope France might be prepared to join.

This raises one of the great mysteries of this Assembly. One has tried to discover, not simply from a distinguished array of ambassadors, all

*Mr. Critchley (continued)*

of whom have played their cards very close to their chests, but also from correspondents of newspapers and from those of our French friends whom we have been able to corner, precisely the nature of the French response to this invitation. I am told that it is yes, but a yes hedged round with so many suggestions as to make it no. I have also been told that the answer is no but with so many qualifications that it might be interpreted as being yes. We must wait and see.

I very much hope that the French Government will feel free to come just this little way into building the kind of European armaments industry, and arms procurement, too, which is essential if Europe is to compete with the United States in an Atlantic-wide armaments industry.

But were that to fail — and I hope that it does not — we are left with a third and final choice, which is for some initiative to emerge from Brussels, through the Commission with French blessing. It may be that at the end of the day it will be by the third of these methods that the States of Europe can at last get together and rationalise their defence policies. It may be that the third way, in particular, might lay the foundations for a common European defence. I believe that all of us would agree that we shall never get a European foreign policy and a United Europe, which is the desirable objective of us all, without a common foreign policy; and that must contain an element of common defence.

We are still playing the old game that we have been playing for years in Europe of trying to get together to make progress in a subject which concerns us all and under which, if we fail to make progress, we shall all be the sufferers. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall adjourn the debate in order to allow the amendment which Mr. Rivière has just tabled to be circulated. The debate on this amendment will take place at the beginning of this afternoon's sitting.

##### **5. Date, time and Orders of the Day of the next Sitting**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I propose that the Assembly hold its next public Sitting this afternoon at 3 p.m. with the following Orders of the Day:

1. European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments (Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 689 and Amendment).
2. Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975 (Presentation of and Debate on the oral Report of the General Affairs Committee and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 693 and Amendment).
3. Air forces on the central front (Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 690).
4. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology (Votes on the draft Recommendation and on the draft Resolution, Document 687).
5. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe (Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Document 683).
6. Second-generation nuclear reactors (Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 686).
7. Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance (Votes on the amended draft Recommendation and on the draft Resolution, Document 682 and Addendum).
8. The International Institute for the Management of Technology (Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Document 685).
9. Northern European countries and the prospect of European political union (Vote on the draft Recommendation, Document 684).

Are there any objections ....

The Orders of the Day of the next Sitting are therefore agreed to.

Does anyone wish to speak ?...

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 12 noon)*

# FOURTEENTH SITTING

Thursday, 4th December 1975

## SUMMARY

1. Adoption of the Minutes.
2. Attendance Register.
3. European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 689 and Amendment*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Rivière, Mr. Lemmrich (*Rapporteur*).
4. Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975 (*Presentation of and Debate on the oral Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 693 and Amendment*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Sir John Rodgers (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Fletcher, Mr. Radius, Mr. Richter, Mr. Sieglerschmidt (*Chairman of the Committee*), Mr. Cermolacce, Mr. Urwin, Mr. Piket.
5. Air forces on the central front (*Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 690*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Roper (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Warren, Mr. de Montesquiou, Mr. Roper (*Rapporteur*), Mr. Critchley (*Chairman of the Committee*).
6. Message from the Greek observers.  
*Speaker*: The President.
7. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology (*Votes on the draft Recommendation and on the draft Resolution, Doc. 687*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Cermolacce.
8. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 683*).
9. Second-generation nuclear reactors (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 686*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Cermolacce.
10. Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance (*Votes on the amended draft Recommendation and on the draft Resolution, Doc. 682 and Addendum*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Valleix, Mr. de Montesquiou.
11. The International Institute for the Management of Technology (*Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 685*).
12. Northern European countries and the prospect of European political union (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 684*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Cermolacce.
13. European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 689*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Rivière.
14. Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975 (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 693*).  
*Speakers*: The President, Mr. Cermolacce, Lord Beaumont of Whitley, Mr. Roper (*on a point of order*).
15. Air forces on the central front (*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 690*).
16. Close of the Session.

*The Sitting was opened at 3.05 p.m. with Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, in the Chair.*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Sitting is open.

### 1. Adoption of the Minutes

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In accordance with Rule 21 of the Rules of Procedure, the Minutes of Proceedings of the previous Sitting have been distributed.

Are there any comments ?...

*The Minutes are agreed to.*

### 2. Attendance Register

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The names of the Substitutes attending this Sitting

which have been notified to the President will be published with the list of Representatives appended to the Minutes of Proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

### 3. European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 689 and Amendment)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the vote on the draft recommendation in the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on European

<sup>1</sup>. See page 40.

*The President (continued)*

and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments, Document 689 and Amendment.

Mr. Rivière has tabled an amendment to this draft recommendation, which I will read out :

In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out : "establish, in the face of the continuously increasing armaments of the Warsaw Pact, the balance of forces which is" and insert : "maintain the forces which are".

I call Mr. Rivière to defend his amendment.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, my reason for tabling this amendment to the draft recommendation is that a word in this paragraph seems to me to suggest a whole strategic orientation I think extremely dangerous for Europe, as I already explained this morning.

We are urged in this paragraph to strengthen the defence potential of the Alliance so as to establish the balance of forces which is essential to the security of Europe. This implies that the Atlantic Alliance should, in the face of the forces of the Warsaw Pact, be in a position to conduct conventional warfare perhaps even also involving tactical nuclear weapons as well.

The question which arises is to what extent Europe could survive such a war, even if the western camp ultimately emerged victorious. I would add that to try and achieve a balance of this sort seems to me to involve a very special danger, in that it might induce our American allies to allow the prospect of a war along these lines to enter into the calculations of their general staffs. Obviously, from the American point of view, strategic nuclear deterrence involves in the event of failure the danger of an atomic war in which the United States would be destroyed. It might accordingly be tempted to look for a substitute strategy, that of holding back its strategic nuclear weapons, that is, conducting a conventional war on European soil.

It appears to me obvious that it is in Europe's interests to prevent at all costs the possibility of any resort to such a strategy. It is also, I think, in the interests of peace for as soon as a potential war ceases to involve the certainty of irreparable destruction on the two great powers' own territory, the resort to war is no longer unthinkable, so that the balance of conventional forces in Europe between the Atlantic Alliance and the

Warsaw Pact could have the effect of cancelling out the benefits of this balance of terror, to which we owe the thirty years of peace we have enjoyed.

These are the reasons for which, without rejecting the idea of strengthening the defence potential of the Alliance, I would earnestly ask you to delete that part of the sentence which states that its strengthening would aim to establish a balance of forces in Europe.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — What is the Committee's opinion ?

Mr. LEMMRICH (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, we have already discussed a similar motion by Mr. Rivière in Committee. A balance of forces means that both groups of forces, power groups, have roughly the same weight. If the balance is upset, one side carries more weight and gains the upper hand, while the more lightweight side loses its position. The entire historical experience of Europe over the last century shows that an imbalance presents the greatest possible danger for peace.

During discussions in Committee we repeatedly explained to Mr. Rivière that a balance of forces included both nuclear and conventional weapons. We discussed this matter at considerable length, and Mr. Rivière's amendment was thrown out by a large majority of the Committee.

As Rapporteur, therefore, I am not able to accept this amendment now.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I put Mr. Rivière's amendment to the vote by sitting and standing.

(*A vote was then taken by sitting and standing*)  
*The amendment is negatived.*

Let us try and save time, as we shall have eight consecutive votes to take after 5.30 p.m.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections ?...

There is one objection.

In that case, the vote is deferred until 5.30 p.m. together with the other votes scheduled for that time.

**4. Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the oral Report of the General Affairs Committee, Doc. 693 and Amendment)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the oral report of the General Affairs Committee on the resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975 and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 693 and Amendment.

I call Sir John Rodgers, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Sir John RODGERS (*United Kingdom*). — Perhaps it would be advisable if I tell the Assembly the brief history of the recommendation.

My friend, Mr. Radius, who tabled the original recommendation, asked me whether I would care to add my signature, and I did so. This matter was taken to the General Affairs Committee where we made considerable amendments to the original paper, as a result of which I was dragooned — I use that word advisedly — to be the Rapporteur and to present the report.

Document 693 arose from Mr. Radius' report, duly amended and approved by the General Affairs Committee.

Not only is the paper before the Assembly today a revised version of Mr. Radius' paper, which was redrafted by the Committee, but I hope that Mr. Radius will speak at some length commenting on his paper because he was the originator of the idea and I was merely one of the signatories.

Those who have read the new draft recommendation will see that the Committee does not seek to condone or condemn either side in the various conflicts in the eastern part of Europe and in the Middle East, but nobody in this Assembly can be happy that the third world, for reasons of its own, moved this resolution in the United Nations condemning Zionism and equating it with racism. Zionism, to my mind, is no more racist than any other national or religious movement. For example, it is no more racist than are pan-Hellenism or militant Islam and the holy wars under Islam.

I seek to condemn the motion so foolishly passed in the United Nations since it takes the

step of isolating Zionism and of trying to condemn it. The older I grow — and I have now been a member of the British parliament for twenty-six years — the more distressed I am that every day in almost every country there are examples of double standards applied by governments, including our own. Nations tend to have one set of rules for those of whom they approve and another set of rules for those whom they dislike and of whom they do not approve. The United Nations resolution is a glaring example of that kind of standard.

The basic incentive for these double standards is, alas, illegitimate self-interest. I use that phrase because no nation has a right to interfere in the internal affairs of any other country. Following the Helsinki conference, we should try to uphold that view in international bodies such as this Assembly.

I want to be brief and I do not intend to elaborate, but I hope that the recommendation before the Assembly is clear and will command the Assembly's support.

Since I said at the beginning that this recommendation is not aimed at any one country or any one set of countries, I sincerely hope that it will be accepted and that the amendment tabled by some of my colleagues on the labour side will be withdrawn. That latter amendment is a most inflammatory piece of drafting and would only add fuel to the flames. It would certainly increase the damage caused by the United Nations resolution.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I thank the Rapporteur.

In the debate, I call Mr. Fletcher.

Mr. FLETCHER (*United Kingdom*). — I find myself in a rather unusual situation in that I cannot speak as the leader of the British Delegation but only in a purely personal capacity. I support Sir John Rodgers and I appeal to my colleagues in the Labour Party to withdraw the amendment.

Perhaps I should take this opportunity to explain my personal position. As far as I personally am concerned, the doctrine of Zionism does not affect me. It so happens that the two greatest Jews since Moses were Heinrich Heine and Albert Einstein, both of whom were Germans. I do not know whether they would have been Zionists. The doctrine of Zionism — the return of the Jews to their ancient Jewish homeland — is a matter for the Jewish people them-

*Mr. Fletcher (continued)*

selves to decide. The question of which person constitutes a Jew is, again, a matter for that person himself to decide. The Chancellor of Austria, my good friend Kreisky, chooses not to regard himself as a Jew — but such matters are for the Jewish people themselves.

I am not concerned with Zionism as such, but I am concerned about the debate that preceded that vote in the United Nations. I am concerned about the propaganda of the last few years, allegedly about the rights of Palestinians. I am concerned about what the United Nations Organisation is turning itself into. I owe no allegiance to a General Assembly of barbarians which would give a higher vote to so-called Field-Marshal Amin than to you, Sir, as a civilised representative of the French Government.

This General Assembly was devised by the Americans in moments of naïvety. It has become something totally different from the “town meeting of the world”, as it was described when it was created. By the terms of the debate and the resolution passed after that debate, let every honourable member — we are all Europeans — know that this resolution has overtones. Israel is opposed, despised and detested and made war upon because Israel happens to be an outpost of European civilisation — not only in my opinion but in the opinion of most honourable members.

If we accept the United Nations resolution, it will become a crime to be a European, to live in a relatively affluent society and to enjoy those freedoms of expression and vote of which we all take advantage and by which we are entitled to come to this Assembly. The resolution about Zionism in essence is directed against western civilisation as such. If there are powers in Europe which want to use this mob in the General Assembly, let us be clear in WEU that this rabble is directed against us — not only against Israel but against what we are, everything that we represent and everything that we try to defend.

Therefore, I support Sir John Rodgers and appeal to my misguided labour colleagues to withdraw the amendment. I repeat that I cannot speak as leader of the British Delegation or even as a member of the British Labour Party in making this appeal. I speak as a free citizen of the United Kingdom which, thank God, is still a democracy, and I speak against a General Assembly of barbarians. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Radius.

Mr. RADIUS (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, the recommendation before us differs slightly from the text which I had the honour to table at the opening of the session. In the text proposed by Sir John Rodgers, in fact, I no longer find any mention of the presence in the Middle East of forces from countries outside the area.

Well, the presence of these forces, which is sometimes obtrusive, has the effect of hardening the extreme and irreconcilable attitudes taken up by both of the two opposing sides.

In spite of this, and with a view to reaching the broadest possible unanimity on an issue so vital to Europe's security, I shall support the recommendation in the form proposed by Sir John Rodgers. My support is not solely motivated by the indignation we all feel at the recent United Nations vote on Zionism. It also stems from the concern that many of us feel when we see the situation in the whole Eastern Mediterranean, more especially in Lebanon, progressively deteriorating. That country, with which we have such close affinities for reasons of history, culture and the example of democracy and tolerance which up to only a short time ago it still set for the whole Middle East, is today torn by discord. Europe must assume its responsibilities towards peoples whose destinies it guided with unparalleled success in former days.

Our action in this part of the world must not take the form of fresh domination; it should, on the contrary, aim at establishing a dialogue between equal sovereign partners.

Since it seems to me to answer these requirements, the recommendation which it is proposed we should adopt will receive the widest support from our Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Richter.

Mr. RICHTER (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to make a few remarks about a related subject. But first I must say that I believe that the United Nations vote also affects this Assembly. I was horrified by the fact that a people who, just because they belong to a particular race, have throughout history had to endure unimaginable cruelties and had to make unimaginable sacrifices — something in which my own nation has been greatly involved — should now be suspected of racism.

*Mr. Richter (continued)*

But we also have to observe critically the tragic fact that we should look particularly at how three of our European partners voted — Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. It is known that these countries approved the call to condemn Israel.

I may say that I had talked on this subject here in Paris a few days ago with the Cypriot Foreign Minister and that the phrases he used to start with were not much to my liking. We must consider the present situation, which is a focus of unrest which also greatly concerns this Assembly. Turkey's intervention in Cyprus cost 500,000 Greek Cypriots, 3,800 dead, 2,200 missing and 200,000 refugees. According to a statement of total losses during the war on the island put out by the Makarios government, 120 out of the 500 Greek settlements were also destroyed.

Foreign Minister Christophides justified his vote in the United Nations by, among other things, the present situation on the island and gave me to understand that there are 20,000 unemployed workers on Cyprus and that the Arab countries have gone to much trouble to absorb some of these unemployed Cypriots. I believe that anybody who offers statistics of this sort is putting us all in the wrong. If I consider the services supplied and the efforts made by all our European partners on behalf of Cyprus, I believe that we shall not get anywhere with totting up figures of this kind.

The Turkish Representative deputising for the Foreign Minister in discussions with the Council of Europe joint committee justified his stance in the United Nations' vote exclusively on religious grounds and ties with the Islamic world. It is very difficult to criticise this. Mr. Denktash tabled the corresponding list of Turkish victims at the same time as Archbishop Makarios and stated that between December 1964 and July 1974, 103 Turkish villages were destroyed. He also alleges that during the same period 30,000 Turks were driven out of their homes as refugees and in some cases left the island altogether; this represents a quarter of the Turkish population.

These are matters which profoundly disturb me. I see the danger that the United Nations decision will send out ripples even into our citadel, and I am very glad that my friend Radius by his initiative attempted to stave this off; I therefore support him. For me, the United

nations decision harks back to the unsolved problem of Cyprus.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Sieglerschmidt, Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. SIEGLERSCHMIDT (*Federal Republic of Germany*) (Translation). — Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen, I can well understand that Mr. Radius finds it deplorable that the General Affairs Committee should have deemed it necessary to delete the two sentences mentioned from his draft. I should therefore like to explain rather more clearly to the Assembly why this was done.

Opinions in the Committee were divided on this issue, and the same division would probably have been largely reproduced in the Assembly. There were some members of the Committee who thought that we should explicitly name the countries somewhat obliquely referred to in the draft, or in other words, the powers actually concerned. And then the question naturally arose: who do we really mean? Do we mean only one lot or the others, or are we referring to both?

On these grounds, Mr. Radius, and also because of the short time available for discussion, we left these sentences out, in order to arrive at a recommendation that would be as balanced and harmonious as possible.

Although I have just said the draft recommendation is well-balanced, I should emphasise that in one respect it is quite deliberately unbalanced. I refer to the condemnation of the United Nations resolution on Zionism. I believe, Mr. President, that in this respect it is, for a very good reason, not balanced. I am very glad to think that, in this case, our countries for once voted in unison at the United Nations, and spoke out against the resolution. That action has been widely approved in our countries.

I think, therefore, that I am faithfully reflecting the sense of the discussions in the General Affairs Committee when I observe that the amendment tabled here in no way corresponds with what the majority of the Committee desired, for the amendment would make the recommendation completely lop-sided.

I find it very difficult, Mr. President, not to go into the details of this amendment here, but I shall refrain from doing so in order to avoid bringing additional acrimony to the Assembly's proceedings. Everybody who reads it will, however, realise what can be said on the subject.

*Mr. Sieglerschmidt (continued)*

I should, having said this, like to call upon the Assembly — and I can do so with a good conscience on behalf of the General Affairs Committee as well as myself — to approve the wording adopted by the Committee, and reject the amendment.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Cermolacce.

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, in our opinion the recommendation on the United Nations resolution condemning Zionism as a form of racism runs counter to its avowed aim of maintaining peace throughout the Mediterranean basin. It is, to say the least, inappropriate and out of touch with current reality.

On the very day it was tabled, a “preventive air strike” — to use the words of the Israeli Defence Minister — was carried out on three Palestinian camps, killing dozens and wounding hundreds more, mostly women and children. This was the most murderous Israeli aerial bombardment of Lebanon since 1967. The new feature of this raid was that it was a warning and a challenge in respect of the United Nations Security Council resolution; for a military source quoted by *Agence France-Presse* announced that Israel has decided to take no further notice of appeals from foreign diplomats to refrain, on account of the situation in Lebanon, from operating against the Fedayeen there.

Tuesday’s victims, therefore, do not suffice for such a display of force. Tel Aviv is preparing to launch its bombers against the refugee camps again, while at the same time four new colonies are being installed in Syrian Golan — a further territorial expansion in spite of budding opposition within the Israeli Government itself.

The recommendation before us seeks to tone down the realities of current problems for, while it is true that there now exists an Israeli nation with legitimate rights, it is equally true that this cannot justify its leaders in continuing to flout the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine and of the Arab peoples of the territories conquered by force.

Clearly, inasmuch as this immoral and cynical operation is carried out under the cover of extreme nationalism, it also serves as a basis for racial discrimination.

The future of Israel does not lie in a permanent state of aggressive defiance, but in a just peace

enabling all the peoples of Palestine to be free, sovereign and independent, which, in the first place, signifies that the Palestinians should recover all the rights of which they were dispossessed by violence and terror. That does not mean that we have the slightest intention of falling for the fallacy of “Zionism equals racism”, “racism equals the State of Israel”, which would mean that the State of Israel must be destroyed. No matter how great the anger inspired by the obstinacy of the Tel Aviv government in rejecting outright any negotiations with representatives of the Palestinian people, that would be a disastrous path to follow.

We for our part have always asserted firmly that the State of Israel has the right to exist. What we hope is that the increasingly numerous forces inside Israel opposed to a dangerous and reckless policy will rapidly succeed in winning over public opinion and echo the disapproval of the overwhelming majority of United Nations member countries, thus obliging the leaders of Tel Aviv to put an end to a deliberately expansionist policy and engage in talks with all parties concerned with a view to finding a peaceful solution.

Then and then only will Israel cease to be a fundamental danger to peace in the eyes of most of the world, and the possibility of two fraternal peoples living together on an equal basis in this corner of the world become a reality.

We do not find in this recommendation this necessary step in the right direction. We shall therefore abstain.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — In Document 693 the Committee submits a draft recommendation.

Amendment No. 1 has been tabled by MM. Faulds, Urwin and Lord Darling.

I call Mr. Urwin to move the amendment.

Mr. URWIN (*United Kingdom*). — The amendment is as follows :

1. At the end of the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a paragraph as follows :

“Noting that Israel has consistently failed to comply with UN resolutions requiring her to abandon occupied Arab territories ;”

2. Leave out the second and third paragraphs of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

3. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from “without prejudice” to the end of the paragraph and insert :

*Mr. Urwin (continued)*

"and through contacts with the Council of Europe and the EEC find means of conveying to the Israeli Government the necessity both of withdrawal to the 1967 borders in compliance with UN resolutions and the ending of attacks by its armed forces on the territory and people of Lebanon ;"

With the best intentions, I want to begin on a rather censorial note about the tabling of this motion in the first place — I am not referring to the fact that it was referred to the General Affairs Committee and superimposed over an already prepared agenda.

In a meeting of about thirty minutes, members were denied a reasonable opportunity to get to grips with the fundamental question which was posed for our consideration. It might well have been advantageous to this Assembly and other assemblies in which we are participants if we could have had a full-scale debate on the whole problem of the Middle East, preparatory to the important debate which is to take place in January next under the aegis of the United Nations.

It is in that context that I now address myself to this question and to the amendment, which stands in the name of Mr. Faulds, Lord Darling and myself. Quite frankly, I do not believe that the motion which has been tabled has served any useful purpose at all. It is ill-timed, especially in the light of developments since 10th November last when that disgraceful motion was adopted by the United Nations — and I say "disgraceful" deliberately because I personally disassociate myself from its terms ; let there be no misunderstanding about that.

It was sheer hypocrisy on the part of some delegations represented there to use the kind of terminology that was used during that session. I unhesitatingly associate myself with the attitude of the representatives of the British Government and so many others who in turn have refused to support the motion.

Events move very rapidly and the overriding concern of some of us is over the continuing difficult situation in the Middle East, this seething cauldron of political activity and hostility which unfortunately so frequently bubbles over and creates further problems for so many people in that difficult area of the world. I have always tried to address myself constructively to those problems and to participate in discussions the

basis of which is finally to seek a solution which is acceptable to all concerned.

We have been overtaken by events. Even as recently as last Sunday in the United Nations a quite important decision was taken relating to the mandate on the Golan heights and the representation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation at the forthcoming conference. I do not want to open up the whole discussion, for I have said that I consider it inappropriate at this time for this Assembly to be debating the question. But these are important developments and their importance is even more heavily underlined by the support given them by United States Representatives at the United Nations.

I would at this stage express a fervent hope that the Middle East debate to be held in January, comprehensively embracing, as it is intended to, those United Nations resolutions which include guarantees of territorial inviolability for all Middle East States, will prove to be highly productive and that we shall finally — and it is about time — begin to see ourselves launched upon a process of consideration which will bring the result which I am sure we all desire.

I find myself in some difficulty, however, as one of the three signatories to this amendment, because I am the only delegate of the three who is present here today, able and willing to speak to the amendment. However, in the light of what I have said, and not because of anything that has been said during this short debate — and I wish to make that abundantly clear — but rather because I feel that further discussion would to some extent be prejudicial to the debate which is to take place in the United Nations in a few short weeks, I seek the indulgence of the Assembly by asking leave to withdraw the amendment. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you, Mr. Urwin. I agree that, for the sake of good order, the amendment must be judged not directly relevant to the resolution ; they are about two different things. Since you are withdrawing your amendment we can resume the debate on another basis.

I call Mr. Piket.

Mr. PIKET (*Netherlands*) (Translation). — I want to begin, Mr. President, by stressing the title given to the draft recommendation : it says clearly that it relates to the resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.

I think we are touching here on the root of the debate we are to have here today. Zionism is,

*Mr. Piket (continued)*

everywhere in the Netherlands and Western Europe, a subject of great esteem. We were all very glad when, after the second world war, Israel had the chance to build its own State and thus to work for the welfare of all men who seek to live in peace.

I am, therefore, specially pleased at the initiative taken by Sir John Rodgers in submitting this recommendation.

I can support this whole-heartedly. It was, however, regrettable to find an amendment put forward by Mr. Faulds, Mr. Urwin and others; I am glad that this has now been withdrawn, and I will say no more about it.

I am glad, too, Mr. President, that we are now getting the opportunity to speak out against this resolution from the United Nations General Assembly, which has made such a deep impression everywhere. This is true of the whole western world, and especially of the Netherlands where many people have been disappointed and filled with indignation. I hope that the initiative to set aside this resolution will come from the free western world, from our countries. It is entirely fallacious to equate Zionism with racism. Quite the opposite, Zionism is a form of freedom and of peace. (*Applause*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall take the vote on the draft recommendation together with the other votes due to be taken at 5.30 p.m.

### **5. Air forces on the central front**

*(Presentation of and Debate on the Report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, Doc. 690)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The next Order of the Day is the presentation of and debate on the report of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments on air forces on the central front and vote on the draft recommendation, Document 690.

I call Mr. Roper, Rapporteur of the Committee.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — It is with considerable pleasure to me, Mr. President, that it is under your Presidency that I present this report. It is my regret that it is likely to be the last debate of the Assembly in which I shall take part.

The report may be thought by many to be rather technical and the sort of report which in this Assembly sometimes gets consigned to debates on Friday mornings. Fortunately, other business has moved rather faster than we imagined and instead of being a Friday morning debate it has an appropriate place on Thursday afternoon.

It is, I believe, an important practical application of the theory of allied co-operation and integration about which we talked so much in this Assembly.

The study on the co-operation between the allied air forces in Central Europe is based upon a number of earlier studies and particularly on the briefing which the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments received in November last year at the Central Army Group Headquarters in Mannheim when we realised that there were serious problems existing in the co-ordination of air power in Central Europe.

We were concerned that our governments were misusing their resources because of a failure to co-operate as adequately as we should. We were worried that traditional national attitudes were on occasion preventing the most effective use of the resources that we were devoting to tactical air power.

This seemed to us to be a particularly serious matter because at a time when we were not using our resources as effectively as we should be, we saw that there was a very considerable increase in the air power of the Warsaw Pact in terms both of quantity and of quality.

The report which I have the honour to put before the Assembly is neither intended to be over-alarmist about the problems of the allied air forces in Europe, nor, I hope, is it over-complacent. It has evolved during its preparation — and it was completed, alas, just before the Assembly and is therefore not in print but in duplicated form — because its preparation has paralleled important developments within the command structures of the allied air forces in Central Europe.

We have seen during the period while the report has been prepared the effective implementation of the decisions of the NATO Council and the development of the new command structure under the Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe at present based in Ramstein in the Federal Republic. I believe, as I hope to show, that this will provide a basis for the more effective use of our tactical air power

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

in Central Europe. The creation of the AAFCE Command at Ramstein is the ultimate step in a long history of attempts at co-ordinating allied air power in Central Europe.

When the Headquarters of the Allied Forces in Central Europe was first established in Fontainebleau in the early 1950s, it then comprised three separate subordinate service commands. At that time, there was an air officer commanding Central Europe who was an RAF officer. However, when the transfer took place from the command at Fontainebleau to the AFCENT Headquarters at Brunssum, there was a streamlining of the structure. Instead of there being three subordinate commands being responsible for the three services, they were abolished and the Commander-in-Chief in Central Europe — CINCENT — acquired instead a Deputy CINCENT who was by tradition an air force officer and I believe has all the time been a British RAF officer.

Underneath that structure — and this is illustrated in the diagram — were two allied tactical air forces, the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force in the northern part of the central front and the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force in the southern part of the central front. Except for one short period in the mid-sixties when it was commanded by a Belgian general, 2nd ATAF has always been commanded by an RAF officer and 4th ATAF until recently has been commanded all the time by a United States air force officer, mainly because the aircraft in 2nd ATAF initiated largely from the RAF although, of course, there were inputs from the Netherlands, Belgium and the Federal Republic, and the aircraft in 4th ATAF came largely from the United States. But it was certainly the case that the Luftwaffe, split between the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force in the north and the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force in the south, found its squadrons, at least initially, trained and equipped in two divergent manners under the guidance of the RAF in the north and the United States air force in the south.

From what we have seen, we have discovered that not only were there differences in uniform but there were also differences in operating philosophies which fed back into the staff requirements for the sort of aircraft and equipment that were required.

The 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force has tended to rely heavily on individual pilot navigation

with the possible use of forward air controllers in the last stages of ground support missions and 2nd ATAF pilots are therefore likely to acquire familiarity with the terrain of their areas through long-term training. They tend to fly low.

On the other hand, the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force, 4th ATAF, has placed much more reliance on continuous ground control of its sorties, a procedure offering advantages in particular for pilots who were rotated frequently from the United States and therefore less familiar with the local terrain.

There has, therefore, been a problem with differences of philosophy and differences of equipment. We were concerned that in the air space of the central front, which was adjacent and which one could not divide in the same way that one can divide the land battle, this would not bring about the most effective use of our resources. We were therefore very pleased to see that the creation of the new structure under the Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe based in Ramstein will give a new co-ordination, because he will be able to allot squadrons from the two allied tactical air forces for operations throughout the whole of the central front.

This will mean that for some missions where low flying is required, aircraft from 2nd ATAF will be used, and where higher flying aircraft may be needed, 4th ATAF may be selected.

The new command structure introduced will take some time to settle down and there is not yet a full understanding of its operations at all levels in the air forces in Central Europe. Nonetheless, it produces at the level of the Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe a central command structure function which will channel intelligence downwards and in the light of the overall situation move squadrons between the two ATAFs.

At the level of the allied tactical air forces, responsibility remains for co-ordination with the land forces of the Northern and Central Army Groups and allocating particular tasks. Below this again — the diagram on the fifth page of the report makes this clear — the tactical operational commands, which will be primarily national, deal directly with the squadrons. It is clear that although this level of command is primarily national, such commands should have an international element reflecting the nationality of the squadrons most likely to be controlled by them.

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

Overall, from what I have been able to see, the new structure appears to provide a much more coherent framework for the air effort on the Central Europe front, but it will be necessary for the Military Committee of NATO to keep its operational effectiveness under review and to make changes as necessary in the light of experience.

In spite of the new command structure, a number of very serious problems remain. I outline some of these in the latter part of the report. From paragraph 24 onwards, I deal with the question of interoperability. One of the most serious problems affecting allied air operations on the central front is the lack of capability to operate between airfields operated by units of different nationalities in the same ATAF or between the 2nd and 4th Allied Tactical Air Forces.

In part, of course, this is due to the differences in tactical doctrine, to which I have referred, but there is also the considerable lack of standardisation among the aircraft in service among the allied air forces in Central Europe. In the Appendix, I identify twenty different variants of aircraft in service at present in tactical air forces in Central Europe, for only four principal rôles. No fewer than six different types are operated by the RAF alone, and unfortunately, even when we occasionally procure what would appear to be the same aircraft, this has not always led to standardisation. The Phantom FGR-2 operated by the RAF has a British engine and therefore cannot be serviced on the same airfield as the Phantom F-4F, which is in service with the Luftwaffe.

This lack of standardisation among aircraft enormously restricts their ability to operate into or out of airfields other than those assigned to squadrons of the same nationality or accommodating aircraft of the same type. Although we were told that a great deal has been done to make available supplies of air and oxygen and fuel, there are considerable gaps in the ability to rearm aircraft in strange airfields. It may be all right in peacetime to have a "get you home" capability, so that when an aircraft lands in a strange airfield, it can get back to its home airfield, but in war one needs a "get you back in the fight", a rearming capability, and that does not exist among the allied air forces in Central Europe at the moment.

As has been said, tactical air forces should be able to concentrate wherever the major attack

or breakthrough occurs. The Warsaw Pact air forces have that capability through standardisation. Allied tactical forces do not. Logistically, it is not possible. One gives examples about the fact that there are different aircraft munitions and different auxiliary power units and therefore not yet a standardised one throughout NATO.

This morning, we discussed a controversial and difficult issue, which is obviously related to the future of the co-ordination of the allied tactical air power in Central Europe — the acquisition of the AWACS aircraft — arising from the report by Mr. Warren. In paragraph 30 onwards, I outline the problems associated with that decision — a decision which is being considered at the moment at a tactical level in Brussels but which will be considered at a political level before the decision is finally made next May.

This is a very difficult decision. Although the availability of AWACS would obviously make the allied tactical air forces considerably more effective, at the moment, given the difficulties which all our countries have with their defence budgets, the additional expenditure of the considerable sums listed in paragraph 34, which is what would be involved, will be difficult to find. As I suggested this morning, the problem is more difficult in terms of this procurement exercise than in almost any other. Whereas, in the procurement of an aircraft produced in Europe, we could have research and development over a period and then the production costs, in the case of the acquisition of the AWACS aircraft, there would be a considerable consolidation of the expenditure over a few years while the aircraft were acquired.

When I say that the costs to the United Kingdom would be an additional £120 million on the defence budget spread over two years, members will realise that this is a decision that Ministers will find it difficult to take. From my conversations with people during my visit, I learned that although AWACS would be desirable, airmen would be sorry to see it acquired at the cost of maintaining the air forces which were in existence. Although some people suggested that it would make air forces two or three times more effective, they were frightened that perhaps the acquisition of AWACS meant that people would cut the number of air forces by half or a third. That would be a mistake, and this shows the difficulty.

I discuss in paragraphs 40 and 41 the question whether the future generation of aircraft coming into service will help in standardisation. Of

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

course we have some successes. When we complain about the lack of co-operation and co-ordination we should not overlook them. The Anglo-French Jaguar is a considerable success and is of course now in service with the RAF, with its dual capability nuclear-conventional, attack-support rôle and is in service with the French tactical air force as well. Unfortunately, although it is the same aircraft, it has a navigational attack system which is different in the RAF from that which it has in the French air force, which is a pity.

Second, we shall have, from the end of next year, the French-German Alpha Jet coming into service with the German air force and subsequently with the French. Third, there is the MRCA, about which production decisions will be taken shortly.

I refer also to the decision by Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway to acquire a single replacement aircraft. The Committee as a whole was glad that they had chosen the same aircraft, which led to standardisation, but the Committee regretted that it had not been possible for us in Europe to design and produce an aircraft to meet the requirements of the air staffs of those countries.

Towards the end of my report I refer to the negotiations now taking place in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions and the suggestion that theatre nuclear weapons should be included in the package that is being discussed there. We can discuss that matter elsewhere, but strong representations were made to the effect that if the number of warheads were reduced, it should not be linked to a reduction in air delivery systems. The suggestion that some of the aircraft squadrons that will deliver nuclear weapons should also be removed would mean a serious weakening of allied air power on the central front.

On my visits to various headquarters I was very impressed by the work of the French liaison officers to various NATO commands in this area. I regard this as practical day-to-day co-operation. Having said that — and I speak as a layman not as an airman — I believe that there are problems arising from the fact that new generations of French airmen do not have immediate familiarity with the procedural arrangements in operation on the central front. There are always difficulties in air space management;

there is always the risk that one's short-range air defence — SHORAD — will be more successful in shooting down one's own aircraft than enemy aircraft.

Therefore, full participation in exercises, even if it does not extend initially to integration outside the exercise periods, is surely in the interest of the French air force. The safe operation of aircraft in time of war depends upon repeated practice in peacetime in co-operation with those who are defending the air space over which one would have to fly in time of war.

*(Sir John Rodgers, Vice-President of the Assembly, took the Chair in place of Mr. Nessler)*

I hope that this matter will be further examined because it is in the interests of all in this Assembly, and indeed of all in Western Europe. There was considerable evidence of a lack of integration between allied air forces in Central Europe a year ago. I believe that there has been a considerable improvement since then, but there is a great deal more to be done. We must ask ourselves whether there are lessons to be learned from what has been done in Central Europe by the new reorganised command — lessons that could be applied elsewhere in the Alliance. I hope that that matter will be further studied in future.

If our conclusions are more optimistic than those we thought we would be able to make when we began our study a year ago, this must give us considerable pleasure because it shows that we are beginning more effectively to practise what we preach. *(Applause)*

*(Mr. Nessler, President of the Assembly, resumed the Chair)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Warren to speak in the debate.

Mr. WARREN (*United Kingdom*). — I should like to say how sorry I am that John Roper will be leaving us, and how much I deplore his party's rule in the United Kingdom Parliament that a member shall not remain with us for more than three years. We cannot afford to lose men like John Roper from our deliberations. Mr. Roper's report was clear evidence of the capability he has brought to WEU and I wish that there were a mechanism by which we could ensure that such members could stay with us.

The report clearly shows that whereas the Russians talk of peace, they plan, through overwhelming force, to bring war if it suits them. When we look at the details of Mr. Roper's

*Mr. Warren (continued)*

stark report, we realise how lucky we are not to have been attacked yet. When I look at the position of France within the defence of Western Europe I become very worried.

Paragraph 13 of the report says :

"The French air defence command and tactical air force, if available, could add a further 460 aircraft."

Paragraph 17 of the report says :

"However, if agreement could be reached with France for only half a dozen of these airfields to be available..."

I am happy within the freedom of the western world that people should be allowed to decide what they want to do, but when we are faced with such overwhelming force as stands against us from the East, I would have hoped that by now our dear French friends could have found the way to agree in time of emergency that their forces would definitely be on our side and available to support the defence of the West. It is illogical that we should have a situation where, at moments of crisis, there should still be doubt.

Within the defence of NATO is the defence of France. Surely France must now be prepared to join us as a united organisation. When we find French airmen, very skilled staff — men flying superb aircraft, particularly those made by Marcel Dassault, a man for whom I have the greatest admiration, and probably the finest builder of fighter aircraft in the world — hindered by the inability to collaborate because of their lack of experience of unified western defence, this is not only a pity but a disaster. It is not fair on those airmen that they should be denied the ability to defend their own homes within the structure of NATO, to whose counsels they will always be welcome.

It is no use saying that France is still a member of NATO. We must look at what will happen in the stark reality of an attack. I do not believe that France is doing justice to her own gallant airmen or to her other forces by leaving them outside the formal structure which exists to defend the French people in a way they must demand in terms of their own protection.

I wish to turn to the question of standardisation, about which I spoke this morning. In paragraph 28 of the report Mr. Roper draws attention to a matter that is so incredible that if it did not appear on the printed page perhaps

we would not believe it. The passage to which I refer reads as follows :

"While aviation fuel has been standardised throughout NATO, the nozzles and rapid-fuelling equipment have not."

We are all familiar with the story of the Battle of Britain. The reality of that battle was that aircraft of any type could land on any airfield in Britain and be put back in the air in a matter of minutes. It would be extraordinary if we were to find ourselves in a position where, in an air battle over Western Europe, it was impossible for aircraft to refuel other than at the base from which they had taken off. The reality of air warfare, as the Egyptians and Israelis well know, is one in which there must be a flexibility that NATO does not possess. We do not seem to be learning from the realities of warfare — warfare not in the 1940s, as in the Battle of Britain, but in the reality of what is happening in the 1970s.

When I examine the recommendation put forward by Mr. Roper, I must inform him that he should accept the danger of my abstaining in any vote because I cannot accept a recommendation which in the longer term calls for the establishment of an integrated logistics system. I know what Mr. Roper means by that phrase, but "in the longer term" is too far away. If we aim at the short term, it will probably happen in the longer term, if the Assembly understands what I mean. But if we use the phrase in the longer term, I fear that it will just not happen until Mr. Roper comes back to WEU for another tour of duty in his old age.

Mr. Roper has drawn our attention to the fact that there are twenty-four different types of combat aircraft in NATO. I talked this morning to a very well-informed air marshal who told me that not all standardisation was a good thing: the Warsaw Pact countries might well be confused since they would never know exactly what was coming at them. Although there is a lot of truth in this, particularly in terms of electronic counter-measures, I do not accept that the addition of more variants to the twenty-four is necessarily a good thing. I would hate to criticise our friends from Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Norway on their choice of the F-16 aircraft, but they have added yet one more aeroplane to the inventory and it is one which, interestingly enough, cannot survive without the Boeing E-3A AWACS aircraft as its mother ship.

*Mr. Warren (continued)*

I may be disclosing some great State secret when I say that Mr. Roper's report is an invaluable document which will be of great benefit to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet for the considerable amount of detailed information it contains.

Here, then, we have this extraordinary commitment to an American aircraft, a long way from repair bases and costing 50 % above that which it would cost direct from the United States, in order that the Belgian and Dutch aircraft companies can be employed, and at a price — and this will cause our French friends considerable distress — greater than the French offered on the Mirage F-1E. That is the price the Dutch are now prepared to pay. They are finding themselves with an aircraft which is not only supplied from a source outside Europe but which entails a commitment for which they must now vote — this Boeing E-3A AWACS aircraft.

I often wonder whose side we are on when it comes to the decisions which we as politicians make. One might think that we were being suborned by the Russians.

However, the question of AWACS has returned, as it rightly should, and Mr. Roper has spoken in terms for the United Kingdom of £120 million. I am told that we need eight of these aircraft in the United Kingdom which, at \$50 million apiece, would amount to \$400 million. I do not think he and I would dispute whether it is £120 million or \$400 million. It is a lot more than we need to pay.

What worries me is the kind of salesmanship we are now getting from the United States. The F-16 was chosen not because it fulfilled NATO's rules. It does not. It does not meet the prime rôle assigned to Holland for that country's defence within NATO and nobody has ever claimed that it does, certainly not the Americans. But it seems that the F-16 was chosen because it was the result of a competition. The essential thing about what went on during the early part of this year was that it was a competition where the winner bought an aeroplane. In this case the winners were the four nations, and they bought the F-16. In the case of the AWACS aircraft we are faced with exactly the same situation. Again it is a competition, and the winner picks the only one available, apparently because it is the only one allowed within the terms of reference.

We must stop this sort of political nonsense. We cannot accept that a war will start tomorrow. We are being sold the E-3A from Boeing on the grounds that we must take a decision by 1978 and that in order to have it by then we have to decide within three months how we are to spend \$1,500 million. The pressure which is on us to make a decision is not that of imminent war. We must stop accepting salesmanship as a reason for carrying out some political action.

I am delighted to feel that war is something which will not come to us for a good many years. The Russians face the terrible danger that they may not win and they dare not launch such a war, particularly when their own programme of subversion is working so well within our separate nations. In the meantime, while we talk about these things, could we not try to do that which Mr. Roper sets out to teach us — get together and act as if we were one nation in Europe? *(Applause)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — As there are no further speakers, I call Mr. Roper.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*) (Translation). — I think that Mr. de Montesquiou wishes to speak.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I had not noticed. I call Mr. de Montesquiou.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — I thank the Rapporteur for his courtesy and the President for his very liberal attitude. I merely wanted to explain my vote.

I very much regret that Mr. Roper is leaving us, for he provided an element of permanent, but intelligent opposition, which made us use our "grey matter". I just wanted to say that, as his speech, to my great regret, basically deals with integrated defence only, it is no concern of France and I shall therefore be obliged to abstain.

But as I have the floor, I would like to pay tribute to Mr. Warren, who acknowledged the merits of the French originators; he is a splendid person to have as a member of the Committee of which I am Chairman.

That is all I wanted to say, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I thank the Chairman of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

I call the Rapporteur.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I am grateful to Mr. Warren and Mr. de Montesquiou for their kind words. I also regret that this is my last Assembly.

*Mr. Roper (continued)*

As far as co-operation with France is concerned, I made it very clear in my report that perhaps the two greatest successes of recent years had been the Jaguar and the Alpha Jet. In practice, co-operation exists; when we talk about theory we sometimes forget the practice. The Jaguar is one of the finest aircraft now flying in the central front. The fact that it is also flying in the French air force is something about which we can be very pleased. When the Alpha Jet comes into squadron service in the Federal Republic and the French air force, it will also be extremely useful and it is very helpful that we have the same aircraft in service in two neighbouring, allied air forces.

Nonetheless, I would agree with Mr. Warren that the existence of liaison officers with NATO commands, however active they are, is only a first step, and I very much hope that, little by little, in practice, co-operation will develop and that when the Assembly discusses this in a year or two's time it will find that the problems have diminished as some of the other problems in the central front have tended to diminish in the past year. We should look forward to progress.

I agree with Mr. Warren's comment on nozzles and rapid-fuelling equipment, although I must say that whenever I put this to members of staff of the air forces they tell me that it is remarkable what can be done with lanyards.

Integrated logistics are obviously of importance, but unfortunately at the present time in NATO logistics are a national responsibility. We ought to move over as soon as possible to integration. It was only because we have not yet reached the decision at the level of the Alliance to make them an integrated responsibility that I thought I should make some reference to the longer rather than the shorter term. Certainly I consider them as urgent, as does Mr. Warren. I agree that if we wish to confuse the Warsaw Pact there are better ways of doing it than by having twenty different types of aircraft.

With regard to his argument on the F-16 and AWACS, I do not think that he should be fooled by the sales arguments either. We must be very careful about some of the stories which we shall hear over the next few months about the AWACS. There will be enormous pressure to buy it just as there was on the American Congress to agree to its purchase. Although it has

considerable advantages, we must remember that it is yet one more aircraft and that it, too, can be shot down in certain circumstances. This is, therefore, a matter which needs a great deal of further study.

It is important that we have had this discussion today and that there is continuing discussion in national parliaments as well as with technicians and politicians in Brussels and NATO.

I hope that, apart from the remarks made by Mr. de Montesquiou, the Assembly will be able to adopt this report without a dissenting vote if not unanimously. I thank my colleagues for having made it possible for me to carry out the study on which the recommendation has been based.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call the Chairman of the Committee.

Mr. CRITCHLEY (*United Kingdom*). — I, too, would like to say goodbye to John Roper, who will be missed not only by this Assembly but by all the better restaurants of Paris. He is a rare bird in that he is a defence expert within the British Labour Party, and we shall miss him all the more for that.

It is an excellent report. I was especially interested in the AWACS part of it because clearly this will be of increasing importance and interest, and although NATO is supposedly to take a decision next May, I have a nasty suspicion that that will be postponed indefinitely, which means that we may be in a position in a year's time to return to the whole AWACS problem and to debate it further.

I say that because only three functions are given for AWACS in this paper: early warning, the defensive mission and the offensive mission. I understand that it has the capability to distinguish at long range armour moving up on roads and the number of airplanes on airfields. If this is true, it could provide the kind of surveillance and inspection which would be essential for the West if any arrangement or agreement were to come out of the mutual balanced force reduction talks. Clearly the warning rôle in AWACS might well be its most important. Quite clearly, all aircraft are vulnerable to interception and attack but not even the most simple politician could disregard the warning element in the destruction of one of these aircraft.

While I am sympathetic with the idea of AWACS I am not committing myself to one or

*Mr. Critchley (continued)*

the other, although I have my doubts whether there is a European alternative to this system. I wish there were. Once again we have begun too late, and the advantages of the present system would seem to be overwhelming. Perhaps Europe ought now to be thinking about a successor to the AWACS and pooling our research and development and production facilities to substitute a particular system for it, perhaps in the 1980s or the year 2000. It is that kind of time scale.

Those are all the remarks I have to make save to bid farewell to John Roper and to thank him for an excellent report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The debate is closed.

As agreed, the votes will be taken together at 5.30 p.m.

I suspend the sitting.

*(The Sitting was suspended at 4.35 p.m. and resumed at 5.20 p.m.)*

The sitting is resumed.

### **6. Message from the Greek observers**

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — My dear colleagues, I hope you will please forgive me for slightly upsetting the time-table, but I have had a message which the Greek observers have asked me to pass on to the Assembly. I will read it out:

“Mr. President,

The Greek Delegation, composed of the Deputies, Mr. G. Apostolatos and Mr. A. Sechiotis, in their capacity as observers at the present session of the Assembly of Western European Union:

(a) Thanks the President of the Assembly for his kind invitation and wishes to convey the greetings of Mr. C. Papaconstantinou, the President of the Greek Parliament.

(b) Expresses its deep gratification at being present in this hall, and thus being afforded the opportunity of following such important discussions on problems of special interest to Europe.

(c) Confirms the desire of the vast majority of Greek parliamentarians, interpreting the feelings of the Greek people, that a united

and democratic Europe should be built. Democratic ideals, human rights and social justice constitute the aims of the European peoples.

(d) Expresses the hope that concertation and co-operation among the European peoples will lead to the formation of an independent Europe, a factor for peace and security in the world at large.

(e) Declares that Greece, as an integral part of Europe, both historically and culturally, looks towards the Common Market as the first step on the road to unification of the continent and rejoices at the welcome given by the member States to its application for membership of the Community.

(f) Affirms our country's hope that both the European governments and the honourable members of this Assembly will not fail to contribute towards finding a just solution to the Cyprus problem, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, since its solution would constitute a basic factor in the peace and security of the whole European continent.

(g) Availing itself of this opportunity, conveys its warm thanks, through your good offices, to all members of the European parliaments for their assistance in the Greek people's struggle to restore democratic freedoms in our country. It is, moreover, because of the recent bitter experiences of our people that the Greek Delegation supports all practical efforts, from whatever quarter they may come, to come to the aid of those European peoples who are also, at this moment, struggling to re-establish free and democratic régimes in their territories.”

That is the text of this message, which I am sure we all appreciate very highly. We salute the Greek observers once again for their presence here and for the intentions they convey in this message. *(Loud applause)*

The next Order of the Day is the votes on all the outstanding matters on which the Assembly has not yet reached decisions.

### **7. United States-European co-operation in advanced technology**

*(Votes on the draft Recommendation and on the draft Resolution, Doc. 687)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now vote on the draft recommendation on United

*The President (continued)*

States-European co-operation in advanced technology and on the draft resolution on setting up a European technology assessment body, Document 687.

There are no amendments.

The Assembly will therefore vote on the text in Document 687, which was the subject of our debate on Tuesday afternoon, 2nd December 1975.

Rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure require the vote on a draft recommendation taken as a whole to be by roll-call, the majority required being an absolute majority of the votes cast. However, if the Assembly is unanimous and there are no objections to the draft recommendation and no abstentions, we can save the time needed for a vote by roll-call.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation in Document 687 ?...

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — I object.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The vote will therefore be by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Roper.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows <sup>1</sup> :

Number of votes cast . . . .	61
Ayes . . . . .	55
Noes . . . . .	4
Abstentions . . . . .	2

*The draft recommendation is therefore adopted* <sup>2</sup>.

I now put to the vote the draft resolution in Document 687 on setting up a European technology assessment body.

Are there any objections ?...

*The draft resolution is agreed to* <sup>3</sup>.

1. See page 41.  
2. See page 46.  
3. See page 47.

**8. Conference on security and co-operation in Europe**

*(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 683)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now vote on the amended draft recommendation on the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, Document 683.

The Assembly will vote on the draft recommendation as amended on Tuesday afternoon, 2nd December.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation in Document 683, as amended ?...

There are no objections.

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously* <sup>1</sup>.

**9. Second-generation nuclear reactors**

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 686)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now vote on the draft recommendation on second-generation nuclear reactors, Document 686.

No amendments have been tabled. The Assembly will therefore vote on the text contained in Document 686, which was debated yesterday morning, 3rd December.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation in Document 686 ?...

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — I object.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The vote will therefore be by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Roper.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

1. See page 48.

*The President (continued)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows<sup>1</sup> :

Number of votes cast . . . .	61
Ayes . . . . .	58
Noes . . . . .	1
Abstentions . . . . .	2

*The draft recommendation is therefore adopted*<sup>2</sup>.

### 10. Developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance

*(Votes on the amended draft Recommendation and on the draft Resolution, Doc. 682 and Addendum)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now vote on the amended draft recommendation on developments in the Iberian peninsula and the Atlantic Alliance, Document 682.

The Assembly will vote on the draft recommendation as amended on Wednesday afternoon, 3rd December.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation in Document 682, as amended ?...

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — I request the floor.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. Valleix.

Mr. VALLEIX (*France*) (Translation). — The report submitted by Mr. Critchley appeared to me and some of my friends ill-judged, in that it seems to convey a hasty interpretation of the situation in the Iberian peninsula.

It hints that Portugal is a pluralist democracy. Full support is given to the present government, although the country is wavering between anarchy and authoritarianism and we have, unfortunately, no means of foreseeing what the government in whose favour we are speaking today will be ; we fear there is a certain frivolity

1. See page 42.

2. See page 49.

about this which might not redound to the credit of the Assembly.

Spain, on the other hand, is considered as a totalitarian country at the very time when it seems to be moving towards democracy.

The recommendation therefore does not in our view reflect the counsels of caution given by the Rapporteur himself and, quite deliberately, I think, by several members who took part in the debate.

The recommendation would also appear to be inconsistent. It emanates from this Assembly, which is a body of WEU, but is in fact addressed to the European Economic Community and NATO. It utterly ignores the part which WEU could play in working out a joint European policy towards the Iberian peninsula. Only NATO and the European Economic Community are considered to be the institutions that will enable the countries of Europe to "retain their freedom". Would WEU have no part to play in this respect ?

A third point is, I think, open to criticism. It is suggested that political advisers should assist NATO commanders. Such a proposal is all the more surprising in that it concerns only six of the seven WEU member States, since France does not participate in the integrated military organisation. Is WEU competent to adopt a recommendation which does not concern all its member States but only some of them ?

As regards the substance of the proposal for creating special NATO political advisers, it cannot be denied that this would extend to the political field the exclusively military responsibilities entrusted to the integrated organisation. This appears to be a move in a dangerous direction and might lead to interference in the internal affairs of States.

For these three reasons, the French Representatives to WEU have decided to vote against the recommendation tabled by Mr. Critchley.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I call Mr. de Montesquiou.

Mr. de MONTESQUIOU (*France*) (Translation). — The vote on the resolution in the addendum to the draft report was postponed to this afternoon.

The addendum reads as follows :

"Noting the accession of H.M. King Juan Carlos of Spain".

It was not put to the vote yesterday.

*Mr. de Montesquiou (continued)*

I personally think it is not incumbent on us to declare ourselves in favour of any Head of State; it is a rule we have followed since the inception of WEU. I would ask Mr. Critchley to find another wording which might satisfy us, but without naming the King. But I, personally, shall not vote for the addendum.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall vote first on the draft recommendation.

The vote will be taken by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Roper.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows <sup>1</sup> :

Number of votes cast . . . .	59
Ayes . . . . .	46
Noes . . . . .	8
Abstentions . . . . .	5

*The draft recommendation is therefore adopted <sup>2</sup>.*

There is no amendment to the resolution in the addendum to Document 682.

I therefore put the resolution to the vote by sitting and standing.

*(A vote was then taken by sitting and standing)*

*The resolution is adopted <sup>3</sup>.*

### **11. The International Institute for the Management of Technology**

*(Vote on the amended draft Recommendation, Doc. 685)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now vote on the amended draft recommendation on the International Institute for the Management of Technology, Document 685.

1. See page 43.

2. See page 50.

3. See page 51.

The Assembly will vote on the draft recommendation as amended yesterday morning, 3rd December 1975.

The vote on the draft recommendation taken as a whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

Are there any objections to the amended draft recommendation ?...

Are there any abstentions ?...

I note that the Assembly is unanimous.

*The amended draft recommendation is adopted unanimously <sup>1</sup>.*

### **12. Northern European countries and the prospect of European political union**

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 684)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now vote on the draft recommendation on Northern European countries and the prospect of European political union, Document 684.

There are no amendments.

The Assembly will therefore vote on the text in Document 684 which was debated yesterday afternoon, 3rd December 1975.

The vote on the draft recommendation taken as a whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation ?...

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — I abstain.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I note that the Assembly is unanimous except for one abstention, which will be recorded in the Minutes — this is a breach of the rules !

*The draft recommendation is adopted unanimously with one abstention <sup>2</sup>.*

### **13. European and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments**

*(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 689)*

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now vote on the draft recommendation on Euro-

1. See page 52.

2. See page 53.

*The President (continued)*

pean and Atlantic co-operation in the field of armaments, Document 689.

There are no amendments.

The vote on the draft recommendation taken as a whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

I call Mr. Rivière.

Mr. RIVIERE (*France*) (Translation). — Mr. President, I rise to speak this evening in explanation of my vote.

France is a partner of proven worth, dependable and mindful of the properly understood interests of the defence of an independent Europe within the framework of Western European Union, of which it is a member.

Contrary to the outrageous accusation levelled by Mr. Critchley at Mr. Jobert — and, I emphasise, I use the same language as he himself used this morning — the France of today has the same feelings as the France of yesterday about its participation in WEU.

Mr. Lemmrich's report emphasises that armaments must be produced on the basis of needs and specifications laid down by NATO. In view of the preponderant influence at present exerted by the United States within NATO, that amounts to letting American strategic choices dictate the principles and priorities of a European policy for co-operation in armaments.

It may be thought, to the contrary, that it is necessary to promote a specifically European concept of the defence of our continent, both in strategic matters and in armaments production. The organisation best fitted to make this effort towards unification of European defence policies seems to be WEU, in other words, the organisation to which we all belong under the Brussels Treaty, to the exclusion of any other subsidiary organisation which might not be to everybody's liking. For this reason, therefore, as well as the substantive reason that would justify Amendment No. 1, which was defeated just now, the majority of the French Representatives will, to their great regret, be obliged to vote against Mr. Lemmrich's report.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now vote by roll-call.

The roll-call will begin with the name of Mr. Roper.

The voting is open.

(*A vote by roll-call was then taken*)

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows<sup>1</sup> :

Number of votes cast . . . .	59
Ayes . . . . .	43
Noes . . . . .	11
Abstentions . . . . .	5

*The draft recommendation is therefore adopted<sup>2</sup>.*

**14. Resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975**

(*Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 693*)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now vote on the draft recommendation on the resolution on Zionism adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10th November 1975.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

Are there any objections to the draft recommendation ?..

Mr. CERMOLACCE (*France*) (Translation). — I request the Assembly to take formal note of the statement I made regarding my abstention in the course of my speech.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — The Assembly takes formal note of your statement.

Am I to take it there are no objections ?..

Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY (*United Kingdom*). — Abstention.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Lord Beaumont announces that he, too, is abstaining. As in the case of Mr. Cermolacce, we take formal note of his remarks.

We may consider that the Assembly agrees to the recommendation, formal note being taken of these statements.

I call Mr. Roper.

1. See page 44.

2. See page 54.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — On a point of order. I realise that it will be for the convenience of the Assembly in future if it follows the procedure you suggest. Nevertheless this represents a change in the Rules of Procedure of this Assembly. As I understand it, the rules make it quite clear that the vote must be by roll-call unless there is unanimity. If the Assembly's record makes it clear that Mr. Cermolacce and Lord Beaumont have abstained there is clearly not unanimity and there must be a roll-call vote unless we decide to change the rules.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Thank you for reminding me of the Rules of Procedure, of which we are well aware, Mr. Roper. It was to expedite matters, since we know in advance what the result of this vote is going to be, that we agreed to take formal note of the statements made by the members who announced in advance the attitude they were going to take, to avoid having to take a roll-call vote. If you insist that a roll-call vote be taken, I am perfectly prepared to go along with you and apply the Rules of Procedure strictly.

Mr. ROPER (*United Kingdom*). — I do not wish to insist on a roll-call vote. All I wish is to have it on record that you are changing the rules of this Assembly.

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — I formally acknowledge that it does amount to a change in normal procedure.

Subject to the reservations we have just expressed, I personally consider that the Committee on Rules of Procedure would be well-advised to review this very special practice for which there was, I believe, some reason in the early days of the Assembly, but which today creates for us rather knotty procedural problems.

*The draft recommendation is therefore adopted*<sup>1</sup>.

### 15. Air forces on the central front

(Vote on the draft Recommendation, Doc. 690)

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — We shall now vote on the draft recommendation on air forces on the central front, Document 690.

The vote on the draft recommendation as a whole will be by roll-call if the Assembly is not unanimous.

1. See page 56.

Are there any objections ?...

There are abstentions.

We shall therefore vote by roll-call.

The voting will begin with the name of Mr. Roper.

The voting is open.

*(A vote by roll-call was then taken)*

Does any other Representative wish to vote ?...

The voting is closed.

The result of the vote is as follows<sup>1</sup> :

Number of votes cast . . . .	57
Ayes . . . . .	46
Noes . . . . .	1
Abstentions . . . . .	10

*The draft recommendation is therefore adopted*<sup>2</sup>.

### 16. Close of the Session

The PRESIDENT (Translation). — Before we go our different ways, I should like, as President, to thank our Clerk, our small permanent team which provides the secretariat for the Assembly, and all the temporary staff who, during the session, join forces with the permanent officials to ensure the smooth progress of our work.

One of them is, alas, about to leave us, because his new and important duties in the House of Commons will no longer allow him to perform his functions at WEU. Over a long period of years, Mr. James Willcox, the British Clerk has, with his French colleagues, been responsible for advising the President on problems arising during sittings. We shall be sorry no longer to see him at our side, and I want to thank him publicly, on your behalf and on my own, for his prolonged and efficient collaboration. (*Applause*)

Does anyone else wish to speak ?...

I declare closed the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Western European Union.

The Sitting is closed.

*(The Sitting was closed at 6.15 p.m.)*

1. See page 45.

2. See page 57.

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