

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

TWENTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

December 1974

III

Assembly Documents

W E U

PARIS

**ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION**  
**43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 - Tél. 723.54.32**

ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

# PROCEEDINGS

TWENTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

SECOND PART

**December 1974**

III

**Assembly Documents**

W E U

PARIS



**The Proceedings of the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU comprise two volumes :**

**Volume III : Assembly Documents.**

**Volume IV : Orders of the Day and Minutes of Proceedings, Official Report of Debates  
General Index.**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
List of Representatives and Substitutes .....	8
Documents :	
643. Agenda of the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session, 2nd-6th December 1974 .....	10
644. Order of Business of the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session, 2nd-6th December 1974 .....	11
645. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1973 — The Auditor's Report .....	15
645 Add. Motion to approve the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1973 .....	36
646. European union and WEU — Report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Mr. Krieg, Rapporteur .....	37
647. Second supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1974 submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur .....	50
648. Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur .....	54
649. Advanced technology in Canada — the consequences for Europe — Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions by Mr. van Ooijen, Rapporteur ....	75
650. Conditions of service in the armed forces — Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Klepsch, Rapporteur .....	107
1 Amendment .....	250
651. European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean — Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur .....	251
10 Amendments .....	268
652. Replies of the Council to Recommendations 246 to 255 .....	278

---

	Page
653. National parliaments and the WEU Assembly — Report submitted on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur .....	302
654. Rational deployment of forces on the central front — Interim Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments by Mr. Dankert, Rapporteur.....	319
1 Amendment .....	329
655. State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects — Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions by Mr. Small, Rapporteur .....	330
2 Amendments .....	339
656. The energy crisis and European security — Report submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee by Sir John Rodgers, Rapporteur..	341
657. The Channel Tunnel — Motion for a Recommendation tabled by Mr. de Montesquiou and others with a request for urgent procedure .....	355
658. State of European aviation activities — Report submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions by Mr. Warren, Rapporteur .....	356

## LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES BY COUNTRY

### BELGIUM

#### Representatives

MM. ADRIAENSENS Hugo	Socialist
DEQUAE André	Chr. Soc.
KEMPINAIRE André	PLP
LEYNEN Hubert	Chr. Soc.
SCHUGENS Willy	Socialist
de STEKHE Paul	Chr. Soc.
TANGHE Francis	Chr. Soc.

#### Substitutes

MM. BREYNE Gustave de BRUYNE Hektor DUVIEUSART Etienne	Socialist Volksunie FDF-RW
Mrs. GODINACHE-LAMBERT Marie-Thérèse	PLP
MM. HULPIAU Raphaël	Chr. Soc.
PLASMAN Marcel	Chr. Soc.
VAN HOEYLANDT D. Bernard	Socialist

### FRANCE

#### Representatives

MM. BOULLOCHE André	Socialist
BRUGNON Maurice	Socialist
CERNEAU Marcel	Centre Union
DELORME Claude	Socialist
de FÉLICE Pierre	Dem. Left
JUNG Louis	UCDR
KRIEG Pierre-Charles	UDR
LEGARET Jean	Ind. Rep.
de MONTESQUIOU Pierre	Soc. Dem. Ref.
NESSLER Edmond President of the Assembly	UDR
PÉRIDIER Jean	Socialist
RADIUS René	UDR
RIVIERE Paul	UDR
ROGER Émile	Communist
SCHLEITER François	Ind. Rep.
SCHMITT Robert	UDR (App.)
VALLEIX Jean	UDR
VITTER Pierre	Ind. Rep.

#### Substitutes

MM. BEAUGUITTE André	Ind. Rep.
BIZET Émile	UDR (App.)
BOURGEOIS Georges	UDR
CERMOLACCE Paul	Communist
de CHEVIGNY Pierre	Ind. Rep.
DAILLET Jean-Marie	Soc. Dem. Ref.
DARDEL Georges	Socialist
DEPIETRI César	Communist
FORNI Raymond	Socialist
GAUTIER Lucien	UDR
GRUSSENMEYER François	UDR

MM. LA COMBE René	UDR
LAURENT-THOUVEREY C.	Dem. Left
LEMAIRE Marcel	RIAS
PIGNION Lucien	Socialist
SOUSTELLE Jacques	Non-party
WEBER Pierre	Ind. Rep. (App.)
YVON Joseph	UCDR

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### Representatives

MM. AHRENS Karl	SPD
ALBER Siegbert	CDU
AMREHN Franz	CDU
DREGGER Alfred	CDU
ENDERS Wendelin	SPD
GESSNER Manfred	SPD
KEMPFER Friedrich	CDU
LEMMRICH Karl Heinz	CDU
MATTICK Kurt	SPD
MENDE Erich	CDU
MÜLLER Günther	CDU
RICHTER Klaus	SPD
SCHLAGA Georg	SPD
SCHMIDT Hansheinrich	FDP
Mrs. SCHUCHARDT Helga	FDP
MM. SCHWENCKE Olaf	SPD
SIEGLERSCHMIDT Hellmut	SPD
Mrs. WOLF Erika	CDU

#### Substitutes

Mr. BARZEL Rainer	CDU
Mrs. von BOTHMER Lenelotte	SPD
MM. BÜCHNER Peter	SPD
CARSTENS Karl	CDU
GÖLTER Georg	CDU
HOLTZ Uwe	SPD
KLEPSCH Egon	CDU
KLIESING Georg	CDU
LAGERSHAUSEN Karl-Hans	CDU
LENZER Christian	CDU
MARQUARDT Werner	SPD
OFFERGELD Rainer	SPD
PAWELCZYK Alfons	SPD
SCHULTE Manfred	SPD
VOHRER Manfred	FDP
WALTHER Rudi	SPD
WÖRNER Manfred	CDU
WURBS Richard	FDP

## ITALY

## Representatives

MM. ARNAUD Gian Aldo	Chr. Dem.
AVERARDI Giuseppe	Socialist
BETTIOL Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
COPPOLA Mattia	Chr. Dem.
LA LOGGIA Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
LEGGIERI Vincenzo	Chr. Dem.
MAMMI Oscar	Republican
MINNOCCI Giacinto	Socialist
Mrs. MIOTTI CARLI Amalia	Chr. Dem.
MM. PECORARO Antonio	Chr. Dem.
PICA Domenico	Chr. Dem.
PRETI Luigi	Socialist
QUILLERI Fausto Samuele	Liberal
SALVATORE Elvio Alfonso	Socialist
TALAMONA Augusto	Socialist
TREU Renato	Chr. Dem.
VEDOVATO Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
ZAMBERLETTI Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.

## Substitutes

MM. ARFÈ Gaetano	Socialist
BONALDI Umberto	Liberal
BOTTARI Carlo	Chr. Dem.
BRANDI Lucio Mariano	Socialist
CASTELLUCCI Albertino	Chr. Dem.
Mrs. CATTANEO-PETRINI Giannina	Chr. Dem.
MM. CAVEZZALI Paolo	Socialist
DRAGO Antonino	Chr. Dem.
FARABEGOLI Furio	Chr. Dem.
LA ROSA Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
MAGLIANO Tezenzio	Socialist
MONETI Alfredo	Chr. Dem.
NEGRARI Andrea	Chr. Dem.
PACINI Arturo	Chr. Dem.
PREARO Roberto	Chr. Dem.
REALE Giuseppe	Chr. Dem.
SANTALCO Carmelo	Chr. Dem.
SPORA Ettore	Chr. Dem.

## LUXEMBOURG

## Representatives

MM. ABENS Victor	Soc. Workers
MARGUE Georges	Chr. Soc.
MART René	Dem.

## Substitutes

MM. HENGEL René	Soc. Workers
KONEN René	Dem.
SPAUTZ Jean	Chr. Soc.

## NETHERLANDS

## Representatives

MM. BOERTIEN Cornelis	Antirevolution.
CORNELISSEN Pam	Pop. Cath.
DANKERT Pieter	Labour
LETSCHERT Hendrik	Pop. Cath.
de NIET Maarten	Labour
PORTHEINE Frederik	Liberal
VOOGD Joop	Labour

## Substitutes

MM. de KOSTER Hans	Liberal
van OOIJEN David	Labour
PEIJNENBURG Marinus	Pop. Cath.
PIKET Frederik	Chr. Hist.
SCHLINGEMANN Johan	Liberal
STOFFELEN Pieter	Labour
WALTMANS Henk	Radical

## UNITED KINGDOM

## Representatives

MM. Stanley COHEN	Labour
Julian CRITCHLEY	Conservative
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS	Conservative
MM. Raymond FLETCHER	Labour
W. Percy GRIEVE	Conservative
John HUNT	Conservative
Dr. J. Dickson MABON	Labour
MM. John MENDELSON	Labour
John OSBORN	Conservative
John PAGE	Conservative
Tom PENDRY	Labour
John PRESCOTT	Labour
Sir John RODGERS	Conservative
MM. John ROPER	Labour
William SMALL	Labour
David STEEL	Liberal
Frank TOMNEY	Labour
Thomas URWIN	Labour

## Substitutes

Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEY	Liberal
Sir Frederic BENNETT	Conservative
MM. Ronald BROWN	Labour
Raymond CARTER	Labour
John CORDLE	Conservative
Lord DARLING of HILLSBOROUGH	Labour
MM. John FARR	Conservative
Andrew FAULDS	Labour
Sir Harwood HARRISON	Conservative
MM. James LESTER	Conservative
Arthur LEWIS	Labour
Hilary MILLER	Conservative
Lord PEDDIE	Labour
Baroness PHILLIPS	Labour
Lord SELSDON	Conservative
Mr. Patrick WALL	Conservative
Lord WALSTON	Labour
Mr. Kenneth WARREN	Conservative

## AGENDA

**of the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session  
Paris, 2nd-6th December 1974**

---

**I. Political Questions**

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. European union and WEU                  | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Krieg on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i>        |
| 2. The energy crisis and European security | <i>Report tabled by Sir John Rodgers on behalf of the General Affairs Committee</i> |

**II. Defence Questions**

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. Conditions of service in the armed forces                        | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Klepsch on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i>   |
| 2. Rational deployment of forces on the central front               | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Dankert on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i>   |
| 3. European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments</i> |

**III. Technical and Scientific Questions**

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. Advanced technology in Canada — The consequences for Europe | <i>Report tabled by Mr. van Ooijen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i> |
| 2. State of European aerospace activities                      | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Warren on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i>     |
| 3. State of European nuclear energy programmes                 | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Small on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions</i>      |

**IV. Budgetary and Administrative Questions**

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. Second draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1974 | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
| 2. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975                      | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |
| 3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1973 — The Auditor's Report   | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration</i> |

**V. Relations with Parliaments**

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| National parliaments and the WEU Assembly | <i>Report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments</i> |
|---|---|

**ORDER OF BUSINESS**  
**of the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session**  
**Paris, 2nd-6th December 1974**

---

**MONDAY 2nd DECEMBER**

**Morning 9.30 a.m.**

Meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

**10.30 a.m.**

Meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

**11 a.m.**

Meeting of the General Affairs Committee.

**Afternoon 3 p.m.**

Meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

**3.45 p.m.**

Meeting of the Presidential Committee.

**5 p.m.**

Meeting of the Federated Christian Democrat Group and British Conservatives.

**5 p.m.**

Meeting of the Socialist Group.

**TUESDAY, 3rd DECEMBER**

**Morning 10 a.m.**

1. Opening of the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session.
2. Ratification of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the Second Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session.
5. European union and WEU :  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Krieg on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.  
Debate.

**Afternoon 3 p.m.**

1. European union and WEU :  
Resumed Debate.  
*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

2. Second draft supplementary budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1974 :  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
3. Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1975 :  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.
4. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1973 — The Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts :  
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Dequae on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration.

*Votes on the draft texts*

**At the end of the sitting**

Meeting of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges.

**WEDNESDAY, 4th DECEMBER**

**Morning 10 a.m.**

European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

**11.30 a.m**

Address by Mr. Destremau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of France.

**Afternoon 3 p.m.**

1. European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean :

Resumed Debate.

*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

**3.30 p.m.**

Address by Mr. Matthöfer, Minister of Research and Technology of the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. State of European aviation activities :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Warren on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

3. State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Small on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

#### THURSDAY, 5th DECEMBER

##### Morning 9 a.m.

##### 1. Rational deployment of forces on the central front :

presentation of the interim report tabled by Mr. Dankert on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

##### 2. Conditions of service in the armed forces :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Klepsch on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments.

Debate.

##### 10 a.m.

Address by Lord Goronwy-Roberts, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom.

##### 11 a.m.

Address by Mr. Van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation of Belgium.

##### 12 noon

Address by Mr. Vredeling, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands.

*Votes on the draft recommendations.*

##### Afternoon 3 p.m.

##### 1. The energy crisis and European security :

presentation of the report tabled by Sir John Rodgers on behalf of the General Affairs Committee.

Debate.

*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

##### 2. National parliaments and the WEU Assembly :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

##### At the end of the sitting

Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments.

FRIDAY, 6th DECEMBER

Morning 10 a.m.

Advanced technology in Canada — the consequences for Europe :

presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van Ooijen on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions.

Debate.

*Vote on the draft recommendation.*

CLOSE OF THE TWENTIETH ORDINARY SESSION

**Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly  
for the Financial Year 1973**

---

**THE AUDITOR'S REPORT**

---

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ON THE ACCOUNTS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1973.

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM COMMUNICATED BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE AUDITOR OF THE ASSEMBLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1973.

APPENDICES

- Appendix I : Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1973. Financial position as at 31st December 1973.
- Appendix II : Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1973.
- Appendix III : Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of WEU, London, in respect of contributions to the WEU Assembly budget 1973.
- Appendix IV : Provident Fund — Account for the financial year ended 31st December 1973.

**Report of the external Auditor  
to the Assembly  
of Western European Union  
on the accounts for the financial year 1973**

*General*

1. The following financial statements, together with an explanatory memorandum, were submitted to me by the President :

- (a) Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1973 and financial position as at 31st December 1973 (Appendix I).
- (b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits for the financial year 1973 (showing also transfers between sub-heads) (Appendix II).

(c) Statement of sums due and received from the Secretary-General of Western European Union, London, in respect of contributions to the Assembly of Western European Union budget 1973 (Appendix III).

(d) Account of the provident fund for the financial year ended 31st December 1973 (Appendix IV).

2. My examination of the accounts has been carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

*Summary of Income and Expenditure*

*(Appendix I)*

3. The approved original and supplementary budgets provided for expenditure of F 4,232,100,

of which F 31,100 was expected to be covered by miscellaneous receipts.

4. Actual miscellaneous receipts amounted to F 33,629, making, with the F 4,201,000 of contributions requested and received, a total income for the year of F 4,234,629. Expenditure, including an excess over the budget authorisation for Head IV (F 40,364), amounted to F 4,228,746, leaving a surplus of F 5,883 for reimbursement to the Council of Western European Union, London. This sum consisted of the budgetary surplus of F 3,354 (as shown in Appendix II) and the surplus of miscellaneous receipts amounting to F 2,529.

*Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits*

*(Appendix II)*

5. The total expenditure on Head IV (General administrative costs), F 637,364, exceeded the budget total for that head by F 40,364. Excesses arose on Sub-Head 7 (Paper, stationery and office supplies) and Sub-Head 8 (Printing and publishing of Assembly documents). The excess on Sub-Head 7 was met and that on Sub-Head 8 was reduced by the application of savings on other sub-heads within the head.

6. The transfers between sub-heads within the same head of the budget, shown in this statement, were duly authorised in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulations. These regulations contain no provision for the authorisation of transfers between heads, but as recorded in my report on the Assembly's accounts for 1972 the Council of Western European Union had recommended in 1973 the introduction of a procedure whereby they would be informed in advance whenever over-expenditure on a budget head was foreseen. This recommendation was accepted by the Assembly and the Council were duly informed and took note of the anticipated over-expenditure on Head IV for 1973.

*Provident fund*

*(Appendix IV)*

7. In my report on the accounts for 1972 I referred to the new arrangements for the admin-

istration of the provident fund of the Assembly, under which the assets of the fund were maintained in six different currencies and amalgamated with the holdings of the provident funds of the other organs of Western European Union in joint deposits administered by the Office of the Secretary General. I also reported that no decision had then been reached on the treatment of variations in the value of the joint deposits resulting from fluctuations in exchange rates.

8. During 1973 the Office of the Secretary-General, acting on the advice of an advisory panel representing all the interested parties, decided that the French franc would be used as the accounting unit for the provident funds and that the joint deposits would accordingly be valued in that currency, at market rates of exchange, on 25th July 1973 and at the end of each accounting period thereafter. Any capital gains or losses thus disclosed would be credited or debited to staff members' accounts, with special adjustments for staff members leaving during the course of an accounting period.

9. As recorded in the President's explanatory memorandum the valuation, by the Office of the Secretary-General, of the joint deposits as at 25th July 1973 disclosed a loss of 4.002189 % of their book value. The accounts of the staff members of the Assembly were accordingly adjusted with effect from 26th July 1973, to reflect the Assembly's share (F 107,181) of the total loss incurred. The office of the Secretary-General also apportioned F 145,575 to the Assembly as their share of the interest received on the joint deposits for the year to 25th July 1973. This sum was credited to the Assembly staff members' accounts proportionately,

10. Therefore, the balances of the Assembly staff members' accounts as at 31st December 1973, shown in Appendix IV as totalling F 2,887,865, do not include interest in respect of the period from 26th July 1973 or reflect any variation in the value of the joint deposits since that date. The assets available to meet these balances consisted of an appropriate share of the joint deposits administered by the Office of the Secretary-General, and I have been unable to verify directly that they were in fact sufficient to meet the balances at 31st December 1973. I have, however, received from the Office of the Secretary-General a statement that

the balance in their books standing to the credit of the Assembly's provident fund at 31st December 1973 was F 2,887,865.14 and a further valuation of the joint deposits as at that date showed a gain of over F 650,000 on the combined balances.

11. I wish to record my appreciation of the willing co-operation of the officers of the Assembly during my audit.

D. B. PITBLADO  
(Comptroller and Auditor General,  
United Kingdom)  
External Auditor

5th August 1974

### Explanatory Memorandum

(communicated by the President to the Auditor of  
the Assembly in connection with the financial year  
1973)

1. The statements attached hereto refer to :
  - (a) Summary of income and expenditure — financial position as at 31st December 1973 (Appendix I) ;
  - (b) Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits (Appendix II) ;
  - (c) Contributions (Appendix III) ;
  - (d) Provident fund (Appendix IV).
2. The statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits indicates that a sum of F 3,354 remains unexpended, whereas the final balance of income over expenditure was F 5,883. The difference between these two figures, F 2,529, represents :

	F	F
— Bank interest .....	17,665	
— Sundry receipts .....	1,374	
— Sale of publications ..	14,590	
		33,629
— Less receipts for 1973 estimated in the bud- get .....		31,100
		2,529

### Transfers

3. Excess expenditure amounting to F 60,841 has been met by transfer between sub-heads within heads. Nevertheless, an amount of F 40,364 relating to expenditure on office supplies and printing could not be covered by transfer within Head IV and this excess expenditure has been deducted from the overall amount of unexpended credits in Heads I and II. In accordance with the new procedure, the Council was duly informed of this<sup>1</sup>.

### Contributions

4. All contributions were received from the Secretary-General WEU London before 31st December 1973.

### Provident fund

5. The Assembly's funds are incorporated with those of the other organs of WEU and the entire fund is administered by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Clerk of the Assembly.

6. The Secretary-General has received advice from the advisory panel set up within WEU and from outside bankers on the investment of the funds. These are at present held in United States dollars, French francs, pounds sterling, Dutch guilders, Deutschmarks and Swiss francs with the International Westminster Bank Ltd., London. The dollar holdings contract runs until 22nd September 1974, while the other contracts expire on 25th July 1974.

7. The total value of the Assembly's part of the fund fluctuated by 4.002189 % (F 107,181) for the year ending 25th July 1973, this being due to the fluctuation in exchange rates. This was duly charged to the accounts of the staff. Interest of F 145,575 was credited to the accounts of the staff for the same period.

8. The balance of the fund on 31st December 1973, as shown in Appendix IV, was F 2,887,865.

1. Document A/WEU/BA (74) 2.

This balance does not reflect the interest due on the deposits for the period 26th July to 31st December 1973, nor the valuation of the currency deposits at 31st December 1973 which was F 3,056,281, an increase of 5.83 % over the abovementioned balance.

9. The President would like to take this opportunity of expressing the appreciation of

the Assembly for the help which was extended to the Office of the Clerk by the United Kingdom Comptroller and Auditor General.

John PEEL  
*President of the Assembly*

*19th April 1974*

## APPENDIX I

**Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1973**  
(in French francs)

## ANNEXE I

**Etat des recettes et des dépenses pour l'exercice financier 1973**  
(en francs français)*Per attached statement**Voir le relevé ci-joint*

Assessments of member States .....	4,201,000
Contributions des Etats membres .....	
Contributions not requested .....	—
Contributions non appelées .....	

*Miscellaneous**Divers*

Bank interest .....	17,665
Intérêts bancaires .....	
Sundry receipts .....	1,374
Recettes diverses .....	
Sale of publications .....	14,590
Vente de publications .....	
	<hr/>
	33,629
	<hr/>
	4,234,629
Expenditure under budget authorisation .....	4,188,382
Dépenses avec autorisation budgétaire .....	
Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Head IV .....	40,364
Dépassement de crédits sur le chapitre IV .....	
	<hr/>
	4,228,746
	<hr/>
Excess of income over expenditure .....	
Résultat .....	F 5,883
	<hr/> <hr/>

**Financial position as at 31st December 1973**  
**Situation au 31 décembre 1973**

*Assets**Actif*

Cash at bank .....	122,265	
Disponibilités en banque .....		
Sundry advances .....	57,345	
Avances diverses .....		
Advances to temporary staff .....	—	
Avances au personnel temporaire .....		
Accounts receivable .....	5,684	
Restes à recevoir .....		
		185,294

*Liabilities**Passif*

Supplementary insurance .....	—	
Assurance complémentaire .....		
Accounts payable .....		179,411
Restes à payer .....		
		F 5,883

Certifié correct :

John PEEL  
Président de l'Assemblée

Francis HUMBLET  
Greffier de l'Assemblée

André DEQUAE  
Président de la Commission des  
Affaires budgétaires et de l'Administration

I have examined the foregoing Summary of Income and Expenditure and the Statement of Assets and Liabilities. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, and I certify, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion these Statements are correct.

J'ai examiné l'état des comptes ci-dessus et l'état de la trésorerie. J'ai obtenu tous les renseignements et explications requis, et je certifie, après vérification, qu'à mon avis ces relevés sont exacts.

*Signed : P. B. PITBLADO*  
*Comptroller and Auditor General,*  
*United Kingdom*  
*External Auditor*

5th August 1974

Le 5 août 1974



DETAILS NATURE DES DÉPENSES		Total budget for 1973 <sup>1</sup>
		Budget total pour 1973 <sup>1</sup>
<b>HEAD I - EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF</b>		
<b>CHAPITRE I - DÉPENSES DE PERSONNEL</b>		
<i>Sub-Head</i> <i>Article</i> 1	(a) Salaries of permanent establishment Traitements du personnel du cadre permanent	1,768,200
	Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling expenses and French social security	
	(b) Recrutement de personnel temporaire supplémentaire de grade B et C, y compris frais de voyage et Sécurité Sociale	7,000
<i>Sub-Head</i> <i>Article</i> 2	<i>Allowances, social charges, etc.</i> <i>Indemnités, charges sociales, etc.</i>	
	(A) <i>Allowances</i> <i>Indemnités</i>	
	(a) Head-of-family allowance Indemnité de chef de famille	47,000
	(b) Children's allowance Allocations familiales	69,800
	(c) Expatriation allowance Indemnité d'expatriation	141,000
	(d) Compensatory rent allowance Indemnité de logement	10,000
	(e) Overtime Heures supplémentaires	10,000
	Guarantee against currency devaluation for non-French staff Garantie de change au personnel non français	
	(g) Education allowance Indemnité d'éducation	22,000
	(h) Allowance for language courses Indemnité pour cours de langues	1,800
	(B) <i>Social charges</i> <i>Charges sociales</i>	
	(a) Social security Sécurité Sociale	116,300
	(b) Supplementary insurance Assurance complémentaire	58,000
	(c) Provident fund Fonds de prévoyance	237,700
Carried forward - A reporter		2,488,800

1. Documents 583 and 620.  
Documents 583 et 620.

**LEVE DES AUTORISATIONS BUDGETAIRES, DES DEPENSES ET DES  
REDITS RESTANT DISPONIBLES POUR L'EXERCICE FINANCIER 1973**

**DOCUMENT 645  
ANNEXE II**

Transfers Transferts		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
+	-	Total après transferts	Total des dépenses	Crédits restant disponibles
		1,768,200	1,767,590	610
	1,196	5,804	5,670	134
		47,000	46,947	53
		69,800	68,327	1,473
51		141,051	141,051	—
		10,000	8,183	1,817
1,145		11,145	11,145	—
		22,000	19,344	2,656
		1,800	1,200	600
		116,300	115,323	977
		58,000	57,839	161
		237,700	237,570	130
1,196	1,196	2,488,800	2,480,189	8,611

DETAILS NATURE DES DÉPENSES	Total budget for 1973  Budget total pour 1973
Brought forward - Report	2,488,800
<p><i>Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials</i></p> <p>(C) <i>Dépenses relatives au recrutement, à l'arrivée et au départ des fonctionnaires permanents</i></p> <p>Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers</p> <p>(a) <i>Frais de voyage et indemnités de séjour pour les candidats ne résidant pas à Paris, qui ont été convoqués pour examen et entrevue, et frais de correction des épreuves</i></p> <p>Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons</p> <p>(b) <i>Remboursement des frais de voyage à l'arrivée et au départ des fonctionnaires et des personnes à leur charge</i></p> <p>(c) <i>Removal expenses</i> <i>Frais de déménagement</i></p> <p>(d) <i>Installation allowance</i> <i>Indemnité d'installation</i></p> <p>Biennial home leave for non-French officials</p> <p>(e) <i>Congé bisannuel au pays d'origine pour les agents non français</i></p> <p>(f) <i>Medical examination</i> <i>Examen médical</i></p>	<p>1,600</p> <p>1,500</p> <p>3,000</p> <p>4,500</p> <p>5,000</p> <p>2,000</p>
Total of Head I - Total du chapitre I	2,506,400
<p>HEAD II - EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY</p> <p>CHAPITRE II - DÉPENSES RELATIVES AUX SESSIONS DE L'ASSEMBLÉE</p> <p><i>Sub-Head 3</i></p> <p><i>Article 1. Temporary staff</i> <i>Personnel temporaire</i></p> <p>Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly Personnel temporaire dont l'assistance est nécessaire durant les sessions de l'Assemblée</p>	238,000
Carried forward - A reporter	238,000

Transfers Transferts		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
+	-	Total après transferts	Total des dépenses	Crédits restant disponibles
1,196	1,196	2,488,800	2,480,189	8,611
		1,600	315	1,285
		1,500	258	1,242
		3,000	2,060	940
		4,500	—	4,500
		5,000	2,237	2,763
		2,000	1,338	662
1,196	1,196	2,506,400	2,486,397	20,003
	18,970	219,030	201,815	17,215
	18,970	219,030	201,815	17,215

<p style="text-align: center;">DETAILS</p> <p style="text-align: center;">NATURE DES DÉPENSES</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">Total budget for 1973</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Budget total pour 1973</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">Brought forward - Report</p> <p style="text-align: center;">2. <i>Linguistic staff</i> <i>Personnel linguistique</i></p> <p>(A) <i>Interpretation services</i> <i>Interprètes</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly</p> <p>(a) <i>Personnel d'interprétation nécessaire pour les sessions de l'Assemblée</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Interpretation services required for meetings of Committees between sessions</p> <p>(b) <i>Personnel d'interprétation nécessaire pour les réu- nions des commissions devant se tenir entre les sessions</i></p> <p>(B) <i>Translation services</i> <i>Traducteurs</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly Traducteurs temporaires pour les sessions de l'Assem- blée</p> <p style="padding-left: 80px;">3. <i>Insurance for temporary staff</i> <i>Assurances afférentes au personnel temporaire</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 80px;">4. <i>Installation of equipment and hire of offices for the sessions</i> <i>Installation d'équipement et location de bu- reaux pour les sessions</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 80px;">5. <i>Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions</i> <i>Dépenses diverses pendant les sessions</i></p>	<p style="text-align: right;">238,000</p> <p style="text-align: right;">87,000</p> <p style="text-align: right;">80,000</p> <p style="text-align: right;">180,000</p> <p style="text-align: right;">3,300</p> <p style="text-align: right;">109,000</p> <p style="text-align: right;">22,700</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Total of Head II - Total du chapitre II</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">720,000</p>

Transfers Transferts		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
+	-	Total après transferts	Total des dépenses	Crédits restant disponibles
	18,970	219,030	201,815	17,215
		87,000	83,990	3,010
4,200		84,200	84,200	—
12,108		192,108	192,108	—
		3,300	2,991	309
2,032		111,032	111,032	—
630		23,330	23,330	—
18,970	18,970	720,000	699,466	20,534

DETAILS NATURE DES DÉPENSES	Total budget for 1973  Budget total pour 1973
<b>HEAD III - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT</b> <b>CHAPITRE III - DÉPENSES DE LOCAUX ET D'ÉQUIPEMENT</b>	
<i>Sub-Head</i> 4 Premises <i>Article</i> 4 Locaux	139,300
<i>Sub-Head</i> 5 Capital equipment <i>Article</i> 5 Dépenses d'équipement	9,400
Total of Head III - Total du chapitre III	148,700
<b>HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS</b> <b>CHAPITRE IV - FRAIS GÉNÉRAUX</b>	
<i>Sub-Head</i> 6 Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents <i>Article</i> 6 Frais d'affranchissement, de téléphone et de télégraphe, transport de documents	160,000
<i>Sub-Head</i> 7 Paper, stationery and office supplies <i>Article</i> 7 Papier et fournitures de bureau	75,000
<i>Sub-Head</i> 8 Printing and publishing of Assembly documents <i>Article</i> 8 Frais d'impression et de publication des documents de l'Assemblée	330,000
<i>Sub-Head</i> 9 Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. <i>Article</i> 9 Achat d'ouvrages de documentation, d'annuaires, etc.	14,000
<i>Sub-Head</i> 10 Official car <i>Article</i> 10 Voiture de service	17,500
<i>Sub-Head</i> 11 Bank charges <i>Article</i> 11 Frais de banque	500
Total of Head IV - Total du chapitre IV	597,000

Transfers Transferts		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
+	-	Total après transferts	Total des dépenses	Crédits restant disponibles
	117	139,183	137,499	1,684
117		9,517	9,517	—
117	117	148,700	147,016	1,684
	6,458	153,542	153,542	—
6,703		81,703	81,703	—
4,101		334,101	374,465	40,364
	1,983	12,017	12,017	—
	1,869	15,631	15,631	—
	494	6	6	—
10,804	10,804	597,000	637,364	40,364

DETAILS NATURE DES DÉPENSES		Total budget for 1973
		Budget total pour 1973
<b>HEAD V - OTHER EXPENDITURE</b> <b>CHAPITRE V - AUTRES DÉPENSES</b>		
<i>Sub-Head</i> <i>Article</i> 12	Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Committees and Rapporteurs Frais de voyage, indemnités et assurance du Président de l'Assemblée, des présidents de commissions et des rapporteurs	45,000
<i>Sub-Head</i> <i>Article</i> 13	Expenses for representation and receptions Frais de représentation et dépenses de réceptions	65,000
<i>Sub-Head</i> <i>Article</i> 14	Committee study missions Missions d'études des commissions	2,000
<i>Sub-Head</i> <i>Article</i> 15	Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk Frais de mission des membres du Greffe	90,000
<i>Sub-Head</i> <i>Article</i> 16	Expenses of experts and the auditor Frais des experts et du Commissaire aux comptes	15,000
<i>Sub-Head</i> <i>Article</i> 17	Expenditure on information Dépenses d'information	21,000
<i>Sub-Head</i> <i>Article</i> 18	Expenses for groups of the Assembly Dépenses effectuées par les groupes de l'Assemblée	15,000
<i>Sub-Head</i> <i>Article</i> 19	Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for Dépenses extraordinaires et toutes dépenses non prévues	2,000
<i>Sub-Head</i> <i>Article</i> 20	Non-recoverable taxes Taxes non récupérables	5,000
<b>Total of Head V - Total du chapitre V</b>		<b>260,000</b>
<b>TOTAL</b> .....		<b>4,232,100</b>

The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1973, and paid for up to 31st March 1974, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly.

John PEEL  
*Président de l'Assemblée*

Franci  
*Greffier*

Transfers Transferts		Total after transfers	Total expenditure	Unexpended credits
+	-	Total après transferts	Total des dépenses	Crédits restant disponibles
	20,000	25,000	24,619	381
2,935		67,935	67,935	—
	900	1,100	1,056	44
	4,754	85,246	85,241	5
26,819		41,819	41,819	—
	3,000	18,000	17,515	485
	1,100	13,900	13,836	64
		2,000	1,999	1
		5,000	4,483	517
29,754	29,754	260,000	258,503	1,497
60,841	60,841	4,232,100	4,228,746	3,354

Dans le total des dépenses figurent des sommes concernant des fournitures procurées et des services rendus avant le 31 décembre 1973 et payées avant le 31 mars 1974, conformément au Règlement financier de l'Assemblée.

André DEQUAE

*Président de la Commission des  
Affaires budgétaires et de l'Administration*

**STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY  
BUDGET 1973**

**ÉTAT DES SOMMES DUES ET REÇUES DU SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL DE L'U.E.O.  
A LONDRES RELATIVES AUX CONTRIBUTIONS AU BUDGET DE L'ASSEMBLÉE  
DE L'U.E.O. POUR 1973**

Member States Etats membres	600ths 600 <sup>es</sup>	Budget surplus from 1972 Excédent budgétaire de 1972	Budget for 1973 Budget pour 1973	Supplementary budget for 1973 Budget supplémentaire pour 1973	Contributions received Contributions reçues
		F	F	F	F
Belgium Belgique	59	(8,372)	402,085	11,013	404,726
France	120	(17,027)	817,800	22,400	823,173
Federal Republic of Germany République Fédérale d'Allemagne	120	(17,027)	817,800	22,400	823,173
Italy Italie	120	(17,027)	817,800	22,400	823,173
Luxembourg	2	(285)	13,630	374	13,719
Netherlands Pays-Bas	59	(8,372)	402,085	11,013	404,726
United Kingdom Royaume-Uni	120	(17,027)	817,800	22,400	823,173
	600	(85,137)	4,089,000	112,000	4,115,863



	F
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1973 Comptes des membres du personnel au 1 <sup>er</sup> janvier 1973	2,494,645
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly of Western European Union Cotisations des membres du personnel et de l'Assemblée de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale	356,355
Repayments of loans by staff members Remboursements de prêts par les membres du personnel	46,480
Interest at 25th July 1973 Intérêts au 25 juillet 1973	145,575
	3,043,055
	3,043,055

John PEEL  
*Président de l'Assemblée*

Fra  
*Greffier*

I have examined the foregoing Statement. I have obtained all the information and explanations that I have required, as  
J'ai examiné l'état ci-dessus. J'ai obtenu tous les renseignements et explications requis, et je certifie, après vérification, qu'à

5th August 1974

D  
*Comptroller and Au*  
*Exte*

**FONDS DE PRÉVOYANCE**  
**SITUATION POUR L'ANNÉE FINANCIÈRE AU 31 DÉCEMBRE 1973**

DOCUMENT 645  
 ANNEXE IV

	F
Withdrawals Retraits	32,009
Loan to a staff member Prêt à un membre du personnel	16,000
Loss due to monetary fluctuations as at 26th July 1973 Perte due aux fluctuations monétaires au 26 juillet 1973	107,181
Accounts of staff members as at 31st December 1973 Comptes des membres du personnel au 31 décembre 1973	2,887,865
	<hr/>
	3,043,055
	<hr/> <hr/>

BLET  
 emblée

André DEQUAE  
*Président de la Commission des  
 Affaires budgétaires et de l'Administration*

y, as the result of my audit, that in my opinion this Statement is correct.  
 cet état est exact.

LADO  
 ral, United Kingdom  
 itor

Le 5 août 1974

***Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly  
for the Financial Year 1973***

---

**MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY  
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1973<sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration<sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur***

---

The Assembly,

Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1973, together with the Auditor's Report, in accordance with Article 16 of the Financial Regulations,

Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial responsibility.

---

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Dequae (Chairman) ; Mr. Legaret, Lord Selsdon (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Ahrens, Alber, de Bruyne, Castellucci (Substitute : Magliano), Dardel (Substitute : Nessler), Depietri, Hengel (Substitute : Mart), Lewis, Page (Substitute : Sir John Rodgers), Lord

Peddie, MM. Peijnenburg, Portheine, Prearo, Santalco, Schleiter, Talamona, Mrs. Wolf (Substitute : Kempfer), Mr. Wurbs (Substitute : Vohrer).

*Also present* : MM. Adriaensens, Müller.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*European union and WEU*

**REPORT<sup>1</sup>**

**submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee<sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Krieg, Rapporteur**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on European union and WEU

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. Krieg, Rapporteur

I. Introduction

II. The problem of European union

III. Conditions for European defence in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance

IV. WEU in the European union

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Substitute: *Vohrer*) Chairman; Mr. Krieg (Substitute for Mr. Roger), *Sir John Rodgers* (Vice-Chairmen); MM. *Abens*, *Amrehn* (Substitute: *Kempfler*), *Bettiol*, *Brugnon*, *Drago*, *Fletcher*, *Mrs. Godinache-Lambert* (Substitute: *de Bruyne*), MM. *Lemaire*, *Leynen*, *Mende* (Substitute: *Müller*),

*Minnocci* (Substitute: *Talamona*), *Nessler*, *de Niet*, *Page*, *Peijnenburg*, *Péridier* (Substitute: *Soustelle*), *Portheine*, *Preti* (Substitute: *Magliano*), *Quilleri*, *Schmidt* (Substitute: *Alber*), *Steel*, *Tomney*, *Van Hoeylandt* (Substitute: *Dequae*).

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Recommendation**  
**on European union and WEU**

The Assembly,

Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty is the basis of European political union in defence matters ;

Expressing the wish that the efforts of the Nine to achieve such a union will allow rapid progress to be made in this direction ;

Deploring the fact that diverging economic interests have affected the cohesion of the Nine ;

Noting the decision of the Heads of State or of Government to examine, in 1975, a report on European union ;

Noting that recent developments in Greece may bring its defence interests closer to those of the WEU countries ;

Considering that there is broad agreement between the members of WEU to plan their defence policy in such a way as to make Europe a true partner of the United States in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Propose that a conference of Heads of State or of Government of the European Community be held forthwith to study the requirements of a European defence policy in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty ;
2. With this conference in view :
  - (a) ask member governments to make the necessary preparatory studies ;
  - (b) harmonise the conclusions thus submitted ;
3. Examine in particular the consequences for European security of the emergence of new nuclear powers and the agreements concluded or to be concluded between the nuclear powers ;
4. Ensure that WEU is maintained with its present responsibilities and that it takes effective action in all matters of concern to it ;
5. Remind the EEC countries which have not yet acceded to it, and the European Mediterranean countries with a democratic régime which wish to be associated with a common defence policy, that they may always accede to the Brussels Treaty ;
6. Consider regularly, at ministerial and at permanent representative level, and in the context of a European defence policy :
  - (a) relations between Europe and the United States ;
  - (b) foreign policy matters affecting the defence of Western Europe ;
  - (c) the defence policies of the member States with a view to co-ordinating military efforts, developing industrial potential and limiting the cost of defence for these States ;
7. Bear in mind, particularly in examining the reactivation of the Standing Armaments Committee for which it is responsible, the need to preserve and develop Europe's industrial potential with special reference to advanced technology.

## **Explanatory Memorandum**

*(submitted by Mr. Krieg, Rapporteur)*

### **I. Introduction**

1. This report follows on the working paper submitted to the General Affairs Committee on 16th September 1974. A particularly substantial discussion was then held during which all the members present — with one exception — stated their agreement with the direction of the Rapporteur's thinking although expressing sometimes major reservations on one aspect or another.

2. In the present text, therefore, your Rapporteur has endeavoured to record each of the arguments put forward, often adopting them and adding his views on specific points or, conversely, indicating where he disagreed with some of the views expressed in the discussion.

3. He has also had to take account of the fact that the General Affairs Committee, contrary to expectations at the beginning of September, will not submit another report at the Second Part of the Assembly's Twentieth Session. He has thus had to add to his original text a number of remarks which would not have been necessary had the Committee submitted a second report. In particular, the Presidential Committee of the Assembly expressed the wish that the Rapporteur tackle the question of relations between Portugal and WEU.

4. Finally, in preparing this document your Rapporteur has had to take account of the fact that no official communication was issued after the meeting of Heads of State or of Government held in Paris on 14th September 1974 and only brief and incomplete indications of the results are available. It has been announced that an official summit meeting will be held in December, but as the agenda of this meeting has not yet been published the conclusions which your Rapporteur has so far reached can but be provisional. It is not even certain that it will be possible to hold a summit conference in 1974 since Mr. Chirac, French Prime Minister, has said that France would not be prepared to convene one if there were not very strong chances of obtaining meaningful results. Your Rapporteur therefore suggests that the questions raised in this report be

taken up again by the General Affairs Committee in another report to be submitted to the Assembly at the First Part of the Twenty-First Session.

### **II. The problem of European union**

5. At their summit meeting in Paris on 21st October 1972, the Heads of State or of Government of the member countries of the European Economic Community determined the framework within which they considered European union might be established :

"The Heads of State or of Government, having set themselves the major objective of transforming, before the end of the present decade and with the fullest respect for the treaties already signed, the whole complex of the relations of member States into a European union, request the institutions of the Community to draw up a report on this subject before the end of 1975 for submission to a summit conference."

6. Since then, progress on the lines laid down at the Paris summit conference has been extremely limited. Not until 5th February 1974 did the Council of Ministers raise the question of European union and the German Government, which was considering holding a summit conference under German chairmanship at the beginning of summer 1974, wished to have an interim report by then as a basis on which to work. However, there is every indication that a first note prepared by the German authorities did not secure enough support from the other members of the Council which consequently merely instructed a working group to draw up a draft questionnaire for the governments. The draft questionnaire was approved at the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg on 25th June. The text was issued by the European Parliament on 12th August 1974.

7. Study of this document shows how little progress had so far been made in the discus-

sions between the nine governments and how far they were from agreement. Nor is there anything to indicate that significant results have been achieved since then. However this may be, the following remarks may be made about the questionnaire :

- (i) an introductory question asks the governments what kind of report should be submitted to them in 1975 and, in particular, whether various options should be presented ;
- (ii) the questionnaire also asks what link there should be between the institutions of the European union and the work pursued in the framework of political co-operation, which implies that it is not at all evident that political co-operation should take a place in the European union ;
- (iii) similarly, the questionnaire asks governments what degree of development they consider the Community should have reached when a union is formed. The result of this might be — if the governments considered it necessary — to link the formation of the union with that of the economic and monetary union or with an agreement on the election of the European Parliament ;
- (iv) another of the questions suggests that those who drew up the questionnaire did not feel that the union should inevitably be achieved by 1980 but that that date might merely mark the starting point for a gradual move towards union ;
- (v) with regard to the possible scope of the union's activities, its powers and *a fortiori* the aims of the policy it should pursue, the wording of the questionnaire reveals the absence of any clear view of these various matters. The same is true of its procedure for taking decisions.

8. In short, the situation at the end of June 1974 showed that the European union and even the preliminary planning stage are still a long way away.

9. Furthermore, uncertainty as to the United Kingdom's intentions with regard to its relations with the European Community in the economic and above all political fields, and the hope of seeing other Western European countries consider joining a European union by 1980 mean that the very shape of the union is still ill-defined.

10. At the beginning of September 1974, Mr. Georges Mavros, Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, visited several European capitals and in Brussels, Paris and Bonn announced that his country wished to join the EEC. Admittedly, we still do not know exactly what steps the Greek Government intends to take and what its position will be towards a possible European political union. Moreover, the return to power of avowed democratic parties in Greece does not constitute a return to parliamentary democracy, which is of course a *sine qua non* of membership of the European Community. However, there is little doubt that with the collapse of the Greek dictatorship the new government will, as soon as reasonably possible, hold free elections in order to restore a democratic régime. It is therefore already possible to think about the action to be taken on Greece's candidature, for which the French Government and the Federal German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Genscher, have promised their support.

11. The decision to hold elections in Greece in November 1974, for which the Committee on European Non-Member Countries of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe has agreed to supervise the democratic nature, means that in the very near future Greece will fulfil the conditions for joining both the EEC and WEU.

12. The Presidential Committee of the WEU Assembly has also informed your Rapporteur that it wishes him to tackle the question raised by the political changes in Portugal in recent months. These changes have been the subject of a survey and report submitted to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe by Mr. Mendelson on behalf of the Committee on European Non-Member Countries. Mr. Mendelson is also a member of the General Affairs Committee of the WEU Assembly and he informed the Committee of the conclusions drawn from

his survey from the WEU point of view. No discussion, however, was held on this statement. General Spínola has since relinquished the presidency of Portugal and in view of uncertainty regarding the future trend of events in Portugal your Rapporteur is obliged to confine himself to a few very general remarks :

13. (i) Unlike Greece, Portugal had a dictatorial régime for almost half a century. The political parties are only just embarking on a period of revival which may be rather long and it is not certain that free elections — which are forecast for March 1975 — will immediately clarify the political situation.

14. (ii) Again unlike Greece, in September 1974 Portugal did not seem to be questioning its membership of NATO. The Portuguese Government has not yet made known its intentions with regard to the EEC.

15. (iii) The Portuguese Government has embarked on an active policy of decolonisation but it is encountering difficulties in the reaction of overseas Portuguese circles and the varying degrees of representativeness of nationalist movements in the territories of the Portuguese empire. It is quite likely that the EEC countries will not want very close political links with Portugal until decolonisation has been completed or at any rate until the methods and timetable have been agreed upon.

16. (iv) It is equally evident that it is in the interests of both Europe and democracy in Portugal for the European Community to bear in mind its duties towards this country in so far as its régime would make it a valid partner.

17. (v) Your Rapporteur consequently feels that before envisaging Portugal taking part in the EEC, European political union or WEU, links should first be strengthened between Portugal and the democratic countries of Western Europe in the framework of the Council of Europe particularly but also by special agreements or even association with the EEC. It also seems possible and desirable to show WEU's interest in Portugal, for instance by inviting it to send observers to the Assembly, and particularly parliamentary observers, as soon as normal parliamentary activities have been restored.

18. (vi) Finally, your Rapporteur considers that in 1975, i.e. when it will be easier to determine the trend of Portugal's internal policy, colonial policy and external policy, the WEU Assembly should study in greater detail what place Portugal might occupy in a European union and how it might contribute to a European defence policy.

19. The various aspects of relations between WEU and the European union are therefore still far from clear. Two member countries of the Community — Denmark and Ireland — have refused to join WEU and, moreover, WEU is based on the modified Brussels Treaty and it is hard in the circumstances to see how it could be merged into a single treaty forming the basis of the union. Nevertheless, it is difficult to envisage a political union which does not cover matters affecting defence policy. But would Denmark and Ireland be prepared in the framework of the Nine to agree to what they refused in the framework of WEU? It is rather unlikely that an early reply will be found to these questions. It may be concluded that for a long time to come the modified Brussels Treaty will stay as it is at present, continue to be binding on the signatory countries and remain the framework of Western Europe in the defence field and other related fields.

20. This seems all the more evident in that there is every indication that nine-power Europe is at present facing a crisis affecting all the fields covered by the Rome Treaty, and in particular the common agricultural policy and economic and monetary union. Although the crisis is due to world economic conditions, this does not alter the fact that, far from progressing, the union of Western European countries now seems threatened and in the circumstances it is essential not to tamper with the remaining firm foundations on which European co-operation can be based, one of the firmest being the modified Brussels Treaty.

21. Some members of the Committee even expressed the opinion that WEU might be called upon to play a particularly important rôle because of the crisis in that it is equipped to deal with crisis situations, as it has proved on several occasions in the past. It is in any event

evident that there can be no lasting European union if defence matters are not covered and at the present juncture the modified Brussels Treaty is the only juridical basis for European defence. A merger of the Rome and Brussels Treaties to form a European union may thus be envisaged in the undetermined future.

22. For the immediate future, there seems to be some advantage in the procedure adopted by the Nine following President Giscard d'Estaing's proposal that the Heads of State or of Government meet informally outside the summit conferences since it provides a means of concerting views at a time when progress seems difficult within the institutions. Such procedure, however, since it does not commit the participants, cannot be considered sufficient, nor can it replace real European union. This applies *inter alia* to all fields in any way connected with defence where the firm undertakings actually entered into by the Seven must not be diluted in talks which, however useful, are not followed by deeds.

23. The governments' intentions, as they appear at the end of September 1974, must rule out the possibility of a federal-type union. Even within the EEC, the governments seem determined to give the Council precedence over the Commission. The apparent difference between the institutions of the Rome Treaty and of WEU is therefore diminishing which enhances the probability of the European union being based on the existing treaties. If Denmark and Ireland — should they eventually be invited officially to join WEU — were to confirm their refusal, it would still be possible to plan a lop-sided union with broader economic responsibilities and narrower terms of reference in defence and foreign policy matters.

### **III. Conditions for European defence in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance**

24. Eight of the nine member countries of the European Community are members of the Atlantic Alliance, as are also the seven member countries of WEU. For them, the North Atlantic

Treaty has a number of implications in the political field on the one hand and the defence field on the other. Signed on 4th April 1949, the treaty dates back to a time when there was no real organisation of Europe. The States which signed it were totally independent of each other. The treaty implies a number of commitments, the principal of which are set out in Article 3, by which the parties undertake separately and jointly to resist armed attack; Article 5, by which the parties agree that if one of them is attacked they will take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area", and Article 9 establishing a Council to consider matters concerning the implementation of the treaty. It should be noted that the undertakings entered into by the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty are rather vague and limited. Article 5 does not define the measures to be taken by each party in the event of one of them being attacked and Article 9 places no obligations on those taking part in the Council set up by the treaty.

25. It therefore became necessary subsequently for the Atlantic Alliance to set up a number of bodies to compensate for the shortcomings of the treaty. Thus, NATO and the military integration of forces stationed in Europe under one command, also integrated, imposed military undertakings on NATO members which went far beyond those to which they were committed under the treaty. Where deterrence is concerned, it may be said that the effect of integrated forces is at least equal and probably superior to what might be achieved through the undertakings set out in the treaty. However, the political effects of this integration went further than some countries considered acceptable in respect of their freedom of action in the foreign policy field, to such an extent that France in 1966 and Greece in August 1974 decided to withdraw their forces from the NATO integrated commands.

26. The European countries handed over control of all or a large part of their armed forces, and therefore a wide degree of independence in their foreign policy, to an integrated command in which by force of circumstances the American element predominated. The position was not the same for the United States since it maintained most of its forces in areas not covered by the

North Atlantic Treaty and was consequently free to do what it liked with them. This allowed it to take political action in these areas which did not necessarily meet with the approval of all its allies but which, because their forces were integrated in Europe, ran the risk of committing them more than they might wish. Thus, by agreeing to bolster undertakings, which were no doubt inadequate, by setting up an integrated military structure, the European countries surrendered a very large part of their freedom of decision to the United States. Some Committee members argued that the maintenance of American troops on the mainland of Europe also meant that the United States was surrendering part of its freedom of decision. However, your Rapporteur does not believe that this concession is quite the same as the one consented by the Europeans since it is confined to the application of the North Atlantic Treaty whereas there is always a danger that the European members of the Alliance might be drawn into a conflict which might start outside the area guaranteed by the treaty. For a long time now, all the signatories of the Atlantic Pact have been aware of this problem and various solutions have been sought.

27. (a) Progress made in the meantime by the European countries in the field of economic integration suggested that a time would come when the forces of a united Europe would constitute a sufficiently powerful element of the Alliance to counterbalance American power. By speaking of the two pillars of the Atlantic Alliance, President Kennedy raised the idea of a partnership in which Europe and the United States would, in principle, be placed on an equal footing. In fact, such equality has never been achieved and was hardly likely to be achieved, on the one hand because Europe had no political unity and hence some European countries were tempted to seek special links with the United States in order to strengthen their own rôle in the Alliance and, on the other hand, because with the disbandment of the colonial empires all European forces were being brought back into the NATO area, whereas the United States was deploying a growing proportion of its forces outside the NATO area, with the result that the freedom of action of one side was diminishing as that of the other was increasing. The prospect of organising the Atlantic Alliance based on two pillars, a European pillar counterbalancing the American pillar, is still a goal of Western Europe and an encouragement to pursue further its

political union. It would be dangerous for the cohesion of Europe if the United States were to relinquish such an approach.

28. (b) In these circumstances, General de Gaulle decided to withdraw French forces from the NATO integrated military structure and to ask NATO forces to withdraw from French territory. France thereby recovered part of its freedom of action in the foreign policy field and the development of its nuclear force has considerably strengthened this position. However, no other member of NATO has followed France's policy and it has consequently become isolated from its European partners. In a manner of speaking it constitutes a separate element of the Alliance since it intends to respect in full the undertakings into which it entered on signing the Atlantic Pact but does not intend to find itself committed beyond that through a system of military integration. Even so, it is prepared to go a long way in military co-operation with the allied countries in order to be prepared to meet any contingencies and in the military field it co-operates closely with its NATO allies.

29. It is still difficult to assess the position of Greece in the Atlantic Alliance. This country, disagreeing with the policy pursued by the United States to terminate the Cyprus conflict, has stated that it would withdraw its forces from the integrated commands so as to be able to use them to counter any threat from Turkey. But the conditions of their withdrawal are not known at present.

30. The case of Greece is quite different from that of France since the former took its decision in the midst of a crisis and faced with a potential enemy which is also a member of the Atlantic Alliance, whereas General de Gaulle took his decision in 1966 when there was no crisis and at a time when no one could imagine that France might have to face enemies which were not also the enemies of its allies. It is quite obvious that Greece's conflict with Turkey calls in question the functioning of the Atlantic Alliance, and particularly the application of Articles 1 and 9 of the treaty, by which the parties undertake "to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means" and the Council "to consider matters concerning the

implementation of this treaty". It is now evident that if the members of the Alliance allow the conflict between Greece and Turkey to degenerate, it is the Alliance itself, at least in the Eastern Mediterranean, which would be implicated.

31. (c) Since 1966, the United States has been pursuing a policy of agreement with the Soviet Union designed to limit their military burdens in both the nuclear and the conventional fields. It was faced with the problem of maintaining maximum cohesion within the Alliance while pursuing this policy, whose broad aims were in the interests of Europe but which, in reality, ran counter to them on at least three points :

- (i) it implied recognising existing frontiers in Central and Eastern Europe and hence of Soviet domination over the member countries of the Warsaw Pact ;
- (ii) it called in question the continued presence of American forces in Europe whereas the Europeans considered them to be an essential element of the deterrent protecting them from the Soviet Union since their presence ensured — which the Atlantic Pact did not — that any aggression from the East would immediately come up against the United States and consequently its nuclear weapons ;
- (iii) it made less improbable the possibility of a conventional war or a limited nuclear war, i.e. European war became not so unthinkable since the United States, like the Soviet Union, might hope to escape utter destruction by maintaining nuclear confrontation at a level which was tolerable for them even if not for their allies.

32. (d) Finally, on 23rd April 1973, Mr. Kissinger, United States Secretary of State, proposed that the United States' allies bring the Atlantic Alliance up to date by signing a new Atlantic Charter.

33. This proposal met with a number of objections in Europe, particularly because it aimed at linking defence matters, where the association between Europe and the United States was in any event very close, with economic and political matters, where Europe was trying to assert itself as a separate entity. The result of this globalisation would have been to extend the effects of American supremacy in the defence field to the economic and political fields. The negotiations between Europe and the United States lasted longer than the American Government expected and led to the North Atlantic Council adopting a declaration in Ottawa on 19th June 1974 which was to be signed by the European Heads of Government in Brussels on 26th June. The text adopted included no economic elements and concerned only the NATO field.

34. On close study, it can be seen that it has little effect on the present situation since the signatories recognise that the presence of American forces in Europe "remains indispensable", without specifying for how long, however. The European countries, for their part, "undertake" to contribute to maintaining the common defence "at a level capable of deterring and if necessary repelling all actions directed against the independence and territorial integrity of the members of the Alliance", while the Americans declare their "resolve" to do likewise.

35. One may of course ponder on the reasons for the difference in wording between paragraph 6 on Europe and the undertakings it has entered into and paragraph 7 on the United States, in which the word undertaking does not appear. Paragraph 8 affirms that all the members of the Alliance would use "all necessary forces" to deny a potential adversary the objectives he seeks and they undertake not to seek agreements limiting "their freedom to use all forces at their disposal for the common defence in case of attack".

36. The very general nature of these undertakings as regards each member's obligations in respect of the use of its forces, particularly nuclear forces, is hardly more reassuring for Europeans than the actual text of the Atlantic Pact. It is impossible to attach much weight

to the provisions of paragraph 9 which recognises "that the further progress towards unity, which the member States of the European Community are determined to make, should in due course have a beneficial effect on the contribution to the common defence of the Alliance". Similarly, while in paragraph 11 the members of the Alliance declare themselves "firmly resolved to keep each other fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations", only very vague mention is made of the nature and subject of these consultations.

37. In short, whereas at the outset the American project aimed at strengthening what is known as American leadership over the Alliance and its members, the text finally adopted no longer has the same drawbacks and does not mortgage the content of a future European union. Nor can it be said to have contributed much to solving the problems arising in the Atlantic Alliance.

38. For all these reasons, while the Atlantic Alliance continues to be useful for the defence of Europe and above all for maintaining peace, NATO can hardly be considered as a possible basis for a European defence policy. The essential is indeed not in its hands, since the strategic nuclear forces are not under NATO command and a satisfactory balance has never been achieved between the European and American elements of the Atlantic Alliance.

39. Some Committee members considered that the need for a European defence policy should not be linked to the policy of the United States whose action in their view could in no way affect Europe.

40. Your Rapporteur is willing to admit that United States leaders have never challenged the building of Europe which they probably still consider desirable. However, by its very nature, United States policy is above all American and the American leaders are not likely to forget this since the United States has a democratic system which works very well and where supervision of the executive by the representatives of public opinion is very real. The union of Western Europe cannot be a major objective for American public opinion whereas Europeans see it increasingly as a condition for the survival

of the States and national societies. Your Rapporteur therefore believes that this difference of view alone makes it necessary to work out a European defence policy separate from that of the United States, even if it has to be closely linked. Pressure on the executive from American public opinion and a growing section of Congress for the withdrawal of at least part of the American forces stationed in Europe seems to bear this out.

41. In Europe, three successive attempts have been made to lay the foundations for a European defence policy.

42. (i) The first was the European Defence Community, which came to naught since it was rejected by the French parliament in 1954 on the grounds that France would have had to relinquish its full freedom of choice in the foreign and defence policy fields while the United Kingdom was not to take part in the organisation and, furthermore, no concessions were to be made by the United States.

43. (ii) The second was the creation of WEU which certainly came into being but which from the outset found itself deprived of most of its prerogatives, defence matters being handed over to NATO and, more recently, most foreign policy questions being discussed in a nine-power political framework.

44. Nevertheless, WEU is now the Western European defence organisation and some Committee members underlined that to the powers which sought to divide Europe it seemed more dangerous than NATO.

45. (iii) A third attempt was made in the NATO framework: Eurogroup. However, France not wishing to take part in Eurogroup, it does not correspond to what a European union might be. Moreover, being in the NATO context means that it would be difficult for it ever to have a truly European character. Finally, since it has no charter and no collective decisions are issued after its meetings, it is not easy to assess its aims and methods. However, so far as your Rapporteur is aware, this group, which is perhaps a centre for reflection on technical matters, in no way harmonises the foreign policies of the participating countries.

46. (iv) Finally, at the Assembly's session in November 1973, Mr. Michel Jobert, then French Minister for Foreign Affairs, underlined his anxiety for the security and independence of Europe stemming from certain aspects of United States policy towards the Soviet Union, particularly the American-Soviet treaty of 22nd June 1973 and its Article IV containing — on the same basis as the North Atlantic Treaty for the United States' European partners — an obligation to concert in the event of danger of nuclear war. He then proposed that Europeans organise themselves in the framework of WEU to meet this new situation :

"I do not forget that the treaty setting up WEU created an alliance among seven European countries. If all its members were in agreement, WEU could constitute a valid theatre for the thinking and talks which I have just suggested. These, today, are more necessary than ever, for Europe must now concern itself with a future which may not be very distant. It must, in any case, concern itself with strategic developments themselves, which have called into question so many programmes that we go on pursuing more through wishful thinking than from conviction.

The French Government, in proposing that the Standing Armaments Committee should provide the privileged framework for European co-operation in armaments manufacture, has already clearly demonstrated the interest it takes in your organisation. I hope that the French proposal will make speedy and satisfactory progress. With a little imagination and a lot of good will the rest, I feel sure, must follow. Why, for example, should the horizon of our thinking, and indeed of the organisation generally, not be widened, both in detail and as a whole, so as to take on a real European dimension ?"

47. There is so far no indication of any response to the proposal by Mr. Jobert, which was particularly explicit as regards the Standing Armaments Committee.

48. There is of course every reason to wonder why all attempts to set up the European pillar

of the Alliance have in the long run either failed or had sparse and uncertain results. It is hardly surprising that in 1954 Europe, which barely existed, was unable to form a defence union.

49. The situation has since changed considerably, Europe having become a reality in the economic sphere. For this reason alone it must assert itself in the foreign policy and defence fields. Two problems which arose during the summer of 1974 provide proof of this :

50. (i) Concurrently with the collapse of the dictatorship in Greece which had induced the EEC to "freeze" its association with that country, the new Greek Government decided to leave the NATO integrated command structure and to ask the EEC to revive its association with Greece. Shortly afterwards, the Greek Government announced that it was applying for membership of the EEC. The Nine are thus compelled to consider Greece's request. This question cannot be linked with that of Greece's relations with NATO since membership of NATO on the one hand and the EEC on the other are *de jure* and *de facto* two entirely separate problems. It seems evident that if Europe wishes the democratic elements which have returned to power in Greece to be strengthened, it must give serious and favourable consideration to the request of the Greek Government.

51. (ii) Since it is necessary to phase out the American F-104 aircraft with which the air forces of Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway are equipped, these countries have decided to give joint consideration to the most suitable type of replacement. This problem is not only a technical one — it has major economic and political aspects, since its solution will have a far-reaching impact on the survival of a modern aeronautical industry in Europe and jobs for many European workers in a time of crisis. Likewise, the choice to be made will necessarily be a political option.

52. This is a matter of considerable magnitude. What sort of a European Economic Community would it be if its member States were to equip their armed forces with arms imported from the United States rather than with European equipment, which in terms of performance and pur-

chase price is generally considered to be on a par with any from across the Atlantic?

53. Last July, there were rumours in the international press that certain countries had imposed as a condition for purchasing the French Mirage F-1 aircraft that France join Eurogroup. France may rightly wonder what significance its accession would have, since Eurogroup seems to many observers, as Mr. Vredeling, Netherlands Minister of Defence, recently stated, to be an instrument of American pressure to undermine the economic solidarity of the members of the EEC.

54. Another argument invoked in favour of procuring American matériel is that the United States insists on financial compensation to offset the cost of maintaining American troops in Europe. Here again the problem of the nature of the Alliance arises: is the aim a partnership between equals or a strengthening of United States leadership in the defence field by extending it to the field in which Europe is trying to assert itself, i.e. that of the economy?

55. It is quite clear that no one envisages a European defence policy without a major American contribution. The question is whether the defence of Europe is an American affair to which the Europeans are merely required to make a contribution or whether it is first and foremost a European affair. In the latter case, Europe must define its intentions in the fields of arms production, strategy and foreign policy, even if it has to discuss them subsequently with the Americans. No institution can replace political determination which, of course, can be defined only in the framework of the nine countries which have affirmed their intention to form a European union.

#### IV. WEU in the European union

56. In his speech on 28th August 1974, President Giscard d'Estaing recalled the French Government's intention to call a summit conference of the Nine during the French chairmanship-in-office, i.e. before the end of this year, in order to consider the prospects of European political union. In view of the stage reached

in consultations between the Nine in this field and uncertainty as to the United Kingdom's European policy, one may wonder what chances there are of this European summit meeting being successful. However this may be, there is no reason to believe that the defence aspects of European union will be discussed on that occasion.

57. Yet these aspects are essential and it may be wondered whether real progress can be made towards political union, i.e. not the creation of any form of new organisation but the definition of a European foreign policy, if there is no fundamental agreement in the defence field. To an increasing extent, the idea is gaining ground in Europe and it is evident in the European press that such agreement cannot be confined to what is done in the NATO framework but must cover:

58. (i) A concept of defence policy and strategy so that relations between Europe and the United States in the defence field are not confined to national resistance — uneven and in any event ineffective — to successive United States concepts which correspond solely to United States interests in this field.

59. (ii) Co-ordination of national nuclear policies. The fact that the United Kingdom and France have national nuclear forces is evidently a source of inequality between the EEC members in the defence field which gives rise to legitimate suspicion on the part of their partners as to the political and military conditions in which these weapons might one day be used. The equipment of French forces with Pluton tactical missiles in 1974 raises a particular problem for the Federal Republic as being the possible battlefield on which these missiles might be used. These problems should be given close consideration by the countries concerned and be the subject of agreements such as already exist — between the Federal Republic and the United States, for instance — with regard to tactical nuclear weapons.

60. Some Committee members doubted that the French and English nuclear forces roused any suspicion on the part of their European partners, which did not take these weapons seriously, attributing the nuclear efforts of the two countries to questions of prestige. Your Rapporteur agrees with them that no European power envisages the possibility of a conflict with the Soviet

Union in which Europe would not have the support of the United States. Nevertheless, he believes that the French deterrent force — he does not wish to take sides here regarding the United Kingdom's political and strategic intentions — achieves justification in the situation created by developments in the Atlantic Alliance. It provides a European country with something of a counter-guarantee in face of the ups and downs of American defence policy. Insofar as it gives it the wherewithal to transform hostilities into a nuclear war, it prevents the United States from agreeing with the Soviet Union to contain fighting which may break out in Europe at the level of conventional weapons or even limited nuclear weapons.

61. Your Rapporteur does not believe the French deterrent force is intended to nor does it separate Europe from the United States; on the contrary, it brings them closer together and prompts greater solidarity in the event of serious crisis.

62. It may even be said that there is a kind of complementarity between the defence policies of France and its partners: each one wishes defence to be based on the pause for discussion allowed by American nuclear weapons, but whereas France's partners do their utmost to ensure that Europe has this protection by strengthening all direct links between Europe and the United States, France hopes to be able to influence the United States indirectly because of the existence of its nuclear weapons. Although at present France's method may not appear indispensable, it might be quite different if American defence policy were to change, and particularly if a large proportion of American troops were withdrawn from Europe. Unless preparations had been made a long time ahead, it would then be too late to look for an alternative policy.

63. There is thus no very great difference between France's position and that of its partners and the fact that, in order to achieve the same aim, they use different methods merely increases the need for concertation in the political and military fields.

64. (iii) The use of various kinds of forces in the event of hostilities so that Europe's defence may be based on a common concept of military action. Naturally, NATO can but remain the preferred forum for concertation as long as American forces occupy an essential place in the Western European defence system.

65. (iv) The development of European military strength in the Mediterranean, essential if nine-power political consultations are to lead to real political action. As long as Europe has no real power, there is no point in complaining, as European public opinion seems to do every time there is a crisis, that Europe is left out of the settlement of matters which concern it. Writing in *Défense nationale*, August-September 1974, General Valentin, former Commander of the French First Army, said:

“This balance in the Central European theatre, which is not parity but is stable because anyone doing anything to upset it would himself be caught up, has no counterpart in the Eastern Mediterranean area or in the Nordic regions, where the extreme weakness of the land and naval resources of the various European countries concerned leaves the United States a free hand in the military field to face the Russians, either directly or through intermediary nations.

Consideration of the present situation shows that there is an evident danger on Europe's flanks due to the absence of any serious effort by the European powers, a danger which can but grow if there is a tendency for the Americans to withdraw, after a settlement in the Near East, for instance.”

66. (v) The maintenance of European forces at an adequate level in the Central Europe sector. In this connection, General Valentin stated in the same article:

“The first reaction to consideration of the balance of forces in the near future is concern at the reduction of the effort being made by the Western European powers, whereas the East's arms are being increased in number and quality. We saw above that the present stability was possible without parity between the opposing forces because of the threat of recourse to nuclear weapons; nevertheless, this balance implies that the level of the West's forces must be above a certain threshold. In other words, the ratio of Warsaw Pact forces to those of the Atlantic Pact must not be such as to allow the former to advance like water through a sieve without any firm reaction or real fighting. Yet it may be considered that this

threshold is not much lower than the point which Western European forces will soon have reached.

The Germans, who are well equipped numerically, are going to reduce their peacetime levels: admittedly, the reduction of numbers in the smaller units will be offset by an increase in the number of brigades and improved organisation of the call-up of reservists. However this may be, overall, it is to be feared that these reforms may not result in an improvement and there will undeniably be a reduction in the number of troops. The British BAOR divisions have two brigades, which does not permit manoeuvre. For several years the Dutch and the Belgians have been steadily reducing their troop levels in Germany, and the future measures envisaged by the latter are hardly likely to reverse this trend, quite the contrary. As for France, although its first army will soon be reinforced with tactical nuclear weapons, it needs more thirty-ton tanks and to speed up the modernisation of its equipment, which is spread over too long a period. Moreover, it is no secret that the fighter aircraft of all these nations are below strength. In fact, the Western European countries should increase the percentage of military expenditure rather than reduce or stabilise it, otherwise, because of the progress of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, the ratio of one army to the other will soon fall below the critical threshold."

67. (vi) Armaments, their standardisation, production and distribution to European forces. It seems increasingly essential to the survival of a European arms industry capable of ensuring some degree of independence for Europe in this field for Europeans to define their needs jointly and work out their production programmes in the light of joint requirements.

68. If such a programme is agreed to, the question arises as to the framework in which it should be implemented. In this connection your Rapporteur wishes to quote from an article by General von Kielmansegg, former NATO Commander-in-Chief Central Europe, published in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on 29th August 1974:

"Politicians might be advised to reread the EDC treaty. The treaty proper covers 55 pages, which means a good hour's reading. Even if many elements, particularly in the military and economic fields, have now had their day or are obsolete, there are also many ideas or provisions in this text which were at the time the subject of very detailed work and which would be usable today. All that covers the finance commissariat, the budget and arms programmes is more or less ready for use and could be used for the continued building of Europe, with a few changes and adaptations, naturally. The question "where" — for instance in Eurogroup or in the framework of European political co-operation — certainly raises problems. First, because it is unlikely that all the members of these bodies would accept the defence framework. But there too we could bear in mind the six-power EDC and the close links it had with Britain through a special treaty. These seven countries are the nucleus of Western Europe. They are grouped in the EEC. They have common interests in the defence field and are the members of Western European Union, which was the only outcome of the EDC disaster in the field of European policy. This is where a sort of metempsychosis might take place, if only we wanted it."

69. Without sharing General von Kielmansegg's regrets about the EDC, of which the least that can be said is that it was premature, your Rapporteur willingly concedes that some elements of the draft treaty to establish the EDC might now be suitable for a European defence organisation. Above all, he does not think it necessary to seek new institutions to carry out what can be done in existing institutions and he wonders what grounds there may be for wishing to hand over to vague institutions involving hardly any commitments for those taking part in them activities which should be handled in sound institutions based on treaties involving firm commitments for their signatories, as is the case of the Brussels Treaty. There would be no point in calling for more European co-operation if the very basis of that co-operation — Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty — were allowed to fade away.

**SECOND DRAFT SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE  
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1974 <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur*

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Summary of Supplementary Estimates for the Financial Year 1974  
Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads  
Explanatory Memorandum

***Summary of Supplementary Estimates for the Financial Year 1974***

Details	Credits approved for 1974 (Docs. 621 and 634 ) F	Increases F	Revised estimates for 1974 F
<i>Head I</i> : Expenditure for staff .....	3,054,400	—	3,054,400
<i>Head II</i> : Expenditure relating to temporary personnel ..	784,000	—	784,000
<i>Head III</i> : Expenditure on premises and equipment .....	118,000	—	118,000
<i>Head IV</i> : General administrative costs .....	686,500	130,000	816,500
<i>Head V</i> : Other expenditure .....	308,000	—	308,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE .....	4,950,900	130,000	5,080,900
TOTAL RECEIPTS .....	37,900	3,000	40,900
NET TOTAL .....	4,913,000	127,000	5,040,000

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and approved by the Presidential Committee by 5 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Dequae (Chairman) ; Mr. Legaret, Lord Selsdon (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Ahrens, Alber, de Bruyne, Castellucci (Substitute : Magliano), Dardel (Substitute : Nessler), Depietri, Hengel (Substitute :

Mart), Lewis, Page (Substitute : *Sir John Rodgers*), Lord Peddie, MM. Peijnenburg, Portheine, Prearo, Santalco, Schleiter, Talamona, Mrs. Wolf (Substitute : *Kempfer*), Mr. Wurbs (Substitute : *Vohrer*).

*Also present* : MM. Adriaensens, Müller.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads**

Details	Credits approved for 1974 (Doos. 621 and 634) F	Increases F	Revised Estimates for 1974 F
<b>Head I — EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF</b>			
Sub-Head 1: Salaries of permanent establishment .....	2,129,200	—	2,129,200
Sub-Head 2: (A) Allowances .....	406,700	—	406,700
(B) Social charges .....	500,900	—	500,900
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials .....	17,600	—	17,600
TOTAL OF HEAD I .....	3,054,400	—	3,054,400
<b>Head II — EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY</b>			
Sub-Head 3: 1. Temporary staff .....	256,000	—	256,000
2. Linguistic staff .....	388,000	—	388,000
3. Insurance for temporary staff .....	3,300	—	3,300
4. Installation of simultaneous interpretation equip ment .....	114,000	—	114,000
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during the sessions ...	22,700	—	22,700
TOTAL OF HEAD II .....	784,000	—	784,000
<b>Head III — EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT</b>			
Sub-Head 4: Premises .....	108,000	—	108,000
Sub-Head 5: Capital equipment .....	10,000	—	10,000
TOTAL OF HEAD III .....	118,000	—	118,000
<b>Head IV — GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS</b>			
Sub-Head 6: Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents, typewriters, etc. ....	160,000	15,000	175,000
Sub-Head 7: Paper, stationery and office supplies .....	90,000	15,000	105,000
Sub-Head 8: Printing and publishing of Assembly documents ...	400,000	100,000	500,000
Sub-Head 9: Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. ....	16,000	—	16,000
Sub-Head 10: Official car .....	20,000	—	20,000
Sub-Head 11: Bank charges .....	500	—	500
TOTAL OF HEAD IV .....	686,500	130,000	816,500
<b>Head V — OTHER EXPENDITURE</b>			
Sub-Head 12: Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for Chairmen of Committees, Rapporteurs and Represen- tatives attending meetings of the Bureau, Presidential Committee and joint meetings .....	50,000	—	50,000
Sub-Head 13: Expenses for representation and receptions .....	70,000	—	70,000
Sub-Head 14: Committee study missions .....	2,000	—	2,000
Sub-Head 15: Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	95,000	—	95,000
Sub-Head 16: Expenses of experts and the auditors .....	45,000	—	45,000
Sub-Head 17: Expenditure on information .....	23,000	—	23,000
Sub-Head 18: Expenses for groups of the Assembly .....	15,000	—	15,000
Sub-Head 19: Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for .....	2,000	—	2,000
Sub-Head 20: Non-recoverable taxes .....	6,000	—	6,000
TOTAL OF HEAD V .....	308,000	—	308,000

**Head IV — General administrative costs**

*Sub-Head 6*

POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS,  
TYPEWRITERS, ETC.

*Supplementary Estimate* : F 15,000  
F 175,000  
Credits approved : F 160,000  
*Supplementary Estimate* : F 15,000

*Sub-Head 7*

PAPER, STATIONERY AND OFFICE SUPPLIES

*Supplementary Estimate* : F 15,000  
F 105,000  
Credits approved : F 90,000  
*Supplementary Estimate* : F 15,000

*Sub-Head 8*

PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS

*Supplementary Estimate* : F 100,000  
F 500,000  
Credits approved : F 400,000  
*Supplementary Estimate* : F 100,000

### ***Explanatory Memorandum***

***(submitted by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur)***

The supplementary budget which is now submitted amounts to F 130,000. The total budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1974 will therefore be F 5,040,000.

This supplementary budget is intended to meet the increase in certain operating expenditure connected with the increased cost of living.

- (i) The increased postage rates introduced during the financial year require an increase of F 15,000 to cover the cost of mail, telephone calls and telegrams up to the end of the year.
- (ii) The first supplementary budget (Document 634) provided for an increase of F 40,000 in expenditure on printing and publishing Assembly documents. It was not until after the June session that it became apparent that this supplementary amount would be inadequate to meet expenditure for the second part-session.

The amount of documents printed (reports and information documents) varies fairly considerably from one session to another without it being possible to foresee the trend and scale of these variations. The amount of documents increased noticeably during the first part of the present session. The total cost of printing connected with this part-session therefore amounted to F 280,000, i.e. definitely more than half the amount foreseen under this head. In any event, therefore, amounts still available for the second part-session are inadequate. An increase of F 100,000 is therefore requested.

- (iii) The increased volume of work also results in increased consumption of paper and office supplies. An increase of F 15,000 is therefore requested to cover the payment of supplies now in course of delivery and which it was absolutely necessary to order for the preparation of the next session.

**BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE  
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1975<sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration<sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1975  
Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads  
Explanatory Memorandum

*Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1975*

Details	Estimate for 1975 F
<i>Head I</i> : Expenditure for staff .....	3,630,000
<i>Head II</i> : Expenditure relating to temporary personnel .....	1,051,000
<i>Head III</i> : Expenditure on premises and equipment .....	153,000
<i>Head IV</i> : General administrative costs .....	1,066,000
<i>Head V</i> : Other expenditure .....	400,000
<b>TOTAL EXPENDITURE</b> .....	<b>6,300,000</b>
<b>TOTAL RECEIPTS</b> .....	<b>35,000</b>
<b>NET TOTAL</b> .....	<b>6,265,000</b>

1. Adopted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration by 10 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions and approved by the Presidential Committee by 5 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. Dequae (Chairman) ; Mr. Legaret, Lord Selsdon (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Ahrens, Alber, de Bruyne, Castellucci (Substitute : Magliano), Dardel (Substitute : Nessler), Depietri, Hengel (Substitute :

*Mart*), Lewis, Page (Substitute : *Sir John Rodgers*), Lord Peddie, MM. Peijnenburg, Portheine, Prearo, Santalco, Schleiter, Talamona, Mrs. Wolf (Substitute : *Kempfler*), Mr. Wurbs (Substitute : *Vohrer*).

*Also present* : MM. Adriaensens, Müller.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads**

Details	Estimate for 1975 F
<b>Head I — EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF</b>	
Sub-Head 1: Salaries of permanent establishment .....	2,533,000
Sub-Head 2: (A) Allowances .....	476,000
(B) Social charges .....	602,000
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and departure of permanent officials .....	19,000
TOTAL OF HEAD I .....	3,630,000
<b>Head II — EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY</b>	
Sub-Head 3: 1. Temporary staff .....	365,000
2. Linguistic staff .....	514,000
3. Insurance for temporary staff .....	4,000
4. Installation of simultaneous interpretation equip- ment .....	130,000
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during the sessions ....	38,000
TOTAL OF HEAD II .....	1,051,000
<b>Head III — EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT</b>	
Sub-Head 4: Premises .....	143,000
Sub-Head 5: Capital equipment .....	10,000
TOTAL OF HEAD III .....	153,000
<b>Head IV — GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS</b>	
Sub-Head 6: Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents, typewriters, etc. ....	240,000
Sub-Head 7: Paper, stationery and office supplies .....	130,000
Sub-Head 8: Printing and publishing of Assembly documents ....	650,000
Sub-Head 9: Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. ....	20,500
Sub-Head 10: Official cars .....	25,000
Sub-Head 11: Bank charges .....	500
TOTAL OF HEAD IV .....	1,066,000
<b>Head V — OTHER EXPENDITURE</b>	
Sub-Head 12: Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for Chairmen of Committees, Rapporteurs and Represent- atives attending meetings of the Bureau, Presidential Committee and joint meetings .....	60,000
Sub-Head 13: Expenses for representation and receptions .....	83,000
Sub-Head 14: Committee study missions .....	2,000
Sub-Head 15: Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk	177,000
Sub-Head 16: Expenses of experts and the auditors .....	20,000
Sub-Head 17: Expenditure on information .....	33,000
Sub-Head 18: Expenses for groups of the Assembly .....	15,000
Sub-Head 19: Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for .....	3,000
Sub-Head 20: Non-recoverable taxes .....	7,000
TOTAL OF HEAD V .....	400,000

**Head I — Expenditure for Staff***Sub-Head 1*

## SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT

*Estimate : F 2,533,000**(a) Basic salaries**Estimate : F 2,525,000*

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
The Clerk .....	Hors cadre	1	96,000
The Clerk Assistant .....	Hors cadre	1	164,000
Counsellors .....	A5	5	786,000
First Secretaries .....	A4	2	271,000
Secretary .....	A3	1	112,000
Secretaries-Translators/Publications .....	A2	3	261,000
Administrative Assistant/Assistant Translator			
Chief Accountant .....	B6	1	85,000
Personal Assistants .....	B4	4	253,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists .....	B3	6	323,000
Switchboard Operator .....	B3	1	54,000
Head Roneo-Storekeeper .....	C6	1	50,000
Messengers .....	C3	2	70,000
		28	2,525,000

*(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling expenses and French social security**Estimate : F 8,000*

*Sub-Head 2*

## ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC.

## (A) ALLOWANCES

*Estimate : F 476,000*

## (a) Household allowance

*Estimate : F 89,000*

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Clerk Assistant .....	Hors cadre	1	10,000
Counsellors.....	A5	4	37,000
First Secretary .....	A4	1	8,000
Secretary .....	A3	1	7,000
Personal Assistants .....	B4	3	12,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists .....	B3	3	10,000
Messenger.....	C3	2	5,000
		15	89,000

## (b) Children's allowance

*Estimate : F 116,000*4,000 F per year per child :  $4,000 \times 29$  ..... F 116,000

## (c) Expatriation allowance

*Estimate : F 217,000*

Rank	WEU Grade	No.	Total F
Counsellors.....	A5	3	90,000
First Secretary .....	A4	1	27,000
Secretary .....	A3	1	25,000
Secretary-Translator / Publications Administrative Assistant / Assistant Translator .....	A2	2	27,000
Personal Assistants .....	B4	2	26,000
Bilingual Shorthand Typists .....	B3	2	22,000
		11	217,000

## (d) Compensatory rent allowance

*Estimate : F 10,000*

## (e) Overtime

*Estimate : F 14,000*

## (f) Guarantee against currency devaluation for non-French staff

*Estimate : token purposes*

## (g) Education allowance

*Estimate : F 28,000*

## (h) Allowance for language courses

*Estimate : F 2,000*

**(B) SOCIAL CHARGES***Estimate* : F 602,000

<b>(a) Social Security</b>	<i>Estimate</i> : F 161,000
27 officials	F 161,000
<b>(b) Supplementary insurance</b>	<i>Estimate</i> : F 101,000
3.5 % of total emoluments × 2,889,000 F	F 101,000
<b>(c) Provident fund</b>	<i>Estimate</i> : F 340,000
14 % of base salaries × 2,429,000 F	F 340,000
<b>(d) Retirement pension</b>	<i>Estimate</i> : token purposes

**(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS***Estimate* : F 19,000

<b>(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris who are convened for examinations and interviews and cost of marking examination papers</b>	<i>Estimate</i> : F 1,600
<b>(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons</b>	<i>Estimate</i> : F 1,500
<b>(c) Removal expenses</b>	<i>Estimate</i> : F 3,000
<b>(d) Installation allowance</b>	<i>Estimate</i> : F 4,500
<b>(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials</b>	<i>Estimate</i> : F 6,000
<b>(f) Medical examination</b>	<i>Estimate</i> : F 2,400

**Head II — Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly***Estimate* : F 1,051,000**Sub-Head 3****1. TEMPORARY STAFF****Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly**

Function	Daily remuneration F	Bonn : 5 days		Paris : 5 days	
		No.	Total F	No.	Total F
Head of the sittings office .....	360	1 <i>b</i>	3,700	1 <i>a</i>	2,900
Heads of sections .....	265		13,000	2 <i>a</i>	11,300
	360	6 <i>b</i>		4 <i>b</i>	
Sergeant-at-Arms .....	310	1 <i>b</i>	1,900	1 <i>b</i>	1,900
Secretaries for the Assembly .....	250		7,400	2 <i>a</i>	6,200
	310	4 <i>b</i>		2 <i>b</i>	
Précis writers .....	250		14,800	4 <i>a</i>	12,400
	310	8 <i>b</i>		4 <i>b</i>	
Verbatim reporters .....	250	3 <i>a</i>	33,600	14 <i>b</i>	35,400
	310	11 <i>b</i>		4 <i>c</i>	
	390	4 <i>c</i>			
Assistants .....	195	6 <i>b</i>	54,000	4 <i>b</i>	41,500
	185	35 <i>b</i>		23 <i>b</i>	
	135	5 <i>a</i>		10 <i>a</i>	
	150	6 <i>a</i>		6 <i>a</i>	
Head ushers .....	100	1 <i>a</i>	1,500	1 <i>a</i>	500
	160	1 <i>b</i>			
Ushers .....	85	16 <i>a</i>	10,300	16 <i>a</i>	8,100
	145	4 <i>b</i>			
Roneo/Assemblers .....	85	18 <i>a</i>	10,800	18 <i>a</i>	10,800
		130	151,000	116	131,000
			49,000	.....	34,000
			200,000		165,000
			365,000		

*a.* Recruited locally.*b.* Recruited outside France.*c.* Recruited as free-lance staff.

## 2. LINGUISTIC STAFF

## (A) Interpretation Services

## (a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly

Function	10 days	
	No.	Total F
Interpreters .....	6 a	120,000
	6 b	
	12	

a. Recruited locally.

Travelling expenses ..... F 10,000

b. Recruited outside France.

F 130,000

(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions ..... F 120,000

## (B) Translation Services

## Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly

Function	Daily remuneration F	No.	Estimate <sup>1</sup> F
Revisers .....	370	3 a	88,000
	565	3 b	
Translators .....	290	4 a	94,000
	460	4 b	
Assistants.....	150	4 a	74,000
	195	3 b	
	135	3 a	
	185	2 b	
		26	256,000

1. Based on 30 days for the revisers and translators.

a. Recruited locally.

Travelling expenses ..... F 8,000

b. Recruited outside France.

F 264,000

## 3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF

Estimate : F 4,000

## 4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT AND HIRE OF OFFICES FOR THE SESSIONS

— Installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment .....	F	98,000
— Installation of telephone booths .....	F	13,000
— Installation of tape-recorders and a teleprinter "France-Presse" for the Press Service .....	F	10,000
— Technicians necessary for the operation of the simultaneous interpretation equipment in the WEU committee rooms .....	F	7,000
— Hire of a photocopying machine for the Press Service.....	F	2,000
— Hire of offices .....		<u>token purposes</u>

*Estimate* : F 130,000

## 5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS

— Removal expenses Paris-Bonn .....	F	13,000
— Medical Service (Doctor and Nurse).....	F	4,000
— Hire of typewriters and technicians .....	F	6,500
— Servicing of lifts .....	F	3,500
— Cleaning .....	F	5,000
— Miscellaneous.....	F	6,000

*Estimate* : F 38,000

**Head III — Expenditure on premises and equipment**

*Estimate* : F 153,000

*Sub-Head 4*

## PREMISES

— Hire of committee rooms outside Paris and installation of simultaneous interpretation equipment.....	F	8,000
— Technician necessary for the operation of the simultaneous interpretation equipment in the WEU committee rooms between sessions .....	F	4,000
— Joint overheads for the premises .....	F	124,000
— Minor repairs to equipment and machines and removal of furniture	F	<u>7,000</u>

*Estimate* : F 143,000

*Sub-Head 5*

## CAPITAL EQUIPMENT

— Replacement of 10 typists' chairs .....	F	3,000
— Replacement of 2 IBM typewriters .....	F	7,000
		10,000
		<i>Estimate : F</i> 10,000

**Head IV — General administrative costs***Estimate : F* 1,066,000*Sub-Head 6*

## POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS

— Postage .....	F	150,000
— Telephone.....	F	70,000
— Telegrams.....	F	6,000
— Transport of documents .....	F	14,000
		240,000
		<i>Estimate : F</i> 240,000

*Sub-Head 7*

## PAPER, STATIONERY AND OFFICE SUPPLIES

— Purchase of roneo paper, stencils, headed writing paper and other office supplies		
		<i>Estimate : F</i> 130,000

*Sub-Head 8*

## PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS

— Printing of Assembly documents (includes the record of debates, minutes of the Assembly and Assembly documents)		
— Printing of Reports of the Council		
— Printing of Texts Adopted		
— Miscellaneous — Bulletins, printing of the Agenda and Order of Business of the Assembly, voting lists, etc.		
— Reprints		
— Brochures		
		<i>Estimate : F</i> 650,000

*Sub-Head 9*

## PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC.

*Estimate : F* 20,500

*Sub-Head 10*

## OFFICIAL CARS

— Hire of official cars ..... *Estimate* : F 25,000

*Sub-Head 11*

## BANK CHARGES

*Estimate* : F 500

**Head V — Other expenditure**

*Estimate* : F 400,000

*Sub-Head 12*

TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY,  
CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES AND RAPORTEURS

*Estimate* : F 60,000

*Sub-Head 13*

## EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS

*Estimate* : F 83,000

*Sub-Head 14*

## COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS

*Estimate* : F 2,000

*Sub-Head 15*

## OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

*Estimate* : F 177,000

*Sub-Head 16*

## EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITOR

*Estimate* : F 20,000

*Sub-Head 17*

## EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION

*Estimate* : F 33,000

*Sub-Head 18*

## EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY

*Estimate* : F 15,000

*Sub-Head 19*

## CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR

*Estimate* : F 3,000

*Sub-Head 20*

## NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES

*Estimate* : F 7,000

**Explanatory Memorandum**

**(submitted by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur)**

1. The draft budget now before you amounts to F 6,265,000. The budget for 1974 — including the two supplementary budgets — amounted to F 5,040,000<sup>1</sup>. The difference is therefore F 1,225,000, i.e. 24.30 %.

Such a large increase from one financial year to another is due to three factors :

- (i) first, the faster rate of inflation in 1974 and the effect over a full year of the higher costs and salaries in the course of the present financial year and which in some instances were felt only at the end of the year ;
- (ii) second, a new method of calculating estimates has been adopted. In 1974, the Assembly had to submit two supplementary budgets to meet the increase in expenditure during the financial year. In order to avoid, as far as possible, having to resort to this practice again, the present budget has been calculated on the basis of known increases and also on the basis of estimated increases, however uncertain, which may prove necessary during the financial year 1975 ;
- (iii) finally, part of the increase is due to the additional expenditure to be incurred as a result of the decision to hold the First Part of the Twenty-First Session in Bonn and to celebrate the Assembly's twentieth anniversary by holding a special sitting. This expenditure is estimated at F 165,000 in respect of :
  - the higher cost of recruiting temporary staff ;
  - mission expenses for members of the staff of the Office of the Clerk ;
  - transport of documents ;
  - publications connected with the celebration of the twentieth anniversary.

2. *Head I — Expenditure for Staff*

The increase (F 573,200) in the estimate for this head takes account of :

- (i) the effect over a full year of increases granted in 1974 in basic salaries and payments to the provident fund, expatriation and household allowances and contributions in respect of supplementary insurance ;
- (ii) annual increments ;
- (iii) an estimated 9 % rise in salaries and other emoluments in 1975 to meet the rise in the cost of living (estimate made by the OECD Economic Committee).

3. *Head II — Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly*

Sub-head 3.1 — Temporary staff.

The increased salaries for temporary staff (F 109,000) follow the scales applied in the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. In accordance with the decision of the Budget Committee of the

---

1. Initial budget	F 4,450,000
First supplementary budget	F 463,000 (of which F 423,000 for salaries and allowances and F 40,000 for publications)
Second supplementary budget	F 127,000 (postage, paper and office supplies, publications)
	F 5,040,000

Council, the WEU Assembly applies automatically, in the course of the year, all increases in salary scales as and when they are applied by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament.

The increase in the estimate for this sub-head is 10 % for 1975.

Since the first part of the 1975 session is to be held in the Federal Republic of Germany, the cost of recruiting temporary staff is expected to be higher than for a session held in Paris.

As Assembly documents are issued in English and French, French staff recruited on the spot for sessions held in Paris form a large proportion of the temporary staff. Since a part-session is to be held away from the seat of the Assembly, allowances and travelling expenses will have to be paid for a larger number of temporary staff.

#### Sub-head 3.2 (A) — Interpretation services

The increase (F 62,000) in the estimate for this sub-head takes account of increased salaries and daily allowances paid to interpreters in accordance with an increase in the scales agreed to by the co-ordinated organisations.

The increase in the estimate for this sub-head is 10 % for 1975.

#### Sub-head 3.2 (B) — Translation services

The increase (F 64,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the scales applied in the Council of Europe.

The increase in the estimate for this sub-head is 10 % for 1975.

#### Sub-head 3.4 — Installation of equipment and hire of offices for the sessions

The increase (F 16,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increased cost of installing equipment needed for sessions.

#### Sub-head 3.5 — Miscellaneous expenditure during the sessions

The increase (F 15,300) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds on the one hand to an increase in certain expenditure corresponding to the rise in the cost of living and on the other hand to the fact that one part-session is to be held in Bonn and will involve expenditure for transporting documents, office supplies, etc. Removal costs are estimated at about F 10,000.

### 4. *Head III — Expenditure on premises and equipment*

#### Sub-head 4 — Premises

The increase (F 35,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is partly to meet the higher cost of maintenance for the premises at 43, avenue du Président Wilson, and partly to cover the higher cost of installing simultaneous interpretation equipment for committee meetings held outside Paris and allowances for the technicians responsible for operating the simultaneous interpretation equipment in the WEU committee rooms.

#### Sub-head 5 — Capital equipment

The sum of F 10,000 is earmarked for :

- (i) the replacement of typists' chairs ;
- (ii) the replacement of two IBM typewriters.

5. *Head IV — General administrative costs*

Sub-head 6 — Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents

The increase (F 65,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to increases in the cost of telephone rental and calls and the sharp rise in postal rates as from 16th September 1974 and the repercussions for the full year in 1975.

The celebration of the Assembly's twentieth anniversary will lead to a substantial increase in the number of documents to be posted, etc.

Sub-head 7 — Paper, stationery and office supplies

The increase (F 25,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the amount actually spent in 1974 plus F 15,000 to take account of the expected rise in costs and F 10,000 to meet exceptional expenditure connected with the celebration of the Assembly's twentieth anniversary.

Sub-head 8 — Printing and publishing of Assembly documents

The increase (F 150,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increased cost of living and the expected increase in the volume of publications due to the celebration of the Assembly's twentieth anniversary.

Sub-head 9 — Purchase of documents, reference works, etc.

The increase (F 4,500) in the estimate for this sub-head is to meet the increased cost of books, newspapers and periodicals.

Sub-head 10 — Official cars

The increase (F 5,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is to meet the increased cost of hiring cars.

6. *Head V — Other expenditure*

Sub-head 12 — Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of committees and Rapporteurs

The increase (F 5,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected rise in travelling costs.

Sub-head 13 — Expenses for representation and receptions

The increase (F 13,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is to meet increased prices.

Sub-head 15 — Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk

The increase (F 82,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is to cover :

- (i) the higher daily allowances paid to officials of the Office of the Clerk and higher travelling expenses ;
- (ii) journeys by officials of the Office of the Clerk to Bonn further to the decision to hold a session in the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany (F 67,000).

Sub-head 16 — Expenses of experts and the auditors

The sum of F 20,000 is to cover fees paid to the Auditor and the expenses of experts.

## Sub-head 17 — Expenditure on information

The increase (F 10,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds on the one hand to an increase in the cost of living and on the other to additional expenditure connected with the session to be held in Bonn.

## Sub-head 19 — Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere provided for

The increase (F 1,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the rise in the cost of living.

## Sub-head 20 — Non-recoverable taxes

The sum of F 7,000 corresponds to non-recoverable taxes paid in France (Value Added Tax).

*Sundry receipts*

Expected receipts in 1974 include :

- (i) sale of publications ;
- (ii) bank interest ;
- (iii) social security reimbursements in respect of staff on sick leave.

**Head I — Expenditure for Staff***Sub-Head 1***SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT****(a) Basic salaries**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 2,525,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 2,122,200
	F 402,800
Net increase .....	F 402,800

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 2.

**(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling expenses and French social security**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 8,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 7,000
	F 1,000
Net increase .....	F 1,000

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of increased rates payable to temporary staff.

*Sub-Head 2*

## ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC.

## (A) ALLOWANCES

## (a) Household allowance

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 89,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 71,400
Net increase.....	F 17,600

This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff.

## (b) Children's allowance

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 116,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 103,200
Net increase.....	F 12,800

This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff.

## (c) Expatriation allowance

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 217,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 186,300
Net increase.....	F 30,700

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of non-French staff entitled to the allowance.

## (d) Compensatory rent allowance

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 10,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 10,000
Estimate unchanged	

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the rent allowance now paid and the number of officials qualifying for an allowance.

## (e) Overtime

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 14,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 12,000
Net increase.....	F 2,000

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of salary increases for permanent staff since 1st January 1974.

## (f) Guarantee against currency devaluation for non-French staff

Estimate for 1975 .....	token purposes
-------------------------	----------------

## (g) Education allowance

Estimate for 1975.....	F 28,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 22,000
Net increase .....	F 6,000

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance.

## (h) Allowance for language courses

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 2,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 1,800
Net increase.....	F 200

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance.

**(B) SOCIAL CHARGES****(a) Social security**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 161,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 135,000
	F 26,000
Net increase.....	F 26,000

**(b) Supplementary insurance**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 101,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 80,300
	F 20,700
Net increase .....	F 20,700

This calculation is based on 3.5 % of total emoluments.

**(c) Provident Fund**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 340,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 285,600
	F 54,400
Net increase .....	F 54,400

This calculation is based on 14 % of basic salaries.

**(d) Retirement pension**

Estimate for 1975 .....	token purposes
-------------------------	----------------

**(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS****(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 1,600
Budget for 1974 .....	F 1,600
Estimate unchanged	

**(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent persons**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 1,500
Budget for 1974 .....	F 1,500
Estimate unchanged	

Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff.

**(c) Removal expenses**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	3,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F	3,000

**Estimate unchanged**

Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff.

**(d) Installation allowance**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	4,500
Budget for 1974 .....	F	4,500

**Estimate unchanged**

Calculated on the basis of possible replacement requirements.

**(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	6,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F	5,000

Net increase .....	F	1,000
--------------------	---	-------

This estimate takes account of increased fares.

Based on the number of staff entitled to home leave in 1975.

**(f) Medical examination**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	2,400
Budget for 1974 .....	F	2,000

Net increase .....	F	400
--------------------	---	-----

This estimate takes account of increased fees.

**Head II — Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly**

**Sub-Head 3**

**1. TEMPORARY STAFF**

Temporary staff required for the sessions of the Assembly

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	365,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F	256,000

Net increase.....	F	109,000
-------------------	---	---------

The basis of the calculation is two part-sessions (one in Bonn and the other in Paris) making a total of 10 sitting days.

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

**2. LINGUISTIC STAFF****(A) Interpretation Services****(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 130,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 98,000
	F 32,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

**(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 120,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 90,000
	F 30,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

**(B) Translation Services****Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 264,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 200,000
	F 64,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

**3. INSURANCE FOR TEMPORARY STAFF**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 4,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 3,300
	F 700

**4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT AND HIRE OF OFFICES FOR THE SESSIONS**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 130,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 114,000
	F 16,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

**5. MISCELLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING THE SESSIONS**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 38,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F 22,700
	F 15,300

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3.

**Head III — Expenditure on premises and equipment****Sub-Head 4****PREMISES**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 143,000
Budget for 1974 .....	<u>F 108,000</u>
Net increase .....	F 35,000

This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the Assembly's share in maintenance costs and hire of committee rooms.

**Sub-Head 5****CAPITAL EQUIPMENT**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 10,000
Budget for 1974 .....	<u>F 10,000</u>
Estimate unchanged	

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4.

**Head IV — General administrative costs****Sub-Head 6****POSTAGE, TELEPHONE, TELEGRAPH CHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOCUMENTS**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 240,000
Budget for 1974 .....	<u>F 175,000</u>
Net increase .....	F 65,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

**Sub-Head 7****PAPER, STATIONERY AND OFFICE SUPPLIES**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 130,000
Budget for 1974 .....	<u>F 105,000</u>
Net increase.....	F 25,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

**Sub-Head 8****PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOCUMENTS**

Estimate for 1975 .....	F 650,000
Budget for 1974 .....	<u>F 500,000</u>
Net increase.....	F 150,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

*Sub-Head 9*

## PURCHASE OF DOCUMENTS, REFERENCE WORKS, ETC.

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	20,500
Budget for 1974 .....	F	16,000
		Net increase..... F 4,500

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5.

*Sub-Head 10*

## OFFICIAL CARS

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	25,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F	20,000
		Net increase..... F 5,000

In the absence of a car belonging to the Assembly, provision must be made for the hire of chauffeur-driven cars for the President of the Assembly and the Clerk.

*Sub-Head 11*

## BANK CHARGES

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	500
Budget for 1974 .....	F	500

Estimate unchanged

**Head V — Other expenditure***Sub-Head 12*

## TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, CHAIRMEN OF COMMITTEES AND RAPPORTEURS

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	60,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F	50,000
		Net increase..... F 10,000

Travel and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly attending committee meetings, including meetings of the Presidential Committee, are paid by the governments.

The Assembly is responsible for travel and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of the Assembly, Rapporteurs and, on occasion, Committee Chairmen when such visits are connected with the preparation of a report or Assembly business. Journeys by Chairmen and Rapporteurs are subject to the approval of the Presidential Committee.

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

*Sub-Head 13*

## EXPENSES FOR REPRESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	83,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F	70,000
		Net increase..... F 13,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

*Sub-Head 14*

## COMMITTEE STUDY MISSIONS

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	2,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F	2,000

Estimate unchanged

*Sub-Head 15*

## OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEMBERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	177,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F	95,000

Net increase..... F 82,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

*Sub-Head 16*

## EXPENSES OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITORS

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	20,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F	45,000

Net decrease ..... F 25,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

*Sub-Head 17*

## EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	33,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F	23,000

Net increase ..... F 10,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

*Sub-Head 18*

## EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	15,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F	15,000

Estimate unchanged

*Sub-Head 19*

## CONTINGENCIES AND OTHER EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED FOR

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	3,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F	2,000

Net increase ..... F 1,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

*Sub-Head 20*

## NON-RECOVERABLE TAXES

Estimate for 1975 .....	F	7,000
Budget for 1974 .....	F	6,000

Net increase..... F 1,000

See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6.

*Advanced technology in Canada — the consequences for Europe*

**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. van Ooijen, Rapporteur*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

on advanced technology in Canada — the consequences for Europe

DRAFT RESOLUTION

on parliamentary collaboration in subjects of advanced technology

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

submitted by Mr. van Ooijen, Rapporteur .

Introduction

Chapter I : Parliamentary control

Chapter II : General policy

Chapter III : Canadian space efforts

Chapter IV : Canadian nuclear power programme

Chapter V : Aircraft construction

Chapter VI : The Pulp and Paper Research Institute

Chapter VII : The National Research Council

APPENDICES

I. Programme of the visit of the Committee to Canada

II. Points for discussion in Canada

III. Organigramme of the Ministry of State for Science and Technology — May 1974

IV. Statement on Canada and the European Community by Mr. Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto — 2nd November 1973

V. Canadian natural uranium heavy-water power reactors in operation, under construction, or committed — May 1974

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. de Montesquiou (Chairman); MM. Warren, Richter (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, de Chevigny, Cornelissen, Fletcher, Gölter, La Loggia, Lenzer, Mammi, Mart (Substitute:

*Hengel), van Ooijen, Osborn, Pecoraro, Schwencke, de Stexhe (Substitute: de Bruyne), Tomney (Substitute: Small), Treu, Valleix, Yvon.*

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Recommendation**  
**on advanced technology in Canada —**  
**the consequences for Europe**

The Assembly,

Sharing the regrets expressed by the Canadian Senate Special Committee on Science Policy in its report on science policy for Canada regarding the absence of international co-operation ;

Considering the Canadian Senate's proposal to create an interparliamentary association for scientific and technological affairs open to all OECD member countries and its wish to hear opinions on this proposal ;

Considering also Canada's wish to develop its foreign policy and overseas trade in new directions ;

Aware of the need to collaborate with Canada on :

- (a) the development of V-STOL aircraft ;
- (b) nuclear research and development ;
- (c) other energy resources within the framework of the overall energy policy ;
- (d) computer communications,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Invite member governments :

1. To afford the interparliamentary association — as proposed by the Canadian Senate — their assistance in the study of the abovementioned subjects ;
2. To instruct the European Space Agency to seek co-operation with Canada on :
  - (a) remote sensing systems in satellites to further environmental monitoring, oceanography, new reforestation methods and worldwide crop assessment ;
  - (b) domestic satellite communications systems.

***Draft Resolution***  
***on parliamentary collaboration in***  
***subjects of advanced technology***

The Assembly,

Sharing the regrets expressed by the Canadian Senate Special Committee on Science Policy in its report on science policy for Canada regarding the absence of international co-operation ;

Considering the Canadian Senate's proposal to create an interparliamentary association for scientific and technological affairs open to all OECD member countries and its wish to hear opinions on his proposal,

INVITES THE PARLIAMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES

To endorse the proposal to create an interparliamentary association for scientific and technological affairs and agree to hold colloquies from time to time between the science and technology committees of the national and international parliaments.

## **Explanatory Memorandum**

*(submitted by Mr. van Ooljen, Rapporteur)*

### **Introduction**

1. After the useful and instructive visit the Committee made to Japan from 2nd to 15th April 1973, it sought the approval of the Presidential Committee to make a similar visit to Canada.

2. From contacts with Canadian parliamentarians, especially those with an interest in high technology questions, it became clear that the Canadians shared many problems of interest to the member countries of WEU, i.e. relations with the United States in general and the ever-increasing strength of American industries in the home and world markets in such high technology fields as space, communications, aircraft construction, nuclear energy, computers, oceanology and electronics. Important conventional industries such as the car industry also feel the impact of the tremendous growth and influence of the American counterparts.

3. Once the Presidential Committee had agreed to the visit, a draft programme was drawn up through the good offices of the Canadian Embassy in Paris. The Department of External Affairs in Ottawa finalised the programme<sup>1</sup> and the Committee then sent them a list of questions<sup>2</sup> it had prepared for discussion in Canada. The Department of External Affairs subsequently distributed this list to other interested ministries and organisations. A special section was prepared for the members of the Senate Special Committee on Science Policy. The Canadian House of Commons does not yet have such a special committee. Moreover, a general election campaign was in process at the time of the visit.

4. Your Rapporteur wishes to express his and the Committee's gratitude to the Canadian officials from the Department of External Affairs, the Embassy in Paris and all ministries and private industries involved in the organisation of the visit.

5. The Committee's discussions with officials from several ministries on the Canadian Government's general policy in scientific and technolo-

gical matters were extremely interesting and especially those with the Senate Special Committee on Science Policy under the chairmanship of the Hon. Maurice Lamontagne, on Tuesday, 4th June 1974, the first day of the visit.

### CHAPTER I

#### **Parliamentary control**

6. The Senate Special Committee on Science Policy has published a three-volume report to which were attached numerous recommendations, many of which have now been implemented. The report — started in 1968 — made a critical review of past and present Canadian policy on science and technology. It set out the targets and strategies for the 1970s and recommended a government organisation for the coming decade.

7. Studying the science policy of Canada — a medium-sized country in terms of population but of continental size in surface area — the Special Committee found that Canada had much to gain by setting its policy, in general, in the context of international co-operation. However, as the Special Committee pointed out, international co-operation is notable for its absence. Private international relations should be promoted as the scientific and engineering community cannot flourish in isolation or merely by communicating through published material. Personal contacts, meetings of international private organisations, and between private Canadian and foreign groups are all desirable and a necessary complement to the government information network.

8. The Special Committee had difficulty in explaining this lack of international co-operation. Its chairman thought that one factor might be the failure of world organisations, like UNESCO, to provide leadership. It must be admitted that national governments have been reluctant to adopt a co-ordinated approach which might maintain and extend more effectively the international pool of scientific knowledge. Lip service has been paid to international co-operation but

1. See Appendix I.

2. See Appendix II.

nothing substantial has been done to achieve it.

9. When the Special Committee discussed the degree of parliamentary supervision of the growing activity of the government and the increasingly specialised administrative machinery, it found that Canada has a science policy by accident and that accidents were occurring at all levels. No overall policy could be detected. For example, 60 % of all Canadian research and development expenditure was in government laboratories and therefore directed mainly by the bureaucracy. There was very little political control and if a member of parliament asked for a definition of Canadian science policy the cabinet usually replied that that policy was decided by the National Research Council or the Atomic Energy Commission.

10. The lack of control was also due to the division of powers between the federal government and the provinces, the latter having far greater power than the American States. In order to promote a Canadian science policy the Special Committee recommended the establishment of a ministry for science and technology<sup>1</sup> whose main rôle would be to assist departments and agencies in bringing their proposals before the cabinet in an orderly manner and in such a way as to give the ministers the clearest picture of the problems under discussion and the options open.

11. This recommendation was implemented in 1971.

12. Another recommendation was to let research and development out by contract to private industry in order to establish a closer liaison between government and industry.

13. A third important recommendation concerned the publication of a visible science budget. This will be published for the first time in fiscal year 1975-76. It will enable parliamentarians to appraise current and future science policy correctly. The research and development programme and other scientific activities may then be compared and duplication avoided.

1. See Appendix III.

14. The Ministry of State for Science and Technology has also provided a focus for scientific and technological activities in Canada.

15. The Special Committee was fully aware of the disadvantages of establishing a ministry cutting across several departments. The Treasury Board would, of course, wish to retain budgetary control and in order to circumvent this the new ministry obtained authority to review and assess the proposals of the different departments with regard to their science budgets. Therefore, although the Treasury Board will still have the last word, the new ministry will have a strong hand. This was of course important if people of ability were to be enrolled.

16. The ministry has a small budget to encourage the launching of new research and development programmes, but as its rôle is mainly one of appraisal, it should not have to grapple with the conflicting task of directly administering a large research and development budget and at the same time appraising the programme of other departments and agencies.

17. An important part of the Canadian budget is also going to foreign companies, in particular American-owned corporations, but also to some Japanese-, British- and continental European-owned companies.

18. There are some fields in which Canada would particularly like to forge ahead and develop a Canadian capability. One such field is pollution since Canada is particularly involved in the construction of oil and gas pipelines; another is oceanology since Canada is a Pacific, Arctic and Atlantic power.

19. A case of Canadian funds going to American controlled and owned corporations is the petro-chemical industry which is 90 % American. Nevertheless, the Government of the Province of Alberta has established a fund of \$100 million for research on tar sands. The extraction of oil from tar sands is of course advantageous for Canada, but a large part of the research is being conducted for and by American companies.

20. Considerable research is also being carried out on natural uranium reactors in which the major part of the Canadian research and development budget has been invested.

21. Canada now sincerely regrets having supplied India with one of its CANDU, natural uranium heavy-water type reactors, under the Canadian aid programme. A contract was drawn up with the Indian Government to supply it with heavy water at a given price. However, India has now exploded an atomic bomb and, although it claims that it is for peaceful purposes, the Canadian Government will have to review its position as it did not intend to play this particular rôle in India's development. Canada itself cannot explode atomic bombs as it has signed the non-proliferation treaty. Since the agreement with India was the first of its type, this aspect was not covered in the agreement. It has since been corrected and safeguards have been written into the treaty with Pakistan to preclude the development of nuclear capacity to explode atomic bombs. The Pakistan Government of course is not too happy about being treated differently. Although India may not have respected the spirit of the agreement, there is no proof that it has broken the letter.

22. With regard to Canadian nuclear research and development the Special Committee had found out at the time it started its enquiry that it was entirely in the hands of the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) which, up to 1968, had spent \$1 billion. Since then much more has been spent as the CANDU reactor has been developed. Now the AECL also has to consider the domestic users of the reactor such as Ontario Hydro or Quebec Hydro which are public utilities and under some sort of parliamentary control. As users they had a large say in how the reactors should be built, especially Ontario Hydro, the first to build such a reactor. It might have been better if several companies in the private sector had been able to undertake the work, but unfortunately the only company in Canada which had the know-how to build a nuclear reactor was General Electric, a Canadian subsidiary of the American parent company. Not wanting to deal directly with a private monopoly, the utilities agreed to deal with the public monopoly, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited. The difficulty of course was that there is no private sector capable of dealing with the development of a nuclear energy programme.

23. The reason why Canada is making such a big effort in building nuclear power plants is that the Canadian oil resources might last only another twelve to fifteen years. There is as yet no certainty of finding new reserves. An alternative source of energy must therefore be found and as Canada has the largest supplies of natural uranium in the world it is logical that the government opted for the CANDU-type reactor.

24. One result of the extensive hearings which the Special Committee held right across Canada was a dialogue between the scientists and Federal Government officials that had not existed before. Another was a dialogue between Federal agencies and the universities. Furthermore, consultation between government departments was promoted. This will certainly lead to avoiding much duplication of work.

25. Finally the Chairman of the Special Committee pointed out that one of the recommendations concerned the establishment of a group of parliamentarians from the Senate and the House of Commons to study science policy methods and problems and opportunities offered by science and technology. To attain this objective it should be authorised to form in due course a Canadian association of parliamentarians, scientists and engineers in collaboration with representatives of scientific and engineering bodies. This group of Canadian parliamentarians should also be authorised to invite parliamentary delegations from OECD countries to a conference in Ottawa for the purpose of creating an inter-parliamentary association on scientific affairs. This organisation would be restricted to parliamentarians but the Special Committee could foresee that the Canadian association of parliamentarians, scientists and engineers might also wish to hold meetings with similar bodies in other countries. The experience of the Special Committee during its visits abroad demonstrated that publications on policy issues are not an adequate substitute for personal contacts.

26. The Chairman said that the Special Committee would greatly appreciate a reaction to this recommendation from European parliamen-

tarians. Meetings could be held in different capitals and the local situation of each country could be considered.

27. After the Acting Chairman had thanked the Special Committee for the interesting discussion and the hospitality at the Senate, the meeting was closed.

28. During the visit to the Canadian federal parliament, the Committee also visited the computer publishing centre of the parliament.

29. The Committee heard an address by Professor Richard von Briesen on how the House of Commons in Canada started computerised printing in the production of its parliamentary publications, particularly Hansard, to cope with spiralling costs and unprecedented increases in the volume of printing in the two official languages. The first broad objective was to publish all parliamentary publications bilingually by computerised processes which produced a simultaneous data base as a by-product at little or no extra cost in both official languages, thereby bringing a second broad objective of automated information retrieval within reach almost as soon as published. The third broad objective, also a by-product, was the provision of machine-readable data bases of all English and French texts in any parliamentary publication for computerised searches to aid in translation to and/or from the official languages. Originally the system was designed for people who need to know the explanation of laws, lawyers, courts, etc., but now in actual fact the system is used by all sorts of students and scientists for general purposes.

## CHAPTER II

### **General policy**

30. On the general policy of the Canadian Government the Committee heard addresses by government representatives of the Department of External Affairs, the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, the Department of Communications, the Ministry of State for Science and Technology and the Science Council of Canada.

31. Your Rapporteur first wishes to recall that Canada is the second largest country in the world, 3.8 million square miles in area, covering nearly half the North American continent. The estimated population is some 22 million people, 40 % of British stock, and 30 % descendants of the original French colonists mostly living in Quebec, but many French-speaking people live in New Brunswick, Ontario and Manitoba.

32. Canada, as a federation, has a federal parliament which, according to the British North America Act of 1867, consists of the Queen, an upper house styled the Senate and a House of Commons. The latter has 264 members which includes the Prime Minister and members of the cabinet. The Senate consists of 102 members appointed for life — 75 is the age limit — on a regional basis by the Governor General on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.

33. The bases of Canadian foreign policy are its membership in the Commonwealth, the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the OECD.

34. Mr. Halstead, Assistant Under-Secretary of External Affairs, welcomed the Committee at the external affairs headquarters, the Lester B. Pearson Building in Ottawa. He pointed out that international affairs not only mean diplomatic affairs, but also international co-operation in science and technology. In these fields Western Europe is a privileged partner of Canada and co-operation on a basis of mutuality can be established. The Common Market countries are, after the United States, the most important source of information for Canada<sup>1</sup>. The cultural civilisations are very much the same and it is therefore not only for sentimental or historical, but also for practical reasons that the European countries, together, are a partner of the greatest importance for Canada. The relationship is multilateral as well as bilateral. All kinds of special agreements have been concluded and co-operation should be strengthened and deepened in a pragmatic way.

1. See Appendix IV.

35. In the economic field OECD is an important forum ; close relations also exist with the European space organisations.

36. In the environmental field Canada would like to deepen relations with the Communities.

37. All these Canadian efforts reflect the policy of diversification which will not however be a substitute for the relations with the United States. They are complementary and not in competition.

38. Senior officials of Canada have contacts with senior officials of the Communities every six months and from these contacts co-operation on problems of mutual interest will have to grow. Pragmatically the nature of Canadian relations with Europe will have to be defined. Much also depends of course on the development of the Communities themselves. More contacts are certainly useful and it is of the greatest interest that they also take place at parliamentary level.

39. Dr. G.Y. Tremblay, Acting Assistant Secretary, Co-operation Branch, Ministry of State for Science and Technology, pointed out the reasons for the establishment of the Ministry of State for Science and Technology, the overall objective being the creation of new science policies that affect the federal government, Canadian industries and universities. The Ministry promotes a better understanding between Canada and other countries in the science and technology fields and exchanges information on key theoretical and technological problems. It also plays the rôle of adviser to the cabinet on policies and programmes relevant to these fields. During the last years it promoted the policy requiring Federal Government departments to contract out to industry a progressively greater share of the research and development previously done in governmental laboratories. Under this new policy the results of research and development will find wider application in industry. The policy branch is the kernel of the Ministry. Its goals are to assure comprehensive, articulated, integrated and dynamic policies for science and technology which are compatible with other government measures and guidelines so as best to serve Canada's interests. The policy branch also provides assistance and advice on how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of federal government activities in science and

technology. It co-operates in this field with the Treasury Board. A division of this branch is the government science and technology division which concentrates most of its effort on space policy, ocean policy and guidelines for development of northern science and technology. It is the intention of the Ministry to define national Canadian goals, to pursue them and pinpoint certain areas demanding special emphasis — and money.

40. Dr. P. McTaggart-Cowan, Executive Director of the Science Council of Canada, said that the basic goal of any science policy is to indicate what should be done and in what field. At the same time the establishment of standards of what is good or bad in a certain situation requires an important scientific effort. The Canadian science budget for 1974 amounts to Canadian \$1,294.5 million. The natural sciences will receive 80 % of the total and the human sciences 20 %. Long-term studies are undertaken in the latter field in order to help the federal government solve its social and economic problems. The studies also help to shape Canada's options between the years 2000 and 2050. The Science Council produces three types of reports: one to the Minister on its general activities, special reports on certain subjects and background studies produced by its staff. The report on Canada's options between 2000 and 2050 is one of the latter studies. Many reports are drawn up in co-operation with university institutes. A large part, one-quarter, of the money spent in federal establishments goes to the Department of Environment. Of the federal budget, 15% is earmarked for research by Canadian industrial establishments, and 16 % goes to universities and non-profit-making institutions.

41. Dr. S. Wagner, General Director, Office of Science and Technology, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, indicated that the department spent about \$100 million a year on promoting research and development in industry in order to keep Canadian industry

healthy and competitive. In the case of specific projects the government provides the same amount of money as industry is willing to invest in a specific project or a new product. Should such projects prove to be profit-earning, industry has to pay back the loan to the government but does not pay taxes on it. Fifty per cent of the projects so started meet with success. This is considered to be quite a good record as in many cases new technology is involved and it is difficult to assess in advance whether it will be successful or not.

42. The department also promotes ties between industry and universities. Until now industry has not made adequate use of knowledge developed in universities. In an industrial research programme the department pays an individual at university to promote the use of certain industrial products developed in university laboratories.

43. At provincial and local levels use is also made of knowledge accumulated at universities and the authorities nominate graduate students to undertake studies of use to industry and cities; especially in the fields of engineering, civic planning and environment such collaboration may be extremely useful. For instance, the department also advises small industries on the use of computers and other materials for which small industries themselves are not equipped to make valid choices between the equipment available on the market.

44. The main decisions on priorities are made at cabinet level. Studies are prepared for instance on the formulation of a policy on ground transportation systems, on the use of STOL aircraft, etc. STOL aircraft are very important for Canada as many small communities cannot maintain airports for jet aircraft. The social impact of the use of this type of aircraft is already noticeable since 150 have been brought into service.

45. Dr. Ronalds of the Department of Industry, responsible for mines and resources gave a general picture of Canadian energy policy. Canada is very rich in energy resources and produces 2 million barrels of oil a year, half of which is exported. One of the problems is that the producing areas are far from the consuming areas. The government will promote pipeline systems in order to avoid imports of oil for

the consuming areas. New oil fields have been discovered, especially in the north.

46. The coalfields are in Alberta and British Columbia. Until now it was cheaper to mine the coal and ship it to Japan than to send it to Ontario.

47. Before the oil crisis it was cheaper to build a conventional power plant than a nuclear power plant, but with the increase in price of fossil fuel this is no longer so.

48. The installed nuclear electric generating capacity in Canada today is 5,500 megawatts, 8,000 megawatts of additional electric generation will go into service between 1980 and 1984. Total nuclear electric generating capacity will be about 20,000 megawatts by 1985, 40,000 megawatts by 1990 and 135,000 megawatts by the year 2000.

49. Canada is rapidly expanding its capacity to provide strategic materials required for its nuclear power programme. It is self-sufficient in uranium and fuel manufacturing capabilities. It is also developing sufficient isotope separation capacity in the form of heavy-water production plants to sustain the nuclear power programme. The greatest success of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited is of course the CANDU reactor, one of which has been built by Ontario Hydro at Pickering. This plant produces 2,000 megawatts of electricity most satisfactorily. The Canadian Government promotes further development of this type of reactor. CANDU reactors are independent of any uranium enrichment facility but need of course a heavy-water production plant. The CANDU is based on sound scientific and economic principles which have been developed since the late 1940s by Dr. Lewis who found that heavy water was the best moderator. A CANDU reactor uses 50 % less uranium and produces twice as much plutonium than the light-water reactor. The latter is the direct outcome of the nuclear weapons development of the United States and moreover accepted by Admiral Rickover of the United States navy who wanted this type of reactor for his nuclear submarines. As often, the beginning of a development of such a complicated instrument is an historical accident. For the new generation of reactors, many talk about fast-breeder reactors but one should not forget that the capital cost of such a reactor will be three to four times more than

for the CANDU reactor. For a country like Canada the cost element is of prime importance.

### CHAPTER III

#### *Canadian space efforts*

50. With Canada's well-known problem of severe climate, vast distances and sparse population, the most obvious and most immediate application of space technology is for communications. Six successful Canadian scientific and communication satellites, four of which have been built in Canada, have given Canada a prominent place in space questions. The first satellite, Alouette I, was launched in September 1962 and in November 1972 Telesat Canada launched Anik I and gave the Canadians the world's first domestic geostationary telecommunications satellite system. The decision to use satellites for domestic communications was taken in 1968. Parliament then created Telesat Canada, an independent corporation in which the government is shareholder, to run a domestic system. Through Anik I, the first domestic communication satellite, a network was established for East-West television, telephone and data transmission. This satellite has allowed modern communications to be introduced in many areas of the country for the first time. A second identical satellite, Anik II, was launched in April 1973. It was primarily intended to back up the first Anik and it provides Telesat with spare channels which are rented out.

51. In order to obtain a close view of the Canadian space effort, the Committee visited the Canadian centre for remote sensing, Telesat, the Department of Communications, the Communications Research Centre at Shirley Bay, the Bell Northern Research and the RCA Victor laboratories.

#### (a) *The Canadian centre for remote sensing*

52. For a country like Canada it is of the greatest importance to have a detailed analysis of its land masses, inland seas and surrounding

oceans. Ever since 1962 when a symposium was held on remote sensing in the United States, the Canadian Government has followed further developments and in 1969 established the Canadian remote sensing consortium. The same year the American earth resources observation satellite, EROS, was launched in order to survey global resources for the United States geological survey. It was a follow-up of reconnaissance spacecraft of the United States Department of Defence employed on classified projects.

53. In his address to the Committee, Dr. L.W. Morley, Director of the Canadian centre for remote sensing, mentioned the book "Secret Sentinels in Space" on satellite reconnaissance for the American Defence Department. In July 1972 the earth resources technological satellite, ERTS, was launched. Canada and the United States were the countries which had developed facilities to produce fully-corrected image data of the multi-spectral images sent by this satellite. The Canadian centre receives pictures made over the North American continent. The complete world coverage takes place in eighteen days, after which the satellite passes the same area with an overlapping of about 10 %. It produces all types of pictures.

54. Remote sensing covers a wide variety of applications :

- mapping new roads and community developments ;
- reconnaissance of geological features which sometimes cannot be detected from the ground ;
- reconnaissance of shipping lanes through ice — direct information can be given to the ships concerned ;
- forest inventory-taking and reconnaissance of forest fires ;
- use of farmland ;
- monitoring world crops, crop diseases and other agricultural applications.

55. Remote sensing cannot penetrate the surface of the earth. The ERTS satellite is not used for oceanography, but this will certainly be a future development. Canadian coverage amounts to approximately seventy scenes per day which are received at the Prince Albert

satellite station. Tape recordings of the data are then flown to the remote sensing centre.

56. The ERTS satellite will be followed by an ERTS B satellite and once the European space-lab becomes operational all kinds of sensors can then be installed and used. It will then, for instance, be possible to indicate through temperature measurements where shoals of fish are to be found; where the feeding grounds of fish are; ships can be rerouted in case of heavy seas; automatic relay information for landing possibilities for aircraft in far-away regions may be given and many other applications will be found through experimentation.

57. Further information on the remote sensing system was given by Mr. Jean-Claude Henein who indicated that the government's rôle in this field was one of general planning, conceptual design, contract management, initial operation and monitoring the commercial operation. Especially as there is a question of a monopoly, it should encourage new applications. The rôle of universities is especially important in research into spectral signatures, applications development such as agriculture, and hardware development such as the laser beam image recorder. Industry's rôle is to build and equip ground receiving stations. Industry is also in charge of commercial operations. The goal of the remote sensing programme is to collect, process, disseminate and develop applications for data applicable to resource management and environmental control of Canadian land and ocean masses, which are obtainable from specialised sensors in spacecraft.

58. The centre serves some 700 users now and this number might rise to some 2,000 in Canada alone. It is the policy of the Canadian Government to co-operate in this field with other nations and to exchange freely the information available. This will become particularly relevant if the space shuttle and spacelab are introduced. Canada also hopes to collaborate with the United Nations space committees and its related agencies such as FAO. There is scope for co-operation with Europe in such fields as environmental monitoring, oceanography and worldwide crop assessment.

(b) *Telesat*

59. Telesat Canada was incorporated as a Canadian company by act of parliament, the Telesat Canada Act of 1969. The corporation was authorised to install and operate a multi-purpose system of communication by satellite throughout Canada. The main objective of Telesat was achieved when commercial service started on 11th January 1973. For the first time reliable 24-hours-a-day interference-free telecommunications of all kinds were possible between all parts of Canada regardless of their isolation or intervening distances. When it visited the Telesat headquarters in Ottawa, the Committee was briefed by Mr. David Golden, President of Telesat, Mr. Beneteau, Vice-President, Mr. Whittick, Director of Operations, and Mr. Steers, Assistant to the President.

60. The satellite communications system began with four earth stations and one satellite. By the end of 1973 two satellites and thirty-four earth stations were providing a variety of telecommunications services by satellite. In 1974 seven locations will come into service and the remaining eight locations are scheduled for service in 1975.

61. To date Telesat's financing has been accomplished through a combination of equity — shares for the carriers — and debt funds. The public might be brought in later, but as yet everything has been financed by the government and common carriers. Telesat is meant to be a commercial operation and does not have a social mandate. It is directed by five board directors appointed by the government, five directors elected by common carriers such as Bell Canada, CBC, etc.; the eleventh director is the President who represents the public. Some \$100 million have been spent: \$40 million on earth stations, \$30 million on satellites and the rest on launchings. During the first year of operation, 1973, Telesat earned \$1.5 million.

62. One of the national objectives here is for Canadian industry to manufacture the satellites and the earth stations and to integrate the whole system. The life expectancy of the satellites is seven years and might be more.

63. It is Telesat's intention to develop transportable earth stations of which two classes are being

constructed for civil as well as for military purposes. The first, a trailer-mounted station with a 32 ft antenna, is designed to be road-transportable and the second, a smaller station, will be air-transportable in small twin-engined aircraft with STOL capability.

64. Bell Canada serves the northern territories and there it has national as well as social objectives. Although Bell does not get any subsidies it has a monopoly in exchange for which it has to provide services in the north.

65. The transportable stations are of great importance at Arctic exploration sites. The major oil companies are also very interested in the transportable earth stations as they can link the oil rigs directly with headquarters.

(c) *Department of communications*

66. At this department the Committee was received by the Assistant Deputy Minister in charge of Research, Dr. John H. Chapman, who explained to the Committee the way in which communications are organised in Canada and also briefly mentioned the highlights of the Canadian space programme. The organisation of communications like so many other things in Canada was an intriguing and complicated compromise between the practices of Europe and those of the United States. Nevertheless the system works surprisingly well. The federal government does not operate any of the communications networks in the country, the largest of which belongs to a private company. Bell Canada, operating mainly in Ontario and Quebec, serves nearly 7 million of the country's 7.5 million telephones and is owned by Canadian shareholders to the tune of more than 95 %. In addition it owns a majority interest in four other telephone companies. The three prairie provinces, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, all operate and regulate their own telephone systems. On the west coast another private company, in this case a United States subsidiary, owns and operates the telephone system in British Columbia. This company, as well as Bell Canada, is subject to regulation by a federal commission. Regardless of their ownership or regulation, all the Canadian telephone organisations work together in such affiliations as the Trans-Canada telephone system and the Canadian Telephone Carriers Association. They work together smoothly and efficiently and are linked with the vast telephone network of the United States.

67. To make the picture more complete one has to mention that the telegraph service and a few telephones are operated by a consortium of the communications branches of the two big railways : Canadian National, which is government-owned, and Canadian Pacific, a private company.

68. All foreign communications other than those to the United States are carried by the Canadian Overseas Telecommunications Corporation, which is a government agency.

69. Telesat Canada operates the domestic satellite system ; it rents broad band channels to other carriers.

70. The satellite system is of the greatest importance for the scattered population centres in the far north which cannot otherwise be reached on an economic basis. The communities depended on high frequency radio for their telephone service and a few local television networks which showed films flown in from Southern Canada.

71. With the establishment of the INTELSAT communications system Canada has established two large ground terminals : one in the east and the other in the west, which are in continuous use providing international connections across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In addition, a leading Canadian manufacturer supplied the entire repeater equipment for one of the INTELSAT IV spacecraft, as well as other wide band amplifiers.

72. ESRO is taking part in the joint NASA-Canada venture to launch a communications technology satellite in 1975-76. In orbit this satellite will be used to conduct a number of communications experiments, designed by several countries, including TV broadcasts to small communities, educational TV (possibly with voice response), a telephone service between small terminals and high-speed data transmission. The communications technology satellites experiments are designed not only to investigate technology but also to evaluate the social and economic factors applying to satellite communications.

73. The Department of Communications is also carrying out a variety of planning studies on possible second-generation domestic satellites.

74. Of particular interest for Canada is a satellite capable of broadcasting TV and audio programmes either direct to homes or semi-direct to the head-end antennas of cable TV systems. In conjunction with Sweden, Canada has played a prominent rôle in the working group on direct broadcasting of the United Nations Outer Space Committee. Canada and Sweden have proposed a compromise set of guiding principles aimed at resolving the difference between those countries which wish complete freedom of information flow between nations and those which prefer to have a veto on any foreign satellite programmes which might reach the homes of their people. If these principles are accepted, Canada hopes that regional systems of TV programme interchange by satellite similar to the present Eurovision system will develop from and contribute to international co-operation.

75. Another area in which the future seems to hold considerable promise is that of navigation. Canada takes part in the Aerosat aeronautical satellite system. Your Rapporteur would point out that the memorandum of understanding between ESRO countries, the United States Federal Administration and the Government of Canada was signed on 9th May 1974. This memorandum provides for a joint programme of experimentation and evaluation using an aeronautical satellite capability over the Atlantic Ocean. The first of the two geostationary satellites envisaged in the programme is due to be launched by the end of 1977.

76. Dr. Chapman said that Canadian interest in the programme resulted from several factors including provision for the future of its present responsibility for air traffic control services in the North Atlantic regions, the possibility of applying similar system concepts to the maritime service and to navigation and communications in Northern Canada, the industrial potential of avionics, component development and sales, and the possibility of industrial participation in the creation of the space portion of the aeronautical satellite system.

77. Summing up, Canada has installed its satellite system in order to provide for the isolated northern communities what the telegraph service offered Western Canada in 1885, bringing them within range of modern communications.

78. Mr. B.A. Walker, Director-General of the Department of Communications for technological and systems planning, informed the Committee that seven years ago the government installed a task force on communications mainly to study communication possibilities for communities more than 200 miles north of the American border. Ninety per cent of the population of Canada lives within the 200-mile limit and communications are assured by normal means. North of the 200-mile limit however are to be found 80 % of the land area, nearly all the mineral resources of Canada and some 250,000 people. The aim of the communications systems programme is to develop the tools and methodology of system research and to carry out research studies in the fields of network and systems evaluation, synthesis and optimisation. Current projects include studies for data communications development in Canada and the cost trends of future trunk transmission systems.

79. Good communications mean more efficient government and more efficient military patrols. By the 1980s the government wishes to have a two-language broadcasting system covering the whole of the country with possibilities of regional and local input. This means that the satellites will have to be equipped with more power on board and the ground stations will become comparatively simple and cheap.

80. Dr. H.J. Von Bueyer, Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee for computer communications programme and policy co-ordination, said that research projects on computer communications in Canada are principally concerned with improvements in machine-to-machine communications, man-to-machine interactions and man-to-man telecommunications services. In Canada there are some twenty-five telephone companies of varying sizes, all under federal control and many of them are now interested in these new types of communications. The United States dominates the computer industry and as the software follows the hardware it is logical that American companies dominate in this field

too. Nevertheless, Canadian industry is making an effort to play a rôle. The Department of Communications is working hard to encourage concertation between the different computer users and systems. It is not very easy to achieve results as the provincial authorities also have jurisdiction in this field. The Interdepartmental Committee promotes studies on the different aspects of the computer uses, the question of privacy, import duties on software, etc. Restrictions have been imposed as a proliferation of private computer systems might not be commensurate with the general welfare. The post offices of Canada are not eager to provide private lines for machine-to-machine communications or for machine-to-man interactions as they want to establish complete networks and systems. The Interdepartmental Committee will therefore have to formulate a policy and establish regulations. At present computer telecommunications are not regulated.

81. The Committee was received at the Communications Research Centre at Shirley Bay by Dr. G.W. Holbrook, Director-General.

82. Dr. Holbrook said that the centre covered a wide field of communications investigations, mostly of a somewhat general nature since the design and development of actual equipment is normally left to private industry. The Communications Research Centre is also the management centre for the whole communications technology satellite project. Although much of the design and all of the manufacture has been contracted out to industry, the final integration and tests take place at the centre in a special laboratory building which the Committee visited.

83. Another rôle for the centre is to support other departments and especially the Defence Department. The laboratories of the centre were originally established to undertake research and development in telecommunications and electronics for the armed forces. In 1969, on the establishment of the new Department of Communications, the centre was renamed and its mandate broadened to include civilian as well as military communications and radar. The staff of the centre consists of 530 civil servants and 120 persons under contract.

84. When the communications technology satellite is launched in 1975 or 1976 the centre will continue with satellite communications experiments, especially in the high frequency field.

(d) *Bell Northern Research*

85. After the visit to the centre at Shirley Bay the Committee visited the Bell Northern Research, a private industry laboratory analogous to the Bell Telephone Laboratories in the United States. As its name implies, it is jointly owned by Bell Canada and Northern Electric. The Committee was received by Mr. Donald A. Chisholm, President.

86. The Committee attended a voice response computer system demonstration. Bell Northern Research places special emphasis on such areas as memory technology, optical communications, computer technology, communications transmission, switching technology, mechanical systems and systems engineering. Accordingly its scientific staff embraces a wide range of disciplines including electrical, civil and mechanical engineering, physics, chemistry, psychology, metallurgy and mathematics. Among the company's 1,800 employees, 700 hold degrees and 400 are graduates from schools of technology. The systems engineering expertise includes satellite communications systems as well as data transmission and other communications systems.

87. On communications satellites Bell Northern Research has made a study of the rôle satellites are likely to play in communications in the 1990s. Economic, political, social and operational influences affect the course of satellite development. Probably by then satellites will be an integral part of telephone toll centres carrying a portion of gross traffic. Northern Canada will rely on satellites 100 % for communications. Overall, the impact of satellites will be pervasive rather than startling.

(e) *RCA Victor Laboratories*

88. On 11th June 1974 the Committee visited RCA Victor Laboratories in Montreal, also a

private enterprise. It was received by the following RCA representatives: Dr. M.P. Bachynski, Director of Research, Mr. J.M. Stewart, Manager Aerospace and Government Systems, Mr. J.A. Collins, Manager Programme Development, Aerospace and Government Systems, and Mr. G.B. MacKimmie, Manager Business Planning and Development.

89. Dr. Bachynski outlined a short history of the company indicating that RCA has worked since the early 1950s for the Canadian East-West electronic defence lines as a counter to airborne missile threats to North America. From that time onwards electronics emerged as a major element in Canada's defence arsenal. The company now numbers 5,600 personnel, the majority of whom are employed in eight manufacturing plants located in Eastern Canada.

90. In 1959 RCA entered the field of satellite communications and it has since become Canada's foremost satellite communications industry both in earth stations and the space segment. Over \$65 million of earth station work has been performed, half of this in the international field, and approximately \$35 million of satellite work in the last fourteen years. Twenty complete earth stations and forty-seven partial earth stations have been built by RCA. Because of Japanese competition — its labour rates and the devaluation of the yen — it has become more difficult to find foreign markets and keep production at the rate of 50 % for export and 50 % for the home market.

91. Dr. Bachynski is the director of the research laboratories created since 1955. New planning has brought new emphasis to the creation of systems and products to fulfil anticipated market needs in terms of price, performance, features and availability. Over the next five years research and development expenditure is estimated at \$23,807 million. More than half will be spent on communications and aerospace systems. An important part of this amount is also going to the laboratories on semi-conductors, micro-integrated circuits, lasers and plasma physics. The Committee visited several of these laboratories.

92. The military programme of RCA is very small — only 2.5 %. Far more important is

government business for communications, the building of satellites and electronic equipment for radio, television, etc. RCA is now able to build a communications satellite in twenty-four months. Design studies are taking place for the communications technological satellite, a multi-purpose satellite and a United States domestic satellite. The last programme involves the design and supply of the complete communications sub-system involving the transponder and antennas.

## CHAPTER IV

### *Canadian nuclear power programme*<sup>1</sup>

93. On 7th and 10th June the Committee was the guest of officials from Ontario Hydro and the Hydro-Quebec Institute of Research respectively and discussed with them Canadian efforts in the nuclear field. The Committee also visited the CANDU (Canada Deuterium Uranium) nuclear power plant at Pickering, near Toronto, where it toured the site and had talks with officials.

94. The Canadian authorities stressed that Canada had developed a unique line of power plants and the Pickering generating station, with its four units, constituted the world's largest generating station.

95. Although Canada has large oil and gas reserves and still has some undeveloped hydro-electric potential, most of the new electric generating stations in Ontario will be nuclear and other provinces will soon have additional nuclear power stations. The reason for this rapid growth of nuclear generating capacity is that the provincial authorities in Canada are of the opinion that nuclear reactors have proved an economical and safe source of energy. As demand increases the use of gas, oil and coal, the cost also increases. On the other hand there are very large deposits of relatively low-cost uranium in Canada which provide an economical alternative to the fossil fuels.

1. See Appendix V.

96. Canada has developed its own CANDU system using heavy water as the moderator, i.e. the material to slow down the neutrons produced in the fission reactor. A major advantage of the heavy-water reactor is that it can employ natural uranium as fuel and does not require enriched uranium as do the light-water reactors. The United States, United Kingdom, France, USSR and China have built enormous diffusion plants as part of their nuclear weapons programme. Enriched uranium installations are not required for the Canadian system.

97. The Committee saw practical proof of the Canadian heavy-water concept at the Pickering generating station near Toronto which is the first full-scale nuclear power station in Canada. The main engineering characteristic of the CANDU system is the use of pressure tubes rather than a pressure vessel to contain the fuel and primary circuit coolant.

98. The Committee was of course very interested in the competitive power costs. Canadian utilities find the CANDU system competitive not only with alternative power sources but also other reactor systems. They expect the competitive margin to increase with time due to the relatively low fuel cycle costs. It is very difficult to make economic comparisons between competing systems and only the utilities concerned can do this. The recent decision by Ontario Hydro to order 8,000 megawatts more of the CANDU system is clear evidence of the system's attraction for them. Hydro-Quebec has launched the first part of its commercial nuclear programme with a unit of 600 MWe and other provinces in Canada have already taken or are expected to take similar decisions. As the Canadian authorities responsible for nuclear energy have all opted for this type of reactor, Canada can produce heavy water in large production units.

99. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited has already authorised several 800-ton per year units. The trend is to locate heavy water pro-

duction plants at nuclear power sites and utilise the low-cost fuel of CANDU reactors to produce the process steam.

100. Several countries such as Argentina and Korea have ordered the CANDU-type reactor, but whether more countries will buy such a reactor will depend largely on its cost. At the moment, the capital cost of the CANDU reactor is very close to that of a corresponding light-water reactor in the United States without fuel or heavy water. If initial fuel load and heavy water are included, the capital cost is something like 10 % more for the Canadian plant, due mainly to the initial heavy-water loading. This is offset in about four years by the lower refuelling cost. Thus, in the longer term, CANDU gains an economic advantage. A significant factor for consideration by utilities will be the relative cost of heavy water for CANDU and enriched uranium for light-water reactors. Both are increasing and only time will show future effects on unit energy cost from these factors.

101. In the opinion of Ontario Hydro the operation of the Pickering station has proved the safety, reliability and economic objectives of the CANDU concept.

## CHAPTER V

### *Aircraft construction*

102. On 10th and 11th June 1974, the Committee visited the Canadair Limited plant near Montreal, toured its facilities and was briefed on research and production carried out by Canadair. At Rockcliffe, near Ottawa, it visited the STOL airport of the Canadian Air Transport Administration, an agency under the Ministry of Transport.

103. As already indicated, Canada's aerospace industry manufactures a broad range of products. One of its most important firms is Canadair which, according to Mr. C. Patrick Sampson, its

Marketing Manager, came into being in 1944 when the former aircraft division of Canadian Vickers Limited was reorganised by the Canadian Government. In 1947 Canadair was purchased by the Electric Boat Company of Groton, Connecticut, to form the nucleus of the organisation which became the General Dynamics Corporation in 1952. On becoming a wholly-owned subsidiary of General Dynamics, an expansion programme was started to provide the company with more space and capability.

104. With its subsidiary Flextrac Nodwell in Calgary, Alberta, Canadair has the capability to design, develop, test and manufacture a complete range of aircraft and aerospace products, both military and commercial, and high-mobility tracked vehicles.

105. The Committee was briefed by a number of officials on Canadair's products :

(a) *Canadair CL-215*

106. Mr. Kunze said that this was Canadair's own aircraft designed for water-bombing forest fires. It is an amphibious multi-purpose aircraft developed from a World War II aircraft.

107. The Committee saw a film on the use of this aircraft in France, Spain and Quebec. In addition to forest fire protection it can carry out large-scale pesticing and herbiciding operations. It can also be used as a transport aircraft carrying 19 persons or some 3,000 kg of cargo. Its other rôles include patrol, survey and aerial spraying.

(b) *Canadair CL-84*

108. In 1963, after a seven-year period of V-STOL research and development, the Canadian Department of Defence financed with Canadair a programme for the design, manufacture and testing of a V-STOL aircraft. Military evaluation was completed in 1972 and since then the United States navy has taken an active interest in this aircraft. New developments are being studied to make it shipborne. It could then be used for anti-submarine warfare and radar surveillance rôles. Actual production of the aircraft has not yet started.

(c) *Canadair CF-5/NF-5*

109. Twenty of these trainer tactical fighter aircraft are in production for the Canadian armed forces. These are being produced under a licence agreement granted to the Northrop Corporation by the Canadian Government. The Canadian armed forces, the Netherlands air force and the Venezuelan air force are using the tactical fighter aircraft F-5. The F-5 was designed for tactical support, interdiction and interceptor rôles, and to these the CF-5 has added both high and low photo reconnaissance capabilities and other operational features.

(d) *Canadair CL-89 (AN/USD-501)*

110. The airborne surveillance drone system has been evaluated and accepted by Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and recently by Italy. In the early stages of its development the project was financed by Canada and the United Kingdom, but since 1965 the Federal Republic of Germany has also participated in the development of the system. Further battlefield surveillance technology has been applied and the system is now being equipped with two types of sensors : a camera system and an infra-red line-scanning system.

(e) *Sub-contracts*

111. Canadair is manufacturing spares and spare components for Lockheed Galaxy transport aircraft and for Dassault's Mercure. A film was shown on a military all-purpose, all-terrain tracked vehicle.

(f) *STOL port, Rockcliffe*

112. Mr. Don Button, Manager of the STOL projects, Federal Ministry of Transport, was allocated \$1 million to test a short take-off and landing service between downtown Ottawa and downtown Montreal. The test aircraft is the Twin Otter which does 32 return flights a day. It tests the environment, the market and certain Canadian products. The result of this testing will be submitted in a report to the Ministry of Transport in order to provide a basis for regular service.

## CHAPTER VI

***The Pulp and Paper Research Institute***

113. On 11th June the Committee visited the Pulp and Paper Research Institute at Pointe Claire, near Montreal, where it was received by the President, Mr. Pierre R. Gendron, the Director of Research, Mr. David A.I. Goring, and the Manager of the Patent Department, Mr. Joseph Merka.

114. The President pointed out that Canada's forests cover 1.2 million square miles, 920,000 of which are productive. British Columbia, Quebec and Ontario contain the largest stands of marketable timber. The manufacture of pulp and paper was for many years Canada's leading industry and ranked first or second in wages, capital invested, value of shipments and export. The industry employs 83,000 workers and annual shipments total some \$3,000 million. The newsprint shipments are the largest in the world.

115. Research has played a vital rôle in the Canadian pulp and paper industry. The Pulp and Paper Research Institute is a technical facility, unique in Canada, whose main purpose is to supplement and complement the technical efforts of individual firms. Fifty-three so-called maintaining member companies pay 62.6 % of the institute's budget, 16.1 % is paid by the Canadian forestry service for logging research, 13.4 % is received from the National Research Council in the form of research assistance grants, 5.2 % comes from the institute services contracts, 2.3 % from pollution abatement contracts and 0.4 % is miscellaneous revenue.

116. The institute originated in the McGill University of Montreal. The main laboratories are at Pointe Claire where the Committee visited a pilot plant, the engineering area, the machine shop and other facilities.

117. The institute has a strong programme of fundamental studies and is at the same time able to carry forward from inception to commercialisation major developments of general interest to the industry. Promising discoveries are carried through to the pilot plant stage in Pointe Claire or in some instances in member company

mills. The industry therefore looks to the institute for research, especially research that no single company could justify carrying out alone.

118. Suggestions for the institute's research programme come from staff, supporting companies and various committees of the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association's technical and woodlands sections.

119. Research objectives of the institute include also matters of public interest such as improvement of the environment and the promotion of higher education. The industry is becoming increasingly concerned about the influence of man and society on technology and vice versa. For example, the creation of optimum working conditions and the development of favourable workers' attitudes are as important to productivity as the efficiency of the production process itself.

120. Of special interest nowadays is the protection of natural resources represented by the forests. At the same time there is the need to eliminate pollution. The institute is aware that too many of the industry's pollution problems are insoluble or that the available technology is so costly as to make its use uneconomic. Therefore the institute is devising new and improved methods to solve these problems, e.g. increasing the recycling of wastes.

121. In reply to questions put by Committee members, it was pointed out that there are some eighteen research institutes of this type all over the world. On an informal basis there is a worldwide organisation. The directors of the institute also meet in the framework of the FAO. With the Soviet Union, which in this field has the same problems as Canada, some contacts have been established but there is very little exchange. In the nordic regions trees are growing very slowly and reforestation is of great importance to renew the resources.

122. Within the Canadian framework there are many contacts with regional laboratories, field stations and the schools of forestry across Canada. In general it can be said that the universities carry out most of the fundamental research and the institute deals with applied research.

## CHAPTER VII

***The National Research Council***

123. On 12th June the Committee was received at the National Research Council by its President, Dr. W.G. Schneider, who pointed out that the Council was originally set up by an Act of Parliament in 1916 when two departments — mines and agriculture — were interested in promoting scientific industrial research. Since then it has branched out into all industrial technology and has set up an industrial research assistance programme stimulating new industrial activity and developing the technological capability of Canadian industry.

124. The National Research Council Act assigns but does not limit the Council to the following functions: improvement of the use of Canada's natural resources; improvement of technical methods and processes employed in Canadian industry; maintenance and improvement of the primary physical standards of measurement for Canada; setting of standards of quality for material used in public work; standardisation of technical and scientific apparatus used in Canadian industry and government; fostering the carrying out of scientific and industrial research. The Council implements its mandate by operating research laboratories, financial assistance for research activities in Canadian universities, financial assistance and promotion of research in industry, the operation of the national science library and the technical information service.

125. From the very beginning the Council has encouraged and supported research in Canadian universities. A system of post-graduate scholarships and post-doctorate fellowships is provided for the assistance of students who have shown promise of research ability. The Council also offers awards for the support of research carried out by staff members of Canadian universities.

126. In Canada about 1 % of the gross national product is spent on research with an emphasis on nuclear research, certain types of air transport (especially V-STOL aircraft), renewable resources of energy and trees which grow rapidly. Special attention is also given to the development of inland waterways, new types of trains and communications in general, both within Canada and between Canada and other countries.

127. The National Research Council has nine laboratories dealing with biological sciences, building research, chemistry, mechanical engineering, aeronautical research, radio and electrical engineering and physics as well as the Atlantic regional laboratory at Halifax, Nova Scotia, and the Prairie regional laboratory at Saskatoon, Saskatchewan.

128. The Committee saw some of these laboratories during its visit.

## APPENDIX I

**Programme of the visit of the Committee to Canada***Monday, 3rd June*

Afternoon Committee members expected to arrive in Ottawa

*Tuesday, 4th June*

9.00 a.m. Leave Holiday Inn (Kent St.) for Vanguard Building

9.15 a.m. Visit to Computer Publishing Centres of the Canadian Parliament

10.45 a.m. Leave for Centre Block, Parliament Buildings

11.00 a.m. Arrival and discussion with members of the Canadian Senate's Special Committee on Science Policy in Room 112-N

12.45 p.m. Luncheon given by the Honourable Muriel McQ. Fergusson, Speaker of the Senate, in the Senate Speaker Chambers, Confederation Building

2.40 p.m. Leave for meeting in SRB Conference Room, Tower A, 3rd floor, Pearson Building

3.00 p.m. Arrival and meeting with following officials: Mr. J. Halstead (Assistant Under-Secretary, External Affairs), Chairman; Dr. S. Wagner (General Director, Office of Science and Technology, Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce); Dr. J. H. Chapman (Assistant Deputy Minister, Research, Department of Communications); Dr. G. Y. Tremblay (Acting Assistant Secretary, Co-operation Branch, Ministry of State for Science and Technology); and Dr. P. McTaggart-Cowan (Science Council of Canada)

5.00 p.m. Meeting ends

*Wednesday, 5th June*

8.30 a.m. Leave for Canadian Centre for Remote Sensing

9.00 a.m. Arrival and introduction by Dr. Morley on the international aspects of remote sensing by satellites

9.20 a.m. Dr. Strome will discuss the Canadian ERTS system and our participation in NASA's programme

9.45 a.m. Brief tour of Sheffield Road facilities

10.15 a.m. Mr. Godby to discuss industrial remote sensing in Canada

10.45 a.m. Mr. MacDowell to talk on visual vs computer aided interpretation

11.15 a.m. Mr. Baker to compare European, Canadian and US airborne operations

11.40 a.m. Mr. Jean-Claude Henein to discuss cost/benefit aspects of remote sensing

11.55 a.m. Conclusion by Dr. Morley

12.00 noon Luncheon

2.15 p.m. Visit to Telesat; tour of facilities along with meeting with officials to discuss the rôle of communications satellites

4.00 p.m. End of tour

*Thursday, 6th June*

- 9.15 a.m. Leave hotel for meeting with officials of the Department of Communications (DOC), Berger Building, 100 Metcalfe Street, CRTC Theatre, 2nd floor
- 9.30 a.m. Arrival and welcome by Dr. J. H. Chapman, Assistant Deputy Minister, Research, DOC
- 9.45 a.m. Discussion of research activities of the Department with Dr. J. H. Chapman
- 10.15 a.m. Discussion of Canadian activities in space applications with Mr. B. A. Walker, Director-General, Technological and Systems Planning (DOC)
- 11.00 a.m. Discussion of formulation of policy for computer communications in Canada with Dr. P. Robinson, Deputy Chairman, Policy Analysis and Research, Interdepartmental Committee for Computer Communications Programme and Policy Co-ordination (ICCCPPC) or Dr. H. J. Von Bueyer, Chairman, ICCCPPC
- 11.45 a.m. Leave for Communications Research Centre (CRC), Shirley Bay
- 12.00 noon Arrival at CRC, Shirley Bay  
Buffet luncheon
- 1.30 p.m. Meeting with Dr. G. Holbrook, Director-General, CRC, and other officials of the CRC followed by a brief tour
- 3.00 p.m. Leave for Bell Northern Research Laboratories (BNR)
- 3.30 p.m. Arrival at BNR followed by brief tour and rôle of BNR's research
- 4.40 p.m. Tour ends

*Friday, 7th June*

- 7.45 a.m. Leave hotel for Ottawa airport
- 9.00 a.m. Leave Ottawa for Toronto airport
- 9.50 a.m. Arrival at Toronto airport. Officials from Ontario Hydro to meet parliamentarians and escort them to the CANDU nuclear power plant at Pickering
- 10.20 a.m. Leave for Pickering
- 10.50 a.m. Arrival at Pickering followed by tour of the site and discussions with officials
- 1.15 p.m. Luncheon
- 2.45 p.m. Leave for Sheraton Hotel in Niagara Falls

*Saturday, 8th June*

- 10.00 a.m. Leave hotel for tour of Sir Adam Beck Generating Station at Niagara Falls
- 10.30 a.m. Tour of Sir Adam Beck Station
- 11.35 a.m. Luncheon (open)
- Afternoon (open)
- 3.00 p.m. Leave Toronto airport for Quebec
- 5.25 p.m. Arrival in Quebec — Hilton Hotel

*Sunday, 9th June*

Tour of Quebec city and area  
10.30 p.m. Arrival Montreal — Holiday Inn

*Monday, 10th June*

9.00 a.m. Departure from hotel to Canadair Ltd. plant  
10.00 a.m. Arrival followed by tour of facilities and a briefing on research and production carried out by Canadair  
12.00 noon Departure for Hydro-Quebec High Voltage Labs at Varennes  
12.45 p.m. Arrival at Hydro-Quebec Lab and luncheon  
2.00 p.m. Tour of facilities  
3.30 p.m. Tour ends, return to Montreal

*Tuesday, 11th June*

9.00 a.m. Leave hotel  
9.30 a.m. Visit to the Pulp and Paper Institute in Pointe Claire near Montreal  
  
12.00 noon Departure for RCA Victor Labs in Montreal  
12.30 p.m. Luncheon at RCA Victor Labs  
2.00 p.m. Tour of research facilities given by Dr. Morel Bachynski  
3.30 p.m. Leave for hotel  
6.25 p.m. Committee leaves Montreal for Ottawa  
7.00 p.m. Arrival at Ottawa airport  
7.30 p.m. Leave for Holiday Inn (Kent St.)

*Wednesday, 12th June*

9.15 a.m. Leave for STOL port at Rockcliffe  
9.30 a.m. Arrival, tour of facilities  
10.30 a.m. Leave for National Research Council (NRC) Labs on Montreal Road ; brief visit and tour with Dr. Schneider, President, NRC  
11.30 a.m. Leave for NRC Spectroscopy Labs on Sussex Drive, Dr. H. Lew to meet group  
  
12.15 p.m. Leave for Pearson Building for luncheon to be hosted by External Affairs, 9th floor Reception Area  
12.30 p.m. Luncheon  
Afternoon Free  
Tour ends  
Evening Leave Ottawa for home countries

## APPENDIX II

*Points for discussion in Canada*I. *General policy*

1. How can the political aims of Canada's scientific and technological programmes be defined? What general policy has been followed in the modernisation of Canadian science and technology?

2. What is the political organisation — federal and provincial — and which ministers are responsible for the activities concerned?

3. How is the federal research budget established and what course is set for it in the near future?

4. In particular, the Committee is interested in problems of energy, especially nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, space research and aircraft construction. Could a brief review be given of Canadian policies in these fields?

5. To which of the above sectors did the Canadian Government give priority during the 1960s and to which fields will it give priority during the 1970s?

6. What is the place of metallurgy, synthetic fibres and electronics in the overall policy?

7. What part is played by private industry? How can governmental action be defined?

8. Which industries are State-owned, which industries are part State-owned part private, and which industries are to remain fully private?

9. What is the part played by American and European industry in the industrial development of Canada?

10. Could a breakdown country-by-country be given of Europe's rôle?

11. What is the part played by Commonwealth countries?

12. What is the Federal Government's attitude towards collaboration with the Western European countries in the 1970s?

13. In which fields is this collaboration sought especially?

14. Are special ties being developed with the Common Market and, if so, in which direction should they be developed?

15. What is the effect of Canadian membership of the OECD?

16. What is the opinion of the Canadian Government on the 1958 Antarctic treaty, the 1963 Moscow test ban treaty, the 1966 outer space treaty, the 1968 non-proliferation treaty, the 1970 seabed treaty and the law of the sea conference?

II. *Discussions with parliamentarians*

17. What parliamentary supervision is there of the growing activities of the government and the increasingly specialised administrative machinery in the complex modern State?

18. Can the parliamentary committees follow the rapid development of technology and what machinery is there to help the parliamentarians in the federal and provincial parliaments to fulfil their tasks?

19. Is technological policy worked out only by the government or do the parliamentary institutions also play a rôle?

20. Science policy is the end product of a process of interchange between scientists, the university, industry and government. What rôle does parliament play in the definition of this policy? Is there any difference where the formulation of technological policy is concerned?

21. How are the committees informed of the specific subjects of research and development being followed by scientists?

22. How do the parliamentary committees supervise public expenditure on research and development?

23. Is there an effective international exchange of views on science and technology at the parliamentary level? More especially, do the com-

mittees have contacts with the corresponding committees of the American Congress and/or European parliaments ?

24. The Committee is especially interested in problems of energy, in particular nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, space research and aircraft construction. Could a brief review be given of the activities of the competent parliamentary committees ?

25. To which of the above sectors did the Committees give priority during the 1960s and to which fields will they give priority during the 1970s ?

26. What is the Canadian Parliament's attitude towards collaboration with the Western European countries in the 1970s ?

27. In which fields is this collaboration sought especially ?

28. What priority does the federal parliament give to environment problems caused by nuclear energy and other sources of pollution ?

29. What are the budget trends ?

30. How is the influence of the parliament brought to bear on space activities? Has a comprehensive and systematic programme been submitted to parliament ?

### III. *The Ministry for Science and Technology*

31. What is the rôle of the Ministry in the overall development of Canadian research and technology ?

32. What is the relationship between the Ministry, the provincial governments and the universities and other institutes of learning ?

33. What is the rôle of the State-owned research institutes ?

34. What is the rôle played by the institutes for fundamental research, institutes for applied research and development, and institutes concerned especially with environment and the well-being of the population ?

35. Is there a special institute for applied research and development in the field of aircraft construction, engine development and

aeronautics in general ?

36. What types of aircraft are going to be built in the 1970s ?

37. For which other forms of transport do special institutes exist ?

38. What is the future of nuclear-propelled ships, jet-powered trains, hovercraft, electric cars ?

### IV. *The Ministry of Industry*

39. What is the task of the Ministry in promoting industries in modern technology ? On which industries is emphasis laid ?

40. What is the relationship between the Ministry and international oil companies ?

41. What influence does the Ministry have on oil-finds in Canada ?

42. Does an import-export bank exist to assist industry ?

43. Could an outline be given of the development of the electronic and of the computer industry ?

44. Could a short history be given of federal activities in these fields ?

45. What is the share of the American computer industry in the number of computers in use ?

46. What is the trend for the 1970s ?

47. Is collaboration sought with Western European computer companies ?

48. What is Canadian policy on software ?

### V. *Oceanology*

49. What is Canadian policy in the field of oceanology ?

50. What is the budget trend and how do figures for oceanology compare, for instance, with those for nuclear energy or space ?

51. How much is spent on submarine research, how much on experiments in fish ranching in shallow waters, drilling and basic research on the continental shelf, research ships and the operation of marine centres ?

#### VI. *Space*

52. When was the Canadian space activities commission established? Its aim is to promote a comprehensive programme for telecommunications by satellite; what progress has been made towards reaching this goal ?

53. What relationship is there with the parliamentary commissions ?

54. What is the rôle of the universities in the establishment and execution of programmes ?

55. Can details be given of the Canadian satellites such as the Isis and Alouette spacecraft, the Anik satellite and the communications technology satellite ?

56. What are the goals of the development programmes for scientific satellites, application satellites, and what are the programmes for other types of satellites, especially earth resources, meteorological, navigational and geodetic satellites ?

57. Where international co-operation is concerned, Canada and the United States have signed an agreement on launchers. What does this involve ?

58. Will Canada participate in the space shuttle; is it planning to use this space shuttle and, if so, what are the programmes ?

59. In which other international space programmes is Canada participating ?

60. With which Western European countries is Canada developing space co-operation and in which fields ?

#### VII. *The aircraft industry*

61. How many people are employed by the Canadian aircraft industry in 1974 and what is its financial turnover? In 1972 production

value was 600 million Canadian dollars, of which 500 million Canadian dollars was exported.

62. What are the rôles of the National Research Council of Canada, the Canadian Defence Research Board, and the university research facilities in this field ?

63. In which aircraft does Canada specialise, e.g. STOL aircraft, fire-fighting aircraft ?

#### VIII. *Nuclear energy*

64. What is now the total electricity generating capacity in Canada ?

65. Of this capacity what percentage is generated from nuclear sources ?

66. How much of the capacity of nuclear generators and electricity is under construction and now operating and completed ?

67. Why has Canada developed the CANDU system ?

68. What is the estimated requirement for generating capacity of electrical energy required in 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, and what percentage of this will be nuclear generating stations ?

69. Which are the utilities ordering, constructing and operating nuclear power stations? What are their relationships ?

70. What is the capital of these electrical utilities and the method of raising funds ?

71. What is the annual budget in nuclear research ?

72. What are the capital assets now employed on nuclear research ?

73. What is the programme of expenditure on atomic energy for peaceful purposes and generation of nuclear energy ?

74. Of the total government expenditure on nuclear research and development how much of this has been contracted out to industry so far and how much will be contracted out in the future ?

75. How many contracts, either development or research, have been given to industry and taken away from government laboratories ?

76. Which companies, consortia and groups are the main constructors of nuclear power stations ?

77. What have they constructed and what is now in operation ?

78. Is research being carried out on fusion reactors, solar energy and geothermal energy ?

79. What has been done in the field of radioactive chemistry and the utilisation of radioelements in order to fight air and water pollution ?

80. What is the uranium fuel situation in Canada ?

81. There is a comprehensive American report on the nuclear reactor choice which states that the uranium supply will probably not keep pace with the continued growth of burner-converter capacity beyond the year 2000. What is your opinion ? Should a crash programme on fast-breeder reactors start now ?

82. The United States has already 183 light-water reactors either built or on order. As it is likely that in the near future the main European countries will also be using this type of reactor, what is your opinion on its safety in view of the recent report on it by the United States Atomic Energy Commission ?

83. Most European electricity boards consider it of great importance to be in the same technical community and that for this reason all European countries should order light-water reactors. Do

you agree with this opinion ?

84. The United States is ordering reactors to produce up to 40,000 MWe more per year. How many will Canada build ?


85. Could you give an indication on the future of :

- (a) the advanced gas-cooled reactor ;
- (b) the liquid metal-cooled reactor ;
- (c) the high-temperature reactor ;
- (d) the steam generating heavy-water reactor ;
- (e) fusion ;
- (f) safety studies ;
- (g) the major research facilities of Canada ;
- (h) applied nuclear work (radio isotopes, radiation techniques) ;
- (i) non-nuclear work, especially on the environment ;
- (j) the financing of industrial research and development activities in Canada ;
- (k) marketing ;
- (l) international relations between Canada, the United States and Europe ?

APPENDIX III

*Organigramme of the Ministry of State for Science and Technology*

*May 1974*



## APPENDIX IV

**Statement on Canada and the European Community by  
Mr. Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto**

2nd November 1973

...We are indebted to the CIIA for the focus it is giving to the European Community — and for the timeliness of this conference, which coincides so neatly and usefully with the official visits to Ottawa of Sir Christopher Soames and his delegation of European parliamentarians. It is my hope that exchanges of this nature will be seen in a wide context — as a part of that dialogue between Canada and the Community that was called for in the communiqué following the European Community summit meeting last October.

For reasons related as much to the evolution of the European Community itself as to immediate Canadian interests, the conference is devoting its attention in large part to economic issues — to questions of trade, industry, agriculture and energy. At the same time, and at the risk of stating the obvious, it is necessary to recall that Canada's relations with Europe have never been, nor are exclusively — or even primarily — based on trade. History, common values, for many of us, common European origins and the sentiment deriving from these factors are the source of continuing and potent links with Western Europe.

The relation, then, is strong and firmly rooted. But it is not static. Sir Christopher Soames and many of you will remember that Canada's approach to the development of the European Community was not always enthusiastic. But as the Community itself developed, as its institutions and its outlook expanded, there has been a responsive evolution in the Canadian attitude toward the Community.

The Canadian attitude has also been shaped by recognition of the world stature of the European Community. The increasing cohesion of the Nine is not simply a matter of new institutional arrangements in Europe. It also represents a growth of real power — self-confidence and

influence — which has significantly altered the world balance of power.

The Canadian reaction to these developments was expressed by Prime Minister Trudeau in the message he sent to Prime Minister Heath on the occasion of British accession to the European Community. The message read in part:

“I should like to congratulate you and your European partners on this splendid example of co-operation. Canadians admire the audacity of concept of the new Community and the skilfulness with which it has been designed. We have confidence that the economic strengths which will flow from it will be employed in a fashion of benefit, not just to the partners but to all members of the international community. A co-operating, prospering Europe has much to offer to the world in friendship, in trade, in economic assistance and in example.”

If that is our basic philosophical approach to the Community, there is also a very practical foundation to our desire for closer and broader relations. One such foundation is, very simply, statistics. Total trade between Canada and the enlarged Community amounted in 1972 to some \$4.6 billion. Canadian exports to the Community in 1972 were some \$2.5 billion. And I understand that for the first six months of 1973 they show an increase of approximately 14 %. This makes the European Community by a wide margin the second-largest of our trading partners — and we are confident that the volume of trade between Canada and the Community will continue to grow. The figures speak for themselves. To Canada, a country heavily dependent on international trade, mutually beneficial dynamic relations with the European Community are vital.

In another very practical way, an expanding relation with Europe is an essential feature of one of the government's most fundamental policies. This is the policy to diversify — to reduce the vulnerability of the Canadian economy to one continental market — to maintain our freedom of action on the international scene — and, equally important, to preserve and nourish our individuality.

In this perspective, the importance of an alternative and readily accessible major market that combines economic, cultural, historical and linguistic links is very clear.

At the same time, let me be equally clear in stating that we were not thinking of substituting Europe for the United States as a trading partner. We are North Americans and the United States, of course, remains our most important partner.

But the mere acknowledgement of this fact does not lead us to accept the constraints of any so-called continental determinism. We believe we can multiply our exchanges with other countries, particularly in Europe, with a view to promoting the cultural life and economic prosperity of Canadians without loosening in the process our vigorous ties with our southern neighbours.

Canadian interest in the enlargement of the European Community and our parallel goal of expanding relations with the Community have taken a number of forms. At the ministerial level there have been visits by both myself and by the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce to Brussels and to other capitals of the member States of the Community. We have attempted — and I think with some success — to establish in the minds of the Community and of its individual members the distinctive character of our position.

These ministerial visits are complemented by increasingly frequent and regular contacts with the Commission at the senior official level and by parliamentary exchanges. I am very pleased that Sir Christopher is accompanied by a number of senior officials of the Commission who are holding bilateral official discussions with the Canadian side. These ongoing exchanges mark a further development in the dialogue between the Community and Canada.

Another important development in the maturing of our relations with the Community has been the appointment to Brussels of a separate ambassador as head of our mission to the European Communities. I hope it will not be long before this is reciprocated by the opening of a representation by the Commission in Ottawa.

In terms of trade and economic relations, we see a continual expansion of our relations with the European Community. We are working closely with the Community in international forums — particularly on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — towards an even greater liberalisation of world trading conditions. Both my colleague the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce and I have been encouraged by the constructive attitude the European Community has been taking in the preparations for the forthcoming multilateral trade negotiations. This positive spirit is a good augury for future Community dealings with the rest of the world.

But there is an aspect of the Community's relations with the world that causes us some concern. This relates to the increasing number of preferential arrangements the Community has, or is negotiating, with a number of countries — in particular those that were formerly colonies of its member States — that discriminate against third countries, including Canada. We continue to believe that these arrangements require further attention.

However, I would not wish to exaggerate their importance. There are many other indications that the Community is and intends to become an increasingly responsive and outward-looking participant in world affairs.

Canadian interest in the attitude the Community will take to its responsibilities to the world community is, of course, natural. Canada, perhaps more than any of the other industrialised nations, is dependent on an increasingly free and open world order, particularly in the economic and trade spheres. It is clear that we have a "vested interest" in the increasing liberalisation of conditions of trade throughout the world. It is highly important to us that bloc confrontations, about which there has been some recent concern, be avoided. The importance of a generally outward-looking world view from the European Community cannot be underestimated. In

any confrontation between economic giants such as the enlarged Community, the United States and Japan, we should all stand to lose — Canada more than most.

Our reasons for seeking to maintain and broaden our dialogue with the Community are clear — and, in our terms, imperative. Our objective has been to seek with the Community a long-term agreement that would cover the broad range of Canadian-European Community relations and would complement existing trade arrangements such as those under the aegis of GATT. Such an agreement, which would provide for regular consultations, might range much more widely, to cover fields such as energy, natural resources, investment, industrial co-operation and environment. We realise that the establishment of such a long-term arrangement may not be immediately realisable. Nevertheless we continue to seek to establish a basis upon which such an arrangement can ultimately be made.

The political rôle of the Community, particularly in relation to North America, has been stimulated by the American initiative of a "Year of Europe". It seems to me that this initiative was designed to serve a number of useful and timely purposes — to redefine and revitalise the Atlantic relationship and as a reaffirmation of an outward-looking American foreign policy. It was also, I believe, a means by which one great power acknowledged the coming of age of another great power.

Although there were some mixed reactions in Europe to the initiative, I believe that the Nine were very pleased to have demonstrated to the world and to themselves their capacity to agree on a collective response to the "Year-of-Europe" message. Certainly, this was the impression that several foreign ministers of the Nine gave me when I spoke to them in New York in September.

There were, of course, some questions about the implications of the "Year of Europe". One of the first questions many of us asked about the "Year of Europe" was — how would the interests of the industrialised democracies, as a whole, fit this conception. Would it involve a tri-polar system — the United States, Europe and Japan? We, of course, remain concerned not to find ourselves polarised around any of the main power

centres. That is very much a part of what our policy of diversification is all about.

Nevertheless, outside this country, I have sometimes found an assumption that Canada should fall naturally and inevitably into the United States orbit. This is perhaps understandable, but it is unacceptable to Canadians. It is inconsistent with our conception both of what Canada is and what our interdependent world should be. It runs against the grain of postwar Canadian efforts to build an open and liberal world trading system. It is also contrary to the Canadian Government's basic policy of a relationship "distinct from but in harmony with" the United States.

North America is not a monolithic whole — economically or politically. Nor do I think it would be in the interest of Europe to deal with a single North American colossus.

Canada's relation with Europe is not the same as the United States relation with Europe. There are political, economic, cultural and linguistic elements in our relation with Europe that are unique.

Perhaps in relative terms our relationship is more important to us than the United States relationship with Europe is to the Americans. Forty-two per cent of our immigration continues to come from Europe. Our national fabric is made up of distinctive ethnic groups — many of them European. These have not been assimilated into a Canadian homogeneity. They preserve and value their links with Europe as they do their Canadian nationality.

Canada's security is inseparable from that of Europe. That is why we are members of NATO. We do not have troops in Europe solely for the purpose of defending Europe, but to defend Canadians.

However, by focusing on the need to revitalise and redefine the Atlantic Community, the "Year-of-Europe" initiative has quickened the pace of development of Community policy toward the rest of the world. This heightened Atlantic

dialogue is leading Canada, the Community and the United States into a greater and deeper exploration of our shared problems and aspirations. The pursuit of this dialogue reaches beyond the economic sphere to encompass all aspects of international relations. I believe that a serious and comprehensive examination of the Atlantic Community, an effort to make the Atlantic relationship more responsive to current realities, can be beneficial to all concerned.

In this context the suggestion of a Canada-European Community declaration is attractive.

But the determining factor will be substance — not form. Canada is seeking opportunities to develop a dynamic, meaningful and distinctive long-term relationship with the European Community. If it is clear that such a declaration can contribute to this objective we will be ready to participate in its elaboration.

With or without a declaration the future evolution of the Community's transatlantic relationship will be of critical interest to Canada. I am confident that common interests and common sense will prevail.

## APPENDIX V

**Canadian natural uranium heavy-water power reactors  
in operation, under construction, or committed***May 1974*

Name <sup>1</sup>	Location	Type <sup>2</sup>	Power MWe net	Nuclear designer <sup>3</sup>	Date of first power
NPD	Ontario	PHW	22	AECL and CGE	1962
Douglas Point	Ontario	PHW	208	AECL	1967
Pickering A	Ontario	PHW	514 × 4	AECL	1971-73
Gentilly 1	Quebec	BLW	250	AECL	1971
KANUPP	Pakistan	PHW	125	CGE	1971
RAPP 1	India	PHW	203	AECL	1972
RAPP 2	India	PHW	203	AECL	1976
Bruce A	Ontario	PHW	745 × 4	AECL	1975-78
Gentilly 2	Quebec	PHW	600	AECL	1979
Rio Tercero	Argentina	PHW	600	AECL	1979
Pickering B	Ontario	PHW	514 × 4	AECL	1980-82
Bruce B	Ontario	PHW	745 × 4	AECL	1981-83
Darlington	Ontario	PHW	745 × 4	AECL	1982-84
		TOTAL	15,263		

1. NPD : Nuclear power demonstration  
KANUPP : Karachi nuclear power project  
RAPP : Rajasthan atomic power project
2. PHW : Pressurised heavy-water coolant  
BLW : Boiling light-water coolant
3. AECL : Atomic Energy of Canada Limited  
CGE : Canadian General Electric Company Limited

**Conditions of service in the armed forces**

---

**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

**submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Klepsch, Rapporteur**

---

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introductory note

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION  
on conditions of service in the armed forces

DRAFT ORDER  
on conditions of service in the armed forces

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM  
submitted by Mr. Klepsch, Rapporteur

I. Introduction

II. The draft recommendation

APPENDIX

Analysis of the replies of thirteen Ministries of Defence to the questionnaire on conditions of service in the armed forces

---

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. *Critchley* (Chairman) ; MM. *Klepsch*, *Dankert* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Arnaud*, *Averardi*, *Bizet*, *Boertien*, *Bouloche*, *Jung*, *Kempinaire*, *Konen*, *La Loggia* (Substitute : *Magliano*), *Lemmrich*, *Pawelczyk* (Substitute : *Ahrens*), *Pendry*, *Prescott*, *Richter*,

*Rivière*, *Roper*, *Schlag* (Substitute : *Gessner*), *Schugens*, *Tanghe*, *Vedovato*, *Wall* (Substitute : *Sir Harwood Harrison*), *Zamberletti*, *de Montesquiou*, *Piket*.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Introductory note**

In preparing this report your Rapporteur had interviews as follows :

*NATO, Brussels — 22nd and 23rd October 1974*

Brigadier-General Ch. Schünemann, Military Adviser to the German Delegation ;

Captain Fritz Hecht, Deputy German Representative to the Military Committee ;

H.E. Mr. F. Krapf, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Germany to the North Atlantic Council ;

H.E. Mr. J.M.A.H. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO ;

Brigadier-General H. von zur Gathen, Deputy Assistant Director, Plans and Policy Division, International Military Staff.

*London — 31st October 1974*

Mr. Christoph Bertram, Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies ;

Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, Deputy Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies ;

Mr. William Rodgers, M.P., Minister of State for Defence ;

Mr. William Reeves, Head of DS 14, Ministry of Defence.

The Committee as a whole met at Headquarters Central Army Group, Mannheim /Seckenheim on Tuesday, 5th November, when it was briefed by :

General Lothar Renner (German Army), Chief-of-Staff, Headquarters Central Army Group ; Lt.-Colonel Gebel (German Army) ; Brigadier-General C. F. Gordon (United States Army), Assistant Chief-of-Staff, on the missions of CENTAG ;

Major-General J. E. P. Groven (Belgian Army), Commander Allied Command Europe, Mobile Force (Land), Colonel Turnill (United Kingdom Army), Chief-of-Staff, and Lt.-Colonel Spencer (Canadian Forces), on the rôle and activities of ACE Mobile Force ;

Lt.-Colonel MacGregor (Canadian Forces), on the problems of 4th Allied Tactical Air Force ;

and held a first discussion on the present report.

The Committee met finally in Lancaster House and at the seat of WEU in London on 13th and 14th November where it met with the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly under the Chairmanship of Mr. Paul Thyness, Chairman of that Committee, and was subsequently briefed by Major-General A. H. Farrar-Hockley, Director, Combat Development, Army, of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, on the military lessons of the Middle East conflict of October 1973. The present report was discussed a second time, and adopted, at that meeting.

The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and senior officers who addressed it and replied to questions. The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee.

**Draft Recommendation**

**on conditions of service in the armed forces**

The Assembly,

Reiterating its conviction that the existence of adequate defence forces clearly able to deter any likely act of aggression is essential to the maintenance of peace ;

Believing that even in a technological age the effectiveness of allied defence depends first and foremost on the men and women of the armed forces, and that their morale in peacetime depends in large part on conditions of service being in no way inferior to those offered by civilian employment ;

Believing that where defence policies require compulsory service, a period of at least fifteen months or a period considered adequate by the North Atlantic Council must be relied on to provide adequate numbers of service personnel ;

Aware that unilateral changes in fundamental aspects of service conditions, especially the period of compulsory service, can have adverse consequences in other allied countries, and

Noting that the rôle of women in the armed forces varies widely from one allied country to another

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

1. That having regard to Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty, it communicate to the Chairman of the North Atlantic Council and to the Chairman of the Military Committee the analysis of conditions of service in the armed forces at appendix to Document 650 with the request that the appropriate authorities study :

- (a) the considerable differences in the rates of pay in the armed forces of various allied countries, and the desirability of military personnel from different allied countries enjoying broadly comparable material conditions when serving in the same country ;
- (b) the experience of those countries that permit elected representatives of the armed forces to participate in negotiations with the authorities on conditions of service and rates of pay ;
- (c) the experience of countries which do not rely on compulsory military service ;
- (d) the possibility of nationals of one allied country serving in the armed forces of another allied country with the consent of the governments concerned ;
- (e) the desirability of making greater use of women in the armed forces ;

2. That it urge member countries to consult their allies in the North Atlantic Council before changing fundamental aspects of the conditions of service in their armed forces, especially the period of compulsory service ;

3. That, having regard to the fact that all countries of the European Community replied to the questionnaire circulated by the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, it communicate to the Council and the Commission of the European Community, with special reference to the conditions of employment offered by the armed forces of the countries of the Community, the analysis of conditions of service in the armed forces at appendix to Document 650.

***Draft Order***  
***on conditions of service in the armed forces***

The Assembly,

Noting that all countries of the European Community replied to the questionnaire circulated by the Rapporteur of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments,

DECIDES to request the President to communicate to the President of the European Parliament and to the President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, for the information of their members, with special reference to the conditions of employment offered by the armed forces of the countries of the Community, the analysis of conditions of service in the armed forces at appendix to Document 650.

## **Explanatory Memorandum**

(submitted by Mr. Klepsch, Rapporteur)

### **I. Introduction**

1. Your Rapporteur was asked to undertake "a comparative examination of rates of pay and terms and conditions of service in the forces of at least the allied countries". He was to examine also "the status and function of women in the forces".
2. He approached his task by preparing a detailed list of nearly two hundred questions which was submitted to Ministers of Defence of thirteen countries, in the form of a questionnaire, in December and January 1974. The countries selected were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, because these include all WEU countries, all countries of the European Community and all NATO countries which, at that time, were parliamentary democracies and had armed forces.
3. All countries replied to the questionnaire, for the most part in considerable detail, and the results have been analysed by an outside expert. The questions, together with the expert's analysis of the replies to each, are at appendix, which comprises the main body of information in the present report.
4. Your Rapporteur takes this opportunity of expressing his thanks to the Ministers of Defence and their officials who have supplied so much detailed information, and to the expert, Mr. James Kitching, for his painstaking analysis of the replies.
5. The Committee believes that the information compiled on the basis of replies to the detailed questionnaire should prove reasonably comparable between countries, and hopes that it will provide a useful source of information for Ministries of Defence and NATO headquarters. So far as the Committee is aware, no other comparable source of information on detailed service conditions in the allied countries is available.
6. An interim report, with an analysis of replies to the questions on pay and allowances was adopted by the Committee on 21st May 1974. The information therein has been incorporated into the present report.

### **II. The draft recommendation**

7. The Assembly has always recognised the need for the allied countries to maintain adequate defence forces which are manifestly adequate to deter any likely act of aggression. In the draft recommendation the Committee stresses in particular that the effectiveness of the defence effort depends before anything else on the men and women in the armed forces. In a period of sustained peace, which Western Europe has now enjoyed for some three decades, the rôle of the armed forces consists inevitably of training and preparing for situations which do not arise so long as the defence effort is successful in its aim of deterring aggression. If frustration is to be avoided and the morale of the forces maintained in spite of the social hardships and the inconveniences which service life necessarily imposes, the Committee recognises that the conditions of service offered to the armed forces must be in no way inferior to those offered by comparable civilian employment, and indeed must be superior to them to offset other drawbacks of military service.

#### *Paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation*

8. Under the terms of the modified Brussels Treaty, Western European Union does not possess any military staffs or headquarters. Article IV of the treaty specifically provides that the Council will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters. The Committee accordingly proposes that the Assembly recommend the Council to transmit the following recommendations to the appropriate North Atlantic Treaty authorities.

#### *Pay and conditions of service*

9. Clearly the rate of pay is an important feature of the conditions of service of the armed forces. Despite the difficulties of comparing pay rates in one country with those of another because of the limitations in applying rates of exchange to national currencies, the Committee is struck by the considerable differences in pay scales between countries of the Alliance. As is said on page 243 of the conclusions to the analysis at appendix, even the WEU countries, which enjoy comparable standards of living, appear in four different categories when the NATO countries

are grouped in order of rates of pay. The Committee recommends that the NATO authorities consider in particular the desirability of military personnel from different allied countries enjoying broadly comparable material conditions when serving in the same country. The Committee recognises that many countries already pay supplementary allowances to lower paid personnel when these are serving in international NATO postings.

10. The Committee's attention has been drawn to the recent development of servicemen's organisations in certain countries which have acquired some of the characteristics of trades unions. While membership of such organisations is compulsory in no country, they now exist in Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway. An international federation of these military organisations has also recently been established (EUROMIL). Of the foregoing countries, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg and Norway reported in reply to the questionnaire (Question F. 5. (a)) that they have a procedure whereby representatives of the armed forces participate in negotiations with the authorities concerning rates of pay and the basic pay structure. Belgium and Denmark specifically stated that such representatives were elected. In view of the growing importance of "participation" in many activities in the civilian sector, the Committee recommends that the experience of those countries permitting this type of service organisation should be studied by NATO.

*Man- (and woman-) power*

11. The Committee is naturally concerned at the problems experienced by nearly all countries in

recruiting sufficient personnel for the armed forces. While certain NATO countries have abolished conscription at the cost of devoting a larger proportion of their defence budget to service pay, the Committee believes that for most countries compulsory service must continue to play an important rôle in the structure of the armed forces. It does not overlook the increased efficiency that is claimed for the better trained and better motivated all-regular forces. Indeed, on the proposal of the Committee, the Assembly, in Recommendation 236 adopted on 21st June 1973, recommended the Council to urge member governments to increase the effectiveness of their defence expenditure *inter alia* by increasing the proportion of regular forces. The Committee recommends that the experience of countries which no longer rely on compulsory service should be studied.

12. However, not only the high cost of all-regular forces but also the social consequences of the military profession becoming more divorced from civilian society will continue to persuade most countries to maintain compulsory service. Moreover, in certain allied countries the period of compulsory service has an important educational function. The Committee believes that efficient conscript forces require a period of service of fifteen months, or a period considered adequate by the North Atlantic Council. The Committee makes this observation in the preamble of the draft recommendation. It recognises however that the efficiency of military units also depends on the proportion of conscripts that they contain. As the following table shows, the period of conscription is usually longer in those services which contain a higher proportion of conscript personnel.

*Periods of compulsory service in NATO countries (months)  
and percentage of conscript personnel in each service*

Country	Army	%	Navy	%	Air force	%
Belgium	12 <sup>1</sup> -15	50	12-15	25	12-15	27
Canada *	—	—	—	—	—	—
Denmark	9	30	9	40	9	40
Federal Republic of Germany	15	53	15	30	15	36
Greece	24	70	24	58	24	52
Italy <sup>2</sup>	15	80	24	55	15	40
Luxembourg *	—	—	—	—	—	—
Netherlands <sup>3</sup>	16	63	18	17	18	25
Norway	12	80	15	60	15	50
Portugal	24	93	24	40	24	82
Turkey	20	94	20	80	20	61
United Kingdom *	—	—	—	—	—	—
United States *	—	—	—	—	—	—

13. The Committee draws attention to other possible ways of increasing numbers in the armed forces. Not all countries of the Alliance have experienced the manpower shortage of Western Europe in the last decade. Foreign workers are already a common feature in many sectors of industry, and indeed the European Community regulations make specific provision to increase the mobility of labour between countries. The Committee believes that there is no fundamental objection to the nationals of one allied country serving in the armed forces of another, where the governments of the allied countries are agreed on the conditions. The Committee recommends that the possibility of such service be studied by NATO.

14. The Committee draws attention in particular to the section of the analysis at appendix on the

rôle of women in the armed forces (appendix, page 228). It believes that in an age where the attitudes of western society are changing, and it is considered normal for both women and men to have equal access to most sectors of employment, there will be growing scope for women in the regular forces of all member countries. The Committee accordingly recommends that NATO study the desirability of making greater use of women in the armed forces.

15. Lastly, on the subject of compulsory service, the Committee urges that member countries consult loyally in the North Atlantic Council before changing periods of conscription because of the inevitable political pressure for a reduction in service that any reduction in one country induces in other allied countries.

\* All-regular forces.

1. For forces in Germany conscript service is twelve months. As of 1st January 1975, ten months for all services.

2. Italy intends to reduce its conscript service for the army and air force to twelve months and for the navy to eighteen months.

3. The Netherlands has a plan to reduce its conscript service periods for the army to fourteen months. There are no similar plans for the navy and air force at the moment.

*Paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation and the draft order*

16. The Committee believes that in a future European union, the European Community may well come to assume responsibility for a European defence identity in the NATO framework. The Committee is gratified to note that the Ministry of Defence of Ireland — the only member of the European Community which is not already a member of NATO — was kind enough to reply to your Rapporteur's questionnaire. As conditions of employment are already among the competences of the organs of the European Community, the Committee proposes that the analysis of conditions of service at appendix be communicated to the various organs

of the Community, with particular reference to the information on conditions of employment that it contains. It is proposed that the Council be requested to transmit the analysis to the Council and the Commission of the European Community, while in the draft order the President of the Assembly is requested to transmit it to the President of the European Parliament and to the President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

17. The report as a whole was adopted unanimously.

## APPENDIX

**Analysis of the replies<sup>1</sup> of thirteen Ministries of  
Defence to the questionnaire on conditions  
of service in the armed forces**

*Dates of replies*

Belgium .....	4 /3 /74
Canada .....	1 /3 /74
Denmark .....	15 /3 /74
France .....	1 /3 /74
Federal Republic of Germany .....	11 /2 /74
Ireland .....	8 /3 /74
Italy .....	4 /3 /74
Luxembourg .....	26 /2 /74
Netherlands .....	21 /5 /74
Norway .....	8 /4 /74
Turkey .....	20 /3 /74
United Kingdom .....	21 /3 /74
United States .....	11 /2 /74

This analysis has been prepared by an expert, Mr. James Kitching, MA, appointed by the Clerk at the request of the Rapporteur. Mr. Kitching was assisted by his wife Diane Y. Thompson, MA.

*Notes*

1. The following rates of exchange have been employed for converting sums expressed in national currencies into United States dollars :

<i>National units per \$ US</i>			
Belgium	38.9	Italy	0.583
Canada	1.0005	Luxembourg	38.9
Denmark	6.05	Netherlands	2.81
France	4.47	Norway	5.82
Federal Republic of Germany	2.68	Turkey	14.02
Ireland	0.408	United Kingdom	0.408

See reservations in the conclusion page 241.

2. The questionnaire was prepared in English and French. Belgium, France and Luxembourg replied in French, the other countries in English. Apart from problems of translation proper, certain expressions may have been understood differently in different countries, in particular :

Other ranks in the United Kingdom means "personnel other than officers" (i.e. privates and NCOs) but in some cases may have been understood as "personnel of the lowest rank" (i.e. privates only).

1. Copies of the (sometimes voluminous) replies of the thirteen Ministries of Defence are available from the Office of the Clerk, Assembly of WEU, 43, avenue du Président Wilson, 75775 PARIS CEDEX 16.

A charge will be made to cover the cost of photocopying.

## SUMMARY

	Page
Introduction .....	117
Questionnaire and analysis of replies	
A. Classification by category of service .....	117
B. Recruitment I. Officers .....	122
II. Ranks other than officers .....	133
C. Promotion .....	140
D. Termination of service .....	156
I. Officers .....	156
II. Ranks other than officers .....	165
E. Conditions of reserve service and pay .....	173
F. Pay .....	177
G. Allowances .....	184
H. Pensions and retirement .....	200
J. Medical and dental care .....	212
K. Food and accommodation .....	216
L. Leave and hours of duty .....	222
M. Legal rights .....	228
Rôle of women in the armed forces .....	228
Conclusion .....	240

INTRODUCTION

The information for this analysis is derived almost entirely from the replies to the questionnaire which was circulated to some thirteen Ministers of Defence by Mr. Klepsch on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. The questionnaire comprises just over 200 questions and sub-questions divided into twelve sections. Each question is reprinted below, followed by a detailed analysis of the replies to each question. This is followed by another section "The rôle of women in the armed forces", and a conclusion ; the conclusion does not include references to the conditions of women's service as these have been dealt with separately in the analysis and the special section.

Unfortunately the Netherlands reply to the questionnaire did not reach us in time for all its answers to be included in the body of the analysis, but many of its replies have been

included in the section on women, the conclusion, and the pay tables in Section F.

For the purposes of making international comparisons from such a mass of information, we have had to interpret rather liberally or simplify at times, especially with reference to conscripts, as it is not always clear from replies whether conditions applicable to regular and short-service personnel are applicable to conscripts too. We hope we have done this in a way which is fair and retains the essence or spirit of the answers. While we are very much aware that we may have misinterpreted the replies of some of the countries, we feel the risks of this are more than balanced by the potential gains to be derived from this sort of comparative study.

QUESTIONNAIRE AND ANALYSIS OF REPLIES

**A. Classification by category of engagement**

*Question*

A. 1. What categories of military service are there in your country ?

	Officers	Other ranks
(a) National service (conscript)	yes/no	yes/no
(b) Short-service engagements	yes/no	yes/no
(c) Career	yes/no	yes/no
(d) Reserve	yes/no	yes/no

*Answer*

A. 1. (See also Table A. 1) Belgium, Denmark, France and Norway reported that they had both officers and other ranks in all four categories of engagement (conscript, short-service, career and reserve).

All the other countries except for Italy, Luxembourg, and Turkey had officers and other ranks in all categories except that of conscripts. Here Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States had neither officers nor men who were conscripts. Germany had conscripts as other ranks, but not as officers.

Italy had both officers and other ranks in all categories except career other ranks. Here it had career NCOs, but no career personnel below NCO, except for soldiers in the Carabinieri Corps.

Turkey reported that it had neither officers nor other ranks in the short-service category, and no other ranks in either the career or reserve categories, although it had officers in both. There were both officers and other ranks in the conscripts category.

Luxembourg reported that it only had short-service other ranks below NCO, and then career officers and NCOs. It reported that it had no conscripts and no reserve, despite mili-

tary law envisaging a reserve, because there was no civil law in existence authorising a reserve.

*Question*

A. 2. Do the various services (army, navy, air force) include personnel from all the categories listed in 1 above ?

yes/no

If not, what are the exceptions ?

*Answer*

A. 2. All countries stated that each of their services included the same categories of personnel as shown above in A. 1, except for Luxembourg, which only has an army, and Canada's unified service, which nonetheless has the same pattern of engagement (no conscripts) for its land, sea and air "elements".

*Question*

A. 3. (a) If there are women in your armed services, are they organised in separate women's corps, or may they serve in certain posts in the three services ?

*Answer*

A. 3. (a) Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway and Turkey replied that they had no women in their armed services. Denmark reported that it had women in all three services in other ranks (but non-conscripts), and was to start training women officers in 1974-75. Ireland reported that it had women only in the army nursing service. (Belgium reported, however, that in the case of mobilisation women are able to enlist voluntarily for non-combat jobs.) All the other countries had women in all of their services, or in the case of Canada, its unified service.

*Canada* : Women are not organised in a separate women's corps. They are fully integrated and serve in selected officer military occupational classifications and other ranks trades. They are precluded from serving in combat classification/trades, or at sea, and in isolated posts.

*Denmark* : While not specifying any separate women's corps, it would appear from its answer

to A. 3. (c) that the Danish navy is not preparing to train women officers in 1974-75, unlike the other two services.

*France* : Women are both organised in separate corps and integrated in certain corps, e.g. medical corps.

*United Kingdom* : For the navy and air force, women are organised in separate women's services (WRNS and WRAF), and nursing services (QARNNS and PMRAFNS), and in the case of the army, in separate women's and nursing corps (WRAC and QARANC). Female medical and dental personnel, however, serve in the medical and dental branches and corps of their respective services, along with their male colleagues.

*United States* : Women are assigned, on an integrated basis, to a specific branch of service (i.e. army, navy, air force), and may serve in a variety of posts within the branch to which they are assigned.

*Question*

A. 3. (b) If the latter, in which of the services and categories (a) — (d) of 1 above may women serve :

Navy ?

yes/no Not in category...

Army ?

yes/no Not in category...

Air force ?

yes/no Not in category...

*Answer*

A. 3. (b) Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States all answered that they have women who are not in separate women's corps, and further that they have them in all categories of engagement except that of conscripts. Denmark did not indicate whether it had separate corps for women, or whether it integrated them ; but it stated that women do not serve as conscripts, nor in the reserve. This question did not apply to the remainder of the countries.

*Question*

- A. 3. (c) What is the proportion of posts open to men that are also open to women (percentage) ?

	Officers	Other ranks	All ranks
Navy			
Army			
Air force			
TOTAL			

- (d) What is the percentage of women in the three services ?

	Officers	Other ranks	All ranks
Navy			
Army			
Air force			
TOTAL			

*Answer*

A. 3. (c) and (d) Canada interpreted the word "post" in this question to mean military occupational classifications/specialities (i.e. types of job), and on this basis it reported that 55 % of officer posts, 35 % of other ranks posts and 38 % of all ranks posts were open to women. In addition, steps have been initiated to increase women in the service to 10 % of overall strength. However, the other countries which replied to this question and for which the figures were available interpreted "post" to mean the total number of jobs (as opposed to types of job) which exist in their services, and for this reason the Canadian figures are not comparable.

France has expressed its servicewomen as percentages of its non-conscript personnel only. Denmark appears to have done this for both sections (c) and (d) as well. In France's case, the figures given under "other ranks" are for

NCOs (*gradés*) only. France also stated that it had no statistics available on the percentage of positions open to women, and indicated that this was an evolving situation.

In the case of the United Kingdom, the percentages of women as a total of the three services are given without including the nursing services, whereas the United States does include them and other related medical personnel (the "healing arts/services"). For the United States navy, it includes 2,341 female officers ; for the United States army 3,228 ; and for the United States air force 3,427.

*Question*

- A. 4. Are service regulations and legal status the same for male and female personnel ? (Where pay, allowances, retirement and pension rights are different, please answer under separate columns in Sections F, G and H.)

yes/no

*Answer*

A. 4. Belgium (in the case of mobilisation), Denmark, France, Ireland and the United States all reported that service regulations and legal status were the same for male and female personnel.

Canada said there were separate regulations for females, dealing with pregnancy. In addition, women's pensions die with them, i.e. there are no survivor benefits. Because of this latter point, women contribute a smaller amount to the forces pension scheme than do men.

For the United Kingdom, the answer was that it was the same except for the legal status of the Women's Royal Naval Service. It was stated that this is an oddity, and betrays no significant difference.

*Question*

- A. 5. Are service regulations and the legal status the same for career and short-service personnel ?

yes/no

*Answer*

A. 5. Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States reported that service regulations and the legal status of career and short-service personnel were the same.

Italy reported that the service regulations and the military criminal code, for both times of peace and war, were the same, but that the legal status of career and short-service personnel were not.

Belgium reported that it had different regulations for different categories of personnel: e.g. regular and reserve officers, supplementary list officers (*officiers du cadre de complément*), etc. Certain regulations, e.g. discipline, service in Belgium itself, are common to all categories of the military; others, e.g. leave, vary with different categories.

*Question*

A. 6. Which of the categories listed in 1 above have "civil service status" ("*Beamter status*") if this exists in your country?

*Answer*

A. 6. Turkey did not answer this question, but Canada, France, Ireland, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States said that either this status did not exist in their countries, or their military did not possess it. Germany reported that it was not applicable.

Only Denmark and Luxembourg responded in the affirmative; Denmark for career officers only, and Luxembourg for all officers and NCOs (who are all career personnel).

Table A. 1

	National service /Conscript		Short service		Career		Reserve	
	Officers	Other ranks	Officers	Other ranks	Officers	Other ranks	Officers	Other ranks
Belgium	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Canada	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Denmark	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
France	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Fed. Rep. of Germany	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Ireland	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Italy	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	NCOs   ranks yes   no *	yes	yes
Luxembourg	no	no	no	NCOs   ranks no   yes	yes	NCOs   ranks yes   no	no	no
Norway	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Turkey	yes	yes	no	no	yes	no	yes	no
United Kingdom	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
United States	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

\* Regular soldiers exist only in the Carabinieri Corps.

Table A. 3. (c) and (d)

		Officers		Other ranks		All ranks	
		Proportion of posts open to men, also open to women, %	% of women <sup>1</sup>	Proportion of posts open to men, also open to women, %	% of women <sup>1</sup>	Proportion of posts open to men, also open to women, %	% of women <sup>1</sup>
Canada							
TOTAL		n. a.	4.4	n. a.	5.0	n. a.	5.0
Denmark	Navy	0	0	2.2	1.9	n. a.	1.0
	Army	Not yet decided	0	5.8	2.5	n. a.	1.3
	Air force	Training to start 1974-75	0	6.0	2.4	n. a.	1.8
	TOTAL	0	0	5.1	2.4	n. a.	1.5
France	Navy	n. a.	0.034	n. a.	(NCOs) 1.4	n. a.	1.24 (0.94) <sup>2</sup>
	Army	n. a.	0.93	n. a.	(NCOs) 8.59	n. a.	6.68 (2.32) <sup>2</sup>
	Air force	n. a.	1.88	n. a.	(NCOs) 6.29	n. a.	5.60 (3.47) <sup>2</sup>
	TOTAL	n. a.	1.08	n. a.	(NCOs) 6.38	n. a.	5.15 <sup>2</sup> (2.4) <sup>2</sup>
United Kingdom	Navy	1.2	4.5	3.0	4.5	2.7	4.5
	Army	1.4	4.9	2.2	3.1	2.1	3.3
	Air force	4.9	3.8	5.6	5.5	5.4	5.2
	TOTAL	2.2		3.3	4.0	3.1	4.1
United States	Navy	n. a.	4.3	n. a.	1.9	n. a.	2.2
	Army	9.5	4.0	15.0	2.9	14.2	3.0
	Air force	62.0	4.2	95.8	3.1	90.0	3.3
	TOTAL	n. a.	4.1	n. a.	2.6	n. a.	2.8

1. In regular forces (in brackets percentage of women in total French forces)

2. Secretariat estimate.

## B. Recruitment

### B. I. Officers

#### Question

B. I. 1. What are the conditions for recruitment?

- (a) Minimum age
- (b) Maximum age
- (c) Training
- (d) Marital status
- (e) Other conditions.

#### Answer

B. I. 1. (a) and (b) The minimum age reported varied from 17 years for Canada, France, Germany, Ireland and Luxembourg, up to the limit of 39 for the United Kingdom, 40 for French females (males' age limit was given as variable), 55 for United States officers, and no limit on Danish army officers. Typically, the minimum entry age was between 17 and 20, and the maximum for the regular non-specialist officer, from somewhere in the low 20s to the middle 30s. See table.

(d) Most countries indicated either that no particular marital status was required, or that being married was not a limiting factor for officer candidacy. Turkey did not answer this question. Those that did make a requirement were Belgium, where any officer recruit must be single, widowed or divorced without children; Ireland, where an officer must be single on recruitment; Italy, where only regular officer recruits must be single, or a widower without children; and Luxembourg, where an officer must be single on recruitment, although he may obtain permission to marry while undergoing training.

(c) and (e) Although it was not stated in every case, it may reasonably be assumed that to become an officer candidate would normally require the possession of citizenship of the State concerned. Further, although again not all stated this, it is assumed, for the purposes of this study, that all officer candidates must be judged physically and psychologically fit, as well as fulfilling

those moral standards or requirements of character necessary to the profession.

*Belgium*: Regular officer candidates must pass the entrance exam to the *Ecole Royale Militaire*, which is based on all or part of the last three years of secondary education. Those officers from the ranks (*voie du cadre*) need to pass a literary (*littéraire*) and scientific exam, which consists of the same subjects as the entrance exam for the ERM.

Doctors, dentists and vets must obtain appropriate qualifications before entry.

Supplementary officers (*du complément*) need to have done their national service, yet not have served for more than four years as a sub-lieutenant of the reserve. They also need to speak both national languages.

Auxiliary officers need to have finished their higher secondary education, or equivalent standard.

*Canada*: Selection for the military colleges or the reserve officer training programme depends on senior or junior matriculation from high school. Direct entry requires a degree or technical diploma.

*Denmark*: Army officer recruits must have undergone training from the rank of private through to sergeant. For the navy, A-line officers must have a high school education, B-line officers a public school education, while reserve officer recruits must have a merchant navy master's or engineer's qualification.

*France*: Candidates must have some (unspecified) level of schooling, and be in full possession of their civil rights.

*Federal Republic of Germany*: Qualifications for admission to a university.

*Ireland*: Candidates should be educated to a standard not lower than the Department of Education leaving certificate.

*Italy* : High school degree.

*Luxembourg* : National certificate of completion of secondary education, or recognised foreign equivalent.

*Norway* : No applicable answer.

*Turkey* : No applicable answer.

*United Kingdom* : No details.

*United States* : Completed secondary education, to be followed (for virtually all recruits) by university level education.

*Question*

B. I. 2. What are the periods of engagement offered ?

*Answer*

B. I. 2. See table.

*Question*

B. I. 3. What are the conditions for extending a period of service ?

*Answer*

B. I. 3. See table.

*Question*

B. I. 4. Are personnel always recruited at the lowest rank or is it possible to be recruited at a higher level ?

*Answer*

B. I. 4. See table.

*Question*

B. I. 5. Are there special conditions for trainees ?

If so, what are they ?

*Answer*

B. I. 5. All countries in effect replied in the negative to this question.

*Question*

B. I. 6. Is it possible to transfer from one category (see question A. 1) to another and, if so, in what conditions ?

*Answer*

B. I. 6. All countries reported that it was possible for officers to transfer from one category of engagement to another. Answers varied in the amount of detail provided :

*Belgium* : Transfer is possible provided that the necessary conditions of recruitment to any particular category are fulfilled by the officer seeking to transfer to it.

*Canada* : There are three possible transfers : (1) A short-service officer may elect career status and be accepted, depending on service requirements. (2) A reserve officer may transfer to the category of regular officer under conditions prescribed by the CDS. (3) A regular officer may transfer to the reserve, if eligible on release.

*Denmark* : Different regulations apply to each of the services. The army allows transfers from the rank of private up to sergeant to either reserve or regular officer. The navy allows a reserve officer to pass through the naval college (four years), in order to become a regular. The air force allows transfer to the regular category if the entrance exam is passed.

*France* : Transfers are allowed, but conditions vary.

*Federal Republic of Germany* : Transfers from short-service to the career category, and from reserve to career, are both possible.

*Ireland* : An officer can apply for transfer to the reserve of officers.

*Italy* : Regulars can transfer to the reserve on request, or be transferred for reasons of age, illness or inability to carry out functions connected with the rank of the officer, or "by authority". A reserve officer can become a regular officer by a competitive exam for a special list of officers, separate from those who enter as regulars through the service academies.

*Luxembourg* : Not applicable.

*Norway* : Transfer is possible, depending on the standard of civil and military education attained, and on service requirements.

*Turkey* : Transfer is possible when necessary.

*United Kingdom* : For the navy, transfer is possible from short-service (the supplementary list) to career (the general list). For the army, transfer is possible from either short-service commission or special regular commission, to a permanent regular commission. For the RAF, transfer from short-service commission to permanent commission is possible.

*United States* : Transfer is possible.

### Question

B. I. 7. (a) Are there special conditions for recruiting personnel for specialist careers (i.e. engineers, technologists, doctors) ? What professional qualifications ?

(b) Can the above conditions be replaced in certain circumstances by other qualifications (ability, output) ?

Is in-service training provided for appointment to such specialist posts ?

### Answer

B. I. 7. (a) and (b) All countries answered "yes" for all or part of this question. Typically, it is specialists such as doctors and dentists for whom most countries lay down special conditions, and whether the country concerned has conscript or non-conscript forces the basic training for these sorts of specialists takes place mainly outside the services. There is also a period, usually of short duration, of some sort of basic officer military training for these specialists when they join the services.

*Belgium* : (Doctors, dentists, pharmacists) : Selection for the *Ecole royale du Service de santé* takes place before professional training begins, at any Belgian university of the candidate's choice, usually at 22 or 23 years of age. During the academic year and during the military vacation, they undergo military training, study medicine, pharmacy or dentistry, with particular application to the military, and take language courses at the ERSS, and then complete their practical training at the *Ecole d'application du Service de santé* (maximum time eighteen

months). If there are insufficient graduates of the ERSS, doctors, dentists and pharmacists can be recruited from other schools, maximum age 30-33 ; they too undergo 18 months' practical training at the EASS.

(Technicians, engineers) : In-service training is provided for candidates who do not already hold a qualification.

*Canada* : In addition to basic standards, certain direct entry officers require special qualifications, e.g. a doctor needs a degree of doctor of medicine from a recognised university, and must hold a current licence to practise in a Canadian province. The same principle applies to dentists, lawyers, etc.

Special conditions can occasionally be replaced. In-service training is provided for appointment to specialist posts.

*Denmark* : For the army, doctors must have a civilian degree ; others are given in-service training. For the navy, only doctors have special conditions re qualifications, and these cannot be replaced by other qualifications. For the air force, doctors, dentists and interpreters must all be university qualified and are sent on special courses.

*France* : There are special conditions for recruiting personnel for specialist careers ; these cannot be replaced in certain circumstances by other qualifications and in-service training is provided for appointment to specialist posts.

*Federal Republic of Germany* : Medical officers, bandsmen, geographers and engineers need to have graduated from high school. This condition cannot be replaced. In-service training is provided for appointment to specialist posts.

*Ireland* : For specialists, a university degree or equivalent professional qualification is required and these conditions cannot be replaced. In-service training is provided for cadets and young

officers taking appropriate degrees (not in medicine or dentistry).

*Italy* : A university degree and professional qualifications are required for recruitment to specialist posts, and these conditions cannot be replaced. In-service training is provided for regular officers for appointment to some posts only.

*Luxembourg* : Doctors and *chefs de musique* must have special qualifications, which are not replaceable. There is no in-service training. (Such training is done abroad.)

*Norway* : Most specialists do their conscript service after they have gained their professional qualifications, and they have therefore completed their civil education. This condition for appointment to a specialist post cannot be replaced. In-service training is not provided, but candidates do a short officers' course on entry.

*Turkey* : Special qualifications are required for reserve officers, but these may be replaced in certain circumstances. In-service training is provided.

*United Kingdom* : Special qualifications are required ; conditions vary according to the rank at which entry is made. These are not normally replaceable. In-service training for specialist posts is provided, but not for medical, dental and legal officers.

*United States* : There are special conditions for recruiting specialist personnel ; in many instances (post) graduate degrees are required, as well as experience on the job, such as that of intern (for doctor).

These conditions are not replaceable. No in-service training is provided.

#### Question

- B. I. 8. How long is the period of training between recruitment and appointment to first officer rank (2nd lieutenant) ?
- B. I. 9. Is there any difference in the type and duration of training given in the period between recruitment and appointment to first officer rank — e.g. as between the three services, or as between specialist regular officers, or for any other reasons ?
- B. I. 10. What training courses have to be successfully completed before appointment to first officer rank ?
- B. I. 11. Are officers recruited from other ranks and, if so, is a full career open to such officers ? If not, what are the limitations ? (See also question C. 4 — Promotion)

#### Answer

- B. I. 8, 9, 10, 11. See tables.

Table B. I. 1. (a) and (b), 2, 3, 4

	Minimum age	Maximum age	Periods of engagement offered	Conditions for extending a period of service	Are personnel always recruited at the lowest rank, or is it possible to be recruited at a higher level ?
Belgium	19 (regular and supplementary officers) 17 (auxiliary)	35 (Regular and supplementary)  35 (auxiliary)	8 years for <i>Ecole Royale Militaire</i> 9 or 10 years for ERSS 3 years for EASS 6 years from the ranks ( <i>voie du cadre</i> ) 8 years for <i>gendarmérie</i> 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 years, then to retirement on request, for supplementary officers ( <i>cadre du complément</i> ) 9 or 12 years for auxiliary officers	Once commissioned as a regular officer, period of service is indefinite Supplementary officers : on request after 5 years Auxiliary officers : service is 12 years maximum	Recruitment always at the rank of <i>sous-lieutenant</i>
Canada	17	35	6 years for short service Indefinite service for regulars	Service requirements	No, may be enrolled at higher rank if possessing special qualifications
Denmark	19 (army) (no minimum specified for navy and air force)	No maximum (army) 27 (navy) No maximum specified for air force	Indefinite for regular army officers (until 60th year) Reserve army officers : service to 35th year Navy, A and B lines, full career officers, age 52-65 Navy reserve : various contract periods Air force : no answer provided	<i>Army</i> : extension of service not possible <i>Navy</i> : satisfactory service <i>Air force</i> : no answer given	<i>Army</i> : officers recruited at rank of private <i>Navy</i> : yes, always at lowest rank

Table B. I. 1. (a) and (b), 2, 3, 4 (continued)

	Minimum age	Maximum age	Periods of engagement offered	Conditions for extending a period of service	Are personnel always recruited at the lowest rank, or is it possible to be recruited at a higher level ?
France	17	Men : variable Women : 40	No such thing, except for reserve officers on active service	For reserve officers on active service only, depending on aptitude for job and approval from the authorities	Yes, with exceptions for certain corps
Federal Republic of Germany	17	25	2, 4, 8, 12, 15 years and career	General qualification	Recruitment at higher level is possible
Ireland	17	20	No specific period of engagement, but cadets who attend university at the expense of Department of Defence must undertake to serve 10 years minimum from date of commissioning	n. a.	Yes, except for doctors and dentists, who are appointed to rank of captain, and engineers and pharmacists, to rank of lieutenant
Italy	18	23 (usually only for university graduates, or officers transferring from short-service and NCO, to regular) 26 for reserves, (except for doctors : 28)	Regulars : 8 years ; 10 years for those going to university at government expense Reserve : 15 months (army and air force) 24 months (navy)	Maintenance of psycho-physic and aptitude fitness, and favourable proficiency report	Regulars : it is possible to recruit, for some services, directly at the rank of 1st Lieutenant Reserve : always at the lowest rank
Luxembourg	17	23 (or 25 if there are difficulties with recruitment)	Career officers only	n. a.	Yes

Table B. I. 1. (a) and (b), 2, 3, 4 (continued)

	Minimum age	Maximum age	Periods of engagement offered	Conditions for extending a period of service	Are personnel always recruited at the lowest rank, or is it possible to be recruited at a higher level ?
Norway	18	24	Less than 1 year engagement is possible (Re-engagements can be given)	If age is less than 30, maximum period of service is 9 years	Yes, always recruited at the lowest rank
Turkey	20	46	(no answer given)	In wartime, by order of the government	(no answer given)
United Kingdom	17 ½ (men) 18 (women)	39	<i>Army</i> : age 55 for regular; 3, 8 or 16 years for short-service <i>Navy</i> : age 50-60 for regular; 3 to 16 years for short-service <i>Air force</i> : age 38 or 16 years' service, for regulars (those who have achieved squadron leader rank can serve to age 55) 3-6 years for short-service	<i>Army</i> : conversion to permanent regular commission from short regular or short-service commission <i>Navy</i> : transfer to general list from supplementary list <i>Air force</i> : extension of short-service commission or conversion to permanent commission	Yes, at the lowest rank, except for officers with certain professional qualifications
United States	19-24, depending on programme	25-55, depending on programme	2-5 years, depending on programme (men) 2-4 years, depending on programme (women)	Satisfactory completion of initial obligated tour, and needs of service	Commissioning is possible at other than the lowest rank, but only in healing arts and certain technical and professional fields

Table B. I. 8, 9

Country	Period of training between recruitment and appointment to first officer rank	Differences in type of training between recruitment and appointment, either between the three services, or between specialist and regular officers
Belgium	2 years, then a period before confirmation (6 months for vets)	<p>Yes, there are differences in type of training :</p> <p>(1) ERM : 5 years for engineers, 4 years for non-specialists (<i>toutes armes</i>)  Officers from the ranks : similar but different courses, 2 years, and 3 to 9 months ; different for each service /specialisation</p> <p>(2) ERSS : doctors, dentists, pharmacists ; and degree from the civil university of their choice</p> <p>(3) Vets : 6 months' training after civil qualification is completed</p>
Canada	Immediate, except for non-degree enrollees, where training : approximately 1 year	No
Denmark	<p><i>Army</i> : For recruitment, must hold rank of sergeant  A-side : 3 years and 7 months to 1st lieutenant  B-side : 2 years to 2nd lieutenant  Reserve : 3 months to 2nd lieutenant</p> <p><i>Navy</i> : A-line : 5 years (4 years at Naval College)  B-line : 8 years (2 years at Naval College)  Reserve : 1 year (6 months at Naval College)</p> <p><i>Air force</i> : A-line : approx. 4 ½ years  B-line : 6 years  Reserve (pilots and navigators) : 2 years, others : 1 year  (Air force figures indicate total time of training from recruitment as private)</p>	Each service has its own officer training schools
France	1 to 2 years for men, 1 year for women	<p>New recruits : direct entry by competitive exam, 2 years' training (men), 1 (women)</p> <p>NCOs : entry by competitive exam ; training at officer candidate schools of the 3 services for 1 year (men and women)</p>

Table B. I. 8, 9 (continued)

Country	Period of training between recruitment and appointment to first officer rank	Differences in type of training between recruitment and appointment, either between the three services, or between specialist and regular officers
France (continued)		NCOs (men only) : recruitment by selection for line or technical officers, and by exam (for technical officers only) ; appointment direct to first officer rank without going to training school
Federal Republic of Germany	21 months	No
Ireland	2 years	<i>Army</i> : After 1 year's training at the military college, some attend university for a degree course in arts, commerce, science, or engineering <i>Naval service</i> : Short period at military college, a period with British Royal Navy, and a period at the Irish naval base and at sea <i>Air corps</i> : Short period at military college, and remainder of training period at air corps
Italy	<i>Army</i> : 2 years for regulars, 6 months for reserve <i>Navy and air force</i> : 3 years for regulars ; 7 months for navy reserve ; 3 months for air force reserve (but not pilots)	Yes, there are differences between both specialist and non-specialist regulars and reserves
Luxembourg	4 years	n. a.
Norway	Normally 2 years (cadet school + 1 year of training)	Yes
Turkey	3 years for regulars 6 months for reserves	None
United Kingdom	These vary between service and type of engagement, from 12 weeks to 1 ½ years	Yes, between services, regular or short-service engagements, and specialist posts
United States	Varies according to pre-commissioning programme : (1) Service academies : 4 years (2) ROTC : 2 or 4 years (3) Officer candidate schools : 4 to 5 months (4) Off-campus college programme : 2 to 3 years (5) Enlisted candidate programmes : 1 to 4 years	Yes. Service academies, ROTC, off-campus college programmes and enlisted candidate programmes are based on the candidate obtaining a college baccalaureate (4 years) degree. Candidates from the latter 2 programmes are required to attend officer candidate school, following college completion

Table B. I. 10, 11

Country	Training courses to be completed before appointment to officer rank	Are officers recruited from other ranks ? Is a full career open to such officers ? If not, what are the limitations ?
Belgium	See B. I. 9	Yes, so long as they fulfil the conditions laid down for the recruitment of officer candidates
Canada	Basic officer training and classification training for non-degree enrollees	Yes
Denmark	<p><i>Army</i> : A-line : A-line officer academy  B-line : B-line officer academy  Reserve : reserve officers' course  <i>Navy</i> : Naval college  <i>Air force</i> : A-line : basic training sergeant school, and 3½ years air force academy  B-line : 2 years at air force academy, after sergeant school, and specialist training  Reserve : Basic training sergeant school and reserve officer school, except for pilots and navigators who go to flying / navigators' school and reserve officer school</p>	<p><i>Army</i> : Officers are always recruited from other ranks  <i>Navy</i> : B-line officers are recruited from other ranks  <i>Air force</i> : Officers may be recruited among all ranks, including NCOs (even reserve officers may apply for air force academy). No limitations as to a full career, provided the necessary personal qualifications are present</p>
France	Schools (for both men and women), except for male technical officers and officers from the ranks	Yes, officers are recruited from the ranks, and there is no limit on their career
Federal Republic of Germany	Officers' basic military training course	Officers can be recruited from NCOs. If they become regular officers, a full career is open to them. In the case of specialist careers, the normal limitation is <i>Hauptmann</i> / <i>Kapitänleutnant</i>
Ireland	2 years' cadetship	Yes, such officers are not normally promoted beyond captain rank. They are mainly employed in administrative appointments

Table B. I. 10, 11 (continued)

Country	Training courses to be completed before appointment to officer rank	Are officers recruited from other ranks ? Is a full career open to such officers ? If not, what are the limitations ?
Italy	Completion of appropriate course	No recruitment from other ranks in the reserve Regular officers may be recruited from other ranks, and can reach the maximum rank of colonel, or captain if they do not have a high school diploma
Luxembourg	4 years' training	No
Norway	12 months at officers' cadet school, except for mates from merchant navy, who do 9 months at the naval academy	Yes. Limited promotion prospects, mainly because of age
Turkey	War college for regular officers ; reserve officer basic course for reserve officers	Yes, they are recruited by examination. Promotion up to captain in the army, or equivalent in other services
United Kingdom	Basic officer training only	Yes, but normal limitations on age on transfer apply. In some branches and specialisations, the commissioning of other ranks is the normal way to fill many officer posts. Frequently commissioned specialists of this kind only have limited career opportunities
United States	ROTC and off-campus college programme candidates must complete summer training (4 to 10 weeks) depending on scholarship / non-scholarship status, for from 1-3 summers, depending on sponsoring military service. Training courses are basic service orientation types, with emphasis on leadership, organisation, missions, and duties of the junior officer	Yes

**B. II. Ranks other than officers***Question*

B. II. 1. What are the conditions for recruitment ?

(a) Minimum age

*Answer*

B. II. 1. (a) Minimum age varies, with 17 being the usual age. The lowest age is 15 for two categories of trainees (A2 technicians at an air force technical school, and navigators) in Belgium, while the highest minimum age is 20, for Turkish personnel and for career NCOs in Luxembourg. See table.

*Question*

B. II. 1. (b) Maximum age

*Answer*

B. II. 1. (b) Maximum age also varies, from 24 (Canada) to 46 (Turkey), while France does not have a fixed maximum age. See table.

*Question*

B. II. I. (c) Training

*Answer*

B. II. I. (c) Five countries specify some level of secondary schooling as a condition for recruitment (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy) ; the others either say that no training is necessary (Ireland, Norway, United States, United Kingdom — except for certain trades), or make recruitment the function of an aptitude test (France, Luxembourg). It is unclear from Turkey's answer of "20 months' training period" whether any training is required before recruitment.

*Question*

B. II. 1. (d) Marital status

*Answer*

B. II. I. (d) Personnel to be recruited may be either married or single in all countries except

Luxembourg, where recruits must be single (and where military personnel require permission to marry). Italy reports that NCO recruits only must be either single or widowed without children, and Belgium reports that personnel who wish to train as air crew must be single, or widowed or divorced without children.

*Question*

B. II.1. (e) *Other conditions*

*Answer*

B. II. I. (e) Other conditions included physical and psychological fitness, and the character and moral qualities becoming to someone in the armed services. Some countries specified nationality as a condition for recruitment ; it is not clear whether the other countries do not make nationality a condition of service, or whether it is regarded as too obvious a condition to need stating. See table.

*Question*

B. II. 2. What are the periods of engagement offered ?

*Answer*

B. II. 2. The periods of engagement offered vary, from Norway's less than one year, to Germany's fifteen years. See table.

*Question*

B. II. 3. What are the conditions for extending a period of service ?

*Answer*

B. II. 3. In general, a period of service can be extended if the candidate meets the same conditions as were required for his recruitment, and/or according to service requirements. See table.

*Question*

B. II. 4. Are personnel always recruited at the lowest rank or is it possible to be recruited at a higher level ?

*Answer*

B. II. 4. Personnel are always recruited at the lowest rank, except in Canada, Germany, and the United States where it is possible to be recruited at a higher rank. Luxembourg, Denmark and Ireland reported exceptions to their general rule of recruitment at the lowest rank : volunteers in Luxembourg can be recruited at a higher rank, though NCOs are always recruited at the lowest rank (sergeant) ; Danish volunteers who have already done national service are recruited at the rank achieved during that time ; and specialists in the Irish naval service can be recruited at a higher rank.

*Question*

B. II. 5. Are there special conditions for trainees ? If so, what are they ?

*Answer*

B. II. 5. Only Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the United States reported that there are special conditions for trainees. These are :

*Belgium* : All servicemen can seek to be recruited as NCOs if they meet the requisite conditions.

*Denmark* : During the first six months, trainees can ask to be released from their engagement, or the authorities can release them.

*Ireland* : Boy apprentices and trainees in the school of music can be recruited at 14.

*Luxembourg* : During the first six months, trainees can ask to be released from their engagement.

*United States* : Restricted privileges if trained at certain posts.

*Question*

B. II. 6. Is it possible to transfer from one category to another and if so in what conditions ?

*Answer*

B. II. 6. It is possible to transfer from one category of service to another in all countries

except Luxembourg and the United States. Turkey did not answer the question. See table.

*Question*

B. II. 7. (a) Are there special conditions (e.g. trade union qualifications) for recruiting specialist personnel (i.e. technicians, medical services) ?

*Answer*

B. II. 7. (a) Denmark, France, Germany and Ireland replied that there are special conditions for recruiting specialist personnel. These are :

*Denmark* : Special conditions apply to such specialists as aircraft mechanics, electricians and photographers.

*Germany* : Technicians, personnel in the medical service and bandsmen must have completed their apprenticeships.

*France* : French women serving in the *Service de Santé* must hold a State nursing diploma.

*Ireland* : Boy apprentices must have reached a specific standard of education.

The United States replied that while there are no special conditions for recruiting specialist personnel, those with skills enter the service at a higher grade.

*Question*

B. II. 7. (b) Can the above conditions be replaced in certain circumstances by other qualifications (ability, output) ?

*Answer*

B. II. 7. (b) France replied that the above conditions could be replaced in certain circumstances, though in any case training would be completed during the course of service. The United States replied that each individual must take a skill-oriented test. Denmark, Germany and Ireland replied that the conditions on recruitment of specialist personnel could not be replaced in certain circumstances. Italy, which replied to (a) in the negative, added in this question that

for other ranks, a previously held job was a preferential element in the assignment of some jobs.

*Question*

B. II. 7. (c) Is in-service training provided for appointment to such specialist posts?

*Answer*

B. II. 7. (c) Norway and Turkey did not answer this question. All other countries except Denmark said that in-service training is provided for appointment to specialist posts, though in Luxembourg this is done principally through training courses taken abroad.

*Table B. II. 1*

Country	Minimum age	Maximum age	Other conditions
Belgium (career NCOs)	16 (15 for some specialisations)	25 (27 for some specialisations)	Meet the conditions for voluntary engagement or re-engagement; medical exam and psychological tests; conduct and morality above reproach and the honourableness demanded of an NCO; be favourably regarded by his superiors (if military); pass a competitive exam comprised of tests of his physical condition and a written test bearing on certain contents of the middle studies for the " <i>degré inférieur</i> "
(temporary NCOs)	17 (16 for navigators in the navy)	32	Be serving already through enlistment or re-enlistment; be approved by the Ministry of National Defence; achieve a certain standard in physical and psychological ( <i>psychotechniques</i> ) tests
(supplementary NCOs)	After 5 years' active service as a temporary NCO	—	Must have served as a temporary NCO; be viewed favourably by his superiors and have the approval of the Ministry of National Defence; pass tests on military and professional subjects, both theoretical and practical, necessary for the exercise of his job
(other ranks — volunteers)	17	30	Physical fitness; possess the moral, physical, and professional qualities and honourableness demanded of a professional soldier; not to have committed certain crimes, or be the object of judicial proceedings; be a Belgian citizen
Canada	17	24	None
Denmark	16 (18 for women)	29 (26 for women)	Normal good health
France	17	Not fixed	French nationality (except for the Foreign Legion); parental consent for minors; no prison sentence of more than 1 year

Table B. II. 1 (continued)

Country	Minimum age	Maximum age	Other conditions
Federal Republic of Germany	17	29	"General qualification"
Ireland (not women)	17	38, if they have previous service	Medically fit and of good character
Italy (NCOs)	16, 17, 18 depending on the specialisation	26 for army, 20 for navy, 22 for air force	Italian citizenship; psycho-physic and aptitude fitness; good character
(other ranks)	19 (conscripts) 16 (volunteers) (VFP)	26, 27, 28, according to duration of university courses	Italian citizenship; psycho-physic and aptitude fitness; no criminal sentence which would bar him from State offices
Luxembourg (volunteers)	17	25	Luxembourg citizenship; sufficient good health for military service
(career NCOs)	20	30	Recruited from among volunteers. Candidature depends on success in a competitive exam, before which the man must have served at least 2 years as a volunteer; reached the rank of <i>corporal</i> ; be at least 1.73 m tall (can be reduced to 1.68 m in case of necessity); have successfully completed three years of middle, secondary or equivalent studies. For nomination to career sergeant, candidate must have done 3 years' service, completed a training period, and passed a definitive admission exam
Norway	17	23	---
Turkey	20	46	Turkish citizenship; good health for military service
United Kingdom	16 (17 for women)	40	"Medical, educational, nationality, personal, aptitude"
United States	18 (with parental consent at 17) (In States which have not given women equal rights, parental consent required under age 21, but over 17)	35 for army, 30 for navy, 28 for marine corps, 27 for air force	Pass physical and mental tests

Table B. II. 2, 3, 6

Country	Periods of engagement offered	Conditions for extending a period of service	Is it possible to transfer from one category to another, and if so, in what conditions ?
Belgium (career NCOs)	6 years. Once they reach rank of sergeant ( <i>quartier-maitre</i> ) they can only resign with approval of Ministry of National Defence	n.a. once the rank of sergeant ( <i>quartier-maitre</i> ) reached	Yes, if the general conditions are met
(temporary NCOs)	6 years	No conditions	»
(other ranks — volunteers)	2, 3, 5 or 6 years	Meet the same conditions as for recruitment (conditions re physical fitness modified for those who fought 1940-45, or who were injured or contracted an illness in the service, or who have served 10 years in the reserve and are still able to fulfil duties)	»
Canada	5 years, followed by indefinite (i.e. career status)	Service requirements	Yes. Short-service members may elect career status and be accepted depending on service requirements. Members of regular force may, if eligible on release, apply for transfer to reserve force. Member of reserve force may apply to transfer to regular force under conditions prescribed by Chief of the Defence Staff
Denmark	Short-period contract until 35 years of age	Satisfactory service	Yes. After at least 4 years and 9 months of short periods of service it is possible to transfer either to long period of service terminating at 45 years of age, or — before the age of 40 is reached — to a long period of service terminating at 60 years of age

Table B. II. 2, 3, 6 (continued)

Country	Periods of engagement offered	Conditions for extending a period of service	Is it possible to transfer from one category to another, and if so, in what conditions ?
France	Minimum : 3 years if age less than 18, or the legal service + 1 month if older than 18 Maximum : 10 years	Meet the same conditions as for recruitment, and show aptitude for his work	Yes. Conscripts can undertake a volunteer engagement ; volunteer NCO can become career NCO after 4 years' service including 2 years as an NCO ; volunteers can become student career officers
Federal Republic of Germany	2, 4, 8, 12, 15 years	General qualification	Yes. From conscript to short-service engagement, and from reserve to short-service engagement if general qualifications met. Transfer to career status is possible for chief petty officers
Ireland	3 years for army, 4 for naval service, 9 years for boy apprentices	Be of good character and have reached an approved standard of training	Yes, if the necessary qualifications are met
Italy (NCOs)	3 years for army, 3 or 6 years for navy and air force	Psycho-physic aptitude fitness, and positive proficiency report	Yes. Volunteer sergeants can be transferred to permanent service after 30 months and after passing an exam ; short-service sergeants (conscripts) can be transferred to permanent service after 4 years' service by a special competition ; transfer to reserve status because of age, illness, inability to discharge the functions connected with the rank, or by authority
(other ranks)	15 months for conscripts (army and air force) ; 24 months for conscripts (navy) ; 24 months for volunteers in all services	Psycho-physic aptitude fitness, and positive proficiency report	Yes. On discharge, all personnel pass into the reserve. In the case of a recall to arms, some soldiers can be placed in the NCO category. It is possible for volunteers to be transferred to the category of reserve NCOs
Luxembourg	3 years, followed by successive 1-year periods up to 7 years' service n.a. to NCOs, who are career personnel)	Service requirements (n.a. to NCOs)	No

Table B. II. 2, 3, 6 (continued)

Country	Periods of engagement offered	Conditions for extending a period of service	Is it possible to transfer from one category to another, and if so, in what conditions ?
Norway	Less than 1-year engagement is possible	If age is less than 30, maximum period of service is 9 years	Yes, depending on civil and military education, and according to requirements
Turkey	—	In wartime	—
United Kingdom	4, 6, 9 or 12 years depending on service and type of entry. Most have option of entering on a notice engagement scheme whereby service can be ended after 18 months' notice but on condition that at least 3 years have been served since completion of training (2 1/2 years for army and air force nurses)	Suitability and vacancies	Yes, but only in 3 main categories of apprentices with 3 years' training or longer, juniors, and adult recruits. Transfer is possible to and from apprenticeships. Those under 17 1/2 on a fixed engagement have option of transferring to a notice engagement at 18
United States	2, 3, 4 and 6 years	Honourable service, normal advancement, recommended by commander	No

### C. Promotion

#### Question

- C. 1. (a) What ranks exist ?
- (b) What is the average time spent in each rank ? (years)
- (c) At what average age is each rank reached ? (years)
- (d) What is the proportion of officers or non-commissioned officers of each rank compared with the total number of officers or non-commissioned officers ? (per cent)
- (i) Navy
- (ii) Army
- (iii) Air force

#### Answer

C. 1. See the six relevant tables for the three services, officers and other ranks.

#### Question

- C. 2. What conditions must be fulfilled for promotion to a higher rank ?
- (a) In respect of training ?
- (b) In respect of seniority ?
- (c) In respect of administrative requirements ?
- (d) In respect of examinations ?

#### Answer

C. 2. The answers to this question varied greatly. France and the United Kingdom answered on a "yes" or "no" basis as to whether conditions of training, seniority, administrative requirements and examinations were factors in promotion ; the other countries provided considerable detail as to just what the conditions for promotion are. See table.

#### Question

- C. 3. What is the limit of normal promotion, if there is one, and after what period of service is it generally reached ?

#### Answer

C. 3. The answers to this question are not strictly comparable, because of the different interpretations given to the phrase "limit of normal promotion". Some countries (e.g. Canada) took this to mean a limit in the absolute sense, and replied that there was no limit to normal promotion; others (e.g. France) indicated that promotion could go on indefinitely ; and others (e.g. Denmark) took the phrase to refer to the average career pattern as opposed to the theoretical limit, and answered accordingly. See table.

#### Question

- C. 4. In what circumstances may ranks other than officers be promoted to officer rank ?
- Is special training provided with a view to such promotion ?

#### Answer

C. 4. See table.

#### Question

- C. 5. Are special qualifications required of officers for promotion to staff appointments or to general rank ?
- Is in-service training available to provide such qualifications ?

#### Answer

C. 5. Canada, Denmark (army), and Norway replied that no special qualifications are required of officers for promotion to staff appointments or to general rank ; however, in-service training is available at staff colleges. (In Norway, all academy officers go to staff college ; other officers go to administrative school.)

This is similar to the United Kingdom reply, that while staff colleges exist to provide staff training, this is not necessarily a prerequisite to staff appointments.

Belgium replied that while special qualifications are not required, in practice numerous functions of a staff officer are filled by officers

holding a staff officer commission (from the *Ecole de Guerre*), and numerous functions of direction, control and co-ordination of administrative bodies are filled by officers holding the commission of military administrator (from the *Ecole des administrateurs militaires*).

Ireland replied that while special qualifications are not required, officers above the rank of captain are expected to have completed a command and staff course of nine months' duration at the military college.

In Luxembourg, also, special qualifications are not required, but in practice staff officers have completed the training preparatory for the rank of major. (There is no qualification or preparation for the rank of general, as it does not exist in the Luxembourg service.)

France, Germany and the United States each replied that special qualifications are necessary for promotion to staff appointments or to general rank, and that in-service training is available to provide such qualifications.

Turkey replied that there are special conditions depending on circumstances.

Italy replied that special qualifications are necessary for staff appointments, for which in-service training is given, but that no particular qualifications or training exist for appointment to general rank.

Denmark, which does not require special qualifications for potential staff officers from the army, does require staff officers from the navy to have successfully completed a staff course. Air force staff officers, depending on the post to be filled, may have to complete a staff course; they do have to complete a technological course and an educational course.

#### Question

C. 6. What are the promotion prospects of officers with university qualifications compared to those who have not been to university?

#### Answer

C. 6. Denmark (army), France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and Turkey replied that there

is no difference in the promotion prospects of officers with university qualifications compared with those who have not been to university.

Italy said that while in principle there is no difference, a degree can represent a preferential element in promotion, other qualifications being equal.

The United Kingdom said that there is no difference except in the lowest rank, where certain ante-dates of seniority are given.

The other countries (and Denmark — air force) give some advantages to those with university qualifications.

Belgium gives university qualified officers a credit towards seniority: officers who, before military training, have done at least two years at university or who are technical engineers, get a seniority credit on promotion to captain equal to the number of years of study successfully completed after the first year, up to a maximum of 4 years.

Canada also gives university-qualified officers academic time credits, towards seniority for eligibility to be considered by a promotion board.

Danish air force officers, with RDAF academy qualifications (equivalent to university qualifications), may expect to attain major/lt.-colonel rank; B-line officers, with "B" academy training, normally stop with the rank of captain.

Norway said that university-qualified officers could expect the same promotion prospects as academy officers (i.e. better prospects).

The United States replied that for men, the promotion prospects of those with university qualifications were "much better", while for women a university degree is required for the initial appointment.

#### Question

C. 7. Are promotion and training carried out in a certain order or is there a system of selection?

*Answer*

C. 7. Most countries carry out promotion and training according to both a certain order (usually seniority), and selection.

*Belgium* : Junior officers, by seniority. From major upwards, by selection.

*Canada* : Junior officers' training and employment usually follows a pattern specified for the applicable classifications. Promotion, and attendance on specific courses (e.g. staff college), by selection. Other ranks : selection applies to promotion and training at all levels above corporal.

*Denmark (Army)* : A-line, seniority, to major. B-line, seniority to captain. Afterwards, selection from among the best qualified. Reserve, special course to reach captain's rank.

(Navy) : A-line, selection above commander. B-line, selection above lt.-commander. Reserve, selection above lt.-commander.

(Air force) : Promotion and supplementary training offered on a selective basis as required.

*France* : Seniority and selection.

*Federal Republic of Germany* : Training is carried out in a certain order. Promotion is by selection on the basis of qualifications and performance.

*Ireland* : Selection.

*Italy* : Officer advancement is based on seniority for certain ranks (lieutenant, captain, lt.-colonel, vice-admiral) and selection for others (major, colonel, general). NCOs, always on seniority.

*Luxembourg* : Promotion is by training order. Selection only for army commander.

*Norway* : Lower ranks, according to order. Higher ranks, selection.

*Turkey* : According to order.

*United Kingdom* : Selection (but for many promotions, successful completion of certain training courses is necessary).

*United States* : Selection, according to established eligibility criteria.

*Question*

C. 8. Is it possible to jump certain ranks during a military career ?

If so, in what circumstances ?

*Answer*

C. 8. Only Canada, Luxembourg and Turkey replied that it is not possible to jump certain ranks during a military career, though Canada did say that accelerated promotion is possible. France replied that jumping ranks is possible only in the case of navy technical officers recruited at second rank, and Germany that it is "generally not" possible. In the other countries, jumping ranks tends to occur rarely or in special circumstances.

*Belgium* : Officer candidates, during training, reach the ranks of *corporal*, *sergeant*, and *adjutant chef* by jumping the other ranks of NCOs.

*Denmark (Army)* : Only for ranks of lt.-colonel and above, and not for reserve officers.

(Navy) : Possible, but very rare.

(Air force) : Career officers may be promoted to any higher rank as required, according to qualifications and depending on post to be filled.

*Ireland* : Company quartermaster sergeant may jump rank of company sergeant and become battalion quartermaster sergeant ; company sergeant may jump rank of battalion quartermaster sergeant and become battalion sergeant-major.

*Italy* : In peacetime, it is only possible to jump the rank of 2nd lieutenant for those particular lists on which recruitment takes place directly at rank of 1st lieutenant.

*Norway* : Only in the ranks above commander/colonel.

*United Kingdom* : By selection.

*United States* : For enlisted personnel at time of service entry, if qualified in a needed skill. Very rare for officers.

*Question*

C. 9. Are promotions always permanent or may they be temporary ?

*Answer*

C. 9. Italy, Luxembourg, Turkey and France (except in wartime) replied that promotions are always permanent. The other countries replied that promotions might be temporary, but the circumstances do not appear very significant.

*Belgium* : Officer and NCO candidates are given temporary appointment to the rank of sub-lieutenant and sergeant respectively, and these are made permanent later ; other temporary appointments are possible to various ranks in order to fulfil special duties.

*Canada* : Promotions in other ranks are normally permanent. Officers may be promoted to acting rank in order to meet service requirements.

*Denmark (Army)* : Promotions normally permanent, but may be temporary.

(Navy) : A few posts of admiral are temporary.

(Air force) : May be temporary. (At the present time temporary appointments are given only to officers posted to allied staffs, and to officers assigned to the very highest posts in the Danish military system.)

*Federal Republic of Germany* : General/admiral rank may be temporary.

*Ireland* : May be temporary.

*Norway* : A few may be temporary.

*United Kingdom* : A few may be temporary.

*United States* : Most enlisted promotions are permanent. Officer promotions may be temporary.

*General note*

*Officer tables* : All countries except Norway include all their officer ranks in their percentage figures.

*Other ranks tables* : Some four or five countries, depending on the service, based their percentage figures on a total which included all other ranks ; the other countries based their percentage figures on a total which included only some (usually NCOs) other ranks.

Therefore in the tables where a double horizontal line occurs, the percentage figures above that line are fully comparable ; below that line, they represent a proportion of a limited number of ranks and should therefore be used with great caution.

(1) Canada is included in all six tables, although it does not have a separate army, navy and air force.

(2) Denmark. Officers of the "A" and "B" lines only are shown in the three officer tables.

(3) Ireland. The same years in rank and age are given for all tables, since the air corps and naval service figures are calculated as part of the army totals. The percentage figures are those of the air corps and naval service respectively.

(4) Italy. (a) The army figures only include regular officers of "all arms" (*Ruoli Normali*), not the special list, technical and logistic science officers, whose average age is slightly higher, and time spent in each rank therefore slightly longer. Also, from the rank of lt.-colonel and above for officers, and sergeant and above for NCOs, the figure for the number of years in each rank is the *minimum* period necessary for promotion to the next rank, and not the average time spent in each rank. (b) The air force figures for officers are for regular pilot officers only.

(5) Norway. The two sets of figures given for the army and air force represent on the top line the service academy officers, and on the lower line the cadet school officers (except for the rank of lieutenant in the air force, which is filled only from the ranks). For the navy, the top line is for service academy officers, and the lower line for officers from the petty officer school.

Table C.1 (a), (b), (c) and (d)

ARMY — OFFICERS

Country	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%			
Belgium	Sous-Lieutenant 4			Lieutenant 5			Capitaine 5			Commandant 2			Major 5 37 14			Lt-Colonel 4 41 7			Colonel 4 45 4			General-Major 2/3 48 0.6		
	← 75 % →																							
Canada	Officer cadet + 2nd Lieutenant 13.7			Lieutenant 11.9			Captain 43.1			Major 19			Lt-Colonel 5.9			Colonel 1.9			Brigadier- General 0.49			Major- General 0.18		
Denmark (A line) (B line)	2nd Lieutenant 4 22			Lieutenant 10 26			1st Lieutenant 5 23 8 36			Captain 5 28 5 44			Major 11 33 11 49			Lt-Colonel 10 44			Colonel 54					
France	Sous-Lieutenant 1 23 4.9			Lieutenant 6 24 28.1			Capitaine 8 30 35.1			Commandant 5 38 19.3			Lt-Colonel 5 43 7.1			Colonel 6 48 4.2			Gén. de brigade 2 54 0.6			Gén. de division 4 56 0.3		
Federal Republic of Germany	Leutnant 22.5 20			Oberleutnant 26.7 14.4			Hauptmann 29.2 31.5			Major 33.7 11.4			Oberstleutnant 41.2 18.7			Oberst 50.8 3.5			Brigade-General 52.8 0.39			General-Major 0.14		
Ireland	2nd Lieutenant 2 21			Lieutenant 5 23			Captain 13 28 39			Commandant 14 42 22			Lt-Colonel 8 53 7			Colonel 55 2			Major-General 54					
	← 30 % →																							
Italy	2nd Lieutenant 2 21			Lieutenant 5 23			Captain 10 28 32.4			Major 4 38 11.2			Lt-Colonel 7 42 20.1			Colonel 5 49 5.8			Brigadier-Gen. 3 54 1.1			Major-General 3 57 0.4		
	← 28.7 % →																							
Luxembourg	Lieutenant 3			Lt en premier 7 31			Capitaine 9 43 57			Major 11 50 28.5			Lt-Colonel 3 53 3.5											
	← 11 % →																							
Norway See note one	2nd Lieutenant 5 23 3.9			Lieutenant 5 25 15.9 10 28 54.8			Captain 8 30 19.3 6 38 33.3			Major 6 38 29.5 5 44 6.8			Lt-Colonel 4 44 26.3 4 49 1.2			Colonel 5 48 7.6			Major-General, Lt-Gen. + Gen. 53			← 1.4 % →		
Turkey	3rd + 2nd Lieutenant 4 21			1st Lieutenant 6 24			Captain 6 30			Major 6 36			Lt-Colonel 3 42			Colonel 6 45			Brigadier-Gen. 4 51			Major-General 4 55		
United Kingdom	2nd Lieutenant 19.3 %			Lieutenant			Captain 31			Major 32.4			Lt-Colonel 10.8			Colonel 3.5			Brigadier-Gen. 1.5			Major-General 0.5		
United States	2nd Lieutenant 2 23 13.7			1st Lieutenant 2 25 13.8			Captain 6 27 36			Major 6 33 18.5			Lt-Colonel 6 39 12.1			Colonel 8 45 5.4			General 46 0.5					

ARMY— OTHER RANKS

Country	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%			
Canada	Private 20.4			Corporal 36.6			Master Corporal 14.4			Sergeant 14.7			Warrant Officer Sergeant 6.5			Master Warrant Officer 3.2			Chief Warrant Officer 1.2					
Federal Republic of Germany	Grenadier 75.8 %			Gefreiter Obergefreiter 1.6			Hauptgefreiter 1.6			Unteroffizier 5.4			Stabsunter-offizier 5.9			Feldwebel 3.6			Oberfeldwebel 3.2			Hauptfeldwebel 4.3		
United Kingdom	Private 50.4			Lance-Corporal 14.2			Corporal 15.2			Sergeant 10.6			Staff-Sergeant 4.7			Warrant Officer II 3.5			Warrant Officer I 1.5					
United States	Pay grades E 1 to E 3. 1 19 46			Pay grade E 4 1.3 20.9 19			Pay grade E 5 0.7 21.6 15			Pay grade E 6 4.7 26.3 11			Pay grade E 7 4.7 31.2 7			Pay grade E 8 6.2 37.3 2			Pay grade E 9 3.2 40.6 0.6					
Belgium	Soldat			Caporal			Sergent 5 22			Premier sergent 5 27			Premier sergent major 8 34			Adjutant 8 45			Adjutant-chef 11 50 8					
Denmark	Constable 1 17			Over Constable 2 19			Corporal 0			Sergeant 2 19			Over Sergeant 2 to 5 21-24			Senior-Serg. II 10 25-28			Senior-Serg. I 35-38					
France	Soldat 1/2 18			Caporal 1/2 18.5			Caporal-chef 1/2 19			Sergent 3 19.5 32.6			Sergent-chef 3 22.6 23.6			Adjutant 7 25.6 23.8			Adjutant-chef 32.6 19.9					
Ireland	Private Not included in percentages			Corporal 5 26 53.1			Sergeant 5 31 32.1			Coy QM Serg. 8 34 9.1			Company Sergeant 7 36 3.7			Battalion QMS 42 1.1			Batt. Serg.-Major 43 0.9					
Italy	Private not included in percentages			Corporal			Sergeant 20 23.8			Staff-Sergeant 24 28.9			Master Sergeant 4 31 15.2			First Sergeant 4 35 13.6			Sergeant-Major 8.3			Warrant Officer		
Luxembourg	Soldat 2 18.5			Caporal 1 20			Caporal-chef 2 20			Sergent 3 24			Premier Sergent 3 31			Sergent-chef 8 32.5			Adjutant 8 43 29			Adjutant-major 8 47.5 34		
Norway										Staff-Sergeant 5 23 2.5			Master Sergeant 9 28 20.8			Senior Master Sergeant 7 37 64.2			(Lieutenant from ranks) 8 44 12.5					
Turkey							Sergeant 3 19			Senior Sergeant 3 22			Staff-Sergeant 3 25			Senior Staff-Sergeant 3 28			Major Sergeant 6 31			Senior Major Sergeant 6 37		

NAVY — OFFICERS

Country	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%				
Belgium	2 <sup>e</sup> Enseigne de vaisseau 4			Enseigne de vaisseau 5			Lieutenant de vaisseau 5			1 <sup>er</sup> Lieutenant de vaisseau 2			Capitaine de corvette 4 37 14			Capitaine de frégate 3 40 7			Capitaine de vaisseau 6 46 4			Commodore 8 54			
	← 75 % →																								
Canada	Officer cadet + 2nd Lieutenant 13.7			Lieutenant 11.9			Captain 43.1			Major 19			Lt-Colonel 5.9			Colonel 1.9			Brigadier-Gen. 0.49			Major-General 0.18			
Denmark (A line) (B line)	Sub-Lieutenant 4 25 9			Lieutenant Junior Grade 10 29 30			Lieutenant 5 25 15 8 39 85			Lieutenant-Commander 5 30 20 13 47 20			Commander 15 35 45 6 54 6			Cdr. Senior grade 10 45 15			Captain 10 50 5			Rear-Admiral 10 52 1			
France	Ens. de vaisseau 2 <sup>e</sup> classe 1 23 5.7			Ens. de vaisseau 1 <sup>re</sup> classe 5 24 25.6			Lieutenant de vaisseau 7 29 32.8			Capitaine de corvette 5 36 18.4			Capitaine de frégate 6 41 11.1			Capitaine de vaisseau 6 46 5			Contre-amiral 3 52 0.8			Vice-amiral 5 55 0.3			
Federal Republic of Germany	Leutnant z. See 22.5 20			Oberleutnant z.S. 26.6 14.9			Kapitänleutnant 30.1 32.4			Korvettenkapitän 33.4 10.8			Fregattenkapitän 39.9 17.4			Kapitän zur See 50.1 3.9			Flottillenadmiral 53.4 0.39			Konteradmiral 0.13			
Ireland	Ensign 2 21			Sub-Lieutenant 5 23			Lieutenant 13 28 51			Lieutenant-Commander 14 42 29			Commander 8 53 5			Captain 55 2									
	← 13 % →																								
Italy	Ensign 1 22			Sub-Lieutenant 4 25			Lieutenant 8 31 37.8			Lieutenant-Commander 4 37 12			Commander 7 42 16			Captain 5 48 7			Rear-Admiral 3 52 1			Vice-Admiral 3 54 0.6			
	← 25,4 % →																								
Turkey	Ensign 1			2nd Lieutenant 3 21			Lieutenant Junior Grade 6 24			Lieutenant 6 30			Lieutenant-Commander 6 36			Commander 3 42			Captain 6 45			Commodore 4 51			
United Kingdom	Sub-Lieutenant 10.9			Lieutenant 37.5			Lieutenant-Commander 22.6			Commander 12.2			Captain 4.0			Commodore 0.2			Rear-Admiral 0.5			Vice-Admiral 0.2			
United States	Ensign 2 23 15.5			Lieutenant Junior Grade 2 25 17.3			Lieutenant 6 27 24.7			Lieutenant-Commander 6 33 23.2			Commander 6 39 12.6			Captain 8 45 6.2			Admiral 47 0.5						
Norway	Cadet + Midshipman 2 22 ← not included in percentages →			Sub-Lieutenant 2 23			Lieutenant 5 25 21			Lieutenant-Commander 8 30 22 6-22 38			Commander 5-22 38 5-17 43			Captain 4-16 44 23 12 48			Commodore 5-12 48			Admirals ← 6 % →			

NAVY — OTHER RANKS

Country	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%			
Canada	Private			Corporal			Master Corporal			Sergeant			Warrant Officer Sergeant			Master Warrant Officer			Chief Warrant Officer					
			20.4			36.6			14.4			14.7			6.5			3.2			1.2			
Denmark	Private			Lance Corporal I and II			Corporal			Sergeant			Staff-Sergeant			Senior Sergeant II			Senior Sergeant I					
	2	18	34	2	20 and 22	27			6	2	23	23 %		25				10 %						
Federal Republic of Germany	Matrose, Gefreiter, Obergefreiter and Hauptgefreiter									Maat			Obermaat			Bootsmann			Oberbootsmann			Haupt-, Stabs- and Oberstabs-bootsmann		
	57.6 %									21.4	10.2		22.8	13.4		25.6	5.7		29.5	5.6		34-43	7.5	
United Kingdom	Seaman			Able Seaman			Leading Seaman			Petty Officer			Chief PO			Fleet Chief PO								
	52.3 %					18			22.7			2.5		0.9										
United States	(E1 + E2) Seaman recruit and apprentice			(E 3) Seaman			(E4) PO 3rd class			(E 5) PO 2nd class			(E 6) PO 1st class			(E7) Chief PO			(E 8) Senior CPO			(E 9) Master CPO		
	1.7	19+	23	1.1	21.3	15.2	3.5	22.7	19.9	6.7	27	17.3	4.1	33.1	14.6	2.2	37.1	7.1	2.9	39.2	1.8	3.6	42.3	0.76
Belgium	Matelot			Premier matelot			Quartier-maitre			Maitre			Premier maitre			Premier maitre-chef			Maitre principal					
	not included in percentages						5	22	54 %	5	27		8	34	38 %	8	45		11	50	8			
France	Matelot			Quart.-maitre II			Quartier-maitre I			Second maitre I			Second maitre II			Maitre			Premier maitre			Maitre principal		
	1	18		2	19		1	21		2	22	34.5	2	24	22.1	4	26	17.3	3	30	17.6	33	8.3	
Ireland	Seaman			Leading Seaman			Petty Officer			Senior PO			Chief PO			Senior CPO			Warrant Officer					
	not included in percentages			5	26	44	5	31	35	8	34	1.5	7	36	17.5		42	0.5		43	1.5			
Italy	Junior Rate			Able, Ordinary Rate			Leading Rate			Petty Officer			Chief PO			Senior CPO I			Senior CPO II			Senior CPO III		
				1	17		0,5	18		6.5	18.5		6	25	39	6	31	22	6	37	22	10	43	17
Norway							Petty Officer II			Petty Officer I			Chief PO											
							2	23		4	25		9-23	29										
Turkey							Sergeant			Senior Sergeant			Staff-Sergeant			Senior Staff-Sergeant			Major Sergeant			Senior Major Sergeant		
							3	19		3	22		3	25		3	28		6	31		6	37	

AIR FORCE — OFFICERS

Country	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%			
Belgium	Sous-Lieutenant 3			Lieutenant 2			Capitaine 5			Commandant 1	32		5	37	14	Lt-Colonel 4	41	7	4	45	4	Général-Major 2/3	48	0.6
	← 75 % →																							
Canada	Officer cadet + 2nd Lieutenant 13.7			Lieutenant 11.9			Captain 43.1			Major 19			Lt-Colonel 5.9			Colonel 1.9			Brigadier-Gen. 0.49			Major-General 0.18		
Denmark (A line) (B line)	2nd Lieutenant 4	29	12	Lieutenant 7	33	16	1st Lieutenant 5	28	18	Captain 5	33	22	Major 9-10	38	26	Lt-Colonel 11	45	4	Colonel 1			Major-General 0.25		
France	Sous-Lieutenant 1	23	8.3	Lieutenant 3	24	27	Capitaine 5	27	35.3	Commandant 5	32	17.4	Lt-Colonel 5	37	7.4	Colonel 6	42	3.6	Gén. de brigade 4	48	0.49	Gén. de division 4	52	0.19
Federal Republic of Germany	Leutnant 22.2	19		Oberleutnant 25.8	29.6		Hauptmann 29.7	25.9		Major 33.3	13.5		Oberstleutnant 38.3	16.5		Oberst 48.4	3.1		Brigadegeneral 52.5	0.36		Generalmajor 0.18		
Ireland	2nd Lieutenant 2	21		Lieutenant 5	23		Captain 13	28	39	Commandant 14	42	22	Lt-Colonel 8	53	7	Colonel 55	2							
	← 30 % →																							
Italy	2nd Lieutenant 1.5	22.5	11.5	Lieutenant 5	26	17.5	Captain 4.5	30.5	30	Major 3.5	35	9.5	Lt-Colonel 4.5	39	20	Colonel 5	43	8	Brigadier-Gen. 3	47.5	1.4	Major-General 2	50	0.6
Norway	2nd Lieutenant 5	23		Lieutenant 8	44		1st Lieutenant 5	25	19	Captain 8	30	21	Major 6	38	29	Lt-Colonel 4	44	26	Colonel 5	48	9%	General 53		
	← not included in percentages →																							
Turkey	3rd + 2nd Lieutenant 4	21		1st Lieutenant 6	24		Captain 6	30		Major 6	36		Lt-Colonel 3	42		Colonel 6	45		Brigadier-Gen. 4	51		Major-General 4	55	
United Kingdom	Flying Officer Pilot Officer 18			Flight Lieut. 43.9			Squadron Leader 24.7			Wing Command. 8.7			Group Captain 2.9			Air-Commodore 0.7			Air-Vice-Marshal 0.3			Air-Marshal 0.1		
United States	2nd Lieutenant 2	23	10	1st Lieutenant 2	25	13.7	Captain 6	27	38.9	Major 6	33	19.3	Lt-Colonel 6	39	12.5	Colonel 8	45	5.3	General 46	0.35				

AIR FORCE — OTHER RANKS

Country	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%	Years in rank	Age	%			
Canada	Private 20.4			Corporal 36.6			Master Corporal 14.4			Sergeant 14.7			Warrant Officer Sergeant 6.5			Master Warrant Officer 3.2			Chief Warrant Officer 1.2					
Federal Republic of Germany	Flieger, Gefreiter and Obergefreiter 62.5 %						Hauptgefreiter 1.4			Unteroffizier 21.5 7.6			Stabsunter-offizier 22.8 8.8			Feldwebel 25.4 5.1			Oberfeldwebel 27.7 7.1			Haupt- Stabs- and Oberstabs- feldwebel 31 to 40 7.5		
United Kingdom	Leading Aircraftsman 38.2 %			Senior Aircraftsman			Junior Technician 9.5			Corporal 18.9			Sergeant 16.4			Flight Sergeant 12.9 %			Chief Technician			Warrant Officer 3.8		
United States	Pay grades E 1 + E 2 0.2 18.5 13.7 0.3 18.8			Pay grade E 3 0.7 19.5 15.5			Pay grade E 4 1.2 21.9 25.1			Pay grade E 5 3.3 28.2 22.2			Pay grade E 6 3 35 13.2			Pay grade E 7 2.9 38.2 7.1			Pay grade E 8 2.6 40.6 1.9			Pay grade E 9 3.7 45 0.9		
Belgium	Soldat not included in percentages						Caporal 54 %			Sergent 5 22			Prem. Sergent 5 27			Pr. Serg. Major 8 34			Adjutant 8 45			Adjutant-chef 11 50 8		
Denmark	Private 1st class 2 19 17.4			Lance-Corporal II 1 21 8			Lance-Corporal I 6 22 18.6			Sergeant 2 22 18.6			Staff-Sergeant 5 24 17.8			Senior Sergeant II 17 28 22.5			Senior Sergeant I 15 38 5.5					
France	Soldat 1 18			Caporal 1 18			Caporal-chef 1 18			Sergent 4 19 35.5			Sergent-chef 4 23 28.7			Adjutant 5 27 18.8			Adjutant-chef 32 16.8					
Ireland	Private not included in percentages			Corporal 5 26 50.7			Sergeant 5 31 32.6			Flight Quarter-master Sergeant 8 34 3.5			Flight Sergeant 7 36 10.7			Regimental QMS 42 1.5			Regimental Sergeant-Major 43 1					
Italy	Airman 2/3 20			Airman 2nd class 1/4 20			Airman 1st class 5/6 21			Sergeant 3.5 24 25			Staff Sergeant 6.5 31 36			Technical Sergeant 4.5 36 14			Master Sergeant 4 40 13			Sen. Master Serg. and Warrant Off. 6 48 12		
Norway							Staff-Sergeant 5 23			Master Sergeant 9 28			Senior Master Sergeant 7 37											
Turkey							Sergeant 3 19			Senior Sergeant 3 22			Staff Sergeant 3 25			Senior Staff Sergeant 3 28			Major Sergeant 6 31			Senior Major Sergeant 6 37		

## Conditions for promotion to a higher rank

Table C. 2

Country	Training	Seniority	Administrative requirements	Examinations
Belgium		<p>(Years of service in a rank to be eligible for promotion to the next rank)</p> <p><i>Officers</i> : 4 years to be eligible for promotion to lieutenant ; 5 years for captain ; 5 years for <i>commandant</i> ; 2 years for major (only 3 months in the <i>gendarmerie</i>) ; 4 to 5 years for lt.-colonel ; 2 to 3 years for colonel. After lt.-colonel, at least 2 years' seniority is required in the immediately preceding grade ; also no one can make major without at least 11 years' seniority as an officer. (Air force officers enjoy more rapid advancement.)</p> <p><i>NCOs</i> : 5 years for 1st sergeant, 5 years for 1st sergeant-major ; 8 years for adjutant ; 8 years for <i>adjutant chef</i>. (For naval navigators, add 24, 30, 36, 42 months respectively to each of the above ranks.)</p> <p><i>Soldiers</i> : 30 months for <i>corporal</i></p>		<p><i>Officers</i> : to reach the rank of major, an officer must pass a test on his knowledge of the second national language, and a professional test. Officers do not have to take the professional test if they hold a commission as a staff officer (obtained after 2 years at the war college) or as a military administrator (obtained after 2 years at the college of military administrators). Doctors holding a staff officer commission must take a series of tests on general medicine and surgery. <i>Gendarmerie</i> officers who hold a doctor of laws are exempt from tests on the organization, duties, administration and service of the <i>gendarmerie</i></p> <p><i>NCOs</i> : To reach the rank of 1st sergeant-major : professional test. For <i>adjutant-chef</i> : competitive qualifying exam on his mastery of technical and military matters</p>

*Conditions for promotion to a higher rank**Table C. 2 (continued)*

Country	Training	Seniority	Administrative requirements	Examinations
Canada	<p><i>Officers</i> : Lieutenant to captain : completed classification training.</p> <p><i>Others</i> : nil</p> <p><i>Other ranks and NCOs</i> : Private 2 to 3 : level 3 for appropriate trade in CFP 123 ; Private 3 to 4 : level 4 for appropriate trade ; Private 4 to corporal : level 5 ; corporal to master corporal : level 5 ; corporal/master corporal to sergeant : level 6A ; sergeant to warrant officer : level 6B ; warrant officer to master warrant officer : level 7, if applicable ; master warrant officer to chief warrant officer : level 8, if applicable</p>	<p><i>Officers</i> : 3 years minimum in rank of lieutenant prior to promotion to captain ; 12 years' credit of military and academic time for promotion to major ; 4 years in rank of major for promotion to lt.-colonel ; 3 years as lt.-colonel for promotion to colonel. Thereafter by selection</p> <p><i>Other ranks and NCOs</i> : 6 months as private 1 for promotion to private 2 ; 6 months as private 2 for promotion to private 3 ; 18 months as private 3 for promotion to private 4 ; 18 months as private 4 for promotion to corporal ; 1 year as corporal for promotion to master corporal ; 4 years as corporal/master corporal for promotion to sergeant ; 3 years as sergeant for promotion to warrant officer ; 3 years as warrant officer for promotion to master warrant officer ; 2 years as master warrant officer for promotion to chief warrant officer (slightly different scale for musicians)</p>	<p><i>Officers</i> : Be selected for promotion by a promotion board</p> <p><i>Other ranks and NCOs</i> : Meet medical classification for his trade or be recommended by medical review board as medically eligible for continued employment ; — be available for unrestricted posting respecting normal employment in his trade ; — suitability : satisfactory conduct, motivation, trade advancement, potential for promotion ; — Commanding officer's recommendation</p>	<p><i>Officers</i> : Nil</p> <p><i>Other ranks and NCOs</i> : sergeant to warrant officer : warrant officer qualifying course</p>

## Conditions for promotion to a higher rank

Table C. 2 (continued)

Country	Training	Seniority	Administrative requirements	Examinations
Denmark	<p><i>Army officers</i> : —</p> <p><i>Navy officers</i> : fully satisfactory service in the lower rank</p> <p><i>Air force officers</i> : no compulsory training. Experience level to match with position</p> <p><i>Air force NCOs</i> : to be promoted from lance-corporal to sergeant requires 4 months' compulsory training at sergeant school</p>	<p><i>Army</i> : For all qualified officers, promotion is in army-list-seniority-order until and including rank of major for A-line, captain for B-line</p> <p><i>Navy</i> : According to seniority list</p> <p><i>Air force</i> : No fixed seniority requirements</p>	<p><i>Army officers</i> : selection above major (A-line) or captain (B-line) from among the best qualified</p> <p><i>Navy officers</i> : —</p> <p><i>Air force officers</i> : Must be placed in a position which presupposes the higher rank</p>	<p><i>Army officers (reserve)</i> : Special course to reach captain rank</p> <p><i>Navy officers</i> : —</p> <p><i>Air force officers</i> : None, except in isolated cases</p>
France	No	Yes	Yes	No
Federal Republic of Germany	Completion of general military professional and specialising courses	Minimum time in each rank : 1 year	For promotion to certain ranks, a minimum time of service in the forces	Exams for becoming petty officer, chief petty officer, officer, staff officer
Ireland	Completion of approved course	Yes	Appropriate experience required for administrative posts	A combination of educational and technical qualifications accepted for promotion to technical posts
Italy	Period of command or of service or of specific activities required for the different ranks	<p><i>Officers</i> : according to seniority from sub-lieutenant to lieutenant, from lieutenant to captain, from major to lt.-colonel (and corresponding ranks in other services)</p> <p><i>NCOs</i> : advancement in relation to seniority and vacancies</p>	<p>— Be included on an annual evaluation list</p> <p>— Be qualified for promotion and be included on the promotion list</p>	—

## Conditions for promotion to a higher rank

Table C. 2 (continued)

Country	Training	Seniority	Administrative requirements	Examinations
Luxembourg	<p><i>Officers</i>: Lieutenant: 4 years' training in a military college; major: training course</p> <p><i>NCOs</i>: training period and exam for rank of sergeant</p> <p><i>Other ranks</i>: <i>soldat</i> 1st class: good conduct + 9 months' service; <i>caporal</i>: aptitude in fulfilling functions of the rank, sufficient level of general education</p>	<p><i>Officers</i>: seniority for promotion to 1st lieutenant and captain, and also for major under condition of having successfully completed a training course preparatory for the higher rank</p> <p><i>NCOs</i>: seniority for promotion to 1st sergeant and <i>sergent-chef</i>, <i>adjudant-chef</i> and <i>adjudant-major</i></p>	Selection for rank of lt.-colonel and army commander	<p><i>NCOs</i>: exam for rank of adjutant</p> <p><i>Other ranks</i>: practical and theoretical exam for rank of <i>caporal chef</i></p>
Norway	Completed the compulsory training for the category	Seniority is a factor — follows average career pattern	—	Staff college for academy officers. Administrative school for other officers
Turkey	Be in active unit	To cover necessary time for promotion	Must be an opening	Good efficiency report
United Kingdom	Varies between rank and branch	Time-promotion is given in certain junior officer ranks	May depend on training, examination, seniority, performance, or any combination	Varies
United States	Qualified in skill	Minimum time in service and grade	Meet service quality criteria	Must attain qualifying score in service tests

Table C. 3, C. 4

Country	What is the limit of normal promotion, and after what period of service is it generally reached ?	In what circumstances may ranks other than officers be promoted to officer rank ? Is training provided with a view to such promotion ?
Belgium	No one (except captain- <i>commandant</i> ) can be nominated to officer rank if he cannot, because of age, serve at least 3 years in that rank (does not apply to doctors, pharmacists, engineers of military fabrications, officers of the <i>gendarmerie</i> ) For senior or general rank officers, candidature can be presented 5 times at the maximum	Normal conditions of recruitment and training
Canada	No limit. Personnel are eligible for promotion up to and including the last year of service. No data is available on average time in rank /years of service by rank	Commissioning from the ranks programme, designed to provide a source of officers to augment those regular force officers commissioned through other plans Training: officer training school, after selection
Denmark	<i>Army</i> : A-line <i>qualified</i> officers: major, 20 years' service B-line <i>qualified</i> officers: captain, 24 years' service <i>Navy</i> : A-line: commander, 15 years B-line: lt.-commander, 30 years Reserve: commander, 20 years <i>Air force</i> : A-line: major, 10 years. Some 50 % of these may expect to be promoted to lt.-colonel after 9-10 more years B-line: captain, 16 years. Reserve (for the future): 1st lieutenant, 10 years, captain, 14 years Other ranks: private 1st class to lance-corporal 1st class, 3 years	Only after satisfactory completion of officers' academy course
France	Average minimum limit is 2 years or more in each rank	Selection, or by result of competitive exam. Special training is provided
Federal Republic of Germany	n. a.	Minimum age: 21. Minimum rank: <i>Feldwebel</i> . Passing of selection course No special training with a view to such promotion
Ireland	<i>NCOs</i> : due to limitation of establishment, majority of <i>NCOs</i> not promoted above rank of sergeant; average period of service before promotion to this rank: 13 years	To fill administrative posts Special potential officers' courses provided

Table C. 3, C. 4 (continued)

Country	What is the limit of normal promotion, and after what period of service is it generally reached ?	In what circumstances may ranks other than officers be promoted to officer rank ? Is training provided with a view to such promotion ?
Italy	No limit of normal promotion	<p><i>Army</i> : NCOs can be promoted in special lists or some services (transport, administration and catering) to age of 40, after passing relevant competitions</p> <p><i>Navy</i> : NCOs can be promoted in special lists to age 33, after passing relevant competitions</p> <p><i>Air force</i> : NCOs can be promoted in some lists (technical assistants, services administration) to age 36, after passing relevant competitions. Pilot NCOs can be promoted to pilot officers by special list, to age 27, after passing relevant competitions</p> <p>No special training is provided (but NCOs with a high school certificate are generally qualified for such promotion)</p>
Luxembourg	<p>1st lieutenant : after 3 years' service as lieutenant</p> <p>Captain : after 3 years' service as 1st lieutenant, if there exists a vacancy (the number of captaincies being fixed by law)</p> <p>Major : at least 5 years' service as captain, + vacancy</p> <p>Lt.-colonel : 5 years as major</p>	n. a.
Norway	<p>No specific answer given</p> <p>Promotion follows career patterns as shown in tables C. 1</p>	As a part of the promotion system in use. The different categories each have a promotion system which is based on the basic military education
Turkey	Normal period of time for promotion to each rank	To pass the examination, and to successfully finish the orientation course
United Kingdom	<p>Officers : brigadier or equivalent</p> <p>Servicemen : warrant officer I or equivalent</p> <p>No specific period of service before these ranks reached, except in specialist branches ; period of service to highest rank varies considerably in all cases</p>	<p>Suitability and selection by promotion board</p> <p>No special training with a view to such promotion</p>

Table C. 3, C. 4 (continued)

Country	What is the limit of normal promotion, and after what period of service is it generally reached ?	In what circumstances may ranks other than officers be promoted to officer rank ? Is training provided with a view to such promotion ?
United States	Officers : major-general/rear-admiral, after 35 years' service Other ranks: (pay grade) E4, after 2 years' service	Navy: appointment by selection boards to limited duty officer status Officer training schools in all services

## D. Termination of service

### I. Officers

(All answers in D. I., including tables, refer to regular and short-service officers, men and women — where applicable — unless otherwise stated.)

#### Question

D. I. 1. (a) What are possible grounds for dismissal ?

#### Answer

D. I. 1. (a) Generally speaking, the grounds for dismissal fall into the categories of misconduct, inability to fulfil the functions of the rank, and ill-health, though the answers of the various countries do differ according to how narrowly the term "dismissal" is interpreted (cf. Italy and the United Kingdom). There is therefore some overlapping with the replies to question 2. See table.

#### Question

D. I. 1. (b) Are (i) marriage, (ii) pregnancy grounds for dismissal or termination of service in the case of female personnel ?

#### Answer

D. I. 1. (b) Of those countries which have women personnel, Canada and Ireland replied that marriage and pregnancy are not grounds for dismissal or termination, and Denmark

replied that this is so in its army and air force (no answer was given for the navy).

France replied that marriage and pregnancy are grounds for termination only if the member herself wishes to leave the services. In the United Kingdom, marriage is grounds for voluntary termination, but pregnancy is grounds for compulsory termination. In the United States, marriage is not grounds for dismissal or termination, but pregnancy is.

#### Question

D. I. 2. Are there provisions for compulsory premature retirement on grounds other than those for dismissal (e.g. redundancy, lack of promotion prospects, etc.) ?

#### Answer

D. I. 2. There was some overlapping of replies to this question with replies to 1. Belgium, France, Italy (short-service only), Luxembourg and Norway (regulars only) replied that there is no provision for compulsory premature retirement on grounds other than dismissal. However, Belgium did answer 5 (a) (ii) on pension rights affected by premature retirement. See table.

#### Question

D. I. 3. In what circumstances may personnel resign before the end of a contracted period of service ?

*Answer*

D. I. 3. There are various circumstances in which personnel may resign before the end of a contracted period of service. See table.

*Question*

D. I. 4. Are bonuses payable at the end of the contracted period of service? How much? When are they paid?

*Answer*

D. I. 4. Turkey did not answer this question. Regular officers in Belgium, Denmark (army and navy), France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway and the United States do not receive a bonus at the end of their contract period. Nor do short-service officers in Denmark (army and navy), France, Luxembourg, and the United States.

Figures for those countries which do pay a bonus are given below. Not all countries specified when it is payable.

*Belgium* : Air force auxiliary officers with nine years' service receive a bonus of 25 times their last monthly salary; with twelve years' service they receive a bonus of 50 times their last monthly salary.

*Canada* : One month's pay for each year of service.

*Denmark* : Air force : 10 % per year  $\times$  number of years' service, paid at end of contracted period; navy reserve : 10 % per year  $\times$  number of years' service.

*Federal Republic of Germany* : Short-service personnel receive a bonus of 75 % of last monthly salary and, depending on length of service (6 to 36 months), an amount 3 to 14 times as large as the last monthly salary, both payable on termination of service.

*Ireland* : No answer given for short-service personnel.

*Italy* : Short-service personnel receive a bonus of \$171.82 for each 6 months of service, payable on discharge.

*Norway* : Short-service personnel receive a bonus of 15-35 % of total salary, payable by the end of the contract period.

*United Kingdom* : Regulars receive a lump sum at the end of a period of at least ten years' service. For men this is \$5,284.50 and for women \$4,836.19; it increases by \$1,054.44 and \$963.71 respectively for each additional year of service beyond ten. Regular officers with less than ten years' service called upon to resign for inefficiency, etc., receive a bonus of \$429.13 per year (men) or \$392.35 (women).

Short-service officers receive a lump sum payment at the end of their contracted period, at the rate of \$796.96 per year (men) or \$728.30 (women). Personnel who serve for eight years in the army air corps receive a bonus of \$6,743.50, and vets are paid a bonus of \$919.57 per year.

*United States* : No bonuses, except for navy nuclear-qualified officers, and physicians and dentists, who sign on for an additional obligated service contract period. The bonus for nuclear-qualified personnel is a maximum of \$15,000; for physicians and dentists it is four months of basic pay for each additional year of obligated service.

*Question*

D. I. 5. How are :

- (a) pension rights;
- (b) reserve pay;
- (c) terminal bonuses or
- (d) other allowances affected by
  - (i) dismissal,
  - (ii) premature retirement or
  - (iii) resignation?

*Answer*

D. I. 5. Most countries answered this question with reference to pensions only, though where information on reserve pay and other allowances has been given, it has been included in the table. See table.

*Question*

D. I. 6. Is there any provision for rehabilitation or training for a civilian post? Is it available during service period? or after termination of service?

*Answer*

D. I. 6. Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Norway do not make provision for rehabilitation or training for a civilian post. Denmark has some facilities for air force, but not army or navy personnel, and Germany has a programme for short-service personnel only. Turkey did not answer the question.

*Belgium* offers an information course of approximately five months' duration, which is available during the service period.

*Canada* offers counselling and advice during the service period. Training may be provided by other government departments on termination of service.

*Denmark* (air force) : Re-education is organised on a limited scale, and is available during the last months of the service period.

*France* makes provision for rehabilitation or training available during the service period.

*Federal Republic of Germany* (short-service) : Rehabilitation and training measures may be offered during or after the period of service, depending on the length of the period of service.

*United Kingdom* : Training and rehabilitation are available both during and after the period of service.

*United States* : The transition programme offers skill training during the final 6 months of service. (This programme terminates on 31st May

1974, as directed by the 93rd Congress.)

*Question*

D. I. 7. Do the authorities afford assistance in seeking civilian jobs on termination of service?

*Answer*

D. I. 7. Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway and Turkey answered "no" to this question. Denmark answered "no" in the case of its army. The other countries — Canada, Denmark (navy and air force), France, the United Kingdom and the United States replied that the authorities do afford assistance in seeking civilian jobs on termination of service; Canada does this through joint programmes with other government departments, Denmark through a defence labour exchange office, and the United States through the Department of Labour employment service.

*Question*

D. I. 8. Do former servicemen have priority for employment in government service at the end of their period of service?

*Answer*

D. I. 8. Belgium, Denmark (army, navy, short-service personnel in the air force), Germany (regulars), Italy, Luxembourg and Norway replied that officers do not have priority for employment in government service at the end of their period of service. Canada also answered "no" — only if a member has wartime service is priority given, on the grounds of veteran's preference. Those countries which do give preference are, therefore, Denmark (for air force regulars), France, Germany (for short-service personnel), Ireland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Table D. I. 1, 2, 3 — Officers

Country	What are possible grounds for dismissal ?	Are there provisions for compulsory premature retirement on grounds other than those for dismissal ?	In what circumstances may personnel resign before the end of a contracted period of service ?
Belgium (career)	Service pension ; resignation from office ; resignation accepted ; penal or disciplinary grounds	No	Air force auxiliary officers may resign after 7 ½ years
(short-service)	Disciplinary, moral, or professional grounds ; air force auxiliary officers navigating personnel : inaptitude, incapacity (radiation)	No	Air force auxiliary officers may resign after 7 ½ years
Canada	Misconduct ; unsatisfactory service ; medical reasons	Yes. Service completed (completion of contract or having reached compulsory retirement age) ; reduction in forces strength ; irregular enrolment ; unsuitable for further service (other than medical reasons)	At any time with 6 months' notice providing they are not serving on period of obligatory service incurred through attendance of subsidised academic or special training, or during an emergency
Denmark (army)	Age ; health ; breaking the law	Yes. Redundancy	On application
(navy)	Breaking the law ; more than 120 days' illness in a 12-month period	Yes	On application — 3 months' notice
(air force)	Any act which in public opinion is considered defamatory	No (regulars), yes (short-service)	On application
France	Disciplinary grounds ; infirmity ; failure to meet medical requirements	No	Short-service : grounds of a serious personal or family nature ; inaptitude for the job ; impossibility of assignment to a job which corresponds to the number of years' engagement undertaken ; temporary discharge

Table D. I. 1, 2, 3 — Officers (continued)

Country	What are possible grounds for dismissal ?	Are there provisions for compulsory premature retirement on grounds other than those for dismissal ?	In what circumstances may personnel resign before the end of a contracted period of service ?
Federal Republic of Germany	Judicial imprisonment ; severe disciplinary offence	Yes. Permanent unfitness for service	Short-service : if remaining in service would mean an extraordinary personal sacrifice
Ireland (career)	Misconduct or inefficiency	Yes, for medical reasons	n. a.
Italy (regulars)	Age ; illness ; inability to discharge the functions connected with the rank (insufficient performance) ; on request ; inobservance of the regulations concerning marriage ; application of the advancement regulations ; reduction in rank	Yes, in the case of personnel temporarily relieved due to cadres reduction ; personnel unqualified for promotion (low-rank officers not included)	On request, provided that they have accomplished their service obligations
(short-service)	Age ; illness ; insufficient performance ; by authority	No	On request
Luxembourg	Serious failure of discipline ; medical reasons. Certain sentences from a civil or military court may involve discharge, dismissal, or removal	No	Officers and NCOs : on request
Norway (regulars)	By conviction	No	By notice
(short service)	By notice	Yes	By notice, during the first year
Turkey	Dishonourable discharge ; unsatisfactory efficiency report	Yes. Health ; excess in TOE	(No answer given)

Table D. I. 1, 2, 3 — Officers (continued)

Country	What are possible grounds for dismissal ?	Are there provisions for compulsory premature retirement on grounds other than those for dismissal ?	In what circumstances may personnel resign before the end of a contracted period of service ?
United Kingdom	Offences against service discipline	Yes. Unsatisfactory service; medical reasons; career planning; redundancy	Resignation within 3 months of enlistment for adults, 6 months for juniors; notice engagement; 18 months' notice after 9 years in any type of engagement. Also "premature voluntary release": purchase of release from \$123 to \$614 depending on type and length of engagement, and time served. May be waived on compassionate grounds. Eligibility for "PVR" varies with the service
United States	Violations of uniform code of military justice	Yes. Physical disability; failure of promotion after specified number of considerations and for specified period of service	Compassionate reasons, and for the good of the service

Table D. I. 5 — Officers

Country	Dismissal	Premature retirement	Resignation
Belgium	No effect. Years passed in the services are validated in the "salaried workers' pensions" sector, so servicemen and their dependants are assured of a normal pension just as if they had been subject to social security	Retirement pension paid based on years of service, years of service in the last rank, and last salary	No effect. Years passed in the services are validated in the "salaried workers' pensions" sector, so servicemen and their dependants are assured of a normal pension just as if they had been subject to social security
Canada	<i>Medical reasons</i> : more than 3, less than 10 years' service : return of contributions or cash termination allowance, whichever is greater ; 10 or more years' service : immediate annuity <i>Misconduct</i> : more than 3, less than 10 years' service : return of contributions ; 10 or more years' service : return of contributions or, with consent of TB, whole or any part of annuity to which entitled if released for economy or efficiency	Less than 3 years' service : return of contributions ; more than 3 but less than 10 years : return of contributions or cash termination allowance, whichever is greater ; more than 10 but less than 20 years : return of contributions or deferred annuity or, with consent of TB, reduced immediate annuity at his option ; 20 years' or more service : immediate annuity	More than 3, less than 10 years' service : return of contributions ; more than 10 but less than 20 years : return of contributions or deferred annuity at his option ; more than 20, less than 25 years : immediate annuity reduced by 5 % for each full year under retirement age ; more than 25 years : immediate annuity reduced by 5 % for each full year under retirement age
Denmark (army) (navy)  (air force)	(Answer not clear) Depends on severity of grounds for dismissal  (Answer not clear)	(Answer not clear) Pension is paid  (Answer not clear)	(Answer not clear) No pension (may be paid in some cases if less than 5 years from normal pension) (Answer not clear)
France	Pension may still be payable, according to pre-set conditions and after disciplinary body consultations. If there is a wife or children, suspension of pension will be only partial	n. a.	Pension rights not affected

Table D. I. 5 — Officers (continued)

Country	Dismissal	Premature retirement	Resignation
Federal Republic of Germany	<p>Regulars lose pension rights. (Short-service personnel do not qualify for a pension — see Section H)</p> <p>All personnel lose terminal bonuses and other allowances</p>	<p>Pension rights may be reduced, depending on duration of service</p>	<p>Loss of pension rights</p>
Ireland	<p>Loss of pension rights</p>	<p>Career personnel (men): pension after 12 years' service; (women, i.e. nurses): pension after 20 years. Women receive a gratuity after 1 year's service on retirement on marriage; gratuity after 5 years on retirement for any cause. Short-service personnel (men): gratuity after 5 years' service but less than 12 years</p>	<p>(Same as for premature retirement)</p>
Italy	<p><i>Age</i>: 20 years' active service: ordinary pension on basis of years of service; 15 or more years of useful service including 12 years of active duty: ordinary pension on basis of 20 years' service; other conditions: pension on basis of years of useful service (calculated as 44 % of 80 % of the last salary — see H. 11)</p> <p><i>Illness</i>: (not due to service cause): as above. Illness due to service cause: special pension not related to years of service</p> <p><i>Insufficient performance</i>: as above</p> <p><i>Failure to observe marriage regulations</i>: as above</p> <p><i>Advancement regulations</i>: as above</p>	<p>—</p>	<p>(Regulars) Pension on basis of useful years of service is paid to officers who have resigned provided they have at least 20 years' active service and are less than 3 years from the normal retiring age</p> <p>A captain's pension is paid to colonels, lt.-colonels and majors who have reached the normal retiring age for the rank of captain</p> <p>No pension or grant is paid in other circumstances</p>

Table D. I. 5 — Officers (continued)

Country	Dismissal	Premature retirement	Resignation
Italy (continued)	<i>By authority</i> : pension paid if the officer has at least 20 years of active service and is less than 3 years from the normal retiring age for the rank		
Luxembourg	<i>Medical reasons</i> : pension paid on the basis of years of service. (A gratuity is also paid if disability results from a service accident) <i>Misconduct</i> : pension rights may be retained, but if retained they may be reduced by 10-50 %	n. a.	With 15 years' service, pension is payable in proportion to years of service, but not before the age of 60
Norway	(Answer not clear)	(Answer not clear)	Age between 40 and 60, pension rate is 40-55 %
Turkey	(Answer not clear)	(Answer not clear)	(Answer not clear)
United Kingdom	(Regular) At least 16 years' service : terminal grant and pension may be paid as a compassionate award, but the maximum is 90 % of what it would otherwise be (Short-service) Discretionary gratuity of not more than 90 % of the usual sum	In addition to any pension or lump sum for which the officer is qualified, there is a special capital payment related to rank and service, a credit of up to 4 years' service for calculating pension, and a lower length of service requirement for a pension — i.e. 10 years	With at least 16 years' service, retirement pay and terminal grant reduced by up to 10 %, depending on age. Normal gratuity paid to those with less than 10 years' service. For those invalidated out of the services : pension calculated at a special rate
United States	Pension not payable Accrued pay and allowances not payable	Payable after 20 or more years' active military service, or when a disability rated at 30 % or more incurred during military service. Not payable to those discharged under less than honourable conditions or for a disability incurred as the result of misconduct, wilful neglect, or during a period of unauthorised leave	(Same as for premature retirement)

## II. Ranks other than officers

(All answers in D. II, including tables, refer to non-officers, regular and short-service, men and women (where applicable), unless otherwise stated. Replies for Canada, France, Germany, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom are virtually the same as in D. I.)

### Question

D. II. 1. (a) What are the possible grounds for dismissal ?

### Answer

D. II. 1. (a) Generally speaking, the grounds for dismissal fall into the categories of misconduct, inability to fulfil the functions of the rank and ill-health, though the answers of the various countries do differ according to how narrowly the term "dismissal" is interpreted (cf. Italy and the United Kingdom). There is, therefore, some overlapping with the replies to question 2. See table.

### Question

D. II. 1. (b) Are (i) marriage, (ii) pregnancy grounds for dismissal or termination of service in the case of female personnel ?

### Answer

D. II. 1. (b) Of those countries which have women personnel, Canada and Denmark replied that marriage and pregnancy are not grounds for dismissal or termination.

France replied that marriage and pregnancy are grounds for termination only if the member herself wishes to leave the services. In the United Kingdom, marriage is grounds for voluntary termination, but pregnancy is grounds for compulsory termination. In the United States, marriage is not grounds for dismissal or termination. Women are "separated" for pregnancy (which one assumes means termination of service) unless they request a waiver to remain in the service. Ireland did not answer the question.

### Question

D. II. 2. Are there provisions for compulsory premature retirement on grounds other than those for dismissal (e.g. redundancy, lack of promotion prospects, etc.) ?

### Answer

D. II. 2. There was some overlapping of replies to this question with replies to 1. Belgium, Denmark (navy and air force regulars), France, Luxembourg, and Norway (regulars) replied that there is no provision for compulsory premature retirement on grounds other than dismissal. See table.

### Question

D. II. 3. In what circumstances may personnel resign before the end of a contracted period of service ?

### Answer

D. II. 3. There are various circumstances in which personnel may resign before the end of a contracted period of service. See table.

### Question

D. II. 4. Are bonuses payable at the end of the contracted period of service ? How much ? And when are they paid ?

### Answer

D. II. 4. Ireland and Turkey did not answer this question.

Regular personnel in Belgium, Denmark (army and navy), Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway and the United States do not receive a bonus at the end of their contract period. Nor do short-service personnel in the United States.

Figures for those countries which do pay a bonus are given below. Not all countries specified when it is payable.

*Belgium* (short-service) : Temporary NCOs receive a bonus of \$2,570.69 on leaving the services after having served five years as a temporary NCO. *Caporaux* and *soldats* receive

a bonus of \$385.60 after one year of service (though in reply to B. II. 2, Belgium replied that two years was the minimum period of engagement offered), \$771.20 after two years, \$1,156.80 after three years, \$1,670.95 after four years, and \$2,570.69 after five years ; these are paid on leaving the service.

*Canada* : Severance pay equal to seven days' pay for each year of service.

*Denmark* : Short-service personnel in the army and navy, and regular and short-service personnel in the air force, receive a bonus of 10 % per year  $\times$  number of years' service, payable at the end of the contract period.

*France* (n.a. to women) : Personnel who contract an initial engagement of five years receive a bonus of \$1,343.18 ; if they serve five years as a result of two engagements the bonus paid is \$1,119.32. For an initial engagement of six years, the bonus is \$1,567.05 ; it increases by \$447.72 per year to \$3,357.96 for an initial engagement of ten years.

For engagements contracted after five years of service, the bonus is \$223.86 for a one-year engagement, \$559.65 for a two-year engagement, and then for each year in addition to the two-year engagement the bonus is \$335.79.

During the first engagement, the bonus is paid at the beginning of the second year of service ; for other engagements it is paid in the four months after the engagement becomes effective.

*Federal Republic of Germany* : Short-service personnel receive a bonus of 75 % of the last monthly salary and, depending on the length of service (6 to 36 months), an amount 3 to 14 times as large as the last monthly salary, both payable on termination of service.

*Italy* : Short-service personnel receive a bonus on the basis of 20 days' pay for each year of service (based on the last pay received) ; it is paid on discharge.

*Luxembourg* : Short-service personnel are paid a bonus of \$308.48 (NI 100) for each year of service (they receive \$630.64 at the present time), payable at the end of the month following discharge.

*Norway* : Short-service personnel receive a bonus of 15-35 % of total salary, payable by the end of the contract period.

*United Kingdom* : Regulars with at least twelve years' service but insufficient service to qualify for a pension receive a lump sum on transfer to the reserve or on discharge. This ranges from \$796.96 (12 years) to \$3,261.40 (21 years) for men, and from \$728.30 (12 years) to \$2,984.36 (21 years) for women.

#### Question

D. II. 5. How are :

- (a) pension rights ;
- (b) reserve pay ;
- (c) terminal bonuses or
- (d) other allowances affected by

- (i) dismissal,
- (ii) premature retirement, or
- (iii) resignation ?

#### Answer

D. II. 5. Most countries answered this question with reference to pensions only, though where information on reserve pay and other allowances has been given, it is included in the table. See table.

#### Question

D. II. 6. Is there any provision for rehabilitation or training for a civilian post ? Is it available during service period ? or after termination of service ?

#### Answer

D. II. 6. Belgium and Norway do not make provision for rehabilitation or training for a civilian post. Denmark does not make provision for regulars in the army and navy, but does for regulars in the air force and for short-service personnel in all three services. Germany and

Luxembourg have programmes for short-service personnel only. Italy replied that provision is made for regular, but not short-service personnel, though the answer given — that a certain percentage of posts in the competitions held at the Defence Ministry and other ministries is reserved for regular personnel — should perhaps be included as the reply to question 8. Turkey did not answer the question.

*Question*

D. II. 7. Do the authorities afford assistance in seeking civilian jobs on termination of service ?

*Answer*

D. II. 7. Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway and Turkey answered "no" to this question. Denmark answered "no" in the case of its army, and Luxembourg answered "no" in the case of regulars. The other countries — Belgium, Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as Denmark (navy and air force) and Luxembourg (short-service) replied that the authorities do afford assistance in seeking civilian jobs on termination of service.

*Question*

D. II. 8. Do former servicemen have priority

for employment in government service at the end of their period of service ?

*Answer*

D. II. 8. Belgium, Denmark, Germany (regulars), Italy (short-service) and Norway replied that servicemen do not have priority for employment in government service at the end of their period of service. Canada also answered no — only if a member has wartime service is priority given, and then on the grounds of veteran's preference.

Those countries which do give preference are, therefore, France, Germany (short-service), Ireland, Italy (regulars), Luxembourg (short-service), Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States. Some countries gave more detail : Germany said that up to a certain percentage have priority for employment in the civil service; Ireland, that certain concessions are granted for posts in the public service ; and the United Kingdom that priority is given in the civil service on a very limited scale. Luxembourg replied that volunteers, at the end of their service, are admitted into the lower grades of the *gendarmérie*, police, waters and forests department, customs, penal establishments, and posts and telecommunications. Priority for admission in the same grade is given in other public departments, offices, and establishments.

Table D. II. 1, 2, 3 — Ranks other than officers

Country	What are possible grounds for dismissal ?	Are there provisions for compulsory premature retirement on grounds other than those for dismissal ?	In what circumstances may personnel resign before the end of a contracted period of service ?
Belgium	Misconduct ; physical or professional incapacity ; inefficiency ; morals ; ideas incompatible with the status of a career serviceman ; subversive activities	No	— Within 3 months of enlistment, if enlisted before 18 years of age — In exceptional circumstances, to be agreed to by the Minister of Defence — In case of failure during training
Canada	Misconduct ; unsatisfactory service ; medical reasons	Yes. Service completed (completion of contract or having reached compulsory retirement age) ; reduction in forces' strength ; irregular enrolment ; unsuitable for further service (other than medical reasons)	At any time with 6 months' notice provided they are not serving on period of obligatory service incurred through attendance of subsidised academic or special training, or during an emergency
Denmark (army)	Age ; health ; breaking the law	Yes — redundancy	In case their own or their family's welfare is threatened by their staying in the service
(navy)	Breaking the law ; more than 120 days' illness in a 12-month period	No	» »
(air force)	Any act which in public opinion is considered defamatory	No (regulars) Yes (short-service)	On application
France	Disciplinary grounds ; infirmity ; failure to meet medical requirements	No	Short-service : grounds of a serious personal or family nature ; inaptitude for the job ; impossibility of assignment to a job which corresponds to the number of years' engagement undertaken ; temporary discharge
Federal Republic of Germany	Judicial imprisonment ; severe disciplinary offence	Yes. Permanent unfitnes for service	Short-service : if remaining in the service would mean an extraordinary personal sacrifice

Table D. II. 1, 2, 3 — Ranks other than officers (continued)

Country	What are possible grounds for dismissal ?	Are there provisions for compulsory premature retirement on grounds other than those for dismissal ?	In what circumstances may personnel resign before the end of a contracted period of service ?
Ireland (men)	Improper attestation ; under age on enlisting ; inefficiency ; misconduct ; civil conviction ; court-martial conviction ; failure to meet physical standards ; services no longer required	Yes, but they are rarely used	By purchase ; on compassionate grounds ; to take up civil employment ; to be appointed an officer. Free discharge given on request to all men with more than 12 years' service
Italy (regulars)	Inability to discharge the functions connected with the rank (insufficient performance) ; by authority ; inobservance of regulations concerning marriage ; age ; illness ; application of the advancement regulations ; on request	Yes	On request, provided that they have accomplished their service obligations (i.e. served the minimum obligated period)
(short-service)	Age ; illness ; insufficient performance ; by authority ; termination of terms of service	Yes	On request, for serious family reasons or following a suspension of at least 60 days from the specialisation courses
Luxembourg	Serious and repeated infractions of discipline ; certain sentences from a civil or military court ; insufficient ability ; permanent physical incapacity or incapacity likely to extend for at least 12 months	Other ranks : n. a. NCOs : no	Other ranks : in case of important changes in family circumstances NCOs : on request
Norway (regulars) (short-service)	By conviction By notice	No Yes	By notice By notice, during the first year
Turkey	Dishonourable discharge ; unsatisfactory efficiency report	Yes. Health ; excess in TOE	(No answer given)

Table D. II. 1, 2, 3 — Ranks other than officers (continued)

Country	What are possible grounds for dismissal ?	Are there provisions for compulsory premature retirement on grounds other than those for dismissal ?	In what circumstances may personnel resign before the end of a contracted period of service ?
United Kingdom	Offences against service discipline	Yes. Unsatisfactory service; medical reasons ; career planning ; redundancy	Resignation within 3 months of enlistment for adults, 6 months for juniors ; notice engagement ; 18 months' notice after 9 years in any type of engagement. Also "premature voluntary release": purchase of release from \$123 to \$614 depending on type and length of engagement and time served. May be waived on compassionate grounds. Eligibility for "PVR" varies with the service
United States	Hardship ; "convenience of government cause" — e.g. criminal activity, unfitness, failure to meet standards	Yes. Based on physical disability	Hardship ; convenience of the government

Table D. II. 5 — Ranks other than officers

Country	Dismissal	Premature retirement	Resignation
Belgium	Pensions and reserve pay not affected. Terminal bonuses for short-service personnel are not paid if member leaves service before end of contract period, or is in receipt of a long-service pension	n. a.	Pensions and reserve pay not affected. Terminal bonuses for short-service personnel are not paid if member leaves service before end of contract period, or is in receipt of a long-service pension
Canada	<i>Medical reasons</i> : more than 3, less than 10 years' service : return of contributions or cash termination allowance, whichever is greater ; 10 or more years' service : immediate annuity <i>Misconduct</i> : more than 3, less than 10 years' service : return of contributions ; 10 or more years' service : return of contributions or, with consent of TB, whole or any part of annuity to which entitled if released for economy or efficiency	Less than 3 years' service : return of contributions ; more than 3 but less than 10 years : return of contributions or cash termination allowance, whichever is greater ; more than 10 but less than 20 years : return of contributions or deferred annuity or, with consent of TB, reduced immediate annuity at his option ; 20 years' or more service : immediate annuity	More than 3, less than 10 years' service : return of contributions ; more than 10 but less than 20 years : return of contributions or deferred annuity at his option ; more than 20 but less than 25 years : immediate annuity reduced by 5 % for each full year under (a) 25 years of service or (b) retirement age, whichever is less ; 25 or more years' service : immediate annuity
Denmark	(Answer not clear)	(Answer not clear)	(Answer not clear)
France	Pension may still be payable, according to pre-set conditions and after disciplinary body consultations. If there is a wife or children, suspension of pension will be only partial	n. a.	Pension rights not affected. For other than accident or illness attributable to the service, terminal bonuses paid in proportion to time served. Other allowances no longer payable
Federal Republic of Germany	Regulars lose pension rights. (Short-service personnel do not qualify for a pension — see Section H) Short-service personnel lose terminal bonuses and other allowances, as do regulars	Pension rights may be reduced depending on duration of service	Loss of pension rights

Table D. II. 5 — Ranks other than officers (continued)

Country	Dismissal	Premature retirement	Resignation
Ireland	Loss of pension rights	Regulars : pension after 21 years' service Short-service: gratuity after 3 years' service and less than 21 years	Regulars : gratuity after 3 years' service and less than 21 years' service
Italy	(Regular NCOs) <i>Age</i> : 20 years' active service : ordinary pension on basis of years of service ; 15 or more years of useful service including 12 years of active duty : ordinary pension on basis of 20 years' service ; less than 12 years' active service ; no pension, but lump sum payment equal to 1/8th of the salary × number of years' service <i>Insufficient performance</i> : as above <i>Failure to observe marriage regulations</i> : as above <i>Illness</i> (not due to service cause) : pension or lump sum, according to years of service. Illness due to service cause: ordinary pension	—	No pension or grant if taking up civil employment
Luxembourg	(Other ranks) pensions : n.a. Terminal bonuses not payable unless incapacity results from service accident (NCOs) <i>Medical reasons</i> : pension paid on the basis of years of service. (A gratuity is also paid if disability results from a service accident) <i>Misconduct</i> : pension rights may be retained, but if retained, they may be reduced by 10-50 %	n. a.	(Other ranks) n. a. NCOs : with 15 years' service, pension is payable in proportion to years of service, but not before the age of 60
Norway	(Answer not clear)	(Answer not clear)	Age between 40 and 60, pension rate is 40-55 %

Table D. II. 5 — Ranks other than officers (continued)

Country	Dismissal	Premature retirement	Resignation
Turkey	(Answer not clear)	(Answer not clear)	(Answer not clear)
United Kingdom	Right to terminal grant and pension is forfeited, though up to 90 % may be granted on compassionate grounds	In addition to any pension or lump sum for which the member is qualified, there is a special capital payment related to rank and service, a credit of up to 4 years' service for calculating a pension, and a lower length of service requirement for a pension — i.e. 12 years	Voluntary retirement : pension benefits not affected. Invalided out : special rate for calculating the pension
United States	Pension not payable Accrued pay and allowances not payable	Payable after 20 or more years' active military service, or when a disability rated at 30 % or more is incurred during military service. Not payable to those discharged under less than honourable conditions or for a disability incurred as the result of misconduct, wilful neglect, or during a period of unauthorised leave	(Same as for premature retirement)

### E. Conditions of reserve service and pay

#### Question

E. 1. (a) In what circumstances are ex-service personnel liable for compulsory reserve service? For how long?

(Section E is not applicable to Luxembourg.)

#### Answer

E. 1. (a) All countries except Canada and Ireland require ex-service personnel to do compulsory reserve service. The conditions vary, and are given below. (All replies refer to regular and short-service personnel, men and women — where applicable — unless otherwise stated.)

*Belgium* : Ex-service personnel (who have not been subject to discharge, dismissal, or have conscientious objector status) are all liable for compulsory reserve service. Service is for fifteen years (duration of active service) ; this appears to mean that personnel are liable to serve only for the difference between their years of active service and fifteen years.

*Denmark* : Women do not serve in the reserve.

(Army) Regular officers are liable for compulsory service to age 65 ; reserve officers to age 50, and short-service personnel (no rank specified) to age 50.

(Navy) Personnel are liable for compulsory reserve service in war, for ex-line officers to age 60, and for others to age 50.

(Air force) Applicable only to certain personnel who are specially contracted for reserve service because it is considered desirable to keep their military education up to date. (They are normally recalled for three weeks per year.)

*France* : Personnel are liable for compulsory reserve service up to the age of 35.

*Federal Republic of Germany* : Short-service personnel only are liable for compulsory reserve service to age 45, and the total periods of reserve service do not exceed 9-18 months, depending on rank.

*Italy* : (The Italian concept of the "riserva" is different from that in other countries ; reserve represents a status and not a body of personnel of all ranks which can be called upon when necessary.) Regular personnel are liable to be transferred to reserve status because of age ; illness ; lack of fitness to execute the duties connected with the rank ; because of failure to observe the regulations concerning marriage ; by authority, and on request. Short-service personnel are liable to be transferred to reserve status because of age ; illness ; inability to perform the duties connected with the rank, and by authority.

Duration of service varies, depending on age.

*Norway* : (Answer for army only. Period of time not specified.) In the army, reservists normally do six refresher exercises, four of thirty days and two of ten days.

*Turkey* : Compulsory reserve service according to needs, in peacetime for fifteen days a year, and in wartime for an indefinite period.

*United Kingdom* : Women officers are not liable for compulsory reserve service.

Regular officers are liable until at least the age of 60 ; short-service officers are liable for four years.

Other ranks (army and air force) : Those with less than six years' service are liable for compulsory reserve service for the balance of seven years ; those with more than six but less than twelve years' service are liable for the

balance of twelve years. There is no liability for those with more than twelve years' service.

(Navy) : Those serving nine years or less are liable for compulsory reserve service for three years ; those with more than nine years but less than twelve years' service are liable for the balance of twelve years. There is no liability for those with more than twelve years' service.

*United States* : Women are not liable for compulsory reserve service.

Male personnel are transferred to the ready reserve after a period of active service of less than six years ; they serve in the reserve until the total of years of active service + years of reserve service = six years.

#### Question

E. 1. (b) In what circumstances may they volunteer for reserve service ?

#### Answer

E. 1. (b) Belgium and Turkey do not make provision for personnel to volunteer for reserve service. Circumstances for volunteer reserve service in the other countries are as follows :

*Canada* : Personnel may volunteer at any time during peacetime, disaster or an emergency.

*Denmark* (Army and navy) : Personnel may volunteer if they retire from active service before the age of 65 (regular army officers and ex-line navy officers) or 50 (others).

(Air force) : Only those personnel considered valuable for the force are considered.

*France* : Personnel may volunteer for the reserve after the age of 35, and may serve up to five years beyond the normal age limit of the rank in the active service.

*Federal Republic of Germany* : All short-service personnel can volunteer ; acceptance depends on the posts available.

*Ireland* : Officers (except those who have given an undertaking to serve for ten years) may transfer to the officer reserve at any time. Other

ranks, when they are making their initial enlistment, may opt to serve in the reserve on completion of their regular engagement.

*Italy* : Regulars can apply for reserve status ; it cannot be applied for by short-service personnel.

*Norway* : Volunteers will be accepted only if needed.

*United Kingdom* : Volunteers are accepted, depending on suitability and service need.

*United States* : Any ex-serviceman or woman may volunteer. Acceptance into a reserve component is normally dependent upon the individual's grade, qualification and type of discharge from actual duty, and the availability of a vacancy in a unit or programme.

#### Question

E. 2. What commitments are involved in reserve service (i.e. is the reservist obliged to accept any post offered) ?

#### Answer

E. 2. Denmark (army and air force), France, Germany, Norway, Turkey, and the United Kingdom replied, with specific reference to the question, that the reservist is obliged to accept any post offered. The United Kingdom added another commitment, that of liability to call-up in circumstances of national or other emergency, in aid of the civil power, or for defence of the United Kingdom. Germany specified that the maximum duration of a period of reserve service is three months.

Belgium and Canada replied that the commitment involved in reserve service is liability to recall to active service. Belgium did not specify a time limit, but Canada said this could be indefinite because of an emergency (war, riot or insurrection, real or apprehended) ; in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, or any other similar instrument for collective defence that may be entered into by Canada ; and because of national disaster or for aid to the civil power. Once called out or placed on active service, they

are subject to all the same laws and regulations which govern regular force service.

Denmark (navy) said that the commitment involved in reserve service is for four weeks' service per year, and there is normally a contract period of four years.

Ireland did not specify any commitment, and said that personnel are normally employed in a similar capacity to that in which they served in regular service.

Italy said that the only commitment was obligation to serve in wartime.

The United States replied that commitments vary with the amount of active duty performed and the programme in which the individual enlists. Though personnel with less than six years' active service are transferred to the ready reserve, they are normally not obligated to participate in a reserve unit or programme. There are exceptions to this rule, however, and for those obliged to participate, assignment is made to a unit within reasonable commuting distance (fifty miles). If there is no reserve unit available within this distance, annual active duty for training is normally prescribed, for a period of not more than thirty days.

Other ranks who volunteer for the reserve may enlist for a period of not less than one year nor more than six ; this contract is renewable. Officers, too, may sign renewable contracts for periods of service of various length.

#### Question

E. 3. (a) In what circumstances do reservists receive pay ?

#### Answer

E. 3. (a) Belgium, Canada, France, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States replied that reservists get paid only during recall, whether for active service or training. (However, the United Kingdom also pays to other ranks a very small sum throughout the rest of the year, ranging from, e.g. \$0.12 per day [private and lance-corporal] to \$0.25 per day [sergeant and above].)

Denmark, Germany and Italy replied that reservists are paid per year of reserve service, regardless of recall.

The Norwegian answer, that personnel "can make a contract with their unit for doing 45 days' service during a period of three years", is not clear on when reservists get paid.

Turkey did not answer the question.

#### Question

- E. 3. (b) What percentage of equivalent full pay is allowed ?  
 (c) For what periods or for how long is it payable ?

#### Answer

E. 3. (b) and (c) The percentage of full pay, and the periods for which it is payable, are given below.

*Belgium* : NCOs and other ranks do not receive a percentage of full pay, but rather a flat daily rate. A *soldat* receives \$2.57 ; *caporal* : \$2.78 ; *sergent* : \$3.01 ; *premier sergent* : \$3.08 ; *premier sergent-major* : \$3.42 ; *adjutant* : \$3.86. In addition, there are special allowances if the member is married or has financial responsibility for someone and is not receiving his full and usual pay from his employer. These daily rates are payable per day of recall.

Figures for officers, who are paid per period of recall, are not given.

*Canada* : Personnel receive "primary reserve pay" (amount not specified) for the actual time devoted to training and military duties.

*Denmark* : (Army) Full pay during recall, normally two to three weeks per year ; special rate at other times (amount unspecified ; perhaps 5 % as in the navy).

(Navy) Full pay during recall. At other times, 5 %, which is payable during the reserve contract period, which is normally for four years.

(Air force) Full pay during recall. At other times, \$47.40 per month, payable so long as the member is under contract and liable to be recalled.

*France* : Full pay during recall, whether for training, mobilisation, or during a crisis. (*Caporaux* and *soldats* in receipt of a salary from the private sector currently receive \$3.13 per day during recall for exercises.)

*Federal Republic of Germany* : 10-22 % of full pay during reserve service.

*Ireland* : Full pay, during a period of full-time service.

*Italy* : Full pay during periods of active duty ; 80 % maximum to persons in receipt of a pension, payable until death of the member.

*Norway* : No sum specified. Personnel are paid according to rank for their service, and also a yearly bonus according to rank. Payment is limited by age, to less than 46 years for majors at field units and less than 50 for lieutenants at field units, and less than 50 years for personnel at staff units.

*Turkey* : No answer given.

*United Kingdom* : Full pay during recall, whether for training or active service.

*United States* : 1/30th of monthly base pay rate for each paid drill period (usually four four-hour training periods per month) and 1/30th base pay and allowances (i.e. full pay) for each full day of active duty for training (usually 15 days per year). Members receive this pay as long as they are qualified to remain in a reserve unit or programme which authorises pay.

#### Question

- E. 4. Is reserve pay reduced in the event of the recipient having earned income from another source ?

#### Answer

E. 4. All countries except Turkey, which did not answer the question, and Belgium, Denmark,

and Italy replied that reserve pay is not reduced in the event of the recipient having earned income from another source.

In Belgium, reserve officers employed in the public service have the choice of keeping whichever pay is higher — reserve pay or pay from their job in the public service.

Denmark reported that reserve air force chaplains receiving an ordinary salary from the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs are not paid by the Defence Ministry.

Italy replied that reserve pay is reduced, but "only in the case that the income comes from subordinate work".

*Question*

E. 5. For what reasons can it be terminated?

*Answer*

E. 5. For all countries except Turkey, which did not answer the question, pay is terminated when service in the reserve ends.

**F. Pay**

*Question*

F. 1. On what principles is the pay structure as a whole designed :

(a) by relation to civilian employment?

(b) by relation to the civil service?

(c) other?

*Answer*

F. 1. All the countries that answered (Turkey did not) this question, except the United Kingdom, stated that their armed forces had their pay structured in relationship to their respective civil services. The United Kingdom reported that it structures its pay in relationship to civilian employment in general. The United Kingdom also pays its women in the services on the same principle. However, of the countries who have women, other than nurses, in their services, (Canada, Denmark, France, United Kingdom, United States), only the United Kingdom pays them on a different and lower pay scale. At present the United Kingdom pays service women 91.4 % of the top rates for men. There will be a progressive elimination of this differential except for the "X" factor by 29th December 1975.

(The "X" factor is a percentage added on to basic pay, and is supposed to compensate service personnel for unsocial hours, danger, uncertain

family life, and other adverse peculiarities of military life. This was 5 % for men and 1 % for women ; we understand this is to be raised to 10 % for men and 5 % for women.)

*Question*

F. 2. (a) Are there basic rates comparable to those payable in civilian employment?

*Answer*

F. 2. (a) Only three countries, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, reported that their service pay scales were comparable to those payable in civilian employment. (Turkey did not answer)

*Question*

F. 2. (b) Which salary groups in the civil service correspond most closely to military pay, and what posts do the officials concerned occupy in the civil service structure?

*Answer*

F. 2. (b) All countries except the United Kingdom (and Turkey, which did not answer), said that the salary groups of their civil services corresponded to a greater or lesser extent with military salaries. The amount of detail provided

was insufficient to draw detailed conclusions, but it ranged from Germany's "exact correspondence to civil service grades" to most of the other countries indicating one or two, usually senior civil service equivalents, to military ranks; and finally to France and Norway's failure to provide details, or Belgium's statement that the appropriate authority sought to preserve "a certain harmony" between civil service and military pay.

*Question*

F. 3. How is an individual's pay within the overall structure calculated:

(a) according to age?

*Answer*

F. 3. (a) Belgium, Canada, France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, and the United States reported that the age of military personnel was not a determinant of their pay. For the United Kingdom it affected only those personnel under 17 years of age, and for Denmark it affected only those on a short service engagement. However, Luxembourg reported that it was one of three factors, and Germany that age and rank were the determining factors. Turkey did not answer.

*Question*

F. 3. (b) according to total number of years' service?

*Answer*

F. 3. (b) Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States reported that the total number of years' service was a determining factor. Luxembourg also indicated it was a partial factor, while Ireland's answer was not clear on this point, and Canada, Germany, and Turkey did not specifically answer this question.

*Question*

F. 3. (c) according to number of years' service in a specific rank?

*Answer*

F. 3. (c) All countries replied "yes" to this question.

*Question*

F. 3. (d) according to duties?

*Answer*

F. 3. (d) Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and the United Kingdom reported that an individual's duties helped determine pay. Belgium, Canada, Italy, Luxembourg, and the United States reported that it did not. France, Germany, and Turkey did not answer this section. It is suspected that the way this section was answered depended on individual interpretations of the meaning of the word "duties", and that the answers provided are not consequently very meaningful.

*Question*

F. 3. (e) according to university, professional, or technical qualifications?<sup>1</sup>

*Answer*

F. 3. (e) Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States reported that qualifications did affect the calculation of pay. Italy and Luxembourg said that it did not. Belgium reported that it affected pay in certain cases only, e.g. *Brevet Militaire* or *Diplôme Universitaire*; Denmark that it partly affected regulars and wholly affected short service personnel; France that it affected non-officers and only in certain cases, officers. (Canada, Germany, Norway and Turkey did not specifically answer this section)

*Question*

F. 3. (f) or a combination of the above, if so, which?

*Answer*

F. 3. (f) It can be concluded that a combination of two or more of the above factors determine

<sup>1</sup> See also question G.1. (b).

pay in each country's case. The two factors common to most were years of service in a specific rank (F. 3. (c)) and total years of service (F. 3. (b)).

*Question*

F. 4. Are scales revalued regularly :

- (a) in accordance with the cost of living ?
- (b) in accordance with pay in civilian employment ?
- (c) in accordance with the pay in the civil service ?

*Answer*

F. 4. All countries (except Turkey) answered this question. Of these, only the United Kingdom did not have the pay of its military personnel regularly revalued in accordance with the pay of the civil service ; the United Kingdom reported that its pay was revalued in accordance with pay in civilian employment, and Denmark reported that this form of revaluation was used for its services every two years, as well as its link to the pay of the civil service. Further, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Norway reported that military pay was linked to the cost of living. Denmark reported a six-month interval between reviews, and Norway a twelve-month interval, while Luxembourg reported an automatic increase with its cost of living index.

*Question*

F. 5. What procedures are followed in determining pay increases, and/or the basic pay structure :

- (a) negotiations with representatives of military units or of military personnel in general ? If so, are such representatives elected or appointed ?

*Answer*

F. 5. (a) Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg and Norway all have a procedure whereby representatives negotiate concerning pay increases and/or the basic pay structure. Belgium and Denmark reported that these were elected personnel, Luxembourg and Norway did not specify whether

they were elected or appointed.

*Question*

F. 5. (b) enquiry by official committee ?

*Answer*

F. 5. (b) Canada and the United Kingdom reported that their procedures involved an enquiry by an official committee ; in the case of the United Kingdom this was an independent review body, "which assessed a fair relation with civilian salaries for work of comparable responsibility and skill, using job evaluation, and adding 5 % (1 % for women) for the special conditions of service life".

*Question*

F. 5. (c) a predetermined system for pay increases ? (sliding-scale) ?

*Answer*

F. 5. (c) Turkey reported that its procedure involved a predetermined system for pay increases, as did Italy, which added that this procedure was underwritten by law (i.e. parliamentary statute), and that the interests of military personnel are protected by appropriate political bodies since military personnel are not allowed to set up trade unions.

*Question*

F. 5. (d) other, if so, what ?

*Answer*

F. 5. (d) France reported that an enquiry by an official committee took place in certain cases to improve the basic rates of pay, but that in general pay was determined according to the principle of parity with the civil service, as laid down by the *Statut général des militaires*. Ireland reported that its procedure was normally by negotiations between the chief of staff's branch and the civil administration, as well as by enquiry by official committee. The United States reported that its basic pay rates were automatically linked to civil service pay increases, and that other pay changes are authorised by the

Congress. Germany reported similarly that its pay rates were linked to the civil service rates and therefore that they changed as the legislature determined.

*Question*

F. 6. What is the maximum and minimum pay by rank, and how many annual incremental steps are there before maximum is reached ?

- (a) Regular engagement — table attached
- (b) Short service engagement (if different)
- (c) Conscripts service (if different)

*Answer*

F. 6. (a) See tables and attached notes on the rationale for the ranks selected for comparison.

This applies to regular (career) military personnel only, and applies to women in all cases where there are women (other than nurses) in the countries' regular services, except for the United Kingdom which has a separate pay rate for women. (Canada, Denmark, France, United Kingdom, United States)

*Question*

F. 7. Are there promotional steps within certain ranks (e.g. private class 1, private class 2, etc.) ?

If so, within which ranks, and how many steps ?

*Answer*

F. 7. The answers to this question were to some extent a duplication of the previous question. Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Turkey, and the United States provided no answer to the question. Germany and the United Kingdom answered "no". Belgium reported that the rank of *corporal* was divided into two grades for both regulars and conscripts. Canada reported that there are no promotional steps within the CAF rank structure, but there are however four distinct pay levels in the rank of private. Denmark split sergeant into three grades, lance-corporal into two, and private into a 1st class (regular) and 2nd class (conscript). France has five grades in the two ranks of regular *corporal* and *soldat*. Italy reported that it is envisaged that a captain after twelve years in the rank would become a first captain, and would be almost as senior as a major. Also, that there were five promotional steps in the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and two steps in the rank of colonel.

F. Pay (regulars only)

Units: \$ US per annum

APPENDIX

Country	OFFICERS								OTHER RANKS					
	Colonel		Major		Captain		1st Lieutenant		Most senior warrant officer	Sergeant	2nd lowest basic rank		Lowest basic rank	
	max.	min.	max.	min.	max.	min.	max.	min.			max.	min.	max.	min.
Belgium <sup>1+2</sup>	18,046	9,865	13,368	7,753	10,443	5,783	9,224	5,438	7,620	3,529	4,684	3,273	4,107	3,208
	After 25 yrs = 15,640		After 14 yrs = 10,560		After 9 yrs = 7,363		After 4 yrs = 6,232				caporal		soldat	
Canada	26,745	23,747	20,988	16,851	18,350	11,933	12,773	6,956	15,531	9,871	10,794	8,299	8,012	3,598
Denmark <sup>3</sup>	26,269	23,554	19,000	on a sliding scale				9,626	10,373				6,810	
													private 1st class	
France	15,259	10,208	9,563	6,877	7,844	6,179	6,447	5,265	6,313	4,056	2,955	1,020	2,230	940
											caporal		soldat	
Federal Republic of Germany	19,979	14,546	13,469	10,698	12,117	8,396	9,938	7,370	9,790	5,101	5,408	4,486	5,123	4,303
										Unter Offiziere	Gefreiter		Grenadier	
Ireland <sup>3</sup>	11,549	10,009	8,499	7,714	7,714	6,748	6,522	5,059	5,793	4,325	4,246	4,059	3,866	—
	single (9,994)	(8,455)	(7,219)	(6,491)	(6,491)	(5,593)	(5,419)	(4,244)	(4,910)	(3,482)	(3,410)	(3,240)	(3,054)	2,140
Italy	9,846	9,537	7,009	5,500	6,262	4,635	5,685	4,058	5,912	2,183	No figure	680	No figure	463
Luxembourg	21,201	16,091	17,984	12,115	13,705	10,071	12,797	9,162	11,661	4,581	No figure	2,714	No figure	2,091
Netherlands	25,209	17,902	17,522	11,543	13,213	9,186	12,004	7,371	10,736	5,419	6,764	4,612	5,214	4,087
Norway	14,846	14,846	12,224	10,172	10,172	8,981	8,090	7,322	8,486	4,956	No figure	No figure	No figure	No figure
Turkey <sup>5</sup>	6,847	6,334	5,478	3,835	4,177	2,876	3,081	2,191	2,739	1,027	No figure	No figure	No figure	No figure
									(4,536)					
United Kingdom <sup>4</sup> (women)	15,816	14,097	10,220	8,950	8,555	6,900	6,140	5,505	7,976	5,080	5,630	3,428	5,164	2,685
	(14,590)	(12,942)	(9,345)	(8,180)	(7,822)	(6,309)	(5,613)	(5,029)	(7,295)	(4,590)	(5,147)	(3,131)	(4,286)	(1,807)
United States	26,268	15,084	17,928	10,260	15,492	9,528	11,496	8,304	16,572					3,912
	(After 25 yrs)		(After 14 yrs = 17,436)	(After 9yrs)			(After 4 yrs)		(WO 4)					(EI)

Notes :

1. Belgium. All figures given are for 1st January 1974. (However, Belgium reported that all ranks were due for a 21.9 % cost-of-living rise as of 1st March 1974.)
2. Belgium has a wider range of pay steps between the maximum and minimum for the ranks selected for comparison. Therefore figures are given in addition, for a colonel after 25 years' service, a major after 14 years, a captain after 9 years, and a 1st lieutenant after 4 years.
3. For Ireland, married pay is given first and single pay in brackets underneath.
4. For the United Kingdom, the top figure without brackets is for men. The lower figure in brackets is for women.
5. Turkey. For the most senior non-officer, the maximum pay of a senior staff sergeant is given first ; in brackets is given the maximum pay of a senior major sergeant (whose pay falls midway on the scale for a Turkish major).
6. Denmark. Denmark has four separate pay groups : an "A" line group of regular officers ; a "B" line group (also regular officers) ; a third group of both short and long-service personnel — e.g. officers of the reserve, NCOs, privates (and women of the same ranks) ; and group 4, which consists of conscripts doing national service. For the purposes of the comparative table, only A line regular officers' pay has been selected for officers ; and for other ranks, from senior NCO to private first class, the pay was taken from group 3.

Pay steps are *not* necessarily annual increments — some are 2, some 2.5, some 3-yearly.

DOCUMENT 650

TABLE II  
F. Pay steps

Units: \$ US per annum

Country	OFFICERS								OTHER RANKS							
	Colonel		Major		Captain		1st Lieutenant		Most senior warrant officer	Sergeant	2nd lowest basic rank		Lowest basic rank			
	max.	min.	max.	min.	max.	min.	max.	min.	max.	min.	max.	min.	max.	min.		
Belgium	18,046 (× 18) After 25 yrs = 15,640	9,865	13,368 (× 14) After 14 yrs = 10,560	7,763	10,443 (× 12) After 9 yrs = 7,363	5,783	9,224 (× 10) After 4 yrs = 6,232	5,438	7,620 (× 77) ← 5 ranks →	3,529	4,684 (× 32) caporal	3,273	2 ranks	4,107 (× 15) soldat	3,208	
Canada	26,745 (× 5)	23,747	20,988 (× 7)	16,851	18,350 (× 10)	11,933	12,773 (× 13)	6,956	15,531 (× 16) ← 4 ranks →	9,871	10,794 (× 4)	8,299	← private 4 ranks →	8,012 (× 5)	3,598	
Denmark	26,269 (× 1)	23,554	19,000	on a sliding scale (× 9) (for 3 ranks)				9,626	10,373	← (× 18) 7 ranks →		6,810	private 1st class			
France	15,259 (× 6)	10,208	9,563 (× 4)	6,877	7,844 (× 5)	6,179	6,447 (× 6)	5,265	6,313 (× 13) ← 5 ranks →	4,056	2,955 (× 5) caporal	1,020	← 5 ranks →		2,230	940
Fed. Rep. of Germany	19,979 (× 9)	14,546	13,469 (× 10)	10,698	12,117 (× 15)	8,396	9,938 (× 11)	7,370	9,790 (× 82) ← 7 ranks →	5,101	5,408 (× 9)	4,486	← Gefreiter →		5,123 (× 8)	4,303
Ireland	11,549 (× 5) single (9,994)	10,009 (8,455)	8,499 (× 4) (7,219)	7,714 (6,491)	7,714 (× 6) (6,491)	6,748 (5,593)	6,522 (× 7) (5,419)	5,059 (4,244)	5,793 (× 20) ← 5 ranks → (4,910) (3,482)	4,325 (3,482)	4,246 (× 4) (3,410)	4,059 (3,240)	← 4 ranks →		3,866 (× 13) (3,054)	2,140
Italy	9,846 (× 2)	9,537	7,009	5,500	6,262	4,635	5,685	4,058	5,912	2,183	No figure	680	No figure	No figure	463	
Luxembourg	21,201 (× 9)	16,091	17,984 (× 10)	12,115	13,705 (× 12)	10,071	12,797 (× 9)	9,162	11,661 (× 64) ← 6 ranks →	4,581	No figure	2,714	No figure	No figure	2,091	
Netherlands	25,209 (× 10)	17,902	17,522 (× 14)	11,543	13,213 (× 14)	9,186	12,004 (× 16)	7,371	10,736 (× 91) ← 4 ranks →	5,419 (3,482)	6,764 (× 26) ← 2 ranks →	4,612	← 2 ranks →		5,214 (× 11) (3,054)	4,087
Norway	14,846 (× 1)	14,846	12,224 (× 4)	10,172	10,172 (× 2)	8,981	8,090 (× 3)	7,322	8,486 (× 13) ← 5 ranks →	4,956	No figure	No figure	No figure	No figure	No figure	
Turkey	6,847	6,334	5,478	3,835	4,177	2,876	3,081	2,191	2,739 (4,536)	1,027	No figure	No figure	No figure	No figure	No figure	
United Kingdom	15,816 (× 5)	14,097	10,220 (× 9)	8,950	8,555 (× 13)	6,900	6,140 (× 5)	5,505	7,976 (× 12) ← 4 ranks →	5,080 (4,590)	5,630 (× 9) ← 3 ranks →	3,428 (3,131)	← 4 ranks →		5,164 (× 12) (4,286)	2,685 (1,807)
(women)	(14,590)	(12,942)	(9,345)	(8,180)	(7,822)	(6,309)	(5,613)	(5,029)	(7,295)	(4,590)	(5,141)	(3,131)	← 4 ranks →		(4,286)	(1,807)
United States	26,268 (× 9) (After 25 yrs)	15,084	17,928 (× 9) After 14 yrs = 17,436	10,260	15,492 (× 9) (After 9 yrs)	9,528	11,496 (× 5) (After 4 yrs)	8,304	16,572 (WO 4) (× 92) ← 9 ranks →	4,899 (E5)	5,900 (× 4) ← (E4) →	4,712	← 3 ranks →		5,166 (× 5) (E3 to E1)	3,912

Pay steps are shown in brackets i.e. five pay steps are shown as (× 5).

**Note on the seven ranks selected for pay tables I and II (F)****1. Officers**

Major, captain and 1st lieutenant (or their equivalents) were obvious choices, because in most of the forces of the countries under study, these three ranks accounted for well over 50% of officers. It was decided also to look at one more senior rank, to put the scale of pay into some sort of perspective from the point of view of the full career pattern of regular officers. The rank of army colonel (or equivalent) was selected, although statistically it varied from 8 % (Italian air force) to 1.9 % (Canadian unified service).

**2. Other ranks**

For a comparative examination of other ranks, there were some definitional problems in deciding what were equivalent ranks between national forces. In the replies of those countries that did give figures, something over 50 % of other ranks were to be found in the two lowest basic ranks (i.e. soldier/soldat, lance corporal/caporal) and therefore these were selected for comparison.

Next it was decided, because of problems of international comparison, not to look at any one further rank for minimum and maximum pay. From the replies to the questionnaire, it was not clear whether some countries had several separate ranks covering the job that other countries would use a sergeant for. So instead of looking at any one rank, it was decided to examine the range of salaries from the minimum for a sergeant, up to the maximum for the most senior non-officer rank (usually senior warrant officer or equivalent). One might obtain a parallel with the civilian world by looking at the minimum for the most junior foreman or supervisor with responsibility over more than 2 or 3 men, up to the maximum for the most senior supervisor below managerial or executive status. It was hoped that this fairly broad range — from the pay of the most junior sergeant to that of the most senior non-officer, while making for fairer national comparisons, would also offer some reasonable indication of what one might term the higher stages of a regular non-officer's career pattern.

### G. Allowances

#### Question

G. 1. What allowances are payable ?

(a) Marriage allowances ?

How much is payable ?

Is authorisation required before military personnel may marry ?

Is it necessary to have reached a certain age or rank, and if so which ?

#### Answer

G. 1. (a) Marriage allowances are payable only in Italy (where it is called a wife's allowance) ; in Ireland (where there are separate pay scales for married and single personnel) ; in Luxembourg ; in Norway (for conscripted personnel only) ; and in France, if there are children.

In Italy, the wife's allowance is about \$206 per annum. In Ireland, the married man or NCO will receive from \$779 to \$887 per annum more than a single man ; the married officer will receive from \$803 to \$1,694 more than a single officer. Marriage allowance in Luxembourg is calculated as 6 % of basic pay, though it should not be less than \$681 per annum nor more than \$832. Conscripts in Norway receive an allowance of \$959 per annum. In France, a family with one child receives an allowance of \$40 per annum ; for 2 children the allowance is \$107, for 3 children \$161. Each subsequent child increases the allowance by \$54.

Personnel in Belgium, Ireland (officers only), and Luxembourg require permission to marry. Permission is not required in France, with the exception of members of the *gendarmerie*, personnel on overseas service, and in certain circumstances when the intended spouse is not of French nationality.

Permission to marry is not dependent on age or rank, except in Ireland where the rank of lieutenant should normally have been reached (there is, nevertheless, a pay scale for married 2nd lieutenants). While personnel in Italy do not require permission to marry, they may not marry before 25 years of age.

#### Question

G. 1. (b) Children's allowances ?

How much ?

(c) Until what age and in respect of how many children are such allowances payable ?

#### Answer

G. 1. (b) and (c) [The countries replying to the questionnaire answered these questions very differently. Some, like Belgium, took it to be a query about a national system of family or child allowances, while others took it to refer to a special system for the children of military personnel as distinct from a national system from which, presumably, all citizens benefit, whether or not they serve in the armed forces. Of those countries which do have a system of allowances for the children of military personnel, it was not always clear whether the allowance was per month or per annum. We believe we have correctly expressed the per annum figures, with the possible exception of Turkey.]

The figures for countries with a special system of allowances are as follows :

*Federal Republic of Germany* : \$223 per annum, in respect of all children up to the age of 18 (27 for trainees).

*Ireland* : \$98 per annum, in respect of all the children of officers to the age of 16. For the children of other ranks it is payable to 16 for boys and 18 for girls. The allowance is payable to any child who is a student or an invalid until the age of 21.

*Italy* : \$103 per annum, in respect of all children to the age of 21.

*Luxembourg* : From \$233 per annum for 1 child to \$2,359 per annum for 5 or more children, payable to the age of 19 (25 for students).

*Norway* : (conscripts) \$97 per annum for the first child, then \$36 for each additional child, payable to the age of 18.

*Turkey* : \$21 per annum, in respect of all children to the age of 18. (If the Turkish figure was a weekly one, this should be \$93 per annum.)

*Question*

G. 1. (d) Education allowance in respect of children ?

If so, how much and until what age ?

*Answer*

G. 1. (d) Only the United Kingdom offers a children's education allowance, and it appears that no distinction is made in its availability to children of officers or other ranks. The allowance is \$978 for the first child, \$1,170 for the second child, and \$1,405 for the third and other children. No age limit is specified. Canada will cover costs, to high school graduation, for the children of servicemen stationed outside Canada. Belgium offers assistance to the children of servicemen stationed in Germany, and under special circumstances in Belgium. The French overseas allowance includes a calculation on the cost of children's education.

*Question*

G. 1. (e) Leave allowance ?

*Answer*

G. 1. (e) Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Norway (conscripts), Turkey, and the United States answered this question in the affirmative. Belgium gives vacation pay of \$321 (time not indicated), and Denmark gives full pay plus 1½ % or 9½ % of annual pay (time not indicated). Norwegian conscripts receive \$1.50 per day for 15 days. The United States allows 30 days' paid leave per year. Turkey and Italy did not give figures about either time or money.

*Question*

G. 1. (f) Overseas allowance ?

On what basis are overseas allowances calculated ?

Do military personnel serving abroad receive a separation allowance if they are not accompanied by their families ? If so, how much ?

*Answer*

G. 1. (f) All countries except Turkey and Luxembourg pay an overseas allowance, though Norway does not give such an allowance to conscripts. Scale was based either on comparative cost of living (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, United States) ; entitlement to free food, free accommodation, and some compensation for being away from home (Denmark) ; a daily fixed sum (Ireland, Norway) ; or hardship (United States, enlisted men only).

Only Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States pay a separation allowance. France, while not paying a separation allowance, does pay the full overseas allowance for the family, even if the family remains in France. German personnel receive 20 % extra if accompanied by their families.

The separation allowance for Canadians is up to \$300 per month. If food and lodging are provided by the forces, the allowance per month is \$15 for men, \$22.50 for senior NCOs, and \$30 for officers. The United Kingdom and the United States each pay an allowance of \$30 per month.

*Question*

G. 1. (g) Long-service allowances ?

If so, how much and for what categories and in what circumstances ? (See also D. 4)

*Answer*

G. 1. (g) Most countries answered "no" to this question. Only the United Kingdom has a comprehensive scheme of long-service allowances. For officers, the long-service allowance forms part of the pay scale, while all NCOs and men receive length of service increments. For the navy and marines, these increments are paid at intervals of 9, 12, 16, and 22 years' service and range, for example, from \$270 per annum after 9 years' service to \$759 per annum after 22 years' service for a most senior NCO, and from \$179 per annum after 9 years' service to \$270 per annum after 12 years' service, for the most junior other rank. Army and air force increments are

paid at 9, 12, 15, 18, and 22 year intervals, and range from \$223 per annum after 9 years to \$759 per annum after 22 years for a warrant officer Class I (most senior rank), and from \$179 per annum after 9 years to \$270 per annum after 12 years, for the most junior other rank. Increments in the women's corps and services, including nursing corps, are the same for army, navy and air force. These are paid at 3, 6, 9, 12, 16, and 22 year intervals, and range from \$153 per annum to \$1,252 per annum for the most senior rank, and from \$153 per annum to \$796 per annum for the most junior rank.

Denmark pays a bonus to short-service personnel consisting of 10 % of pay, with an extra bonus for 3 and 5 years of service.

Germany pays to short-service personnel a long-service allowance of \$373 to \$3,358.

Ireland pays an allowance to nurses and other ranks of \$31 per annum after 15 years' service, and \$64 per annum after 20 years' service.

The United States pays a bonus to navy nuclear-qualified officers, and to physicians and dentists in all services, at the end of an additional obligated service contract period. To navy personnel it is \$15,000, and to physicians and dentists it is four months' basic pay for each additional year of service.

#### Question

G. 1. (h) Allowance for exercises, manoeuvres, etc. ?

If so, how much ?

#### Answer

G. 1. (h) Canada, Ireland, Norway (conscripts), Turkey and the United Kingdom do not pay an allowance for exercises, manoeuvres, etc. Figures are given for the other countries.

#### Question

G. 1. (i) Danger allowance ?

If so, how much ?

#### Answer

G. 1. (i) Denmark, Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom do not pay a danger allowance. Figures are given for the other countries.

#### Question

G. 1. (j) Entertainment allowance ?

If so, for which ranks and how much ?

G. 1. (k) Allowance for special work or functions (e.g. battalion commanders, pilots, frogmen, etc.) ?

If so, how much ?

#### Answer

Some answers to (j) obviously include special post allowances more appropriate to (k).

G. 1. (j) Only Denmark, Norway (regular officers and conscripts) and Turkey answered "no" to this question. Figures are given for the other countries. (The Belgian figures include payment for special work or functions ; the Luxembourg figures include a uniform allowance for officers.)

G. 1. (k) Canada, Luxembourg and Norway (conscripts) answered that there were no allowances for special work or functions. Figures are given for the others. It should be noted that French rates for flying and submarine pay also appear in the previous table (G. 1. (i) as danger allowances. British figures include some allowances for special qualifications G. 1. (l).

#### Question

G. 1. (l) Allowance for special qualifications (e.g. doctors, engineers, staff training, State-recognised studies, diplomas, etc.) ?

Is this allowance additional to pay advantages under question F. 3 (e) ?

If so, how much ?

*Answer*

G. 1. (l) Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States pay allowances for special qualifications in some circumstances. For Belgium and Ireland, these allowances are not additional to the figures given in F. 3 (e), i.e. the allowances have already been included in the basic pay rate. Figures are not given for Turkey.

French allowances are as follows : 20 % of basic pay for holders of a commission from a military academy, and \$427 per annum for holders of a diploma ; \$1,128 to \$1,880 per annum for engineers ; and \$67 to \$148 per annum for musicians.

Germany pays doctors an allowance of \$1,567 per annum.

The United Kingdom pays special qualification pay (army) and technical qualification pay (air force) of \$314 per annum to officers below the rank of colonel in the three technical corps of the army, and the air force engineering branch. Medical officers who obtain post-graduate qualifications receive an allowance of \$270 per annum.

The United States pays allowances of from \$1,200 to \$4,200 per annum to physicians and dentists, depending on years of active duty completed, and \$1,200 per annum to optometrists.

*Question*

G. 1. (m) Uniform allowance ?

If so, how much and on what scale ?

*Answer*

G. 1. (m) All countries except Italy and Norway (conscripts) give their personnel an allowance for uniforms. Figures are given. (Luxembourg's figures include an officers' entertainment allowance.)

*Question*

G. 1. (n) Are personal servants provided free to certain ranks ? If so, how many, which ranks ? If not, is a servant allowance payable in lieu ?

*Answer*

G. 1. (n) Only Ireland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States provide free servants. Figures for Turkey and the United Kingdom are not given. In Ireland, servants are provided to officers in barracks as exigencies of service permit, on the following scale : *single officers*, 1 orderly to 3 junior officers, 1 orderly to 2 senior officers, 1 to each colonel, and 1 to each general ; *married officers*, 1 orderly to each junior officer, 1 to each senior officer, and 2 to each general.

In the United States, generals and flag rank officers in government quarters are entitled to one aide per star, but the scheme is under review, and the number of aides will be greatly decreased.

Only Turkey pays an allowance (\$14.26 per month to each officer) in lieu of a servant, though the United States reported that it was giving consideration to the idea.

*Question*

G. 1. (o) Other allowances or bonuses ?

*Answer*

G. 1. (o) The replies to this question were, so far as possible, included in the table on allowances for special work or functions [G. 1. (k)], as there was considerable overlapping. The exceptions were Belgium, which pays an education allowance if stationed in Germany, or under special circumstances in Belgium [see also G. 1. (d)], and a moving or travel allowance in certain circumstances ; and Luxembourg, which pays bonuses to NCOs and volunteers according to years of service. NCOs receive a bonus of \$210 for 10 years' service, \$313 for 20 years' service, and \$420 for 30 years' service. NCOs and volunteers receive a bonus related to stripes and years

of service : \$19 per annum for 6 years' service, \$38 for 15 years' service, and \$57 for 25 years' service. Officers and NCOs also receive a special bonus (*prime d'astreinte*) of \$643 per annum.

*Question*

G. 2. (a) Are loans made for the purchase of accommodation ?

If so, what is the maximum ?

Is interest payable and in what conditions ?

For how long a period are loans granted ?

*Answer*

G. 2. (a) Belgium did not reply to this question.

Most countries do not give loans to service personnel for the purchase of accommodation, the exceptions being Denmark, France, Germany, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Figures are given for these countries.

*Question*

G. 2. (b) Are other savings facilities granted ?

*Answer*

G. 2. (b) Most countries do not offer other savings facilities to servicemen. Of those countries which do, Germany offers a scheme of contractual savings, with government contributions ; Luxembourg has a compulsory saving plan for volunteers ; Ireland has a scheme of national savings and insurance (which presumably is available to the general public) ; and the United States has a savings deposit programme, paying 10 % interest, available for those serving overseas, but this programme will be phased out by 30th June 1974. The United Kingdom replied "yes" to the question, but gave no details.

*Question*

G. 3. What allowances are there for :

(a) Travel on duty (indicate the scale) ?

*Answer*

G. 3. (a) See table.

The answers to this question in some cases overlap with G. 3 (c).

Turkey answered that there were allowances, but gave no figures. The United Kingdom appears to expect that travel expenses will be met from allowances for special functions and qualifications. [G. 3. (k) and (l)].

*Question*

G. 3. (b) Travel between home and duty station (indicate the scale) ?

*Answer*

G. 3. (b) All countries answered "none" to this question, though German conscripts are entitled to free use of the railways once per month, and conscript and short-service personnel up to the rank of *Hauptfeldwebel* are entitled to a 50 % reduction on rail fares. Norwegian conscripts are entitled to three free journeys per year. Belgians receive a special allowance if there are consecutive changes of duty station within Belgium.

*Question*

G. 3. (c) Nights spent away from home (what social measures are applicable) ?

*Answer*

G. 3. (c) Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States answered that there are no allowances for nights away from home, though Luxembourg does make a grant if a night exercise is involved, and the United States expects that in most cases the cost will be met out of a \$25 per diem.

Belgium gives an allowance for hotel or private accommodation. Canada reimburses hotel

expenses, and gives an allowance for meals and for private accommodation. Germany gives an allowance of \$2.05 per night, and Ireland gives a subsistence allowance based on civil service rates.

*Question*

G. 3. (d) Travel on aircraft and railways — are servicemen or their families entitled to reductions or free travel, and, if so, how much? And when?

*Answer*

G. 3. (d) See table.

*Question*

G. 3. (e) Are servicemen entitled to free flights in military aircraft and may members

of their families accompany them free of charge?

*Answer*

G. 3. (e) See table.

*Question*

G. 3. (f) Are the children of servicemen serving abroad entitled to free travel in their home country and, if so, how many times a year?

*Answer*

G. 3. (f) All countries answered "no" to this question except Belgium and the United Kingdom. Belgium gives assistance for the cost of travel to and from school, and for journeys between school and the parents' residence abroad during school holidays. The United Kingdom provides free travel for holiday visits to parents overseas.

Table G. 1. (h) Allowances for exercises, manoeuvres, etc.

Country	Rank	Rate
Belgium <sup>1</sup>	General officers	\$2.31 per day (\$1.61 on board ship)
	Senior officers	\$2.06 per day (\$1.61 on board ship)
	Junior officers	\$1.80 per day (\$1.61 on board ship)
	NCOs	\$1.54 per day (\$1.29 on board ship)
	Other ranks	\$1.29 per day (\$1.03 on board ship)
Denmark	All	\$6.61 - \$8.26 per day
France	All	For food and lodging only. Amount varies according to rank, family circumstances, and the place where manoeuvres held. Food allowance from \$1.10 to \$4.03 per day
Federal Republic of Germany	All	\$2.05 per day
Italy	<i>Army &amp; air force</i>	
	Officers	\$1.37 - \$2.33 per day
	NCOs	\$0.34 - \$1.37 per day
	Other ranks	\$0.05 per day
Luxembourg <sup>1</sup>	Officers	\$0.77 per main meal, and \$0.77 per night exercise
	NCOs	\$0.64 per main meal, and \$0.64 per night exercise
Norway	Officers and POs	\$7.23 per weekday, \$11.16 on Sundays
United States	Enlisted men on sea duty	\$8.00 - \$22.50 per day

1. Belgium and Luxembourg also pay allowances for exercises, manoeuvres, etc., carried out in other countries.

Table G. 1. (i) Danger allowance — Allowance for all ranks unless indicated

Country	Diving	Explosives, mines, etc.	Air duty	Sea duty	Submarines	Other
Belgium	Pumper : \$0.51 per 30 min. Diving guide : \$1.80 per 30 min. Diver : \$5.96 per 30 min.	\$4.76 per day				Exposure to radiation, toxic substances : \$4.76 per day Work at high altitude : \$0.82 to \$1.65 per hour, depending on altitude
Canada	<i>Per month</i> Clearance : \$149.91 Training clearance : \$74.95 Shallow diving : \$30	Non-military explosives disposal : \$50 per day	\$75 per month, \$7.50 per day Transport cabins : \$45 per month, \$4.50 per day	2nd tour lt. & above : \$75 per month 1st tour lt. : \$30 p.m. MWO/CWO : p.m. \$90 Private 4 to WO: \$75 p.m. Private 1, 2, 3, \$30 p.m.	Officers and CWO/MWO: \$239.87 per month, \$9 per day Private 4 to WO : \$179.90 per month, \$9 per day Private : \$119.93 per month, \$9 per day (Lower training and shore rates)	Parachutists : \$60 per month
France	Diving or work in compressed air : \$1.95 per hour	\$0.85 to \$1.68 per day, depending on rank	50 % of basic pay until major 1st rank		50 % of basic pay until major 1st rank Prolonged submersion in a nuclear submarine : \$8.95 per day	Exposure to radiation, toxic substances : \$0.85 to \$1.68 per day, depending on rank <i>gendarmerie</i> for special police tasks : 12-24 % of basic pay according to rank

Table G. 1. (i) Danger allowance — Allowance for all ranks unless indicated (continued)

Country	Diving	Explosives, mines, etc.	Air duty	Sea duty	Submarines	Other
Federal Republic of Germany						\$11.19 to \$89.55 (per month?), tasks not specified
Luxembourg		\$2.57 per half-day				
Norway	Officers & POs Depth 0-15 m. : \$0.07 per minute 15-30 m. : \$0.14 per minute More than 30 m. : \$0.25 per min.	Mine-sweeping : \$1.67 per day (officers and POs), \$1.24 per day (conscripts) Mine-clearing : \$7.13 per day (officers and POs)		FPB allowance (officers and POs) \$1.48 per day	Captain : \$2.21 per day Other officers and POs : \$1.48 per day For every day at sea for more than 1 hour : captain receives \$5.75, officers and POs \$4.89	Coastal artillery allowance (officers and POs) : \$1.48 per day
Turkey						Special allowances for some personnel
United States						Special pay for duty subject to hostile fire : \$65 per month

Country	Diving	Parachutists	Sea duty	Submarines	Office	Air duty	Other
Belgium		Under training : \$24.89 (per month ?) Less than 15 months' service : \$62.21 More than 15 months' service : \$82.96 Instructor : \$103.69 (These figures are for basic pay + cost of living index)	Officers : \$6.25 per day Junior ( <i>sous</i> ) officers : \$4.86 Other ranks : \$4.16 (These figures are for basic pay + cost of living index)				— Allowance for commanding officers in Germany, and for all attached to staff HQs, general HQs, and international organisations in Belgium. Includes entertainment allowance (see G.I. (j)). Allowance for service in Germany ( <i>indemnité d'éloignement</i> ): general officers, \$5.26 per day (married), \$4.14 (single); senior officers, \$4.89 (married), \$4.14 (single); junior officers, \$4.14 (married), \$1.19 (single); NCOs, \$2.31 (married), \$0.78 (single); other ranks, \$1.90 (married), \$0.60 (single) — Allowance for service on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays: officers, \$9.22 (Sat.), \$12.29 (Sun. and holidays); NCOs, \$6.14 (Sat.), \$9.22 (Sun. and holidays); other ranks, \$4.61 (Sat.), \$6.14 (Sun. and holidays) — Allowance for military expenses (basic pay + cost-of-living allowance): officers, \$553 per annum; (warrant officers) <i>adjudants et adjudants chefs</i> , \$461, 1 <sup>st</sup> <i>sergents-majors</i> , \$369, <i>sergents et premier sergents</i> , \$276.50; other ranks, \$165.90
Denmark	\$8.92 per day's diving (\$272.06 per month)		\$5.78 to \$8.26 per day depending on rank, for all except A-line officers Watch duty: \$11.57 to \$27.26 per day depending on rank, for all except A-line officers			\$16.52 per day when flying or \$253.46 per month	
France			12.5 % of basic pay	50 % of basic pay until major 1st rank		— 50 % of basic pay until major 1st rank — those responsible for ground control: \$22.39 to \$40.30 per month, according to rank	— Managers of funds, materials, supplies: \$89.50 to \$201.50 per annum. — Units on permanent alert for operating strategic defences: \$1.34 per day; officers who fire SSBS: \$5.60 per day. — Allowance for military expenses (reviewed once per year in same way as basic pay in public service): general and senior officers, \$715 per annum (single), \$1,088 (married, 1 or 2 children), \$1,381 (married, 3 or more children); junior officers, \$553 per annum (single), \$889 (married, 1 or 2 children), \$1,155 (3 or more children); NCOs and other ranks, \$231 per annum (single), \$390 (married, 1 or 2 children), \$513 (married 3 or more children)
Federal Republic of Germany	Frogmen: \$89.55 (per month ?)	Up to \$55.97 (per month?)		\$100.75 (per month ?)	General in integrated staff: \$746 to \$1,493 per annum	Aviators: up to \$140.67 (per month?)	Allowances for other functions (not specified), \$11.19 to \$140.67 (per month ?)
Ireland	\$2.45 per day's diving (\$74.73 per month)		\$0.98 per day		Chief of staff: \$3,281 per annum Assistant chief of staff, adjutant-general, quarter-master-general: \$2,386 per annum Officers commanding commands: \$1,194 per annum	On qualification as pilot: \$36.17 per month After 2 years as pilot: \$50.68 per month After 4 years as pilot: \$65.59 per month After 6 years as pilot: \$95.83 per month Commandant: \$88.89 per month Lt.-colonel: \$78.67 per month Colonel: \$72.13 per month	
Italy		\$15.45 per month	\$20.60 (rating) to \$171.65 (admiral) per month, depending on rank and years of service Unit commanders: \$0.76 to \$1.14 per day	\$41.79 to \$172.63 per month	Brigadier-general: \$4,573 per annum Colonel: \$2,575 per annum	Flying instructor: \$102.99 per month Flight allowance: \$77.24 + \$82.78 per month	— Observer office: \$159.63 per month — Operational allowance (3 forces), not to be accumulated with sea pay and flight allowance: \$34.33 to \$180.23 per month
Norway						<i>Basic flying pay per month, officers and POs:</i> — Regular pilots and navigators in active flying service: \$254.64 — Pilot and navigators on contract to another service: \$148.76 to \$254.64 — Regular pilots and navigators not in active flying service, salary as major or lower: \$254.64; as lt.-colonel: \$201.58; as colonel or higher: \$148.70 — Flying allowances — all categories of navigators and pilots in active flying service: \$76.41 per month	
Turkey							There are allowances for special functions, which vary in amount. No details given
United Kingdom	According to intensity of diving and category of dives: \$17.76 to \$70.09 per month	\$32.69 per month	Hard-lying allowance (where living conditions are especially arduous): \$0.37 per day	Continuous as long as a man remains qualified and liable for submarine work: \$73.15 to \$104.33 per month (not normally above commander rank)	— In command of deep sea-going ships while waiting to proceed to sea: \$179 to \$716 per annum, according to rank — In command of tank or armoured car: \$358 per annum	— Flying instructional pay: \$0.74 to \$1.47 per day during training — Flying pay (officers): \$73.15 to \$118.52 per month (major), then falling to \$64.16 per month — Specialist aircrew flight lieutenants: \$150 to \$215.37 per month — Other ranks: \$22.48 to \$120.15 per month	— Hydrographic pay, \$135 to \$841, according to rank, per annum — Medical and dental consultants pay (colonels and below): \$1,476 to 2,148 per annum, according to length of service — Medical and dental specialist and senior specialist pay (not above lt.-col. and col.), \$402 and \$1,074 per annum. — Nursing specialist pay (major and below), \$98 to \$402 per annum — Veterinary specialist pay (below colonel): \$243 per annum — Also Gurkha additional pay, aero medical and escort duties, pilotage, responsibility pay (naval ratings), master-at-arms pay, instructors pay (naval ratings), pay for work of an objectionable nature (other ranks), pay for undergoing research experiments (rates not given)
United States	\$65 to \$110 per month, depending on skill level of the job	Officers: \$110 per month Enlisted: \$55 per month		Officers: \$100 to \$245 per month, depending on pay grade and length of service Enlisted: \$50 to \$105 per month, depending on pay grade and length of service		— Flight crew (officers): \$100 to \$245 per month, depending on pay grade and length of service — Flight crew (enlisted): \$50 to \$105 per month, depending on pay grade and length of service — Flight deck: \$110 per month for officers, \$55 per month for enlisted	Demolition. Officers: \$110 per month; enlisted: \$55 per month

Table G. 1. (j) Entertainment (or special post) allowance

Country	Rank	Amount per annum
Belgium <sup>1</sup>	<i>For forces in Germany</i>	\$
	Commander-in-chief	1,679
	Assistant commander-in-chief	1,254
	Sector commander	1,254
	Sub-sector commander	806
	<i>For forces in Belgium</i> (attached to staffs, GHQs & international organisations)	
	General officers	2,314
	Senior (superior) officers	1,841
	Junior ( <i>subalternes</i> ) officers	1,468
	NCOs ( <i>sous-officiers</i> )	1,144
Other ranks ( <i>caporaux et soldats</i> )	696	
Canada		Expenses reimbursed as required by function
France	Officers of higher and general rank holding certain positions of command or particularly important jobs	363 to 3,022 in 7 grades, depending on responsibilities
Federal Republic of Germany	Battalion commander upwards	187 to 672
Ireland	Chief of staff, assistant chief of staff, OCs commands, OC naval service	171
	Adjutant general, quartermaster-general, OCs military college, naval base, naval vessels, air corps	103
Italy	High-ranking officers	not given
Luxembourg <sup>1, 2</sup>	Lt.-colonel	359
	Major	310
	Captain	265
	1st lieutenant and lieutenant	222
United Kingdom	Lt.-colonel in command, colonel, brigadier	394 to 698
United States	General or flag rank officers	4,000
	Chiefs of services (and others in pay grade 0-10)	2,200
	Lieutenant-general and pay grade 0-9	500

1. These figures include an allowance for special work or functions (see G. 1. (k)).

2. These figures include an allowance for uniforms.

Table G. 1. (m) Uniform allowance

Country	Officers	Other ranks
Belgium	\$165 per annum	
Canada	\$84 per annum \$96 per annum (women)	\$84 per annum \$96 per annum (women)
Denmark	2/3 of the price in general	2/3 of the price in general
France	\$112 at beginning of career; afterwards at own expense	Army and air force: free uniform Navy: \$153 per annum Gendarmerie: \$97 per annum
Federal Republic of Germany	Army: \$116 per annum Air force: \$116 per annum Navy: \$123 per annum	
Ireland	\$351 at beginning of career; \$197 per annum thereafter	Nurses: \$213 at beginning of career; \$132 per annum thereafter
Luxembourg	1st outfitting: \$456 Afterwards (including entertainment allowance): Lt.-col. \$359 per annum Major \$310 » » Captain \$265 » » 1st lieutenant & lieutenant: \$222 per annum	1st outfitting: \$272.50 Afterwards: \$143 per annum
Norway	\$229 per annum	\$229 per annum (petty officers only)
Turkey	Uniform provided	Uniform provided
United Kingdom	Various	Various
United States	Initial allowance: \$300	Uniforms issued free Thereafter \$65 to \$94 per annum depending on length of service \$94 to \$133 per annum depending on length of service, for women

*Table G. 2. (a) Purchase of accommodation*

Country	Amount	Interest rate	Period of loan
Denmark	\$991 (available only when transferred to another station) \$1,652 as a deposit when renting accommodation	4 % per annum	6 years
France	\$1,903 \$5,709 (available to public servants in general)	None 4 % per annum during first 3 years then 7 % per annum	5 years 10-15 years
Federal Republic of Germany	\$123 per square metre	0.5 % to 1 % per annum	50 years
Turkey	\$4,493	5 % per annum	15 years
United Kingdom	About \$2,942	May or may not be payable, depending on period of loan	10 years

Table G. 3. (a) *Travel on duty (applies to all ranks unless otherwise indicated)*

Country	Transport	Food	Lodging	Other
Belgium	5 to 8 hours' travel, \$1.04 per day More than 8 hours' travel, \$1.45 to \$11.41 per day, according to rank, location, and availability of military facilities		\$5.60 per day. After 30 days in same place: \$1.66 to \$2.70 per day, according to rank	Monthly rates and supplement per night
Canada	Rail, air, taxis, etc.: reimbursed Private car: 13.5 cents per mile required; 5 cents per mile convenience	\$11 per day (\$13 outside Canada)	Hotels, etc.: reimbursed. Private: \$6 per day	— Where food and quarters provided: \$2 (officers), \$1.75 (sergeant and above), \$1.50 (corporal, private) per day — Rates for individual meals
Denmark			About \$6.61— \$8.26 per day	
France		\$10.97 to \$16.11 per day, according to rank		
Federal Republic of Germany				\$7.46 to \$12.69 per day, and \$8.58 to \$12.69 per night
Ireland	Officers in certain appointments receive car allowance based on engine size; others who use their own cars receive the cost of travel by public transport			

Table G. 3. (a) *Travel on duty (applies to all ranks unless otherwise indicated) (continued)*

Country	Transport	Food	Lodging	Other
Italy				Monthly rates ? Lt.-general : \$30.90 ; major-general : \$25.75 ; brig.-general and colonel : \$21.63 ; lt.-colonel, major, captain : \$18.54 ; 1st and 2nd lieutenant : \$16.48 ; sergeants (5 ranks) : \$11.33 ; other ranks : \$8.24
Luxembourg		Allowance for two meals per day (same as for public servants). Amount varies according to rank and country, e.g. in Germany the allowance is \$17.99 per day for army commander and colonel, \$16.45 for major and cap- tain, and \$14.65 for other officers and men	Hotel room (with breakfast) reim- bursed	
Norway	Conscripts : free fare. For more than 12 hours' tra- vel per day : \$11.50 Officers : free fare	Conscripts : \$4.64 per day ; officers and POs : \$2.15 (4 to 8 hours), \$5.84 (8 to 12 hours), \$13.74 (more than 12 hours)	Officers and POs : \$7.55 (8 to 12 hours), \$16.48 (more than 12 hours)	

Table G. 3. (a) *Travel on duty (applies to all ranks unless otherwise indicated) (continued)*

Country	Transport	Food	Lodging	Other
Turkey				No figures given
United Kingdom				No figures given
United States				Various. Includes \$25 per diem where government quarters and messing unavailable. Household goods, personal effects and an auto may be shipped overseas, for a permanent change of station, by pay grades E-4 and above.

Table G. 3. (d), (e) *Travel by rail and air, and free use of military aircraft (applies to all ranks unless otherwise indicated)*

Country	Travel by rail and air		Free use of military aircraft	
	Servicemen	Families	Servicemen	Families
Belgium	50 % reduction on railways	No reduction	Yes	Free at beginning and end of period of service abroad, and at leave period
Canada	No reduction	No reduction	Yes	Yes
Denmark	No reduction	No reduction	No	No
France	Airways : free on service business Railways : Free on service business Otherwise, 75 % reduction for career and short-service personnel	No reduction, unless a service move is involved, when the State pays	No, unless on service business, or a change of residence imposed by the service	No, unless a change of residence imposed by the service
Federal Republic of Germany	No reduction	No reduction	No	No
Ireland	Two free travel warrants per year for members of nursing service and other ranks. Free travel for all ranks when moving on transfer of station	Free when moving on transfer of station	No	No
Italy	Airways : 30 % reduction for service travel Railways : free for service travel, 65 % reduction for personal travel	Airways : 30 % reduction for service travel. Railways : free for service travel, 44 % reduction for personal travel	No	No

Table G. 3. (d), (e) *Travel by rail and air, and free use of military aircraft (applies to all ranks unless otherwise indicated) (continued)*

Country	Travel by rail and air		Free use of military aircraft	
	Servicemen	Families	Servicemen	Families
Luxembourg	No reduction	No reduction	No	No
Norway	25 % reduction (officers and POs), 50 % reduction (conscripts)	No reduction	Yes	Yes, when there is room
Turkey	20 % reduction on railways and maritimes	20 % reduction on railways and maritimes	No	No
United Kingdom	Free leave warrants	No reduction	Yes, on a fill-up basis	Yes, on a fill-up basis
United States	Most airlines offer special rates to servicemen	No reduction	Yes, if space available	Yes, if space available

### H. Pensions, retirement

#### Question

H. 1. When do service personnel qualify for a pension ?

- (a) From the time they are recruited ?
- (b) After a certain period ? If so, how long ?

#### Answer

H. 1. (a) and (b) Belgium, France, Germany (career personnel only), Italy and Luxembourg (career personnel only) replied that personnel qualified for a pension as soon as they were recruited. In the other countries, personnel qualified only after a specified period of service, which varied in the different countries. See table.

#### Question

H. 2. Under what conditions are pensions paid ?

- (a) By postponing payment of the pension when retiring age has not been reached at the time of termination of service ?
- (b) Immediately after termination of service ?

#### Answer

H. 2. (a) and (b) Eligibility for a pension from the time of recruitment does not mean that it will be paid on termination of service, regardless of age or years of service. All countries attach qualifications of age and/or years of service to when pensions are payable. See table.

*Question*

H. 3. Are pensions payable in regular instalments or as a lump sum ?

*Answer*

H. 3. All countries replied that pensions are payable in regular instalments. Denmark replied that personnel on long-service engagements receive a pension on retirement as a lump sum, (to which they have contributed 5-10 % of their monthly pay, and the authorities have contributed 10 %). This does not apply to regular engagement personnel.

*Question*

H. 4. (a) On what basis are pensions calculated ?

*Answer*

H. 4. (a) In general, pensions are calculated on the basis of last (or highest) basic pay and years of service. In some countries it is also calculated on the basis of bonuses and allowances. See table.

*Question*

H. 4. (b) Do years of active service or war service count double ?

*Answer*

H. 4. (b) Belgium and France (in some circumstances) reported that years of active service or war service count double. Italy said that war service counts double, and that some services (e.g. sea duty, flying, navigation) can count 1/3 to 1/2 more. Luxembourg replied that war service (in World Wars I and II on the side of the allies) and active service in United Nations forces counts double. Denmark, while not referring to war or active service, counts as double the last five years of service of personnel with a retiring age before 60.

The other countries replied that war or active service did not count double.

*Question*

H. 4. (c) Is other government service counted in addition to years of service in the armed forces ?

*Answer*

H. 4. (c) Only in Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States is other government service not counted in addition to years in the armed forces in calculating the pension. Turkey did not answer the question.

*Question*

H. 5. How much do personnel contribute towards their pension ?

*Answer*

H. 5. Personnel in Belgium, Denmark (regulars), Germany (career), Ireland and the United Kingdom do not contribute anything towards their pension. Personnel in the United States do not contribute anything towards a retirement pension specifically, but they do contribute 5.85 % of their first \$12,600 towards a general social security system.

Canadians contribute 7 % of their pay towards their pensions (but women contribute at a lower unspecified rate because their pensions "die" with them) ; the French contribute 6 % ; the Italians 6 % of 80 % of their pay ; Luxembourgers contribute 3 % of their gross pay ; and the Norwegians contribute 2 % of their gross salary directly, and 4.5 % of their gross salary included in tax. In Turkey, personnel contribute 8 % of basic pay. (Danish long-service personnel contribute from 5 % to 10 % of their monthly pay.)

*Question*

H. 6. Do the authorities also contribute ?

*Answer*

H. 6. It was reported that the authorities contribute to military pensions in all countries except Germany and Italy. (This seems unlikely

in the case of Germany, where personnel contribute nothing; perhaps the German reply means that the military authorities, as distinct from the State, do not contribute.)

*Question*

H. 7. Can pensions be revalued or are they indexed (i.e. to prices or salaries or both) ?

*Answer*

H. 7. Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway and Turkey said that pensions could be revalued. In Canada, Denmark, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States pensions are adjusted to the cost of living or salaries index. Belgium, Luxembourg and Norway said that pensions were not only revalued, but were also indexed.

*Question*

H. 8. Are widows and/or orphans entitled to a pension ?

If so, what percentage of the full pension is payable ?

*Answer*

H. 8. All countries replied that widows and orphans were entitled to a pension; its value as a percentage of the full pension varied from country to country. In Ireland, the right to a pension applies only to the widows and orphans of officers; widows and orphans of other ranks receive a pension from the Department of Social Welfare (i.e. from the civil rather than the military authorities). See table.

There appears, from the replies, to be some blurring of the distinction between orphans and fatherless children, and it is not always clear whether "orphan" is being used according to the strict meaning of the word.

*Question*

H. 9. When does the right of widows and/or orphans to a pension expire ?

*Answer*

H. 9. The rights of widows and orphans to a pension expires, in most countries, when widows remarry or when orphans reach a certain age. See table for the various conditions.

*Question*

H. 10. What is the normal retiring age in the various ranks ?

*Answer*

H. 10. See table.

*Question*

H. 11. Is it possible to retire before the normal retiring age and if so after how many years' service ?

How are such pensions calculated ? (see also D. 5. (a) (iii)).

*Answer*

H. 11. This question was taken to mean voluntary retirement or retirement through disability, and not retirement for reasons of economy, efficiency, redundancy, misconduct, etc., which are covered in D. 5. (a) (iii). See table for the various conditions, and the basis on which these pensions are calculated.

*Question*

H. 12. Are retired servicemen entitled to wear uniform ?

If so, is a uniform allowance payable ?

*Answer*

H. 12. Retired servicemen are entitled to wear uniform in Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, but no uniform allowances are payable.

Table H. 1, H. 2, H. 4. (a), H. 10, H. 11

Country	When do personnel qualify for a pension, and under what conditions are they payable ?	Basis of calculation	Normal retiring age in the various ranks	Is it possible to retire before the normal retiring age ? How are such pensions calculated ?
Belgium	<p>Personnel qualify from the time they are recruited</p> <p>Pensions are payable immediately on termination of service if conditions for payment (age, disability) have been met</p>	<p>1/60th of last year's salary, with increases for length of service in last rank</p>	<p>Junior officers : 56 ; commandant : 51 ; major and lt. colonel : 55 ; colonel : 56 ; major-general : 59 ; general : 61</p>	<p>No provision for retirement beforehand (While not eligible for a military pension, he will be eligible for the normal social security pension for salaried workers, which will include benefits for his years of military service)</p>
Canada	<p>Personnel qualify after 10 years' service</p> <p>Pensions are paid immediately on termination of service if retirement age is reached, or in case of disablement, and if at least 10 years have been served</p>	<p>2 % of salary of each year's service, calculated on the average of the best 6 years</p>	<p>General service officers : colonel and above : 55 ; lieutenant-colonel : 51 ; major : 47 ; lieutenant and captain : 45. Officers commissioned from the ranks : colonel and above : 55 ; lieutenant-colonel and below : 50. Specialist officers (e.g. those in chaplain, dental, legal, music classifications) have slightly higher retiring ages. These provisions apply to an officer on or after completion of 30 years of service for colonel and above, 28 years of service for lieutenant-colonel and below</p> <p>Other ranks : sergeant and above : 50 ; corporal and</p>	<p>Yes. Disabled, 10 or more years' service : immediate annuity. Other reasons : 10 or more but less than 20 years' service : deferred annuity ; 20-25 years' service : immediate annuity reduced by 5 % for each full year under retirement age (officers), or immediate annuity reduced by 5 % for each full year under (a) 25 years of service or (b) retirement age, whichever is lesser (men). 25 or more years' service : immediate annuity reduced by 5 % for each full year under retirement age (officers), or immediate annuity (men)</p>

Table H. 1, H. 2, H. 4. (a), H. 10, H. 11 (continued)

Country	When do personnel qualify for a pension, and under what conditions are they payable ?	Basis of calculation	Normal retiring age in the various ranks	Is it possible to retire before the normal retiring age ? How are such pensions calculated ?
Canada (continued)			below : 44. These provisions apply to sergeant and above on or after completion of 30 years of service, and to corporal and below on or after 25 years of service. (A number of officers and men who served in the Canadian armed forces before unification will not retire according to the above schedule, as they elected to retire according to the retirement ages in effect before unification)	
Denmark (regular)	Personnel qualify after 3 years' service Pensions are payable immediately on termination of service if at least 10 years have been served (Personnel on long-service engagement receive a lump sum at the end of their period of engagement)	According to total number of years of service and last salary	Officers of the A-line : 1st lieutenant/lieutenant, captain/lt.-commander, major/commander : 52 (technical and supply corps : 60); lt.-colonel/commander sen. gr. : 60; colonel/captain : 62; generals/admirals : 65 Officers of the B-line : 2nd lieutenant/sub-lieutenant : 52 (techni-	Yes, after 3 years' service Pension payable at age 67, calculated on same basis as regular pension, but not indexed at all If age 60, with at least 10 years' service, pension payable immediately but reduced by a percentage per year from the actual retiring age to the normal retiring age

Table H. 1, H. 2, H. 4. (a), H. 10, H. 11 (continued)

Country	When do personnel qualify for a pension, and under what conditions are they payable ?	Basis of calculation	Normal retiring age in the various ranks	Is it possible to retire before the normal retiring age ? How are such pensions calculated ?
Denmark (continued)			cal and supply corps : 60 ; lieutenant /lieutenant jun. gr. : 56 (technical and supply corps : 60) ; 1st lieutenant /lieutenant, captain /lt-commander, major /commander : 60	
France	Personnel qualify from the time they are recruited Pensions are payable on termination of service after 15 years' service for non-officers, after 25 years or age 50 for officers, though some women officers who are also mothers can receive a pension after 15 years' service	On the basis of the pay scale corresponding to the last rank held for at least 6 months by the time of retirement, years of service, and bonuses and allowances	No figures given. The normal retirement age is the maximum age above which a man can no longer be retained in the services	Yes, after 15 years' service Pension is calculated on the same basis as the regular pension
Federal Republic of Germany (career)	Personnel qualify from the time they are recruited Pensions are payable immediately on termination of service, if conditions for payment (age, disability) have been met	35 % to 75 % of last salary, depending on years of service	POs to <i>Hauptmann</i> : 52 ; major : 54 ; lt.-colonel ( <i>Obersileutnant</i> ) : 56 ; colonel ( <i>Oberst</i> ) : 58 ; general : 60 ; pilots : 40	Yes, but only in the case of permanent unfitness for service Pension is 35 % of salary for up to 10 years' service, increasing by 2 % per year for each additional year

Table H. 1, H. 2, H. 4. (a), H. 10, H. 11 (continued)

Country	When do personnel qualify for a pension, and under what conditions are they payable ?	Basis of calculation	Normal retiring age in the various ranks	Is it possible to retire before the normal retiring age ? How are such pensions calculated ?
Ireland	Personnel qualify after 12 years for officers, 21 years for other ranks, 20 years for women (nurses) Pensions are payable immediately on termination of service, after qualification period has been served	Fixed rates comprised of elements for years of service, and rank Women : 60ths of pay and emoluments	NCOs and privates : 60 ; 2nd lieutenant/lieutenant : 47 ; captain : 54 ; <i>commandant</i> (major) : 56 ; lt.-colonel : 58 ; colonel : 60 ; major-general : 63	Yes, after 12 years' service (20 for nurses) for officers, 21 years' service for other ranks Pension calculated on same basis as regular pension
Italy	Personnel qualify from the time they are recruited (but not before 17 years of age) Pensions are payable immediately on termination of service, if at least 13 years have been served	80 % of last pay	All NCOs : 56. Varies for officers according to the service and the branch of the service. Sub-lieutenant, 1st lieutenant/subalterns : 45 to 54 ; captain/lieutenant : 47 to 54 ; (air force specialists list : subalterns : 59 ; captain : 61) ; major/lt.-commander : 51 to 58 ; lt.-colonel/commander : 52 to 59 ; colonel/captain : 55 to 61 ; general/admiral : 58 to 65	Yes, on request after 25 years' service or, with at least 20 years' service, 3 years before normal retiring age for the rank. For other reasons, retirement is possible after 13 years' service  On request, pension is 53 % of 80 % of the last salary. Retirement for other reasons, pension is 44 % of 80 % of the last salary
Luxembourg (career)	Personnel qualify from the time they are recruited Pensions are payable immediately on termination of service, if	20/60ths of last salary. It increases by 1/60th of the emoluments for each year's service over 10,	55 for all officers and NCOs	Yes, after 5 years for reasons of disability or, without regard to age or length of service, if injured in the army or in doing an

Table H. 1, H. 2, H. 4. (a), H. 10, H. 11 (continued)

Country	When do personnel qualify for a pension, and under what conditions are they payable?	Basis of calculation	Normal retiring age in the various ranks	Is it possible to retire before the normal retiring age? How are such pensions calculated?
Luxembourg (continued)	retirement age reached. Postponed to age 60 if a man leaves the service voluntarily after at least 15 years' service	but cannot be more than 50/60ths of the salary serving as the basic rate. Career personnel retired at 55 and with at least 30 years' service are entitled to a pension equal to 50/60ths of last salary		<p>act of public service, as a result of which he is unfit to resume his duties or to take up other employment suiting his qualifications. Voluntary retirement is possible after at least 15 years' service</p> <p>Pension is calculated on same basis as ordinary retirement pension. If incapacity results from an accident in the service, a gratuity for years of service is paid. If incapacity results from an act of public service, 10-15 years' service are credited, in calculating the pension. In case of blindness, amputation of two limbs, or severe disablement, pension can be the same as pay. In case of amputation or loss of use of one limb, pension can be 2/3 pay</p> <p>In case of voluntary retirement, pension is proportional to years of service, but paid at age 60</p>

Table H. 1, H. 2, H. 4. (a), H. 10, H. 11 (continued)

Country	When do personnel qualify for a pension, and under what conditions are they payable ?	Basis of calculation	Normal retiring age in the various ranks	Is it possible to retire before the normal retiring age ? How are such pensions calculated ?
Norway	<p>Personnel qualify at 60, except for 2nd lieutenants and CPOs, who qualify at 52</p> <p>Pensions are payable on termination of service if retirement age has been reached ; otherwise they are postponed</p>	66 % of last salary	<p>2nd lieutenants and CPOs : 52</p> <p>All others : 60</p>	<p>Yes, after age 40</p> <p>Pension rate is 40 % to 55 % of last salary</p> <p>Retirement with full pension is possible at age 57, if the sum of age and years of service is 85</p>
Turkey	<p>Personnel qualify after 25 years' service</p> <p>Pensions are payable when retirement age is reached</p>	The pension rate is determined by special law	Colonel : 58 ; major : 46 (No other figures given)	<p>Yes, after 25 years' active service</p> <p>Pension is determined according to a special scale</p>
United Kingdom	<p>Personnel qualify after 16 years' service for officers (from age 21), and after 22 years' service for men (from age 18)</p> <p>Pension is payable immediately on termination of service, after qualification period has been served</p>	<p>Minimum pension is worth roughly 1/4 to 1/3 pay ; full career pension (34 years' service for officers, 37 years for other ranks) is worth roughly 1/2 pay</p>	<p>Varies. Average for full career officers : 55</p>	<p>Yes, after 5 years' service from the age of 18 for reasons of disability, or premature retirement at own request for an officer with at least 16 years' service</p> <p>In case of disability, pension calculated on same basis as regular pension, but with enhancement</p> <p>In case of voluntary premature retirement, pension calculated on same basis as regular pension, but may be reduced (along with terminal grant) by up to 10 % depending on age</p>

Table H. 1, H. 2, H. 4. (a), H. 10, H. 11 (continued)

Country	When do personnel qualify for a pension and under what conditions are they payable ?	Basis of calculation	Normal retiring age in the various ranks	Is it possible to retire before the normal retiring age ? How are such pensions calculated ?
United States	<p>Personnel qualify after 20 years' service, or after a disability rated at 30 % or more is incurred during military service</p> <p>Pension is payable immediately on termination of service, after qualification period has been served</p> <p>It is postponed to age 60 for reservists</p>	<p>By multiplying the terminal basic pay to which the member is entitled by 2 ½ % by his years of service</p>	60-62	<p>Yes, after 20 years' service</p> <p>Pension calculated on same basis as regular retirement pension</p>

Table H. 8, H. 9

Country	Widows (percentage of husband's pension)	Orphans and/or children (percentage of father's pension)
Belgium	<p>30 % of husband's last salary (approximately 60-66 % of his pension) for the first 20 years (or part thereof) of contributions to the survivor's pension fund, plus 1 % for each additional year after 20 years, the total not to exceed 50 % of the salary on which the pension is calculated. If this calculation does not result in a pension of at least \$2,385 (\$3,025 indexed), the pension may be calculated on the basis of 40 % for the first 30 years (or part thereof) of contributions plus 1 % for each additional year after 30 years, but the sum thus calculated should not exceed \$2,385 (\$3,025 indexed)</p> <p>Right to a pension does not expire unless the pension is calculated according to 40 % for 30 years' service, in which case it expires if the widow remarries or takes up unauthorised employment</p>	<p>Increases in widow's pension for dependent children : for the first child, 5 % of the sum which served as the basis for calculation of the pension, 3 % for the second child, and 2 % for each additional child</p> <p>Pensions for orphans : 1 orphan : 6/10ths of the widow's pension ; 2 orphans : 8/10ths of the widow's pension ; 3 orphans : widow's full pension ; 4th orphan : full pension plus 5 % of the basic salary ; 5th orphan : full pension plus 3 % ; 6th and other orphans : full pension plus 2 %</p> <p>Expires at 18 years, though may be extended for a handicapped child</p>
Canada	<p>50 %</p> <p>Expires on remarriage</p>	<p>10 % for children, 20 % for orphans</p> <p>Expires at 18, or 25 if in school (university)</p>
Denmark (regular)	<p>About 66 %</p> <p>Right does not expire</p>	<p>\$1,211 per annum</p> <p>Expires at 18</p>
France	<p>50 % (also for widowers)</p> <p>Expires on remarriage or cohabitation (<i>concubinage</i>)</p> <p>Payment can be resumed if she again becomes a widow, is divorced or separated, or ceases to cohabit</p>	<p>10 %</p> <p>Complete orphan, and orphan of female personnel : 50 %</p> <p>Expires at 21, except in case of serious infirmity</p>
Federal Republic of Germany	<p>60 %</p> <p>Expires on remarriage</p>	<p>Up to 20 %</p> <p>Expires at 18, or 27 for trainees</p>

Table H. 8, H. 9 (continued)

Country	Widows (percentage of husband's pension)	Orphans and/or children (percentage of father's pension)
Ireland (officers)	50 % Expires on remarriage	1/6 (8.33 %) of widow's pension (16.6 % of father's pension Expires at 16, or 21 if in school (university)
Italy	50 % Expires on remarriage	Increases in widow's pension for dependent children : Widow, 1 child : 60 % ; 2 children : 70 % ; 3 or more children : 75 % Expires when child comes of age
Luxembourg	2/3 of the basic pension, and 60 % of the rest of the pension Loses half the pension on remarriage	Increases in widow's pension for dependent children : 1 child : up to 20 % ; 2 children : up to 30 % ; 3 children : up to 40 % ; 4 children : up to 50 % Complete orphans : 1 child : up to 33 1/3 % ; 2 children : 50 % ; 3 children : 65 % ; 4 children : up to 100 % Expires at 18, unless child is an invalid
Norway	60 % Expires on remarriage	Figure not given (same as for widows?) Expires at 18
Turkey	50 % Expires on remarriage	Each child : 25 % Expires after a certain age
United Kingdom	33 % to 50 % Expires on remarriage	25 % for each of 2 children Expires at 16, unless child is receiving full time education or training
United States	55 % Expires on remarriage	Figures not given Expires at 18, or 22 if in school (university)

### J. Medical and dental care

#### Question

- J. 1. (a) Are service personnel entitled to full free medical and dental treatment?
- (b) Is such treatment given by the forces medical and dental service?

#### Answer

J. 1. (a) and (b) All countries provide free medical treatment for their service personnel, and all but Norway provide free dental treatment. Treatment is given by the forces medical and dental service, except to short-service and career personnel in France and Denmark. Canada and Britain added that other arrangements can be made where forces services are not available.

Treatment is not comprehensive in all countries, and details for these are given below.

*Denmark*: Free treatment for conscripts only, and also for enlisted personnel at military institutions. (Otherwise, treatment is free under the public health service.)

*France*: Free treatment for conscripts only. Short-service and career personnel are offered free diagnosis, but not treatment, unless the illness is due to service causes. (However, treatment is mostly free under social security provisions.)

*Ireland*: Free treatment for everyone, but officers do not receive free spectacles or dentures.

*Italy*: Free treatment for privates, corporals and equivalent ranks, and for short-service personnel generally. Regulars receive free treatment only for an illness resulting from war or a service cause; otherwise they receive assistance from ENPAS (State employee's national health service).

*Luxembourg*: Treatment is completely free for volunteers. Treatment for career personnel is free, on the basis of a periodically fixed scale of charges or allowances. If the cost of treatment is

greater than can be met from the allowances, the difference is the responsibility of the serviceman.

*United Kingdom*: Free treatment for all. However, charges are made for the supply of civilian-type spectacles, and they may also be made for some items, e.g. dentures supplied to replace those originally provided at service expense and lost or damaged through neglect or misconduct.

#### Question

- J. 1. (c) If so, are service personnel obliged to use the forces services or may they also be treated by non-military doctors and/or specialists?

#### Answer

J. 1. (c) Canada, Denmark (conscripts), France (conscripts), Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States specified that personnel are normally required to use the medical services of the forces, though exceptions may be made in the case of an emergency, or where service facilities are not available, or where service medical personnel authorise treatment by civilian doctors and/or specialists.

Belgium (except conscripts), France (career and short-service), Luxembourg (career) and Turkey offer personnel the choice of being treated by the forces medical and dental service or by civilians.

#### Question

- J. 1. (d) If service personnel may be treated by non-military doctors and/or specialists, is this at their own expense?
- (e) If treatment is not free, how much is payable by the personnel concerned?

#### Answer

J. 1. (d) and (e) Only Turkey replied that treatment by non-military doctors and/or specialists is at the expense of the serviceman.

Canada, Ireland, Norway and the United States replied that treatment by civilian doctors and/or specialists is not at the expense of the serviceman.

The other countries replied that only in some circumstances is treatment by civilian doctors and/or specialists at the serviceman's own expense.

*Belgium* : Expenses are met by the serviceman where treatment has not been ordered by the forces medical service (*service de santé*), or where the cost is not covered by sickness and invalidity insurance (*assurance maladie invalidité*). Where part of the costs are covered by AMI, the serviceman pays the difference between the actual costs and the reimbursement from AMI

*Denmark* : Treatment is free if it has been ordered by the forces medical service ; if not, it is at the serviceman's own expense.

*France* : Cost of treatment is paid by the serviceman, but expenses are reimbursed in whole or in part by social security, to which all servicemen contribute. On average, the serviceman pays 20 % of the costs which are borne by social security.

*Federal Republic of Germany* : Treatment is free if it is ordered by military doctors ; if not, it is at the serviceman's own expense.

*Italy* : Treatment by civilian doctors is at the serviceman's own expense, except where he is eligible for assistance from ENPAS (State employees' national health service).

*Luxembourg* : Career servicemen have to meet charges not covered by the scale of allowances for medical treatment ; the serviceman pays the difference between the fixed allowances and the actual cost of treatment.

*United Kingdom* : All expenses are paid by the serviceman where treatment is not covered by the national health service or other approved arrangement.

#### Question

J. 1. (f) If part of the treatment is not free, are there other (non-military) schemes under which an allowance may be paid ?

If so, is it compulsory for service personnel to contribute ?

#### Answer

J. 1. (f) Canada, Denmark (conscripts), France (conscripts), Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Turkey and the United States either answered "no" or "not applicable" to this question.

*Belgium* : Personnel benefit from *assurance maladie invalidité*, to which they make compulsory contributions, unless stationed abroad.

*Denmark* : Enlisted personnel benefit from the civilian health service, to which they have contributed through government taxes.

*France* : Short-service and career personnel benefit from social security, to which contributions are compulsory. They may also join any voluntary insurance scheme at their own expense.

*Luxembourg* : Career personnel contribute \$1.84 per month to the state insurance scheme. They may also join any surgical or dental insurance scheme in order to cover some or all of the medical charges to which they might be liable outside of state reimbursements.

*United Kingdom* : Servicemen make compulsory contributions to the national health service. They may also insure privately, at their own expense, against any expenses they might incur for which they are not eligible for reimbursement from public funds.

#### Question

J. 1. (g) If such a contribution is compulsory, is provision made for the authorities to reimburse this amount in full or in part ?

#### Answer

J. 1. (g) No country reimburses servicemen for any contribution made to any kind of insurance scheme, compulsory or voluntary.

#### Question

J. 2. (a) Are servicemen's families entitled to full free medical and dental treatment ?

(b) Is such treatment given by the forces medical and dental service ?

*Answer*

J. 2. (a) and (b) The families of servicemen from Belgium (if stationed abroad), Ireland (other ranks), Luxembourg (career personnel), Turkey, and the United Kingdom (army and air force at home or abroad ; navy abroad) are entitled to free medical treatment ; they are also entitled to free dental treatment, except that the families of United Kingdom servicemen are entitled to this only if stationed abroad.

The families of American servicemen are entitled to free hospital out-patient care, and they pay a low charge for in-patient hospitalisation (\$3.50 per day). Dental care is provided only in isolated areas where provision of dental care by civilians is not sufficient to care for military dependents.

This free treatment is provided by the forces medical and dental services (though the services are available to Irish families only at the Curragh training camp).

In addition, families of French servicemen may receive treatment from the forces medical and dental service, and the families of Canadian personnel may also receive treatment from the forces medical and dental service in certain isolated areas ; in neither case is the treatment free.

Though Italy and Norway replied that the families of servicemen are entitled to free medical and dental (Italy only) treatment, this is a result of civilian, not service, programmes, and treatment is not given by the forces medical and dental services.

The families of Danish and German servicemen are not entitled to treatment from the forces medical and dental services.

*Question*

J. 2. (c) If so, are the families obliged to use the forces services or may they also be treated by non-military doctors and/or specialists ?

*Answer*

J. 2. (c) Families who may receive treatment from forces medical and dental services are not obliged to use them, but may choose to be treated by non-military doctors and/or specialists.

*Question*

J. 2. (d) If families may be treated by non-military doctors and/or specialists, is this at their own expense ?

(e) If families' treatment is not free, how much of the cost has to be borne by the serviceman concerned ?

*Answer*

J. 2. (d) and (e) Canada and Turkey replied that treatment by non-military doctors is at the family's own expense. (However, Canada now has a system of national health insurance from which, one assumes, the families of servicemen would benefit to some extent.) The charges in the other countries are given below :

*Belgium* : For families of personnel stationed abroad, treatment by non-military doctors is at the families' own expense, unless such treatment has been authorised by the forces' health service (*service de santé*) or unless there is a bilateral arrangement with *assurance maladie invalidité*, or in the case of an emergency, when costs will be reimbursed by DIS.

*Denmark* : Treatment is at the families' own expense, but the public health service, funded by government taxes, reimburses most of the expense.

*France* : Treatment is at the families' own expense, but it is largely reimbursed by social security, to which all persons contribute. On average, the serviceman's family pays 20 % of the costs borne by social security.

*Federal Republic of Germany* : (This answer is not clear.) "45 % for the wife and 5 % less for each child down to 90 %."

*Ireland* : Families of other ranks may receive free hospital treatment. Officers must pay the full cost of their families' treatment unless they are insured under the social welfare acts (which

was to have been made compulsory as of 1st April 1974). The rate of reimbursement is not given.

*Italy* : Treatment is at the families' expense unless assisted by ENPAS (State employees' national health service). The rates of contribution and reimbursement are not given.

*Luxembourg* : The families of career servicemen have to meet any charges not covered by the fixed scale of allowances for medical and dental treatment.

*Norway* : Cost of families' treatment is covered by the national health insurance regulations.

*United Kingdom* : The family bears the costs unless entitled to free or reduced charges for treatment under the national health service in the United Kingdom. Expenses for treatment abroad are reimbursed where treatment takes place under approved arrangements, or for emergency treatment outside these arrangements.

*United States* : Dental expenses are the responsibility of the families. Medical expenses are either the total responsibility of the family, or only 20 % of the cost if they are members of CHAMPUS (civilian health and medical programme for the uniformed services).

#### Question

J. 2. (f) If part of the families' treatment is not free, are there other (non-military) schemes under which an allowance may be paid? If so, is it compulsory for military personnel to contribute?

#### Answer

J. 2. (f) Allowances for medical and dental treatment are paid under the following schemes :

*Belgium* : Assurance maladie invalidité, to which contributions are compulsory.

*Canada* : There is a national health scheme for medical, but not dental, care ; contributions are compulsory.

*Denmark* : Public health service ; contributions through government taxes.

*France* : Social security ; compulsory contributions. Personnel may also contribute to private insurance schemes.

*Federal Republic of Germany* : (This answer is not clear.) "55 % of the treatment costs plus 5 % for each child up to 20 % all together of the treatment costs will be subsidised by the authorities." (This appears to indicate that the authorities will meet 55 % of the treatment costs of a wife's illness, and 5 % for each child up to a maximum of 4 children ; however, this is in conflict with the answer to (e).)

*Ireland* : Hospital insurance is available from the voluntary health insurance board. (Medical and dental costs are paid now under the social welfare acts, contributions to which were made compulsory on 1st April 1974.)

*Luxembourg* : Personnel contribute \$1.84 per month of the State insurance scheme. They can also join any surgical or dental scheme (voluntary) in order to cover some or all of the charges to which they might be liable and which are not covered by the State scheme.

*Norway* : National health insurance meets the cost of treatment. Membership is compulsory ; the contribution is 3.8 % of pay.

*Turkey* : (No answer provided.)

*United Kingdom* : National health service ; compulsory contributions. Servicemen may also insure their families privately at their own expense against any expenditure they might incur for which they are not eligible for reimbursement from public funds.

*United States* : CHAMPUS (civilian health and medical programme for the uniformed services), which pays all but 20 % of expenses ; participation in this scheme is voluntary.

#### Question

J. 2. (g) If such a contribution is compulsory is provision made for the authorities to reimburse this amount in full or in part?

#### Answer

J. 2. (g) Only Canada makes any reimbursement to personnel for their participation in any health insurance scheme ; it reimburses in part the costs for medical, but not dental, insurance.

**K. Food and accommodation***Question*

- K. 1. (a) Which categories of service personnel are required to live in barracks?  
 (b) Which categories of service personnel may live in barracks if they wish?

*Answer*

K. 1. (a) and (b) All countries except Denmark required some category or categories of personnel to live in barracks. The personnel were more often than not single other ranks below NCO, or sometimes below a certain age; some countries required single officers below a certain age or rank also to live in barracks.

All countries allowed some or all of their personnel to live in barracks if they so wished, although in practice several indicated that this was limited by shortages of accommodation. See table.

*Question*

- K. 2. (a) In case 1 (a) and 1 (b) is a deduction made from pay to cover food and accommodation?

- (b) If a deduction, or payment, is made in respect of food and accommodation, how much is it and is the amount the same for all those living in barracks or is a distinction made between different groups (e.g. married couples and non-married personnel)?

*Answer*

K. 2. Deductions are as follows.

*Belgium*: (a) This answer is not absolutely clear, but it would appear that no deduction is made for accommodation. For food, charges are made according to the meals which an individual eats in barracks.

(b) No details, other than married couples do not live in barracks.

*Canada*: (a) Yes, deductions are made.

(b) For food, this is at the rate of \$42.66 per month for other ranks, and \$52.66 per month for officers. For quarters, from \$20 to \$81 per month, according to standard.

*Denmark*: (a) Yes, deductions are made.

(b) Different rates for barracks and married quarters.

Barracks	Copenhagen	Provinces
1 person . . . . .	Kr. 187 (US \$ 30.90)	Kr. 139 (US \$ 22.94)
2 persons . . . . .	Kr. 140 (US \$ 23.10)	Kr. 104 (US \$ 17.16)
3-4 persons . . . . .	Kr. 94 (US \$ 15.51)	Kr. 70 (US \$ 11.69)

There are only 850 married quarters (i.e. a limited supply); the cost ranges from Kr. 6,432 to Kr. 7,524 (\$1,061 to \$1,241).

*France*: (a) During the period of national service, there is no deduction for food. After that, personnel pay for their own food.

(b) No deduction for quarters. (But there are charges for certain services for personnel on monthly salaries eventually.)

*Federal Republic of Germany*: (a) There are no deductions for conscripts, but there are for others.

(b) For food, a deduction of DM 3.75 per day (\$1.40) is made. For accommodation, single men under 25 pay from DM 84 to 89.50 per month (\$31.33 to \$33.38). Others pay on a scale from DM 16 to 64 per month (\$5.97 to \$23.87).

*Ireland*: (a) Deductions are made for both food and accommodation.

(b) No details are provided on either food or accommodation charges for unmarried other ranks. Married other ranks who live in barracks pay 55p. per day (\$1.35) for accommodation. Unmarried officers' accommodation charges are 17p. per day (\$0.42) for 2nd lieutenant, 23p. (\$0.56) for lieutenant, and 28p. (\$0.69) for all others. Food is provided in the officers' mess, and officers pay their own accounts.

*Italy* : (a) Yes, deductions are made.

(b) Deductions for single and married personnel are different for accommodation, varying from about 1,000 to 3,000 lira per month (\$1.72

to \$5.15) ; deductions for food for single and married personnel are the same.

*Luxembourg* : Other ranks receive free food and accommodation. Others pay a rent of the order of 250 Fr. Lux. per month (\$6.43). Their food is charged to them at the following rates : 12 Fr. (\$0.31) for breakfast, 30 (\$0.77) for lunch, and 20 (\$0.51) for supper.

*Norway* : (a) Yes, deductions are made.

(b) For food, the rate is N. Kr. 11.25 per day (\$1.92). For accommodation, as follows :

No. of occupants	New barracks	Old barracks
1 man per room . . . . .	Kr. 4 per day (\$ 0.68)	Kr. 3.20 per day (\$ 0.55)
2 men per room . . . . .	Kr. 2.60 " " (\$ 0.44)	Kr. 2.20 " " (\$ 0.38)
3 men per room . . . . .	Kr. 1.80 " " (\$ 0.31)	Kr. 1.50 " " (\$ 0.26)

*Turkey* : (a) No.

(b) No answer.

*United Kingdom* : (a) Yes, deductions are made.

(b) For food, 46 p. per day (\$1.13). For standard accommodation a scale of charges ranging from £76.65 to £255.50 per annum (\$187.95 to \$626.49) for single quarters. For married quarters, the charges range from £160.60 to £313.90 (\$394 to \$770) for other ranks, and £368.65 to £594.95 (\$904 to \$1,459) for officers.

*United States* : (a) The United States usually pays a quarters allowance and a subsistence allowance to all personnel. Those who live in barracks do not receive either of these allowances, but no deduction is made from their basic pay for food and accommodation.

(b) Quarters allowances payable to personnel who do not live in barracks range from \$123.90 to \$230.40 per month for an officer without

dependants, and from \$160.80 to \$288 per month for an officer with dependants ; for enlisted personnel they range from \$60 to \$130.80 per month without dependants, and from \$105 to \$184.20 per month with dependants.

The subsistence allowance for officers (commissioned and warrant) and aviation cadets is \$47.88 per month. Enlisted personnel receive \$2.57 per day when rations in kind are not available, \$2.28 per day when permission to mess separately is granted, and \$3.42 day when assigned to duty under emergency conditions where no government messing facilities are available.

*Question*

K. 3. (a) Are married quarters provided for married male personnel ?

Female personnel ?

(b) Are married personnel accompanied by their spouses required to occupy married quarters when available?

(c) Is a reduction from pay made for rent of married quarters?

*Answer*

K. 3. See table.

*Question*

K. 4. (a) How are service personnel not living in barracks housed?

*Answer*

K. 4. (a) Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Turkey reported that personnel not in barracks have to live in private accommodation. In France and Norway, some married quarters are provided for the military, but others have to live in private accommodation, as is the case for the United Kingdom although there is the additional possibility of living in a "hiring" (i.e. in government-rented accommodation). The United States reported that personnel live in government-rented accommodation or private housing, and Luxembourg reported that, for NCOs only, certain accommodation either owned or rented by the State was available.

*Question*

K. 4. (b) Do the authorities provide assistance with housing or do personnel have to deal with this themselves?

*Answer*

K. 4. (b) Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Turkey reported that no assistance with housing was given by the authorities.

Belgium reported that assistance was given for personnel in Germany.

France reported "that the Minister of the Armed Forces provides assistance to military personnel by eventually finding housing for them".

Luxembourg reported that officers must find their own accommodation.

Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States reported that the authorities provide assistance.

Norway reported both that the authorities provide assistance and that personnel have to deal with housing themselves.

*Question*

K. 4. (c) Is a housing allowance payable to personnel not living in barracks?

*Answer*

K. 4. (c) A housing allowance is not payable to the military personnel of Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Turkey and the United Kingdom who are not living in barracks.

Belgium pays a housing allowance to personnel in Germany, if accompanied by their families.

France only pays a housing allowance in certain circumstances, e.g. in order to maintain the accustomed standard of accommodation; (this allowance is not only for the military, but applies also to other civil servants in metropolitan France).

Germany and the United States reported that they pay a housing allowance.

*Question*

K. 5. Are personnel not living in barracks obliged to live at the place of their duty station?

*Answer*

K. 5. All countries except France, Italy, and Luxembourg replied "no" to this question. Luxembourg reported that an exception could be made by ministerial authorisation to the rule that personnel not living in barracks are obliged to live at their place of duty station. France and Italy said that there were no exceptions to this rule.

*Question*

K. 6. What are the housing provisions in the case of personnel being transferred abroad?

*Answer*

K. 6. Germany, Ireland, Italy and Turkey reported that no housing provisions are made for personnel being transferred abroad. Details for the other countries are given below.

*Belgium* : Assistance is given to personnel accompanied by their families who are posted to Germany.

*Canada* : Rent support or housing is provided.

*Denmark* : The military authorities pay the rent.

*France* : Housing is supplied to officers and NCOs stationed abroad ; their pay is reduced by 15 % and 10 % respectively (in lieu of rent). This housing provision does not apply to French forces in Germany and in certain African States.

*Luxembourg* : Personnel themselves rent accommodation. Then the authorities, when they fix the allowance for the post concerned, take into account the difference between the actual rent being paid and a normal rent in Luxembourg. (They presumably compensate the individual through an increased allowance.)

*Norway* : Normally, military quarters.

*United Kingdom* : The same housing provisions as in the United Kingdom.

*United States* : Many overseas stations have government quarters, but they are usually insufficient in number to house all married members. Many members thus rely on local private housing.

Table K. 1. (a), (b)

Country	Categories of service personnel required to live in barracks	Categories of service personnel who may live in barracks
Belgium	All conscripts, and soldiers below officer rank, single men, widowers and divorcees without responsibility for a child, are required initially to live in barracks ; however when they have served more than 3 months and are over 21 years of age, they may live outside	All categories who wish to may live in barracks, (so long as there is room)
Canada	All personnel are required to live in barracks until graduation from a basic trade course	All who wish to may live in
Denmark	No category required to live in	All may live in
France	Soldiers of the <i>gendarmerie</i> , (both single and married), conscripts, regular other ranks, single NCOs, and all other military whose presence in barracks is necessary, are required to live in	Married NCOs who are temporarily separated from their families, may, if space is available, live in barracks
Federal Republic of Germany	Conscripts and single men until their 25th year are required to live in	All may live in barracks who wish to

Table K. 1. (a), (b) (continued)

Country	Categories of service personnel required to live in barracks	Categories of service personnel who may live in barracks
Italy	Privates, corporals, single sergeants and master sergeants, officers in charge of a depot, and corps commandants are required to live in	No one is excluded from living in barracks, but there is a limitation because of lack of space
Luxembourg	Other ranks are required to live in	Single officers and NCOs may live in
Norway	Enlisted men are required to live in	All ranks may live in
Turkey	Enlisted men	Enlisted men (?)
United Kingdom	Most unmarried personnel are required to live in	Any married personnel temporarily separated may live in
United States	Unmarried enlisted men and officers below pay grade 04 are required to live in	Officers pay grade 04 and above may live in

Table K. 3. (a), (b), (c)

Country	Are married quarters provided ?	Are married personnel required to occupy married quarters ?	Is a reduction made from pay for rent of married quarters ?
Belgium	Yes — for some, on the basis of need and availability	Answer not clear, but seems to be "no"	Yes, except in Germany
Canada	Yes, for both male and female personnel	Yes	Yes
Denmark	No	No	No
France	Yes. No distinction between male and female personnel	No, except when a post has an official residence attached to it	No. The rent is paid by the occupants to the organisation ( <i>société</i> ) responsible for their management
Federal Republic of Germany	No	n. a.	n. a.
Ireland	Yes for males, no for females	No	Yes
Italy	Generally not, i.e. married quarters are only provided in some places	No	Yes
Luxembourg	No, but some accommodation is available for married NCOs	No	Yes, rent is paid (not clear whether this is deducted from pay)
Norway	Yes	Yes	Yes
Turkey	Yes	Yes	Yes
United Kingdom	Yes for males, no for females	No	Yes
United States	Yes, for both males and females to the extent available	Yes	Forfeiture of quarters allowance

### L. Leave and hours of duty

#### Question

L. 1. (a) Do the regulations recognise fixed working hours and working weeks in the armed forces in peacetime? If so, how many hours and days in the working week?

(b) If personnel are officially deemed to be available at any time, what in practice is the normal working week in hours and days?

#### Answer

L. 1. Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway and Turkey answered that the regulations recognised fixed working hours and/or weeks in the armed forces in peacetime. These were as follows (all three services unless otherwise indicated):

*Denmark*: 8 hours 33 minutes per day  $\times$  5 days per week.

*Italy*: (Army) 44 hours  $\times$  6 days.

(Navy and air force) 40 hours  $\times$  6 days.

*Luxembourg*: 40 hours for officers and NCOs officially, but in fact considerable variations; other ranks get compensated for hours worked over this figure by being excused some other duties.

*Norway*: Officers and NCOs: 42 ½ hours per week; conscripts: 45.

*Turkey*: At least 7 hours per day  $\times$  6 days per week.

The other countries reported that although personnel are officially deemed to be available at any time, in practice the normal working week in hours and/or days was as follows:

*Belgium*: 41 ½ hours  $\times$  5 days.

*Canada*: 40 hours  $\times$  5 days.

*France*: 42 ½ hours  $\times$  5 days (calculated in accordance with the civil service). There are exceptions for certain branches, i.e. the *gendarmerie*.

*Federal Republic of Germany*: 50 hours  $\times$  6 days.

*Ireland*: 44 ½ hours  $\times$  6 days.

*United Kingdom*: Reported only that the working week "varied considerably".

*United States*: (Army) 44 hours  $\times$  5 days (in normal circumstances).

(Navy) anything from 40 hours to 74 hours (for ship at sea).

(Air force) normal 40 hours  $\times$  5 days, up to 72 hours  $\times$  6 days in emergency, or war.

#### Question

L. 2. For each rank and category, what is the basis of working days per civil year for calculating leave? Is the number of days' leave increased in accordance with rank, number of years' service or age and, if so, after how many years, and how many extra days' leave are granted?

#### Answer

L. 2. Six of the countries (Canada, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Norway and Turkey) did not answer the part of the question which asked what was the basis of working days per civil year for the calculation of leave. Belgium replied that it calculated by the civil year and civil calendar month, Germany by the calendar year, Ireland and the United Kingdom simply replied "365 days", and Italy "the solar year". The United States reported that working days per year were not a factor in calculating leave. Set out below are the other factors which were reported as determining the calculation of leave for the different countries.

*Belgium*: Leave is fixed by category, not by rank or seniority, e.g. one category for officers, another for *sous-officiers*, *caporaux* and *soldats* (regular), a third for conscripts.

*Canada*: For all ranks and ages, 20 working days for less than 5 years' service; 25 working days for 5 years and over.

*Denmark* : For all except conscripts, 20 working days, not affected by age, rank or seniority.

*France* : 45 days, not affected by age, rank, or seniority.

*Federal Republic of Germany* : Leave dependent on age and rank, but not seniority.

	To 30th year	To 40th year	After 40th year
<i>Grenadier to Stabsunteroffiziere . . .</i>	21 days	26 days	30 days
<i>For Feldwebel to Oberleutnant . . .</i>	24 days	27 days	32 days
<i>For Hauptmann to Oberstleutnant</i>	26 days	31 days	33 days
<i>Above Oberstleutnant . . . . .</i>	—	33 days	36 days

*Ireland* : Differences according to rank, and for other ranks, by service ; not by age or seniority.

Other ranks : 18 days for army ; 21 days for naval service.

Officers : up to captain, 30 days ; above captain, 42 days.

*Italy* : Different leave periods for regulars and short-service personnel ; no increase for rank or age, but increase for seniority.

Regulars : 30 days' basic, with increases after 10 years' service to 40 days, after 25 years' service to 45 days.

Short-service personnel : 15 days.

*Luxembourg* : Basic leave periods calculated on age, not on rank or years served. There is supplementary leave of 8 days for all regulars, 6 days for those who are war invalids or invalids resulting from accidents in the course of duty, or those physically partially disabled.

#### *Basic leave periods*

Personnel under 18 : 24 days  
 over 18 : 18 days  
 over 30 : 21 days  
 over 42 : 24 days  
 over 50 : 26 days

*Norway* : Neither age, seniority, nor rank affects the calculation. 4 weeks for all regulars, except those serving on board ships, who receive 5 weeks. Conscripts receive 1 day per month served ; service varies from 12 to 15 months.

*Turkey* : 30 days' leave per year for all personnel ; does not change with rank.

*United Kingdom* : For the navy and air force, the leave period does not change with either rank, age, or years served. No figure for leave period given for these 2 services. For the army, the maximum number of days' leave by rank was given, although all were at the commanding officer's discretion.

Private up to corporal : 30 days.

Sergeant up to subaltern : 42 days.

Captains and above are at present limited to 42 days.

(But majors and above are theoretically entitled to 56 days.)

*United States* : Leave is calculated for all ranks regardless of years served or age, on the basis of 2 ½ days per month of active duty.

#### *Question*

L. 3. What special leave may be granted (e.g. for marriage, funerals, public holidays, sickness, etc.) ?

*Answer*

## L. 3. Special leave is as follows :

*Belgium* : Leave may be given for urgent reasons requiring the presence of the member of the armed forces with his family, e.g. death of a parent or relative, 4 days, 2 days, or 1 day ; serious illness, accident of parent or relative, 4 days or more ; confinement of wife, 4 days ; marriage of the serviceman or his child, his parent or relative, 4, 2 or 1 day(s) respectively ; ordination or entrance of child into convent, 1 day ; end of career leave, 3 months. Also, exceptional leave is given to conscripts for exams, or a serious personal or family situation requiring a long absence.

*Canada* : 12 public holidays ; compassionate and sick leave as required.

*Denmark* : Special leave may be granted, normal maximum 1 week.

*France* : Exceptional permission is given for conscripts only, for 3 days' leave.

*Federal Republic of Germany* : "Side leave", leave for important personal and family affairs ; special leave may be granted for some other important occasions.

*Ireland* : 3 days for serious illness or death of immediate relative ; 14 days to participate in an international athletics contest ; to attend examinations of the Department of Education ; public and army holidays (11 days).

*Italy* : Special leave may be granted for : exceptional personal reasons ; death or serious illness of parents, or immediate family ; marriage ; convalescence ; military or State examinations ; medical care ; transfer ; retirement ; after long service abroad ; before going abroad for service.

*Luxembourg* : Special leave may be granted for : marriage, 6 days ; confinement of spouse, 2 days ; marriage of child, 6 days ; decease of spouse, parent, or close relative, 3 days ; decease of sister or brother, 3 days ; decease of relative, 1 day ;

moving, 2 days ; adoption of a child, 1 day.

*Norway* : Welfare leave of different kinds.

*Turkey* : 15 days.

*United Kingdom* : A variety of forms of leave, according to circumstances.

*United States* : Emergency leave "charged to member's leave account", granted for family emergencies requiring member's presence.

*Question*

L. 4. What provision is made for maternity leave for female personnel ? Are pregnant female personnel placed on the non-active list ?

*Answer*

L. 4. For Belgium, Germany, Italy, Norway, and Turkey this question was not applicable. Luxembourg reported that for its female personnel (who are not subject to the *Statut des Militaires*), there was 3 months' maternity leave.

All who answered the second part of the question said that women were not placed on a non-active list. The details of leave are given below :

*Canada* : Female personnel are given maternity leave without pay, but are eligible for federal unemployment benefits.

*Denmark* : 14 weeks in all.

*France* : The general rule is 14 weeks.

*Ireland* : At present, no maternity leave. However, the question is under review since the marriage bar has recently been eliminated.

*United Kingdom* : No maternity leave.

*United States* : The army grants convalescent leave. For the navy and air force, ordinary leave chargeable to member's leave account.

*Question*

L. 5. Is compensation granted in respect of leave not taken? If so, in what form?

*Answer*

L. 5. Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy Luxembourg, Turkey and the United Kingdom replied that no compensation is granted in respect of leave not taken.

Canada replied "no" but permitted the carrying over of leave until retirement.

The United States replied "yes", and permits the carrying over of base pay and allowances (for up to 60 days), to the end of military service. For enlisted men, this carry-over would be to the end of each enlistment period.

France replied "no", but reported the possibility of accumulating leave not taken during a stay overseas, and taking it later.

Norway and Denmark replied that compensation is granted in the form of money, or leave the next year.

*Question*

L. 6. Apart from ordinary and exceptional leave, is it possible to take unpaid leave?

*Answer*

L. 6. Italy and Turkey reported that it was not possible to take unpaid leave. Germany reported that it was generally not possible.

All other countries reported that personnel could take unpaid leave. Some specified further details, which are given below.

*Belgium*: A minimum of 3 months at a time, maximum of 12 months in the course of a career.

*France*: Only in certain particular circumstances.

*Norway*: After 10 years' service, a maximum of 4 years' unpaid leave.

*Question*

L. 7. May military personnel spend their leave abroad without permission from the authorities?

*Answer*

L. 7. None of the countries gave an unqualified "yes" to this question. All, in effect, made asking permission a requirement for visits to certain countries (only Germany specified Soviet bloc countries). Furthermore, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Turkey and the United States require their military personnel to get permission to spend their leave anywhere abroad.

*Question*

L. 8. Can service personnel take paid leave for refresher courses and, if so, after how many years' service? Are allowances still payable during this period and, if so, which?

*Answer*

L. 8. Denmark, France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States in some way permitted service personnel to take paid leave for refresher courses, for the details of which see below. All other countries did not allow this procedure.

*Denmark*: This is allowed when ordered by the authorities, and normal allowances are paid, plus extra expenses.

*France*: In principle, regular personnel with a certain degree of seniority are allowed to go on refresher courses. Allowances which are normally part of their pay are payable.

*Turkey*: Personnel may go on such courses after 10 years on active duty. (No mention of allowances.)

*United Kingdom*: It was reported that it "depends on the course".

*United States*: In general, a member of the armed services could attend a refresher course at a civilian institution while on "leave status", without regard to length of service. Basic pay, and quarters and subsistence allowances would continue, so long as covered by the accrued leave. However, there is no programme whereby attendance of such refresher courses is encouraged, or otherwise supported.

### M. Legal rights

#### Question

- M. 1. What right of appeal have service personnel if they feel they have been unjustly treated?
- (a) Within the military structure?
  - (b) In non-military juridical bodies?
  - (c) In other mediating bodies (e.g. "Ombudsman" or "Wehrbeauftragter")?

#### Answer

M. 1. (a), (b) and (c) Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany and Norway answered "yes" to all three sections of this question. Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States answered "yes" to only sections (a) and (b), and Ireland and Luxembourg answered "yes" to only section (a). Turkey did not answer. For full details of each country's replies, see below.

*Belgium* : (a) All personnel who have a grievance or complaint to make about a decision which concerns them can appeal through the military structure to the authority who made the decision. Senior officers can ask to be heard by the Minister of National Defence, junior officers by the army corps commander, NCOs by the divisional commander, and others by their commanding officer (*chef de corps*).

(b) All military personnel can appeal to civil tribunals in respect of their civil rights, as can any citizen. However, it is military personnel who must bear the onus of showing proof of injustice; and therefore must show that the responsible authority made a mistake and further, that there is a causal connection between the administrative fault and the injustice suffered.

(c) The *Conseil d'Etat* (which has no juridical standing) can annul or overrule the acts and rulings of the administrative authorities or their disputed decisions, for violation of limited or major procedures, as well as for exceeding or abusing their powers.

*Canada* : (a) Every person who has been tried and found guilty by a court martial has a statutory right of appeal in respect of any or all of the following : the severity of the sentence, the

legality of any or all of the findings, or the legality of the whole or any part of the sentence.

(b) Apart from appeals arising out of court martial, an officer or man who considers that he has suffered any personal oppression, injustice, or other ill treatment, or that he has any other cause for grievance, may as a matter of statutory right seek redress from the superior authorities prescribed in regulations made by the governor in council, (the highest federal government executive authority). Further, any appeal relating to legality of the findings or sentence of a court martial is required by statute to be referred to the court martial appeal court, consisting of not less than four judges of the federal court of Canada. From this level, appeal is to the supreme court of Canada.

(c) If a grievance, having been submitted, does not receive redress, it may be submitted in writing to the Minister of National Defence, who shall, if the complaint require him to, submit the complaint to the governor in council.

*Denmark* : (a) Rights of appeal go up through the normal channels of command and personnel organisation, both at a local level and at higher echelons up to the Ministry of Defence. National service personnel may also appeal to the Minister of Defence's board for complaints.

(b) Cases can be submitted to civilian courts for trial.

(c) Like all citizens, military personnel can have a case tried by the *Ombudsman*. (There is no special *Ombudsman* for the military.)

*France* : (a) Personnel have rights of appeal through the military structure.

(b) They also have right of appeal to civil or administrative tribunals, according to the general principles of French law.

(c) They may also appeal to a mediator.

*Federal Republic of Germany* : (a) Personnel may appeal according to the military regulations for making complaints.

(b) They also have unrestricted right of appeal to civil bodies, like any other citizen,

according to the basic law.

(c) Appeals to "*Wehrbeauftragter*".

*Ireland* : (a) Appeal to the Minister of Defence. (This was the only right of appeal specified in the answer.)

*Italy* : (a) Service personnel have a right of appeal within the military structure.

(b) They may also appeal to civil bodies

(c) n.a.

*Luxembourg* : (a) Service personnel have the right of appeal to the military authorities and to ministerial level. (No other right of appeal specified.)

*Norway* : (a) Service personnel have the right of appeal to higher military authorities or the Ministry of Defence. Promotion matters may be appealed to parliament.

(b) If accused of a "punishable offence", personnel can bring the case to a civil court.

(c) Appeal to the *Ombudsman*.

*Turkey* : Turkey did not answer this question.

*United Kingdom* : (a) There is a statutory right of appeal to the superior authorities in the services if personnel think themselves wronged in any matter.

(b) Members of the forces may only appeal to non-military judicial bodies in certain limited and prescribed circumstances. Mainly these are when they feel their fundamental rights as citizens, rather than as members of the services, are affected.

(c) n.a.

*United States* : (a) Service personnel have the right of appeal within the military structure.

(b) They also may appeal to civil bodies.

(c) n.a.

### Question

M. 2. (a) Is membership of an organisation representative of military personnel ("trades unions") prohibited? permitted? compulsory?

(b) Where such organisations exist what is the proportion of military personnel who are members? (Give separately proportion of officers and of other ranks.)

Are such organisations open equally to officers and other ranks, or do separate organisations exist?

(See also F. 5. (a) on pay)

### Answer

M. 2. Membership of an organisation representative of military personnel ("trades union") was not given as compulsory by any country. It was permitted in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg and Norway, and prohibited in Canada, France, Ireland, Italy and Turkey. In the case of the United States membership is allowed, but the military services and commanders are not permitted either to recognise or to bargain with them. The United Kingdom did not answer the question in such a way as to make it possible to ascertain whether such an organisation is permitted or prohibited. (It was stated that "No such organisation exists".)

For those States that answered that such organisations are permitted, details are given below.

*Belgium* : There are different organisations for several different groups of military personnel. Those that are recognised are : for officers, *le Syndicat Belge des Officiers* (SBO) ; for NCOs, (1) *le Syndicat National des Sous-Officiers* (SNS) and (2) *l'Union Professionnelle des Sous-Officiers de Belgique* (UPSOB) ; for corporals and soldiers, *le Syndicat National des Militaires* (SNM) ; for members of the *gendarmerie*, *le Syndicat National du Personnel de la Gendarmerie* (SNPGd). None of these organisations is obliged to inform the military authorities of the number of their members, and so the percentage belonging to them cannot be provided.

*Denmark* : 98 % of career officers and officers on a long-service contract, and 92 % of career other ranks and other ranks on short-service contract, belong to such organisations. However, there are fourteen separate but co-operating organisations for officers, and one main organisa-

tion, with several sub-organisations, representing other ranks.

*Federal Republic of Germany* : No percentages are given, but such organisations are open equally to officers and other ranks.

*Luxembourg* : There are different organisations for officers and other ranks, and participation is estimated at 65 % for officers and 95 % for other ranks.

*Norway* : 90 % of officers and 70 % of other ranks belong to such organisations, of which some are exclusively for officers, and some for all ranks except conscripts.

*United States* : There are no restrictions on military personnel being members of organisations which purport to represent servicemen. There are numerous associations of service members which support the interests of their members' welfare, and express opinions on matters of defence policy. There are, however, no officially recognised servicemen's unions.

#### RÔLE OF WOMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES

A complete analysis of the utilisation of women in the armed forces is not possible in this study because of the limited material available. The questionnaire provided factual information on pay and conditions of service, but tended to reveal very little about such things as career opportunities, job satisfaction, etc. Because of this we have used some other sources of information which were available to us<sup>1</sup>, which were particularly helpful for American attitudes; if similar material were available for the other countries, a more complete analysis would be possible.

The United States and the United Kingdom have utilised women as members of their armed services continuously since World War I, and would appear to have done so on a larger scale than the other countries included in this study. At the end of World War II, which was the peak point in the utilisation of women, the United Kingdom had 437,000 women or 8.5 %

of its total forces, and the United States 265,000 women or 2.18 %<sup>1</sup>. After the war, the numbers fell (e.g. in 1955, 2.4 % of the United Kingdom forces were women, and 1.27 % of the American forces), but when both countries went for an all-volunteer force they increased their recruitment of women significantly.

Those countries which now have women in their armed services are Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. In Ireland, women are enrolled as nurses and paramedical personnel in the army nursing service; information on their conditions of service has been included in this analysis where it is relevant. It appears that in 1955 Turkey introduced women into its regular forces and trained some as officers<sup>2</sup>, but from the Turkish reply to the questionnaire one must conclude that there are no longer any women in the Turkish forces.

In none of these countries do women serve as conscripts, and reserve service is not open to them in Denmark and the Netherlands. The pattern of service which is open to women, therefore, is as career or short-service personnel in Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, and as reserve personnel in Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Service in the Irish army nursing service is on a career basis only.

1. Nancy Goldman: "Recent trends in the utilisation of women by the armed forces of NATO countries", a paper read to the British Inter-University Seminar for the Armed Forces and Society, University of Hull, April 1974.

*Commanders Digest* (a publication of the United States Department of Defence), XIV, 8th November 1973.

Lt. Commander Beth F. Coye and others, "Is there room for women in navy management: An attitudinal survey", *Naval War College Review*, XXV, January-February 1973, pages 69-87.

Report of the Secretary of Defence, James R. Schlesinger, to the Congress, 4th March 1974.

1. Goldman, page 2.

2. Goldman, page 5.

Service regulations and legal status are virtually the same for men and women in all the countries, and in theory at least women may serve in all ranks (though Denmark is only beginning to train women officers in 1974-75). Specific differences in conditions of pay and service are discussed under the headings of the questionnaire, but two important differences of a general nature should be noted: women are not allowed to serve in combat or combat-related posts, and in some countries women are organised in separate units (corps or services).

Women in the Canadian armed force do not serve in a separate corps, but are fully integrated; they serve in selected military occupational classifications (officers) and trades (other ranks). They are precluded from serving in combat classifications/trades, or at sea, or in isolated posts.

Women in France and Britain are organised in separate women's corps, except for the medical (non-nursing) branches, where they are integrated. In France, nurses also serve on an integrated basis, but in Britain they are organised into separate units. In neither country may women serve in combat positions. It has been stated that the presence of women in the French services, except for the medical and nursing services, is to be considered an experiment until 1975, and that women may command other women, but not men<sup>1</sup>, but the French reply to the questionnaire gave no indication of these points.

Women in the Netherlands are organised into separate corps, though they may serve on an integrated basis. Moreover in the future, as a result of the Netherlands having ratified the convention of New York on the political rights of women, all positions in the three services will in principle be open to women, except for most of the combat positions and jobs on board ships.

The Irish army nursing service is, as the name implies, a separate corps. Denmark did not specify whether women serve on an integrated basis or are organised into separate units.

1. Goldman, page 4.

In the United States army, women (except medical personnel) are enlisted or commissioned in the women's army corps, but they are trained and assigned on a fully integrated basis. There are no separate women's corps in the navy, air force, or marines. Combat and combat-related jobs are closed by law to women, although the United States navy now has a hospital ship, the USS Sanctuary, with a mixed crew.

The proportion of posts open to men that are also open to women is not easily comparable, as the different countries calculated the figures in different ways<sup>1</sup>. The number of women in the armed services is low. In Canada, women represent 5% (approximately 4,150) of strength, in the Netherlands 0.8% (approximately 900), in the United Kingdom 4.1% (approximately 14,800), and in the United States 2.8% (approximately 60,000). Women in Denmark represent 1.5% of the non-conscript force. The overall percentage of women in the French forces was not available, but they do represent 1.24% of the non-conscript navy, 6.68% of the non-conscript army, and 5.60% of the non-conscript air force. Canada is taking measures to increase the number of women in the service to 10% of overall strength, and the United States plans to more than double the number of women in uniform to have at least 130,000 by 1978<sup>2</sup>.

So long as women are not permitted to serve in combat and combat-related areas it is unlikely that their numbers will be greatly increased, in spite of the fact that women could provide an important source of personnel, particularly in those countries which do not have conscription<sup>3</sup>. The reasons given by the Americans for this limitation of numbers are probably applicable in the other countries as well. As the Americans see it, it is necessary to have a sufficient number of jobs in the United States to which military men can be assigned in between overseas and at-sea assignments; and it is necessary to retain a high capability to react in emergencies — military men in support-type

1. See the analysis of A. 3. (c) and (d).

2. Schlesinger report, page 189.

3. For example, the American Army more than met its recruitment goals for women in late 1973, but fell short of its goals for men. Goldman, page 4.

jobs can be quickly reassigned to fighting units and deployed overseas<sup>1</sup>.

In spite of this determination to exclude women from combat-type jobs and therefore limit their numbers, the United States has pushed ahead with its goal to make military and civilian service in the Department of Defence a model of opportunity "regardless of race, sex, creed or national origin"<sup>2</sup>. The basic concept, according to the director of the women's army corps, is that "women are completely equal with men and can do everything men can — while recognising that there are practical limitations to this assumption and some valid constraints"<sup>3</sup>. Or, according to the air force philosophy, "all policies and procedures should be the same for men and women unless there is a legal or rational basis for difference"<sup>4</sup>. Thus while the number of women to be enlisted or commissioned in the United States forces remains limited, they may now serve in most job categories. Only 48 of 482 military occupational specialities in the enlisted job spectrum are closed to women in the WAC because they are combat or combat-related positions<sup>5</sup>. In the air force only three (pilot training, navigation, missile operations) officer career fields are closed to women, and five enlisted fields<sup>6</sup>. In the navy, women may serve in all posts which are not combat-related, while in the marines 28 out of 39 occupational fields are open to women<sup>7</sup>. This means that in the army and navy women may now train as pilots (but not in the air force, where all personnel must be combat qualified in order to permit maximum assignment flexibility); women in the services are also to be found training as parachutists, military police, chaplains, etc.

1. Secretary of Defence Laird, report on the all-volunteer force, August 1972, in *Commanders Digest*, pages 2-3.

2. Secretary of Defence Richardson, statement to Congress for FY 1974, 10th April 1973, in *Commanders Digest*, page 3.

3. *Commanders Digest*, page 5.

4. *Ibid.*, page 11.

5. *Ibid.*, page 5.

6. *Ibid.*, page 12.

7. *Ibid.*, page 15.

Specific differences in the conditions of service for men and women in the various countries, following the format of the questionnaire, are given below.

#### *B.I. Recruitment, officers*

(The replies to this section were not applicable to Ireland, where women serve only as nurses or paramedicals.)

In Canada and Denmark, the same conditions for the recruitment of men and women apply.

In France, the maximum age for female officer recruits is 40, whereas for men it varies. In addition, women are trained for a shorter period of time — one year — before appointment to first rank, whereas men are trained for one to two years.

In the Netherlands, the conditions of recruitment for women officers vary in several respects from those for men; all except the age restriction appear to make it easier for women to be recruited. In respect of age, the minimum age for women is stated to be variable, whereas it is 17 for men; the maximum age is 30 for women and 40 for men. (However, in actual fact, both vary according to the service.) For women, exceptions may be made to the rule that recruits must be single.

The two-year period of engagement offered to career women officers is much shorter than that offered to men, who must agree to serve for seven or ten years. There are no special conditions for women trainees, whereas conditions relating to allowances and marital status are applied to men; nor are there special conditions for recruiting women personnel for specialist careers, whereas men must have a university degree. Women undergo a much shorter training period (two to twenty months) than do men (three years for navy career officers, four years for army and air force career officers) before appointment to first rank; in fact the training

period for career women is the same as that for short-service male officers. Finally, women are not admitted to the naval and military academies, which male career officers must attend.

In the United Kingdom, the conditions of recruitment are the same except for age: the minimum age for women is 18, and for men it is 17 ½.

In the United States, conditions of recruitment are the same except for periods of engagement; women may opt for engagements of two to four years, depending on the programme, while men may opt for periods of two to five years.

#### B. II. Recruitment, other ranks

Only Canada reported that conditions of recruitment for male and female other ranks were exactly the same. Denmark, Netherlands and the United Kingdom reported differences in age limits. In Denmark, the minimum age for women is 18 and the maximum age is 26; the respective ages for men are 16 and 29. The minimum age for women recruits in the Netherlands is 17 and the maximum age is 30; the ages for men are 16 and 24 (though in fact both vary according to the service). In the United Kingdom, the minimum age is 17 for women and 16 for men.

Both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom reported differences in the periods of engagement offered to men and women. In the Netherlands, women other ranks enlist for two years, whereas men enlist for six years (career) or one to eight years (short-service). In the United Kingdom, the period of maximum engagement for women is six years, whereas men can sign on initially for a longer period of service, thereby qualifying for a slightly higher initial rate of basic pay.

The only difference reported by France was in the area of qualifications for specialists: nurses must have a State nursing diploma.

In the United States army, navy, and marines, women other ranks with dependants are treated differently from men with dependants. These services accept married women without dependants on waiver only; no such condition is imposed on men. The air force accepts married women with dependants.

#### C. Promotion

In Canada, women officers fill ranks ranging from officer cadet through colonel, and the full range of ranks in the NCO and other ranks category. No figures are available for the average age each rank is achieved, and the years spent in each rank.

In Denmark, the training of women officers is only beginning in 1974-75. In the NCO and other ranks category, no figures are given for average age/years spent in each rank in the army and navy. In the air force, women serve as lance-corporal 2nd class and private 1st class; the average time spent in each rank and the average age each rank is reached are the same for women as for men.

In France, women officers in the navy fill ranks from *sous-lieutenant* through *général de brigade*; in the other ranks category they serve in the ranks of sergeant, *sergeant-chef*, *adjudant*, and *adjudant-chef*. No figures are available for the time spent in each rank and the average age each rank is achieved. In the army and air force, women officers fill ranks from *sous-lieutenant* through *général de brigade*; in the NCO and other ranks category they serve in the whole range of ranks (from *soldat* to *adjudant-chef*). No figures are available on the time spent in each rank, and the average age each rank is reached.

In the Netherlands navy, women serve from *officier Marva 3 klasse* through *hoofdofficier Marva 2 klasse*; the average age each rank is reached, and the number of years spent in each rank are shown in the accompanying Table I, along with the equivalent figures for men. In navy other ranks, women serve from *Marva 3 klasse* through *sergeant-majoor Marva*. As army officers, women serve from *2 luitenant* through *majoor*, and as air force officers from *2 luitenant/vaandrig*

through *lt.-kolonel*. The average age each rank is reached and the number of years spent in each rank are shown in Table I, together with the equivalent figures for men. As army and air force NCOs and other ranks, women serve in the full range of ranks, spend the same average time in each rank as do men and reach it at the same average age as do men.

In the United Kingdom navy, women officers have a separate rank structure ; they serve from 3rd officers through commandant (roughly equivalent to commodore). In the army, women officers serve from 2nd lieutenant through brigadier. In the air force, they serve from pilot officer through air commodore. In the NCO and other ranks category of all three services women serve in the full range of ranks. No figures are available for the time spent in each rank and the average age each rank is achieved.

Table I — Netherlands

Women Rank	Average		Men Rank	Average	
	Years	Age		Years	Age
<b>NAVY OFFICERS</b>					
<i>Officier Marva 3 klasse</i>	3	20	<i>Luitenant ter zee 3 klasse</i>	2	21
<i>Officier Marva 2 klasse (jongste categorie)</i>	8	23	<i>Luitenant ter zee 2 klasse (jongste categorie)</i>	3	23
<i>Officier Marva 2 klasse (oudste categorie)</i>	10	31	<i>Luitenant ter zee 2 klasse (oudste categorie)</i>	7	26
<i>Officier Marva 1 klasse</i>	—	—	<i>Luitenant ter zee 1 klasse</i>	9	33
<i>Hooftofficier Marva 2 klasse</i>	9	41	<i>Kapitein-luitenant ter zee</i>	4	42
			<i>Kapitein ter zee</i>	5	46
			<i>Commandeur</i>	—	—
			<i>Schout-bij-nacht</i>	2	51
			<i>Vice-admiraal</i>	3	53
<b>NAVY OTHER RANKS</b>					
<i>Marva 3 klasse</i>	1½	17	<i>Matroos 3 klasse</i>	1½	17
<i>Marva 2 klasse</i>	2	18	<i>Matroos 2 klasse</i>	2	18
<i>Marva 1 klasse</i>	2	19	<i>Matroos 1 klasse</i>	4	19
<i>Korporaal-Marva</i>	4	21	<i>Korporaal</i>	8	23
<i>Sergeant-Marva</i>	14	25	<i>Sergeant</i>	9	31
<i>Sergeant-majoor Marva</i>	11	39	<i>Sergeant-majoor</i>	5	40
			<i>Adjutant-onder-officier</i>	11	39

Table I — Netherlands (continued)

Women Rank	Average		Men Rank	Average	
	Years	Age		Years	Age
<b>ARMY OFFICERS</b>					
<i>2 luitenant</i>	5	18	<i>2 luitenant-vaandrig</i>	1	23
<i>1 luitenant</i>	5	23	<i>1 luitenant</i>	4	24
<i>Kapitein</i>	10	33	<i>Kapitein</i>	7	28
<i>Majoor</i>	12	55	<i>Majoor</i>	6-8	34-36
			<i>Lt.-kolonel</i> <i>Kolonel</i> <i>Brigade-generaal</i> <i>General-majoor</i> <i>Luitenant-generaal</i> <i>Generaal</i>	5½-10	40-46 Depending on vacancies ; at least 24 years of service
<b>AIR FORCE OFFICERS</b>					
<i>2 luitenant /vaandrig</i>	1	22	<i>2 luitenant /vaandrig</i>	1	24
<i>1 luitenant</i>	6	28	<i>1 luitenant</i>	4	25
<i>Kapitein</i>	11	39	<i>Kapitein</i>	8	29
<i>Majoor</i>	9	48	<i>Majoor</i>	9	37
<i>Lt.-kolonel</i> (depending on vacancies)	At least 2	50	<i>Lt.-kolonel</i> <i>Commodore</i> <i>Generaal-majoor</i> <i>Lt.-generaal</i>	depend- ing on vacan- cies	At least 2 52 52 —

Table II — United States

Women Pay grade	Average		Men Pay grade	Average	
	Years	Age		Years	Age
<b>NAVY OTHER RANKS</b>					
E-9	5.1	44.9	E-9	3.6	42.3
E-8	3	41.1	E-8	2.9	39.2
E-7	5.5	39.8	E-7	2.2	37.1
E-6	4.3	32.4	E-6	4.1	33.1
E-5	1.7	24.8	E-5	6.7	27
E-4	0.9	22.5	E-4	3.5	22.7
E-3	0.7	21.5	E-3	1.1	21.3
E-2	0.4	20.6	E-2	1.3	22.2
E-1	0.2	20	E-1	0.4	19.7

Table II — United States (continued)

Women Pay grade	Average		Men Pay grade	Average	
	Years	Age		Years	Age
<b>AIR FORCE OTHER RANKS</b>					
E-9	3.9	41.5	E-9	3.7	45
E-8	2.4	39.2	E-8	2.8	40.6
E-7	3.2	37.9	E-7	2.9	38.2
E-6	3.3	34.8	E-6	3	35
E-5	1.8	24.5	E-5	3.3	28.2
E-4	1.1	21.6	E-4	1.2	21.9
E-3	0.7	19.5	E-3	0.7	19.5
E-2	0.3	18.8	E-2	0.3	18.8
E-1	0.2	18.5	E-1	0.2	18.5

In the United States air force and navy, women officers serve in the full range of ranks, spend the same average time in each rank as do men, and reach it at the same average age. (In the navy, however, flag rank is at the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy; it is conferred for a particular position and the rank is retained only while the woman occupies that position.) Women army officers serve in the full range of ranks, but figures are not available on the number of years spent in each rank, and the average age at which each rank is reached. In the other ranks category of all three services, women serve in the full range of pay grades. Figures on years of service and average age for the army are not available; for the navy and air force they are given in Table II, together with those for men. The circumstances do not differ greatly.

As for the other aspects of promotion, Canada, Denmark (including officers when training starts), France and the United Kingdom report that the same conditions for promotion apply to both men and women. Somewhat different conditions apply to women in the Netherlands and American services. The question is not applicable to Ireland.

In the Netherlands, three questions in this section were said to be not applicable to women. These are, the completion of a specific in-service training programme for promotion to a higher rank; the effect of university qualifications on promotion prospects; and attendance at staff college for promotion to general rank (there are no women generals). Finally, the limit of normal promotion for women is *majoor* or equivalent, whereas for men it is *lt.-kolonel*.

In the United States, women officers are required to have a university degree for their initial appointment, which is true of most — but not all — men. Women are not accepted into the military academies or combat arms schools. In the other ranks category, a higher standard of education is required from women: all must be high school graduates and in mental categories I, II and III (average or above)<sup>1</sup>; the standard for men is that 55% must be high school graduates and 82% in mental categories I, II and III<sup>2</sup>.

1. Goldman, page 6.

2. Schlesinger report, pages 177, 175.

The biggest difference in the promotion of men and women in the American services is that women officers in the army, navy and marine corps by law compete only among themselves for promotion, and have a separate promotion list and separate quotas<sup>1</sup>. This law was designed to protect women officers: it was seen that as women would be denied the opportunity to work in the great majority of military occupational specialities, to participate in some of the training and to hold certain types of jobs, it would be unfair to force them to compete with men for promotion. Despite the great changes in the conditions of women's service since this law was enacted — particularly the fact that most military occupational specialities are now open to women — it would be wrong, in the opinion of the WAC director, to change this law until all women officers have been exposed to exactly the same training and have exactly the same opportunities as men.

By contrast, enlisted personnel in the three services compete with men on an equal basis, as do women officers in the air force.

#### *D. I. Termination of service (officers)*

Grounds for termination of service are the same for men and women in the Canadian forces and in the Danish army and air force. Conditions for men and women in the other countries are virtually the same, but with a few exceptions which are given below.

Women enrolled in the Irish nursing service receive a pension for premature retirement or resignation after twenty years' service; male regular officers receive a pension after twelve years. Women also receive a gratuity after one year's service on retirement for marriage, a bonus which men do not get. (In fact, men cannot resign after only one year of service.)

1. *Commanders Digest*, page 7.

In both France and the Netherlands, women do not receive a bonus at the end of a contracted period of service, whereas men do. Moreover in the Netherlands no provision is made for the rehabilitation or training of female short-service personnel for a civilian post; such provision is made for male short-service personnel.

In the United Kingdom the same conditions apply to both men and women, except that pregnancy is grounds for dismissal or termination of service. Also, women receive lower rates of gratuity than do men when they are transferred to the reserve, discharged, or resign.

In the United States, the same conditions apply to both men and women, except that pregnancy is grounds for dismissal or termination of service.

#### *D. II. Termination of service (other ranks)*

The grounds and conditions for the termination of service of other ranks are the same as they are for officers, except that the question is not applicable to Ireland and that in the United States, while pregnancy is grounds for dismissal or termination of service for officers, among other ranks a waiver may be requested to remain in the services.

#### *E. Reserve service*

Canada and France replied that the same conditions of reserve service and pay apply to women as to men. They are also the same in the United Kingdom and the United States, except that women's service in the reserve is always voluntary, whereas it may be compulsory for men in some circumstances. Women cannot serve in the reserve in Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands.

#### *F. Pay*

Pay for male and female personnel is the same in Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands and the United States.

In Ireland, pay for nurses is related to rates payable to nurses employed in public health

board hospitals, and pay increases or changes in the basic pay structure are agreed through negotiations with the Irish nursing organisation. While this is exclusive to the army nursing service, the only part of the Irish services to employ women, it is worth noting that these procedures are similar to those used to establish the pay of male professionals in the services.

The United Kingdom alone pays slightly lower rates of pay to female personnel. At present women receive 91.4 % of men's salary, though this difference is to be eliminated by 29th December 1975, except for the "X" factor which compensates personnel for the unsocial hours, danger, and other peculiarities of military life. It was recently reported that as of 1st April 1974 the factor is 10 % for men and 5 % for women<sup>1</sup>. (Up to this time it was 5 % for men and 1 % for women.)

#### G. Allowances

Generally the same system of allowances is applicable to both men and women in all the countries, except for the uniform allowance and/or the long-service allowance.

In Canada, the uniform allowance is \$8 per month for women and \$7 for men.

In Denmark and France, all allowances are the same for both men and women. (The uniform allowance for women in France is related to the uniform allowance for the navy and *gendarmérie*, rather than to that for the army and air force.)

Women in the Netherlands receive a uniform allowance of \$71 after ten years' service; men receive \$106.50 after six years' service.

Women in the United States receive a uniform allowance of \$7.80 to \$11.10 per month; men receive \$5.10 to \$7.80.

1. *The Economist*, 1st June 1974, page 24.

Women in the United Kingdom benefit from more favourable conditions in the payment of the long-service allowance. Women receive this allowance after three years' service and at a higher rate than do men, who receive it only after nine years' service.

Of those allowances which were applicable to Irish nurses, the long-service and uniform allowances were different for men and women. The long-service allowance is larger for women than it is for male other ranks (the only other group to receive it). The uniform allowance for nurses is \$213 at the beginning of the career and \$132 per annum thereafter; for male officers it is \$351 at the beginning of their careers and \$197 per annum thereafter.

#### H. Retirement and pensions

The treatment of women for retirement and pensions is essentially the same as for male personnel, though there are some differences in rates of contribution, years of service, and survivor benefits. Canadian women contribute at a lower rate to the forces pension scheme than do men. The pension contributions of Irish nurses are calculated on a percentage basis rather than as a fixed rate, which is done for men. France and Ireland have different periods of service for men and women to qualify for a pension. French women officers who are mothers may receive a pension after fifteen years' service; men officers receive a pension only after 25 years' service. Irish nurses qualify for a pension after twenty years' service, as opposed to twelve years for officers and 21 years for other ranks.

France and the Netherlands say that pensions are payable to widowers in some circumstances; Canada specified that women's pensions "die" with them. In practice the pensions of Irish nurses "die" with them as at present all are unmarried, though this may change now that the marriage ban has been lifted. Neither Denmark, the United Kingdom nor the United States make it clear whether, by answering the question on

widows'/orphans' pensions in the affirmative, they mean this to apply to widowers as well.

#### *J. Medical and dental care*

The same conditions for men and women apply in Canada, Denmark, France and the Netherlands. We assume this is also true of the United Kingdom and the United States, though in their detailed replies to this section they spoke only in terms of men and their families.

#### *K. Food and accommodation*

All countries except Ireland and the United Kingdom have the same regulations for men and women concerning food and accommodation; the exceptions are that neither Ireland nor the United Kingdom makes married quarters available to female personnel, though they do for men.

#### *L. Leave, hours of duty*

Leave and hours of duty are the same for male and female personnel in all the countries. However, special arrangements are made for maternity leave in Canada, Denmark, France and the Netherlands. Ireland is reconsidering the subject in the light of the fact that the marriage ban has recently been lifted. The United Kingdom makes no provision for maternity leave. The United States army offers convalescent (sick) leave during pregnancy, but the navy and air force make no special provisions. Instead, ordinary leave chargeable to the member's leave account may be taken, which might make combining pregnancy with a continued career in the services rather difficult when one remembers that ordinary leave is 2 ½ days per month of active duty.

#### *M. Legal rights*

Legal rights are the same for male and female personnel in all the countries.

\*\*

Despite the experiences of some countries during World War II when massive use was

made of women, not just by replacing men in civilian industry but also by accepting some hundreds of thousands into the uniformed ranks of their armed services, most of the non-communist world has been slow to realise the full potential of what must be regarded as a relatively untapped military resource. In the 1970s and 1980s it is the resource of manpower which is proving, for the western alliance at least, a very real problem. Manpower costs a great deal more in relative terms as full employment and a rising standard of living become two of the accepted parameters of European defence. Whether personnel in the armed services are paid an "economic" wage (i.e. if they serve on a career or short-service basis) or a nominal sum (if they are conscripts) does not really matter. If a nation has a small regular force it tends to pay its personnel more, and will generally be more intensive in its use of high technology weapons and equipment. If it has a larger, mostly conscript force it may pay its conscripted personnel less, but its total costs for pay, equipment, and especially training are not likely, other things being equal, to be very much less than they would be for an all-volunteer force<sup>1</sup>. Moreover, the real costs of manpower to a society is the denial of men's labour for industrial and commercial purposes, and the fact that they are the consumers of extremely expensive hardware which in itself is non-productive of any further saleable item.

Regardless of whether countries have all-volunteer or conscript forces, women represent a large reservoir of "manpower" which has hardly been touched yet by the services. Civilian employers in most western societies make greater use of women quantitatively than do the armed forces, but qualitatively the types of job offered, the pay, and the career prospects are, in many societies, less than satisfactory to the ambitious and able women who are now appearing on the labour market as part of the vast expansion of secondary and higher education and the concomitant social revolution in attitudes and expectations. It would appear that in this situation the services could recruit a large number of more able and more highly motivated women than some of the male personnel they are currently forced to recruit, because those males with many

1. Schlesinger report, page 178 ff.

of the requisite skills and motivation find more attractive opportunities in civilian employment. The services could, therefore, even if only from motives of self-interest, help to implement the various policies of equal opportunity of employment to which some governments are already pledged, and to which many other governments are likely to turn in the not too distant future. At the same time the armed forces would be obtaining, for the same cost, the services of qualified women who are sometimes unable to develop their full potential in civilian employment and are therefore likely to be more eager, given equal skills and opportunities, to join the forces on a career basis than are men.

If the principle of the armed services as a large potential employer of women is accepted, what precisely should be the rôle of women within a military organisation? At present, no women in the countries under study are permitted to train for or fill positions which would lead to involvement directly in combat. So long as this bar is maintained, the employment of women in large numbers, however desirable in principle, will not be possible because of the need to maintain combat-ready units and a sufficient number of positions at home into which combat personnel can be placed after service abroad or at sea. Not only will numbers remain limited, but a fully equal career pattern will be denied to women. Therefore one might well ask whether this bar is really valid or necessary.

It is important that our heritage, which attributes to women a rôle without military connotations, should not be confused with the personalities and inclinations of certain individuals who, whether they be male or female, are not suitable for a combat rôle. To presuppose a degree of physical and/or psychological unfitness in women under combat conditions is an assumption which cannot be left unquestioned. As some types of war and some types of weaponry become more complex, and as the destruction of targets takes place at longer range and in a more impersonal manner, blurring the concept of the combat zone, the emphasis put on the greater physical strength of men must surely decrease in impor-

tance. Instead, the qualities which assume more importance are emotional and psychological stability, and the intellectual ability to understand and use effectively extremely complex pieces of equipment, qualities which are not the exclusive preserve of men. In other words, at least some jobs which are necessarily integrated into combat units or which must be performed in forward areas, really require few, if any, of the attributes which are supposed to belong exclusively to the male sex. It is therefore not easy to show satisfactory reasons why the combat barrier should remain absolute, unless it can be shown that women as a sex, rather than certain women (as, indeed, certain men) are unfitted for a combat or combat-related rôle.

A valid question must be whether the perceived rôle of women as a non-violent group would lead very many women to volunteer for combat and combat-related jobs, even if such jobs were open to them. The only women whom we can currently note showing considerable military ability tend to be in terrorist and guerrilla movements, organisations which are unlikely to recommend themselves to the authorities as suitably analogous to the legitimate armed forces of the State. However, surely those women who participated in the resistance movements of World War II did demonstrate, in many cases, both physical and personal qualities suitable for more conventional forms of combat.

While the number of women for the time being remains limited, more and more positions in the services are being opened to them, and the American experience tends to suggest that women are eager and able to undertake new assignments. The analysis of the replies to the twelve sections of the questionnaire shows that while legal status and service regulations are essentially the same for men and women, there are some differences in the conditions of service. Some of these, such as higher maximum recruitment age, might be said to be to the advantage of women; others, such as the exclusion of women from military academies, are to their disadvantage. In this connection, one might bear in mind the words of a United States Assistant Secretary of Defence: "Separate organisations and res-

stricted assignments do not provide adequate career opportunity for women, even though pay and promotion potential are equal to that of men.”<sup>1</sup>

This statement seems to be borne out by a study made of male and female officers in the United States navy<sup>2</sup>. This study suggests that equal pay for equal rank is of far less importance to women in their job satisfaction than are “unequal promotion plans and unequal assignments. Discontent centres not on unequal privileges but on opportunities denied and lackluster assignments”. The women themselves who were surveyed feel confident of their ability as line officers to handle the manager/subordinate relationship and feel they should not be excluded from command; they also feel they should be eligible for flag rank in any billet (job) for which they are qualified. The men surveyed, on the other hand, expressed doubts about women’s abilities to command, and almost half of them thought women should limit their aspirations to those jobs to which they have traditionally been assigned. Finally, many men expressed the belief that the attributes for a commanding officer were in direct conflict with femininity, and that therefore women should continue to be excluded from command and from key middle rank billets. Thus in spite of the navy’s declared intention to give women equal opportunity, the “uncertainty and confusion” which the male officers expressed concerning the rôle of female line officers “precludes instant equality”.

The conclusion of this survey, though it is expressed in terms of the American navy, may

well be relevant in all the countries where women serve or may one day serve in the armed forces :

“For meaningful implementation of Z-116 [the directive from Admiral Zumwalt that women will be given full and equal rights in pursuing navy careers] to be possible, a career rôle for women must first be developed and defined... This plan must reflect an unbiased evaluation of the talents, accomplishments, and aspirations of young women who choose the navy as a career. If we are to give true commitment, rather than lip-service, to equal opportunity for women in the navy, there is no alternative but to produce a realistic and credible programme which will fully support this commitment.”

Finally, it must be recognised that the question of utilisation of women in the armed forces rests not so much on the logic of the case as on the attitudes and beliefs of the current members of the forces. These personnel are not only predominately male but are also, in matters of social change at least, generally regarded as a conservative group in most western societies. Their collective attitudes to the rôle of women in the forces are almost certainly the key determinant of whether real equality of opportunity is created. If continued uncertainty, or indeed in some cases hostility, towards greater utilisation of women prevents the creation of these opportunities, then of course the arguments of those against women’s further entry into the profession of arms are likely to prove self-fulfilling.

1. Roger T. Kelly, 6th April 1972, in *Commanders Digest*, page 15.

2. Lt.-Commander Beth F. Coye and others: “Is there room for women in navy management: An attitudinal survey”, *op. cit.* 343 women were surveyed, which was one-half of the entire female line officer population; 270 replied to the questionnaire. 303 male officers were surveyed, taken from navy students in the college of naval warfare and the college of naval command and staff, classes of 1972; 190 replied to the questionnaire.

## CONCLUSION

*Types of service*

The questionnaire revealed several differences among the countries as to the categories (conscripts, career, short-service, reserve) of service which exist in the various countries. Five of them — Canada, Ireland, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States — do not have conscripts. In the other countries, conscripts are used as both officers and other ranks except in Germany, where they serve as other ranks only. All the other categories of service (career, short-service, reserve) exist in all the countries except Luxembourg, which does not have a reserve category, and Turkey, which does not appear to have a short-service category. In general, the three services of each country include personnel from all the categories of service which exist in that country, but there are a few exceptions. Apart from Turkey, neither Italy (except for the carabinieri corps) nor Luxembourg employs career personnel below the rank of NCO ; moreover in Luxembourg all ranks below NCO are on a short-service basis only, and all ranks above NCO are on a career basis only. There is no reserve service for other ranks in Turkey, and in the Netherlands navy there is no short-service engagement for other ranks. (For complete details, see analysis to questions A.1, 2.)

All countries except Ireland and Canada require ex-service personnel to do compulsory reserve service ; the circumstances and periods of time vary. Belgium, Turkey, and Italy (short-service) do not make provision for personnel to volunteer for reserve service. The Italian concept of reserve, in fact, is different from that in the other countries : it represents a status to which personnel can be transferred, and not a body of personnel of all ranks which can be called upon when necessary. (E. 1.)

The legal status and service regulations for career and short-service personnel are the same in all the countries except Belgium (where service regulations are different) and Italy (where legal status is different). (A. 4.)

Except for Turkey, for which the information was not available, all personnel in all the

countries have legal rights of appeal within the military structure, and all except those in Ireland and Luxembourg have rights of appeal in non-military judicial bodies. In all the countries except Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States appeal is also possible to other mediating bodies such as an *ombudsman*. (M. 1.)

Civil service status for the military is unusual : Denmark accords it to its career officers, and Luxembourg to its officers and NCOs. In the other countries, the status either does not exist or is not applicable to the military.

*Pay*

In spite of the fact that the military, with the above exceptions, does not have civil service status, their pay is nevertheless structured in relationship to the civil service in all countries except the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (and Turkey, for which the information was not given). The United Kingdom structures its pay in relation to civilian pay in general ; the Netherlands has a separate pay structure, though in important respects it is related to the civil service pay structure. Only Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States report that service pay scales are comparable to those paid in civilian employment ; the Netherlands reports that its minimum military pay (excluding conscripts) does not fall below the civil service minimum, which in itself is at least equal to the legal minimum rates for civilian employment. Except in the United Kingdom, the salary groups of civil servants correspond to a greater or lesser extent with military salaries. (F. 1, 2.)

Pay is calculated in various ways in the different countries, based on one or more of the factors of age, number of years of service, years of service in a specific rank, duties, university, professional or technical qualifications ; most commonly it is years of service in a specific rank and total number of years of service. Only the United Kingdom does not have the pay of its military revalued regularly in accordance with the pay of its civil service ; instead it is revised

in accordance with pay in civilian employment. In addition, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway reported that military pay is linked to the cost of living. (F. 3, 4.)

Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg and Norway all have a procedure whereby military representatives negotiate concerning pay increases and/or the basic pay structure. Canada and the United Kingdom use an enquiry by official committee; Turkey and Italy use a predetermined system of pay increases; France, Ireland, Netherlands, Germany and the United States replied that normally the same procedure is used as for determining civil service pay increases. In the case of the Netherlands, this includes negotiations with military representatives, and France and Ireland may also call for reports from official committees. (F. 5.)

The correlation of armed forces pay to that of their respective civil services rather than to general civilian employment in nearly all the countries should not, we suppose, come as a great surprise. However, it does make any comparison with civilian employment more complex, since the armed forces are, in terms of pay, not currently able to offer a salary structure designed to be directly competitive with the private sector of employment. This means, in effect, that the forces are competing with the private sector and the rest of the State sector on no better general financial terms than other parts of the public service for the same relatively scarce manpower. In terms of basic pay as a factor in the recruitment and retention rate of armed forces personnel therefore, direct comparisons with civilian employment are almost bound to be unfavourable to the forces, except perhaps in areas of industrial stagnation or high unemployment, and except in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, the only countries to report that their forces' pay scales are comparable to those payable in civilian employment.

The attached table relates average age on attaining one of the eight ranks selected (see pay Tables F. I. and II.) to the minimum basic pay for that rank. It had been hoped to relate these

to broadly comparable figures for civilian employment; unfortunately it has not been possible to obtain these figures in the time available for the preparation of this study. One of the problems is that except for some trades or professions in forces and civilian life which more or less correspond, there are some very real differences in others. Therefore trying to match mean earnings, the age at which these are attained, and the necessary qualifications in civilian employment with those of the military, requires a great deal more information than the questionnaire provides, and also presupposes answers to questions such as what civilian function, at what grade, can be deemed equivalent to a long-service (non-technical) sergeant who is the commander of a small infantry section.

The large differences in basic pay (Table F. I.) for the ranks selected for comparison are clearly of interest to all those concerned with the problem of armed forces pay — whether they be personnel in the armed forces, the governments which determine pay rates, the parliaments which vote the necessary monies, or not least the taxpayers who must ultimately pay the bill.

However, a note of caution in the use of these figures should be sounded. First, the rates of exchange shown on page 115 reflect an average over the twelve months of 1973 and not the exchange rate at any particular time and their usefulness may be limited by the rapidly changing economic situation, particularly the different national rates of inflation and floating exchange rates. Second, these are gross figures, i.e. figures before tax, and we have no information on the relative rates of tax which the different ranks under consideration would pay in their respective countries. Third, there has been no attempt to assess the purchasing power of the sums concerned in the countries where the military of the various States are called upon to serve.

Nevertheless, given the limitations of these figures, some interesting comparisons can be made on the rates of pay in the various countries. To take the most extreme example, a senior Canadian, Danish, or American colonel gets paid

Average age and minimum salaries

Units: US \$ per annum

Country	Colonel		Major		Captain		1st Lieutenant		Most Senior Warrant Officer		Sergeant		2nd Lowest Basic Rank		Lowest Basic Rank	
	Age	Salary min.	Age	Salary min.	Age	Salary min.	Age	Salary min.	Age	Salary min.	Age	Salary min.	Age	Salary min.	Age	Salary min.
Belgium	45 = 9,865 (After 25 years = 15,640)		37 = 7,753 (After 14 years = 10,560)		Not given (After 9 years = 7,368)	5,783	Not given (After 4 years = 6,232)		50 = 4,058 (After 25 years = 6,753)		22 = 3,529		Not given	3,273	Not given	3,208
Canada	Not given	23,747	Not given	16,851	Not given	11,933	Not given	6,956	Not given	14,044	Not given	9,871	Not given	8,299	Not given	3,598
Denmark	54 = 23,554		33 No figure ← Max. 19,000		28 No figure on a sliding scale to		23 = 9,626		38 to 35 ← Max. 10,373		No figure		19 No figure on a sliding scale to		19 No figure	17 6,810
France	48 = 10,208		38 = 6,877		30 = 6,179		24 = 5,265		32.6 No figure		19.5 = 4,056		18.5 = 1,020		18 = 940	
Federal Republic of Germany	50.8 = 14,546		33.7 = 10,698		29.2 = 8,396		26.7 = 7,370		Not given	7,222	Not given	5,101	Not given	4,486	Not given	4,303
Ireland	55 = 10,009 (8,455)		42 = 7,714 (6,491)		28 = 6,748 (5,593)		23 = 5,059 (4,244)		43 = 5,209 (4,320)		31 = 4,325 (3,482)		26 = 4,059 (3,240)		Not given	(2,140)
Italy	49 = 9,537		38 = 5,500		28 = 4,635		23 = 4,508		Not given	4,346	20 = 2,183		Not given	680	Not given	463
Luxembourg	Not given	16,091	50 = 12,115		43 = 10,071		31 = 9,162		47.5 = 7,686		24 = 4,581		20 = 2,714		18.5	2,091
Netherlands	Not given	17,902	36-34 = 11,543		28 = 9,186		24 = 7,371		43 = 5,663		19-18 = 5,419		Not given	4,612	Not given	4,087
Norway	48 = 14,846		38 = 10,172		30 = 8,981		25 = 7,322		37 = 7,715		23 = 4,956		Not given	No figure	Not given	No figure
Turkey	45 = 6,334		36 = 3,835		30 = 2,876		24 = 2,191		28 = 2,739 (37 = 3,355)		19 = 1,027		Not given	No figure	Not given	No figure
United Kingdom	Not given	14,097 (12,942)	Not given	8,950 (8,180)	Not given	6,900 (6,309)	Not given	5,505 (5,029)	Not given	6,059 (6,005)	Not given	5,080 (4,590)	Not given	3,428 (3,131)	Not given	2,685 (1,807)
United States	45 = 15,084 (After 25 years = 26,268)		33 = 10,260 (After 14 years = 17,436)		27 = 9,528 (After 9 years = 15,492)		25 = 8,304 (After 4 years = 11,496)		Not given	9,709 (After 16 years = 14,047)	21.6	4,899	20.9	4,712	Not given	3,912

almost four times<sup>1</sup> more than a senior Turkish colonel, and the most senior Canadian private is paid \$1,000 per annum more than a senior Turkish colonel. The pay tables in Section F are worth careful study in this respect.

For purposes of analysis, the countries can be arranged in five groups according to how much they pay their personnel :

- (1) Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, United States ;
- (2) Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg ;
- (3) France, Norway, United Kingdom ;
- (4) Ireland, Italy ;
- (5) Turkey.

The relative position of each country appears not to be entirely determined by whether it has an all-volunteer or partially conscript force, nor by its GNP, nor wholly by its cost of living or standard of living. As the following figures<sup>2</sup> show, percentage of GNP spent on defence does not provide a complete answer either, as the countries which spend the smallest percentage on defence pay their personnel as well or almost as well as the country which spends the largest percentage on defence.

Country	% of GNP spent on defence 1973
Belgium	3.1
Canada	2.3
Denmark	2.7
France	4.2
Federal Republic of Germany	3.9
Ireland	1.6 *
Italy	3.2
Luxembourg	0.9
Netherlands	3.7
Norway	3.8
Turkey	4.7
United Kingdom	5.7
United States	6.6

1. 3.9 times for Canada, 3.8 times for Denmark and the United States.

2. From NATO definition of defence expenditure.

\* Except Ireland — Secretariat estimate.

Another way of looking at the problem is to note what percentage of the defence budget is spent on pay and allowances. For five of the countries, the figures are as follows<sup>1</sup> :

Country	% of defence budget spent on pay and allowances
United Kingdom	45.2
France	34
Federal Republic of Germany	43.5
United States	49.7
Canada	63.6

Obviously the fact that Canada spent 63.6 % on pay and allowances could help to explain the higher rates of basic pay in that country. Equally, the fact that France spent 24.8 % on procurement and had a particularly high research and development figure of 17.1 % could help to explain the low percentage spent on pay and allowances, and therefore the lower rates of basic pay.

Another perspective on relative basic pay structure, although again it should be stressed that this is before either tax or allowances in cash and kind have been taken into consideration, can be arrived at by seeing how many times the maximum basic pay for a private can be divided into the maximum basic pay for a colonel of the same nationality. (For those countries which did not give the maximum basic pay for a private, the minimum basic pay for a sergeant was used instead, since in some countries they were roughly the same. Both figures have been shown for France, where the sergeant's minimum and private's maximum pay are not roughly the same.)

Country	Colonel's maximum pay divided by private's maximum pay	Colonel's maximum pay divided by sergeant's minimum pay
Belgium	4.39	
Canada	3.33	
Denmark	3.85	
France	6.84	3.77

1. Defence expenditure by functional category (1972), in IISS, *The Military Balance 1973-74*, page 76.

Country	Colonel's maximum pay divided by private's maximum pay	Colonel's maximum pay divided by sergeant's minimum pay
Federal Republic of Germany	3.89	
Ireland	2.98 (married) 3.27 (single)	
Italy		4.51
Luxembourg		4.62
Netherlands	4.83	
Norway		2.99
Turkey		6.66
United Kingdom	3.06 (men) 3.41 (women)	
United States	5.08	

Whatever a country's position in the international table of comparative rates of pay, the internal differences vary considerably. For example, among the countries which pay a high salary, the United States maintains a differential of 5.08 between the rank of colonel and private, whereas Canada maintains a differential of only 3.33. Among the countries which pay a low salary, Turkey maintains a differential of 6.66, whereas Ireland has a very low differential of 2.98 (for married personnel).

### *Recruitment*

Recruitment ages differ in the various countries. The minimum age for officers is between 17 and 20 in all countries except the United States, where the minimum can be as high as 24; this probably reflects the fact that the United States requires officer recruits to have a university degree before they can be commissioned. For other ranks, the minimum age varies from 16 to 20, except for two categories of trainees in Belgium who can be as young as 15. While there are no great differences among the countries as far as minimum age is concerned, therefore, there is a considerable spread in the maximum age for recruitment. For officers, this ranges from 20 (Ireland) to 55 (United States); for other ranks it ranges from 24 (Canada) to 40 (United Kingdom), and France reported that

there is no fixed maximum age. (B. I. 1; B. II. 1.)

Most countries do not impose a limitation on marital status for officer recruits, the exceptions being Belgium, Ireland, Italy (regulars), Luxembourg and the Netherlands. This rule is further relaxed for other ranks: while Luxembourg and Italy retain it, Ireland drops it completely, Belgium applies it only to those who wish to train as aerial navigators, and the Netherlands presumably allows exceptions under the rule that recruits should "generally" be single. Personnel in Belgium, Ireland (officers) and Luxembourg require permission to marry; personnel in Italy may not marry before 25 years of age, and some French personnel may require permission in certain circumstances. (B. I. 1 (d); B. II. 1 (d); G. 1 (a))

While not all countries have the same conditions for recruitment, these generally include physical and psychological fitness, good character, and, in some cases, nationality. There are, in addition, various training or educational requirements. For all the countries for which this information was available (including the Netherlands), completion of secondary education is required for officer recruits. Many countries appear to give their officer recruits a university education during the course of their training, but the questionnaire did not specifically ask this and we are not familiar enough with the various programmes of the military schools to say definitely which ones do provide a university education. Only the United States specified that in practically all cases officers, to be commissioned, must have obtained a university degree either at a service academy or at a civilian university. Belgium, Canada, Denmark (air force), the Netherlands, Norway and the United States stated that the promotion prospects for officers with a university education are better than for those without, and it seems to us highly desirable that all officers should graduate from university level courses from either military or civilian colleges, in view of the fact that more and more of their counterparts in civilian life are graduates. (B. I. 1 (c) and (e); B. II. 1 (c) and (e); C. 6.)

In addition to education, Denmark requires all army officer recruits to undergo training

from the rank of private through sergeant. (B. I. 1 (c))

For other ranks recruits, the training requirement varies more. Some countries require some level of secondary education, others say that no training is necessary, and yet others make recruitment the function of an aptitude test. (B. II. 1 (c))

For both officers and other ranks the periods of engagement offered vary, as do the conditions for extending a period of service. Recruitment is usually at the lowest rank, with some exceptions. Transfer from one category of service to another is possible for officers in all the countries; it is possible for other ranks in all the countries except Luxembourg and the United States. In the officer category, there are special conditions for recruiting specialist personnel, which are different in each country, and specialist training is often done outside the services. In the other ranks category only Denmark, France, Germany and Ireland said there are special conditions for recruiting specialist personnel. In-service training is provided for most or all specialist posts except in Denmark. (B. I. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7; B. II. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7.)

Officers may be recruited from other ranks in all the countries except Luxembourg, and possibly Denmark<sup>1</sup>. Ireland, Italy, Norway and Turkey said that promotion prospects in such cases are limited, but the other countries said that a full career was usually open to such recruits. Canada, France, Ireland, Norway and the United States specified that they provide special training with a view to such promotion. (B. I. 11; C. 4.)

For officers, there are differences among the countries as to the period of training between recruitment and appointment to first officer rank; these range from two months for some Netherlands posts to five years for navy A-line officers in Denmark. In all the countries except Canada, Germany, Luxembourg and Turkey there are differences in the type and duration

1. Compare the replies to B.I. 11 and C. 4.

of training given in the period between recruitment and appointment to first officer rank — differences, for example, as between the three services or as between specialist regular officers. (B. I. 8, 9.)

All countries require officers to attend a military academy or to take a basic military training course. For purposes of comparison, however, the important thing presumably is not that such attendance is required, nor for how long, but rather what is taught, and the questionnaire did not deal with this topic. (B. I. 10.)

### *Promotion*

When promotion is considered, one finds a wide variety of systems. Table C. 1 shows what ranks exist, the average time spent in each rank, the average age at which each rank is reached, and the percentage each rank represents within its service. Table C. 2 shows that only seniority is a common factor in promotion in all the countries (except for the Danish air force). Table C. 3 shows that comparisons on the limit of normal promotion based on replies to the questionnaire are not possible, other than that the limit varies from one country to another.

In most of the countries (except Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Turkey) it is possible to jump ranks, though this occurs rarely or in special circumstances. Promotion is always permanent in France (except in wartime), Italy, Luxembourg and Turkey; temporary promotion is possible in the other countries. (C. 8, 9.)

### *Pensions*

Personnel in Belgium, France, Germany (career), Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands qualify for a pension as soon as they are recruited; in the other countries they qualify after varying periods of time. All the countries attach qualifications of age and/or years of service to the payment of the pension. (H. 1, 2.)

In general, pensions are calculated on the basis of last (or highest) basic pay and years of service, but in some countries the pension is also calculated on a base which includes bonuses

and allowances. These pensions may be further supplemented by war or active service : Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands may count such years of service as double. Other government service is also calculable in the pension in all the countries except Ireland, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. (H. 4.)

Normal retiring age, the conditions under which personnel may retire before this age, and the effects an early retirement has on the pension, differ in each country. (H. 10, 11 ; D. I. 5 ; D. II. 5.)

Personnel in all the countries except Belgium, Denmark (regulars), Germany (regulars), Ireland and the United Kingdom contribute some part of their pay towards their pension, ranging from 3 % (Luxembourg) to 10 % (some personnel in the Netherlands). The authorities also contribute to pensions in all countries except Turkey, and perhaps Germany. It is not possible to compare the military contribution and resulting pension with contributions and pensions in civilian life, as this information was not given in the questionnaire. In all countries pensions are adjusted by some means or other to take account of pay rises or cost-of-living increases. (H. 5, 6, 7.)

Widows and orphans of military personnel in all the countries are entitled to a pension ; its amount varies. The right to a pension expires, in most cases, when a widow remarries, but it is retained in Belgium and Denmark and only partially reduced in Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Orphans lose their right on attaining the age of majority, or in some cases after they have completed their studies. (H. 8, 9.)

#### *Termination of service*

Generally speaking, the grounds for dismissal fall into the categories of misconduct, inability to fulfil the functions of the rank, and ill-health, though answers differ according to how narrowly the term "dismissal" is interpreted. For example, in some countries (e.g. the Netherlands) redundancy is grounds for dismissal; in others (e.g. Canada) it is grounds for premature retirement. "Premature retirement" as a concept does not exist in Belgium, Denmark (air force regulars), France, Italy (short-service),

Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway (short-service) for officers, nor in Belgium, Denmark (navy and air force regulars), France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway (regulars) for other ranks. Countries which do not allow for premature retirement do not necessarily have broader grounds for dismissal. (D. I. 1, 2 ; D. II. 1, 2.)

In most countries it is possible to resign before the end of a contracted period of service, though this is easier in some countries than in others, and for some ranks than others. Where resignation is possible it may be by notice, by request, or by purchase, and the time factor varies. (D. I. 3 ; D. II. 3.)

Dismissal is grounds for termination of pension rights for all personnel in Germany, Ireland, and the United States. It is also grounds in Canada if the member has less than ten years' service, and for officers in the United Kingdom with less than sixteen years' service and other ranks in Italy and the United Kingdom with less than twelve years' service. Pension rights are not affected by dismissal in Belgium and the Netherlands. In the other countries for which the information is available pension rights are usually retained, but conditions of payment and/or the amount to be paid may be altered, depending on the grounds for dismissal. The United Kingdom also said that though the right to a pension is forfeited, up to 90 % can be granted to short-service officers and other ranks on compassionate grounds. (D. I. 5 (a) (i) ; D. II. 5 (a) (i))

In the case of premature retirement, pensions are payable in Canada (with more than ten years' service), Ireland (more than twelve years' service for officers, twenty-one years for other ranks), and the United States (twenty years' service or 30 % disability), Pension rights in Germany may be reduced, depending on length of service. In the United Kingdom on the other hand, premature retirement results in a special capital payment and years of credit in calculating the pension. (D.I. 5 (a) (ii) ; D. II. 5 (a) (ii))

Resignation means loss of pension rights in Canada with less than ten years' service), Den-

mark (air force officers, unless they are within five years of normal retirement), Germany, Ireland (with less than twelve years' service for officers, twenty-one years for other ranks), Italy (less than twenty years' service for officers, or if taking up civilian employment for other ranks), Luxembourg (officers with less than fifteen years' service) and the United Kingdom (officers with less than sixteen years' service). In the other countries it may be paid at a reduced rate, depending on age and years of service. (D. I. 5 (a) (iii) ; D. II. 5 (a) (iii))

Regular personnel receive a bonus at the end of their period of service in Canada, Denmark (air force) and the United Kingdom. Short-service officers receive a bonus in Canada, Denmark (air force), Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom ; short-service other ranks are paid a bonus in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway. Bonuses are also paid to air force auxiliary officers in Belgium and to some American officers (physicians, dentists, and navy nuclear-qualified personnel) if they re-enlist. In some countries bonuses are payable as a fixed lump sum, and in others as a percentage of salary. (D. I. 4 ; D. II. 4.)

Most of the countries make provision for rehabilitation or training of service personnel for a civilian post, though not all countries do it for all ranks or categories of service. Many countries also provide assistance in seeking jobs on termination of service, including giving priority for employment in government service. (D. I. 6, 7, 8 ; D. II. 6, 7, 8.)

#### *Allowances, food and accommodation*

There would appear to be a welter of different sized allowances, varying both by nation and by service. Their value ranges from relatively small sums such as leave allowances, to major additions to pay such as flying and submarine pay. These cash allowances should perhaps be considered alongside those allowances or subsidised benefits "in kind", i.e. accommodation and food. There is no doubt that particularly for some of the lower paid personnel, the allowances in cash and kind help to boost their real income or standard of living. In general, the allowances

in kind tend to benefit all forces personnel (though some categories such as conscripts benefit more than others), while the larger cash allowances tend to benefit certain specialist personnel whose recruitment and retention are a particular problem for the services. (G. 1.)

The questionnaire did not ask which of the cash allowances, if any, are free of tax ; those that are — especially if they are bonuses or gratuities payable at the end of a period of service — are clearly worth proportionately more than the same increase in basic pay and are substantial, if partially obscured, benefits of service life.

Allowances in kind, i.e. food and accommodation, we assumed to be tax free, in which case it is possible to point to a range of benefits open to service personnel. For those living in barracks, there are either no charges for food and accommodation (typically for conscripts), or charges that appear to amount to varying degrees of subsidised food and accommodation. These range, for example, from \$1.13 per day (United Kingdom) to \$1.92 per day (Norway) for food in barracks, and from \$1.72 per month (the minimum Italian charge) to \$81 per month (the maximum Canadian charge) for accommodation in barracks. (K. 2.)

Married quarters are provided for some or all married personnel in all the countries except Denmark, Germany, Italy (with exceptions), Luxembourg (with exceptions) and the Netherlands. Ireland and the United Kingdom provide married quarters for male, but not female personnel. Married personnel are required to occupy married quarters where available in Canada, Norway, Turkey and the United States. Rent is paid in all cases (except for Belgian personnel stationed in Germany), whether directly or through a reduction in pay or allowances, but in most cases the rent is less than an economic rent in the civilian sector. (K. 3.)

For those personnel who must or who choose to enter the private sector for housing, many countries offer some form of financial assistance. Germany and the United States pay a housing allowance, Belgium pays an allowance to personnel stationed in Germany, and France and the Netherlands pay an allowance in certain circumstances. When personnel are transferred abroad, all countries make provision for housing except Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Turkey; presumably this is because few of their personnel serve abroad. (K. 4, 6.)

Finally, if personnel wish to buy their own houses, just over a third of the countries provide loans, varying in duration and size, but nearly all of which are at a much lower rate of interest than could be obtained commercially. (G. 2.)

#### *Medical and dental care*

As with food and accommodation, medical and dental care is subsidised for service personnel. All countries provide free medical treatment for some or all of their personnel, and all but Norway (and some exceptions in the Netherlands) provide free dental treatment for some or all of their personnel; this is usually provided by the forces medical and dental services. In those countries where the service is not comprehensive — i.e. where all ranks or categories of service may not be entitled to free treatment from the forces medical services — personnel are covered entirely or almost entirely by the State health schemes. (J. 1 (a), (b), (d) and (e))

Belgium (reservists), France (career and short-service), Luxembourg (career), and Turkey offer personnel the choice of being treated by the forces medical services or by civilians; in the other countries personnel are normally required to use service facilities, though exceptions may be made. In Turkey, treatment by civilians is at the serviceman's own expense; in the other countries it is paid for by the authorities if it has been ordered by the forces' medical staff, and by the serviceman himself if the treatment has not been ordered, though he may receive assistance from State health schemes. (J. 1 (c), (d) and (e))

Canada, Denmark (conscripts), France (conscripts), Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey and the United States report that their personnel do not contribute to State health schemes, and in no country are personnel reimbursed for any contributions made to any health insurance schemes, whether participation in them is compulsory or voluntary. (J. 1 (f) and (g))

The families of servicemen from the Canadian, French, Danish and German services are not entitled to free medical and dental treatment. In the other countries it is free or partly free, and may be totally or partially provided by the forces medical and dental services. Among those countries where treatment is free or partially free, Norway and Italy specified that this was the result of civilian, not military insurance programmes, and in fact we believe that similar schemes provide free or partially free treatment to families in Canada, France, Denmark and Germany. Treatment by non-military doctors may or may not be at the families' own expense, depending on circumstances. In other words, in all the countries medical insurance is available for families, whether through military, State, or private schemes which meet all or part of the costs. Only Canada and the Netherlands reimburse personnel for their participation in health insurance schemes. (J. 2 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g))

#### *Leave, hours of duty*

While only Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway and Turkey answered that service regulations recognise fixed working hours and working weeks in the armed forces in peacetime, of approximately forty hours for five or six days, in practice the personnel of the other countries work similar hours also. (L. 1.)

Leave period, and the basis of its calculation, varies from country to country; the minimum is eighteen days (Irish army other ranks) and the maximum is forty-five days (Italian regulars after twenty-five years' service). Special leave is granted in all the countries; the time and circumstances under which it is granted vary. Personnel in Denmark, France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States are given paid leave for refresher courses, and all countries except Italy and Turkey allow personnel to take unpaid leave, though usually only in exceptional circumstances. (L. 2, 3, 6, 8.)

Only Denmark and Norway allow compensation for leave not taken, either as money or as an additional leave for the following year. The United States allows the carrying over of basic pay and allowances for up to sixty days to the end of military service or to the end of each enlisted period, and Canada does permit the carrying over of leave until retirement. France allows the accumulation of leave during a tour of duty overseas to be taken later. (L. 5.)

All countries require personnel to obtain permission to visit certain countries. Germany and the Netherlands specified permission is required to visit communist countries, and Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Turkey and the United States said simply that permission is required for personnel to spend their leave anywhere abroad. (L. 7.)

#### *Military trades unions*

Membership in a military trades union is not compulsory in any of the countries under study. Membership is permitted in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway, and the table below shows the percentage of officers and other ranks who are reported to belong to such organisations.

Country	Officers	Other ranks
Belgium	No figures	No figures
Denmark	98 % (career and long-service)	92 % (career and short-service)
Federal Republic of Germany	No figures	No figures
Luxembourg	65 %	95 %
Netherlands	60 %	80 % (50 % for conscripts)
Norway	90 %	70 %

In the United States, servicemen's organisations are permitted, but they are not officially recognised, and no figures for membership were reported. The United Kingdom reply to the questionnaire does not make clear why no such organisations exist in the United Kingdom.

Military trades unions are prohibited in Canada, France, Ireland, Italy and Turkey. (M. 2.)

***Conditions of service in the armed forces***

---

**AMENDMENT No. 1<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by Mr. Wall***

---

Insert the following paragraph after paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation :

“That it urge member governments who participate in the NATO Defence Planning Committee to call on that body to conclude its examination of the United Kingdom’s proposed defence review with a public statement of its findings as it did on concluding its examination of the Netherlands defence review on 9th July 1974 ;”

*Signed : Wall*

---

1. See 11th Sitting, 5th December 1974 (Amendment withdrawn).

**European security and the situation in  
the Eastern Mediterranean**

**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

**submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Introductory note

**DRAFT RECOMMENDATION**

on European security and the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean

**EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM**

submitted by Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. The situation in Cyprus
- III. Cyprus and European security
- IV. Attitudes and objectives of the Soviet Union
- V. Greece and NATO
- VI. Turkey and NATO
- VII. The United Nations General Assembly debate
- VIII. Conclusion

**APPENDICES**

- I. Recommendation 254 on security and the Mediterranean
- II. Statement by the Chairman of the Committee — 29th July 1974
- III. Convention regarding the régime of the Straits signed at Montreux on 20th July 1936
- IV. Written Question 148 and reply of the Council

---

1. Adopted in Committee by 14 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. Critchley (Chairman); MM. Klepsch, Dankert (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Arnaud, Averardi, Bizet, Boertien, Bouloche (Substitute: Delorme), Jung, Kempinaire, Konen, La Loggia (Substitute: Magliano), Lemmrich, Pawelczyk (Substitute: Ahrens),

Pendry, Prescott, Richter, Rivière, Roper, Schlaga (Substitute: Gessner), Schugens, Tanghe, Vedovato, Wall (Substitute: Sir Harwood Harrison), Zamberletti, de Montesquiou, Piket.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

*Introductory note*

In preparing this report the Chairman had interviews as follows :

*NATO, Brussels — 15th and 16th October*

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Norton GCB, Chairman of the Military Committee ;

Mr. S. I. P. van Campen, Head of Secretary-General's Private Office ;

H. E. Mr. Orhan Eralp, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Turkey to the North Atlantic Council ;

Mr. Peter Moon, Head of General Affairs Section, Division of Political Affairs ;

Mr. Otino Caracciolo, Head of Plans and Policy Section, Force Planning Directorate ;

H. E. Sir Edward Peck, Ambassador, United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council ;

H. E. Mr. J. M. A. H. Luns, Secretary-General of NATO ;

H. E. Mr. B. Theodopoulos, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Greece to the North Atlantic Council ;

Mr. Eugene V. McAuliffe, United States Deputy Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, *Chargé d'affaires a.i.*

The Committee as a whole met at Headquarters Central Army Group, Mannheim/Seckenheim on Tuesday, 5th November, when it was briefed by :

General Lothar Renner (German Army), Chief-of-Staff, Headquarters Central Army Group ; Lt.-Colonel Gebel (German Army) ; Brigadier-General C. F. Gorden (United States Army), Assistant Chief-of-Staff, on the missions of CENTAG ;

Major-General J. E. P. Groven (Belgian Army), Commander Allied Command Europe, Mobile Force (Land), Colonel Turnill (United Kingdom Army), Chief-of-Staff, and Lt.-Colonel Spencer (Canadian Forces), on the rôle and activities of ACE Mobile Force ;

Lt.-Colonel MacGregor (Canadian Forces), on the problems of 4th Allied Tactical Air Force ;

and held a first discussion on the present report.

The Committee met finally in Lancaster House and at the seat of WEU in London on 13th and 14th November where it met with the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly under the Chairmanship of Mr. Paul Thyness, Chairman of that Committee, and was subsequently briefed by Major-General A. H. Farrar-Hockley, Director, Combat Development, Army, of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, on the military lessons of the Middle East conflict of October 1973. The present report was discussed a second time, and adopted, at that meeting.

The Committee and its Chairman express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and senior officers who addressed it and replied to questions. The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee.

**Draft Recommendation**  
**on European security and the situation in**  
**the Eastern Mediterranean**

The Assembly,

Deploring the loss of life and human suffering in Cyprus ;

Believing that any solution to the crisis in the island depends on improved relations between Greece and Turkey involving mutual concessions on several issues ;

Recalling the continued increase in Soviet military power, especially at sea ;

Aware that European security is endangered by any weakening of the links between NATO and its member countries and by any deterioration in relations between NATO countries ;

Believing that the continued presence of British forces in British sovereign areas in Cyprus, in accordance with international agreements to which representatives of the Cyprus communities are parties, contributes both to the defence of Europe and to a return to normal conditions in the island as a whole ;

Reiterating its earlier recommendations for the establishment of a United Nations observation satellite capability under the authority of the United Nations Secretary-General and for the correct application of the Montreux Convention to prevent the passage of aircraft-carriers through the Dardanelles,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Endeavour to ensure that the good offices of NATO and of the members of the European Community continue to be available to all parties in order to secure a general settlement of the Cyprus problem through negotiations between the two communities ;
2. Impress upon all parties to the conflict the manifold advantages which active membership of NATO bestows on each and every member ;
3. Recognise the importance of a continued British military presence in the sovereign base areas ;
4. Foster the association of Greece and Turkey with the European Community ;
5. Request member governments to arrange for their Ministries of Defence to assist in the provision of humanitarian aid for the 200,000 refugees on Cyprus through rapid deliveries from reserve defence stocks to ensure the survival of the refugees through the winter.

## **Explanatory Memorandum**

*(submitted by Mr. Critchley, Chairman and Rapporteur)*

### **I. Introduction**

1. The Committee reported on the security situation in the Mediterranean as recently as last May<sup>1</sup> and on that report the Assembly, on 20th June, adopted Recommendation 254 to which, at the time this report was adopted, the Council had not replied<sup>2</sup>.

2. However, the coup d'état in Cyprus on 15th July, engineered by the colonels' régime in Athens, followed by the Turkish landings, the grave deterioration in relations between Greece and Turkey, and the ensuing strains within NATO, created a very serious situation with implications for the security of the whole of Europe. Your Chairman seriously considered convening the Committee urgently at that time, with a view to adopting a draft recommendation to the Council. In the light of subsequent events however, it was decided that an urgent meeting would serve no purpose. On 29th July, your Chairman issued a statement to the press on his own responsibility, in accordance with Rule 41 (10) of the Rules of Procedure, and proposed in the Presidential Committee that the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean should be referred to the Defence Committee for report to the second part of the session. On 14th October, the Presidential Committee agreed to that proposal. A copy of the Chairman's statement, which was immediately communicated to all members of the Committee, is attached at Appendix II.

3. As it was highly desirable that the Committee should discuss a draft report at its next scheduled meeting, the Chairman followed established precedent concerning such urgent matters in submitting a draft on his own authority at the meeting on 5th November. He was confirmed as Rapporteur at the meeting on 13th and 14th November.

4. In view of the very recent date of the Committee's last report on the security situation in

1. Security and the Mediterranean, Document 637, adopted by the Committee on 21st May 1974 (Rapporteur: Mr. Jung).

2. Text of Recommendation 254 at Appendix I.

the Mediterranean as a whole, the present report concentrates essentially on the direct consequences for European security of events in Cyprus and those arising from them. These are discussed under the following heads: the situation in Cyprus; the importance of Cyprus from the standpoint of European security; attitudes and objectives of the Soviet Union; Greece and NATO, Turkey and NATO.

### **II. The situation in Cyprus**

5. Under the terms of the 1959 agreements between Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, which led to an end of the disturbances, Cyprus was recognised as a Republic, its independence, territorial integrity and security being guaranteed by the three external powers. British defence interests were provided for by the retention of two British sovereign areas together with certain defence sites and training areas. The Constitution of the Cyprus Republic which emerged provided special guarantees for the large Turkish Cypriot minority.

6. Cyprus duly became independent on 16th August 1960 with Archbishop Makarios as its President, who, from having been a supporter of Enosis (or union with Greece) in the colonial period, now emerged as the champion of independence. By the end of 1963, however, the new constitution with its built-in safeguards for the Turkish Cypriot minority was proving unworkable and disturbances had broken out. In January 1964 British troops, with the agreement of Greece, Turkey and the Cyprus Government, assumed temporary responsibility for law and order. President Makarios rejected an Anglo-American proposal for the despatch of a NATO force to the island, and the problems for Cyprus were referred to the United Nations Security Council. In March that year, after Turkey had threatened military intervention if the Turkish Cypriot population was not protected, the Security Council established a peacekeeping force in Cyprus which has remained there ever since. Turkish municipalities thereafter became largely

self-administered, while within the Greek Cypriot community demands for Enosis emerged again this time in opposition to the government of Archbishop Makarios, and backed by the terrorist group EOKA-B.

7. Intensified terrorist activities led President Makarios, on 2nd July 1974, to write to General Ghizikis, President of the Greek Government, accusing the Greek Government of planning to take over Cyprus, of supporting and directing the activities of the terrorist EOKA-B, and demanding the withdrawal of the 650 Greek officers serving with the Cyprus National Guard.

8. On 15th July, the Greek officered National Guard seized power and appointed Nicos Sampson, a former terrorist, President of Cyprus. President Makarios escaped, and with subsequent assistance from the British authorities, left the island.

9. On 16th July, the Secretary-General of the United Nations called on the Security Council to take "appropriate measures... to protect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus". On 20th July, Turkish forces landed.

10. Turkey, fearing the imminent declaration of union with Greece, and having sought unsuccessfully to secure joint British-Turkish action to restore the government in Cyprus, landed forces on Cyprus on 20th July. The Security Council met urgently and adopted a cease-fire resolution (353) the same day which also requested the withdrawal of "foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements". The (first) cease-fire took effect on 22nd July, partly as a result of United States mediation.

11. On 23rd July, the colonels' régime in Athens collapsed and Mr. Karamanlis, leader of the National Radical Union, and Prime Minister of Greece up to 1963, was recalled from exile to assume the Premiership. Greece had already mobilised and at the height of the crisis there were ominous troop movements on each side of the Greek-Turkish frontier in Thrace. Mr. Clerides, Speaker of the Cyprus parliament, was sworn in as President of Cyprus, the Sampson régime having disintegrated along with the

Greek colonels.

12. The first Geneva talks of the three guarantor powers of the 1959 agreement — Britain, Greece and Turkey — led to a first agreement on 3rd July providing for a security zone to be established by United Nations forces along the cease-fire line, but the second round of talks convened on 8th August broke down on 14th August in the face of Turkish reluctance to accept constitutional proposals for the island and the extent of Turkish Cypriot autonomy. That day Turkish forces advanced from the Kyrenia bridgehead, and by 16th August, when Turkey proposed a second cease-fire, had seized the north-eastern third of the island. The Security Council, at meetings on 14th and 15th August, adopted Resolutions 357 and 358 calling for full implementation of a cease-fire, and Resolution 359 urging all parties to co-operate with the United Nations force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

13. The deplorable situation in Cyprus, caused by the reckless action of the Greek military régime in July, aimed, it is widely believed, at imposing union with Greece, led inevitably to the first Turkish landing on 20th July to prevent an unacceptable extension of Greek sovereignty. But a solution has been made more difficult by the exploitation of military advantage by Turkey on 14th August when, in the midst of negotiations with a new Greek Government which bore no responsibility for the original coup, it seized about one third of the island, including much of the most valuable agricultural area, to gain bargaining power in the constitutional negotiations.

14. The Committee welcomes the resumption of talks between the two Cypriot communities represented by Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, but is aware that these negotiators enjoy little real freedom of action in the present situation.

### III. Cyprus and European security

15. The military facilities on Cyprus itself undoubtedly make a significant contribution to European security. Under the 1959 agreement between Britain, Greece, Turkey and representatives of the Cyprus communities, Britain

retained two sovereign base areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, totalling 250 square kilometres, together with some thirty other defence sites and ten training areas. These represent the only British military facilities in the Eastern Mediterranean since the British withdrawal from the Suez Canal in the 1950s. The Near East headquarters of the Royal Air Force is located there with Vulcan aircraft in a strategic rôle in support of CENTO. While British troops and installations are not formally assigned to NATO, the military capability obviously strengthens the position of the Alliance as a whole in Southern Europe. Cyprus is only seventy miles from the important Soviet naval base at Latakia in Syria, and in addition to the sovereign base areas, Britain operates an important radar facility on the Troodos mountains, which provides radar surveillance of the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean.

16. Since the establishment of the United Nations force in Cyprus in 1964, Britain has provided much of the support and a large part of the manpower of the force now comprising units from Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden also. The British contingent in the United Nations Force is now 1,350 strong, having been increased by 600 men at the request of the United Nations Secretary-General towards the end of July. During the recent fighting, Britain was in a position to repatriate 8,000 foreign nationals from forty-nine different countries including the Soviet Union, according to the statement in the Commons on 30th July by Mr. Mason, the British Secretary of State for Defence.

17. The British sovereign base areas were formally recognised by Greece, Turkey and representatives of both Cypriot communities in the 1959 agreements, and the presence of British troops has not been explicitly challenged during the recent crisis, although Soviet demands for the withdrawal of "all foreign troops from Cyprus" may have been deliberately ambiguous. The bases are estimated to bring Cyprus some £20 million annually of foreign currency, which compares with total Cyprus Government expenditure of £32 million in 1970

#### **IV. Attitudes and objectives of the Soviet Union**

18. During the Cyprus crisis the Soviet Union has shifted its public attitude as it sought to gain political capital from a rapidly changing situation, and to inflict political damage on NATO. The tone of Soviet comment has however been moderate, and there have been no overt moves to gain direct military advantage.

19. The first Soviet reaction in July was to discredit the colonels' régime in Greece while adopting an understanding attitude to the initial Turkish intervention. A statement on 16th July, referring to the overthrow of the lawful Makarios Government of Cyprus continued: "the anti-government putsch in Cyprus for which the Greek military are responsible is regarded in the Soviet Union as an act openly violating the United Nations Charter and the generally accepted standards of international law... Leading circles of the Soviet Union expect the Government of Greece to put an immediate end to the open interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus... The Soviet Government is undertaking appropriate démarches with the Governments of Greece and Turkey and also the United States, Britain and France, which together with the Soviet Union are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council".

20. A second Soviet statement issued by the government on 21st July, dragged in NATO indirectly: "The Greek military are continuing their aggressive actions against the independence of the Cypriot State... these actions were made possible as a result of support from certain circles of the NATO military bloc". The statement noted the Turkish armed intervention of 20th July and noted without comment that the Turkish Government had declared these actions were intended to restore the independence of Cyprus and bring back the legitimate government to power. The statement continued: "the Soviet Union reaffirms that it consistently and resolutely stands for the independence and sovereignty of the Cypriot State, against so-called Enosis, or to put it in a different way, the annexation of Cyprus which the Greek military are seeking, intending to turn the island into a NATO military base".

21. The first United Nations Security Council cease-fire resolution, No. 353 of 20th July, which called *inter alia* for "... the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements" was interpreted by the Soviet representative as referring to the Greek officers. Asked if he favoured action to halt the Turkish invasion, the Soviet representative was quoted as saying: "Why do you call it an invasion? We want the Greek officers out and the legal government restored".

22. With the fall of the colonels' régime in Greece, however, Soviet attitudes immediately became more favourable to the new Greek Government, and more even-handed as between Greece and Turkey, and sought to internationalise a Cyprus settlement in the United Nations framework — in which the Soviet Union would of course participate. On 30th July, the Soviet ambassadors to Greece and Turkey were reported to have warned both countries that the massing of large forces in the area of their common frontier was a threat to the security of the southern frontiers of the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet Government was pressing for the departure of "all foreign troops" from Cyprus.

23. The Soviet Union consistently criticised the three-power Geneva talks as being an unsuitable framework for settling the Cyprus problem, ostensibly because representatives of the Cyprus communities were absent, and proposed a conference of all fifteen members of the Security Council plus other non-aligned States. Mr. Gromyko, for example, speaking in the United Nations General Assembly on 24th September, said the Cyprus problem "must be brought out of the impasse resulting from NATO attempts to solve it *in camera*, in political darkness". Following the visit to Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia by the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Ilyichev, from 11th to 18th September, the Soviet proposal was supported by Mr. Mavros, the Greek Foreign Minister, and by Mr. Clerides for the Greek Cypriot community, but was rejected in Ankara. Soviet diplomacy had reversed itself since July, it now fostered good relations with Greece, seeking to encourage that country in blaming NATO for what in Greek eyes is the débâcle in Cyprus.

## V. Greece and NATO

24. Following the Turkish refusal to continue with the second round of Geneva talks, and the seizure of the whole of the north-eastern part of the island by the Turkish forces, the new Greek Government under the Premiership of Mr. Karamanlis issued the following statement on 14th August:

"After the Atlantic Alliance demonstrated its inability to prevent Turkey from creating a state of conflict between two allies, the Prime Minister ordered that the Greek armed forces should be withdrawn from NATO. Greece shall remain a member of the Alliance only in connection with its political aspects."

The Greek Government thus gave notice of its intention to withdraw from the integrated military structure of the NATO Alliance, action which had previously only been taken by France. The reason given by the Greek Government for their intended withdrawal was that of dissatisfaction with NATO's "failure" to prevent the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

25. The Greek Government recognised that a period of negotiation would be required, and negotiations will not begin until after the Greek elections, due to be held on 17th November. NATO and Greece will prepare lists of the many items to be negotiated.

26. The NATO Alliance is a contractual agreement, and a member cannot leave without the approval of its allies. The parallel between Greece and France is a misleading one. Were Greece to withdraw completely from the integrated military structure, it would no longer be able to rely safely upon Article 5 of the treaty concerning mutual defence. That article was carefully worded to safeguard the position of the United States Congress with regard to the presidential power to declare war. During the period that General Eisenhower was SACEUR, the integrated military structure was subsequently developed, in part at least to act as a "trigger" to make mutual defence more automatic in practice than it need be under the treaty. France has not a common frontier with the East, and its response need not be immediate: Greece shares a common frontier with Bulgaria; and only twenty-five kilometres separates that country from the Aegean Sea. France, too, is a major power, self sufficient in armaments, capable of a sustained defence with

both nuclear and conventional weapons. Greece is none of these things.

27. Were negotiations to begin between a new Greek Government and NATO, the military priorities would include: the continued Greek participation in early warning arrangements such as NADGE, the operation of maritime patrol aircraft and the problem of the continuous operation of communications links from SHAPE to Greece, and through Greece to Turkey. There are many other bilateral arrangements with the United States, agreements which include the stockpiling of tactical nuclear weapons (under United States custody), and home-porting. Other matters of common importance would include base facilities at Suda Bay, and matters of command and control to do with the right of passage through the Aegean, overflying rights, operational training, etc. Presumably the question of military exercises would have to be discussed, such as the occasional deployment of ACE Mobile Force in Greek Thrace, and the periodical activation of the Naval On-call Force Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED). The structure of 6th ATAF would have to be considered.

28. It can be simply demonstrated that Greek withdrawal from the integrated military structure would be costly to that country, and contrary to Greek interests.

**NATO infrastructure programmes**  
**Cumulative expenditure to 1971 — £ million**  
**pre-devaluation**  
*(Rough secretariat estimates)*

Country	Country contributions to programmes	Value of projects constructed in country
Belgium	76	53
France	215	255
Federal Republic of Germany	142	307
Italy	87	150
Luxembourg	2	*
Netherlands	62	38
United Kingdom	178	68
<b>TOTAL WEU</b>	<b>762</b>	<b>880</b>

Country	Country contributions to programmes	Value of projects constructed in country
Canada	83	*
Denmark	42	38
Greece	10	105
Norway	34	105
Portugal	3	15
Turkey	18	195
United States	548	38 <sup>1</sup>
Miscellaneous	—	120
<b>TOTAL Non-WEU</b>	<b>738</b>	<b>620</b>
<b>TOTAL NATO</b>	<b>1,500</b>	<b>1,500</b>

29. From the foregoing figures for NATO infrastructure, the Committee understands that up to about 1971 total Greek contributions to NATO common infrastructure projects amounted to some £10 million, whereas the value of such projects constructed in Greece was more than £105 million. It is believed that current Greek contributions to projects in the course of construction in Greece amounts to 8 % of the cost, 92 % being met by the rest of the Alliance. These projects are important to the security of Europe as a whole; they are also vitally important to the defence of Greece itself, they include: improvements to the Metaxas defence line in Northern Greece, Suda Bay, telecommunications radar, airfields, etc. Even if many Greeks for the moment consider that the principal threat to their security comes from Turkey, and not from Russia and its allies, a point of view with which this Committee does not agree, it is true that Greek security *per se* remains a function of its NATO membership. And the memory of the conflicts of 1945-47, when many Greek children were abducted into Bulgaria, is not so easily effaced.

30. Were Greece to withdraw from the integrated military structure, this could not but fail both to weaken Greek security, and to jeopardise the security of the Alliance as a whole. NATO could be deprived of valuable radar coverage and

\* Small, not estimated.

1. Not necessarily on United States territory.

other, more inconvenient and costly, means of surveillance would have to be found. There is also the political damage that would be done to the validity of the Alliance itself, which would be devalued by the reality of Greek withdrawal.

31. The decision by the Greek Government to announce its intention to withdraw from the integrated military structure of NATO can only be understood when placed in the context of national humiliation. The Sampson coup in Cyprus, which was engineered by the "colonels", the Turkish invasion which followed, the change of régime within Greece itself, and the sense of frustration and powerlessness caused by Turkish successes on the island, all these factors combined to render Greek public opinion, at best volatile, bitterly anti-American, and therefore anti-NATO. The Soviet Union, (see Section IV above) has sought to foster this attitude. Thus the gesture to withdraw was inevitable; at least it has served as a device to channel anti-NATO feeling to the advantage of the more moderate political groupings. A weakened NATO is not a Greek interest, for its security, from whatever quarter a threat might come, is largely dependent upon matériel supplied by its allies, but rationality is the first victim of political misfortune. In Greece, the man in the street now sees Turkey as the enemy, and NATO is cast willy-nilly in the rôle of false friend.

32. NATO has been unfairly charged both with bias and pusillanimity by the Greeks. There is no Greek hostility to Greece in NATO. Comparisons made by the Greeks between 1967 and 1974 (in 1967, President Johnson brought pressure to bear on Turkey which at that time appeared to have prevented an invasion of Cyprus) are not valid. The present crisis was triggered off by the coup in Cyprus, an act for which the present Greek Government bears no responsibility, but from the consequences of which it cannot escape. The NATO Council has held twenty meetings in the course of the Cyprus crisis, (five meetings in six days at the height of the crisis) and the Secretary-General can claim some credit by his personal interventions of having prevented the outbreak of war in Thrace. But Mr. Mavros' sudden request at Geneva on the night of 29th July for an immediate NATO Council meeting at ministerial level could not be acceded to for three reasons:

- (i) because no government could dictate at what level (minister or ambassador)

another government should be represented in the North Atlantic Council;

- (ii) because there is no difference between the ministerial and permanent Council (of ambassadors);
- (iii) because it was impossible to expect fifteen Foreign Ministers to meet at such short notice.

33. Cyprus was not Greek territory, and in arguing that NATO had failed to defend Greece that country seems to imply that Cyprus was, in fact, Greek territory.

34. The negotiations on the future Greek relationship with NATO will depend for their progress upon the course of events in Cyprus. There are indications that the Turks are prepared to relinquish some of the territory they have taken. The negotiations will be complicated by the necessity to include both multilateral and bilateral (Greek-United States) agreements. Greece's European allies might point out the contradiction in the Greek position, at one and the same time wishing for close associate status with the EEC, while rejecting integration within the framework on which Europe relies for its common defence. The object of the Greek-NATO negotiations will be to limit any damage that could result from the Greek decision, in particular to avoid any rupture with regard to radar and communications. A total withdrawal from the integrated military structure would be damaging to NATO as a whole, but there is no doubt that the chief sufferers would be Greece and, to a much lesser extent, Turkey. They are the most exposed members of the Alliance.

## VI. Turkey and NATO

35. The Committee does not report on NATO-Turkish relations in this report<sup>1</sup>, they have not been fundamentally modified by the Cyprus situation. While Turkey continues to make a large and important contribution to European security through its own defence effort and its active membership of NATO, the Committee stresses that the value of this contribution is

1. They were dealt with in Document 537 which followed the Committee's visit to Turkey in 1971.

largely negated through the deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations, and that the Turkish attitude in Cyprus has so far done little to help a settlement of the Cyprus problem.

36. The Committee recalls that Turkey makes a special contribution to European security through the application of the Montreux Convention which regulates the passage of warships through the Turkish Straits. Two Soviet aircraft-carriers of some 40,000 tons displacement are under construction in the Black Sea; the first is expected to enter service shortly. In the Committee's view the passage of these carriers through the straits could not be reconciled with the Montreux Convention which permits Black Sea powers to send through the straits in peacetime only "light surface vessels, minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels" (Article 10), or "capital ships" (Article 11) under special conditions (Article 14). The definitions at Annex II to the convention specifically exclude aircraft-carriers from the foregoing authorised categories, and make it clear that the Soviet vessels are aircraft-carriers under the terms of the convention. Relevant extracts are at Appendix III.

### **VII. The United Nations General Assembly debate**

37. The debate in the General Assembly was concluded on 1st November with the unanimous vote — in which Cyprus, Greece and Turkey participated — of a resolution urging "the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus, and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs." Earlier drafts of the resolution, like the Security Council Resolution No. 353 (paragraph 10 above) spoke of the withdrawal of foreign military personnel "present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements..." implying that the 900 Greek and 600 Turkish troops provided for under the 1959 Zurich Agreements could stay, but Greece and representatives of the Turkish Cypriots preferred the adopted wording which calls for the departure of these troops, together with the Turkish invasion forces.

38. The expression "Republic of Cyprus" does not refer to the British sovereign base areas on

the island, as these are not part of the "Republic of Cyprus"; thus the resolution does not call for the withdrawal of British troops. Only the Soviet Union and its allies have called ambiguously — but still without specifically mentioning British troops — for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from "Cyprus".

39. The General Assembly resolution further called on all States "to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus" and recognised that the constitutional system was a matter to be settled through negotiations between the two Cyprus communities. It expressed the hope that "if necessary, further efforts, including negotiations" could take place in the United Nations framework. The Committee does not believe that the United Nations framework will be necessary, or indeed helpful, in the case of Cyprus. The resolution also called on all parties to co-operate with the United Nations force in Cyprus.

40. The Committee believes this resolution to be a workable basis for a settlement, and welcomes its acceptance by Mr. Clerides, President of Cyprus. In a statement on 6th November, he also said: "I see no prospect of the Turks accepting any settlement that does not include federation and some geographical basis for it." The Committee commends the resolution to both communities and all parties to the conflict.

### **VIII. Conclusion**

#### *The draft recommendation*

41. In the *preamble* to the draft recommendation the Committee recalls the Assembly's earlier proposals in Recommendation 254, adopted on 20th June 1974. One called for an observation satellite capability to be available to the United Nations Secretary-General, to provide impartial evidence for the use of the Security Council when cease-fire terms have to be established. The need for such a capability has been demonstrated once again in Cyprus. The second drew attention to the Montreux Convention in the terms of paragraph 36 above.

42. The operative part of the recommendation in *paragraph 1* recognises, as does the United Nations General Assembly resolution mentioned in paragraphs 37 *et seq.* above, that a lasting constitutional settlement in Cyprus, to replace the London and Zurich agreements of 1959, must depend on negotiations between the two communities concerned. The Committee believes that the good offices of NATO and of the members of the European Community must continue to be available to the other parties to the conflict — Greece and Turkey — to assist in particular in settling other matters which, while not in reality related to the problems of the two communities in Cyprus, are inevitably linked through the involvement of the two external countries. In reply to Written Question 148<sup>1</sup>, the Council has already recognised that the London and Zurich agreements would not necessarily form the basis of any new settlement.

43. *Paragraph 2* of the draft recommendation stresses the advantage to each and every member of NATO of active participation in the integrated military structure of NATO. The recommendation is made with particular reference to Greece. The problem of relations between Greece and NATO has been dealt with in paragraphs 24-34 above. One member of the Committee was unable to support this paragraph.

44. In *paragraph 3*, the Committee recognises the importance of a British presence in the sovereign base areas, which were recognised as such by the Cyprus communities, and by Greece and Turkey in the 1959 agreements. In its reply to Written Question 148 mentioned above, the Council has recognised that the six other WEU members are not legally bound by the United Kingdom's guarantee to Cyprus, and that the possible application of Article V of the revised

Brussels Treaty is purely hypothetical. One member of the Committee was unable to support this paragraph.

45. The Committee recognises that mutual concessions will be called for from both Turkey — concerning territorial arrangements in Cyprus, for example — and from Greece — concerning other outstanding matters, not excluding seabed and petroleum rights in the Aegean — before the problem of Cyprus proper can be solved to the lasting benefit of the two communities primarily concerned, and to the security of Europe. Paragraph 1 of the recommendation called for the good offices of the members of the European Community to continue to be available to the parties. In *paragraph 4* the Committee expresses its belief that by fostering full associate status for Greece and Turkey in the European Community, the members of WEU can make it easier for these two countries to settle their other differences.

46. In the first paragraph of the preamble, the Committee deplores the loss of life and human suffering in Cyprus. The Committee is acutely conscious of the fact that there are at present 200,000 refugees in Cyprus, many living in wretched conditions and faced with the approach of winter. The Committee urges in *paragraph 5* of the draft recommendation that relief supplies should be made available rapidly from reserve defence stocks to assist in the provision of humanitarian aid.

47. The report as a whole was adopted by the Committee by 14 votes to 0 with 2 abstentions.

1. Appendix IV.

## APPENDIX I

**RECOMMENDATION 254**<sup>1</sup>***on security and the Mediterranean***<sup>2</sup>

The Assembly,

Deploring the resumption of hostilities in the Near and Middle East in 1973, and expressing its sympathy with all the peoples involved ;

Considering that Europe should make its views known and its voice heard through the European Community, and endorsing therefore the communiqué issued by the nine governments on 13th October and the resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 17th October 1973 ;

Expressing its full support for Security Council Resolutions 338, 339 and 340 ;

Recalling paragraph 8 of its Recommendation 227 ;

Concerned at the possible strategic consequences of Soviet involvement in the Middle East ;

Having considered the security problems of the Mediterranean area as a whole, the attitudes of the Western Mediterranean countries in particular, and hoping that at an appropriate time it will be possible to associate Spain with the defence of Europe ;

Welcoming in this connection the decisive step on the road to democracy taken by Portugal ;

Convinced however that there is no alternative to NATO as the basis of European defence both in the Mediterranean and elsewhere,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

Urge member governments :

1. To call for the establishment of a United Nations observation satellite capability under the authority of the Secretary-General ;
2. To ensure that the intensive study being carried out in NATO of the lessons which that organisation might learn from the conduct and outcome of the Middle East conflict covers fully the use of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and observation satellites ; the conclusions to be drawn for the equipment of NATO forces ; and the downgrading of the concept of political warning of impending hostilities ;
3. To call on all WEU countries able to deploy naval forces in the Indian Ocean to provide reciprocal access to all available bases, and to co-ordinate their plans to ensure that the total naval presence maintained by NATO countries in the Ocean is commensurate with that of the Soviet Union ;

---

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1974 during the First Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (5th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Jung on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 637).

4. To make appropriate representations to ensure that the Montreux Convention of 1936 is correctly applied, in particular so that aircraft-carriers do not pass through the Turkish Straits ;

5. To press for improvements in NATO defence arrangements in the Mediterranean, especially through the resumption by France of its former command responsibility in the Western Mediterranean and by transforming the present on-call force into a Standing Naval Force, Mediterranean, with a substantial European contribution and with international financing in appropriate circumstances.

## APPENDIX II

**Statement by the Chairman of the Committee**

*Paris, 29th July 1974*

Mr. Julian Critchley, M.P. (United Kingdom, Conservative), Chairman of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Assembly of Western European Union, issued the following statement today :

"In view of the grave deterioration in relations between Greece and Turkey which followed the recent coup d'Etat in Cyprus, and the fact that the security of Europe is inevitably endangered in any dispute between members of NATO, I had seriously considered convening the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments urgently with a view to adopting a draft recommendation to the Council of WEU.

In the light of subsequent developments however, in particular the very great restraint and political courage shown by the leaders of Turkey and Greece in the talks between the three guarantor powers, and the intervention of the cease-fire, I have decided that an immediate

meeting of the Committee would serve no purpose. I have instead proposed that the Committee be instructed to report to the next part-session of the Assembly on the situation in Cyprus and security in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Assembly of WEU is in fact the only European parliamentary body responsible for making recommendations on matters affecting European security, and it behoves it to make its views known promptly in situations such as these. The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has in the past had the opportunity of visiting Turkey to examine defence problems at first hand. I hope that at an appropriate time in the future the Committee may be able to visit Cyprus and Greece to make a similar appreciation.

I am certain that I express the views of my colleagues, members of the Committee, in deploring the tragic loss of life and the human suffering that has occurred in Cyprus and in expressing sympathy to all the communities concerned."

## APPENDIX III

**Convention regarding the régime of the Straits  
(the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora,  
and the Bosphorus)**

*Signed at Montreux on 20th July 1936*

*Entered into force on 9th November 1936*

Parties : Australia, Bulgaria, France, Greece,  
Japan, Romania, Turkey, USSR,  
United Kingdom, Yugoslavia

(Extracts)

.....

## ARTICLE 10

In time of peace, light surface vessels, minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea powers, and whatever their flag, shall enjoy freedom of transit through the Straits without any taxes or charges whatever, provided that such transit is begun during daylight and subject to the conditions laid down in Article 13 and the articles following thereafter.

Vessels of war other than those which fall within the categories specified in the preceding paragraph shall only enjoy a right of transit under the special conditions provided by Articles 11 and 12.

## ARTICLE 11

Black Sea powers may send through the Straits capital ships of a tonnage greater than that laid down in the first paragraph of Article 14, on condition that these vessels pass through the Straits singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers.

(Article 12 concerns submarines only)

.....

1. The Convention was concluded in the French language only. The extracts are taken from the official English translation presented to the British Parliament (Cmd 5551 of 1937).

## ARTICLE 14

The maximum aggregate tonnage of all foreign naval forces which may be in course of transit through the Straits shall not exceed 15,000 tons, except in the cases provided for in Article 11 and in Annex III to the present Convention.

The forces specified in the preceding paragraph shall not, however, comprise more than nine vessels.

Vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea powers, paying visits to a port in the Straits, in accordance with the provisions of Article 17, shall not be included in this tonnage.

Neither shall vessels of war which have suffered damage during their passage through the Straits be included in this tonnage ; such vessels, while undergoing repair, shall be subject to any special provisions relating to security laid down by Turkey.

.....

## ANNEX II

.....

B. *Categories.*

(1) *Capital ships* are surface vessels of war belonging to one of the two following sub-categories :

- (a) surface vessels of war, other than aircraft carriers, auxiliary vessels, or capital ships of sub-category (b), the standard displacement of which exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) or which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 in. (203 mm.) ;

- (b) surface vessels of war, other than aircraft-carriers, the standard displacement of which does not exceed 8,000 tons (8,128 metric tons) and which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 in. (203 mm.).

(2) *Aircraft-carriers* are surface vessels of war, whatever their displacement, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of carrying and operating aircraft at sea. The fitting of a landing-on or flying-off deck on any vessel of war, provided such vessel has not been designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of carrying and operat-

ing aircraft at sea, shall not cause any vessel so fitted to be classified in the category of aircraft-carriers.

The category of aircraft-carriers is divided into two sub-categories as follows :

- (a) vessels fitted with a flight deck, from which aircraft can take off, or on which aircraft can land from the air ;
- (b) vessels not fitted with a flight deck as described in (a) above.

.....

## APPENDIX IV

*Written Question 148 and reply of the Council***QUESTION 148<sup>1</sup>*****put by Mr. P.-C. Krieg***

148. Taking account of the fact that in its reply to Recommendation 241 the Council affirmed that "the courses of action" proposed by the Assembly "with a view to uniting the efforts of its members" to ensure peace in the Near and Middle East were "already under consideration in the specialised international fora concerned",

Does the Council consider that a return to the status imposed in Cyprus by the London and Zurich agreements can constitute the basis for lasting peace in that island ?

Does it consider that the six other members of WEU are committed by the guarantee accorded by the United Kingdom to this status ?

Does it consider that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty would be applied in the event of the United Kingdom being involved in hostilities because of this guarantee ?

***Reply of the Council<sup>2</sup>***

148. (i) The London and Zurich agreements on Cyprus provided the basis of the constitutional arrangements on the island from 1960 onwards. It is clear that these arrangements which had not been working in practice for some years, have been shown to have substantial weaknesses. Any new settlement on the island would not necessarily be based on the previous agreements.

(ii) The six other members of WEU are not legally committed in any way by the guarantee accorded by the United Kingdom — as one of three guarantor powers — to the Cyprus constitution under the treaty of guarantee of 1960.

(iii) With regard to the hypothetical point raised at the end of this question, the Council consider that any question of the application of Article V of the revised Brussels Treaty would have to be examined in the light of the precise circumstances in which such a situation arose.

---

1. Addressed to the President of the Assembly on 25th July 1974, and transmitted by him on the same day to the Chairman of the Council, in accordance with Rule 45 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly.

2. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th October 1974.

***European security and the situation in the  
Eastern Mediterranean***

---

**AMENDMENT No. 1<sup>1</sup>**  
***tabled by Mr. Krieg***

---

Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

“4. Foster the accession of Greece to the EEC ;”

*Signed : Krieg*

---

1. See 9th Sitting, 4th December 1974 (Amendment consolidated with Amendment No. 6 and adopted).

***European security and the situation in the  
Eastern Mediterranean***

---

**AMENDMENT No. 2<sup>1</sup>**  
***tabled by Mr. Krieg***

---

1. In the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "contributes" and insert "contributed".
2. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper.

*Signed: Krieg*

---

1. See 9th Sitting, 4th December 1974 (paragraph 1 withdrawn, paragraph 2 negatived).

***European security and the situation in the  
Eastern Mediterranean***

---

**AMENDMENT No. 3<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by MM. Roper, Dankert and van Ooijen***

---

In the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "Turkey" insert "and between the communities in Cyprus".

*Signed: Roper, Dankert, van Ooijen*

---

1. See 9th Sitting, 4th December 1974 (Amendment adopted).

***European security and the situation in the  
Eastern Mediterranean***

---

**AMENDMENT No. 4<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by MM. Roper, Dankert and van Ooijen***

---

Leave out the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation.

*Signed : Roper, Dankert, van Ooijen*

---

1. See 9th Sitting, 4th December 1974 (Amendment withdrawn).

***European security and the situation in the  
Eastern Mediterranean***

---

**AMENDMENT No. 5<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by MM. Roper, Dankert and van Ooijen***

---

In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "NATO and" and insert "their partners and allies in Europe and in particular".

*Signed : Roper, Dankert, van Ooijen*

---

1. See 9th Sitting, 4th December 1974 (Amendment amended and adopted).

***European security and the situation in the  
Eastern Mediterranean***

---

**AMENDMENT No. 6<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by MM. Roper, Dankert and van Ooijen***

---

In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Foster the association" and insert "Develop the association agreements".

*Signed : Roper, Dankert, van Ooijen*

---

1. See 9th Sitting, 4th December 1974 (Amendment consolidated with Amendment No. 1 and adopted).

***European security and the situation in the  
Eastern Mediterranean***

---

**AMENDMENT No. 7<sup>1</sup>**  
***tabled by Mr. Roper***

---

Leave out the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert :

“Believing that the continued presence of British defence installations in Cyprus, in accordance with international agreements to which representatives of the Cyprus communities are parties, contributes to the defence of Europe as a whole ;”

*Signed : Roper*

---

1. See 9th Sitting, 4th December 1974 (Amendment adopted).

***European security and the situation in the  
Eastern Mediterranean***

---

**AMENDMENT No. 8<sup>1</sup>**  
***tabled by Mr. Roper***

---

In the preamble to the draft recommendation, after the fifth paragraph insert the following new paragraph :

“Convinced that the United Nations force in Cyprus, to which three members of the European Community have contributed, is playing an essential rôle in the return to normal conditions in the island ;”

*Signed : Roper*

---

1. See 9th Sitting, 4th December 1974 (Amendment adopted).

***European security and the situation in the  
Eastern Mediterranean***

---

**AMENDMENT No. 9<sup>1</sup>**  
***tabled by Mr. Roper***

---

Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert :

“3. Recognise the importance of the continued presence of British defence installations in Cyprus ;”

*Signed : Roper*

---

1. See 9th Sitting, 4th December 1974 (Amendment adopted).

***European security and the situation in the  
Eastern Mediterranean***

---

**AMENDMENT No. 10<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by MM. Mattick and Richter***

---

1. At the beginning of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following paragraph :  
“1. Request member governments of WEU to examine to what extent humanitarian aid for the 200,000 refugees on Cyprus could be enhanced, particularly, whether through rapid deliveries from reserve defence stocks the survival of those concerned through the winter could be ensured ; furthermore to appeal to the responsible States to dissolve the refugee camps and to house the refugees in civilised quarters ;”
2. Leave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.

*Signed : Mattick, Richter*

---

1. See 9th Sitting, 4th December 1974 (Amendment amended and adopted).

*Replies of the Council to Recommendations 246 to 255*

---

**RECOMMENDATION 246 <sup>1</sup>**  
***on the political activities of the Council* <sup>2</sup>**

---

The Assembly,

Considering that the political activities of the Council were very limited in 1973 ;

Noting the information given on matters dealt with in other bodies ;

Regretting, however, that the replies given to certain recommendations — particularly Recommendation 241 — are still quite insufficient ;

Recalling the wish already expressed in Recommendations 19 and 103 concerning the appointment of the Secretary-General ;

Noting that progress towards the political union of Europe in institutional matters and in the preparation of a common policy has been slight and uncertain,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Pursue its efforts to improve the dialogue with the Assembly in ensuring the full application of the modified Brussels Treaty ;
2. Give the Assembly more details concerning bilateral relations between its members and third countries ;
3. As in NATO and the Council of Europe, preferably appoint a political personality as Secretary-General of WEU after consulting the Presidential Committee of the Assembly.

---

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1974 during the First Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (2nd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Steel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 633).

---

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>**  
**to Recommendation 246**

---

1. As stated in their reply to Recommendation 249, it is the Council's aim to maintain a close and satisfactory relationship with the Assembly.
2. The Council consider that to provide more details concerning bilateral relations than those normally given in Chapter II of the annual report would give rise to a number of objections, both practical and of principle.
3. The Council remain of the opinion that the appointment of a political personality as Secretary-General of WEU is not called for in present circumstances. Moreover, comparison with NATO and the Council of Europe does not appear justified in this context.

---

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 30th September 1974.

**RECOMMENDATION 247<sup>1</sup>**  
***on the application of the Brussels Treaty<sup>2</sup>***

---

The Assembly,

Welcoming the Council's recognition that it retains all its responsibilities under the treaty, as exemplified by the full account in the annual report of activities under the treaty, whether now exercised within the Council or in other bodies ;

Aware that the Council's reply to Recommendation 209 states that : "the Council will continue to make every effort to ensure that the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty relating to the control of armaments are observed as fully as possible", but aware also of : "the difficulties in attaining this aim" ;

Aware however that the Council has not accepted the Assembly's proposals to facilitate full observation by eliminating the discriminatory provisions of the treaty either through amendment or *ex gratia* acts of the member States ;

Calling therefore for a clear public statement of the extent to which the arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are applied or not applied, and insisting on the entry into force of the Convention on the due process of law ;

Congratulating the Agency for the Control of Armaments on the way in which it has carried out in difficult circumstances the limited tasks assigned to it by the Council ;

Recalling that it has expressed the greatest interest in the use of the Standing Armaments Committee as a co-ordinating and review body responsible for detecting and making proposals for eliminating duplication in other international bodies concerned with the standardisation and joint production of armaments,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Include in its annual reports a clearer and more detailed statement of its activities concerning the levels of forces of member States, in particular the information given in reply to Written Question 130 ;
2. Include in its annual reports a prominent, full and clear statement of all aspects of the arms control provisions of the Brussels Treaty which are not fully applied, and respect the undertaking given in reply to paragraph 2 of Recommendation 222 to include in their annual report each year certain specified material ;
3. Continue to press for the entry into force of the Convention on the due process of law signed on 14th December 1957;
4. Submit to the Assembly at the second part of the present session an interim report on the examination by the Permanent Council of the work of the Standing Armaments Committee.

---

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1974 during the First Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (2nd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 638).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**  
**to Recommendation 247**

---

1. In drawing up their annual reports, the Council make every effort to provide the Assembly with as clear and detailed information as possible on their activities concerning the level of forces of member States. The Assembly will realise however that, as stated on previous occasions, in providing this information, certain limitations have to be taken into account, in particular the secret nature of some of the military information involved. As to the information given in reply to Written Question 130, the Council are prepared to furnish this in their future annual reports.

2. It will be clear from the foregoing that within certain limitations, the Council provide the Assembly with as much information as they can. With regard to those arms control provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty which cannot be fully applied, the Assembly's attention is drawn to the Council's statements in their annual reports.

3. As the Assembly is aware, the problems which prevent the entry into force of the Convention on the due process of law still exist.

4. As the Assembly is aware, the Council have been engaged for some time in a review of the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee. Although the Council have devoted considerable time and effort to this complicated question and made a study of several possible solutions, they have not yet been able to reach definite conclusions.

In these circumstances, the Council are of the opinion that they are not in a position to submit an interim report on their examination of the activities of the Standing Armaments Committee. They will bear in mind the possibility of reporting to the Assembly as soon as more substantive results have been obtained.

In the meantime, the Assembly may rest assured that the Council are anxious to avoid any duplication of the work of the Standing Armaments Committee with that of other international fora in the field of the standardisation and joint production of armaments.

---

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 3rd October 1974.

**RECOMMENDATION 248 <sup>1</sup>**  
**on the European Space Agency <sup>2</sup>**

---

The Assembly,

I. Taking note of the parts of the nineteenth annual report of the Council on scientific, technological and space questions and considering the time taken by the Council in answering the Assembly's recommendations on aviation and nuclear policies ;

\*

\*\*

II. Welcoming the draft convention for the establishment of a European Space Agency ;

Noting that it did not prove possible to bring the European space activities into the framework of the European Communities and hence into that of the future European political union, but considering that the situation might be turned to better account by promoting a wider membership of the agency ;

Regretting that through delays in nominating a director-general and other senior officials the European Space Agency could not start work on 1st April 1974 ;

Aware of the draft resolution on the establishment of relations between the agency and the Council of Europe, appended to the final act ;

Conscious of the need made evident by the energy crisis to accelerate study, research and development on European earth resources satellites to conduct surveys, *inter alia*, for deposits of concentrated minerals,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

I. Answer in an appropriate manner and with greater alacrity the Assembly's recommendations on topical questions such as "an aviation policy for Europe" and "nuclear policies" ;

\*

\*\*

II. Invite all free Western European countries to join or be associated with the European Space Agency and its scientific and technological work or its application satellites ;

Convey to the governments concerned the political reasons for losing no time in providing the agency with the wherewithal to fulfil its task and urge the immediate appointment of a director-general and other senior officials in order to assure that the programme will be executed as foreseen ;

Seek to include in the abovementioned convention a commitment by the European Space Agency to co-operate with the Assemblies of the Council of Europe and Western European Union as well as with the national parliaments of the member countries, and to submit to them an annual report for information or an opinion and, if it is not possible to include this in the convention, to amend the resolution accordingly ;

Urge the Council of the European Space Agency to implement its programme without forgetting to promote in the near future, in the framework of its application satellites programme, research and development of earth resources satellites.

---

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1974 during the First Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (2nd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Richter on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 639).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>**  
**to Recommendation 248**

---

1. On the substance and speed of replies to Assembly recommendations, the Council draw attention to their reply to Assembly Recommendation 249.

2. The Council would welcome wider participation in the European Space Agency as suggested in the first sub-paragraph of paragraph II of the recommendation. Those participating in the European Space Conference, from which the European Space Agency will be formed, include all member governments of the European Communities (with the exception of Luxembourg) and several other governments. The draft European Space Agency Convention contains provision for new membership, associate membership and participation by non-member States in particular programmes.

The Council share the Assembly's concern about the delay in the appointment of a Director-General and other senior officials to the European Space Agency. Negotiations on this and other outstanding issues are at present taking place at the European Space Conference.

As for co-operation with parliamentary bodies, draft Resolution No. 5 appended to the draft Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries set up to establish the European Space Agency is designed to maintain the arrangements which have applied hitherto to ELDO and ESRO. Parliamentary discussion of the work of these organisations was facilitated by an arrangement by which their annual reports were sent for information to the Council of Europe where they were debated in the Consultative Assembly. The texts of the draft convention and the draft resolution are the product of much negotiation between all the member States of the European Space Conference, some of whom are members of neither the European Communities, nor the Council of Europe nor Western European Union. Consequently, the Council do not consider it desirable to amend them.

The programme agreed at the ministerial meeting of the European Space Conference on 31st July 1973 for creation of the European Space Agency, participation in the United States post-Apollo programme by the construction of the European Space Laboratory (SPACELAB), design and construction of a European Maritime Orbital Test Satellite (MAROTS) and development of a European heavy rocket launcher (Ariane), is already well under way. The importance of the research and development of earth resources satellites is recognised by most member States of the European Space Conference, several of which are developing their own earth resources surveying facilities. It is expected that earth resources satellites will be discussed when future programmes for applications satellites are discussed in the Council of the European Space Agency.

---

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 16th September 1974.

**RECOMMENDATION 249**<sup>1</sup>  
*on relations between the Assembly and the Council*<sup>2</sup>

---

The Assembly,

Considering that most of the replies of the Council to the recommendations adopted by the Assembly at the second part of the nineteenth session reached the Assembly at a date which did not allow the Committees to examine them when preparing the first part of the twentieth session ;

Noting the inadequacy of the reply to Recommendation 241 ;

Noting that no reply has been given to Recommendation 242 ;

Reserving the right to use the procedure provided for under Article V (h) of its Charter,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Reply henceforth to recommendations of the Assembly within eight weeks ;
2. In respect of such recommendations, furnish substantial replies to all the points on which the seven member countries are able to reach agreement.

---

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 18th June 1974 during the First Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (2nd Sitting).

2. Motion for a recommendation tabled by Mr. Kahn-Ackermann and others with a request for urgent procedure (Document 642).

---

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>**  
**to *Recommendation 249***

---

In his speech on behalf of the Chairman-in-Office of the Council on 18th June, Mr. Roy Hattersley assured the Assembly of the Council's wish to maintain the closest possible dialogue with the Assembly. At the same time, he stressed that it would be a mistake to underestimate the task of formulating common views on the various important problems with which the Assembly is concerned (in this context, he referred specifically to Recommendation 242), and the difficulty of furnishing replies to recommendations with the speed which not only the Assembly, but the Council themselves, would wish.

The Council have given urgent and serious thought to various points which were raised in the course of the Assembly's recent debates, and in particular to possible ways of improving their procedure for replying to the Assembly's recommendations. They have concluded, with regret, that it would be unrealistic to give an undertaking to reply to all recommendations within eight weeks. They will nevertheless take all steps they can to ensure that replies are sent to the Assembly in the shortest possible time, and indeed wherever practicable, well within eight weeks. They will also be concerned to make these replies as substantial as possible.

The Council wish to reaffirm the high importance which they continue to attach to the maintenance of a close and satisfactory relationship with the Assembly.

---

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th July 1974.

**RECOMMENDATION 250**<sup>1</sup>  
**on improving the status of WEU staff**<sup>2</sup>

---

The Assembly,

Congratulating the government budgetary experts for expressing the will, in the 94th report of the Co-ordinating Committee, to work out a pension scheme similar to that in force in the Communities and for making proposals, in the 93rd report of that Committee, for ensuring equal treatment for male and female staff in the co-ordinated organisations ;

Aware of the problems raised by fluctuating exchange rates for non-resident officials with commitments in their countries of origin ;

Considering the discrimination between officials of nationalities other than that of the country in which they are employed according to whether they occupy grade C posts on the one hand or grade A, L or B posts on the other ;

Regretting finally the extreme difficulty or even impossibility of promotion for WEU officials,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

I. In the framework of the co-ordinated organisations :

1. Ensure that a pension scheme which is truly similar to that in force in the European Communities is introduced with provision, *inter alia*, for the establishment of a system of internal taxation of salaries and pensions, bonuses for officials remaining in service after the normal age of entitlement to a pension and the creation of a joint management body with its own legal status separate from the organisations in respect of which each government would enter into financial commitments which would thus remain unaffected in the event of a country withdrawing from one of the co-ordinated organisations or an organisation being wound up ;

2. Provide further for :

- (i) introducing a system of separation allowances which would not be affected by currency depreciations for officials not remaining in service long enough to qualify for a pension ;
- (ii) maintaining the possibility for officials to obtain loans for building or renovating accommodation ;
- (iii) establishing for retired officials — particularly those who do not have medical coverage in the country to which they retire — a system providing suitable coverage and which shall be partly financed by their contributions ;
- (iv) granting widowers of female officials the reversionary rights allowed in the case of widows of male officials ;

3. Seek a means of allowing non-resident officials to meet financial commitments in their countries of origin by authorising — subject to specific justification — the payment of a portion of their salaries in their national currencies on the basis of salary scales applicable in the countries concerned ;

---

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1974 during the First Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (3rd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration (Document 631).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>**  
**to Recommendation 250**

**I. Measures recommended by the Assembly in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations**

1. In their reply to Assembly Recommendation 240 on improving the status of WEU staff, the Council informed the Assembly of the progress of the initial work by the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts on the establishment of a common pension scheme for the staff of the co-ordinated organisations.

This work has been continued at subsequent meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee on the basis of the report submitted to the Committee by the specialist working group on pensions. The taxation arrangements to be applied to pensions have yet to be agreed and there are a small number of other points of lesser importance still to be resolved. These problems will be the subject of further discussion in the Co-ordinating Committee at its meetings in the course of the next few months. The Council are not yet, therefore, in a position to reply in full to all the points raised in Recommendation 250.

It can be stated, however, that agreement is near on the establishment of a system of bonuses for officials remaining in service after the normal age of pension entitlement, but that this may be applied only to staff serving in the co-ordinated organisations prior to 30th June 1974.

The form which the joint management body suggested by the Assembly might take has still to be studied in detail.

2. No decision has been taken by the Co-ordinating Committee on points (i), (ii) and (iii).

The Co-ordinating Committee was unable to agree that, at the present time, widowers of female officials should be granted a reversionary pension on the same conditions as widows of male staff.

3. Proposals to enable non-resident officials to meet financial commitments in their countries of origin through the payment of a portion of their salaries in their own national currencies, were submitted by the Secretary-General of WEU to the Co-ordinating Committee in 1973. The Committee decided, however, that such proposals could only be considered if submitted by the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General following normal procedure. Should the Secretaries-General of the other co-ordinated organisations agree on an appropriate formula, fresh proposals will be submitted after current work on the pension scheme has been completed.

4. This point has not yet been considered by the Co-ordinating Committee, but the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General are at liberty to put forward appropriate proposals should they consider them justified.

**II. Measures recommended by the Assembly in the framework of WEU**

5. While recognising that the position of WEU staff gives rise to certain special problems as regards promotion prospects, the Council feel unable to act upon the Assembly's recommendation for the introduction of a general system of dual grading at every level. They consider that individual special measures should be sufficient to resolve the difficulties arising in this connection.

---

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th October 1974.

4. Grant grade C officials who are not nationals of the country in which they are employed the right to home leave and education allowance on the same basis as non-resident grade A, L and B officials;

II. In the framework of WEU:

5. Give urgent consideration to dual grades at every level in order to offset promotion difficulties.



**RECOMMENDATION 251 <sup>1</sup>**

***on obstacles to agreement between Europe and the United States  
on solving present economic and political problems <sup>2</sup>***

The Assembly,

Considering that close understanding between Europe and the United States is essential for the solution of present-day political, economic and monetary problems and for the security of the western world ;

Believing that President Kennedy's proposal to base the Atlantic Community on two pillars should be the basis of relations between the European and North American members of the Alliance ;

Regretting that Europe has not yet managed to harmonise its views sufficiently to form a real partner for the United States ;

Fearing that this situation may further weaken Europe's influence in the world and augment the reciprocal mistrust on either side of the Atlantic which has sometimes attained dangerous proportions in recent months ;

Considering that a declaration of principles can in no event replace institutionalised consultations between the European Community and the United States, which form the two pillars of the Alliance ;

Considering that the development of American-Soviet relations makes it urgent to initiate detailed consultations on this subject in the Alliance ;

Noting that in accordance with the modified Brussels Treaty WEU is still the only truly European organisation with responsibilities in the defence field ;

Wishing to organise and develop its relations with the North American members of the Atlantic Alliance in the parliamentary field,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Consider what repercussions the problem raised by co-operation between Europe and the United States might have on European security and include these matters in its agenda as being one of its main duties under the Brussels Treaty ;
2. In a more general respect, consider regularly the problems raised by the security of Europe and discuss accordingly in the Alliance the solutions it proposes ;
3. To this end, meet prior to each meeting of the North Atlantic Council with a view to preparing the discussions with the other members of the Atlantic Alliance.

---

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1974 during the First Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (3rd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Sieglerschmidt on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (document 632).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**  
**to Recommendation 251**

---

The Council share the Assembly's view that close understanding between the partners of the Alliance, especially between the United States and its European allies, is essential for the security of Western Europe.

In the opinion of the Council, Europe's development towards political unity is by no means inconsistent with the maintenance of solidarity within the Alliance. On the contrary, as stated in paragraph 9 of the Atlantic declaration, it is also recognised that the further progress towards unity, which the member States of the European Community are determined to make, should in due course have a beneficial effect on the contribution to the common defence of the Alliance of those of them who belong to it.

In the Atlantic declaration, the allies have given themselves a practical guideline for their future action. To this end, they have reaffirmed their resolve to inform each other fully and to intensify the practice of frank and timely consultations.

The security of the members of the Atlantic Alliance is indivisible. It is therefore necessary that questions affecting the security and defence of the allies should be treated by them jointly. The appropriate organ for this is the North Atlantic Council. This does not preclude the European allies concerting their point of view in appropriate cases before such questions are dealt with by the North Atlantic Council. In the past, a number of European allies have already met, within the framework of the relevant bodies, for a specific exchange of views on such questions. The Council will continue to discuss all problems which fall within their sphere of competence under the Brussels Treaty and, in doing so, co-operate closely with the organs of the Atlantic Alliance in accordance with Article IV of that treaty.

---

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th October 1974.

**RECOMMENDATION 252**<sup>1</sup>  
***on consultation and decisions in the Atlantic Alliance***<sup>2</sup>

---

The Assembly,

Concerned at the inadequacy of consultation and joint decision in the Atlantic Alliance on various occasions during the past eighteen months ;

Aware that at different times there has been unreadiness to consult both on the part of the Nine and the United States ;

Believing that machinery alone cannot ensure consultation if the will to consult is lacking,

RECOMMENDS TO THE COUNCIL

1. To improve consultation in the North Atlantic Council through the attendance of political directors at least twice a year, and by maintaining in that Council "the fullest possible exchange of views and information, and close consultation and co-operation, in a spirit of mutual trust, on all problems of common concern" \* irrespective of the geographical areas in which the problems may arise ;
2. To urge the North Atlantic Council to pay more attention to Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty ;
3. To invite the Nine to hold consultations with the United States on matters of common concern when the formulation of decisions is sufficiently advanced to allow the Nine to defend a common point of view but before the Nine have finalised their decision ;
4. To ensure that bilateral channels of information and consultation with the United States remain open ;
5. To ensure through the foregoing processes of consultation that no concessions are made that are contrary to the vital interest of Europe in the three East-West conferences CSCE, MBFR and SALT, whatever pressures for agreement there may be.

---

\* North Atlantic Council communiqué of 11th December 1973.

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1974 during the First Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (3rd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Critchley on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 635).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>**  
**to Recommendation 252**

---

1. The Council can assure the Assembly that the importance of close consultation and co-operation is fully recognised within the Alliance, as paragraph 11 of the Ottawa declaration on Atlantic relations makes clear. Meetings of the North Atlantic Council are attended by senior officials and experts from capitals as and when their authorities consider this to be useful.

The Council point out that the importance of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty was fully recognised in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Ottawa declaration, which states that allied governments will work to remove sources of conflict between their economic policies and recalls their dedication to the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, justice and social progress.

2. As regards the separate problem of relations between the Nine and the United States, the Council are glad to inform the Assembly that informal practical arrangements for consultation between the Nine and the United States have been worked out, and are already being put into effect. Such consultation in no way derogates from the importance of the bilateral channels of information and consultation between individual members of the Nine and the United States.

The Council can assure the Assembly that there are close and regular consultations between the allies taking part in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and in the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions. The United States authorities also keep the European allies informed, in the North Atlantic Council, of the progress of the strategic arms limitation talks. In all these negotiations, Europe's vital interests in the matter are constantly stressed by the European governments directly concerned.

---

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 28th October 1974.

**RECOMMENDATION 253<sup>1</sup>**  
***on a European policy on the peaceful  
uses of nuclear energy<sup>2</sup>***

---

The Assembly,

Regretting that after nearly twenty years of nuclear activities in the European framework it has not proved possible to formulate a common industrial nuclear policy ;

Aware of the present tendency, particularly since the oil crisis, to seek solutions to energy problems within a national framework without attempting to find a European solution ;

Aware also that no binding decisions can be expected from international organisations such as the United Nations ;

Conscious of the need to reach to a greater extent common political decisions on the type of reactors which the national utilities should adopt ;

Considering that political decisions will be based on the advice of the national nuclear energy agencies ;

Considering that industrialists cannot act in concert unless political agreements have been reached,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

Urge the governments of member countries :

1. To convene the heads of national nuclear energy agencies and of public utilities to meet within the appropriate framework with a view to determining a joint policy and making recommendations to their respective governments on the choice of reactors for the medium and long term ;
2. To seek political agreement on the choice of reactors to be built for the utilities for the medium and long term ;
3. To promote the formation of a limited number of large-scale industrial nuclear groupings and to extend competition to the whole of Western Europe ;
4. To establish incentives for industrial development for European groupings on a European rather than national scale ;
5. To ensure that Europe has sufficient independence in the nuclear field so that it may elaborate its own industrial strategy and be free to export European-made nuclear power plants and other nuclear industrial products ;
6. To initiate joint action to inform public opinion of the necessity and implications of the widespread use of nuclear power and the alternatives if this is denied.

---

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 19th June 1974 during the First Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (3rd Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Osborn on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 640).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>**  
**to Recommendation 253**

---

The need to find a solution for the energy problem, which has been a matter of constant concern to Europe, particularly since the second world war, has now developed into an outright challenge on which the economic future of our continent largely depends.

Europe is not, however, without assets and hopes in this field. At the moment, these include the recent discoveries of oil and natural gas under the North Sea and the prospects of significantly-augmented nuclear energy programmes in the fairly near future.

While co-operation between European countries is still to be established in the case of oil and gas, achievements in the nuclear field, and particularly in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, are already substantial even if imperfect and open to improvement.

Over the last few years, for example, many attempts have been made to promote, if not a common industrial nuclear policy, at least some concertation of national policies.

Reference to the part played by Euratom is made in the Council's reply to Recommendation 235. Efforts in this direction are made in particular through the regular contacts which are now taking place between political and industrial leaders in Europe, between national nuclear energy agencies and in European co-operative fora such as the European Nuclear Energy Society and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD.

This concertation of policies has already produced practical results in the shape of a number of joint actions which are limited in scope no doubt, but are by no means unimportant and are encouraging for the future. These include, for example, shared nuclear power stations (Franco-Belgian), UNIREP, Eurodif, Urenco, the Laue/Langevin Institute at Grenoble for the construction and operation of a high-flux reactor, the EDF-RWE-EWEL agreement on the Super Phénix reactor, the Franco-Italian agreement on fast neutron reactors, UNIPEDE, the European fusion programme at Culham, the Benelux/German programme for the development of a fast reactor at Kalkar, the Dragon HTR programme at Winfrith, the participation of French, German, Italian and Spanish interests in mining uranium in Niger, and so on.

It may seem that such measures should be even more actively encouraged. It should not be overlooked, however, that in present circumstances, this line of action, which some may consider to be too limited and over-cautious, represents a pragmatic, realistic approach to the situation which has offered the only means of achieving the successes enumerated above. It seems likely that the setting of over-ambitious targets involving authoritarian procedures paying less attention to the interests of individual countries or industries, might have blocked attempts to co-operate in this field, or even led to their failure.

In this respect, the experience of the last few years shows that economic, environmental and industrial considerations have largely decided each country's choice of a type of reactor and that the advice which national nuclear agencies can give should not be overestimated.

It would appear that while the conclusion of political agreements is an essential condition, it is by no means sufficient if industrialists are not already willing to act in concert. Their willingness to do so would of course be encouraged by such political agreements.

Lastly, while the vital rôle of reactors in the nuclear energy process cannot be disputed, the main guarantee of a measure of European independence in the nuclear field lies not in reactors but in supplies

---

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1974.



of uranium and in the means of enriching it. The importance of the problem of uranium supplies was appreciated by the founders of Euratom. But the supply agency set up under Chapter VI of the treaty is not suited to its aims and changes have now been proposed. Reactors are no more than a product of technical "know-how". Once access to this technology is obtained, either by developments in Europe or through licences, it remains a permanent acquisition. If, however, no reliable supplies of uranium are available, Europe is still and will remain dependent in the nuclear energy field, even if it possesses original reactor techniques.

**RECOMMENDATION 254<sup>1</sup>**  
***on security and the Mediterranean*<sup>2</sup>**

---

The Assembly,

Deploring the resumption of hostilities in the Near and Middle East in 1973, and expressing its sympathy with all the peoples involved ;

Considering that Europe should make its views known and its voice heard through the European Community, and endorsing therefore the communiqué issued by the nine governments on 13th October and the resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 17th October 1973 ;

Expressing its full support for Security Council Resolutions 338, 339 and 340 ;

Recalling paragraph 8 of its Recommendation 227 ;

Concerned at the possible strategic consequences of Soviet involvement in the Middle East ;

Having considered the security problems of the Mediterranean area as a whole, the attitudes of the Western Mediterranean countries in particular, and hoping that at an appropriate time it will be possible to associate Spain with the defence of Europe ;

Welcoming in this connection the decisive step on the road to democracy taken by Portugal ;

Convinced however that there is no alternative to NATO as the basis of European defence both in the Mediterranean and elsewhere,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

Urge member governments :

1. To call for the establishment of a United Nations observation satellite capability under the authority of the Secretary-General ;
2. To ensure that the intensive study being carried out in NATO of the lessons which that organisation might learn from the conduct and outcome of the Middle East conflict covers fully the use of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and observation satellites ; the conclusions to be drawn for the equipment of NATO forces ; and the downgrading of the concept of political warning of impending hostilities ;
3. To call on all WEU countries able to deploy naval forces in the Indian Ocean to provide reciprocal access to all available bases, and to co-ordinate their plans to ensure that the total naval presence maintained by NATO countries in the Ocean is commensurate with that of the Soviet Union ;
4. To make appropriate representations to ensure that the Montreux Convention of 1936 is correctly applied, in particular so that aircraft carriers do not pass through the Turkish Straits ;
5. To press for improvements in NATO defence arrangements in the Mediterranean, especially through the resumption by France of its former command responsibility in the Western Mediterranean and by transforming the present on-call force into a Standing Naval Force, Mediterranean, with a substantial European contribution and with international financing in appropriate circumstances.

---

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1974 during the First Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (5th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Jung on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 637).

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL <sup>1</sup>**  
**to Recommendation 254**

---

The problems raised by Recommendation 254 on security and the Mediterranean have been considered and studied by all the member countries of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance.

However, changes in some aspects of the political and military situations in the Mediterranean area would suggest that studies already completed will have to be brought up to date and that, in some cases, new criteria will have to be adopted for assessing and evaluating facts and data previously accepted as definite.

Nevertheless, the basic reasons which lead the member governments to watch over any developments in the security situation remain valid.

The Council therefore accept the soundness of the point made in the recommendation, that full use should be made of the lessons learned from the latest conflict in the Middle East to complement the study, referred to in the recommendation, of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and observation satellites.

In this context, however, the Council are convinced that the use of missiles has not basically affected the value of the tank and the fighter bomber, particularly in view of Europe's special geographical configuration. While agreeing that the problem of the use of observation satellites is worthy of detailed study, the Council doubt whether it would be appropriate for them to call for the establishment of a United Nations observation satellite capability.

As the Indian Ocean is outside the area both of Western European Union and of the Atlantic Alliance, the Council, while taking note of the Assembly's views, do not feel able to comment on the strength or disposition of naval forces maintained there by certain member countries of the Alliance.

The recommendation that the present on-call force in the Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) should be transformed into a standing force has already been under consideration by the competent military authorities for some time; there are difficulties arising from the limitation of the defence budgets of some of the countries concerned but there is hope of an early solution.

More generally, the Council wish to recall that a draft declaration on the Mediterranean, prepared jointly by the nine member countries of the EEC and approved by all the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance has been submitted to the CSCE in the context of the close links which exist between security on the mainland of Europe and in the Mediterranean area. This draft is intended to provide an opportunity to the conference, 35 States meeting for the first time to discuss problems of security and co-operation in Europe, to indicate to the non-participating Mediterranean States that the implications for security in the Mediterranean have not been ignored.

The proposal that the passage of aircraft-carriers from Black Sea States through the Turkish Straits should be prevented necessitates a close examination of complicated legal issues relating to the interpretation of the Montreux Convention to which nine States in all are party. The Council have been assured by the two WEU member governments concerned that this matter will be given careful consideration.

Finally, as regards the suggestion that France should resume its former command responsibility in the Western Mediterranean, the Council are not in a position to express an opinion on a point concerning France's relations with the military command structure of the Atlantic Alliance.

---

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1974.

**RECOMMENDATION 255<sup>1</sup>**  
***on obstacles to European political union*<sup>2</sup>**

---

The Assembly,

Recalling that an aim set by the European Heads of State and of Government is to establish a European identity ;

Regretting that the stages decided on at the summit conferences, particularly in the monetary and regional policy fields, have not been achieved within the agreed time limits, and that the introduction of the European union is not being actively prepared ;

Considering that WEU is still the only European organisation with responsibilities in the field of defence policy and that as such its rôle is to provide the defence framework of a united Europe without however calling in question the Atlantic Alliance ;

Particularly deploring the fact that in energy matters nine-power Europe has been unable to draw up guidelines for a common policy in time ;

Fearing that without adequate co-ordination of the foreign policies of the member countries progress already achieved in the Community may be jeopardised ;

Fearing further that if European views on security matters are not harmonised Europe's position may be weakened in the current international negotiations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Promote the creation, in the framework of the European union, of a political decision-taking centre subject to parliamentary control with responsibilities in the foreign policy field ;
2. In view of the close connection between foreign policy and defence, define a concept of European security which should be taken into account in any policy pursued by nine-power Europe ;
3. In the appropriate framework, promote a policy aimed at defining Europe's identity in the political, defence, economic, currency and energy fields ;
4. Establish a permanent link with the political consultations in which all its members take part, *inter alia* by ensuring that the Secretary-General of WEU attends all political consultations whether in the framework of the Nine or of the Atlantic Alliance ;
5. Remind the two EEC member countries which are not members of WEU that the modified Brussels Treaty is still open to them.

---

1. Adopted by the Assembly on 20th June 1974 during the First Part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session (5th Sitting).

2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Leynen on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Document 630).

---

**REPLY OF THE COUNCIL<sup>1</sup>**  
**to Recommendation 255**

---

1. The institutions of the European Community having been instructed by the 1972 Paris summit conference to prepare a report on European union, the Council see no purpose in commenting on this matter at the present time.
2. The Council note with satisfaction that in paragraph 9 of the declaration on Atlantic relations signed in Brussels on 26th June 1974, the allies recognised "that the further progress towards unity, which the member States of the European Community are determined to make, should in due course have a beneficial effect on the contribution to the common defence of the Alliance of those of them who belong to it". In another paragraph of the declaration it is reaffirmed that the North Atlantic Treaty provides the indispensable basis for the security of its members.
3. The Council also note with satisfaction the progress made by the Nine within the framework of European co-operation in important areas of foreign policy. They regard this as a confirmation of the statement contained in the document on the European identity of December 1973 that the European identity will evolve in a dynamic way as the construction of a united Europe proceeds. The same applies to the other fields referred to by the Assembly.
4. In the opinion of the Council, it is not appropriate for the WEU Secretary-General to take part in the political co-operation of the Nine or in political consultations within the Atlantic Alliance. For, as has been explicitly emphasised by the Assembly, all WEU member States are taking part in these procedures on all operative levels.
5. The Council bear in mind the possibilities offered by Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty.

---

1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1974.

*National parliaments and the WEU Assembly*

---

**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

*submitted on behalf of the  
Committee for Relations with Parliaments <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur*

---

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION  
on national parliaments and the WEU Assembly

DRAFT ORDER  
on national parliaments and the WEU Assembly

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM  
submitted by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur

I. Improvement of relations with national parliaments

II. Committee action on texts adopted by the WEU Assembly

III. Conclusions

APPENDICES

I. Table of action in the parliaments of member countries

II. Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1972

III. (a) Visits to parliaments by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments

(b) Speech by Mr. Mattarella, Minister for the Budget of the Region of Sicily — 8th July 1974

(c) Speech by Professor Virga of the University of Palermo on the nature, characteristics and prospects of regionalism in Sicily — 8th July 1974

(d) Speech by Mr. Fasino, President of the Regional Parliament of Sicily — 9th July 1974

IV. Model draft order to accompany a private member's bill

---

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mrs. Miotti Carli (Chairman); Mr. Enders (Vice-Chairman); MM. Cermolacce,

Cohen, Delorme, Fox, Hengel, Müller, Salvatore, Schugens, Spautz, Stoffelen, Tanghe (Substitute: Plasman).

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation***  
***on national parliaments and the WEU Assembly***

The Assembly,

Regretting that the work of WEU is little known in the parliaments of member countries ;  
Anxious to develop a sense of European solidarity in the parliaments of member countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the governments of member countries to present a report, during debates on foreign policy, on their position on matters considered by the Council or Assembly of WEU and the action they intend to take on Assembly recommendations.

**Draft Order**  
**on national parliaments and the WEU Assembly**

The Assembly,

Regretting that the work of WEU is little known in the parliaments of member countries ;  
Anxious to develop a sense of European solidarity in the parliaments of member countries,

INVITES THE MEMBERS OF EACH NATIONAL DELEGATION

1. To take steps for parliaments to ask governments to present a report, during debates on foreign policy, on their position on matters considered by the Council or Assembly of WEU and the action they intend to take on Assembly recommendations ;
2. To promote relations between the Assembly of WEU and national parliamentary committees, *inter alia* by Rapporteurs of the Assembly of WEU being heard by these committees when matters are being discussed which have been dealt with in reports submitted to the Assembly of WEU.

## **Explanatory Memorandum**

(submitted by Mr. Delorme, Rapporteur)

### **I. Improvement of relations with national parliaments**

1. The main task of this Committee is to draw the attention of parliamentarians of member countries to the work of the Assembly and to invite them to ensure that the recommendations which we transmit to the Council are appropriately followed up. The Committee has had to note with regret, however, that for several years hardly any mention has been made of the work of the Assembly of WEU in parliamentary speeches. This is particularly regrettable since the Assembly's recommendations derive a large part of their value from the support they receive in the parliaments of member countries. It is in fact for parliaments to intervene in accordance with various procedures to ensure that governments take account of the Assembly's recommendations. But the success of building Europe, which is the ultimate aim of the various texts adopted by the Assembly, depends very largely on the more general development in our parliaments of a favourable approach to European union.

2. The last Collected Texts relating to action taken in national parliaments in implementation of recommendations adopted by the Assembly (No. 19) is dated October 1972 and contains only three questions put in the French Senate on 20th June 1972. The Committee must try to remedy this situation.

3. First, more information must be propagated about the Assembly of WEU, its present work, and past and future rôle. The Presidential Committee has asked the Office of the Clerk to prepare for the Assembly's twentieth anniversary an information booklet which it is hoped will help to provide an answer to the only too frequent lack of knowledge of WEU and of its Assembly.

4. Another reason for action not being taken<sup>1</sup> in our parliaments is often the complexity of the

recommendations adopted. For some time, the Committee has been suggesting that the texts be more condensed, deal only with a well-defined subject and be drafted so that parliamentarians may easily refer to them when putting questions to their governments.

5. The Assembly sometimes deals with a question which might be the subject of a bill. In these instances, parliamentarians should follow the procedure at their disposal and table identical bills in each of the seven parliaments.

6. Finally, the action of national delegations should be strengthened in order to establish better relations between the Assembly of WEU and the parliaments of member States. *Inter alia*, national delegations should urge their parliaments to ask the governments to report during foreign policy debates on their position towards matters discussed by the Council or Assembly of WEU and the action they intend to take on Assembly recommendations.

7. Each national delegation should appoint one of its members as co-ordinator (as advocated by Mr. Meyers, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, in 1963). The co-ordinator (if possible the Chairman of the delegation) would be responsible for sharing tasks between members of the delegation (speeches in debates, written or oral questions, etc.) and would keep in touch with the secretariat of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments and with the co-ordinators of the other delegations.

8. In this connection, your Rapporteur wishes to underline a facility available in Italy, i.e. the procedure whereby regional parliaments may table bills in the national parliament. For instance, the Italian regional parliaments have on several occasions tabled bills on the election of members of the European Parliament by direct suffrage<sup>1</sup>, changes in the central administration<sup>2</sup>, etc. This method might be used from time to time to arrange for a text from the Assembly of WEU

#### 1. Yearly totals of speeches :

1956 : 3	1962 : 31	1968 : 126
1957 : 12	1963 : 41	1969 : 91
1958 : 12	1964 : 56	1970 : 55
1959 : 9	1965 : 80	1971 : 48
1960 : 29	1966 : 98	1972 : 10
1961 : 11	1967 : 98	1973 : 7

1. Italian Senate documents 1142 of 21st May 1973 from the regional parliament of Piedmont ; 1438 of 19th December 1973 from the regional parliament of Umbria ; 1516 of 14th February 1974 from the regional parliament of the Abruzzi.

2. Italian Senate document 1335 of 29th October 1973 from the regional parliament of Tuscany.

to be tabled in the Italian Chamber of Deputies or Senate.

9. Furthermore, the national delegations should ask for Rapporteurs from the Assembly of WEU to be heard in their parliamentary committees when subjects dealt with in reports submitted by the Assembly of WEU are discussed.

10. It would thus be possible to draw attention to the reports of the WEU Assembly, the corresponding debates in plenary session and the recommendations adopted, thus making the work of the Assembly part of the activities of each national parliament.

11. The national delegations should also meet after each part-session (perhaps with the Chairman or Rapporteur of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments) to determine the action to be taken in the parliaments and plan approaches to the governments.

12. These measures would help to make WEU better known in the parliaments of member countries, arouse interest for questions it handles and strengthen the Assembly's essential rôle of promoting the unification of Europe within WEU's field of responsibilities. More vigorous action by the national delegations would testify that the members of the Assembly of WEU are anxious to pursue in their own parliaments the work undertaken here.

13. The fact that the Assembly of WEU has reverted to the practice of holding its plenary sessions away from Paris from time to time — its May 1975 session is to be held in Bonn — may be of considerable assistance in making known the Assembly and its work.

## **II. Committee action on texts adopted by the WEU Assembly**

14. After twenty-one reports presented by the Working Party, the Committee has subsequently prepared eleven reports on activities in the parliaments of the WEU member countries. The present report covers the period June 1974 to November 1974. Collected Texts No. 20 includes

all the texts received by the Secretary of the Committee since the publication of No. 19.

15. After considering the texts adopted at the first part of the Twentieth Ordinary Session of the WEU Assembly, your Committee submitted the following texts for transmission to the parliaments of the member States :

- Recommendation 248 on the European Space Agency ;
- Recommendation 255 on obstacles to European political union.

16. As is customary, these texts were sent by the President of the Assembly to the Presidents of the thirteen parliamentary assemblies of the member countries on 20th June 1974. The German Delegation has published a parliamentary document containing, in addition to the texts translated into German, a summary of work at the last session together with the full speeches of the German members of the Assembly.

### **A. Follow-up of the texts adopted**

17. Your Committee prepared two texts for questions to be put in all the parliaments of the member States drawing the governments' particular attention to the penultimate paragraph of Recommendation 248 and the third paragraph of the preamble and paragraphs 1 and 4 of Recommendation 255. In Italy, Mr. Bonaldi sent a letter to the Prime Minister, Mr. Mariano Rumor, on the latter recommendation and also put a written question on Recommendation 248.

18. In addition, he also put written questions or sent letters on Recommendations 246 on the political activities of the Council, 247 on the application of the Brussels Treaty, 251 on obstacles to agreement between Europe and the United States on solving present economic and political problems, 252 on consultation and decisions in the Atlantic Alliance, 253 on a European policy on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and 254 on security and the Mediterranean<sup>1</sup>.

### **B. Visit to the Sicilian parliament**

19. On 8th, 9th and 10th July 1974, the Committee paid a visit to the Sicilian parliament and

1. Collected Texts No. 20.

government. Under the chairmanship of Mr. Fasino, President of the regional parliament of Sicily, the Committee held a joint meeting with the members of that parliament. The Head of the Sicilian Government and President of the region of Sicily, Mr. Bonfiglio, explained to the members of the Committee the special situation of Sicily and Mr. Mattarella, Minister of the Budget, and Mr. Virga, Professor at the University of Palermo, spoke of the status of the region of Sicily, its government and parliament. Finally, Colonel Marchello, Mayor of Palermo, gave an address on Italian municipalities from the Roman era through to the present day. In a most interesting discussion, many questions were put by the Italians on WEU and its task and by the members of the Committee on the situation and parliamentary procedure in Sicily.

20. This visit<sup>1</sup> was one of a series of visits to other regional parliamentary assemblies (Berlin,

Tuscany, Jersey, Bavaria) and was most useful in making the WEU Assembly known.

21. Finally, the Sicilian parliament intends to study the suggestions contained in Document 614 (tenth report of the Committee) with a view to submitting to the Italian Parliament a bill based on paragraphs 334 to 336 of that document.

22. The speeches by MM. Mattarella, Virga and Fasino are reproduced at Appendix III, parts (b), (c) and (d).

### III. Conclusion

23. WEU must affirm itself. This can be done only by drawing attention to the texts which are the outcome of its work. This is a long-term task which requires the co-operation of all members of the Assembly.

---

1. A full list of the Committee's visits is given at Appendix III, part (a).

## APPENDIX I — ANNEXE I

*Table of action in the parliaments of member countries**(Totals by country for each part-session from 1966 to 1974)**Tableau concernant les interventions dans les parlements des pays membres**(Totaux par pays par partie de session de 1966 à 1974)*

Recommendations adopted in Recommandations adoptées en	Member countries — Pays membres							Total Totaux	
	Belgium Belgique	France	Italy Italie	Luxembourg	Netherlands Pays-Bas	Fed. Rep. of Germany Rép. Féd. d'Allemagne	United Kingdom Royaume-Uni		
1966	I	2	11	12	1	3	8	16	53
	II	0	1	37	0	1	4	2	45
1967	I	9	5	18	2	4	8	9	55
	II	5	4	11	0	2	14	7	43
1968	I	2	3	19	0	9	12	21	66
	II	4	11	3	1	7	8	26	60
1969	I	4	5	1	0	0	4	18	32
	II	7	10	7	0	4	13	18	59
1970	I	0	0	3	0	0	5	0	8
	II	3	15	4	2	3	10	10	47
1971	I	0	0	3	0	0	14	6	23
	II	0	4	6	0	6	5	4	25
1972	I	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	6
	II	0	0	1	0	1	2	0	4
1973	I	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	4
	II	0	4	2	1	0	2	0	9
1974	I	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	8
Total 1966-74		51	122	213	11	73	165	186	821
Yearly average Moyenne annuelle		2.69	6.42	11.21	0.58	3.84	8.68	9.79	6.17

For the figures for 1956-65, see Documents 493, 524, 534, 555 and 570.

Pour les chiffres des années 1956 à 1965, se reporter aux Documents 493, 524, 534, 555 et 570.

## APPENDIX II — ANNEXE II

*Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since June 1972*

*Tableau concernant les interventions (débat, questions, réponses, etc.) relatives aux textes adoptés depuis juin 1972*

Session	Recommendation Rec. n°	Transmitted to parliaments Transmise aux parlements	Belgium Belgique	France	Italy Italie	Luxembourg	Netherlands Pays-Bas	Fed. Rep. of Germany Rép. Féd. d'Allemagne	United Kingdom Royaume-Uni	Total Totaux	Total for each part-session Totaux par partie de session
June Juin 1972	218	x		2						2	6
	219	x		2						2	
	220	x		2						2	
	221									—	
	222									—	
Dec. 1972	223									—	4
	224									—	
	225									—	
	226									—	
	227	x								—	
	228	x								—	
	229									—	
	230									—	
	231	x			1					1	
	232									—	
Other action Interventions diverses							1	2		3	
June Juin 1973	233									—	4
	234									—	
	235				1					1	
	236				1					1	
	237				1					1	
	238	x			1					1	
Rés. 52		x								—	
Nov. 1973	239				2					2	9
	240									—	
	241	x		2						2	
	242									—	
	243									—	
	244									—	
	245	x						2		2	
Other action Interventions diverses				2		1				3	
June Juin 1974	246				1					1	8
	247				1					1	
	248	x			1					1	
	249									—	
	250									—	
	251				1					1	
	252				1					1	
	253				1					1	
	254				1					1	
	255	x			1					1	

For the figures for 1965-71, see Documents 438, 475, 493, 524, 534, 555 and 570.

Pour les chiffres de 1965-1971, se reporter aux Documents 438, 475, 493, 524, 534, 555 et 570.

## APPENDIX III

**(a) Visits to parliaments by the Committee  
for Relations with Parliaments**

22nd February 1963	Paris
10th October 1963	Rome
11th-12th November 1964	Bonn
28th-29th April 1965	The Hague
15th-16th December 1965	Brussels
30th October-1st November 1966	London
23rd-24th November 1967	Berlin (Regional parliament of Land Berlin)
2nd-3rd April 1968	Luxembourg
26th-27th March 1969	Rome
27th-28th October 1969	Paris
14th-15th April 1970	Bonn
1st-2nd April 1971	Rome
4th-5th November	Bonn
24th-25th February 1972	The Hague
18th-19th September 1972	Florence (Regional parliament of Tuscany)
1st-2nd May 1973	St. Hélier (Regional parliament of the States of Jersey)
15th-18th October 1973	Munich (Regional parliament of the Free State of Bavaria)
8th-10th July 1974	Palerme (Regional parliament of Sicily)

**(b) Speech by Mr. Mattarella, Minister for the Budget  
of the Region of Sicily****8th July 1974**

On behalf of the regional government, I am happy to welcome the members of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments of Western European Union.

The work which the Committee wishes to complete by a study of regional structures in Europe is also of general interest for its consideration of the prospects which the comparative study of regional structures offers for the greater independence of our region.

We are indeed far from feeling that the institutional procedure of independence is com-

pleted by the promulgation of the statute and the exercise of legislative and administrative functions. On the contrary, critical study of the new situation which has emerged in Italy in recent years since the common law regions were created — which have been able to draw on experience of independence already achieved in order to obtain undeniably better results in terms of institutions and political and social guarantees — the faults of certain systems and principles which appeared quite advanced when our region came into being immediately after the war and which now seem to be out-dated because of the evolution of the regional system and the require-

ments of the political and social framework in which independence is placed, the delays and omissions in the promulgation of methods of applying the statute, all proves that the process of creating and adapting the regional institution is still incomplete.

Moreover, the study of the regional structures of the European countries is proving of great interest. The causes must be analysed in the whole complex of relations by which the policies of States are integrated in a supra-national context ; and it is precisely in relations between States, even at the level of reciprocal knowledge, that Europe acquires the first sound basis for its unity.

In this connection, European events which evolve despite difficulties inevitably implicate not only our country but also the regions because it is precisely in the regional system and its co-responsibilities that the tasks and activities of the State are best worked out and defined. The time has therefore come for growing awareness and for the institutional system of the Italian regions to be inserted into the wider European framework, in the same way as, on the contrary, consideration of the regional structure of the other countries, insofar as Europe, which is developing every day and which cannot be reduced to economic integration but must include political integration, becomes increasingly the term of reference of all the political and economic problems encountered there.

Furthermore, in the Italian constitutional system, regionalism represents one of the most advanced structures and, from various points of view, the most democratic : legislative power, the maximum expression of independence and sovereignty, exercised by the regional councils and parliaments, supervision of local undertakings by regional bodies, independence in respect of organisation and budget and the direct exercise of administrative functions are features sufficient in themselves to prove the extent of innovations introduced by the regions into traditional planning and organisation.

However — it is hardly necessary to recall it — although regionalism has its roots in the history of national unity, we have had to wait more than a century for it to be received as a political and institutional fact in our country. Throughout this period, economic problems linked with the enormous gaps between the regions and

the many differences due to natural causes, sometimes aggravated locally by historical and contingent reasons, have shown the need to plan the regional structure on the basis of the State constitutional structure ; and these new systematics which became necessary represented the best criticism of the notion of administrative concentration which had asserted itself as and when, in national history, events favourable to unity occurred.

This phenomenon, which appeared in varying degrees in other European countries, appeared first in Italy where specific historical conditions and the very remote situation of Sicily led, ever since the first decades of the last century, to the awakening of an independent political conscience in the island, which paved the way for the promulgation of the regional statute in 1946, well ahead of the State constitutional charter.

The first in Italy and with a total lack of experience, Sicilian regional independence has nevertheless faced for more than a quarter of a century the imbalances and inadaptation of certain outmoded constitutional solutions — as proved by the choices made in the other statutes — by the very evolution of the political, juridical and social prospects which emerged since the formative years of the new democratic State. At the same time, it represented a phenomenon of great importance ; thanks to the activities of the regional office, it developed areas of activity and the ability to include Sicily in the national political debate ; it led to a new awareness and afforded a constitutional framework in which the difficult socio-economic problems of the island may be solved.

This is why I said at the beginning of my speech that the study of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments of Western European Union is now of great interest since, by assembling information on structures and experience in the various regional organisations in Europe, it will allow useful comparisons to be made and encourage the exchange of information.

In renewing its welcome to the members of the Committee, the Sicilian regional government is happy to seize this opportunity which is both propitious and promising to give its assurance that it is prepared to co-operate in any way which might be useful for the preparation of the study.

**(c) Speech by Professor Virga of the University of Palermo on the nature, characteristics and prospects of regionalism in Sicily**

8th July 1974

1. Immediately after the war, the political independence of Sicily was preceded by bureaucratic decentralisation.

The first measure by which the State granted Sicily wide administrative decentralisation appeared in decree 91 of 18th March 1944 creating a civil high commissioner for Sicily with extensive decision-taking powers.

But this was a first step towards real political independence. On the basis of studies carried out by a regional council set up for the purpose, the national government, which exercised not only legislative power but also constituent power, promulgated the real statute of the region in decree 455 of 15th May 1946, creating the first independent Italian region. Admittedly, this decree contained the reservation that the statute would be submitted to the Constituent Assembly for co-ordination with the new State constitution, then being prepared, but, by constitutional law 2 of 25th February 1948, co-ordination with the constitution was carried out without major changes and the Sicilian statute thus became part of State constitutional law.

I shall now define from a juridical standpoint the form of decentralisation achieved by the special Sicilian statute.

As you know, the meaning of decentralisation is twofold : (a) the transfer of responsibilities from the State to territorial or institutional public bodies (autarkic or institutional decentralisation) and, from this point of view, decentralisation comes within the wider framework of local independence ; (b) the transfer of responsibilities from the State to peripheral bodies (bureaucratic decentralisation) and, from this point of view, decentralisation comes within the framework of the internal organisation of territorial bodies, and in particular the State.

Decentralisation as opposed to centralisation meets three specific requirements of a modern State :

- (a) better knowledge of problems by the authorities ;

- (b) adaptation of administrative measures to local requirements ;

- (c) speeding up and lightening of procedure and services.

These requirements still apply, although the growing interdependence of interests, technological progress and the ever wider use of planning techniques now necessitate an overall view for political and administrative options which goes further than purely local considerations.

2. The first problem arising in relation to decentralisation is to decide whether it is better to choose the ternary system (region, province and commune) or the binary system (province and commune).

In structures which adopt the ternary system, a distinction must be drawn between those which confine themselves to the achievement of regionalism (Italy) and those which aim at real federalism (Germany, Switzerland).

The distinction between the member State of a federal State and the region of a regionalised State does not stem only from the fact that the former has more responsibilities than the latter but rather from the fact that the independence of a region is limited to ordinary legislative powers whereas the independence of a member State also covers constituent powers. In other words, whereas a member State draws up its own constitution through its constituent bodies with due respect for the general principles of the federal constitution, an independent region on the contrary has no constituent powers in that, although it has statutory powers, its own organisation and the responsibilities of its bodies depend on constitutional rules laid down by State constituent bodies.

Furthermore, whereas the member States of a federal State are included in the constitutional system through their participation in elections to the second chamber, this is not the case for the regions of a regionalised State.

As for the legislative powers granted to regions or member States, either they concern matters of purely local interest or they are of a

complementary nature in that the region must confine itself to integrating State laws by measures which conform to the fundamental principles contained in those laws.

By granting legislative powers to bodies of a third category, political polycentrism inevitably ensues because all laws imply a specific political course ("To legislate is to govern", said Mr. Schmitt) ; at the same time as legislative powers, political powers are also inevitably exercised.

This may lead to friction should a parliamentary majority different from that of the national parliament win a vote in the federal or regional legislative parliament ; thus almost all organisations of a federal or regional type apply the principal characteristic of the German system by which *Reichsrecht bricht Landesrecht*, i.e. State legislation overrides that of a region or member State.

In general, it may be said that the object of federal or regional legislation is not to lay the foundations of a new juridical structure but to adapt State legislation to specific local needs. Regional laws are mainly concerned with organising public services and bodies dependent on the region or with handling subsidies or grants to stimulate certain activities or making available credits for public works or services. It is therefore a supporting legislation, the main rôle of the intermediary body of the third category, i.e. the administrative function.

Moreover, there is no lack of examples of nations in which the regional circumscription has been used not for autarkic decentralisation but for bureaucratic decentralisation, entrusted with specific tasks of an exclusively administrative nature (from this point of view, the example of French departments is interesting).

3. The independence granted to the region of Sicily is beyond doubt the most extensive compared with the common law regions, and also compared with the other four special status regions (Sardinia, Val d'Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia).

The statute of the region of Sicily has several special features which distinguish it from the statutes of the other such regions.

The principal features are :

- (a) the attribution of fairly wide primary legislative responsibilities (which the Sicilian statute calls "exclusive", a term not to be found in the other statutes) limited only by State constitutional laws and the respect of agrarian and industrial reforms decided on by the Constituent Assembly (Article 14) ;
- (b) the adoption for regional finances of a clearly separate system by which all taxes, except those expressly intended for the State, are payable to the region (Article 36) ;
- (c) the participation of the President of the region in the Council of Ministers with the right to vote in fields concerning the region (Article 21, sub-paragraph 3) ;
- (d) the limitation of preventive supervision of regional legislation to verification of legality, without being able to raise the fundamental question for opposing interests in parliament ;
- (e) the designation of the President of the region as "representative of the regional government" (Article 21, sub-paragraph 1), i.e. his integration in the State organisation as a decentralised body for matters remaining within the competence of the State) ;
- (f) the guarantee of parliament's vote for dissolving the regional council (known in Sicily as the "regional parliament") (Article 8).

With regard to legislative powers, the region of Sicily has received two types of legislative responsibility : exclusive and complementary. There are no limits on the former other than the general limits on regional legislative powers (limits imposed by constitutional laws, territorial limits, limits imposed by the State's international commitments, limits on hindering the free circulation of persons and goods). There is in fact a particular commitment because these legislative powers must be exercised "without prejudice to agrarian and industrial reforms decided on by the Constituent Assembly of the Italian people"

but since these two reforms, contrary to expectations, were not carried out by the Constituent Assembly, it must be understood by this limit that the general principles of national planning are binding even on the regional legislator. On the other hand, the limits of the application of the general principles of the State juridical structure, and still less the limits established by outline laws, are not the exclusive responsibility of the region of Sicily.

With regard to administrative powers, Article 20 lays down that the President and regional "assessors" shall exercise in the region the executive and administrative functions relating to the questions set out in Articles 14, 15 and 17; as for those not mentioned in these articles, they exercise administrative activities in accordance with instructions from the State government.

Consequently, the regional executive bodies may, in the framework of the regional territory, exercise two different types of administrative activity :

- (a) *administration proper* : the region has its own administrative powers for matters over which it has legislative powers, this being according to the principle of parallelism whereby the body which is responsible for promulgating laws must also be responsible for implementing them by administrative measures ;
- (b) *decentralised administration* : the statute of Sicily (Articles 20 and 21) stipulates that for the police and all matters which are the responsibility of the region, the regional administrative bodies (President of the region, "assessors" and dependent bodies) shall act as State decentralised bodies in accordance with the orders and under the supervision of the central government.

All matters which are not the specific responsibility of the regional administration (independent, decentralised or delegated) remain the exclusive responsibility of the State which deals with them through its own administrative structure. However, the latter, in the region of Sicily, contrary to what happens in the other regions, does not come under the State Commis-

sioner. In Sicily, he is not an authority with administrative powers but rather an organ whose functions are limited to supervising regional laws and recourse against them.

Finally, with regard to fiscal powers, Article 32 of the statute lays down that the financial requirements of the region shall be met from the taxes it shall have determined, the State keeping for itself taxes on production, duty on tobacco and the lottery.

In any event, this does not constitute exclusive legislative powers as envisaged in Article 14 because fiscal powers, according to the interpretation of the Constitutional Court, are not only limited, like the complementary powers provided for in Article 17, by the principles and general interests on which State legislation is shaped, but must be exercised in such a way as not to disturb interests and fiscal relations in the remainder of the Republic and must meet a specific requirement of the regional community.

To grant to the region only the sums received from taxes levied in the territory would not be sufficient to meet the aims of compensation which was a purpose in granting regional independence ; that is why Article 38 of the statute of Sicily provides for the State to grant the region an extraordinary annual subsidy known as the "National solidarity fund", subject to review every five years. According to the provisions of the same article, this contribution "is to offset the fact that income from work in the region is below the national average" and it has to be used "in accordance with an economic plan for carrying out public works". The statute thus sought to lay down criteria of principle for the use and amount of this contribution. But the decision as to the amount payable to the region obviously has to be the object of a bilateral agreement between State and regional bodies.

4. It is not easy to draw definite conclusions about the experiment in regional independence covering twenty-eight years of activity by the regional government because, during this period, the region has had to function in the midst of serious economic and financial difficulties connected either with war damage or the crisis which occurred in some of its own activities, such as the cultivation of cereals, the production of sulphur and fishing.

The development of tourism and the discovery of a few oil deposits have not sufficed to offset these negative economic factors : the first has been hampered by the fact that Sicily is a long way from the main tourist routes and the second by the disappointing results due to the small scale of the deposits and the bad quality of the sulphur.

However, it cannot be denied that there are some definitely positive aspects to independence such as :

- (a) the creation of a leading class prepared to tackle serious problems linked with the promotional development of the island ;

- (b) the training of qualified manpower for the process of industrialising the island ;
- (c) greater civic conscience among the citizens, who have become aware of their rights and duties ;
- (d) an increased level of education and a reassessment of the serious phenomenon of emigration.

It can certainly not be said that all the problems which it was hoped would be solved by independence have already been suitably solved, but the latent energy of the island is beginning to emerge and this will allow Sicily to become an active and effective element of the European Community.

**(d) Speech by Mr. Fasino, President of the Regional Parliament of Sicily**

9th July 1974

In my own name and on behalf of my colleagues in the Sicilian regional parliament, I warmly welcome all the members of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments of Western European Union.

I am happy to receive you here, in this building whose architecture portrays both the history of our country's art and the historical and political evolution of our region which some experts now consider to be a nation.

This place visibly links the foundation of our independent regional political organisation with the first parliament or, in any case, with one of the first, the Norman parliament. And the tradition which made Palermo the seat of the kingdom has remained intact even during the centuries when Sicily was under foreign rule. Palermo has always been the seat of the kingdom or of the lieutenants of the kingdom.

Our organisation is therefore connected with this tradition and the Sicilian parliament is, as you were told yesterday, the main instrument of legislative power and supervision in our region, the place where the various political groups on the island meet, the place which therefore reflects the political structure of our region and the permanent seat of the defence above all of the prerogatives of our independence and also its application and implementation by the formation of governments elected by the Sicilian regional

parliament and laws which, in the various fields within the competence of the region, show the potential ability of our independence to tackle and solve, in the framework of an adapted national policy, the most urgent problems connected with the economic and social development of our people.

To say that independence is based on and supported by its parliament is tantamount to paying tribute to Western European democracy in whose national parliaments are to be found the basis and expression of those values which constitute democracy.

I therefore consider that today's meeting between parliamentarians from the region of Sicily — who consequently have legislative, electoral and supervisory powers within the territory of the region — and members of the national parliaments of various Western European countries is a demonstration of democratic solidarity and a means of making known our work which gives us great pleasure. Particularly since — if I may say so — Sicily is certainly known for its monuments, history, climate (and in these respects it is well known), we feel that the more modern aspects of its life, the most striking features of our Sicilian civil society, are inadequately and ill-known and for various reasons seem to have been deformed in the eyes of national public opinion and fairly often in that of international public opinion.

All we ask is to be known for what we really are. We do not want to be overestimated but nor do we want our affairs to be exposed to the current aspersions which give general application to certain specific and negative aspects of our common life and almost an essential part of our political and social activities.

I will refrain from giving examples but I would only have to say the word "mafia" to indicate at the same time the reality of a problem and its mystifying and derogatory amplification beyond the bounds of any truly criminal act in this region.

We should like to be known for the 600,000 persons who have emigrated in recent years, in addition to the two million Sicilians who have gone to live in various parts of the world in the last twenty-five years. We should like to be known not so much for the disparity in terms of economy and income which exists between Sicilians and richer people of the industrial areas of the north of our country as for what places us within the standard of living and average income of the whole Italian people. We do not wish to compare ourselves with the wealthiest but with the average situation of the country. And the difference between us and the national average in respect of income, productive structure, infrastructure, communications, the marginalisation of our people and regions in relation to the vital centres of Europe is evident not only statistically but also by merely looking, however superficially, whereas at the same time we have almost been replaced in the function we might have towards the Arab peoples of the Mediterranean basin.

These are things you must know, of which we are not ashamed because they do not depend and never have depended on our ability or will but on historical and economic developments of which we should have strong reasons to complain if it were not completely pointless to look to the past while it is absolutely essential to look to the future.

The Sicilian regional parliament is working for the future in the midst of all the difficulties of this day and age, eternal political difficulties

which are moreover rooted in the economic and social conditions of our people and are maintained by them. We are working for the future with all the means at our disposal — and this is the fundamental idea to which I wish to draw not only your intelligence and memory but also your hearts — we are aware that we cannot, although independent, deal alone with the development problems still facing us. Nor do we think this is sufficient from the point of view of the economic policy of our whole country, Italy. Our leaders have undertaken to change the situation in the island and in southern Italy. Our destiny is no different from that of the southern regions.

The government has done something but we cannot, as Senator Pecoraro knows, say that we are satisfied with what the national government has done because, in a period of spontaneous development and overdevelopment we have not been able to participate in the increased national income and, in a period of energy, financial and monetary crisis, we have to pay a heavy additional tribute of solidarity to the life of the country; whereas the others have at other times been able to enjoy the advantages of the development of the times, while we were lagging behind, there is now solidarity in restrictions whereas there was no question of it when there was abundance.

I could follow up this general remark with further bitter considerations, but will refrain from doing so. Why, for instance, is there no further mention of the bridge over the Straits of Messina? Why is our harbour communications system still behind that of the rest of the country? Why has the construction of motorways in Sicily had to be met from the budget of the region whereas in other regions the treasury and State economic bodies have borne the cost by issuing shares which immobilised money which could have been used productively in southern Italy? Why, in agriculture, has no line of political action been followed in Brussels which takes account of the real interests of the southern populations? Why is our industry not yet under way, despite our efforts? Why are our hospitals and civil equipment still so far behind those of the rest of the country despite the hundreds of millions which the region has usefully spent in various sectors?

We express these views because we think that the solidarity of the country is not enough to avoid a repetition of the same shortcomings and errors ; if the country wishes its credentials to be thought credible, it must ensure planned development which will put an end to the economic duality of our country. But we need — and this is the principal remark I wished to make to you delegates from the European parliaments — the solidarity of Europe. We say this for the modest policy of our region, but the representative of our country's industrialists, Mr. Agnelli, recently said so when he affirmed that, in view of the responsibilities of Confindustria, a suitable solution could be found to the problems of the south and the island if we for our part envisage the development of the country differently but also in a context of international solidarity. It is evident that the first international context, the closest and the one with which we have the greatest solidarity, is Western Europe.

I must not make a speech, I only wish to make a few remarks, however bitter they may be, to say that we here in this parliament nevertheless work with tenacity, confidence and, despite everything, enthusiasm. We are the first to feel

the needs and problems of our people and we thus come to grips with these problems every day and always find immediate and concrete solutions. Because they are concrete and immediate we often make mistakes and we have also made some as the region of Sicily ; we could not avoid it, but from a standpoint and with a sense of responsibility certainly different to those behind the omissions and errors committed at a higher and more far-reaching level of responsibility.

I merely wished to renew our cordial greetings and reaffirm the sincere esteem with which we view your visit to obtain information, meet people and study our independent regional institutions. We are sincerely grateful to you, as we shall be for any good you can say when you return to your respective countries, in your convictions and parliaments ; I am sure that through this exchange of ideas, even critical if need be, we are together contributing to the economic and social development of the people of Western Europe and to deepening the value of the freedom and democracy which are perhaps the only standards of the institutions of our respective countries which have any value and are not open to criticism. Thank you.

## APPENDIX IV

***Model draft order  
to accompany a private member's bill***

## DRAFT ORDER

The Assembly,  
Having adopted the text herewith,

## DECIDES

That this text shall be submitted to the parliaments of the member countries  
of WEU, and

## REQUESTS

The members having voted for this text to sign it in their national parliaments.

## APPENDIX

*Private member's bill on ...*

- A. Explanatory memorandum  
.....
- B. Bill  
Article 1  
.....

***Rational deployment of forces on the central front***

---

**INTERIM REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

***submitted on behalf of  
the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Dankert, Rapporteur***

---

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**DRAFT RECOMMENDATION**  
on the rational deployment of forces on the central front

**DRAFT ORDER**  
on the rational deployment of forces on the central front

**EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM**  
submitted by Mr. Dankert, Rapporteur

- I. Introduction
- II. Initial findings
- III. Rationalisation in other fields
- IV. Other recent developments
- V. Conclusions

**APPENDICES**

- I. Order 43 on the rational deployment of forces on the central front —  
21st June 1973
- II. Terms of reference — rational deployment of forces on the central front  
(from Appendix III to Document 559)

---

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee* : Mr. *Critchley* (Chairman) ;  
MM. *Klepsch*, *Dankert* (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. *Arnaud*,  
*Averardi*, *Bizet*, *Boertien* (Substitute : *de Niet*), *Boulloche*,  
*Jung*, *Kempinaire*, *Konen*, *de Koster*, *La Loggia*, *Lemmrich*,

*Pawelczyk* (Substitute : *Büchner*), *Pendry*, *Prescott*, *Richter*,  
*Rivière*, *Roper*, *Schlags*, *Schugens* (Substitute : *Dequae*),  
*Tanghe*, *Vedovato*, *Wall*, *Zamberletti*.

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in  
the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation***  
***on the rational deployment of forces on the central front***

The Assembly,

Noting the urgent need to introduce standardised training, tactical doctrines and weapons systems into the forces of the Alliance and specialisation in defence tasks among the allied countries,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge member governments concerned :

1. To press for the establishment of the European defence research institute called for in Recommendation 236 ;
2. To study the possibility of common funding for the procurement of major weapons systems.

**Draft Order**  
**on the rational deployment of forces on the central front**

The Assembly,

Noting that the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments has made satisfactory arrangements for the study called for in Order 43 to be carried out,

INSTRUCTS THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE QUESTIONS AND ARMAMENTS

1. To arrange for the study on the rational deployment of forces on the central front to be published before the opening of the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session ;
2. To report to that part-session on the conclusions to be drawn from the study.

## **Explanatory Memorandum**

(submitted by Mr. Dankert, Rapporteur)

### **I. Introduction**

1. The Assembly adopted Order 43<sup>1</sup>, on 21st June 1973, instructing the Committee "to arrange for the study of the rational deployment of forces on the central front, proposed in Document 559, to be carried out forthwith... and to be printed and published on completion". The terms of reference for the study are set forth at Appendix to Document 559<sup>2</sup>.

2. The Assembly adopted Order 43 on the report from the Committee on "European security and relations with the countries of Eastern Europe"<sup>3</sup>. That report dealt in part with the then proposed negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions; the Committee urged "that if some American withdrawals are agreed, then Western Europe should urge upon the United States changes which would improve its reinforcement, supply and deployment capabilities" in Europe (paragraph 24). The MBFR negotiations had not then begun, and the Committee proposed that the study on the rational deployment of forces on the central front should be initiated urgently.

3. The proposal for the study had first arisen in an earlier report from the Committee on European security and arms control<sup>4</sup> on the basis of which the Assembly, on 17th November 1970, adopted Order 36, instructing the Committee "to examine the possibility of organising a conference on the rationalisation of the defence efforts of the European countries, members of the Alliance". In implementation of this earlier order, the Committee, having first established a sub-committee which held extensive hearings and discussions throughout 1971, finally recommended<sup>5</sup> that five preliminary studies be undertaken prior to any decision on the convening of a conference. The

1. Text at Appendix I.

2. Text at Appendix II.

3. Document 604, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley, adopted by the Committee on 3rd May 1973.

4. Document 527, Rapporteur Mr. van der Stoep, adopted by the Committee on 3rd November 1970.

5. Document 599, "A conference on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts", Rapporteur Mr. Rivière, adopted by the Committee on 16th November 1971.

proposed study on the rational deployment of forces on the central front was among the five subjects then proposed for study. The Assembly endorsed this proposal in Order 40 and Resolution 50 adopted on 1st December 1971. The Council, in 1972, having declined to make available the necessary finance for the studies (estimated then at some F 555,900), the Assembly, in adopting Order 43, decided that the cost of the single study should be met from the ordinary budget of the Assembly.

4. On 7th December 1973, in implementation of Order 43, the Presidential Committee, on the recommendation of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, appointed General Ulrich de Maizière, former *Inspektor General der Bundeswehr*, as the expert to undertake the study on the rational deployment of forces on the central front. The Defence Committee appointed your Rapporteur to be associated with General de Maizière in the study, in accordance with the procedure envisaged in Document 559.

5. Accordingly, General de Maizière and your Rapporteur have visited the capitals of countries maintaining forces on the central front, and the various NATO headquarters concerned, for discussions with ministers, senior officials and officers concerning the subject of the study. General de Maizière undertook to complete his text of the study by 31st October, and has duly submitted it to your Rapporteur who is now examining it in detail before discussing it with the General. It is apparent that it will not be possible to prepare a final version of the study for publication in time for the forthcoming session of the Assembly. Accordingly, your Rapporteur proposes that the Committee now submit an interim report to the Assembly, to be followed by a final report to the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session in May 1975, which will accompany the study, in published form.

### **II. Initial findings**

6. The study as at present submitted is a comprehensive and authoritative document on which

General de Maizière is to be congratulated. In accordance with the terms of reference, the study examines the present deployment of forces on the central front and the historical reasons which led to the pattern of deployment; and then considers its suitability from the point of view of current NATO strategy of forward defence and flexible response. General de Maizière concludes that the peacetime locations of NATO units are in many ways not ideally suited to the rôle the units would be required to play if called upon to implement NATO's defensive strategy. After considering certain alternative deployment possibilities, the study concludes that on the grounds of cost, and in view of the changing nature of any defence plans, there would be no overall advantage to the defence effort in undertaking major relocation of units in peacetime. Certain minor adjustments are however advocated, and recommendations are made concerning improved reinforcement capabilities and facilities for receiving reinforcements. The need for binding agreements with France concerning the circumstances and time in which French forces would be available to NATO command is also mentioned.

### III. Rationalisation in other fields

7. General de Maizière goes on to consider other ways to make more economic use of the funds provided for defence, through rationalisation in three broad fields. He considers first an improvement of national defence structures, including unification of the three services, modernisation of service equipment, and the need to ensure a proper balance between the three services. The study then discusses rationalisation through specialisation on a multinational basis, and finally deals with rationalisation by standardisation, including logistics, the procurement of equipment, and standardisation of training and procedures. The study draws particular attention to the lack of interoperability and compatibility in equipment in service with the NATO forces, quoting General Goodpaster to the effect that NATO loses about 30 to 50 % of its potential capability merely by lack of standardisation. General de Maizière concludes that rationalisation by standardisation is the most promising and most

convincing way to achieve greater effectiveness from the funds made available for defence.

8. The Committee notes that the areas for rationalisation of the defence efforts to which General de Maizière draws attention at the conclusion of his study of the deployment of forces on the central front are precisely the four remaining topics for study which the Committee proposed in its initial report on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts<sup>1</sup>. These were: a rational distribution of defence tasks between countries; a concerted long-term programme for standardised armaments procurement; collective logistic support; the structure of national defence organisations. Funds for these studies have not so far been made available by the Council. The Committee notes that the need for proper study of these problems has been stressed independently by General Johannes Steinhoff, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, who has proposed in a recent article<sup>2</sup> the establishment within NATO of a research and study institution on the lines of the Rand Corporation in the United States.

9. The Committee recalls in this connection Recommendation 236, adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1973, which, among other proposals for increasing the effectiveness of defence expenditure, called for the establishment of "... a private European defence research institute...". The Council's reply was not specific: "... member governments recognise the importance of increasing the effectiveness of their defence expenditure. They welcome the Assembly's interest in identifying specific measures to this end and will take the Assembly's views fully into account". In its report accompanying the draft of Recommendation 236<sup>3</sup>, the Committee envisaged that the European defence research institute, financed by private foundations and governments would aim at informing the non-expert decision-makers on defence problems. It would be linked with a European defence information centre concerned with supplying defence information to national parliaments. In the draft recommendation, the Committee now calls on member governments to

1. Document 559, 16th November 1971.

2. "Der Zwang für Verteidigungskooperation Westeuropas", *Europa Archiv*, 29th Year No. 14, 25th July 1974.

3. Document 605, adopted by the Committee on 3rd May 1973.

press for the establishment of a European defence research institute.

#### IV. Other recent developments

10. In recent months the Committee's attention has been drawn to certain other developments and certain weaknesses in defence arrangements on the central front which are directly related to the subject of the study.

##### (a) Standardisation of equipment

11. The vital importance of standardisation emerges clearly from the study on the rational deployment of forces, and from the findings of virtually all observers of the European defence scene. General Steinhoff makes the point in his recent article<sup>1</sup> that 30 to 40 % of the defence expenditure of the smaller and medium NATO countries is wasted through duplication in weapon projects, training, logistics and administration. In the Atlantic Alliance as a whole he finds that half of the \$20 billion spent each year on defence research and development is wasted through duplication of competing projects.

12. The Committee believes that the possibility of common funding on the lines of the very successful NATO infrastructure programme should be studied as a means of facilitating the common procurement of standardised equipment.

##### (b) Tactical air forces on the central front

13. In the course of briefing at Headquarters Central Army Group on 5th November, the Committee learned of the difficulties in the way of interoperability between the squadrons of 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, operating in the northern half of the central front, and those of 4th Allied Tactical Air Force, operating in the south. The restrictions on mutual support across the boundaries of the two tactical air forces arise both from differences in operating procedures

as well as from differences in types of aircraft, and even in the types of equipment different countries have chosen to instal even in the same basic aircraft (e.g. F-104).

14. In the course of the same briefing a problem of air deployment which has been drawn to the Committee's attention by NATO commanders in the past was again stressed. In the 1950s, under the commonly-financed NATO infrastructure programme, many airfields were constructed in France and in the western part of Germany to provide the main air bases for the allied tactical air forces. Thus located, they provided adequate dispersal, keeping the bulk of the air forces out of range of surprise attack and allowing for immediate reinforcement of the forward airfields to meet operational requirements. With the withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure of NATO in 1967, the airfields constructed on French territory ceased to be available to the allied air forces. As a consequence these are now crowded in a dangerously narrow belt of advanced airfields on the territory of Germany and the Benelux countries. Only political agreement with France can make the NATO airfields in that country once again available to the tactical air forces, thus providing the necessary depth and dispersal in deployment.

15. Finally, it was pointed out that the bulk of the reinforcement tactical air power of the central front is provided by the United States, but, as in the past, United States forces have been assigned almost exclusively to 4th ATAF, it would be concentrated in the southern part of the central front which is the area where *it is least likely to be required*. The Committee hopes that negotiations will continue to make further airfields available to United States squadrons in 2nd ATAF area.

16. The deployment of the air forces is dealt with in General de Maizière's study, and will be discussed by the Committee in its final report on redeployment. Meanwhile the Committee welcomes the establishment of Headquarters Allied Air Forces Central Europe at Ramstein, co-ordinating 2nd and 4th ATAFs, to provide much needed centralised operational control of

1. *op. cit.*

all air forces on the central front, with a view to achieving much improved interoperability.

**(c) Allied Command Europe Mobile Force**

17. During the visit to Headquarters Central Army Group, the Committee was also briefed on the rôle and functions of ACE Mobile Force. In certain circumstances mobile forces might provide a possible alternative deployment pattern for some of the forces contributed to the central front, and are discussed by General de Maizière in his study; the Committee will examine them in more detail in its final report. As the Committee has had occasion to report in the past, it believes that ACE Mobile Force makes an important contribution to the defence of Europe, chiefly through its ability to demonstrate in military terms the political cohesion of the Alliance as a whole, especially on the northern and southern flanks where any localised conflict would otherwise involve the forces of only one allied country. The Committee is therefore concerned at the possibility of restrictions being imposed on the proper training and exercising of this force, partly due to the political difficulties of deploying in southern Europe because of the strained relations between Greece and Turkey<sup>1</sup>, but chiefly because of restrictions on the airlifting of the force for exercise purposes because of the greatly increased cost of aviation fuel necessary for such deployment. Twice-yearly exercises of this force are essential if it is to remain a realistic entity — its component parts, drawn from six different NATO countries, meet only during the exercise periods.

**(d) United States brigades in Germany**

18. Finally, the press of 5th November, reporting the visit by Mr. Schlesinger, United States Secretary of Defence, referred to proposals for the creation of two further United States brigades to be stationed in Germany, the necessary manpower being found through reductions

1. The Committee reports elsewhere on the problem of Greek and Turkish relations with NATO: "European security and the Eastern Mediterranean", Document 651.

in the support troops of existing United States forces in Europe. Among sites mentioned for the new brigades are Wildflecken, near the Czechoslovak frontier, and Hanover in the Northern Army Group area. The Committee would welcome any such redeployment of the American forces towards the northern plains, a possibility which it had in mind when proposing the study on the rational deployment of forces. It believes such a move by one brigade would provide useful experience of the types of logistical problems that would arise during hostilities if major units of one country had to move into areas allocated to forces of other countries. Proposals for the strengthening of Northern Army Group forces by United States army units have also been made in a recent study by Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record, published by the Brookings Institution.

19. The United States Department of Defence is undertaking a review, arising from the Nunn amendment to the defence finance bill, of the numbers and types of tactical nuclear weapons which it maintains in Europe. Stocks of these 7,000 warheads appear to have remained unchanged since before the official adoption by NATO of the policy of flexible response in 1967. There have also been reports of the possible introduction of tactical nuclear weapons with lower yields. The communiqué of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group of 12th June 1974 stated:

"The Ministers were also briefed by Mr. Schlesinger on some technological developments that could bear on the tactical nuclear capability of the Alliance and had a preliminary exchange of views on possible ways in which technological improvements might affect NATO's deterrent posture and defence capabilities. They also agreed to keep under review the wider political and military implications of these developments

20. The United States has refuted suggestions that such developments might blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear hostilities. Addressing the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on 23rd May 1974, Ambassador Martin, the United States representative said:

"As Secretary of Defence Schlesinger has stated, we have been engaged over many years in a gradual process of moderately upgrading our tactical nuclear stockpile. There is nothing new about the existence of tactical nuclear weapons of very low explosive yields. Indeed, it is public knowledge that nuclear weapons with explosive yields measured in the sub-kiloton range were introduced in the American inventory many years ago. No decisions have been made to produce or deploy any new systems.

.....

In response to speculation that further developments of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons would blur the present distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons, I wish to state categorically that the American Government has no intention whatever to treat such tactical systems as interchangeable with conventional arms. We fully appreciate that the distinction, or 'firebreak', between nuclear and non-nuclear arms is a major factor in preventing nuclear warfare, and we will not act to erode this distinction."

21. The Committee appreciates that tactical nuclear weapons play a vital rôle in assuring the necessary linkage between any conventional hostilities and the United States strategic deterrent, but it recognises that there may well be scope for modifications in the particular "mix" of different types of tactical warheads stockpiled in Europe.

#### V. Conclusions

22. In this interim report the Committee restricts itself to the recommendation that member governments press for the establishment of a European defence research institute (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above) and study the possibility of common funding for the procurement of major weapons systems (see paragraph 12 above).

23. In the draft order the Committee proposes that it be instructed to arrange for the publication of a final version of the study on the rational deployment of forces on the central front, to examine carefully the conclusions to which it comes and to report finally to the Assembly at the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session.

## APPENDIX I

ORDER 43<sup>1</sup>*on the rational deployment of forces on the central front*

The Assembly,

Recalling Resolution 50 and Order 40 on the rationalisation of the European defence efforts ;

Recalling that the letter from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of 30th March 1972 asserted that the Council shared the Assembly's aims in this connection ;

Considering the results of certain meetings that governments, in implementation of the foregoing letter, have arranged with their parliamentarians who are members of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ;

Aware of the need to study fully the particular problems and requirements of European defence with undiminished security at any lower force levels that may be agreed in the course of negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions,

1. Instructs its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments to arrange for the study on the rational deployment of forces on the central front, proposed in Document 559, to be carried out forthwith in accordance with paragraphs 20 to 24 of the explanatory memorandum and Appendix III (i) (b) of that document and to be printed and published on completion ;
2. Decides that the cost of the study shall be met from the ordinary budget of the Assembly.

---

1. Adopted unanimously by the Assembly on 21st June 1973.

## APPENDIX II

*Terms of reference*

(from Appendix III to Document 559)

*Rational deployment of forces on the central front*

The study should first describe the present relationship between the permanent locations of forces assigned to Allied Forces Central Europe and their war locations called for by the policy of forward defence. The contribution of recent history, such as the second world war and earlier patterns of NATO deployment, should be mentioned.

The study should then consider whether the order in which the broad areas of the war locations are allocated to assigned national units, both from right to left of the central front and from front to rear, corresponds to the optimum when account is taken of :

- military effectiveness for a strategy of flexible response and forward defence, and the relative military capabilities of different national units and their weapons systems ;
- political effectiveness and the need to demonstrate the cohesion of the Alliance in all situations ;
- possible future levels of the different national units ; the possible impact of any negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions.

The study should suggest possible models for optimum deployment, not eschewing innovations such as the creation of highly-mobile multinational units in reserve positions, or the possibility of a pattern of deployment designed to facilitate agreement on MBFRs without prejudicing military effectiveness at any stage.

The study should examine any changes in the permanent location of assigned units which present or possible optimum war locations make desirable, taking account of :

- the need for a high standard of accommodation and amenities for allied forces and their dependents ;
- the need for access to local training areas ;
- the provision of logistic support, and lines of communication in reinforcement and supply ;
- the cost of any changes.

The study should finally review any proposals advanced for optimum deployment in war locations, in the light of the feasibility of adapting permanent locations accordingly.

*Rational deployment of forces on the central front*

---

**AMENDMENT No. 1<sup>1</sup>**  
*tabled by Mr. Reale*

---

In the first line of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "Urge" and insert "Encourage".

*Signed: Reale*

---

1. See 11th Sitting, 5th December 1974 (Amendment negatived).

**State of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects**

**REPORT<sup>1</sup>**

**submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions<sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Small, Rapporteur**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**DRAFT RECOMMENDATION**

on the state of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects

**EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM**

submitted by Mr. Small, Rapporteur

Introduction

Chapter I: Nuclear energy — a political problem

Chapter II: Security aspects

Chapter III: Third party liability in the field of nuclear energy

Remarks by the Committee

**APPENDIX**

Note on the conventions on third party liability in the field of nuclear energy  
— Paris, Brussels and Vienna

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee: Mr. de Montesquiou (Chairman); MM. Warren (Substitute: Farr), Richter (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, de Chevigny, Cornelissen (Substitute: Porthoine), Fletcher, Gölter, La*

*Loggia, Lenzer, Mammi, Mart, van Ooijen, Osborn, Pecoraro, Schwencke, de Stezhe, Tomney (Substitute: Small), Treu, Valleix, Yvon.*

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Recommendation**  
**on the state of European nuclear energy programmes — security aspects**

The Assembly,

Conscious of the dangers involved in the large-scale establishment of nuclear energy installations throughout Europe and aware that the risks cut across national frontiers ;

Considering the need to protect the population of Europe against possible dangers inherent in the national programmes planned for execution up to 1985 ;

Noting the uneasiness among the public as expressed through information media and the press regarding the possible widespread use of nuclear energy and its consequences for the environment ;

Aware of the Paris, Brussels and Vienna conventions on nuclear liability,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

Urge the governments of member countries :

1. To organise a public European conference, within the framework of the OECD, to define the safety and security requirements of nuclear reactors, materials processing operations and the handling of nuclear waste based on international and world-wide experience and on the liability aspects of the use of nuclear energy ;
2. To promote the accession of all member countries to or the entry into force of the Paris, Brussels and Vienna conventions and, should they refuse, to communicate to the WEU Assembly the reasons for their refusal ;
3. To keep the public in all member countries regularly informed of all plans throughout Europe to establish nuclear power plants.

## **Explanatory Memorandum**

(submitted by Mr. Small, Rapporteur)

### **Introduction**

1. In the next twenty-five years many important decisions on nuclear energy will have to be taken with consequences which will be felt for much of the next century. The future of our civilisation may therefore hinge on our foresight today. The impression in many circles is that political decisions on nuclear energy are being taken with a short-term goal in mind due to the present energy crisis. At the same time Europeans clearly wish to know what will happen if the nuclear policy of member governments is applied.

2. It is also feared that large multinational enterprises have too much influence on governmental decision-making processes and that they have the ability to create, willingly or unwillingly, considerable difficulties for future generations of mankind. The demands of industry and commerce already influence to a great extent the production of energy and nuclear energy is required to play an increasing rôle.

3. This growing absorption of energy in the pursuit of greater economic well-being might eventually leave mankind with a landscape as despoiled as Ezekiel's valley of dry bones. The much-vaunted commercial and industrial spin-off might then be of little value.

4. Without going so far as to say that choosing nuclear energy, nuclear reactors, enriched uranium, fast breeders, etc., is like playing Russian roulette, one has to admit that many elemental forces are badly understood. There is a danger that the sophisticated thoughts of scientists may be embraced by politicians in order to overcome present-day difficulties, especially those which came to the fore with the oil crisis. The scientists' nuclear advisory rôle might lead to a situation where expert opinion exercises a greater power over our lives than kings ever did. They have adopted the attitude that nuclear energy is desirable in itself and the supply of it should be as widespread as possible.

5. Times have changed and politicians can no longer take decisions in secret "caucus". Decisions taken behind closed doors are not accepted and governments know that they cannot govern without the consent of the governed. As society grasps the potential danger of nuclear energy, governments have to explain more clearly the need for this energy and the scale on which it will be applied.

6. Mr. Osborn, the previous Rapporteur on this subject, provided the Committee with an exhaustive report but the Committee thought it would be useful if your Rapporteur looked more closely into the safety aspects. He did not think it wise to deal in a technical manner with radioactive waste management, materials and plant protection, control and accounting requirements of nuclear fuels and transportation of radioactive materials. His aim is to turn the searchlight on matters of political concern to the general public. In the United States as well as in Europe, many technical studies on these subjects have been made under the auspices of the national atomic energy authorities. After indicating the dangers and the hesitations of the general public, your Rapporteur wishes to propose guarantees against the risks of the misuse of nuclear energy.

### CHAPTER I

#### ***Nuclear energy — a political problem***

7. In all our countries, decisions on nuclear energy have very pronounced political characteristics which may be of an international, European or military nature or concerning the relationship between economic growth and the use of nuclear energy, but most discussions always revert to security aspects.

8. When the Committee met in London on 4th September 1974, it was addressed by Mr. E.C. Williams, United Kingdom Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations, Department of Energy,

who pointed out that society easily accepts physical damage to human bones, tissues and organs and, for instance, the fact that every day twenty-two people are killed on the roads in the United Kingdom alone. People are also killed in aircraft and through professional accidents as in mines and society accepts these accidental killings because it knows about them and can understand them, but people are very nervous about damage from radiation as it cannot be seen, at least initially.

9. There is also considerable insecurity due to differences of opinion between experts. Recently, Professor N. Rasmussen chaired a committee of experts charged by the United States Atomic Energy Commission to look into the safety aspects of the light-water and pressurised-water reactors. His committee produced a fourteen-volume report stating that the security of these stations could be considered assured. The Atomic Energy Commission has since had to close down — temporarily — twenty-one boiling-water reactors because of leakages. It is therefore not surprising that several countries, like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, have hesitated a long time before taking decisions on their future programmes and especially the question of how large the programmes should be.

10. In many countries there is little formal opposition from the general public to the establishment of nuclear reactors in their localities, but a number of pressure groups, which for one reason or another are opposed to nuclear reactors, foment uneasiness towards nuclear energy. For instance, it is well known that in Italy the oil companies have provided these pressure groups with money in order to influence the government not to use nuclear energy for their power plants but to use fuel. Since the oil crisis, the situation in Italy has of course changed fundamentally.

11. Another aspect which is politically difficult to measure is the relationship between the growth of energy, the national product and nuclear energy. The Club of Rome believes that the growth rate of the gross national product in the Western European industrialised countries should stay at zero; the underdeveloped countries would then be in a position to use scarce fossil resources.

12. The attitude of the community living near a nuclear power plant can be important. Two nuclear power plants are operating in your Rapporteur's constituency. The Chairman of the South of Scotland Electricity Board allows the public to visit them, thus demonstrating his confidence in the stations. Each station has what is called a local liaison committee composed of the station superintendent, senior officials, local authorities, residents' associations and representatives of other interested parties. The liaison committee meets regularly and explains to the local people what state the station is in, etc.

13. Faith in nuclear energy can only grow slowly over the course of the years. Timely statements by the authorities, explaining their plans and the changes involved beforehand rather than afterwards, can greatly help the growth of confidence.

14. Another important factor regarding the siting of a station is, of course, the ownership of land.

15. One great drawback of nuclear energy which is always quoted is the existence of radioactive waste. Although waste from nuclear power stations is five or six times less than from conventional power stations, its radioactivity, and especially long-life alpha radiation, fosters particular political uneasiness. Radioactive waste has to be stored in facilities which must be so designed and constructed as to prevent any leakage or escape of radioactivity to the environment. Long-life highly-active waste is at present stored in liquid form in high-integrity stainless steel tanks. Solid waste, which is much less active, is stored in concrete silos. However, nuclear technology being only thirty years old, no conclusive proof of safety can yet be given.

16. After a certain period it is possible to remove all radioactivity from a site. However, nuclear power reactors are large structures, which of necessity have massive concrete shields, and therefore involve high demolition costs.

17. A by-product of the use of nuclear energy is the production of plutonium which can also be used to manufacture nuclear explosives.

18. The great advantage of nuclear energy is of course that it is cheaper than the energy produced by conventional power plants. Although it would be difficult to give exact figures, generally speaking the difference per kilowatt hour is between 3.5 and 5 %.

19. Another advantage is that it provides a means of breaking the oil monopoly and providing an alternative source of energy. If the EEC energy programmes are carried through, oil consumption will be reduced from 64 % to 41 % by 1985. This means of course a big difference in the balance of payments of the oil-importing countries.

20. Yet another advantage is that uranium can easily be stored for a number of years which offers the possibility of assuring the long-term use of nuclear power plants.

21. From the very beginning, European countries have understood that in order to safeguard energy resources they should establish a common energy plan for the years to come. Therefore, at the Copenhagen summit conference the Heads of State and Government agreed to set up an EEC energy programme. However, no practical decisions have since been taken. Last summer the Commission submitted a number of proposals to the Council of Ministers: each member country should adopt basic changes in its energy policy in order to achieve, by 2000, an energy situation in which 50% of the total energy requirements would be covered by nuclear energy, 30 % by gas — either through natural gas or the gasification process of coal — and 20 % should be covered by oil or other existing energy sources, such as hydroelectricity and others. By the year 2000, the Community should be dependent on external resources for only 40 % of its energy.

22. This plan calls for a very great number of nuclear power plants to be built of some 1,000 MWe each. The Commission hopes that by 1985 200,000 MWe will be installed, mainly in the form of light-water reactors. This enormous increase will also mean a comparative increase in the security risks. If one considers that not one light-water reactor of 1,000 MWe is yet operational in the United States, can one be absolutely certain about the safety of such a large number of nuclear installations and the possibility of mastering the waste disposal problem ?

## CHAPTER II

### *Security aspects*

23. In talking about security aspects your Rapporteur would draw attention to the problems of safeguards in the event of unauthorised acquisition of special nuclear materials in quantities sufficient for the manufacture of nuclear explosives. In Europe, this problem will have to be looked into by all countries concerned as such acquisition is always on an international basis. The national security authorities in the various European countries are able to take effective action only if they have organised their security and appropriate measures beforehand.

24. In recent years the factors which made safeguards a really imminent and vital issue have changed rapidly for the worse. In many countries the press has spoken of "nuclear terrorists", and since terrorist groups have greatly increased their professional skills, intelligence networks, finances and levels of armaments throughout the world, they might well become a very serious threat. International terrorist organisations have already shown their ability to infiltrate small, highly-trained teams into any country undetected. Political kidnappings are taking place in many European as well as non-European countries and diplomatic representatives appear to be favourite targets.

25. New terrorist groups are often led and staffed by well-educated people.

26. For some time now, there has been widespread and increasing dissemination of precise and accurate instructions on how to make nuclear weapons. In addition, there is a large-scale movement of personnel in and out of areas of high technology as many high technology industries are experiencing economic difficulties and are having to dismiss personnel. All these factors make the problem of nuclear terrorism more acute and should be given as much attention as the possibility of power plant accidents.

27. Illicit nuclear weapons present a greater potential public danger than radiation accidents and the factors involved in preventing their potential manufacture have received a great deal less attention with the result that the relevant regulations are far less stringent.

28. Your Rapporteur believes that it is necessary in this instance to adopt the same approach to safeguards as for the safety of power plants and to examine this question with the same rigour. This will mean an increase in the budgets allowed for safeguard reviews and the number and qualifications of the people concerned with safeguards will have to be substantially increased.

29. The governments should provide the budgets for safeguards since defence and security are their responsibility. Intelligence measures have to be taken against groups which might use illegal methods to acquire special nuclear materials to make weapons. This is all the more important because of the difficulty of verifying the accuracy of figures for the nuclear material used in nuclear power plants. In Europe as elsewhere, it will become increasingly difficult to keep an exact check on the nuclear material as more and more nuclear power plants come into operation.

30. The degree of danger represented by the potential acquisition of special nuclear material by terrorist groups has thus risen considerably. The high-level professional skills and intelligence of these groups throughout the world should force our governments to agree jointly on a wide range of security measures. More attention should be paid to this aspect of safeguards as the potential threat to the public from the explosion of a terrorist nuclear weapon is far greater than from a possible power plant accident. There should be more physical protection of the plant, better intelligence and testing and new methods of accounting and measuring nuclear material.

31. These measures should be taken in a European framework since terrorist activities are conducted at international level. It might be necessary to take measures in the framework of the United Nations too, although its activities

with regard to political kidnappings, for instance, have not exactly been successful.

### CHAPTER III

#### *Third party liability in the field of nuclear energy*

32. As the production and use of atomic energy involves hazards unlike those with which the world had long been familiar, it became necessary to establish a special régime for this type of liability. Most experts are inclined to think that the probability of a catastrophic nuclear incident is extremely low. However, the possibility remains, and enormous losses could fall both upon the public exposed to injury and upon the nuclear operators.

33. Within the framework of the OECD, the Paris convention on third party liability in the field of nuclear energy was concluded in 1960. Supplementary protocols and conventions were concluded thereafter, as well as the Vienna convention of 1963, concluded under the auspices of the United Nations and its International Atomic Energy Agency.

34. In 1962, the convention on the liability of operators of nuclear ships was adopted in Brussels, and in 1971, the convention on civil liability in the field of maritime carriage of nuclear material.

35. With respect to the nature of the liability, the conventions declare that the rule would be absolute liability ; liability irrespective of fault. The only exoneration is in the case of damage caused by a nuclear incident directly due to certain disturbances of an international character such as acts of armed conflict and hostilities, or of a political nature such as civil war. Whether nuclear terrorism would come under the conventions is not clear.

36. As far as nuclear ships are concerned your Rapporteur would point out that military as well as civil nuclear ships are covered by the Brussels convention. However, the European countries which operate nuclear submarines have not signed the convention. It is clear that acci-

dents to reactors occurring under or near water would have totally unpredictable and indiscriminate effects, so, it need hardly be said, would accidents to nuclear submarines. Your Rapporteur believes therefore that the conventions on the operation of nuclear ships and on the maritime carriage of nuclear substances should be duly signed and ratified.<sup>1</sup>

37. In order to give the general public an insight into the aspects of safety, liability and security of nuclear plants and materials it would be appropriate to organise a public European conference on the liability aspects of the use of nuclear energy and on the security aspects of plants and materials. The public should be regularly informed of all plans throughout Europe for the establishment of nuclear power plants. If this is not done the public in many European countries, informed only of national programmes, would have a distorted view of the actual picture. For one reason or another many national governments choose to build nuclear power plants near their frontiers which may lead to a concentration of nuclear power plants in certain frontier areas.

38. In conclusion, your Rapporteur would say that, fully aware of the hazards involved, it is nevertheless not possible to imagine a society powered by sails and windmills. Already in ancient Rome the saying was *Vestigia nulla retrorsum* — there are no footprints back from the lion's den.

#### **Remarks by the Committee**

39. During the discussion on the report on 2nd December it was pointed out that Sir John Rodgers had already submitted a report to the Assembly, on behalf of the General Affairs Committee, dealing with the energy crisis and Euro-

1. For the signatories of the conventions to date, see Appendix.

pean security. The report examined the general political aspects of energy supplies and their relationship with foreign policy, and paid particular attention to the ways in which the energy crisis affected European security.

40. As this report, submitted on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions, deals in particular with security aspects, it was suggested that these words be used as a subtitle to the report.

41. The Rapporteur recalled that many technical data were mentioned in the report by Mr. Osborn on a European policy on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy<sup>1</sup>. It is stated, for instance, in paragraph 111 that: "It is intended to solidify the wastes in the form of a glass which will immobilise the waste, further ensuring its containment and reducing the need for surveillance" and in paragraph 113: "For safe and final disposal, the method considered most attractive, at least for the present, was that of using deep and stable geological formations such as abandoned salt mines." He had therefore not mentioned the latter method in paragraph 15 of his report which also dealt with radioactive waste.

42. Regarding nuclear conventions on third party liability, it would be useful for governments to inform parliaments and especially the Assembly why certain conventions had been prepared but not signed or ratified. The present situation is rather difficult to define as many of the security aspects concerning civil and military nuclear-propelled ships can only be considered if all States concerned, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, adhere to the conventions.

43. A third point, suggested and agreed to by the Committee, was in respect of asking the advice of experts on the safety and security aspects of nuclear reactors with a view to informing the public since governments cannot set up nuclear reactors on a large scale without the consent of the general public.

1. Document 640.

## APPENDIX

The convention on third party liability in the field of nuclear energy was signed in Paris on 29th July 1960 by the following European countries :

Austria	Netherlands
Belgium	Norway
Denmark	Portugal
France	Spain
Germany	Sweden
Greece	Switzerland
Italy	Turkey
Luxembourg	United Kingdom

The Paris convention was modified by an additional protocol signed in Paris on 28th January 1964 by the contracting parties to the Paris convention.

At the present time, the Paris convention has received the instruments of ratification of :

Turkey	10th October	1961
Spain	31st October	1961
United Kingdom	23rd February	1966
France	9th March	1966
Belgium	3rd August	1966
Sweden	1st April	1968
Greece	12th May	1970
Finland (accession)	8th June	1972
Norway	2nd July	1973
Denmark	4th September	1974

The additional protocol to the Paris convention was ratified by the same countries on the following dates :

Spain	30th April	1965
United Kingdom	23rd February	1966
France	9th March	1966
Belgium	3rd August	1966
Sweden	1st April	1968
Turkey	5th April	1968
Greece	12th May	1970
Finland (accession)	8th June	1972
Norway	2nd July	1973
Denmark	4th September	1974

The supplementary convention to the Paris convention was signed in Brussels on 31st Jan-

uary 1963 by the following contracting parties to the Paris convention :

Austria	Netherlands
Belgium	Norway
Denmark	Spain
France	Sweden
Germany	Switzerland
Italy	United Kingdom
Luxembourg	

The Brussels supplementary convention was also modified by an additional protocol also designed to avoid possible conflict with the Vienna convention and signed in Paris on 28th January 1964.

The supplementary convention and the additional protocol to this convention have been ratified by the following countries :

United Kingdom	24th March	1966
France	30th March	1966
Spain	27th July	1966
Sweden	3rd April	1968
Norway	7th July	1973
Denmark	4th September	1974

The convention on civil liability for nuclear damage was elaborated by a world-wide diplomatic conference convened in Vienna in May 1963 by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Up to now, the Vienna convention has been signed by the following countries :

China	21st May	1963
Columbia	21st May	1963
Yugoslavia	21st May	1963
The Philippines	21st May	1963
Spain	6th December	1963
United Kingdom	11th November	1964
Cuba	10th December	1964
Arab Republic of Egypt		
	19th August	1965
Argentina	10th October	1966

The present state of ratifications of the Vienna convention is the following :

Cuba	25th October	1965
Arab Republic of Egypt	5th November	1965
The Philippines	15th November	1965
Argentina	25th April	1967

In addition, the following countries have acceded to the Vienna convention :

Cameroon	6th March	1964
Trinidad and Tobago	31st January	1966
Bolivia	10th April	1968

The convention on the liability of operators of nuclear ships was adopted on 25th May 1962 at the close of a diplomatic conference on maritime law in Brussels.

To date, the present convention has been signed by the following countries :

Belgium	Malaysia
China	Monaco
India	Netherlands
Indonesia	Panama
Ireland	The Philippines
Yugoslavia	Portugal
Korea	United Arab Republic
Liberia	

The convention has been ratified by :

Portugal	31st July	1968
----------	-----------	------

The present state of accession is the following :

Republic of Malagasy Democratic Republic	13th July	1965
of the Congo	17th July	1967

The convention relating to civil liability in the field of maritime carriage of nuclear material was opened for signature on 17th December 1971 at the end of a diplomatic conference in Brussels.

To date, this convention has been signed by the following countries :

Belgium	Italy
Brazil	Norway
Denmark	Portugal
Finland	Sweden
France	United Kingdom
Germany	Yugoslavia

This convention has been ratified by :

France	2nd February	1973
Spain (accession)		
Denmark	4th September	1974

***State of European nuclear energy programmes —  
security aspects***

---

**AMENDMENT No. 1<sup>1</sup>**

***tabled by MM. Waltmans and de Bruyne***

---

Add the following paragraph at the end of the draft recommendation :

“4. To study the consequences of a possible break-off of nuclear development within ten years.”

*Signed : Waltmans, de Bruyne*

---

1. See 10th Sitting, 5th December 1974 (Amendment negatived).

***State of European nuclear energy programmes —  
security aspects***

---

**AMENDMENT No. 2<sup>1</sup>**  
***tabled by Mr. Alber***

---

Add the following paragraph at the end of the draft recommendation :

“To build nuclear power plants near a frontier only after agreement with the neighbouring country concerned.”

*Signed : Alber*

---

1. See 10th Sitting, 5th December 1974 (Amendment adopted).

*The energy crisis and European security*

**REPORT<sup>1</sup>**

**submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee<sup>2</sup>  
by Sir John Rodgers, Rapporteur**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION  
on the energy crisis and European security

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM  
submitted by Sir John Rodgers, Rapporteur

I. Introduction

II. The facts of the problem

III. Current problems

IV. Conclusions

---

1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

2. *Members of the Committee: Mr. Sieglerschmidt (Chairman); Mr. Krieg (Substitute for Mr. Roger), Sir John Rodgers (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Abens (Substitute: Mart), Amrehn, Bettiol, Brugnon, Drago, Fletcher (Substitute: Mendelson), Mrs. Godinache Lambert (Substitute:*

*de Bruyne), MM. Lemaire, Leynen, Mende, Minnocci, Nessler (Substitute: Soustelle), de Niet, Page, Peijnenburg (Substitute: de Koster), Périquier, Portheine, Preti, Quilleri, Schmidt (Substitute: Büchner), Steel, Tomney, Van Hoeylandt (Substitute: de Stezhe).*

N. B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

***Draft Recommendation***  
***on the energy crisis and European security***

The Assembly,

Recalling Recommendation 241 on oil and energy problems ;

Regretting that the Council did not find it necessary to give a satisfactory reply to that recommendation ;

Considering that supplies of energy for Europe at stable and reasonable prices are essential for its security ;

Noting with satisfaction that the Nine have affirmed their intention of working out a common European energy policy ;

Welcoming the initiative taken by the Group of Twelve to promote solidarity between the western countries and Japan in respect of oil supplies ;

Expressing the hope that as many countries as possible, including Norway, should co-operate with the International Energy Agency ;

Considering that close concerted action between the oil-producing and consumer countries is essential for the re-establishment of a balanced world energy market,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

1. Urge the Nine to define their common energy policy without delay ;
2. Encourage the French Government to take part in the International Energy Agency ;
3. Invite the governments of the other member countries to seek to concert the action of producer and consumer countries with a view to organising the world oil market on a basis acceptable to all ;
4. Ensure that each member country constitutes or maintains strategic reserves of oil products at a level it shall define ;
5. Inform the Assembly of measures taken in the specialised international fora referred to in its reply to Recommendation 241.

## **Explanatory Memorandum**

*(submitted by Sir John Rodgers, Rapporteur)*

### **I. Introduction**

1. On 14th October 1974, the Presidential Committee decided to ask the General Affairs Committee to submit a report on the energy crisis and European security. The Chairman of the Committee then had to appoint a Rapporteur who was consequently left with very little time to prepare the present document.

2. The problem is of such importance, however, that Mr. Sato, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, said, at the end of 1973, that energy supplies would be the main aim of foreign policy for the next twenty years. The question thus deserved more time for study and analysis than was available to your Rapporteur. The present report therefore must be considered merely as an introduction to a study to be continued by the Assembly during subsequent sessions.

3. There is every indication that the problems raised by the energy crisis will continue to evolve in the coming months and years and a parliamentary assembly whose main task is to examine the various aspects of European security will have to examine their implications for a long time to come.

4. My colleague Mr. Krieg submitted a report on oil and energy problems on behalf of the General Affairs Committee at the November 1973 session. As Rapporteur I therefore confine myself to examining the energy crisis which came to a head in October 1973 and the consequences which have unfolded in the course of the year now drawing to a close. The repercussions are very far-reaching since following the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973 the oil-producing Arab countries decided to impose an embargo on oil supplies to certain western countries and the speed at which prices rose threw the world market into complete disarray, not only where oil was concerned but also in monetary matters and the whole range of industrial and even agricultural products. Mr. Krieg had had no opportunity of studying these consequences in the report adopted by the General Affairs Committee on 19th November 1973, although he referred to certain

aspects of the crisis which was already taking shape before the October 1973 war.

5. Moreover, replying in April to the recommendation adopted by the Assembly, the Council merely pointed out that the matters raised in the recommendation were being considered in other fora, without giving the slightest indication about the policy of the seven governments in this respect. The General Affairs Committee has asked its Rapporteur to emphasise that it considers this reply to Recommendation 241 to be unacceptable.

6. The General Affairs Committee had a first reading of this report on 12th November 1974. Your Rapporteur was thus able to take into account most of the objections or suggestions then made. In the few cases where he felt unable to concur, he has indicated the remaining differences between himself and certain Committee members.

### **II. The facts of the problem**

7. Energy has become a problem of prime importance for all western countries since the 1973 Israeli-Arab war. The war, however, merely precipitated a process which had begun several years earlier. In the last ten or twenty years the market for energy had been undermined by the maintenance of the cost price of Middle East oil for the producer companies at too low a level. Prices had to reflect only a very low level of investment in relation to the volume of oil extracted and for many years the producer countries had hardly increased dues for the extraction of their oil in spite of the general increase in prices for industrial products and the depreciating value of currency throughout the world.

8. Mr. Krieg indicated in his report that, already in 1972, Kuwait and Libya had decided

to impose limits on their oil production. He also mentioned the discontent he had noted in many producer countries which were witnessing a steady devaluation of their monetary reserves built up from the sale of oil, and their criticism that because of inflation the western countries were taking back a major part of the dues paid to the producer countries. It might therefore seem profitable for the producer countries to cut back their output and leave their oil reserves untapped in the hope that prices would rise in due course rather than accumulate dollars whose value was shrinking in foreign banks. Moreover, to cut back production might lead to higher prices. In other words, obvious economic reasons made far-reaching changes in the oil market inevitable.

9. Again, the distribution of oil products, particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom, met with serious difficulties in the spring and summer of 1973 because the fairly low prices of oil products failed to provide the oil companies with sufficient incentive to invest enough to increase their refining and distribution capability to keep up with consumer demands which were probably increasing at an unreasonable rate.

10. Such increases were due to the availability of oil products at such low cost that there was obvious waste. Although most countries had other sources of energy such as coal, there was a tendency to allow them to lapse since the comparative cost of operating them was too high.

11. At an energy conference in London in October 1974, Professor Frankel, President of Petroleum Economics, presented a comparative table of investment costs for the exploitation of energy by source, giving the following figures for a given quantity of energy produced :

Middle East oil	1
United States open cast coal	3.5
Deep mine coal	6
North sea oil	12
Tar sand	20
Oil shale	25
Coal-produced gas	25
Hydrocarbons extracted from coal	35

12. Naturally the cost of producing electricity by hydraulic means is particularly low. The cost per KWh by nuclear means as compared with thermal means (fuel) is as follows :

	Nuclear	Fuel	
	Now	Now	Before autumn 1973
Investments .....	2.1	1.3	1.3
Operation .....	0.80	0.7	0.7
Fuel .....	0.95	6.0	2.1
TOTAL .....	3.85	8.0	4.1

13. It thus appears that for some time to come and whatever other sources of energy there may be, the Middle East oil producers will be able to influence the cost of energy by raising or lowering their dues and a large section of the market will inevitably remain under their control.

14. If consideration is now given to the consequences of the present crisis for the security of Europe, one might say that there are no grounds for dwelling unduly on the purely military aspects of security. No military establishment or country can envisage a long war at the present time. Should proof of this be necessary, the strain on men, equipment and munitions during the Israeli-Arab war in 1973 demonstrated that no country can sustain protracted warfare. The existence of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons implies that no side, at least in a war in which Europe's fate would be at stake, would allow itself to reach the point of capitulation for lack of resources since it would always be able to resort to nuclear means should it no longer be able to wage conventional warfare.

15. The western countries must therefore have adequate oil reserves to wage a short war during which all oil supplies would be cut off. It is estimated that reserves to cover three months' consumption would be sufficient to avoid these countries being paralysed by an oil shortage. It is important, however, for their reserves to be

sufficient to avoid them having to resort to nuclear means.

16. The Western European countries have agreed to keep in reserve the equivalent of three months' average consumption of crude oil. But this is more of an "economic" reserve intended to meet a generalised boycott by the oil-producing countries rather than a truly military reserve to meet the very high requirements of the armed forces in wartime. It is essential to make a clear distinction between the two types of reserves so that difficult economic circumstances — which might be a prelude to hostilities — do not induce governments to draw on their military stocks.

17. Your Rapporteur has no idea of the size of the military reserves of the WEU member countries and the basis on which they have been established. He can but stress the need for them to be maintained everywhere at a high level decided on jointly by the governments of these countries. Insofar as this governs the security of all, and particularly the possibility of having a common defence without the use of nuclear weapons, it is normal for the level of reserves to be defined jointly.

18. Western security, however, does not depend on military means alone. Western industrial society developed on a basis of mineral sources of energy which, since the eighteenth century, has produced the industrial revolution. Its speed of development is due to an ever-increasing consumption of energy. It seems clear that the maintenance of this society and, *a fortiori*, the hope of it making further progress, means maintaining and even increasing the consumption of energy. The maintenance of all the values on which the western world is based depends on the industrial civilisation. Without the wealth it offers, individual freedom and political democracy would not survive for long. Thus, the security of the West depends on the perpetuation of the industrial society which itself depends on an adequate increase in the consumption of energy.

19. Some Committee members felt that this increase could be very slight or virtually nil in

the industrialised countries. Your Rapporteur personally believes that although some slowing down is possible, and perhaps even some cut-backs may be necessary, these can only be regarded as short-term measures.

20. Further, the maintenance of a high standard of living for the whole population seems to be a requirement for the survival of the western world. Short of this, it could be expected that a large part of the population would no longer accept present political systems and this would very probably lead to most serious disturbances. The western world cannot therefore allow too much of its wealth to pass into other hands for fear of being ruined and seeing its very foundations challenged by a large majority of the population. It might be added that at the present time the "other hands" seem hardly capable of using this wealth rationally and usefully for the benefit of all mankind.

21. Finally, the security of the West which depends on the maintenance of its economic activity implies that the western currencies keep their value and that the labour market should not move too far away from full employment. Yet the movements of currency now being effected by the oil-producing countries — if continued at the same rate without being compensated by large-scale redistribution in the form of trade, investments or grants — would quickly lead to the total collapse of the western monetary system. The only way the western countries could defend their monetary system would be by sharply slowing down their economic development which would mean abandoning the principle of employment with all the economic and social drawbacks and dangers that involves.

22. To these various considerations, which apply to the more industrialised countries, must be added another which concerns the underdeveloped countries. The latter cannot allow themselves zero economic growth, which would quickly lead to a drop in the standard of living — already very low — because of the rapid increase in population. They are not all large producers of energy products — far from it — and the lack of energy is already slowing down their development considerably. The rising cost of energy has hit them even harder than the industrialised countries and their chances of quickly transforming their economies have been reduced. But there can be no lasting peace in the world if these countries are

unable to hasten their development and their case must not be overlooked in seeking a solution to the present energy crisis.

23. From these various considerations emerge two distinct aspects of the problem which the energy crisis raises for the western economy.

24. First, the global energy deficit which would make it impossible to maintain the economic structure of the western world, second, the cost of certain sources of energy in present market conditions. These two problems are quite obviously connected since it is not possible for very long to consider settling a global energy deficit at no matter what the cost.

25. It is quite obvious that there is no one solution to the energy crisis in the western world today and, depending on local considerations, greater attention will be paid to one or other aspect and certain types of solution will assume greater or lesser importance.

26. One inevitable consequence of the present situation is the need to develop all types of indigenous energy resources in each country, i.e. to continue extracting coal but using the latest methods in order to lower production costs, to develop nuclear industries and the production of hydraulic energy and, above all, to prospect for and systematically exploit natural gas and oil resources on land or off-shore including the immense reserves of oil shale and sand throughout the world.

27. Western Europe's share of these possibilities, however, is limited. Coal seams that can be mined mechanically are becoming rare and one can but hope to delay for a few years the closing of mines which can no longer be operated profitably. Hydroelectric means are today practically extended to the full and although considerable progress is still possible in the field of nuclear energy serious difficulties are being encountered in this respect. Some are technical difficulties and some of the nuclear energy production lines adopted by the European countries are still not very profitable. The gas centrifuge system now seems to be the most reliable and the least costly.

In the United States — the most advanced country in the field of nuclear energy — many nuclear plants are having to be closed as a result of technical incidents which have increased in recent months. The installation of new plants is coming up against growing difficulties through the local population's fear of nuclear pollution which means that lengthy studies have to be made before such plants can be installed, if at all.

28. The Conservative Group in the European Parliament issued a statement in September 1974 to define a European policy as follows :

“Nuclear power is seen by the group as a medium- to long-term solution and as a development largely dependent upon investment by member countries. Support from Community funds may well be appropriate to ease the excessive burden on certain countries and at the same time accelerate the creation of a nuclear capacity in the Community. The group sees no merit in the adoption of uniformity in reactor design, apart from economy in manufacturing, but stresses the vital need to ensure that the sourcing of nuclear fuel shall not repeat or extend the exposure to interruption which has occurred in oil. The establishment of a uranium enrichment capacity should be along similar lines, the group strongly preferring a number of enrichment plants throughout the Community as opposed to one or two highly-concentrated units. The group sees in the gas centrifuge system a means of achieving this, and at the same time reducing the processing cost significantly.”

29. It should be added that Western Europe has little hope of finding sufficient quantities of natural uranium on its own soil and the purchase of uranium from abroad may run up against much higher prices in the future since several of

the principal exporting countries have said they wished to organise themselves on the same lines as the oil producers.

30. With regard to oil and natural gas, discoveries in the North Sea in the last five years indicate an expected annual output in four or five years' time of some 200 million tons of oil. This calls for the investment of considerable sums without any hope of meeting more than 20 % of Western Europe's requirements. It is estimated that by 1980 the requirements of the United Kingdom and Norway, the main producer countries, will be met and that they will then become oil exporters, but France, the Federal Republic of Germany or Italy will still have to import most of the oil they expect to use from outside Europe.

31. Consequently, the problem of Western Europe's oil supplies is, and will remain for a long time to come, a foreign policy problem. One might even say that at least for the next ten years Europe will have to continue to import most of its oil requirements from the Middle East.

32. Insofar as Europe's aim is to form an economic unit, close co-operation between the European countries in energy matters seems essential. There should be co-operation in the investment necessary for developing indigenous resources, constituting reserves for the civil and military uses of by-products of oil and the foreign policy and foreign trade policy governing the acquisition of oil from other parts of the world.

33. All these problems must be examined both from the long-term and short-term angle. Investments cannot offer speedy solutions to the present crisis. On the contrary, foreign policy and the constitution of reserves are not intended to alleviate the drawbacks of the present situation in the long term but as an attempt to meet problems arising here and now. The specific responsibilities of the various European institutions correspond to this distinction between long and short term. Whereas the European Economic Community is responsible for all that concerns long-term policy, investments and economic and monetary measures to meet the rocketing oil prices, short-term questions affecting more directly the security of Europe and which con-

cern its foreign policy are rather the responsibility of WEU. If, for instance, one considers the programme proposed by the Conservative Group in the European Parliament, it is quite evident that this is concerned with the long term but makes little effort to meet short-term requirements. Your Rapporteur will therefore concentrate on the latter element.

### III. Current problems

34. The oil crisis in the last months of 1973 led to three series of measures taken by the oil-producing countries :

35. (i) An overall cut in production, in principle 25 %, at the beginning of 1974 by the OAPEC countries only, accompanied by an embargo on countries reputed to be hostile to the Arab cause.

36. (ii) Further nationalisation of the property of the western companies by most producer countries, which led to far more participation oil and less oil subject to the payment of dues.

37. (iii) The very large increase in dues, the posted price of a barrel of Arab 34° API light oil having risen from \$1.80 in August 1970 to \$3.011 on 1st October 1973, \$5.119 on 1st November 1973 and \$11.651 on 1st January 1974. The price has now levelled out at about the latter figure which is slightly higher than the taxation paid to the producer countries on each barrel of crude oil. Crude participation oil is often auctioned and reached prices of almost \$17 per barrel at that time, but subsequently fell slightly.

38. Thus, the consumer countries have had two problems to face : oil supplies, threatened by production cuts and boycotts, and the price of crude oil itself. Today, the latter problem is of far greater importance than the former.

39. In the circumstances, it is evident that long-term requirements must be taken into account in considering the present situation and the short-term measures to be taken. Nor can strictly foreign policy matters be considered to the

exclusion of the economic problems now facing the whole western world.

40. The policies of the Western European countries differ as to the relative importance of long- and short-term matters. Countries such as the United Kingdom, Norway and the Netherlands, which have firm hopes of producing enough national oil to meet or even exceed domestic requirements, have only to consider the short term in their relations with the oil-producing countries. Conversely, countries like France, Germany and Italy which have little or no hope of finding the energy resources they need on their own territory in the foreseeable future cannot afford to disregard the long term in elaborating their foreign policies.

41. These countries have therefore approached the contradictions of the oil crisis from different angles. Since they depend on the international market for oil purchases for a protracted period, the countries which have little chance of becoming major producers must maintain very large monetary reserves. To protect their currencies, these countries must thus come to grips with the danger of economic recession and all the inherent drawbacks for society as a whole. At the same time, they must arrange to accelerate their exports so that, in a market where the terms of trade have developed too quickly, they can export more in order to purchase the same volume of energy supplies.

42. The oil-producing countries will therefore draw some \$32 to \$37,000 million from the main consumer countries in 1974 alone. The accrued monetary reserves of these countries amount to less than \$90,000 million, which means that failing a radical change in the situation nothing will be left within three years. The industrialised countries must therefore take steps to :

- (i) try to halt the increase in the price of crude oil, or even bring it down through agreements with the producer countries ;

- (ii) restrict their energy consumption, particularly of oil products. Measures already taken in this sense have not yet achieved the desired results since, despite the very considerable increase in consumer prices, the quantities consumed have not fallen by more than 10 % ;

43. However, one Committee member underlined that even the strictest measures to ration petrol for cars would have only very limited repercussions on imports of crude oil, whereas the drawbacks for the economic life of the consumer countries could be very serious. In short, the indications are that too much must not be expected of rationing. In some countries such as Britain, however, there could be considerable savings through better insulation of private dwellings and factories.

- (iii) gear their economies and consequently their energy consumption towards manufactures likely to increase exports, particularly to the oil-producing countries ;
- (iv) adopt austerity policies in order to protect their currencies and limit imports ;
- (v) work out ways of increasing the value of their monetary reserves and particularly revaluing gold so that the official rate for gold is brought closer to its commercial rate ;
- (vi) elaborate a domestic social policy to make it easier for the population to support a halt in economic expansion let alone a very serious recession ;
- (vii) encourage the oil-producing countries to invest the part of their resources which cannot be used directly for their own development in economically-profitable firms in the western countries and give them the financial and political guarantees they require. The monetary surplus to be accumulated by the OPEC countries in 1974 is estimated at between \$40 and \$60,000

million, bringing their total foreign exchange reserves to between \$65 and \$85,000 million dollars. During the first eight months of 1974, out of an estimated overall surplus of between \$25 and \$28,000 million the OPEC countries are believed to have invested \$7,000 million in the United States, \$3,000 million in the United Kingdom and \$10 to \$13,000 million in Euro-currency. However, the recent bankruptcies of several continental banks seem to have considerably slowed down investments by oil-producing countries in Europe ;

44. Some Committee members underlined that the economic security of the West required a large proportion of these investments to be long-term ones and no longer payable at sight as was usually the case so far.

45. Such deposits encouraged speculation in exchange rates and thus increased inflationary movements in the various western countries. Those who had such capital were also able to upset the monetary balance of any western country merely by deciding to withdraw their deposits, whether for political or economic considerations.

46. However, the use of foreign capital to purchase majority holdings in firms essential to the economic life of the West also raises a serious problem for each country regarding the control of its economy. It is certain that if guarantees are to be given to investors to induce them to back European firms there must also be guarantees that such investments do not upset the conditions of production, employment and trade in the West.

(viii) concert efforts to ensure that the countries most affected by the crisis are not forced to take, at national level, measures which would ruin world trade and amplify and extend the crisis. A second aim of this concertation might be to reach joint agreement on a programme for reduc-

ing consumption of oil products so as to influence the market price of crude oil and force the producer countries to lower their selling prices. However this may be, this is one of the avowed aims of the United States, but some experts wonder whether, in view of the cohesion of the OPEC, such a policy would have any prospect of achieving the result expected. Many producer countries could considerably reduce their production without any hardship and mutual aid between the OPEC countries would allow the others to withstand the pressure.

47. Consultation will be all the more necessary since certain countries may have a different approach to the oil crisis. Future oil exporters can allow themselves to depart somewhat from monetary orthodoxy since they have only to meet a passing crisis.

48. This probably explains why, since the oil crisis began at the end of 1973, two attitudes have emerged in the West, the main protagonists being Mr. Jobert, former French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Kissinger, United States Secretary of State.

49. France's special situation and its lack of energy resources no doubt explain the apparent panic of its Minister for Foreign Affairs, who described as "every man for himself" the policy upon which he embarked with such alacrity in order to try to obtain twenty-year contracts for supplies from the oil-producing countries. He apparently felt that direct agreement with the producers would ensure adequate supplies of oil for his country at high prices but at the same time would provide outlets for French industry, so that exports would offset as far as possible the new expenditure resulting from the increased price of oil. Such a policy made co-operation with other countries difficult since, if they had the same interests, they automatically became France's competitors.

50. Being able to enter into undertakings covering some twenty years, France was well-placed to negotiate with the producer countries, but it tied its own hands before any consultation with its European partners or even the United States. This policy inevitably led to a crisis in European solidarity whose effects extended — often to the detriment of France — to all the fields covered by western solidarity including the EEC common agricultural policy. It was obviously not possible to entertain solidarity for France's benefit when France had renounced solidarity in fields which did not bring it immediate rewards.

51. Some Committee members disputed this view, pointing out that, at the time of the crisis, other European countries had shown no more European solidarity than the French Government or that, without panicking, the latter had merely speeded up a policy which it had been pursuing for some time. Your Rapporteur is prepared to concur with both these remarks, but he must nevertheless record that France's eight partners agreed to the American proposal for the western countries to join their efforts on oil questions. This led to the Washington conference being held in February 1974 and the formation of the Group of Twelve without the participation of France.

52. On the other hand, the United States has considerable oil resources which, although not yet adequate to cover its own consumption, suffice to prevent a serious shortage. But above all it has enormous reserves of oil-sands and shale which would become profitable to operate if the price of oil on the world market rose above a certain level. In the foreign policy field, the United States has therefore mainly sought solutions to short-term problems since in the long term it can expect to find national or continental solutions.

53. Thus, Mr. Kissinger called on the United States' industrialised partners, i.e. Japan and the Western European countries, to form a united front vis-à-vis the producer countries. The organisation of producer countries in the OPEC and particularly the OAPEC was perfect justification

for a parallel organisation of consumer countries. The position of these countries would be particularly strong in face of the demands of the producer countries if they agreed not to give in to pressure. This of course meant the more favoured nations, particularly the United States, affording considerable assistance to countries which were boycotted, as in the case of the Netherlands, or under pressure from the rising cost of oil — the case of all the Western European countries and Japan. It is certainly regrettable that during the summer of 1974 United States leaders appeared to threaten military intervention against oil-producing countries, particularly as such threats were hardly credible.

54. The strength of the United States would certainly not allow it to take control of the Middle East oil wells by force. Apart from all the moral and political reasons which would deter the United States from taking such a step, there were no practical means of preventing the producer countries, whose monetary reserves would have allowed them to sustain an interruption in their oil exports for some years, from destroying their wells. Such a move would also have been regarded as provocative by the Russians who might have been tempted to intervene. The only result of such threats would be to worsen relations between the West and the oil-producing countries and make it more difficult for the latter to make the concessions necessary for maintaining prices at a level acceptable to all.

55. Despite any doubts there may be about the effectiveness of the tactics sometimes adopted by the United States, its proposal had the great merit of trying to make the industrialised countries join together in face of the demands of the oil-producing countries. Results were achieved at the Washington conference in February 1974 when the Group of Twelve was set up, consisting of eight members of the EEC, the United States, Canada, Japan and Norway. In October 1974, this group produced a draft agreement which is now before the governments of the participating countries.

56. The main feature of this project is the creation of machinery for sharing oil deficits in the event of one of the signatory countries being

boycotted by the producer countries. Implementation would be the responsibility of an International Energy Agency which would have to work out the conditions in which the agreement would be applied. Should the normal oil supplies of one of the signatory countries be cut by more than 7 %, the sharing procedure would automatically come into effect. The agreement will probably be ratified by eleven of the twelve signatories, Norway having put forward very serious reservations, but a number of OECD countries (Switzerland, Austria, Spain) which did not take part in preparing the text seem inclined to accede to the agreement and take part in the International Energy Agency. However, it was announced by Mr. Sauvagnargues, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 15th October and subsequently by Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, President of the Republic, that France, which refused to take part in the Washington conference in February 1974 in order to pursue its policy of bilateral co-operation with certain producer countries, will not accede to the agreement for three reasons :

57. (i) France considers that the agreement between the Twelve covers solely the event of supplies being restricted, which does not seem to be an essential problem at present, and not the problem of prices, which it considers to be far more important. This implies that France rejects the American view that an overall cut in consumption should lead to a cut in prices.

58. (ii) France fears that solidarity between the industrialised countries may lead to a confrontation between the oil-producing and consumer countries.

59. In this connection, one Committee member pointed out that the EEC countries, which had agreed on a policy of understanding with the oil-producing countries, formed a majority in the Group of Twelve, where they were in a position to make their views prevail and prevent such a confrontation, particularly since majority voting is to be the rule in the International Energy Agency.

60. (iii) France fears that the decisions taken by the group of industrialised powers in the energy field leave no room for the definition of a common European energy policy. According to Mr. Sauvagnargues, the development of the work of

the Agency in particular would leave little room for the definition of a Community policy.

61. If France does not take part in the Agency, the situation of the European Community in energy matters would certainly be compromised because eight of the members would be members of the Agency but not the ninth. This would appear to preclude the participation of a representative of the European Commission in the work of the Agency since he would *ipso facto* have to represent the interests of the whole nine-power Community. But, because of France's position, there is no common nine-power view.

62. Thus, if France does not join the Agency, there is every reason to think that it will oppose the Commission being represented. Conversely, if France were to accede to the treaty there seems no reason why the European Community could not play its due rôle, particularly in so far as the agreement worked out by the Twelve does not cover the whole oil problem nor, *a fortiori*, the energy problem.

63. Yet there are certain positive aspects to the French position, particularly in respect of the proposal made by President Giscard d'Estaing on 24th October to convene a conference at the beginning of 1975 of the principal oil-producing and consumer countries, both industrialised and underdeveloped, in order to organise the oil market so that the benefits in real terms for the producer countries are clearly fixed. This would alleviate the disadvantages of the rapid devaluation of the dollar for the producer countries and at the same time shelter the consumer countries from any unilateral measures which might be taken by the producers. A proposal in this sense, moreover, had already been made by the Federal Republic at the beginning of 1974.

64. The French President also expressed the wish that nine-power Europe have a single representative at this conference. To a large extent this presupposes a solution having been found to the problem raised by French policy for the other EEC members. If France refuses the agreement committing its eight partners in the Group of Twelve, it is hard to see how it could agree to be represented by a representative of the signatory countries in a wider forum. In fact, it

is hard to imagine true European co-operation in the energy field if it is not based on a common attitude towards the International Energy Agency.

65. The Community has already decided to tackle a number of aspects of the energy crisis from both the internal and the foreign policy standpoint. Thus, on 8th and 9th October 1974, talks were held between an OAPEC delegation and two members of the European Commission with a view to exchanging information on matters affecting the price of oil and also investments both in the Arab countries and in the western countries.

66. There is no reason to suppose that the development of such co-operation with the Arab countries would be incompatible with an overall strategy among the oil-consuming countries or at least a degree of discipline in their relations with the producer countries.

67. The proposals made by the Shah of Iran at his press conference on 2nd November 1974 should be accorded due attention by the western countries and encourage them to work out a joint reply. These proposals seek to :

- (i) introduce a single base price for oil, which implies a higher price for participation oil and a lower price for oil purchased directly from producer countries, the average price per barrel remaining the same. This proposal has since been accepted by several Gulf countries, but not by all producer countries ;
- (ii) lower the price of oil for consumers by making a sharp reduction in the profits of oil firms, bringing them down from \$2 to \$0.5 per barrel.

68. It is evident that it would be in the interest of both producers and consumers to reorganise the market by introducing a single price for oil, whatever its source. But it is equally clear that uniform prices, as proposed by the Shah of Iran, would bring no reduction in the average price of crude oil.

69. It might appear tempting to reduce the profits of the oil companies, particularly since they may seem excessive, at least at first sight. However, it must be borne in mind that what the Shah calls profits are not net profits. They include payment for services rendered in the form of transport, transformation and distribution of oil and also sums reserved for self-financing, i.e. for expanding the companies' activities. Drilling for new oilfields, bringing them into operation and transforming oil shale or sand require considerable investment by the companies and it is normal for them to obtain the necessary funds from the oil they distribute.

70. In this field, the point of view of the producer countries is certainly quite different from that of the consumers. The former feel that the companies are levying sums at their expense in order to produce a competitive situation and bring down prices. The latter see this as a normal way of bringing the law of supply and demand into play in order to reduce the price of crude oil to a reasonable level.

71. Your Rapporteur by no means feels that the western countries have to endorse the Shah's proposals, but he believes they are serious proposals which deserve detailed study by the consumer countries. In any event, this is a field in which the adoption of a specific position by one or other of them can but weaken the position of all in regard to the producers' demands and consequently it is necessary for there to be close consultation and concerted action by the consumers prior to any negotiations with the producer countries.

72. If such steps are not taken soon, all western cohesion in respect of the OPEC countries' demands might disappear. Already Norway, which is about to become a major oil exporter, has decided not to participate in the International Energy Agency and moves are afoot in the United Kingdom for keeping that country out of the Agency, whereas other western countries, such as Sweden, are on the contrary considering joining it.

73. It is thus in everyone's interests to promote western cohesion in the energy field without delay

and to set up the Agency while future oil exporters may still be associated with countries liable to remain importers for a long time to come.

74. For its part, the European Community has agreed to grant assistance to the tune of some \$3,000 million in 1975 to its members who have serious balance-of-payments difficulties due to the increase in petrol prices.

75. The Federal Republic has agreed to provide 40 % of this amount provided the countries benefiting from such assistance agree to take the necessary steps to fight inflation. It may therefore be concluded that the solidarity of the industrialised countries shown in the agreement between the Twelve does not in itself jeopardise closer solidarity between the member countries of the European Economic Community. It is, on the contrary, the refusal of one of the Community members to take part in the agreement between the Twelve which jeopardises the future of a European energy policy.

76. On 23rd October 1974, the European Commission, at the request of the Belgian Government, sent governments a report on the question of compatibility between the Rome Treaty and a European energy policy on the one hand and membership of the International Energy Agency on the other. Although the text of this report has not yet been published, information gleaned from the press suggests that the Commission, while underlining compatibility, has laid down certain conditions, i.e. :

- (i) that the Community as such form part of the system set up by the Group of Twelve, which implies France accepting this indirect representation. At his press conference on 24th October, President Giscard d'Estaing appears to have responded favourably to this ;
- (ii) that the Community have its own machinery for sharing oil. While in the immediate future France may find certain advantages in not subjecting its Arab policy to arrangements of this

kind, the fact that some of its partners will have become oil-exporters in a few years' time should induce it to weigh the future advantages of such machinery ;

- (iii) that definite progress be made without delay towards a European energy policy in the framework of the Community.

77. Thus, despite certain difficulties, procedure for bringing order to the oil market seems to be taking shape and should be introduced fairly soon. This has not left the oil-producing countries indifferent since, at its meeting in Vienna on 23rd October, OPEC announced a complete change in its price policy which would henceforth be determined by the law of supply and demand, other sources of energy competing with oil and the rate of inflation. This is obviously a very reasonable basis on which a long-term agreement between producers and consumers, including a simplification of the system for fixing prices and dues and indexing prices and dues, would become possible.

78. Should these decisions be confirmed, the Western European countries should remember that they were reached only because of consultation and that the machinery which is to be set up by the Nine and by the signatories of the agreement of the Group of Twelve will, for a long time to come, be the best guarantee that the OPEC countries will abide by their undertakings.

#### IV. Conclusions

79. Your Rapporteur therefore considers that the energy crisis may affect European security in two quite separate ways :

80. (i) Directly, because of the use of the oil weapon by the producer countries, as was the case in October 1973, either to paralyse the West's economy or to render its armed forces powerless. In particular, the possibility cannot be ruled out of the Soviet Union trying to use its influence on the producer countries to disarm Europe by depriving its armed forces of the fuel essential

for the conduct of military operations. Although this may now seem quite hypothetical, it should at least be considered and the stocks necessary to avert such a manoeuvre, or the threat of such a manoeuvre, should be constituted and maintained by all headquarters where military stocks are concerned, and by the governments for the requirements of the economy.

81. Even apart from the threat of armed attack, there is still a very serious danger of certain countries being tempted to make political concessions in exchange for advantages offered by the oil-producing countries. Should they do so, they would be very seriously jeopardising any prospect of European political union in any framework whatsoever.

82. (ii) Indirectly, but this is now far more serious, through the unilateral action of producer countries on prices, with all the inherent consequences for the economies of the consumer countries for which the danger of rapid inflation has increased considerably since October 1973.

83. Such is the type of crisis which Europe now has to face. This is not possible without close concertation with its American allies, but nor must it overlook the establishment of medium-term contracts with the producer countries. Your Rapporteur therefore sees no contradiction between the policy advocated by the United States, adopted by most of the western countries and Japan in Washington in February 1974 and

implemented by the Group of Twelve on the one hand, and the policy of agreement with the producer countries, as advocated mainly by France, but in the long run practised in one form or another by all the Western European countries. Your Rapporteur sees no reason why the energy crisis should split the Nine who are all aware of this twofold necessity. He believes the vain dispute in this connection is merely preventing Western Europe from meeting the crisis effectively and from advancing along the road towards economic and political integration which is still the declared aim of all.

84. Today, such integration implies adopting a common policy towards all problems raised by the reintroduction of capital controlled by the oil-producing countries in the West's economy. Guarantees to be given to suppliers of capital and to be obtained from them will be truly effective only if they are based on active solidarity between the western countries.

85. For all these reasons, your Rapporteur considers that the WEU Assembly cannot be content with the Council's reply to Recommendation 241. Such a reply means that the Council is relinquishing what is its responsibility since the security of Western Europe is at stake even though studies and decisions relating to energy problems are to be undertaken and prepared in the framework of other institutions.

***The Channel Tunnel***

---

**MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION**

***tabled by Mr. de Montesquiou and others  
with a request for urgent procedure***

---

The Assembly,

Considering the building of a tunnel under the Channel, for the peoples of the WEU member countries, to be a symbol of the irreversible achievement of the European union advocated by the Brussels Treaty ;

Considering further that the opening of such a means of direct communication is essential to meet the new requirements arising from increased trade between the EEC members ;

Considering that the investment required for such an undertaking is amply justified by the benefits which all the EEC member countries will derive therefrom ;

Recalling that the main burden of this expenditure is to be borne by private investment,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

Invite the governments of member countries to overcome jointly the political, ecological and technical problems raised by the building of a tunnel under the Channel, a longstanding hope of the European nations.

*Signed : de Montesquiou, Valleix, Krieg, Treu, Richter, Mart, de Bruyne, Adriaensens, Porthoine, Lenzer, Osborn, van Ooijen*

*State of European aviation activities*

**REPORT <sup>1</sup>**

**submitted on behalf of the  
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions <sup>2</sup>  
by Mr. Warren, Rapporteur**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION  
on the state of European aviation activities

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM  
submitted by Mr. Warren, Rapporteur

The background

Chapter I : Military aviation

Chapter II : Civil aviation

---

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. *Members of the Committee*: Mr. de Montesquiou (Chairman); MM. Warren, Richter (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, de Chevigny, Cornelissen (Substitute: Portheine), Fletcher (Substitute: Farr), Gölter, La Loggia,

Lenzer, Mammi, Mart, van Ooijen, Osborn, Pecoraro, Schwencke, de Stezhe, Tomney (Substitute: Small), Treu, Valleix, Yvon.

N.B. *The names of Representatives who took part in the vote are printed in italics.*

**Draft Recommendation**  
**on the state of European aviation activities**

The Assembly,

Concerned about the consequences of the oil crisis for the European civil air transport market and hence for the aviation industry ;

Aware of the part played by air transport in Europe's prosperity and the development of its advanced technology ;

Considering the interdependence of military and civil markets,

**RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL**

Invite the member countries to :

1. Agree on joint specifications for all military aviation procurement ;
2. Take particular account in the formulation of these specifications of the aircraft, engine and equipment capability of European aviation companies ;
3. Ensure that export market requirements are incorporated in the specifications ;
4. Give preference, wherever reasonable and possible, to the products of European aviation factories so that a self-sustaining design and manufacturing capability able to compete in world markets can be retained in Europe ;
5. Agree with the United States Government on equality of opportunity for the export and import of civil and military aerospace products between member countries and the United States and, until such agreement is reached, establish such commercial protection of the European market as is necessary to protect the jobs of European aerospace workers and the balance of payments of member countries ;
6. Recognise and establish Western Europe as a unified, single market for air transport operations and aircraft sales ;
7. Establish a strong and co-ordinated government- and EEC-backed programme of commercial, financial and diplomatic support for all aviation export sales.

## **Explanatory Memorandum**

*(submitted by Mr. Warren, Rapporteur)*

### **The background**

1. By the second half of the 1960s, the courses which the European aircraft industry could follow were already discernible. At that time the Committee expressed its fear that national European industries would not be able to withstand competition from outside Europe unless they were firmly linked together. In a long series of reports various Rapporteurs have drawn attention to the fact that the European aircraft industries would fail in their struggle for survival unless they came together and worked in conjunction with one another. Time and again figures were given showing the escalating cost of new aircraft. The era of the DC 3, which had a development cost in the region of \$300,000, is long past. The DC 10 cost about \$1.5 billion.
2. The Rapporteurs invariably concluded that urgent steps had to be taken to avoid disaster in the European civil aircraft industry. However, they all suffered the fate of Cassandra — nobody listened. If governments and industrial leaders happened to listen, they mostly found the figures so alarming that they preferred to ignore them. In its replies to recommendations the Council predicted that everything would work out satisfactorily in the end.
3. Since 1973 increased oil prices have seriously aggravated the situation and the threat to the European aeronautical industry will be greater than ever if no concerted policy is agreed upon to provide a broad basis of co-operation between governments, manufacturers and airlines.
4. In recent months, speaking in the House of Commons and elsewhere, the British Minister for Industry has remarked on the serious lack of orders for the British aircraft industry in the civil field.
5. On 3rd October 1974 the board of directors of SNIAS, the French national aerospace company, stated that they had had a deficit of Frs. 480 million in 1973 and that the 1974 figures might show a deficit of about Frs. 450 million ; they therefore could not continue without State aid. In the United Kingdom, Ferranti Limited, an important producer of aircraft electronics equipment, has also had to ask for State aid in order to continue operations.
6. On the other side of the Atlantic the \$18 billion sales in 1973 of the United States aviation industry had a tremendous impact on the United States balance of trade. 1973 exports accounted for \$3 billion. By the end of 1973 the United States balance of trade had moved from a \$7 billion surplus at the end of 1972 to a \$7 billion deficit. But for the exports of the aircraft industry, the deficit would have been \$10 billion. This industry at present employs 750,000 personnel compared with 400,000 in Europe's industry.
7. At the same time the business performance of the world's airlines is very unfavourable. In the United States discussions are being held between the federal government, TWA and Pan Am with a view to collaborating to reduce the competition between the two airlines. The federal government has already refused aid of the kind requested by Pan Am and the directors may have to wind up the company if it cannot reach agreement with TWA.
8. In Europe, Alitalia, KLM, Sabena, British Caledonian, Air Inter and UTA are all in serious financial difficulties.
9. If the French confederation of aeronautical and space industries was able to conclude in its annual report that, although going through a difficult period, the French aeronautical industry is at present far from being in a state of acute crisis, it is only thanks to orders for military aircraft and missiles. In 1973, export orders for military aircraft and other equipment reached a figure of Frs. 5,470 million. The United Kingdom figure for export sales was Frs. 5,740 million (£520 million).
10. However, where civil aircraft are concerned the situation is becoming increasingly serious. The vast sums of money invested in aircraft such as the Concorde, Airbus and Mercure are becoming extremely difficult to amortise. Yet to abdi-

cate from the spearhead sciences of aerospace would be to pass the entire market to the Americans on their terms and conditions.

11. Europe was the cradle of aviation. Europe has a remarkable aerospace capability. It has repeatedly proved it can produce and sell its products in the world's markets. The industry's customers have returned satisfied. We must have their confidence in our industry.

12. This report seeks to show a way ahead for Western Europe.

## CHAPTER I

### *Military aviation*

13. Agreements on common military specifications for a number of aerospace projects in Western Europe have proved that European nations share common requirements in their defence forces. This has been an obvious requirement since the establishment of NATO, but it has taken twenty-five years to establish the reality in production.

14. The Anglo-French Jaguar, the Franco-German Alpha Jet, the Anglo-German-Italian MRCA illustrate the proof. However, work-sharing programmes have, so far, tended to be protectionist rather than assigned on merit to the best industrial resources. Industrial capacity and competition within Europe has been increased faster than the market's size. Let us hope, for the sake of their aerospace industry, that European governments will come together in a permanent understanding of the need to base their future defence programmes on the encouragement of proven industrial performance. Europe has a magnificent aerospace industry, separated by national frontiers. To compete effectively in world markets, this European industry must be based on the response to a common defence market for all of Western Europe.

15. It is to be hoped, most earnestly, that Western European governments will not take too long to establish the required collective customer policy — a time scale of five years should be ample. However, it would be folly to do nothing to protect Europe's aerospace industry, even on national bases, whilst the policy is being established.

16. The duty of governments as customers of their industries is one about which more awareness is needed. Governments created the excess capacity now found in Europe. Governments must ensure that in a future collective policy they use their purchasing power to ensure a stable industry working on defence programmes which also can meet the requirements of world export markets. This simple act would do more than anything else to ensure the worldwide competitiveness of Europe's aerospace industry.

17. The United States Government has always had this dedication in its selection of defence contractors. It has even promoted individual projects because of their export potential when no substantial domestic demand existed. The Starfighter was a clear example. Export promotion has been a rôle which the United States Government expects to play to help the nation's balance of payments, employment and foreign policy<sup>1</sup>. European governments, acting together, could do the same for their own aerospace industry.

18. Airframe, engines and equipment each cost about one-third of the total cost of an aircraft. Added to this must be the costs of training personnel, operations, maintenance and spare parts.

1. United States Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Frederick B. Dent, said :

"Our status internationally is also dependent upon maintaining our superiority in sophisticated technology. The contribution of the aerospace industry is just one example of the rôle of technology in our trade with other nations. Without billions of dollars in aerospace exports we would have had a deficit trade balance every year since 1968. In national security too the essential ingredient of our strength is the sophistication of our research and development, an element of our strength which is respected throughout the world."

Over the lifetime of an aircraft, all these will add up approximately to a sum equal to the original purchase price of the aircraft. Thus, nowadays, air forces and suppliers are continually seeking ways to extend the life of aircraft by upgrading the aircraft's capability to meet new threats<sup>1</sup>. But a point is reached when new aircraft must be acquired. Just such a point has been reached now by the governments of Belgium, Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands.

19. It would be presumptuous to seek to influence the decision of these nations but, as NATO partners, their defence rôles and equipment selection are of common concern to Western European Union. The four nations are considering the acquisition of some 350 aircraft of a common type to support their armies by strike missions on ground targets, meet attacks by enemy aircraft and gain air superiority<sup>2</sup>. Four contenders are being considered: the Marcel Dassault F1 M 53, the Saab Viggen, the General Dynamics YF 16 and the Northrop YF 17. There is also a proposal for the selection of one of these aircraft plus the Anglo-French Jaguar S version to make sure that the spectrum of NATO's defence requirements of the four nations

---

1. Tactical warfare aircraft are being revolutionised. Precision weapons, sensors, real-time gathering and processing of battlefield information, modern command and control are all changing the nature of warfare. This was seen during the 1973 war in the Middle East. This new type of warfare requires new weaponry.

The biggest development areas for future military systems are: sophisticated weapons and their delivery, guidance systems for missiles and space technology.

The price of aircraft and their systems have risen steeply. As costs increase, smaller numbers of aircraft are ordered. This consequently leads to shorter production runs and even higher prices. To offset this, each new aircraft has the capability of several of its predecessors.

2. On 26th September 1974, in the parliamentary discussion on the 1974 defence paper, the Netherlands Minister of Defence, Mr. Vredeling, stated that the question as to whether these light fighters will also have a dual rôle — nuclear and non-nuclear — will not have to be decided until about 1980. Moreover, the technical requirements for equipping the aircraft for this dual rôle are relatively simple and cheap, and their nuclear capability will not therefore have much bearing on the price.

is properly met<sup>1</sup>. Only the Jaguar and the Viggen are in operational service. The United States bidders have extended their industrial bases by the teaming of McDonnell-Douglas with Northrop and Ling Temco Vought with General Dynamics as part of the current Department of Defence fly-off competition between the YF 16 and YF 17 which will be completed at the beginning of 1975.

20. Extensive evaluations of all the contenders are still in progress. All bidders are offering impressive financial and industrial cost offset inducements. There are wide variations between the aircraft prices quoted, but it is to be hoped that the selectors take account of three major considerations before making their judgment.

21. Firstly, it is essential to add up the total cost of ownership over the required life of each contender including the value of offsets and local purchases of import substitutes.

22. Secondly, there are very substantial fiscal benefits obtainable through local purchases of aircraft, engines, or equipment as opposed to foreign purchases in that Western European suppliers will be paid out of the taxation of the four nations and therefore money will be recycled within Western Europe. Much could go straight back to the four governments by way of direct and indirect taxes incurred by indigenous supplier companies and their employees. Calculations have shown that a premium of 40% can be added to a local product before it is more costly than an imported product because of these tax advantages.

23. Thirdly, and most important of all, it is essential for the selectors to take account of the impact a particular choice will have on the future capability of Europe's aircraft industry to supply Europe independently of reliance on

---

1. In September 1974, the Ministers of Defence of the four countries met the French Minister of Defence who, of course, emphasised the European aspects of the problem they hope to solve in common. From the technical point of view the four Ministers agreed with their French colleague that the Mirage F1 M 53 would be capable of fulfilling the tasks set out under NATO requirements, i.e. principally strike missions in close support of the army and the maintenance of air superiority over the battlefield. Your Rapporteur notes that no decision has yet been taken and no commitment was made at the abovementioned meeting.

the United States. If the cycle of design through service to new design is broken in European factories, it cannot be restored later because the United States will have used their European sales to take them forward to a new generation of technology when the Europeans will not have even been involved in the last one.

24. Lavish work-sharing offers are being made by some of the bidders to the four nations. Indeed one has offered more work to one nation than there are the necessary experienced workers in the economy. The real benefits available from work-sharing have to be carefully analysed before political commitments. There are two effects to be considered, one direct and valuable, the other indirect and dangerous. The direct effect can be job conservation and the opportunity of working experience of someone else's technology. Good management control can take advantage of lower European labour rates if a United States selection is made. But it is unlikely to be economical to look for many changes in the United States selection of equipments on board in favour of local purchases. Of course technology transfers are possible in electronic equipments like weapons and navigation systems between different aircraft types, but these necessitate further flight tests to ensure compatibility with the aircraft.

25. The dangerous indirect effect of work-sharing on foreign projects is that it may offer jobs for the present but it does not secure them for the future. Only when there is a visible, continuous route from engineering to customer experience in any type of technology can that technology flourish. Without applications, exciting engineering is only a waste of scarce resources. The tragedy of European technology is that Europe has already invested heavily in these resources but does not understand how to use them as a European asset.

26. All of us want the four nations to choose the best aircraft, balanced with the best contract terms and conditions. We have confidence in their ability to make the right choice. But the selection is really a test case about technology which all of Europe's politicians and technologists must answer. They, rather than the aircraft, are on trial. The basic question has been asked before about computers, atomic energy, space and numerous defence issues. Now it

appears again in aerospace. It is straightforward and it is about time that Europeans heard a clear answer to the question: "When will Europe's politicians and technologists work together to match capability with opportunity?"

## CHAPTER II

### *Civil aviation*

27. Airlines around the world are facing severe financial problems because 1973 Arab oil price increases reduced world passenger traffic demand and by raising airlines' costs of operation, reduced this demand still further. The demand for more and more civil aircraft on which airframe, engine and equipment manufacturers had generally prospered for the last twenty-five years, has declined sharply. Many airline ground support equipment companies have suffered as traffic growth slowed during 1974.

28. In the western world, many airlines are no longer their own masters. Their bankers and government officials find themselves in a stronger position to influence airline policy than the companies' directors. In Europe nearly all of the large airlines are publicly owned. They are accountable to the State and most have received substantial subsidies from taxation. The phrase "national flag carrier" is commonly heard about these airlines. This may be an important duty for them for which they have a right to expect payment from their governments where these duties conflict with economic choice in operations. But their prime task should be to carry their nationals as safely, cheaply and comfortably as possible. When one examines the routes and fare structures of European airlines, all of which are subject directly or indirectly to government approval, one is constantly amazed at the extraordinary anomalies which are accepted as standard business practice. Four examples will illustrate these phenomena. Pooling of income by airlines to reduce competition on routes is common-place and clearly at the expense of the passenger. Scheduled air fares are up to three times as high as the equivalent cost of flying the same distance in the same aircraft type in the

United States — with average United States wages more than double those of Europe. First class passengers are subsidised by those travelling economy. While those travelling economy are often subjected to cramped accommodation because 20 % or more seats have been added than found in the same aircraft type in the United States.

29. Europe needs a better air transport system to serve its people. Governments must act together to establish a system of airline operations to serve the interests of Western Europe as a whole. But these matters, although important to European travellers, are recounted as they lead on to the greater problem of the existing European market for civil aircraft. Until the air transportation system of Western Europe is organised as that required to serve a market of continental dimensions as big as the United States, European aircraft manufacturers will never have the broad home market base essential for their prosperity. They will always be out-sold by the Americans at home and will never get into the United States on the scale essential to survive.

30. The manufacturers have gone as far as they dare with collaborative industrial agreements in the absence of collective agreement by their governments that Western Europe is one market <sup>1</sup>.

31. Today Western Europe's aerospace industry has been caught badly by their customers' economic recessions. The European manufacturers built up a challenge to the United States domination of 80 % of the world civil market and this has peaked at the wrong time through no fault of their own. The sales of Concorde, the

1. During the September 1974 Farnborough Air Show, six European companies — Hawker Siddeley, British Aircraft Corporation, VFW-Fokker, Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm, Dornier and Aérospatiale — agreed to form an association with a view to meeting the airlines' requirements in the 1980s. This association is open to other European companies.

Airbus, the Mercure, the VFW-614 and the Fellowship have all slowed to an unacceptable pace. Hawker Siddeley say their 146 project will not be a viable aircraft because of cost inflation in wages, materials and oil. However, it is significant that two types of demand have held up. Companies making small passenger aircraft with low operating costs have not been so hard hit by the recession. Passenger demand at the short haul end of the market is still sufficient to warrant purchases of new aircraft. Secondly, the demand for air freight capacity still prospers.

32. For twenty-five years, airframe manufacturers the world over traded on "calculated obsolescence" for future sales. Growing personal and corporate wealth created demand for all kinds of faster and more distant air services. Even today Boeing, the leading commercial aircraft manufacturer in the world, is predicting the market for commercial aircraft in the next ten years will amount to \$50 billion, half of it in the United States <sup>1</sup>.

33. We have to plan for the day when the cost of oil will be matched by peoples' ability to afford the price of airline tickets. Boeing's calculations show that despite the fuel crisis, air transportation remains an expanding industry which will bring as big a growth over the next ten years as was recorded over the last twenty-five years <sup>2</sup>.

34. European manufacturers' problems, however, do not stop with a clear resumption of airline demand. The awkward industrial alliances established by politicians in the 1960s as part of their grand design for Europe may have kept men at work, but they have not sold aircraft. European engineers have triumphed over the problems of the alliances and have produced, in aircraft like Concorde, products without rival. Unfortunately the political encouragement of the

1. Royal Aeronautical Society lecture, October 1974, by Mr. J. E. Steiner, Vice-President Technology and New Programme Development, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co.

2. Guild of Air Pilots and Navigators lecture, October 1974, by Mr. J. E. Steiner, Boeing.

manufacturing industry was not matched by an essential parallel political encouragement of Europe's government-controlled airlines to buy what was being built by the tax-payers of Europe. Nobody would expect these airlines to buy aircraft from any source which did not offer competitive operating economics. But it is ridiculous for the governments of Western Europe to leave the market place of Europe wide open to the Americans. Over a year after the import-export problems facing European manufacturers were stated publicly at the WEU colloquy in Paris on a civil and military aeronautical policy for Europe, no action has been taken by any European government to erect proper tariff barriers against United States imports of the kind which face European civil aircraft exporters to the United States<sup>1</sup>. Barriers eliminated on both sides should be the aim, but in the meanwhile, it is folly to expose our home manufacturers like this. No resolution either has been obtained in the critical area of credit facilities available to European exporters compared with those available to American exporters. It is worth recalling what Mr. Valleix wrote in his report<sup>2</sup>:

"In order to maintain its preponderant position on the world market, the United States has taken a number of measures to promote export sales for its aircraft industry. One such measure is the establishment of the Export-Import Bank for the purpose of promoting sales of aircraft and equipment on the civil market. Credit up to 40 or 45 % of the market price of the aircraft

1. The United States Government has adopted a number of protectionist measures which are detrimental to the European aerospace industry. Well known is the 5 % customs duty to be paid on all equipment imported from Europe whereas no European duty exists for American equipment. Fiscal measures are based on the "buy American" act giving a 7 % reduction in comparative prices when American equipment is bought. Domestic international sales corporations, which are ventures established especially to promote exports, obtain tax exemption on 50 % of their earnings.

2. Document 618, paragraph 84, 1973.

equipment is given to all countries at a fixed interest rate of 6 % for a period of up to ten years. If this loan is not sufficient, further loans may be obtained from commercial banks in the United States with the possibility of guarantees by the Export-Import Bank."

35. The assiduousness with which the Americans prosecute their trade war can be seen in the fact that they will not give Export-Import Bank finance for the American engines used in the Airbus or Mercure.

36. Competition in aerospace stimulates progress. But it is essential for Western European governments to understand that the American Government is making all the rules for the competition<sup>1</sup>.

37. The Americans, operating from a well-protected, unified home market base, enter world markets with the strength and support of all the United States Government agencies and banks behind them. Europe is their prime export target. It has open frontiers for United States aerospace imports. The Americans have established a good record of customer service with European airlines. Their invasion has been so successful that some large airlines, like Lufthansa, only operate American aircraft. Having wiped out most European competition in Europe, there is not much chance of that competition succeeding elsewhere in the world.

38. With all these disadvantages facing them before they start, it is amazing that the British, Dutch and French manufacturers have achieved so much. They provide proof that Europe has the skill and technology to produce successful

1. At the WEU Paris colloquy, 17th and 18th September 1973, Mr. Ludwig Bölkow of Airbus Industrie pointed out that it was all very well for the United States to demand a continuation of their strong position in the transport aircraft field as this was vital to their balance of trade, but in view of Europe's historical contribution to aviation and its industrial and economic ability the United States attitude was unacceptable. He also cited the opinion of the chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board (the authority governing United States airline activities) who said: "I do not want to see us buying a 300-B Airbus".

civil aircraft. Think how much more could have been done if European governments had been on their side all the time !<sup>1</sup>

39. The European market is large enough to need its own civil aerospace supply sources. Europe's manufacturing capability will not survive, however, if Europe's governments fail to carry out their twin duties to organise Europe as a single market and to back up their aerospace industry to enable it to compete on equal

terms with the Americans.

40. The challenge to Europe's governments is thus, in the end, the same whether one is considering the military or the civil problems of the aerospace industry of Europe. The issues are perfectly clear and straightforward. It is painful to restate problems which could have been solved years ago. Are the years ahead to be filled with more reports and more talk, or will somebody, somewhere, step forward and take action? Europe will honour that man.

---

1. In the recommendation contained in the report by Mr. Valleix, Document 618. 1973, the Assembly invited the member governments :

"10. To define a common policy for the expansion of the aeronautical industry enabling it to compete equitably through the adoption of appropriate measures of compensation producing parity in world competition, it being understood that the purpose of such a policy is not to be antagonistic but to safeguard the European aeronautical industry ;"

and the Council stated in its reply :

"10. The Council accept the aim of a European aeronautical industry which is economically viable and competitive on world markets and believe that any policy of support for the industry should be considered against these objectives. The Council consider that the size of the industry must be matched to the markets it is able to secure."