Report
drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee

on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

Rapporteur: Mr L. RADOUX
On 15 November 1972, the European Parliament adopted a resolution drawn up by Mr Radoux on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee, on preparations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

In paragraph 5 of this resolution Parliament instructed its Political Affairs Committee to follow the progress of the negotiations closely and to report back to it at the appropriate time.

By letter dated 10 May 1973 the President of the European Parliament confirmed these instructions to the Political Affairs Committee.

At its meetings of 4/5 September, 3/4 December 1974, 8/9 January, 23/24 January and 5/6 February 1975, the committee considered the draft report; at the last of these meetings it adopted the motion for a resolution together with the explanatory statement unanimously with one abstention.

The following were present: Lord Gladwyn, vice-chairman and acting chairman; Mr Radoux, vice-chairman and rapporteur; Mr Antoniozzi (deputizing for Mr Colin), Mr Behrendt, Mr Alfred Bertrand, Mr Corterier, Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker, Mr Kirk, Mr Klepsch (deputizing for Mr Jahn), Mr Ligios (deputizing for Mr Andreotti), Mr Lücke, Mr Noé (deputizing for Mr Giraudo), Mr Petersen (deputizing for Mr Durieux), Mr Scelba, Mr Scott-Hopkins, Mr Spénale (deputizing for Mr Faure), Mr Terrenoire (deputizing for Mr Bourges).
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The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement:

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

The European Parliament,

- welcoming all initiatives likely to ease tensions and improve cooperation between all States in Europe,
- taking note of the progress achieved so far in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
- desirous of establishing closer commercial, economic and industrial relations with the countries of Eastern Europe,
- considering that further progress is still required, particularly in the field of freer movement of people and ideas,
- reaffirming that the results of the CSCE can in no way inhibit the progress of the Nine towards European Union,
- stressing, therefore, in the context of the principle of the inviolability of frontiers in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the right of individual Member States of the European Community to change their boundaries by peaceful means and to create a political entity (European Union),
- considering that the documents to be approved in the final stages of the CSCE should be drawn up during the present stage,
- expressing its satisfaction at the degree of political unity demonstrated by the nine governments of the European Community in the CSCE negotiations, resulting in common policies and positions concerning the issues negotiated,
- having regard to the report of its Political Affairs Committee (Doc.485 /74)
1. Urges the governments of the nine Member States of the European Community, having due regard to the legal bases and objectives of the Rome and Paris Treaties;

- to insist, in order that agreement may be reached in the third phase of the CSCE:

(a) that a greater balance should be achieved within the First, Second and Third Committees;

(b) that, with that aim in view, further progress should be made in the First Committee on questions relating to security in Europe and in the Third Committee on cooperation in humanitarian and cultural fields;

- to ensure that any follow-up negotiations concerning issues for which competence has been transferred from the Member States to the Community are conducted by the Commission of the European Communities; and

2. Requests its President to forward this resolution and report of its Committee to the Council and Commission of the European Communities, and to the Parliaments and Governments of the Member States.
I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 6 July 1972 the Parliament referred to the Political Committee a Motion for a Resolution submitted by Mr Berkhouwer on behalf of the Liberal and Allies Group, concerning the preparation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Doc. 101/72). This Motion was considered by the Political Committee at its meetings of 12 September, 19 and 22 October and 9 November 1972. A Rapporteur was appointed by the Political Committee on 17 October 1972. On 9 November 1972 the Political Committee adopted a Motion for a Resolution which the Rapporteur submitted to it. This Motion instructed the Political Committee to follow the negotiations concerning the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and to follow, also, the development of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks (MBFR) at Vienna. The Motion was adopted by the Parliament on 15 November 1972.

2. Since the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations at Vienna are both large and complex subjects a separate draft report is being submitted to the Political Committee on each negotiation. This draft report concerns the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A separate draft report on MBFR has already been circulated to members of the Political Committee in March 1974 (PE 36.476).

3. In the context of these two negotiations the attention of members is drawn to the debate held in the Parliament on 15 January 1974 on oral questions numbers 101/73 and 138/73 on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in which Mr Scheel participated, as Chairman of the Council, and also to the first sentence of paragraph 8 of the European Identity paper agreed at the Copenhagen Summit meeting of 14 December 1973 which stated: "The Nine, one of whose essential aims is to maintain peace, will never succeed in doing so if they neglect their own security."
II. BACKGROUND

4. Proposals to hold the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) can be traced back to 1954 when the Soviet Union proposed a European Security Conference (1) to consider the establishment of a collective security agreement. Mr Molotov’s ideas were seen by the West as an attempt to hold up the ratification of the Paris agreements by which West Germany was rearmed and integrated into the newly created Western European Union and into NATO. After the creation of the Warsaw Pact as an Eastern response to the establishment of WEU and German re-armament, Mr Bulganin proposed, at the Geneva summit of 1955, the idea of a collective security agreement to replace the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. Following this the late 1950s saw many different proposals for "disengagement".

5. The 1958-59 East-West negotiations broke down over the contradictory approaches of East and West concerning the German problem. Whereas the West insisted on reunification, the East made the existence of two German states their point of departure.

6. A new invitation to hold a European Security Conference, launched by Mr Rapacki in December 1964, was considered by the West to be aimed at disrupting the negotiations then proceeding within NATO on the creation of Multilateral Nuclear Force, at questioning the American presence in Europe, and at sowing political discord within the Western Alliance.

(1) For many years the Eastern European countries, which have been the main promoters of the Conference idea, referred to the "European Security Conference" or the "pan-European" or "all-European conference." In the US and Canada the Conference was more normally referred to as the "Conference on European Security" so as not to imply the exclusion of the US and Canada. More recently the NATO countries devised the term Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which has been adopted by all the parties concerned.
7. In January 1965 the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee approved the Polish initiative, and subsequently the idea of convening a Conference to discuss collective security in Europe was explored in bilateral talks between some of the smaller NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and in the "Group of Nine" and then the "Group of Ten" (1). Statements by Mr Gromyko and Mr Brezhnev in April 1966 showed a renewed Soviet interest in the holding of a European Security Conference.

8. The Group of Nine/Ten met several times to explore initiatives that might be taken to promote détente in Europe. However, following the failure of attempts at reconciliation after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the experiment of the Group of Ten came to an end, at least for the time being.

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(1) Set up following adoption by the UN General Assembly in December 1965 of Resolution 2129 (XX). The Nine countries which originally constituted themselves into an informal grouping during 1966 were Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Roumania, Sweden, and Yugoslavia. In 1967 the Netherlands joined the Group which thus became "The Group of Ten".
III. DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR THEMES

9. Following the publication by the Warsaw Pact of a "Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe" at Bucharest in July 1966, NATO and the Warsaw Pact developed a diplomatic ping-pong match of proposals and counter-proposals concerning the holding of a security conference. Some non-aligned and neutral countries (especially Austria, Finland and Switzerland) also played an active part in making proposals concerning the Conference. Whereas the Warsaw Pact took the original initiatives concerning the holding of CSCE, since December 1967 NATO has seen the overall improvement of East-West relations as one of its main political aims.

10. It may be useful to examine briefly the development by both sides of the main themes relating to the holding of a Conference. These themes include: dissolution of the blocs; participation; other pre-conditions and agenda items.

Dissolution of the Blocs

11. One of the main proposals made by the Eastern European countries in the opening shots in the campaign over CSCE was the simultaneous abolition of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact, as proposed in the Bucharest Declaration. The implementation of this proposal would, so it is considered in the West, be very advantageous to the USSR. Whilst the dismantling of NATO would mean that the West would lose its integrated defence system, the results on the Eastern European side would not be comparable since there exists a network of bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the Governments of Eastern European countries which enables the USSR to station forces and missiles in the other Pact countries quite apart from the facilities she has to do so under the Warsaw Pact itself. Thus even if the blocs were dissolved these bilateral arrangements would remain unless special additional steps were taken to abrogate them. It is also considered in the West that the Warsaw Pact, if disbanded, could be reactivated rapidly, whilst the reconstitution of NATO would be a long and difficult task.

Participation

12. Until the Budapest meeting of June 1970 the Warsaw Pact countries did not make it clear whether the US and Canada would be welcomed at CSCE. The ambiguity concerning the North American presence at a Conference was
widely interpreted in NATO circles as being an attempt to detach the North American from the European wing of NATO. In the West there were further doubts as to whether the US and Canada would be able to participate in any standing East-West institution set up by the Security Conference. In practice the US and Canada have taken part in all stages of CSCE, so far, and there is little doubt that if a standing institution were to be established the two North American countries would play a full part in it.

13. On their side the Eastern European countries have always insisted that the German Democratic Republic should participate on equal terms with other countries taking part.

Agenda

14. The first formal proposals concerning the agenda for CSCE were made by the Warsaw Pact at Prague in October 1969 when it suggested two items: (a) the ensuring of European Security and the renunciation of the use or threat of force in the mutual relations of European states; and (b) the expansion of commercial, economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations on the basis of equal rights for the purpose of developing political cooperation between European states. At the Budapest meeting of June 1970 the Warsaw Pact added a third item to its agenda proposals: the establishment by the Conference of "an appropriate organ of all interested countries for questions of security and cooperation in Europe".

15. At its Ministerial meeting in Rome in May 1970, NATO made two agenda proposals which, although similar in nature to the two initial Warsaw Pact proposals, were significantly different in emphasis. These two items were: (a) the principles that should govern relations between states, including the renunciation of force; and (b) the development of international relations with a view to contributing to the freer movement of people, ideas and information and to developing cooperation in the cultural, economic, technical and scientific fields as well as in the field of human environment. In December 1969 NATO had already suggested that an agenda item for an eventual CSCE might be cooperation concerning oceanography, but that proposal soon dropped by the wayside.
16. Following the multilateral preparatory discussions at Helsinki, all states participating in the preparation of CSCE agreed on the agenda (which was to be adopted at the initial ministerial stage) which should govern the work of the specialised Committees and Sub-committees during the second, expert stage and should be as follows: (a) questions relating to security in Europe; (b) cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology and of the environment, and (c) cooperation in humanitarian and other fields. On the insistence of the NATO countries the Warsaw Pact proposal that the creation of a standing East-West body should constitute an agenda item was transformed into agreement - albeit reluctant on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries - that the questions concerning institutional follow-up to CSCE should be considered in the light of progress made on specific issues in the Committee stage. In effect it would be the hope of most Western countries that the question of follow-up could be agreed during the second stage so that a recommendation on this subject - as on others - would be ready for submission to the third stage without the need for more substantive negotiation.

Other Pre-conditions

17. Apart from the pre-conditions established by the Warsaw Pact and NATO concerning participation, NATO demanded progress on two points as the condition for its advancing towards the multilateral preparation of CSCE. At their meeting in Rome, in May 1970, the Foreign Ministers of NATO stated that they would be ready to explore the possibilities of holding CSCE on condition that sufficient "progress" was recorded in: the discussions between the two parts of Germany; the separate sets of negotiations between the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet Union and Poland; the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT); and, the Four-Power talks on Berlin. The signature of the two separate renunciation-of-force treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR and Poland in 1970 seemed to go a long way towards fulfilling this condition. But the failure of the Western powers to obtain concessions from the Russians in the Berlin discussions led NATO to harden its posture concerning CSCE. Thus in December 1970 the North Atlantic Council stated that transition to the multilateral preparation of CSCE would depend not merely on "progress" in but on a "satisfactory solution" to the Four-Power talks, whilst still requiring that "progress" be made in SALT and in the bilateral discussions between the two parts of Germany. The conclusion of the Four-Power talks on Berlin largely fulfilled this condition.
18. The most important condition, however, imposed by NATO for the holding of CSCE was that the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies should agree either to the discussion of substantive military security issues in CSCE or in separate negotiations to be held in parallel with it. Since its June 1968 Reykjavik meeting NATO consistently urged the Warsaw Pact to hold negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. The events of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 delayed progress concerning Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions for a time, and, in any case, the initial Warsaw Pact reactions to the NATO proposal were unenthusiastic. However, after NATO had placed pressure on the Warsaw Pact to agree to discuss military security in Europe - in the form of force and arms reductions - as a *quid pro quo* for acceptance of the Eastern European proposal to hold CSCE, Mr Brezhnev, in speeches in Moscow and Tbilisi in March and May 1971 expressed Soviet readiness to negotiate force reductions.

19. However, progress in launching MBFR remained slow. Fourteen members of the Atlantic Alliance appointed Mr Manlio Brosio, former Secretary General of NATO, to explore Soviet views on MBFR and report to the NATO Ministerial Council on Soviet attitudes. He waited in vain for a Soviet invitation to Moscow. But, following positive statements by Mr Brezhnev and Mr Kosygin in December 1971, the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact gave general support, in Prague in January 1972, to the idea of force reductions declaring that an agreement to reduce foreign and indigenous forces and arms in Europe would strengthen European security. "Preparatory consultations relating to Central Europe" involving nineteen European states were held in Vienna from 31 January 1973 to 28 June of that year. Full negotiations on "mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe" opened in Vienna at the end of October 1973 and these still continue. (1)

(1) For details see Draft Report, by your Rapporteur, on "The mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations (MBFR)" (PE 36.476).
IV. MOTIVES

20. It has been considered by at least some Western officials and commentators that major Soviet motives for impressing the holding of CSCE have included:

(a) the multilateral recognition of the status quo and the Soviet position in Eastern Europe;
(b) the division of NATO members, particularly the North American from the European;
(c) the securing of the European flank of the Soviet Union at a time of crisis with China;
(d) the diversion of Western European countries from moves to closer political or defence cooperation in favour of some kind of "all-European" cooperation;
(e) an attempt to lull Western Europe into a state of euphoria in which it relaxes its political cohesion and military vigilance;
(f) the acceleration of American disengagement from Western Europe;
(g) an attempt to obtain Western economic and technological aid for the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries;
(h) obtaining a greater degree of international recognition for the GDR.

21. Further, some Western commentators consider that by the holding of CSCE and through follow-up to the Conference - particularly if this were to take the form of a standing East-West institution - the Soviet Union could, especially in the light of possible US force withdrawals from Europe, establish itself as THE major European power whilst making the role of the US and Canada in European affairs seem increasingly marginal.

22. The list of alleged motives set out above is difficult to verify. Its nature is something of a "shopping list" resulting from different Western analyses which may be realistic or which may simply be pessimistic. It should be stressed that some of the alleged motives mentioned above are not contrary to Western European interests nor to European security. In addition it should be remembered that on the Western side - and in this context the Community must be mentioned - a series of objectives has been pursued, especially concerning 'the freer movement of people and ideas'.
23. Also some of the Eastern European countries have motives of their own, distinct from those of the Soviet Union, both in favour of holding CSCE and concerning the results they would like to see coming out of it. Roumania is an obvious instance of this, but it is not alone as is demonstrated by the special and obvious interests of the GDR in the Conference.
Preparation

24. Before the multilateral preparatory talks started at Helsinki in November 1972 a number of proposals had been made concerning preparation and form of CSCE. Thus as early as December 1969 the then British Labour Government proposed the establishment of a Standing Committee on East-West Relations (SCEWER) which, acting as a forum for members of both blocs, together with the European neutral and non-aligned states could prepare CSCE (1). The Prime Minister, Mr Harold Wilson, in a television interview in January 1970, described the proposal as envisaging "permanent machinery for dealing with all the problems in Europe that we could solve, economic as well as political and military and the rest."

25. The Belgian Government proposed that the Conference should be prepared by a "salon ouvert" formula, under which Ambassadors of the interested countries would meet informally at a neutral capital to evolve an agenda by mutual consent. Variants of this idea were suggested by the Finnish and Austrian Governments, and the Warsaw Pact countries, at their Budapest meeting in June 1970, proposed that the preparation of the Conference should be carried out by the "direct participation" of interested countries. At one stage the Hungarian Government urged the creation of a four-member preparatory group that might work out an agenda and a method for discussion, and a variant proposal was that a three-member group or "troika" might perform the same function. In July 1970 President Kekkonen of Finland proposed that the Security Conference might take the form of a series of preparatory meetings leading ultimately to a full scale CSCE. In the event, following drawn out preliminary discussions within and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, all European countries, with the exception of Albania, accepted the Finnish Government's invitation to hold multilateral preparatory talks at Helsinki. These talks began in November 1972 and lasted until the opening ministerial phase of the Conference proper in July 1973.

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(1) SCEWER was proposed by the British Government as being adaptable to three alternative forms: (a) as a preparatory mechanism for a conference, as outlined above; (b) as a permanent follow-up institution to a conference; (c) as an alternative to a conference.
26. On the Western side, the US at first considered that the Conference should consist of two stages. First a preparatory stage at expert level, and, second, a ministerial phase to adopt a resolution and conclusions on condition — and only on condition — that the discussions of the experts had resulted in satisfactory substantive results.

27. The French Government proposed that the Conference should be held in three phases. A formal opening Ministerial round, a closed phase of expert work in Committees and a third ministerial phase to adopt conclusions.

28. Whereas the NATO countries have, as a group, adopted the French approach, they have insisted both in the multilateral preliminary talks and during the first and second stages of CSCE at Helsinki and Geneva that the third, ministerial stage of the Conference should only take place if substantive progress is made by the experts in the second, Committee stage. They have also insisted that follow-up be discussed only when its usefulness or non-utility (in their view) will be clearer.

29. The original Soviet and Warsaw Pact view seemed to be that a single ministerial conference would be sufficient. However the Eastern European countries showed no objection to adopting the French approach though they have suggested that the final ministerial stage be at "summit" level. The Warsaw Pact countries are not, however, content with NATO insistence that the holding of the third Ministerial phase should be dependant on the achievement of "satisfactory" (in the Western view) results in the Committee stage. During the second phase at Geneva they have showed signs of wishing to reduce the importance and length of the committee stage so as to move on to the final phase.

(1) Following the Nixon-Brezhnev talks in Moscow in July 1974 it seems as though the US position has shifted in favour of the Soviet idea of a "summit" third stage. Does this mean that the US has lost interest in trying to obtain substantive results in the Committee stage at Geneva?
VI. A PERMANENT INSTITUTION?

30. The reluctance shown by the members of the Atlantic Alliance at Helsinki and Geneva to create a standing East-West institution to follow up any decisions that may be taken by the Conference is largely due to fears that such a body could permit the Soviet Union to become the major European power, particularly if the US were to significantly reduce its military presence in Europe (1). It is also feared, in the West, that the establishment of a standing East-West body might lead to the creation of a new European Security system which would involve the dissolution of NATO.

31. On the economic front fears have been expressed in Community circles that the Soviet Union and the Comecon countries might try to use a standing body in order to replace the EEC process of economic integration by a watered down form of all-European cooperation. Fears have also been expressed within governmental circles of the Nine that the USSR might try to use a standing East-West body to prevent the development of political and defence cooperation by the members of the Enlarged Community. It is fears of this order which have led the Western participants to insist, successfully, that the question of the establishment of a standing body should not be considered until its utility, or otherwise, can be judged in the light of the progress made at Geneva by the expert committees.

32. Nonetheless, some Western commentators consider that the creation of a standing East-West body could provide a useful basis for the development of new multilateral links between all countries taking part in CSCE (2). On the Eastern side, the Warsaw Pact has consistently urged, as an Agenda item of the Conference, the creation of a permanent East-West institution.

(1) See for instance the speech of Mr Manlio Brosio of 17 November 1970 to the WEU Assembly.

33. To the extent that the NATO countries consider that there should be any form of institutional follow-up at all, and even this is not yet clear, they seem to consider that this should take a minimal form, such as occasional meetings of the Ambassadors of the interested countries in a selected capital. Some observers consider that the Economic Commission Europe at Geneva might provide a suitable clearing house for economic and commercial follow-up to CSCE. UNESCO, either in its present form or a European sub-organ of it, might be responsible for East-West cultural follow-up contacts and the Inter-Parliamentary Union is actively interested in exploring the possibilities of establishing an East-West parliamentary Assembly ("Euroform").

34. The reticence of the Community Nine and the NATO Fifteen concerning follow-up in no way implies, however, that the West is opposed to follow-up to the Conference as such. They argue that they would welcome follow-up but they do not consider that follow-up activities require new institutions - at least not at first and not until a period of time has elapsed following CSCE, during which the utility of creating special institutional machinery can be assessed in the light of practical developments.
Participation

35. The first problem posed to the European Community by CSCE was that of participation. Although the German Government at one time suggested that the Community could "participate in an adequate fashion" in CSCE as a distinct identity the French Government opposed such a move and it was not long before a consensus emerged by which the Member Governments (1) agreed that the solution should be that Community Member States should speak with one voice at CSCE in discussing matters within the competence of the Community.

36. The practical form that this agreement took both in the multilateral preparatory and the first ministerial stages of CSCE was for the representative of the country which held the Chairmanship of the Council to act as spokesman for the other countries of the Community in setting out their joint position. This procedure appeared, however, inappropriate for the working of the Conference, especially concerning the commercial policy where exclusive competences of the Community were involved. Thus, by decisions taken by the Foreign Ministers of the Nine on 11 September 1973 in Copenhagen and by the Council of the EEC on 20 September 1973 in Brussels, representatives of the Commission of the EEC have been incorporated into the delegation of the Nine countries holding the presidency of the Council in order to present the viewpoint of the Community.

Preparation

37. The main preparatory work by the Nine for CSCE has been carried out in the Political Committee (2) which, for this purpose, set up a Sub-Committee of officials instructed to cover the political aspects of the preparation

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(1) At that stage the Six, but in close consultation with the four governments which were then hoping to become new members.

(2) Officially the Political Committee of the Member States of the European Communities.
of CSCE and an Ad Hoc Group, in which the Commission is represented, which has worked on the economic aspects of CSCE. Joint meetings between the two groups have been held to discuss subjects which are of both political and economic significance, such as relations between the Community and Comecon. Rather more detailed arrangements, referred to later, have been made in preparing the work of the expert Committees in stage two.

Liaison with the Atlantic Alliance

38. There has been some concern within the Atlantic Alliance, particularly on the part of members of NATO which do not belong to the European Community, that the preparation of a joint position by the Nine concerning CSCE should not result in the adoption of significantly different postures by the Community and the Alliance on major points at issue. To ensure the harmonious development of their common viewpoints in both organisations the countries working in the Community's Political Committee have arranged that members of their national delegations to the North Atlantic Council (who work there on problems concerning CSCE) represent them at meetings of the Community's Political Committee and of its Sub-Committee and Ad Hoc Group within the framework of the political cooperation procedure, though the delegations are led by those responsible in national capitals. In this way a coordinated approach to CSCE has been worked out by the Eight (Ireland not being a member of NATO) in both organisations. NATO countries are kept aware of the attitudes of the Community and the Political Committee of the Nine is fully informed of the national viewpoints of other NATO allies.

39. At an early stage during these institutional developments some observers speculated whether these ad hoc links between the Political Committee of the Nine and NATO might prejudice rather than favour the development of European political unity, wondering whether the Nine could speak with "a voice of their own" if their joint foreign policies were influenced from the very beginning of their formation by non-Member States in NATO. In practice, however it is the Nine which has played a more active and dominating role in the Helsinki and Geneva negotiations, since they started, than has the Atlantic Alliance.

The Interests of the Community in CSCE?

40. The major interest of the European Community in CSCE is the relationship - or priority - between the development of integration by the
Nine and the development of overall East/West relations. Within the Community the Nine (overtly or implicitly) are agreed that whereas they are prepared to take positive steps in improving East/West cooperation such cooperation must take second place, wherever a conflict of interests might possibly arise, to the possibility for the Nine to develop whatever measures of integration they wish. Accordingly the Eastern European countries must realise that there is no incompatibility between Western European integration and all-European cooperation so long as it is accepted that, for Community members, the first of these two activities has priority.

41. If the countries of Eastern Europe use all-European cooperation, either at CSCE or in any follow-up that may develop, to try to block the Community integration process or to try to substitute all-European cooperation for it, the limits of what is possible in détente will be seen to be very narrow and the prospects for all-European cooperation will themselves, in consequence, be strictly limited. In this context Community integration must be held to include foreign affairs and defence if the Nine decide to push ahead in these two fields.

42. The other major interest of the Community in CSCE is that if detailed follow-up negotiations are held on all-European cooperation in specific domains, these negotiations should be held with the Commission itself on behalf of the Nine on any matter concerning which member countries have handed over competence to the Community under the Treaties. This would apply whether follow-up negotiations are held within the framework of a new institution, whether they are held within the general framework of the Economic Commission for Europe (in the trade sector), or whether they are carried through on an ad hoc basis. Specific areas that would be directly concerned would include those covered by the common commercial policy, agriculture and some aspects of transport and energy policy.
Organisation of phase two

43. The second stage of CSCE, held in Expert Committees and Sub-Committees at Geneva, is organised as follows. The recommendations of the multilateral preliminary talks (1) are being considered in three Committees, generally known as "baskets". Basket I is working on questions relating to security in Europe. Basket II is working on "cooperation in the fields of economics, of science and technology and of the environment". Basket III is concerned with "cooperation in humanitarian and other fields".

44. The work of Basket I is divided between three Sub-Committees. The first Sub-Committee is charged with the task "of considering and stating in conformity with the purpose and principles of the United Nations those basic principles which each participating state is to respect and apply in its relations with all other participating states irrespective of their political, economic or social systems, in order to ensure the peace and security of all participating states". (Helsinki Recommendation 17). The second Sub-Committee is concerned with what are known as confidence building measures, and the third Sub-Committee is concerned with the peaceful settlement of disputes.

45. In Committee II the first Sub-Committee is concerned with commercial exchanges, the second with industrial cooperation and projects of common interest, the third with science and technology, the fourth with problems of the environment and, finally, a fifth Sub-Committee is concerned with cooperation in other fields.

46. The third basket has one Committee dealing with human contacts, and another with information, the third with cooperation and exchanges in the field of culture and a fourth Sub-Committee dealing with cooperation and exchanges in the field of education.

47. A Coordinating Committee (which does not constitute a separate "basket" or a further substantive Committee) deals with the organisation and day to day running of CSCE and is charged with considering follow-up to the Conference, though - as has been stressed earlier - the NATO

countries have been insistent that there should be no decision on follow­
up to the Conference until they can judge what degree of progress has been
achieved in Committee.

Work of the three "Baskets"

48. In the first "basket", or Committee I, the most important question
dealt with so far has been that of the "inviolability" of frontiers.
This concept has been raised and pushed hard by the Soviet Union and its
Warsaw Pact allies which wish the States participating in CSCE to
recognise the permanent nature of the present geographical frontiers in
Europe. Although Western participants made a major concession by basically
accepting the Eastern viewpoint at an early stage, the members of NATO
have insisted, on their side, that the Soviet Union should recognise that
in the Western view the "inviolability" of frontiers should not preclude
the alteration of frontiers by peaceful means, notably as far as the
eventual reunification of the two parts of Germany is concerned, and the
eventual merging of national sovereignty by the Nine members of the
European Community to form some kind of a single political entity.
However, some Western observers consider that this major concession to the
USSR was made prematurely and that the West should have demanded
substantive concessions concerning human contacts and the liberalisation
of information, in Committee III, before conceding this point.

49. There has been little progress in Committee I in reaching agreement
on "the principles" which should "ensure the peace and security of all
participating states" as proposed by the Warsaw Pact States. Although
paragraph 18 of the Helsinki "Final Recommendations" foresees that "the
principles to be stated shall be included in a document of appropriate
form to be submitted by the Committee for adoption by the Conference",
there is considerable confusion as to what and how many documents will be
adopted by the conference. Thus, at present, all documents submitted to
the conference (apart from the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki
consultations) are merely working papers and have no official status,
though there will clearly be a Declaration of Principles emerging from
Committee I and a number of resolutions on various other subjects on the
agenda.

50. In Committee II, where some observers had hoped that considerable
progress might be made on such subjects as joint ventures in industry
across East/West frontiers, progress has been limited, though there has been
some "illusion" of progress in comparison with the near deadlock in

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"baskets" I and III. Even if the results of the work in "basket" II are not striking, the Nine consider them to be satisfactory to the extent that, in general, the rather modest requests they have made have been satisfied and Mr Destremau, replying for the Council, in the European Parliament, on 26 September 1974, to a question put by Mr Jahn even described the results so far obtained in Committee II as being "quite positive and encouraging". Most of the running in Committee II has been made by the West, and especially by the Nine. But despite the pressures generated by the energy crisis, the Soviet Union has remained reserved on the proposal of the Nine on "projects of common interest in the field of industrial cooperation", which is the subject in "basket" II concerning which least progress has been made. But there has been satisfactory progress of the proposal of the Nine on "business contacts" (1) and concerning their proposal on "the provision of economic and commercial information". Observers at Geneva consider that one of the main restraints on progress in "basket" II has been the negative spill-over from "baskets" I and III, especially from "basket" III where the Soviet Union has refused to make any real concessions on human contacts. (2) As noted above, the work of "basket" III is basically in deadlock and the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies show practically no sign of being willing to make concessions concerning any of the substantive points under consideration.

Chairmanship

51. Quite apart from the political obstacles to progress in the three "baskets", there has been a technical obstacle which, according to some participants at least, has not helped the progress of stage two. This is the system of chairmanship used in both the three principal committees and in the sub-committees. The chairmanship rotates with each sitting of a committee or sub-committee so that there is no continuity of committee or sub-committee chairmen to provide firm guidance for the work of the conference. If a committee or a sub-committee holds two sittings on one day there is a different chairman for each of the morning and afternoon sessions.

(1) Here the Nine developed a joint position with the United States
(2) Though some observers consider that the Eastern European countries can hardly be expected to make concessions concerning the freer movement of persons across East/West frontiers or the liberalisation of information in Eastern Europe, since these points affect directly the ideology and internal political structure of Communist States.
sub-committee holds two sittings on one day; there is a different chairman for each of the morning and afternoon sessions.

Press

52. Although CSCE is one of the largest international conferences ever to be held in Europe, its press coverage has been limited. This is probably largely due to the slow rhythm of work of the conference, but the decision taken by the participating countries at Helsinki to exclude the press from committee and sub-committee meetings during the second stage is another reason why public opinion has not been well informed concerning either the issues at stake in CSCE or the negotiations concerning them.

Participation of the Nine in the second stage

53. How do the Nine organise their contribution to the second phase of CSCE at Geneva? Apart from their approach to CSCE as a whole, which has been analysed earlier in this paper, their management of the day-to-day work of the committees and the sub-committees at Geneva can be divided into three parts. First, the general concertation of the positions of the nine Member States concerning the work of the three committees and the sub-committees. Second, the approach to work carried out in Committees I and III. Third, the approach to Committee II.

54. The overall concertation of the positions of the Nine concerning both the organisation and the substance of stage two of CSCE is carried out in regular meetings of the Heads of Delegations of the Member States. When the second phase of CSCE opened, coordinating meetings of the Heads of Delegations were held on an almost daily basis, but it is now found that between two and three meetings a week of the Heads of Delegation, at Geneva, are sufficient.

55. It is at these meetings of the Heads of Delegation, which are, in effect, an on-the-spot form of meetings of the Sub-Committee and the Ad Hoc Group of the Political Committee that the day-to-day approach to the work of Committees I and III is prepared. After the Nine have hammered out their attitudes to specific problems in discussion in Committees I and III a representative of the State holding the chairmanship of the Council, or, sometimes, spokesmen of other members of the Nine, will outline the "point of view" of the Nine in the Committee or the Sub-Committee concerned. Papers on specific points are tabled by two, three or four Member States -
but only when the Nine have agreed, between themselves, on the proposals outlined.

56. The most interesting aspects of the preparation of a common approach to CSCE by the Nine can be found in Committee II. Here, because the subject matter is economic cooperation, the Commission itself participates in the work of the Committee and its Sub-Committees. Representatives of the Commission sit at the table in Committee II and in the meetings of its Sub-Committees as part of the Delegation of the State holding the Chairmanship of the Council. Moreover, the officials concerned are listed on the attendance sheet with their titles and grades as members of the Commission Secretariat. At first this gave rise to protests from representatives of the Warsaw Pact States, but since the Nine were resolute in recalling that it had already been decided at Helsinki, in the multilateral preparatory talks that each participating state would be free to compose its Delegation as it chose, these protests were overruled and, in light of the firmness shown by the Nine on this question, the presence of Commission officials in "Basket"II is now no longer challenged. Wherever appropriate the Commission's officials speak in the discussions in "Basket"II, and present statements representing the collective viewpoint of the Community.

57. Although there is no formal linkage between NATO and the Nine in the day-to-day management of CSCE by the Western participants, a high degree of coordination of the positions of NATO and the Nine is achieved, in practice, by the fact that those responsible for preparing the approach of the Nine are often the same individuals as those responsible for preparing a common NATO approach to the questions concerned, the delegations of the Eight regularly attending informal coordination meetings, both of the Nine and of the Fifteen.
SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO THE COMMUNITY

58. Two main concerns shape the attitudes of the USSR and the other Eastern European countries to the European Community within the context of CSCE. First, on the political and ideological levels, they are worried that the Community might become a "super-power", especially through the acquisition of political and military competences. (1) Second, the Eastern European countries wish to obtain both freer access to the markets of the Community countries and advanced technological and industrial help from the Nine.

59. This report does not examine the Eastern European attitude to the Community in depth in the light of the work being carried out by Mr Jahn for the Political Affairs Committee in his Opinion addressed to the Committee on External Economic Relations on the relations of the European Communities with the USSR and Comecon (PE 32.956/rev.2). Nonetheless, it is useful to note some of the salient factors in the recent development of Eastern European attitudes. Until recently ideology has prevented the Comecon countries from making formal approaches to the Community, but in February 1972 Roumania requested the EEC Council to include her amongst the (less developed) countries which benefit from generalised preferences. Although Eastern European attacks on the effects of Community policy on East/West trade have become more subdued in recent years, the view that the tariffs and quotas imposed by the Community on imports from third countries constitute "discrimination" is still widely held in Eastern Europe.

60. The speech of Mr Brezhnev to the Trade Union Council in Moscow on 20 March 1972 was something of a turning point. In this speech acknowledging the reality of the Common Market and its evolution he stressed that the condition for better relations between Eastern Europe and the Nine

(1) A typical illustration of this view is found in an article by Mr Andrezj Towpik in Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, Warsaw, January 1972, arguing that the development of the European Community into a super-power would not help the development of all European relations and could be regarded as being a new form of Western European "imperialism".
was that Community countries should "recognize the realities existing in the socialist part of Europe, specifically, the interests of the Member countries of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. We are for equality in economic relations and against discrimination".

61. On 21 December of the same year Mr Brezhnev again spoke of EEC. He stated: "Can bases be found for some form of practical relations between the trade and economic organisations existing in Europe, between Comecon and the Common Market? Probably they can, if the states belonging to the Common Market refrain from any attempts at discrimination against the other side, if they will contribute towards the development of natural bilateral relations and cooperation throughout Europe".

62. A practical demonstration of changing Eastern European attitudes towards EEC was reflected by the visit of Mr Fedayev, Secretary-General of Comecon, to Copenhagen, during the Danish Presidency of the Council, to discuss possible EEC-Comecon links with the then Danish Foreign Minister, Mr Andersen. This visit proved somewhat abortive - probably because it took the Council somewhat by surprise - but it seems probable that further contacts will be developed between the two economic groups with a view to exploring possible forms of relationship.

63. At this point your Rapporteur wishes to stress that in his view it would be unwise for the Community, on its side, to insist that contacts between EEC and Comecon should develop either with Comecon as an entity or on the basis of separate negotiations between EEC and individual Eastern European countries. The great differences that underlie the multilateralism of the Community and that of Comecon should not be forgotten. It might therefore be wise for the Community not to try to force a particular approach on the members of Comecon (apart from the basic fact that they must negotiate with the Community and not with its individual governments) but to react pragmatically to Eastern approaches as they arise, especially in view of the complex internal political dynamics.
Meanwhile, the main problem is to determine which specific questions could be the most appropriate subject of negotiations.

Finally, to return to the context of CSCE, it is noteworthy that neither the Soviet Union nor other Warsaw Pact or Comecon members have challenged the right of the Nine to speak, and act collectively at Helsinki or Geneva. Thus, the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries have tacitly recognised the international status of the Nine and their right to act as an entity in international political and security as well as economic negotiations. This represents a major step forward in Community/Eastern European relations.

(1) On 13 March 1974 Sir Christopher Soames, the competent member of the Commission, agreed with the suggestion made to him by Mr Jahn during Parliament's Question Time, that Eastern European contacts with the Commission might take both a multilateral and/or bilateral form if this were preferred by the Comecon members. On 11 February 1974, Mr Dahrendorf, and on 13 March 1974 Sir Christopher Soames, stressed that future Comecon approaches to the Community should be addressed to the Commission as the competent institution. The Danish Ambassador in Moscow, as a representative of the President of the Council, informed Mr Fedayev, in September 1973, that should Comecon wish to engage in further contacts with the Community it should do so with the Commission. At the end of September 1974 Mr Fedayev, Secretary-General of Comecon, invited Mr Ortoli, President of the Commission of the European Communities, to Moscow for discussions.

(2) Barring a limited number of individual protests concerning the participation of the Commission in Committee II at the beginning of the second stage.

(3) Confirming and enlarging precedents established in a more purely commercial sense within GATT.
65. A considerable number of conclusions could be suggested with respect to how the fifteen members of the North Atlantic Alliance, Western participants in general, or individual Western countries might wish to appraise CSCE and its possible results. However, in the context of this report it seems wiser to concentrate on conclusions of specific interest to the Nine Members of the European Community. As mentioned earlier in this report, two definite conclusions emerge with regard to the Community's interests. First, any follow-up negotiations with the Eastern European participants concerning issues for which the competence has been transferred from the individual Member States of the Community to the Commission, under the Treaties, must be conducted not with the member governments but with the Commission itself. Second, the Member States of the Community must continue to make it clear that although they are prepared to develop closer commercial and other relationships with the countries of Eastern Europe, for the Nine the development of Western European integration must have priority over East/West cooperation. If this is recognised by the Eastern European countries there should be no inconsistency between the goals of Western integration and East/West cooperation. Finally, two more general points. It is in concerting joint policies towards all the major issues arising at CSCE that the political cooperation process of the Nine has proved more successful than in dealing with any other political problem so far. Also, at CSCE the USSR and its Warsaw Pact Allies have tacitly recognised the Nine to be their interlocuteur valable in dealing with major problems of East/West economic cooperation.