ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

TWENTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION
(Second Part)

Europe's external relations

REPORT
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee
by Mr. Gessner, Rapporteur
Europe's external relations

REPORT
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee
by Mr. Gessner, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION
on Europe's external relations

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
submitted by Mr. Gessner, Rapporteur

I. Introduction

II. Internal preconditions of Europe's external relations

III. Europe's position in the world

IV. External policy interests and objectives
   (i) The preservation of European security
   (ii) The continuation and expansion of détente
   (iii) The protection of raw material supplies and the assurance of economic security
   (iv) The continuation of the North-South dialogue with the goal of a more equitable international economic order
   (v) Assuring the stability of Southern Europe

V. Summary

1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee.

2. Members of the Committee: Mrs. von Bothmer (Chairman); Sir John Rodgers, Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Abens (Alternate: Spautz), Ariosto, Beith (Alternate: McNamara), Sir Frederic Bennett (Alternate: Channon), MM. Berrier, Bruignon, Deschamps, Dynon, Faulds, Gessner, Genella, Hanin, Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank (Alternate: Voogd), Mangelbachs (Alternate: Van Waterschoot), Mende, Minnoeci (Alternate: Trew), Mommersweeg (Alternate: Mrs. van der Werf-Torrefa), Müller, Pécletier, Perin (Alternate: Van Aal), Portheine (Alternate: Schlingemann), Reddemann, Segre, Urwin.

N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
Draft Recommendation
on Europe's external relations

The Assembly,

Considering that Europe can prosper only if peace is preserved;

Considering that the Western European countries share the common objective of promoting democracy and human rights universally and that this objective does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of other states;

Considering that Western Europe's foreign policy must demonstrate a readiness to co-operate with all parts of the world in order to assure the security and well-being of their peoples;

Considering that military security, which presupposes a stable balance of forces, can best be maintained through the preservation of the Atlantic Alliance;

Concerned at the intensification of the Soviet Union's armament efforts;

Considering further that an uncontrolled arms race between East and West cannot increase our security, but only precipitate new dangers;

Convinced that the continuation and extension of détente with the objective of arms control and balanced force reduction agreements serve the interests of peace and military security;

Considering that East-West co-operation in all fields is an essential element of security and should be continued on a stable basis;

Considering that the North-South dialogue should be intensified in order to overcome as soon as possible the gap between North and South;

Convinced that economic and social progress and hence internal security and stability are in the interest of industrial and developing nations alike;

Aware that Europe's dependence on imports of raw materials constitutes a high degree of vulnerability;

Considering that the restoration of democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain is a great achievement for Europe as a whole which must be consolidated through appropriate assistance measures by Western Europe;

Convinced that world economic recovery and hence the economic stabilisation of the western democracies require close international co-operation in the political and economic fields;

Considering that the activities of the WEU Council are based upon a treaty which grants it wide-ranging responsibilities extending into the economic and social area, even though these are effectively exercised through other international organisations,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1. Examine regularly, particularly at its ministerial meetings, all the problems raised by the application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty with a view to ascertaining the extent to which the opportunities that this article offers have been fully exploited;

2. Examine regularly the military balance and state of East-West relations in Europe and maintain close co-operation between member countries in order to promote the progress of détente and negotiations on the reduction and control of armaments;

3. Study the security aspects of the North-South dialogue;

4. Investigate the problem of conventional arms transfers especially to third world countries with a view to developing a common policy for the control of weapon exports;

5. Promote close co-operation in all appropriate international organisations with the democratic nations of Southern Europe and the Mediterranean region and support these nations' early entry into the European Community and their share in the process of European integration.
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Gessner, Rapporteur)

1. Introduction

1. This report attempts to outline the external relations of Europe. The Rapporteur is aware that such an endeavour is extremely difficult and would require, to be in any sense complete, much greater length than is customary for reports of this Assembly. He must therefore limit his discussion to a few central aspects of European foreign relations and cannot treat even these in a systematic or comprehensive manner.

2. Security policy, the central responsibility of WEU, will provide the emphasis of this report; in this connection, however, the conditioning factors, goals, and interests of Europe's external relations will also be examined. For this purpose it is first of all necessary to select the definition of Europe most appropriate in the present context. Further, the internal preconditions of Europe's foreign relations must be discussed with candour. Only on the basis of such an analysis can one grasp Europe's contemporary position in the world with some degree of realism and precision and examine Europe's most important foreign policy interests and objectives in order to clarify the foreign policy options available to it in its present state.

3. In speaking of Europe one can refer to quite different geographical expanses, political entities, or international groupings. For the purpose of this report it would perhaps be most logical to select a definition of Europe which is as flexible as possible without, on the other hand, being so nebulous as to lose all practical meaning. An immediate limitation is given by the fact that Western Europe provides the starting point for our discussion. This concept of Europe embraces in the first instance the domain of the European Community and WEU, without, however, restricting itself to these two organisations. The European Community and WEU conceive of themselves as open communities, and the European Community is presently negotiating the enlargement to the south. This fact alone requires a definition of Europe more flexible than one limited to the existing institutional structures of the European Community and WEU. Moreover, on the level of security policy, an integral component of foreign policy, no less than thirteen European nations have bound themselves to an alliance with the United States and Canada.

4. For these reasons the Rapporteur prefers to use a different criterion of selection and speak of the European, western-type democracies, i.e. of those European states which share the common foundation of pluralist democracy. Such a definition would embrace the member states of the Council of Europe along with a number of smaller countries which have not, or not yet, acceded to that body. More important, however, than determining the precise number of states to be included in our examination of Europe's external relations is our definition of this community of nations on the basis of certain shared values, namely a common dedication to western pluralist democracy and a common concern for human rights. In this sense, Europe would thus refer to democratic Europe. This concept would not embrace the continent of Europe in all political and geographical respects, which would of course also include the Eastern European communist countries. Even if one regards the conference on security and co-operation in Europe as a first manifestation of this "pan-Europe", allusion to common external relations is hardly in place. But common foreign policy instruments are largely lacking as well for democratic Europe, the concept chosen by the Rapporteur. Such instruments are no doubt most fully developed in the European Community. Therefore great weight must be placed upon the initiatives developed here. In addition, however, one must examine a wide range of interests and objectives which extend far beyond the domain of the Europe of the Nine and of WEU and which can be numbered among the foundations of Europe's common external relations.

II. Internal preconditions of Europe's external relations

5. The democratic European states discussed in this report belong to different alliances and groupings. They maintain both joint and separate relations with the rest of the world, as is evident in their membership of various regional groupings. Only two such organisations, however, are responsible for the defence and security concerns of their member states: NATO, which includes the United States and Canada; and Western European Union, which joins seven European nations in a collective defence pact with a guarantee of long-term validity. WEU does not, however, dispose of its own military forces but relies on those of NATO; thus there exists no autonomous European defence community. Rather, the European members of the Atlantic Alliance (Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Turkey) are convinced that the maintenance of European security requires close co-operation with Canada and the United States to counter successfully the threat which the
Soviet military potential poses to Western Europe.

6. This European-American defence community must be regarded as a structural element of the European state system. In other words, the American presence in Europe must be regarded as permanent. In its core this community has remained essentially the same as it has developed since 1949, even though not all European nations maintain the same type of ties with the Alliance. Its Scandinavian members, for example, are careful to take the northern balance of forces into consideration in their relationship to the Atlantic Alliance. They allow neither foreign military bases nor the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory. France withdrew from the NATO integrated command structure in 1966. The relationship of Greece and Turkey to NATO has been altered as a consequence of the Cyprus conflict of 1974, Greece having withdrawn to a considerable extent from the military integration. Turkey’s relations with the United States were burdened for several years by the American arms embargo but have been normalised following the latter’s recent repeal. NATO remains weakened, nevertheless, by the unsolved Cyprus question on its southern flank.

7. A major gain for Europe and the entire Atlantic Alliance has been the elimination of dictatorial régimes in Portugal and Greece. With the domestic political transformations in Spain following the death of Franco, Western Europe can now be said to be composed entirely of democratic states. This important fact deserves to be emphasised, for it proves that democracy has not lost its attraction as a way of life. Spain has long been tied to the United States through a bilateral defence pact and is presently applying for membership of the European Community; whether it will choose to join NATO as well remains an open question for the moment. The Rapporteur would emphasise that this decision lies entirely in the hands of the Spanish Government and the Spanish people.

8. Ten of the thirteen European members of NATO (Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Turkey) have informally joined together in the so-called Eurogroup within the Atlantic Alliance and have adopted common programmes, particularly in the years since 1970. France, Ireland and Portugal were also invited to join in this co-operative effort but chose not to participate. Portugal has since decided to join the group. The fact that the countries composing the Eurogroup have consciously avoided placing their co-operation on a formal basis proves that it is not an attempt to create an autonomous European defence community. The formation of a European programme group to harmonise defence and armaments proposals demonstrates, on the other hand, the need perceived in Europe for greater co-operation in matters of mutual defence. It should, however, not alter the existing foundations of the alliance. The precise forms in which defence co-operation could be organised presently constitute, in the view of the Rapporteur, an open question.

9. A number of observers have perceived possibilities of co-operation in defence and security issues within the European Community. Such proposals discussed among experts envisage among other things the creation of an integrated defence sector in the European Community similar to the existing European political co-operation. The Rapporteur regards such proposals with scepticism. He is convinced that, while European political co-operation has developed into an extremely useful and effective instrument of the European Community and has led to a considerable capacity for action, the defence of Europe can be effectively organised only within the Atlantic Alliance. The reasons for this are obvious. First of all, several member states of the European Community have openly declared their opposition to such military co-operation; the attempt to expand the European Community into a new defence community nonetheless could create considerable dangers for the level of European integration already achieved. The Rapporteur is also of the opinion that Europe’s strategic position does not permit such a solution. He is convinced that Europe’s military vulnerability cannot in this manner be reduced. One cannot recognise in the proposals any increase in Europe’s security as compared to the present alliance system. On the contrary, the United States could conclude that a common responsibility for Europe’s military security no longer exists to the same degree as previously. Such a development would not promote the maintenance of a stable balance of power in Europe. The European Community has proved so successful in foreign policy precisely because it has not appeared as a military power and has made no claims to domination, but is rather a factor of conciliation and peace.

10. On the basis of European political co-operation, Europe has succeeded in making its voice heard and its weight felt in many cases:

— at the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, the European Community acted largely as a group, making its own contributions and proposals. The European Community member states presently share a common foundation for their positions on all essential questions of Ostpolitik and détente;

— the European Community has similarly been represented as a community in international negotiations involving economic and energy issues, such as those sponsored by UNCTAD and the CIEC. The European Community also appears as a
community in the United Nations, and the country providing the current President of the Council is authorised to speak for the Nine as a group;

— the European Community has conducted the dialogue with the United States begun in September 1973 on the basis of mutually-agreed positions. A practice of close bilateral consultations between the Community and the United States has now developed from these consultations;

— with its declaration on the Middle East of 6th November 1973 the Nine adopted a joint position regarding the Middle East conflict and introduced a balanced common Middle East policy. They have subsequently repeatedly taken a position on this problem.

11. All in all, the European Community is today in a position to adopt common policies towards almost all significant international issues, including those relevant to international security. This contribution to Europe’s foreign relations should not be underestimated, even if the voice of the Community cannot speak for the potentially much larger Europe beyond the borders of the Nine.

12. This larger Europe has in the Council of Europe an institution which now unites practically all the democratic nations of the continent and which, given sufficient consensus, can express the position of its members on international affairs. The Council of Europe exercises an indispensable bridge-building function between the members and non-members of the European Community. It has promoted and developed joint solutions for many problems beyond the borders of the European Community which affect all the democratic nations of Europe. Its contributions to the implementation of human rights are undeniable. It has proved useful and deserves praise in the area of cultural exchange, in the promotion of social rights, and in the struggle against international terrorism. The fact that neutral and non-aligned nations as well as states with specific foreign and defence policy ties are represented in the Council of Europe often prevents the formation of a foreign policy consensus, even though the Council of Europe’s joint action, for instance in the United Nations and other international bodies, would be highly desirable. Both the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers concern themselves nonetheless with a large number of international questions and have made valuable contributions inter alia to the CSCE, the East-West relationship, questions of the third world, Africa and the Middle East.

13. Naturally, with such a diversity of members, the Council of Europe cannot take major steps in foreign policy or, a fortiori, defence matters. However, due emphasis must be laid on its importance as a forum, both at Committee of Ministers and at Parliamentary Assembly level, for discussions between democratic European countries which have so often proved extremely fruitful on such matters as respect for human rights, East-West relations and the North-South dialogue. Your Rapporteur is happy to associate himself with the Committee members who asked for this remark to be included in the report.

14. Even this brief examination of the internal preconditions of Europe’s external relations demonstrates that almost all of the European international organisations combine a variety of partially overlapping ties and commitments which do not, however, evidence a homogenous structure. Even the most advanced European union, the European Community and its highly-effective European political co-operation, is comprised of members united simultaneously in a plethora of other significant international European organisations. It suffices to point here to the simple fact that members of the European Community, WEU and NATO belong at the same time to the Council of Europe, the OECD, the Nordic Council and other similar groupings, thus bringing their specific interests to, but also accepting additional responsibilities from, each of these organisations. Finally, the reality of national interests distinct from all attempts at international co-operation must not be denied or minimised. On this basis, the process of common foreign policy formation thus represents a tremendously complex task, which becomes more difficult to fulfil according to the number of states involved. This task places great demands on the willingness to compromise of all European governments and therefore often places results in an uncertain light.

III. Europe’s position in the world

15. Europe exercised a dominant influence in world politics for many years in the past. This is no longer the case, for two world wars have left major traces and destroyed the traditional European state system. This insight is clearly expressed in the document on Europe’s political identity published by the nine foreign ministers on 14th December 1973. This text reads:

“Although in the past the European countries were individually able to play a major role on the international scene, present international problems are difficult for any of the Nine to solve alone. International developments and the growing concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of a very small number of great powers mean that Europe must unite and speak increasingly with a single voice if it wants
to make itself heard and play its proper rôle in the world."

The combined potential of the European democracies is considerable. The potential of the countries of the European Community alone represents an order of magnitude comparable in respect to a series of factors of power to that of the two superpowers. Measured by its gross national product, its population, its monetary reserves and its share of world trade, the European Community is equal and in some respects superior to the superpowers. The European Community takes first place, for example, in world trade. Wide-ranging conclusions have been drawn from these facts, including the thesis that the European Community will "necessarily lead to a superstate and that this superstate will sooner or later ineluctably result in a superpower."

16. The Rapporteur can hardly imagine, however, that the European Community will emerge as a superpower, at least in the sense in which this word is normally used. Decisive internal and external preconditions for such a development are lacking, for it does not suffice to point to economic potential and the illusion of a defence union as proof of the superpower quality of the existing European Community. Equally, if not more important is, in the view of the Rapporteur, the consideration of Europe's economic and military vulnerability, for this vulnerability determines how Europe defines its foreign policy and forms its relations with the rest of the world. Prime Minister Tindemans' report on European integration is based on the accurate assumption that Europe's strategic position,dependence on exports and raw materials and lack of a homogenous internal structure force it to find its way to a common foreign policy:

"That which struck me in all my conversations was above all the widespread feeling of our impotence and vulnerability. This is a new experience for our peoples in recent history. The unequal distribution of material goods threatens the stability of the world economic system, the exhaustion of natural resources heavily burdens the future of industrial society and the internationalisation of economic activity increases the dependence of our productive apparatus. Our nations are too weak to accept this challenge by themselves. What importance do individual voices have today, aside from those of the superpowers?"

......

The reasons for a joint involvement of our nations in the world are, seen objectively, obvious: they arise from the correlation of forces and from the dimensions of the problems we face. At the same time they are, viewed subjectively, deeply felt by our peoples: our vulnerability and relative impotence are all too readily apparent. The combination of these two factors renders our external relations one of the most important motives for European integration and therefore the European union has to conduct a foreign policy."

17. The Rapporteur concurs with this view expressed in the Tindemans report. In his opinion the conclusion emerges that Europe's involvement in the world must be directed not at attaining the attributes of a superpower, but rather Europe should prove itself a factor of conciliation, cooperation and peace. Since Europe's character makes it primarily a civil power based essentially on civil rather than military forms of power, its greatest foreign policy task is not to build a new centre of military might, but to contribute to political peace and to a civil world order through the example of its domestic order which aims at the implementation of social justice, democratic liberties and human rights.

18. The two world wars have largely destroyed the basis of Europe's previous military and political might; the two superpowers today confront one another on its soil. In Eastern Europe this development at the end of the second world war led to a relationship of clear subordination according to the traditional logic of power politics. Western Europe, by contrast, has remained an important centre of world trade and, in political terms, has emerged as more than a mere junior partner of the United States. An imperial relationship was avoided, in good part because of close European-American cultural ties, although Western Europe's military security rests upon the alliance with America and especially upon the latter's nuclear guarantee. Thus, while Europe's capacity for military action has been decreased, the political, economic, social and cultural possibilities open to it remain considerable. This is due no doubt in part to the circumstance that in the atomic age the increasing destructive power of nuclear weapons has if anything reduced the likelihood of their use. The former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger expressed this paradox as early as 1965: "Military might has never been so strong as today, but neither was it ever so useless as at present."

19. Europe derives from this recognition considerable room for manoeuvre in the non-military


field, even though it does not strive to establish a third force between the two superpowers. In the view of the Rapporteur, a series of opportunities present themselves for Europe's rôle in world politics:

20. (i) Regarding the relationship between the two major nuclear powers, Europe possesses sufficient independent political and economic significance to exercise a conciliating rôle. An essential objective of European foreign policy should thus be to prevent renewed East-West confrontation and a possible return to the cold war. In the phase of Soviet-American bilateralism, as is developed in the early seventies with a series of comprehensive agreements between the two superpowers including the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war of 22nd June 1973, many Europeans feared that the Soviet Union and the United States would be in a position to decide the fate of Europe over the heads of the Europeans. This impression is, in the Rapporteur's opinion, inaccurate, for Europe can have no interest in a relationship between the superpowers marked by hostility and confrontation. Such confrontation would largely exclude any rapprochement between East and West and further cement the division of our continent. Europe's policy should instead be to promote its interest in stable and continuing co-operation between East and West through close consultation with the United States and corresponding contacts with the USSR.

21. The conference on security and co-operation in Europe, in which the United States and Canada as well as the Soviet Union took part, provides a successful example of how constructive co-operation between East and West can be arranged. This remains true even though undeniable difficulties became apparent at the OSCE follow-up conference in Belgrade in the spring of this year. The Helsinki final act opens up opportunities for the European Community as well as for individual European states to broaden their bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. The European Community is also presently conducting talks with COMECON in order to examine how far the two organisations can agree on mutual co-operation.

22. Co-ordination of European and American foreign policy takes place primarily within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. In addition, a permanent dialogue between the European Community and the United States has developed since 1973 which concerns especially economic affairs.

23. (ii) Japan offers another possibility of close co-operation with Europe. Europe shares with Japan a number of similarities with regard to its economic and strategic situation. Like Europe, Japan is extraordinarily dependent on foreign raw materials and export-oriented at the same time. The alliance with the United States is, as far as security is concerned, decisive for both partners. Both Japan and Europe number among the most important industrial centres of the world yet do not play any significant military rôle. The renunciation of a rôle as a military power has been elevated to a guiding principle of Japanese foreign policy. Japan and Europe share an interest in participating in decisions affecting the world economy. In some respects, such as the maintenance of export opportunities, Japan and Europe appear as competitors, yet this does not diminish their broad convergence of interests in the problems of the world economy.

24. Japan's export surplus with the European Community has risen dramatically in recent years, amounting to around five thousand million United States dollars in 1977. The European Community is therefore seeking, along with Japan and the United States, to limit the resulting dangers to the world economy. All three parties have committed themselves to fulfilling their common responsibilities in maintaining free international trade. Progress has already been achieved in economic discussions between the Community and Japan.

25. Japan is an important partner of Europe in all economic issues. The triangular relationship between Japan, Europe and the United States has been strongly emphasised in the latter country, particularly through the activities of the trilateral commission, one of whose founders is President Carter's current National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. This trilateral concept can prove quite useful in the opinion of the Rapporteur, as far as world economy is concerned, although he would emphasise that it must not lead to the formation of a bloc of powerful industrialised nations, which could lead to a hardening towards the third world and a stalemate in the North-South dialogue.

26. (iii) Europe's readiness to co-operate with all parts of the world should certainly not exclude China. Only recently, on 8th April of this year, the European Community concluded a commercial treaty with the People's Republic of China. It should really be self-evident that such a treaty is directed against no one, but serves the exclusive purpose of broadening international economic co-operation. The Rapporteur believes that security considerations that have attached to the Chinese-European relationship cannot be a decisive objective in the further development of Europe's ties to China. Co-operation between China and Europe could certainly take on a certain significance for Chinese domestic development as far as economic and technological matters are concerned, and Europe, as an economically highly-developed region, could certainly make a contribution. Europe could also help constructively to bring China into discussions of major international issues. A security alliance
with the People's Republic of China, however, is not, in the view of the Rapporteur, an object of discussion.

27. (iv) Europe can and must also play a conciliating rôle in the North-South dialogue. The European Community is already connected with fifty-three developing countries of Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean through the Lomé Convention. Other European nations, such as Sweden, are making major contributions to development policy. Europe's geographical proximity and traditional ties that many European states have with Africa should lead it really to declare its general solidarity with that continent's strivings for independence and so contribute to guaranteeing the peaceful economic and social development of the African continent. This does not exclude the careful examination and evaluation of the objectives and operating methods of the particular forces active in Africa.

28. As pointed out in Professor Hofer's recent report on the African situation to the Council of Europe, co-operation between these two continents must be the co-operation of equal partners. Democratic Europe, whose member states have granted independence to their former colonial possessions, can play a major rôle in strengthening the independence of the young African nations, some of which again face the danger of losing their independence through external intervention and the presence of foreign troops.

29. (v) Similar considerations apply as well to the Middle East. That region's conflict potential and geographical proximity demand a specifically European contribution to peace in this region. This contribution could not, of course, be of a military nature, but could well assume economic dimensions.

30. The European Community has worked, especially since 1973, for the restoration of peace in the Middle East and has repeatedly issued policy declarations concerning this area. Since 1974 it has conducted the so-called Arab-European dialogue with the Arab states, which is conceived as a long-range endeavour to intensify European-Arab co-operation. This dialogue should not, however, affect the continuing efforts to establish a lasting peace in the Middle East. The prospects for such a peace have brightened considerably since the signing of an outline agreement between Egypt and Israel on 17th September 1978. This agreement calls for the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two countries within three months. Europe could contribute to the achievement of the long-desired peace settlement by offering its comprehensive cooperation with all the nations of the Middle East. The preamble of the Camp David agreement states:

"Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress towards that goal can accelerate the movement towards a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by co-operation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security."

IV. External policy interests and objectives

31. The Rapporteur will attempt in this section of his presentation to outline the most significant interests and objectives of Europe's foreign relations. As previously mentioned, he cannot provide in this limited space a comprehensive and systematic treatment of this subject; nonetheless he considers it important to discuss a few essential goals and interests underlying Europe's relations, even though no complete consensus exists in all aspects of the opinions here expressed.

32. The Rapporteur is of the opinion that Europe's most urgent and inspiring objective must be the preservation and guarantee of peace. Without the maintenance of peace in freedom, neither Europe as a whole nor the individual European states and societies can thrive. Under contemporary conditions, a war in Europe would cause unimaginable destruction of political, economic, social and cultural values.

33. From this fundamental consideration arise for the Rapporteur five foreign policy goals which, in his view, form the essence of Europe's external relations. These are:

- the preservation of European security;
- the continuation and strengthening of détente;
- the protection of raw material supplies and the achievement of economic security;
- the continuation of the North-South dialogue with the objective of a more equitable world economic order; and
- the preservation of stability in Southern Europe.

These goals and interests of Europe cannot, of course, be so sharply distinguished from one another as might appear at first glance. The Rapporteur will attempt to clarify the various interconnections between these five major objectives and interests insofar as this is feasible within the confines of this presentation.
34. This objective presents, in the Rapporteur's analysis, four essential aspects:

- military security;
- economic security;
- social security; and
- internal security.

(a) Military security

35. Most of the European nations considered in this report regard their security as best guaranteed through their membership of the Atlantic Alliance. These nations believe that in the age of nuclear weapons, national efforts alone cannot suffice to assure their security in the face of the military threat posed by the Soviet Union. As mentioned previously, there are various degrees of membership of the Alliance and a number of European states have chosen not to enter the Alliance at all. This is explained in some cases by a long tradition of neutrality (Sweden, Switzerland), in others by a freely-chosen neutral status (Austria), and in still others by concerns for national independence and because some states perceive less strongly an immediate threat through the Soviet Union. For Europe as a whole, however, a neutral stance would not be tenable: even armed neutrality would pose excessive dangers for the security of the European states.

36. In the judgment of the Rapporteur, the existence of a political and military balance between East and West in Europe forms the pre-condition for the preservation of peace in this region; such a balance is possible only on the basis of an American commitment to and presence in Europe. As Chancellor Schmidt pointed out in his speech before the United Nations in May of this year, the military balance:

"must not necessarily be expressed in a total arithmetic identity in all types of weapons and forces. An overall strategic parity, however, must exist. It must also be psychologically understood and accepted as such by the European peoples."

37. According to the most recent assessment of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, we can proceed from the assumption of a military balance of power in Europe which largely excludes the possibility of a military attack. This balance of power arises from an assessment of the total military situation. The Warsaw Pact enjoys superiority or is catching up in certain fields, but the overall correlation of forces is at present so constituted as to render the possibility of an attack unattractive to it, according to The Military Balance 1978-79. The

(b) Economic security

39. Since the oil crisis of 1973 we have all become increasingly aware that an assured supply of raw materials and the ability to carry on uninterrupted economic activity are as essential to our security as military protection. The oil shock made clear that the withholding of vital supplies can strike at a society almost as hard as direct military pressure.

40. Many Europeans have perceived the oil crisis as a real threat, and some have introduced various proposals, including military scenarios, to deal with such a situation. The Rapporteur would maintain that Europe's vulnerability in this respect cannot be overcome, i.e. that we Europeans cannot take refuge in a new faith in autarchy. Rather, we must learn to live with this vulnerability and demonstrate our willingness to co-operate in an interdependent world economy.

41. As a rule, dependence is seldom one-sided. If this were the case, only capitulation before the demands of the other side would be imaginable. In this connection it appears essential to the Rapporteur to emphasise the political willingness to compromise in all efforts to reduce Europe's vulnerability and its dependence, as is presently being attempted, in the field of energy. Without such a willingness, a dependent region such as Europe would reel from one crisis to another, seriously endangering our economic and military security in the process. The Rapporteur will return to this subject at another point in his presentation.

---

(c) Social security

42. This aspect of security concerns first of all the preservation of social peace. Poverty and unemployment can threaten a society from within. Social objectives such as full employment, price stability and balance of external accounts should therefore not be underestimated in respect to external security as well.

43. Europe has achieved a relatively high degree of social security and domestic peace in recent years. In comparison to most of the countries outside Europe, many of the European nations may be regarded as socially progressive and relatively stable economically. Significant disparities, however, still exist in our continent. A major long-range objective of European cooperation must be to eliminate or at least to reduce these disparities.

(d) Internal security

44. In the recent past we have all become increasingly aware that terrorism can threaten our societies from within. At the same time terrorism has proved to be an international phenomenon which must be fought at an international level. The Council of Europe has made a useful contribution to this effort, and the seven leading industrial powers which gathered in an international economic summit conference last July in Bonn found it necessary to issue a joint statement on the struggle against terrorism.

45. The conflict with terrorism has shown that this phenomenon is quite capable of endangering the bases of western pluralist democracy. A common interest thus exists in acting jointly and decisively against terrorism.

46. These new dimensions of security extend far beyond the competence of those European institutions concerned primarily with external security, namely NATO and WEU. They are of importance beyond the borders of the European Community as well, and can be properly understood and effectively guaranteed only in a wider context and in a new consciousness of global interdependence. The Rapporteur would maintain that the existing organisations and institutions in Europe and beyond are by all means adequate to address these new problems of European security.

47. These different institutions and organisations must, however, carefully harmonise and co-ordinate their respective activities in order to guarantee maximum success. WEU must provide its contribution, but it must also recognise that in many cases, more comprehensive institutions such as the European Community, NATO, the OECD or the Council of Europe can act more effectively in regard to the appropriate measures. It would be advisable to adopt a flexible attitude in dealing with these tasks in order to live up to the complexity of the security problems. As the Rapporteur hopes to have made clear, these problems involve not only external military security, but also numerous issues traditionally considered as domestic concerns.

(ii) The continuation and expansion of détente

48. Détente, along with military defence, constitutes the second pillar of European security policy, as the Harmel report has already recognized in principle. Recognition of détente's importance to international security opened, in the late sixties and early seventies, a rather large area of East-West negotiation through a number of agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States on the one hand, and the USSR and the European nations, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other. The most important of these agreements include:

- the quadrilateral agreement on Berlin;
- the SALT agreements;
- the eastern treaties of the Federal Republic of Germany;
- the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe ; as well as
- a series of bilateral agreements between Eastern and Western European states.

49. These agreements have created a new framework for decreasing the conflict potential of Europe. The Rapporteur is aware that certain aspects of détente are understood differently in East and West. Détente cannot eliminate the fundamental political and ideological contrasts between East and West; these continue to exist. Understood as the process of gradual de-escalation of conflicts and agreement in areas where this is possible without abandoning vital interests, however, détente is a necessary element of western security policy to which there is no acceptable alternative. This concept of détente should really be undisputed, presuming as it does a balance of military power between East and West as its prerequisite. Its objective is the more effective assurance of peace through co-operation and the protection of security at a lower level of armaments.

50. Above all, the Helsinki final act constitutes in the opinion of the Rapporteur an extraordinarily useful instrument of co-operation between East and West whose provisions open up a wide range of practical collaboration among the European states. The CSCE follow-up conference in Belgrade two years after the signing of the final act allowed an assessment of the implementation of that document's provisions and of further measures of détente in Europe. A second follow-up conference is scheduled for 1980 in Madrid.

51. The Rapporteur is of the opinion that the WEU Assembly should contribute to the pre-
parations for this conference and concern itself with the pertinent topics by preparing a timely report. In his view, however, one should avoid overburdening the process of co-operation in the framework of the CSCE with new demands. The experience of Belgrade demonstrated that continuing differences in fundamental questions such as human rights do not have to preclude collaboration in vital areas such as the economic and humanitarian fields; these latter areas should receive closer attention in Madrid than was possible at Belgrade.

52. The Belgrade CSCE follow-up conference took place in a period of uncertainty over the further progress of détente which arose as a result of uncertainties in the Soviet-American relationship. The complex reasons for this uncertainty cannot be discussed here in detail. They are very complex, but may perhaps be indicated by the following factors:

- intensification of the Soviet Union’s military build-up combined with an increasing interventionary pressure in Africa;
- new complications in the continuing arms control negotiations created by developments in military technology on both sides; and
- a hardening of Soviet domestic policy in response to the protests and demands of Soviet civil rights movements.

53. The Rapporteur believes that this phase of uncertainty may now possibly have been surpassed and that more promising prospects for the development of East-West co-operation have again arisen. He draws this conclusion from recent encouraging developments in the SALT talks and, despite continuing difficulties, in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna. As is now reported, a personal meeting between President Carter and CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev may well be in the offing.

54. The SALT II negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union should be completed shortly. The success of these negotiations lies in the interests of Europe as well. The progress achieved in the Vienna MBFR negotiations has been above all the Warsaw Pact’s acceptance in its reply of 8th June 1978 of the principle of conventional parity for the reduction area. This principle was previously acknowledged in the common declaration signed by Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev on 6th May 1978. This text states:

“Both sides deem it important that no one should seek military superiority. They proceed on the assumption that approximate equality and parity suffice to safeguard defence. They believe that adequate measures of disarmament and arms limitation in the nuclear and the conventional fields, which meet that principle, would be of major significance.”

55. An important question, however, remains to be clarified, namely the discrepancy between NATO and Warsaw Pact figures concerning eastern military personnel in the reduction area. The Rapporteur is of the opinion that clarity in the question of data must be achieved to prevent the negotiations in Vienna from reaching an impasse. The Rapporteur would further consider balanced arms control agreements an extremely important component of détente.

56. The central objective of the MBFR negotiations remains a balanced level of forces at lower levels attained through reductions by East and West. The SALT talks aim at fixing a balance in strategic nuclear weapons by a treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States. This, however, could increase the significance of existing disparities between East and West in the conventional and tactical nuclear field. In addition, certain nuclear weapons which have been excluded from both SALT and the MBFR discussions cannot be excluded from consideration in a system of military balance. These nuclear weapons, such as the Soviet SS-20 rockets targeted at Western Europe, must also be included in negotiations.

57. Europe must also, in the judgment of the Rapporteur, accord decisive importance to economic co-operation between East and West. This co-operation is an element of détente which has been forced into the background somewhat because of the world economic recession. Europe must seek new initiatives in this area.

(iii) The protection of raw material supplies and the assurance of economic security

58. Experts do not presently reckon with a critical shortage of raw materials in the near future. The problems of inflation, recession, balance of payments imbalances and protectionist tendencies must apparently be taken much more seriously. Europe faces a serious problem with respect to its raw material supplies, nonetheless — unlike the other industrialised countries with the exception of Japan, which finds itself in a similar position, it is between 70 and 100% dependent on imports from third countries. The United States, by contrast, imports only about 15% of its raw material requirements.

59. It is understandable that this heavy dependence presents difficult problems for all of Europe’s national economies. The foreign policy vulnerability resulting from this dependence would become immediately apparent in the event of another major crisis such as the 1973 oil embargo and subsequent quadrupling or quintupling of oil prices, since raw materials are indispensable for industrial production. It is quite conceivable that the success of the oil
cartel could exercise a kind of domino effect for other raw materials. In certain cases this has already taken place.

60. We must recognise, on the other hand, that the export of raw materials is a major source of monetary reserves for many third world countries and therefore assumes a key function in their growth and employment policies. This fact alone points up the connection between raw material policy and development policy, the North-South dialogue and the effort to create a more equitable international economic order, which will be further discussed later in this report.

61. The Rapporteur would especially emphasise here that Europe's dependence on foreign raw materials cannot, in principle, be eliminated. Partially, substitution possibilities may exist, perhaps combined with limits on consumption in the consuming countries, but one cannot completely put an end to the fundamental problem of raw material dependence. Europe has largely exhausted its own raw material reserves.

62. In this situation, economic security can be secured only by political means and this means that a solution to Europe's problems can be found only in conjunction with the raw material producers. Thus co-operation rather than confrontation must be the guideline for Europe's foreign policy. This requires due consideration for the needs and opportunities of the developing countries in the context of a raw material policy for Europe.

(iv) The continuation of the North-South dialogue with the goal of a more equitable international economic order

63. Closely connected with this last-mentioned objective is thus the continuation of the North-South dialogue and the construction of a more equitable international economic order. The demands of the developing countries in this respect have been well-known since the United Nations declaration on the establishment of a new international economic order of 1st May 1974. They include inter alia:

- every nation's free choice of its economic and social system;
- complete and permanent sovereignty over natural resources and all economic activity;
- adoption of an integrated programme to stabilise raw material prices through arrangements patterned after the Lomé Convention and providing for buffer stocks under a common fund to stabilise the developing countries' income from raw material exports;
- promotion of producers' cartels in developing countries;
- industrialisation of the developing countries with the objective of assuring them at least one-fifth of the world's industrial production by the year 2000;
- instruments and mechanisms for the transfer of technology under equitable conditions;
- granting of preferences to developing countries and non-reciprocal treatment in all areas of international economic co-operation;
- development assistance without conditions amounting to at least 0.7% of the industrialised nations' GNP's;
- a link between development assistance and the creation of new special drawing rights in the IMF;
- a solution to the third world countries' problem of indebtedness; and
- a greater voice for the developing countries in the IMF and other international organisations.

64. The Rapporteur is of the opinion that Europe must not close itself to the legitimate demands of the developing countries, even though protection of their own vital interests is of course a legitimate right of the European countries as well. Europe should not acquire the reputation of a club of rich societies unwilling to meet the third world countries half-way. Rather, it should seek to find suitable compromises in appropriate international conferences and in the United Nations General Assembly.

65. The Rapporteur would point in this connection to the work of the international North-South commission under the chairmanship of Willy Brandt. He expects from this commission's report important initiatives for the policy of the European states. He believes further that the long-range interests of the industrial and the developing nations are not contradictory but complementary and reveal common perspectives as well.

66. With a certain apprehension we must also observe that the international weapons trade, particularly the export of weapons to third world countries, is increasing considerably. A growing demand for arms on the part of countries in the third world, along with growing export pressures within the industrialised nations, could create a dangerous momentum. Global expenditures on armaments in 1977 are estimated at about $400 thousand million. The total value of weapon transfers to the third world has increased sharply. For so-called heavy weapons alone it amounted to around $7.3 thousand million in 1976, as compared to $2 thousand million in 1966 (expressed in constant prices).
67. Regrettable in this connection is the Soviet Union's apparent propensity to limit its relationship to the third world largely to the delivery of weapons. In the view of the Rapporteur, serious steps should be taken better to control arms exports in the future. The export of weapons is not an appropriate form of foreign aid. The European nations should contribute to developing effective international instruments of control and assist in transforming military into peaceful technology.

(v) Assuring the stability of Southern Europe

68. If Europe is to develop successful and stable foreign relations, it must also find convincing solutions for the problems which exist in its midst. The experience of the continuing crisis in Cyprus demonstrates that Europe can optimally exercise its function of assuring peace abroad only when it is able to overcome its own internal conflicts. Whether Europe possesses this ability will be borne out in no small measure by whether it will prove capable of providing an effective contribution to the stabilisation of Southern Europe. This task is directly related to its commitment of solidarity with less-developed Southern Europe.

69. It is now certain that Greece, Spain and Portugal are firmly committed to applying for membership of the European Community. This is a welcome step in the interest of stabilising democracy in these countries.

70. Moreover, the entrance of Spain and Portugal into the European Community means at the same time that both nations can assume a bridge-building function with respect to Latin America. Both nations have historically maintained close ties to Latin America which rest upon a common cultural tradition. Further, following the end of its colonial domination in Africa, Portugal can now play a very useful role in European-African relations as well.

71. The Rapporteur is particularly pleased that the governments of the Economic Community member states have agreed in principle to these countries' admission. He would, however, point out in this connection that the accession of these nations will not only make evident social and economic problems within the countries willing to accede - for a solution - will require specific measures of assistance on the part of the European Community. Perhaps an even greater concern is the economic gap that could arise between the developed north of Europe and the entire southern region of the continent. The entry of Greece, Spain and Portugal into the European Community will create economic difficulties especially for Turkey, Cyprus, Malta and the other Mediterranean states which will likewise require Europe's attention.

72. A further question arises with respect to Yugoslavia. The Rapporteur believes that the problems of those countries in Southern Europe which, at least for the foreseeable future, are not able to join the European Community also urgently require solutions in order to prevent their estrangement from the rest of Europe, especially the European Community. He would therefore raise the question of whether Europe should commit itself to a special programme of economic solidarity for this region. The Rapporteur believes that such a solidarity programme would lie in the interest of the donor as well as of the recipient countries. Europe could thereby provide an important example of its capacity for effective foreign policy action and its determination to provide practical assistance.

V. Summary

73. It is certainly not yet possible at this point in time to speak of a unified, co-ordinated European foreign policy. Above all, a number of internal prerequisites for such a development are lacking. Nonetheless, in the Rapporteur's view a web of external relations has grown up among the democratic states of Europe which reveals a unified pattern and which, despite all variations in national interests, shows a series of common features. Outstanding among these is the high degree of Europe's dependence and vulnerability owing to its economic and military position. Europe can guarantee its security only within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. Hence arises the common interest of preserving Europe as a force for peace, conciliation and détente and of developing a foreign policy characterised by a willingness to co-operate with all parts of the world. Europe can best develop its influence in the world not as a military but as a civil power.

74. Europe's most vital interests include:

- the maintenance of its security;
- the continuation and expansion of détente;
- the assurance of raw material supplies and the maintenance of economic security;
- the continuation of the North-South dialogue with the goal of a more equitable international economic order; and
- the assurance of stability in Southern Europe.

75. Without desiring to overestimate Europe's position in the world, one may observe that these objectives present a common challenge which demands of the democratic states of Europe considerable energy in maintaining their common security.