The European Union's Identity

and

The Politics of Reconciliation

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Abstract
Voluntary associations such as the European Union (EU) rest on a sense of common identity formed around ideals and traditions, as well as on material and security interests. Yet many EU citizens and even some of their leaders express confusion as to what this common tradition might be. My essay is a theoretical and empirical analysis of one major principle of action, the principle of reconciliation, that I detect in the identity formation of the European Union. Certain issues and debates in political theory can inform this principle; and I draw from Hannah Arendt’s reflections on action, promise and forgiveness, and also from Montesquieu, to analyze its normative dimension. But this principle has become another “lost treasure” (Arendt’s words for the legacy of the American Revolution). Thus I attempt to retrieve it in the “speech and deed” of founders and current actors of European integration politics (in memoirs, autobiographies, official documents and 45 interviews I conducted in 1995 and in 1999 with close collaborators of Jean Monnet, members of the European Parliament, and senior Commission officials). This enquiry has political as well as theoretical relevance. The principle of reconciliation, if remembered and understood, could become part of a shared “political tradition” for the citizens of the European Union. One of my interviewees, former EU Commission President Jacques Delors, drew from my Arendtian analysis of the principle of reconciliation to comment publicly on the EU policies in the Balkans.

Introduction

Peace, like good health, attracts little attention. But in the European historical context fifty years of non-violent and non-hegemonic relationships among 15 nation-states is an anomaly worthy of interest. In 1945 Hannah Arendt had praised the resistance movements’ program for a federal Europe including Germany, because out of the crisis of the national states she saw a new tradition of European solidarity being born (Arendt 1994, 109-117). But disillusion soon set in; the “men of the European Resistance” returned to “the weightless irrelevance of their personal affairs” and lost their treasure like so many others before and after them (Arendt 1993, 4-5). Yet, since that time, European actors have pioneered innovative policies, which the traditional concepts of economic self-interest or national power politics cannot fully explain. How then to understand what changed in Europe after WWII? The fact that former enemy nations could pool the production and marketing of coal and steel in the 1951 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) only six years after the end of a murderous conflict is too often taken for granted or explained by economic calculations only (Nugent 1999; Hoffmann 1964). Such accounts do not probe adequately how participants in the European founding dealt with their historical memories of war, invasion and mutual exploitation, and how they could trust one another enough to put their war industries under a common authority with no hegemonic power mediating conflicts. Political theory is an intellectual approach especially well suited to a reappraisal of European integration: its rich scholarly tradition takes seriously, albeit not uncritically, the ends and the motivations of the founders of a new political community. This is an approach familiar, of course, to the students of American political roots 1 and one, which Arendt made her own in her comparative study of the French and American revolutions. To “retrieve” the ethical and political impulses behind the fifty year-old European integration process, I follow a similar path by interpreting theoretically the European founders’ speech and deed. 2

The exact nature of the interaction between ideals and interests will remain a topic for debate in the field of European integration studies. 3 Some, like Alan Milward and Andrew Moravcsik (Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1998), describe a process essentially driven by the commercial interests of still powerful nation-states. But, in The European Sisyphus. Essays on Europe, 1964-1994, and his more recent review essays, Stanley Hoffmann, is quite open about the shifts in his understanding of European
integration. In 1964, he asserted that, "the only common heritage of the ‘new Europeans’ is one of guilt and shame” although each nation practiced its own brand of amnesia in the “passionate pursuit of the pleasures of the present.” Europe was “converting itself to the functional necessities of a new type of social order,” but it had not converted itself “to a new set of values” (Hoffmann 1995, 19-22). In 1994, Hoffmann was careful “not to minimize what has been accomplished. For all its current tensions, Franco-German relations have been revolutionized, turned from hatred and war to reconciliation and friendship. Britain is a reluctant and ambivalent partner, but it is ‘in.’ Membership in the Union has been essential for the democratic process of Spain and Greece. The ‘founding fathers’ who saw the Union as indispensable for the peace and prosperity of its members have been vindicated. Brussels, for all the flaws of the institutional setup, is one of the last refuges of idealism on the continent.” But the glass remained half empty. After so many accomplishments Europe had not yet found “a bold program at home and abroad” (Hoffmann 1995, 63-64). One may quibble with Hoffmann’s assessment that programs to create a single monetary zone among fifteen nation-states and to accept the accession to the EU of twelve Eastern and Central European new Member States, lack “boldness.” More recently, this noted scholar of European politics has called the EU a “federation of nation-states” and a “genuine innovation” that “might be adequate to its ambiguous tasks” (Hoffmann 1999, 39). Today he describes an EU “built on a mix of material interests and visionary faith. That faith has helped its members overcome crises and periods of stagnation. A Europe based on pure reason is certainly conceivable, but it needs a vision that transcends dry computation of interests. In fact, the definition of interests varies depending on the passions and emotions of the players.” 4

Exploring the ethical politics of European integration is thus important for scholarly purposes, but it matters also politically. Voluntary associations such as the EU rest on a sense of common identity formed around ideals and traditions, as well as on material and security interests. Yet many EU citizens, and even some of their leaders, express confusion as to what this common tradition might be. Moreover, scholars and public figures engaged in conflict-resolution efforts often cite European integration as a model to follow.5 But what is to be emulated? Specific economic policies and legal arrangements may not be transferable. Focusing instead on the “principles and practices” (as Arendt would call them) of the actors in the process can help illuminate a more hidden yet vital factor for the success of the enterprise. As Andrew Moravcsik writes, it is important to “generalize” the European experience because, “by subsuming European integration wherever possible under general theories, rather than treating it as sui generis, we invite outsiders to treat its lessons as relevant to their own experience” (Moravcsik 1998, 500). Moravcsik concludes that the European experience fits the Liberal rather than the Realist view of International Relations. My theoretical standpoint is different. I interpret the European “experience” as a political theorist, and my way of “generalizing” is to draw my analytical framework from major 20th century political thinkers who took seriously the challenge of non-violent participatory politics in highly diversified societies. For lack of space, I cannot adequately develop here the theoretical and empirical evidence for the three principles, reconciliation, compromise and recognition, that I detect in the identity formation of European Union. 6 Therefore I devote the remainder of this essay to the principle of reconciliation; and Hannah Arendt’s reflections on action, forgiveness and promise provide me with my main interpretative categories. But, first, I will expose the intellectual and political scaffolding for my argument by reviewing briefly some of the scholarly and political attempts to outline a common EU identity. I will also explain why I find the Arendtian concepts of “lost treasure” and “principles” so relevant to a discussion of the ethical politics of European integration.

European identity and the “Vision of the Good:” Scholarly and Political Responses

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the EU is like Janus the two-faced Roman god of doorways and beginnings: it looks back on some solid achievements, peace and prosperity, but it is also
becoming one of the most divisive political issues in Europe, replacing the traditional split between parties of the left and right with a new divide between pro and anti-integrationists. Scholars who ponder European citizens’ disorientation and disaffection conclude that “shared values” could give European citizens a sense of their common identity (Brigid Laffan 1996; Daniela Obradovic 1996; Dominique Wolton 1993). For Laffan the sense of political identity essential for the legitimacy of the European Union will be built on “three core dimensions, namely, cooperative institutions, instrumental benefits and affective attachment” (Laffan 1996, 83). But German historian Wolfgang Schmale (Schmale 1997) argues that Europe suffers from a “myth deficit:” it has never articulated its goals in a clear enough way to enlist the allegiance of citizens. Obradovic defines the missing myth as a set of symbolic values “through which people share an idea of origin, continuity, historical memories, collective remembrance, common heritage and tradition as well as a common destiny” (Obradovic 1996, 191). The word myth, however, carries some dark connotations; too often a myth served to seduce people into foolish collective adventures, one recent instance being the redeeming of the Battle of Kosovo by the Serbian people. This is why I prefer the Arendtian concept of “principle.”

More recently some European politicians have joined the search for the European tradition. In a 1999 speech in Strasbourg Cathedral former Commission President Jacques Delors called on his audience to give a “soul to Europe” which he equated with “meaning,” and “spiritual strength.” Commission President Romano Prodi used similar language when he accepted his appointment by the European Council in April 1999. He declared to the Financial Times his “hope” that during his presidency “the EU would begin to develop . . . a common European soul.” Prodi compared the common European soul to “a common will.” But “soulful” language applied to politics evoke like myth unsettling memories, the nationalist mysticism of fascist regimes for instance. Some admit quite candidly their inability to define the European project. Former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González, one of the negotiators of the 1992 Maastricht treaty, drew a satirical portrait of the discussions around the renaming of the European Communities into the European Union:

> We needed to define what it is, or no one would understand us. Hence, like curious children who question their parents, we asked ourselves, the forefathers of the invention: What is this? Imagine the difficulties we encountered when EU advocates, Euroskeptics, and other political fauna from 12 countries attempted to define the new creation. Finally, we decided that the European Union is a union of peoples. Exhausted by the effort, we had to hush the questioning child because we were having difficulties finding the answer to the next question: What do we mean by a union of peoples? (González 1999, 31).

One reason for this confusion, according to anthropologist Marc Abélès is that European politicians and civil servants of the Commission too often live the communitarian identity in a futuristic mode: Everything happens as if Europe should reinvent itself every day, assert an eternal youth . . . Reference to the past is limited to a brief evocation of the founding fathers; no sign indicates the presence of a tradition” (Lequesnes et Smith 1997, 54-55). Current events confirm that economic arguments and constitutional discussions, however important, will not be enough to guide the ongoing institutionalization of the new political community and to motivate citizens to participate. In 2000 the Danish people refused to abandon the krone in favor of the euro “against the advice of virtually the entire political and business establishment, not to mention the leading unions and media,” partly out of fear of losing their national identity. Commentators pointed out that the Danish government made an important mistake by using only economic arguments to convince the electorate. Similar comments were made after the Irish people refused to ratify the Nice Treaty in a 2001 referendum. But this inability to articulate purpose and identity, and to remember, might not have surprised Hannah Arendt; she who mourned the “lost treasures” of so many political experiences.

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The “Lost Treasure”
Political Principles and European Integration

Affective attachment and shared values are not Arendtian terms; but in Arendt we also find the conviction that an “idea of origin, historical memories, common heritage and tradition” (Obradovic 1996) are key to the health of a political community. In On Revolution Arendt traces back the tradition of the American Revolution to the principles and practices of the Founding Fathers. “Public freedom, public happiness, public spirit,” these are “the lost treasure” of the revolutionary tradition in France and in the US (Arendt 1990, 221). The last fifty years of European integration can also be conceptualized as a founding although Europe’s founding did not occur “at once” or “according to a single plan.” Commentators have compared the European transformation to a “revolution.” It has involved both deepening, the gradual creation of stronger links of interdependence among member states, and widening as the Communities have grown from six to 15 members. For Arendt the founding of new political communities is an exciting but ephemeral time of inventing or “natality.” Man in action is at the heart of founding moments. With a matchless appreciation for the uniqueness of each individual actor, as she calls those who have the courage to insert themselves into the human world (Arendt 1958, 176) Arendt describes the “heroes” (ibid., 187) as the subjects of stories which eventually form the “storybook of mankind” (ibid., 184).

Because of her keen appreciation for the fragility of political relationships, Arendt wants us to remember these stories and their heroes. By talking over political experiences and crystallizing them into political concepts, thinkers create political memories within which there could be no stability in the polis. They have a special responsibility for creating “certain guideposts for future remembrance” (Arendt 1990, 220). Otherwise the liveliest political traditions risk “losing their treasure.” Arendt feared that a people lacking political concepts would tend to rely on far-fetched ideas, which had little relation to the reality of their life; the tragedy was that since Socratic times men of thought and action had parted company (ibid., 219). For Arendt the great question of her age that required understanding was totalitarianism. She depicted totalitarianism as the offspring of “imperialism,” a manifestation of the bourgeoisie attempt to gain power on a world scale. Many commentators (however, not Arendt) have recognized that the European integration process started as a response to such “isms.” Thus it is not surprising that Arendt provides me with some key conceptual tools as I attempt to reflect on the experience of European integration in an Arendtian mode.

The “lost treasure” of the American Revolution, which Arendt also calls “principles” or “practices,” is a certain set of public attitudes and commitments: to public freedom, to the pursuit of the common good with others, in other terms to an ethics of political participation. Perhaps the most famous theorist of the “principles” inherent in each constitutional order is Montesquieu who adopted the Aristotelian classification of political constitutions in The Spirit of Laws. Montesquieu’s “principles” are love of country and equality, or “political virtue,” in republics; honor in monarchies; moderation in aristocracies; and fear and suspicion in tyrannies. Montesquieu carefully emphasized that the republican “virtues” are political; they have nothing to do with moral or Christian virtues (Montesquieu 1989, xli). Nor does this mean that honor cannot be found in republics or moderation in monarchies. But Montesquieu’s political principles are what make each specific government “act” (ibid., 21). As Isaiah Berlin notes, Montesquieu’s “central notion” is that “individuals and states decay when they contravene the rules of their particular ‘inner’ constitution” (Berlin 1980, 141). Undoubtedly Arendt shares this conviction hence her concern for “lost treasures.” She writes that Montesquieu was “probably right” to think that different polities were moved by a different inspiring principle, “recognized as the ultimate standard for judging the community’s deeds and misdeeds,” even if his list of principles was “pitifully inadequate” to account for the “rich diversity” of people sharing a common life on earth (Arendt 1978, II, 201-202). Although Montesquieu calls his principles the “human passions” that make a government act (1989, 21), neither he nor Arendt stress the role of feelings or
emotions in politics. Arendt retained from her encounter with Nazism a healthy mistrust of moral posturing; only action revealed the ethical core of a person or a polity. Montesquieu was an empiricist who favored explanations based on concrete observations and the “active philosophy of the Greeks” (Beyer 1982, 20). Margaret Canovan reminds us that Arendt, like Heidegger, had an idiosyncratic way of using words. For her, “principles are not abstract but they are extremely general, inspiring actions without prescribing them. They relate to the manner in which people act, and particularly to the way they begin to act, the principium that establishes the principle of later action” (Canovan 1992, 172). In other terms, principles are not theoretical absolutes or laws demanding compliance but practices, which arise from the human conditions of plurality and natality. People realize their full humanness only when they act together in a political order freely chosen and open to change and reform.

The problem with European “principles” is that often they are more implied than articulated; and when they are expressed in preambles to the treaties, in governmental declarations, even in European Commission publications such as Agenda 2000 it is in a language that does not excite the enthusiasm of citizens. (The 1950 Schuman Declaration that launched the European Coal and Steel Community is an exception in this regard). As I “retrieve” the principle of reconciliation from the “speeches and deeds” of European Founders and their successors, I am well aware that these are always in part self-justificatory acts. But writings by major political actors may provide us with some of the most politically salient contemporary political theory. This is, of course, nothing new. Men of action, such as Machiavelli, Locke, Burke, and Tocqueville used the pen to comment on the conduct of public affairs. The study of the links between ethics and politics seems invariably to call for the examination of individual actors. This is because ethics implies choice and is founded on human agency. Political scientists have been reluctant to focus on leadership, a concept not easily quantifiable and which can lead to oversimplified interpretations of politics as being driven by “great men.” But historically political foundings seem to result from action by small groups of leaders. I define leadership here as the capacity to initiate political action; and although many of the political actors of European integration are elected politicians or senior administrators, others are civicly engaged citizens (on this see pp. 22-26 of this essay). European founders did not reflect at length on their motivations. So it is up to the historian of political thought to interpret the meanings of their words and deeds and map the way political concepts have developed. Arendt thought that the agent, who reveals himself in action, could not decipher its meaning, which “is revealed only when the action itself has come to an end and becomes a story susceptible to narration” (Arendt 1995, 21). Understanding the story is to understand its principle of action and, thus, what informs the political identity of the actor(s).

The Principle of Reconciliation

Thinkers do not choose words idly. Arendt is a theorist of action, not of peacemaking and reconciliation. That she introduced in politics the notion of forgiving which is commonly associated with acts of reconciliation has not escaped, however, authors interested in political conflict resolution. Walter Wink writes in When the Powers Fall - Reconciliation in the Healing of Nations: “As Hannah Arendt reminds us, human societies could not exist without forgiveness and the public acts of contrition and confession that make reconciliation possible” (Wink 1998, 14-15). We can only speculate why Arendt herself hardly ever used the terms peace or reconciliation. Perhaps these words struck her as too passive given her understanding of action as “a passionate drive to show one’s self in measuring up against others” (Arendt 1958, 194). She makes a brief comment on peace in On Violence, calling it an “absolute,” that is an end in itself like power, although periods of peace have “nearly always” been shorter than periods of warfare in recorded history (Arendt 1970, 51). So peace may be simply unattainable in a world of unpredictable and irreversible actions.

Although she is not a theorist of reconciliation, Arendt wrestled with her relationship to Germany after the war, as did the French and Benelux Founders of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). She concluded in her 1947 “Dedication to Karl Jaspers” that unless individuals
were willing to leave “the abyss of factual territory” and abandon either “fanatical hatred” or the “complicity” imposed by the Nazis, they could not reach understanding among themselves (Arendt 1994, 214-215). The human capacity to forgive, which is her answer to the irreversibility of human action, is linked with the capacity to promise, which is the answer to the unpredictability of human deed. Forgiveness and promising are not to be understood as dispositions of the soul, but as actions, Without forgiveness, there is no freedom, that “freedom from vengeance, which incloses both doer and sufferer in the relentless automatism of the action process, which by itself need never come to an end” (Arendt 1958, 241). As for promise, it is “the only alternative to a mastery which relies on domination of one’self and rule over others” (ibid., 244). Arendt broached a provocative topic. Unfortunately she devotes less than eight pages to the discussion of this “remedy” for the vagaries of political action (ibid., 236-243).

Definitions of forgiveness abound in scholarly literature. For Robert D. Enright, forgiving is “a willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, negative judgment, and indifferent behavior toward one who unjustly injures us, while fostering the undeserved qualities of compassion, generosity, and even love toward him or her” (Enright 1995, 1). In this definition, the act is voluntary, acknowledges a real injury, includes affect, cognition and behavior, and is not conditioned on the recognition of the offense by the injurer. Enright distinguishes forgiveness from reconciliation, an act that involves two persons instead of one, and where the injurer acknowledges the wrong that he or she has committed, and offers restitution. Arendt is not interested in private affect or cognition; her primary concern is to preserve the human conditions of plurality and of natality, which are the sine qua non conditions of political life. Forgiveness does not act without promise (Arendt 1958, 237, 246). “Entirely based on the presence of others” (ibid., 238), forgiveness and promise undo the inevitable damages caused by action and protects the web of relationships against an irreparable break.¹⁸ With these palliatives to action, Arendt wants to secure the permanence of the public sphere. The primary political good is action and power.

Power comes out of the “capacity to act in concert” (Arendt 1970, 44). One of the most powerful acts in which a group of persons could engage is the foundation of a new political community. I interpret the launching of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950 as a foundational act, the fruit of both power and its “remedies,” forgiving and promising and I suggest that the “principle of reconciliation” moved its founders. Establishing lasting peace and “solidarity” between France and Germany was central to the vision of the good of the Framers of Europe. The terms peace and peaceful figures five times in the brief Schuman Declaration, which made public the French offer to Germany to create jointly a European Coal and Steel Community. The Schuman proposal would lead to the “elimination of the age-old opposition between France and Germany” through “action taken immediately on one limited but decisive point . . . so that any war . . . becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”⁹ The fusion of strategic and economic interests (in this case the “pooling of coal and steel production”) would provide the “leaven” for the ultimate goal: “the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace” (Fontaine 2000, 36-37). Interestingly, the Schuman Declaration did not use the word reconciliation, but a negative expression: “elimination of opposition.” This expression corresponds almost perfectly with the Webster’s Dictionary’s definition of reconciliation: “to render no longer opposed.” Perhaps it was too early, only five years after the end of WWII, to set reconciliation as a positive goal, the best one could hope for was the elimination of opposition. The elimination of opposition between former enemies was framed as the means to reach the ends of peace and community, but the founders of the ECSC announced in the next sentence that this means would also be the main goal of the ECSC.²⁰

The Declaration spelled out other practices which define the originality of the project to this day: Inclusiveness, “the organization” would be “open to the participation of the other countries of Europe;” creative incrementalism, “Europe will not be made all at once;” rejection of hegemonic
leadership, "Europe will not be made according to a single plan;" institutionalization of the new process of peaceful decision-making among recent enemy nations through "a treaty signed between the States and submitted for the ratification of their parliaments;" voluntary acceptance by all signatories of the authority of a supranational institution over certain fields of activity; the High Authority would be "composed of independent persons appointed by the governments, giving equal representation;" compensation for unequal economic starting positions between the Member States to level the playing field.

Ideally political theorists should let political reality challenge, and if necessary, change their own ideas. However this is a difficult act. Political events rarely give cause for rejoicing or hope. Arendt did not see that the capacity to "act together" of formerly bitter enemies such as France and Germany could actually illustrate the more hopeful part of her writing on engaged citizenship: the human capacity for new beginnings. Her view of participatory politics literally hinges on natality. She writes of this life-changing ability with awe as "the new therefore always appears in the guise of a miracle" (1958, 178). This explains why, in spite of her obvious misgivings about the leaders of postwar Europe she did not conclude The Origins of Totalitarianism on a despondent note:

But there remains also the truth that every end in history necessarily contains a new beginning; this beginning is the promise, the only 'message' which the end can ever produce. Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the supreme capacity of man; politically, it is identical with man's freedom... This beginning is guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every man (Arendt 1979, 478-479).

In the case of European integration Schuman was "every man." He assumed the political risks of the initiative for the ECSC and on May 9, 1950 chose to announce the plan "neither to diplomats nor to heads of state but directly to the public" (Brinkley and Hackett 1991, 137), as "from now on it was essential to act quickly and to impact public opinion before any diplomatic negotiation, thus pushing the governments toward an agreement" (Poidvin 1986, 260). According to Schuman, "the surprise was general. Nobody expected an initiative of this kind" (Schuman 1964, 166). "The act of forgiving can never be predicted" (Arendt 1958, 241). Arendt compares action and forgiving to "the more general power of performing miracles" because they introduce an entirely unexpected element in the realm of human affairs which would otherwise follow its course to its "normal, 'natural' ruin" (ibid., 247) According to the Webster's Dictionary definition, a "miracle is an effect or external event which surpasses all known human or natural power and is ascribed to supernatural causes." This is hardly rational. I would not impute to Arendt the hidden desire to introduce "supernatural causes" in politics. But it is important to note that in her own words her very participatory concept of politics requires a "miracle," an element which escapes sheer rationality. Perhaps this is why "forgiving... has always been deemed unrealistic and inadmissible in the public realm" (ibid., 243).

The interaction between German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, French Foreign Affairs Minister Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet who conceived the Schuman Declaration, illustrates the "ripple" effect, which is the unavoidable outcome of any human action. It takes place in the web of "human relationship that exists wherever men live together." This is how Arendt describes it:

The disclosure of the 'who' through speech, and the setting of a new beginning through action, always fall into an already existing web where their immediate consequences can be felt. Together they start a new process which eventually emerges as the unique life story of the newcomer, affecting uniquely the life stories of all those with whom he comes into contact (1958, 184).
Duchêne recalls the first meeting between Adenauer and Monnet, who was bringing Schuman's offer 24 hours before the official press conference: "Armand Bérand, the French Assistant High Commissioner, who was present, was struck by the high-flown terms in which the two old men talked. Their task was political, not technical; they had a 'moral' duty to their peoples, and Adenauer would not let detail interfere with the European goals he had entertained all his life" (Duchêne 1994, 207). Italy and the Benelux countries negotiated with the Federal Republic of Germany and France the Paris Treaty founding the ECSC, which was ratified in 1952.

**The dual nature of reconciliation politics**

It is important to note with Lily Gardner Feldman that successful reconciliation policies rest on two components: the "pragmatic" aspect includes programs of economic and political cooperation which serve state interests and constitute a "proven source of security and prosperity," and the moral one implies a process of psychological and emotional transformation, a "break with age-old national animosities" (Banchoff and Mitchell 1999, 70). Max Kohnstamm, a Dutchman who was the first Secretary-General of the ECSC, insists on the complex character of the European reconciliation process. Having spent time in a concentration camp and later in prison for his resistance activities as a student leader, he explains the "rational" aspect of the collaboration with the Germans: "At first, there was a very strong feeling of hate among the prisoners. But it did not last very long. No genius was required to understand that we could not rebuild Europe without the Germans. The Netherlands, a de facto economic province of Germany, needed German industry. But what was the meaning of German renaissance if bombs were again fabricated in the Ruhr and dropped on Rotterdam? How to break out of this vicious circle?" Kohnstamm was in London preparing a meeting of the foreign affairs ministers of the Benelux countries, France, Great Britain and the US, when he read the Schuman Declaration in the newspaper: "I was struck as if by thunder, so convinced was I that this was the answer to the vicious circle which was not only economic, but also moral and ethical. Twice my generation had experienced and inflicted terrible cruelties: We could not go on like that." Kohnstamm prefers to speak of reconciliation rather than forgiveness in spite of his harsh prison experience. He concurs with George Kateb's critique of Arendtian forgiveness as being too vague and all encompassing. Kateb writes that, "no one is entitled to forgive me for the wrong I have done except the person to whom I have done wrong" (Kateb 1984, 35). For Kohnstamm also,

Forgiveness is a personal act. To speak of forgiving the Germans in general is already the beginning of the Holocaust, a dangerous abstraction. Moreover, to find the guilty ones is a complex task. It is absurd to speak only of the German sin; Europe was guilty. Few countries can be entirely proud of their attitude during that period. Keynes had warned us that the Treaty of Versailles might provoke another war.

If we understand Kateb and Kohnstamm right, forgiveness is not a politically relevant concept, because it is only about a relationship between two people directly involved with each other. But what about collective evil, harm inflicted by one collectivity upon another? Given the number of genocides during the twentieth century, the question cannot be evaded.

The other major objection raised against forgiveness in politics is that it may contradict the requirements of justice, on which rests the legitimacy of democratic political orders. I agree with Peter Digeser's argument that it is precisely because of the "intractability of injustice even in the best regimes that we should consider the appropriateness of forgiving" (Digeser 1998, 707). Forgiveness is a supplement to justice, not the opposite of punishment. For Arendt only punishable acts can be forgiven; the radical evil manifested in Nazism is beyond the scope of forgiveness, although she was willing to consider most Germans as fellow travelers of Nazism, rather than actual culprits. Kateb and
Kohnstamm notwithstanding, concepts like forgiveness, apology and reconciliation have entered the “space of appearance.” Noam J. Zohar writes that the interpersonal process of forgiveness can also take place in international relations as “the state functions as a vehicle for action of a human collective . . . .” Thus the relation between two states have the character of ‘interpersonal’ relations where the personae are the two political communities” (Zohar 1996, 11). If collective forgiveness could be granted between states this would transform the nature of the international system concludes Digeser (Digeser 1996, 17). This transformation was precisely the aim pursued by the founders of the ECSC.

For Kohnstamm, “reconciliation is better than forgiveness.” But was reconciliation in Europe after WWII possible without forgiveness? Kohnstamm responds that the requirements of justice were satisfied by the Nuremberg trials, by the denazification programs imposed by the occupiers, and by the sizable reparations Germany paid to war victims. The Germans atoned for their past by renouncing dictatorship, adopting a democratic constitution, and accepting the leadership of men like Adenauer who had not been compromised with the Nazi regime. “We trusted Adenauer and if a few of his collaborators were former Nazis, we accepted it. All this would have been unthinkable if we had not been entirely turned toward the future. We had much to accomplish together.” What mattered was promise and action in common.

Kohnstamm and his peers gave a chance to the Bonn Republic and history has vindicated them. Nevertheless, the past was never very far away: “I knew I had a real friendship with a German when we could talk about the concentration camps,” says the directeur de cabinet of Jean Monnet, Jacques-René Rabier, of his early years with the ECSC in Luxembourg. And the desire for revenge could lurk. Kohnstamm admits that negotiating the ECSC Treaty in Paris as a member of the Dutch delegation, and having dinner with Hallstein, was difficult. Two of his aunts had died in Auschwitz and so had the parents of Étienne Hirsch, the closest collaborator of Monnet during the negotiations of the Schuman Plan. Kohnstamm recalls vividly an incident in Luxembourg after he had become secretary-general of the ECSC: “The window of my office opened right above a bridge crossing a very deep ditch in the middle of the city. One day I was eating my sandwich when I saw a young German man who was walking alone, in a raincoat that resembled a Nazi uniform. The thought flashed through my mind: ‘Why not push him in the ditch!’ I was shocked by my reaction.” This is why it is difficult to understand Kohnstamm when he says that the postwar reconciliation process is not about forgiveness as Arendt defines it. If forgiveness is about action, about giving up revenge, about treating former enemies in an amicable way and daring to “act in concert” with them, as Arendt argues, then the politics of the ECSC can be interpreted as emblematic of this human capacity.

Some of the senior initiators of the European integration process did leave us commentaries on the ethical “principles” which moved them at the time. Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Affairs minister who launched the negotiations for the ECSC, was born a German citizen in Lorraine. He studied law in German universities and became a French member of parliament in 1919. Although, like the majority of his colleagues, he granted full powers to Maréchal Philippe Pétain in July 1940, he had refused to participate in the Vichy government and was arrested by the Nazis in Metz two months later. Taken to Germany, he escaped in 1942 and lived clandestinely until 1944 when he returned to the Moselle. This cabinet minister from 1948 to 1953 described in his collection of essays Pour l’Europe the “essential task” of a political leader: to act on “the relationship of men as members of a collectivity, and on the relationship between collectivities themselves toward better understanding and cooperation” (Schuman 1964, 12). What was needed between France and Germany was “a detoxification from history books” (ibid., 49). This is why Schuman proposed to “extend our hand to our enemies not simply to forgive, but to build together the Europe of tomorrow,” (ibid., 44) which was an “undertaking of peace” beyond “antagonism and resentments” (ibid., 26). However Schuman did not minimize the difficulty of the relationships with Germany, “which will remain perpetually dissatisfied, history has proved it” (ibid., 88). But he acknowledged that France had also had dynamic and ideological ambitions, manifested in Napoleon’s wars (ibid., 91). So both countries had to overcome “painful

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memories" to move "from hate to esteem and mutual trust," (ibid., 106) and to deal with each other on a basis of equality.

Konrad Adenauer, who became the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, and responded enthusiastically to the Schuman Declaration, had been arrested several times during the war; his first wife died in the late 1940s following her internment in a Gestapo camp. In spite of his own suffering, Adenauer identified with the duty for Germans to atone for their war crimes. He wrote in the first volume of his Memoirs, "If we were to emerge from this misery and find the right way forward, we first had to understand what had brought us so low . . . To find our course we had to search our conscience" (Adenauer 1966, 39). One of the most striking illustrations of this search is Adenauer's description of Germany's negotiations with Israel to offer compensation for the "eternal suffering" the German nation had inflicted upon the Jewish people. In 1951 when the negotiations started the economic situation was difficult for Germany: it was still in the process of rebuilding its infrastructures, providing care for 12 million German-speaking refugees, and of repaying loans to the Allies. "In regard to this situation, political points of view should override economic and financial considerations," wrote Adenauer (Adenauer 1967, 127). "The demands of the State of Israel and of the world Jewish associations were first of all justified morally. They should be examined in this spirit" (ibid.). An agreement on reparations between Germany and Israel was successfully concluded in September 1952. Although the settlement was generous, Adenauer "was happy to have contributed however little to erase the evil committed. I was of course aware that in the issue of reparations this agreement was only a symbol, that it represented only a modest tentative to rehabilitate Germany (ibid. 141). "Beginning something new" is dangerous business. The negotiation process was so controversial in both countries that it took place in the Netherlands, and even there an assassination attempt was made in March 1952 on the person of Adenauer. Fourteen years after the signing of the agreement, Adenauer visited Israel in 1966 on the invitation of its government. He met many Israeli citizens who had grown up in Germany and "hardly felt in them hate or enmity; they showed moving greatness...The path toward rapprochement is difficult for each side, for us because of the monstrosities which burden our past, for the Israelis because of the infinite sufferings that the Jewish people had to endure. But life goes on. To face the future, we must look ahead and not let the weight of the past paralyze us" (ibid., 145).

Although Arendt felt that some crimes are too grave to be forgiven, she believed like Adenauer that life should go on; forgiveness and promise allowed the process of political interaction to continue.

Jean Monnet, the French civil servant who conceived with a few collaborators the Schuman Declaration, had lost his massive prewar archives to the Germans during the occupation. He was more reticent about his inner motivations and simply wrote of his passion "to unite men" (Monnet 1978). Monnet had not received the formal education and legal training of an Adenauer or a Schuman; neither did he share their fervent Christian convictions. In his five hundred page Memoirs there are no comments on what inspires "the good man," except for a mention of the daily solitary walks early in the morning which help him "to concentrate." Rabier depicts Monnet as a "man of action who had adopted a lifestyle favoring reflection." But Monnet's Memoirs are exemplary of his life-long preoccupation with the need to organize peace. Once, he mentions the problem lack of forgiveness may cause in international affairs. He condemns the "negative attitude" of Jules Moch, France's Minister of Defense of 1952, who "like some others, had never forgiven Germany for the crimes committed by the Nazis." This attitude would prove "untenable," so France had to take a new, bold initiative "in transforming the situation as a whole . . . and remove the controls and restraints on Germany faster than we had planned" (Monnet 1978, 341-2). The "bold initiative," another brainchild of Monnet, would be the Pleven Plan for a European Community of Defense.

Arendt would not have faulted Kohnstamm and Monnet for not revealing or analyzing publicly their innermost motivations. She believed that the motives of the human heart must be protected from public scrutiny, lest they become "an object of suspicion rather than insight" (Arendt 1990, 96); indeed we can never be sure even of our own motives; turning the searchlight on others' motivations turns us
all into hypocrites. Arendt cited the example of Robespierre, whose insane mistrust of others “sprang ultimately from his not so insane, but quite normal suspicion of himself” (ibid., 97), and led to the excesses of the Terror. Thus action manifests its goal and principle, but not “the innermost motivation of the agent” (ibid., 98).

**Promising and the Founding of a New Political Order**

Institutions matter. The boundlessness of action does not only result in irreversible consequences, which call for forgiving, but also in unpredictability. With her keen appreciation for the distinctiveness of every single human initiative, Arendt asserts that, “one deed, and sometimes one word, suffices to change every constellation” (Arendt 1958, 191). For every person acts and reacts to others’ actions and reactions, and given the multitude of human beings there is no predictable pattern to this endless process of interactions, nor is there any way to foretell the consequences of a specific action “in a community of equals where everybody has the same capacity to act” (ibid., 244). With the faculty of promising, men create “islands of certainty” which allow them to treat the future as if it were the present. Political promises are almost always written: “Laws and constitutions, treaties and alliances—all of which derive in the last instance from the faculty of promise and to keep promises in the face of the essential uncertainties of the future” (Arendt 1993, 164). Founding a public space where people meet to deliberate and act in concert is for Arendt the political act per excellence. This is where natality, the human capacity for new beginning manifests itself in its most glorious form. Political foundings concern themselves with the future, and that of our successors (Arendt 1990, 175). The modern equivalent of the Roman founding, which she takes as the archetype of all foundings, is the framing of a constitution (ibid., 125). Constitutions house “the combined power of action” of people (ibid., 175), and draw their authority from their capacity to be “augmented” or amended (ibid., 200).

In *On Revolution* Arendt presents an idealized version of the American Revolution, a revolution which succeeded because America had a pre-Revolutionary tradition of political participation in the townships (Arendt 1990, 166), and because America was already a prosperous country. Thus the American revolutionaries were not driven by “necessity,” but motivated by the will to act. This last interpretation is questionable. We know that pressing economic problems were on the minds of those who assembled in 1787 in Philadelphia to revise the Articles of the Confederation. Nevertheless, Young-Bruehl justifies Arendt’s discussion of revolution as the presentation of “an ideal for practice” (Young-Bruehl 1982, 406), and this is how I understand it here. Arendt sees in the development of the early colonies, and eventually of the US of America, a practical example of the contract theory at work although the colonists certainly did not know the theory (Arendt 1990, 169) The communities formed on this basis were characterized by equality and mutuality. They rested on “free and sincere promises” (ibid., 170), which augmented the power of each contracting party. It is the opposite of the Hobbesian contract theory where each participant entrusts its power to a ruler (ibid., 171).

Arendt’s version of the successful revolution provides the student of European integration with a measuring rod. The successful revolution occurs preferably in a polity reasonably prosperous, where the political actors share not only a “passion” such as in France, but also an “experience” of public freedom such as in America (Arendt 1990, 118); and where institutions can be periodically “augmented.” The polity will not enlarge thanks to conquest, “but the further combination of powers” according to the principle of federalism (ibid., 168). “Stability” or “permanence” of the institutions is insured by special bodies, the Senate in Rome and the Supreme Court in the US. In 1950 the economic renaissance of Western Europe had already started. Legitimate representatives of duly elected governments, with a national “experience” of public freedom, negotiated the treaties undergirding the European integration process; they signed and ratified them according to the rule of law. Enlargement of the community would proceed peacefully according to other treaties negotiated between the
Community and the candidates for accession. The task of augmenting the constitutional framework was entrusted to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

The Robert Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950 which launched the whole process can be compared to the American Declaration of Independence in so far as it set forth basic goals and principles. The preamble of the Treaty, which was ratified in 1951 by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries, retained the lofty language of the Schuman Declaration. The signatories stated that they were "resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared." 37 However, the remaining 180 pages of the Treaty do not make for politically inspiring reading, in spite of Monnet's assertion that "it was beautifully written, in a strict and limpid style which has inspired the constituent documents of the developing Community for more than twenty-five years" (Monnet 1978, 356-7). With its hundred articles divided into ten chapters, three annexes, two protocols, one exchange of letters between the governments of France and Germany regarding the status of the Saar, and a Convention on the transitional provisions, the ECSC Treaty is no match for the American Constitution, a short document of seven articles, written in a language readily accessible to all. Article 2 defines the tasks of the community: "to contribute . . . to economic expansion, growth of employment and a rising standard of living of the Member States." The other articles deal with implementation of free competition, the establishment of a common market for coal and steel, fair prices, and the modernization of production. It is under Title II and Title III, defining the institutions of the new community and their functions that a clue can be found to the novelty of the enterprise. On one hand the responsibilities of the Community executive, the High Authority, are technocratic and economic: grant loans to encourage investment programs (Art. 54), promote technical and economic research related to production (Art. 55), assist "redundant workers" (Art. 56), authorize industrial agreements and concentration (Art. 65 and 66). On the other hand the Treaty contains already in essence many of the features, which characterize the government of the European Union. It defines the executive of the new Community, the High Authority (HA), as much more than a group of delegates representing the interests of individual Member States. The HA shall be independent, and not take or seek instruction from the governments of the Member States (Art. 9). Its guiding purpose is to find the common interest of all partners. It shall act by majority, which means that even if their government may sway individual members of the Authority, Member States’ wishes may be ignored. But the main function of the HA, and its institutional successor, the Commission, seems to be the administration of a vast regulatory program dealing with material concerns; the pursuit of the “common interest” becomes a series of policy and technocratic decisions buried in complex legal documents. This is why the “Monnet method” is often understood as an instrumental functional process rather than a political initiative moved by the principle of reconciliation.

"Under modern conditions, the act of foundation is identical with the framing of a constitution" (Arendt 1990, 125). Legal experts regard the successive treaties founding the European Union as a “constitutional framework” (Louis 1995, 93) because they do not go into a lot of details, which will be decided by subsequent legislation, and were concluded for an “unlimited period” (ibid., 90). The Treaty on the ECSC was the first of some twenty treaties “founding” the EU, which constitute an intricate juridical construction. 38 In some respects, the ECSC Treaty, thought of as an experiment to develop a common approach and mutual understanding among all concerned, is an anomaly. It was written to expire after fifty years and left little room for legislative activity because so many rules were laid down. But legal expert Klaus-Dieter Borchardt argues that even the ECSC treaty established larger tasks for the Community that are usually assumed by international organizations, the community-wide administration of industries which played a key role in national economies. This implied a limitation of national sovereignty and the beginning of the establishment of “independent Communities endowed with their own sovereign rights and competence” (Borchardt 1994, 10). Whereas most other
international agreements allow members to refuse to be bound by any rule decided by the organization. To sum up, what is most characteristic of the European treaties is the “establishment of permanent institutions, endowed with extensive legal powers, to plan and manage the integration, which is typically seen as a step-by-step process in which specific objectives have to be achieved by certain dates” (ibid., 25). Promises have to be kept. Consistent with her critical stand on the post-WWII order in Europe, Arendt writes of “the extraordinary instability and lack of authority of most European governments restored after the downfall of Hitler’s Europe” (Arendt 1990, 265). In the case of Western Europe at least, her verdict has proved wrong. Governments have been stable and strong enough to found a new covenant among themselves. Shortly after the war, several West European constitutions also laid down dispositions to further integration. 39

Reconciliatory practices and “elementary republics”

I have described the politics of reconciliation as a series of creative acts, often unexpected, which call upon the human capacities to initiate new beginnings, to forgive, and to make and keep promises. The foundation of the ECSC was legitimate, ratified by the six Member States according to constitutional rules, but it did not call upon civic participation of the many although it did enjoy popular support (Hewstone 1986). There was, however, a surge of popular participation in reconciliation movements in the years immediately following the war. Thus the principle of reconciliation in European identity has popular as well as elite roots.

Arendt was intensely critical of representative democracy, because “opinion” cannot be represented, and political parties promote “interests” instead of “public happiness” (Arendt 1990, 267-268). So the process of treaty negotiation and ratification, which gave the European integration process its legitimacy, would have struck her as falling very short of her exacting standard of participatory politics. Because of her dislike of representative politics, some commentators think that she does not have much to contribute to modern democratic theory (Wolin 1983, 3; Canovan 1978, 5-6; Kateb 1983, 115). Arendt herself recognized that her very participatory concept of politics might work best in a small society (Arendt 1970, 84). However, Jeffrey Isaacs offers a more sympathetic interpretation of Arendt’s contribution to democratic political theory (Isaacs 1994, 156-168). He argues that Arendt took for granted that representative democracy was here to stay. But she advocated for a complement to this political form. Her “elementary republics,” be they the Councils of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the student and the civil rights movements of the 1960s, or the labor movement, were meant to “invigorate” democracy, not to replace the institutions of representative democracy. They are like “oases in the desert” (Arendt 1990, 275) and members of the participatory “elite” select themselves:

[They] are counterposed to the masses. But the counterposition is not between a privileged few and an incapable many. It is not between two classes or types of people as much as between two competing attitudes. . . . But this is not a derogation of average people. It is an invitation, perhaps even an incitement, for them to surpass their ordinariness simply through their voluntary association and concerted action” (Isaacs 1994, 159).

I discuss here a few “elementary republics” which invigorated the early European integration process. When I asked Jacques-René Rabier whether the European Union could use its experience of reconciliation to mediate between Greece and Turkey or in the Middle East, he was doubtful: he responded that in Western Europe there was a “maturation” of the process of reconciliation between
France and Germany starting already in the 1920s, which may not yet have occurred in South-East Europe. All kinds of groups, religious, cultural and political in nature, started to speak with each other as soon as WWII ended. For instance, Joseph Rovan, a former prisoner of Dachau, founded in 1945 the International Bureau of Liaison and Documentation, an organization dedication to Franco-German reconciliation. In 1949 the French-German Institute of Ludwigsburg was created to serve a “real political and cultural interpenetration” between the two countries (Bouvet, et al. 1998, 16). There were also many youth meetings. Michel Rocard, former French prime minister and an energetic member of the European Parliament, traces back his interest in European integration to a Boy Scout camp for European youth, which he attended at the age of 16 in 1946.

Edward Luttwak calls the “astonishingly rapid French-German reconciliation after 1945 . . . both the precondition and true origin of the (Western) European integration movement that in tum transformed European politics” (Johnston and Sampson 1994, 38). He documents the role of one NGO, the Moral Re-Armament (MRA) movement which relied on the work of hundreds of volunteers from all walks of life to run its programs (ibid., 37-57). One hundred Swiss families pooled their savings together to buy a dilapidated hotel in the village of Caux and rehabilitated it with the express purpose to serve European reconstruction. In the years immediately following the war between 1946 and 1950 MRA brought together in Caux 1,983 French citizens and 3,113 Germans (ibid., 49). Among the French visitors were 3 cabinet ministers (future French president Francois Mitterand was one of them) and other government officials, 200 trade unionists, 207 industrialists, 35 clergy, 30 media representatives and 100 from education including two university rectors. 82 came from German government circles, including Konrad Adenauer, 400 trade unionists, 210 industrialists, 14 clergy and 160 media representatives (ibid., 49-51). The participation of French and German coal industry representatives from labor and management was strong. According to Luttwak, these encounters dovetailed with the launching of the ECSC in a “classical case of serendipity.” Monnet, the initiator of the ECSC, did not have contact with MRA (although Schuman and Adenauer both did). However, “it was certainly a crucial advantage for the politicians and bureaucrats on both sides that many leading French and German coal and steel industrialists and trade union leaders had already developed warm personal relationships at Caux” (ibid., 52). Luttwak concludes that “MRA did not invent the Schuman Plan but it facilitated its realization from the start” (ibid., 55).

Private citizens are often freer than public figures to reflect self-consciously on the principles moving them to action. One of the organizers of the Caux Conferences, Leif Hovelsen, a former student member of the Norwegian resistance, incarcerated and brutalized by the Gestapo for several years, chose to work for reconciliation between Germany and Norway and spent several years in Germany. In his autobiography Out of the Evil Night he describes the encounter between a former French resistance fighter Irène Laure, who had become a socialist member of the French Constituent Assembly, and a group of young Germans in Caux in 1946. The Germans recognized that Mrs. Laure was justified in hating, but they made up their mind that if she expressed her hate for Germany publicly they would remind her of the exactions committed by the French occupying forces in the Black Forest. But Mrs. Laure' unpredictable speech brought them up short. She said only three sentences, that she had so much hated Germany that she had wished it erased from the map of Europe; but that she had understood that her hate was not justified, and that she would like to ask all Germans present to forgive her for it. One of the young Germans who had served in the Nazi Youth Movement describes in somewhat Arendtian terms the transformation this simple declaration provoked in him:

For several nights I could not sleep. All my past rebelled against the courage of this woman. I suddenly realized that there are things that we as individuals and as a nation could not repair. However my friends and I knew she had shown us the only possible way, if Germany wanted to play a role in the rebuilding of Europe. The basis for a new Europe must be forgiveness. Some
days later we told Mrs. Laure how sad and ashamed we were of the sufferings she and her people had experienced by our fault and we promised that we would from now on dedicate our lives to make sure that such horrors would not be repeated anywhere in the world (Hovelsen 1960, 58).

The young German, Peter Petersen, would eventually become an influential member of the German Bundestag. Other religiously motivated groups whose action revealed the principle of reconciliation were the World Council of Churches who organized a meeting with leaders of Germany's Confessing Church already in 1945, the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, and Pax Christi. But there were also powerful lay movements at work. The May 1948 Congress in The Hague organized by the European Union of Federalists gathered representatives of the European cultural and political elite. Its outcome was the creation of the Council of Europe, an organization that disappointed the most fervent partisans of integration, as it remained a purely consultative body.

The ECSC, a "failure that succeeded"

The founders of the ECSC pursued complex political goals through an unusual form of economic cooperation. Given this complexity it is not surprising that assessments of the ECSC vary greatly. According to Anne Daltrop the ECSC had a remarkable economic impact. In five years: “All customs tariffs and quotas had been abolished and policy-making powers for the coal and steel industries had been transferred to the Community institutions. The Belgian coal and Italian steel industries were being given help to overcome the impact of competition. Inter-state trading in coal had grown by 21 per cent, in iron ore by over 25 per cent and in steel by 157 per cent” (Daltrop 1982, 10). John Gillingham, an American historian with special expertise on the ECSC is much less sanguine. In spite of the elimination of tariffs and quotas, “the economic impact of the community was slight” (Brinkley and Hackett 1991, 152). The German steel cartels were never successfully dismantled partly because Monnet did not want to antagonize the German government during the difficult negotiations over the European Defense Community; by 1954 the international cartels were reconstituted behind Monnet’s back, and by 1957 the entire German steel production was controlled by only eight firms (Gillingham 1991, 355). In fact, it was impossible to create a free market of coal and steel as both industries had been heavily regulated for decades in all six Member States of the ECSC. So Monnet focused primarily on the adoption of public price listing and price reduction, with limited success (ibid., 319-331). The main economic accomplishments of the ECSC were the development of community-wide tax policies, the regulation of community scrap economy and the construction of subsidized housing for workers and readaptation assistance to the unemployed (ibid., 332). But for Gillingham, if “the ECSC actually delivered on only one of its promises,” it was “the most important one: it advanced the integration process” and “substituted for a peace treaty with Germany” (Brinkley and Hackett, 152, 154). It “provided the political underpinnings for a new international settlement, premised upon the recognition that unlimited exercise of national sovereignty had become a prohibitively costly historical luxury” (ibid., 157). Milward also writes of the Plan as “a peace settlement” (Milward 1984, 420). Moreover, by creating a public space where German and French actors could relate on equal terms, the treaty facilitated the resolution of the thorny issues of the Ruhr status and of the French annexation of the Saar territory.

Dirk Spierenburg, the Dutch representative on the first High Authority, and his co-author French historian Poidevin, agree that the HA “never managed to dismantle certain cartels under Article 65” and “did not put an end to collusive practices on the steel market” (Spierenburg and Poidevin 1994, 653). The ECSC paved the way, however, for the future European Economic Community and Euratom
created in 1957 by the Rome Treaties. Thanks to its levies on production and to loans from the US and Switzerland it was able to develop generous social programs which would serve as a model; it gathered crucial information about the European energy markets which had not been available in a structured form before and developed a rich experience in the areas of investment, competition and economic forecasting and planning. Moreover, the experiment had important psychological and political repercussions. Throughout its life the High Authority operated on a truly collegial basis (ibid., 649):

The Luxembourg melting-pot forged a European team that was more often than not capable of looking beyond the national horizon and serving a broader cause. Many of its members, imbued with this new spirit and fortified by their experience, made substantial contributions to the establishment of the new Communities before leaving Luxembourg for Brussels when the High Authority ceased to exist (ibid., 654-655).

European identity and the principle of reconciliation

Elizabeth Pond and Lily Gardner Feldman document more specifically the reconciliatory dimension of the new European identity. In The Rebirth of Europe, Pond describes the “miracle of the present chain reaction of reconciliation in Europe” (Pond 1999, 14). The French-German reconciliation, which was the cornerstone of European integration, is no longer an isolated example. In order to qualify for membership in the EU, Hungary and Romania have signed a peace treaty which deals with the tricky issue of the Hungarian minority living in Romania; there have been official reconciliation processes between Germany and Poland (recognizing as permanent the post WWII borders between the two countries) and Germany and the Czech Republic (putting to rest the claims of the ethnic Germans expelled from the Sudetenland after WWII). In this context Pond argues that the conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia constitute a tragic “exception,” and that four-decades of teamwork between Western European nation-states have been “habit-forming” (ibid., 13). According to Gardner Feldman, one of the EU’s “fundamental achievements and core legitimating values” is “the development of a ‘peace community’ entailing reconciliation between former enemies” (Banchoff and Mitchell 1999, 66). Values of peace and reconciliation have remained salient over the decades and “resonate for European elites and public opinion” (ibid., 67). But they also work on the international place by providing EU foreign policy with “a distinct content—a focus on peace and development, on the one hand, and the creation of cooperative institutional structures, on the other” (ibid.). Gardner Feldman uses the program of enlargement of the EU to include Eastern, Central and Southeastern European countries as a case study for her argument. She believes that popular support for enlargement will “depend in part on whether European leaders can effectively connect it with the theme of reconciliation and peace” which represents “an untapped political resource . . . to increase the legitimacy of the integration process” (ibid., 68). In the Eurobarometers of 1995 and 1996 respondents put a high priority on peace, ranking it before promoting economic growth in 1995, and just after fighting unemployment in 1996. Gardner Feldman concludes that the reconciliation process represents “not only an important historical achievement, but also an actual and potential resource for European leaders in their efforts to boost the legitimacy of the EU at home and in world politics” (ibid., 84).44

The Foundational Character of Speech

The principle of reconciliation corresponds to the two characteristics of the human condition as Arendt defines them: plurality and distinctiveness. But the citizens of Europe have not shared for the most part in the experiences of reconciliation of their leaders. Clearly they do not identify with the institutions and basic principles of action of the political space in which they live. On the contrary many fear the loss of their distinctiveness in the plural European world. In many respects the citizens of the
*polis* have barely begun assembling across the EU. But someone has to start the conversation and for this, thanks to modern means of communication, the “room” need not “gather them all” (Arendt 1958, 235). In an essay on EU legitimacy and political rhetoric John Gaffney writes that discourse is a “formative moment” of politics, albeit “seriously under-researched” (Banchoff and Smith 1999, 208-9). Political discourse constitutes,

The verbal equivalent of political action: the set of all political verbalisation, and expressible forms adopted by political organizations and political individuals. It generates response which may range from indifference, through hostility, to enthusiasm and which may or may not lead to political action. It is as complex in its inter-relations as political action is. The significance of any instance of political discourse will be affected by its overall relation to political action. And together discourse and action constitute political practice (ibid., 200).

According to Gaffney, discourse by leaders is perhaps the most consequential form of political discourse because the relationship between leadership and popular legitimacy involves “organized linguistic exchanges” (ibid. 201), and it has an important role to play within the European context. But at the continental level the situation is complicated by the fact that European political leaders are primarily perceived as national leaders and draw their legitimacy from the national context (ibid., 202). Although the European elite is multilingual, the European people and media are not, and “Europe itself since 1992 has become a popular issue, of both identity and communication about Europe between Europeans” (ibid., 204).

For Arendt also speech has a foundational character. Times of founding rest on the initiator, the courageous actor who dares to show himself for who she/he is in the space of appearance (Arendt 1958, 1860. Unless European leadership reconnects with the electorate in a way that is both intelligible and credible, there is little chance for a public dialogue to start on issues of understanding and meaning. Even today when the beginnings of the European integration process lay open to the “backward glance” of the historian, opinions differ on how to assess the ethos of engagement of the European “revolutionaries” (Gorham 1999, 6). French Member of the European Parliament (MEP) and former Secretary-General of the Council of Europe Catherine Lalumière regrets that the “flame of the postwar reconciliation is not fanned more vigorously in Europe.” With the creation of the European Economic Community the stress was put on economic questions and reconciliation was taken for granted:

Recently we talked again of war on European soil. But our political and philosophical vigilance had lost its edge. We hesitated. In the case of Bosnia, a multicultural, multilingual, multireligious state, which lived at peace with itself for a long time, certain European countries took side for the Muslims, others for the Croats, others for the Serbs without stressing enough the possibility to live together in spite of differences. This only stirred up conflicts. We needed another Hannah Arendt to fan the flame of the basic principle of the EU: live together in spite of differences.\(^{45}\)

German MEP Doris Pack, who is the president of the EP Delegation for relations with Southeast Europe, says that when she goes to Bosnia, she feels she has the authority to speak of the forgiveness that took place among WWII belligerents. “In Bosnia people have not forgiven for 600 years. Forgiveness is a Christian word which is not the property of Christians, and goes way beyond religion.”\(^{46}\) But in Western Europe “European peace politics” have unfortunately become “normalized, and taken for granted.“ Pack tells the story of the seven-year old son of a German constituent who came home one day saying that his teacher had gone crazy because she mentioned wars between France and Germany. Even the thirty-five year old father had trouble remembering according to Pack.\(^ {47}\) But for German MEP Daniel Cohn-Bendit the experience of forgiveness between France and Germany, which
made European reconciliation possible, is still necessary in Northern Ireland, in the Basque country, in Bosnia. "I often talk about it. Moreover political forgiveness is the basic justification for amnesty laws" (Cohn-Bendit 1999). Spanish MEP Enrique Barón Crespo lived through the transition to democracy in Spain "which was founded on forgiveness and promise," and he experienced the "most moving moment" of his political career when he voted for the laws of amnesty in the Cortes (Spanish legislature) in 1977. He adds, "Arendt is still relevant today. I share the frustrations of most of my colleagues regarding the situation in the Balkans. The method that we followed in the EU is the only solution there, too." For Austrian MEP Reinhard Rack the issue of reconciliation is not less concrete. Being the only representative of Styria in the European Parliament, he gets letters and petitions from some of his constituents who want restitution now that Slovenia (until 1918 Southern Styria) will accede to the EU. After WWI, borders were drawn arbitrarily and German-speaking citizens suffered discrimination and loss of property there. Rack agrees that "grievances must be dealt with if we want to live together in a community," but he also tells his constituents that they must be satisfied even with partial compensation. "At some point you have to draw the line and put an end to past history. Forgiveness is part of the game."30

In contrast, another Austrian MEP, Maria Berger, who negotiated her country's recent accession to the EU, thinks that interests mostly motivated European integration. "In everyday politics principles as such do not count very much. A peace agreement is about the right balance of interests. Even the integration of the coal and steel industries was a very pragmatic way to prevent war."51 Belgian MEP Fernand Herman, an economist by training, thinks that peace rather than forgiveness is part of the "charisma" of European integration, which is a "rational process." "We obtain from European integration all the benefits we hoped to gain in earlier days though war... The causes of resentment are so old that political and economic rather than spiritual considerations are the motor of the process."52

French MEP Jean-Louis Bourlanges sums up the debate by acknowledging that there are "two logics" to the project of European integration, one "rationalist, utilitarian, Benthamian," the other "affective, based on memory and forgiveness." Bourlanges admits to an almost Freudian concept of Europe:

The EU is the superego of the nation-states, imposing on them the mastery of their nationalisms, of their ethnic urges. The EU represents the victory of reason over folly, of law over force. The 'European ethic' resides in the realization that we defend our interests only by taking into account the others' interests. This is the Benthamian logic, which is the opposite of the logic of forgiving and promising which is essentially affective.53

Bourlanges recalls that Simone Weil drew her "European faith" from her experience in Auschwitz; she saw only two solutions, kill all Germans or create a united Europe. So Arendt has an important point to make. "There is also in the EU the idea that union is born out of the remembrances of sufferings imposed and received. Forgetfulness is the beginning of disunion. In effect, because I remember I forgive" (ibid.).54 Arendt does not celebrate memory as such, except in a few passages of On Revolution. But her entire work consists of an effort to remember in order to "understand," be it the American Revolution or the Holocaust. I have followed here a similar method and I asked my interlocutors to do likewise.

Never a static state of affairs reconciliation, is both a principle of action and the process it initiates, a process, which new actors must engage in lest they destroy it. For former EU Commission president Jacques Delors, "Even perhaps without having read Arendt, the European Founding Fathers implicitly applied her maxims. As recently as 1995, when one spoke about Europe with the giants of history who were finishing their careers, they responded 'never again war between us,' which implies a promise and a forgiveness." My interview with Delors took place on the first day of the Kosovo bombings by NATO forces in March 1999. I asked him whether Europeans could have drawn more
from their experience of reconciliation, which is akin to an Arendtian “treasure,” to help avoid the tragedy of ex-Yugoslavia; he responded negatively: “The logic of hate and rejection of the other took over the Arendtian logic.” However, ten months later, Delors stated in a speech given in Paris that if Europe had remembered its “treasure,” the “virtues of promise and forgiveness borrowed from Hannah Arendt,” it would have dealt with the Balkans issue quite differently (Delors 2000, 3,4). He added, “We must therefore find in the Balkans, on both sides, men and women whom we could trust to face the principle of forgiveness and develop together a promise, of course, with the support of nearby countries, among others Bulgaria and Romania. But this was not done because the little light – the treasure I spoke about – is no longer shining” (ibid.). More “prosaically” Delors asked why one of the “recipes” of the ECSC, the pooling of economic resources, was not applied to Kosovo and its neighbors, which would impel them to develop common institutions to administer their exchanges. “Forgiveness without forgetfulness, and promise to prevent the other from sinking into despair or revenge” is a “project” which is part of the “legacy” left to the European people, according to Delors.

In his speech Delors recalls the past to inspire action. The principle of reconciliation, if remembered and understood, could become part of a shared “political tradition,” and provide Europeans with standards of judgment. As Montesquieu wrote long ago, citizens need to practice the kind of virtue and rationality appropriate to the maintenance of the particular kind of constitution under which they live (Montesquieu 1989, ). In this case rationality requires an understanding of the principle of reconciliation, which is one of the ethical commitments underpinning European integration.

Notes


2 Charles Taylor calls his monumental study of the formation of modern identity, Sources of the Self, an “essay in retrieval” (1989, 10). My attempt at “retrieval” is much less ambitious than Taylor’s: it bears only on fifty years of history and a comparatively limited number of political actors.


5 Bahchel, Coulumbis and Carley (1997) compare the divisions between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus to the former Franco-German antagonisms and draw hope from the Franco-German reconciliation for a similar resolution in Cyprus. Christopher Pinning (1997) documents how plans for economic communities in Latin America have been inspired by European integration.


8 Peter Norman, Lionel Barber, James Blitz, “In search of a soul for Europe,” Financial Times, Tuesday April 6, 1999. See also Jacques Delors. “Esprit évangélique et construction européenne.”


10 The Swedish business sector and the Swedish government, who plans to hold a referendum on the euro sometime before 2004, intend to draw lessons from the Danish referendum. Jan Häggström, the chief economist of Svenska Handelsbanken, says: that the “Danish experience has taught Swedish euro supporters that they cannot argue on purely economic grounds. Political aspects of the single currency and further integration are the most important arguments” (Nicholas George, “Big No drives Persson to set vote deadline,” Financial Times, Week-end September 30/October 1 2000.

11 French Foreign Affairs Minister Robert Schuman’s words in his May 9, 1950 Declaration proposing the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community (Fontaine 2000, 36).
12 Weiler 1999, 4; Gorham 1999, 1.
13 Arendt writes of the "lost treasures" of the European Resistance, and of the French and Hungarian Revolutions, a loss which "was consummated by oblivion, by a failure of memory which befell not only the heirs but, as it were, the actors, the witnesses, those who for a fleeting moment had held the treasure in the palms of their hands" (Arendt 1993, 6).
14 Agenda 2000 is a major policy document published by the European Commission in July 1997. It outlines both the reforms needed in the EU, and those needed in the East and Central European countries that are candidates for accession to the EU.
15 I find these speeches and deeds in memoirs, autobiographies, scholarly monographs, official documents and 50 interviews I conducted in 1995, 1999 and 2002 with close collaborators of Jean Monnet, members of the European Parliament, senior Commission officials and diplomats from the countries candidate to accession.
16 Taylor argues that history is the best recourse for those searching to retrieve a collective vision of the good (Taylor 1989, 104). Former French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau agrees. Noting that the adjective 'European' is not defined by "precise and definitive features," he writes, "An authoritative vision of Europe is foremost historical, it comes from an existing tradition" (Pineau 1991, 8).
17 See also Donald Shriver 1995, 34-35.
18 The act is forgiven for the sake of who did it, out of a form of respect, which is "independent of qualities or achievements which we may admire," but acknowledges the common humanity of both doer and sufferer (Arendt 1958a, 243).
19 My italics.
20 Arendt felt that political action should escape altogether the category of means and ends because she wanted to avoid instrumental politics where noble ends could justify corrupt means (Arendt 1958a, 206). The fusion of ends and means in the Declaration was not the complete renunciation of the category of means and ends she called for; nonetheless it was an acknowledgment of the importance of matching ends with appropriate means.
21 In an article entitled "Collaboration between longtime enemies France and Germany political miracle," syndicated columnist James McCartney wrote in terms reminiscent of Arendt: "When I was an American soldier in Europe in World War II, it was impossible to imagine that France and Germany in my lifetime, would not only become allies, but leaders in a drive to unite all Europe. . . . The French and the Germans success so far in looking forward rather than back can give hope. The French and the Germans have already proved that miracles do happen (James McCartney. "Collaboration Between Longtime Enemies France, Germany Political Miracle." St Paul Pioneer Press, June 15, 1992).
22 Max Kohnstamm, student leader and prisoner of war in the Netherlands, became a diplomat for the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry after the war. In 1952 he became secretary-general of the ECSC. When Jean Monnet retired from the presidency of the ECSC, Kohnstamm helped him set up the Comite d\'Action pour les Etats-Unis d\'Europe and became his first secretary-general and eventually its vice-president. He was the first President of the European University Institute in Florence from 1974 to 1981.
23 Ducci, Melchionni interviews FJM 1984; interview with author 1999. See Appendix 2 for details.
24 Ibid.
25 One day Franz Etzel, the ECSC German vice-president, sent to Kohnstamm a former German officer for a job interview. Kohnstamm recalls: "When the man entered he insisted to tell me all about his career in the Wehrmacht. I replied that this was none of my business. We were here for the future's sake, not to remain bound to the past. But my German visitor insisted to tell me how he had served under seven German generals in France, North Africa and Russia. He wanted me to know about his past so that things would be clear between us. I did not have anything to forgive him. We became great friends" (Interview with author 1999).
26 Eichmann in Jerusalem is illustrative of the difficulty of putting an end to the past, which satisfies the requirements of justice. On one hand the trial of Eichmann in the District Court of Jerusalem was needed "to defend the honor or authority of him who was hurt by the offense so that the failure to punish may not cause his degradation" (Arendt 1994b, 287). On the other hand, there were many irregularities to the trial: the accused was kidnapped, the witnesses were all volunteers who often presented evidence drawn from their Eastern European experience with which Eichmann had little to do, (ibid., 292-294) the prosecutor gave press conferences shunning the exclusion needed for fair administration of justice (ibid., 5). In the end, Arendt concludes that it seems just that a man who refused "to share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a number of other nations" should hang because "no member of the human race can be expected to want to share the earth with you" (ibid., 279).
27 Vladimir Jankel\'evitch thinks on the contrary that forgiveness exists for desperate and incurable cases (Abel 1996, 223).
28 Interview with author 1999.
29 By the year 2000 international payments amounting to about $70 billions will have been made to Israel, to individual Jews who survived the Holocaust and to people in all Nazi-occupied nations who could prove that the occupiers had inflicted serious damage to them. Donald Shriver quotes these figures from a 1988 document published by the Bonn Information Office, which concludes, "No matter how large the sum no amount of money will suffice to compensate for National Socialist persecutions. . . . But in dealing with the legacy of the Hitler Regime, the Federal Republic of Germany has established a precedent, namely that of legislating and carrying out a comprehensive system of restitution for injustice"
(Shriver 1995, 89). By 1970, 12,900 persons had been prosecuted in German courts, and 5,200 imprisoned, 76 for life (ibid., 82).

30 Interview with author 1999.

31 Hélène Miard-Delacroix documents how the seven successive Presidents of Germany, from Heuss in 1949 to Herzog in 1995, have challenged Germans "not to run from their history" and to assume their full responsibility for the Holocaust. ("De Heuss à Herzog: les présidents allemands parlent de la défaite." Le Nouveau Quotidien, Lausanne, 20 July, 1995). But the debate on whether the German people have sufficiently reflected on and atoned for their past is by no means closed. In Heidegger's Crisis, Hans Sluga writes: "Heidegger's actions and inactions in those years [after 1945] were symptomatic of the condition of the whole of German philosophy and, indeed, of the state of German society. . . . To anyone growing up in those years with a sense of curiosity about the recent past, those were familiar and foreseeable evasions. An entire society had devoted itself to the task of forgetting, and the philosophers were only too willing to participate in the communal act of erasure" (Sluga 1995, 244). I believe that Donald Shriver's nuanced assessment in An Ethic for Enemies. Forgiveness in Politics (1995) is more accurate. Without denying that there are unresolved issues highlighted in 1985 by President Reagan's controversial visit to the German military cemetery of Bitburg, Shriver concludes: "Germans have come a long way. . . . They have moved, by stops and starts, from denial to memory of their Nazi past; from absorption in their own wartime suffering to appreciation of the greater suffering imposed by Nazi Germany on others; from formal regret for the atrocities of Nazism to material restitutions to survivors; and from traditional cultural contempt for democratic government to the construction of such a government that has endured now for forty-five years" (Shriver 1995, 116). For a similar argument, see Eternal Guilt? Forty years of German-Jewish-Israeli Relations, (1993) written by Michael Wolffsohn, a German Jewish historian.

32 Interview with author 1999.

33 Interview with author 1999.

34 Arendt writes that the politics of purity ended up devouring its own children (Arendt 1990a, 97-98).

35 Unpredictability, which is "of a twofold nature", also arises from the "darkness of human heart, that is, the basic unreliability of men who can never guarantee today who they will be tomorrow" (Arendt 1958a, 244).

36 The difficulty to pay back the national debt incurred during the revolutionary war and its aftermath, the need to prevent another Shay's Rebellion against excessive state taxation and to replace thirteen state commercial policies with a single, national one required a stronger federal government. Some historians such as Charles A. Beard, Jackson Turner Main and Gordon Wood have even interpreted the American constitution as a document primarily motivated by social and economic considerations.


38 Besides the nine accession treaties signed between 1972 and 1994 with new Member States, these are: the Treaties of Paris (1951) and Rome (1957), the Merger Treaty (1965), two Treaties amending certain budgetary and financial provisions (1970 and 1975), the Act concerning the election of representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage (1976), the Single European Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). The Treaty of Nice, which was signed in 2000, has yet to be ratified.

39 The German Basic Law of 1949 set forth in Article 24 "that the Federal Republic is ready to transfer sovereign rights to international institutions, and to accept those limitations upon its sovereign rights which will produce and secure a lasting peaceful order in Europe and among the nations of the world" (Adenauer 1955,11). In 1953 the Dutch Constitution made provision for transfer of sovereignty to the Community. The 1956 Luxembourg Constitution contains a similar disposition, so does the 1948 Italian Constitution, and the Danish Constitution since 1953. The preamble of the 1946 Constitution of France stated that, "subject to reciprocity, France may agree to limit its sovereignty where necessary for organization and defense of peace." The 1958 French Constitution refers to this statement (Louis 1995, 171-180).

40 Gillingham shows how an economic partnership of sorts developed between the future members of the ECSC, 20 years earlier; the International Steel Cartel formed between France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium in 1926 to regulate market shares. Its performance was disappointing in the 1920s because of German overproduction, but it was revived in the 1930s, with some success. After 1936 Hitler's policies of autarchy brought an end to the ISC. But, according to Gillingham, "a tradition of economic cooperation took hold in the heavy industry of Western Europe during the 1930s" (Gillingham 1991, 28). This form of "business diplomacy" (ibid.) and "industrial self-government" (ibid., 30) would create habits of cooperation, and a "framework around which, after a generation of conflict, failure, and little overall progress toward solving the Ruhr problem, a satisfactory Franco-German settlement would be built" (ibid., 44).

41 Interview with author 1999.

42 Interview with author 1999.

43 Robert Schuman wrote the preface to Rejaire le monde, the French edition of a collection of speeches by Frank Buchman, the initiator of MRA, which was first published in 1950 and republished in 1958. He started with the following words, "The editors of these speeches have decided to entrust the writing of this preface to a man in political life, a Cabinet minister in office. We have to admit, however, that thus far statesmen have been only moderately successful in 'remaking the world.'
The fact remains that it is their duty, more than anyone else's, to apply themselves to this task; and it is to their advantage to welcome every assistance offered to them." Schuman's preface was included in a revised English edition of Buchman's speeches from which I quote (Buchman 1961, 347).

44 Given the evidence for the importance of the peace dimension in the European integration process, both Pond and Gardner Feldman discuss why little attention was paid to it. "Probably never before in history has a transformation of such magnitude been so little remarked as it occurred," Pond writes (Pond 1999, 7). It may be because the European reconciliation process does not fit realist assumptions. The polity slowly emerging out of the process will not resemble the United States of America, and its consensual political culture strikes Americans as ineffective and possibly even dangerous on the international scene (ibid., 20-21); and Gardner Feldman (Banchoff and Mitchell 1999, 75). Gardner Feldman also thinks that because European peace is a "stable peace, it is taken for granted and has become "invisible." It is the very fragility of unstable or limited peace which makes it visible (ibid., 66).

45 Interview with author 1999.
46 Interview with author 1999.
47 Of course, even Felipe Gonzales, the prime minister of Spain during the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty, writes that the founding fathers had an easier time reaching agreement in the 1950s because "an ethics of peace" shaped Europe: "it was not difficult to reach consensus" (Gonzales 1999, 31).
48 Interview with author 1999. Cohn-Bendit's parents were Germans Jews who took refuge in France in 1933 where Cohn-Bendit was born in 1945. They were good friends of Arendt. Cohn-Bendit studied in Germany and in France where he was a student leader in the May 1968 demonstrations. Cohn-Bendit, who carries both French and German citizenship and calls himself a "European mongrel," (bâtard européen) was a German Green MEP in 1994-1999 and was reelected in 1999 as a French Green MEP. He says that Arendt inspires his political thinking: "Our big challenge is to overcome the reduction of politics to the economic. This is the debate and the stake in the coming European elections to the EP. The primary mission of Europe is political, cultural and social" (ibid.).
49 Interview with author 1999.
50 Interview with author 1999.
51 Interview with author 1999.
52 Interview with author 1999.
53 Interview with author 1999.
54 Ibid. Bourlanges remarks that there has been a strange exchange of political values in the realm of international affairs between the US and Europe: the EU has integrated the Wilsonian ideals of equality and self-determination into the international place, while the US with Kissinger incorporated Bismarckian realpolitik into its foreign policy.
56 Ibid.

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