Comments are welcome!

It fires back!
The Impact of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on the Evolution of a European identity

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Introduction

Ever since the conclusions of the European Councils of Cologne and Helsinki – in other words: ever since the watershed event of the war in Kosovo in spring 1999 – the issue of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and even a Common European Policy on Security and Defence (CEPSD) are on the top of the European agenda. The European Union is finding itself in the midst of a discussion about the means it should dispose of in order to cohesively act abroad, diplomatically and militarily.

This recent and breath-taking development marks a major shift in the general discourse on the European Union. The European Union, long conceived of as a “mere” civilian power is now arriving at a language of the past, a language which may provocatively called the language of “war and peace”. This discourse entails central political questions. Europe is discussing its role in the international diplomatic and security environment. It defines the kind of international order it envisages.

By the same token, foreign policy is not only about a state’s relationship with the outside world. The content of foreign policy equally reveals which values and principles constitute a state’s political community internally. Thus, the evolution of a European system of foreign policy governance allows for an alternative view on one of the most contested and most opaque puzzles of European integration: The configuration of the European citizenry’s identity. What impact has the institutional development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) exerted on the shape of the European polity and its identity? Does European foreign policy in fact “fire back” on identity as the title of this paper so confidently claims? Under which conditions does it shape which kind of (substantive) idea of a European citizenry?

In answering this question, I will first, embark on a conceptual discussion. How do we need to conceive of foreign policy in order to allow for the linkage between foreign policy and citizenship? The decisive step consists of using an extended definition of the state as the base-line of inquiry. Conceptually, the state may not be based merely
upon the presence of centralised government and territorial sovereignty, but it equally requires the inclusion of the concept of identity as an important benchmark. Accordingly, in the first part of this paper, I will elaborate on a constructivist definition of the state as an analytical blue-print for examining the texture of the European Union. In the second part, I will devise tentative hypothesis on the impact of the evolution of the European foreign policy governance system on the definition of a European identity. This section is split in two periods: A pre-Kosovo period and a post-Kosovo period. The pre-Kosovo period, I find, is not likely to have contributed to the development of a common identity conception. The post-Kosovo period, on the other hand, has opened up considerable opportunities to do so. It has created leeway for a discourse which is central for the emergence of a European identity: The de-coupling of the United States.


What does a European foreign policy have to do with the substantive definition of the features of a European citizenship? On first sight, foreign policy and citizenship cannot be related to each other directly. Their only commonality is their respective dependence upon the state. Foreign policy is a state activity geared at the outside world. There cannot be a foreign policy without a state. Equally, citizenship provisions demarcate legally who belongs to the state and who does not. Without the state, there would not be any citizenship. Analytically, therefore, our abilities to conceive of the linkage between foreign policy and citizenship depends upon the definitional scope of the “transmission belt” state. Here, as I will explain below, the state needs to be conceived of as a political unit characterised not only – or not even most importantly – by territory and centralized government, but by a binding identity.

A state does not merely consist of an institutional arrangement (centralised government and territory) but is equally based on a cultural or ideational agreements. A state is based upon an identity. However, an identity is not a given but is in constant flux and subject to constant changes. Foreign policy – a state’s actions vis-à-vis the outside - then not only serves as the expression of this identity but equally determines and constitutes it. Citizenship, on the other hand, functions as an expression of this identity, an indicator. Therefore, one may argue that the conduct of foreign policy allows for conclusions about the substantive content of citizenship within a certain political community.
How can this rather abstract conceptual suggestion be usefully applied to the European Union? The problem with analysing the European Union – this strange and *sui generis* political animal – with even conceptualising it, has always been the dominance of a state definition based on centralised government. Without centralised government, thus states the basic argument, there is no European state. Without a state, the story continues, there is no foreign policy. This claim, as has been pointed out by several authors, is neither doing justice to the state as a historically contingent form of political organisation nor to the kind of political organisation the European Union represents.

The state needs to be viewed as a political community sharing some kind of common idea about the organization of public life. It is only then that the “state of Europe” can be re-considered in a fruitful manner. How does foreign policy fit in such a state conception? Which relationship to the concept of citizenship can be established? What do both tell us about state transformation in Europe?

*The State*

My arguments are based upon a constructivist ontology, which, in turn rests upon three claims: First, the world is socially constructed. *Intersubjectively* shared knowledge constitutes the structure which constrains the options available to the actors. Second, structure precedes action but simultaneously results from action. This is to say action changes structure. Third, political order rests upon normative prescriptions embedded in the structure. Constructivists\(^1\) assume that the world does not consist of objectively given entities. Quite the contrary, the *world is a “social fact,” constructed intersubjectively* by a given political community. Adler defined the structure – the sum of social facts - as knowledge that “…persists beyond the lives of individual social actors, embedded in social routines and practices as they are reproduced by interpreters who participate in their production and workings. Intersubjective meanings have structural attributes that do not merely constrain or empower actors. They also define their social reality.*\(^2\) The intersubjective quality of the constructivist world serves as the lynchpin of the argument and, by the same token, as a safeguard against pure

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\(^1\) Notwithstanding the general agreement on the aforementioned postulates, constructivism, like any other “paradigmatical” camp, is not necessarily an amalgam of happy scholarly bedfellows. Quite the contrary, the ontological and the epistemological differences within the group roughly labeled “constructivism” is quite striking. See: Adler, Emanuel, ”Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, in: *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3 (3), (1997), p.327

(relativist) volatility, as Friedrich Kratochwil has pointed out: “... [A]lthough the human world is one of artifice, it is not an idiosyncratic or subjective creation. Rather, it is through the intersubjectivity of language, and its shared meaning that social order is created.” While the first claim is commonsensical, the second claim is highly problematic for the constructivist congregation, namely the question of change and the role of agency within this change. Constructivists deviate from methodological individualism as much as they deviate from mere structuralism. For them, agent and structure are mutually constitutive, which implies that the structure precedes and determines the actor but that the actor himself has the chance of altering and changing the structure. Thus, intersubjective interpretations are changed through action. This action is primarily defined as communication through speech-acts. Although the argument has a sound – and almost commonsensical – theoretical content, it proves hard to pin down empirically. The third claim ties together structure and agency. It is through the prescriptive – normative - function of the structural component that the limits of action are determined. Norms de-limit the scope of action. These propositions have been introduced and discussed extensively in the literature. I will spare the reader further elaborations. Following up on the discussion in the previous section, I am interested in the use of this meta-theoretical earthquake for the analysis of foreign policy. Which implications does the constructivist argument contain for the definition of the state?

In fact, constructivism does not have a theory of the state proper. In fact, constructivism does not have a theory of anything proper. It is, as several authors have mentioned, primarily a set of meta-theoretical or ontological conjectures. In that, its application leaves a great leeway to the respective author in devising concepts and applying them to his or her specific subject matter of research. Here, I present a definition and conceptualization of the state, which starts from the assumption that the state is a social construct in the sense of Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Community. On that basis, one build the state upon four inter-connected conceptual pillars, each in line with constructivist ontology: The state is conceived of as a system of governance which does not rely on a the presence of centralized government but on the presence of an identity of the political community. This identity entails normative prescriptions. The parts of this system are tied together by the legitimacy of the political authority. These concepts are now being addressed in turn.

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1 Kratochwil, Friedrich, “Constructivism as an Approach to International Law and International
Traditionally, the presence of centralized government has served as one of the decisive benchmarks of statehood. The authority of government “tied” all those citizens together, which were living on the territory a government claimed jurisdiction of. Now, if the state, in line with the basic constructivist argument, is a social construct, one might infer that its existence, i.e. the legitimacy of its government is based upon more than the mere monopoly of the use of force. Therefore, it appears to be a fruitful step to grant, even terminologically, space for this “more.” Therefore, the first conceptual innovation consists of introducing the term governance instead of government. Rainer Eising and Beate Kohler-Koch define the term “governance” as follows: “In essence, ‘governance’ is about the structured ways and means in which the divergent preferences of independent actors are translated into policy choices to ‘allocate values’, so that the plurality of interests is transformed into co-ordinated action and the compliance of actors is achieved.”

Centralized government is but one possible feature of a system of “governance”. The presence of centralized government might be neither necessary nor sufficient to translate divergent preferences of independent actors into policy. This proposition begs for the follow-up question. If it is not centralized government which is constitutive of a decision-making system, or even not only centralized government, which are the constitutive elements then? The entry point for answering this question is the concept of legitimacy. Let me repeat the Weberian state definition cited above: “Staat is diejenige menschliche Gemeinschaft, welche innerhalb eines bestimmnten Gebietes – dies: das ‘Gebiet’, gehört zum Merkmal – das Monopol legitimer physischer Gewaltsamkeit für sich (mit Erfolg) beansprucht.” Note that two of Weber’s criteria - territoriality and hierarchical decision-making - have been included in most of the common definitions of statehood. They are relatively easy to spot empirically. The aspect of legitimacy, on the other hand, has frequently been omitted, possibly due to its fuzzy character. Yet legitimacy is central in that only those political decisions which are considered legitimate have a binding force. Legitimacy needs to be awarded by those concerned. In practice, legitimacy can be either processual in character or substantive. The processual aspect of legitimacy pertains to the proper procedure in respect to the investiture of the political authority as well as to the process of decision-making. The proper process of selecting political leaders in the modern Western state is linked to democracy. The substantive dimension of legitimacy pertains to the content of the policy decisions. Political decisions have to be within a range of policies which are considered proper. It is only then that they pass the

“legitimacy test”. In the next step, then, one may ask: Where do the standards of legitimacy come from? Where are they rooted? How do we know what is considered right and wrong and which policy is considered proper and which is not?

Here, I assume a specific “state identity” to represent the “pool” of policies that are considered “acceptable” by those concerned, i.e. the citizens. On an abstract level, the term identity comprises the sum of an actor’s knowledge pertaining to rules of social behavior. This “knowledge” has been given several alternative names, depending on the respective theoretical pedigree. A few examples may suffice: Lebenswelt (Habermas), Frames (Jachtenfuchs), belief systems (George) or, most prominently, identity. On a less abstract level, the idea of the existence of an identity implies that every single act an agent performs is rooted in a coherent set of interpretations. Embedded therein are prescriptions on proper behavior – norms - which Martha Finnemore defines " ... in a simple and sociologically standard way as shared expectations about appropriate behavior held by a community of actors."

The difference between an identity-based state definition and positivist state conception cannot be exaggerated. Instead of assuming that a centralized government ties separate state entities together, identity functions as the “glue” that unites the citizenry. Above, I have argued that the state is the basic unit to which both foreign policy and citizenship are tied. Given the constructivist state definition, how can these two concepts be integrated? Which functions do they fulfill?

**Foreign Policy**

What is foreign policy? What are its functions? Foreign policy inherently is a *state* activity. It is, as an undergraduate introduction to the analysis of international relations, puts it " … the output of the *state* into the global system … " [Italics added by me, F.G.]" It is about the articulation of a state’s interests and the realization thereof. A state disposes of several means – diplomacy, force, money, and “culture” – to realize these interests.

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In that the content of these interests is rooted in a political community’s identity, the values it cherishes and the norms it adheres to. It is this “identity” which is being projected to the outside world. In that, foreign policy is an inside-out process. However, foreign policy also has a crucial domestic function. In voicing its interests vis-à-vis others a political community – acting as a whole – equally becomes visible to itself. Foreign policy not only creates the “other”, it also reaffirms the “self”. It symbolizes the state and its community much more than any other policy area. Foreign policy “fires back.” Jonathan Bach summed up this relationship between foreign policy and identity as follows: “Foreign policy is the key practice through which sovereignty – and with it core assumptions of identity – is articulated. Maintaining one’s own sovereignty, and the integrity of the system of sovereign nation-states, is the primary theoretical task of foreign policy. The principle of state sovereignty serves to delimit (and discipline) the realm of inside and outside, and foreign policy is the primary way in which the state expresses this delimiting function. Foreign policy exists in a dialectical relation with the concept of sovereignty: without a concept of sovereignty, foreign policy is meaningless, but since sovereignty is not an a priori given, the understanding of sovereignty is partially dependent on the practices of foreign policy.”

David Campbell has most convincingly elaborated this relationship. Here, I will refrain from discussing it any further and instead focus on the link between the state, foreign policy, and citizenship.

**Citizenship**

The notion of citizenship essentially is a legal term. The legal concept fulfils two functions. First, it determines who belongs to a certain political community – and who does. In general, citizenship can be acquired either by birth (ascription) or by request (naturalisation). The criteria for each vary. Usually, they include elements of descendancy as in the "the law of the blood" principle (jus sanguinis) and elements of "the law of the soil principle (jus soli.") In that it is an instrument of exclusion. Secondly, citizenship defines the individual citizen’s rights and duties within that community. The substantive content of citizenship is usually evaluated according to a “thick” conception which emphasizes the element of duties and participation and a “thin” conception which emphasizes the aspect of negative rights - a conception, which complies rather with the liberal ideal of the the Nachtwaechterstaat? The legal notion

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of citizenship has prominently been used as a heuristic tool to extrapolate the “identity”
of a political community, most notably a state or a nation-state. This tool has been most
skilfully applied by Rogers Breaker\textsuperscript{10} who compared identity conceptions in Germany
and France.

Here, however, the legal provisions of the citizenship concept within the European
Union are not of primary interest. As elaborated in the Treaties of Maastricht and
Amsterdam, citizenship within the European Union is primarily conceived of as a
“liberal” or a “thin” concept. I will not recount the specific treaty provisions here, but
Mary O’Rourke, for example, giving a speech on the priorities of the Irish presidency
cited an anonymous critic who stated that "the concept of Union citizenship as
embodied in the Maastricht Treaty amounts to nothing more than a new name for a
bunch of existing rights, a nice blue ribbon around scattered elements of a general
notion of citizenship. The dynamism is ... pie in the sky."\textsuperscript{11}

Thus, citizenship here is viewed less as a legal concept\textsuperscript{12} but more as one dimension of
a wider discourse on the “rights” and “duties” that flow from an individual’s belonging
to the European Union. In that sense, I am defining the term citizenship in the sense
Friedrich Kratochwil does: "It is perhaps best to conceive of 'citizenship' as a space
within a discourse on politics that institutionalises identities and differences by drawing
boundaries, both in term of membership and in terms of the actual political practices
which are connected with this membership."\textsuperscript{13}

Foreign policy creates and re-creates a member state’s identity. Citizenship serves as a
manifestation of a state’s identity. To which extent then, has the foreign policy of the
European Union contributed to the evolution of a European identity, i.e. a European
citizenship?

2. Does it fire back? EPC, CFSP and European Identity

\textsuperscript{9} Bach, Jonathan P.G., \textit{Between Sovereignty and Integration. German Foreign Policy and National
\textsuperscript{10} See also Brubaker, Rogers (ed.), \textit{Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North
America} (German Marshall Fund and University Press of America; Lanham, Md.; 1989).
\textsuperscript{11} O'Rourke, Mary , "The Union and its Citizens," (Speech delivered at the Institute of European
\textsuperscript{12} It should be highlighted. The use of the term citizenship in a sense which is not specifically tied to
citizenship as a \textit{legal concept} is somewhat problematic when it comes to the distinction between
identity and citizenship. In essence, both concepts aim at the definition of the individual citizen from
the viewpoint of a coherent normative structure formed through intersubjective informal agreement.
In the analysis of the European Union both concepts – foreign policy and citizenship – are moving targets. And they are moving slowly. The European Union is not a state in the proper sense. It lacks centralised government. Yet, often the Union has been depicted as a system of governance. This equally applies to foreign policy. From EPC to CFSP to the installation of the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, a governance system in respect to foreign policy has been created. Has the emergence of a European system of foreign policy governance then contributed to the emergence of a European citizenship? In the following sections, I will elaborate primarily on the theoretical possibility of an European identity to evolve which different institutional expressions of foreign policy governance have allowed for. The specific “hard” empirical evidence for each of these claims still needs to be elaborated.

*European Foreign Policy from EPC to CFSP: A Private Affair*

Has the European system of foreign policy governance had a major impact on the creation of a “thicker” notion of European citizenship? For a long time, namely until the war in Kosovo, it does not appear to, or only in a very restricted manner. A system of European foreign policy governance has been in the making, although in an almost private manner. In order for foreign policy to have an effect on wider identity formation, however, it needs to be *public*. This argument will be substantiated in the following sections.

The coordination of the foreign policy of the member states of the European Union has been a persistent element of European integration. The 1954 project of the European Defense Community (EDC), the Fouchet Plans (1962) and the European Political Cooperation (EPC) of 1969 are points in case. Gordon acknowledges “… [f]or decades, and in particular since the 1991 Treaty on European Union ... the EU has been trying to enhance its ability to act diplomatically and militarily abroad.” Ben Soetendorp even goes as far as to call the formulation and the realization of a common foreign policy a

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14 Although I expect events to be examined to date back further than the formal creation of the European Union (1993), I proceed to subsume the European Communities (EC) under the abbreviation EU.
"continuous goal of the member states". While the ambitious EDC and the de Gaulle-driven Fouchet Plans were still born projects, cooperation in respect to the foreign policy started to gain pace with the installation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970. The Luxembourg Report, also called the “Davignon Report”, published on October 27, 1970 called for regular consultations, for the exchange of information, the harmonization of positions, and where, possible common actions. These mechanisms where to provide a better mutual understanding on the great problems of international politics.

The foreign affairs ministers were now to meet at least twice per year to discuss matters of importance to foreign policy. Simultaneously, a Political Committee (PoCo), which was supposed to meet at least four times a year was created in order to prepare the ministerial conferences. It should be noted, however, that the EPC mechanism remained completely and explicitly outside the framework of the European Communities. EPC and EC approached each other only slowly. In 1973 the Copenhagen Report described that a “permanent constructive dialogue” with the EC had become regular practice and that the inter-governmental contacts on the ministerial as well as the diplomatic level had been intensified. In 1981, the London report tied EC and EPC closer together by assigning the rotating EC’s Presidency the responsibility of coordinating EC and EPC topics at the Foreign Ministers’ meetings and by allowing the Commission to be “fully associated with the EPC at all levels.”

The 1983 Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart stated that ”the European Council ensures consistency” between EC and EPC” and that the EC Council of Ministers could deal with matters coming within the scope of EPC. In 1986, with the Single European Act (SEA), the Community and the EPC were put on the same contractual basis. In 1993, EPC, now labeled Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), was integrated as “the second pillar” in the framework of the (Maastricht) Treaty on the European Union (TEU). The Treaty of Maastricht called upon the member states of the European Union to act as a ”cohesive force” in international relations and extended and specified the

18 Schmalz, Uwe, ”The Amsterdam Provisions on External Coherence: Bridging the Union’s Foreign Policy Dualism,” European Foreign Affairs Review, (3) 1998, p.422.
19 Ibid, p.423.
instruments and decision-making procedures at hand. The Amsterdam Treaty introduced the position of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and specified the means at the Union’s disposal.

Although the Maastricht and the Amsterdam Treaties call upon the member states of the European Union to act as a “cohesive force in international relations, the call has not been heeded in an institutionally apt manner. Consensual decision-making remains the starting point for any common foreign policy. The ”dual structure” labeling the division of foreign policy tasks between Commission and Council of Ministers has essentially been maintained. The Western European Union (WEU), potentially representing the military dimension of the European Union, has only been associated loosely. Institutionally, the center of foreign policy remains located at the national level. Foreign policy institutions have not jumped over the threshold of intergovernmentalism. Despite these severe limitations, however, the record does not necessarily need to be negative. It is conceivable that in the ”civilian” realm the Union has scored some points in devising a coherent approach.

How did the EU institutions then fare in their foreign policy practice? How did they perform? The record, at best, is mixed. In terms of foreign performance, the EU institutions so far have displayed more weakness than strength. As some authors mention, as of the early 1970s, especially during the time immediately following the oil shocks and the cooling down of transatlantic relations, Europe has succeeded in devising a rather coherent policy toward the Middle East. It has been very successful in the CSCE process. The same applies, after the end of the Cold War, to countries in Eastern Europe, as Karen Smith has claimed\(^{22}\). On the other hand, the EU failed to implement an effective policy in conflicts arising after the end of the cold war, most prominently the war in former Yugoslavia. The lack of any ”unified European action” was equally evident throughout the repeated crises in the Persian Gulf\(^{23}\). An overall balance sheet would rather present a negative judgment of the performance of the EU. Christopher Hill writes: ”True actorness requires not only a clear identity and a self-contained decision-making system, but also the practical capabilities to effect policy.

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In all these dimensions the EU falls some way short. Which effect did the EPC and the pre-Kosovo CFSP exert on the definition of the Union’s citizenship? In sum, I consider the impact to be non-existent. This is due to the nature of the EPC and CFSP projects. Both primarily aimed at ensuring cooperation and coordination among foreign affairs ministries (FAM). Disregarding the balance sheet of this coordination efforts, it was marked by several distinct features.

First, the EPC/CFSP machinery did not succeed in creating a European discourse on foreign policy. The argument about the identity-creating effect of foreign policy hinges upon the condition of public participation or at least public acknowledgement of the respective foreign policy. Public attention is primarily drawn to crisis situations within which questions pertaining to “war and peace” are to be answered. Given the institutional restrictions of the EPC process, i.e. the absence of a military dimension, the EPC could not depict itself as a cohesive actor in these situations. Quite the contrary, these were answered on a national basis. If “push came to shove” the European Union, i.e. the European Communities, had to withdraw. However, if foreign policy functions as an engine of identity creation for a political community, the community concerned needs to be involved, either in the discourse about the respective foreign policy. Neither EPC nor CFSP created a forum for a European discourse on foreign policy. This is not to say that EPC and CFSP are not likely to have had an effect on the identities of specific actors, namely diplomats or politicians which have been involved in the process. In that EPC and CFSP may in fact have had a state transforming impact for they might have Europeanized the national identities of governmental agents. But this certainly does not lead to a substantive determination of the content of a European citizenship.

Secondly, in the process of EPC and CFSP debates about a specifically European political approach have been avoided and, by the same token, have not been forced to arise from the outside. Although EPC has build upon the principle of co-ordination, its political intention, has been handled in a rather modest manner, that is to say, the member states of the European Union aimed at a cohesive policy. However, this was not built upon the notion of some coherent political strategy about the European Union. In that sense, it has not always been clear in which direction the process of foreign policy integration was heading and which script it was to follow. In that sense, answers

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to general questions: Which goals does Europe pursue in the world, i.e. who is Europe as a political actor, which ideal of political order does it intent to implement etc. were avoided. On the other hand the general idea about a specific political order which is to be projected to the outside bestows substantive content upon the definition of the citizenship. This has not been the case within the European Union.

Third, in addition, one may argue that the member states of the European Union did define themselves not primarily in European terms but primarily in transatlantic terms. In other words, the Soviet Union, during the Cold War did function as Europe’s “other” but equally as the “other” of the United States which forged a transatlantic security community which – despite several disturbances – proved to be the prime reference point in respect to some kind of not state-based multi-lateral foreign and security policy. In addition to this rather cognitive aspect, the importance of American presence on European soil, a priori pre-cluded an over-emphasis on a specifically European foreign policy.

In sum, I find that the EPC as well as the early CFSP did not offer the possibility to translate discussions on the subject matter European foreign policy in a wider debate on European identity. This, I argue, has changed considerably with the war in Kosovo.

Kosovo, the United States, and the Creation of Europe

The war in Kosovo, in spring 1999, has pushed the issue of European foreign policy to the top of the political agenda and even extended it to the area of defense. What the treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam had prepared hesitantly, the post-Kosovo European Councils of Cologne and Helsinki have fervently put into place: An ever-tighter foreign policy and security framework, personified by Mr. Javier Solana, the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); the concomitant installation of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) unit. The Helsinki declaration heralds the ambitious goal to create a European Rapid Reaction Force comprising 60,000 troops deployable within 60 days. By the year 2003 this contingent is supposed to be in place. In spring 2000 the institutional provisions included in the conclusions of the Finnish Presidency at the Helsinki summit are feverishly established in Brussels: The participation of the member states’ defence ministers in the meetings of the General Affairs Council, the installation of a standing

25 This aspect constitutes the focal point of my doctoral dissertation. Empirically, I am examining the
Political and Security Committee (PSC) composed of national representatives of senior/ambassadorial level dealing with all aspects of CFSP, including the CEPSD\textsuperscript{26}, the establishment of an EU Military Committee composed of the Chiefs of Defence, represented by their military delegates, which will give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC, as well as provide military direction to the Military Staff, the establishment of an EU Military Staff within the Council structures which will provide military expertise and support to the CESDP, including the conduct of EU-led military crisis management operations.

However, as breath-taking the recent institutional activities as numerous are the political questions which beg for answers: What should be the quality of the future relationship between the European Union and the United States? Is a European military capacity a complement or an alternative to NATO? Under which circumstances, is European military action conceivable without NATO? To what extent is Europe capable of acting? Which investments need to be made, in terms of procurement, in order to reach a somewhat autonomous European defense capacity? What is the structure of the European defense industry supposed to be like? On the basis of these deliberations, the European decision-making structure moves to the fore: Who organizes? Who decides? Based upon which information? Is it “Mr. CFSP” Javier Solana, the High Representative of Foreign and Security Policy, who plays the European foreign minister, or Commissioner Chris Patten? Which information does the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), as of now poorly staffed, dispose of?

These questions, and here is the difference to the pre-Kosovo foreign policy integration process to be found, cannot be answered on an ad-hoc basis any more. They need to be answered by reference to larger and more encompassing puzzles: What should Europe, as a foreign policy actor, be? What does the European Union represent in terms of foreign and defense policy? Which values are to be promulgated? Or, to put it more bluntly: Which common element binds the 15 member states of the European Union in manner which justifies the construction of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or even a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CEPSD)? The

political developments push for public answers to the most pressing questions: What does the European Union represent in terms of foreign policy? Which values are to be promulgated? To what extent does the European identity differ from the transatlantic one?

The discourse on the integration of foreign and defence policy into the framework of the European Union, ever since the war in Kosovo, is a public and it’s a political one. In that, it creates a central forum of discussion on the bases of the community as a whole. This opens up the possibility for foreign policy to turn into one of the main factors shaping a European identity. My main argument here is that the discourse – not necessarily the institutional implementations – that is currently arising in this respect will serves as the starting point for a major European de-coupling of the United States. It is the substantive differentiation from the US – at first, but not only in respect to foreign and defence policy – which will substantially determine the shape of the European citizenship. Why should the discourse on European foreign policy governance be anti-American in character? Identity – the “selves” - are formed in opposition to the “other”. This is an old story. In the 19th century the Germans defined themselves in opposition to the French and vice versa. In the 20th century, the US defined itself in opposition to the Soviet Union, post-WWII Germany conceived of itself, as Waever has pointed out, in opposition to the past of the Holocaust and so on and so forth. Which, then, could be Europe’s “other”? Russia may be depicted as a threat. By the same token, Islamic – or partly Islamic states – may be constructed this way. However, none of these “others” logically entails the self “Europe” as the logical answer. Quite the contrary, in terms of security, the answer to these kinds of threats would be a transatlantic one: NATO or, in other words, Karl Deutsch’s “pluralistic security community” being based on the notion of liberal democracy. It is only, if Europe distinguishes itself from its closest partner, the United States that it fact might emerge as a political community with distinct features. In fact, however, “security” arguments may merely serve as starting points for such a de-coupling.

But is this argument mere fiction? To what extent is it grounded in some kind of political “reality”? Of course, any desire for a real disentanglement from the United States is constantly and consciously denied on the European side of the Atlantic. On the other hand, one may in fact detect signs and indicators of a growing estrangement among the members of the pluralistic security community. The growing American
tendency to pursue unilateral strategies in its foreign and security policy have led to major irritations among the Europeans – which did not necessarily have to be French. This tendency has recently only been re-enforced by the American ambition to construct a National Missile Defence Program (NMD), allegedly capable of protecting American territory against a small number of missiles carrying nuclear war heads originating from rogue states like North Korea or Iraq. For the Europeans, this program is hard to swallow. This is so not only because the United States is watering down the existing disarmament treaties but also because the US demonstrates that American priorities do not necessarily comply with European priorities. Strikingly, the nascent debate on NMD is likely to bring back strategic debates dating back to the times of the Cold War: The European resistance to accept a shift in American nuclear strategy, away from “massive retaliation” to “flexible response”, and the European “insecurities” that followed. The current debate on the Common European Policy on Security and Defence (CEPSDP) may partly be a response to this “trend”. It certainly does not indicate that the European Union disposes either of technical or material capacities to establish its own defence, however the mere fact that such an intention is denied marks a shift in the range of conceivable futures.

However, “Europe” as the blunt answer to American unilateralism will not suffice to contribute to the construction of a European identity if the differences between the US and the member states of the European Union are not extrapolated beyond the limits of security. This means, that in terms of security and foreign policy arrangements, the EU needs to give an answer to a very specific question: In which cases would the EU act abroad in which the United States would not? In other words, the European “justification strategy” would be required to highlight the differences between the ideal of a European world order and an American world order. In other words, the European political project would need to be distinguished from the American political project. Naturally, this goal is not to be achieved merely by recourse to the realm of defence. Quite the contrary, these consideration require a justification which had to be based in European socio-economic features: To put it provocatively, this might arise to the “Third Way” as the justification for both – the de-coupling of the US and the construction of a European foreign policy.

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Thus, my main argument may be coined as follows: The development of the European system of foreign and defence policy governance may push the Europeans to extrapolate the differences between them and their closest partner, the United States. It is in that discourse on the commonalities that tie the member states of the Union together, that a substantive definition of European citizenship may in fact occur. *European foreign policy after Kosovo could fire back!*

### 3. Conclusion

In the course of this paper I have examined the relationship between the evolution of a European system of governance of foreign and security policy and the substantive definition of a European citizenship. In a first step, I have established a conceptual relationship between foreign policy, citizenship, and the state. I have argued that the state definition needs to include the notion of identity – as an ideational component – if a direct line between foreign policy and citizenship is to be drawn. Accordingly, a political community’s foreign policy actions may in fact have a major impact on the substantive definition of the community’s citizenship. In addition, the integration of the concept of identity into a definition of the state allows for the examination of the relationship between foreign policy and citizenship within the European Union – despite the obvious absence of centralised government. In the second section of this paper, I have roughly described the development of the European foreign policy institutions before drawing tentative conclusions about their apparent impact on citizenship. Prior to the war in Kosovo, I have claimed, neither EPC nor CFSP have been likely engines of a European citizenship. It has been only after this watershed event that a public and political discourse has changed the role of an ever-tighter European foreign policy and defence policy governance system. Here, I have presented a somewhat speculative and polemic follow-up claim. I have argued that the process of European foreign policy integration will only have an impact on the substantive definition of the European citizenry if it entails a debate on European differences to the United States – not only in terms of security, but primarily in terms of economic and social policies!
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