REPORT

drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee

on European Political Cooperation and European Security

Rapporteur: Mr N. HAAGERUP
The following motions for resolution were referred to the Political Affairs Committee by plenary at its sittings on:

- 9 March 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr SCHALL and others on European political cooperation on matters of security policy (Doc. 1-931/80),
- 13 March 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr LOMAS and others on peace and security (Doc. 1-30/81),
- 16 September 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr SCHALL and others, on the two-part NATO decision (Doc. 1-497/81),
- 16 November 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr EFREMI DIS and others, on the European Parliament's support for the Member States of the EEC in their endeavours for peace (Doc. 1-700/81),
- 18 November 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs GAIOTTI de BIAS E and others, on balanced and controlled disarmament (Doc. 1-760/81),
- 18 November 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs LIZIN and others, on peace in Europe (Doc. 1-766/81),
- 18 December 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr GLINNE and others, on the USA-USSR disarmament negotiations in Geneva (Doc. 1-904/81)
- 15 February 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr VAN AERSENN, and others on the violation of Swedish territorial waters by a Soviet submarine (Doc. 1-784/81),
- 14 June 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr EPHREDEMMIS and others on the second UN Special Session on Disarmament (Doc. 1-268/82).

At its meeting of 21-23 April 1981, the Political Affairs Committee decided to draw up a report on European Political Cooperation and European Security.

At its meeting of 13 May 1981, Mr HAAGERUP was appointed rapporteur.

The Political Affairs Committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 22-24 September 1982 and 3 November 1982.

At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution as a whole by 33 votes to 5 with 4 abstentions.
The following took part in the vote:

Mr Rumor, chairman; Mr Haagerup, first vice-chairman and rapporteur; Mr Fergusson, third vice-chairman; Mr Antoniozzi, Mr Balfe (deputizing for Mr Lomas), Mr Barbi, Mr Battersby (deputizing for Lord Douro), Mr Berkhouwer, Lord Bethell, Mr Bettiza, Mr Deniau (deputizing for Mr Lalor), Mr Deschamps, Mr Ephremidis, Mr Fellermaier (deputizing for Mr B. Friedrich), Mr Gawronski (deputizing for Mr Donnez),

Mr Habsburg, Mr Hansch, Mrs Hammerich, Mr von Hassel, Mrs van den Heuvel, Mr Jaquet, Mr Klepsch, Mr Kyrkos (deputizing for Mr Piquet), Mr Langes (deputizing for Mr Bournias), Mrs Macciocchi (deputizing for Mr Cariglia), Mr de La Malene, Mr d’Ormesson (deputizing for Mr Diligent), Mr Paisley (deputizing for Mr Romualdi), Mr Pelikan (deputizing for Mrs Gredal), Mr Penders, Mr Plaskovitis, Mr Price (deputizing for Lord O’Hagan), Mr Ripa di Meana (deputizing for Mr van Miert), Mr Schall, Mr Schieler, Mr Segre, Mr J.M. Taylor (deputizing for Lady Elles), Mrs Theobald-Paoli (deputizing for Mr Motchane), Mr Turner (deputizing for Sir James Scott-Hopkins), Mr Walter (deputizing for Mr Brandt), Mr Wawrzik (deputizing for Mrs Lenz), Mr Zagari.
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The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

on European Security and European Political Cooperation

The European Parliament,

A confident of the contribution which the Member States of the European Community can make to international peace and stability by acting in unison,

B calling for a European peace and security policy which aims at stabilizing East-West relations and promoting detente, a constructive North-South dialogue and effective crisis management,

C recognising that questions related to European Security are not the exclusive concern of Member States, but of vital importance to all the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act,

D gravely disturbed by the continued increase in the number of nuclear weapons in the world and by the vast amount of money spent on these and on ever more sophisticated conventional weapons,

E associating itself with the preoccupation of the peoples of the Community with both European and global security problems,

F understanding the widespread concern with the threat of a nuclear war expressed by way of demonstrations, mass meetings, books, pamphlets and petitions,

G whereas adequate defence measures and arms control are two sides of the same coin: a balanced security policy designed to prevent war and not merely nuclear war,

H deploring the lack of progress in disarmament and arms control negotiations,
I expressing its support for the ongoing arms control and arms reduction talks dealing with Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF), Strategic Arms Reduction (START), and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in the hope that they will ensure European and global peace and security and reduce the vast arms arsenal of the super-powers and others,

J convinced that arms control negotiations between East and West are important for both sides, that they should take the form of a continuous process and that they should be aimed at mutual security based on balanced military relations at the lowest possible arms level,

K recommending continued close consultations within European Political Cooperation (EPC) for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),

L having regard to the importance of measures to promote genuine trust as a pre-requisite for and complement to balanced arms reduction in both East and West,

M recognising that, while the European Community and its institutions have no explicit responsibility for defence and military security, the Parliament can discuss any matter that seems to it relevant,

N realizing the impossibility of separating a large number of foreign policy issues of vital interest to Europe from their direct or indirect security implications,

O taking into account, that the concept of European peace and security goes beyond those issues which are related to military defence and embraces non-military aspects of security such as the furtherance of global peace and stability, international order and the protection of world trade,

P supporting the decision by the governments of the Ten to include questions related to political security in their deliberations and consultations within the context of European Political Cooperation,

Q convinced that a new war in Europe is not the solution to our political problems and that a nuclear war would result in the destruction of European civilization,

R concerned that in recent times there has been an increasing tendency to solve political problems between states using war as an instrument of policy,

S recognising that peace is also threatened by economic crises and that worldwide tensions are increased when, as in Poland, the population and particularly the working population are denied the right to participate in the construction of a free and just order,
having regard to the following motions for resolutions presented by:

- Mr SCHALL and others, on behalf of the Group of European People's Party (Christian Democrat Group), on European political cooperation on matters of security policy (Doc. 1-931/80),

- Mr LOMAS and others, on peace and detente (Doc. 1-30/81),

- Mr SCHALL and others, on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democratic Group), on the two-part NATO decision (Doc. 1-497/81),

- Mr EFREMI DIS and others, on the European Parliament's support for the Member States of the EEC in their endeavours for peace (Doc. 1-700/81),

- Mrs GAIOTTI DE BIASE and others, on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party (CD Group), on balanced and controlled disarmament (Doc. 1-760/81),

- Mrs LIZIN and others, on peace in Europe (Doc. 1-766/81),

- Mr GLINNE and others, on behalf of the Socialist Group, on the USA-USSR disarmament negotiations in Geneva (Doc. 1-904/81),

- Mr VAN AERSSEN and others, on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party, on the violation of Swedish territorial waters by a Soviet submarine (Doc. 1-784/81),

- Mr EPHREMI DIS and others, on the second UN Special Session on Disarmament (Doc. 1-268/82),

having regard the report of the Political Affairs Committee (Doc. 1-946/82)

States as its conviction that:

1. - The Member States of the European Community share a number of vital security concerns even if the Community has no military dimension of its own;

2. - These shared security concerns should be fully explored and elaborated, particularly within the context of EPC, in order to give substance to and realize a true European peace and security concept and to promote the security of all European peoples;

3. - Efforts should be made to bring about a wider understanding by the public, political parties and governments of the many diverse elements which contribute to the evolving European security concept, without infringing the rights and responsibilities of national governments in defence matters;
4. - The European Parliament can play a significant role in bringing about such an understanding by its active and growing participation in European Political Cooperation, by identifying and debating common European security concerns and by arranging hearings and seminars on security-related issues;

5. - As all present and probable Community Member States but one are members of the Atlantic Alliance, it is urged that a more effective co-ordination take place between the political consultations in EPC and NATO respectively;

6. - Consultations in EPC must not negate political consultations within the Atlantic Alliance but should on the contrary strengthen such consultations;

7. - While efforts to sustain close relations and intimate cooperation with the United States and Canada as a vital element of European security should be maintained and, if possible, further increased, improvements should be sought in the East-West relationship in Europe in full compliance with and on the basis of the Helsinki Declaration of 1975 with the aim of reducing existing tensions and enlarging the scope and the role played by the CSCE process;

8. - Increased competition in the fields of armaments constitutes a grave threat to security and peace in Europe, and so the voices of the peace movements which have spoken out in Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the USA against the growing arms race and the admonitions and warning coming from Christian churches are of great importance;

9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the ten Community Member Governments and the Governments of Spain and Portugal, and further to the Governments of the United States, Canada, Norway, Iceland, and Turkey.
Introduction.

Why has it been deemed useful to have a report on EPC and European security? It is a well-known fact that the Community has no legal competence in the field of defence and security and that no one commissioner has been specifically appointed for these areas. The Treaty of Rome has no clauses dealing with security and there has been no full-scale attempt to broaden the scope of the Community to include defence since the signing of the Treaty of Rome.

The reason for a report dealing with European security is manifold. European Political Co-operation, which has developed rapidly over the last ten years, puts increasing emphasis on security aspects of foreign policy issues. The reason for this stems not from a preoccupation with security issues as such, but from the increased tensions in the world (and not only within the traditional East/West cold war context), thus the growing disorder which is noticeable in several regions of the world have made it inevitable that security concerns have come to play a growing role.

It is an indisputable fact that attempts to maintain or secure world order fail more often than they succeed and that developments in various parts of Africa, Latin America, and Asia, and notably the Middle East, have left the impression that world order, insofar as it ever existed, is crumbling.

A second reason for a report on European security is the growing interest in arms control and disarmament and the widespread opposition to any increase of the nuclear weapons arsenals and to a further proliferation of nuclear weapons. This interest arises again from the growing feeling of insecurity, which has to do with the increased international tensions and growing disorder, but it is also a sign of a certain impatience with the present security system.
in Europe, although it has managed to keep peace in our continent for more than 35 years.

Furthermore, there is undoubtedly a need to sort out the issues and explain the problems and terms used in the debate dealing with both world security and European security. The London report of November 1981 on European Political Co-operation made, for the first time, a reference to security by officially accepting the need to discuss the political aspects of security among the Foreign Ministers of the Ten. But where is the borderline between defence and security? One of the underlying motives for this report is to make an attempt to differentiate between such commonly used terms as security, defence, arms control and disarmament.

The emphasis will not be on the strictly military aspects of security, which are the responsibility of national governments and for the military alliance - the Atlantic Alliance - to which all the Member States of the Community but one belong. However, security is a much more comprehensive concept than just a policy concerned with the purely military aspects of security. It is a fact that some political and economic decisions by Member States and by the Community often have obvious security implications.

Such decisions, therefore, inevitably lead to a more identifiable European concept of security determined by those concerns which are shared by the ten Member States, irrespective of their membership or non-membership of the Atlantic Alliance.

It is the task of this report to briefly trace these developments to ascertain how and why they lead to a concept of European security.

This will also explain why the report makes no recommendation as to the setting-up of new institutions in the immediate future to deal with the vital security concerns of the Member States of the Community. Such concerns will for the time being have to be dealt with by the Member States and by the Community within the context of existing institutions, though it is obvious that the growing
European identity of interests will necessarily mean that both governments and Community institutions may consider new ways of dealing with many international problems.

Unlike most other reports on European security, this report deals primarily with the present and the immediate future. It is not a blueprint for how a future European defence community can and should look and it is not recommending policies and steps which are only realizable in a European context more advanced and very different from the present Community and EPC structure.

The rapporteur recognizes that the future may hold several options for closer European co-operation not only on broad security problems but also on specific and general defence issues. If, how and when they are to be brought about is beyond the scope of this report, which focuses primarily on the present needs and current problems, insofar as European Political Co-Operation and European security are concerned.
The security environment of Europe is, like the rest of the world, characterized by the existence of a destructive potential far superior to anything in history. The destructive capability of existing arms arsenals could conceivably do away with civilisation and kill all mankind, maybe even ten or twenty times over. It is a situation which is sometimes referred to as overkill capacity, which is to be explained by the enormous military nuclear power available to, above all, the two super-powers, but also to three other and potentially more nations for purposes of war.

It is often alleged that this overkill capacity is in itself a highly destabilizing factor, which could lead to outbreak of war. This is by no means certain. Without going to the other extreme and simply stating that there is 'safety in numbers' - a statement not wholly without truth - the staggering number of nuclear warheads and other destructive means may not proportionally increase the danger of war. However, they are certainly evidence of an enormous waste, because there is no agreement between the super-powers or, for that matter, among other nations as to what is enough. To define what would be enough to deter a future global war is a principal objective of the current START talks (formerly SALT).

On the whole, the existence of nuclear weapons since 1945 has played an important, maybe decisive, role in preventing a new world war. On the other hand, they have by no means contributed to a more satisfactory international world order. On the contrary, the world scene is marked by increased violence and disorder. There is no generally accepted international system of world order and security.

The United Nations, in spite of its global membership, has in no way become strong enough to form the basis of such a system.
The emergence in the post-war era of two super-powers, which today remain by far the strongest powers, was the basis of the so-called system of bipolarity. It undoubtedly lent the international system a certain stability. But even that element is gradually being eroded. The regional security system in Europe continues to provide for a considerable element of security, so far as the danger of open military conflict between East and West is concerned. But outside Europe it is becoming increasingly evident that the super-powers are less and less able to influence events to the extent that they were, say, 15-20 years ago. Wars and other forms of armed conflicts in South-East Asia, in the Middle East, in Africa, and in Latin America testify to this development.

As far as Western European security is concerned it continues to be closely linked to North America and the United States nuclear guarantee of European security. This is a state of affairs which neither the United States and Canada on the one hand, nor the Western European Member States of the Atlantic Alliance on the other wish to see brought to an end. However, the Atlantic Alliance is becoming burdened with an increasing number of problems, partly but not wholly in consequence of the economic crisis, the rising number of unemployed, and unsatisfactory economic growth. Foreign policy perceptions differ between Washington and European capitals, and if divergencies across the Atlantic should seriously threaten the credibility of Atlantic cohesion it could have harmful and maybe fatal consequences for European security.

Not only European economic well-being but also European security depend on the continued access to oil and to a number of minerals. However, these are often to be found only in regions of potential instability and they will normally have to be transported to Europe by way of sea lanes that would be dangerously exposed by local conflicts and by the threat of a wider conflict.
During the last few years, popular expressions of opposition to nuclear weapons and indeed to a continued policy of armed defence are coming to play an important role in a number of Western European countries. Irrespective of the sincere desires for peace such manifestations reflect they could mean a serious threat to European security, insofar as volatile public opinion may make it more difficult, if not impossible, one day to maintain an adequate defence posture. The rise of the peace movements and the large scale anti-nuclear weapon rallies in several European cities indicate the difficulties inherent in implementing policies of nuclear weapons deployment or increased defence expenditure.

This is of special significance in light of the so-called double decision taken by the NATO Council in December 1979 to deploy 572 Pershing II and Cruise Missiles from 1983 onwards. The other part of the double decision was made with the aim of opening discussions with the Soviet Union on Intermediate Range Nuclear Weapons (INF), and it was before these negotiations were started on November 30, 1981, that most large scale anti-nuclear rallies took place in several European cities. If the negotiations should fail to bring about the desired and hoped for results such rallies may occur again and could make it politically difficult to implement the decision to deploy the weapons.

Even if the Soviet Union has built enormous military power during the last decades, there are obvious weaknesses on the Soviet side as well. The enormous Soviet military power cannot compensate for the glaring weaknesses in the Soviet system. Although the Soviet Union is in a relatively better position as to access to oil and other minerals than is Western Europe, the deplorable state of Soviet agriculture is one but by no means the only sign of the serious gaps in Soviet economic development. Other gaps include a dependence on access to Western technology.
Events in Poland since early 1980 are indications of another striking weakness of the Soviet position. The whole Soviet empire has to be kept together by military force and strict police control. This would appear to make a conscious Soviet decision to launch a war upon Western Europe less likely. However, the need for continued suppression in at least part of Eastern Europe and the unwillingness to allow organized political opposition of any kind may make new local explosions more and not less likely in Eastern Europe. Indeed, it could be one of the frightening scenarios for Europe that local unrest could spread and involve Soviet armed forces and make an incursion into NATO territory a temptation in order to distract attention from the serious situation inside the borders of the Soviet empire.

Threats to European security are normally viewed within an East/West context. However, as wars in 1981 and 1982 have proved repeatedly (the Iran-Iraq war, the Israel invasion of Lebanon, the Falkland war) threats to peace and international security may arise outside the East/West context. European security is therefore not to be viewed only on the basis of her geographical position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, but also in terms of her economic dependence on trade and her continued free access to raw materials and broad international respect for codes of conduct such as international law and multilateral and bilateral treaties and conventions. Seen in this light, the prospects for European security can hardly be considered reassuring.
Whether or not one believes that armaments constitute the primary source of international conflict, it is hardly a matter of dispute that disarmament and arms control - two terms frequently used interchangeably - should be the subject of serious study and discussion.

It would be erroneous to think that our security concerns would simply disappear as a result of disarmament and arms control agreements. In fact, one of the things that is wrong with the often heated discussion is the blind faith of far too many people in them as panaceas leading to a peaceful world.

One does not have to go to the other extreme and state that arms are only the symptoms of conflicts. The existence of arms and arms races may indeed create or worsen tensions and thereby increase the risk of open conflict. Following this line of reasoning, it is therefore considered an indisputable fact that arms control and disarmament can lead, and in some cases have led, to measures stabilizing relations between two opposing countries or groups of countries.

It is therefore, for the purpose of this report, essential to take a closer look at present and future arms control negotiations and agreements to assess the contributions they may make to European security.

If no particular mention is made of the role played by the United Nations it is because this role has - unfortunately - been rather marginal except when the two super-powers have played a leading part as they did in the negotiations which led to the Non-Proliferation Agreement in 1968.

The two special sessions of the United Nations devoted exclusively to disarmament may have been useful in highlighting the preoccupation of government leaders with disarmament problems, but they led to virtually nothing. The second session held in the Summer of 1982 was generally considered an outright
failure.

UN sponsored disarmament negotiations continue to take place in the framework of the Committee on Disarmament (CD), which was created by the 1978 UN special session of disarmament to replace the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). One of the changes made was to increase the number of participating countries, a procedure which in the past has not led to more rapid progress, but the political pressure for more countries to take an active part in the talks was too strong to resist.

As seen from the point of view of European security, these UN talks are considered less important than the START, INF, and MBFR negotiations. Of these negotiations, the European countries take part in the MBFR talks only, but European security depends as much if not more on the course and the eventual outcome of the START and INF negotiations between the two superpowers.

A mention should also be made of the role played by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), even if these negotiations are not solely devoted to security issues. However, discussions on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and other security related issues have shown the potential significance of the ongoing CSCE process for European security, in spite of the disappointing results of the two follow-up conferences to the original Helsinki Conference in 1975, i.e. the Belgrade Conference in 1977-78 and the Madrid Conference in 1981-82.

The START talks (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), which began in Geneva in June 1982, are for all practical purposes the continuation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). These talks resulted in the first SALT Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972, later ratified by both super-powers, and in the SALT II-Treaty signed in 1979. Unlike SALT I, the SALT II-Treaty was never ratified.
by the United States' Senate because of the deterioration in East/West relations following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the widespread reservations in the US about the provisions of the Treaty.

President Reagan let it be known in 1981 that he did not intend to ask the Senate to ratify the SALT II Treaty as he shared the misgivings about its provisions. However, both super-powers are apparently adhering to the provisions of the Treaty, pending the outcome of the START talks begun in June 1982. The new acronym START rather than SALT is used to underline the new US emphasis on reduction rather than just limitation of the nuclear arsenals. This is in line with President Reagan's proposal for a new agreement on strategic arms, which would lead to considerable cuts in the present strategic armoury of the two super-powers.

The INF talks which started in late 1981, deal with Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (hence the term INF) in Europe. They comprise, above all, the so-called SS 20 missiles which the Soviet Union started to deploy in the mid-1970's, and the planned 572 Pershing II and Cruise Missiles which the NATO countries have decided to deploy from 1983-84 onwards, unless the talks with the Soviet Union on INF are successful.

The Western negotiating position as outlined by President Reagan is one of the so-called 'zero-option', implying that the West will not deploy the Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Western Europe if the Soviet Union agrees to cancel all its SS 20 missiles and the smaller SS 4 and SS 5 Missiles which are older and much less sophisticated versions of the highly mobile SS 20 Missiles.

The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) were earlier called TNF (Theatre Nuclear Forces) and they are sometimes referred to as the LRTNF (Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces), a term used to differentiate these medium range missiles from the intercontinental ballistic missiles deployed in the Soviet Union and in the United States or
on nuclear submarines on the one hand, and from tactical nuclear weapons to be used as battlefield weapons on the other hand.

The MBFR talks started in 1973 as a sort of military corollary to the CSCE process. The participating countries include all Warsaw Pact countries and most NATO countries, notably minus France. They deal with proposals to reduce the number of army and air force personnel in a precisely defined area in Central Europe.

After more than 9 years of negotiations the talks have produced no results, mainly because the two opposing parties have been unable to agree on the actual force levels on both sides, the Soviet Union insisting that the Warsaw Pact forces are at least 150,000 men smaller than postulated by the NATO countries. The East has claimed that there is a relative balance of forces in Europe, whereas the West has always claimed that there is a disparity amounting to more than 150,000 ground force personnel in favour of the East. The declared Western aim is therefore to eliminate this disparity in order to enhance stability in Central Europe.

When the talks were resumed on 8th July, 1982, the NATO countries tabled a draft treaty proposing that NATO and the Warsaw Pact agree to a common collective ceiling of 900,000 ground and air force personnel for each alliance, the ground forces to represent no more than 700,000 of these. Whereas no immediate Soviet reaction was forthcoming, it was pointed out by a Soviet spokesman that the West had made no effort to estimate the numbers of forces currently deployed.

Although both the negotiations on START and INF are bilateral between the United States and the Soviet Union, both are of direct interest to the Europeans.

The Europeans have been closely involved in the evolution of the INF negotiating position submitted by the Americans in Geneva and the US consults closely with its European allies on all aspects of the negotiations.
through a Special Consultative Group (SCG). The United States also informs its Allies on a regular basis of developments in the START negotiations.

By late autumn 1982, no progress had been reported on the INF talks, and Soviet statements by among others, President Bresjnev in November 1982 indicated a hardening of the Soviet position. The European NATO countries have warmly welcomed President Reagan's proposal for a zero-option, a proposal which was seen by some commentators as a concession to European pressures, which were, in part, due to the widespread demonstrations against the planned deployment of American medium range missiles. It was also seen as a response to the rise of peace movements not only in several Western European countries but also in the United States.

As far as the CSCE process is concerned, the disappointing outcome of the Madrid conference in the spring of 1982 was due to the new and colder climate in East/West relations and not to any reduced European interest in détente, arms control and confidence building measures. The proposal tabled by France to hold a European disarmament conference has not been abandoned and has in fact won general support. The holding of this conference and the prospects for it achieving concrete results obviously depend on the development of East/West relations, including developments in Afghanistan and, in particular, in Poland.

A further extension of the confidence building measures such as pre-notification of military manoeuvres and exchange of military observers will also have to await new developments in East/West relations in Europe.

When the Madrid Conference resumed on 9 November 1982, the prospects for a successful outcome had hardly improved.
It is a source of great concern to some and a source of great relief to others that the European Community is an economic and political entity without a military dimension. That this is so in no way means that Western Europe has neglected its defence. However, the task of providing for the defence of Western Europe has been entrusted to the national governments of the Western European countries and, in the case of most Western European countries, in close co-operation with the United States and Canada within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is not disputed that military defence falls outside the scope of responsibility of the European Community.

Throughout the history of the European Community, it has repeatedly been discussed if and when a military dimension could and should be added to the economic and political dimensions. Without going into the already long history of the European unification movement and of the European Community, it should be recalled that plans for the European Defence Community preceded the European Community and that the said Defence Community never got off the ground. In fact, the present European Community may partly owe its existence to the collapse of the planned European Defence Community in 1954.

Two motives were behind the EDC Treaty in the early 1950's. One was to incorporate a German military contribution to the defence of Western Europe, thereby avoiding the creation of a new German army and a national general staff. The other motive was to bring about a short-cut to the creation of a European political union without which a common defence was not conceivable. The two had to go together. That was as true then as it is true today.

The refusal of the United Kingdom to join the EDC and the non-ratification by the French National Assembly in August 1954 effectively blocked the creation of a truly united political European entity with its own integrated defence. The means by which the
desirable objective of uniting Europe should be brought about would have to be realized in other ways - if at all.

This has not stopped the discussion as to how a close European defence cooperation could be brought about. 25 years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the Community may not have moved closer to the establishment of a separate European defence capability, but Europeans are as preoccupied with security issues as ever. This preoccupation is by no means exclusively focused on the needs to bring about a specific European defence entity, which is a very controversial subject in several Community Member States. It rather takes the form of advocating an active policy of détente, in some cases amounting to a policy of equi-distance for Western Europe vis-à-vis the two super-powers. Others, however, see a need to strengthen both the conventional and the nuclear defence of Western Europe. This explains the European support for the decision in 1978 to increase defence expenditures in NATO by 3 per cent annually in real terms, (although the decision was never implemented in full) and the double decision in December 1979 to deploy Pershing II and Cruise Missiles from 1983 onwards and to start arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

There is no agreement on the consequences of Western Europe having no defence capability of its own. In a booklet in 1981 written by the directors of four Western foreign policy institutes, it was stated, 'So far, despite the existence of two nuclear powers in Western Europe and of a strong German conventional army, the Europeans have not been willing or able since 1954 to move towards a more independent European defence posture. This failure has inhibited Europe's ability to play a more significant role in world affairs.'

This may or may not be true. It cannot be stated with any certainty that Western European influence in world affairs depends on the ability of the Community to project military power in other parts of the world. It may even be alleged that the civilian status of the Community may make it somewhat more
attractive as an active partner to several countries of the Third World, as they view with considerable distrust the awesome military capabilities and possible intentions of the two competing super-powers.

On the other hand, it can hardly be disputed that if European integration is to continue, and if European Political Co-Operation is to grow significantly over the next 5-10 years, then the common security concerns of the ten, soon to be twelve, Member States of the Community will become more easily identifiable and reinforce the discussion of a new institutional approach to European defence.

However, a quick look at the existing institutions dealing with European defence tasks and preoccupations does not appear to make it more likely that the European Community is about to develop its own military dimension.

The Western European Union as it exists today on the basis of the modified Brussels Treaty of 1955 may be regarded by many as obsolescent and a relic of the past. However, it is worth recalling that article V of the Brussels Treaty lays down the nature of the commitment entered into by its signatories for their collective security. Article VIII defines the foreign policy and defence implications of this undertaking.

The WEU continues to play an arms control role, even if some of the original 1955 provisions have been modified. Furthermore, the Assembly of Western European Union continues to devote considerable time and work to defence issues, which are the proper responsibilities of the Assembly, and regularly adopts recommendations in the field of defence.

The present French Government has more than once made references to the existence of the Western European Union as the proper forum for a debate on European defence.

The reports adopted and published by the Western European Union on a number of defence issues are generally of a high quality, and some of them have been used as background
However, the Western European Union cannot be considered the natural vehicle for creating a closer Western European defence co-operation or for adding a military dimension to the European Community. This is due to its limited membership, to the general lack of interest even among several of the member governments, and to the improbability of EEC countries like Ireland, Denmark, and Greece joining the Western European Union. It would be unfortunate if some kind of rivalry should develop between the Western European Assembly and the European Parliament or, for that matter, between the Western European Union and the European Community as to which institution should be the focal point for a future European security policy. One way to avoid this is to keep in mind the difference between the military aspects of security, which are properly being discussed and dealt with by the Western European Union, and the broader issues of security, which will increasingly play a role in the European Community.

Two other institutions while making useful contributions to Western European defence cannot be considered adequate as a wider framework for a closer co-operation on defence among the ten Member States of the European Community. One is the Euro-Group, which was created in 1968, comprising the European Member States of the Atlantic Alliance except France. The primary task of Euro-Group remains the improvement of the defence capabilities of NATO in Europe. The Euro-Group activities are divided among seven sub-groups 1). The Euro-Group is closely associated with NATO, and an additional task undertaken by the

Euro-Group has been an active information policy to give public opinion, particularly in the United States, a better knowledge of the extent and nature of the contribution of Euro-Group countries to the Alliance's defence.

The Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), which was founded in February 1976 with the aim of furthering European co-operation in the defence equipment field, consists of all European member states in NATO with the exception of Iceland. The participation of France has enabled the IEPG to become gradually the pivotal European organization in the field of defence procurement. This means that nine of the ten present Member States of the Community take part in IEPG, the major objective of which is to create the basis for a more equitable European co-operation with the United States and Canada in production and procurement in the defence equipment field.

There is no formal link between NATO and IEPG, a factor that has made it possible for France to take part in the work. However, the actual progress of IEPG has been rather limited and, in the words of one of its active participants, "there has so far been more promise than delivery." The IEPG is not linked to the Community in any way, but the work of the IEPG would certainly have to be taken into consideration if further progress is to be achieved within the Community to co-ordinate arms procurement, arms production and arms sales as proposed first in the 1978 Klepsch report and in the forthcoming Fergusson report.

Several suggestions have been made in the past to co-ordinate the British and the French nuclear forces, and there has even been some talk of Franco-German nuclear co-operation. For several reasons, these proposals have never been realized and are unlikely to be realized under the present circumstances. Under the prevailing strategic conditions, Western Europe seems highly unlikely to be able to develop a credible deterrent of its own. It would require a much closer

(1) See also the report by David Greenwood of late 1980 to the Commission of the European Communities on a policy for promoting defence and technological cooperation among West European countries.
political integration than is the case today.

An institutionalized approach to setting-up a distinct European defence entity seems therefore, for the time being, to be out of the question, without even considering whether or not this would be desirable. This leaves European Political Cooperation (EPC), which despite its lack of institutional machinery - or maybe even because of it - is more likely to play an ever increasing role in the developing European security concept. Whether or not this will lead to the establishment of a military dimension for the Community is for the future to tell.
Ever since the onset of the cold war Western European security has been closely linked to and, in fact, depend upon North America, and the United States continues to play a crucial role in European security. The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, comprising nine of the ten present Community Member States and the setting-up of NATO, comprising eight of the Community Member States, was tantamount to the creation of a multilateral and institutional framework for the United States' military presence in Europe to carry out the United States' guarantee against potential Soviet aggression.

Significant changes in the Atlantic relationship could therefore have a far-reaching impact upon European security. This is not the place to review all the divergencies between the United States and Western Europe. In any discussion of the crisis in NATO - as it is sometimes called - it should be recalled that many such crises have occurred in the 33 year old history of the Atlantic Alliance.

Atlantic divergencies have been reflected in different assessments of the Soviet menace and in the conduct of détente policy. In the early 1980's, important economic issues have come to the fore. The dispute over steel exports from the Community to the United States and over agricultural policies is to be seen against the background of the drawn out economic crisis in the industrialised world. Following the decision by the United States' Government in June 1982 to apply sanctions against US companies in Europe or European companies working on US licenses to delay or to prevent the much discussed natural gas project from the Soviet Union to a number of Western European countries, yet another element has been added to strain the relationship between the United States and the Community.

Even if the disagreements are mainly outside the field of security, European-American disputes over
vital economic matters could lead to troubles for the Atlantic Alliance because the mutual perceptions of the Atlantic relationship would inevitably be affected by disputes which have their origin in different economic policies and in two distinctly different views as to the proper policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

For the purpose of this report one particular aspect needs closer examination insofar as it has a bearing on the political aspect of the Atlantic relationship. This concerns the evolution of EPC and the relationship between political consultations in EPC and the political consultations which are taking place in the NATO Council among the NATO Ambassadors and their principal aides.

During the past 10 years, EPC has come to play an ever increasing role in identifying and pursuing common European interests. It was pointed out by the then six Member States, as far back as 1970 that, security concerns were not to be explicitly excluded from the foreign policy deliberations among the Community Member States. In fact, security issues as such were only rarely discussed and military problems never. However, the co-operation among the nine Member States during the preparatory and later phases of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe did bring in a number of security issues, even if it almost happened by a backdoor. The CSCE process has been less dominated by security problems than might appear from the term itself. But a practice developed according to which the EEC States co-ordinated their views amongst themselves before they were taken up in the NATO Council, sometimes including issues that certainly bordered on security such as the Confidence Building Measures between East and West in Europe and the holding of a disarmament conference in Europe on the basis of the French proposal. By and large, this practice was deemed useful by all countries concerned including those NATO countries.

1) For a history of EPC and the Parliament's recommendations for further development of EPC, see the report by Lady Elles, adopted by the European Parliament on July 9, 1981 (Doc.No.1-335/81).
which were not and are not members of the Community.

The expansion of EPC involving a growing number of officials from the Foreign Ministries of the now ten Member States, the frequent participation by the Political Directors and the discussion of foreign policy issues, not only among the Foreign Ministers of the Ten but even in the European Council, have come to mean that EPC is having a policy-making role with obvious implications for the consultations conducted within NATO.

Contrary to the belief of some, this is not due to the Ten deliberately making inroads on security issues which have been the principal themes constantly under review in the NATO Council. Military/security issues continue to be avoided in the EPC, but the latest report on EPC - the London report adopted in October 1981 during the UK presidency - recognized for the first time that security issues have a place in EPC.

This was stated in the passage of the report which reads, "As regards the scope of EPC and having regard to the different situations of the Member States, the Foreign Ministers agree to maintain the flexible and pragmatic approach which has made it possible to discuss in political co-operation certain important foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security."

EPC deliberations on security are limited on the one hand by the participation of the Republic of Ireland, which adheres to a policy of neutrality. This Irish neutrality is to be viewed in a historical context and therefore to be seen especially in the light of the sometimes strained relationship with the United Kingdom. It has not prevented Ireland from taking full part in EPC, although the need to maintain Irish neutrality was given as the official explanation for Ireland's position during the latter phase of the Falkland conflict in 1982. The other constraint on EPC deliberations on security stemmed from the simple fact that vital security issues, including military as well as
non-military aspects of security, are being dealt with in a forum involving both the United States and Canada and those European states which are members of NATO but not of the European Community, such as Norway, Turkey, Iceland, and — for a brief while yet — Spain and Portugal.

The growing scope and the increasing significance of EPC consultations have indisputedly downgraded to some extent the NATO consultations. This is in part also due to the way EPC consultations are being prepared and carried out by the Foreign Ministries of the Ten in ever closer co-operation. This has the effect of sometimes pre-empting NATO consultations, which are not and cannot be limited to strictly military aspects of security.

The difference is, however, that security deliberations in NATO are always to be seen against the background of the role played by the armed forces of the Member States of the Alliance in deterring aggression and promoting détente, whereas EPC scrupulously avoids discussing military issues for a variety of reasons.

No formal liaison exists between EPC and NATO and in Brussels there are generally no lines of communication between EEC officials of the Commission and the Council, including those working on political problems, and NATO officials.

The modus operandi of NATO and EPC is quite different. The Foreign Ministers meet twice a year in the NATO Council, whereas the day-to-day work is being carried out by the permanent representatives and their staffs. Over the years they have established almost a club-like atmosphere in which policy recommendations and decisions are being taken on a number of political and political/military issues with the ever-present aim of maintaining an effective deterrent posture.

Within EPC, the Foreign Ministers meet more frequently. So do the Political Directors and several other officials, who form a number of specialized working groups. Because of the frequency of these meetings on several levels and the continuous co-ordination of views by way of the electronic links that connect all Foreign Ministries of the Ten, the EPC process manages
to influence national decision-making at an early stage up to and including meetings of Foreign Ministers and Heads of Government.

Procedures rather than themes are therefore one reason why the EPC process may appear to play a more crucial role in actual decision-making.

There is also an inherent attraction to EPC, because it is a relatively new phenomenon, and it forms part of a European unification process that may have lost much of its drive and public appeal, at least as far as many aspects of Community policies are concerned. But EPC has for that very reason an appeal of its own because it does give the impression of a Europe on the move. Cynics may add that it is easier to agree on lofty statements of principle and declarations of intent, such as the Venice Declaration on the Middle East, than it is to agree on policies which entail financial commitments or political obligations which may hurt at home. It is politically more attractive - and sometimes easier - to make it look as if the Community is actively involved in solving the problems of the Middle East than to reach an agreement on a fisheries policy.

It may also be a fact that political security issues which are being dealt with in EPC are considered so much more appealing than military/security issues, especially when the latter involve expenditures and maybe politically controversial commitments such as the commitment to deploy nuclear weapons. In EPC, the talks focus more on CSCE, confidence building and even disarmament.

It goes almost without saying that it could prove politically disruptive of the Atlantic relationship if the Europeans were left to consider the less controversial and politically more attractive issues within the context of the EPC, even including disarmament and arms control, whereas the more controversial issues were left to NATO. Such a division of labour does not, of course, exist but the impression lingers that it is nevertheless so.
The difficulties arise out of the historical fact that NATO consultations and EPC approach security issues from opposite sides. It therefore needs pointing out that if EPC should ever become more closely involved in drawing up arms control schemes and disarmament plans, it is an absolute necessity that EPC tackle the problems of which arms to control and which armaments to reduce. If that were to happen, it would be unavoidable that EPC should deal with the strictly military aspects of security, i.e. defence, although that is anathema to some political parties and governments in the Community—and probably unwelcome to NATO countries outside the Community. It would be sheer hypocrisy, however, to let the public gain the impression that EPC could render worthwhile contributions to the ongoing debate on arms control and disarmament without going into the more difficult area of arms deployment, force levels and other defence related topics.

Rather than keeping away from such topics it might be advisable for EPC to tackle them, as this may have a salutary effect upon those who think there is a short cut to a more comfortable level of national and international security by concentrating on arms control without taking into account the role played by armed forces on both sides in Europe to maintain a balance of power.

There is little doubt that the continuing EPC process presents problems, especially in relation to the United States. Any US Government is usually finding itself in the difficult role of being criticized if it exercises forceful leadership, but of being equally criticized if it avoids exercising any leadership at all. European attitudes vis-a-vis the presidencies of Mr. Carter and Mr. Reagan are cases in point. However, a certain frustration on the part of the United States is sometimes felt in Washington, when the administration is confronted with an EPC process whose agenda it may be unaware of and whose results may prove embarrassing, as seen from an American point of view, for later consultations in NATO.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE.

There have been nuclear weapons in Europe for almost 30 years. The first were so-called tactical nuclear weapons sent to the US forces in Europe in the early 1950s following a NATO decision and made available to certain other NATO forces in Europe under the so-called double key system. The number of nuclear warheads supplied by the United States and stationed in Western Europe was for many years semi-officially given to be about 7,000.

After NATO's decision in December 1979 to deploy medium range missiles from 1983, it was decided to withdraw 1,000 US warheads, a decision that was implemented by December 1980.

Other nuclear weapons in Europe on the Western side include of course the French and British nuclear forces.

The debate on nuclear weapons reached new heights in the early 1980's as a result of the so-called double decision by NATO in December 1979, which was again preceded by the deployment of the Soviet SS 20 missiles each equipped with three separately guided warheads. By late 1982 the number of Soviet SS 20 missiles exceeded 320.

With very detailed information on nuclear weapon deployment in Europe available elsewhere, it is beyond the scope of this report to give a breakdown of the number of nuclear weapons in Europe and their classifications and of the different assess-

1) Among the most recent publications on nuclear weapons in Europe, the rapporteur has found particularly useful the report to the Assembly of Western European Union 'The Problem of Nuclear Weapons in Europe' by Mr. Mommersteeg, who is also a member of the European Parliament, the Adelphi Paper No. 168 on 'Nuclear weapons in Europe' by Gregory Treverton, who was one of the experts who addressed the Political Affairs' Committee of the European Parliament in December 1981 in London, and the Handbook 'Nuclear Forces In Europe' by H.J. Neuman. The last two publications are issued by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. They are all included in the bibliography.
It is a development which places a considerable burden upon the political tact and diplomacy of the presiding country among the Ten. It would be both unrealistic and undesirable to try to put a brake on the expanding EPC process. It is part of the uneven and sometimes slightly disorganized development towards the elusive objective of a distinct European identity towards which the United States has always professed its sympathy.

It may be an additional obstacle for fully appreciating EPC that it sometimes appears from the outside to be in a much more advanced stage than it really is. It is also true that the legal distinction between external relations decided on a Community basis in the economic field and political decisions taken within the context of EPC are not comprehended by the outside world, which often fails to notice which hats Foreign Ministers of the Ten are wearing.
ments of the current military balance.

Three basic observations are required before going into the very significant role played by nuclear weapons both in the present military calculations on both sides and in the public debate in most Community Member States:

- The large scale demonstrations in favour of 'banning the bomb' and several statements by leading politicians and other leading figures in Western Europe notwithstanding, it must be stated categorically that nuclear weapons cannot be totally abolished if for no other reasons than because we cannot obliterate the knowledge of how to make them.

- There is therefore no conceivable policy providing an absolute guarantee that a nuclear war will not break out or that nuclear weapons will never be used. It is a matter of choosing between policies which entail different degrees of risk.

- Nuclear weapons cannot and should not be viewed simply as a new kind of more powerful weapons. In view of the enormous destruction that would follow even a limited nuclear exchange, the role of nuclear weapons can only be properly evaluated on the basis of their function as a war deterrent.

The cost of the research and developments which have led to the present sophistication of the weapons held in the huge nuclear arsenals of the two super-powers has been very large indeed. However, the controversy surrounding nuclear weapons and the widespread opposition to their deployment have very little to do with how much they cost. In fact, compared with highly sophisticated modern weaponry of a conventional nature, several types of nuclear weapons are today comparatively inexpensive. The actual price in terms of money for acquiring nuclear weapons plays only a minor role in the efforts to prevent a further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear weapons came to Europe in order to offset the quantitative Soviet preponderance in conventional forces in Europe. This preponderance has continued to exist and is generally believed to have grown more pronounced during the 1970's, especially as the qualitative lead by NATO vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact has now been mainly eroded. Even more significant has been the development in the Soviet arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons, which by the mid-seventies resulted in what is now considered parity in terms of strategic weapons between the two superpowers. At present, the Soviet Union holds a clear lead in the number of weapon launchers and in total megatonnage, whereas the United States still has a lead in the total number of warheads.

It should be added that this is the prevailing Western view on the balance of forces between East and West. The Soviet view is different. The Soviet Union maintains that there is a rough balance in all categories of weapons and forces, even if there are certain asymmetries in a number of weapon categories. The Soviet Union does not deny, however, that the overall global balance of forces has changed. The official Soviet expression is that the 'correlation of forces' has been considerably improved and that the 'Socialist camp' has grown strogger.

It is therefore to be assumed that the Soviet Union accepts that a state of nuclear parity roughly exists between the Soviet Union and the United States. This was so-to-speak codified by the SALT I Agreement in 1972, the most important part of which was not the ceiling agreed on for offensive strategic weapons, but the virtual outlawing of missile defence systems (the Anti Ballistic Missiles Treaty) except for the protection of one limited area only.

The provisions of SALT I are still in force, although new technological developments have led to a renewed discussion in the United States as to the desirability of building an ABM system.
The abolition of ABM systems gave credence to the widely accepted notion or doctrine of 'Mutually Assured Destruction', sometimes referred to as MAD.

This doctrine is based on the capacity and the intention to retaliate in kind. Insofar as the notion of MAD can be considered a military doctrine at all, it is flawed. Its credibility in preventing nuclear war presupposes not only an element of stability in the relations between the two super-powers but also in the political situation within the two countries and the absence of serious crises in the world, which might upset the bilateral super-power relationship.

In view of the strategic parity, the credibility of the United States nuclear guarantee has also been questioned by many, as it was by de Gaulle already in the mid-1960's, when the French President withdrew France from the integrated and US dominated defence system in NATO.

The debate has for many years centered around the question of whether the United States' President would be willing to retaliate in kind in case of a Soviet nuclear aggression against Western Europe or part of Western Europe - or to use nuclear weapons against a conventional Soviet attack. Would the US President be willing to risk the destruction of Washington, Boston and Pittsburg for attacks on Hamburg, Portsmouth and Bologna? Such questions and other points raised in the nuclear debate may not take fully into account the complexities and the uncertainty which are parts of the deterrent theory. The counterargument says that the Soviet Union is effectively deterred not by any certainty of the United States response to an aggression but by the uncertainty as to how and where a riposte will in fact be made.

There is, in other words, a considerable element of ambiguity in the nuclear equation between East and West. The important feature is, however, that the situation is changing all the time and it is indisputable that the Western preponderance, on which NATO strategy was based for several years, has given way to a situation marked by parity on the strategic
level and continued Soviet preponderance insofar as conventional forces are concerned. The latest element is the Soviet build-up of what is called by strategists Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF), mainly the deployment of the SS 20 missiles.

Following a speech by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London in 1977, the NATO countries started to consider the best way of dealing with what was viewed as an additional threat to the West and, in particular, to Western Europe - deliberations which led to the already frequently mentioned NATO double decision in December 1979.

This is the basis for the current controversy over nuclear weapons. It is remarkable to note that the existence of several thousand nuclear warheads in Western Europe and a similar or possibly smaller number of nuclear weapons in the East never gave rise to a debate of the kind which Europe has experienced during the past 18 months. Debates were earlier provoked when the deployment of enhanced radiation weapons - the so-called neutron bomb - was discussed. That plan gave rise to cross-Atlantic misunderstandings and to President Carter shelving the production of the weapon, though President Reagan later decided to produce it without making its possible deployment in Western Europe an issue.

The medium range missiles with nuclear warheads now commonly referred to as INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) have come to epitomize the very heated nuclear debate and have created political difficulties in some Western European countries as far as the deployment of these weapons is concerned. Opposition to the deployment has been voiced within the German Social Democratic Party and the SPD's former coalition partner, the FDP. Both the previous and present German governments have refused to modify the German acceptance of the NATO decision in 1979, which was, by definition, a unanimous decision. Since then the Belgian government has had to make its
position on the deployment issue explicitly dependent upon the outcome of the INF talks started on 30th November 1981.

The situation in the Netherlands is also uncertain after the former centre-left government decided on an open-ended postponement of the decision on whether to station the planned 48 Cruise Missiles on Dutch territory.¹

Whereas the resumption of the INF talks in late 1981 has had a somewhat calming effect upon the groups in Western Europe, which took to the streets earlier on in protest against the decision to deploy medium range missiles in Western Europe, the political unrest and demonstrations could very well return if the INF negotiations have not made real progress by the summer of 1983. The deployment of the 572 missiles in Western Europe is scheduled to start in the autumn of 1983 and to be completed by 1988.²

Whereas the first round of INF talks until March 30, 1982 was described as businesslike, no progress was noted. The Soviet position differs markedly from the Western position. In the Soviet calculation of the INF balance, a number of US weapon systems consisting primarily of fighter bombers in Western Europe plus the French and British nuclear forces, is included so as to make a rough balance. The Soviet position that a balance already exists is also explained by a reference to the partial removal of the obsolescent SS 4 and SS 5 missiles which have been replaced by SS 20 missiles during the past five years. The United States position in favour of a zero solution - which has been accepted by all NATO countries - has been criticized by the Soviet Union as favouring NATO.

Whatever one's assessment of the current balance of forces and the prospects for the INF talks

¹ The same number - 48 Cruise Missiles - is envisaged to be deployed on Belgian territory. The United Kingdom has committed itself to deploying 160 Cruise Missiles, Italy 112 Cruise Missiles, and the Federal Republic of Germany 96 Cruise Missiles + 108 Pershing II Missiles. The latter are intended to replace the 108 Short Range Pershing I Missiles.

² The missiles - if deployed - will not be deployed in all 5 countries at the same time. It is envisaged that the deployment will begin in the UK by the end of 1983 and considerably later in Belgium and Holland.
there is little doubt that the British and, in particular, the French nuclear forces are playing an important role in both military and arms control calculations. France refuses to let French nuclear forces be counted as part of the NATO forces. France is not taking part in the NATO consultations on INF (or the parallel START talks), though President Mitterand has publicly and clearly supported the decision to deploy American medium-range missiles in Western Europe to offset the Soviet advantage in these weapons.

Such are, briefly summarized, the nuclear issues currently under discussion in most Community Member States. There is no question of the Community being involved in the military nuclear controversies as such. They are not being debated by the EEC Council or by foreign ministers in the context of EPC. It is nevertheless evident that the preoccupation with the nuclear weapon issue in most Community countries and in many other countries as well, and the growing significance of security problems in EPC, make it impossible to bypass these nuclear issues in any report dealing with European security.
THE GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY.

The inclination to compartmentalize the treatment of foreign policy issues into distinct categories and isolate those with security implications from those without security implications is gradually being overtaken by events. Issues like defence planning and weapons deployment are obviously related directly to defence and are dealt with in NATO and by national governments—not by the EC and EPC. The relations between the European Community and many parts of the world, including the Third World, may be economic and political but are not deprived of security implications, when one considers for example the dependence of Western Europe on external supplies of raw materials.¹)

The European Community is unable to project military power on a Community basis to other parts of the world, including those from where the Community gets its vital supplies. Nobody can deny, however, the need to maintain conditions allowing for continued and uninterrupted trade and the European Community is in a position to apply both political and economic means to maintain those conditions. It would therefore be wrong to deny that the European Community, the largest trading bloc in the world, has a strategic role to perform in the world, even if that role is performed by non-military means. It should be added that individual members of the Community are free to act in a military capacity and that military actions, such as those carried out by France in Africa and by the United Kingdom against the Argentinian occupation of the Falkland Islands do not require prior approval by the other members of the Community.

The participation of certain Community countries

¹) No complete inventory of the mineral and vegetable raw materials available in the Community exists. However, a useful survey with much practical information and a number of recommendations is contained in the report by Mrs. L. Moreau drawn up on behalf of the Committee on External Economic Relations (Doc. 1-873/81), which was adopted by the European Parliament on March 9, 1982.
in Peace-Keeping forces, such as in Cyprus and in the Middle East, most recently in Beirut, is also evidence of the fact that Community Member States can and will play a military role outside the continent of Europe in the interest of avoiding military conflict. The participation of some Community countries in the Peace-Keeping Force in Sinai marked a new and remarkable development, because this force is not a UN force.

This participation reflects the strong European interest in the Middle East and a recognition of the need to make a visible contribution to the preservation of peace between Egypt and Israel.

The relations of the Community with the rest of the world have an undeniable global dimension. This is explained by a number of factors. The European dependence on supplies from Asia, Africa and Latin America has already been mentioned. Western Europe is dependent on other countries for 75 per cent of its supplies of basic materials. The developing countries play a very important role in supplying the Community in view of the fact that more than half of the raw materials available on the world markets are produced in these countries. The EEC's dependence is likely to increase because of the relative scarcity of raw materials as compared with a foreseeable growth in requirements. Furthermore, prices will not only depend on the free play of competition but also on the political factors involved. The situation is aggravated by the fact that 75 per cent of the reserves of 15 minerals are held by only five countries, which often conclude agreements among themselves based as much on political considerations as on market rules.

Western European dependence on oil from the Middle East is often quoted as an example of Western Europe's strategic vulnerability in light of the lack of a European military capability to protect its...

These figures are quoted from the Moreau report op. cit.
vital oil supplies from the Middle East. That situation has been evident for a number of years, however, and it has not led the members of the European Community to take steps to try to protect these vital supply routes by military means on a Community basis. However, some Community countries are militarily active, or could become militarily active, in the area if required, but it is generally recognized that in terms of military defence the United States' role will in any case be vital.

Whenever individual Member States of the Community and Community institutions or the ten Governments acting collectively are taking steps in the political and economic sphere to protect the interests of Western Europe, it has a bearing on European security.

It is also true that it is a matter of concern to the Community what kind of government exists in the developing world. Through the Lomé Convention the Community maintains particularly close relations with 63 developing countries, above all in Africa, and although the Lomé Convention does not in any way imply a protective European role vis-à-vis the 63 ACP countries - and would be counterproductive if it did - it is in the interest of the Community that these countries act as free agents and do not become satellites of external powers. It is in the same vein that the Community will always be interested in encouraging a political evolution towards democratic and pluralistic societies, though there is, of course, no attempt being made to enforce such developments on the part of the Community.

The active involvement of the Community and its Member States is also evident in countries and regions which are less directly associated with Community than are the Lomé countries. One example is the agreement concluded between the Community and the ASEAN countries in South-East Asia.

This situation was dealt with in the report prepared for the Political Affairs Committee by Mr Diligent, Doc. 1-697/80-adopted by the European Parliament on 19 November 1981.
In the framework of EPC, the Ten have repeatedly expressed views on developments in Asia, Latin America and Africa. Although such pronouncements and sometimes even actions can frequently be seen in the light of the humanitarian efforts undertaken by the Community there is obviously a distinct political perspective in such positions. They are implicitly, if not explicitly, designed to foster developments towards a greater degree of stability as is, for instance, the case in Central America.

In conclusion, it is fair to say that although the European Community always and its Member States usually, abstain from direct military intervention in Third World Affairs the Community has considerable leverage by virtue of its economic power to influence developments in various parts of the world.

On a number of occasions the Community has flexed its economic muscles. In May 1980, economic sanctions were introduced against Iran. They were limited in scope and had presumably little effect. Economic sanctions were introduced by the Community on 16th March 1982 against the Soviet Union because of developments in Poland, and during the Falkland conflict an immediate arms boycott was introduced followed by an interruption of all trade with Argentina until the cessation of hostilities when the restrictions were again lifted.

Economic sanctions are normally not considered a very effective instrument of foreign policy. In a report prepared by Hans-Joachim Seeler for the Committee on External Economic Relations (Doc. 1-83/82) it is clearly and in the view of this rapporteur correctly stated that the history of economic sanctions is marked by negative results and that economic sanctions have generally turned out to be incapable of achieving foreign policy goals. A similar view has been expressed by the US Secretary of State George Shultz, though the United States' policy in terms of economic sanctions especially vis-à-vis the Soviet Union has occasionally turned out to be somewhat different from that of the Member States of the European Community.
Whatever the effect of economic sanctions, such measures can under certain conditions serve political purposes. The half-hearted European sanctions vis-à-vis Iran in 1980 were less an attempt to force Iran to release the hostages than an act of solidarity with the United States. It is uncertain whether the economic sanctions by the Community towards Argentina had any significant results on Argentinian war efforts, but the political and psychological impact of the sanctions was considerable.

The recent examples of sanctions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and Argentina are therefore evidence of the willingness of the Community Member States to support their foreign policy declarations with actions.

The extent to which such actions in the economic sphere can, in fact, contribute to the security of the Community Member States is uncertain. As an act of solidarity, a decision by the Ten or a majority of the Ten - as in the case of the latter phase of the Falkland conflict - it may well have consequences with a bearing on the security position of the Ten. This obviously also applies to a situation where the United States applies sanctions and the Member States of the Community do not. This has been clearly and most dramatically illustrated in the case of the gas project from the Soviet Union to Western Europe.

If European and American views on economic, including credit, policies towards the Soviet Union continue to diverge it could have unfortunate repercussions for the Atlantic Alliance and consequently for the security of Western Europe. The risk may not be so much that either the United States or the European members of NATO would reappraise their continued adherence to the Atlantic Pact. The danger is rather that a deep split between the United States and Western Europe could change the Soviet perception of the Atlantic Alliance and the United States' commitment to Europe in a way which could seriously enhance the threat to Western Europe.
NEUTRALISM AND PACIFISM IN EUROPE.

The rise of different peace movements and of anti-nuclear organizations of one kind or another has undoubtedly had an impact upon the security debate in Western Europe during the last few years. It appears that as of 1981 onwards it has a parallel in the United States, although there is not complete similarity between the so-called freeze movement in the United States and the anti-nuclear movement in Western Europe. The latter comprises, among others, the unilateralists who are willing to do away with nuclear weapons on the Western side in Europe without any previous agreement with the Soviet Union to ensure that abolition of nuclear weapons is mutual.

There is no question that the peace movements in Europe have had an impact upon governments and that they reflect a considerable segment of public opinion. How large and how important is very difficult to assess, because the term peace movement is used to cover various groups and movements with somewhat different aims and united only in their protests against what they consider to be a continued arms race and, especially, a continued nuclear arms race.

Some of the peace movements focus on the planned deployment of American medium range missiles from 1983 onwards in order to prevent the decision from being implemented. Others support unilateral Western European renunciation of all nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of all American nuclear weapons from Europe. Others advocate a freeze at the present level of nuclear weapons. Others are directed exclusively against the United States under President Reagan and others again are protesting against both superpowers.

In an attempt to analyse whether the rise of the peace movements and anti-nuclear groups is likely to have a lasting effect upon the conduct of the security policy of all or some of the Community Member States, the first question to ask is if the current trend will lead any NATO member state to leave the Atlantic.
Alliance. This must be considered very unlikely. Government declarations and party programmes clearly indicate a preference for the continued existence of the Atlantic Alliance and those groups almost exclusively to be found on the extreme left, who want their countries to leave the Atlantic Alliance are quite obviously a minority, even a rather small minority.

Disagreements are much more discernible when it comes to a definition of how to implement NATO policies. Public opinion polls reveal, perhaps not quite unexpectedly, that the majority of Europeans are in favour of NATO and are against a heavy reliance on nuclear weapons for the defence of Western Europe. At the same time only a minority is ready to support increased defence expenditure, which could strengthen the conventional defence posture and diminish the dependence on nuclear weapons.

It seems reasonable to conclude that the various peace movements, their mass meetings and demonstrations against nuclear weapons notwithstanding, do not offer a clearly defined alternative security policy. There are obviously strong neutralist currents both within and, to a lesser extent, outside the peace movements. Insofar as they advocate alternative policies to continued membership of NATO, they do not seem to favour the establishment of an independent Western Europe with its own armed forces. The neutralist tendencies seem rather to go hand in hand with pacifism and a widespread, if by no means unanimous, view is that Western Europe should withdraw from unhealthy military competition between the two superpowers and base its future security on being
more or less disarmed or only lightly armed and certainly without any nuclear weapons on the continent. However, even the British Labour Party, which is officially committed to nuclear unilateralism, has no majority in favour of outright withdrawal from NATO.

Others who lean towards at least the objectives of some of the peace movements want to renounce nuclear weapons in Western Europe, but advocate at the same time an increased rearmament to equip Western Europe with a more credible conventional defence posture to enable the West to accept a no-first-use of nuclear weapons doctrine to which the Soviet Union already professes to adhere.

In some countries, and notably in the Netherlands, the churches play an important role in the peace movements. Public opinion polls indicate a widespread support for the large scale peace demonstrations and especially the opposition against the planned deployment of medium-range missiles.

Public opinion polls may not be the most instructive guide to the complexities of foreign policy and security issues. A simplified question (Are you for or against nuclear weapons in Europe?) is likely to provoke an equally simplified reply. However, the sentiments opposed to a further increase of the nuclear weapons arsenal are evident, even if they in no way constitute a clear-cut alternative to present security policies.

A recent American Congressional publication dealing with the crisis in the Atlantic Alliance contains a warning example of how mutual perceptions can take extreme forms. In Europe, it is said, "much of the media and certain leaders of the anti-nuclear movement painted the picture of the United States gone wild, bound and determined to confront the Soviet Union led by a reckless cowboy with six guns at the ready... In the United States, corresponding images characterized the Europeans as weak-willed pacifists, duped by Soviet propaganda, manipulated by the KGB and ready to unfurl the flag of
surrender at the first sign of trouble.

It would certainly be premature and probably also unrealistic to view the current trends as an indication of an early breakup of the Atlantic Alliance. There seems little likelihood that the security system which has existed in Europe for more than 30 years, with the United States and the Soviet Union both playing vital roles within their respective alliance systems, should cease to exist or even radically change.

For the purpose of this report, it is of particular interest to note that the present restlessness with the existing security system and especially with the role played by nuclear weapons, is not associated with any new plan to give the European Community its own independent military dimension. Most peace demonstrators seem unwilling to face the choice of whether a Europe more independent of the United States than at present should be armed at all.

Because EPC must occasionally focus on and identify areas where European interests are not identical with those of the United States, EPC does contain a certain appeal to the neutralist left in Western Europe, although the left-wing neutralists usually view EEC with considerable scepticism and are generally hostile to the idea of an integrated (Western) Europe. As nine of the ten Member States belong to the Atlantic Alliance (although France has been outside the military arm of NATO since 1966) and have no intention whatsoever of leaving the Alliance, there is no anti-American bias built into EPC. But in view of the divergent US and European views on a number of economic and even political issues, such a bias may be perceived by those who would like to advocate and encourage anti-Americanism.

This does not by itself create the necessary political conditions within the Community Member States for the establishment of a common European defence entity. It may, however, have an impact upon the perceptions which will eventually form part of a European security concept.

There is no need for Western Europe, even in times of deep crisis vis-à-vis the United States, to provide a military defence against North America. Only a tiny minority will allege that the United States constitutes an armed threat against Western Europe, however much many people may dislike the policies or the verbal extravagances of the current US administration. Anti-American and anti-nuclear sentiments may encourage neutralist tendencies in Western Europe, but if they should continue to grow, they are more likely to lead to a fragmented Europe than to a united Europe with its own foreign policy and own defence establishment. In short, neutralism and pacifism provide no viable alternative to the present security concept of two opposing alliance systems.
CONCLUSIONS.

People impatient with the progress of European integration, amply represented in the European Parliament, will sometimes feel tempted to call for the revival of the European Defence Community. This is not realistic under present conditions. It is also considered highly undesirable by many.

A new treaty setting up the framework for a European defence entity would not be signed by all Member Governments and probably ratified by even fewer. It would stir new controversies which would harm the present Community and it could have a paralyzing effect upon the progress of European Political Co-operation.

This also explains why this report is not recommending the setting-up at the present time of a separate committee, or a sub-committee under the Political Affairs Committee, to deal with security problems. Such a procedure could isolate security issues from the foreign policy context where they belong.

But if the European Community has a future at all it is inevitable that security and one day even defence will become part of it. The absurdity of building up a European economic and political entity and ignoring forever security and defence has been pointed out by many. It was succinctly put by Mr. Leo Tindemans in his far too often overlooked report on a European Union in 1975. It has been underlined several times in debates in the European Parliament long before the Parliament was directly elected. It has been clearly stated by the present President of the European Commission, Mr. Gaston Thorn. The Genscher/Colombo initiative is directed towards creating a more satisfactory link between Community policies and foreign and security policies.

It is logical and indeed necessary that security considerations are now officially part of the agenda of European Political Co-operation. It is also a fact that increased attention is now being given to the role in a European industrial policy to be played by
a common European approach to arms development, arms procurement, arms research, and arms sales. 1)

However logical the connection between security, foreign policy and Community affairs, talks, reports and blueprints do not constitute the necessary political basis for building a European defence community. It is this rapporteur's view that it would be a fundamental error to focus exclusively or even primarily on an institutional solution to the problem of integrating security and defence fully into the affairs of the Community. In fact, as the Community has developed it is logical to assume that a truly integrated European defence will constitute the final phase of the whole European integration process. Few people would dare to set a date for the likely achievement of this goal.

It is the thrust of this report that without a military dimension, and even without an openly stated common security policy, the Community Member States are nevertheless developing a joint security concept. This grows out of decisions taken both on a national level and on a Community level.

A European identity is not created simply by accepting a governmental declaration on the subject as was done a decade ago. It is being created by an increasing number of decisions made and attitudes taken by the Ten - and sometimes more than the Ten - focusing on those elements which are uniquely European. The more European decisions and attitudes, the more substantive will be the European identity and subsequently the corresponding European security concept.

1) This is the principal topic of the forthcoming Fergusson report for the Political Affairs Committee. See also the speech by Mr. Christopher Tugendhat, Vice-President of the Commission, on May 14, 1981 on the Community dimension to Europe's defence.
This process is forced upon the Community by political and economic developments in the world, by new and existing trade patterns, by availability of resources and by many other factors.

It is being made increasingly clear that European countries have a growing number of identical interests. It is also clearer today than before that these interests are not always identical with those of the United States, the principal guarantor of European security.

This does not mean that diverging security interests will lead to the breakup of the Atlantic Alliance. If that happened, it would be only as a result of miscalculation on either side of the Atlantic. The more that common European interests are identified and perceived, the more effectively they can be managed.

The Atlantic security link can therefore be handled more confidently, both when the sharing of interests between North America and Western Europe can lead to joint or parallel actions and policies, and when recognizably different American and European interests require different actions and policies executed with the understanding that the security relationship need not, indeed should not, be fatally harmed.
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When the report was put to a vote in the Political Affairs Committee, there were 33 votes in favour, 5 against and 4 abstentions.

It is not possible to summarise jointly the views of those who either voted against or abstained, because their views differed and their motives varied. Mrs. Hammerich (of the Group for Technical Co-ordination) found the report to be in violation of the Rome Treaty and dangerous from the point of view of peace in Europe and in the world, paragraph 5 being the most dangerous paragraph.

Mr Capanna, an alternate Member from the same Group, saw the report as contributing to a European security community with the inevitable result of bringing about a military industrial complex within the Community. This could lead to 'adventurous military interventions' by the Community outside Europe.

Mr Balfe, of the Socialist Group, voted against because the report was in contradiction to the position taken by his party, the Labour Party, on unilateral nuclear disarmament.

Mr Ephremidis, of the Communist Group, considered the report to be in violation of the Treaty. He has found several imprecise formulations in the explanatory statement.

Mr Kyrkos, of the Communist Group, while recognising the validity of many parts of the report, took exception to its political line, which was contrary to his own political beliefs.

Mr Plaskovitis, of the Socialist Group, could support many parts of the report, but was dissatisfied with the Rapporteur's unwillingness to give explicit attention to the special position of certain Member countries, politically and geographically.

Mrs. van den Heuvel, of the Socialist Group, expressed herself in favour of several parts of the report, but took exception to paragraph 5, and consequently abstained in the final vote.
THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION

12 December 1979

Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers
Brussels (1)
Chairman: Mr. J. Luns.

Quantitative and qualitative improvements to Soviet long range nuclear capability

1. At a special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels on 12th December 1979:

2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 Summit where governments expressed the political resolve to meet the challenges to their security posed by the continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up.

3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been especially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet decisions to implement programmes modernizing and expanding their long-range nuclear capability substantially. In particular, they have deployed the SS-10 missile, which offers significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theatre role. During this period, while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) both quantitatively and qualitatively, Western LRTNF capabilities have remained static. Indeed these forces are increasing in age and vulnerability and do not include land-based, long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

4. At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a modernization and expansion of their shorter-range TNF and greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the background of increasing Soviet inter-continental capabilities and achievement of parity in inter-continental capability with the United States.

5. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance, because, if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theatre nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in inter-continental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance’s deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO’s available nuclear response to aggression.

6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the Alliance if NATO’s strategy of flexible response is to remain

(1) France did not participate in the Special Meeting.
credible. After intensive consideration, including the merits of alternative approaches, and after taking note of the positions of certain members, Ministers concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance would best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization and arms control.

7. Accordingly Ministers have decided to modernize NATO’s LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of US ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing US Pershing I-A, and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads. All the nations currently participating in the integrated defence structure will participate in the programme: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries and certain support costs will be met through NATO’s existing common funding arrangements. The programme will not increase NATO’s reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this connection, Ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernization, 1,000 US nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, Ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group is undertaking an examination of the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO’s nuclear armoury as a whole. This examination will form the basis of a substantive report to NPG Ministers in the Autumn of 1980.

8. Ministers attach great importance to the role of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of détente. This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and détente in the 1980s. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance’s efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member States and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcome the contribution which the SALT II Treaty makes towards achieving these objectives.

9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NATO, arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems. This would reflect previous Western suggestions to include such Soviet and US systems in arms control negotiations and more recent expressions by Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

A. Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems.
B. Limitations on US and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on US and Soviet land-based long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.

10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the US negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defence Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations as well as in other arms control negotiations at their semi-annual meetings.

11. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defence and thus maintain the security of its member States.

A. A modernization decision, including a commitment to deployments, is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defence needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.

B. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements, and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence and détente as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC. 1-931/80) ANNEX III
tabled by Mr Schall, Mr Lucker, Mr Klepsch, Mr Vergeer, Mr von Hassel, Mr Adonnino, Mrs Gaiotti de Biase, Mr Janssen van Raay, Mr Penders, Mr Pflimlin, Mr d'Ormesson, Mr Herman, Mr Fischbach and Mr Pottering
on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrat Group)
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure
on European political cooperation on matters of security policy

The European Parliament,
- conscious of its responsibility to the citizens of Europe on all issues of vital importance to Europe,
- aware of the role which the European Community must play and of the need for it to make a significant contribution to international peace,
- aware of the disturbing increase in the level of armaments, which also imposes serious burdens on the developing countries,
- conscious of the commitment to safeguard human rights, which is inseparable from the commitment to the security and independence of nations,
- aware of the need to guarantee the security of shipping routes and international trade in the interests of the economy of Europe and of all nations,
- deeply concerned at the grave international political situation,
- having regard to the worrying fact that the invasion of Afghanistan and the brutal Soviet repression has remained a 'fait accompli' despite condemnations from all over the world and the brave resistance of the Afghan people,
- having regard to the instability of the international political situation, in which major economic and social disparities and the sharp increase in areas of tension may provide opportunities for or provoke military adventures,
- whereas the present situation dangerously weakens the prospects for disarmament and makes it more difficult to achieve the necessary reduction in nuclear arsenals,
- aware of the fact that the growing concentration on military expenditure in the industrialised and developing countries alike intensifies the imbalance in the world economy and increases the risk of tension
- convinced that détente is indivisible and inevitably depends on our countries taking joint coordinated measures to deter any aggression,
1. Strongly urges the Member States of the Community to include in their sphere of responsibility and in the context of political cooperation all aspects of the serious threat to world peace and the security of the nations of Europe as well as that of the more directly threatened countries of the Middle East posed by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and to take the necessary steps to guarantee international peace and the security of the nations of Europe;

2. Instructs its Political Affairs Committee to submit to Parliament a report on security and defence questions based on the following political premises:
   - the realization that there is no alternative to the political and military alliance between the United States and Europe - an alliance which has in the past provided and still provides a guarantee for international peace and security and which has demonstrated its peaceful, defensive and democratic nature over the past 30 years - and that complete solidarity with the United States is therefore compatible in this respect with a joint European initiative;
   - support for all political moves that genuinely aim at securing arms limitation subject to controls, an important contribution to the protection of nations and the progress of détente;
   - intensification of political and economic cooperation with the Third World and increased support for countries particularly hard hit by current developments;
   - support for the Western European Union and its Parliamentary Assembly, which are responsible for arms policy and arms control, and for the efforts of the Atlantic community in security matters;

3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Commission of the European Communities.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC. 1-30/81)
tabled by Mr Lomas, Mr Seal, Mr Caborn, Mr Megahy
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure
on peace and detente

The European Parliament,

- notes the constructive proposals made by President Brezhnev
  in his speech to the Congress of the Communist Party of the
  Soviet Union,
- notes particularly the following proposals:

1. the calling of a Special Session of the Security Council
   of the United Nations with the participation of top leaders
   of Member States and other states to look for solutions
   to prevent war,
2. the holding of Soviet/United States talks at the highest
   level,
3. agreed advance notification of military exercises in the
   whole of the European USSR with corresponding extensions
   by the West,
4. concrete negotiations for Far East confidence building measures,
5. an international agreement on the Persian Gulf which could be
   discussed along with the international aspect of Afghanistan.

1. Calls upon the Governments of all Member States and the
   United States to respond positively to these proposals and
   to make genuine efforts to improve detente and cooperation
   in Europe and the world,
2. Instructs the President to forward this resolution to the
   Governments of the Member States and to the Government of the
   United States.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc. T-497/81)
tabled by Mr Schall, Mr Pedini, Mr d'Ormesson, Mr von Hassel, Mr Jansen van Rasy, Mr Fischbach, Mr Herman
on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party (Christian-Democratic Group)
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure
on the two-part NATO decision

The European Parliament,

- conscious of its responsibility as a directly-elected parliament for the security of the European partner states,

- having regard to the military superiority of the Warsaw Pact over NATO, particularly following the introduction of Soviet nuclear theatre weapons, against which NATO has nothing comparable to offer as a deterrent,

- recognizing that the measures decided upon in December 1979 by the supreme NATO bodies to modernize their Euro-strategic weapons and at the same time to offer to negotiate on disarmament represent a decision of fundamental importance, particularly for the security of the European partner states,

- having regard to the decisions by the European governments to adhere to the two-part NATO decision, albeit on certain conditions in some cases,

- convinced that detente, the security of the nations of Europe and mutual balanced disarmament talks between East and West in future will be centrally and fundamentally dependent on this decision,

- having regard to the wave of propaganda and efforts to create confusion directed primarily at the European partner states by the Soviet Union and to the threats of various political activities by the Soviet Government designed to prevent NATO modernization following the previous unilateral arms build-up by the Warsaw Pact and to being about the cancellation of the NATO two-part decision,

- concerned at the growing influence now being exerted on security issues in large areas of public opinion by emotions aroused by political parties and the media, which is in line with and furthers Soviet security strategy and is likely to weaken the consensus, among the European members of NATO and encourage opposition to United States security policy.

1. Reaffirms, in the light of the security interests and the desire of the nations of Europe for peace, detente and mutually balanced disarmament, the necessity of modernization in the field of Euro-strategic weapons as an essential counterdeterrent and simultaneously and independently thereof an immediate resumption of disarmament talks;
2. Repudiates the threats issued by the Soviet Government to individual European members of NATO and the European public as gross interference in the most important sphere of sovereign states' external affairs;

3. Calls upon and encourages the national governments of the allied European states, the Council and NATO,
   - to adhere unconditionally to the two-part NATO decision and thus ensure the security of Europe and
   - to counter one-sided Soviet propaganda by providing more information to clarify the security issues involved and explain these more clearly to the public;

4. Instructs the President of the European Parliament to forward this resolution to the NATO Supreme Command, the Council, the Commission, the national governments of the Member States and to bring it to the attention of the European public.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC. 1-700/81)
tabled by Mr Efremidis, Mr Adamou and Mr Alavanos
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure
on the European Parliament's support for the Member States of the EEC in their
endeavours for peace

The European Parliament,

- whereas the 1982 draft preliminary budget of the European Communities now under discussion includes expenditure on research in the nuclear sector,

- whereas proposals have recently been made seeking systematically to develop the European Communities into a military Community (Genscher proposals), to build up the EEC's naval power (decision of the Political Affairs Committee) and to encourage the European Communities to play an active role within the framework of the dangerous cold war policy of the USA and NATO (Commissioner Tugendhat's statements),

- whereas the problem of European security has now reached an extremely critical point, particularly following the decision to base Pershing II and Cruise nuclear missiles in member countries of NATO, and in the light of the production of the neutron bomb by the USA and the promotion of plans to develop it in the Member States of the EEC following the statements by American officials on limited nuclear war,

- whereas all the countries of Western Europe are in ferment in an unprecedentedly powerful mass movement against nuclear weapons and the neutron bomb that embraces the peoples of all our countries regardless of political persuasion,

- whereas the European Parliament, which is elected by direct universal suffrage, cannot ignore the foremost problem concerning the peoples of our countries.

Resolves

1. To express its support for the peoples of Western Europe in their endeavours to remove the nuclear threat, to promote détente and to bring about a reduction in the level of armaments, fully sharing their deep anxiety for the future of peace in Europe;
ANNEX

To express most emphatically its opposition to the aspirations and proposals of leaders of the European Communities aiming to bring about the open involvement of the EEC in the USA's cold war policy and to convert it into a European branch of NATO;

3. To examine with special care the allocation of appropriations in the 1982 draft budget and to delete those directly or indirectly connected with military aims, particularly in the nuclear sector;

4. To declare itself in favour of the immediate opening of negotiations to achieve a balance at the lowest possible level, as a decisive step in the process of mutual, controlled disarmament;

5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council and the Governments of the Member States.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC.1-760/81)
tabled by Mrs Gaiotti de Biase, Mr Klepsch, Mr Vergeer, Mr Simonnet, Mr Herman,
Mr Ligios, Mr Macario, Mr Ghergo and Mr Fischbach
on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party (CD Group)
with request for topical and urgent debate pursuant to Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure
on balanced and controlled disarmament

The European Parliament,

- whereas the Geneva arms negotiations open on 30 November 1981,
- considering that, by launching their political initiative, European
governments helped to pave the way for these negotiations,
- reaffirming its own commitment to peace, being taken to mean

(a) complete openness to negotiation and dialogue,
(b) searching for means to establish mutual trust,
(c) economic cooperation and balanced development amongst all the peoples
of the world,
(d) furtherance of democracy and human rights,

- aware of the duty of a parliament elected by universal suffrage to
represent the hopes and aspirations of all European peoples for peace,
- aware of the need for the principles of Helsinki to be reapplied in
a coherent manner so that, for example, Afghanistan regains self-
determination and the situation in Poland is allowed to develop
peacefully without interference,

1. Requests the governments of the powers taking part in the arms
negotiations beginning on 30 November 1981 to pursue with the utmost
determination the objective of balanced and controlled reduction
of nuclear and conventional weapons to the lowest possible level;

2. Calls on the President of the Council and the governments of the
Member States to engage in transparent and concerted political
cooperation to be able to bring due influence to bear in the
defence of European interests in the cause of peace and security
within the framework of the Atlantic alliance and of balanced and
controlled disarmament;

3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council
and Commission.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC. 1-766/81) tabled by Mrs Lizin, Mr Boyes, Mrs Baduel-Glorioso, Mrs Castellina, Mrs Cinciari-Rodano, Mr Michel, Mr Capanna, Mrs Clwyd, Mrs Ewing, Mr Balfe, Mr Vandemeulebroucke, Mr Griffiths, Ms Quin, Mr Lomas, Mr Hume, Mr Ceravolo, Mr Ferrero, Mr Vitale, Mr Papapietro, Mr Bonacini, Mr de Goede, Mr Eisma, Mr Veronesi, Mr Kyrkos with request for urgent and topical debate pursuant to Rule 48 on peace in Europe

"The European Parliament,
- recalling the deep attachment to peace of the peoples in Europe;
- noting that recently, in Bonn, Rome, London, Brussels, Paris, Amsterdam and other cities, well over a million people have demonstrated against Europe becoming the battleground of a nuclear conflict;
- concerned that while resources are wasted on nuclear weaponry, the pressing needs of economic and social development in the third world are inadequately met;
- noting that negotiations are due to start on November 30 between the United States and the Soviet Union about arms reductions;
1. Calls on the negotiations to take account of the wishes of the people of Europe, who:
   - reject the installation of new NATO medium-range missiles on European soil;
   - seek the dismantling of similar missiles installed by the Soviet Union;
   - reject the deployment of neutron bombs in Europe;
   - want gradual elimination of all nuclear weapons in Europe;
2. Urges that every effort be made to promote world peace;
3. Calls on its President to transmit this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the governments of the Member States, of all other European States, and of the USSR and the USA."
ANNEX IX

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC.1-904/81)
tabled by Mr Glinne, Mr Jaquet, Mr G. Fuchs, Mr Hansch, Mr van Miert, Mr B. Friedrich,
Mrs Focke, Mr Zagari, Mr Cariglia, Mr Dido, and Mr J. Moreau
on behalf of the Socialist Group
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure
on the USA-USSR disarmament negotiations in Geneva

The European Parliament,

- having noted the recent statements as to the possibility of limited nuclear war in Europe,
- having regard to the deployment of Soviet SS 20 missiles,
- having regard to the danger of Pershing II and cruise missiles being installed by way of retaliation,

1. Reaffirms that disarmament, non-use of force and recourse to international arbitration must continue to be the guiding principles of all responsible political action;

2. Expresses the wish that the negotiations between the USA and the USSR which resumed on 30 November should have as their objective a reduction of armaments and tension in Europe and lead to effective and simultaneous disarmament guaranteeing the security of each nation and its right to self-determination;

3. Expresses its resolve to press for the necessary balance of forces to be achieved in Europe at the lowest level, by the dismantling of SS 20 missiles together with the non-installation of Pershing II and cruise missiles, and by endeavouring also to achieve a balance - at the lowest level - of all medium-range nuclear weapon systems in Europe;

4. Endorses moreover the aim of the total abolition of medium-range nuclear weapons in Central Europe;

5. Considers that the success of the disarmament negotiations in respect of both nuclear and conventional weapons presupposes the attainment of an overall balance of forces, of such a kind that neither side can gain advantage over the other;

6. Wishes the European Parliament to follow the progress of the negotiations stage by stage and to adopt a position in the light of the concerns expressed above;
7. Expresses finally its sympathy with the attitude of the hundreds of thousands of men and women who recently underlined, by their demonstrations, the fact that the maintenance of peace is the prerequisite for social well-being and who, in their vast majority, are motivated by the desire to safeguard peace and strengthen understanding between peoples through a resumption of the East-West dialogue and intensification of the North-South dialogue;

8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign Ministers of the Ten meeting in Political Cooperation and to the Council and the Commission.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC. 1-784/81)
tabled by Mr van Aerssen, Mr Klepsch, Mr von Hassel, Mr Giavazzi, Mr d'Ormesson,
Mr Penders, Mr Herman, Mr Aigner, Mr Habsburg, Mr Barsani, Mr Siminitz, Mr Béumer,
Mr Katzer, Mr Estgen, Mr Adonnino, Mr Lemmer, Mr de Kaersmaeker, Mr del Duca,
Mr Deschamps, Mr Hoffman, Mr Brok, Mr Notenboom, Mr Ghingo, Mrs Cassan-Magnago Cerretti,
Mr Docklet, on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party
for entry in register
pursuant to Rule 49 of the Rules of Procedure
on the violation of Swedish territorial waters by a Soviet submarine

The European Parliament,
— deeply shocked by the news of the presence of a Soviet submarine,
equipped with nuclear weapons, intercepted and boarded in Swedish territorial waters;

1. Condemns this violation of international law, of the sovereignty
of a neutral state and of the Helsinki Final Act which was also
signed by the USSR;

2. Notes that the Swedish authorities have expressed the fear that
the Soviet submarine had released nuclear mines in the surrounding
waters;

3. Expresses its sympathy to the Swedish people and government and
its admiration for their resolute attitude in this situation;

4. Considers that this unfriendly act by the USSR is inconsistent
with its own proposals to denuclearize the Arctic and Baltic waters;

5. Demands that the negotiations which are about to commence in Geneva
and which concern a mutual reduction to the lowest possible level
of European strategic nuclear weapons should be entered into in a
spirit of sincerity and mutual honesty, which presupposes that the
incident which took place in Sweden cannot be repeated under any
circumstances;

6. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign
Ministers of the ten Member States of the Community meeting in
political cooperation and the Swedish, Soviet and United States
Governments.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOC. 1-268/82)
tabled by Mr Ephremis, Mr Adamou, Mr Alavanos, Mr Lomas, Mr Boyes, Mr Balfe,
Mrs Clwyd, Mr Megahy, Mr Caborn, Mr van Minnen and Mr Seal
Pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure
on the second UN Special Session on Disarmament

The European Parliament,

A. whereas the second UN Special Session on Disarmament will be held in June;

B. aware that, particularly over the last few months, new elements of international tension have built up which threaten world peace more than ever before;

C. considering that the enormous expenditure on arms, particularly nuclear weapons, the production of the neutron bomb, the deployment of new weapons systems, the promotion of plans for chemical and other weapons of mass destruction, the use of and threat to use the 'food weapon' and the intensification of the climate of war, are matters of grave concern to the peoples of the world and threaten the human race with extinction;

D. considering that peace is the common heritage of all mankind, that there is no alternative and that, consequently, its defence is both the duty of all peoples and all governments and also a basic human right;

E. considering that peace can be maintained and strengthened by halting the arms race, reducing military expenditure and by encouraging disarmament;

F. recognizing the close link for all countries between disarmament and international security, the economic and social development of nations and the establishment of a new world economic order;

G. whereas these considerations carry particular weight for Europe, where there already exists the greatest concentration of nuclear weapons and where plans are being advanced for the installation of new weapon systems (Pershing II, Cruise, neutron bomb), while the doctrines of 'limited nuclear war' and 'first strike' on European territory are being put forward;

H. recognizing the urgent need for the cancellation of these plans and for action to reduce the nuclear arsenal to the lowest possible level with a view to the complete removal of all weapons of mass destruction from the European continent;
I. recalling that at the first UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, the Member States of the United Nations, including the Member States of the EEC, resolved to take action in favour of disarmament as the only solution for the survival of mankind;

1. CALLS ON:

a) the Member States to contribute with all means at their disposal to the success of the second UN Special Session on Disarmament;

b) the governments of the Member States, who approved the declarations in the final document of the first Special Session in 1978, to meet the obligations entered into;

c) the governments of the Member States to take all necessary steps - by radio, television etc. - to inform their peoples of the dangers arising from the production of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and of the benefits of a policy of arms reduction and disarmament;

d) the governments of the Member States to respond positively to the desire of their people for disarmament expressed in pacifist demonstrations;

2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council of the European Communities, the governments of the Member States and to the Secretary-General of the UN.