REPORT

drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee

on the surveillance and protection of shipping routes for supplies of energy and strategic materials for the countries of the European Community

Rapporteur: Mr A. DILIGENT
At its sitting of 20 May 1980 the European Parliament referred to the Political Affairs Committee the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr d'Ormesson, Mr Blumenfeld, Mr Bersani, Mr Schall and Mr Penders, on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party (C-D Group), and Mr de Courcy Ling and Mr Hutton, on behalf of the European Democratic Group to wind up the debate on oral question 1-30/80/rev., on the surveillance and protection of shipping routes for supplies of energy and strategic materials to the countries of the European Community (Doc. 1-119/80).

At its meeting of 29/30 May 1980 the committee appointed Mr Diligent rapporteur.

The committee considered the motion for a resolution at its meetings of 20-22 October and 26-28 November 1980 and adopted it during the latter meeting by 20 votes to 12.

Present: Mr Rumor, chairman; Mr Haagerup, vice-chairman; Mr Diligent, rapporteur; Mrs Baduel-Glorioso (deputizing for Mr Berlinguer), Mr Beyer de Ryke (deputizing for Mr Bettiza), Mr Blumenfeld, Mrs Cassanmagnago-Cerretti, Mr Damseaux, Mr Deschamps (deputizing for Mr Klepsch), Lord Douro (deputizing for Lord Bethell), Mr Fergusson, Mr B. Friedrich, Mr Galluzzi (deputizing for Mr Segre), Mr Habsburg, Mr Hänsch, Mrs Hammerich, Mrs van den Heuvel, Mr C. Jackson, Mrs Lizin (deputizing for Mr Van Miert), Mr Lomas, Mr Mertens (deputizing for Mr Tindemans), Mr van Minnen (deputizing for Mr Cariglia), Mr d'Ormesson (deputizing for Mr Antoniozzi), Mr Penders, Mr Prag (deputizing for Lady Elles), Mr Romualdi, Mr Schall (deputizing for Mr von Hassel), Mr Schieler, Mr Scott-Hopkins, Mr Seefeld (deputizing for Mr Brandt), Mr Simmonds (deputizing for Sir John Stewart-Clark), Mr Simonnet (deputizing for Mr Seitlinger) and Mr Zagari.
CONTENTS

A. MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION ........................................ 5

B. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT ........................................... 7

ANNEX: Motion for a resolution tabled by Mr d’Ormesson,
Mr Blumenfeld, Mr Bersani, Mr Schall and Mr Penders,
on behalf of the Group of the European People’s
Party (C-D Group),
and by Mr de Courcy Ling and Mr Hutton on behalf
of the European Democratic Group, (Doc. 1-119/80)...18
The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement:

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

on the surveillance and protection of shipping routes for supplies of energy and strategic materials to the countries of the European Community

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr d'Ormesson, Mr Blumenfeld, Mr Bersani, Mr Schall and Mr Penders, on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party (C-D Group), and by Mr de Courcy Ling and Mr Hutton on behalf of the European Democratic Group to wind up the debate on oral question 1-30/80/rev. (Doc. 1-119/80),

- having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee (Doc.1-697/80),

1. Is fully aware of the high degree of dependence of the EEC which is obliged to import most of the oil and raw materials it consumes from third countries, almost all such imports being transported by sea;

2. Is perturbed by the vulnerability of its sea links with Africa, the Persian Gulf and other parts of the world, since the North Atlantic Treaty does not cover areas south of the Tropic of Cancer in which the increasing seapower of the Soviet Union, both her naval forces and her merchant marine, presents a growing and calculated threat;

3. Points out that freedom of movement by sea is vital to the economies of both the EEC countries and the Third World countries with which they maintain relations and whose economic development depends on their ability to export;

4. Notes with the greatest concern the continued armed conflict between Iraq and Iran, which, if prolonged and extended in the Persian Gulf area, could directly threaten the security of Europe's oil supplies;

5. Calls on the Member States with naval forces to coordinate their patrols outside the zone covered by the North Atlantic Treaty and to strengthen their naval forces;
6. Points out that one of the European Community's main concerns is to promote the economic development of the Third World, which would be seriously and permanently jeopardized if interruption of deliveries were to lead to a scarcity of oil and a succession of price increases;

7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign Ministers of the Member States meeting in political cooperation and to the Council and Commission of the European Community.
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The motion for a resolution referred to the Political Affairs Committee was tabled by the Group of the European People's Party and the European Democratic Group to wind up the debate on the oral question by Mr d'Ormesson 'on surveillance and protection of shipping routes for supplies of energy and strategic materials to the countries of the European Community'.

The motion for a resolution raises three problems:

(a) It emphasizes the high degree of dependence of the EEC, which is obliged to import most of the oil and raw materials it consumes from third countries, almost all such imports being transported by sea;

(b) It notes the disturbing increase in strength of the Soviet navy; at the same time there has been a proliferation of destabilizing operations by Soviet troops and their allies in Third World countries;

(c) It points out to Member States the value of coordinating patrols and of strengthening the naval forces of those countries possessing a fleet.

The aim of the rapporteur has been to carry out a detailed study of the three problems raised on the basis of the most recent evidence available.

I

The EEC's dependence on its sources of supplies has already been pointed out in the oral question to the Commission by Mrs MOREAU, Mrs LENT, Mr FILIPPI, Mr JONKER and Mr de KEERSMAKER on 'supplies of mineral and vegetable primary materials to the EEC' (European Parliament sitting 14.1.1980). In 1973 Europe suddenly became aware that oil was its principal source of energy, and that almost all the oil consumed in the EEC (470 million tonnes in 1978, i.e. 55% of total energy consumption) was imported and transported by sea. It is equally clear that Europe would be in a vulnerable position if supplies of raw materials were discontinued: the Community's dependence on imports of raw materials is as follows:
- 100% for manganese including 45% from the Republic of South Africa and 38% from the USSR
- 100% for chrome 96% from South Africa and Zimbabwe
- 100% for cobalt 38% from Zaïre and Zambia and 21% from the USSR
- 100% for platinum 82% from the Republic of South Africa and 16% from the USSR
- 99% for tungsten 47% from China, 11% from the USSR and 6% from North Korea
- 99% for vanadium 78% from the USSR and 19% from the Republic of South Africa.

A working party preparing the VIIIth French Plan has just issued a warning: although we are now acutely aware of the oil problem, this is not true of raw materials, particularly strategic materials. Although at the present time the price of some of these materials has little noticeable effect upon the trade balance, cessation of deliveries would affect entire production processes, in terms of either price level or output. In 1978, events in Zaïre caused the price of cobalt to rocket. Manganese is needed in the production of ordinary steel and aluminium alloys; silicon is vital to the electronics industry, platinum is used as a catalyst in the petrochemicals industry, chrome is vital in the production of stainless steels, vanadium is used as cladding for nuclear fuel rods, molybdenum in the manufacture of specialized steels used by the armaments industry and cobalt, titanium sponge and zirconium are equally vital to the new technology industries.

To loosen the stranglehold of a dependence which could bring Europe to a standstill in a few days, it is of course possible to stockpile contingency supplies and obtain the cooperation of all those involved in a production process so as to ensure security of supplies at all stages. We must also make increased use of our own resources, recycle raw materials, prevent waste, and invest more money in the mining industry. However, all the Community's efforts to safeguard its lines of supply of raw materials will not be enough to guarantee its genuine independence. Freedom of movement by air and sea is also one of the prerequisites for the survival of the Community in the decades to come. Trade with certain Third World countries, especially in Africa and the Middle East, can only be maintained if these strategic regions and their maritime approaches are not subjected to political and military destabilizing operations with the intention of severing their contacts with the West.
Although it is impossible to be absolutely certain about the intentions of those in charge of Soviet foreign policy, it is undeniable that the Socialist camp has made a number of advances outside its traditional sphere of influence since the end of the 60s. The intervention on a massive scale of Soviet and Cuban troops in Angola in 1975 demonstrated two things: first, that having learnt the lessons of its failure in Cuba in 1962, the Soviet Union has acquired the means of transporting its conventional military forces from one part of the world to another very rapidly indeed. The Soviet Union has achieved Russia's traditional and historic objective: to cease to be a purely continental power and become a world one. Secondly, the victory of Communist forces in a country where Western influence was predominant has shown the Third World that the balance of power has been overthrown. The lack of any reaction from the United States, not to mention European impotence, has reduced the West's credibility.

Events in Ethiopia, the Yemen, Iran, the Lebanon and Afghanistan have demonstrated the USSR's interest in the Islamic oil regions, and consequently the dangers for Europe if the Soviet Union were to gain control of them.

The motion for a resolution tabled by Olivier d'Ormesson expresses concern about 'the vulnerability of its (Europe's) sea links with Africa, the Persian Gulf and South America since the North Atlantic Treaty does not cover areas south of the Tropic of Cancer in which the increasing strength of the Soviet navy presents a growing threat'.

The Atlantic Alliance was conceived in 1949 with the aim of protecting Europe from Soviet attack in the theatre of Central, Northern and Mediterranean Europe, but it is not designed to cope with the indirect threat developing at the confines of western Europe.

The current massive presence of ships armed for interception and attack missions in all the oceans of the world is a reflection of the spectacular expansion of the Soviet navy.

The balance of naval power (Military Balance 1978/79 by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London) is as follows:
Nuclear-powered attack submarines  
(USA - 70)  
Diesel-powered attack submarines  
Large and medium sized surface warships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Atlantic Alliance</th>
<th>Warsaw Pact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80 (USA - 70)</td>
<td>85 (all USSR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>420</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This list takes no account of the armament, electronic devices, age or tonnage of the vessels. But it has to be acknowledged that the Soviet Union has amply made up for its former inferiority in naval strength.

The appearance of Soviet aircraft carriers, and the commissioning on 23 May 1980 of the first Soviet nuclear-powered cruiser, the Kirov, show that the Soviet Union is continuing to improve the quality of its ships, especially as regards their tonnage, armament and operational capability.

On 1 October 1979 the Soviet Union had 2,345,000 tons of combat vessels in service, while the American navy had 2,229,800 tons.

In 1964, 95 Soviet ships passed through the Turkish straits each year; this figure is now 225. Over the same period, Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean has increased from 1,500 ship/days per annum to 18,500.

There are a number of geographical constraints on the Soviet navy: Soviet ships have four home bases: Murmansk, Leningrad, Odessa and Vladivostok. The passages to these four bases, i.e. the passage between Greenland, Iceland and Scotland, the Skagerrak, the Dardanelles and the Japanese archipelago, can either be blocked or easily patrolled. The remoteness of the bases and the vulnerability of supply lines make it necessary for Soviet ships to have facilities (anchorage, ports of call, dry docks) in the various regions of the world where they happen to be operating.

This largely explains the constant diplomatic efforts on the part of the Soviet Union towards the governments of the southern Mediterranean countries and of African countries situated on the Cape route and the Indian Ocean.
There is a close link between the different ways in which the Soviet presence manifests itself in the Third World countries, ranging from occupation by armed force to economic and military cooperation and to the presence of a powerful fleet patrolling the approaches to strategic zones.

Freedom of movement by sea is vital to the very existence of the European Community, which is the major trading power in the world and whose inhabitants depend for their high standard of living upon a high level of activity in the manufacturing and processing industries and in trade. The development of Third World countries depends upon continued trading links with the West and with Europe in particular. A war severing shipping routes would have disastrous consequences not only for the free world but for developing countries. In 1939, Germany had 56 submarines; today the USSR has 219 attack submarines of which 85 are nuclear-powered.

With this two-fold vulnerability caused by her dependence and by a strong naval and potentially hostile Soviet presence on her external shipping lanes, what can Europe do?

III

The resolution referred to the Political Affairs Committee 'calls on the Community institutions to invite the Member States with naval forces to coordinate their patrols and boost their ship-building industries'.

The rapporteur would first make the following formal observation: since it seems pointless for an institution such as the European Parliament to address a request to the European institutions of which it is itself one, the most appropriate formula might be:

'the European Parliament ... requests Member States possessing etc....'

It is the opinion of the rapporteur that only the Member States are in a position to take the necessary steps for the coordination of patrols mentioned in the resolution by concerted inter-governmental action. The starting point for this concerted action at the technical level could be the EPC (European Political Cooperation) and the necessary impetus could be provided by the European Council or the Council of Ministers meeting in political cooperation.

There are several fundamental arguments in favour of the proposal put forward in the motion for a resolution:
(a) The course of international negotiations on the law of the sea should encourage the EEC as an entity to protect the EEZ (exclusive economic zones) lying within the 200 nautical miles over which the states of the EEC will have sovereignty from third countries. Surveillance and policing patrols designed to protect installations related to the exploitation of resources in the seabed, to ensure that the rules relating to fishing policy are respected, and to combat pollution, could be carried out by the coordinated efforts of the various coastguard fleets of European countries with a seaboard.

(b) There has been coordination between European fleets as shown by the joint exercises carried out by the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. For example the 'DAWN PATROL' naval manoeuvres took place in the central Mediterranean between 5 and 17 May 1980 involving the navies of seven NATO countries (Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Turkey, Great Britain, USA) as well as French ships belonging to the Toulon fleet. The purpose of this exercise was to test the protection of the naval lines of supply in the Mediterranean. It has now been announced that the American Government has just warned its allies that it will perhaps be forced to take some ships from the Mediterranean Sixth Fleet to reinforce its naval strength in the Persian Gulf.

Similarly, France has invited the navies of five NATO countries (Canada, USA, Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, Great Britain) to take part in joint naval, air and sea exercises in the Atlantic known as SOUTH-WEST 80. The theme of this manoeuvre is the protection of the shipping routes threatened by air, surface and submarine attacks.

There is a growing feeling within the Alliance that each Member State can only hope to safeguard its share of external maritime trade if it is prepared to coordinate its military efforts with its partners in the Alliance, since each state does not have the strength to provide its own naval protection (Admiral Jean Lannuzel, chief of staff of the French navy, quoted in 'Le Monde' on 30 May 1980). Joint protection will be all the more effective in the context of the EEC in that it will result from systematic coordination at the technical as well as the political level on the division of responsibilities.
The rapporteur is convinced that the prerequisites for the defence of strategic interests common to the EEC countries are better coordination and greater armaments effort, and this conviction has been reinforced by the fact that the Assembly of the Western European Union has just adopted the same position.

In adopting the draft recommendation 'on the application of the Treaty of Brussels following the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union', (document 836, 26th Ordinary Session - 3 June 1980), by 55 votes to 6 with 2 abstentions, the Assembly of the WEU has asked the Council to 'delete paragraph 5 of Annex III of Protocol III of the WEU Treaty'. The provision in question seeks to limit ship-building in Germany to 8 destroyers, while other surface combat vessels must be of no more than 3,000 tons and auxiliary vessels of no more than 6,000 tons. Submarines are currently limited to 1,800 tons and may not be nuclear-powered.

If the WEU could obtain government approval for the removal of these restrictions and bans, the Federal Republic of Germany would be able to increase the size and quality of its navy, which would strengthen Europe's overall potential. Secondly, the WEU points out that so far the German navy has been assigned exclusively to SACEUR (apart from one destroyer assigned to STANAVFORLANT), which effectively limits it to the Baltic and to the western coast of Denmark; the Union also recommends that 'henceforth German naval forces should be assigned to all NATO commands as needed and according to units'.

The WEU rapporteur adds that the Treaty of Paris contains no provision limiting the geographical patrol area of German warship-, as evidenced by the courtesy visit currently being made by two German destroyers, accompanied by two support vessels, to certain parts of the Indian Ocean.

IV

Europeans have only recently become aware of Europe's vulnerability in the event of an interruption in its supplies, and this awareness is still insufficiently widespread. But it was Lenin himself who emphasized the weakness of a Europe whose industrial development in the 19th century was largely based on the exploitation of natural resources coming from overseas colonial empires. (In this respect it is significant that Russia is the only European nation in the 20th century which has not been obliged to relinquish her colonies and, on the contrary, took advantage of the Second World War to extend her possessions on her western frontiers. Is it because there is no ocean between the foreign,
non-European populations (Turkmens, Uzbeks, Mongols etc.) and the white, Russian population that the latter has not been forced to withdraw from the colonial territories acquired under Tsarism in the same way that all other European powers have had to? Do possessions have to be overseas to be colonies?)

Due to long and active participation in the world division of labour industrialized Western Europe has become the most important commercial power in the world but has failed to recognize the implications of this. This strength can also be its greatest weakness.

To evaluate the European Community's dependence and to encourage Member States to find means of safeguarding their sources of supply, we shall consider three possible general hypotheses/scenarios as envisaged by experts and listed in order of importance.

1. **Interruption in supplies at source**

Taking advantage of the instabilities of existing political régimes in Middle-East and African countries which have good relations with the West, revolutionary movements (Marxist-Islamic) supported by the Soviet Union or their allies take power by violent means (coup d'état, assassinations, border wars).

One of the first acts of the new governments is to reduce and then discontinue production and export of oil or strategic materials bound for the West. By making the lifting of this embargo dependent upon the satisfaction of overtly political demands (Middle-East settlement) or claiming to question the traditional relationship with the 'capitalist, imperialist' world, the revolutionary governments force the importing States to take immediate emergency measures: using up existing stocks, implementing plans formulated by the International Energy Agency, rationing; many signs of strain become apparent in the economic structure of European countries and Japan, which have found it difficult to cope with the astronomical rise in world prices when a large part of their supplies is cut off. Irritated by the shortages, public opinion encourages governments to take measures to re-establish the status quo. Only the threat of direct military intervention seems likely to prevent a worsening of an internal situation so serious that the very democratic and liberal political system is at risk. But while Western countries prepare for external intervention, the Soviet Union lets it be known that, under mutual aid agreements with the revolutionary states which have imposed the embargo, any attack against these territories will be considered as an attack on its own security.
Having no nuclear means of reply to the SS 20s deployed against it by the Soviets, Europe allows itself to be intimidated by Moscow's nuclear blackmail. Having its own resources and access to those of neighbouring territories, the United States regards itself as less directly affected by the interruption in supplies, and sees the situation as an expression of West-South tension. Washington will encourage the Europeans to work out the basis for a global arrangement with Moscow on the sharing of raw materials between COMECON, Western Europe and Arab and African Third World countries. A pan-European conference is organized. The right of the Soviet Union to control the flow of trade in raw materials and energy from the Middle East and Africa and bound for the whole of Europe is recognized. In return for Soviet naval 'protection' on the shipping routes, Europeans are obliged to ask the United States to effect a considerable reduction in their military presence in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. The Member States of the EEC sign a series of bilateral economic, technological and financial agreements with COMECON. Little by little the Community loses its identity. Most decisions by European governments are taken after consultation with the Soviet authorities.

There is no need to describe in detail the further stages of the progressive neutralization of Western Europe. The logical conclusion of this scenario is that the Socialist camp would gain political domination over Europe, without NATO and Warsaw pact forces being brought into direct confrontation. Soviet strategic parity with the United States would lead to a weakening of the American defence guarantees which Europe has enjoyed for 30 years.

2. Shipping routes cut as a result of armed intervention at sea

The second scenario is based on a different hypothesis. Unable to exert sufficient influence on the governments of raw material-producing countries of the Third World to force them to discontinue their supplies, the Soviets decide on direct action by cutting the shipping routes from the Strait of Hormuz or from any geographical point they choose e.g. the Mozambique Channel, the Cape of Good Hope if, whether it liked it or not, the Republic of South Africa was forced to provide facilities for Soviet ships, and the South Atlantic, etc... Unable to use these routes, oil tankers and cargo ships bound for Europe turn to the navies of Western countries for protection. But despite having no peace-time plans for coordination in zones outside the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, the latter put in an appearance in the areas of tension. But in view of their lack of numbers, disparity, unpreparedness for intervention missions in the absence of local bases and appropriate logistic facilities, the European navies are inferior to the Soviet navy. Only the United States' navy is strong enough to challenge it.
Concerned at the prospect of direct confrontation between units of their respective navies, Moscow and Washington agree to avoid the risks of escalation. Powerless to prevent the Soviet blockade, the Member States of the Community hesitate to engage in naval hostilities. The lack of coordination between the two most powerful navies, those of France and Great Britain, reduces the Community's operational capacity.

When a sufficient time has elapsed to allow European stocks to run out, the USSR and Europe enter into negotiations leading to the concessions already mentioned in the previous hypothesis.

3. War at sea accompanying and aggravating direct confrontation in the European theatre

The third scenario assumes conflict in Europe between Warsaw Pact and NATO forces. The offensive begins in one of three zones - in Southern, Central or Northern Europe, or simultaneously on an extended front from the Baltic to the Adriatic. At the very onset of hostilities the Soviets may use their SS 20 nuclear weapons to hit the main targets in Western Europe (cities or economic centres) at the same time reducing their capacity to reply. This possibility, which Soviet doctrine has not discounted, would mean that the deterrent had not worked. There is no need to enumerate the consequences of this situation. If, on the other hand, the Soviets prefer the 'graduated response', they will begin the war by attacking with conventional forces with the possible support of tactical nuclear weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union may be extremely reluctant to take the fateful steps leading them to consider the possibility of an initial strategic nuclear exchange. All the signs are that in order to avoid nuclear conflict, both camps will try to achieve a position permitting them to win a conventional war waged in part of the European theatre, probably Central Europe. The present numerical imbalance in favour of the Warsaw Pact as far as conventional weapons are concerned (tanks, divisions, combat aircraft) would rapidly result in a defeat for NATO on the ground, if the allies were unable to obtain American reinforcements in time.

The enormous consumption of equipment characteristic of modern war necessitates large quantities of replacement stocks. During the Yom Kippur war, 520 aircraft and 2800 tanks were destroyed in ten days. The speed with which equipment can be transported by air but particularly by sea between the United States and Europe will be one of the key factors in the outcome of a war which would long remain conventional because the two super-powers would both refuse to resort to nuclear weapons.
Control of the seas is thus still of major importance, for it guarantees that the link between far-distant nations which are nevertheless allies in the same alliance cannot be broken by an enemy power. An imbalance in naval power between East and West and the serious disruption of freedom of movement in the Atlantic as well as in the Mediterranean would compromise the allied nations' chances of replying effectively to a conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces. If the Allies had insufficient naval power, it might not be feasible to use even the MLNS\(^1\) which in turn would compromise the whole deterrent strategy. There is a strong possibility that a conventional confrontation of the type envisaged in the third scenario would begin with a limited confrontation at sea with the purpose of isolating Europe from its sources of supply and from its ally on the other side of the Atlantic.

The three scenarios mentioned in this report do not exclude other possibilities which could, either directly or indirectly, bring the forces of East and West into direct confrontation.

Moreover, each of the scenarios contains a number of variables which increase the uncertainty about possible methods of reply, the scale of the risk, and the degree of possible solidarity between Europe and the United States.

Like any hypothesis, this study inevitably contains generalizations. Its only aim is to make European public opinion aware of how important it is for Member States to take joint responsibility for their security, outside the zone covered by the Alliance, at a time when their dependence and threats to their supplies are increasing. It is time for us all to consider the price we must pay for our freedom and in order to guarantee the continuation of the conditions upon which our spiritual values and material benefits depend.

\(^1\)Missile-launching nuclear submarines which require protection.
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc. 1-119/80)

tabled by Mr d'Ormesson, Mr Blumenfeld, Mr Bersani, Mr Schall and Mr Penders, on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party (C-D Group), and by Mr de Courcy Ling and Mr Hutton, on behalf of the European Democratic Group with request for early vote pursuant to Rule 47(5) of the Rules of Procedure to wind up the debate on oral question 1-30/80 rev. on the surveillance and protection of shipping routes for supplies of energy and strategic materials to the countries of the European Community

The European Parliament,

1. Is fully aware of the high degree of dependence of the EEC which is obliged to import most of the oil and raw materials it consumes from third countries, almost all such imports being transported by sea:

2. Is perturbed by the vulnerability of its sea links with Africa, the Persian Gulf and South America since the North Atlantic Treaty does not cover areas south of the Tropic of Cancer in which the increasing strength of the Soviet navy presents a growing threat;

3. Points out that freedom of movement by sea is vital to the economies of both the EEC countries and the third world countries with which they maintain relations and whose economic development depends on their ability to export:

4. Calls on the Community institutions to invite the Member States with naval forces to coordinate their patrols and boost their ship-building industries.