Enlargement of the European Union:
Impacts on the EU, the Candidates and the "Next Neighbors"

Written especially for the ECSA Review (14: 1), Winter 2001, pp. 2-7.
Visit the ECSA Review Fora page for other essays on EU topics.

In this Forum, five ECSA members examine the progress and prospects of EU enlargement to the east and south, asking about the impacts of the enlargement process on the existing members of the Union, the candidate countries, and the "next neighbors" of an enlarged EU.

Helen Wallace

FURTHER ENLARGEMENT HAS-sort of-become the next strategic goal of the European Union (EU). The conclusions of the European Council in Nice recently reaffirmed "the historic significance of the European Union enlargement process and the political priority which it attaches to the success of that process ... It endorses ... the strategy proposed by the Commission ... The roadmap for the next 18 months will ease the way for further negotiations ... and will place the Union ... in a position to welcome those new Member States which are ready as from the end of 2002 ..." The "roadmap" had been clarified by the Commission in November 2000, and the Treaty of Nice, agreed in December, makes adjustments to the EU institutions to cater for up to 27 members.

These reassuring declarations suggest that there is now a clear pathway to the enlargement process. On the EU side some of the practicalities of prior reform have been addressed and the candidates have been given the glimmerings of a timetable for their accession, subject to "differentiation" among them in relation to "each country's merits" ... and their scope for "catching up." Indeed, it seems, there has been a marked change of tone and tempo on the part of the EU, compared with the ambiguities and hesitations of previous months. Yet this smooth and soothing language in the declaratory policy of the EU masks a number of fundamental questions about the character of the enlargement process, its consequences for the EU as a form of "deep" integration, its impacts on the aspiring candidates, and the potential effects on not-yet-or perhaps never-candidates among the next neighbors in Europe.

The contributions to this ECSA Forum address some of these questions and highlight further issues that need to be addressed both empirically and theoretically. It seems rather clear that to get a grip on these questions requires us to step outside the conventional discussion of what has, after all, been so far a west European integration process. Critical to the analysis of EU enlargement these days are issues that relate to: (a) processes of domestic or "in-country" transformation, especially in the post-Communist countries; (b) how the EU defines collective interests vis-a-vis its region and projects power and influence over its near-abroads, both candidate and non-candidate neighbors; and (c) whether or not our core definition of Europeanization should be elided with "EU-ization."

Domestic transformation
One important strand of both the practice and the study of west European integration is the way in which it may generate-or be shaped by-the processes of domestic transformation. But we need to relate our understanding of this process better to the circumstances of post-communist transformation. In Central and Eastern Europe, as Brigid Fowler discusses especially in relation to Hungary, the "return to Europe" is as much a process of leveraging domestic transformation as one of satisfying the tough EU criteria for accession. As she explains, much more attention needs to be paid to the interweaving of EU conditionality with the other "in-country" influences on the dynamics of post-communist transformation. Moreover, we cannot assume that an EU-derived template will make for a good fit with local circumstances-or that EU policy-makers are able to make nuanced judgements about what makes best sense for the differentiated circumstances of individual candidate countries.

Next neighbors
Over the past decade the EU has faced a radical rearrangement of its near-abroads. The impacts can be seen in EU enlargement policy, in the development of a common foreign and security-and now defense-policy. Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy comment on the tricky policy issues presented by the pattern of developments in South Eastern Europe, not only post-Cold-War but post-Yugoslav-war. As they point out, the perspective of eventual accession for this additional group of countries was perhaps unavoidable for an EU with responsibilities as a regional power. But the confusion between foreign policy and enlargement policy clutters up practice with ambiguities and inconsistencies, not least since the further east and south-east the border of the EU moves the more potential aspirants for EU membership emerge. Similar problems are evident in the tangled development of the EU-Turkey relationship, currently going through yet another period of reciprocal antagonisms over the terms of the Accession Partnership and the relationship between EU defense autonomy and NATO. Nor should we forget the continuing political difficulties about the accession of Cyprus to the EU.

Europeanization or EU-ization?
All of our contributors comment on the EU efforts to export "its" template further east across the continent. As Ulrich Sedelmeier comments, this generates broader tensions between "material interests" and the normative dimension in the construction of EU enlargement policy. He suggests that we need to make a better job of drawing together the conceptual work on "Europeanization" with a more fine-grained understanding of transformation in the aspirant members of the EU. It is not hard to understand why EU policy-makers and publics would prefer that their newly accessible neighbors should become more like "one of us," whether inside the club or in the near-abroad. "EU-ization," as defined by the acquis communautaire, has become the chosen instrument for hastening this process. Yet perhaps there is a prior underlying process of Europeanization-both substantive and normative-that needs to be undertaken. It is interesting to note that in the exceedingly bad-tempered final phases of the Nice European Council successive French presidency proposals sought to allot lower political weights to the candidate countries within the EU institutions, because, its was said (and heard) "these countries" should not-even after membership-be accorded parity. For the candidate countries, in both reality and substance, Europeanization may be much more important than EU-ization, and this is surely at least as important for the next neighbors, whether or not they ever become plausible EU members.

Helen Wallace is Co-Director of the Sussex European Institute and Director of the Economic and Social Research Council One Europe or Several? Programme, and from September 2001 will be Director of the Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute.

Brigid Fowler

THE DESIRE TO "return to Europe" has been one of the dominant forces for change in the Central and East European countries (CEECs) since the late 1980s. Membership of the EU is seen in the region as an integral part of this goal. The prospect of membership in European institutions, within a benign regional political and security environment, is the key difference between the situation of the CEECs in the post-communist era and their unhappy previous experience of independent statehood between the two World Wars. The prospect of an institutionalized "return to Europe" also makes for an important difference between the CEECs' post-communist experience and democratic transitions outside Europe. For most of the CEECs, the need to satisfy sometimes tough conditions to win membership in European institutions has acted as an "anchor" of democratizing and marketizing reforms since the revolutions of 1989-90.

Owing to the nature of the EU, its post-Single Market acquis and the accession process designed for the CEECs, the EU has achieved an especially large influence over candidate states. Just as the prospect of enlargement is by now suffusing all aspects of the EU (Wallace and Wallace 2000), the prospect of EU accession has influenced virtually every aspect of post-communist change in the candidate countries. In the policy sphere, the EU's preference is for the candidate states to adopt and implement as much as possible of the full EU acquis prior to membership, but the nature of EU conditionality for the CEECs has awarded the Union influence across a range of fields and processes more extensive than that falling under EU competence in the existing Union (Grabbe 1999). This is one reason why the relationship with the EU has been experienced as profoundly asymmetric by the CEECs, especially those closer to EU membership. Asymmetry fuels both criticism of the Union in the CEECs and fears towards both the left and right ends of the political spectrum about the impact of accession on the new members. However, in their game of accession politics with the EU, the CEECs lack leverage: any threat not to conform to EU preferences fails to advance CEEC elites' own goal of speedy accession, instead presenting new grounds for the EU to be cautious about enlargement. Despite these strains, the consensus on EU membership extends to almost all political forces in the CEECs, helping to create a highly constrained policy environment for political competition in the new democracies. However, some parties' declared support for EU membership collides with their actual policy preferences (for the Polish case, for example, see Blazyca and Kolkiewicz 1999; Millard 1999).

There are several methodological and empirical difficulties involved in seeking to untangle the precise impact of the EU accession process on the CEECs from the multiplicity of other forces, institutions and actors involved in the "return to Europe." As regards general transition "success," for example, there are a set of chicken-and-egg problems. Not all post-communist states, even among those unambiguously European in geographic terms, have sought to "return to Europe" (Yugoslavia and Croatia until recently). The openness to EU influence is thus historically and logically to be explained prior to an investigation of its consequences. Even within the universe of CEECs coming under EU accession conditionality, diversity has arguably increased rather than decreased in the last decade. Two cycles of mutually reinforcing factors can come into existence in the CEECs: a weak economic transition, democratic fragility and distance from EU accession on the one hand, and transition success, democratic consolidation and proximity to EU accession on the other. But how and where these cycles start is not necessarily clear. Was the EU's 1997 exclusion of Romania from the initial accession negotiations, for example, cause or effect of the country's transition weaknesses and the failure of the administration just voted from office?

Another source of complexity is that the EU has not been a consistent, unitary or unambiguous actor in the CEECs. The fact that both the institutions and policies of the EU are "moving targets" represents a serious difficulty for CEEC policy-makers preparing for accession; the vagueness of some of the accession criteria and requirements is another, although whether vagueness ultimately gives the EU or the candidate states more room for maneuver is worthy of investigation. Moreover, the influence of the EU is not wholly captured in the written documentation of the acquis, the Accession Partnerships and so forth that have been the official guides for policy-makers in the CEECs since 1995. My own current research on adjustment to EU regional policy in Hungary suggests that policy "went further" than it might have needed to in an effort to satisfy (perceived) EU preferences and secure not just accession but a successful and speedy accession; that EU actors other than the Commission in Brussels were important players; and that work on legislation aimed at conforming with EU requirements may have been underway before Hungary applied for membership in April 1994.

The politics of EU enlargement also interfere with policy-makers' public claims about the relationship between accession and post-communist change, which therefore cannot be taken at face value. CEEC elites have an interest in claiming to both the EU and domestic audiences that post-communist change has been implemented in line with, and in order to meet, EU membership conditions. By implying a moral obligation on the EU, such claims offer CEEC elites one of their few sources of leverage over the Union, while also-assuming domestic support for EU membership-providing a means of blunting domestic opposition to the changes in question. For their part, EU actors have an interest in claiming that EU conditionality is acting to enhance economic and political transition, rather than their own leverage over the CEECs and the accession process.

Overall, the picture emerging at least in the states closest to EU accession is of a set of highly complex and dynamic interrelationships, in which the EU influence is mediated through a range of other factors, both domestic and international, and embedded in much wider processes of change. In ways which will be familiar to students of Europeanization in existing member states, initial domestic conditions, national cultures and traditions, bureaucratic and party politics and issues of sequencing and learning are shaping the impact of the EU in the CEECs, sometimes reinforcing existing features as much as changing them. This helps to explain diversity of outcomes among the candidate states, despite the toughness and extent of EU conditionality. Domestic politics and policies are increasingly viewed through a "European" prism, while the EU is beginning to be understood and constructed in terms of domestic policy priorities (see Hughes et al 1999) and political competition. The "fight for Europe" in the politics of the CEECs can take the form of valence competition over parties' ability to deliver EU membership or responsibility for setbacks in the accession process; this was the pattern even in Meciar's Slovakia (Henderson 1999). Alternatively, elites in the CEECs can seek to differentiate their interpretations of the EU and the relationship with it in ways which chime with their various domestic political preferences and appeals; thus for the dominant party in the current right-wing Hungarian government, EU membership is a means of protecting small and otherwise endangered cultures.

Under these circumstances, accession may not be a shock for the CEECs so much as a point, albeit a very important one, in an ongoing process of multifaceted change and European integration in a broad sense. Accession's impact for each new member state will depend partly on its location in time, relative to these ongoing processes, and space, relative to the accessions of other candidate countries. However, the entry terms to be negotiated in coming months will also make a difference; the EU is likely to pursue trade-offs whereby the CEECs accept less favorable membership terms in return for earlier accession. This is likely to present governing elites in the CEECs with a dilemma: they seek early EU entry in part to gain retrospective justification for reforms implemented, but entry terms perceived as unfavorable will provide a new source of complaint for rival elites and perhaps publics increasingly critical of the EU. Especially if the entry terms limit tangible immediate gains for the mass of the populations in the CEECs, elites are likely to be the most obvious beneficiaries at the moment of accession. They will achieve influence over EU policies and institutions which have been shaping the CEECs' development for well over a decade-hence what might be called the "EFTA argument" for membership, being made increasingly by CEEC leaders for both their domestic and EU audiences. However, the final achievement of the "return to Europe" in institutional terms, in the perspective of both the last decade and the last few centuries, will in turn trigger new processes of political and psychological adjustment.

Brigid Fowler is a Research Fellow in the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Birmingham, UK.

Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy

IN VIEW OF THE gloom and doom that sometimes surrounds EU enlargement debates-despite it being 11 years since the fall of the Berlin wall, enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe has not happened-it would seem obvious that the EU should concentrate on finalizing accession negotiations with the twelve countries concerned rather than extend membership promises to even more countries. It is striking then that since mid-1999, there has been a renaissance in EU membership due to its use as a tool of EU foreign policy. The perspective of EU membership has been given to five South Eastern European countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Macedonia). In view of the difficulties in the accession of the existing queue of candidates, we ask whether this promise can be dismissed as cheap talk and whether it has any impact on the on-going EU enlargement process?

The renaissance of EU membership
The perspective of membership for the five South Eastern Europe countries was part and parcel of the so-called Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. It was agreed in turbo-charged negotiations completed in less than four months (April-June 1999) (Friis and Murphy 2000). The Pact was a response to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, which also threatened to undermine the German coalition government and the EU's credibility as an international actor. Precisely because it had to react so quickly-and because membership was judged to be the only available tool that could make a difference in the region-the EU extended the perspective of membership to the countries of South Eastern Europe. Considering the EU's difficulties in just taking in the first candidates for EU membership, this decision was contentious. The French, in particular, tried to dilute the membership perspective as much as possible, for instance, by blocking German attempts to refer directly to the enlargement article of the Amsterdam Treaty (art. 49) in the Stability Pact. In the final compromise, the member states agreed that the EU "will draw the region closer to the perspective of full integration of these countries into its structures through a new kind of contractual relationship, taking into account the individual situation of each country, with a perspective of EU membership on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty and once the Copenhagen criteria have been met" (General Affairs Council 1999).

This dilution was underlined by statements from even the main promoter of the Pact, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer: "If you talk about the general prospects for integration, that's what the Stability Pact is proposing, but it doesn't go into too much detail. We're certainly not talking about accession dates." (quoted in Friis and Murphy 2000: 101).

Just cheap talk?
Attempts to dilute the membership perspective could easily lead to the conclusion that the Stability Pact was just cheap talk uttered in a moment of crisis, i.e. the EU did not really mean what it said. Even if this was the case, we argue that this promise, however vague and conditional, cannot be withdrawn. Instead, it will force the Union to increase its level of engagement with the region and to advance the on-going enlargement process. Evidence of these effects can already be seen.

All of the South Eastern European countries interpreted the Stability Pact as a promise of EU membership. For them, membership is the sine qua non of EU policy towards the region. This perspective was given substance in the stabilization and association agreement with Macedonia, agreed in November 2000. It is framed around Macedonia being a "potential candidate" for EU accession. It constitutes another rung in the membership ladder and a precedent for South Eastern Europe. We can now expect countries such as Macedonia and Croatia to actually apply for membership as a means to copperfasten EU commitments. This would echo the evolution of EU policy towards Central and Eastern Europe where William Wallace observes that "it is too late to ask whether such an extensive enlargement of west European institutions is really desirable. Promises have been given, expectations raised, prestige committed, in all of the accepted applicants" (Wallace 2000).

Secondly, the promises to South Eastern Europe have already had a knock on effect on the overall enlargement process. First, the Stability Pact commitments raised concerns among the so-called second wavers in the enlargement process, i.e. those six applicants that were not invited to accession negotiations in December 1997 (Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Malta). Bulgaria, for example, feared that extending the membership perspective to South Eastern Europe could effectively relegate it to the same position as Albania and Macedonia. In order to diffuse this concern, which could undermine reform efforts in the candidate countries, and to reinforce the credibility of the EU's commitment to these countries, the European Council in Helsinki (December 1999) invited these six candidates to open accession negotiations with the EU. The decisions to do more for both the South Eastern European countries and the second wave enlargement candidates also triggered concerns amongst some of the first wavers (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus). Would they now have to wait for the slowest ship in the convoy before joining the EU? The EU addressed those concerns by agreeing a target date of 2002 by which the EU should finalize its institutional reforms to allow for enlargement. The knock on effects also reached to Turkey. By upgrading ties with the countries of South Eastern Europe and all membership candidates, Turkey would, by default, be further distanced from the EU. Hence, Turkey (also due to an improvement in bilateral ties with Greece) obtained the status of "accession candidate" at the Helsinki summit. Finally, and perhaps not too surprisingly, the inclusion of South Eastern Europe within the circle of potential EU members raised expectations in countries, such as Ukraine and Moldova: if those countries can join, why can't we?

The EU after the Renaissance
No matter how vague and conditional the EU decision to extend the membership perspective, the genie is now out of the bottle. It cannot be dismissed as cheap talk. Nor can it be isolated from the on-going enlargement process. For the foreseeable future, the EU will have to manage a long and differentiated queue of accession candidates, complete negotiations on entry terms and conditions, and develop measures that can bridge the long waiting-period for countries like Albania and Macedonia who have been offered a loose membership perspective. As has been argued above, the EU now has to ensure the credibility of the membership promise (both to achieve the underlying objectives of building peace and stability and to maintain the credibility of the EU itself) by developing closer ties with all of the countries concerned.

This process of strengthening ties with countries prior to accession but within the conditioning framework of membership also alerts EU scholars and theorists that the external dimension of EU-governance should not be ignored. By framing its relations with outsiders in terms of the perspective of membership, by establishing structures and stepping stones towards accession, the EU can more effectively govern beyond its territory. Similarly, the effects of that process on the EU system of governance are also apparent prior to the actual accession of new candidates (Friis and Murphy 1999).

Lykke Friis is a Senior Research Fellow at the Danish Institute of International Affairs in Copenhagen, Denmark; Anna Murphy is Senior Policy Analyst at Forfas, the National Policy and Advisory Board for Enterprise, Trade, Science, Technology & Innovation, in Dublin, Ireland.

Ulrich Sedelmeier

WELL OVER TWO YEARS into the accession negotiations with the first CEECs, it is still very difficult to predict the likely impact of enlargement on the EU and the applicants. The concrete modalities of enlargement are contingent upon a number of interrelated processes on the EU's enlargement agenda (Friis and Murphy, forthcoming). These processes include internal institutional and policy reform; accession negotiations, which will determine how quickly the CEECs will enjoy the benefits of full membership and how rigidly and rapidly they have to align with the EU's regulatory regimes; as well as policies for the wider eastern and South Eastern European region, which include arrangements to soften exclusion effects between candidates that do not join at the same time (and their neighbors).

Some of these processes are still open, and even an assessment of the outcomes that we have is not straightforward. Prior to the European Council meetings in Berlin (June 1999) and Nice, it was not taken for granted that the EU could agree on policy reform and institutional reform respectively. However, while agreement on Agenda 2000 and the Nice Treaty reforms were important in allowing enlargement to go forward, most commentators also suggest that these decisions merely postpone confronting the tough challenges that lie ahead.

Despite these uncertainties, we should not overstate how unmapped eastern enlargement is. We have certain clues as to the emerging patterns of how the EU has handled the processes on the enlargement agenda. For example, we can observe rigidities of the incumbents and attempts to shift the adjustment burden onto the applicants, but also that despite the apparent difficulties, the process has not been blocked.

I would therefore suggest that we should first try to obtain better conceptual understanding of the key factors that shape these emerging policy patterns. A theoretical understanding of enlargement should allow us to understand not only which factors affect the EU's decision to enlarge, but also the substantive policy outcomes of the various enlargement-related processes and thus the likely impact of enlargement. In the broadest terms, it makes a difference whether we have to understand the EU as a club or whether certain factors facilitate an accommodation of the would-be members' preferences.

We have no "enlargement theory" as this subject has been so far neglected in theoretical studies of the EU (cf. Friis 1998; Schimmelfennig 2000; Wallace forthcoming). However, we can formulate hypotheses on the basis of generalizable (mid-range) theories. What we need are more systematic analyses that test their explanatory value in the various processes related to enlargement. For example, some excellent contributions to Keohane, Nye and Hoffmann (1993) systematically test the relative importance of institutions, state strategies and domestic politics on different aspects of the evolving relationship between the EU and the CEECs. Unfortunately however, since then there have been no comparable systematic analyses.

Some more recent theoretical studies have questioned whether eastern enlargement can be fully explained through material factors alone. Fierke and Wiener (1999) have emphasized the significance of the "promise" of the CSCE Helsinki Process for both NATO and EU enlargement. Frank Schimmelfennig (1999) has focused on the relevance of liberal democratic norms and the instrumental use of arguments referring to these norms. My own work (Sedelmeier 1998, 2000) suggests that the discursive creation of a specific role of the EU towards the CEECs has led, on the one hand, to a principled advocacy of the CEECs' preferences inside the EU. On the other hand, it has constrained the scope for open opposition on purely self-interested grounds against the principle of enlargement and accommodating the CEECs' preferences in EU policy. Since this discursively constructed role has been primarily a constraint on opposition to enlargement, it has not always overcome countervailing material interests on questions of policy substance. In this sense, it would explain why EU policy has been so incremental and not very generous, but also why, albeit incrementally, policy continues to evolve towards enlargement, and why it has done so despite the major difficulties with agreeing internal reforms and despite the ability of each member government that is concerned about the effects of enlargement, to block the process.

In order to advance our conceptual understanding of enlargement, analyses emphasizing social norms would need to specify more clearly the causal mechanisms through which they have an impact on policy, and under what conditions they lead to policy outcomes that are different from alternative explanations. A better understanding of the EU's enlargement policy should also significantly improve our understanding of the impact of the EU on the applicants, which depends to a large extent on the EU's accession conditionality. However, to understand how a particular conditionality affects institutions and policies in a specific applicant country, further conceptual work is necessary.

Current research on the EU's impact on the CEECs consists mainly of in-depth empirical studies by lawyers and economists from the region. However, this literature is often technical and descriptive, and rarely comparative across sectors and countries (for certain exceptions, see e.g. Inotai 1999). In order to provide more cumulative and generalizable results, this research could benefit from drawing on the conceptual insights from two distinctive bodies of literature.

First, certain conceptual analyses of systemic transformation more broadly have examined, for example, how different institutional legacies have led to distinctive models of capitalism across various CEECs (e.g. Stark and Bruszt 1998). In principle, these insights should be also applicable to analyses of the distinctive impact of the EU. Second, the insights from conceptual research on the impact of "Europeanization" on domestic change in the member states (Boerzel and Risse 2000; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Radaelli 2000), have not yet been applied to the CEECs (but see Grabbe 2000; Goetz 2000). However, as the applicants prepare to take on the obligations of EU membership, the domestic effects of transferring policies and institutions to them are in principle comparable to the effects of the EU on its current member states.

The conceptual frameworks employed in the "Europeanization" literature will need to be adapted to take account of-but might also allow us to better appreciate-the distinctiveness of the case of the CEECs. For example, there might be a much more fundamental mismatch between CEECs' transformation trajectories and the socio-economic models reflected in the EU's regulatory regimes. The power relations between the EU and the CEECs are very different from the situation of current members. There is also a greater variation in the interactions between EU and CEEC policy-makers which might then allow us to analyze how different diffusion mechanisms affect implementation.

In sum, we might not need, or even want, a theory of enlargement. Mid-range theories of institutions, domestic politics, inter-state bargaining, norms, or Europeanization might allow us to understand the enlargement process and its impact on the candidates. But we need to test their explanatory value more systematically. Empirically, such research can build on comparative insights from other enlargement processes and from disaggregated observations within eastern enlargement. Conceptually, it would benefit from cross-fertilization between currently fairly distinctive bodies of literature. At the same time, we should be careful about using off-the-shelf concepts and guard against approaching the distinctive case of the CEECs with preconceived, overdeterminate research frameworks.

Ulrich Sedelmeier is Assistant Professor of International Relations and European Studies at the Central European University, Budapest.

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