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DOCUMENT 1-1531/83

Report

drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee

on the situation in Chile

Rapporteur: Mr G. ISRAEL

PE 88.279/fin.
Or. Fr.

The European Parliament referred the following motions for resolutions, pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure, to the Political Affairs Committee:

- on 18 June 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr GLINNE and others on the situation in Chile (Doc. 1-306/81),
- on 20 November 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr LOMAS and others concerning Mr William BEAUSIRE (Doc. 1-783/81),
- on 21 January 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr KLEPSCH and others on the expulsion and banishment of democratic opposition leaders in Chile (Doc. 1-622/81),
- on 15 February 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr GLINNE and others on the arrest of 10 trade union leaders in Chile (Doc. 1-751/81),
- on 7 March 1983, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs VAN HEMELDONCK and others on the violation of trade union rights in Chile (Doc. 1-1283/82).
- on 4 July 1983, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs BADUEL GLORIOSO and Mr VERONESI on the detention of the Chilean Juan Carlos Monaga Duque (Doc. 1-492/83)

At its meeting of 24 September 1981, the Political Affairs Committee decided to draw up a report and appointed Mr Gerard ISRAEL rapporteur at its meeting of 29 November/1 December 1982.

The Political Affairs Committee considered the draft report at its meeting of 25 - 27 January 1984 and 28 February - 1 March 1984.

At the latter meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution unanimously.

The following took part in the vote: Mr Haagerup, acting chairman and first vice-chairman; Mrs Charzat, second vice-chairman; Mr Fergusson, third vice-chairman;

Mr Israel, rapporteur: Mr Antoniozzi, Lord Bethell, Mr Bournias, Mr Cariglia, Mr Croux (deputizing for Mr Barbi), Lady Elles, Mr Fellermaier (deputizing for Mr B. Friedrich), Mr Gerokostopoulos (deputizing for Mr Deschamps), Mr Hapsburg, Mr von Hassel, Mrs van den Heuvel, Mr Klepsch, Mrs Lenz, Mr Mommersteeg (deputizing for Mr Schall), Mr Moorhouse (deputizing for Mr Newton Dunn), Mr d'Ormesson, Mr Penders, Mr Plaskovitis, Mr Ripa di Meana (deputizing for Mr Jaquet), Sir James Scott-Hopkins, Mr Seitzinger (deputizing for Mr Rumor), Mr J.D. Taylor (deputizing for Lord O'Hagan), Mrs Theobald-Paoli (deputizing for Mr Schieler), Mr Van Miert, Mr Walter and Mr Zagari.

The report was tabled on 6 March 1984.

The deadline for tabling amendments to this report will be indicated in the draft agenda for the part-session at which it will be debated.

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The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament the following motion for a resolution:

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

on the situation in Chile

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr GLINNE and others on the situation in Chile (Doc. 1-306/81),
 - having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr LOMAS and others concerning Mr William BEAUSIRE (Doc. 1-783/81),
 - having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr KLEPSCH and others on the expulsion and banishment of democratic opposition leaders in Chile (Doc. 1-622/81),
 - having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr GLINNE and others on the arrest of 10 trade union leaders in Chile (Doc. 1-751/81),
 - having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs VAN HEMELDONCK and others on the violation of trade union rights in Chile (Doc. 1-1283/82),
 - having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs BADUEL-GLORIOSO and Mr VERONESI on the detention of the Chilean journalist Juan Carlos Monaga Duque (Doc. 1-492/83),
 - having regard to the report by the Political Affairs Committee (Doc. 1531/83),
- A. whereas the return to democracy which is emerging among various Latin-American countries is an essential prerequisite for the well-being of the peoples of this part of the world,
- B. whereas Chile was one of the oldest democracies of the Southern American continent and had republican institutions similar to those found in Europe,

- C. whereas the last elected government of Chile was weakened by an unprecedented economic crisis and was finally overthrown by a military coup d'état which caused considerable loss of human life,
- D. whereas since the coup of 11 September 1973 human rights, and particularly civil and political rights, have been violated by authorities directly responsible to the government,
- E. whereas there are frequent reports of disappearances, assassinations and torture under medical supervision,
- F. whereas trade union rights are restricted,
- G. whereas the economic situation of Chile has deteriorated to the point where about one in three of the working population is unemployed and whereas this country has one of the largest debts in the world,
- H. whereas negotiations started in September 1983 about the forthcoming elections and the proposed constitutional changes between the Chilean Government and the coalition of democratic opposition parties have apparently been abandoned,
- I. whereas most of the opponents of the present regime, including some of the leading opposition figures, are to be found in the Democratic Alliance and offer every guarantee of patriotism, political integrity and loyalty to the state,
- J. whereas in April 1983 the Catholic Church was subjected to a threat from the Chilean Government on the pretext that the Episcopal Committee had refused to censure a religious textbook which criticized the doctrine of 'military security' in force in Chile,
- K. whereas the Chilean authorities have promised that free elections will only be held in 1989,
- L. whereas the European Parliament's rapporteur was refused permission by the Chilean authorities to visit Chile to gather information on the present situation in the country, this refusal being an expression of their determination not to cooperate with the international community and of their repressive policy since the coup which brought the present regime to power,

- M. whereas there is no external threat to Chile,
- N. whereas by adopting this resolution the European Parliament, respecting the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, is expressing a moral judgment, both in political terms and in terms of respect for human rights, which in no way departs from this principle of non-interference,
- O. whereas, in cases like that of Chile, the European Community may nevertheless implement economic policies and diplomatic measures giving concrete expression to its moral censure,
- P. noting the Italian proposal for global action by the Ten to secure the return of democracy in Chile,
- Q. noting the proposal made to the Ten by the Kingdom of Spain for intervention with the Chilean authorities,
- R. noting that in July 1983 the Greek Presidency of the European Community protested about the development of the situation in Chile to a Chilean representative in Athens,
- S. recalling the following motions for resolutions previously adopted by the European Parliament on the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Chile¹, on the reprisals in Chile following the demonstration in Santiago on 11 May², on the situation in Chile^{3, 4}, on the massive and continued repression of the Chilean people by the Pinochet regime and the need to help the victims⁵, on the arrest of Mr Pedro Felipe Ramirez and Mr Juan Pablo Cardenas⁶, and on the arrest of nine Chilean activists of the Revolutionary Left Movement⁷,

¹ OJ No. C 117 of 12.5.1980, p. 43

² OJ No. C 161 of 20.6.1983, p. 123

^{3, 4} and ⁵, OJ No. C 277 of 17.10.1983, p. 129

⁶ OJ No. C 307 of 14.11.1983, p. 82

⁷ OJ (adopted on 15.12.1983)

1. Considers that the situation currently obtaining in Chile is unacceptable and that the present system of government is contrary to democratic principles;
2. Calls on the Chilean Government to resume negotiations forthwith with opposition representatives, in particular with the Democratic Alliance, and also with the trade union organizations, with a view to establishing the conditions and defining the stages for a return to democracy;
3. Calls urgently for free elections covering all elective offices, including the presidency, to be held within nine months at most, so as to return to the Chilean people its inalienable right to choose its representatives and to adopt the institutions of its choice;
4. Considers that the economic and social situation of Chile is extremely grave;
5. Calls on the Chilean Government to start consultations with all the groups within the Chilean opposition to consider ways of improving the economic situation, especially with regard to the fight against unemployment;
6. Affirms that a return to democracy will enable the European Community to express its solidarity with Chile and to grant economic and financial aid to strengthen the revived democracy;
7. Is convinced that once freedoms are restored, economic solidarity will emerge at both regional and international level, to the benefit of the Chilean people, and undertakes to take the initiative in this respect;
8. Urges the Chilean Government formally to proscribe, with immediate effect, any practices which violate the civil and political rights of Chilean citizens and to announce that practices such as arbitrary arrests, torture, disappearances and the holding of detainees in sports stadiums or other places will actually be prohibited;
9. Asks that the Government should consider instituting the right of appeal from the military tribunal to the civil courts as well as providing an adequate system of compensation for victims of torture,

10. Affirms its solidarity with, and will give concrete expression of its support for, Chilean organizations for the protection of human rights, the churches and all those fighting for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms;
11. Undertakes to increase the opportunities for meetings and joint discussions, with a view to action, with all those Chileans concerned about the democratic future of their country;
12. Finally, expresses its wholehearted and steadfast solidarity with the Chilean people in their struggle to preserve their dignity;
13. Calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to make a formal approach to the Chilean Government to express the anxiety of the peoples of Europe, particularly as affirmed by the European Parliament, about the present political and social situation, and the position with regard to freedoms, in Chile;
14. Also calls on the Foreign Ministers to ensure, notably within the framework of their relations with the Government of the United States, that the human rights situation in Chile is taken fully into account when credits or any other form of aid are granted to that country, and calls for the representatives of the EEC countries in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to use their influence to the same end;
15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation and to the Government of Chile.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Alexandre SOLZHENITSYN is said to have once declared, 'Chile is far away'. Yet developments there have held the attention of Europe. For eleven years Chile has been living through a political and economic experience that sets it apart from democratic Europe. Aware of the concern and interest aroused in Europe for Chile, the European Parliament considers it necessary to speak out in an analysis of the situation now prevailing in Chile, to affirm its solidarity with the Chilean people, and to propose a European and Western policy for dealings with the government in Santiago.

The dictatorship established by General Pinochet following the military coup d'Etat of 11 September 1973 was institutionalised by the constitutional referendum of 1980 by virtue of which the emergency regime will keep power until 1989 when general elections will be held for a return to democracy. In the meantime, General Pinochet, chairman of the military junta and chief executive, will be his own successor, exercising extraordinary powers through the extension of the state of emergency which is automatically renewed every six months.

And yet before 1973, Chile was one of the oldest democracies of the South American continent; it had never been subject to the "caudillo" cult and for a century had had only two constitutions which were briefly interrupted by the military. Its republican institutions, similar to those of Europe enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of Chileans - 90% of whom are literate - against a background of law and order, an incorruptible administration and an army which was known for its deep commitment to the constitution.

But these institutions and democratic traditions did little to mark the considerable backwardness of the Chilean economy, whose uncompetitive industries survived behind a wall of protectionism. The balance of trade was kept in uneasy equilibrium thanks to exports of minerals, particularly copper which alone accounted for 45% of the total exports. The uncompensated nationalization by the Allende government of private undertakings, several of which belonged to North American companies fuelled a crisis that pitted the government forces against the centre and right-wing forces.

In their struggle against expropriation and economic planning measures the centre and right-wing political forces enjoyed the overwhelming support of the middle classes and their professional organizations, particularly the well-known truckers' union whose general strike before the military takeover had prepared the ground for a successful coup.

Substantial sections of even the working class, especially the miners who formed a sort of working-class aristocracy, protested against growing shortages and the runaway inflation caused by the policies of Allende's government which was unsuccessfully attempting to reconcile its democratic legitimacy with revolutionary measures on the economic and social front.

Consequently, although the coup d'Etat staged by the army under the leadership of General Pinochet and the air force commander, General Leigh, culminated in an unacceptable infringement of the democratic order and shocking violations of human rights - arbitrary arrests and executions of opponents or their disappearance, systematic practice of torture by specialized police units - from the beginning, a substantial proportion of the workers were resigned to the situation and the middle classes were in favour of the takeover.

There were even some signs of relief among the lower and middle class "bourgeoisie" while the reaction of the intellectuals was one of attentive if not benevolent interest.

The situation started to deteriorate quite soon, not so much as a result of the suspension of democratic freedoms but because the economic situation could not be improved, in spite of the illusion of a recovery.

THE 1973 - 1980 EXPERIMENT WITH MONETARIST ECONOMICS

Applying to the letter the monetist theories of the American economist, Milton Friedman, at the promptings of a team of young economists dubbed the 'Chicago Boys', the junta began by placing a severe curb on public spending, drastically cutting back social security services, encouraging wage reductions, dismissing several thousand civil servants, de-nationalising almost all the companies and giving back most of the big farms to their former owners. These policies succeeded in checking the inflation bequeathed by the government of popular unity. It fell to just a little over 30% in 1980. At the same time the government jettisoned the protectionist policy of its predecessors

by widely opening its borders and allowing bank rates to find their own level. This economic liberalism won Chile the confidence - reflected by a huge influx of capital - of the IMF and international finance circles. Consequently, shops in Chile were once more well stocked, although there were substantially fewer customers as a result of the spread of poverty and unemployment caused by measures which hit hard at the poorest sections of society.

THE ECONOMIC FAILURE

Unfortunately, the world economic crisis compounded the failings of the extreme form of monetarism practised by the junta. The decline in Chilean exports, in conjunction with the world economic depression, revealed the somewhat artificial nature of Chile's economic 'miracle'. The influx of capital and loans did not lead to industrialisation, made difficult by a reduction of customs duties in absolute terms under the impulse of a liberal policy tinged with dogmatism. In order to give a new impetus to external trade, General Pinochet renounced the 'welfare market-economy' creed according to which every Chilean had to own a car and a television. After having declared that he would 'give his right arm rather than devalue the currency', in June 1982 Pinochet approved substantial devaluation of the peso carried out by Sergio de Castro, his Minister for Finance. But the cure only made the illness worse. The devaluation failed to stimulate exports but simply increased the balance of payments deficit and the external debt, estimated at \$19,000 million in 1982 (the second highest per capita debt in the world). Today, the repayment of the public debt consumes half of the export earnings.

Bankruptcy was avoided only through a re-scheduling of the debt. An additional loan of \$1300 million granted by American banks in June 1983 enabled the government to honour immediate bills and to calm the demands of labour by increasing the wages of the copper miners and the salaries of civil servants.

The fact is that since 1981 the financial crisis has led to an acceleration of unemployment and a substantial drop in real wages. In 1982, 28.8% of the workers in the building sector and 21.9% in the industrial sector were unemployed. Official statistics put the jobless figure in 1982 at 22% of the total workforce employed. But this figure is too low because the number of employed workers is artificially inflated by people engaged in 'national projects' that are carried out and financed by the government. Under these projects, workers receive a daily salary of 500 pesos (about FF50); heads of family are given priority in employment. The workers repaint house fronts or build roads that lead nowhere. This means that in actual fact 40% of the working population is under-employed.

Acceptance of a lower level of job is also becoming more widespread. As part of social re-adaptation, many engineers and industrial executives have become taxi drivers or small retailers.

Unemployment, as much as government incentives, helped to bring the real value of salaries down. In 1981, under the pressure of unemployment, nominal by 9.5% and even by as much as 21% in 1982.

This serious social decline has reduced large sectors of the population from poverty to misery, especially people settled in the extensive shanty towns known as 'poblacionos' on the outskirts of the cities. Cases of malnutrition are growing more frequent and child prostitution is on the increase because parents lack the means of subsistence.

THE REACTION OF THE TRADE UNIONS

This situation inevitably aroused the opposition of the trade unions and, to a lesser degree, that of the political parties. Certainly, dictatorship and the maintenance of a state of emergency in which those who take part in strikes or meetings - activities considered illegal - are prosecuted hardly lend themselves to civil protest. Furthermore, the first phase of the Pinochet regime, that of the 'welfare market-economy' which brought some measure of prosperity was hardly capable of mobilising the masses who were either terrified or disappointed by the failure of the government of popular unity.

However, from 1979, with the end of that prosperity which, after all, was only artificial, there was a resurgence of protest movements led not by the political parties that were banned and even somewhat discredited in the public opinion but by trade union movements.

Mention should be made of both the workers' movements and those that comprised the middle classes and which, initially, supported the regime.

Under the slogan of "active non-violence" all these movements held demonstrations during the strikes of May and June 1983.

First and foremost there was the 24,000-strong Copper Mineworkers Confederation whose president, Rodolfo SEGUER, was imprisoned by the regime. On 13 June 1983 Mr Pieter DANKERT, President of the European Parliament, wrote to Chile's Minister of the Interior requesting his release.

Mr SEGUEL has since been released, and has even been able to tour Europe and America (December 1983).

At the head of the Copper Mineworkers Confederation is the National Trade Union Confederation which has 200 000 other members including students, Christian-Democrats and a minority of communists.

The novelty of the protest movement is that its membership includes former supporters of the military regime who belong to the middle class or sometimes even the upper middle class. More than forty organizations of taxi drivers, truckers, doctors and engineers belong to a National Organization for Coordination which in May 1983 called for a national day of protest and strike on 14 June. By joining the movement, more than 500 artists and 70% of the students proved that fear no longer reigned in Chile.

Nevertheless, from what observers say, it appears that the strike of 14 June 1983 was only a partial success - or a partial failure.

A substantial number of workers and people of the middle classes did not heed the call for a strike because they were afraid either of losing their jobs, already threatened by unemployment, or of the kind of reaction which had already led to the "preventive" imprisonment and deportation of many trade union leaders.

But perhaps this lack of total participation can also be attributed to the effectiveness of the government appeal which denounced the national strike as a manifestation of "an international communist plot".

POLITICAL PARTIES

The Communist Party

According to government sources, the Chilean Communist Party which is run from the Soviet Union by its Secretary-General in exile, Mr Corvelan, has about 50,000 militants, the number before the coup being as high as 200,000. But its ranks were depleted as a result of repression, deportation and emigration. Whereas it totally upheld the rule of law when it formed part of the government of popular unity and was even on the right of that government compared to some revolutionary socialists and the M.I.R. - a Cuban-leaning insurrectional leftist faction - the Communist Party made an abrupt revolutionary turn following an exercise in self-criticism based on the experiences of the coup in which it

taxed itself with over-confidence in the army as the repository of legality and in the possibilities of change in "bourgeois" democracy. The party therefore concluded that the scope for class collaboration with the Christian Democrats was exhausted and that the abolition of the military regime would require the use of violence capable of producing a Cuban or Sandinist type of people's democracy. Such a development was facilitated by the harder policy line adopted by the Soviet Union and by the fact that the situation of latent or open civil war in Central America was conducive to revolution.

The Socialist Party

ALLENDE's former Party, the Chilean Socialist Party could not be counted on as an effective counterweight against this drift towards violence. Under the influence of its Marxist wing, the majority chose the revolutionary option in the heat of the emotion caused by the assassination of its former leader, President ALLENDE. At a congress held in East Berlin in 1979 the party's former Secretary-General, former Senator Carlos Altamirano, was defeated and suspended for "irresponsible behaviour". He was replaced by Mr Clodomiro Almeyda, former Minister of Foreign Affairs in Allende's government and advocate of an "alliance with the Communist Party of Mr Corvalan or a leftist group which will include the Communists". During the last few years, the Leninist wing of the Socialist Party again lost control of the party which split into about ten different groups, thus denying itself any effective political role.

The Christian Democrats

The Christian Democrats, the party of President Edouard FREI, formed the official opposition to Allende's regime; its criticism of the coup, when it came, was muted, but its opposition to the junta subsequently hardened. Consequently, it was banned by the government but enjoyed the support of the Church. Its members were also active in the Copper Mineworkers Union and the National Trade Union Confederation in which the party established good relations with the AFL - CIO, the American Trades Union.

Christian Democrat trade union leaders are not, in principle opposed to joining forces with the Communists against the military dictatorship to obtain social rights; but they are concerned by Communist involvement in acts of sabotage such as the destruction of high-voltage pylons during the demonstrations of 14 June. The Christian Democrats clearly reject the violent overthrow of the dictatorship. They therefore joined with Mr d'Orge Lavandero, former Senator and opponent of Allende, in sponsoring the so-called "National Development Programme" which involves Social Democratic and Socialist as well as C.D.

representatives. This programme provides for an agreement between civilians and the military, excluding General Pinochet who would then be forced to resign. Civilians would work out transition measures to enable the country to gradually return to democracy through elections. The military would hold power on a provision basis for a period to be determined. Moderate circles in Chile feel this gradual return to democracy is absolutely necessary, otherwise the country will be plunged into chaos, civil war or another coup d'Etat whose ultimate beneficiary could only be Cuban or Soviet Communism.

The arrest of Mr VALDES, chairman of the Christian Democrats together with other officials of his party on 9 July 1983 and their release a few days later under the pressure of public opinion prove that General Pinochet sees in these moderates the most potent danger to his regime.

Christian-Democratic Members of the European Parliament were able to visit Chile towards the end of 1983. They observed a considerable strengthening of the Christian-Democratic movement, in terms both of numbers and of political will and combativity.

HUMAN RIGHTS

This return to legality is all the more essential as it is the surest means of ending the violations of human rights in Chile that have been condemned on several occasions by the United Nations and the European Parliament.¹⁻² Since 1976, the situation has scarcely improved. Although a few thousand Chileans have been able to return to their country, 37,444³ are still the victims of arbitrary expulsion. After a period of 'normalisation' from 1977 to 1978, Chile went through a further period in which human rights were violated, especially after 1980. The technique of kidnapping, discarded in 1977, came into use again in July 1980.

¹ Resolution of the European Parliament on the violation of human rights in Chile adopted on 15 October 1973 (OJ C 259/38 of 4 November 1979). The main point of this resolution is contained in paragraph 5 in which the Parliament urgently requests the Council and governments of Member States to suspend all economic and military aid to Chile so long as fundamental human rights and freedoms are not respected and a state of law and democracy is not restored.

² Resolution of the European Parliament on human rights in the world, adopted on 17 May 1973, general report by Mr ISRAEL, co-rapporteur. Mr JAS GAWRONSKI condemning the disappearance of thousands of people including children in Argentina and Chile (Doc. 1-83/83 - OJ C 161/58 of 10 June 1983).

³ Information obtained from the Chilean Committee for the return of expelled Chileans.

Furthermore, in July 1980, the Government legalized the extension of the detention period for offences "threatening the security of the state" from 5 to 20 days. About 80 people were detained in the second half of 1980 under this presumption. The longer detention period is an encouragement to torture and according to Chilean jurists, torture is still practised under medical supervision¹.

Mr Christian ROSTOKER, one of the officials of the International Federation for Human Rights, who investigated the extent of police repression in Santiago and Valparaíso during the last 3 months, says some torture techniques used after the coup d'Etat of 11 September 1973 have been revived. Doctors have testified to Mr ROSTOKER that women were subjected to sexual abuses with dogs. Lastly, in the overcrowded prisons, 8 to 11 prisoners are locked up in cells of 8 square metres.

Of the matters that Amnesty International found most disturbing in 1982, the most noteworthy concerned the torturing of detainees by the security forces or 'death squads' (95 complaints in 1982) and two executions, something that had not happened for a number of years.

An Amnesty International mission visited Chile from 23 April to 15 May 1982 to question people who had been tortured. The Interior and Justice Ministers refused to meet this delegation.

The Amnesty International delegation was able to question 19 persons, 18 of whom stated that they had been tortured by the security forces. They also met a number of qualified local doctors who had treated and tried to rehabilitate torture victims.

Thirteen of the former detainees told that they had been tortured in a secret centre belonging to CNI (Central Nacional de Informaciones), located in the centre of Santiago, and stated that no warrant had been shown to them on their arrest.

Those guilty of torture have never been investigated or tried before any court. The majority of enquiries into the implication of members of the security forces were conducted by military courts, which have systematically shelved them for 'lack of evidence'.

¹ Statement by the Chairman of the Chilean Medical Association, Dr Juan LUIS GONZALEZ (Le Monde of 16 June 1983).

Amnesty International continues to exert pressure on the authorities to get them to clarify the fate of some 650 cases of 'disappearances' while in custody between 1973 and 1975. No new measure has been taken in the course of the year, despite overwhelming evidence.

In December 1982, the United Nations' special rapporteur for Chile stated that he was unable to point to any improvement in the human rights situation in Chile, and that none of the recommendations put forward by the international community in 1982 had been taken into consideration.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION

Faced with more and more frequent popular demonstrations involving growing numbers of Chileans, and faced too with international pressure and the condemnation of international public opinion, the Santiago Government announced in September 1983 that it might be prepared to engaged in dialogue with the opposition. This course was facilitated by the relative discretion of the movement of the revolutionary left (MIR) and the disrepute into which the pro-Soviet Communist Party had fallen. Dialogue with the Democratic Alliance appeared not to be ruled out. On 11 August 1983, the Chilean Government went so far as to instruct Mr Onofre JARPA, appointed as Minister of the Interior, to take steps pointing in this direction. The latter was able, despite the assassination towards the end of August of Mr Carol Urzua, the Governor of Santiago who had enjoyed the confidence of General Pinochet, to state that the policy of negotiation and opening would be maintained.

On 13 October 1983, an event took place that effectively put an end to the task entrusted to Mr JARPA. On that day, at least 80,000 people responded to an appeal by the extreme left and demonstrated in the streets of Santiago. There were similar demonstrations in the rest of the country. The Christian-Democratic movement (GUD) under its chairman, Mr Jorge LAVANDERO, had preferred to distance itself from the demonstration. To a certain extent, the success of the demonstration has weakened the Democratic Alliance, but its very success has provided the government with a pretext for going into reverse and ruling out any idea of negotiating with the opposition. It appears, however, that by late 1983 the Democratic Alliance had recovered a large part of the ground lost in the (European) autumn. The demands submitted by the coalition have since become clear and specific:

- (1) a referendum on elections to a constituent assembly to be held in 1984,
- (2) a joint committee to be set up to draw up statutes for political parties, with a 90-day deadline,
- (3) an emergency economic plan to be implemented,
- (4) political parties to have access to television.

The government rejected these proposals, sensing that behind these specific demands there lay the idea that General PINOCHET should relinquish power. It was not so much a clear statement of prior conditions, but rather an inevitable consequence of implementing the Democratic Alliance's proposals.

What is the Chilean Government's real position?

From the contacts that the European Parliament's rapporteur was able to establish with serving Chilean diplomats in Paris, it appears that the Santiago Government wishes, above all, to prevent any return to the previous regime and to close the way to power to the revolutionary left once and for all. Santiago denies having resorted to unacceptable means to achieve this aim. Cases of torture were said to be extremely rare and to have resulted in sanctions. The use of exile had been finally dropped (and numerous exiles had returned). Demonstrations were not being put down by the use of excessive force (there had only been two deaths - of accidental causes - at the 11 October 1983 demonstration organized by MIR). There could be no possibility of negotiation with the Democratic Alliance, which would, unwittingly, pave the way for Communism. It would take until 1989, i.e. another five years, for the Communist threat to be finally removed, so that elections could be held. In the meantime, only the present Chilean Government was in a position to restore the economic situation (Chile obtained a major bank loan in July 1983 of 1.2 billion US dollars from the IMF).

It should also be pointed out that the Santiago Government cares little for international opinion. It has refused to allow the European Parliament's rapporteur to enter the country. The circumstances are as follows :

The Ambassador to Paris telephoned our secretariat asking to meet the European Parliament's rapporteur. Your rapporteur then called the Ambassador, Mr CISTERNAS, back. He suggested that he come to see your rapporteur to provide him with various information on the situation in Chile. Your rapporteur stated that he would himself come to see the Ambassador. The meeting took place on 18 October 1983.

Your rapporteur indicated that he was concerned, as rapporteur to the European Parliament, to understand fully the position of the Chilean Government in the present situation. A detailed discussion then followed covering both the human rights question and the nature of the political demands submitted by the opposition. During the discussion of human rights, an additional diplomat, Mr CALDERON, was present in the Ambassador's office.

During this first meeting, no objection was made in principle to the visit by the European Parliament's rapporteur.

At the request of the Ambassador, a second meeting was held on 10 November 1983. Mr CISTERNAS then stated that his country had experienced too many problems with 'missions of inquiry' to admit any more. Your rapporteur naturally stated that he had no intention of conducting any mission of inquiry in Chile, and that his intention was to collect information, in particular from the Chilean Government, to assist him in drawing up the report for which he was responsible.

Mr CISTERNAS noted these observations and stated that he would again consult his government.

On 16 November, Mr CISTERNAS telephoned to state that his government would not admit the 'European Parliament's mission of inquiry'.

Approaches by the European Parliament's Director-General for Delegations to the Chilean chargé d'affaires in Brussels, and intervention by the French Embassy in Santiago have since failed to detect the slightest relaxation of the Chilean Government's position.

It is perhaps worth noting, without necessarily establishing any connection between the two facts, that the Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs has just been relieved of his duties by reason of his failure to manage his country's external relations competently, in particular in the United Nations . . .

The collective conscience of Europe cannot remain indifferent to the situation just described. In practice, however, our means of intervention are limited, since economic relations with Chile are relatively undeveloped. But the Chilean economy depends on international aid, particularly from American banks. It would be up to the EEC to approach out American ally to express the concern of the Community about the drastic deterioration of the standard of living of Chileans who are even threatened with malnutrition and further violations of human rights.

The absolute need to rescue the Chilean economy which is on the verge of collapse cannot be a justification for aid whose sole condition is orthodox financial management. While the survival of the Pinochet regime still depends on international credits, these should be granted only insofar as guarantees

for the respect of human rights are publicly given and systematically applied. Although it is obviously necessary to avoid interfering in the affairs of a country proud of its independence and severely shaken by the crisis, international solidarity requires that assistance be given to a people, 80% of whom are against the dictatorship and whose dignity is threatened. Such a policy of international political solidarity is also in line with the requirement of joint Atlantic and European security. The development of an endemic situation of misery and repression can only help to spread such ills which are fertile ground for totalitarianism.

We cannot therefore encourage the people of Chile to carry out acts of violence and armed rebellion. In accordance with the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Chileans, the gradual return to democracy within 5 months to one year¹ must be encouraged. In this connection, the example of their Spanish forebears, who made the transition from a dictatorship to a constitutional parliamentary democracy, should be a source of inspiration to the people of Chile.

As part of a joint policy for the defence of the western hemisphere, Europe and its American ally would then have the responsibility of contributing to the revival and development of Chilean democracy.

¹ National Development Programme.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT 1-306/81)

tabled by Mr GLINNE, Mr VAN MIERT, Mr COLLA,
Mrs VAN DEN HEUVEL, Mrs WIECZOREK-ZEUL, Mr PELIKAN,
Mr KEY and Mr SCHMID

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the situation in Chile

The European Parliament.

- hearing of the new wave of arrests in Chile relating this time in particular to activists belonging to the Chilean Socialist Party,
 - whereas, despite the 'plebiscite' of September 1980, the Chilean military dictatorship continues to flout human rights in Chile,
1. Calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to adopt practical measures against the Chilean dictatorship with a view to inducing the latter to put an end to the arbitrary arrests and to respect human rights;
 2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign Ministers of the Member States.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT 1-783/81)

tabled by Mr LOMAS, Mr SEAL, Miss GUIN,
Mr BOYES, Mr BALFE, Mr CABORN, Mr ROGERS,
Mr ADAM, Mr GRIFFITHS, Mr MEGAHY, Mrs CUNYD
and Mr ENRIGHT

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

concerning Mr William BEAUSIRE

The European Parliament.

- aware of the case of Mr William Beausire, an Anglo-Chilean businessman and British passport holder, who disappeared in Chile in July 1975,
 - noting that prior to his disappearance, he has been subjected to eight months of brutal torture by Chilean police,
 - noting that this case is well documented and was the subject of a British television programme recently,
 - noting that the family and lawyer of Mr Beausire were refused a meeting with the Chilean Minister of Mines in October this year whilst he was on official business in London,
 - concerned that no information or explanation is forthcoming from the Chilean authorities on the disappearance of Mr Beausire,
 - noting that the Beausire family's lawyer has evidence of the identity of the two police agents who tortured Mr Beausire,
1. Urges the Council of Ministers to demand an explanation on the fate of Mr Beausire, a British citizen, from the Chilean authorities,
 2. Calls on the Council of Ministers to hold the Chilean police or secret police (The DINA) responsible for the fate of Mr Beausire, if no explanation is forthcoming from the Chilean authorities.

PROPOSITION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT 1-622/81)

presented by Mr KLEPSCH, Mrs CASSANMAGNAGO CERRETTI,
 Mr VERGEER, Mr Van AERSSEN, Mr AIGNER, Mr ANTONIOZZI,
 Mr BARBAGLI, Mr BERSANI, Mr BEUMER, Mrs BOOT, Mr BROK,
 Mr CLINTON, Mr COLLESELLI, Mr COSTANZO, Mr CROUX,
 Mr DALSASS, Mr DEL DUCA, Mr DIANA, Mr DILIGENT,
 Mr ESTGEN, Mr FILIPPI, Mr FRANZ, Mr L. FRIEDRICH,
 Mr K. FUCHS, Mrs GAIOTTI DE BIASE, Mr GHERGO,
 Mr GIAVAZZI, Mr GOPPEL, Mr HAHN, Mr von HASSEL,
 Mr HELMS, Mr HERMAN, Mr Karl-Heinz HOFFMANN,
 Mr JANSSEN van RAAY, Mr JONKER, Mr KATZER, Mr LENZ,
 Mr LIGIOS, Mr MCCARTIN, Mrs MAIJ-WEGGEN, Mr MAJONICA,
 Mr MALANGRE, Mr MARCK, Mr MERTENS, Mr MÜLLER-HERMANN,
 Mr NOTENBOOM, Mr O'DONNELL, Mr PEDINI, Mr PENDERS,
 Mr PFENNIG, Mr PFLIMLIN, Mr PÖTTERING, Mr RINSCHKE,
 Mr RYAN, Mr Konrad SCHÖN, Mr SIMONNET, Mr TOLMAN,
 Mr WAWRZIK, Mr WEDEKIND and Mr von WOGAU
 on behalf of the EPP (Christian-Democratic Group)
 pursuant to Rule 49 of the Rules of Procedure

on the expulsion and banishment of democratic
 opposition leaders in Chile

The European Parliament

- alarmed at the expulsion of the former Minister of Justice,
internationally respected lawyer and chairman of the Chilean
Human Rights Commission, Jaime Castillo,
 - concerned at the use of arbitrary expulsion of opponents of the
regime to silence democratic opposition in Chile, another
victim of such treatment being the chairman of the Christian
Democratic Party of Chile, Andrés Zaldívar,
 - convinced that to take such measures is to play into the hands of
political extremists,
1. Calls on the Chilean Government,
 - (a) to allow Jaime Castillo, Andrés Zaldívar and other expelled
persons to return home forthwith,
 - (b) to put an immediate end to expulsions of political opponents;
 2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the
Council, the Commission, the Foreign Ministers meeting in
political cooperation and the Governments of the Member States.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT 1-751/81)
 tabled by Mr GLINNE, Mr SEEFELD, Mrs VAYSSADE,
 Mrs DUFORT, Mr ALBERS, Mr SIEGLERSCHMIDT,
 Mr BOMBARD, Mrs BUCHAN, Mr MEGARY, Mrs SALISCH,
 Mrs HOFF and Mr ARNDT

for entry in the register
 pursuant to Rule 49 of the Rules of Procedure
 on the arrest of 10 trade union leaders in Chile

The European Parliament.

- Having regard to its commitment to the respect of trade union rights throughout the world,
 - whereas at the end of June the CNS, with a mandate from 500 trade unions and 2,000 trade union leaders representing 800,000 workers, presented the economic and social demands of the Chilean workers to the Chilean Government,
 - whereas, following this action, the dictatorship brought charges against the 11 leading members of the Executive of the Coordinadora Nacional who had presented the 'Table of National Demands',
 - whereas on 7 July 1981 10 of these leaders were arrested, the eleventh being out of the country at the time,
1. Calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to make contact with the Chilean Government with a view to obtaining the immediate release of the 10 trade union leaders;
 2. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council of Ministers.

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCU MECT 1-1283/82)

tabled by Mrs VAN HEMELDONCK, Mr GLINNE, Mr PETERS and Mr DIDO

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the violation of trade union rights in Chile

the European Parliament,

1. having regard to its resolution on the deportation of political and trade union personalities in Chile,¹
2. reaffirming its previous condemnation of the persistent violation of human rights and fundamental freedom in Chile,²
3. alarmed at the fact that the military regime's police, at the beginning of December 1982, beat up, wounded and arrested the President of the Trade Union Co-ordinating Committee (CNS), Manuel BUSTOS before expelling him from the country together with other trade union leaders,
4. Protests loudly against these arrests and expulsions which constitute a flagrant infringement of basic human rights and fundamental freedom;
5. Calls on the Chilean Government to respect trade union rights;
6. Calls on the Governments of the Member States as well as on the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation, without delay, to make a joint protest to the Chilean Government concerning these arbitrary arrests and expulsions;
7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation, the Commission and the Governments and the parliaments of the Member States.

¹ OJ No C 36, 12.3.78, p. 38

² OJ No C 117, 12.5.80, p. 43

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (DOCUMENT 1-492/83)

tabled by Mrs BAQUEL GUERREIRO and Mr VERONESI

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the detention of the Chilean journalist
Juan Carlos Monaga Duque

The Subsequent Proceedings.

- A. deeply concerned by the arrest of the Chilean journalist Juan Carlos Monaga Duque on 17 December 1982 in Santiago,
 - B. whereas Juan Carlos Monaga Duque, a political refugee since the 1973 military coup had been resident in the F.R.G. since 19 January 1974,
 - C. whereas he had resumed mobility to CHILE on 5 September 1981 because of his parents' serious illness without having had time to apply for the necessary authorization,
 - D. whereas he was tortured for 48 hours after his arrest,
 - E. whereas he is at present standing trial before a military tribunal and faces the death penalty,
 - F. whereas he has abstained from returning clandestinely to Chile and whereas during his visit he has done nothing against the state and has behaved irreproachably,
 - G. having regard to the position it adopted recently on human rights in the world (Doc. 1-63/83/1),
1. Strongly condemns this new violation of human rights by the Chilean authorities;
 2. Calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to bring pressure to bear on the Chilean authorities to achieve the restoration of democratic liberties in CHILE;
 3. Calls on its President and the President of the Council of Ministers to do all in their power to obtain the release of Juan Carlos Monaga Duque;
 4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council of Ministers meeting in EPC and to the governments of the ten Member States.