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## Report

drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee  
on the situation in the Middle East

Rapporteur: Mr J. PENDERS

PE 73.166/fin.



The European Parliament, pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure, referred the following motions for resolutions to the Political Affairs Committee;

- at its sitting of 17.4.1980, the motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-99/80/rev.) tabled by Mr LALOR on the situation in South Lebanon;
- at its sitting of 17.4.1980, the motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-101/80) tabled by Mrs CHARZAT and others on the situation in the Middle East;
- at its sitting of 12.1.1981, the motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-774/80) tabled by Mr FANTI and others on the expulsion of Palestinian mayors;
- at its sitting of 16.1.1981, the motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-819/80) tabled by Mr d'ORMESSON and others on Lebanon;
- at its sitting of 14.10.1981, the motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-583/81) tabled by Mr de la MALENE and others on the death of President Anwar el Sadat
- at its sitting of 14.10.1981, the motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-596/81) tabled by Mr FANTI and others on the situation in the Middle East;
- at its sitting of 14.10.1981, the motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-601/81) tabled by Mr van AERSSSEN and others on the stabilization and extension of peace efforts in the Middle East;
- at its sitting of 16.12.1981, the motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-892/81) tabled by Mr KYRKOS on the decision taken by the Israeli Knesset to annex the Golan Heights;
- at its sitting of 18.12.1981, the motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-902/81) tabled by Mr EPHREMIDIS and others on the annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel;
- at its sitting of 18.12.1981, the motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-906/81) tabled by Mr SEGRE and Mr CARDIA on the annexation of the Golan Heights by the State of Israel;
- at its sitting of 15.2.1982, the motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-956/81) tabled by Mr MARSHALL and others on the Israeli annexation of the Golan;

- at its sitting of 22.4.1982, the motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-158/82) tabled by Mr KYRKOS on the occupied Arab territories on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip;
- at its sitting of 14.6.1982, the motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-333/82) tabled by Mr ROMUALDI and others on the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon, and
- at its sitting of 9 July 1982, the motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-59/82) tabled by Mr GLINNE and others on the imposition of martial law in the territories occupied by Israel.

At its meeting of 29 / 30 May 1980, the Political Affairs Committee decided to draw up a report on the matter.

At its meeting of 8 July 1980 it appointed Mr PENDERS rapporteur.

It considered the draft report at its meetings of 27 / 28 October 1981, 24 / 26 February 1982, 22 / 24 March 1982, 23 / 25 June 1982, and 19 / 20 October 1982. At the latter meeting the motion for a resolution as a whole was adopted by 28 votes to 5 with 2 abstentions.

The following took part in the vote: Mr Rumor, chairman; Mr Haagerup, 1st vice-chairman; Mr Fergusson, 3rd vice-chairman; Mr Penders, rapporteur; Mr Barbi, Mr Berkhower, Lord Bethell, Mr Beyer de Ryke (deputizing for Mr Donnez), Mr Bournias, Mr Capanna (deputizing for Mrs Hammerich), Mr Cariglia, Mrs Charzat (deputizing for Mr Motchane), Mr Croux (deputizing for Mrs Lenz), Mr Denis (deputizing for Mr Marchais), Mr B. Friedrich, Mrs Gaiotti de Biase (deputizing for Mr Antoniozzi), Mr Gawronski (deputizing for Mr Bettiza), Mr Habsburg, Mr Hänsch, Mr von Hassel, Mr Israel (deputizing for Mr de la Malène), Mr Jaquet, Mr Katzer (deputizing for Mr Diligent), Mr Klepsch, Mr Kyrkos (deputizing for Mr Pajetta), Mr Lomas, Mr Van Minnen (deputizing for Mrs Van den Heuvel), Mr Mommersteeg (deputizing for Mr Deschamps), Mr Moorhouse (deputizing for Sir James Scott-Hopkins), Lord O'Hagan, Mr Prag (deputizing for Lady Elles), Mr Romualdi, Mr Schall, Mr Schieler, Mr Segre and Mr Walter (deputizing for Mr Zagari).

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The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament the following Motion for a Resolution, together with explanatory statement:

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

on the situation in the Middle East

The European Parliament

- A. desiring a comprehensive, just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East,
- B. desiring a solution to the problems of the Lebanon that will ensure the independence, sovereignty and integrity of that country and the security and further development of the different peoples living there,
- C. having regard to Resolutions Nos. 242 and 338 of the United Nations Security Council,
- D. recalling its resolution of 11 October 1978 on the result of the conference at Camp David and its resolution of 26 April 1979 on the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and the contribution of the Community to a comprehensive peace settlement<sup>1</sup>,
- E. having regard to the statement on the Middle East by the European Council on 13 June 1980 in Venice,
- F. welcoming the participation of four EEC Member States in the Sinai multinational peace-keeping force and the participation of two Member States in the international peace-keeping force in Lebanon,
- G. noting the Fahd Plan, made public for the first time on 7 August 1981,
- H. recalling its resolutions of 12 October 1978, 10 April 1981, 22 April 1982, 17 June 1982, 16 September 1982 and 15 October 1982, on the Lebanon<sup>2</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> OJ No. C 261, 6.11.1978  
OJ No. C 127, 21.5.1979, p. 59

<sup>2</sup> OJ No. C 261, 6.11.1978, p. 38  
OJ No. C 101, 4.5.1981, p. 112  
OJ No. C 125, 17.5.1982, p. 79  
OJ No. C 182, 19.7.1982, p. 52  
OJ No. C 267, 11.10.1982  
OJ No.

- I. having regard to various statements on Lebanon by the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Ministers meeting in political cooperation,
- J. taking the view that the de facto annexation by Israel of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, the settlement policy pursued in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank and the policy of dismissing elected mayors in the West Bank are not compatible with progress towards a comprehensive peace settlement,
- K. believing that recent events in the area, such as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli siege of West Beirut and the war between Iraq and Iran have made the need for a political solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict even more urgent,
- L. deploring the assassination of President Beshir Gemayel, President of the Lebanese Republic, the subsequent entry of Israeli forces into West Beirut, and the massacres in the Palestinian camps in September 1982,
- M. having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs Charzat and others on the situation in the Middle East, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Lalor on the situation in Southern Lebanon, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Fanti and others on the expulsion of Palestinian mayors, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr d'Ormesson and others on Lebanon, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr van Aerssen and Mr Blumenfeld on the stabilization and extension of peace efforts in the Middle East, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Kyrkos on the decision taken by the Israeli Knesset to annex the Golan Heights, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Ephremidis and others on the annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Segre and Mr Cardia on the annexation of the Golan Heights by the State of Israel, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Marshall and others on the Israeli annexation of the Golans, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Kyrkos on the occupied Arab territories on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Romualdi and others on the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon, and the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Glinne and others on the imposition of martial law in the territories occupied by Israel;
- N. having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee, (Doc. 1-786/82),

1. Is convinced that Resolutions 242 and 338 of the United Nations Security Council constitute a good and workable framework for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East;
2. Is convinced that the Camp David agreements can and must be a sound basis on which to build a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict;
3. Notes, however, that a new initiative will be necessary if the negotiations on autonomy in the Camp David context fail;
4. Considers the Venice Declaration as a useful contribution towards such a settlement;
5. Is of the opinion that any European initiative should follow in the footsteps of Camp David, and should therefore be coordinated with the United States;
6. Appreciates the proposals made on 1st September 1982 by President Reagan as a means of giving a new impetus to the Camp David process;
7. Urges the European Council and the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to start from the following principles:
  - 7.1. the use of force and annexation is unacceptable as a means of gaining control of territory,
  - 7.2. Israel must end the occupation of territories held since 1967,
  - 7.3. the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every State in the region, including Israel, must be upheld together with their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries,
  - 7.4. self-determination for the Palestinian people to be implemented by a procedure compatible with the right of Israel to existence and security as part of a comprehensive peace settlement, including the option of a possible Palestinian State;
8. Takes the view that the Fahd Plan in the form adopted by the Arab Summit at Fez in September 1982 contains usable elements;
9. Considers that the Palestinians themselves should decide by whom they are to be represented, and that the PLO can only be accepted as a legitimate participant in the negotiations when all paragraphs of its charter calling explicitly or implicitly for the destruction of Israel are formally deleted;

10. Considers it essential for Israel and the Palestinian people, including the PLO, to hold talks with each other and to initiate a process leading to mutual acceptance and recognition;
11. Urges the European Council and the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to consult with the United States on Lebanon with a view to securing:
  - (a) the withdrawal of all foreign troops;
  - (b) the stationing in Beirut and other parts of the country of an international peace force in which the EEC Member States would participate, preferably to replace UNIFIL;
  - (c) the disbanding of the militias;
  - (d) the reestablishment of an effective Lebanese police force and Lebanese armed forces;
  - (e) the rebuilding of the Lebanese State and Lebanese society in a manner that does justice to all sections of the population;
12. Takes the view that any contribution from the European Community and its Member States to a comprehensive settlement must include the following:
  - 12.1. an offer to make Member State contingents available to a peace-keeping force, possibly under UN auspices, to ensure observance of military and security provisions;
  - 12.2. offers of economic, financial and technical aid to all States in the area and to the Palestinian people as participants in the settlement;
13. Considers that, in the meantime, the European Community and its Member States must continue supplying humanitarian aid, particularly to Lebanon;
14. Takes the view that the authority of any comprehensive peace settlement will ultimately depend on a UN Security Council follow-up resolution to Resolution 242, making explicit reference to the State of Israel and to the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people;

15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, Council and foreign ministers meeting in political cooperation, to the parliaments of the Member States of the Community and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENTPART I: THE MIDDLE EASTIntroduction

1. The strategic location of the Middle East and the resources its countries possess mean that events in the area directly affect nations everywhere. It is possible to discern two basic periods in the recent history of the area which may now serve to focus this report.
2. These are:-
  - (1) A semi-colonialist period, considerably influenced by Britain and France, lasting until the early 1960s, dominated by the Arab-Israeli conflict.
  - (2) Since the Suez crisis and the early 1960s, the emergence of the Middle East as an area of Soviet-American tensions, and the dominance of the Palestine question in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
3. A third and important situation became increasingly evident in the early 1970s: namely the dependence of the industrialized nations of Western Europe, Japan, the United States, and possibly in the future, of the Soviet Union, upon the energy resources of the oil-producing countries of the Middle East.
4. Finally, in view of the traditional ties and common interests on a religious and cultural level which so obviously also link Europe to the Middle East, it is becoming increasingly clear that the European Communities now have a role to play in helping to bring about a just peace and stable conditions in the area. This role must be performed by the European Community in consort with the United States.
1. The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Question of Palestine
5. Any true understanding of the present situation in the Middle East must take into account the long history of nationalism and international involvement in this troubled area. It is clear that enormous barriers of historical, religious and cultural antagonisms, nationalism and suspicion have to be overcome if peace is to be brought to the Middle East.
6. The Balfour Declaration of 1917, supporting the creation of a Jewish Home in Palestine, for example, followed in 1922 by the British Mandate over Palestine, ensured that control of the region fell to the British Government after more than four hundred years of rule by the Ottoman Turks. In 1947 the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended a division of Palestine into Jewish and Arab sectors which would work together in economic cooperation, while Jerusalem was to receive international status. Israel accepted the

proposed division, the Arabs rejected it, and this plan, together with the declaration of independence by Israel, marked the beginning of a period in the history of the Middle East which was to be dominated by the Arab-Israeli conflict, a conflict which four wars were unable to resolve. It gradually became clear - particularly after the 1967 war - that the Palestinian factor was assuming an increasingly significant and independent dimension. Following the 1973 war, renewed attempts were made to achieve a settlement through the United Nations. However, nothing came of the Geneva Conference. In the ensuing period the United States initiated moves to secure bilateral agreements in the Middle East, and it was largely thanks to the efforts of Dr Kissinger that disengagement agreements were concluded between Egypt, Israel and Syria.

a) Camp David: Towards a peace settlement in the Middle East

7. A valuable breakthrough in a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, however, was to come following the visit of the Egyptian President, Mr Anwar el Sadat to Jerusalem in November 1977. His speech to the Knesset paved the way for a reciprocal visit by the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr Begin, to Ismailia and the historic summit conference between the two leaders and United States President Carter at Camp David in September 1978. Here, they agreed on a "framework for peace in the Middle East" and proclaimed their intention to reach a "just, comprehensive and durable settlement" through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Resolutions 242 and 338 of the United Nations Security Council. (See Annex 1.)

8. The Camp David Agreements provided for the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 26 March 1979 and should be seen as the first important step in the direction of a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict.

Camp David - Main Points of the Settlement

9. The agreements dealt with four main issues<sup>1</sup> :

- Peace - a cessation of hostilities;
- Withdrawal - an end to Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip;
- Security - for all parties involved;
- Autonomy for the Palestinian people.

(i) West Bank and Gaza

10. The proposals outlined a process of change which President Carter saw as in keeping with Arab and Palestinian hopes, while also respecting Israel's vital security interests. Inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were to be given the right to full administrative autonomy for a transitional period of five years, although the final status of these zones was to be the subject of negotiations during the transitional period between Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian representatives of these areas. A major problem is that the wording of the framework covers several conceptions of autonomy.

<sup>1</sup> See Annex 5

(ii) Security

11. The Agreements aimed to provide for the security of all the parties involved - including Israel - so that none need fear attack or military threats from any other.

During the transitional period, Israel was, therefore, to continue to man specified garrisons, while domestic security was to be ensured by a local police force.

A variety of security arrangements were outlined to reinforce peace between Israel and its neighbours.

(iii) Autonomy for the Palestinian People

12. Camp David also provided that Egypt, Israel, Jordan and representatives of the Palestinian people should take part in negotiations to solve all aspects of the Palestinian problem and that any solution to emerge from negotiations must recognise the 'legitimate rights and just requirements' of the Palestinian people.

(iv) The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty

13. The Agreements signed at Camp David also provided the framework for the conclusion of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The Treaty reaffirmed the signatories' adherence to the Camp David Accords. It provided also for:-

- an end to the state of war;
- the return to Egypt of the Sinai Peninsula captured by Israel in 1967;
- the recognition by Egypt of the state of Israel, providing thereby for the establishment of 'normal and friendly' relations through the exchange of ambassadors and the opening of cultural and trade channels between the two sides.

14. President Carter's initiative to bring peace to the Middle East and the conclusion of the Peace Treaty was considered at the time to be of great historical importance. It was hoped that the Agreements and the Treaty would accelerate the movement towards a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East. The Governments of the (then) Nine EEC Member States, for example, endorsed the Carter initiative and expressed their hope that the outcome of Camp David would be a major step on the road to a lasting peace.

15. In April 1979 a resolution of the European Parliament on the signing of the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel warmly welcomed the conclusion of the Treaty.<sup>1</sup> It urged that the Nine should do all in their power to intensify the existing links between the Community, Egypt and Israel and emphasised the desire of the European Parliament to seek to make an effective contribution to the Community's efforts to assist in the achievement of a comprehensive settlement.

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<sup>1</sup> OJ C 127/59 of 21.5.1979 (Doc. 82/79)

b) Progress since Camp David

16. However, hopes that the peace settlement contained the seeds of a secure and peaceful future proved premature. It is increasingly recognised that the Camp David Agreements, important as they are and should remain, cannot be seen as constituting a sufficient basis for a comprehensive agreement. Briefly, a number of events have served to compromise the chances of achieving a just and lasting peace.

(i) PLO and Arab rejection of the Camp David Agreements

17. One of the most significant of these events was the rejection of the Agreements by other Arab States and by the PLO, who refused to accept Agreements with whose negotiation they had not been associated. It was believed that the Agreements could not contribute to any final and positive solution, and President Sadat's indication of his readiness to negotiate with the enemy, Israel, was considered a mortal sin, which led to the immediate economic and political boycott of Egypt by the other Arab States. It is clear that the success of any future peace moves, therefore, rests on the promotion of broader based contacts than those of Camp David to include representatives from all the countries and parties involved in the Palestinian dispute, including the PLO.

(ii) Palestinian autonomy and the Israeli settlements

18. The main failure of the Camp David Agreement lies in the inability or unwillingness of Israel to grant any meaningful autonomy to the Palestinians on the West Bank or in the Gaza strip. So far, it has not even been possible to find Palestinians prepared to take part in negotiations on autonomy, not least because many Palestinians fear that participation would put their lives in jeopardy. The Israeli Government's policy of rapidly founding new settlements and expanding those that already exist on the West Bank is incompatible with the spirit of Camp David. It also means that the prospect of self-determination for the Palestinians is becoming increasingly remote. The further Israeli action in March 1982 of deposing the Arab mayors of El-Bireh, Nablus and Ramallah, on the grounds of their pro-PLO sympathies, was the signal for serious disorders in the West Bank, which cost several lives.

(iii) Jerusalem

19. Following the Camp David agreements, in March 1979 Prime Minister Begin also stressed the Israeli view of the status of Jerusalem as the indivisible capital of Israel. In July 1980 the Israeli Knesset adopted a law on the annexation of East Jerusalem - technically part of the West Bank - proclaiming it the capital of Israel. The Arab World, Egypt included, condemned this move. In the FAHD-Plan, Jerusalem is mentioned as the capital of the Palestinian State.

(iv) The wider context

20. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine problem have become increasingly interwoven with other conflicts and power struggles inside the region. The revolution

in Iran, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war have created new areas of tension and new instabilities, rendering a just and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the one hand all the more urgent and on the other hand all the more difficult. The Lebanon has more and more become a new battlefield in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Changes in the dispositions of armed personnel and weaponry in the Lebanon have become related to the said conflict.

(v) Recent developments

21. 1981 was marked by a number of spectacular events. The assassination of President Sadat threw into relief not only the importance but also the vulnerability of the Camp David Agreements. Sadat's policy has been continued by Mubarek, his successor, but in what measure he will attempt to improve relations with the other Arab States is not yet clear. Meanwhile, four Community Member States (France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) have agreed to send contingents to the Sinai peace-keeping force, whose task is to ensure that the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is duly observed. The other Community Member States have endorsed this move as a step towards a comprehensive peace settlement based on mutual acceptance of the principle that all states in the region have a right to exist and enjoy security, and on the need for the Palestinian people to exercise fully its right of self-determination. The United Kingdom can justifiably look back with satisfaction on this achievement of the British Presidency. The participation of the four Community Member States is also to Israel's advantage, since it implies, albeit indirectly, their commitment to the Camp David process and hence to the security of Israel. A further significant development was the plan proposed by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia (Annex 6).

22. The plan provides for the creation of a Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital and recognizes the right of all states in the region to live in peace, a formulation which could be construed as recognition of the State of Israel. While the plan requires extensive clarification and obviously cannot be directly implemented, it is a point of departure for further discussion. The plan affords Egypt a chance to end its isolation within the Arab world and is for this very reason of major importance to Israel as well. It is therefore exceedingly regrettable that Israel deemed it necessary to proceed with the de facto annexation of the Golan Heights in December 1981, and also to replace its military administration in the West Bank by a civilian one, which was seen by the Palestinians as a step away from autonomy.

(vi) The Reagan Administration

23. It was extremely difficult to predict the direction that the new American Administration would follow under President Reagan, and even now a degree of uncertainty remains. In recent months, there have been indications that in the Middle East, and particularly in the Gulf area, Washington has been more concerned with curbing Soviet influence than with solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the United States has also, on a number of occasions, provided sufficient evidence that it is genuinely aware of its responsibilities as the major guarantor of Israel's security.

Nevertheless, while Washington has reached a 'strategic consensus' with Israel, the most spectacular arms deal has been struck with Saudi Arabia.

24. The willingness of four Community Member States to contribute to the Sinai peace-keeping force, the purpose of which is to ensure continued peace between Egypt and Israel has doubtless been a source of considerable satisfaction to the United States. The interest shown by the latter in the plan proposed by Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia and discussed at greater length below permits the cautious conclusion that Washington is seeking not only to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict but also to enlist the support of the moderate Arab States against the Soviet Union. For the United States it would, however, seem advisable to avoid giving distinct priority to the East-West confrontation in the Middle East, since continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict would provide the Soviet Union with both motive and opportunity for extending its influence in the area.

(vii) EEC attitude to the Palestinian problem

25. A change in EEC attitudes towards the Middle East has occurred largely as a result of the increasing importance of the Palestine question over the past few years. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands, for example have publicly declared their support for the Palestinian demand for the right to self-determination. The French Government has made a statement in which it opts for a Palestinian State. In view of this change, the apparent impasse over the Camp David Agreements and the serious consequences that could result from it, Europe needs now to assert its influence to propose new bases for discussion, using the Camp David Agreements as the necessary foundation upon which to build European policies.

c) The PLO and the Palestinian issue

26. Although the Palestinians have been engaged in resistance since the beginning of the century, the popular resistance movements of today only really began to emerge since the 1948 war and notably after the Palestinians' defeat and subsequent Israeli occupation of Sinai and the Gaza Strip in 1956 - the emergence of terrorism and guerrilla tactics being seen as the consequence of the manifest Arab inferiority in mobile warfare.

27. In 1956, for example, a clandestine Palestinian Arab nationalist organisation, 'Al Fatah' was formed by a small group of Palestinian exiles in the Gaza Strip. Then, in 1964, the Arab Governments meeting in Cairo established the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, both as a central forum for the Palestinians and as an instrument of Arab control.

28. In the aftermath of the 1967 war, however, the cult of the Fedayeen - or 'Freedom Fighters' - began to sweep through the Arab countries and a whole range of guerrilla groups sprang up. Today, the PLO comprises several diverse groups

pledged to the recovery of the Palestinian land and to the establishment of a Palestinian State (see Annex 2). Since 1969, Al Fatah has emerged as the most powerful and best organised of the resistance movements; its leader Yasser Arafat became Chairman of the PLO in that year.

#### Aims and objectives of the PLO

29. The officially declared aim of the PLO is to re-establish a state of Palestine and to secure recognition of the refugees' right to return. The Palestine National Charter - or Covenant of the PLO - amended by the Palestine National Council (the Parliament of the PLO) in July 1968 sets out the common political programme of the various Palestinian movements and goes some way to spelling out a future constitution (see Annex 3). The guiding principles of the Covenant are as follows:

- In the future Palestinian state citizenship will be granted only to those Jews who have lived in Palestine since before 1917 (article 6),
- The Jews are not a nation and consequently possess neither the right to self-determination nor the right to an independent state (article 20),
- The Palestinian people are a nation and are therefore alone entitled to self-determination and may claim possession of the whole and undivided territory of Palestine (articles 3 and 21),
- Any solution not based on the right to total liberation of the country must be rejected. The objective - the establishment of an independent state - cannot be achieved by political means but only by armed combat (articles 9 and 21),
- The struggle against Israel is legal, but the defence of Israeli interests is illegal (article 18).

The PLO therefore condemns the existence of the state of Israel, whose establishment it regards as illegal, and seeks the establishment of an independent Palestinian state through armed revolutionary means.

#### External relations of the PLO

30. Under the leadership of Mr Yasser Arafat the PLO has succeeded in gaining international recognition, with its own representatives in more than fifty states. In October 1974 the Arab Summit Conference at Rabat recognised the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians. Then in November 1979 Mr Arafat was invited to address the 29th session of the UN General Assembly and was guaranteed the status of official UN Observer. Since then Mr Arafat has gone from triumph to diplomatic triumph. He has been received by the former Spanish Prime Minister, Mr Adolfo Suarez and by the Austrian Chancellor, Mr Bruno Kreisky. The Greek government has offered diplomatic status to a PLO representation in Athens.

31. Consequently, recent years have seen the adoption of a more moderate stance by some elements within the PLO, which have shown a readiness to accept certain compromises and a greater interest in intensifying contacts with non-Arab organisations such as the European Communities. In 1974 the PLO announced that it would be ready to found a Palestinian state in any part of the territory of the Palestinian Mandate. In August 1980, for example, Mr Arafat<sup>1</sup> declared that the Palestinians' objective was to set up a 'liberal, democratic state on territory evacuated by Israel in which Moslems, Jews and Christians could live together in peace'. In November 1980 he also dismissed the resolution proposed to the May 1980 Fatah Conference which called for the liquidation of Israel.

## 2. The Middle-East as an area of Soviet/American tensions

32. That the Middle East should have suddenly become in the early 1960's an area of Soviet-American confrontation may be considered in many ways unavoidable. After the 1956 Suez Crisis, the defeated President Nasser turned for support to the Soviet Union, whilst the US, anxious to safeguard its security interests in the area, was for the first time brought into diplomatic moves towards a peace settlement and soon established itself as the main guarantor of the existence of Israel. In addition, Washington had to fill the gap left by the United Kingdom and France.

33. The area lies strategically within the field of tension between the traditional spheres of influence of the two superpowers, and in view of the importance to both sides of the oil resources the region possesses, events in the countries of the Middle East have thus come to have a direct bearing on the state of East-West relations and on the general state of détente. In recent years the United States has succeeded in retaining the initiative and occupying a dominant position in the area, as evidenced in particular by the expulsion of 10,000 Soviet advisers from Egypt by President Sadat and the active diplomacy of the US Secretary of State, Dr Kissinger, who initiated a process of rapprochement in the form of disengagement agreements between Israel on the one hand and Egypt and Syria on the other. However, the Soviet Union remained alert: Moscow concluded treaties of friendship with Iraq, Syria and the People's Republic of Yemen, while continuing to bring great political influence to bear on Damascus. The revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have prompted the United States to develop a 'Rapid Deployment Force', troops which can be swiftly mobilized within the Middle East should the need arise, particularly for the protection of oil fields. While such a move is understandable, there is a danger of it provoking a reaction from the Soviet Union, particularly if the presence of such a force is conspicuous through land bases.

34. The 15th Session of the Palestinian National Congress, in mid-April 1981 has revealed a strong desire for a closer relationship between the PLO and the Soviet

<sup>1</sup> Interviewed in Le Monde

Union. The Chairman of the Palestinian National Council, Mr Farouk Kaddoumi, launched an attack on US policy in the Middle East, describing it as an attempt to provoke the PLO. He added that it was important for the PLO to strengthen its ties with 'friendly countries' - namely the Soviet Union - and the Congress gave a warm welcome to 'comrade Brezhnev's proposal on the Middle East and the Palestinian issue.'

35. This Soviet move - (placed before the XXVI CPSU conference) consisted largely of a proposal to revive the Geneva peace Conference, which was convened to seek a peace settlement after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, but failed to achieve one.

36. During all this period, the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been silently present in the region. An element of uncertainty and potential danger in the Middle East lies in the extent to which Israel, Iraq and Libya are developing a nuclear capability. Both countries have been importing materials in order to endow themselves with the possibility of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But there have been persistent suggestions in the European press that these materials may in time be capable of adaptation to military use. If these reports are based on fact, the acquisition of military nuclear capability by two countries at the heart of the Arab-Israeli dispute could alter the balance of power in the Middle East and have untold effects on US-Soviet relations there.

37. The Israeli position is never to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the region. This does not disclose the actual state of Israeli nuclear weapons technology, research and development. Not being a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and allowing only imperfect verification procedures on its nuclear installations, Israel's stance in recent events such as the raid on the Iraqi Tammuz reactor is bound to be politically weak. It would seem advisable for Israel to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It should not be forgotten that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has a withdrawal clause that could be used by Israel when its highest interests are at stake.

### 3. The question of Middle East Oil

38. The disruptive effect on oil supplies of a series of military conflicts and the subsequent political instability in the Middle East throughout the 1970's, together with the massive increase in oil prices, has had extremely serious consequences for the industrialised nations of Western Europe.

39. The close relationship between oil imports and economic growth in the Member States became increasingly clear in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crises, and was one of the prime motives for the opening of the Euro-Arab Dialogue in that year. Sixty to 70% of Europe's oil imports currently come from the Arab countries and the proportion of GNP that European countries have to spend on their oil imports has been constantly rising.

40. In view of this, the state of European relations with the Arab oil producing countries constitutes an important element in any consideration of the situation in the Middle East, and it is becoming increasingly important that, in order to mitigate the economic effects of the oil price policies of OPEC, the European Community supports the process of technological, economic and social modernisation of the Arab oil states and their participation in world economics. Middle East oil also plays an important role in the economy of the United States (comprising 34% of total oil imports in 1981) and the Soviet Union has shown a particular interest in oil from the Gulf States for domestic consumption, preferring to use its own supplies to earn valuable investment credits.

4. The role of the European Community in the Middle East

a) The Euro-Arab Dialogue

41. As we have seen, the 1973 oil crisis served, dramatically, to bring home to the European Community its dependence on the Arab Oil States. In the same year, therefore, initial contacts were established on the initiative of the Arabs between the oil-producing countries of the Arab League and the Communities, which were later formalised into the Euro-Arab Dialogue. The main themes of this Dialogue are the economic and industrial development of the oil-exporting countries, guaranteed energy supplies for the Community countries and the joint financing of development projects in the Third World Arab nations.

42. Between 1975 and 1978 discussions were held on priority problems in the field of agriculture, industrialisation, trade, finance and scientific and technical cooperation. The Arab side tried also to raise Political aspects. Following the signature of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel in March 1979, the Dialogue was suspended. An eventual reopening of the discussions will raise the question of the status of the PLO.

b) The Venice Declaration

43. Since 1973 in particular the Community Member States have also been active concerning the Middle East on the level of political cooperation. A good start was made with the Declaration of November 6, 1973 in which a breakthrough was realised concerning the definition of the Palestinian problem. A quite remarkable speech was made by the President-in-office of the Council, Mr O'Kennedy, at the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 1979. He enunciated the principles on which a settlement must be based. These principles are as follows:

- (i) The inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force
- (ii) The need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967
- (iii) Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries
- (iv) Recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

44. At the meeting of the European Council in Venice in June 1980, the Heads of Government and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Nine held a comprehensive exchange of views on all aspects of the present situation in the Middle East. They agreed that growing tensions affecting the region constituted a serious danger and rendered a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict 'more necessary and pressing than ever.' Basing itself on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the European Council expressed concern on four major points in its Venice Declaration of 13 June 1980 -

- The ending of the territorial occupation,
- Self-determination for the Palestinian people,
- Security in the Middle East,
- The status of Jerusalem.<sup>1</sup>

Further, it enunciated two basic principles universally accepted by the international community:-

- '- The right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and
- Justice for all the peoples which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.'

45. The Nine declared that they were prepared to participate 'within the framework of a comprehensive settlement in a system of concrete and binding international guarantees, including guarantees on the ground' and they refused all unilateral initiatives whose purpose was to change the status of Israel. The Palestinian people and the PLO should be associated with the peace negotiations.

c) The Missions of Messrs. Thorn and Van der Klaauw

46. The Council Presidents responsible, Messrs. Thorn and Van der Klaauw undertook contact missions in the second half of 1980 and the first half of 1981, respectively. Mr Van der Klaauw operated on the basis of a working document that represented a broad consensus among Community Foreign Ministers. It was designed as an internal report setting out options for discussion rather than any final plan for peace. According to press reports the working document covered the four main points of the Venice Declaration :

- Israeli withdrawal
- Palestinian self-determination
- Security guarantees for all states in the region
- Jerusalem

The aims especially of the Van der Klaauw mission, seems to have been to attempt to stimulate the different states and people in the region themselves to get involved in discussions, and later negotiations, and that European interlocutors

<sup>1</sup> for full text see Annex 4

should gradually fade away in the background.

47. Following a meeting with Mr Van der Klaauw in Damascus, the PLO leader, Mr Yasser Arafat, insisted that a European initiative must take full account of Palestinians' rights. Mr Arafat refused to make any statement which did not challenge Israel's right to existence. In mid-April 1981, the 15th session of the Palestinian National Council confirmed the general hostility to any European initiative, especially since President Sadat's address to the European Parliament in February.

#### Israeli Reaction

48. The meeting with Mr Arafat prompted immediate criticism from the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mr Yitzhak Shamir, who on 16 April 1981, strongly condemned the activities of the Ten in the Middle East. The Minister strongly attacked Europe's "pro-Palestinian" stand, which advocated "solutions which could only lead to the total elimination of Israel", and encouraged the PLO.

49. The European Council in June 1981 concluded that the Ten should continue 'energetically and without respite' their efforts to promote a peaceful settlement. Ministers were instructed to elaborate further the practical possibilities available to Europe to this end by internal reflection, while maintaining appropriate contacts with all parties concerned, including the United States. The reference to consultations with the USA would appear to indicate that the European Council has accorded an added importance to the Camp David Agreements. We have referred elsewhere to the participation of 4 Member States in the Sinai Peace-keeping Force.

#### d) The basis of a future Community strategy

50. The Europe of the Ten has an obvious interest in promoting a settlement in the Middle East, and it is clear that the European Parliament can and must now adopt a coordinated strategy for action in the Middle East covering all the main problems and crisis points in the area, and based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

51. In view of this European policy should be to develop ideas that run parallel and not contrary to the peace process that has been started at Camp David. It is necessary, then, that a new European initiative be presented - not as an alternative which might undermine any US mediatory role in the dispute, but as a series of coordinated actions and complementary policies developed within the framework of greater consultation and coordination of efforts. The Ten should, therefore, continue to consult the USA, the Arab States, the PLO, other Palestinian representatives, and Israel and to inform the UN about future proposals for a peace settlement.

#### The Palestinian Issue and the PLO

52. In particular the European Community must emphasise the need to draft some new suggestions on the question of Palestinian self-determination and autonomy, and on the participation of the Palestinian people, the PLO and the other Arab States in the negotiating process aiming at an overall settlement of the dispute. European policies must equally serve to clarify some basic questions on the position of the PLO in a future peace plan. It should be clear that the Ten cannot recognize the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. The Palestinians themselves are able to decide by whom they wish to be represented. The PLO is nevertheless an important factor in the processing of a peace settlement. Its importance could be enhanced if the PLO were to cease acts of terrorism and to repeal those sections of the PLO Covenant which threaten the existence of Israel.

53. The essential element in the whole problem would be for Israel and the Palestinian people, including the PLO, to hold talks with each other and to initiate a gradual process leading to mutual acceptance and recognition. It will be clear that the Israeli settlement policy and the question of Jerusalem will be very hard nuts to crack. One should not rule out options which foresee a total or partial internationalisation of Jerusalem.

#### Security guarantees

54. Security is of vital importance for all states in the region, but especially for the State of Israel. Without convincing security arrangements Israel will never agree to any solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Once again, in this context, one has to underline the paramount importance of the Peace Treaty of 1979 between Egypt and Israel. On a practical level, the role of the European Community could include, together with the USA and the UN, the implementation of various military measures. For instance, Membership of UN peace-keeping forces and the maintenance of demilitarized zones. In proposing this, one should never lose sight of the fact that peace in the Middle East is of prime importance for Israel, but that real hard security guarantees can only be provided by the United States.

### Economic assistance

55. The European Community could help very fruitfully on economic, financial and technical levels. It could render assistance of this type to Israel, to the Palestinian people and to other states who are willing to cooperate. A valuable stepping stone in this regard was provided the resolution passed by the European Parliament on 26 April 1979, on the occasion of the signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. In this resolution the Council and Commission are called upon to intensify existing links between the European Communities, Egypt and Israel, and to offer stronger cooperation to those states of the area which are willing to participate in the process of achieving a comprehensive peace settlement.

56. The Commission is also instructed to submit concrete proposals to increase industrial cooperation between the Communities and Israel and between the Communities and Egypt as a contribution to a development of the region, and the Report includes suggestions for specific projects in order to increase the industrial capacity of both countries to diversify their economies.

### A comprehensive settlement

57. It must be clear that a comprehensive settlement and a durable and lasting peace can be achieved eventually only by bringing in the Soviet Union. That could be done by drafting, in the final stages a follow-up resolution to Security Council Resolution 242. That new resolution should make explicit reference to the State of Israel and to the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people.

## PART II LEBANON

### 1. Brief history of Lebanon

58. Although Lebanon was part of the Ottoman Empire, its population was predominantly Christian. The renown of the Lebanese as successful merchants extended far beyond its borders. Lebanon was the place where the Arab States met the rest of the world.

59. During the armed conflicts at the end of World War I, the Turkish troops were driven out by the French and British, in some cases with Arab support. In 1926 Lebanon was placed under French administration and was thereby officially separated from Syria for the first time in its history.

60. In 1943 Lebanon achieved independence as the Republic of Lebanon. Under the threat of a general strike in November 1943, all social sectors subscribed to a compromise known as the 'National Agreement' which provided for official posts (and consequently the three highest offices of state) to be allocated to the Moslem and Christian communities in a ratio of 5:6; this ratio was based on the results of the 1932 census. The agreement contained mutual concessions: the Moslems renounced union with Syria - i.e. incorporation in an enlarged Arab community - and the Christians accepted a Lebanese state 'with an Arab face' not protected by France.

61. The agreement was based on the following principles:

- (1) Lebanon is an independent sovereign state on an equal footing with all the other world states.
- (2) Lebanon is the common mother country of all Lebanese, irrespective of the existence of numerous religious groups. Every Lebanese has the right to hold public office, the sole reservation concerning the number of offices allocated to each denomination.
- (3) Lebanon is an Arab State, a member of the great Arab family. It therefore cooperates with all Arab States although it does not enter into alliances with them or subjugate itself to them.

62. This agreement still constitutes the foundations of the Lebanese State today; for several decades it was the basis for a peaceful partnership between the various religious groups and enabled the political institutions to function efficiently.

63. The constitution of the State of Israel led to an influx of Palestinians, mostly Moslem, refugees into Lebanon. The battles for Jordanian territory and Jordan's expulsion of the Palestinians in 1969 and 1970 led to a further overall increase in the number of Moslems in Lebanon. The refugees are not recognized as Lebanese citizens but they expressly support the demand made by the Moslem Lebanese that they should have a greater say in political life. The justification for this demand is that the number of Moslems has increased constantly since the 1932 census, and that the 1943 National Agreement, which governs the allocation of political offices, should now be revised because at present the majority of the population is Moslem - a demand which is categorically rejected by the Maronites and other Christians.

64. The causes of the conflict which has been seething in Lebanon for a decade lie partly in the semi-feudal structures of the social system, which contrast sharply with the ultra-modern democratic forms; partly in the inability of the government to mediate in the conflict between the religious groups; and partly in the severe internal and external pressures affecting Lebanon because of the Palestinian problem.

65. The conflict has manifested itself in a continuing civil war, now active, now passive, between armed elements of the contending religious groups. In South Lebanon mainly to launch attacks on neighbouring Israeli territory; these in turn provoke armed reprisals by land and air by the Israelis. The Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) of Syrian soldiers intervened in Lebanon originally to limit the armed hostilities between Christians and Moslems, to give some advantage to the latter. However, in April 1981 Syrian SAM-missiles of Soviet origin were for the first time used against Christian communities in Zahle, in south-east Lebanon. This action provoked Israeli air raids against the Syrian missile units, thus further aggravating the already tense situation.

Intensive negotiations, directed by the American Under secretary of State, Mr Philip Habib, brought about a fragile cease-fire which has remained fragile because the missiles have still not been removed from the Bekaa-valley. A positive development was however that for the first time indirect contacts have been established between the State of Israel and the PLO.

#### Main power groups

66. The main social forces in Lebanon are the Christians, the Moslems, the Palestinians and the Syrians. The Christian sector of the population consists of Maronites, Greek-Orthodox Christians and Greek Catholics reunited with Rome and is western oriented. The Moslems belong to the Sunnites, the Shi'ites and the Druzes, all of which would like to see Lebanon integrated into the Arab world. There is also a minority Jewish group.
67. The third large population group consists of approximately 400,000 Palestinians, of whom some 10,000 are armed. Most of the Palestinians are Moslems, i.e., their integration into the political system would strengthen the Moslem population and exacerbate the conflict between Christians and Moslems over the allocation of political power. Many Palestinians are former refugees who fled to Lebanon after the constitution of the State of Israel in 1948. The political mouthpiece of the Palestinians is the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) which was founded in 1964 and has its headquarters in Beirut. The PLO claims that the 1969 Cairo Agreement grants the Palestinians the right to reside in Southern Lebanon.
68. This agreement was signed by representatives of the Lebanon, Egypt and the PLO, at the instigation of President Nasser; it governs relations between the Lebanese State and the Palestinians. The terms of the agreement are regarded as a victory for the Palestinians living in Lebanon, who were granted the right to take part in the (armed) Palestinian revolution provided that they agreed to respect the principles of Lebanese sovereignty and security. In practice the Palestinians were granted the right to wage their liberation struggle from bases on Lebanese territory.
69. Almost all the Syrians in Lebanon are soldiers of the Arab Deterrent Force - some 30,000 strong and put together after the Civil War of 1975/76 - who were the determining factor in the battles in Beirut against the Christian militia. Their presence has been in the past, and at some times, useful in guaranteeing to some extent peaceful co-existence between the eastern (Christian) and western (Moslem) halves of the Lebanese capital.

#### Political groups

70. There are some 20 different political parties in Lebanon which cover the entire political spectrum. They do not, however, exert any determining influence on political life, which is governed mainly by the religious groups.

71. The Constitution (first draft of 1926) lays down that the President of the Republic must be a Maronite, the Premier a Sunnite Moslem and the President of the Chamber a Shi'ite. Executive power is exercised by the Chamber which has 53 Christian and 45 Moslem members.

72. At present the following coalitions exist in the Parliament: the right-wing (Christian) group (with an overwhelming majority of Maronites) consists of Lebanese phalangists (Al Kataeb) and the National Liberal Party (PNL), who support a division of Lebanon into Christian and Moslem parts. There is a group of small left-wing parties - the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the Lebanese Communist Party (PCL), which previously shared a common party executive committee with Syria; it supports the PLO and is the only party where membership of a religious group is not a factor - it is 'multi-denominational' together with the Organization for Communist Action in Lebanon (OAC) they form the National Progressive Movement. In addition, there is the independent Nasserite movement which sees itself as the 'Union of Working People's Force' and two Syrian-influenced movements which play no more than a minor role in parliamentary activities (the National Syrian Socialist Party) (PSNS) and the National Syrian Party (PNS).

## 2. Special situation in South Lebanon

73. The comprehensive nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict is most clearly demonstrated in southern Lebanon. In this area Palestinian guerrillas confront the militia units of the Christian Lebanese Major Saad Haddad, who has set up his own state (Independent Free Lebanon) on a 700 sq. km. strip along the Israeli-Lebanese frontier. The area is also a target for Israeli attacks on Palestinian bases which have resulted in a large number of dead and wounded among the civilian population of southern Lebanon.

74. Israel receives arms from the USA for the military protection of its existence. The Carter Administration appealed unsuccessfully to the Israeli Prime Minister Mr Begin not to use these weapons for Israeli interventions in internal Lebanese conflicts.

75. The Lebanese Government is powerless to intervene in the conflict. Its own army numbers barely 6,000 soldiers and its combat effectiveness is limited because of religious divisions; consequently it is unable to prevent the conflicts in this area. In view of this situation, the Lebanese Government appealed to the UN Security Council to station UN troops in the combat zone.

## 3. UN intervention in the Lebanese Conflict

76. As a result of Syrian intervention in Lebanon, the failure of the ADF, increased Israeli attacks and retaliatory strikes in southern Lebanon, the United Nations Security Council decided in resolutions Nos. 425 and 426 of 16 March 1978 to station a UN force in the combat zone (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon - UNIFIL).

77. UNIFIL's task was set out in resolution No. 425 as follows:

1. Israeli troops should be required to withdraw from all Lebanese territory.
2. Lebanon's territorial integrity and peace in this area should be restored.
3. The Government of Lebanon should be assisted in its efforts to restore its effective authority in the area.

78. UN Resolutions Nos. 427/78, 434/78, 436/78, 444/79 and 450/79 also concern the situation in Lebanon: they extended UNIFIL's mandate on several occasions, increased the contingent to a maximum of 6,000 men, strongly criticized Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory, called on the Israeli Government to withdraw its troops from the combat zone: called on the warring factions to allow the International Red Cross to have access to the wounded, extended UNIFIL's mandate so that it could act as a military unit, granting it the right to act in self-defence, and called on the Lebanese Government to draw up a programme setting out the concrete measures it could take to restore its authority.

79. The following Member States of the European Community were and/or are involved in UNIFIL: France, Italy, Netherland and Ireland. The UN troops are only lightly armed and have been attacked on several occasions by Israeli troops, by the Palestinians and by the Christian militias. UNIFIL is stationed south of the Litani river and north of Major Haddad's region (Free Lebanon). Its task is made more difficult by the unwillingness of the warring factions to cooperate. It is supported only by the powerless Lebanese Government.

4. Statements made by the European Council and Foreign Ministers

80. At the European Council in Venice in June 1980, the Nine Member States stressed the need to take immediate measures to restore peace in Lebanon and thereby to contribute at the same time to defusing the situation in the whole of the Middle East. They emphasized the important task devolving on UNIFIL and recalled their declaration of 22 April 1980 setting out UNIFIL's tasks: it was to control the territory within the internationally recognized frontiers in southern Lebanon. The European Council meeting at Maastricht in March 1981, underlined the support given by the Ten to UNIFIL and called on other nations to do likewise.

5. Missions of Mr Thorn and Mr van der Klaauw

81. Following the European Council's declaration at Venice on the Middle East, the President in office of the Council, Mr THORN, undertook a contact mission to the Middle East, visiting Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi-Arabia and Egypt. In his talks with Mr Thorn, the Lebanese President, Mr Sarkis (Maronite), stressed that in his view the problems faced by Lebanon must be considered quite separately from the overall problems facing the Middle East. Mr Thorn's successor, Mr van der KLAUW, undertook a follow-up mission in the first half of 1981. After his visit to Lebanon, he stated that at present the idea of an international peace-keeping force there seemed impracticable.

82. On 10 April 1981 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on Lebanon, calling for an immediate ceasefire, the cessation of the Syrian bombardment, the withdrawal of all outside forces except UNIFIL, and the re-establishment of the authority of the Lebanese government. A further resolution of 22 April 1982 requested the Palestine Liberation Movement to recognise the sovereignty of the Lebanese Government, called for free elections in Lebanon and insisted that all foreign armed forces be withdrawn.

#### 6. EEC-Lebanon

83. The European Community's Cooperation Agreement with Lebanon was signed in 1977 and entered into force on 1 November 1978. It is of indefinite duration and provides for entry free of duty or quantitative restriction into the EC for most industrial products and raw materials. Preferential access is also granted for imports of agricultural products. A financial Protocol to the agreement made available a total of 30 million EUA in the period ending 31 October 1981. Some projects are still being financed in the Lebanon with funds made available under this Protocol. In common with other Maghreb and Mashreq countries, the Lebanon has also recently concluded negotiations for a second Financial Protocol, under which over 5 years 50 million ECUs will be made available (16 million from the EC's budgetary "own resources" and 34 million in EIB loans). The signature of this Protocol is expected to take place shortly.

As regards food aid, the 1981 Community programme provided for direct aid of 10,000 tonnes of cereals, 1,100 tonnes of skimmed milk powder and 1000 tonnes of butter-oil for Lebanon. Under the 1982 Community programme, it is planned to send aid of 20,000 tonnes of cereals, 1,100 tonnes of skimmed milk powder and 1000 tonnes of butter-oil. In addition, small quantities of skimmed milk powder and butter-oil were sent through non-governmental organisations in 1981 and more are proposed for 1982. Emergency aid of 94,000 tonnes of skimmed milk powder is being sent through the International Committee of the Red Cross to Lebanon.

#### 7. The Future Course

84. Proposals by the European Parliament on Lebanon should take account of the following factors:

##### (a) Solution of Lebanese problem

A solution of the Lebanon problem must be sought independently of a solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute, though a solution of the latter would greatly assist the settlement of the former. It seems advisable to work in the direction of the withdrawal or disengagement of as many as possible of foreign armed forces (UNIFIL excluded) from Lebanon. These forces should in some vital areas be substituted by UN peace keeping forces. This would create room for rebuilding and reconstructing the Lebanon, including a reintegration of Haddad's entity in the country. One could also start then with the rebuilding of Lebanese armed forces and police.

(b) Withdrawal of Israeli and Palestinian units

The repeated calls for the withdrawal of Israeli and Palestinian units have been unsuccessful. Condemnations of Israeli attacks by the UN Security Council have been ineffective so far. In talks with the PLO, the Palestinians should be asked to negotiate an agreement with the Lebanese Government which would give them the right - at least until a lasting settlement of the Palestinian problem was achieved - to remain in a geographically well-delineated area of Southern Lebanon (for example, the Tyre area). Armed actions by the Palestinians should come to an end because otherwise Israel will not agree on stopping reprisals and preventive strikes.

(c) Substitution of ADF by UN Force in Beirut

To reduce tension in Beirut and restore that city's position as a trading centre, the Lebanese Government should be asked to negotiate a troop withdrawal with Syria. This will not be easy since the Syrians do not regard themselves as occupying forces but as members of the ADF. A UN force could then replace the Syrians to guarantee the truce in Beirut.

(d) UNIFIL's role

The numerous condemnations of attacks on UN troops by both Israeli and Palestinian units have been fruitless so far. The European Parliament should call on the UN Security Council to set out afresh the duties and rights of UNIFIL and give the UN forces greater room for manoeuvre. This might be achieved, for example, by increasing the size of the contingent. Furthermore, permanent consultation groups consisting of officers of the UN troops and the leaders of the other warring factions should be set up in order to achieve better cooperation. The Palestinians could be induced to agree to this suggestion if it were pointed out that their refusal would lead to a withdrawal of the UN troops - a move which would result in a serious aggravation of the situation in South Lebanon.

Major Haddad's troops could be persuaded to agree if it were pointed out that any refusal to cooperate would firstly lead to a withdrawal of UNIFIL troops and would cut out possibilities for an eventual gradual reintegration of Haddad's entity in the Lebanon.

(e) Community support for Lebanon

The European Community should again inform Lebanon that it is ready to provide technical and material assistance should the Lebanese Government so request. The Lebanese Government should therefore be asked to draw up a detailed programme illustrating the extent to which emergency humanitarian aid could assist in the restoration of its authority. In this context, the problem of rebuilding an effective Lebanese army and police force should also be considered. This would have to go hand in hand with the dissolving of militias.

## 8. Supplementary summary on the Lebanon

### 8.1.- Israel's Intervention in Lebanon

The Israeli army invaded Lebanon on 6 June 1982. The UNIFIL troops, as was indicated in a report by the United Nations Secretary General, could not prevent the invasion, as they had neither the mandate nor the military capacity to counter such a strong attack. <sup>(1)</sup>

The operation 'Peace in Galilee' was first said by the Israelis to be aimed at protecting the civilian population of Galilee from PLO attacks from Southern Lebanon. Nevertheless, military operations soon proved to be on a much larger scale, Beirut was thrown into a state of siege and the Israeli Government made it clear that the aim of the operation was to free Lebanon from the PLO.

### 8.2.- The Conflict with Syria

Syrian forces intervened soon after the invasion was launched in an attempt to halt it. Large scale air battles ensued and a very large number of Syrian planes were shot down. Israel also attacked Syrian missile batteries (SAM-6) in the Bekaa Valley. Nevertheless in an appeal to the Syrian President, Mr Hafez al-Assad, the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr Begin declared to the Knesset that Israel did not want war with Syria.

### 8.3.- The United Nations and the Crisis in Lebanon

On 5 June 1982, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 508 calling upon all parties concerned to stop immediately and simultaneously all military activity in Lebanon and along the Israeli-Lebanese border. A second resolution (509) was adopted the following day, calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from Lebanon.

Resolutions 511 and 512, adopted respectively on 18 and 19 June, called for a prorogation of the mandate of the UNIFIL and for humanitarian aid from the Red Cross and the Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA).

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(1) United Nations Security Council; Report of the Secretary General submitted in application of resolution 508 (1982) of the United Nations Security Council.

#### 8.4 - The Ten and the Lebanese Crisis

On 9 June 1982 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted a statement in which they vigorously condemned the new Israeli invasion and called on Israel to withdraw all its forces immediately and unconditionally from Lebanon and to place the UNIFIL in a position to accomplish its mission without hindrance.

The European Council of 29 June, in its conclusions on the Middle East and Lebanon, maintained the vigorous condemnation of the Israeli invasion.

The Ten also stated that a final peace in Lebanon required :

- the complete and prompt withdrawal of Israeli forces from that country;
- the departure of all foreign forces except those authorised by a legitimate and broadly representative Government of Lebanon, whose authority would be fully re-established over all its national territory.

The Ten indicated that 'Israel will not obtain the security to which it has a right by using force and creating faits accomplis but it can find this security by satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people, who should have the opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination with all that this implies.' The PLO should be associated with the negotiations.

The Ten also confirmed the suspension of the signature of the second Financial Protocol with Israel and decided to suspend the next Ministerial meeting of the EEC-Israel Agreement.

The European Parliament adopted on 17 June a resolution on the situation in Lebanon in which it condemned both the armed action in Lebanon by Israeli troops, and all the acts of terrorism against Israel which had preceded it. The resolution insisted on the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon; and also called on the Commission and the Council of Ministers to draw up immediately a programme of aid for the victims of war.

#### 8.5 - United States' Diplomatic Activity

From the beginning of the crisis the United States deployed considerable diplomatic activity in order to reach a solution. President Reagan's special envoy, Mr Philip Habib, applied 'shuttle' diplomacy during the crisis, visiting alternatively the capitals of Israel, of the Arab States and also of Lebanon. Mr Habib submitted various peace plans to the parties, one of which was finally adopted by the Lebanese Government, by Israel and by the PLO besieged in West Beirut.

## 8.6. The evacuation plan

The plan provided for the evacuation from West Beirut of PLO and Syrian forces under the supervision of an international force, to consist of 800 French, 800 United States and 400 Italian troops. 3,000 Lebanese soldiers were to collaborate with this force.

The plan also indicated that :

- non-militant Palestinians who wished to live in Lebanon would be subject to Lebanese legislation;
- the mission of the international intervention force would be concluded if one of the points of the agreement had not been observed;
- the mandate of the force of one month might be extended on request of the Lebanese Government;
- the evacuation must be completed within fifteen days.

The agreement does not specify the ultimate destination of the Palestinians, but says that the Syrians will join units of their army in the Bekaa Valley and Northern Lebanon.

The request for a presence of an international force was announced on 18 August by the Lebanese Premier Shafiq al-Wazzan, who said that the Cabinet had made its decision to seek an international force on the understanding that the evacuation plan should be the first step to the implementation of resolutions 508 and 509 of the United Nations Security Council.

## 8.7. - The PLO

During the two months' war, the PLO showed a strong willingness to start a political dialogue with the United States. The PLO President, Mr Yasser Arafat, signed a paper for a United States congressional group in which he stated his acceptance of all United Nations resolutions relevant to the Palestinian question.

In an interview given to the French newspaper 'Le Monde' on 10 August, Mr Arafat stated that after the 1982 Lebanese war, the entire world must deal with the matter at an international conference, attended by all the countries concerned as well as by the great powers.

#### 8.8.- Iran-Iraq War

The war between Iran and Iraq started in September 1980, when Iraq invaded Iran in order to gain control of the Shatt-al-Arab waterway leading into the Gulf. The war adds a dangerous element to the complicated pattern of the Middle East. In late July 1982, Iranian forces invaded Southern Iraq. An eventual defeat of the Iraqi Government could threaten other governments in the Gulf with a new outbreak of Islamic fundamentalism.

#### 8.9. - The future course

Proposals by the European Parliament on Lebanon should take account of the following factors :

##### (a) Solution of the Lebanese problem :

A solution of the Lebanese problem must be sought independently of a solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute, although a solution of the latter would greatly assist the settlement of the former. The departure of the PLO and of Syrian troops from Beirut should represent the first step towards the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon. To secure such a withdrawal, the Ten should consult with the United States on Lebanon and in particular on the replacement of the UNIFIL troops by an international peace-keeping force under United Nations auspices; this force would be stationed in Beirut and in other parts of the country. EEC Member States would participate in such a force. This would create an opportunity for reconstructing the Lebanon, including the reintegration of Major Haddad's entity in the country itself. One could also start then the re-building of Lebanese armed forces and police, and secure the disbandment of the militias at the same time. It is essential that the reconstruction of the country should take into account the complex pattern of the various ethnic groups in order to satisfy their legitimate aspirations. It is also vital that armed action by the non-militant Palestinians who remain in Lebanon should be prevented, as otherwise Israel might be pushed to new reprisals and preventive strikes. One might well expect that the newly-elected President of Lebanon, Mr Beshir Gemayel, will seek to develop policies along these lines.

(b) The withdrawal of Israelis, Syrians and armed Palestinians :

With the departure of the PLO and the Syrians from Beirut, Israel has achieved its main objective. Israel should eschew permanent military control of Southern Lebanon and should agree to leave Lebanon. The major problem remains of the Syrian and armed PLO presence in Lebanon, especially in the Bekaa Valley. This could lead to a new conflict between Israel and Syria. The Community, together with the United States, should therefore direct their diplomatic endeavours towards a total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. The various groupings in the Lebanon could be persuaded to come to a general agreement if it were pointed out that any refusal to cooperate would firstly lead to a withdrawal of the international peace-keeping force and secondly would eliminate any possibility of reconstructing the country.

(c) Community support for Lebanon :

The European Community must continue supplying humanitarian aid, particularly to Lebanon. Also, the European Community should, again inform Lebanon that it is ready to provide technical and material assistance should the Lebanese Government so request. The Lebanese Government should therefore be asked to draw up a detailed programme illustrating the extent to which emergency humanitarian aid could assist in the restoration of its authority.

ANNEX 1

22 November 1967

Security Council Resolution 242 (1967)

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims of states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats of acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity:

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

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22 October 1973

Security Council Resolution 338 (1973)

Demand of Cease-Fire in the Middle East

The Security Council

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

The Main Palestinian Resistance Groups

Some estimates indicate that there have been as many as 100 groups defining themselves as fedayeen and dedicated to the liberation of Palestine. Between 1967 and 1977 alone, over 30 such organisations emerged, all extremely divided and fragmented. However, the main resistance groups are as follows:

The Palestine National Liberation Movement: (Al Fatah)

Founded in 1957 - leader Yasser Arafat

Political spokesman - Faruq Qaddumi

The largest guerilla group - numbering some 7000 men

Also the best known and the most acceptable group to the Arab Governments

The least extremist group, contains both Left and Right wing elements

Based in the Lebanon - does not believe in operations outside the

Middle East involving innocent neutrals.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Founded 1967/68 - leader George Habash

The second largest of the commando groups - membership of about 3500

Believes in resistance both within and outside the Middle East

Extremist group - concentrates on urban sabotage and on special

operations such as hijackings and bombings. Marxist-Leninist

connections.

The Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP)

Founded 1969 from a split in the PFLP - leader Nayif Hawatmeh

Advocates local rather than remote action

Probably numbers only a couple of hundred men based around Lebanon's southern border with Israel. Strongly pro-Moscow.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command

Founded 1968 again from a split in the PFLP - leader Ahmad Jibril

Has the reputation of being one of the toughest of the guerrilla groups

Numbers only about 200 men - based in Lebanon.

Vanguards of the Popular Liberation War (Al Sa'iqah)

Founded 1968 by the Syrian Ba'ath Socialist Party - leader Samini Attari  
Sponsored by Syria. Fedayeen drawn from Palestinian refugee camps in  
Syria and Lebanon  
Seldom mounts any commando raids.

Arab Liberation Front (ALF)

Founded 1969 and sponsored by Iraq. Leader Abd al Wahhab  
al-Kayyali. The smallest of the resistance groups.

In addition the PLO maintains a regular military force known  
as the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA).

Increasingly, the organisation of the Palestinian Resistance  
is split between the militants and the moderates. The hard-liners  
defend the view that only force can liberate Palestine and that  
negotiations could never produce more than an unsatisfactory  
compromise. Others are willing to explore the possibility of a  
negotiated settlement and suggest readiness to compromise both on  
the extent of a Palestinian state (that is, whether it should include  
all the territory West of the River Jordan or only on the West Bank  
and Gaza) and on the means of achieving it.

THE COVENANT OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION (PLO)  
of July 1968

('Palestinian National Covenant')

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5.2.1976

(PE 43.623)

Translation from the original French by the Secretariat of the European  
Parliament

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

The latest version of the Covenant, dated July 1968, sets out the common political programme of the various Palestinian movements that make up the PLO, and goes some way to spelling out a future constitution.

The previous version of the Covenant was drawn up at the first Palestinian Congress held in Jerusalem in May 1964, when the PLO was founded. (The official English translation referred to it as a 'Covenant'.) The preamble concluded - and still concludes - with an oath binding the signatories to implement the Covenant.

The 1964 Congress decided that the Palestinian National Council - the supreme body embracing the Palestinian organisations - would meet periodically and that amendments to the text of the Covenant could only be adopted by a two-thirds majority of its members.

Following changes within the PLO after the 1967 'Six-Day War', the Palestinian National Council met in Cairo from 1 to 17 July 1968 for its IVth Session and amended the Covenant.

Practically all the Palestinian organisations existing in the Arab countries took part in this Congress, including the most important fedayin organisations. El Fatah and the fedayin organisations under its influence had 37 seats in the Council out of a total of 100, compared with the ten held by the representatives of the 'Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine'. Since the 'hard-line' movements were so strongly represented, it may be assumed that the amendments that produced the present version were carefully discussed and assessed.

The guiding principles of the Covenant the full text of which is given below, may be summarised as follows:

- In the State of Palestine only those Jews who were living in Palestine before 1917 will be recognised as citizens (Article 6);
- The Jews do not constitute a nation and have no right of self-determination nor any right to a state of their own (Article 20);

- Only the Palestinians can claim the right of self-determination and full and total possession of the country (Articles 3 and 21);
- Any solution which does not consist in total liberation of the country will be rejected; this aim cannot be achieved by political means, but by military means (Articles 9 and 21);
- The struggle against Israel is lawful; on the contrary, any defence offered by Israel is not (Article 18).

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THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COVENANT

Article 1

Palestine is the fatherland of the Palestinian Arab people; it constitutes an inseparable part of the great Arab fatherland and the Palestinian people form part of the Arab nation.

Article 2

Within the frontiers of the British mandate, Palestine forms an indivisible territorial unit.

Article 3

The Palestinian Arab people hold a lawful right to their fatherland and the right to determine their destiny after achieving the liberation of their country in accordance with their own wishes and resolve.

Article 4

The Palestinian identity is fundamental, essential and intrinsic; it is indissoluble and passes from father to son. The Zionist occupation and the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people as a result of the disasters they suffered do not affect or call in question their Palestinian identity or their membership of the Palestinian community.

Article 5

Palestinians are the Arab citizens who were living permanently in Palestine until 1947, regardless of whether they have been expelled or are still there. Anyone born of a Palestinian father after that date, either in or outside Palestine, is a Palestinian.

Article 6

The Jews who were living permanently in Palestine up until the beginning of the Zionist invasion shall be considered Palestinians.

Article 7

The fact that there exists a Palestinian community and that it has material, spiritual and historical links with Palestine is incontrovertible. It is a national duty to educate the individual in line with the Arab revolution. Every means must be employed to provide a link between the Palestinian and his country in the fullest sense, both spiritual and material. He must be prepared for armed struggle and the sacrifice of his possessions and his life for the purpose of regaining his fatherland and completing the liberation of his territory.

Article 8

The Palestinian Arab people are at this stage fighting for the liberation of Palestine. The contradictions between the Palestinian national forces are therefore secondary and must be relegated to the background, whereas the major conflict, that between the Zionist and imperialist forces and the Palestinian Arab people, must be resolved. On this basis, the Palestinian masses in the occupied national fatherland or in the diaspora (al ma'hdjar) constitute, both as organizations and as individuals, a national front working for the redemption of Palestine and its liberation through armed struggle.

Article 9

Armed struggle is the only path to the liberation of Palestine. It is therefore a strategy and not a tactical phase. The Palestinian Arab people confirm their absolute determination and firm resolve to continue their armed struggle and to work towards a popular armed revolution for the liberation of their country and its restitution. The Palestinian Arab people also reassert their right to a normal life in Palestine, the exercise of their right of self-determination and their sovereignty over it.

Article 10

The Palestinian people's war of liberation centres on action by the commandos. This must be intensified, extended, its development safeguarded and the full Palestinian potential in men and experience must be mobilized; they must be organized and associated with the armed Palestinian revolution, bringing into play the combined effect of the national struggle (watani) by the various groups making up the Palestinian Arab people and the Arab masses (in Arab countries) to ensure that the revolution is continued, extended and is triumphant.

Article 11

Palestinians shall uphold three principles:

National union (wataniya), national mobilization (gaoumia) and liberation.

Article 12

The Palestinian Arab people believe in Arab unity and Arab unification. They therefore believe that in order to achieve this objective they must, at this stage in the national struggle, safeguard their Palestinian identity and all that this entails, strengthen the awareness of their identity and reject any scheme liable to destroy or weaken it.

Article 13

Arab union and the liberation of Palestine are complementary objectives. The achievement of one of these objectives shall constitute a preparatory stage for the other. Arab union paves the way for the liberation of Palestine, and the liberation of Palestine paves the way for Arab union. Action to achieve one of these two objectives goes hand in hand with action to achieve the other.

Article 14

The destiny of the Arab nation and, beyond it, the Arab existence itself, depend on the fate of the Palestinian cause. This link between these two destinies is the foundation for the efforts of the Arab nation and its work towards the liberation of Palestine. The Palestinian people will maintain its leading role in the achievement of this sacred national objective (gaoumi).

Article 15

From the Arab viewpoint the liberation of Palestine is a national duty (gaoumi), to drive back the Zionist and imperialist invasion from the territory of the Arab fatherland and to cleanse Palestine of the Zionist existence. The full responsibility for this rests on the Arab nation, both peoples and governments, and at their head, the Palestinian Arab people. It is with this aim that the Arab nation owes it to itself to mobilize its full military, human, material and spiritual potential to actively assist the Palestinian Arab people in the liberation of Palestine and, at the present stage of the Palestinian armed revolution, to offer unstintingly to the Palestinian Arab people every aid and every material and human support, to provide them with every means and facility to continue to fulfil their leading role, to carry on their armed revolution until their fatherland is liberated.

Article 16

From the spiritual viewpoint, the liberation of Palestine will endow the Holy Land with an atmosphere of peace and calm in which the holy places will be safeguarded and which will guarantee freedom of religion and will allow entry by everyone, regardless of race, colour, language or religion. It is for this reason that the Palestinians hope for support from all the spiritual forces of the world.

Article 17

From the human viewpoint, the liberation of Palestine will restore to the Palestinian his honour, his dignity and his freedom. The Palestinian people therefore count on the support of everyone in the world who believes in man's honour and his liberty.

Article 18

From the international viewpoint, the liberation of Palestine is a defensive action dictated by the needs of self-defence. The Palestinian Arab people, desirous of maintaining ties of friendship with all peoples, therefore count on the support of all States which believe in freedom, justice and peace, so that legality will be restored in Palestine and its community will be able to exercise national sovereignty (wataniya) and national freedom (gaoumiya).

Article 19

The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the creation of Israel are null and void, regardless of how much time passes before the situation is reversed, since they conflict with the will of the Palestinian Arab people and their natural right to their fatherland. The creation of Israel and the partition of Palestine from which it stemmed are therefore in contradiction with the United Nations charter and above all with the right of peoples to self-determination.

Article 20

The BALFOUR Declaration, the Palestinian mandate and the ensuing developments will be considered null and void; the claims of a historical and spiritual link between the Jews and Palestine are incompatible with the historical facts or with the real conceptions from which the concept of statehood derives. As Judaism is a divine (i.e. revealed) religion, it cannot constitute a nationality enjoying an independent existence; similarly, the Jews are not a people with a specific identity; on the contrary, they are the citizens of the states to which they belong.

Article 21

In expressing its existence as an entity through the Palestinian Arab revolution, the Palestinian Arab people reject any solution that sought to replace the complete liberation of Palestine by any other proposal; they also reject any plan to suppress or internationalise the Palestinian problem.

Article 22

Zionism is a political movement organically linked with international imperialism, which is hostile towards any freedom action and any progressionist movement in the world. By nature it is a fanatical racist movement, in its aims it is aggressive, expansionist and colonialist and in its methods it is Nazi-fascist. Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement and the human (in the sense of human members) and geographical base of world imperialism and represents its base and springboard in the very heart of the Arab fatherland, from which to strike at the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, union and progress.

Article 23

The needs of security and peace, as well as those of right and justice, require all States which are anxious to maintain friendly relations between peoples and ensure their citizens are loyal to their respective countries, to consider Zionism an illegal movement and ban its existence and activities.

Article 24

The Palestinian Arab people believe in the principles of justice, liberty, sovereignty, self-determination, human dignity and the right of the peoples to enjoy them.

Article 25

To achieve the aims of the Covenant and its principles, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation will fulfil its role until the liberation of Palestine is completely achieved.

Article 26

The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, which represents the Palestinian revolutionary forces, is responsible for the movement of the Palestinian Arab people in their struggle for the restitution of their fatherland and its liberation, the restoration to the latter and the exercise within its territory of the right of self-determination. This responsibility extends to all fields; military, political, financial and everything that the Palestine problem calls for at the Arab level and the international level.

Article 27

The Palestinian Liberation Organisation will cooperate with all the Arab states, each according to its capabilities, and will adopt a neutral attitude towards them in accordance with the needs of the war of liberation; and on this basis it will not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state.

Article 28

The Palestinian Arab people emphasise the deeply rooted authenticity of their national revolution and their independence, and therefore reject any form of intervention, trusteeship or satellite status.

Article 29

The Palestinian Arab people have the fundamental, essential and authentic right to liberate Palestine and re-establish it as their fatherland. The Palestinian Arab people will determine their position towards the various states and forces on the basis of their attitude towards the Palestinian problem and the degree of support they have given the Palestinian Arab people and their revolution aimed at achieving the objectives they had set themselves.

Article 30

The fighting forces and those who bear arms in the war of liberation make up the nucleus of the Arab army, which will constitute the protective force guaranteeing success for the Palestinian Arab people.

Article 31

The Palestine Liberation Organisation will have a flag, an oath and an anthem which will be determined by special agreement.

Article 32

To the articles of this Covenant shall be added the fundamental laws of the Palestine Liberation Organisation laying down the way in which the Organisation shall be composed, its organs, its committees, their objectives, obligations and commitments in accordance with the text of the Covenant.

Article 33

The texts of the Covenant may only be amended by a two-thirds majority of all the members of the National Council of the Palestine Liberation Organisation meeting in extraordinary session convened for the purpose.

THE VENICE DECLARATION, 13, June 1980

Middle East

1. '1. The Heads of State or Government and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs held a comprehensive exchange of views on all aspects of the present situation in the Middle East, including the state of negotiations resulting from the agreements signed between Egypt and Israel in March 1979. They agreed that growing tensions affecting this region constitute a serious danger and render a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and pressing than ever.
2. The nine Member States of the European Community consider that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to play a special role and now require them to work in a more concrete way towards peace.
3. In this regard, the nine countries of the Community base themselves on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the positions which they have expressed on several occasions, notably in their Declarations of 29 June 1977 , 19 September 1978 , 26 March and 18 June 1979 , as well as in the speech made on their behalf on 25 September 1979 by the Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the thirty-fourth United Nations General Assembly.
4. On the bases thus set out, the time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence and to security of all the States in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.
5. All of the countries in the area are entitled to live in peace within secure, recognised and guaranteed borders. The necessary guarantees for a peace settlement should be provided by the UN by a decision of the Security Council and, if necessary, on the basis of other mutually agreed procedures. The Nine declare that they are prepared to participate within the framework of a comprehensive settlement in a system of concrete and binding international guarantees, including (guarantees) on the ground.

6. A just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestinian people, who are conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully their right to self-determination.

7. The achievement of these objectives requires the involvement and support of all the parties concerned in the peace settlement which the Nine are endeavouring to promote in keeping with the principles formulated in the declaration referred to above. These principles apply to all the parties concerned, and thus the Palestinian people, and to the PLO, which will have to be associated with the negotiations.

8. The Nine recognise the special importance of the role played by the question of Jerusalem for all the parties concerned. The Nine stress that they will not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem and that any agreement on the city's status should guarantee freedom of access for everyone to the Holy Places.

9. The Nine stress the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967, as it has done for part of Sinai. They are deeply convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. The Nine consider that these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law.

10. Concerned as they are to put an end to violence, the Nine consider that only the renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all the parties can create a climate of confidence in the area, and constitute a basic element for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

11. The Nine have decided to make the necessary contacts with all the parties concerned. The objective of these contacts would be to ascertain the position of the various parties with respect to the principles set out in this declaration and in the light of the results of this consultation process to determine the form which such an initiative on their part could take.'

Camp David Summit Middle East Agreements, 17 September 1979

A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David

Muhammad Anwar Al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from 5 September to 17 September, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.

**PREAMBLE**

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

- The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbours is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.

- After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilisation and the birthplace of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for co-existence and cooperation among nations.

- The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the Parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

- The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

- To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbour prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of resolutions 242 and 338.

- Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress towards that goal can accelerate movement towards a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.

- Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarised zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

#### FRAMEWORK

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighbourly relations. They recognise that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbours which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

#### A. West Bank and Gaza

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

(A) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

(B) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an Agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The Agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

(C) When the self-governing authority (Administrative Council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbours, and to conclude a peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbours, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives

of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognise the legitimate rights of the Palestine people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

- (1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.
- (2) Submitting their Agreement to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
- (3) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their Agreement.
- (4) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan.

2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbours during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

3. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. Egypt-Israel

1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of this framework a peace Treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The framework for the conclusion of a peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the Treaty.

C. Associated Principles

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbours - Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:
  - (a) full recognition;
  - (b) abolishing economic boycotts;
  - (c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.
3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.
4. Claims commissions should be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.
5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the Agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace Treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace Treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this framework.

FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace Treaty between them.

It is agreed that:

The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

All of the principles of UN Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace Treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace Treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

- (a) The full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognised border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;
- (b) The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;
- (c) The use of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafah, Ras En Naqb, and Sharm El Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations;
- (d) The right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez, and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;
- (e) The construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Elat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and
- (f) The stationing of military forces listed below.

Stationing of Forces

- A. No more than one division (mechanised or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 kilometers (Km) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.
- B. Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 Km to 40 Km.
- C. In the area within three Km east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.
- D. Border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions, will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to ensure compliance with the terms of the Agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 Km of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and (b) in the Sharm El Sheikh area to ensure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace Treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including: full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

Interim Withdrawal

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace Treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

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ANNEX 6

PRINCIPLES OF A PLAN FOR PEACE

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Proposed by H.R.H. Crown Prince FAHD of Saudi Arabia

Source: Interview by Crown Prince FAHD with the Saudi Press Agency,  
7 August 1981

'There are a number of principles on which a just settlement might be based, and these are laid down in the resolutions adopted and confirmed by the United Nations over the last few years.

These principles are:

1. Withdrawal by Israel from all the Arab territories occupied during the 1967 war, including the Arab sector of Jerusalem.
2. Removal of all Israeli settlements from the territory occupied in 1967.
3. Guaranteed freedom of worship for all Islamic religions in the Holy Land of Palestine.
4. Recognition of the right of repatriation of the two million Palestinian refugees and of the right to compensation for those who do not wish to return.
5. Placing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip under UN supervision for a transitional period of a few months only.
6. Creation of an independent Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital.
7. Recognition of the right of all the states in the region to live in peace.
8. Application of the principles listed above to be guaranteed by the United Nations or a number of its members.'

CONFERENCE OF ARAB HEADS OF STATE  
FEZ, SEPTEMBER 1982

The following are the key points of the resolution adopted unanimously at the Conference of Arab Heads of State at Fez, 8-10 September 1982:-

1. The withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied in 1967 including Arab al Qods (Jerusalem),
2. The dismantling of settlements established by Israel on the Arab territories after 1967,
3. The guarantee of freedom of worship and practice of religious rites for all religions in the holy shrines,
4. The reaffirmation of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and the exercise of its imprescriptible and inalienable national rights under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), its sole and legitimate representative, and the indemnification of all those who do not desire to return,
5. The West Bank and Gaza Strip to be placed under the control of the United Nations for a transitory period not exceeding a few months,
6. The establishment of an independent Palestinian State with Al Qods as its capital (Jerusalem),
7. The United Nations Security Council to guarantee peace among all states of the region including the independent Palestinian State,
8. The United Nations Security Council to guarantee that these principles are respected.

Excerpt from President Reagan's speech of 1 September 1982  
outlining the United States' proposals on Palestine

..."The Lebanon war, tragic as it was, has left us with a new opportunity for Middle East peace. We must seize it now and bring peace to this troubled area so vital to world stability while there is still time. It was with this strong conviction that over a month ago, before the present negotiations in Beirut had been completed, I directed Secretary of State Shultz to again review our policy and to consult a wide range of outstanding Americans on the best ways to strengthen chances for peace in the Middle East. We have consulted with many of the officials who were historically involved in the process, with members of the Congress and with individuals from the private sector. And I have held extensive consultations with my own advisors on the principles I will outline to you tonight.

The evacuation of the PLO from Beirut is now complete, and we can now help the Lebanese to rebuild their war-torn country. We owe it to ourselves, and to posterity, to move quickly to build upon this achievement. A stable and revived Lebanon is essential to all our hopes for peace in the region. The people of Lebanon deserve the best efforts of the international community to turn the nightmares of the past several years into a new dawn of hope.

But the opportunities for peace in the Middle East do not begin and end in Lebanon. As we help Lebanon rebuild, we must also move to resolve the root causes of conflict between Arabs and Israelis.

The war in Lebanon has demonstrated many things, but two consequences are key to the peace process.

First, the military losses of the PLO have not diminished the yearning of the Palestinian people for a just solution of their claims; and second, while Israel's military successes in Lebanon have demonstrated that its armed forces are second to none in the region, they alone cannot bring just and lasting peace to Israel and her neighbors.

The question now is how to reconcile Israel's legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. And that answer can only come at the negotiating table. Each party must recognize that the outcome must be acceptable to all and that true peace will require compromises by all.

So, tonight I am calling for a fresh start. This is the moment for all those directly concerned to get involved - or lend their support - to a workable basis for peace. The Camp David Agreement remains the foundation of our policy. Its language provides all parties with the lee-way they need for successful negotiations.

I call on Israel to make clear that the security for which she yearns can only be achieved through genuine peace. A peace requiring magnanimity, vision and courage.

I call on the Palestinian people to recognize that their own political aspirations are inextricably bound to recognition of Israel's right to a secure future.

And I call on the Arab states to accept the reality of Israel - and the reality that peace and justice are to be gained only through hard, fair, direct negotiation.

In making these calls upon others, I recognize that the United States has a special responsibility. No other nation is in a position to deal with the key parties to the conflict on the basis of trust and reliability.

The time has come for a new realism on the part of all the peoples of the Middle East. The state of Israel is an accomplished fact; it deserves unchallenged legitimacy within the community of nations. But Israel's legitimacy has thus far been recognized by too few countries, and has been denied by every Arab state except Egypt. Israel exists; it has a right to exist in peace behind secure and defensible borders, and it has a right to demand of its neighbors that they recognize those facts.

The war in Lebanon has demonstrated another reality in the region. The departure of the Palestinians from Beirut dramatizes more than ever the homelessness of the Palestinian people. Palestinians feel strongly that their cause is more than a question of refugees. I agree. The Camp David Agreement recognized that fact when it spoke of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. For peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. Only through broader participation in the peace process - most immediately by Jordan and by the Palestinians - will Israel be able to rest confident in the knowledge that its security and integrity will be respected by its neighbors. Only through the process of negotiation can all the nations of the Middle East achieve a secure peace.

These then are our general goals. What are the specific new American positions, and why are we taking them?

In the Camp David talks thus far, both Israel and Egypt have felt free to express openly their views as to what the outcome should be. Understandably, their views have differed on many points.

The United States has thus far sought to play the role of mediator; we have avoided public comment on the key issues. We have always recognized - and continue to recognize - that only the voluntary agreement of those parties most directly involved in the conflict can provide an enduring solution. But it has become evident to me that some clearer sense of America's position on the key issues is necessary to encourage wider support for the peace process.

First, as outlined in the Camp David accords, there must be a period of time during which the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza will have full autonomy over their own affairs. Due consideration must be given to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of the territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

The purpose of the 5-year period of transition which would begin after free elections for a self-governing Palestinian authority is to prove to the Palestinians that they can run their own affairs, and that such Palestinian autonomy poses no threat to Israel's security.

The United States will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements during the transition period. Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.

I want to make the American position clearly understood: the purpose of this transition period is the peaceful and orderly transfer of domestic authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, such a transfer must not interfere with Israel's security requirements.

Beyond the transition period, as we look to the future of the West Bank and Gaza, it is clear to me that peace cannot be achieved by the formation of an independent Palestinian state in those territories. Nor is it achievable on the basis of Israeli sovereignty or permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza.

So the United States will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and we will not support annexation or permanent control by Israel.

There is, however, another way to peace. The final status of these lands must, of course, be reached through the give-and-take of negotiations. But it is the firm view of the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace.

We base our approach squarely on the principle that the Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved through negotiations involving an exchange of territory for peace. This exchange is enshrined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which is, in turn, incorporated in all its parts in the Camp David agreements. U.N. Resolution 242 remains wholly valid as the foundation stone of America's Middle East peace effort.

It is the United States' position that - in return for peace - the withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applies to all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza.

When the border is negotiated between Jordan and Israel, our view on the extent to which Israel should be asked to give up territory will be heavily affected by the extent of true peace and normalization and the security arrangements offered in return.

Finally, we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations.

In the course of the negotiations to come, the United States will support positions that seem to us fair and reasonable compromises, and likely to promote a sound agreement. We will also put forward our own detailed proposals when we believe they can be helpful. And, make no mistake, the United States will oppose any proposal - from any party and at any point in the negotiating process - that threatens the security of Israel. America's commitment to the security of Israel is ironclad, and I might add, so is mine.

During the past few days, our ambassadors in Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia have presented to their host governments the proposals in full detail that I have outlined here tonight.

I am convinced that these proposals can bring justice, bring security, and bring durability to an Arab-Israeli peace.

The United States will stand by these principles with total dedication. They are fully consistent with Israel's security requirements and the aspirations of the Palestinians. We will work hard to broaden participation at the peace table as envisaged by the Camp David accords. And I fervently hope that the Palestinians and Jordan, with the support of their Arab colleagues, will accept this opportunity."...

**European Communities**

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**EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT**

# **Working Documents**

**1980 - 1981**

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**DOCUMENT 1-99/80 /rev.**

**MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION**

**tabled by Mr P. LALOR**

**pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure**

**on the situation in South Lebanon**

The European Parliament,

- considering the declaration of the Nine on the situation in the Lebanon,
  - considering the plight of the Lebanese people and the human suffering caused by the continued state of war in the country,
  - considering the recent bombardment of Irish Unifil troops in the village of Bar-Shit, and the holding of hostages at Al-Tiri by the Haddad forces,
  - considering the Palestinian attack on the Kibbutz Misgar-Am,
  - whereas the Security Council mandate to the Unifil forces, which has been renewed four times, calls for the restoration of the authority of the Lebanese Government and the supervision of the withdrawal of external armed elements,
1. Calls on the Foreign Ministers of the Nine meeting in political cooperation to
    - (a) insist on an Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon;
    - (b) intensify their efforts to restore peace and the legitimate authority of the Lebanese Government;
  2. Condemns the attacks on the kibbutz at Migar-Am;
  3. Condemns the recent attacks on Unifil forces and the holding of Irish Unifil troops as hostages by the Haddad forces;
  4. Requests the President of the European Parliament to submit this motion for a resolution to the President of the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation.

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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Working Documents

1980 - 1981

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DOCUMENT 1-101/80

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mrs CHARZAT, Mrs ROUDY, Mr SARRE  
and Mr LOO

pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure  
on the situation in the Middle East

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the fact that a just and lasting peace can be brought about only on the basis of an overall settlement along the lines of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338,
  - having regard to the fact that there cannot be more than one way of establishing a just and lasting peace and that the Israelo-Egyptian peace treaty in accordance with the Camp David agreements constitutes for its signatories a first step towards an overall settlement to end 30 years of hostility and mistrust,
  - having regard to the fact that the European Community owes it to itself to uphold the right of the State of Israel to live in peace and security within safe frontiers recognized by all,
  - having regard to the fact that the Palestinians, like all peoples, are entitled to a homeland within a legal framework that it will be for the parties to determine through negotiation,
  - having regard however to the fact that in its Charter and in statements by its leaders the Palestine Liberation Organization continues to assert that its objective is to destroy the State of Israel, the very existence of which it refuses to recognize, and to construct not alongside but in its place a Palestinian State,
1. Recalls that the peoples it represents are deeply committed to the existence and security of Israel and to the means of attaining its security;
  2. Calls for respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each State in the region and its right to live in peace within safe frontiers recognized as part of a regional equilibrium independent of blocs that involves the creation of demilitarized zones;
  3. Acknowledges that a just and lasting peace will have to take account of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians;
  4. Considers that the rights of the one side cannot be asserted to the detriment of the rights of the other;
  5. Resolutely opposes any de facto recognition of the PLO so long as its Charter continues to proclaim its determination not to recognize but to destroy the State of Israel;
  6. Urges the Heads of State and Government of the Nine and their Ministers for Foreign Affairs not to impede application of the Camp David Agreements, the only peace process currently effective in the Middle East, with ill-timed declarations;
  7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Heads of State, governments and parliaments of the Member States and to the Council and Commission of the European Communities.

European Communities

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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Working Documents

1980 - 1981

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DOCUMENT 1-774/80

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr FANTI, Mr GALLUZZI and Mr SEGRE  
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure

on the expulsion of Palestinian mayors

### The European Parliament

- Concerned at the repeated attempts by the Israeli Government to maintain a military presence in the occupied territories in contempt of the UN resolutions,
  - Whereas this occupation forms a serious obstacle to any attempts to find a political solution to the conflict,
  - Having regard to the repeated measures to confiscate land on the West Bank,
1. Expresses its strong protest at the expulsion of the mayors of Hebron and Halhul;
  2. Requests the Council of the European Community to take measures to put an end to all persecution of the legitimate representatives of the inhabitants;
  3. Requests the Council to take positive action to develop the initiatives it has several times announced for creating the necessary conditions for a peaceful solution to the conflict, in the Middle East;
  4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council of the European Community.

# European Communities

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## EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

# Working Documents

1980 - 1981

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DOCUMENT I-819/80

### MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr d'ORMESSON, Mr ALBER, Mr PEDINI,  
Mr PFLIMLIN, Mr FISCHBACH, Lady ELLES, Mrs FOURCADE,  
Mrs MOREAU, Mr GALLAND, Mr BEYER de RYKE, Mr DOUBLET,  
Mr TURCAT, Mr FERGUSON.

pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Procedure  
on Lebanon

The European Parliament,

- Convinced that the restoration of a lasting peace in the Middle East requires the establishment of diplomatic and political relations which will guarantee to each of the states of the region respect for its territorial integrity and recognition of its right to live within secure and recognized borders,
- Anxious to make its contribution to a solution of the problem of Lebanon, which currently is one of the principal centres of tension likely to inflame the whole region,
- Endorsing the resolution adopted by the European Council on 2 December 1980 which reaffirms that one of the objectives of the Nine's action for peace in the Middle East is to restore Lebanon within the integrity of its borders and to the full exercise of its national sovereignty,
- Underlining its solidarity and attachment to the Lebanese people whose tradition of tolerance and openness has allowed the harmonious co-existence of cultures and religions within one national community, and anxious to see the individuality of this people protected against attempts at destabilisation and domination perpetrated on Lebanese territory by foreign powers,
- Wishing to give its expression of solidarity an institutional form,
  1. Calls for the early creation of an EEC-Mashrek parliamentary delegation along the line of the already operational EEC-MA HREB delegation;
  2. Asks that a special relationship be established within this delegation to enable Lebanon to be represented in complete independence of neighbouring states and revolutionary movements receiving outside support and active on Lebanese territory;
  3. Instructs its President to determine with the Bureau of the European Parliament the means of implementing this resolution under conditions which respect the rights of the Lebanese people.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Working Documents

1981 - 1982

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9 October 1981

DOCUMENT 1-583/81

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr de la MALENE, Mr ANSQUER, Mr CLEMENT,  
Mr COUSTE, Mr CRONIN, Mr DAVERN, Mr DELEAU, Mr DENIAU,  
Mrs EWING, Mr FANTON, Mr FLANAGAN, Mr GERONIMI,  
Mr ISRAEL, Mr JUNOT, Mr LALOR, Mr de LIPKOWSKI,  
Mr MEO, Mr NYBORG, Mr REMILLY, Miss De VALERA,  
Mr VIE and Mrs WEISS

on behalf of the Group of European Progressive  
Democrats

with request for topical and urgent debate pursuant  
to Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure

on the death of President Anwar el Sadat

The European Parliament.

- dismayed by the tragic death of President Anwar Sadat,
  - recognizing the immense contribution made by President Sadat to peace in the Middle East and in the world,
  - regretting that his efforts did not meet with a wider response,
1. Affirms the need to continue the work for peace undertaken by President Sadat;
  2. Calls on all the relevant Community bodies to take action so as to advance the peace process in the Middle East;
  3. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and Commission of the European Communities and to the foreign ministers meeting in political cooperation.

# European Communities

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## EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

# Working Documents

1981 - 1982

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12 OCTOBER 1981

DOCUMENT 1-596/81

### MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr FANTI, Mr SEGRE, Mr GALLUZZI,  
Mrs BADUEL GLORIOSO, Mr CAROSSINO, Mr FERRERO,  
Mr BONACCINI, Mr SPINELLI, Mr PAPAETRO, Mr LEONARDI,  
Mr GOUTHIER, Mr DE PASQUALE, Mrs CINCIARI RODANO,  
Mr CERAVOLO, Mrs BARBARELLA, Mrs CARRETONI ROMAGNOLI,  
Mrs SQUARCIALUPI, Mr CARDIA, Mr IPPOLITO, Mr VERONESI  
and Mr VITALE

with request for topical and urgent debate  
pursuant to Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure

on the SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The European Parliament,

- deeply shocked by the assassination of President Anwar Sadat,
- aware of the growing and very serious threat to the situation in the Middle East and the Mediterranean,

1. Strongly condemns the assassination;
2. Considers it urgent effectively to take the political and diplomatic steps envisaged by the European Council in Venice for the achievement of a general peace in the Middle East on the basis of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the states of that region, including Israel, and the reassertion of the right of the Palestinian people to their own independent state;
3. Requests the President of the Council to report to it in the near future on the measures it has taken;
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments of the Member States.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Working Documents

1981 - 1982

14 October 1981

DOCUMENT 1-601/81

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr van AERSEN, Mr BLUMENFELD, Mr KLEPSCH, Mrs CASSANMAGNAGO CERRETTI, Mr VERGEER, Mr ALBER, Mr AIGNER, Mr BARBI, Mr BEUMER, Mr BERSANI, Mr von BISMARCK, Mr BOCKLET, Mrs BOOT, Mr BROK, Mr CLINTON, Mr CROUX, Mr DALSSASS, Mr DE KEERSMAEKER, Mr DESCHAMPS, Mr ESTGEN, Mr FISCHBACH, Mr FRANZ, Mr Ingo FRIEDRICH, Mr FRUH, Mr FUCHS, Mr GHERGO, Mr GIUMMARRA, Mr HERMAN, Mr HABSBERG, Mr von HASSEL, Mr HAHN, Mr HELMS, Mr Karl-Heinz HOFFMANN, Mr JANSSEN van RAAY, Mr JONKER, Mr KATZER, Mr LEMMER, Mrs LENTZ-CORNETTE, Mr LIGIOS, Mr LUCKER, Mr LUSTER, Mr MACARIO, Mrs MAIJ-WEGGEN, Mr MAJONICA, Mr MALANGRE, Mr MERTENS, Mr MICHEL, Mr MULLER-... Mr NOTENBOOM, Mr d'ORMESSON, Mr PEDINI, Mr PENN... Mr POTTERING, Mrs RABBETHGE, Mr RYAN, Mr RJNSCHE, Mr SCHALL, Mr SASSANO, Mr SIMONNET, Mrs SCHLEICHER, Mr SCHINITKER, Mr Konrad SCHON, Mr SEITLINGER, Mr TOLMAN, Mr TRAVAGLINI, Mr WAWRZIK, Mr WEDEKIND, Mr von WOGAU and Mrs WALZ

on behalf of the Group of the European People's Party

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the stabilization and extension of peace efforts in the Middle East

The European Parliament

- aware of its responsibility for peace in the world,
- mindful of the efforts being made to achieve peace in the Middle East,
- inspired by the successful visit to the European Parliament by the winner of the Nobel peace price, President Anwar El Sadat of Egypt,

I. Calls on the Council and the Commission:

1. To ensure that the European Community plays an active part in the stabilization and extension of the peace efforts of the Egyptian, Israeli and American Governments and to implement to this effect the 12-point programme set out below;
2. To make the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty an integral part of a new European Community policy for the Mediterranean;
3. To undertake intensive political efforts to bring other Arab states into this peace offensive and its intensification;
4. To lay, by means of additional protocols to the agreements with the Maghreb, the Mashrek and Israel, the foundations for close regional cooperation on the lines of the Lomé Convention;
5. To take legislative and administrative measures as a decisive means of combating the economic boycott practised by the Arab League against firms in the European Community which trade with the countries involved in the peace effort and the constantly recurring attempts by the Arab League to extend this boycott;
6. To pursue accordingly efforts to extend comprehensive financial, economic, technical and scientific cooperation as a way of buttressing the peace efforts;
7. To set in train a process of concerted action based on economic, financial and investment-incentive measures in the form of projects between Egypt, Israel and the European Community involving all the organs of the Community;
8. To make provision for a contribution to the development and extension of a modern railway line between Cairo and Jerusalem with connections to Jordan and Lebanon;
9. To provide assistance in the tapping of water resources and the exploitation of crude oil and mineral deposits in the Sinai;

10. To provide technological and financial assistance in the building of power stations to serve the needs of Egypt, Israel and other areas of the Middle East;
  11. To furnish development aid for the canalization of the River Jordan and the exploitation of phosphate deposits in Jordan by participation in projects;
  12. To consider carefully, in the light of their implications as regards joint European responsibility, the applications made by the countries in this region to Member States for arms supplies and to ensure that proportionality is observed in accordance with the principles of defence, détente and stability;
- II. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and Commission of the European Communities.

## Explanatory statement

Hitherto, Europe's political approach to the Middle East has remained reserved and cautious. The European Community has done no more than act as an observer in the solution of the Middle East conflict. At no time has the involvement of the European Community in the Middle East peace efforts been commensurate with the scale and importance of its interests in the region. Europe's dangerously vulnerable southern flank with the constant threat of new conflicts and the possibility of global escalation and the danger of the oil weapon being used again, with all that that implies for the economy and employment in the European Community, has been the subject of no more than joint statements. Among the countries of the Western Alliance, the arduous task of actively seeking a comprehensive solution for the Middle East conflict has been entrusted and left entirely to the United States. The European Community has taken hardly any active practical measures to further this quest.

Following the Camp David Agreement and the Washington Treaty, it is high time that the European Community campaigned actively for peace in the Middle East, which is a region of such obvious political, strategic and economic importance for Europe. This is the purpose of this 12-point programme.

The murder of President Sadat shows that such action is now needed more than ever before.

**MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION**  
**tabled by Mr KYRKOS**  
**pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure**  
**on the annexation of territory in the Golan**  
**region approved by Israel's Knesset**

The European Parliament.

- having regard to the decision by Israel's Knesset to annex territory in the Golan Heights, which constitutes a high-handed action, reveals clearly expansionistic tendencies and threatens to lead to a new armed confrontation in the region,
- having regard to the justifiably sharp reactions on the part of Syria, Egypt and the other Arab countries, as also by the PLO, which have been provoked by this action,
- confirming the declaration made in Venice by the Member States of the European Communities,
  1. Calls on Israel's Knesset to revoke its decision;
  2. Calls on the Community Member States participating in the peace-keeping forces in the Sinai to cancel their participation should Israel fail to revoke its decision;
  3. Calls upon the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to take an immediate initiative consisting of strict measures in accordance with the decisions taken at Venice in an effort to achieve a peaceful outcome to the continually deteriorating crisis in the Middle East.

**MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION**  
tabled by Mr EPHREMIDIS, Mr ADAMOU and Mr ALAVANOS  
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure  
on the annexation of the Golan Heights by Israel

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the fact that the Government of Israel has decided to annex the Golan Heights, a region which under international treaties belongs to Syria and which is forcibly occupied today by Israel,
  - whereas this expansionistic action on the part of Israel is contrary to Resolutions No. 242 and No. 338 of the United Nations and to the fundamental principles of International Law,
  - whereas this action is a serious threat to peace in the Middle East and the entire world, especially at the present time of international tension, and represents a provocation to all the Arab countries,
1. Severely condemns this inadmissible and dangerous action on the part of the Israeli Government;
  2. Declares its full solidarity with Syria and all the other Arab countries;
  3. Calls on the governments of the Member States to take all suitable steps at international level to have this action by Israel condemned and revoked;
  4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the governments of the Member States, the governments of Israel and Syria and the UN Security Council.

## MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

tabled by Mr SEGRE and Mr CARDIA

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the annexation of the Golan Heights by the State of Israel

The European Parliament,

- whereas the continued military occupation by Israel of Arab territories constitutes a serious threat to peace in the Middle East and the Mediterranean,
  - whereas the position of Israel is not only illegitimate and contrary to international law but also represents the most serious obstacle to a just and lasting solution to the problems of the Middle East,
1. Condemns Israel's decision, following its annexation of the eastern part of Jerusalem, to annex the Syrian territories of the Golan Heights, thereby provoking vigorous reactions from many quarters around the world;
  2. Requests Israel to end its occupation of the Arab territories by withdrawing, in application in UN Resolutions Nos. 242 and 338, to within the frontiers fixed prior to the war of June 1967;
  3. Calls upon the Commission and the Council of the Ten to undertake a new and more vigorous political and diplomatic initiative, on the basis of the Venice declaration, with the aim of promoting peace and cooperation among the peoples of the Middle East and securing recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to have a state of their own, while respecting the autonomy and security of all States, including Israel;
  4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting in political cooperation.