The Lisbon European Council and the Future of European Economic Governance

Written especially for the ECSA Review (13: 3), Summer 2000, pp. 2-7.
Visit the ECSA Review Fora page for other essays on EU topics.

THE PORTUGUESE PRESIDENCY, WHICH organized the work of the Council during the first six months of the year, was tasked with the heavy responsibility of organizing the opening months of the 2000 IGC (see Dinan and Vanhoonacker, this issue), yet the Portuguese also embarked on a major campaign to sponsor an academic and political debate on economic reform, and on the future of European economic governance.

Throughout their presidency, the Portuguese sought to stimulate a debate on both the substance and process of European economic policymaking, proposing a "new strategic goal for the Union in order to strengthen employment, economic reform and social cohesion as part of a knowledge-based economy." Toward this end, the presidency commissioned a series of papers from both distinguished academics and EU institutions on subjects ranging from employment policy to the reform of the welfare state, modernization of public services, social inclusion, and the information society and e-commerce (for an on-line listing and texts of these reports, see Portuguese Presidency 2000). In March, the presidency organized a special European Council, which largely endorsed the Portuguese program of economic reform, with particularly detailed statements on the information society and the promotion of e-commerce.

As important as the substance of the proposed reforms, however, is the process proposed by the Portuguese presidency, and endorsed by the Lisbon European Council, dubbed "open coordination." As Jim Mosher explains below, open coordination involves the establishment of common social policy guidelines, indicators and "benchmarks," which are intended to guide national policies through a process of policy coordination and peer evaluation. Although the practice of open coordination is not itself new, having been pioneered in recent years in a trio of joint policy processes (namely the Luxembourg Process on employment, the Cardiff process on structural reforms, and the Cologne process on macroeconomic policy coordination), the explicit endorsement of open coordination in Lisbon raises a number of important questions about the future of European economic governance, which are addressed by three ECSA members in this Forum.

In the first essay, Martin Rhodes analyzes the outcome of the Lisbon European Council as a pragmatic effort by the EU to find a "Third Way" between the traditionally conflicting imperatives of economic efficiency and equality, and between the extremes of European harmonization and national autonomy. In the process, he suggests, the presidency has created a "new European architecture for social policy" which will rationalize existing processes under the umbrella of a broader economic strategy and an annual Spring meeting of the European Council. In the second essay, Janine Goetschy looks back at the record of open coordination in the most developed of the three current processes, the European Employment Strategy, noting both the strengths and the weaknesses of the process during its formative years. In the third and final essay, Jim Mosher places the emerging process of open coordination in the context of a broader move to "post-regulatory governance," which promises both functional and political advantages to member governments eager to cooperate in a flexible fashion, but also the familiar dangers of "voluntarism" and weak or uneven national implementation of common EU goals. Despite differences in emphasis and in levels of optimism about the future, all three essays echo Rhodes' conclusion that the Lisbon European Council is likely to emerge as a watershed in EU social policy, in terms of both the articulation of a new set of common policy goals for the member states, and the endorsement of new policy processes which may-or may not-serve to facilitate the achievement of those goals in the coming years.
- Forum Editor

Lisbon: Europe's "Maastricht for Welfare?"
Martin Rhodes

THERE HAS BEEN MUCH vacuity in discussions of "progressive" or "Third Way" approaches to policy in Europe. Yet there is a very clear sense in which the Portuguese presidency of the EU has confirmed a search for a new, pragmatic way forward for Social Europe, in at least two key respects.

First, against the background of new challenges to social cohesion, there has been a quest for a new synthesis in EU social policy, reconciling flexibility and security in labor markets, and solidarity and sustainability in broader welfare programs. In so doing, an implicit objective has been the conciliation of efficiency imperatives with social justice. This has led to the emergence in EU policy discourse of what Ronald Dworkin has called "a unified account of equality and responsibility" - one which bridges the traditional concerns of egalitarians and conservatives by embracing both the individual and collective rights and responsibilities of citizens (see Dworkin 1999).

Although not explicitly using such language, the special meeting of the European Council in Lisbon on 23 and 24 March emphasized the need to create an "active welfare state" via a "positive strategy which combines competitiveness with social cohesion." And while the Presidency Conclusions of the March European Council talk in the guarded "Euro-speak" of "modernizing social protection" for a "knowledge-driven economy," a brief glance at the Commission's Broad Economic Policy Guidelines published shortly before the Lisbon Summit presents a rather clearer recipe for reform. Alongside stability-oriented macroeconomic policies, sound and sustainable public finances and ensuring efficient product (goods and services) markets, the emphasis in the social and employment sphere is very much on the following:

• reducing the tax burden on low-wage labor;
• encouraging real wages to increase in line with labor productivity;
• facilitating access to training;
• reforming tax and benefit systems to ensure appropriate incentives and rewards for participation in active working life; and
• negotiating a modernization of labor markets including flexible working hours and a review of tight job protection legislation and high severance payments.

In essence, the aim is to marry a shift towards a more liberal social policy and employment system-as long advocated by the OECD, for example-with a more traditional European emphasis on social dialogue and solidarity.

Second, there has also been a search for a middle path between EU intervention via directives and the alternative (given the long history of blockages in the Council) of leaving policy instruments in the hands of the member states, thereby renouncing broader social policy ambitions. The "Third Way" in EU policymaking amounts to a "soft" and as yet underdeveloped form of governance now referred to as "open coordination." This new approach to policymaking and implementation is simultaneously more ambitious in terms of objectives than previous social action programs (no less than a gradual convergence of welfare outcomes across Europe) and more flexible with regard to the methods (see also the essay by Jim Mosher below).

In this respect, the Portuguese presidency made a major contribution (for a fuller analysis, see Ferrera, Hemerijck, and Rhodes 2000). By further refining and stressing the centrality of "open coordination," the Lisbon Labor and Social Affairs Councils consolidated a process of transformation in European policy style which began in 1992 with recommendations on social protection "convergence." "Soft" policy innovation then occurred in two main areas: gender, where a series of initiatives have "mainstreamed" gender equality across a wide array of EU programs; and employment, where the "Luxembourg process" (launched in 1997) seeks a "management by objective" coordination of national policies. In July 1999, the Commission proposed a "concerted strategy for modernizing social protection," and under the Finnish presidency in 1999 a group of high level officials was asked to take the process forward. That group's first major report (May 2000) was submitted by Coreper and the Council to the European Council meeting held in Feira, Portugal, on 19 and 20 June, and its conclusions now underpin official EU policy.

Most observers of the Portuguese EU presidency have praised its energy but bemoaned its lack of headline-grabbing initiatives. Yet almost by stealth, there has been a surprisingly rapid set of advances in putting in place a new European architecture for social policy. A summary of the Council and high level working party's initiatives suggest that-if the political will is there-then Lisbon may one day be considered Europe's "Maastricht" for the welfare state.

First, on the procedural front, there has been a much-needed rationalization of decision making. The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines have become an umbrella for strategic planning, with a greater involvement of Council ministerial groupings other than Ecofin in order to encourage a better management of policy interdependencies. Social protection is now to be considered the "third side of a triangle with other interrelated but separate sides being macro-economic policy and employment policy" and the European Council will now meet every Spring to address economic and social questions. Member states will have to prepare each year a document illustrating their own social policy agenda (with indicators and targets), and this will contribute to greater continuity and coherence in Council deliberations.

Second, the notion of an "open method of coordination" has been further refined to include: fixing guidelines for social policy combined with specific timetables for achieving short, medium and long term goals; establishing quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks tailored to the needs of different member states and sectors; translating European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific targets and measures; periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review as mutual learning processes; and benchmarking best practices on managing change to be devised by the Commission, networking with companies, social partners and NGOs. In effect, this is the Luxembourg process writ large for the modernization of the welfare state.

And third, the high level working party is charged with setting the agenda for change in two priority areas of welfare state reform-social exclusion and the sustainability of Europe's pensions systems. National reports on both areas will be submitted by December this year to enable the working party to draw up recommendations, but it is already clear from its first report where the emphasis for future policy will lie. In social protection, the extent to which activation measures are provided as an integral part of minimum income schemes will receive close attention; while in pensions there will be a stress on "active ageing"-extending the retirement age-alongside an examination of the implications of second and third tier pensions. These innovations are potentially far-reaching in their implications, both for the architecture of European policy making and the future of European welfare states.

As far as policy making is concerned, the rationalization of decision-making procedures helps overcome the rather complex and baroque processes and initiatives launched during the 1990s, while the new Spring Council could help provide the missing institutional hub of Social Europe, around which other processes and initiatives can effectively rotate. Social protection issues will move much closer to the center of European policy making-helping to correct the asymmetry between positive and negative integration-and their interdependencies with other areas of employment and macro-economic making will be explicitly acknowledged. As in the past, questions of national sovereignty will inevitably be raised, but this is unavoidable as action on the broad employment policy front logically spills over into related areas of social security and taxation policy where member state autonomy is still jealously guarded.

As for "open coordination," there is also a logic in the extension of the Luxembourg process from labor market issues strictly defined to other dimensions of the welfare state. The new focus on benchmarking and the definition of qualitative and quantitative indicators for cross-national coordination, coupled with deadlines for the achievement of short, medium and long-term objectives, provides the basis for an EMU-style approach to European welfare state convergence. Granted, there are enormous problems in store in terms of policy design, actor coordination and monitoring reform across highly diverse systems, not to mention the legitimacy of a process which seeks explicitly to penetrate previously protected national policy domains. And yet, in most member states there are already processes in place, frequently involving social partner concertation, which are tackling the complex interdependencies between social protection, employment and broader economic policies upon which a new coordinated policy for the EU can build.

As for the nature of welfare reform itself, it is obvious that there is a risk that national conflict over the direction of change (e.g., in pensions systems) will transfer to the supranational arena, creating the prospect of new policy blockages and joint decision traps. But a stable system of multi-level and multi-actor interaction may also help "de-politicize" the issues at stake, shielding them from national political cycles and encouraging a problem-solving style in their management. As with the EMU process, governments may be able to use a coordinated European strategy to engage in a certain degree of "blame avoidance" to force through controversial reforms. But given that the reform of most European welfare states requires confrontation with often well-organized vested interests, it is essential that mechanisms of concertation are reinforced without, however, giving the parties involved the power of veto on decisions.

Of course, enormous political will is required to even initiate the new approach implied by Lisbon initiatives. And there are numerous pitfalls in its path. Nevertheless, unless progress is made in the general direction embarked upon, there is a real danger that the structural asymmetry between negative and positive integration will remain uncorrected.

Martin Rhodes is a Professor at the European University Institute, Florence.

The European Employment Strategy
Janine Goetschy

THE EUROPEAN EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY (EES) was initiated by the Delors White Paper on "Growth, Competitiveness and Employment" (1993), made operational by the Essen procedure following the European Council in December 1994, formalized within the employment title of the Amsterdam Treaty (June 1997) and put into practice before the official implementation of the Treaty on the basis of the employment guidelines of the special Luxembourg summit (November 1997). Indeed since the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, a majority of member states have had to face high levels of unemployment and decreasing employment rates. However, employment situations and performances demonstrate considerable diversity among EU member states.

The annual EES process, as specified in the Treaty of Amsterdam, is the following. Each year common European employment guidelines are proposed by the Commission and elaborated and adopted by the Council (Social Affairs and Ecofin) by qualified majority vote. Afterwards they have to be translated into national employment policies on which each member state must report to the Commission and the Council in their yearly "national action plans" (NAPs). An annual evaluation takes then place on the basis of which recommendations can be addressed by the Council to member states. Such recommendations to individual states deemed not to have followed the guidelines would have no obligatory effect but could be symbolically powerful. Governments are expected to associate trade-union and employer organizations at various levels both when elaborating and implementing their NAPs.

Three elements characterize the employment title in the Treaty: the employment title of the Treaty is based upon the previous experience of the Essen procedure; the approach to employment is inspired by the already existing convergence process in the macro-economic field; and, although employment is an issue of common concern for both the national and the community level, it is the national level which remains primarily responsible for employment policies and achievements.

Since 1997, the annual European employment guidelines have been organized under four pillars: improving employability; developing entrepreneurship; encouraging adaptability both for employees and in businesses; and strengthening equal opportunities between men and women. Around twenty such EU guidelines are set up each year, although only a few of them correspond to specific, quantified targets. Until now there has been great continuity as to the EU annual guidelines, with only minor changes from year to year.

What do the preliminary assessments of the EES carried out in the successive EU Joint Employment Reports teach us? Though all member states have fulfilled the obligation to deliver a national plan each year, the following shortcomings have been underlined:

• The main focus of most NAPs was on "employability" and "entrepreneurship," with considerably less attention given to measures concerned with "adaptability" and "equal opportunities."
• Most plans consisted of a mere list of discrete initiatives, often not specific responses to the guidelines, and without overall integration.
• Despite the emphasis in the EU guidelines on prevention of long-term unemployment through targeting those at risk of social exclusion, the majority of measures reported tended to focus on those already unemployed for a long period.
• The contribution of the European Social Fund (ESF) to the various national measures was in general insufficiently addressed.
• Most NAPs failed to define precise quantitative objectives, the resources allocated to the measures, the timetable for implementation and the statistical tools which would enable evaluation of the outcome; in most cases the NAPs largely reflected national employment plans which had already been adopted or were on the drawing-board. Labor market flexibility and the reduction of working time remain in general the issues which give rise to most disagreement between unions and employers, whereas training and employability are more consensual topics.
• Both at the elaboration and implementation phase, the social partners have been insufficiently associated with the process, which has often remained a governmental issue. On the whole, the consultation process over NAPs has not really generated new initiatives from the social partners or new national strategies towards unemployment. Though consultations over NAPs generally took place at central level only, it was not usually the top officials on each side who were involved. This contrasts with experience in negotiating social pacts at national level; in such cases, top representatives of the union and employers' organizations are invariably the protagonists.

In 1999, following the second evaluation exercise of national action plans, recommendations were issued to member states for the first time. The Commission has identified eight areas where national implementation remained insufficient: the fight against youth unemployment (Belgium, Greece, Spain, Italy); preventing long-term unemployment (Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy); tax reforms and unemployment benefit reforms (Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Austria); job creation in the service sector (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal); making the tax system more employment-friendly (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Finland, Sweden); modernizing the organization of work (Greece, France Portugal, UK); the fight against gender inequalities (Germany, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Austria, UK); improving indicators and statistical tools (Germany, Greece, Spain, Italy, Netherlands, UK). Altogether, 55 recommendations were issued to all fifteen member states. Among the least criticized countries, one finds the three Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland) and those where unemployment is currently fairly low (Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Austria).

Overall, the EES is characterized by systematic strengths and weaknesses. The strengths of the EES are linked to the fact that it is an iterative process, which provides an opportunity to tackle employment issues in a medium-term perspective and relies on an elaborate method implying targets, deadlines and an evaluation process.

First, the fact that the EES is an iterative process between the EU and national levels, which combines an intergovernmental logic with a EU community logic, presents a number of advantages: it enhances member states' political commitment in EU decision-making, since they are in a better position to control, accept and implement EU guidelines; it implies decisions which are better adjusted to the national diversity of institutions and employment policies; and it enables the involvement of a multitude of economic, social and political actors at various levels (supranational, national, regional). These features provide the opportunity for real national social priorities (employment, but later on also social protection issues) to figure on the EU agenda: social issues of "high politics" which are not really fully acknowledged EU competences and which are highly contentious, can thus be dealt with at EU level. Ideally, the EES encourages at the same time a "Europeanization" and "renationalization" of employment policies through a mutual learning process; and it should increase the legitimacy of decisions, both by input (since more actors are involved) and by output (since better employment performances are to be expected).

Second, the aim of the EES is to integrate member state policies with Community-level guidelines in a medium-term, pluriannual perspective, with results of an incremental nature which transcend short-term political gains and can solve progressively the more fundamental problems of unemployment within the EU. One can say that the EES is a way to "depoliticize" the unemployment problem from its immediate national contingencies and to address it in a longer-term perspective: implicit in this orientation (as with EMU and its convergence criteria) is the belief that politicians need to be detached from their immediate national constraints and political contingencies. The fact that the EES is designed as an enduring process means also that the nature of transactions between member states is different from that which applies in the case of the adoption of directives. In the latter instance, the diplomatic mode of interaction-where utilities are exchanged, involving trade-offs among a variety of issues, and where short-term political conjunctures are often decisive-tends to prevail; this is less so with the EES.

Third, the method itself of the EES is meant to serve as a catalyst for the efficiency of national employment policies in several ways: by establishing external constraints and targets to be reached within a specified timetable (a method which had proved successful for setting up the European monetary union); by aligning such targets on the best performing countries (benchmarking); and by putting employment policies to the test of national comparison, submitting them to the examination of a wide range of EU institutions and subjecting them to public EU recommendations. Tough monitoring and a real evaluation culture are at the heart of the EES.

However, the EES is not without a number of serious weaknesses, including: the lack of real sanctions; the subordination of EU employment guidelines to monetary and economic guidelines, a situation which the Cologne (June 1999) and Cardiff (December 1998) processes, and the new commitments of the Lisbon summit (March 2000) have been trying to change; the scarcity of EU financial resources for facilitating the development of an active EU employment policy; the complexity of the multi-level governance process which the EES implies; and the nature of jobs created (not only the number of jobs created, but also their substantive quality and their duration which should be examined).

The foregoing analysis suggests, in turn, four general conclusions. First, seen as a process or mode of governance, the EES has been rather well received and even inspiring other EU policies. Indeed, the EES appears to have "fait ecole" in fields such as the broad economic policy guidelines, innovation policy, the fight against poverty, and the social protection convergence process, and remains a sort of model for ETUC's claims in other policy spheres.

Second, at this stage, assessments of the EES as to its quantitative and qualitative impacts on national employment policies and performances, must remain cautious: the process is still recent and it is quite difficult to separate the effects of EU guidelines from autonomous national policies.

Third, the spillover effects from the EES to other national policy fields (wage policy, social protection, tax policy, administrative reforms, etc.) will have to be examined very carefully in the future.

Fourth and finally, more general questions will have to be raised. To what extent are EU employment guidelines able to reshape the triangle of preferences of each nation-state relative to its employment levels, its desired degree of social justice and its tax policy preferences (Scharpf 1999)? To what extent is the EES a solution to offset "beggar-thy-neighbor" competitive employment policy developments (Streeck 1999)? The increasing interconnection of policy fields and the better knowledge of their mutual links (between employment, economic guidelines, social protection, training and education, innovation policy, etc.), the multiplicity of actors involved in the various EU coordination policies, and the multiplicity of discussion/negotiation forums and coordination procedures (Luxembourg process, Cologne process, Cardiff process, and Lisbon conclusions) open up different sort of perspectives: Will some guidance levels will become more important than others? Will the traditional spearhead function assumed by the European Commission in the monitoring of social Europe's policies remain important, or will member states be tempted to take over with a view of "reinforced cooperation" constellations in the social field in mind?

Janine Goetschy is senior research fellow at CNRS-University of Nanterre, France, and scientific collaborator at the Institute for European Studies, Free University of Brussels, Belgium.

Open Method of Coordination: Functional and Political Origins
Jim Mosher

AT THE CONCLUSION OF the Lisbon Summit (23-24 March 2000), the Portuguese Presidency advocated implementing a "new open method of coordination" to facilitate reaching the EU's strategic goals in the areas of building knowledge infrastructure, enhancing innovation and economic reform, and modernizing social welfare and education systems. The open method of coordination is intended to spread best practice and help achieve greater convergence towards these goals. Its fullest current implementation is in the European Employment Strategy, described above by Janine Goetschy.

The announcement of a push to expand the use of the open method of coordination suggests several questions. What forms of governance is open coordination intended to replace or to supplement? Why is this new method being adopted? What are its potential advantages over alternatives?

The open method of coordination, as outlined by the Portuguese Presidency, is composed of four elements: 1) fixed guidelines set for the Union with short, medium, and long term goals; 2) quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks; 3) European guidelines translated into national and regional policies and targets; and 4) periodic monitoring, evaluation, and peer review, organized as a mutual learning process (Portuguese Presidency 2000).

Open coordination is a post-regulatory approach to governance (Teubner, 1983; Sabel, 2000). While traditional regulation imposes mandates that are relatively specific and uniform, hierarchically determined, static, and substantive, in post-regulatory governance there is a preference for procedures or general standards with wide allowances for variation rather than detailed rules, for intensive consultation to set and modify standards, for standards that are wholly or partly voluntary, and for adjustment over time in response to feedback. Post-regulatory governance is flexible in the face of different conditions across space and time and may foster mutual learning over time that improves policy.

For much of its early history, the EU relied heavily on traditional regulation through harmonization directives to coordinate actions of the member-states and secure regulatory uniformity. Although some progress was made, many proposed directives were stillborn. By the 1970s, the resulting stagnation in the integration process revealed the limits of harmonization in a diverse polity such as the European Community. The solution advanced in the 1980s was mutual recognition, which allowed the Union to surmount many trade barriers caused by variation in legal arrangements. In addition, many saw mutual recognition and intensified trade and capital flows setting in motion regulatory competition. Proponents championed the resulting regulatory competition as a learning process in which the "best" regulation would eventually prevail. Others were far more skeptical, observing that regulatory competition could lead to a race to the bottom that would undermine social and consumer protection and put the European social model in jeopardy. Eventually, it also became clear that in many policy areas regulatory competition would have less impact than first expected.

Governance through the post-regulatory approach of open coordination may provide some potential functional advantages over traditional regulation by harmonization on the one hand and mutual recognition with regulatory competition on the other.

Open coordination allows policy initiatives to be adapted to the diverse institutional arrangements, legal regimes and national circumstances in the EU. It also allows member states to move at different speeds in reforming policy, while attempting to keep the member states moving together in the same direction.

With open coordination, member-state governments are able to opt-out, permitting them to respond to future unexpected real shocks. Member states that might oppose regulation that permanently takes away policy responsibility may be more willing to grant supranational input and guidance into policymaking through open coordination.

Many of the issue areas proposed for the new open method of coordination are policy areas where member-states seem capable of proceeding individually but may be unsure of the best path to take. Thus, while supranationalization may not be necessary for the member states to act in a given area, open coordination at the EU level institutionalizes the sharing of member states' experiences with reform experiments. This organizes and institutionalizes cross-national learning without the risks present in regulatory competition.

Finally, while reforms in individual member-states may need to be adapted to specific circumstances, there may be collective action problems blocking reform or increasing returns to policy reform. In such cases, it may still be necessary for several or most member states to move at the same time for the reforms to be most effective or beneficial. Open coordination permits simultaneous movements that are also adapted to local circumstances.

Compared to traditional regulation, open coordination seems to offer the possibility of acting in areas where full harmonization is blocked. Compared to mutual recognition and regulatory competition, it can facilitate learning while also allowing policy coordination and possible convergence.

While these functional advantages may be significant, the political advantages may be as important or more important in explaining member-state support for this new method of open coordination.

As a corollary to the first functional advantage, flexible governance may overcome member states' opposition to EU mandates that they find too disruptive or too alien to national arrangements. To that extent, flexible governance may allow more EU action in policy areas that are sensitive politically and previously gridlocked. Any action taken, though, is likely to be more diffuse and uneven. In addition, the generally voluntarist nature of the mandates may leave weak actors subject to exploitation by stronger actors when member states decide on implementation, even when the mandates are intended to help weak actors.

Possibly the most important political reason for the expansion of open coordination is that it may allow domestic political actors to shift blame for unpopular decisions to the EU, without having to shift real control. In the area of employment policy, many member-state governments, even Social Democratic governments, see a need to reform and adjust some labor regulation. One could interpret the European Employment Strategy as designed primarily to help overcome domestic opposition to "necessary" reforms. In this sense, open coordination may indeed serve to strengthen the state, insofar as member governments gain leverage to pursue their preferred policies against domestic opposition.

Finally, open coordination may be a new means to pursue symbolic politics, giving the appearance of responding to policy crises without having to carry out any action.

A diverse polity such as the EU certainly requires flexible governance tools to function successfully. In addition, the advantages in the effectiveness of these flexible governance mechanisms may be significant enough that the EU would adopt them even in areas where it is politically capable of pursuing traditional regulation. However, at this point, the effectiveness of this new approach is unproven. It is also too early to tell whether the functional advantages are driving these developments or whether the political advantages are the real driving force. If the latter is closer to the truth, open coordination, rather than generating more effective governance for everyone, may instead create new winners and losers within member states.

Jim Mosher expects to receive his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin Madison in Fall 2000 and will be a Jean Monnet Fellow at the European University Institute, Florence, in Spring 2001.

References

Dworkin, Ronald (1999) "Does Equality Matter?" in European University Institute and New York University, Progressive Governance for the XXI Century, Conference Proceedings, Florence, 20th and 21st November 1999.
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