Report

drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee
on the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe

Rapporteur: Sir James SCOTT-HOPKINS
The European Parliament referred the following motions for resolutions to the Political Affairs Committee pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure:

- at its sitting of 12 January 1983, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr MARSHALL and others on political rights in Zimbabwe (Doc. 1-1064/82),
- at its sitting of 7 February 1983, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Gérard FUCHS on the threats of destabilization in Zimbabwe (Doc. 1-1151/82), referred to the Committee on Development and Cooperation for its opinion.

At its meeting of 22-24 February 1983, the Political Affairs Committee decided to draw up a report.

The committee appointed Sir James SCOTT HOPKINS rapporteur at its meeting of 28 September 1983.

The committee considered the draft report at its meetings of 23-25 November 1983 and 28 February - 1 March 1984.

At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution unanimously.

The following took part in the vote: Mr HAAGERUP, acting chairman and first vice-chairman; Mr FERGUSSON, third vice-chairman; Sir James SCOTT-HOPKINS, rapporteur; Mr ANTONIOZZI, Mr CARIGLIA, Mr CROUX (deputizing for Mr DESCHAMPS), Lady ELLES, Mr EPHRE MIDIS, Mr FELLERMAIER (deputizing for Mr B. FRIEDRICH), Mr GEROKOSTOPOULOS (deputizing for Mr SCHALL), Mr HABSBURG, Mr von HASSEL, Mrs van den HEUVEL, Mr ISRAEL (deputizing for Mr de la MAL ENE), Mr KLEPSCH, Mrs Lenz, Mr MOMMERSTEEG (deputizing for Mr BOURNIAS), Mr MOORHOUSE (deputizing for Lord BETHELL), Mr NORMANTON (deputizing for Lord O'HAGAN), Mr d'ORMESSON, Mr PENDERS, Mr RIPA DI MEANA (deputizing for Mr JAQUET), Mrs SCRIVENER (deputizing for Mr DONNEZ), Mr SEITLINGER (deputizing for Mr RUMOR), Mr SIMONNET (deputizing for Mr BARBI), Mr VAN MIERT and Mr ZAGARI.

The opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation is attached to this report.

The report was tabled on 2 March 1984.

The deadline for the tabling of amendments to this report will be indicated on the draft agenda for the part-session at which it will be debated.
A. MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION ........................................... 5
B. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT ............................................. 8

I. POLITICAL SITUATION
   A. Lancaster House and after ............................................. 9
   B. The Army and dissidents ............................................. 12
   C. Human Rights ......................................................... 14

II. FOREIGN POLICY
   A. A front line State ...................................................... 16
   B. Non-alignment .......................................................... 17

III. ECONOMIC SITUATION
   A. The drought ............................................................. 18
   B. The economy ............................................................ 19
   C. Agriculture ............................................................. 19
      Tobacco ................................................................. 20
      Foot and mouth disease ............................................. 20
      Protection of farmers ............................................... 21
   D. Resettlement ........................................................... 21
   E. The outlook for industry and commerce ............................ 22
   F. Emigration, education and training ................................ 24

IV. DEVELOPMENT
   A. SADCC ................................................................. 24
   B. Assistance from the Community and from Member States ....... 25
   C. Assistance from other Sources ...................................... 26

V. CONCLUSION ............................................................... 27
   ANNEX I - Political Parties in Zimbabwe ............................... 28
   ANNEX II - EEC aid to Zimbabwe ....................................... 30
   ANNEX III - Motion for a Resolution
      Doc. 1-1064/82 ......................................................... 35
   ANNEX IV - Motion for a Resolution
      Doc. 1-1151/82 ......................................................... 36
   Opinion of the Committee on Development and
   Cooperation .............................................................. 37
The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament the following Motion for a resolution, together with Explanatory Statement:

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

on the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe

The European Parliament,

- Having regard to its resolutions on Southern Africa of 9 February 1983¹, and on human rights in Zimbabwe of 17 November 1983²,
- Having regard to the following motions for resolution:
  - motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Marshall and others on political rights in Zimbabwe (Doc. 1-1064/82),
  - motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Fuchs on threats of destabilization in Zimbabwe (Doc. 1-1151/82),
- Having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee and the opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation (Doc. 1-1529/83),

A. Having regard to the close links Zimbabwe has had with Europe and especially with the United Kingdom,
B. Having regard to the importance of Zimbabwe in Southern Africa and also in the development of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC),
C. Having regard to the fact that the first act of independent Zimbabwe was to apply for membership of the ACP and EEC Convention,
D. Recognizing the difficult task facing the government of Zimbabwe in securing peace and stability after 15 years of civil war,
E. Having regard for the need to respect the safeguards in the Zimbabwe constitution for the rights of all minority groups in Zimbabwe,
F. Having regard to violations of human rights particularly in Matabeleland,
G. Having regard to the ambivalent attitude of the government of South Africa to the development of a multi-racial democracy in Zimbabwe,

¹ OJ No. C 68, 14.3.83, page 42
H. Having regard to the importance of trade and communication links between Zimbabwe and the Republic of South Africa,

1. Affirms its desire to see the continued development of a prosperous, multi-racial and democratic state in Zimbabwe;

2. Congratulates the Zimbabwe Government on the initial integration it has achieved in the armed forces, urges it to continue to encourage ex-ZIPRA men to remain in them, and welcomes the successful disarmament since independence of guerrilla groups;

3. Urges that the Zimbabwe government's policy of reconciliation be sustained and that serious efforts to accommodate the minorities and to provide full civil and political rights for all individuals;

4. Welcomes the impressive expansion by the Zimbabwe Government of universal education, and urges that freedom be maintained in the private sector of education as regards pupil intake and employment of teachers;

5. Condemns the attacks by dissident forces in Matabeleland on innocent people and calls upon the leaders of minority parties in the country to avoid recourse to violence for any reason;

6. Welcomes the setting up of a Commission of Inquiry into the alleged atrocities committed by the Zimbabwe army in Matabeleland;

7. Expresses concern at the detention without trial of many individuals, including Bishop Muzorewa and urges that all detainees are given a fair trial and not abused or tortured while in detention;

8. Condemns South Africa's activities outside its borders which are leading to instability in the region;

9. Calls upon the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to invite the front line states and the Republic of South Africa to a round table conference under the Community Presidency to examine methods both of bringing to an end destabilizing activities by all parties and to secure the economic expansion of all states in Southern Africa;

10. Urges the Government of Zimbabwe not to seek renewal of the State of Emergency Act, even though its continuance was part of the Lancaster House Agreement, and to bring to trial without delay those persons held in detention, to this end repealing the appropriate provisions of the Constitution;
11. Cautions the Government of Zimbabwe against allowing any kind of development which has the effect of ending political pluralism in Parliament and particularly of no longer enabling the white minority, which the country urgently needs for its development, to be represented;

12. Regrets the circumstances which have led to a large number of skilled personnel leaving the country, which emigration is having a detrimental effect on its development, and could lead to the possible breakdown of essential public services;

13. Calls upon the Commission and Council in conjunction with the government of Zimbabwe urgently to examine the possibility of arranging crash courses in Member States in Government administration, telecommunications, electricity services, and mechanical engineering for Zimbabweans as a component of both Community and bilateral aid programmes to Zimbabwe;

14. Welcomes the impartiality of the judiciary of Zimbabwe;

15. Urges the Council and Commission to provide emergency aid to Zimbabwe immediately in the form of aid to combat the drought, and also in the form of technical assistance, facilities for training and support for the resettlement policy;

16. Welcomes the work of the Commission's staff in Harare in the proper utilization of Community funds (EDF) and suggests that all staff engaged in this work should in future be officials of the Commission;

17. Calls upon the Council and Commission, in view of the critical shortage of foreign exchange, to help Zimbabwean exports, especially of beef, sugar and tobacco;

18. Expects the European Community to continue to provide assistance to SADCC countries and also to help Zimbabwe to develop economically in order to reduce its long-term dependence on South Africa;

19. Welcomes the aid given by the Community for the building of a Veterinary Institute in Zimbabwe and for the training of veterinary officers;

20. Suggests that at least 20 qualified Veterinary Surgeons be seconded to Zimbabwe on short-term contracts with EDF to re-establish a good veterinary service until local staff can be trained to replace them;

21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Foreign Ministers meeting in Political Cooperation, the Parliaments of the Member States, the ACP/EEC Council of Ministers, and the Government of Zimbabwe.
B.

**EXPLANATORY STATEMENT**

**Introduction**

1. Zimbabwe has rich natural resources, an excellent climate, areas with rich soil, and one of the most developed economies in Africa. It is a multi-racial society with fundamental rights protected by the 1980 Constitution.

2. On the other hand, the history of Zimbabwe in the last two decades has been dominated by a civil war, which lasted from 1965 to 1979, cost 27,000 lives, and caused widespread damage to industry, agriculture and communications. Not least was the damage it caused to relations between one group of Zimbabweans with another on grounds of colour, tribal origin and political beliefs. The war left an important legacy in the Emergency Powers legislation, enacted by the Smith régime but renewed annually since 1980.

3. The most striking feature of Zimbabwe today is not, as might be expected, the bitterness left by a terrible civil war, but the resolve of the great majority of Zimbabweans to work together to realise the great potential of their country and to heal the wounds of the past. That resolve is being severely tested at present by the challenge to the government and people presented by the worst drought for fifty years, by the world economic recession and by the destabilisation policies of the Republic of South Africa (RSA).

4. The importance of Zimbabwe to the European Community is manifold; it is a multi-racial society with historical, cultural and economic ties with the West; Zimbabwe is also a signatory of the Lomé Convention, a front-line state neighbouring the Republic of South Africa and the most economically developed state in Central and Southern Africa apart from the Republic of South Africa. The stronger the economy of Zimbabwe the greater is the mutual advantage to it and to the Community by way of trade and the more stable the social situation in Zimbabwe.
I. POLITICAL SITUATION

A. Lancaster House and after

5. The Lancaster House Agreement of December 1979, which brought the civil war to an end and provided for free elections in February 1980 is, as much as the Constitution of 1979, a living document in Zimbabwe. The Constitution guarantees individual and personal liberty and freedom of association and prohibits the use of torture and inhuman treatment. Although it can only be amended by unanimous vote of the Assembly, certain provisions can be overruled by the State of Emergency Act, first passed by the Assembly under the Smith régime, and renewed annually by the Assembly since. This Act was widely used to detain thousands of people during the civil war; since independence it has been used from time to time to detain individuals for long periods without bringing them to trial.

Internal political developments

6. There are 11 political parties in Zimbabwe but only 4 are represented in Parliament at present, following the elections of 27–29 February 1980. New elections must be held by February 1985 according to the Constitution. The members of three of these parties were elected from the common roll constituencies (80 seats), and of the fourth from the constituencies reserved for European members (20 seats).
(See Annex I). In 1981 the total population was 7.4 million, comprising:

- 5.8 m. Shona
- 1.5 m. Ndebele
- 223,000 Europeans
- 37,000 Asians and coloured

7. There has been continued rivalry between the followers of Mr Mugabe, Prime Minister and Secretary General of the ZANU-PF Party, who are mainly of the Shona tribe, and those of Mr Nkomo, the leader of the ZAPU party, who are mostly of the Ndebele minority.

1 ZANU - PF: Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front
ZAPU: Zimbabwe African People's Union (see Annex I)
Speeches by several government ministers, including the Prime Minister, in the latter half of 1981 clearly revealed ZANU's intention to establish a one-party state, claiming it would make the country more united.

They suggested the possibility of replacing the Prime ministerial system by one based on an executive president. However, Mr Mugabe emphasised at the same time that such a change would only be introduced after a national consensus had been reached, possibly with a referendum. In fact, the Constitution guarantees the right of association and this could only be amended by a unanimous vote of all 100 members of the Parliament.

8. Nevertheless in forming his first Cabinet, and in subsequent Cabinet changes, the Prime Minister included both ZAPU and white Ministers in a coalition in order to overlay the dissensions caused by the civil war. The Cabinet still contains both ZAPU and white Ministers, although Mr Nkomo himself was dismissed in February 1982, following the discovery of large illegal arms caches in ZAPU territory in Matabeleland. The Government regarded such caches as evidence of a plot to overthrow it and has since then kept a close watch on Mr Nkomo's activities. Eventually in March 1983, the Government alleged that Mr Nkomo was contravening the law on four specific counts and he was placed under police surveillance. After the army had searched his house and killed three people there, he fled to Botswana and went on to London, whence he returned to Zimbabwe in September 1983.

9. Of the other parties in Parliament, the UANC\(^1\) is led by Bishop Muzorewa and has three seats. Bishop Muzorewa was arrested on 31 October 1983 as part of an operation 'designed to check on subversive elements connected with South African bandits', according to Mr Munangagwa, the Minister of State for Security. Bishop Muzorewa has repeatedly been accused by the Prime Minister of having links with the RSA, and was recently criticised by him for suggesting that diplomatic relations should be established with Israel. Zimbabwe has not recognized Israel on the grounds of its military cooperation with the RSA and of its Palestinian policy. Bishop Muzorewa has denied that his visit to Israel was for the purpose of conspiring with Israel and the RSA to destabilise Zimbabwe. At present he is detained in prison and no date has been fixed for his trial.

\(^1\) See Annex 1
10. At the elections in February 1980 the Republican Front (RF) (formerly the Rhodesian Front led by Mr Smith) won all the 20 seats in the Assembly which are reserved for whites. Since then, partly as a result of by-elections and partly of defections, there are now 9 RF Members and 11 Independents representing whites. The Independents have adopted a positive attitude to the government and prefer to play a full part in developing Zimbabwe; the RF Members appear to find it difficult to adapt themselves to the post-independence situation and many of their supporters have left the country.

11. Mr Mugabe's ZANU-PF party holds 57 seats in the Assembly, and the great majority of these Members hold ministerial office. The central committee of the party exercises considerable influence over the Cabinet and espouses strongly Socialist policies. Your Rapporteur was told by a Minister that cabinet responsibility existed in Zimbabwe and that the Prime Minister's statements reflected Government policy. On the other hand Ministers were permitted to make statements which did not necessarily represent government policy, as they held differing views on how policy should develop. The government were trying to accommodate different points of view and to seek reconciliation after a civil war. Although your Rapporteur applauds these objectives, confusion and disquiet are obviously being caused in Zimbabwe and outside it by conflicting and sometimes extreme statements by Ministers, which are not unnaturally assumed to be government policy.

12. The Prime Minister stated in November 1983 that at the ZANU-PF national congress in May 1984 the creation of a one-party state would be proposed in a resolution; if this was carried, the party would, after the elections due by February 1985 'work towards a one-party state'. He continued 'ZAPU has agreed with us on a one-party state, but it wants to be properly accommodated and we will look at how best to accommodate them'. This statement marches with one made by a Minister to your Rapporteur that the government had no intention of acting illegally to introduce a one-party state.

-------

1 The Herald, Harare, 19.11.83
13. The Lancaster House Agreement can technically be circumvented through the State of Emergency Act, under which parties can legally be banned. If those parties voting with the government were allowed to remain, the semblance of a multi-party state would be upheld. But some sources claim that whether opposition parties are legally abolished or not is irrelevant: a one-party state has already been 'de facto' established in Zimbabwe. ZANU is consolidating its power and it is highly unlikely that it could lose the next election. ZANU militants are known to manifest their intolerance of UANC members, sometimes violently. In March 1982, the Government announced its intention of eventually reducing the number of white seats in Parliament. The power of patronage of ZANU in the Civil Service is being fully exploited. Strong ZANU support was a prerequisite for appointments to nearly all the new heads of department for the University of Zimbabwe. Most companies feel obliged to donate to party funds in order to receive government contracts. Some sources feel that Parliament is becoming little more than a rubber stamp, with most key decisions being made by the party central committee. Parliament now meets in only three months every year.

B. The Army and the dissidents

14. Observers in 1981 felt that the integration of the armed forces was going smoothly, but with the heightened tensions between ZAPU and ZANU, the number of deserters began to rise, most of them being ex-ZIPRA (pro-Nkomo) members. In response to the deteriorating situation, Prime Minister Mugabe created the 5th Brigade, a group of 5,000 men, mostly of Shona origin and all former ZANLA guerrillas, trained and equipped by North Korea. This marked the first violation of the principle of ZANLA/ZIPRA integration. The Brigade answers directly to the Prime Minister and it was feared that it would be used to impose a one-party state, especially since Mr Nkomo was not consulted about its formation. Mr Mugabe repeatedly stated that it would never be used in Matabeleland, but the situation in the area deteriorated, as the Ndebele community there felt that they had profited little from independence, especially in comparison with the Shonas.
15. This led to insurgent activity seeking solutions to social and economic grievances, which was however politicised by three events in February 1982. First, the hidden arms caches were discovered. Then Mr Nkomo was excluded from the government. Finally, 100 members of the Ndebele forces were arrested, including General 'Lookout' Musuka and Mr Dumiso Dabengwa, former ZIPRA Leaders. The number of deserters increased from 500 at the beginning of 1982 to between 2,500 and 4,000 by April 1983. The situation in Matabeleland grew very serious: buses were intercepted, banks and stores were robbed, farms were attacked, people were ambushed, etc. Furthermore, there was a wave of assassinations, particularly of white people; over 500 killings are attributed to the insurgents, said to have been led by the former ZIPRA army deserters. 

16. Although until the end of 1982 the dissident activity was not viewed as a real threat to the government, it judged it essential to prevent any signs of weakness or anarchy, in order to circumvent a possible intervention by South Africa. Police and army forces in the area were stepped up, and a curfew was declared in July in the area to the west of Bulawayo, where the police suspected the dissidents were taking refuge. On 25 July 6 foreign tourists (2 English, 2 Americans and 2 Australians) were kidnapped. As a result searches and identification controls were multiplied, the curfew zone was extended and non-government vehicles were restricted (until November). By November 425 dissidents had been captured by the army. The curfew and prohibition on circulation aggravated conditions in the region, which had already been affected by the worst drought since 1947. In January 1983 Mr Mugabe judged the situation to be uncontrollable, and sent in the 5th Brigade to West-Matabeleland to restore order partly because it was feared that, if integrated units were to be sent, the loyalty of the Ndebele elements in them would be severely tested. This force was composed of former ZANLA (Mugabe forces) guerrillas, 5,000 strong, mostly of Shona origin and trained and equipped by North Korea.

1 Le Monde, 3.11.1982
C. Human rights

17. It is clear that respect for human rights has greatly increased by comparison with the actions of the illegal Smith régime during the civil war. Only in Matabeleland have there been violations of human rights by the Government on a serious scale. The Government claim to have been acting on behalf of the majority in quelling a dissident minority, mainly Ndebele supporters of Mr Nkomo, which was being abetted by the RSA as part of its destabilisation policy.

18. The automatic renewal every 6 months of a State of Emergency, introduced in 1965 under the Smith government, increases the possibility of abuse of Civil Rights. This Act, most recently extended in January 1984, authorises the use of incommunicado detention without charge or trial for up to 30 days, the confiscation of property in conditions of a state of war of anyone believed to be an 'enemy agent', the seizure of passports, search and arrest without warrants, and for detention orders of indefinite duration, among others. Many allegations of police excesses have been confirmed. Prisoners in Harare have shown their scars from torture during interrogation and affirmed that others were beaten to death. The six detained Air Force officers claimed that their 'confessions' were obtained by torture and one has published a detailed account of this. All the officers have now been released, but have had to leave Zimbabwe. Detention is sometimes used to bypass the judiciary altogether.

1 Daily Telegraph, 7.2.84.
19. It is impossible to know how many people have died; estimates vary between 1,500 and 3,000 persons. Several thousand refugees have fled their homes to Botswana. The government claims that most of the civilians were victims caught in crossfire and denies accusations of misconduct. But the sheer weight and consistency of the evidence, most of which comes from refugees, indicates otherwise. In addition, several religious groups and independent relief organisations, doctors and diplomats have confronted the government with detailed reports substantiated by case histories, photographs, statements by witnesses, locations of corpses, and a list of over 200 individuals known to have died during the first two weeks of the campaign. Government supporters give further credence to the allegations by privately admitting the killings, while arguing that they are justified by the need to quell dissidence which is being abetted by South Africa.

20. Early in 1983 the government replaced the 5th Brigade in Matabeleland by the British-trained, integrated 2nd Brigade. Following protests in March 1983 by 12 human rights organisations, which included a request for the appointment of a judicial commission of inquiry, a four-man commission was set up in September to investigate violations of human rights in Matabeleland. In September 1983 doubts of the Government about the loyalty to it of elements of the 2nd Brigade led to its replacement by the 5th Brigade yet again.

\[\text{---}\]

1 Reports to religious missions, Le Monde, 11.3.83
2 M. Sekeramyi, Minister of State for Defence, Le Monde, 11.2.83
3 Guardian, 23.3.83
4 Ibid. and Financial Times, 6.1.83, quoting Mr. Munangagwa, Minister of Security

- 15 - PR 86.470/fin.
II. FOREIGN POLICY

A. A frontline state

21. The focus of interest in Zimbabwe's foreign policy is its relationship with the Republic of South Africa. Political and diplomatic relations have been officially broken off since September 1980, but economic and trade links have been maintained and each country maintains a trade mission in the other. Relations reached a low point in 1981. In June of that year, Mr Mugabe stated that Zimbabwe intended to support the Liberation Movement's fighting in Namibia and South Africa diplomatically and politically through the OAU, although it was not prepared to give bases to SWAPO and African National Congress (ANC) guerillas. In retaliation, in August 1981 South Africa refused to renew the work permits of thousands of black Zimbabweans living there, of whom more than 20,000 were officially registered workers, but many more were living there illegally. South Africa also threatened not to renew the preferential trade agreement in 1982, but in fact eventually did so.

Zimbabwe's economy, like that of other countries in the region, except those of Angola and Tanzania, is heavily dependent on South Africa, especially as regards sources of supply, markets and transport, particularly by rail. Most important is the South African railway system, which links the land-locked states with overseas markets and supplies through either their own ports, or those in Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania.

22. Evidence of Pretorian involvement in destabilisation is mounting. In July 1982, commandos using South African equipment sabotaged Zimbabwe's new fleet of fighters at Gweru, comprising nearly 2/3 of the Air Force. South African soldiers have been killed or captured during raids as have self-confessed South African spies, and the Ndebele language 'Radio Truth' broadcasts its attacks on the Mugabe government into Matabeleland from the Transvaal. In December 1982, Mr Emmerson Munangagwa, the Zimbabwean Minister responsible for security, claimed that four camps in Northern Transvaal housed 4,000 anti-Mugabe Zimbabweans, recruited from Ndebele refugees, who were infiltrated into Zimbabwe where they posed as supporters of Mr Nkomo and 'commit crimes, make roadblocks and kill people' (1). On 25 February 1983, Prime Minister

(1) Financial Times, 6.1.1983
Mugabe declared for the first time publicly that South Africa was supporting the current rebellion in Matabeleland, allied with ZAPU forces.

B. Non-alignment

23. When Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980, Prime Minister Mugabe announced his intention of following a foreign policy of strict non-alignment. Diplomatic relations were formally established between Zimbabwe and many Western countries, including France, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy and the United States. Zimbabwe also announced that it would continue to maintain and strengthen its alliances with China, Yugoslavia and Romania, which had given support to the ZANU wing of the Patriotic Front Alliance during the war. Later in the year, relations were established with Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and East Germany. Plans made under Bishop Muzorewa's regime for establishing diplomatic ties with Israel were dropped. In Africa, Mr Mugabe established particularly close ties with Mozambique and Zambia and the front-line states. He stated that he would not refuse to enter into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, which had supported Mr Nkomo, if they wished to do so, but he would not seek them. An agreement was finally reached in February 1981 with Poland, but the USSR only started taking steps to establish an embassy in Harare at the end of that year.

24. Independent Zimbabwe has recently developed its relations with the Warsaw Pact countries. On 6 May 1983 the Zimbabwe-Romania Joint Commission held its first meeting to discuss cooperation in economic fields. The two countries have already signed friendship, trade, agricultural and cultural agreements. In May 1983 Mr Mugabe made a 10-day official visit to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, when agreements on economic, political, technical and cultural cooperation were signed. The Prime Minister said the trip had served to 'consolidate relations between Eastern Europe and ourselves'. This does not necessarily mark a shift to the left in the non-alignment policy, as Zimbabwe's economic ties with the East are in no sense comparable with those with the West. A visit by Mr Mugabe to the Soviet Union planned for 1983 did not take place, and no date has yet been fixed for it.
25. On independence, Zimbabwe became the 43rd member of the Commonwealth and applied for membership in the Lomé Convention, but did not officially become a member until March 1982. It continued its participation in the non-aligned Movement, which the Patriotic Front had joined in 1979. Zimbabwe became the 50th member state of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in June 1980, and the 153rd of the United Nations on 25 August. (It was elected on 1 January 1983 to serve on the Security Council for two years as a non-permanent member). In September 1980 Zimbabwe joined the World Bank and its affiliate, the International Development Association (IDA), the African Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It also became the 111th member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in September 1981.

III. ECONOMIC SITUATION

A. The drought

26. In 1981 and 1982, the southern and western areas of Zimbabwe experienced their worst drought and highest temperatures for 50 years. By February 1984 insufficient rain had fallen, and fears existed of a third year of drought. All those whom your Rapporteur consulted in Zimbabwe were agreed that a third year of drought would be disastrous. The maize crop for 1983-84 is forecast as 610,000 tonnes, or only 30% of that for 1981-82. Winter wheat production, at 124,000 tonnes, is expected to be only 58% of the previous season's crop. Production of oilseeds will be considerably reduced. Only sugar and tobacco production has increased. As a result of the drought, earnings from agricultural exports will be Zimbabwean $ 40 million lower this year. Almost half of the population of 7.6 million will require to receive food aid from the State, at a cost of about US $ 100 million.

1 In November 1983 1 Zimbabwean $ = US $ 1.03
27. Legal independence was a stimulus to the Zimbabwe economy, mainly because the UN lifted its trade sanctions. 1981 and 1982 were marked by extraordinary growth due to excellent farm seasons, (notwithstanding the drought, which has particularly affected the southern and western parts of the country), access to international markets and the massive inflow of aid. The prospects for 1983 are, however, bleak. The IMF estimates an inflation rate of at least 17%, which is expected to be exceeded. There is an external debt of Z$ 1,500 million with a 16% debt-serving rate. The deficit for the first half of 1983 was Z$ 243 million (US$ 252.4m) 84% over the target. The Standard Bank's February 1983 forecast predicted that instead of 0% growth previously expected, there will be -3% growth in real GNP. There are several reasons for this pessimistic outlook. First the world recession is decreasing demand and export prices, while import prices and interest rates on loans are rising. Transport costs are high because Zimbabwe has no natural gas or oil of its own; yet its fuel consumption has gone up 50% since independence.

28. Prime Minister Mugabe restated in November 1983 the objectives of the government in regard to industry and manufactures as being to establish state enterprises or cooperatives; to invest in existing companies by negotiation; and to promote workers' committees. These objectives, he said, did not involve nationalisation. This statement follows one in April 1983 which foresaw possible government control of the grain milling, fuel procurement and transport industries; nevertheless, the budget for 1983-84 provided for a reduction in investment.

29. In March 1982 26.5% of the work force of Zimbabwe were employed in agriculture and forestry, the next highest percentage being in manufacturing (17%). In 1981, agricultural products accounted for 40% of foreign currency earnings, of which unmanufactured tobacco accounted for 23%, and other products (mainly cotton lint and raw sugar) 17%.
Tobacco

30. The tobacco industry is of primordial importance to Zimbabwe. It is organised by private enterprise into a growers' body and a merchant and manufacturing body; the private enterprise marketing body is overseen by a statutory marketing board. All sectors are inter-linked and work together closely and harmoniously. The industry operates without financial assistance from the government. There are 1,200 growers, the average size of holdings being 42 hectares. Zimbabwe exports 46% of its tobacco to the EEC by a quota arrangement under the Lomé Convention and wishes at least to maintain its quota, in order to earn foreign currency, which it desperately needs. Tobacco from Zimbabwe can be blended into Italian tobacco, and the two products are complementary one to the other. It is vital for Zimbabwe therefore that its tobacco quota for import to the EEC is at least maintained, if not increased, and the European Parliament should take action to this end.

Foot and mouth disease

31. Under Lomé Convention arrangements, Zimbabwe is allotted an annual quota for import into the EEC of 8,100 tonnes of high-quality beef. However for some years such imports have been prohibited by the EEC on account of outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease in the Zimbabwe cattle herd; this represents a serious loss of foreign currency to the country and of income to its producers of top-class beef. To help contain and combat foot-and-mouth disease, the EEC has contributed towards the cost of a vaccination campaign and of erecting fences in the Bulawayo area and in the South East corner of Zimbabwe. The object of the fences is to create a buffer zone between disease-carrying African buffalo in the national parks and game reserves in these areas, and cattle in adjacent farms, and also between non-vaccinated and vaccinated cattle. A further measure consists in the elimination of buffalo from the areas concerned; in addition, before cattle are transported from one area to another, they have by law to be vaccinated and branded.
32. Doubt was cast in certain circles in Harare however about the efficacy of these measures. It was claimed that as a result of a breakdown in law and order as fast as the fences were constructed, the wire disappeared; that control on cattle movement was lax; and that veterinary officers were unable to operate in Matabeleland. Of 19 Ministry of Agriculture veterinary officers who had resigned in 1982, 16 had been born in Zimbabwe and, although a veterinary institute was under construction in Harare, there was a clamant and immediate need for trained personnel who could help to control cattle diseases. During his visit your Rapporteur was told that only seven government veterinary officers were in post in the whole country. This would appear to be an area for priority action by the Zimbabwe Government, for as soon as foot-and-mouth disease is controlled, exports to the EEC can be resumed to its financial advantage.

Protection of farmers

33. Commercial farmers (who are mainly white) face problems arising from dissident activity in Matabeleland, and from squatters. Your Rapporteur was told that South and West of Bulawayo the dissidents were comprised of ex-ZIPRA Guerrillas, 'super-ZAPU' guerrillas assisted by the RSA, and common bandits. The lives of commercial farmers were so endangered that recourse had had to be made to protective measures first used during the civil war, such as direct radio contact between farmers in the bush and their farms and police posts, and protected vehicles. Commercial farms in Matabeleland had become unsaleable and even the government would not purchase them. In the North and South East areas of Zimbabwe squatters, often refugees from Mozambique, had moved on to commercial farms. These factors had encouraged white farmers in South West Zimbabwe to seek refuge in towns or to leave the country, just when their expertise was most required. Elsewhere in the country, it was emphasised, farmers were not in danger.

D. Resettlement

34. One of the immediate projects the new government tackled after independence was the resettlement of blacks from overcrowded communal lands onto formerly white-owned land. The target was 162,000 peasant families (1 million people) by 1985. Up to November 1983 32,000 families have been resettled under the normal intensive scheme, and about 6,000 families under the accelerated
resettlement scheme. Success in this project is important politically for ZANU, and economically for a country whose population is growing at 3.3% per year. 2.8 million ha have been purchased by the government on a 'willing seller-willing buyer' basis, financed as to 50% by the UK Government and 50% by the Zimbabwe Government. Plots vary in size between 20 ha of good, and 100 ha of poor, land, the average plot being 60 ha. Seeds and fertilisers are given to resettled families for the first year, after which long- and medium-term credit is provided by the EEC, which has granted 4m. ECU for normal schemes. The Zimbabwe Government is seeking a further 5.45 million ECU. Community grants are used to provide infrastructure for normal schemes, e.g. roads, bridges, fencing, clinics and schools, of which schools are built by the resettled families, clinics by contractors, and other services by government direct labour.

35. Accelerated schemes, in which the average plot is 12 ha, are based on government purchase of small farms and use of existing infrastructure. The EEC is assisting by upgrading the existing infrastructure in order to hasten resettlement. Inevitably, there have been problems, one of the most intractable being the continuing severe drought. Others are a shortage of capital; inadequate numbers of experts to advise people new to farming; and unwillingness to abandon traditional farming methods. Nevertheless, the resettlement policy is of cardinal importance to Zimbabwe, and should be pursued with the utmost energy by the government; EEC aid has been well-directed but the drought emergency calls for a special effort by the Community to ensure that the momentum of resettlement is maintained. The Chisumbanje project to create plots for 12,000 people over 12-15 years in a 40,000 ha scheme on rich, irrigated soil in the Lowveld, in South East Zimbabwe, has attracted interest from British banks and is worthy of study by the Community.

E. The outlook for industry and commerce

36. Industry in Zimbabwe faces substantial, but not insoluble, difficulties. Paramount among them is a serious lack of external investment, which is required to modernise existing, and to develop new, industries, and the effects of the world recession. The recession has restricted markets for exports from Zimbabwe, and led to commodity stock-piles which are forcing down prices, e.g. of minerals. Disincentives to investment include strict controls on expatriation of profits, slowness in decision-making by government, an apparent lack of any overall plan for encouraging investment, strict price controls by the government and a moribund stock exchange.
37. In 1979 the mining industry was responsible for almost one-half of Zimbabwe's export earnings, although it accounted for only 8% of GDP and employed only about 6% of the labour force. In 1980, 34 different minerals were produced and sold at a total value of Z$ 416m. In order of importance, the main ones were gold, asbestos, nickel, copper, coal and chromium. The value of mineral output in 1982 was put at Z$ 383m. down by 8.7% from 1980, but the volume was the lowest for 11 years. The recession in world metal prices continued in 1982 and resulted in the closure of many mines. Exploration activity came to a virtual standstill during the guerrilla war but has now resumed, with more than 50 exploration programmes started during the first two years of independence. Disquiet has been expressed, by both local and foreign firms, over the government's placing of the marketing of all minerals under a state-controlled Minerals Marketing Corporation in 1982. The companies claim that this will discourage private investment in the sector. Official policy has limited retrenchment to save costs so although employment in 1982 fell by 4,500 there are still an estimated 3,000 surplus miners. Mining faces a shortage of skilled manpower and, in spite of a considerable level of training, the situation may not change much in the immediate future. Transport problems have limited the exports of bulk, low-value minerals such as chromium and coal. Partly because the mining sector has no control over the price of its output on world markets, and partly because of current depressed prices of minerals, there is considerable concern within the sector regarding the potential impact of further cost increases.

38. Delays in decision-making by government, especially on allocation of foreign currency for imports, on major schemes for investment from abroad, and on allowing price increases e.g. for steel and maize, were heavily criticised by industrial and commercial leaders, and also admitted by the government. Yet relations between industry and Ministers were said to be good. The government has invested in a large hotel and conference centre in Harare, but apart from a Zimbabwe $ 150 million project for a pulp mill, it was admitted that industry had never discussed a long-term investment strategy with the government. Ministers drew attention to heavy transport costs, particularly of steel and minerals, through Mozambique or the RSA to the coast. They claimed that the steel industry, though making heavy losses, was essential to the economies of the SADCC countries. They agreed that a satisfactory Zimbabwe stock exchange was necessary, and were preparing amending legislation in order to strengthen it.
F. Emigration, Education and Training.

39. One of the main reasons for slowness in government decision-making which was cited to your rapporteur was the departure of whites from middle-rank posts in the civil service and the lack of trained blacks to take their places. This is a legacy of the refusal of the Smith régime to train blacks in preparation for majority rule, and highlights the need for accelerated training programmes. Your rapporteur was also told of serious shortages of skilled artisans in sectors such as engineering and telecommunications, and of trained teachers and agricultural experts, e.g. veterinary officers.

40. The white community, which numbered 275,000 in the mid-1970s, now stands at 140,000. Between 1980 and 1982 alone 64,000 whites left the country, and the recent monthly emigration rate of whites has been about 1,500. The principal anxieties of white Zimbabweans are a decline in standards of schooling and health care, poor prospects of employment for their children in Zimbabwe, price controls, and restrictions on sending money abroad. While your rapporteur was in Harare, the Minister of Education, Dr. Mutumbuka, announced that the 27 private schools in Zimbabwe, most of which have a Church connection, must from January 1984 have at least 60% black pupils, and eventually 60% black teachers, and that not more than Z$ 500 per term could be charged in fees.\(^1\) The immediate reaction among whites was one of dismay, as it is known that insufficient qualified black teachers are available to maintain standards of schooling,\(^2\) and currency restrictions prevent whites sending their children to school outside Zimbabwe. Although the Minister has since controverted this statement, the damage has been done and the ensuing uncertainty will serve to increase white emigration, which has already reached a critical level for the future management of agriculture, industry and commerce.

IV. DEVELOPMENT

A. SADCC

41. Your Rapporteur dealt at some length with the SADCC countries in his report on Southern Africa, on which Parliament adopted a resolution in February 1983.\(^3\) He remains convinced that the SADCC deserves the maximum amount of support from the Community, particularly in the short-term in the form of drought relief, and in assistance for training black Zimbabweans for employment in teaching, government service, and in the skilled trades necessary to sustain the economy.

\(^1\) The average fee charged at present is Z$ 600 - 800 per term
\(^2\) In 1981, 60% of teaching staff at University and other higher education institutions had a University degree; 46% of secondary school teachers had certificates of education; and 82% of primary education teaching staff had 1-3 years of secondary education. (National Manpower Survey 1981).
B. Assistance from the Community and from Member States

42. Zimbabwe requested admission to the Lomé Convention on the day of its independence, 18 April 1980, and the agreement on its admission entered into force on 1 March 1982. It was granted admission to the special regime for certain States on the exports of beef and veal. In turn, Zimbabwe undertook to use the revenue accrued from taxes on these exports to meet national priorities in the livestock sector, relating to small-holder production. As Zimbabwe was a party to the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, it was granted entry as a member of the Protocol on ACP sugar. It was also given special attention as it is a land-locked State.

43. EEC aid to Zimbabwe can be classified under four main headings - that granted in 1980 before accession to the Lomé II Convention; that under the National Indicative Programme; that derived from regional projects; and drought aid. (See Annex II). Under the first heading, 16m. ECU was approved in 1980 as emergency aid and food aid (mainly for returning refugees) and reconstruction of infrastructure in peasant farming areas. In 1981, 14.5m. ECU was approved, principally for the construction of rural clinics, for educational facilities and equipment, and to assist resettlement (Annex II, section A). The latest (provisional) figures for the review of the National Indicative Programme show that 27.75m. ECU has been granted for agriculture and rural development; 10.5m. ECU for training; 7.5m. ECU for economic infrastructure (mainly drilling for water); and 3.02m. ECU for supporting activities. Including a reserve, the grand total under this programme is 49m. ECU. (Annex II, section B).

44. Zimbabwe is also benefiting directly from current regional projects covering the SADCC countries, to the extent of 32m. ECU. Of this sum 12.8m. ECU has been committed to control of foot-and-mouth disease and 8m. ECU to control of the tsetse fly. (Annex II, section C). Finally, drought aid approved up to November 1983 amounts to 9.7m. ECU, of which about 5m. ECU is for emergency supplies of beans, and 2.8m. ECU for an accelerated drought relief programme (Annex II, section D). The administration of aid under these four headings, especially as a rapid response to the serious drought, calls for special qualities of judgement, initiative and dedication. Your Rapporteur found that the staff working in the Commission's delegation brought these qualities, in particular, to their work, and wishes to record his appreciation of them. He was therefore distressed to learn that only two were Commission officials and that the others, as employees of the European Agency for Cooperation (EAC) were on short-term contracts without the arrangements for promotion.
and pensions enjoyed by full officials of the Commission. Your rapporteur is of opinion that the Commission has allowed this situation to carry on for far too long and should take early steps to regularise it.

45. Zimbabwe also has extensive agreements with the Member States of the Community. For example, in negotiations held during the first quarter of 1983, France agreed to provide US$ 40 million in aid to be used to finance public sector projects and commodity aid programmes to the private sector. A £20 million (US$ 30.9m) aid agreement between the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe was concluded on 31 January 1983 - a £5 million grant from the funds pledged at ZIMCORD and a £15 million loan. West Germany is to provide Z$ 29 million (US$ 30m.) in aid in 1983.

C. Assistance from other Sources

46. The World Bank is Zimbabwe's leading individual donor. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) had committed US$ 50 million by January 1983 through the Commodity Import Program (CIP) which makes foreign exchange available for imports. This has not been fully disbursed. Talks have begun for a second CIP of approximately US$ 37m. - 80% to go to the private sector and 20% to the public. President Reagan requested security assistance for 1982-1983 of US$ 78.2 million; this has recently been approved by Congress despite substantial opposition on Human Rights grounds. This amount is due to stay the same in 1983-1984. The development aid requested for 1982-1983 is US$ 75 million, to be reduced to zero in 1983-1984, and the projected foreign military sales credits for that year are to equal US$ 3 million. An approved US$ 45 million agricultural scheme has yet to be used.

47. Japan signed an aid agreement on 28 March 1983 worth Z$ 3 million, and China has committed US$ 33 million. North Korean aid has been primarily in the military sector. By the end of 1980, it had given US$ 16 million to finance the training and equipping of the 5th Brigade; 106 advisers were sent in August 1981 (of whom all but 3 were asked to leave in August 1982). The equipment - tanks, artillery and light arms - was valued at Z$ 12.5 million and given as an unconditional gift; it was all manufactured in the Soviet Union. It should be pointed out that in June 1980, Prime Minister Mugabe refused to allow the army to bring in Soviet-made tanks and MIG aircraft from Zambia as they would require spare parts and instructors, a dependence on the USSR he did not wish to accept.
48. Finally, Zimbabwe receives aid from several international financial organisations. For example, a US$ 10 million credit was granted in January by the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) for a 3 year road development programme. The World Bank approved a US$ 26.4 million, 20 year loan for the same project in May. The IMF granted a loan in March for SDR 56.1 million (worth US$ 60.2m.). An 18-month standby facility for SDR 300 million (worth US$ 323.7m.) was also agreed upon, to reduce government financial imbalances.

V. CONCLUSION

49. His discussions in Harare have led your Rapporteur to the conviction that the leadership given by the Government to the country since independence has done much to heal the wounds caused by the civil war and to lay the foundations for a multi-racial state based on a sound economy. This is a remarkable achievement (which incidentally has largely been overlooked by the European press), especially in the face of a devastating drought and of persistent insurgent activity and attempts at destabilisation by the RSA. Nevertheless, anxieties remain in Zimbabwe about human rights, about continued dissidence in Matabeleland, about the future of white Zimbabweans, and about shortages in trained and skilled personnel. The Community can help Zimbabwe to combat the effects of the drought, and with training and resettlement, providing markets for tobacco, sugar and other agricultural products, and aid both direct and through SADCC. It is for the government however to allay anxieties felt in the Community about human rights, to remove as far as possible the motivation to dissidence, and to safeguard the rights and position of all minorities by applying the leadership, determination and dynamism in these fields which it has shown in so many others.
POLITICAL PARTIES IN ZIMBABWE

A. Parties and Groups with seats in the Assembly

(1) Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)
   Majority party with 57 seats; African nationalist, socialist.
   Pre-independence links with China
   President and Secretary-General: Robert Mugabe

(2) Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)
   Wing of the original Patriotic front Alliance with ZANU
   20 seats (15 from the 16 allotted to Matabeleland)
   Left wing; long-standing links with the Soviet Union
   Leader: Joshua Nkomo
   Acting President: Josiah Chinamano
   Secretary-General: Joseph Msika

(3) United African National Council (UANC)
   3 seats: African Nationalist, moderate
   President: Bishop Abel Muzorewa
   Secretary-General: Edward Mazaiwana

(4) Republican Front (RF) -- formerly Rhodesian Front
   Won all 20 guaranteed European seats in the elections,
   but today only holds 8.
   Leader: Ian Smith

(5) Independents (formerly RF)
   12 seats

B. Other parties:

(6) National Democratic Union
   Conservative
   Leader: Henry Chihota

(7) National Unifying Force
   Leader: Nick McNally
7) United National Federation Party (UNFP)
   Conservative
   Leader: Chief Kayisa Ndiweri

8) Zimbabwe African National Union - Sithole (ZANU - S)
   Centrist: splinter group from ZANU-PF and UANC
   President: Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole

9) Zimbabwe Democratic Party
   Traditionalist; splinter group from UANC
   Leader: James Chikerema

10) Zimbabwe National Front
    Leader: Peter Mandaza

11) Zimbabwe United People's Organisation (ZUPO)
    Leader: Jeremiah Chirau

[(12) Democratic Party was the alternative white party, supporting
the Mugabe government, led by André Holland. But they dissolved
in May, 1982 after failing to win any seats in the by-elections.]
ECC AID TO ZIMBABWE

A. PRE-RATIFICATION OF LOME II ACCESSION AGREEMENT

I. Approved in 1980

1. Emergency Aid
   (via UN High Commission for Refugees) 9.4
   - for resettlement of refugees (8.3 MECU)
   - for livestock control (1.1 MECU)

2. Food Aid
   - for returning refugees (via UNHCR and OXFAM) 1.2

3. Cofinancing with NGOs (17 projects) 1.4

4. Non-Associated Programme 1980 (NA 80) 4.0
   - Reconstruction of Infrastructure in Peasant Farming Areas (NA 80-4)
     . Equipment for reconstruction of rural feeder roads, 1.25 ECU
     . Reconstruction of NGO cattle dip tanks, 2.75 MECU

   TOTAL 1980 16.0
II. Approved in 1981

1. **Non-Associated Programme 1980**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>MECU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Rural Clinics (NA 80-41)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cofinancing with Government of construction and equipment of 115 rural health clinics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Educational facilities and equipment (NA 80-40)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Gwelo Technical College (construction and equipment), 2.2.MECU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Equipment for University of Zimbabwe, faculties of Agriculture and of engineering, 0.3 MECU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Basic science kits for 487 secondary schools, 0.5 MECU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) National Extension Services (NA 80-39)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Intensive Resettlement Programme (NA 80-38)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cofinancing with UK and Zimbabwe Government of a comprehensive rural programme including infrastructure and land cultivation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Study Programme (NA 80-42)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rural Development Study Mashonaland East; 0.6 MECU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Smallholder Coffee Development Study</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Smallholder Fruit and Tree Nut Development Study</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Technical Assistance Programme (NA 80-43)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three experts (60 men/months) to Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development, to prepare development projects.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL:** Non-Associated Programme approved in 1981 14.5

2. **Cofinancing with NGOs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>MECU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(6 projects)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL 1981** 14.8
### B. TABLE I. REVIEW OF NATIONAL INDICATIVE PROGRAMME (NIP) (provisional, November 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MECU</th>
<th>Committed</th>
<th>Under preparation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### A. Agriculture and Rural Development

1) Mashonaland East  
2) Coffee/Fruit Development  
3) Accelerated Resettlement Programme  
3 bis) Technical Assistance to Ministry of Lands and Rural Development  
4) Micro-projects  
5) Tsetse Control Project (part from NIP)  
6) Credit line Farm Irrigation Fund (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MECU</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 27.75

(a) as shown

#### B. Development of Human Resources

1) 'Multi-Annual Training Programme'  
2) Veterinary Faculty (part from NIP)  
3) Gweru Technical College (training of trainers)  
4) Training of Medical Assistants (Rural Clinics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MECU</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 10.5

#### C. Economic Infrastructure

1. Rural Water Supply  
   . Drilling programme Masvingo  
   . Drilling programme Matabeleland  
2. Energy Development
   2.1. Coal utilisation study  
   2.2. Alternative energy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MECU</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 7.5

PE 86.470/ fin.
D. Supporting Activities

1) Rural Technology Exhibition (1982)  
   0.12  X

2) Trade Promotion  
   0.3  X

3) Studies (beef marketing study)  
   Water consultancy  
   0.3

4) Prep. of Lomé III, short term consultancies and reserve  
   2.6

   TOTAL  
   3.02

Reserve  
0.27

Grand total National Indicative Programme  
49.00

C. REGIONAL PROJECTS DIRECTLY INTERESTING ZIMBABWE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>MECU</th>
<th>Committed</th>
<th>Under Preparation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foot and Mouth Disease</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinary Faculty, Harare</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsetse Control</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Fairs</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reintegration of African Nationals</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADCC Secretariat Technical assistance</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESARIPO (Industrial patents)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   ----

32.25
D. DROUGHT AID 1983 APPROVED BY EEC AS OF 30 NOVEMBER, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount (1 000 ECU)</th>
<th>Breakdown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Emergency Aid</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>1 300 000 ECU = about 1 500 t. for hyprobeans (processed soya beans) 200 000 ECU = about 2 000 t. for salt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Emergency Food Aid</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>plus transport cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry beans (about 1 500 t.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dry beans for drought relief (6 000 t.)</td>
<td>3 100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>5 175</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rural Water Supply - Accelerated Programme for Drought Relief in</td>
<td>2 800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria Province</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Project is part of Zimbabwe's normal Indicative Aid Programme but was</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>specifically designed as a drought relief drilling programme and was</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>approved extremely rapidly)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Cattle Rescue Operation</td>
<td>1 750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No extra funds, but EEC approved inclusion of this new item under the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agreed use of Food Aid counterpart funds)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9 725</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) 500 000 ECU plus transport costs
Motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-1064/82)
tabled by Mr MARSHALL and others
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure
on political rights in Zimbabwe

The European Parliament

A. - confirming its belief in democracy and the civil rights of all,

B. - remembering the welcome given by the Community to Zimbabwe's achievement of democracy and independence,

C. - concerned at recent reports of interference with the political and civil rights of various critics of the Government of Zimbabwe,

1. Requests the Zimbabwe Government to safeguard the rights of all citizens;

2. Urges that the future of Community aid to Zimbabwe be re-examined if such rights are not safeguarded;

3. Requests its President to submit this Resolution to the President of the Council of Ministers and the President of Zimbabwe.
Motion for a resolution (Doc. 1-1151/82

tabled by Mr Gérard FUCHS

pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure

on the threats of destabilization in Zimbabwe

The European Parliament,

A - reaffirming its faith in democracy and in the exercise of civil rights

in general,

B - recalling that the Community welcomed the advent of democracy in Zimbabwe

when that country attained independence,

C - welcoming the objective of a non-racial society established by the

Zimbabwean authorities and the progress made towards this goal despite

memories of the war of liberation,

1. Is alarmed at the increasing threats of destabilization imposed on

Zimbabwe by the aggressive policy of South Africa;

2. Denounces the fact that paramilitary forces are being trained by that

country in order to create insecurity in Zimbabwe;

3. Condemns the recent acts of sabotage carried out on the deira-Mutare

pipeline by Mozambiquan dissidents with South African backing with the

aim of increasing Zimbabwe's economic dependence on South Africa;

4. Requests as a matter of urgency that in accordance with the resolution

adopted by the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly in Rome (November 1982),

sanctions be envisaged against South Africa in order to induce it to

cease such activities;

5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of

the Council of Ministers and to the authorities in Pretoria.
OPINION

of the Committee on Development and Cooperation

Draftsman: Mr G. BERSANI

On 19 October 1983 the Committee on Development and Cooperation appointed Mr Bersani draftsman.

The Committee considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 26 January 1984 and 2 February 1984. On 2 February 1984 it adopted it with two abstentions.

Present at the time of the vote: Mr Bersani, Vice-Chairman, acting Chairman, draftsman; Mrs Carrettoni-Romagnoli; Mr Cohen; Mr de Courcy Ling; Mr Deschamps (deputising for Mr Narudcci); Mrs Dury; Mr Enright; Mr Ferrero: Mr Howell (deputising for Mr Pearce); Mr Irmer; Mr Jackson, C.; Mr Lezzi; Mr Lomas (deputising for Mr Fellermaier); Mr Taylor, J.D.(deputising for Dr. Sherlock); Mr Vankerkhoven; Mr Wawrzik; Mr Wedekind.

The opinion was tabled in its final form on 6 February 1984.
The Committee on Development and Cooperation,
- having regard to the motion for a resolution\(^1\) tabled by Mr Gérard FUCHS
  pursuant to rule 47 of the rules of procedure on the threats of destabilisation
  in Zimbabwe,
- having regard to the Community's special links with Zimbabwe through the Convention
  of Lomé,
- having regard to its opinion\(^2\) adopted on 22 September 1982 on Southern Africa,
- having regard to the reports\(^3\) of the first two stages of the fact-finding mission
  in the countries affected by the consequences of South African acts of aggression,

1. Pays tribute to the remarkable degree of stability that has been achieved by
   Zimbabwe since independence following 15 years of armed conflict;
2. Points out that Zimbabwe's geographical position makes it particularly vulnerable
   as
   - it is a front-line state having a common frontier with the Republic of South
     Africa,
   - it has in the past had very close economic links with South Africa, the dominant
     economic force in Southern Africa,
   - it is a landlocked country still highly dependent on South African railways and
     road links for its external trade;
3. Is convinced that a sound economy constitutes the best basis for political
   stability, and notes the economic difficulties at present facing Zimbabwe due
   in great part to the world economic recession and the prolonged drought;
4. Is aware of the potential for instability resulting from the existence of
   important ethnic minorities in Zimbabwe;
5. Believes that a peaceful and stable Zimbabwe can only be built on the basis of
   mutual respect for all the ethnic groups comprising the population, in a spirit
   of political tolerance and respect for human rights;
6. Condemns the manner in which the Republic of South Africa has attempted to
   destabilise Zimbabwe, in particular by providing support for dissident groups
   within that country and its neighbouring states;

\(^1\) Doc.1-1151/82
\(^2\) Draftsman Mr Lezzi, Doc.1-657/82, page 79
\(^3\) CA/CP/270 and CA/CP/184
7. Regrets the denial of human rights by the imprisonment of the former Prime Minister, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, without any charge being preferred;

8. Calls on the European Community to give active support to Zimbabwe, through the Lomé Convention, notably in relation to
- transport infrastructure
- industrial cooperation
- veterinary health
- education and technical training;

9. Feels that the Community should provide Zimbabwe with special assistance to combat the effects of the severe drought which is having serious economic and social consequences, thereby contributing to the potential for instability;

10. Stresses the importance of Zimbabwe's exports of tobacco and sugar to the Community, and insists that no steps be taken to reduce the volume of this trade; hopes that the agreed quota of Zimbabwe beef can soon be exported to Europe;

11. Calls for an increased level of cooperation with the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) which can help the independent states of Southern Africa to reduce their dependence on South Africa; this should include financial and technical assistance in the following sectors:
- transport and communications infrastructure
- the preparation of joint food strategies
- industrial development
- mining and energy
- education and training.
I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its sitting of 7 February 1983 the European Parliament referred the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Gérard FUCHS, pursuant to Rule 47 of the rules of procedure, on the threats of destabilisation in Zimbabwe (Doc. 1-151/82) to the Committee on Development and Cooperation for its opinion.

2. Your draftsman has visited Zimbabwe on two occasions, in 1981 and 1982, as co-chairman of the fact-finding mission to the countries affected by South African acts of aggression, and also with the ACP-EEC Joint Committee in February 1982. During these visits he had meetings with the Prime Minister, and members of the government, and senior Zimbabian officials, at which issues relating to the subject of the present opinion were discussed.

3. Your draftsman would like to pay tribute to the remarkable degree of stability which has been achieved by the government of Zimbabwe following the long period of fighting which terminated with the Lancaster House agreement. Zimbabwe has close historical and economic links with the European Community, and notably with the United Kingdom, and it is gratifying to note that one of its first acts as an independent country was to apply for accession to the Lomé Convention.

4. This opinion will attempt briefly to examine the potentially destabilising factors affecting Zimbabwe and the means by which the European Community can assist the stability of this country.

II. INTERNAL FACTORS

5. A potential factor for destabilisation exists in the ethnic breakdown of Zimbabwe's population which consists of some 5.8 million Shona, 1.5 million Ndebele, 140,000 Europeans and 37,000 Asian and coloured. During the last years of the Smith regime, when fighting was at its fiercest, Mr Robert MUGABE's ZANU-PF\(^1\) was predominantly supported by the Shona people, while the minority Ndebele supported Mr Joshua NKOMO's ZAPU\(^2\). This differentiation has continued in the post-independence period even though both ZANU-PF and ZAPU are represented in the government.

\(^1\)Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front
\(^2\)Zimbabwe African People's Union - PE 86.470/fin.
III. EXTERNAL FACTORS

14. Zimbabwe is in the most literal sense of the word a front-line state. Across the Limpopo river lies the Republic of South Africa which, apart from the specific case of Namibia, constitutes the last white minority-governed state on the African continent. Though Zimbabwe has had no diplomatic relations with South Africa since September 1980, economic and commercial links are important and each country has maintained a trade mission in the other. Relations between the two countries are not good, and in August 1981 South Africa refused to renew work permits for several thousand black Zimbabweans who work in that country.

15. It is obvious that many in South Africa would not like to see the development of a strong and independent state on its northern border. The Pretoria government is, moreover, particularly hostile to Prime Minister MUGABE who has declared his political and diplomatic support for the liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia even though he was not willing to permit SWAPO or the ANC to set up operational bases in Zimbabwe. There is evidence of South African involvement in activities to destabilise Zimbabwe. In 1982 the Beira-Mutare pipeline was sabotaged by Mozambique dissidents with South African backing. This pipeline acted as a link between Zimbabwe and the coast and its sabotage increased Zimbabwe's economic dependence on South Africa. In July 1982 nearly two-thirds of Zimbabwe's airforce was destroyed at Gweru by guerrillas using South African equipment. South African soldiers have been captured in raids and several South African spies have confessed to activities within Zimbabwe. Radio-Truth broadcasts daily to Matebeleland in the Ndebele language from South Africa. This radio station regularly criticises the Zimbabwe government and its leadership. It seems that some Ndebele guerrillas find refuge in camps in South African territory.

16. It is certain that its geographical situation leads to a considerable transport dependence on South Africa, whose railway system dominates Southern Africa. Other railway and road links are less sure. The highly indirect rail link via Zambia, Zaire and Angola (the Benguela railway) is no longer regularly operative because of the activities of UNITA in Angola. The link via Zambia with Dar-es-Salaam carries mainly Zambian and Tanzanian traffic and is affected by serious over-crowding in the port of Dar-es-Salaam, while the links through Mozambique to
Beira and Maputo have been subject to attacks by Mozambique dissidents backed by South Africa. Thus Zimbabwe is largely dependent on South Africa's rail links, road links and port system. Such dependence leads to a degree of economic vulnerability which can be a destabilising factor.

IV. ECONOMIC FACTORS

17. The rapid economic growth which Zimbabwe enjoyed during its first years of independence following the removal of sanctions has been replaced by a serious depression, inflation at nearly 20%, a high level of external debt and a negative growth in real GNP (estimated by the Standard Bank at minus 3% in 1983). Zimbabwe has been seriously affected by the world economic depression and is suffering from the worst drought in 50 years. Rains were negligible in 1981-'82 and 1982-'83 and to-date the 1983-'84 rains have still not started.

18. As a result the agricultural situation is extremely serious and the recession has led to greatly increased internal tensions.

19. Three agricultural products can be exported from Zimbabwe to the European Community: tobacco, cattle and sugar. Tobacco is of particular importance as almost half of Zimbabwe's tobacco is exported to the European Community and is a valuable source of foreign exchange. While there is no quantitative quota on Zimbabwe's tobacco exports to the Community, it is possible that, in the future, the safeguard clause could be invoked as this tobacco could be in competition with European-grown tobacco. Any restriction on Zimbabwe tobacco imports into the Community would have serious repercussions on the Zimbabwean economy which is dangerously short of foreign exchange.

20. Under a special protocol to the Lomé Convention Zimbabwe is entitled to sell 8,500 tonnes of beef a year to the Community. Owing to the existence of foot and mouth disease in Zimbabwe, however, such imports have been prohibited with consequent losses to the Zimbabwean balance of payments. The Community at present finances measures, through the EDF, aimed at the creation of foot and mouth free zones from which cattle could be exported.

21. Zimbabwe has an annual quota of 25,000 tonnes of sugar under the Sugar Protocol. It is equally important that this be maintained despite the Community's overproduction of beet sugar.
22. Partly as a result of the emigration of skilled whites, the Zimbabwean economy has been seriously affected by lack of trained personnel. This is particularly true in the case of skilled tradesmen and technicians, and inhibits economic development.

23. It is believed that the IMF has imposed stringent terms on the loans granted in 1983. In March of this year the first stand-by credit worth SDR 300 million started, along with SDR 66.1 million compensatory financing facility allocation to make up for the 1982 export shortfall. It is probable that the IMF terms run counter to the socialist economic policy that the Zimbabwe government would like to follow.

V. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

24. The Committee on Development and Cooperation believes that it is incumbent on the European Community to do all in its power to assist the development of Zimbabwe and to counter any attempts at destabilisation. Of particular importance in this regard is support for the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) of which Zimbabwe is an active member. It is of paramount importance for Zimbabwe to reduce its dependence on South Africa and SADCC is a valuable instrument in this respect. Increased cooperation with SADCC should include appropriate technological assistance, as well as finance in the field of transport and communications infrastructure, the preparation of collective food strategies, industrial development, education and training.

25. In addition the Community must continue to give economic assistance to Zimbabwe through the EDF and through the activities of the EIB. Though the subject of a separate report by Mr. PEARCE, your draftsman feels that assistance should be provided to Zimbabwe to deal with both the immediate and long-term consequences of the drought that is so seriously affecting agriculture. Assistance is also required in the development of internal communications infrastructure, veterinary controls, notably with regard to foot and mouth disease, and education and training particularly in the technology sectors.

26. The Committee on Development and Cooperation recognises the importance of Zimbabwe's exports to the Community and would oppose any measure taken to restrict the imports of tobacco, or any interference with the operation of the Sugar Protocol. At the same time it hopes that the animal health situation can be brought under control so that Zimbabwe can in the near future avail of its beef export quota. It is the Committee's view that a sound economy
is the best basis for political stability.

27. At the same time the Community must exercise its political weight in international fora in support of Zimbabwe. It must make it abundantly clear that it condemns totally any attempts by a third country to destabilise Zimbabwe. The Community should support all measures leading to the internal stability of Zimbabwe and the improvement of the security situation throughout the country with due regard for the rights of minorities. It is the belief of the Committee on Development and Cooperation that a peaceful and stable Zimbabwe can only be built on the basis of mutual respect for all the ethnic groups comprising the population, in a spirit of political tolerance and respect for human rights.

28. In conclusion, the Committee on Development and Cooperation calls on the Political Affairs Committee when drawing up its report, to take account of the views expressed on pages 4 and 5 of this opinion.