Introduction

The revitalisation of the EU since the 1980s has seen a qualitative change in the trajectory of the integration project. Market integration is at the core of the change and represents Europe’s response to competitive challenges from US and Japanese markets. The Single European Act and the subsequent rounds of intergovernmental conferences [IGCs, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice etc] have deepened market integration by removing both tariff and non-tariff barriers to the free-movement of goods and services. This has been achieved by relaxing the intergovernmental decision-making process and allowing for qualified majority voting [QMV] in the Council of Ministers in policy areas concerned with market making. The consolidation of the single market has been followed by the creation of a single European currency. Although the UK has yet to decide whether or not to participate in Economic and Monetary Union [EMU], these changes are significant for trade unions. Previously nationally bounded firms have now become Euro-companies with corporate governance, in addition to macro-economic, financial and political governance, shifting to the European level.

For trade unions, the neo-liberal core of the European integration project has important implications for the achievement of their aims and objectives. Member states of the EU can no longer pursue independent national strategies of macro-economic management and therefore trade union political achievements, linked as they are to the nation-state, are threatened by erosion.

The Maastricht Social Agreement [MSA], although limited, has provided a potential mechanism at the Euro-level for trade union participation in EU decision-making. The EU has delivered some important new social and labour market Directives. In addition the European Trade Union Confederation [ETUC] has made some important changes to its structure that are significant given the limited and contested nature of the incentives deriving from European integration [Dølvik 1997]. Interpretations of these developments are highly contested between optimistic and pessimistic views on the EU as an arena to deliver more than market integration. The assessments of the threats and opportunities of European integration for trade unions are complex and their responses to these processes are contingent on factors not solely associated with the European level.

This paper argues that the perceived costs, benefits and opportunities of deeper European integration will vary across trade union organisations due to sectoral orientation. In addition, a positive assessment of ‘Europe’ and further integration does not necessarily result in Europeanisation of any kind. A particular trade union’s response to the EU is also subject to internal ideological and organisational constraints [Marks & McAdam 1996]. By analysing responses of
Trade union organisations to instances of EU integration this study hopes to highlight

- How union organisations assess deepening European integration and the developing European political economy.
- The role of industrial location or sectoral orientation in the assessment of perceived economic and political interests.
- The role of internal organisational dynamics/constraints in determining the direction and extent of responses.

The following section overviews the most important literature relating to trade union organisation/ideology and the optimistic and pessimistic interpretations of developing governance structures and political economy at EU level.

**Trade Union Case Study: Level of Analysis and Concept.**

This paper explores individual trade union organisations [T&G, GMB] rather than European level [ETUC] or National level federations [TUC], although quite clearly the approach of both the ETUC and TUC influence, not determine, the positions and strategies of the affiliates. The paper deals mainly with trade union positions, defined as the official policy positions of a trade union together with the attitudes of its leaders and key personnel, for instance the senior European or research officers. The role of the rank and file, unless significant, in the formation of a union’s policy will be outside the scope of this study.

In addition the paper briefly outlines the engagement by the union with EU issues. By examining the different avenues pursued by trade unions in attempting [or not] to influence decision-making in the EU helps shed light on the extent of Europeanisation. Teague [1989] suggests that even if the TUC were to move away from its negative anti-Europe position of the 1980s, its lack of strategic analyses on the opportunity structure of the EC meant that in strategic terms there were no differences between the pro, anti or pragmatic trade union responses ‘none attached any importance to industrial or economic initiatives at the European level’ [ibid. p.42].

If a meaningful Europeanisation thesis is to be argued then trade unions must be doing something in addition to changing their policy positions. Trade unions are after all ‘agencies for action’ [Offe & Wiesenthal 1985]. In addition by tracking how trade unions represent interests in the EU polity the particular union’s conceptualisation of the EU becomes clearer. Simplistically if trade unions focus their interest representation on National government ministers and/or institutions then this suggests that they view the nation state as the most influential and/or legitimate actor in the EU, an inter-governmentalist interpretation of the polity.

This brings us to the question of what do trade unions do. In Britain the focus of trade union activity has been industrial and specifically workplace orientated; this fits with the narrow theory of labour organisations from the ‘Anglo-Saxon’
school.\textsuperscript{1} The trade union movement in Britain established the TUC and subsequently the Labour Party as the vehicles to represent the political interests of the working class; a clear divide between industrial and political spheres. Although both sides of the labour movement jealously guard their respective spheres from the other [Minkin 1991] developments in the twentieth century clearly illustrate that such a distinction, in the British case at least, is untenable. Initially, it is true, trade unions generally only ventured into politics to secure their immunities from the law [Hyman 2001, Pelling 1963]. However, post World War II until the late 1970s saw the trade union movement drawn into the affairs of State, in a very peculiarly British way, culminating in the Social Contracts of the 1970s. Therefore, the Anglo-Saxon pre-occupation with collective bargaining and voluntarism was tempered by attempts to negotiate a social wage, a form of unionism referred to as ‘Labourism’ [Saville 1973 in Hyman 2001].

This paper adopts the conceptual approach to trade unions taken by Marks & McAdam [1996] and Dølvik [1997]. EU governance represents something very different from previous national developments and so it is highly unlikely that trade union Europeanisation is going to follow national norms, in Britain based on voluntarism and the ‘free collective bargaining’ fundamental. Trade unions are one of a number of ‘challenging groups’ seeking to influence the emerging European polity and so national distinctions between pressure groups, social movements and trade unions are irrelevant in this context.

Given the lack of collective bargaining at the EU level it seems reasonable to concentrate on the political sphere of union activity. In addition the two trade unions [GMB & T&G] that form this case study represent membership constituencies in a number of different industrial sectors; a comprehensive analysis of each industrial sector within each union is well beyond the scope of a single-researcher project.

**Europeanisation**

Relating this study to the definitions of Europeanisation set out in the paper by Bache & Jordan [2004] it reveals that trade union organisations could be approached using a number of the five definitions, with imagination? For instance, using the ‘top-down’ approach; measuring the impact of EU initiatives on domestic trade union discourse, structure and policy. A theme ripe for study under this definition might well be the current vogue for the ‘social partnership’ approach to industrial relations among some TUC affiliates. In a study of this kind, given that the establishment of an EU industrial relations regime is in its infancy\textsuperscript{2}, the analysis of the ‘horizontal transfer of concepts and policies in the EU between member states’ [definition 4, ibid] could be included to determine which member states’ model [if any] is being cross-loaded. Trade

\textsuperscript{1} Perlman [1926] theorised that a ‘mature’ trade union is one that deals specifically with its members interests in the workplace/industrial sector, political action is deemed a perversion of trade unionism.

\textsuperscript{2} Although clearly its design to date is in line with ‘social partnership’ ideology.
unions interact with their European counterparts in the ETUC via the TUC and the European Industry Federations [EIFs] and the sub-committee structure. Also in the modern technological age unions have the capability to link up more easily with sister European organisations independently on a bi-lateral basis.

However, establishing causality is a major issue for studies of this type. Identifying changing practices that are similar or identical to EU or other member states is one thing being precise and conclusive about where they originated is another. One example clearly illustrating this point is the use of the term Europeanisation to describe the Conservative Government’s legislation on industrial relations. Legislation replacing voluntarism and legal immunities does appear to bring British industrial relations more in line with Continental models but to term this process as Europeanisation is misleading because quite clearly the design and impact of this legislation was to shift the British model away from European norms of social partnership toward American norms of share-holder value [MacShane 1991].

Another potential problem faced by the researcher when using this definition of Europeanisation is that particular practices are identified as being potentially Europeanisation [and then examined] with the potential to overlook other factors contradicting a process of Europeanisation. For instance, together with ‘social partnership’ another response of the British trade unions to their domestic ‘crisis’ has been the ‘organising’ theme. Focusing on recruiting members and organising the grass roots rather than seeking partnership deals with employers. Inspiration for this approach comes from Australia and the United States and it reinforces the traditional oppositional ideology of British trade unionism ‘bounced’ back from other Anglo-Saxon models. How do we then conclude if British trade unions are Europeanising or not? Compare the extent to which both themes are manifest? Given that the TUC has established an organising academy are we to term this the Australianisation of trade unionism?

Another possible relevant definition of Europeanisation could be to track efforts of British trade unions to pre-empt any kind of domestic adaptation to EU initiatives by ‘uploading’ its national model of industrial relations to the EU level. However, the domestic crisis of the British industrial relations surely rules out attempts to ‘upload’ voluntarism in order to forgo legislative initiatives for increased worker rights? A study of the German or Swedish trade unions might however be a good case study for this definition.

These definitions although potentially viable; in this case are more spurious than the final two outlined below. The remaining two definitions are therefore the most pertinent for this paper.

Cowles et al. [2001] utilise a definition of Europeanisation that is identical to European integration and then explore the response to ‘the accumulation of policy competences at the EU level’ by domestic actors. This paper looks

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3 The T&G do however want to ‘upload’ British policy on macro-economic management to reform EMU and the ECB.
specifically at trade union responses to integration in general and EMU specifically both involve the accumulation of competences at the EU level. Although the establishment of an EU industrial relations regime is incomplete the rough contours of a social partnership model from the level of the firm to EU level is beginning to take shape. Exploring trade union positions on EMU illustrate the extent to which trade unions view the EU as a legitimising reference point when justifying their policy positions. If the EU ‘is akin to a lodestar that is difficult if not impossible to ignore’ then this should be apparent in their policy positions and the extent of their engagement with the EU polity.

By analysing responses of trade union organisations to instances of EU integration this study links empirical research directly to EU initiatives, thereby removing the obstacle of establishing causality highlighted above. Four possible trade union responses are conceivable; ideological opposition [not Europeanisation], inertia [not Europeanisation], coercive Europeanisation [not ideologically opposed but opposition based on the specifics] and voluntary Europeanisation [support]. In addition voluntary and coercive Europeanisation can refer to the Direct or Indirect impact of an EU initiative. This paper is concerned with ‘the accumulation of policy competences at the EU level’ and the response of trade unions. Therefore, Direct Europeanisation refers to changes at the EU level and Indirect Europeanisation to the inadvertent knock on effects at the domestic level and other policy areas. Taking EMU as an example, a particular trade union might support the idea of European economic and monetary union but oppose EMU based on the specific EU rules governing the macro-economy [intentional] and the perceived impact domestically in other sectors, for instance public services [inadvertent since EMU does not specifically set out to cut public spending]. In such a case the response is coercive Europeanisation [both Direct and Indirect]4.

**European Integration, Trade Unionism and Europeanisation.**

*Existing approaches to the study of trade unions have been historically contingent on the evolution of national industrial relations rooted in the implicit assumption of congruence between regulatory systems of employment and the nation-state” [Dølvik 1997, p.14]*

As a starting point Visser [1997] highlights to the interplay between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that encourage trade unions to Europeanise. This chimes well with the well-worn debate in European integration studies between the neo-functionalists and inter-governmentalists. For the neo-functionalists, the emphasis is the ‘pull’ of the European level [Haas 1958]. Inter-governmentalists posit that integration generally occurs only when the domestic context can no longer deliver what it once could [Moravscik 1993].

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4 See Figure 2.
Unions may be pushed or forced to seek co-operation across national borders because they no longer find allies, protection or rewards within national arenas. This may be true for labour and capital, and may be unrelated to European integration. [Visser 1997, p.231]

Sequentially the push comes before the pull. The internationalisation of markets and capital means national industrial relations regimes are no longer able to deliver what they once did for the trade union movement and this forces them to look further a field for solutions. Implicit here is that the push dynamics will vary according to the sectoral orientation of the particular trade union. A distinction can be made between exposed and sheltered sectors of the labour market [Bieler 2003].

Unions operating in production sectors that are trans-nationally organised and nationally organised but produce goods for international markets are more likely to be supportive of European integration given their exposure to globalisation. They are likely to be more supportive of economic [negative] integration and the neo-liberal restructuring this entails due to exposure to international competition. Labour market regulation and political [positive] integration at the EU level are to be supported as a means to claw back political control over the market as it expands from national to European proportions without running the risk of regime competition and social dumping.

Unions with members located in sectors domestically organised predominantly producing goods for national consumption are likely to oppose further European integration [especially economic] ‘since it undermines national policy autonomy, on the support of which they depend’ [Bieler 2003: p.29]5.

Both the T&G and the GMB represent membership constituencies across both the exposed and sheltered sectors of the labour market. The T&G has a slightly larger proportion of its members in the exposed sector of the labour market than the GMB. This is not to say that sectoral orientation is less salient in General Unions, it simply indicates that the perceived cost and benefit analysis of support or opposition to further integration becomes much more complicated for union organisations.

Recent developments at the EU level make it the obvious target [pull] for trade unions simply because other international organisations [ILO, IMF, World Bank etc] do not provide any opportunity presently for directly regulating the employment relationship and wider issues in social policy.

In industrial relations literature the functional logic of trade union organisation matching the boundaries of the market stretches right back to the turn of the century. The seminal work of Commons [1909] examined the expansion of local markets to the national level in the USA; his basic argument was that in order to “take wages out of competition” trade unions must extend their organisational

5 Findings have been mixed on the strength of this hypothesis. Bieler[2003] found that in Britain the hypothesis held [UNISON anti-EMU and the AEEU pro-EMU]. Foster & Scott [2003] found that public sector unions across a number of EU member states have been predominantly supportive of EMU!
[bargaining] coverage from the local to the national level. Given that the single market process implies an internationalisation of capital by the removal of trade barriers [negative integration] within a European context the extension of functional logic suggests that this is accompanied by trade union efforts to Europeanise their organisation, bargaining strategies and labour market regulation more generally [positive integration].

The optimistic perspective of functionalist thinking has been questioned by a more pessimistic stream of thought encouraged by the conspicuous lack of collective bargaining and/or a comprehensive social dimension at the European level.

Ever since Commons, [1909] it has been a familiar argument that the boundaries of employment regulation are shaped by the scope of product markets; but there is nothing automatic in this process. [Hyman 2001b: p281].

The Euro-pessimistic view criticises the assumed link between market expansion and positive integration. The pessimists’ view does not contest that for trade unionism, in general, the rational course of action in response to market expansion is to ‘redraw the boundaries of solidarity’ [Dølvik 1997] but they emphasise that the obstacles faced at Euro-level preclude this course of action and thereby drive trade unions into cross-national competition [Streeck 1995, 1999].

Specifically the obstacles to positive integration at the EU level are, the neo-liberal core of the EU political economy, the lack of a central European government [political resources] to promote and sustain industrial relations institutions, the inability and/or unwillingness of employers to engage at European level and the specific problems of collective action faced by the ETUC.

Recent Treaty changes from the mid 1980s onwards have significantly shifted the character of the EU in a neo-liberal direction [Geyer 1997, Scharpf 1996, Streeck & Schmitter 1991]. This supra-nationalisation of market making has not been accompanied by a comparable shift in social policy competence to the EU. The scope of the Maastricht Social Agreement [MSA] is limited to a small number of specified areas excluding some crucial elements seen within national systems of industrial relations. The MSA does not balance the asymmetry between EU social/political and economic governance and signals the defeat of the aspiration for an effective pan European Social Dimension by reinforcing the principle of Subsidiarity in EU decision-making. This has shifted previous EU aspirations for convergent social standards toward the principal of mutual recognition, leaving

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6 Haas [1958] also predicted that trade unions would extend their organisational and bargaining strategies to the Euro-level – he claimed that his would then ‘compel an increasing measure of supranational unity among employers’ [p.388].

7 For instance Article 2.6. states, “The provisions...shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock outs.” These constitute basic trade union rights underpinning trade union activity but remain the prerogative of national systems of regulation, thereby compounding European diversity between trade union movements.
effective power with the member-states. Social democracy at the Euro-level is therefore overshadowed by neo-liberalism.

While Streeck [1995] recognises that markets do indeed need governance, he differentiates between Community social policy and European social policy. Community policy is sufficient to make the market work and is not the same nor will it evolve into a European social policy capable of redistributing in ways seen previously in national systems. Streeck emphasises the lack of political resources at the European level able to limit market forces ‘that pulverize social commitments and obligations unless placed under political control’ [Streeck 1995: p. 409]. Without the support, or existence, of EU political resources providing incentives for Euro-level institutions they are unlikely to develop under a ‘voluntarist’ regime.

Streeck [1995] also highlights the role of the other ‘player’ in Euro industrial relations, the reluctance [or ability] of the employers’ organisations to engage in any constructive dialogue at the Euro-level, let alone collective bargaining, unless they have an opportunity to dilute forthcoming legislative initiatives.

The success of the ETUC, emerging as a single umbrella organisation representing the majority of trade unionists from across Europe is also a potential weakness. The ‘conundrum of cross-national diversity’ [Ebbinghaus & Visser 1994, p.4] and the difficulties faced by labour movements in divorcing themselves from their respective national, ideological and/or confessional orientation [Geyer 1997, Dølvik 1997]. The ETUC as a vehicle for integration and coordination of trade unions is constrained by the diversity of its affiliates.

The responses of trade unions to this ‘peculiar form’ of integration [EU] are regime competition and competitive solidarity based on short-term domestic survival, not European coordination or integration [Streeck 1995, 1999].

_The decisive impact of intergovernmentalism and the neo-liberal European political economy has structurally precluded development of an effective supranational regime of social regulation and prevented any significant Europeanisation of trade unions._ [Dølvik 1997: p.17]

This pessimistic line of thinking has in turn been criticised by approaches that view integration as an on-going process where predictions of the ‘end-state’ of the integration process can not be made based solely on current structure. Historic institutionalist and multi-level governance approaches concede that nation states are important actors, especially with regard to Treaty changes. However, they add that once competences have been shifted to the EU level path dependencies, political agency and unintended outcomes dilute the importance of nation-state actors and create unforeseen possibilities for political agency for a number of non-nation-state actors [Pierson 1996].

Drawing on the above, unions are therefore more likely to engage in Europeanisation to secure policy objectives if the following two [material] conditions are met.
• The ‘push’ factors emanating from the domestic level are sufficiently strong to cause unions to re-assess their historic reliance on national structures of governance. This suggests a sectoral divide on questions of further integration, especially economic [EMU].

• Unions assess the emerging EU governance structure and political economy optimistically. An optimistic interpretation provides incentives for Europeanisation ‘pulling’ trade unions into engaging with the EU polity.

Until this point it has been assumed that trade unions are able to slavishly pursue viable and rational responses based solely on perceived economic interests. The ‘logic of influence’ argument [Marks & McAdam 1996, Dølvik 1997]. Trade unions are also political communities. Responses of trade unions are not solely determined by exogenous changes to economic, political and institutional structures that are subject to divergent interpretations. Trade unions are ‘social institutions in their own right, and develop their own internal patterns of power, goal-seeking and conflict’ [Crouch 1982, p. 161].

It seems to us that these external agents of change have done little more than present union leaders and their allies with additional problems to solve. Such change agents usually allow union leaders a variety of alternative responses, including, on some occasions, the alternative of inaction. [Undy et. al 1981: p.23]

Strategic choice is possible and responses are the outcome of ‘internal discussion, debate and often conflict’ [Hyman 2001: p.170]. The internal dynamics/constraints of the organisation do provide another potential variable influencing trade union policy responses. Responses to European integration can also depend on intra-union institutional and ideological struggles.

With regard to the perceived EU opportunities, Marks and McAdam [1996] qualify the assumption that changes in the location of institutionalised power will inevitably lead to a shift in the location of mass politics in the following way. The ability of trade unionism to interact with the EU political environment is

more a function of its internal characteristics. Of particular relevance here is the way inherited institutions and ideologies may constrain a group’s ability to exploit whatever EU-level opportunities are available. That the link between political opportunity and movement response is not at all reflexive [Marks & McAdam 1996: p.103 – emphasis added]

Although the focus of Marks & McAdam [1996] was the internal characteristics of the ETUC, the analytical framework is applicable to union organisation at the national and sub-national level. Trade unions at the lower levels must also combine the two logics implied by this analytical perspective. The extent and direction of Europeanisation is assumed to be dependent on the ‘logic of influence’ [perceived EU opportunities] and the ‘logic of membership’ [internal organisational constraints]; trade unions are after all democratic organisations that have to reconcile both effectiveness and legitimacy [Traxler & Schmitter 1994 & Dølvik 1997]. If leaderships are not perceived by members to be
legitimate then members’ participation in action, their *willingness to act*, will be jeopardised [Offe & Wiesenthal, 1985], undermining the role of unions as *agencies for action* [Ibid.].

Whether or not Europeanisation results from the confluence of these competing logics of ‘influence’ and ‘membership’ is subject to empirical investigation and can’t be decided *a priori*. The extent to which external environment and internal organisational constraints influence trade union Europeanisation can not be determined by a simple analysis of EU governance or political economy and/or internal organisational constraints. However, two key hypotheses can be drawn from the literature

1. Trade unions representing members in the exposed sector of the labour market will be more supportive of European integration.

2. Trade union organisations with high internal constraints are less likely to engage with the EU, regardless of whether Europeanisation represents a viable and rational response. [see Figure 1]

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8 Trade unions in Britain comprise Craft, Industrial, General, White Collar, Public Sector types, all with different ideologies and identities and internal methods of balancing effectiveness and accountability – simplistically broken down into the tension between participatory vs. representative organisations.
The British Trade Union Movement.

TUC enthusiasm for European integration is not shared by all its affiliates. Teague [1989] identifies three ideological groups or factions with regard to Europe among the TUC affiliates: the pro-Europeans, the anti-Europeans and the Pragmatists. Rosamond [1993] updates these categories as he argues the question of membership is no longer up for debate but that the debate now concerns the type of Europe rather than membership of the EU. Rosamond describes the various factions as the pro-commission group, the sectoral pragmatists and the left sceptics. A more recent study claims that the changing external environment has indeed Europeanised the TUC leaving the anti-EU camp marginalised [Strange 2002] However, divisions do remain, although the components of each faction may have shifted, and can be illustrated by the following three policy statements with regard to EMU.

Joining the single currency early in the next parliament when the British economic cycle and that of the members of Euro-land are closer together offers us many advantages...Opting out is not a low risk policy for Britain. It is a dangerous game to play with all our futures.9

UNISON reaffirms its policy of opposition to the single currency based on the Maastricht convergence criteria and the Amsterdam Stability Pact.10

Orchestrating a push for a referendum at this moment is premature as it cannot possibly be responsibly delivered within the lifetime of this Parliament, or indeed could Britain become a member of the single currency in this Parliament, so why behave like euro lemmings eager to leap off the euro cliff irrespective of the economic consequences?11

In order to more accurately categorise the ‘perceived opportunities’ of the two unions in this study the paper will refer to Dyson’s [2002 – cited in and adapted by Foster & Scott 2004: 708] EMU discourse themes. The interpretations underlying oppositional and supportive positions on EMU are more nuanced than debates on European integration previously and therefore require more effective categorisations [pro, anti do not suffice]. The four discourses on EMU Dyson identified are

1. EMU as an agent for globalising neo-liberalism.
2. EMU as dissolution of national identity and sovereignty.
3. EMU as preserving European model against Americanisation.
4. EMU as harmonising European model with globalisation. [cited in Foster & Scott 2004: 708]

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GMB Overview.

The GMB is a general union and has over 700,000 members from a number of different sectors in both the exposed and sheltered parts of the economy. The union has an unusual regional structure, with each of the 10 regions guaranteed places on the Central Executive Council [CEC] dependent on their respective membership levels. The National Office [General Secretary] has jurisdiction over international policy and given the regional structure this insulates the leadership from the membership on EU issues. Since 1988, it has been solidly located in the pro-Europe camp in the Labour movement. The leader of the GMB has been instrumental not only in shaping GMB policy toward the EU but also in the conversion of the TUC. The GMB has traditionally sat on the centre-right of the Labour movement.

John Edmonds was the General Secretary of the GMB until 2003. First elected in 1986, he was re-elected in 1991 and 1996. A member of the TUC General Council and its Executive Committee, he was President of the TUC in 1998. He is regarded as a leading strategist of the trade union movement and as such, he chaired the TUC Committee on European matters. The GMB was the first union in Britain to open an office in Brussels, two years before the TUC opened their office. Edmonds helped to launch Trade Unionists for Europe [Tufe] to campaign for early entry into the Euro and for a strong social dimension to the EU. The GMB were not so keen on participation in Britain in Europe because of the focus on EMU, representing business interests, rather than a more balanced approach to Europe that also stresses the importance of developing the social dimension.

Edmonds is often painted as an extreme Europeanist [Guardian 2003], however, one that voted against British membership of the EEC in the 1970s. The engaging approach of the GMB to the EU originated in domestic crisis and is based on the acceptance that the integration project is here to stay.

1986 was a bleak time to become a union leader and Edmonds is quick to point out the instrumental role of Thatcher’s ‘unrelenting hostility’ in making the EU an attractive alternative. The closed doors of Whitehall contrasted to the open doors of Brussels ‘where arguments were taken on their merit’. The possibility of bypassing Thatcher, opening up a new flank of attack, to enhance workers’ rights and protection seemed too good to be true. Operating in a coercive domestic environment, both the UK government [Labour & Conservative] together with the CBI have resisted efforts to build a comprehensive social dimension at EU level. For the GMB the EU without the social dimension is both untenable and a concept harder to sell to British workers and the public more generally.

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12 The Sections are Clothing & textiles, commercial services, construction & furniture, Timber & Allied, Energy & Utility, Engineering, Food & Leisure, Process, Public Services

13 The Regions are Birmingham & W. Midlands, Liverpool/N. Wales/Irish, Lancashire, London, Midland & E. Coast, Northern, Scotland, Southern, South-Western, Yorkshire & N. Derbyshire.
Frankly, it does not help us when we are trying to build a positive case for Europe if the TUC has to keep taking the British Government to the European Court of Justice to win back employment rights which are clearly enshrined in Directives and which are freely accepted elsewhere in Europe. I would like to see a Labour Government in Britain leading the debate on social improvement, not being the last in a very long convoy expressing arrogant disapproval. [John Edmonds Speech to TUC – 12th Sept. 2000]

GMB ideology shifted from legal immunities and voluntarism, the drawbacks of which were all too apparent to trade unionists in the 1980s. The European social model containing the basic elements of welfare state, positive worker rights and industrial democracy contrasted with the neo-liberal Thatcher government. In the case of the GMB; the Thatcher government’s ‘push’ together with the aspiration to build a European social model at EU level, in order to download change in to domestic industrial relations, ‘pulled’ the GMB toward Europe. Ideology, in this case, shifted in order for the union to fulfil its role as a *power-seeking organisation* able to respond based on their own assessment of the changing external environment.

The GMB perspective on the development of an EU social model is exactly congruent with the TUC. Both organisations recognise the diversity of models within the EU but argue that this is only apparent when comparison is between member-states. If comparisons are made between the contours of Japanese and American industrial relations and the various European models then a discernable European Social Model is clearly distinguishable; the legitimate role of trade unions, strong welfare states and the belief that the state has a role in protecting the casualties of globalisation. [Tufe 2002]

The GMB has developed a very positive policy response to further EU integration. A perspective that is optimistic on the efficacy and legitimacy of the EU to construct and maintain a social dimension at EU level. The overall strategy to Europe has been termed ‘going over and under’, referring to bypassing the UK government to cooperate with local, regional and European tiers of government and organisations. Since the early 1990s the GMB have located an office in Brussels to lobby and act as an early warning mechanism. The GMB recognise that the EU is not simply a process resulting in power shifting upwards to the EU level but given the principal of subsidiarity, a multi-level polity is emerging. ‘The EU is a hybrid of the intergovernmental and the supranational’ [ibid: 22].

Policy was generally formulated within the GMB ‘European steering group’ consisting of the General Secretary, European Officer, Director of Research, various interested Regional heads and National officers. The group only made recommendations and had no authority to dictate policy. The intention was to draw in and involve union personnel in the European dimension of the organisation.

*John was always trying to make it to provide opportunities for his colleagues to take a greater interest actually than they were inclined to do. [GMB official]*
The Brussels Office provides a direct feed into the Commission and the European Parliament, the GMB currently has 16 MEPs. The Brussels Office personnel are in constant contact with the General Secretary probably more so than with their direct supervisor [Director of Research]. In terms of interest representation at the EU level the office has enabled the GMB to establish a network of contacts not simply confined to the Commission or the European Parliament but with other trade unions, political parties and pressure groups not normally encountered on traditional trade union paths to interest representation. However, priority was still given to efforts to ensure the position of the TUC was in line with that of the GMB. EU engagement prioritised the political rather than the industrial sphere of action. The TUC was potentially an integral player at EU level both within the ETUC and vis-à-vis the Commission. Edmonds was head of the TUC European Steering group and GMB officials regularly attended the TUC’s Network Europe Contact Points [NECP] monthly meetings of affiliate officials.

The office helped established a high European profile and this enables the GMB to monitor and disseminate information both within the union organisation and to their lobby targets. One way of achieving both aims has been the production of a monthly bulletin, the European News Bulletin, this is sent out each month to Labour MEPs, Commission officials, other MEPs [outside the EPLP], members of the EP Secretariat, the ETUC, the EIFs, sister trade unions across the EU and internally to Regional Secretaries/National Officers/Heads of Departments etc. The bulletin contains a regular briefing on GMB activities and views on European issues and effectively kills two birds with one stone.

Some GMB officials question the current requirement for an office in Brussels. When the office was established the British trade union movement had no full time representation in Brussels therefore it was a necessity to locate in Brussels in order to track initiatives and ensure the interests of British workers were channelled into the EU institutions. However, the maintenance of the office is very expensive [£250 000 a year] and given developments since the early 1990s some ask the question if the GMB currently didn’t already have an office in Brussels the establishment of one be justified? The most important factor is presenting a coherent and well thought out position to the Commission and other lobbying targets and this does not require a presence in Brussels.

In the beginning of the 1990s the TUC did not have its own office and its own staff in Brussels, there was no Channel Tunnel to make travel between London and Brussels so easy, you didn’t have John Monks at the ETUC that is very important now and you didn’t have the internet you have today or the ability to access all sorts of Commission documents via the internet…the context is very different today. [GMB Official]

The GMB have been forced to make a number of cuts to their organisational capacity in past 12 months due to a financial crisis. Interestingly, under new leadership, the GMB still take the view that the office is justified. One of the major reasons, outside of the cost, that other trade union organisations have not located an office in Brussels is that the perceived benefits are hard to quantify.
In addition to informing their membership and raising their profile [local, regional & European], can a tangible benefit be discerned from the permanent presence in terms of the contents of EU legislation? One MEP certainly thinks so.

I am a practical sort of person and perhaps I can best refer to my area of work… since 1984 I have concentrated on health & safety and workplace legislation. During all of that time, my greatest ally and advisor in moulding the laws passing through the Parliament has been Nigel Bryson, GMB’s Director of Health, Safety and the Environment. Some 60% of the amendments, which we have adopted in this field, have been incorporated in the finished legislation. That means in reality that much of the content of these laws has come from Nigel’s pen or the pen of other trade unionist. [Simon Hughes MEP – Address to GMB Congress 1993, p.425 – Report of Congress]

On specifics, such as the institutional set up of the EU, the ‘democratic deficit’ and the lack of fundamental workers’ rights the GMB are critical. In a nutshell the current institutional arrangements have not sufficiently delivered positive EU integration. Reform is required for the political economy to shift favourably at the EU level.

Rather than weaken the EU role there should be greater legislative powers for the European Parliament, more qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers and a strong Commission to carry out EU decisions. [Tufe: 14]

Research to date has indicated strongly that there was no serious internal opposition to the European policies or strategies of the GMB. This could be the result of a lack of interest in EU issues by activists or members or even a lack of knowledge with the GMB official policy position and strategy. When asked if this lack of opposition was in part due to the EU being a remote issue for the membership a GMB official stated

..no actually there was clearly evidence of real interest amongst activists and members generally about Europe. I think they accepted the case that the General Secretary might be in a position to deliver, the union might be in a position to deliver, by lobbying in Brussels and when you consider what the alternative was, at least it was practical and pragmatic, the GMB, GMWU at its core …is pragmatic and practical

Internal documents presented and passed by conference are supportive of both economic and social integration. In addition when the Brussels Office was originally opened in the early 1990s the funding for this experiment had to be passed through the bi-annual Conference.

In addition, within the executive council [CEC] of the GMB John Edmonds was able and willing to lead.

To be quite honest I think the General Secretary had an easy run on matters European, there was never any strong opposition to the union’s formal stance

Within the CEC the regional rather than the sectoral representatives are important, members of the CEC generally vote with their respective regional head. Some regions, notably London, were not of the same EU perspective.
Interestingly the London region membership has a larger percentage of public sector workers than the GMB average\textsuperscript{14}. However, the regional heads were prepared to let the General Secretary take the lead on matters European providing he would leave them more or less alone to run their regions.

The preceding brief overview of the GMB is therefore an example of voluntary Europeanisation both in terms of policy position and engagement; this approach encountered few internal constraints of note.

**Position on EMU**

The GMB view the establishment of a single European currency as a dynamic toward deeper integration in other sectors of integration. The introduction of the Euro will bring European macro-economic governance and quicken the pace of the construction of a European regime of industrial relations. EMU is not analysed solely on the detail of its provisions and their likely effects but as an integral part of driving forward the integration process. By signing up to EMU Britain would then be entrenched in the EU making the prospect of British workers enjoying the benefits of a EU social model much more likely. Long term considerations seem to have been prioritised over the short term impact of UK entry.

Britain’s role in the EU is an additional factor that has influenced GMB appraisal of the pros and cons of UK entry and is not specifically connected to the terms of EMU. Domestic inertia on this crucial EU issue is not a viable long-term position for the UK. If Britain wants to be at the ‘heart’ of Europe it must surely be at the table when some of the most important economic decisions are taken affecting British citizens?

But indifference is not an option. We cannot stand back from the issue of the single currency. If we fail to prepare for entry we risk a disaster. Can we be an important member of the EU and stay outside the Euro? Almost certainly not. The slogan I have seen, “Europe yes, the Euro no” is a con. [speech at TUC 2000]

These two [indirect] political arguments in support of the single currency outweigh the actual costs for the GMB. In economic terms UK entry into EMU would bring with it the following benefits for Britain; easier trade and travel, protection against currency speculators, increased employment and the maintenance of high inward investment from non-EU based countries [Tufe 2002 & Edmonds 2000].

The major fault line for divergent interpretations of EMU regard the likely impact of the Stability and Growth Pact [SGP]. Mulhearn [2004: 305] asks the question how do the pro-Euro trade unions,

\textsuperscript{14} The London Region in particular is not supportive of the national leadership on the pro-Euro policy, GMB London members are predominantly public sector workers. An internal poll of 1,252 shop stewards [respondents out of 2,952] found that 67\% do not want to join the Euro [Guardian March 17\textsuperscript{th} 2003].
reach such a benign conclusion given what we have so far learned, in particular about, for example, the strictures of the Stability and Growth Pact?

For Mulhearn the question remains unanswered. According to the GMB [Tufe] the SGP being applied in Britain is not to be feared.

These rules pose no special problem for Britain now that the Labour Government has eliminated the structural deficit in our public finances. British public sector borrowing is comfortably within the Maastricht criteria. It is simple scaremongering to argue that joining the single currency would require public spending cuts. [Tufe 2002: 11]

There are some fears expressed here that joining the euro will mean public spending cuts. We believe those fears are misplaced. The Chancellor has tough, golden rules for public finance, even tougher than those in the Eurozone Stability and Growth Pact. Indeed, joining the Eurozone, given their current standards, would mean more flexibility for public spending over the economic cycle, not less. Britain's public services have nothing to fear from joining the Euro and manufacturing has everything to gain. [Steve Pickering (GMB) speaking in support of Composite Motion 17, TUC 2002]

Detailed consideration has not been given to the SGP by the GMB. Documents referring to EMU tend to skip over the SGP dismissively and focus in on the long-term strategic and political benefits of UK entry. This is somewhat surprising since there have been dissenting voices from within the GMB concerning the SGP from the London Region [Guardian 2003a] and CEC officials representing members in the public sector. However, reiterating the above, dissenting voices have been placated.

The members in public services are familiar with the TUPE regulations, the Acquired Rights Directive and so long as they can be reassured that the UK joining the single currency would not mean a squeeze on public spending…as long as the wording of the stance takes that on board [GMB Official]

Returning to the Dyson’s discourses on EMU the GMB position reflects the latter two and rejects the notions that EMU is a force for globalising neo-liberalism and/or the dissolution of national identity/sovereignty. Economically the GMB views EMU using a form of discourse four; the GMB accepts the rationale that a single market and EMU are necessities if European firms are going to compete in international markets vis-à-vis the USA and Japan. Industrial restructuring is preferential to long-term extinction. Additionally the GMB uses discourse three, EMU as preserving the European model, as a condition attached to its acceptance of neo-liberalism. The development of the social dimension is assumed to flow from economic integration. This is a big leap of faith given the present governance structure and political economy at EU level. In terms of Direct and Indirect impacts of EMU, GMB Europeanisation is voluntary even if it presently views the governance of EMU as inadequate its policy reflects the belief that this will alter in the future.
The T&G Overview.

The T&G represents over 900,000 members and organises in a number of sectors, it has a slightly higher percentage of members in the manufacturing sector than does the GMB. The key differences between the T&G and the GMB are ideological and organisational. The relative strength of each region does not compare to the ‘baronial status’ of the regional heads in the GMB; the union polity is much more sectorally orientated and politicised. Traditionally the T&G has been a more ‘participatory’ model of trade union organisation than the more ‘representative’ orientation of the GMB. Democracy and accountability are important concepts for the T&G [T&G Official].

The major fault lines among the membership are industrial sector and ideology. The T&G is much more factionalised [at all levels] and this resulted in a particularly bitter period of in fighting and rivalry in the run-up to the recent leadership elections. Interestingly the issue of Europe did not surface in the recent elections. The differences between the GMB candidates Kevin Curran and Paul Kenny on the issue were stark; it seems that all of the candidates for the T&G leadership were either extremely hostile or indifferent to European integration.\(^{15}\)

In the mid to late 1980s it appeared on the surface that the T&G had indeed turned a corner. Ron Todd’s infamous speech, at the 1988 ‘Delors’ Congress, although hardly Euro-idealistic did suggest a pragmatic acceptance of the potential EU opportunities in the face of the paucity of domestic opportunity. Todd’s speech was however made in his capacity as head of international committee of the TUC and not as head of the T&G. It was also made reluctantly as up until then the prevailing view in the T&G was that the EC represented a pro-business agenda, it was a capitalist’s club. [Interview]

Internal T&G documents dated around the time of the 1992 programme highlight the pessimistic view that officials held vis-à-vis the development of the EU. The analysis at this time focuses almost exclusively on the industrial implications of the 1992 process and the subsequent Maastricht Treaty. The political possibilities were not as systematically presented except for the possibility of the European Works Council Directive. The T&G preferred to pursue traditional industrial policies based in horizontal linkages but were not prepared to shift power upwards to their EIFs. Indeed the T&G were already concerned at the coordinating role the EIFs were to obtain in the area of European Works Councils [EWC] [T&G 1989, 1990, 1995].

The T&G did however agree that the economic benefits of market integration as espoused by the Commission were real and tangible for workers across Europe. European industrial restructuring in some form was a competitive necessity for Europe. In principle the search for European solutions to problems no longer

\(^{15}\) In a recent Guardian Article the new General Secretaries of the T&G and AMICUS both came out against the proposed European Constitutional Treaty. [Guardian June 30th 2004].
manageable in the domestic context is the correct one. For the T&G the devil is in the detail.

The T&G position is more critical than the GMB. The focuses for criticism are the specifics of the integration project rather than the concept of it. In many ways criticisms mirror those of the GMB although they are much more forcefully put and do not dissolve away by stepping back and looking at the wider picture.

The institutional development of the EU and the lack of real democratic accountability in the EU contrasts with the T&G culture of ‘transparency, openness and accountability’ in union organisation [Morris interview]. These developments have left the people behind; Europe has become a Europe of institutions, both industrial [trans-national companies] and bureaucratic [formal institutions of EU], with little or no democratic accountability or transparency. Therefore the emphasis of T&G positions has been EU reform before deeper integration rather than deeper integration to drive reform. A policy position in line with the definition of coercive Europeanisation rather than ideological opposition. The T&G view this line as ‘constructive engagement’ aimed at reform. On the surface however the criticisms appear much the same as the GMB.

Parliament [EU] should have the responsibility of controlling the Executive, the Council of Ministers and the Commission itself, we are also arguing for greater accountability to the peoples of Europe and so build a different type of Europe than the one we have at the moment…Conceptually we are not anti this and anti that, we see Europe as a very very very important [T&G Official].

In terms of the labour market Directives that have resulted from the incorporation of the social chapter into the Treaty proper, the T&G have been very supportive. This is hardly surprising given the lack of rights stemming from Westminster and Whitehall. Even those in the National Executive Council [NEC] vehemently ideologically opposed to European integration found it difficult to argue against EU-level workers rights [T&G Official]. From another perspective this support for the EU social dimension is surprising. At the domestic level the T&G have not been supportive of the TUC in their promotion of the ‘social partnership’ theme but have supported the organising approach. The information and Consultation Directive, for instance, brings the social partnership model into British industrial relations. The dual channel model of worker voice and the potential threat to the traditional model of oppositional bargaining represents a clear misfit in institutional and ideological terms. The T&G viewed these mechanisms for worker voice as only likely to dominate traditional British norms of industrial relations in workplaces where trade unions were not influential. In workplaces where bargaining already takes place the arrangements are not likely to collapse simply because a consultative forum is opened up to union members and non-members alike. Only where trade unions were weak are these consultative forums likely to be the main channel for worker voice. In the view of the T&G consultative forums potentially provides leverage for union organisations in unorganised companies rather than a threat to collective bargaining arrangements in organised firms.
Although the T&G were the first to appoint a dedicated Euro-coordinator, it was a position based in London. The official would travel to Brussels periodically but was not a permanent fixture there. The official eventually was ‘let go’ by the T&G in the late 1990s and the post was never replaced. In addition the T&G fail to send a representative to NECP meetings at the TUC although they do receive the papers. The T&G rely very heavily on the TUC office in Brussels for information gathering and can tap into the information at Congress House.

The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, via national government officials, are the preferred targets of interest representation. Contact with the MEPs is variable rather than constant and is no where nearly as developed as GMB networks. The T&G do not lobby the Commission directly and therefore miss the opportunity to represent their interests in the initial formulation of initiatives. One of the stated aims of the GMB approach was to go over UK government objections and filter their interests into the EU before the EU parliament or Council amend and adopt\(^{16}\). The T&G views transposition as the key stage to influence because at the EU level Directives generally only set out the broad concepts and framework of the initiative, domestic governments translate them into law. For the GMB the more you could get included at the EU level the less scope for a minimal transposition. Given the opposition of the domestic UK government [and employers associations], minimal transposition is very likely; lobbying the Commission is therefore a pre-emptive strike. The T&G view this process slightly differently. They are happy with ‘framework’ Directives rather than something more prescriptive at the EU level. By enabling domestic actors at domestic level to hammer out the detail, the initiative in question is more likely to fit into domestic ways of doing things.

Responsibility for the political aggregation and representation of T&G interests is vested in the office of the General Secretary although the leeway apparent in the exercise of this responsibility is subject to a much higher degree of internal constraints than was the case in the GMB. The institutional set up is very similar, sector and regions, but in practice the Executive Council was more politicised and unwilling simply to allow the leadership of the union to lead. Political factions compound the prominent sectoral composition. This is particularly noticeable when analysing EMU position of the T&G.

**Position on EMU.**

The general economic benefits of EMU are accepted by the T&G especially for the manufacturing sector. The clear division with GMB interpretations again is in the detail rather than the concept of integration. The conference motion passed by the T&G demonstrates the diversity of perspectives that have left their mark on policy. In this particular sphere of integration the T&G is again advocating reform of EU institutions to a large extent with the intent of uploading a domestic

\(^{16}\) The T&G therefore use traditional methods of trade union political interest representation – primarily via the TUC and Labour Party.
model of economic management. The economic arguments for the single
currency are, for the T&G, the starting point for the debate not the conclusion of
the discussion. The benefits, for trade unions, are only attainable if the
framework for EMU is conducive to their objectives.

The European Central Bank [ECB] and the SGP require radical reform as a
prerequisite for UK entry. The ability of national governments to control their
own economies will be limited by the SGP and there is no subsequent shift in
political control to EU level. Bill Morris often presented the T&G position in terms
of timing, a ‘yes but not yet’ message [T&G 2001, 2003a b c]. However, when
asked directly if the T&G would support entry if the Chancellor announced that
the 5 economic tests were met he replied

But where is the transparency or reform of the ECB...Does this mean that you
[Gordon Brown] will abandon the investment in public services? What about the
constraints monetary union places upon you, if you measure the government’s
policy of public investment against the Maastricht criteria, it doesn’t add up.

Taking the ECB first the lack of direct democratic control is of deep concern to
the T&G, an example of the ‘democratic deficit’ endemic in EU governance
presently. Given the absence of central democratic control the rules governing
what the ECB can do are crucial. The T&G point out that the rules allow the ECB
to act when inflation is above target [price stability] but do not allow the ECB to
intervene if the economy experiences low growth and under target inflation. The
deflationary bias of the ECB is compounded by the necessity of a ‘one fits all’
interest rate. A potential for a recessionary disaster with no political or
democratic intervention possible.

So the European Union will lack both the resources and the power to conduct an
interventionist economic policy.....We have argued that by introducing greater
democracy into the working of the EU, and establishing political supervision of a
European Central Bank, these issues could be addressed. [Morris1998]

The SGP quite simply would mean that the current levels of public spending in
the UK are unsustainable.

inflexible criteria and strict budget limits of the Euro’s Stability & Growth Pact is
putting public expenditure and government commitments to improved services in
these Eurozone countries the severest pressure  [T&G Composite 24, July 2003]

The EU should adopt the British model of economic policy making and macro-
economic management developed by the present Chancellor. The ‘golden rule’
of balancing budgets over the economic cycle is preferred especially as this
would provide increased flexibility in a Europe with a single ‘one fits all’ exchange
rate. The operation of the Bank of England provides a better example of how a
central bank should operate according to T&G representation to Treasury Select
Committee [Mulhearn 2004]. The Treasury, a government department with a
democratically elected head, determines the policy that the Bank has to operate.
Policy can alter in response to economic conditions and the execution of policy is
transparent as the minutes of meetings are published.
Referring to Dyson’s types of discourse the T&G position needs to be divided into two; EMU as it is now and EMU as it could be. The T&G does accept the economic arguments for EMU and can envisage UK entry but only once the political issues have been remedied. The removal of national autonomy is not viewed as discourse 2, in terms of national sovereignty being diminished. The fear is not for national sovereignty but that the ability to manage macro economics is removed from democratic accountability. Therefore, given the terms of the SGP and the limited remit and accountability of the ECB, EMU is an agent of globalising neo-liberalism [discourse 4]. A coercive Europeanisation response to both Direct and Indirect impacts of EMU.

**Conclusions.**

In terms of Europeanisation the case studies are both diverse and similar. In both organisations the importance of the EU is recognised and accepted. The thesis put forward by Strange [2002: 332] that there ‘has been a marked further ‘Europeanisation’ of British trade unionism’ is confirmed. However, this does not translate into support for further EU integration. The changing political economy environment has led to the abandonment of naive national Keynesian economic policy preferences. It is in the response to the specifics of EU initiatives and the modes of interest representation that a distinction can be made between voluntary and engaging [GMB] and coercive and aloof Europeanisation [T&G].

The GMB has been active both domestically and in the EU in promoting the social dimension to Europe. It has made use of multiple channels of interest representation by building networks at the EU level. This has led the organisation on to paths outside formal trade union structure. Lobbying a handful of MEPs aside, the T&G has not ventured out much. It relies heavily on the TUC for EU information and interest representation [political] and its responses are reactive rather than proactive. Ignoring the Commission and concentrating more on transposition rather than the formulation of labour market Directives ‘misses a trick’.

The internal constraints of both organisations vary massively. Public sector workers in both organisations are more wary of EMU making a simple sector assessment of perceived economic interest difficult. The GMB policy making process is peculiarly void of the real checks and balances faced by the T&G. Sector and ideology rather than perceived economic interest are of over-riding importance for the T&G and its governance structure facilitates a more participatory model of union democracy. This has been explicitly recognised in their conference policy position.

*This Conference, mindful of the variety of opinions held by T&G members, and conscious of the differing effects British entry into the Euro-zone could have on different sectors of the economy and the union’s membership, believes that the T&G policy on this issue must be rational and open-minded.* [T&G Composite 24, July 2003]
The desirability of further integration is accepted as a necessity for realising traditional trade union objectives. However, assessments of perceived EU opportunities are fundamentally divergent based the specifics, of the current governance structure and political economy and how they are likely to develop. Divergent positions on European integration are explained by the level of internal constraints both in terms of ideology and inherited institutions.
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Figure 1. Internal and external conditions of European interest organisations [source Dølvik 1997: 22 & Marks & McAdam 1996: 104]

Internal Constraints
[logic of membership]

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<td>Perceived EU opportunities [logic of influence]</td>
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Figure 1: Different Types of Europeanisation [source Bache & Jordan 2004 adapted for this paper – bold script added]

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<th>Voluntary</th>
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<td><strong>Direct</strong></td>
<td>intended impact of an EU initiative [at EU level] unopposed by dominant Member State actors [trade unions]</td>
<td>intended impact of an EU initiative [at EU level] opposed by dominant Member State Actors [trade unions]</td>
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<td><strong>Indirect</strong></td>
<td>unintended or inadvertent impact of an EU initiative on the Member State unopposed by dominant Member State actors [trade unions]</td>
<td>spillover consequences of coercive-direct Europeanisation in one area to another [opposed by trade unions].</td>
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