The Europeanisation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
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Dealing with European integration is nothing new for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). For the past 60 years it has, like British government in general, shown both enthusiasm and suspicion for developments on the continent whether they were in the shape of the original European Coal and Steel Community or the latest proposals for a European constitution. Such a long and close involvement has inevitably had an impact upon the way the FCO operates, the way it sees the world, and how others perceive and work with it. This study of the FCO will concentrate mainly upon the impact of Europeanisation on the FCO and its changing role in UK policy-making and implementation, rather than on UK politics or British foreign policy. It sets out to explore to what extent we can say the FCO has been ‘Europeanised’, and through which processes this has occurred.

Ian Bache and Andrew Jordan have defined Europeanisation as ‘the reorientation or reshaping of aspects of politics in the domestic arena in ways that reflect the policies, practices and preferences of European level actors, as advanced through the EU initiatives and decisions.’ When applying such a definition to the FCO we must take note of how it is influenced by changing domestic societal and constitutional arrangements, in addition to transformations in the international and European system such as Britain’s relative decline as a world power since 1945. When faced with such a context we must view the FCO through the lenses of domestic, European and international issues. It is also important to recall that the FCO is not a department confined to London but a complex system of overseas posts and diplomatic processes, which produce a diverse collection of outlooks and concerns, and which we must also assess for Europeanisation.

This paper will begin by examining the history of the FCO reflecting upon its interactions with European integration, highlighting that this has been only one of several key challenges for the FCO over the last 60 years. The paper will then move onto explore the setup of the FCO and how it operates today. The current structure of the FCO reflects a cumulative adjustment to change over a considerable period of time, although the pace of this change has quickened since Britain became a member of the EU. As the
government department responsible for Britain’s external relations it has invested considerable resources and energy into Britain’s relations with its European partners, although this has not always been to good affect. Its position within Whitehall and British government has been both enhanced and challenged by European integration. Indeed, as we will show, for the FCO European integration is something from which it has neither gained nor lost. This in turn returns us to the key difficulty of the wide variety of pressures to which the FCO has been subject, which we explore in some detail. These include international issues and domestic challenges such as constitutional reform, societal changes, new trends in management and institutional structuring, and the style of leadership adopted by Foreign Secretaries and Prime Ministers, the latter of which will be discussed towards the end of the paper.

The paper will highlight several issues. First, that the FCO has neither won nor lost from European integration; but that it has experienced something of a relative decline in control over European policy making. Second, that the patterns of adaptation shown by the FCO have been in line with the wider patterns of adaptation shown throughout Whitehall, in that change has been kept to a minimum with the key approach being adaptation of existing procedures. Third, as highlighted above, the FCO has been subject to a wide variety of pressures and Europeanisation must be seen as just one of many. Fourth, the development of European Political Cooperation (EPC) and now the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has given the FCO an area over which it alone has expertise. Fifth, that there remains a considerable amount of bi-lateral work that has an influence upon EU activity, especially in the area of CFSP. Finally, foreign ministries and national diplomatic services face a general problem of losing control over international relations between sub-national authorities and domestic departments. Similarly the blurring of boundaries between the domestic and the foreign presents a formidable challenge to national foreign ministries which is highlighted and emphasized by EU membership but by no means limited to it. UKREP is an exceptional external representation but its role as a kind of mini-Whitehall is to be found to a lesser extent in a number of UK embassies abroad and not just in those in other EU member states. However, we should be careful to avoid dismissing the influence of Foreign Ministries which remain strong and resource rich environments.
It is worth noting that the difficulty of identifying the causes of change in this area are nicely illustrated by the recent publication of two similar volumes. In *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation* (Macmillan 1999) Brian Hocking has edited a book of contributions that examines changes in a selection of foreign ministries and diplomatic services drawn from all corners of the world. The introduction and conclusions seek to generalise about the impact of globalization and interdependence on diplomatic organisations and procedures. In *European Foreign Ministries: Integrating Diplomats* (Palgrave 2002) the same editor Brian Hocking (with David Spence) has produced a similar volume, this time limited to the foreign ministries of the EU member states, which has as its implicit focus the Europeanisation of EU member state foreign ministries. It is thus hard to be clear about the extent to which significant changes in the FCO are related specifically to EU membership or more generally to changes either to national circumstance or the broader international context.

**History and development of the FCO**

The history and role of the Foreign Office in the making and implementation of British foreign policy has been told in a number of places and needs only a brief rehearsal here. The Foreign Service can be traced back to 1479 and the Foreign Office to 1782. Until the mid-1960s the UK chose to handle its imperial and post imperial relationships separately from its dealings with the rest of the world. The Colonial Office, the India Office, the Dominions Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office have all evolved and merged over time to form the Commonwealth Office and, in 1968, the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office themselves merged to form the present FCO. The present Diplomatic Service was established in 1965 amalgamating the Foreign Service, the Commonwealth Service and the Trade Commission Service.

The administration of British aid has a complex history of semi-detachment from the FCO. Overseas aid was traditionally administered by the Foreign Office but in 1964 the Labour Government created a separate Ministry of Overseas Development headed by a Cabinet minister. Since then Conservative governments (1970-1974 and 1979–1997) have chosen to handle aid through an Overseas Development Administration (ODA)
under the overall control of the FCO whilst Labour governments (1964-1970 and 1974-1979) preferred a separate Ministry. In 1997 the incoming Labour government maintained this pattern by establishing a Department for International Development headed by Claire Short (now replaced by Hilary Benn) with a seat in the Cabinet. This paper will therefore not explore the idea of any Europesiation of UK development policy.

The Foreign Office and now the FCO have always had a central role in the management of Britain’s external policies. This role has been challenged by the relative decline of Britain’s position and role in the international system throughout the twentieth century (most spectacularly since 1945) and by the changing nature of international relations – the shifting agenda, the changing basis of power and influence and the growth of interdependence and of multilateral attempts to manage that interdependence. Despite these trends, which have tended to blur the distinction between foreign and domestic politics and policy, the FCO has managed to retain a central role in the shaping and management of Britain’s external policies. The most significant example of Britain’s involvement in multilateral management is, of course, its membership of the European Union that has both challenged and, in many ways, enhanced the role of the FCO. The continued strength and high reputation of the FCO has, in recent years, played a major part in enabling Britain to ‘punch above its weight’ in the international system in general. Faced with the contradictory pressures of changing demands and diminishing resources, the FCO has firmly resisted ‘external’ attempts to reform it (see below) whilst demonstrating an effective willingness and ability to make the necessary internal adaptations. It is a measure of the FCO’s adaptive ability that the Diplomatic Service has successfully retained its separate and unique status within the British administration and that successive Foreign Secretaries have preserved their senior position within the British Cabinet hierarchy. The position of Foreign Secretary remains one of the most important posts in the British government although the particular importance of the relationship between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary has been modified in recent years by the growing power of the Prime Minister’s office in Downing Street. This can in part be attributed to the impact of Britain’s membership of the EU, the increasing demands on Foreign Ministers, and the external policy leadership and coordinating role that the
expansion of the power of the European Council has given to the head of the government and his office. We will return to this subject a little later.

The general expansion in the number of states in the international system has challenged the FCO’s determination to preserve Britain’s global power status by retaining a global representation. This FCO managed to do this in response to the proliferation of states as a result of decolonisation in the 1960s and 1970s; the new challenges posed by the emergence of new states following the break-up of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia in the 1990s have proved more testing and the FCO has struggled to keep up with its major European rivals. In 2003 Britain maintained 233 posts of which 153 are embassies (compared with just 136 countries in 1968) whilst Germany maintained 208 posts and France 279 posts. In April 1999 the FCO had a total of 5635 UK-based staff of whom 2295 were serving overseas (whilst Germany had 3361 and France 5669 staff serving overseas) although these figures partly reflect a continuing British tradition of, and preference for, employing quite high numbers of local staff in its missions abroad. The rapid expansion of tourism and travel along with an increase in the number of states has increased certain of the demands on overseas posts whilst the increased ease and speed of both travel and communications has raised contradictory doubts about the purpose of, and need for, overseas posts. These and other issues relating to both change and Britain’s declining resources have meant that the FCO has been the subject of a number of formal inquiries and reviews. The Plowden, Duncan and Berrill Reports in 1964, 1969 and 1977 (see below) respectively all made recommendations which the FCO was inclined to resist. More recently the 1992 Structural Review, the 1995 Fundamental Expenditure Review, the 1996 Senior Management Review, and the work that led to the recently published FCO Strategy Document were all conducted ‘in house’, albeit with the participation of outside consultants, and produced recommendations that the FCO was more inclined to accept. The latter reviews were partly occasioned by a self-perceived need to rethink certain aspects of the FCO’s work (its staffing policies in the face of demands for racial and sexual equality of opportunity and for more rapid career advancement in a Diplomatic Service that had become ‘top-heavy’ as a result of various administrative reorganisations; its postings policies as more FCO spouses were reluctant to sacrifice their own careers in
order to accompany FCO staff abroad and its staff training and development policies as the demands for functional expertise increased) partly by the need to find further financial savings and partly by the general trend of governmental reform (Thatcherite market testing, financial devolution, delayering, performance targeting and analysis etc.) which had developed in recent years.

During Mrs Thatcher’s period in office, the FCO was subjected to a continuous level of criticism by a dominant Prime Minister who became increasingly interested, as all long-serving prime ministers tend to, in playing a major role in foreign affairs. Mrs Thatcher’s frustration and problems with the European Union, which she associated with the pro-European leanings of the FCO, led her to contemplate, but in fact never to seriously implement, the possibility of building up Downing Street’s foreign policy capabilities as a counter to the central role of the FCO. In Charles Powell, a debonair career FCO official, who became increasingly politicised during his time at No.10, Mrs Thatcher had an ambitious and effective Private Secretary for Overseas Affairs who was more than capable of assisting her in her occasional forays against the FCO – his part in the drafting of her attack on the EU and its President, Jacques Delors, in a speech made at the College of Europe in 1988 is a case in point. Mrs Thatcher also appointed a succession of ex-ambassadors to advise her but, by and large, they were always careful not to undermine their previous employers when briefing her. Under Mrs Thatcher, plans for the establishment of a Foreign Affairs Unit along similar lines to the American National Security Council were overtaken by the events that led to her eventual resignation. John Major showed no real inclination to side-step either the Foreign Secretary or the FCO in the handling of foreign policy in general or the EU specifically. In April 1998 Mr Blair rejected proposals put forward by some of his colleagues for creating a powerful Prime Minister’s Department based upon a reconstructed Cabinet Office. However there was a small controversy over the revelation that the Prime Minister had appointed several overseas personal envoys (Lords Levy, Paul and Ahmed). Press comment saw these appointments as indicative of ‘an American style of foreign policy’ and noted the fact that these envoys were unaccountable to parliament and could be seen to be part of a process that by-passed the FCO. When Mr Blair was returned to office in 2001 however he did take significant steps to enhance the role of Downing
Street over both EU policy and foreign policy towards the rest of the world. Mr Blair chose to move two of the Cabinet Office Secretariats (dealing with Overseas and Security policy and with the EU) into Downing Street under the control of his two foreign policy advisors – Sir Stephen Wall (ex head of UKREP) and Sir David Manning (ex head of the UK Delegation to NATO). We will return to this a little later.

The FCO is staffed largely by members of the Diplomatic Service but with some members of the Home Civil Service. The Diplomatic Service is staffed by around 6000 UK-based personnel (around 4000 in the Diplomatic Service and 2000 Home Civil Servants mainly in support roles in London) who serve both at home and abroad. In 2003 there were around 2295 UK-based staff serving abroad and they were assisted in posts by 7841 locally engaged staff. The FCO have been forced to accept considerable reductions in budgets and overall staffing levels (21% since 1980) in recent years. The FCO vote (minus the variable costs of peacekeeping operations) is around £1 billion at 1995 prices. The FCO thus has a relatively small budget in contrast to the £20+ billion allocated to the Ministry of Defence or the nearly £100 billion expenditure of the Department of Social Security. The FCO has hardly any programme expenditure (unlike the DFID) and so budget cuts can be directly translated into staff slots or overseas posts. As a consequence FCO morale has been quite badly affected in recent years by the constant budgetary pressures. Staff who have become disillusioned, either by budget reductions, seemingly inconsiderate postings policies or the lack of opportunity for career advancement have been able to find better paid and often less demanding employment in the private sector and, for some, in the European Union.

The FCO under review:

As noted above, the FCO has been the subject of a number of formal inquiries in recent years. The Plowden Report delivered in 1964 ‘provoked the most radical changes and the least controversy’. It was responsible both for the creation of the unified diplomatic service and for the eventual amalgamations that led to the establishment of the FCO. Despite the obvious decline in British global influence that was apparent by the mid 1960s the Plowden report was ‘friendly’ towards the FCO in its assumption that Britain
should nevertheless maintain the foreign policy capability of a global power. To this end, Plowden recommended improved conditions of employment for the diplomatic service which it felt should be maintained at a level approximately 10% above basic requirements so as to allow for enhanced training, leave and travel. These proposals were never implemented and subsequent inquiries were never so generous in their recommendations.

In 1969, after the traumas of devaluation and the military withdrawal from east of Suez, the Duncan Report was much tougher on the FCO. It set out to achieve savings of between 5 and 10 per cent by distinguishing between two distinct areas of British attention. Duncan recommended that the countries of western Europe plus North America should be grouped together in an Area of Concentration whilst the rest of the world (including Japan and the whole of the Middle East!) would form an Outer Area. Countries within the Area of Concentration and one or two other ‘special cases’ would be served by Comprehensive Posts, which would be staffed in the traditional way, but most of the countries that fell within the Outer Area would be served by much reduced Selective Posts from which there would be virtually no political reporting. The main emphasis of diplomacy was to be on commercial work and the Duncan Report made it clear that it did not consider a foreign policy apparatus suitable for a global power with comprehensive political and commercial interests any longer appropriate for Britain. This view of the role of the FCO and the Diplomatic Service was of course strongly contested by the FCO, whose delaying tactics were all that were required as the change of government that occurred in June of 1970 led to the shelving of the Duncan Report.

Even more radical however was the report produced by the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) under Kenneth Berrill. Charged with recommending ‘the most suitable, effective and economic means of representing and promoting British interests both at home and overseas’ the CPSR team came up with a proposal that the Diplomatic Service and the Home Civil Service be effectively merged creating a Foreign Policy Group. This suggestion was based on the assumption that the necessary specialisms required to advance British interests were to be found in the Home Civil Service and that the essentially political advice, expensively provided by the Diplomatic Service, was no longer relevant to British needs. Were this advice to be made today it would almost
certainly be regarded as an indicator of europeanization. In addition, the CPRS Report called for the closing of 55 posts on top of the 30 that had been closed since Duncan reported. The CPRS Report was nothing more than a direct attack on the FCO and all that it stood for and it provoked an enormously hostile response. Typical was the reaction of one of Britain’s senior Ambassadors whose Paris embassy was singled out for particular attack for the ‘lavishness’ of its hospitality. In his diaries, Sir Nicholas Henderson records ‘This is the third such enquiry in the past fifteen years. True, Plowden and Val Duncan did the service no harm but the setting up of yet another and outwardly more hostile enquiry has not been good for morale.\[1] The FCO produced a line by line rebuttal of the entire report and they were supported in their endeavors by Jim Callaghan, the Prime Minister, who had fond memories of his time as Foreign Secretary\[1]. The CPRS Report provoked such a hostile reaction, with hundreds of serving diplomats threatening to resign rather than face incorporation into the Home Civil Service, that it probably never stood much chance of being implemented. Despite its spirited and successful defence, the FCO showed in later years that it recognised some of the problems highlighted by the CPRS Report, even if it rejected the proposed solutions.

More recently, the FCO has been given a more searching examination by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, particularly over its response to new commercial challenges in the Far East and over its management of Public Diplomacy via the BBC World Service and the British Council (both of whom are FCO responsibilities and paid for under the FCO vote). In the 1990s the FCO has responded to the general climate of government reform by holding its own internal Structural Review in 1992, a Fundamental Expenditure Review (FER) in 1995 and a Senior Management Review (SMR) in 1996. The acceptance and implementation of these more recent reports are part of the FCO’s response to a changing European and international environment although it is hard to distinguish between the two or to isolate influences which are specifically European or EU. In 2004 the FCO published its own Strategy Document; the product of consultation both within and beyond Whitehall.

Structure of the FCO
The FCO is headed by the Foreign Secretary who is always a senior member of the Government. There are usually at least three junior ministers (four when ODA is situated within the FCO) one of whom, in recent years has been designated Minister for Europe. The FCO is headed by a Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS) who is responsible both for the administration of the FCO and the work of overseas posts through a Board of Management and for strategic policy advice to ministers through a Policy Advisory Board. In recent years the work of the PUS has become increasingly focussed on the management of the FCO in London. The post of Political Director, which was initially created so that Britain could willingly play its part in the EU’s system of European Political Cooperation, is now effectively the top policy advisory post. Whereas twenty years ago the PUS would always accompany the Foreign Secretary or Prime Minister on his travels overseas now it is usually the Political Director who clocks up the air miles whilst the PUS stays at home to look after the shop. The specific position of Political Director can be explained in terms of Europeanisation, in particular a form of voluntary – direct Europeanisation in that the FCO willingly adapted to take advantage of EPC and this adaptation has led to spillover whereby the Political Director now plays a larger role than perhaps originally intended. However, the different roles played by the PUS and Political Director are the result of both EU membership and other factors, especially the need for improved management within the FCO.

The basic FCO unit remains the geographical desk within a geographical Department and Command. Although there has been a considerable growth in functional departments in response to the ‘internationalisation’ and ‘Europeanisation’ of a number of traditional domestic issues and to the growth of multilateral forums, the FCO has resisted suggestions that, as a multi-functional organisation, it should reorganize itself around its functions although in the case of EU membership this is now changing. The Fundamental Expenditure Review of 1995 argued for the preservation of a structure based on regional and multilateral organisation partly because of the high estimated cost of restructuring the FCO and partly because of the continuing logic of geographical specialisation. The FCO believes that it’s knowledge of specific countries and its development of bilateral relationships that span across a number of specific functions, adds significant value to the advancement and coordination of British interests. If the
FCO were to be reorganised along functional lines then the fear would be that a number of functions could then be ‘hived off’ to domestic ministries along the lines suggested by the 1977 CPRS Report. In January 2000, shortly before he became Minister for Energy in the reshuffle that followed the resignation of Peter Mandelson, Peter Hain, then a Foreign Office Minister, published a pamphlet in which he advocated the scrapping of Departments based on geographical divisions in favour of ‘issues’ departments dealing with subjects such as human rights, the environment and conflict prevention. To the extent that the ‘desks’ for other EU member states have recently been removed from a geographical command and placed within functional (EU) departments (more below) then Hain’s proposals seem to be gaining acceptance at least as far as the management of European multilateral and bilateral policies are concerned.
Within the FCO, the problems raised by the proliferation of functional and multilateral commands cutting across the geographical divisions is best illustrated by reference to arrangements for dealing with the countries of Western Europe and the EU. Across Whitehall the coordination of British foreign policy is not in the exclusive control of the FCO. Long gone are the days when all contacts with the outside world were handled by the FCO acting as some form of ‘gatekeeper’. Today just as the FCO has sprouted a number of functional departments that in many ways ‘shadow’ the work of Home Departments so, in turn, most Home Departments have developed their own international and European sections (however, they rarely in turn shadow the FCO!). The FCO continues to play a major role in the coordination of all these different aspects of Britain’s external policy but the British system also recognises that, with reference to a number of cross-cutting issues, the FCO is not the unchallenged sole determinant of the overall British interest but merely an ‘interested’ department amongst many others. In these cases, the Cabinet system and the work of the Cabinet Office provide consistency and coherence. At the very top of the decision-making process, the British Cabinet is meant to be collegial and the doctrine of collective responsibility pertains. In practice many decisions are delegated down to Cabinet Committees of which the Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) and the Committee on the Intelligence Services both chaired by the Prime Minister and the Sub-Committee on European Questions ((E)DOP), chaired by the Foreign Secretary, are the most important in relation to foreign policy.

The work of these ministerial committees and of their official counterparts is supported by the Cabinet Office, headed by the Secretary of the Cabinet who is also the head of the Home Civil Service. There were five separate Secretariats within the Cabinet Office of which three (the Overseas and Defence Secretariat, the Joint Intelligence Secretariat and the European Secretariat) had external relations coordination responsibilities. Two of these Overseas and Defence and Europe have now been moved from the Cabinet Office to the Prime Ministers Office in Downing Street. The Secretariats are quite small, staffed mainly by home civil servants but also by members of the diplomatic service. The relationship between the FCO and the staff of the relevant secretariats is a close one; in no sense are they rivals although on issues where the FCO is
in dispute with other government departments it is the Secretariat staff who record the
minutes of the meetings at which government policy is thrashed out.

The FCO and today’s challenges

In recent years the FCO has faced a number of specific issues in addition to the general
problem of managing the consequences of Britain’s relative decline in the international
hierarchy. The biggest external challenge has arisen from the need to adjust both the
procedures and substance of British foreign policy to the growing importance of the
European Union. Participation in the European Union has given particular emphasis to
the blurring of the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy. A considerable
amount of EU business is conducted by officials from the Home Civil Service working in
domestic ministries such as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the
Department for the Environment, Food and Agriculture (DEFRA). Where once most
dealings with foreign governments were conducted through the FCO and Britain’s
embassies abroad, now there are direct dealings between domestic ministries and their
opposite numbers in the other EU member states. This has highlighted a number of
issues of both coordination and control that have challenged the FCO’s dominant role in
the identification and pursuit of British interests overseas.

In the past a separate European Ministry has been proposed and, under Edward
Heath in the 1970-74 Conservative administration, a Cabinet minister with EU
responsibilities (Geoffrey Rippon) was appointed to support the Foreign Secretary,
although, once the accession negotiations were completed, the post was soon abolished.
The FCO has always resisted attempts to separate EU business from the overall
responsibilities of the FCO and successive Foreign Secretaries have shown little
enthusiasm for suggestions that the present Minister of State for Europe be elevated to
Cabinet rank. A Foreign Secretary stripped of his EU responsibilities and prerogatives
would suffer an enormous loss of political stature so central is the EU to so many internal
and external policy issues. Furthermore, removing the EU from the UK department of
state responsible for external affairs would also represent a major political and symbolic
change that would touch the nerve of national sovereignty. Nevertheless the idea was
raised again and was discussed also at the Convention on the Future of Europe with the suggestion that senior cabinet ministers (Jacques Delors even suggested Deputy Prime Ministers!) reporting directly to Prime Ministers might be permanently based in Brussels and charged with sustaining the authority of the European Council between the six-monthly summits. This would indeed have called into question the role of the FCO and of the Foreign Secretary, especially if, as was mooted at the time, the UK candidate had been Peter Mandelson. Proposals to transfer the management (as opposed to the coordination and strategic consideration) of European business to the Cabinet Office or to Downing Street would have had the same effect.

The FCO has undoubtedly gained from the centralising tendencies that EU membership has encouraged and Martin Smith has identified the rise of ‘an informal, yet powerful elite comprising Number 10, the FCO, the Cabinet Office and the UK permanent representation (UKREP)’, a system described by one diplomat in the Cabinet Office as the ‘iron triangle’ at the heart of British European policy making. However the British system of coordination, whilst it gives the FCO by far the major role, is also designed to ensure that where necessary the FCO is treated as another interested Department and not as the sole determinant of the UK national interest. The role of the European Secretariat which arranges, chairs and records the results of interdepartmental discussions at all levels ensures that the FCO can not claim sole ownership or authorship of EU policy. The Cabinet Office is also responsible for the process whereby Parliament is informed and consulted about EU legislation. The FCO is usually represented in the European Secretariat, but only with one official in a team of about seven – the rest coming from the home civil service.

However one has to be careful about making too much of the restraints on the FCO’s role in EU policy-making and coordination. The European Secretariat is quite small, although large by Cabinet Office standards, and it does rely heavily on FCO support. Similarly whilst UKREP is indeed an unusual embassy, with more than 50% of its staff being drawn from the home civil service, it has always been headed by an ambassador from the FCO and the FCO retains the right to oversee its instructions. The position of Permanent Representative is an extremely powerful one with the incumbent responsible for the day to day management of EU business in Brussels as well as usually
playing a pivotal role in Treaty negotiations within the Intergovernmental Conference framework. The very style of EU negotiations and policy making places the Permanent Representative and UKRep into an intensive and ever changing dialogue with London. The UK Permanent Representative, additionally gets to return to London each Friday to participate in EU policy-making meetings both within the FCO and the Cabinet Office – an opportunity resented by some home based officials and envied by some other UK ambassadors.

Thus, despite the constraints mentioned above and elsewhere in this paper, the FCO probably has succeeded in retaining a predominant (and not simply a symbolic) EU role within the UK system. Because of its competent handling of EU business the FCO has earned the respect of, and worked smoothly with, other government departments. It has been quite relaxed about allowing other departments to get on with EU business that clearly lie within their exclusive competence. The FCO has considered and sensibly rejected the idea of charging other departments for the work that its overseas posts carry out for them; it has instructed those of its departments, such as European Union Department (Internal), who ‘face’ domestic ministries to consult with them about their requirements vis-a-vis FCO posts overseas and it has sought to maintain its position, if not of supremacy, then at least of ‘primus inter pares’ in the overall direction of British foreign policy. Although Smith argues that ‘as EU business increases, the FCO and the Cabinet Office are losing control and departments are increasingly conducting business with the Commission and other member states directly’ and that the FCO is incorrect in its belief that it still controls contact with Brussels, it is the contention of this paper that, on the important EU matters, the FCO retains a significant degree of control (the case of the Treasury and its control over the issue of the euro is probably now a significant exception) and that it is probably wise to not try and take on business that it is beyond both its competence and its resources.

The Labour Government’s devolution policies may well eventually have an impact on the way that the UK and FCO relate to the EU, although the Government seems determined to try and retain London’s control over these matters. Each of the devolved administrations has agreed a concordat with the Westminster Government covering their role in international relations in general and the EU in particular. These
were agreed without undue difficulty and the arrangements so far seem to be working well, although some have noted that this is based mainly on informal cooperation between civil servants who remain UK (i.e. not Scottish or Welsh) civil servants. In Brussels the regional offices of the devolved assemblies and administrations carry full diplomatic accreditation as part of the ‘UKRep family’, and as a result gain access and information not afforded to regional offices from other EU Member States (nor is it afforded to English regional representations!) The anticipated problems and disagreements have not so far materialised, with the result that the FCO has now disbanded its short-lived Devolved Administrations Department. Whilst the UK government and the FCO are determined to remain officially responsible for international relations, including relations with the EU, it may well find itself under pressure from the devolved administrations as their work develops. Already there have been suggestions that Scotland might seek to expand the level of its separate representation in Brussels, and it is expected that a Minister from the Scottish Executive will represent the UK in fisheries negotiations during the British EU Presidency in 2005. Such moves might eventually threaten the role of UKREP and the UK Permanent Representative. Comparison with the growing EU role of the German Lander in this context may well be instructive in the future. In the long term, of course, the possibility of devolution leading to independence would challenge the whole concept of UK foreign policy and the role of the UK FCO.

Within the FCO, following several recent reorganisations, EU matters and bilateral relations with individual EU member states are now handled within the same Command – the EU Command which now has four departments (CFSP, EU Internal, EU External and EU Bilateral) who report to the FCO Director EU and then (except for CFSP Dept, who report to the Political Director) to the Director Economic and EU. CFSP Department, in effect, provide a secretariat for the FCO Political Director who has chief operational responsibility for the UK’s input into the CFSP process. The Wider Europe Command brings together all the Departments dealing with Central and Eastern Europe (except the Balkans, which has a separate Command) and Western European countries which are not in the EU. As a result most elements of European policy have now been brought within the same arrangements inside the FCO.
The number of FCO staff working or having some contact with EU issues has continued to rise as a result of the impact of CFSP, the growing scale of European coordination at overseas diplomatic missions and the increased scale of European policy. In particular, the European Fast Stream has provided the UK with a constant supply of diplomats with an excellent working knowledge of the EU. This has not, however, been confined to just the FCO with a large number of civil servants also gaining European experience; although it can be argued that, compared with other government departments, within the FCO there is a smaller ratio of Europeanists to non-Europeanists. However, such is the scale of the ‘Europeanists’ in the FCO that they have been seen to supplant the ‘Arabists’ in appearing to hold the dominant position in the FCO. This has created something of a ‘creative tension’ within the FCO, and not gone unnoticed by those who regard the FCO as too pro-European.

However, it is not just euro-sceptics who voice their concerns about the apparent imbalance within the FCO towards the EU. Some diplomats from posts beyond the EU point to how over 600 diplomats and accredited staff (excluding those at UKRep) work in the missions to the EU Member States, while the entire United States lists just around 200. This in part reflects the growth of ‘mini-Whitehall’ style British diplomatic postings, especially to EU member states where domestic, European and international affairs merge more so than beyond the EU. This is not to say that overseas missions beyond the EU have been immune from Europeanisation. The continuing progress in CFSP has resulted in overseas posts holding regular coordination meetings with the representations of other member States. However, there exist differing levels of enthusiasm for such meetings with one senior British diplomat arguing they were akin to a social gathering of most Western allies only notable because of the absence of Americans. Some also question the value of holding such EU coordination meetings (over 2,000 a year between the EU Missions at the United Nations) when this time could be better spent lobbying and completing other essential diplomatic work. Others argue that the real work is completed by the larger member states such as the UK, France and Germany, and in turn cannot be considered as truly representing the whole EU given the limited representations of many small EU Member States combined with the circumscribed role of the European Commission’s external offices. However, the
momentum within the FCO and other Member States diplomatic services towards coherent EU diplomatic efforts is aimed at inculcating a natural reflex to work with one another and the EU representations. The challenge for the FCO lies in ensuring that this does not result in pressure to merge representations. In particular, ideas to create an EU Permanent Seat on the UN Security Council have been fiercely resisted by the UK and the FCO.

The growing complexity of the foreign policy agenda has forced the FCO to develop more and more functional competences but it has responded to this challenge by firmly sticking to an organisational structure that subsumes functional expertise to geographical and multilateral Commands and therefore emphasises the importance of the FCO’s coordination role in relation to other government departments. This however may at last be changing, but within a context where budgetary pressures play as key a role as the growing domestic-European linkages. Similarly the FCO, by preserving the pivotal role of the ambassador in overseas posts, has resisted the argument that domestic specialists who are posted overseas should report directly to their ‘home’ departments. Thus, in the name of coherence and consistency, the FCO has successfully defended some form of ‘gatekeeper’ role both at home and abroad, even though the participants in the foreign policy process are increasingly drawn from a number of non-FCO sources.\footnote{46}

Again, this is most clearly seen in the key roles that the FCO and the UK Permanent Representation to the EU (UKREP)\footnote{47} play in the overall management of British policy towards the EU.

As well as seeking to preserve its central role in Whitehall by improving its links with other government departments, the FCO has also had to develop strategies for reforming its own internal structure and management practices, partly in response to changes in the foreign policy environment including the EU and partly in response to the general pressures for governmental reform that have developed in the last decade. The FCO approach seems to have been to try and be seen to participate in this process of change and reform with as much enthusiasm as possible, whilst preserving its separate status and warding off any attempts to downgrade its overall significance by placing organisational emphasis on functional rather than geographical and multilateral coordination tasks.
As mentioned earlier, in 2003 the FCO produced for the first time a Strategy Report which maintained a trend to show due significance to the role of the EU but also to make it clear that the UK also operated as an independent actor in the wider international system. The UK strategy document suggests that whilst the FCO may well have been subjected to Europeanisation it is not necessarily either integrating or converging with the foreign ministries of the other EU member states. At the same time the Strategy Report, while discussing the operation of the FCO, does explore the main foreign policy concerns of the United Kingdom, and in this the document shares many similarities with the 2003 European Union Security Strategy Document. Both emphasize the importance of effective multilateralism tackling problems ranging from international terrorism and the spread of WMD through to environmental crises and human rights abuses. The two documents would certainly seem to share more similarities than they do with the US National Security Strategy document. This in part stems from the strong British input to the EU document and again returns us to the idea of Europeanisation being a circular process.

The FCO has revised its mission statement three times in recent years so as to relate its corporate objectives more clearly to its core functions and also to facilitate better monitoring of those objectives and their attainment. The FCO Annual Departmental Report is now replete with lists of objectives and targets with regard to political and economic work as well as commercial, consular, entry clearance and information work and with records of their achievement. To this end, as well as reemphasising, reinforcing and, where appropriate in Europe and South Asia, reorganising, its geographic Commands, the FCO has also sought to implement a policy of devolving both financial and management responsibility down through Commands to departments and to overseas posts in line with similar developments elsewhere in the government service. The FCO has sought over time to remove a complete layer of senior management (DUS level) by making geographic Commands directly answerable to the PUS and to give more responsibility at departmental level to officials, by encouraging them to brief ministers directly rather than moving documents through several layers of authorisation and control. Attempts have also been made to improve the role of policy planning in the FCO (partly in association with other EU foreign ministries), to better
associate the work of the Research Analysts with their customer departments and to reorganise the management structure so that those responsible for policy planning and advice and those responsible for the management of resources are more closely associated with each others work. This latter objective has been partly achieved by devolution and partly by unifying the Policy Advisory Board and the Board of Management and strengthening their links with the Commands as well as their ‘visibility’ to the rest of the FCO. A number of these reforms can be tracked around the Foreign Ministries of the other EU member states but whether this can be described as europeanization, adaptation, emulation or policy transfer is a debatable point.

Changes in British society and in the approach to work and working conditions have forced the FCO to reconsider the way that it recruits staff and carries out its business. Attempts to open up the recruitment process have had mixed results; whilst the FCO can point to figures that suggest a steady increase in the employment of women and in the decline of candidates from private schools, its record on the employment of representatives of ethnic minorities is not impressive and it attracted highly unfavorable publicity in January of 1996 when its most senior woman, Pauline Neville-Jones, resigned ‘noisily’ after being denied the position of ambassador to Paris, on the face of it because she was both female and unmarried even though there have been women ambassadors in several countries, eg Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Chile and South Africa. On a variety of staff matters the FCO is increasingly in competition with a number of other employers for the talents of the young high flyers that it used to recruit with ease. Relatively poor pay, poor conditions of service, long working hours, slim chances of rapid promotion in a service where a number of senior posts have been cut on efficiency and economy grounds have all taken their toll and the FCO has been relatively slow to respond, leading to reports of growing dissatisfaction and low morale. Whether a Labour Government intent on ‘opening up’ the FCO to a wider recruitment base and more open and modern working practices is likely to restore the once high morale of the Diplomatic Service remains to be seen. Many of the most unpopular changes to the nature of the work, and thus to the prospects of a satisfactory career, have been driven by the constant need to find financial savings rather than by the nature of the work. As Sir Michael Jay, Permanent Under Secretary, noted in the ‘FCO Connect’ Report of October
2003, ‘The FCO is over-extended… the resourcing of our network has now fallen below the minimum levels to enable us to do our job.’ It does not seem very likely that this pressure will be significantly eased in the foreseeable future and so the FCO will continue to be disabled in its efforts to create a modern service capable of attracting and retaining high quality staff. This may well force the FCO in the future to give much more serious consideration to moves within the EU to create a European diplomatic service involving both Commission and Council officials and those from EU national diplomatic services.

Indeed, one area of possible change/adjustment which previous governments have resisted, concerns developments in the EU and the institutional consequences of pursuing a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The British government, despite finding it increasingly difficult to devote the necessary resources to its foreign policy machine, has not been tempted by the European option of pooling resources particularly those overseas although Britain and France have recently (outside the EU framework) announced plans to work more closely together in Africa. Proposals to establish joint EU embassies and eventually to establish a full blown European diplomatic service have been stoutly resisted by Britain in favour of retaining a national foreign ministry and diplomatic service, even though, recently, Britain has gone along with an increasing concentration of CFSP activity in Brussels. In keeping with this approach, in March of 1999, the Foreign Secretary proposed the establishment of a permanent committee of deputy political directors in Brussels to steer and reinforce the CFSP. The idea of this committee was clearly to keep control of the CFSP firmly in the hands of national foreign ministries by boosting the Council of Ministers and the Council Secretariat rather than enhancing the Commission’s external powers. This British proposal led in time to the creation of the Political and Security Committee which is a good example of what has been described as the ‘Brusselsisation’ of the CFSP process. This is also a good example of the circular nature of Europeanization as the FCO having advocated the establishment in Brussels of something like the COPS now has to adjust to its existence!

Another area where the FCO has been forced to respond to change in recent years concerns the growing interest of the wider public, both at home and abroad, in foreign policy. Domestic publics, particularly in the developed world and, particularly of late within the EU member states, are now less trusting of governments and more aware of
what they are up to in the foreign policy area. Britain is no exception to this general post-
war trend which has, if anything, accelerated since the end of the cold war. The FCO
must now pay more attention to both Parliament and the wider public in Britain whilst the
state of public opinion in those countries which Britain seeks to influence is now also a
factor that needs to be given far more attention than in the past. Recent meetings of the
European Council and the last three IGCs have been notable for the concern of individual
European leaders for public opinion and reaction back home. The FCO can be criticised
for being slow to react to this phenomenon. Commentators noted the persistent refusal of
the FCO to either acknowledge or seek to reach a consensus with the significant
‘Falklands lobby’ which nevertheless exerted influence on British attempts to change
its policy on the ownership of the Falkland Islands and the FCO and the British
government in general can be faulted for their failure to seek a broad domestic consensus
on a whole host of European Union issues. Similarly the FCO was heavily criticised for
its recent attempts to cut the budget and restrict the activities of both the BBC World
Service and the British Council at a time when the importance of this type of ‘public
diplomacy’ was becoming more rather than less significant. The FCO and the UK
government in general continue to struggle to find a way of creating a domestic
consensus for the EU policies that they wish to pursue and the EU structures that they
wish to support.

However, the issue of public diplomacy has now begun to be addressed by the
FCO. The Fundamental Expenditure Review devoted a whole section to the growing
importance of public diplomacy and to the need for the FCO to develop a public
diplomacy strategy statement as well as individual country strategies. The BBC World
Service and the British Council are to have their objectives reevaluated with a view to
aligning them more closely to the FCO’s aims and objectives and the FCO Information
and Cultural Relations Departments have been restructured. The FCO now has a Public
Diplomacy Dept and EUD(I) a Public Diplomacy Section. At a recent seminar of all the
UK’s present and former ambassadors to the EU, the present incumbent and his
immediate predecessor both commented on their changing roles with much less time
being spent in COREPER and much more time being spent on more traditional
ambassadorial work with interest groups and members of the EP. At the same time, as
noted above, the increased demands of European co-operation at embassies abroad has been seen to detract from the amount of time available for other work, including public diplomacy.

It is easy to forget that overseas diplomatic missions also cater to the needs of national citizens residing or visiting overseas, a situation that with the growing number of tourists and ease of working abroad (especially within the EU) has placed considerable pressures on the FCO and overseas missions. As already noted, such financial pressures have already led to EU Member States sharing diplomatic assets and support. Perhaps the most significant challenge today for overseas posts is dealing with the threat of another attack such as that of 11 September 2001. For the UK and the FCO, the experience of handling the crisis 9/11 was almost entirely British in outlook and learning. This mainly stemmed from New York being the one city in the world where every nation state has at least some form of diplomatic representation and therefore some means of dealing with its nationals in that city when the emergency occurred. The experiences of the British Consulate in New York essentially helped to write the guidelines on how to deal with future such atrocities. Dealing with incidents such as Bali or Istanbul have brought into the equation the opportunities for help and assistance from other EU member states.

**Europe, Downing Street and the FCO**

No discussion of the growing impact of the EU on the FCO would be complete without discussion of the growing role played in European and foreign policy by the Prime Minister and Downing Street. The movement of the European and Overseas and Defence Secretariats from the Cabinet Office to Downing Street has ratcheted up the role played by the PM. This in part reflects the interest shown by the current Prime Minister in foreign affairs and his ‘presidential style’. At the same time it also stems from much longer term patterns such as the growing number and importance of EU summits, in particular those of the European Council. For the FCO this has brought mixed results. It has produced a Prime Minister who has dedicated a considerable amount of time to the field of foreign policy in turn providing the UK with an international statesman. At the same time it has apparently sidelined an FCO that the Prime Minister does not consider to be staffed by ‘his people’. There have been repeated complaints of the FCO being
sideline from policy making on issues such as Iraq, the EU constitution, relations with Washington and world leaders and the general overall strategy and justifications behind British foreign policy. The problem being that the perceived need for overall strategy from Downing Street has provided an impetus to give direction but in turn fail to address the detail of such issues as post-war reconstruction in Iraq or certain loopholes in the EU constitution. The letter to the Financial Times in May 2004 from 52 retired British diplomats attacking the Prime Minister’s position in the Middle East was the most visible sign of such discontent.

In part the increased involvement of the PM in European policy also stems from his attempts to tackle British euro-scepticism and broaden the nature of the UK government’s relationship with its EU partners. These too may challenge the role of the FCO in the future. The Prime Minister has long been keen to establish stronger links between the centre-left parties in power in a number of the 15 EU states although in recent years their number has declined and Mr Blair’s willingness to develop bilateral relationships with almost anybody regardless of political stance has increased. For a brief period Mr Blair appointed Mr Mandelson, seemingly with the then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook’s blessing, to act as a ‘roving ambassador’ but this did not appear to last long or bear much fruit.

For his part Mr Cook when Foreign Secretary set up a powerful committee to increase the Labour party’s influence in Europe. The committee, which is chaired by the Minister for Europe included policy advisors from Downing Street, the FCO and the Treasury. It represents the kind of development that the FCO has to embrace but, one suspects, with the intention of smothering rather than nurturing a potential challenger to its control of UK relations with European governments. The idea of someone like Mr Mandelson becoming a ‘roving European Ambassador’ was about as pleasing to the mandarins within the FCO as the idea of a foreign policy unit in Downing Street or a Minister for Europe in the Cabinet Office.

**Conclusions**
As we have seen throughout, the key problem when examining the FCO rests in it operating at the national, European and international levels. It is not easy to discern a process of Europeanisation against such a background and it is therefore necessary to view Europeanisation as one key element of the context and pressures to which the FCO has been adapting over the past 60 years. The main challenge brought about has been with foreign and European policy increasingly becoming issues of coordination across government, with the FCO striving to remain a [the] central department in this process. At the same time the FCO has been keen to maintain its own separate identity and interests such as its so far successful defense of a separate Diplomatic Service, a position endorsed by the 1994 White Paper on the Civil Service which stated that “The Diplomatic Service is a separate branch of the public service with its own particular needs and structure.”

The areas where Europeanisation has played a part include: the structure of the FCO in terms of both the Political Director and the PUS; the management of desks for EU member states and the growing importance of the European command; the growth in the role of UKRep and other ‘mini-Whitehalls’; the increased prominence of ‘Europeanists’ and the European dimension to the budgetary and personnel challenges; the EU coordination work in overseas posts; the more prominent role played by the PM and Downing Street; and finally the approach the FCO has taken to the development of CFSP. Such developments have not occurred overnight but have been a process stretching over decades. Indeed, it is essential to recall that the FCO has played a central role in how the UK has approached European integration since before the signing of the Treaty of Rome. In response the FCO has generally developed responses that resemble ‘fine-tuning’ rather than radical reform but they have enabled the FCO and the Diplomatic Service to retain their central position in the making and implementation of British foreign policy. Indeed it has been argued that EU membership has provided opportunities for the FCO, along with the DTI and MAFF/DEFRA to ‘increase their role and autonomy.’

The FCO has responded reasonably well to change whether the stimulus comes from within the UK, from Europe or from the wider international system. As we noted above, its basic tactic has been to strongly resist all attempts to impose reform from
outside, whilst internally making some quite radical adjustments to the way that it organises itself and carries out its work. The changes in the substance of foreign policy and the blurring of boundaries between foreign and domestic policy have forced the FCO to work much more closely with other government departments, both within Britain and abroad, and to organise itself for the demands of multilateral (of which the EU is the most significant) as well as bilateral diplomacy and negotiation. In this sense Europeanisation has ended the idea that the FCO can play the role of a gatekeeper through which all contact with the outside world must flow. Such a role is now impossible, and the FCO, and the rest of Whitehall, accept that such a role is no longer plausible. However, the FCO remains the central department for monitoring, managing and, with Downing St and the Cabinet Office, coordinating the direction of British European and foreign policy. In this sense the EU has redefined the role of gatekeeper.

All in all the FCO, as a collective entity, has been neither a winner nor a loser from Europeanisation. For the FCO is has been given a greater field into which to become engaged while at the same time facing burgeoning pressures in terms of financial limits, global problems, and domestic shifts, which are in part also fed by European pressures. It has both strengthened and weakened the foreign policy of the UK, and at the same time strengthened and weakened the role played by the FCO. If there is an element of decline in the input of the FCO to relations with EU member states then this is better understood as relative decline given the growth in issues that now form relations and discussions.

As if to reflect the diverse levels at which the FCO operates and the wide variety of offices and outlooks, there is no single process by which Europeanisation has occurred. Top-down Europeanisation can apply to the position of the Political Director or the demand that Member States overseas diplomatic representations increase co-ordination. Indeed, it remains to be seen whether the decision to create a European Foreign Minister will bring considerable top-down pressures for greater co-operation. At the same time the UK and the FCO have been involved in EPC and now CFSP since the very start (unlike European integration in general) and have succeeded in uploading/domesticating British concerns at EU level. That the EU Security Strategy Document reflected British concerns was in part a result of it being written by the British
diplomat (and former advisor to the PM) Robert Cooper, perhaps the best example of a Europeanised British diplomat. Indeed, British attempts to shape EU external relations have been a key element of British membership and transatlantic relations. Here though we again see the limits in Europeanisation as we must also account for the role of Nato and the United States. Indeed, the role of the United States has been central to British and, to some extent, FCO, approaches to CFSP and the EU; perhaps in turn diminishing any arguments that Europeanisation of the FCO has been ‘voluntary’!

There is one final effect of Europeanisation which deserves mention. This paper has raised some questions about the ability and willingness of the FCO to adjust to the general challenge of a transformed world and the specific challenge of EU membership. One conclusion would seem be that, whilst the FCO has undoubtedly proved itself to be a foreign ministry capable of both responsiveness and flexibility (although Peter Hain MP when an FCO Minister talked of his ‘frustration that the (FCO) machine is geared to responding to new circumstances mostly by incremental shifts in emphasis’), it has yet to be fully tested by, or called upon to serve, a government willing to adopt a consistently proactive EU policy. If the Labour administration is to actively pursue the objectives, laid out in Robin Cook’s mission statement, of ‘exercising leadership in the European Union, protecting the world’s environment, countering the menace of drugs, terrorism and crime, spreading the values of human rights, civil liberties and democracy and using its status at the UN to secure more effective international action to keep the peace of the world and to combat poverty’ then the FCO just might find its organisation and working practices more fundamentally tested than it has to date.

The FCO was once described as being akin to a ‘Rolls Royce’. Indeed, it remains a traditional, debonair (some might say pompous) and highly effective instrument and symbol of the British state and British power. In part this stems from European cooperation and the changes the FCO has adopted in part as a response to the EU. Indeed, like Rolls Royce, which is now owned by BMW, the FCO owes a large part of its current and future success to continuing investment in European cooperation.


3 Clarke, *British External Policy-Making*, p.77

4 Martin Smith reports that the FCO was ‘thought by many to have had a new lease of life from membership (of the EU) after the shock of the decline of Empire’, Martin J Smith, *The Core Executive in Britain*, (London, Macmillan, 1999) p. 232


6 For instance the FCO has just 2 diplomats in Uzbekistan compared with France’s 17 and Germany’s 26. In Kazakhstan the UK has 3, France 10 and Germany 18, see *Financial Times*, 16 July, 1998


14 Dickie, *Inside the Foreign Office*, pp. 280-283

15 Dickie, *Inside the Foreign Office* p. 283

16 Robert Preston and George Parker, ‘Cabinet Office to keep role as independent mediator’, *Financial Times*, 21 April, 1998


19 Andrew Parker ‘Cook moves to cut costs at Foreign Office’, *Financial Times*, 5 February, 1999
20 Dickie, *Inside the Foreign Office*, p.62


26 Nicholas Watt, ‘Hain seeks to end “nationalist” line on foreign policy’, *Guardian*, 23 January 2001

27 This view is robustly challenged by David Owen who argues that Blair’s ‘presidentialism’ especially with regard to EU policy-making is significantly undermining the role of the cabinet to the detriment of the UK interest. See Lord Owen, ‘The ever growing dominance of No 10 in British Diplomacy’, lecture delivered at the LSE, 8th October 2003.

28 For a detailed account of the work of the various cabinet committees in the making of European policy see Alisdair Blair, ‘UK Policy Coordination during the 1990-91 Intergovernmental Conference’, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 9, No. 2, especially pp. 161-167


30 Martin J Smith, *The Core Executive in Britain*, pp. 234-235


32 See Donald Macintyre, ‘Making Europe more democratic will also make it too powerful’, *The Independent*, 19 March, 1999

33 For a further examination of these issues see Tim Oliver ‘Who’s afraid of a European Office?’ Forthcoming 2005.

34 Martin J Smith, *The Core Executive*, p. 233

35 Interview with Dr Philip Budden of the Cabinet Office European Secretariat, June 2002.

36 See Alisdair Blair, ‘UK Policy Coordination during the 1990-91 Intergovernmental Conference’, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 9, No. 2, especially pp. 161-167 for a detailed description of official and ministerial EU committees

37 Alisdair Blair, ‘UK Policy Coordination during the 1990-91 Intergovernmental Conference’,

38 See for instance the role played by the FCO in the recent Defence Review conducted by the Ministry of Defence, *Guardian*, 4 July, 1997 and the recent joint publication with the DTI of a
39 Martin J Smith, *The Core Executive in Britain*, p.234

40 See ‘Devolution and Foreign Affairs’ a speech by FCO Minister of State, Ms Joyce Quin, to the Northern Ireland Assembly, Belfast, 26 February 1999


42 Interview with senior member of UKRep, March 2003.

43 Figures taken from names listed in the Diplomatic Service List 2002. This, we admit, is not the most reliable measurement of allocation of resources, but the figures demonstrate a significant difference.

44 Interview at UKRep, March 2004.

45 Interview at European Commission Office to the UN, June 2004. Also, does Karen have some figures on these?

46 For an example of the sort of challenge that the FCO has had to rebuff see Tessa Blackstone, ‘Too many Britons abroad’, *Guardian*, 21 May, 1993


51 FCO Connect, October 2003.

52 For further details see ‘Review of Management at posts overseas’ by Robin Hoggard and Chris Green, FCO, November 2003.


55 This does not exclude British overseas missions which are ‘co-located’ with EU partners. In 2003 the following missions were co-located: Quito (UK/Germany); Dar es Salaam, (UK/Germany/Netherlands/EU); Freetown (UK/France); Gaborone (UK/France); Minsk (Italy); Nicosia (Italy); Sofia (European Commission). Letter from Secretary of State Baroness Symons to Lord Wallace of Saltaire, 31 December 2003.


57 David Buchan, ‘Cook to propose EU foreign policy committee’, *Financial Times*, 13 March 1999


59 See John Tusa, ‘A Dismal Volte-Face’, *The Observer*, 17 January, 1999

See Kampfner Blair’s Wars, Speech by David Owen, Seldon...


*Financial Times*, 16/17 January, 1999


Martin J Smith, *The Core Executive in Britain*, p.235

*Guardian*, 23 January 2001