The Puzzles and Paradoxes of Europeanisation - Lessons from the Scottish Experience

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INTRODUCTION

In certain key respects, the Europeanisation of government bureaucracy leads to outcomes which might be regarded as somewhat puzzling and paradoxical. This puzzle is seen to revolve around the belief that whilst membership of the European Union (EU) has wrought significant impact upon the shape and direction of national policies and policy processes, the impact upon the bureaucratic infrastructure of domestic government systems has by comparison been somewhat limited. Of late, however, a means of resolving this puzzle has been put forward. In short, the preoccupation of historical-institutionalist analysis with largely structural, institutional and procedural-based aspects of change may, it is argued, have led to the apparently divergent or contradictory paths taken by the respective policy-related and bureaucratic-administrative forms of Europeanisation. A less puzzling interpretation of developments might flow if, in addition to the purely institutionalist perspective, more attention were to be focused upon broader cultural factors and the role played by individuals within the context of bureaucratic adaptation processes.

This paper attempts to follow the latter course by way of a case-study examination of how bureaucratic Europeanisation came to impact upon the institutional basis of territorial government in Scotland across a thirty year period. The focus is thus upon the long-term impact on first the Scottish Office from 1973 onwards and then the Scottish Executive with the advent of devolution in 1999. The aim is to examine the trajectory and relative depth of Europeanisation experienced in this particular case and the extent to which that Europeanisation has in fact been influenced by not only the broader structural and procedural context of the UK administrative system as a whole but also by cultural, actor-based and departmental factors specific to the Scottish case. In so doing it should also be possible to ascertain where this case-study sits in terms of broader theoretical definitions and conceptualisations of Europeanisation and in particular, whether it might be deemed compatible with the ‘top-down’ interpretation which frames the various contributions to this volume.

THE DOMAINS OF EUROPEANISATION

The apparent puzzles and contradictions surrounding the Europeanisation of government bureaucracy form only part of much wider debates. The very term ‘Europeanisation’ in itself of course has become a key focus for analysis in recent years. In particular, issues surrounding the definition and application of this term...
have been hotly debated (eg. see Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001; Featherstone and Kazamias 2001; Knill 2001; Featherstone 2003). Whilst these debates continue apace, some common frameworks have nevertheless emerged. In particular, the ‘domains’ of Europeanisation set forth by Radaelli (2003) provide a useful starting point. In an attempt to avoid the dangers of ‘conceptual stretching’, Radaelli suggests that Europeanisation might be taken to mean slightly different things when applied to different areas or ‘domains’. Thus, while each of public administration, public and private institutions, intergovernmental relations, legal systems, party politics or interest representation might experience Europeanisation in the broadest sense of ‘adapting to Europe’, the specific processes and outcomes particular to each area would differ (Radaelli 2003: 34-36). Similarly, Olsen (2002: 923) argues that it may be possible to offer differing yet complementary interpretations of the term depending upon the area of application.

The present analysis focuses upon the governmental aspects of Europeanisation and in particular the impact of Europe on the departmental bureaucracy of central government in the UK. For this reason, the terms ‘administrative’ and ‘bureaucratic’ Europeanisation will be used, so as to re-emphasise the particular domain under consideration. Given that the emphasis here rests with how a particular department has adapted to and accommodated the European dimension it would seem logical to make reference to that school of thought which treats Europeanisation as an essentially ‘top-down’ phenomenon (eg. Buller and Gamble 2002; Bulmer and Radaelli 2004). In this sense, the experiences of the Scottish Office and Scottish Executive can be most easily measured against a conceptualisation of Europeanisation which sees downward pressures for change stemming from membership of the EU as the national (and sub-national) levels adapt to governing actors, processes and institutions framed at the European level. Within this broad conceptualisation there is also the more specific typology set forth by Bache and Jordan in their Introduction to this volume ie. the demarcations between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ Europeanisation (whereby the EU impact is either intended or unexpected/inadvertent), ‘voluntary’ and ‘coercive’ (whereby the EU impact is willingly accepted by domestic actors or alternatively resisted) and the various fusions between these distinctions through ‘voluntary-direct’, ‘coercive direct’ and so on.

PUZZLES AND PARADOXES

A common thread running through analyses of the impact of Europeanisation on government bureaucracy is this key observation. While membership of the EU has wrought immense changes across a range of policy competences within member states and has affected how that policy is formulated, discernible patterns of change and adaptation within departments and the procedural machinery of national government systems has been much more limited. This state of affairs is quite often regarded as something of a ‘puzzle’ (Jordan 2001: 6; Bulmer and Burch 2001: 75; Olsen 2003: 524-525). The puzzle would seem to centre around the apparent absence of a direct correlation between potential pressures for change and those changes which actually transpire in terms of administrative accommodation of the EU dimension. The case of the UK, where administrative practice and civil service structures tend to vary considerably from many other EU member states (Edwards
1992: 70-71; Dowding 1995: 149-150), is cited frequently within this context. In view of the ‘gap’ between UK and continental administrative traditions (the EU system drawing heavily upon the latter) one might have expected either a clash or convergence of styles to have occurred but this has simply not been the case (Bulmer and Burch 1998: 620-621; Goetz 2001: 214-215). Although the UK presents perhaps the most blatant example, similar ‘gaps’ between expectations and reality can be identified in other member states, for example Sweden (see Ekengren and Sundelius 1998: 138-140).

The study of bureaucratic-administrative Europeanisation would thus seem to be marked by a ‘puzzling inconsistency’; on the one hand, the deep-seated impact of Europeanisation on policy and on the other, a more limited, incremental and generally ‘shallower’ impact on departmental infrastructure (Jordan 2001: 6). The fact that member state bureaucracies have been able to accommodate the extensive Europeanisation of policy competences whilst largely maintaining their own distinctive administrative structures has, for some commentators, indicated the limitations of European integration; in effect, the existence of the EU is not in itself a strong enough force or motor to push towards some kind of administrative and institutional convergence across member state bureaucracies (Featherstone and Kazamias 2001: 11; Goetz 2001: 217).

Given these apparent puzzles and inconsistencies, the need for an explanatory or conceptual framework becomes all the more pressing in this area. Of prime significance in this respect are the various strands of institutionalist theory which can be applied in seeking to understand bureaucratic adaptation to the European dimension (Aspinwall and Schneider 2001; Bulmer and Burch 2001: 73-74; Featherstone and Kazamias 2001: 7-10). The first of three key variants is rational choice institutionalism. Here, the emphasis is very much on an actor-based approach with wider contextual factors such as political or cultural background assuming secondary importance. The second variant is sociological institutionalism. Here, the analysis is applied on the basis of longer-term perspectives and draws much more on the cultural background to government, state and institutions. Within the Europeanisation context, an understanding of the roles and development of institutions comes from placing them within the context of the overall historical-cultural approaches to European integration adopted by the member state in question. The third and final variant which can be applied is historical institutionalism. Again, as is explicit in its title, the emphasis here is very much on the longer-term perspective, on the cumulative impact of bureaucratic adaptation over extended periods of time. The aim is to look out for historically driven pathways which might be marked by incremental processes springing from convention and tradition. In simple terms, past experience is seen to shape future developments, in particular by limiting diversions from preconditioned pathways and thus heavily constraining any rational choice elements.

Studies of Europeanisation have found historical institutionalism to be a useful benchmark or at least, a starting point in conducting analysis of institutional change (eg. Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001; Knill 2001). Indeed, Bulmer and Burch (2001: 75) highlight the attractions of such an approach by relating it directly to the puzzle and inconsistency angle referred to previously. In this respect, the lack of deep-seated modification to national government bureaucracy in the face of EU
influences can be partly explained through historical institutionalist interpretations. In short, a potential match is perceived between the theory and experience which indicates a robustness and even a propensity for reinforcement of existing national administrative structures and procedures in the face of Europeanisation. With reference to the ‘top-down’ typology forwarded by Bache and Jordan, bureaucratic Europeanisation might thus be seen to fit into the ‘coercive-indirect’ mould as any pressures for administrative change are resisted and any resultant change is kept to a minimum. However, this assumes of course that such Europeanising pressures exist in the bureaucratic domain in the first place. In this respect, it may well be that the ‘top-down’ model of Europeanisation, as broadly defined, is less persuasive when applied to the Europeanisation of bureaucracy than to the Europeanisation of policy. Indeed, if as historical-institutionalism would seem to suggest, there is a ‘puzzling gap’ between Europeanising outcomes in these two domains then it is entirely possible that the Europeanisation of bureaucracy is more dynamic, variable and subject to inter and intra-member state interaction than a wholly ‘top-down’ interpretation would otherwise suggest.

On the other hand, much of the above depends upon the accuracy or general applicability of the ‘puzzle’ put forward by historical-institutionalism. Tellingly, however, those deploying historical institutionalist interpretations are careful to qualify their approach. For example, Bulmer and Burch (2001: 74) state categorically that whilst historical institutionalism is their chosen path, they nonetheless recognise the attractions of sociological institutionalism. In particular, they believe that the cultural dimensions inherent to the latter should be accommodated and used to facilitate understanding within a broader historical institutionalist framework for analysis. Such sentiments are echoed amongst other commentators who use historical institutionalism as their initial starting block. Thus Knill (2001: 25-27) presses the need to modify historical institutionalism as an analytical tool, principally so that additional account might be taken of the role of individuals and their interaction within institutions. The significance of individual actors is equally highlighted by Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001: 11).

It would seem therefore that a mixture of factors and variables have to be taken into account in seeking a fuller understanding of how Europeanisation has impacted upon domestic government bureaucracy. In effect, there seems much to support Jordan (2001: 6) and his argument that the culture, values, history and role of individual actors within particular departments (what he terms the ‘software’ of policy-making) may be just as important in shaping Europeanisation outcomes as the formal rules, procedures and administrative structures (the ‘hardware’ of policy-making). For Jordan, the fact that the ‘softer’ factors have not been sufficiently taken into account would help to explain why those approaching Europeanisation, particularly from historical institutionalist perspectives, have been able to argue so readily that changes to bureaucratic infrastructure have been limited and that, compared to the impact on policy itself, this is ‘puzzling’. Jordan’s work has focused largely on one UK government department, the Department of the Environment (DoE) in London. By looking at the long-term Europeanising experiences of another UK department, the Scottish Office (and Scottish Executive), some further evidence can be provided on both the extent to which bureaucratic and administrative forms of Europeanisation might take place, the impact which actor-based, cultural and departmental characteristics can have on developments and
ULTIMATELY, THE APPLICABILITY OF EITHER HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM OR ‘TOP-DOWN’ DEMARCATIONS TO THE GIVEN CASE.

THE NATURE OF EUROPEANISATION ACROSS MEMBER STATES

INTERPRETING BUREAUCRATIC EUROPEANISATION

On the basis of Page and Wouter's (1995) analysis the impact of the EU on national administrative systems is seen to be limited. In their view this stems from the absence of a cohesive, homogeneous EU bureaucracy upon which national governments can model themselves. In addition to this line of argument, elements of those institutionalist perspectives highlighted earlier can also be introduced in seeking to explain the limitations of bureaucratic Europeanisation. In particular, it is worth noting that such perspectives suggest that institutions do not always respond to external forces for change and indeed, occasionally lead to the purposeful avoidance of adaptation processes. Within a Europeanisation context such thinking assumes an obvious relevance.

By expanding our understanding of what actually constitutes bureaucratic Europeanisation, however, a quite different picture emerges. For example, Ladrech (1994: 69) departs from the above line of analysis by arguing that there is not a distinct split between the two types of Europeanisation referred to, namely those relating to policy and administration respectively. In his view, the two are closely related, processes of policy adaptation having a clear impact on those of institutional adaptation. In this respect, processes of structural adaptation within national bureaucracies are clearly as dependent upon the form taken by EU policy processes as they are upon the prevailing institutional and cultural ethos within EU administration. For example, emerging styles of European policy-making have clearly had an effect on traditional forms of national administration (Meny et al 1996: 4-5). Thus, established policy communities, where domestic government departments tended to play a pivotal role, have been forced to adapt to the complexities of transnational lobbying and intergovernmental bargaining at the EU level.

While they employ the very same institutionalist perspectives referred to above, Wessels and Rometsch (1996a) reach a set of conclusions which differ quite substantially from those of Page and Wouters. This stems from the fact that they do not confine themselves to the narrower definition of bureaucratic Europeanisation used by Page and Wouters but take into consideration once again those policy related factors highlighted earlier. Within this context they conclude that the Europeanisation of national institutions has been highly significant and pervasive in terms of the effects wrought on national administrative infrastructure. Indeed, they argue that the structural and operational forms of adaptation within government departments have been so pronounced as to lead to a process not only of Europeanisation but also of subsequent 'institutional fusion' whereby the lines of demarcation between purely national and European levels of institutions become increasingly blurred, 'interwoven' and 'mutually dependent' (Wessels and Rometsch 1996a: xiii-xiv). However, they stop short of arguing that 'institutional convergence'
has taken place because member states are not perceived to be 'losing their specific politico-institutional structure and behaviour' (Wessels and Rometsch 1996b: 329-330 and see also Mittag and Wessels 2003: 444-447). In this sense, while national institutions are increasingly affected by an EU bureaucracy and interact more frequently with the latter in policy processes, this does not extend, as yet, to domestic government departments being subsumed within an all-embracing system of 'Euro-administration' although precisely how one can measure or define what constitutes ‘administrative convergence’ in this context is a matter of some debate and uncertainty (see Olsen 2003).

With yet another analysis, however, the outcomes of bureaucratic Europeanisation are seen to take perhaps their most extreme form. In the case of Germany, Goetz (1996: 24) argues that Europeanisation has had such a profound impact on national administration as to entail deep-rooted cultural change as well as purely structural and operational adaptation. In this example, Europeanisation is seen to encompass most of the outcomes discussed above plus a more overtly political and cultural element which actually leads government departments themselves to act as institutional motors or driving forces in pushing forward the integration process. A similar situation can be identified in Belgium. Regarded as one of the most enthusiastic, pro-federal member states, this political dynamic is also strongly reflected amongst officialdom (Kerremans and Beyers 1998: 29-30; Franck, Leclereq and Vandevievere 2003: 88).

What these various analyses indicate is that there is some debate as to how the outcomes of adaptation within government departments manifest themselves. However, while debates take place on the nature and outcomes of Europeanisation, there is some consensus on the wider processes as they affect individual member states. Recalling Wessels and Rometsch's comments on the 'politico-institutional structure and behaviour' of EU member states, most commentators are agreed that forms of administrative adaptation will not take identical shapes across member states, given the differences which prevail in pre-existing national bureaucratic infrastructure (Ladrech 1994: 70; Page and Wouters 1995: 197; Wessels and Rometsch 1996b: 329-330; Kassim 2003: 102-104). Thus, while some common features of bureaucratic Europeanisation have been identified above (albeit with some debate on their resultant outcomes), it is nonetheless the case that the specifics of such processes will be very much dependent upon the administrative infrastructure and cultures prevailing in each member state.

The above observations have clear implications for a study of the Europeanisation of Scottish governance. On the one hand, by establishing the fact that the nature of bureaucratic Europeanisation varies across member states, there is evidently a need to examine how wider administrative traditions in the UK have impacted upon processes of individual departmental adaptation. In this respect, the forms of bureaucratic adaptation in evidence at the Scottish Office and later the Scottish Executive will have been as much dependent upon national administrative tradition as they were upon any of the general features of bureaucratic Europeanisation identified above. In turn, this points towards an element of dynamism and variability in terms of a ‘top-down’ framework of bureaucratic Europeanisation.
EUROPEANISATION PROCESSES IN THE UK

There appears to be general agreement that administrative traditions and values within the departmental and civil service infrastructure have had some impact on the nature of EU adaptation processes within the UK (Edwards 1992: 67; Dowding 1995: 149-150; Armstrong and Bulmer 1996: 256; Bulmer and Burch 1998: 603). An illustration can be provided which serves to distinguish administrative Europeanisation in the UK from its political equivalent as well as from administrative trends in some other member states. In this respect, the analysis hinges upon the apolitical nature or 'theoretically neutral' position of the UK civil service (Armstrong and Bulmer 1996: 256). Thus, Wallace (1996: 62) argues that the skill, expertise and efficiency which are apparent in the way UK civil servants deal with EU matters can be contrasted with the arguable 'awkwardness' (George 1994) and reticence displayed by some UK politicians in coming to terms with the EU dimension. The culture and ethos of neutrality underpinning the general approach of UK administration to European adaptation can therefore be seen to have led to a situation where the UK civil service has been quicker to adapt to the conventions and demands of EU membership than the politicians. Not only does this situation contrast with the fluidity and controversy which has marked political debates on Europeanisation within the UK, but it also clearly departs from the state of affairs in Germany where, as Goetz (1996) argued earlier, the bureaucracy has arguably become Europeanised in a more overtly political sense. Similarly, it differs from the French experience where, according to Lequesne (1996: 112), there have been marked variations across the civil service, some departments regarding themselves as 'winners' from Europeanisation processes, others as 'losers' and both camps tailoring their approaches to adaptation processes accordingly.

From the above it would therefore seem to be the case that administrative traditions in the UK have had a number of clear implications for the nature of EU adaptation processes within the national bureaucracy. However, given that the present work is concerned with the study of Europeanisation as it affected one particular department, it would seem pertinent to consider whether these implications can be applied or interpreted in a uniform manner across the administrative system as a whole. For departmental characteristics to have had any impact in practice, it would have to be assumed that the overall context within which UK departments Europeanise is sufficiently flexible to allow for some variation at the level of the individual department, even though broader administrative traditions across the UK as a whole might still exert a predominant influence.

Patterns of adaptation: consistency and variation across Whitehall

According to the foregoing analysis, one key determining factor in the Europeanisation of administration in the UK is the neutral or apolitical nature of the civil service and the fact that it has no broad opinion or outlook on the validity or direction of the European integration project as a whole. However, while agreeing with the general thrust of this conclusion, some commentators have nevertheless suggested that it exhibits subtle variations, both as it applies across the administrative system and as it applies to individual departments. For example, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has been perceived by a number of former government ministers to have assumed a 'pro-European' position over the
years (Young and Sloman 1982: 79-80; Wallace 1996: 68). On the other hand, both the Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) are seen to have varied their attitudes over time, ranging from enthusiasm or indifference to hostility on EU matters (Edwards 1992: 81-83). With such evidence in view, it becomes more difficult to assert that all government departments have adopted a strictly apolitical approach in adapting to the EU. As a consequence, it may be more appropriate to suggest that while there is some truth behind this general trend, given the traditions of civil service neutrality in the UK, there are nevertheless variations in its applicability or consistency within specific departments. In this initial sense, therefore, it is already clear that bureaucratic Europeanisation has not materialised in an entirely homogenous form across UK departments.

With regard to the more practical manifestations of structural adaptation, similar patterns of uniformity and variation can be identified. At one level, for instance, the most obvious pattern is that different departments have had to respond to the European dimension to varying degrees, depending upon how far the supranational level has impacted upon their respective policy competences or administrative roles within UK government as a whole. Following accession in 1973, increasing numbers of departments came to be affected by the EC dimension. In the 1970s, the FCO, the Treasury, the Departments of Trade and Energy and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) were the main departments involved in EC matters (Bender 1991: 14) with MAFF in particular experiencing 'radical reorientation' (Edwards 1992: 78). By the late 1980s and early 1990s other departments such as the Home Office and the Department of Health were drawn increasingly into the fold (Bender 1991: 14). In general terms, however, while more and more departments came to experience some form of Europeanisation, the impact of the latter processes varied between individual departments, depending upon the maturity and intensity of EC/EU policy competences in any given area.

Of perhaps greater significance in attempting to ascertain how far processes of bureaucratic Europeanisation have been characterised by either uniformity or diversity, is the question of co-ordination and direction between departments in their approaches to EU matters. For example, Armstrong and Bulmer (1996: 269) highlight the fact that a decision was taken in 1973 not to create a separate European ministry within Whitehall to take overall charge of the EC dimension. Instead, the Heath administration decided that, while a co-ordinating unit would continue within the Cabinet Office (European Secretariat), it would nevertheless be left to individual departments to adapt as they saw fit. One long term consequence of this decision, it is argued, is that common patterns of adaptation across departments have perhaps been less easy to discern due to the fact that 'modifications have usually been an intra-departmental' affair (Edwards 1992: 77). However, the development of the European Secretariat and what are generally regarded to be rigorous and effective mechanisms for the overall co-ordination of EU matters in Whitehall (Bender 1991: 16-18) must also be seen to be of significance. In this respect, Armstrong and Bulmer (1996: 264) highlight the existence of arguably divergent forces. On the one hand, the existence of the European Secretariat is entirely consistent with traditions of centralised control in the UK. On the other, individual departments have largely been left to adapt to the EU as they have seen fit. Within this context therefore, there would indeed seem to be scope for the characteristics of
the Scottish Office and Scottish Executive to have had an impact on processes of bureaucratic adaptation within that department.

Given the above conclusions, the forms of bureaucratic change which affected Scottish governance were dependent upon three key sets of factors. The first concern the wider aspects of bureaucratic adaptation in evidence across member states as, in effect, domestic government departments restructure or reorientate themselves to meet the demands and requirements of EU membership. The second relate to the significant impact which national administrative traditions have upon the general forms taken by structural change and the fact that as a consequence there are as many differences as there are similarities to bureaucratic Europeanisation as it affects different countries within the EU. The third and final set of factors revolve around the fact that even within one individual state, the nature of bureaucratic Europeanisation need not be marked by a blanket of consistency and homogeneity. In this respect, the traits and characteristics of single departments are afforded the opportunity to have an effect on the specifics of structural change as it applies to those departments, albeit within the strictures of broader, national administrative traditions. In general, this serves to reinforce the point made earlier that care has to be exercised when seeking to apply a ‘top-down’ definition of Europeanisation to the bureaucratic domain. Whilst national administrations and departments are responding to downward adaptation and accommodation pressures, the actual processes of change and outcomes are neither uniform nor predictable. Instead, there would appear to be an element of dynamic, variable interaction both within the parameters of national administrative systems themselves and between these systems and the ‘top-down’ Europeanising pressures.

THE NATURE OF ADAPTATION PROCESSES WITHIN THE SCOTTISH OFFICE AND SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE

As highlighted earlier, a variety of interpretations exist as to how processes and outcomes of change can be defined as they apply across the EU as a whole. In this respect, the practical and cultural effects of change upon national bureaucracies were seen to range between the limited (Page and Wouters 1995), more pronounced (Ladrech 1994; Meny et al 1996b) and far-reaching (Goetz 1996; Wessels and Rometsch 1996a and 1996b). In short, while the existence of adaptation processes and instances of their specific impact were not disputed, there was a clear lack of consensus on the broader question regarding the depth and extent of Europeanisation in terms of its long-term impact upon government departments. From the historical institutionalist perspective, however, there was an arguably ‘puzzling’ outcome. In this sense, while extensive Europeanisation of policy had taken place, it was claimed that the Europeanisation of bureaucracy had indeed been limited by comparison.

At one level, elements of the Scottish Office and Scottish Executive experience clearly illustrate how the specifics of change could manifest themselves in practice. Thus, the creation of dedicated European units in the European Funds Division (EFD) and a European Central Support Unit (ECSU) were tangible examples of structural accommodation within the Scottish Office and likewise the Executive Secretariat (External) and later the External Affairs Division (EAD) within the Scottish Executive. Equally, the introduction of European training and increasing
use of secondments heralded key forms of cultural adaptation. In terms of ministers and civil servants executing their day-to-day business, the influence of Europeanisation has made itself further evident in a number of ways. For example, ministers could be confronted by European business in full Cabinet or Cabinet Committee (particularly OPD(E) - the Ministerial Sub-Committee on European Questions). More significantly, for senior officials from Edinburgh, participation in the network of European Secretariat committees could form a substantial proportion of their Europeanised activity. Many parts of the Scottish Office and Scottish Executive have also been involved in more or less continuous bilateral discussions and co-ordination with other Whitehall departments on EU-related issues, particularly in relation to agriculture, fisheries and the Structural Funds. In Brussels itself, ministers and civil servants have also found themselves embroiled in various forms of interaction with the UK Permanent Representation (UKREP) and EU institutions during the course of European policy-making processes. Finally, for certain parts of the Scottish Office and Scottish Executive (particularly the agriculture and fisheries, environment divisions and EFD) Europeanisation entailed a substantial role in terms of implementing EU policy obligations (For more details on the above see Smith 2001a; Smith 2001b; Smith 2003; Sloat 2002; Bulmer et al 2002).

Viewing the above developments together, there is little doubt that the Scottish Office and Scottish Executive have faced a measure of practical, readily identifiable adaptation which has been far from negligible or peripheral in its impact. However, the more probing question to be additionally addressed concerns the long-term depth and extent of change in the given case. In effect, was the Scottish Office experience closer to Page and Wouters' (1995) suggested scenario, whereby Europeanisation greatly affected policies but not governmental infrastructure, or did it share more in common with alternative outcomes stemming from deeper-seated administrative changes? Taking the former scenario to begin with, a case could certainly be made for highlighting the limitations to Europeanisation as it applied to the Scottish Office. In this respect, ammunition for the ‘puzzle’ posited by the historical institutionalists may be at hand.

Possible limitations to Europeanisation

A recurring conclusion or observation running throughout the Scottish experience was that, concomitant with UK-wide trends, existing administrative conventions and traditions (ie. pre-Europeanisation) played a heavy role in determining the final shape of adaptation processes within the Scottish Office. In one sense, this need not have led to a more limited form of Europeanisation as such. Indeed, it may even have strengthened the accommodation of the European dimension in certain ways. For example, with regard to the implementation of policy the Scottish Office experience, like that of other UK departments, encompassed a striving for efficiency and thoroughness in ensuring that every letter of a piece of legislation was put into effect. Thus, former civil servants (Hamilton 1998; McCrone 1998) have stressed how successful implementation stemmed largely from the fact that the Scottish Office sought to ensure that any potential problems were identified and ironed out during the policy formulation stages, be it in Whitehall or Brussels. Moreover, the ‘legalistic assumptions’ (Armstrong and Bulmer 1996: 275-276) and sense of obligation driving UK administrative attitudes were clearly evident within Scottish
Office circles. The comments of a former minister, the Earl of Lindsay, typify the attention afforded to the implementation dimension:

‘There was always so much detail that a constant threat hung over ministers and civil servants that if something went wrong, penalties and controversies would ensue.’ (Lindsay 1998)

The above factors perhaps contributed to a degree of Europeanisation more robust than that which prevailed in some other member states and indeed could be regarded as an instance of that ‘voluntary-direct’ adaptation included within Bache and Jordan’s ‘top-down’ typology. Although the implementation angle was never going to be perfect within the Scottish context, problems with the CAP Integrated Administration and Control System during the mid-1990s being a case in point (Scottish Affairs Commitee 1996: 2), the lapses which did occur were not comparable to say the Italian experience where transposition of EU obligations into national law has not always led to tangible implementation and enforcement (Guiliani 1996: 119-125). In other senses, however, the predominance of established traditions may have served to limit or ring-fence the intensity of Europeanising outcomes.

Empirical findings on cultural change act as illustrators of the latter argument. For example, the impact of European training programmes and secondments was in many ways limited. Their key purpose was to facilitate a narrower form of adaptation, to give Scottish Office officials a practical grasp of EU structures and procedures; the kindling of a European or ‘communautaire’ spirit was very much a secondary outcome. In these respects, the extent of cultural change was strictly limited. The style of administrative operations did not change and any shift in emphasis which did take place did not really extend beyond responding more quickly to the possible implications and effects wrought by a ‘foreign’ dimension upon the existing work and remit of a department (Fraser 1998; Hamilton 1998; McCrone 1998). In terms of Bache and Jordan’s typology, the limited nature of cultural change could thus be classified ‘voluntary-indirect’.

Additionally, apart from a few pockets of resistance to change during the early years following accession, Europeanisation did not entail that political dimension which arguably affected officialdom in some other member states. In this respect, Scottish Office civil servants did not adapt outward views on the merits or otherwise of European integration and allow these to permeate their conduct of EU-related business:

‘It was a fact of life that we were in Europe. We had a job to do and had to get on with it; we were there to serve ministers, not to have opinions on the politics of the matter.’ (Cormack 1998)

This quote exemplifies the attitudes expressed to the author by all those officials interviewed and quite clearly reflects the situation across Whitehall departments as described by Edwards (1992: 66-67) and Armstrong and Bulmer (1996: 256). Traditions of neutrality and apoliticism continued to prevail, prohibiting that deeper, politicised form of change which arguably affected the German bureaucracy (Goetz 1996). Finally, the Europeanising influence of secondments could be seen to have
been even more limited. Rather than officials 'going native' or seeking to import European styles and working methods, those returning from placements tended to reinforce existing national culture, largely as a result of sceptical encounters with more politicised bureaucratic infrastructure in Brussels. In particular, some secondees from the Scottish Office found it difficult to come to terms with the degree of politicisation across the directorates-general of the Commission (Mackay 1998). In such respects, any 'contagion' effect (Page and Wouters 1995: 197) is clearly absent. Using the ‘top-down’ demarcations, if identifiable forms of Europeanisation outcomes had actually transpired in these respects, these would have fallen into the ‘coercive’ category. However, the fact that tangible change did not take place lends weight again to the argument that, given the dynamics and variable cultural factors involved, not all aspects of bureaucratic Europeanisation fit neatly into the ‘top-down’ typology.

From a broader perspective, the arguable limitations to Europeanisation can be discerned in further ways. For example, it was clear that forms of structural accommodation within the Scottish Office tended to follow an accretive route (see Smith 2003). In this respect, apart from EFD and ECSU (and later the EAD within the Scottish Executive) there was no great restructuring of departments and divisions or creation of a large number of posts devoted solely to EU matters. European business tended to be accommodated within the confines of existing infrastructure and was handled by staff who continued to be engaged in other, non-EU related tasks. Indeed, along with the cultural dimension of change, adaptation processes within the Scottish Office seemed to be broadly characterised by accretion and incrementalism which, at face value, may have lessened the overall impact of Europeanisation processes.

The early 1990s witnessed exceptions to the established pattern of accretive and incremental change, namely through the creation of EFD and ECSU and this once again reflected general developments across Whitehall. Thus, the more strident and self-evidently EU-related forms of restructuring which did take place centred around the introduction of European co-ordination units with the emphasis resting firmly on co-ordination, there being no reversal of previous patterns of accretive accommodation by established functional units (Scottish Office 1991a: 3; Scottish Office 1995: 11). The general approach of civil servants was still to initiate practical measures, as and when necessary, to meet immediate practical objectives. In this sense there was arguably little in the way of a deep-seated re-alignment of structure or culture. In short, these arguments correlate with Page and Wouters' (1995) conclusion that the effects of Europeanisation have been limited (because deep-seated change has not taken place) though not with their explanation for this outcome (ie. that there is, as yet, no common European administrative style or model for national bodies to copy or subsume). Within the context of historical institutionalism, the Scottish Office experience would also appear to lend weight to the ‘puzzle’ of limited bureaucratic Europeanisation sitting alongside more extensive policy Europeanisation.

Deep-seated change

While there is some prima facie merit in the above arguments, they ultimately fall short of providing a full understanding of the developments under consideration.
This stems largely from the fact that they underestimate the complexity of both Europeanisation *per se* and the course of developments within the Scottish Office. In such respects, it may in fact be possible to identify the existence of undercurrents of deep-seated change. In effect, by digging deeper and modifying the historical institutionalist approach so as to take more account of the ‘software’ (Jordan 2001: 6) of policy-making (history, culture and the role of actors within individual departments) it may be possible to discern that ‘incremental-transformative change’ put forward by Bulmer and Burch (2001: 81).

The case of accretive adaptation can be revisited once again to provide initial expansion and illustration of the above point. Earlier it was suggested that the accretive approach may have led to a less intense form of Europeanisation. However, by way of countering this argument, crucial significance lies in the fact that the said approach did not prevail by accident. Following accession an elite-level decision was taken within the Scottish Office not to use large-scale European units or divisions (Fraser 1998). In one respect it was simply deemed more practical for relevant responsibilities to be dispersed and handled by existing units. In addition, however, a secondary consequence of this approach was that it arguably engendered, in the long-term, a more deep-seated form of Europeanisation. This stems from the fact that existing units and divisions were more likely to be exposed to front-line EU tasks and responsibilities. A less thorough form of adaptation may have resulted if divisions had been able to delegate or transfer European commitments to a potentially cumbersome, all-embracing European unit. It was also arguably true that the thoroughness of Europeanisation was further advanced by the calibre and enthusiasm exhibited by many of those officials assigned to European tasks. As noted earlier, officials maintained an apolitical stance but at the same time this did not prohibit an ‘apolitical enthusiasm’ from developing. The fact that different departments across Whitehall have been able to adopt varying degrees of effort and outlook in adapting to the European dimension whilst simultaneously maintaining an apolitical stance on the merits or otherwise of European integration *per se* is well established (Edwards 1992: 81-83; Wallace 1996: 68; Buller and Smith 1998: 166). In the case of the Scottish Office, ministers were quick to note how their officials remained apolitical but at the same time grasped the European nettle in firm, confident and non-reluctant fashion (Brown 1998; Younger 1998).

Mention of the word 'enthusiasm' draws attention to additional factors which can be used to strengthen the above arguments. For example, it was apparent that not all civil servants restricted themselves to the limitations of the strictly formal European training highlighted earlier. In this respect, many of those involved in EU-related business actively sought to 'Europeanise' by immersing themselves in the procedures and demands made by EU membership. Equally, during the early years of membership in particular, a degree of non-politicised 'Euro-enthusiasm' amongst certain senior officials and ministers may have helped to intensify such processes. Thus, some six months before UK accession in January 1973, Scottish Office ministers and more particularly, senior civil servants, began to make frequent visits to the Commission and UKREP and in so doing set a ‘pro-active’ example which was to be followed in later years (McCrone 1998).

Of perhaps greatest significance, however, in indicating the existence of deeper forms of Europeanisation were the patterns of practical experience which prevailed.
A key illustrative example centres around the Scottish Office being able to use its 'Euro-enthusiasm' and nurturing of Euro-expertise to good effect in the course of interdepartmental discussions in Whitehall. According to George Younger (1998), a former Secretary of State for Scotland, this represented the department making use of 'extra muscle' (in seeking to forward territorial inputs successfully at the Whitehall level) which stemmed from its broader approaches to Europeanisation processes. This 'muscle' could manifest itself in various ways. For example, a former Head of the European Secretariat within the Cabinet Office in London recalls the Scottish Office making notable inputs to committee discussions on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) - (Hadley 1998). What can be further noted is that the interest and dedication exhibited by Scottish Office officialdom in dealing with European matters had an arguable impact on the extent to which that department came to rely on the advisory and information provision aspects of the role carried out by the European Secretariat. For example, Younger (1998) was certainly of the belief that in seeking out information on particular issues, 'you got a better answer, much quicker, if you dealt direct with UKREP and the EC institutions.' By implication, therefore, it would seem that the Scottish Office was one of those departments identified by Spence (1993: 56-57) which, due to having built up their own expertise, did not have to over-rely on the Secretariat’s advice and support functions. From the perspective of the Scottish Office, the fact that lower grade officials had developed direct EC level contacts over time meant that there was less need to depend upon Whitehall channels for information provision (Hamilton 1998; McCrone 1998; Younger 1998). Similarly, the establishment of a permanent Scottish Executive EU Office in Brussels is perhaps of relevance in that, while this development is clearly linked to political as well as administrative changes stemming from devolution, it does not mark discontinuity with what went before. In other words, it could be taken that the approaches adopted by some officials, approaches which might be termed pro-active as opposed to reactive, resulted in a more thorough, intense form of Europeanisation than would otherwise have prevailed. Indeed, it could be argued that this approach goes beyond even the ‘voluntary-direct’ demarcation within a ‘top-down’ typology of Europeanisation. In effect, ‘top-down’ pressures are not merely ‘unopposed’ or ‘accepted’ in this instance but the actors concerned seem to go further, arguably into the realm of ‘bottom-up’ engagement.

Other aspects of practical experience can be used to reinforce the above. For example, with reference to the Council of Ministers working groups and committees, a deeper form of change was arguably in evidence. This stems from the fact that over an extended period, Scottish Office officials came to play 'a more active, directional role' (Findlay 1998) in such forum, thus reflecting the process of becoming 'more socialised as European actors' (Beyers and Dierickx 1998: 292) although not to the extent of subscribing to ‘European values’ (see Egeberg 1999). Equally, reference can be made to the fact that the Scottish Office was all too keenly aware that close direct liaison with the Commission could reap benefits in terms of achieving policy objectives (Fraser 1998; Lindsay 1998; Stewart 1998). In this respect there was a clear recognition that seeking to influence the Commission at the policy initiation stage could be as important as later intergovernmental bargaining within the Council of Ministers. As with other departments (Bulmer and Burch 1998: 621; Hadley 1998), the Scottish Office was also aware that the ‘elaborate and fast moving nature’ of developments within the Commission made it imperative for
Edinburgh to nurture its own direct links with Brussels, for information gathering purposes if nothing else, as well as rely on the efficient but ultimately stretched services provided by UKREP. In effect, this could be seen as going beyond the bare minimum of Europeanisation, a deeper form of immersion being of perceived advantage to government bureaucracies as they seek to exert influence and achieve objectives. This state of affairs holds distinct echoes of that deeper form of Europeanisation predicted by Wessels and Rometsch (1996a and 1996b), namely that more intense change results from an increasing ‘fusion’ between European policy processes and concomitant interaction between national and EU administrative systems. It also tallies with the argument of Bulmer and Burch (2001: 93-94) that bureaucratic Europeanisation has indeed impacted upon the institutions of government in tangible ways. They accept that this change has been limited in the sense that it has not entailed radical overhaul or restructuring. By the same token, however, they also argue that change has not been quite as limited as a strictly historical institutionalist interpretation would suggest. Thus, by taking into account the more abstract factors such as culture, attitudes and the role played by individuals (ie. Jordan’s ‘software’) alongside the purely historical determinants of institutional change, a more accurate picture emerges. From their analysis, the outcomes point to ‘incremental-transformative’ change over extended time frames. Thus, while the broad pattern may seem limited (ie. slow, incremental change), the cumulative impact runs deeper. With these arguments in view, the case studies upon which they draw their conclusions and the further empirical evidence on the Scottish case presented here, the apparent ‘puzzles’ of bureaucratic Europeanisation seem to recede somewhat.

The influence of territorial factors

As noted above, many aspects of Europeanisation within the Scottish Office mirrored broader patterns or trends attendant to such developments as they applied across the spectrum of Whitehall departments. Key examples included incremental and accretive approaches to structural change and the maintenance of apoliticism within the ranks of the civil service. From the outset, however, it was suggested that while Europeanisation processes might display certain common features as they affected the UK administrative system generally, it was also likely that the intensity and specific impact of adaptation would vary between departments. Much would hinge in this respect upon the maturity of EU policies viz-a-viz the competences of individual departments (Dowding 1995: 130; Armstrong and Bulmer 1996: 269-272) and, to some extent, upon cultural and organisational traditions within departments (Bender 1991: 18; Edwards 1992: 77-85). Within this context, therefore, it was speculated that the responsibilities of the Scottish Office as a territorial department may have held implications for the specifics of adaptation within that department. In other cases, such as Spain and Germany for example, clear linkages have been established between Europeanisation processes and their specific forms of impact on territorial institutions (see Borzel 2002).

A number of key, longstanding features of territorial governance in pre-devolutionary Scotland can be highlighted, features which may be deemed potentially significant within a Europeanising context. These included the parallel existence of variable but generally limited measures of territorial policy autonomy alongside traditionally high levels of centralised control in London. Of additional
perceived relevance are the multi-functional remit of the Scottish Office itself and its multi-departmental infrastructure as well as questions relating to the 'dual role' (the department representing Scottish interests in London but also representing UK government in Scotland) and political legitimacy of work carried out by Scottish ministers (given that they were mandated on basis of UK general elections and could thus exercise power on the basis of minority support in Scotland itself). However, when subjected to closer empirical examination, the actual impact of these and other features on the shape of Europeanisation can be seen to be limited in a number of ways.

Ring-fenced territorial influences

In one respect, certain aspects of European integration related to the field of territorial governance generally, came to have little effect upon the Scottish Office case. Thus, the Committee of the Regions and subsidiarity did not form a central part of the department's adaptation processes. This was largely because these European influences did not force UK central government to reassess or realign to any great extent its traditional departmental-based mechanisms for territorial administration. The negligible impact of the Committee of the Regions within the Europeanisation context stemmed partly from its highly limited role within the EU generally, its lack of full institutional decision-making status and its largely consultative based remit being key factors in this respect (Warleigh 1997; McCarthy 1997). In addition, the direct role played by the Scottish Office in relation to this body was limited, given that UK nominees to the Committee came from local as opposed to central government. As for subsidiarity, its potential impact was extremely limited given that the Scottish Office was part of a member state which viewed subsidiarity principally as a means of preserving the then status quo in terms of the distribution of power within pre-devolutionary constitutional arrangements (Scott, Peterson and Millar 1994).

In other respects, where traditional departmental characteristics did have an impact on what might broadly be termed 'territorial Europeanisation', the sum effect tended to be limited in the sense that slight distinctions arose within the parameters of broader UK developments. For example, in terms of structural accommodation a tendency towards accretive change in the Scottish Office mirrored developments across Whitehall. Within this context, however, interviews revealed how some civil servants felt that the Scottish Office's status as a territorial department, at one steps remove from the heart of Whitehall, made it all the more easier to adapt to a new 'remote' power centre in Brussels. Similarly, like many departments the Scottish Office recognised the general benefits to be gained from secondments to EU institutions and UKREP. Again, however, a territorial dimension was present in that there was a perception in Edinburgh that such representation was an essential means of ensuring that the territorial voice was directly heard. It was also true that the multi-functional background of Scottish Office officials often made them attractive UKREP propositions. These and other examples thus served to indicate the more or less ring-fenced nature of distinctive territorial outcomes within a broader UK setting.

The roots of departmental distinctiveness
Notwithstanding the above, there were nevertheless some specific instances which seemed to depart from the perceived norm. In such cases, Europeanisation assumed forms which appeared, on the surface at least, to be more distinctively territorial in nature. For example, it became clear from primary research that adaptation processes had variable effects across different parts of the Scottish Office (see Scottish Office 1997). This indicated the definite impact of the department's multi-functional remit and its existence as a conglomeration of mini-departments. While the variability factor was not unique to the Scottish Office case, it can be argued that the structure and multi-functionalism of the latter made it a more exaggerated and protracted feature than was even the case in other territorial departments. In fact, in this instance the Scottish Office could be seen to act as a microcosm of patterns in evidence across Whitehall departments generally. Thus, even here a higher measure of distinctiveness was essentially rooted in broader UK wide developments.

Another form of salient distinctiveness seemed to make itself apparent in that adaptation processes exhibited a more intense, thorough and protracted edge than they perhaps did elsewhere in the administrative system. From the cultural perspective, for example, approaches to change adopted by many of the Scottish Office officials involved were not marked by those elements of scepticism and occasional outright hostility which were evident in some other departments such as the Treasury (Edwards 1992: 81-83; Buller and Smith 1998) and, during the 1970s and 1980s, the Department of the Environment (Jordan 2002: 43). Indeed, by contrast a non-politicised pro-active enthusiasm could be perceived. To some extent, the thoroughness and intensity sprang from traditional departmental characteristics in that workload pressures across a range of policy areas left officials with no time for reflection and little option but to press ahead with the task in hand. In other respects, the enthusiasm could be attributed to the post- accession lead set by a number of individuals within the upper ranks of the civil service hierarchy in Edinburgh. While it is true that all this took place within the context of a broader UK factor, namely a dominant apolitical ethic within the civil service, the available evidence points to a heightened sense of distinctiveness to the Scottish Office case in this respect.

Following on from the above, the more co-ordinated strategic reforms initiated within the Scottish Office from the early 1990s also appear to stand out (Scottish Office 1991a and see Smith 2003). Any distinctiveness in this respect could be partly attributed to traditional territorial characteristics. With particular reference to the 'legitimacy gap', it may be that a changing political climate in the late 1980s, with the opposition SNP and Labour parties taking increasingly pro-active positions on the European issue, forced a reappraisal of tactics in the then Conservative-led Scottish Office (Mitchell 1996: 275). On the other hand, however, it is arguably the case that the reforms of the 1990s were rooted in factors which were not directly tied to traditional territorial characteristics. In this respect, the long-term attitudes and approaches exhibited by officials towards adaptation processes, as mentioned above, and the personal initiatives set in motion by Ian Lang as Secretary of State for Scotland (Lang 1991) may have been of greater significance.

In addition, any distinctiveness in evidence was yet again ring-fenced by broader developments. Thus, a heightened awareness and focus on EU issues within the Scottish Office from the early 1990s ran concurrent to similar, if uneven,
developments across Whitehall at that time as more intense European integration *per se* led to heavier Europeanising pressures upon departments i.e. the impact of those ‘quantum jumps in integration’ referred to by Bulmer and Burch (1998: 613-614). Furthermore, such distinctiveness as did exist was not pushed forward solely or even largely by traditional territorial factors. Instead, it stemmed from a broader Whitehall environment which allowed for a measure of flexibility in the way that departments handled their adaptation processes. In this sense, Scottish Office flexibility (and any consequent distinctiveness) was, as with other departments, afforded from without rather than stemming from within.

*Territorial factors post-devolution*

The changeover from the Scottish Office regime to the Scottish Executive model within the broader context of devolution might have been expected to hold potential for changes in how the European dimension was accommodated at the territorial level. Probably the most obvious change is that, on the surface at least, there is arguably a greater degree of transparency, accountability and legitimacy in terms of how EU matters are framed and handled within the Scottish context. Of key significance in this respect is of course the fact that the Scottish Executive is directly accountable to a territorially elected body, the Scottish Parliament. The very existence and activities of the latter has arguably led to a greater level of scrutiny and openness in subjecting EU-related matters in Scotland to public analysis and striving for greater accountability in terms of territorial inputs and involvement in EU policy processes. The activities of the Parliament in this respect and in particular its European and External Committee (which meets at 2-3 week intervals and produced 30 major reports between November 1999 and June 2004) far outstrip the more limited UK level scrutiny of the Scottish Office’s EU activities which was generally restricted to parliamentary questions at Westminster and the occasional EU-related report of the House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee (eg. Scottish Affairs Committee 1996). In such respects it could be argued that this has served to enhance transparency (in terms of accessing information), accountability (in terms of holding the Scottish Executive to scrutiny) and legitimacy (in terms of the territorial-based electoral mandate underpinning the Executive’s actions). However, on each of these counts it could equally be argued that fundamental change has been limited and that as far as EU-related matters are concerned, the devolved infrastructure is in many ways just a ‘democratised Scottish Office’ (Sloat 2002: 73). Much of this stems from the apparent lines of continuity between the pre and post-devolutionary regimes as regards territorial executive (as distinct from parliamentary) involvement in European business.

Although the Scottish Parliament and Executive have been devolved much responsibility for the implementation of EU policy in Scotland, in overall terms the EU dimension is considered a non-devolved matter with the final say on all such issues reserved to London. As such, the scope for territorial factors to influence Europeanisation processes in Scotland is in many ways as it was before the advent of devolution. Of particular relevance here is the fact that Scottish involvement in EU policy processes continues to be constrained within the parameters of overall UK activity in this field and that territorial input is channelled through the interdepartmental co-ordination mechanisms in Whitehall and through UKREP. In this respect, the concordats between the devolved administrations and Whitehall
departments (setting out arrangements for territorial inputs to EU-related matters) are based heavily on pre-devolutionary practice and indeed could be regarded as merely ‘codifying prevailing practices which were widely understood and unproblematic’ (Bulmer et al 2002: 67-68). This is not to suggest that continuity between the pre and post-devolutionary regimes has been absolute because clearly it has not. As illustrated above, the scrutiny and transparency angle has changed markedly with the existence of the Scottish Parliament. Equally, the Scottish Executive has been able to Europeanise itself in ways that the old Scottish Office would have been unable or unwilling to do such as in the opening of a permanent departmental base in Brussels. In fact, it has even been suggested that the Executive has taken ‘a step too far’ on occasion such as in 2001 when the FCO apparently clamped down on what it regarded as over-zealous attempts by Scottish ministers to assert the extent of their regional autonomy on both European and international stages (Wright 2002: 216-217). Despite such developments, however, the continuity factors still seem more significant. Although devolution in the UK may have run parallel to a wider growth in regionalism across Europe as a whole during the 1990s, including struggles for greater sub-national involvement in EU policy processes and debates on subsidiarity and a ‘Europe of the Regions’, the weight of evidence points to UK decentralisation being a primarily domestic driven project with little EU influence over developments (Sloat 2002: 20-21; Bulmer et al 2002: 171). As such, whilst there may have been some changes in how EU matters are dealt with at the territorial level in the UK over the past 5 years, the degree of continuity ring-fencing these changes and the fact that these were domestically driven serves to downplay the significance of any ‘top-down’ Europeanising pressures. In relative terms, however, devolution is still in its formative stages and as Bulmer et al (2002: 171-172) suggest, the longer-term may see Europeanisation assume more distinctive territorial paths as the devolved administrations consolidate their identity and autonomy and use this to flex extra sub-national muscle within an EU setting. As a signatory to the ‘Salzburg Declaration’ in 2003 and within its own strategy documentation, the Scottish Executive has certainly made it clear that it wishes to see ‘an enhanced role for the legislative regions within the EU’ (REGLEG 2003; Scottish Executive 2004: 2). Equally, the trajectory of Europeanisation may become more volatile and unpredictable in the event of different political parties holding the reins of power in Edinburgh and London respectively.

The source of departmental flexibility (pre or post-devolution) notwithstanding, the significance of the above for the study of bureaucratic Europeanisation is quite clear. In short, the evidence presented here quite clearly adds fuel to Jordan’s (2001) argument that an understanding of the true nature and extent of departmental adaptation to Europe depends as much upon the analysis of ‘softer’ cultural and actor-centred factors as it does the study of institutional hardware. Crucially, however, the influence of these various factors must be viewed collectively if their true impact is to be realised. For example, out of the ‘softer’ factors there is no doubt that individual actors can play an instrumental role. Thus, Kerremans and Beyers (1998: 17) cite instances in the Belgian system where departmental adaptation to the EU was stimulated by the appointment of senior civil servants with a keen interest in European affairs. Equally, within the UK system John Gummer exerted discernible influence on Europeanisation processes in DoE during his tenure as Secretary of State for the Environment (Jordan 2001: 30). At the same time, however, the true measure of Gummer’s pro-active influence could only be ascertained when taking
into account other ‘softer’ factors and in particular the reactive, hesitant and
sometimes hostile approaches to Europeanisation which had been evident in that
department prior to Gummer’s arrival (Jordan 2001: 9). By the same token, whilst
there is evidence to suggest that Ian Lang, as Secretary of State for Scotland, had a
very direct impact on the course of Europeanising developments within the Scottish
Office in terms of his personal, pro-active influence (Scottish Office 1991b: 1;
Stewart 1998), the nature of Europeanisation continued to be influenced too by the
‘apolitical enthusiasm’ of civil servants which had influenced patterns of EC/EU
adaptation in Edinburgh since the early 1970s.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the above arguments, the nature of bureaucratic Europeanisation
processes, as illustrated by the Scottish case, become a little clearer. As a result, it
becomes easier to link together the broad empirical findings of this research with
specific theoretical positions on Europeanisation.

In short, Page and Wouters’ (1995) conclusions are justified to some extent in that
Europeanisation has not involved the wholesale importation of a common European
model or style of administration which serves, in effect, to supplant national
bureaucratic infrastructure. Where they are wrong, however, is to offer the
consequent general observation that while policies and policy processes have been
substantially Europeanised, governing institutions within member states have not. In
one sense, the Scottish experience does reflect an observation made by most
commentators on Europeanisation, namely that national administrative traditions
and culture will affect the course of development in a given case. Within the UK, for
example, paths of change within the Scottish Office and Scottish Executive were
influenced by broader factors relating to, amongst other things, a culture of
administrative efficiency and political neutrality. However, it would be wrong to
take an apparently logical step and assume that this state of affairs led to a more
limited or restricted form of Europeanisation. In this sense, deeper forms of change
evident in the Scottish case justify the need to place Europeanisation in a context
(Ladrech 1994; Meny et al 1996) whereby changes in bureaucratic method and style
become inextricably linked with changes in policy and policy processes. In sum,
therefore, the evidence relating to the Department in question shares much in
common with the distinction offered by Wessels and Rometsch (1996a and 1996b),
namely that broader processes of Europeanisation entail institutional fusion,
whereby changes stem from increased interaction between national and
supranational levels of administration, but do not lead to full institutional
convergence, whereby a common, homogenous system of Euro-administration
emerges. An additional evident outcome from this case-study relates to the ‘top-
down’ interpretation of Europeanisation. As far as bureaucratic Europeanisation is
concerned, this definition of change holds general utility in seeking to explain how
and why domestic government departments undergo processes of change in seeking
to accommodate and adapt to the European dimension. However, whilst various
aspects of the Scottish experience could be seen to fit relatively neatly into the
direct/indirect and voluntary/coercive typology held within the ‘top-down’
interpretation, other aspects did not appear so readily compatible. In particular, the
‘apolitical enthusiasm’ discerned within the ranks of Scottish officialdom seemed to
push beyond even the ‘voluntary-direct’ variant of ‘top-down’ Europeanisation and towards something more akin perhaps to a ‘bottom-up’ classification in the sense that responses to Europeanising pressures could be pro-active as well as merely willingly (or voluntarily) reactive.

What the Scottish case quite clearly indicates is the qualified utility of historical institutionalism as a means of interpreting and understanding processes of bureaucratic Europeanisation. In this respect, the advantages of looking at longer-term trends and historical factors inherent to a particular department and its position within the broader context of a national administrative setting prove invaluable in putting more detail onto the Europeanisation picture. At the same time, however, while historical institutionalism brings positive benefits as a conceptual tool, the need to modify this approach is clear. In short, the ‘softer’ culture and actor-based factors are of crucial importance in tracing the courses taken by Europeanisation. However, even when taking these factors into account the Scottish experience, as with that of DoE, indicates that the relative extent or depth of bureaucratic Europeanisation is not as easy to pinpoint as historical institutionalism might otherwise suggest. On the one hand, there are aspects of bureaucratic change which suggest that yes, the impact has been generally limited. On the other hand, certain developments do suggest some form of deeper change, pushing towards institutional fusion. Evidence from the Scottish case seems to support a fusion thesis and pulls away from the broader ‘puzzle’ which is seen to characterise bureaucratic adaptation to Europe. In this sense, the ‘gap’ between the respective impact of policy-related and bureaucratic forms of Europeanisation grows smaller and thus, by implication, the saliency of the ‘puzzle’ starts to recede. In overall terms, however, this field demands more in the way of in-depth case studies of particular departments and also more comparative work on the impact of ‘softer’ factors across national bureaucratic systems and indeed, across the systems of different member states as they adapt to Europe. Only then might a fuller resolution of the puzzles of bureaucratic Europeanisation come into view.

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