The Euro-Mediterranean project of security partnership in comparative perspective

Abstract. The main aspects of the building process of the Euro-Mediterranean security system are assessed in this article with the tools of analysis of the regional security systems. The Mediterranean security project is also compared with other forms and cases of regional security system. The presence of other multilateral initiatives on Mediterranean security is pointed out as a strategic tool for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean project, and the proposal for increasing the relations between the EMP and other multilateral initiatives is put on the table as a step forward to strengthen the process for building the Mediterranean security system.
In the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) approach, the construction of security co-operation in the Mediterranean region is the expected effect of two causes, i.e. the multidimensional strategy of the three Chapters of the Barcelona Declaration and the specific initiatives of the partners within the 1st Chapter frame. For this reason, the Barcelona Declaration is the fundamental agreement of a regional security system that will produce full round security effects when the partner governments add to it new agreements that create the operative mechanisms and measures that set up a comprehensive and cooperative security system. Accordingly, one of the most important tasks ahead in carrying out the Mediterranean security system is to restart and make progress in the negotiation of the Mediterranean Charter of Peace and Stability. In fact, official documents - as, for example, the European Commission’s *EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Final Report*, June 2004 - consider important the re-launching of the discussion on the draft of the Charter but “when the situation allows”.

In this analysis, the building process of the Euro-Mediterranean security system is assessed by making use of the tools of analysis of regional security systems. In particular, the study of regional security partnerships I have been working at for the last years allows to put the study of the Mediterranean security project in comparative perspective. Profiting from such perspective and knowledge, the existence of different multilateral initiatives on security in the Mediterranean is pointed out as a strategic tool for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean security project, and the proposal for increasing the relations between the EMP and other multilateral initiatives is put on the table as a step forward to strengthen the process for building the Mediterranean security system.

The forms of regional security systems

In a recent study (Attinà, 2004), I propose to distinguish and order different forms of regional security system according to the level of institutionalization of security co-operation and social integration of the members. This order varies from zero-level, i.e. no agreement on co-operative measures of security, to the most
institutionalized structure of co-operation, i.e. the amalgamated security community defined by Karl Deutsch. The graphic representation of this classification is given in Figure 1.

**Figure 1**

![The regional security arrangement line](image)

- A - Opposite alliance system
- B - Collective security
- C - Regional security partnership
- D1 - Loosely coupled Pluralistic security community
- D2 - Tightly coupled Pluralistic security community

Leaving apart the left-hand extreme of the line, i.e. regions in which states refuse to create stable security arrangements by explicit agreement because of current military confrontation like in the Middle East, in the left-hand part of the line the *opposite alliance system* is the main example of the concerted form of regional security. In this case, however, governments do not agree on any form of collective solution of security problems. Concert is only the tacit accord of the governments to keep on with the existing condition of (military) power equilibrium rather than negotiating for the building of a regional co-operative system. After World War Two, during forty years the European security system has been a system of opposite alliances, but on the early 1970s it headed for a different arrangement that came into being in the very early Nineties, as it is explained later in this analysis. On current time, the Mediterranean region is free from the conditions for an opposite alliance system but is potentially open to such an occurrence.

The *system of collective security* occupies the center of the line because with this arrangement, governments prefer to keep armed forces under strict national control and agree to make them available on request to intervene against the aggressor. At the
region level, as for example in Africa with the Organization of African Union, collective security did neither bring the constitution of permanent military forces nor the signature of agreements on obligatory co-operative measures for conflict management. In contemporary Europe, collective measures and the support of mechanisms for their effective implementation are the content of the security system created with the Helsinki Process and the institutionalization of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), later changed into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). However, these measures and mechanisms, associated with other instruments, created a different regional security arrangement which is better defined as regional security partnership. This system is later explained in this analysis.

A security community, as initially theorized by Karl Deutsch, is a group of people that have become integrated and consider war as an obsolete instrument of conflict resolution (Deutsch et al., 1957). A security community is brought into being by the high level of transaction and communication flows that bind together a group of people who think of themselves as a community, and produce favourable conditions for the establishment of institutions of peaceful conflict resolution. Deutsch made a distinction between amalgamated security communities, which are formed by states that abandon unconditional sovereignty and merge into an expanded state, and pluralistic security communities in which states retain their legal independence but develop common institutions and a sense of “we-ness” and “we-feeling”. As Adler and Barnett remark (1998), pluralistic communities vary between two forms – i.e. the loosely and tightly coupled form - on whether they are close to persistent state sovereignty separation or emerging government centralization. Therefore, the right-hand part of the line of regional security systems is populated with three forms of arrangement. Amalgamated security communities coincide with federal states like the formation of Germany in the 19th century demonstrates. Scandinavia, Canada and the United States, and the Euro-Atlantic community, instead, are examples of the loosely coupled form of pluralistic security community. Finally, the European Union is example of the tightly coupled form of security community, but the whole European continent is hardly a security community, and the wider Europe and its surrounding area is still far from qualify as a case of this arrangement. It fits, instead, into another form which is presented here below.
Regional security partnership is the arrangement based on the approach to international security that developed in Europe with the Helsinki Process (See, among others, Flynn and Farrell, 1999; Ghebali, 1989; Ghebali and Warner, 2001, Hopmann, 2003). In this approach to security, all (or almost all) the states of a region and also extra-regional powers are partners in a single arrangement. Measures of cooperative security (like exchange of information on military policies and structures) and comprehensive security (i.e. the military and non-military aspects of security) are constitutive means of this security arrangement. In addition, partners make use of international and internal measures to improve the security of the region and preserve geopolitical stability. In contrast to security communities, security partnerships can be formed by groups of countries characterized by conflict divisions, irregular flows of transactions and communication, and a small sharing of values and institutions. These conditions apply to the whole group of the countries of the partnership, but some countries of the group are not divided by conflict lines, are linked by large flows of mutual transactions and communication, and share the same cultural and institutional values. In addition, the countries of the region have different security cultures but these are not so distant from one another as to prevent the formation of consensus on introducing cooperation on security problems. In other words, for some political and practical reasons, these countries are inclined to act together for the reduction of the risk of violent confrontation, and allow the flow of mutual communication and material transactions to increase on their own. In as much as security cooperation in a regional partnership becomes strong and durable over time, observance of common practices by the partner states produces common orientations towards problems and values and, consequently, reduces the partners’ security culture difference. On their turn, common practices and orientations lead to the formation of we-ness and common identities of the people of the partner states. Hence, it is possible that a regional security partnership turns into a security community.

In conclusion, regional security partnership is the arrangement that originates from the consensus of the states of a region to cooperate on the reduction of violence and enhancement of stability and peace by making use of different types of agreements and mechanisms like formal security treaties, security international organizations, joint action agreements, multilateral dialogue processes, peace and
stability pacts consisting of confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy measures, and also measures for influencing the domestic structures and processes of the countries at risk of internal violence.

A regional security partnership is based on a set of documents, i.e. one or few fundamental agreements, and a number of related operative agreements. In the fundamental agreement(s), shared principles of peaceful relations are proclaimed, commitment to avoid power confrontation is given, and sources of conflict, tension and instability are made public by the partner governments. Within the frame of the fundamental agreements, the regional states agree to establish also the operative agreements and mechanisms that are needed to implement co-operative measures for the management of the common security problems. With the operative agreements, the partner governments create multilateral offices and make use of existing and new created international organizations to deal with the perceived security threats. Multilateral offices and organizations are the most important collective instruments of the security partnership, especially in as much as they are responsible for peace-making and peace-keeping operations. In these conditions, a certain extent of defence de-nationalization and, in the long-term, also the constitution of a security community can be expected as consequence of the establishment of a regional security partnership.

The main attributes of the regional security partnership model are summarized as it follows.

*Pre-conditions*
- awareness of the countries of the region for interdependence and the local effects of global problems,
- relaxed or no power competition in the international politics of the region and restrained use of violence in international conflicts.

*Conditions*
- consensus of the governments of the region on building security cooperation by reducing violence in international relations, improving international and domestic stability, and promoting peace and economic growth,
- no system of opposite military alliances.

*Structures and means*
- written fundamental agreements,
- operative agreements, multilateral offices and international organizations,
- a set of international and internal measures and mechanisms of conflict management and prevention,
- involvement of extra-regional powers (very probable).
Consequences

- reduction of the gap between the security doctrines and cultures of the countries of the region,
- increase of defence de-nationalization,
- development of security community (possible).

The partnership model is built on the observation of current processes aimed at changing the nature of security management in some regions of Europe and Asia. The construction of the European security system since the early Seventies, i.e. from the opening of the Helsinki Process, is the most important case of regional security partnership in international politics, but current initiatives in Asia – namely in the East Asia/Pacific (i.e. the ASEAN Regional Forum, ARF) and Central Asia (i.e. the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO) – are examples of this form of regional security co-operation.

The European security partnership arrangement developed after the launching of the Helsinki Process in the early 1970s and matured in the 1990s. It includes all the states of Europe, the non-European members of the OSCE (i.e. the United States and Canada) and the former Soviet Union countries of Southern Caucasus (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia). On the contrary, the five former Soviet countries of central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), which are formal members of OSCE, cannot be considered any more members of the European security system because their security policies are tightly linked to the Central Asia security complex. Indeed, at the exception of Turkmenistan, they are members of the Central Asia security partnership, which is presented later in this analysis. This condition signals the overlapping of regional security arrangement, which is worth of future analysis.

The fundamental agreements of the European security partnership are the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter of Paris for A New Europe. Many operative agreements have been made within the Helsinki Process, which gave birth to the offices, mechanisms and activities of the CSCE/OCSE. The OSCE structure includes the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and 18 Mission and other Field Activities in member countries. They have been added to a number of agreements signed by European governments during the past
fifty years. All these agreements are *de facto* complementary with the European partnership fundamental agreements (Attinà and Repucci, 2004). This is the case of NATO and NATO’s Eastern projection mechanisms known as the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the EU’s mechanism known as the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) created within the European security and defence policy (ESDP), and EU’s economic cooperation programs (like PHARE and Tacis).

The European security partnership has been put to a test in various occasions during the Nineties, namely in former Soviet states and the Balkans. Performance has not been always good, sometimes deceptive. However, the role of the security mechanisms was important in several cases in which the direct intervention of peacekeeping forces helped to restrain violence, and the programmes of relief and rehabilitation helped to restore civilian conditions in countries ravaged by internal violence. As of today, OSCE displays a range of 18 field missions in member countries in need of assistance for security, political and economic problems.

Since the last Nineties, the European security partnership is under the challenge of the current worldwide *in-security* environment. Accordingly, the European governments’ preference for cooperative and comprehensive security has been tempered by the so-called “new discourse of threat and danger” (Krause and Latham, 1999: 39). To cope with the problem of containing the policies of governments which are perceived as aggressive, irrational and unreceptive of the cooperative mechanisms (like the Milosevic’s regime), and the problem of dealing with the threats of global terrorism, the European governments increased their concern for upgrading military preparedness. This policy change has many aspects including the development of the ESDP for worldwide use and, in some cases, the enhancement of the Euro-Atlantic strategic preponderance as condition for international stability and peace.

The development of the Asia/Pacific security partnership is centred in the *ASEAN Regional Forum*, also known as the ARF (See Attinà and Zhu, 2001; Kivimaki, 2001; Narine, 2002). The membership of this initiative increased from initial 18 to 23 countries including the United States and European Union. The fundamental agreement is the First ARF Chairman's Statement, issued in 1994. ARF objectives are to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest, and make significant contributions towards confidence-building and preventive
diplomacy in the region. Despite its rather long life, ARF has been unable so far to develop operative agreements and create permanent offices for security issues.

The summit meeting of five states (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) in the Chinese city of Shanghai in April 1996 is the founding event of the Central Asia security partnership (See Attinà and Zhu, 2001; Zhang, 2001). The meeting launched the so-called Shanghai Five Initiative, which turned into the *Shanghai Cooperation Organization* (SCO) on June 15, 2001. On this occasion, the fundamental agreement of the Central Asia security partnership system was signed. After Uzbekistan’s admission in 2001, the SCO counts on six member states. Since the first summit meeting, a series of operative agreements have been concluded and practical measures have been agreed on to strengthen effective cooperation in various fields and mutual trust among member states. The “Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field Along the Border Areas” and the “Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas”, signed in 1996 and 1997, are the first operative agreements aimed at implementing security partnership building among the five countries. Lastly, in January 2004, the SCO’s secretariat office was created in Beijing, and the SCO’s Antiterrorism Centre in Tashkent. Cracking down on international terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, illegal migration and other forms of cross-border crimes are perceived as the most urgent task of the Organisation. These measures are pertinent to the building of regional security cooperation, but the implementation of existing confidence-building measures and their development are still uncertain. However, taking into account the peculiarities of the region, this first step is recognized as the inception of the “Central-Asian way” of building a regional security partnership.

**The Euro-Mediterranean project**

A Euro-Mediterranean project of security cooperation was implicitly launched in Barcelona in 1995 with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) agreement. But formal negotiation started in the late Nineties with the initiative for the Mediterranean Charter of Peace and Stability.

The EMP approach to security is a multidimensional approach, as stated in the Barcelona Declaration which includes three Chapters on Politics and Security Affairs, Economic and Financial Affairs, and Human, Social and Cultural Affairs
(Attinà, 2003; Philippart 2003). For this reason, the Barcelona Declaration has the nature of the fundamental agreement of a regional security partnership. It will have full effect only if and when the partner governments agreed on operative agreements to implement multilateral mechanisms and measures of cooperative security. The negotiation of the Mediterranean Charter of Stability and Peace was claimed to be the most important step towards introducing operative measures and mechanisms. The aim of the proposal of the Stability and Peace Charter for the Mediterranean was to obtain from all the Mediterranean governments the solemn commitment to work for political stability and abstain from war to solve conflicts and disputes over border and national issues. Agreement about starting negotiation at the level of Senior Officials and experts was reached on 1997, but very soon it was understood that the Mediterranean governments had divergent perceptions of threats and challenges to political stability. Discussions among experts continue to be held as of today by the EuroMeSCO network, but the Charter negotiation has been interrupted1.

By all means, the negotiation of the Charter has been confronted with many obstacles like the derailment of the Middle East Peace Process, the post-9/11 anti-terrorism policies of the Western governments, and the Iraq and post-Iraqi war problems. All these events slowed down the partnership building process and, finally, made the Charter negotiation to be suspended for the time being. However, it is noted that the 9/11 events and the spread of global terrorism had the positive effect of reinforcing efforts to include co-operation on domestic security and police co-operation in the agenda of the Barcelona Process. At the same time, the true consequences of the Iraqi war are still unclear. Finally, the new EU “neighborhood policy” (ENP) may affect the Mediterranean security partnership building process, although in the above

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1 On April 1999, the Stuttgart EMP Ministerial Conference made public the state of the Charter negotiation. In the Conclusions, Ministers welcomed the initiatives aimed at exchanging information on the signature and ratification of international instruments in the fields of disarmament and arms control, terrorism, human rights, and international humanitarian law; underlined the importance of developing measures like the establishment of a Euro-Med system of disaster prevention, mitigation and management; recognized that the Charter would be a political - and not a legal - document committing the partners to political dialogue and the evolutionary and progressive development of partnership-building measures, good-neighborly relations, and preventive diplomacy; included the commitment to endow the Charter with the appropriate decision-making mechanisms to make all decisions by consensus. In the Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Mediterranean Charter, annexed to the Conference Conclusions, the EMP Group of Senior Officials was assigned the task of working out a comprehensive schedule of the negotiations in order to complete the elaboration of the Charter by the time of the successive Ministerial Conference. No real progress, however, has been made since Stuttgart.
mentioned document on the *EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East*, the European Union pledges to work for all the existing security commitments.

The March 2003 Communication of the Commission on ENP names fourteen countries as neighbouring countries and partners to the project of creating a new framework of relations. They are Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Libya and all the present members of the Barcelona Process (namely Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and the Palestinian Authority) but Turkey because candidacy to EU makes this country not eligible to participate in the European Neighbourhood Policy. In the July 2003 Communication on the Neighbourhood Instrument, also Rumania and Bulgaria, which are formal candidates, and the Balkan countries, which are prospective candidates, were associated to the ENP programmes. In addition, in the Solana document on *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, released in Brussels on December 12, 2003, the Southern Caucasus was included in the “ring” of special interest for the EU. In fact, in the European Commission’s *Strategy Paper on the ENP* (May 12, 2004) and the Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (June 17-18, 2004), the Southern Caucasus countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have been added to the ENP partner countries, but Bulgaria and Rumania were not mentioned. Therefore, as of today, the ENP counts on 17 partners, i.e. the earliest fourteen countries and the three Southern Caucasian countries.

The new policy plan is expressly aimed at developing *a zone of prosperity* and a *'ring of friends' with whom the EU can enjoy close, peaceful and co-operative relations*. Political and economic interdependence is recognized as a reality that puts on the European Union the duty to creating an enlarged area of political stability and functioning rule of law. The European Union offers the prospect of a stake in the EU's internal market to those countries that make concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms.

Neighbouring countries are invited to take political and legislative measures to enhance economic integration and liberalization, and measures to promote human rights, cultural cooperation and mutual understanding. Besides these measures, which are coherent with the European view of regional security, neighbouring countries are explicitly invited also to make steps towards regional security co-management and
participate in initiatives aimed at (a) improving conflict prevention and crisis management, and (b) strengthening co-operation to prevent and combat common security threats. In such a perspective, it is apparent that the Neighbourhood Policy approach to security consists of the classical concepts that distinguish the European regional security partnership of the last thirty years: i.e. the concepts of comprehensive security – as interdependence between the political, socio-economic, environmental, cultural and military dimensions - and cooperative security – as the constant exercise of dialogue and exchange of information, knowledge and expertise.

In the security area, the European Union is firmly committed to the long-range strategy of building security by improving the domestic conditions (both economic and political) of the neighbour and partner countries, and by furthering mutual confidence and understanding of the states. At the same time, to face the threats of trans-national crime and terrorism, it urges intense coordination and the use of new instruments. *A Secure Europe in a Better World* is, in a certain sense, the twin document for the political and security area of the neighbourhood policy as the July document on the Neighbourhood Instrument is in the economic and technical area. *A Secure Europe in a Better World* is a wide-range document that devotes special attention to relations with the neighbouring countries. In this regard, the message of the document is ambivalent in the sense that commitment to dialogue with the partners is sided with commitment to the full-round development of the military capabilities of the Union. In fact, this is an obligation of the Union since it committed itself to develop ESDP.

Attention must be directed also to an important obstacle hindering negotiation in the Mediterranean region, i.e. the divide of security culture (Attinà, 2001). The security policies and decisions of the states are intrinsically influenced by past experiences in security problems. More precisely, recent experiences and beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols are intimately related and add to one another in shaping the country’s security culture. This culture shapes the preference of national governments for certain security instruments (or combination of instruments) rather than others that are also available. However, culture is never static. Learning from recent experiences is responsible for culture change as it is interaction with the security culture of other states and regions as well as the influence of new ideas, practices and experiences.
The current security culture of the European countries is linked to three recent experiences: (1) the arms control negotiations of the Cold War and détente times; (2) the Helsinki Process with the three-decade long elaboration of new ideas and the formation of the mechanisms of comprehensive and cooperative security; and (3) the formulation of new defense policies in the 1990s to react to unexpected crises and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to countries and non-state actors insensitive of the conventional logic of military strategy. It is reasonable that the present double-sided form of the European security culture, which combines the concepts of cooperative and comprehensive security with the discourse of the new threats and dangers, will last as long as an arms control culture does not gain again over the proliferation of WMD at the global level, and the regional security partnership model is firmly introduced in other regions of the world like the Mediterranean.

The security culture of the contemporary Arab countries contains four distinct views. Two of them are based on long-time traditions. They are (1) the Arab nation view, which advocates for an Arab trans-state community as the building block of peace and security in the area, and (2) the view of the society of Arab states, which believes, instead, in friendly relations between the Arab states as the foundation of security in the Arab world and the condition for protecting the individual Arab country against external interference. In the 1990s, two views contrasting with the traditional views came to the front. (3) A reformist view developed, especially in North Africa, with great emphasis on civil society security, achievement of better conditions of life and the need for economic reforms in agreement with the traditions of the Arab culture and Islamic religion. (4) However, the largest critical movement against the status quo discourse of domestic politics is the fourth view of security, the Islamist view. It is constructed around a radical conception of the security needs of the Islamic countries and strong emphasis on religion and culture identity. Islamists’ concerns are the external threat of the non-Islamic world and the internal enemies of un-Islamic groups. Some Islamist movements engage in violent actions; others use non-violent means. All of them criticize the state for failing to meet the socio-economic needs of the society and the aspiration to turn down external influence and intervention.

Security cooperation at the region level is unfamiliar to the Arab security culture. Building regional security through co-operative means creates strong suspicions.
in governments attached to national military power and the traditional view of strategic secrecy. The Arab countries never practiced co-operative security mechanisms as the European countries have been doing since the Helsinki Process. Also comprehensive security is suspicious concept to Arab political elite and policy-makers.

Finally, since the EMP security project is not the only multilateral initiative for building a new security arrangement in the Mediterranean, attention must be called on the need for enlargeing the negotiating table of the Mediterranean security system.

In 1994, OSCE decided to establish an informal contact group with experts from Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia with the aim of sharing information on confidence-building measures with the representatives of these countries. OSCE’s projection in the Mediterranean dates back to the early years of the Helsinki Process. On the assumption that security in Europe was closely linked with security in the Mediterranean and the process of improving security could not be confined to Europe but extended to other parts of the world, in particular to the Mediterranean area. A chapter on "Questions relating to security and co-operation in the Mediterranean" was included in the Helsinki Final Act (1975). Starting in 1995, annual seminars were organized by the OSCE and Mediterranean partners. The OSCE initiative has been loosing momentum with the passing of time, but the Seminars are regularly celebrated.

In 1995, NATO made a proposal to the governments of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, and later to Algeria, to open direct Dialogue with a view to achieve better mutual understanding and foster the process of regional stabilization. The Dialogue focuses on civil issues, like exchange of information and technical assistance in the area of civil emergency planning, but develops also a military dimension which includes observation visits of officials of the Six non-NATO members to NATO exercises and military bodies, exchange of staff officers and port visits to Dialogue Countries by NATO’s naval forces. Except for seminars, conferences and other information sessions, the dialogue has been strictly bilateral between NATO and the single dialogue country. The Iraqi war and Bush’s strategy of attention to North Africa have negatively influenced the NATO’s Mediterranean policy. However, it has not been formally closed.
The OSCE and NATO initiatives and the importance of the military presence of the United States in the Mediterranean area signal the need for taking into consideration the problem of including external actors in the negotiation on the Mediterranean security partnership. It is worth to remind that the European and East Asia/Pacific security partnerships demonstrate the importance of including external actors as partners of the regional security arrangement. The European Union had to pay more attention to the positive results that the convergence of the Euro-Mediterranean project with other multilateral initiatives could produce. A EU-NATO-OSCE-Mediterranean conference could provide a good start for intensifying co-operation in the region. Such a conference was suggested by the OSCE Chairman-in-Office at the last annual OSCE Conference on Security Policy in Munich (February 11, 2004). The construction of the Mediterranean security system will become more probable if the existing multilateral initiatives were coordinated, and also multilateral initiatives developed on the opposite side of the Mediterranean, i.e. among the Arabic countries of North Africa.

Comparison and conclusions

The current state of the four regional systems that, to a different extent, fit into the security partnership model is presented in Table 1. The table is a matrix for confronting the four cases and also a checklist for assessing the state of the Mediterranean project. In comparison with the other cases, the Mediterranean looks what it really is, i.e. a potential rather than a real case of security partnership building. On the whole, it is also on the back of the Shanghai system. The governments of the SCO created a Secretariat and Anti-terrorism Office, so demonstrating their will to enter into a true process of regional security building by providing the region with operative mechanisms.

Table 1: A comparison of the four regional security partnerships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-conditions</th>
<th>European security system</th>
<th>Asian Regional Forum</th>
<th>Shanghai Security Organization</th>
<th>Mediterranean security system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>awareness for interdependence and global problems</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>medium/ high</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>medium/low in general but absent in the M.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• restrained use of violence and relaxed or no power competition</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>medium/ high</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>medium/low in general but absent in the M.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• consensus on reducing international violence, improving international and domestic stability, and promoting peace and economic growth</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>medium/ high</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>medium/low in general but absent in the M.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• no system of opposite military alliances</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Structures and means                        | yes        | yes          | yes    | yes                                         |
|                                          | many       | some         | few    | no                                          |
| • written fundamental agreement           | yes        | yes          | yes    | yes                                         |
| • operative agreements and multilateral offices | many       | few (international) | one (anti-terrorism) | no |
| • international and internal measures and mechanisms for conflict management and prevention | yes        | yes          | no     | no                                          |
| • involvement of extra-regional powers | yes        | yes          | no     | no                                          |

| Consequences                             | yes        | probable    | probable | uncertain |
| • reduction of security culture difference | yes        | probable    | probable | uncertain |
| • increase of defence de-nationalization  | to some extent | no           | no       | no        |
| • development of security community       | possible   | uncertain   | uncertain | uncertain |

All the regions but the Mediterranean one have similar attributes concerning the “pre-conditions” of security partnership. In fact, the building of the security partnership in the Mediterranean lacks the pre-condition of the restrained use of violence because conflict and war ravage the Middle East. However, should all “pre-conditions” be fulfilled in the Mediterranean, the governments of the region had to give unequivocal demonstration of their commitment to the “consensus” condition which includes consensus on stability in the domestic domain. In other words, the countries of North Africa have to go down the road of liberalization and democracy without hesitation.

Furthermore, apart from signing the Barcelona Declaration and repeatedly pledging, in numerous documents, to give execution and implementation to the fundamental objective of making the Mediterranean a zone of peace and stability that is solemnly declared in that founding document, for ten years the partner governments
have been unable to form any agreement on the structures and means of the regional security arrangement. No operative agreement has been signed so far. No mechanism and office for violence prevention and peaceful conflict resolution has been created. No discussion has been started for amalgamating the different “security dialogues” that are currently practiced in the region and consequently introduce that means that proved to be essential in the two most advanced cases of security partnership (the European and East Asia/Pacific cases), that is the enlargement of the negotiation to all relevant actors, including external actors like Russia and the United States.

Forecasting the consequences of the current state of the four processes, one can be confident on the positive impact of the existing structures and means of security cooperation in Europe, and moderately confident on the future impact of the process in East Asia/Pacific and Central Asia, especially on the security cultures of the countries of the regions. But uncertainty prevails on these expectations with respect to the Mediterranean region.

Since the present trends of the European and Arab security cultures are different from one another, the Euro-Mediterranean partners have been able to achieve a broad consensus on security cooperation, but great difficulties exist against the creation of operative instruments of security partnership. Reliance on the discussions of the network of diplomats and security experts, however, can help to approach the convergence of the security cultures and, hopefully, find out the measures of partnership-building that best fit to the expectations and values of all the parties. Finally, it is stressed again that policy-makers have to pay more attention to the evidence provided by the comparative analysis of regional security building, that is to say to the enlargement of the negotiating table. The chance of positive results of the Mediterranean security building process will be enhanced in as much as all relevant actors take part in the negotiation. This condition can be reached in the Mediterranean by opening formal discussions among the existing multilateral initiatives, that is the OSCE Mediterranean Initiative, NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, the Euro-Mediterranean process, and also the Arab multinational initiatives that are very much wished for to come.
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