

# EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT



---

*Directorate General for Research*

WORKING PAPERS

## DEMOGRAPHY AND DEVELOPMENT

PUBLIC HEARING

HELD BY

THE COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION

BRUSSELS, 25 NOVEMBER 1993.

*External Economic Relations Series*

---

W - 8

---

THIS PUBLICATION IS ONLY AVAILABLE IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH.

IN THE EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS SERIES II HAVE ALREADY BEEN PUBLISHED THE FOLLOWING TITLES:

- |         |  |
|---------|--|
| No. 1   | (10/1989): L'ASSOCIATION EUROPÉENNE DE LIBRE-ÉCHANGE ET LE MARCHÉ UNIQUE COMMUNAUTAIRE. FR   |
| No. 2   | (10/1990): THIRD WORLD DEBT - ANALYSIS. ALL LANGUAGES.   |
| No. W 1 | (1/1992): STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN THE ACP COUNTRIES AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INTERVENTION - SITUATION AND PROSPECTS: EN/FR/DE/ES            |
| No. W 2 | (3/1992): TRADE OF THE NEW GERMAN LANDER WITH THE FORMER COMECON COUNTRIES. DEVELOPMENT, PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS. EN/FR/DE                     |
| No. W 3 | (11/1993): STIMULATING ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE RECOVERY PROGRAMMES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES. EN                 |
| No. W 4 | (9/1993): AGREEMENT ON THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA - BACKGROUND AND CONTENTS. EN  |
| No. W 5 | (10/1993): LE TRANSFERT INTERNATIONAL DE TECHNOLOGIES À DOUBLE USAGE - LE COCOM ET LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE. FR (EN TRANSLATION FORESEEN). |
| No. W 6 | (12/1993): THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN). EN  |
| No. W 7 | (1/1994): ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE - NEW POLICY CHALLENGES. EN   |

THE CONTENTS OF THIS PUBLICATION DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT.

REPRODUCTION IS AUTHORIZED, EXCEPT FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES, PROVIDED THE SOURCE IS ACKNOWLEDGED, THE PUBLISHER IS INFORMED IN ADVANCE AND A COPY OF THE TRANSLATION IS SENT TO THE PUBLISHER.

**PUBLISHER:**        **THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT**  
DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR RESEARCH  
DIRECTORATE A: EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS DIVISION  
L - 2929 LUXEMBOURG.  
TEL: (00352) 4300-1  
FAX: (00352) 43 40 71

**EDITOR:**            **NIELS KRISTOFFERSEN**

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT



---

***Directorate General for Research***

WORKING PAPERS

DEMOGRAPHY AND DEVELOPMENT

PUBLIC HEARING

HELD BY

THE COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION

BRUSSELS, 25 NOVEMBER 1993.

***External Economic Relations Series***

---

W - 8

---

6 - 1994

## **FOREWORD**

On 8 January 1993 the European Parliament's Committee on Development and Cooperation decided to hold a public hearing on the subject of Demography and Development, partly because of the crucial importance of this issue to development policy in general and partly because of the need for the European Parliament to adopt a position on this subject before the World Conference on Population in Cairo on 5-13 September 1994. In order to provide the Members with valuable background material and to serve as a reference for future debates - both in connection with the Cairo conference and afterwards - the Directorate General for Research has been requested to publish the contributions of experts at the hearing.

The present paper includes the introduction by the Chairman of the Committee and the contributions of the experts invited to the hearing, but not the discussion following these contributions. Finally, for the ready reference of the reader, the European Parliament's Resolution of 11 March 1994 on the Demographic Situation and Development is annexed.

**DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR RESEARCH**

## CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD. . . . .	5
 I. INTRODUCTION by the Chairman of the Committee on Development and Cooperation Mr Henri Saby. . . . .	  9
 II. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PARTICIPATING EXPERTS . . . . .	 15
1. FAMILY PLANNING: CHOICES AND RESPONSIBILITIES Mrs Rajamani Rowley, Director, Population Concern, London. . . . .	 17
2. THE POPULATION PROBLEM AND FAMILY PLANNING AND WOMEN IN EUROPE Mrs Sophie Apostolopoulos, President of the Greek Family Planning Association, Athens . . . . .	 22
3. POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT Professor H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Professor of Public Law, University of Nairobi and Chairman of the National Council for Population and Development, Kenya. . . . .	 27
4. THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF POPULATION GROWTH FROM FACT AND DOCTRINE TO SCIENTIFIC DEBATE Professor Dominique TABUTIN, Institute of Demography, Catholic University of Louvain . . . . .	 31
5. DEMOGRAPHY AND DEVELOPMENT FROM THE ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW Professor TAPINOS, Institute of Political Science, Paris . . . . .	 47
6. FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMMES IN LDC'S Mr Van Ginneken, Dutch Institute of Population Studies, the Hague. . . . .	 55
7. THE GERMAN POSITION ON POPULATION POLICY AND FAMILY PLANNING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES Dr Michael Bohnet, Ministerialdirigent, Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany . . . . .	 58
 ANNEX Resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 11 March 1994 . . . . .	  61

# **I. INTRODUCTION**

**by the Chairman of the Committee  
on Development and Cooperation  
Mr Henri Saby**

## INTRODUCTION

by the Chairman of the Committee on Development and Cooperation Mr Henri Saby

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We shall endeavour today to take a long, hard look at the problem of population growth and development, and to help us we have the following eminent experts:

- Mrs Rajamani Rowley, Head of Population Concern, London. Of Malaysian origin, she has spent many years of her life studying population problems,
- Mrs Sophie Apostolopoulos, President of the Greek Family Planning Association in Athens. A few weeks ago in Greece, she met various members of our committee to discuss the question under consideration today,
- Professor Okoth-Ogendo, from Nairobi, President of the National Council for Population and Development,
- Professor Dominique Tabutin, from the Institute of Population Studies at the Catholic University of Louvain,
- Professor Georges Tapinos, from the Institute of Political Science in Paris,
- Mr van Ginneken, from the Dutch Interdisciplinary Institute of Population Studies, the Hague, and
- Dr. Michael Bohnet, from the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany.

As you will see, the subject is very big. We have therefore asked the experts to consider the fundamental points in the light of a number of related issues i.e. the environment, economic aspects, family planning, implementation of the relevant programmes, and to select from the Asian and African traditions some elements that involve the place of women in the family and in society.

However, before giving the floor to the experts, I should like to briefly outline the problem as it presents itself in the context of development cooperation, but also, quite simply, as it is perceived by the European citizen.

Some time ago I suggested that our committee hold a public hearing on the subject of Population and Development, because this is an issue in which we are deeply interested, and because, involving a variety of disciplines, it lends itself perfectly to an exchange of views with experts whose experience is drawn from a range of fields. The Commission and Council are giving serious thought to the matter and the UN will hold a conference on Population in September next year in Cairo. Parliament will have to adopt a position, in due course, on this issue. We should not be content merely to study statistical surveys and general trends, but seek to better identify the risks and benefits of a growing population for the developing countries and for Europe, and determine what measures we take among the peoples directly concerned to safeguard their interests and afford them help.

Now comes our first question: Is population growth essentially regional or is it a planetary phenomenon? Does it only concern us Europeans indirectly, or is it, on the contrary, a direct threat? No expertise in semantics is needed to

understand the emotive force of words like overpopulation, or population explosion. Witness the irrational fears of the people of Europe during the debate on political asylum in France, Germany and the Netherlands but also in other parts of the Community and Western Europe occasioned by increased flows of people from East to West and South to North. All too often this issue is surrounded by panic and hysteria. We are told that we have had just about enough. But what is the greatest danger? Can one, indeed, genuinely speak of danger? Does it really come from the South? Or, rather, from the East? Do we need to spell out how and why the North American continent was peopled by immigrants from Europe in the last century? And why the arbitrary claim that the influx of foreigners threatens our culture and welfare system? Are we not tempted to forget that they make an important contribution to society, at a time when our population is aging? More generally, how are we to view population constraints when interdependence at planetary level is increasingly evident?

Another aspect of the problem is the environment. Thousands of square kilometres of virgin forest vanish every year, whilst the desert further encroaches on the Sahel through deforestation and over grazing. The planet's resources grow scarcer, food staples go down and a severe water shortage looms. Here in Europe we still think that the situation is pretty satisfactory. Not content to monstrosly wreck the environment, to pollute the air, to use up 80% of the planet's resources though we represent not more than one-fifth of the world's population, we buy raw materials cheap and ignore the cost to the environment because we have the necessary purchasing power. Is our taste for luxury really justifiable today, when we consider the state of the planet? Do we not have to reconsider our often cynical views about surplus population? The reaction of the developing countries at the Rio Conference made this perfectly clear. This planet might be able to take even more people, whose dignity would be respected, if everyone finally agreed to accept their responsibilities more completely and show more solidarity. Must we wait for cataclysms to strike, for famine to ravage an entire continent and for the fight for a share of the wealth to reach such a pitch before man's conscience finally stirs?

We have just touched on something which informs our entire strategy for development cooperation: partnership across the planet, founded on solidarity between all its people. How can the Community help the developing countries in their problems with population growth and the economy? Can the situation really be brought under control? At any rate, the strings attached to development aid by donor countries in terms of measures to be taken by the beneficiary countries to control population growth are unacceptable.

Difficulties exist at very many levels, and economic problems bulk large. Poverty, famine and over-population are inseparable: whilst the situation steadily worsens, we cannot provide definite proof that over-population is the cause of poverty. Why the Chinese model does not work in Africa, a rather unfair question in this context, was raised on the occasion of the Joint Assembly's last meeting in Brussels. We should not forget that child labour is an important economic factor in some of the newly-industrialized countries such as India and Pakistan.

In this connection, it is undeniable that the developing countries, faced with a population growth of 3%, cannot solve their economic problems without help from outside. The situation is nothing short of explosive in many parts of the world. As a rule, consumption deprives the national economy of resources which should go into productive investment i.e. to provide training and improve



productivity. But are these countries' efforts at development bound to fail? And how effective can a population policy be which seeks to maintain the rate of growth within the limits of economic possibilities? What contribution can the Community make in this area? What regional disparities are there, and what are their causes? How will AIDS affect the population over large areas, especially in Africa? How can we help check the spread of this terrible scourge?

Finally, there is a balance to be struck between the interests of society and the right of each man or woman to shape their own life, in particular to decide on the size of their family and the number of children they have. To what extent can the State intervene in this sphere of private life, and what are the means at its disposal? Is it really possible to inculcate in the individual a sense of collective responsibility to the society? On the other hand, can the individual legitimately expect society to take care of his children? Clearly, the advice dispensed in family planning programmes to bring down the birth rate, influences the decisions people take. But does it take their interests into account? As things now stand, are women free to make their own choices? Judging by the many unwanted pregnancies and the extremely hazardous nature of abortions, this seems doubtful.

I am aware that other cultures are not faced with some of the problems we have made for ourselves, with our compulsive rationalization, our conviction that just about anything is possible, our anxious pursuit of happiness, which drives so many of us, and because an exaggeratedly individualistic approach to life is not necessarily a proof of wisdom.

For all these reasons, then, we need in this hearing to consider the world view and traditions of other peoples. How, in Africa and Asia, do ideas about life, the protection and propagation of life, influence the size of the family? Are these deeply rooted convictions? Do they involve economic and social considerations, such as providing against old age? To what extent has contact with Western cultures, particularly in the areas of education, training and employment, brought about change? How has it affected population numbers? What is the status of women within the family and society? Are their prospects any different now from those they have faced traditionally? Also to be considered are the convictions of the world's great religious communities who, as a force to be reckoned with, often want a hand in the shaping of government policy, particularly when it comes to demographic issues, but refuse to accept the real-life consequences. Note the Vatican's unyieldingly hard line in this area and the criticism and potent opposition from the Catholic Church. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that in some countries compulsory sterilization is widely practised.

After this brief review of the subject, I would now ask you to help our committee prepare a few basic ideas, with the help of the experts present, for a position by Parliament on the issue of population and development.

## **II. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PARTICIPATING EXPERTS**

## 1. FAMILY PLANNING: CHOICES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Mrs Rajamani Rowley  
Director  
Population Concern, London

Mr. President, Parliamentarians, Ladies and Gentlemen

I feel privileged to be here, and to speak to you this morning. I do so as a woman, as a Third Worlder, and as someone who has spent most of a lifetime promoting the cause of birth planning, reproductive health, and the right of women to make decisions about their own fertility.

Ever since the 1960s - when Paul Ehrlich wrote his bestselling book, *The Population Bomb*, the idea of controlling runaway population growth has been a hot topic. It has been beset by controversy and tension. Perhaps that was inevitable. Perhaps controversy has helped to mature our thinking.

At the heart of confusion, has been the conflict over how we should deal with our fertility. Population control implies interference in intimate personal decisions, and the very natural human desire for children.

As Professor Roger Revelle has said, children have always provided hope, security, participation and remembrance. "Hope that the future will be better than the present, security that the future will not be worse than the present, participation in shaping our future, remembrance - a kind of immortality, so that something will last after we are dead."

Thirty years later, a simple fact remains. In a free society decisions about marriage, sexual behaviour and family size are made within the home and family. They are, and should be, free choices.

In an uncertain world there are a few other certainties.

Rapid improvements in death control have brought down mortality rates almost everywhere, especially among children. Birth rates are now falling too, in most developing countries. BUT the young age profile of the population means that there is a tremendous momentum for growth.

As a result within the last second, three more people have been added to the world total. Each day, another 250,000 souls are added to the human family. In this critical decade the absolute increase will be the greatest ever, an addition of 96 million this year, rising to 100 million each year by the end of the century.

The 6th billion expected in 1998 and the medium projection for 2025 is 8.5 billion. The eventual stabilised total on this projection will be around 11 billion, or if the transition to the two-child family is delayed, 15 billion or more.

Which of these scenarios comes about, depends very much on whether we grasp the opportunities to speed up the transition in the remaining years of this century. If the population juggernaut is allowed to roll on its present course for another seven years, the momentum may be too great to slow - at least in a civilised fashion.

But, I do not wish to pursue this population theme further now. I would rather use the time I have left, to stress another certainty.

A reproductive revolution is spreading across much of the developing world. Use of effective contraception has risen rapidly. Fertility has been falling.

Many developing countries, such as Thailand, Korea or Sri Lanka, have seen average family size fall from six to between two and three in twenty years. Others like Mexico and Colombia are well along the same road. Bangladesh, one of the world's poorest nations has seen family size fall from seven to a little over five in the last decade. Even Kenya, which had the world's fastest growth rate and families of eight children has seen this number fall in the last few years.

Overall, family size in developing countries has dropped from an average of six children to four in the last 30 years.

There has been a sea-change in desired family size in almost every region of the world. In most countries outside Africa, at least half of all married women do not want any more children. Even in Africa, almost all the surveys show that at least half of all married women either want to postpone their next pregnancy or do not want any more children.

The tragedy we face today is that services have not kept pace with the demand for voluntary family planning services.

Just a quick word then on four aspects of this dilemma:

First: the huge unmet need for family planning

Second: the special needs of young people

Third: the neglected question of male responsibility

and Fourth: the urgent need for better international cooperation in dealing with these matters.

Demographic and health surveys from around the world show that there remains a huge unmet need for family planning services. They indicate that more than one out of every five married women outside of China - or some 120 million - is out of reach of family planning advice and services. And these surveys exclude single, separated, divorced and widowed women.

If their needs could be met, it would vastly improve the health and life chances of women and children. It would save the lives of many of the 500,000 women who die each year from pregnancy related causes, and most of the two million infants who perish as a result of being born too closely spaced. It would also slow population growth rates by the equivalent of at least one child per woman. That alone would bring about the three-child family. That alone would bring the world half way to replacement level, and set us on course for stable world population nearer to 10 than 15 billion.

Such calculations are valuable, because they show that governments can achieve their demographic aims without panic driven targets, which often lead to insensitive top-down programmes.

But they do not address at least two key issues, which I would like to stress.

First: much of this unmet need is among poor and marginal communities either in remote rural areas or in the rapidly growing shanty towns of the developing world.

Second: if services are to succeed they must focus on the client and they must use strategic approaches which provide access to a range of methods, and which are affordable and acceptable.

All this has to be supported with proper counselling, careful monitoring by paramedics and field workers, and supervision of staff.

Last week I was in Pakistan. This is a country where contraceptive use is less than 15 per cent. Nearly five months ago one of the western donors had cut all aid to Pakistan. As a result various family planning programmes had come to a grinding halt. Within the NGO sector:

150 family planning clinics closed down

36 voluntary surgical centres were shut

30 community based family planning programmes ceased operation

4000 family planning workers were laid off and

some 300,000 contraceptive users had become non users.

Access to services and quality care had had a tremendous impact in some of these project locations. Within 18 months contraceptive prevalence had increased from 13 per cent to some 30 per cent. And now, many of these families who live on less than 50 pence a day cannot afford commercial rates for the services they require.

International donors and governments must begin to put people first, and be consistent in the way they administer programmes which directly affect people's lives.

Let me now move on to adolescent fertility. Teenage pregnancy is a problem in all countries. Whether it is the result of early or imposed marriage, or sexual experimentation, it puts at risk the health of both mother and child.

The emphasis in surveys has usually been on married women. This fails to take into account the huge unmet need of unmarried teenagers. It is estimated that each year more than 20 million young girls, between 15 and 19, falls pregnant. Perhaps five million of these will opt for an abortion. Where this is illegal the procedure may kill or maim them. The others will go through with an often unwanted pregnancy, that may seriously harm their health and life chances. The majority of these pregnancies owe a great deal to society's permissive attitude to male sexuality.

The needs of both young men and women for family life education and contraception must be a priority. Of the hundreds millions of adolescents requiring sexual and reproductive health services, only a few lucky ones have access to good quality information, advice, contraceptives and health care.

In many societies providing such education and services is a delicate matter. Yet education on sexuality, family life and reproductive health can help to promote a common value system. It can promote mutual respect and equality between men and women. It can reduce unwanted pregnancies, abortion and the risk of sexually transmitted diseases.

The other neglected issue involves the men. As I travel in my job, I bring back with me the images, voices and memories of the people I have met. Early this year I was in Sierra Leone, staying in the villages and meeting with chiefs, tribal leaders and local men and women. In every village the principal concern was the high rate of infant mortality.

Both men and women expressed anguish at the loss of children and the need to replace this loss. Their children were dying of tuberculosis, measles, diarrhoea and whooping cough. Many of the women I spoke to were exhausted from their triple workloads: work in their households, labouring in the field and their reproductive roles.

I talked to a woman less than 30 years old. She wept and said "I bore my first child when I was 15 years old. I have had 11 pregnancies and only three surviving children. This child in my arms is nine months and he has been ill a long time. I know I am going to lose him too. I am tired of child bearing but the decision to have children is my husband's. I have no charge over my body."

In the developing world, men are usually the decision makers in areas of contraceptive use and reproductive behaviour. Only recently have family planning programmes come to realise that men are an important target audience for information and education. This failure to educate has kept men from taking an active role in family planning. Traditional methods such as abstinence and withdrawal requires it ... moving to more effective methods should increase rather than decrease male involvement. Alas, the number of methods open to men is limited.

Besides being users, male opinion leaders have helped to legitimise family planning programmes within local communities. Village leaders, religious leaders and politicians can have a tremendous influence.

Ladies and Gentlemen...

Resources for family planning need to double if international targets and demographic goals are to be achieved. The amounts of money required are not great, for such an important objective.

We are talking about increasing annual spending to support population activities from 4.5 billion US dollars to 9 billion dollars by the end of century. Of today's total expenditure, 3.5 billion dollars are provided by the developing countries themselves. But some of the poorest countries have the greatest need. The international community must rise to the challenge.

I cannot think of a better investment in all our futures.

For the European Union I have four suggestions:

First: Existing support for population should be more clearly stated and promoted.

Second: Although resources have increased, they fall short of the need set out, and agreed, at the Amsterdam Forum and elsewhere.

Third: Expertise on population within the Commission should be strengthened to ensure that funds are effectively used.

Fourth: A population unit should be established within the Commission to ensure coordination between the two Directorates, DG1 and DG VIII, and to work closely with the very few population NGOs in Europe.

## 2. THE POPULATION PROBLEM AND FAMILY PLANNING AND WOMEN IN EUROPE

Mrs Sophie Apostolopoulos, President of the Greek Family Planning Association, Athens.

Next Autumn the United Nations is organizing in Cairo the Third World Conference of its Member States: the subject is population growth and development.

The aim of this Conference is to study and chart population policies for our planet for the decade ahead.

It should be noted that this conference follows the UN World Conference on the Environment held two years ago in Rio de Janeiro and the World Conference on Human Rights held one year ago in Vienna. The UN is thus establishing a link between these three mutually interdependent sectors.

Advocates of family planning and workers in this sector frequently find themselves confronted with the following questions:

- Is there any link between the population issue and the policies in this field that are either planned or already being implemented at local or world level, and the planning services?
- What direct or indirect impact do they have on the protection and promotion of the fundamental rights of man and more specifically: what steps are taken to guarantee the right recognized by the United Nations of each citizen, regardless of sex, race, colour and religion, freely to choose the number of children he/she wishes to have, when he/she wishes to have them and the interval between them?

The demographic approach to this problem is of course valid in its own terms; it uses specific data to shed light on the current situation in the world and to make projections for the decades ahead. However, despite the significant contribution it has made in charting out this problem, it cannot be an end in itself and constitute the only criterion for drawing up a population policy addressed at men and women with their realistic desire to live in dignity.

It is therefore essential to address this problem as part of measures to safeguard the right of human beings to have children, which is the 'mission' of the non-governmental family planning bodies which are working in this area as members of the International Family Planning Federation (IFPF) to promote the relevant services provided in more than 140 countries all over the world.

The objective pursued by the IFPF since its foundation in 1952 demonstrate its humanitarian approach, the importance attached to women's issues and its interest in tackling population problems. These include:

- the promotion of training in family planning and responsible sexual conduct;
- the fostering of mental and physical health through the promotion of, and support for, effective family planning services (parents, children, young people);



- measures to support scientific research regarding all aspects of human fertility and means of regulating it; the dissemination of the results for the benefit of the general public;
- the provision of information and training in demographic problems (at local and international levels).

These objectives will provide a framework for the IFPF's proposals during the preliminary UN committee meetings which have been convoked and which will continue to meet to prepare the agenda of the Cairo Conference.

The term 'population problem' is employed and interpreted differently by family planning workers.

It concerns us but we do not feel comfortable with it.

The knowledge that this term has often been used to provoke feelings of culpability and shame, notably among the female population, leads us to believe that the so-called 'population problem', even as an idea, is contrary to family planning, and militates against the free exercise of human rights, since it serves economic, political, national and nationalistic objectives in a struggle pitting the weak against the strong.

The horror stories in Ceausescu's Romania up to 1989 are still fresh in our minds:

The infamous population policy of the former dictator sought to increase the population of Romania within ten years by between 23 and 30 million inhabitants.

In order to achieve this goal all access to family planning and information services was forbidden.

Abortion was permitted only for women over 45 years of age with five or more children.

In all other cases it was banned and also a punishable offence for both the women and the doctors involved.

Contraception was also forbidden so that illegal backstreet abortions constituted the main method of birth control: 86% of mortality among mothers was due to this.

After the fall of the regime in December 1989 abortion was legalized and over the following six months mortality among mothers fell by 317% (data provided by the WHO).

Even in European countries, in which, at least officially, no specific population policies are pursued, misguided notions concerning the desirability of increasing increase in the national population are encouraged by the State and the Church so that the quality of family planning services provided suffers and this undoubtedly leads to an increase in the number of backstreet abortions and mortality among the female population.

In particular :

- As far as family planning is concerned, we currently find the same desperate needs and shortcomings in Europe as in Third World countries;
- In the former Soviet Union most women use abortion as their only form of birth control because other methods are of poor quality and based on outdated technology. The average woman has between five and seven abortions between 15 and 45 years of age;
- According to WHO data in 1990 over 700 000 women had an illegal, 'backstreet', abortion and 447 of these died as a result;
- In Armenia, according to government sources, women have an average of six abortions; the Red Cross puts the figure at 20;
- In Russia today, 108.6 women out of every 1000 undergo an abortion and mortality among mothers is almost 47 out of 100 000, the highest figure per number of abortions in the world;
- In Albania neither women nor men had access to primary health services or family planning up to one year ago.

Modern contraception methods are practically unknown and, of course, inadequate. 'Traditional' methods are ineffective, resulting in high abortion rates and figures for mortality among mothers.

Despite the geographical, political, religious, linguistic, cultural and national specificities of each of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (the former Soviet republics, Albania, the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Slovenia, the Republics of Central Asia, etc.), they have the following in common

- as a 'general picture':

a dismal economic situation;

ineffective services structures;

poverty affecting large sections of the population;

non-existent or inadequate social policies;

shortages in essential products (pharmaceuticals, food, fuel, etc.);

political instability and war;

mass refugee movements;

- at family planning level:

family planning associations are not everywhere available;

there are problems in communicating with and approaching the public, due to religious and social 'rules', for instance in the case of Muslims and gipsies.

Family planning workers are regarded with distrust and the population lacks confidence in the services they provide;

Sex hygiene and education is poor or even non-existent.

In other words, beyond the need for material infrastructures and staff for family planning services, a change in mentality and new models are required.

This is the priority objective for the IFPF and special programmes have already been launched involving every type of assistance in the countries of Eastern Europe.

In certain countries attempts are being made due to religious influences or national priorities, to abolish women's right to safe and legal abortions.

The official Croatian model for 'demographic revival' expects families to have between three and four children and is therefore opposed to abortions, divorce and the professional activity of women.

In Ireland and Poland, countries in which abortion is prohibited, women have found an original solution: they go on weekend trips to have abortions in neighbouring countries.

It is a fact that the small family is thriving in Europe and the population growth curve is declining.

This should under no circumstances be seen as an isolated phenomenon, but in the context of the general conditions which determine citizens' lives (the economy, social policy, the quality of health, unemployment, education, likelihood of political instability).

This cannot serve as an alibi for a population policy which ignores the human right to reproduction, puts the blame on women and violates her right to express her sexuality when, with whom and however she wishes.

It is not fair to use woman's child-bearing function as a target for these policies and to put the onus on women to 'behave responsibly', thereby depriving them of the ability to participate in decision-making concerning their own private lives and also in drawing up policies on national and international bodies.

Europe needs an overall population policy: discussions, studies and proposals are necessary to allow a comprehensive approach to the subject, taking into account of course the specific circumstances obtaining in individual states.

If population policies are to be considered fair and effective, they must be based in the principle of social justice and promote the well-being of the population.

In view of the 1994 UN World Conference:

In the expectation that effective population policies will be drawn up for the decade ahead, let us bear in mind that:

- by the year 2002 the present world population of 5 billion will have risen to 6 billion;
- the factors which influence fertility are directly linked to development, and notably economic, social and human development;
- less than 1% of world development aid is spent on population policies and family planning, sectors which will contribute to improving social and economic conditions on a small and large scale and improving the quality of the environment.

In the light of the above, let us declare our support for a uniform framework for action at world level and the right of every person to freedom of choice and dignity and let us continue to watch over the future of our planet.

### 3. POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Professor H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Professor of Public Law, University of Nairobi and Chairman of the National Council for Population and Development, Kenya

Honourable members of the Committee, distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

1. Let me start by thanking you for the singular honour you have accorded me and my country by inviting me to address you on this important issue. It is most fitting that the theme of the Cairo conference next year - the third in the series organized by the United Nations - should be on the relationship between population and development. For although the issue of population has been on the agenda of the international community for a very long time, its development implications have not always been systematically explored at that level. The scant, and in some ways, cavalier attention which the population issue received at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro last year is clear evidence of this.
2. Instead the international community has been concerned - and I dare say, excessively concerned - with the orchestration of various scenarios of doom based on current growth rates and absolute numbers of people in relation to what is seen as the very limited resources available to mankind. These scenarios, especially as regards Africa, have been clear, graphic and frightening. The message to be drawn from them is that unless something drastic is done to reduce population growth rates - currently estimated at 1.7% globally, 2.3% in the third world (excluding China) and 3% in Africa, a malthusian catastrophe of immense proportions is inevitable. The prescription which has been handed down to the third world generally, and Africa in particular, is vigorous fertility reduction policies anchored by comprehensive family planning programmes.
3. And yet it should be obvious that what is important is not fertility reduction per se. The small family "norm" is not necessarily appropriate for all societies at all stages of development. What is important is how to balance human numbers and the rate at which these are growing or not growing and the rate at which the resources needed by that population are being generated, consumed and sustained. In other words, population is a problem only when it outstrips the capacity of the development process to sustain it. That is an issue which requires that attention be paid to both human and natural resource development and management. For a country's population is, first and foremost, its most important resource.
4. Available statistics indicate that while Africa's population is still growing at about 3% per year, African economies are generally in stagnation due largely to the lack of capacity, by its own population, to manage the enterprise of development. Wars, pestilence and political instability have compounded this state of affairs by creating one of the largest internal human displacement conditions in any continent. Thus Africa remains the only continent that is unable to grow enough food to feed its people. Indeed every indication is that African economies are unlikely to recover soon.
5. The challenge for governments in Africa is therefore threefold. First the continent must seek to develop its human resources to ensure that capacity exists for endogenously propelled development. Education, skills and

management training, science and technology development, improvement of public health, and investment in social infrastructure must, therefore, take priority in the continent's development agenda. Second the continent must break out of the stranglehold of international capital which has been and remains the fundamental cause of its underdevelopment. Third, the continent must strive to put its institutions of governance in order as a means of creating and enabling environment for development.

6. Only in this context will fertility reduction policies and family planning programmes make sense. For the goal then would be to restore and maintain the equilibrium between population growth and resource availability through development and reduction in growth rates. This is an option which Europe and North America did not have to take. The demographic transition in those continents was not reached through family planning or modern methods of contraception. It occurred at least in Europe inter alia, through plagues, an agrarian revolution, industrial revolutions, industrialisation and imperialism.
7. As a result nearly all African countries, including my own, now have fertility reduction policies and family planning programmes. Contrary to early concerns about the supposed cultural impenetrability of African social structures to fertility reduction, modest achievements have been recorded on this front in a number of countries including Kenya, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Mauritius. Let me turn to Kenya with which I am most familiar.
8. The demographic profile of Kenya has previously been characterized by a high population growth rate due mainly to an exceptionally high fertility regime. Thus the first population census conducted in 1948 recorded a total of 5.4 million people. This increased to some 8.6 million in 1962; 10.9 million in 1969; and 16 million in 1979.
9. A turning point was reached in 1989 when for the first time, there was evidence that fertility levels had started declining. A Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) conducted in that year indicated that the total fertility rate (TFR) had declined from 8.1 live births per woman in 1984 to 6.7. A second DHS conducted in 1993 now indicates that the TFR has further declined to 5.4. The corresponding trends in population growth rate have consequently changed from 3.8% in 1979 to 3.4% in 1989. The aim is to achieve a TFR of 5.2 and growth rate of 2.5% by the year 2000. As a result, the country's population is currently estimated at 25 million; a figure which is expected to rise to about 32 million by the year 2000.
10. These changes are the result of important planning strategies that have been in operation since 1967 when the first population programme was outlined. These strategies include a vigorous individual choice-based family planning programme, clear political commitment and advocacy for integrated population management in general, and fertility reduction in particular, strong donor and NGO support, and broad receptivity by various public constituencies to population programme rationale. The establishment of National Council for Population and Development (NCPD) in 1982 to supervise the implementation of these strategies and the holding of the first population conference for national leaders in 1984 constitute the high water mark in the Kenya government's commitment to population management.

11. As early as 1965, in Sessional Paper no. 10 of that year, the crucial link between the rate of population growth and development had been acknowledged. The same relationship was subsequently explored in detail when the 5 year family planning programme was launched between 1975-1979. All of the country's development plans in the 1980s and 1990s have, in consequence, placed the population issue at the centre of development policy. Indeed population issues have become fully integrated into development policies, plans, programmes and activities. The primary concern of the government is to ensure that the country's population growth rate does not outstrip her ability to generate and sustain its natural resources.
12. In this regard, the government has taken important initiatives to address critical issues in both human and natural resource development. These include youth and adolescent management, enhancement of the status of women, education and training, basic skills development, strengthening maternal and child health services and improvement of public health and associated infrastructure. Further, important policies and programmes for the sustainable management of natural resources have been put into place. These include agricultural sector adjustment operations, a programme for the development of the arid and semi-arid lands, a comprehensive environmental action plan, and a vigorous science and technology programme.
13. Specifically the government has taken steps to ensure that virtually all school-going children are enrolled and that the quality of education continues to improve. The incorporation of technical education in the primary school curriculum, in particular, has made it possible for the informal sector of the economy to participate fully in the reduction of unemployment. Further, every effort is being made to remove all impediments (social, economic and cultural) to genuine gender equality through, inter alia, ensuring equal access to education and employment, public advocacy, and legislative reform. As a matter of fact, an important task force has been set up to examine all laws that discriminate against women and to make appropriate recommendations to the country's Attorney General.
14. Despite these efforts a number of important constraints still remain. These include serious economic stagnation and reduced donor support for development programmes, an unusually high influx of refugees from neighbouring countries, a relatively high morbidity rate (even though actual mortality rates are falling) and the threat of HIV/AIDS. Indeed HIV/AIDS which was first diagnosed in 1984/85 is set to claim up to two hundred thousand lives in the year 2000. It will also increase the cost of health care. Real possibilities therefore exist for a serious set-back in the country's current population programme. Indeed unless concerted efforts are made to mobilize domestic resources to cover the shortfalls due to reduced international assistance, the modest gains already achieved could be lost.
15. The government has tried to address some of these constraints by adopting a number of strategies. These include the widespread introduction of community-based distribution of family planning services which enhances the programmes' capacity to reach more clients and help eradicate some socio-cultural obstacles to family planning acceptance. It has also formulated a national Information, Education and Communication (IEC) strategy in which specific IEC gaps are being addressed e.g. adolescent fertility and women empowerment, in order to apply relevant messages to appropriate audiences.

National leaders population conferences are also held from time to time with the aim of increasing political support to the programme. A new strategy to combat the AIDS menace through public education is also in force.

Honourable members of the Committee, distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

16. The road ahead is certainly not easy. I am confident, however, that we shall succeed, through these policies and programmes, to ensure a decent quality of life for our people into the twenty-first century and beyond.

Thank you very much for having invited me.



#### 4. THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF POPULATION GROWTH

##### FROM FACT AND DOCTRINE TO SCIENTIFIC DEBATE

Professor Dominique TABUTIN

Institute of Demography, Catholic University of Louvain

##### SOME BACKGROUND DATA BY WAY OF AN INTRODUCTION

For the past forty years or so, the world has been going through an unprecedented period of demographic, social, economic and environmental change. In the demographic field, the geographical distribution of the world's population is rapidly changing. The population figures for the South are rising in both absolute and relative terms whereas, in the North, they have almost reached the point of stagnation. In the economic field the opposite situation is to be found, with North America, Europe and Japan becoming increasingly dominant and imposing their 'law' on the rest of the world. With the exception of a few of the countries of East Asia, problems of all kinds continue to build up almost everywhere else in the world. In the environmental field, the situation is alarming both at global level and in many regions and countries.

A (perhaps rather smug) mood of optimism reigned during the 1950s and 1960s. Rostow's 'take-off' ideology, based on growth along Western lines, ruled the day. However, by the end of the 1960s, uncertainty and a certain degree of scepticism had already begun to set in: the problem of the South's development was not going to be settled as quickly as had been thought. In 1972, the Club of Rome published its 'worst-case scenario' which, even though overstated and open to criticism, made a large impact owing to the bleak prospects it held out for the future. Development theories and models continued to be put forward, but the disturbing facts of the situation would not go away. The 1980s were marked by a sense of crisis and a mood of pessimism, with a world recession between 1980 and 1983, rising inflation and growing debt burdens, a decline in living standards and social welfare in many countries - all of which was finally capped by austerity or structural adjustment policies (mostly imposed by the IMF), the long-term social impact of which has yet to be properly assessed. Many observers saw this as proof of the bankruptcy of the theories and solutions put forward and of the total failure of capitalism and central planning - both the free-market model and the Communist model (which was soon to collapse totally). This despite the fact that some areas (East Asia) were faring better than others (sub-Saharan Africa) and the seriousness of food, health and environmental problems varied enormously around the world.

Although it would appear paradoxical, it was against this general background of economic and ideological crisis, economic recession and a recourse to short-term or short-sighted policies, that the concept (or paradigm) of sustainable development (striking a medium-to-long-term balance between needs, population size and resources) first emerged in the 1980s. Terms such as interrelated phenomena, interdependency, systemic analysis and multi-disciplinarity now became common currency. International scientific circles developed new combinatory paradigms: population/development in the 1970s, population/environment in more recent times and even population/environment/development.

This broadening of the scope of debate, research and, perhaps one day, strategies for action was brought about by a combination of two factors: the pressure of events and a new view of the world and of science.

The events involved were the limited success or downright failure of the policies pursued or recommended hitherto, economic stagnation or recession in some southern regions, growing problems with employment, education and food supplies, appalling crises at both local and regional levels, a widening of the gap between North and South, etc. Furthermore, the world's population continued to grow rapidly and the prospect of a further 15 to 20 years of such growth placed a formidable constraint on any medium-to-long-term planning, while a wide range of environmental problems at both global and regional levels were finally acknowledged and given wide media coverage.

In the face of this situation, starting in the 1970s, a new view of the problems of the world and of science gradually started to gain ground, mainly in scientific circles but also among international development agencies. (Could this be seen as a new ideology?) this less evolutionist, much more intricate view of the situation is based on a concern for the future:

- The world is finite (its resources will not last for ever), fragile and complex (there is constant interaction between the biosphere and Man, and between culture and Nature).
- The world is one, but its inhabitants differ greatly, with different backgrounds, different cultures and different circumstances.
- Some feel that the world is going through a period of disequilibrium, while others see it as being on the road to self destruction; however, all agree that Man is responsible.
- Economic considerations can no longer regulate nor explain everything: all of society's problems (from fertility to soil degradation) have social, cultural, historical and political causes and effects.
- Irrefutable theories and cast-iron historical models do not exist or no longer apply; there is no longer any place for easy solutions. To exaggerate a little, theorizing has reached a dead end and the way forward now lies through pragmatism and cautious action.
- Lastly, and perhaps most important of all, the future is the main concern: future generations also have a right to a decent life. The long-term must take precedence over the short-term.

Which brings us back to the *concept of sustainable development*, defined in the Brundtland report as development which meets the needs and aspirations of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. However, and this is the crux of the matter, we still need to define the objectives and the needs and, above all, determine exactly how to eliminate poverty and thereby solve many of the problems in the developing countries. The principles of viability, sustainability, fairness and integration are central to an approach based on finding a balance between available resources and environmental protection and meeting not just today's needs but those of future generations as well. *Population size, the environment and development must all be taken into account in medium- and long-term planning.*

We shall now examine the issues of population growth and the environment, both of which will remain on the agenda for a long time to come. The age-old equilibrium between Man and Nature has now been broken by environmental stresses leading to a deterioration of marine, aquatic or terrestrial ecosystems, air pollution, the destruction of flora and fauna and so on. At the same time, over the past 30 to 40 years, there has been unprecedented growth in the world's population, particularly in the South. This trend will continue for at least another thirty years.

Now population growth (in other words, the southern hemisphere, given that population growth is almost nil in the North) is often accused of being responsible for all our problems. However, is the situation really that simple, and is the relationship that direct, that simplistic? How much responsibility should the North, as opposed to the South, take for the main global problems (ozone, CO<sub>2</sub>, etc.)? How will this ratio stand in the future? Can population growth always be said to be the primary or only cause of problems at regional and local levels?

We are now entering an area in which politics, ideology and science start to overlap and often to clash. Many conflicting views have been put forward both orally and in print. We shall first briefly run over the main demographic and environmental issues before going on to examine the three main doctrines (or ideologies) and what the scientists do or do not know about the relationship between population growth and the environment.

#### **A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE FACTS AND THE ISSUES AT STAKE**

Generally speaking, we have a fairly good understanding of the basic situation, which is reasonably well documented. However, many uncertainties still remain, particularly with regard to how the situation will develop in the future. We will now have a brief look at some of the problems.

#### **A - Population**

##### **Uncertainty about the long-term situation**

Although demography is a reliable science when it comes to medium-range forecasts (let us say 10 to 15 years hence) it becomes less and less so the further one looks into the future. How is one to determine precisely the fertility rates by country and by region in 2010, 2020 or 2030? Demographers always work on the basis of three scenarios but often, only the mean estimate is taken into account. None the less, there is a wide variance between the upper and lower values. For instance, according to which estimate you choose to believe, the world's population will grow or shrink by nearly 2 billion inhabitants by the year 2025 - a total variance of nearly 23%, due mainly to the unpredictability of fertility rates in the southern hemisphere, particularly in Africa and 'pivotal' countries such as China and India.

##### **Estimates have been revised upwards**

The world's population has risen from 2.5 billion in around 1950 to approximately 5.4 billion people (77% of whom live in the southern hemisphere) today. Within 10 years time, at the beginning of the 21st century, it will have risen to 6.4 billion, representing a mean (undisputed) growth rate of approximately 100 million people per year. The still quite recent forecast that

the population would stabilize at 10 billion in 2075 has had to be revised: it is now thought that this level will be reached in 2050. The latest theory is that growth will finally tail off at the end of the 21st century, at which point the world's population will stand at between 12 and 13 billion. However, even the wildest estimates as to the numbers and the timescale involved seem possible.

**One thing is certain: demographic transition has started, but growth rates remain high.**

In the North, growth rates are now very low and in some cases actually negative. Most (95% or so) of the world's future population growth will occur in the developing countries: for example, between 1990 and 2025 the population of southern Asia is likely to grow from 1.2 to 2.2 billion, that of Latin America from 450 to 760 million and that of Africa from 650 million to 1.6 billion. An unprecedented redistribution of the world's population is currently taking place.

At the same time however, regional disparities are becoming increasingly acute: in addition to the obvious gap between North and South, there are differences between regions and between individual countries within these regions. Disparities in the rate of decline and fertility and mortality levels are becoming more and more pronounced. Population growth is slowing down almost everywhere (except in sub-Saharan Africa), but still stands at an annual rate of 1.3% in East Asia, 2.1% in Latin America, 2.3% in southern Asia and nearly 3% in Africa. The differences are even more pronounced at national level. Every society has its own demographic patterns, its own transition models and its own reproductive patterns, and adjusts as best it can to its economic, social or physical environment; a wide variety of responses may be made to any new situation. This important factor must be taken into account if one is to understand why some regions or societies are 'ahead of' or 'lagging behind' others. When it comes to demography, as in other areas, one can no longer afford to treat the Third World (or the 'South') as a single entity.

**Some of the direct results: youth and population density**

Following a general decline in fertility rates, the world as a whole has now embarked upon an irreversible ageing process which, although already well advanced in the North, is only in its very early stages elsewhere. Throughout the South populations are extremely young: the average age in the Third World as a whole is 21 (as opposed to 34 in the North). Only 4.5% of the population is over 65 years of age, with 35% being under 15. Because of the speed at which it is likely to take place and the number of people concerned, the ageing of the population in the South will be a major concern in the 21st century.

Furthermore, in some countries and regions population growth rates of between 2 and 3% per year are leading to a totally unprecedented increase in population density. By 2025 Bangladesh will have over 1500 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup>, Korea 600 and Vietnam 320. Rwanda and Burundi will be coping with 750 and 500 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup> respectively. Many observers feel that these countries' ecosystems will be unable to sustain such population levels.

**Major population movements: the drift from the land and urbanization**

Although hardly new phenomena, the drift from the land and urbanization are still very much with us, particularly in the South. In the North, urbanization

will continue at a slow pace in the future. Elsewhere its progress will be much faster, with the proportion of the population living in towns rising from 34 to 57% over the next 30 years. Should these forecasts prove correct, by the year 2025 there will be some 2.7 billion more town dwellers in the developing countries and 25 towns with over 10 million inhabitants.

*Internal migratory flows* are directed mainly towards towns - most often towards capitals - resulting in some regions becoming drained of young people, who leave in search of jobs or a new lifestyle. This can lead to an ageing of the population in rural areas and even to a fall in agricultural output. *International migration* represents another way out. Almost by definition, the extent of this phenomenon is unclear, but migratory pressures on northern countries are clearly strong and will remain so in the future. *Refugee movements* are another form of migration, caused by civil war, political repression or natural disasters. Estimates point to nearly 18 million refugees in the world, approximately half of them in Africa.

## **B - The environment**

### **Inadequate statistical data**

In the environmental field, the statistical data available are inadequate in terms of both quantity and quality - so much so that, in comparison, demography looks like a precise science. Although over the past ten years an increasingly large body of data has become available on climatology, the atmosphere, desertification and so on, when one gets down to national or regional level the picture becomes much less clear and estimates much less reliable. Since the environment became a matter of concern only recently, few regions or countries have adequate information-gathering bodies or the necessary resources. Much of the information is out of date and local in scope. Most of the existing figures must therefore be seen as rough estimates and handled with care.

### **The main problems at global level**

Scientists first raised the alarm in the 1960s. Environmentalists started mobilizing in the 1970s and governments followed suit in the 1980s. The Stockholm Conference of 1972 paved the way for the Rio Conference held in 1992. The seriousness of the problems cannot be ignored, despite the fact that broad agreement has yet to be reached as to their extent, the timescale involved and the levels at which the process will become irreversible.

*Damage is being caused to the atmosphere* not just over towns but all around the world: over-production and excessive use of CFCs are depleting the ozone in the atmosphere, thereby lessening the earth's protection against ultraviolet radiation. At the same time, *carbon dioxide* levels in the atmosphere are rising (greenhouse effect) which, in the medium-to-long-term, will lead to an increase in the average temperature on earth, a rise in sea levels and a change in climate patterns. The rise in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions is caused by the increasingly widespread use of coal and petroleum products in industry and society as a whole (e.g. the motor car). Modern farming methods have led to the intensive use of *nitrates* - a well-known pollutant. The sea itself, once considered an infinite resource, must now be protected against oil spillages and other forms of pollution. The air in large towns in both North and South is polluted and toxic. Acid rain is destroying the West's forests. Owing to its production and

consumption patterns, the North is largely responsible for these problems, but the South is no longer totally blameless. We shall come back to this later.

### **Deforestation**

Forests, which are of considerable importance to the world's ecosystem and genetic heritage as well to both national and local economies, are gradually disappearing. Estimates vary but, according to the FAO (1985), approximately 150 000 km<sup>2</sup> (five times the surface area of Belgium) of the world's forests (including approximately 100 000 km<sup>2</sup> of tropical forest land) disappear each year. Reforestation takes place at a much slower rate: for every 10 hectares of forest land cleared in the southern hemisphere, only about three are replanted. Mankind is destroying its own forests through a need for new grazing or arable land, for wood for commercial or private use, by accident or through clumsiness (forest fires). Governments (e.g. Brazil, in the Amazon) sometimes give tacit or open support to such activities. It has been estimated that, at the current rate, approximately 35% of the forest land which existed in the southern hemisphere in around 1985 will have disappeared by the year 2000. The situation of course varies from place to place: the annual rate of deforestation during the 1980s ranged from below 1% (in forty or so countries) to over 5% in the Ivory Coast, Costa Rica and Nigeria.

### **Firewood**

Firewood remains the basic source of energy for one quarter of the world's population. In around 1980, it accounted for 21% of overall energy consumption in the developing countries (18% in Latin America, 58% in Africa and 17% in Asia); however, it accounted for over 70% in 26 countries. The shortage of this source of energy is a very real daily concern for over two billion people.

Deforestation has reached such a level both in the countryside and on the outskirts of towns that this shortage is growing steadily worse. As a result, wood prices in towns are rising sharply, women and children are becoming increasingly overworked and the already difficult living conditions of the poor and country dwellers in particular are continuing to deteriorate. Although there is also a shortage of firewood in Latin America, the areas hardest hit are Asia and Africa, where the situation is particularly serious.

Conventional energy sources (oil, gas and coal) are vital to the development of industry, transport and urban areas. However, owing to the price of such energy sources and to distribution difficulties, firewood will long continue to be necessary to the survival of many inhabitants of the southern hemisphere. Generally speaking, reforestation policies have had only a limited impact and, in view of the installation costs and the technology required, renewable energy sources (solar, wind) continue to be little used. In the view of J. Clément and S. Strasfogel (1986), no technical, economic or social measures will suffice to reduce significantly the pressure on forests and the demand for wood by the end of the century: wood will remain an irreplaceable energy source.

### **The land under threat: from degradation to desertification**

The declining productivity of much of the agricultural land in the South is without a doubt one of the major challenges facing the world in the closing years of this century. Through over-farming, a lack of care (e.g. intensive deforestation) or poor management (ineffective irrigation systems), we are in the process of destroying a fragile balance which took a long time to develop.

If we fail to re-establish this balance in the near future, soil fertility will decline and erosion (by wind or water) will set in, leading gradually to desertification. Whenever land is irrigated without proper drainage systems, soil saturation, alkalization or salting takes place. By failing to manage the environment in a responsible manner, *Man becomes both the instigator and the victim of a process* which can lead to malnutrition, food shortages or migration ('environmental refugees').

*This process is of concern to the world as a whole*, even though it is far more advanced in some regions than in others and estimates of its extent vary from source to source. According to A. Grainger (1990), 200 000 km<sup>2</sup> of land become barren every year and 6-7 million km<sup>2</sup> are affected by desertification. Most important of all, this process directly threatens 500-600 million people. *Africa is particularly threatened*: 60 of the 140 million people living in areas in which desertification is rapidly taking hold are African. Tropical forests are shrinking, brushwood is gradually disappearing in savanna land and arid areas are spreading rapidly. According to the UNEP (1985), the Sahel is turning into a desert, savanna land into a Sahel-type environment and the forests into savanna land.

#### **Water: quantity and quality**

Water supplies are a daily worry for over half of the world's population. Even in the temperate countries of the North, there is now talk of possible water shortages within the next 25 years, together with poor management, ground water pollution, overconsumption and price considerations. The expert view (J. Theys, 1987) is that cheap, easily-accessible water will gradually become the exception. But what of the Third World? Already, 30-40% of the world's population live in areas affected by water shortages. This figure could rise to 50% by the beginning of the next century. Three-fifths of Third World households have no access to drinking water supplies. This problem, which was mainly restricted to rural areas 20 or so years ago, now also affects urban areas owing to rising domestic, agricultural and industrial demand. Furthermore, it is not just a problem of quantity, but also of quality. Its seriousness depends on climate, pedological considerations, the reserves available, the level of development and the policies implemented. The problem is particularly acute in regions such as North Africa, the Middle East and the Sahel.

#### **Urban problems**


The unprecedented urban expansion now taking place is already creating enormous problems in the South, with urban sprawl, the ruralization of towns, the pauperization of increasingly large sections of the population, the growth of shanty towns and generally difficult living conditions. Towns are still seen as a source of hope but can no longer really be seen as a source of jobs and material comfort or at least much less so than before.

There is a growing discrepancy between the needs of the population and the services and infrastructures provided by local councils (owing to inadequate financial and human resources) and *living conditions and the environment are steadily deteriorating to varying degrees almost everywhere*, with increasingly scarce low-cost housing, property speculation, unreliable drinking water supplies, inadequate electricity distribution, over-stretched and often out-dated sewage networks, unregulated refuse collection and storage, inadequate

social and health provision in outlying areas, a shortage of transport facilities and schools, and so on.

#### THE THREE MAIN DOCTRINAL (OR 'IDEOLOGICAL') APPROACHES

No one branch of science can lay claim to the environment, which is a sort of 'disciplinary crossroads' at which empirical sciences (biology, agronomy, physics, etc.) and social sciences (economics, sociology, demography, etc.) intersect - or should in principle intersect. In systemic terms, all development processes are the result of interrelations between four main factors: population, technology, socio-political organization and the environment (space, resources, ecosystems, etc.).



This general situation obviously adds to the complexity of the mechanisms involved and of the overall approach to adopt to the causes and effects of the deterioration of a given environment.

However, here we shall concentrate on the relationship between population and the environment, an area in which there are three main doctrinal approaches. The traditional dichotomy of approach used in respect of population and development applies once again in this context. Basically speaking, on the one hand population growth is seen as being responsible for all the world's problems and, on the other, as being almost blameless. Rather than being just an academic debate, this is a fully-fledged ideological conflict. While the positions of the various camps were clearly staked out in the 1960s and 1970s, the differences between them are now less pronounced. However, the basic problem remains the same.

#### The hardline neo-Malthusian approach: now losing momentum

At a time when doubt is setting in as to the planet's future ability to meet humanity's needs Malthus's theory about the negative impact which population growth has on agricultural output has been 'logically' extended to cover the environment. The world is finite and the earth's physical and biological



capacities therefore constitute the ultimate limits on population growth and socio-economic change. In other words, population growth in the southern hemisphere (since growth is almost nil in the North) is causing all the problems and is a threat to the future of the world as a whole. The world's population is growing at such a rate and is going to be so large that it is neither likely nor possible that the necessary adjustments will be made over the next 20-30 years. F. Ramade (1987), an ecologist who has espoused the neo-Malthusian cause, writes that the major disaster threatening mankind and causing most of its present or potential ills is of an intrinsic nature, in that it stems from anarchic reproduction patterns which are leading to an exponential growth in the number of people in the world.

According to this viewpoint, which finds support among many agronomists, biologists and ecologists, we have already gone beyond the point at which the world's ecosystems are capable of regenerating themselves, are now in the process of running down its biological resources and have almost reached the point of non-return. On the basis of this pessimistic view of things, a firm, effective policy of birth-control in the Third World must be seen as the priority, if not the only way of avoiding disaster. This rather simplistic view is still widely held. It formed the basis of the North's population policies for the South in the 1960s and 1970s and has given rise to vertical, isolated family planning systems which have sometimes been taken to extremes and, in many cases, have had little or no effect.

#### **Qualified neo-Malthusianism: now widespread**

Since the end of the 1970s, a less radical, more reasoned approach has gradually been gaining ground, based on the premise that *demographic pressure is not the direct cause of environmental problems, although it does serve to amplify them*. It effectively acts as a permanent brake on any form of development, progress or change. The main underlying factor is *poverty*, which is both a cause and an effect of high fertility rates. *Population growth is seen simply as an immediate cause* which aggravates the overall situation and must therefore be acted upon swiftly in order to prevent any further deterioration.

This represents something of a break with simplistic theories, rudimentary universal formulas (contraception) and quick solutions. None the less, the proponents of this approach still feel that, with a view to both limiting the damage and preparing for a better future, swift, vigorous action must be taken to control fertility, which is the root cause of current and future population growth.

#### **Anti-Malthusianism: a minority view**

The apparent optimism of this third approach contrasts with the pessimism underlying the others. The basic precept is that mankind has always shown itself capable of facing up to external threats and will be able to solve the problems of tomorrow in the same way as those of today, having demonstrated a remarkable capacity to adapt and innovate. Population growth is a wholly secondary factor which may in some cases even be favourable, and the true causes are to be sought elsewhere: in poverty, inequalities, unsuitable technologies, agricultural policy (priority given to cash crops), land ownership, the bias in favour of towns, war, political regimes, etc. Proponents point out that family planning is not the sole priority, and this approach may be used to justify a policy of non-intervention in respect of fertility rates.

The anti-Malthusianist camp embraces views such as the hardline *populationist theory*, supported by J. Simon (1981) among others, that there is no such thing as a population problem, almost going so far as to deny the existence of environmental problems. The larger the population, the greater its capacity for invention and technological innovation. Population growth in the Third World may in the long term help to promote economic development, although it is recognized as being a constraint in the short term. Then there is the *famous Boserup theory* (1965, 1981) that population growth acts as a stimulant, or rather a necessary precondition, for agricultural progress. This view tends to stand the previous relationship on its head, considering population growth to be responsible for technological progress.

Given that it sees population growth as having a positive role, the anti-Malthusian approach perhaps reflects past developments in Western or temperate countries, but does not appear to be applicable to the whole of today's world in general. None the less, the arguments put forward have served to relativize the negative and sometimes over-pessimistic view taken of population growth in whatever form, to stimulate new debate on the subject and to show conclusively that the real situation is more complex than many people have long felt it to be.

#### **A SCIENTIFIC VIEW OF THE ROLE PLAYED BY POPULATION GROWTH**

Environmental problems occur at various levels (global, regional and local) and different approaches are therefore required.

#### **Wealth and poverty, the root causes of global environmental problems**

It is now generally accepted that global environmental degradation has two basic causes: the (dominant) economic growth model adopted by the countries of the northern hemisphere (and a few isolated areas in the South) and the under-development and poverty of much of the southern hemisphere. While the rich of this world (approximately one billion people) produce, transport and consume most of the world's energy and are mainly responsible for the current problems of sea pollution, ozone depletion, acidification and warming of the atmosphere, the dispossessed (one to one and a half billion) clear trees, damage the land, grow crops (such as rice) which contribute towards the greenhouse effect and set up 'dirty' industries (which the North no longer wants) simply to be able to survive from day to day. In short, one half of the world sacrifices sustainability or the 'long-term' for maximum profit and pleasure today while the other half is obliged to over-utilize the natural resources available simply to stay alive. As the Brundtland report puts it, poverty is to a large extent both an effect and a cause of environmental degradation. When this is combined with a high population growth rate, one may well agree with the assessment made by the UNFPA in 1990 that, in developed and developing countries alike, the larger the population, the more pollution there will be.

However, we must not be too hasty in blaming what is simply an immediate contributory factor (population growth) for a situation caused by underlying factors such as the prevailing economic system, poverty and inequalities between North and South.

In our view, quantitative studies have yet to confirm the oft-made assertion that the final destruction of the world's environment depends solely upon its

total number of inhabitants and that population growth is the prime cause of damage today and will continue to be so in the future, even if growth were to slow down. The research carried out by B. Commoner on the USA and the developing countries during the 1970s and 1980s highlighted the central role played by technology. However, the debate is far from over. For example, P. Harrison (1992) found that population growth (and thus the South) had a much more important role in the process although the extent of its responsibility varied, that complex interrelations were at work and that the available data were often incomplete or insufficiently reliable. Conversely, an even more recent study on atmospheric warming (F. Bartiaux and J. P. van Ypersele, 1993) paints a very detailed picture of how in the industrialized nations between 1950 and 1990, per capita CO<sub>2</sub> emissions combined with population growth had a much larger impact than population growth in the countries of the southern hemisphere.

None the less, when one takes into account the certainty that the poorer nations will in future account for a growing share of the world's population, and the probability that income and consumption levels will increase throughout the South (at least in absolute terms), it is clear that *over the next 40 years, the poorer nations will take an increasingly large share of the responsibility for global environmental degradation*. This does not mean that the southern hemisphere is and will continue to be solely responsible for global degradation - far from it - but the combination of population growth and rising production and consumption levels in this part of the world will result in a more even sharing of the responsibility. That is, unless the technologies used and the way of life in these countries change radically; unless they move away from the Western model. However, the South has neither the desire nor the technical and financial resources to do so. 'Clean' or new technologies are expensive and short-term needs (such as debt servicing) are compelling. While, in approximate terms, the South currently accounts for 30% of global environmental damage and the North for 70%, by the year 2050 the ratio will in all probability be 50/50. A few recent estimates are given in the table below.

# The South's responsibility for global environmental degradation

<u>Authors</u>	<u>over recent years</u>	<u>in the future</u>
B. Commoner(1988)	From 25 to 35% depending on the problem	
P. Shaw(1988)	25%	2025: 35% with no change in income levels 51% with a 3% growth in per capita income
P. Harrison(1991)	22% for CFCs 62% for CO <sub>2</sub> (!)	
Population Council(1991)	36% for CO <sub>2</sub>  1765-1990	2100: 55%
R. Warrick and A. Rahman(1992)	27% for the greenhouse effect 22% for deforestation 16% for CO <sub>2</sub>	

In a forward study covering the period up to the year 2100, the Population Council (1991) estimated the relative contributions of North and South to the foreseeable overall increase in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Production and consumption will account for two-thirds of the overall increase and population growth for only one-third; the South will account for 60% (29% stemming from population growth and 31% from production) and the North for 40% (34% stemming from production). In per capita terms, by the year 2100 the North will still be producing three times as much CO<sub>2</sub> as the South, but will account for only 46% of total emissions as against 65% in 1985.

**Responsibility of North and South, population growth and other factors for the increase in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions between 1985 and 2100 (%)**

Region	Population growth	Production/ consumption	Total
South	29	31	60
North	6	34	40
Total	35	65	100

Source: Population Council(1991)

*The production systems and lifestyles we choose to adopt and the way in which we treat Nature will of course affect the biosphere, but the full extent of the damage caused will also depend on how many people attain a decent standard of living and how many remain poor. In the North, population growth is sluggish, while the financial and technical resources are available for enormous improvements to be made in the field of technology. In the South one could, as has been widely recommended, make it a priority to limit the damage by reducing population and poverty levels (Malthus's approach), by tackling the problem of anarchic urbanization, by implementing properly targeted local environmental protection programmes and so on. However, this would be to ignore the failure (or at least the very limited success) of many of the environmental and population measures implemented during the 1970s and 1980s, the basic inertia of all population groups and all the various other forms of resistance to change. Above all, we would merely be treating the symptoms which, although necessary, would not remove the underlying causes: under-development and regional inequalities which, for a large section of the world's population, will continue to grow over the next few decades. One can only reduce the environmental impact of poverty by first tackling the problem of poverty itself, and high fertility rates are simply one aspect of this problem. In the absence of genuine social and economic development, no population policy is likely to have more than a minimal, gradual impact.*

**Regional and local problems: population growth is only one part of the equation**

While theory, doctrines and general concepts are of course necessary, they always over-simplify the real situation, skimming over the differences which exist at regional, local or community levels. Reality is complex and multi-faceted. In 1989, G. Gallopin et al. wrote that any action taken to influence ecosystems is dependent on the manner in which the social system works, on how human beings perceive the environment and the value which they attach to it. Furthermore, in terms of demographic patterns (fertility, migration and marriage), individuals rarely act by whim or chance. *There is therefore a certain logic or rational pattern to the behaviour of any society, even one in which the population, food or environmental situation is unstable.* Case studies on carefully-targeted problems, regions or societies allow one to go beyond

outward appearances and trace back the real mechanisms behind environmental degradation. Such studies often contradict the peremptory judgments of the past.

An increasingly large number of studies support the view that *population growth is not in all cases and at all times the principal factor behind environmental degradation or foreseeable shortages of certain resources.*

There can be no disputing the fact that population pressure is a problem in much of the Third World and in Africa in particular, or that it often aggravates existing problems and may sometimes jeopardizes future prospects. The size of the population in some towns (Mexico City, Cairo, Sao Paulo, Algiers, New Delhi, etc.) clearly *leads directly* to unacceptably high pollution levels, declining health standards in some cases, and unacceptable living conditions for most of the population. But how did this situation come about? Although it is true that, in ecologically and climatically vulnerable areas (such as the Sahel or the grasslands of the Maghreb) and already densely-populated areas (Rwanda, Burundi, the Kivu region in Zaire, etc.) population pressure greatly magnifies all the other problems, damage also occurs in less densely-populated areas, in some of which space is still available.

Are water or soil salting problems, currently a concern in the Maghreb and the Middle East, solely due to population growth? Could soil degradation and the process of desertification not also be due to poor rural development strategies (for example, the priority given to cash crops), or perhaps to errors at both individual and collective levels (farmers and breeders with a 'subsistence' mentality; governments keeping prices low for town dwellers; action by international creditors or agri-food multinationals)? Might the rapid pace of deforestation not, in many cases, be put down to government policy or to the strategies adopted by some private entrepreneurs?

Lastly, mention must also be made of the *wars, rebellions and ethnic conflicts* which have become increasingly common over the past 30 years, all of which have taken their toll in lives and damage to the environment. It is a long list, from Vietnam to the Lebanon, Iran-Iraq, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Afghanistan, Iraq-Kuwait and, more recently, the former Yugoslavia and Burundi. Over the past 20 years Africa in particular has been beset by coups d'état, ethnic or political wars and repression (Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, etc.). All such events have some impact on the environment, destabilizing rural communities, disrupting agricultural production, nullifying the effects of development projects and forcing hundreds of thousands of people to flee. The *major natural disasters* which occur regularly in various countries or regions of the southern hemisphere should, of course, also be taken into account.

## CONCLUSION

Population growth is a very real factor in both global and regional problems but must be considered together with other causes stemming from technological options, production and consumption patterns and national or international political strategy. *The impact of population growth must therefore be seen as relative in both time and space.* This has always been true and will continue to be so. None the less, gaps still remain in our understanding of the relationship between population and the environment, particularly at local level.

Rather than waiting for the current controversies and uncertainties in scientific circles to come to an end (if they ever do), we must take swift action at both demographic and environmental levels. Exactly where and how is another matter. However, two almost obvious points must be made:

1. Given the complexity and disparity of the various problems and the contexts in which they occur, any national policy covering population (ranging from fertility to geographical dispersion) and the environment (from regional to local levels) must take account of the cultural particularities and real needs of each population group. All those directly concerned (communities, elected representatives and government) must therefore be involved in its formulation. Despite the urgency of the situation, however, decision-making powers must not be concentrated solely in the hands of national, foreign or international technocracies.
2. Given the present economic situation in many countries in the southern hemisphere and the prospects for the future, such sustainable development policies, which take into account population and environmental considerations, must receive long-term financial support from the international community and the North. The whole future of our planet depends upon it.

## SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bartiaux and J.P. van Ypersele, 1993, *The Role of Population Growth in Global Warming*, communication à la Conférence Internationale de la Population, Montreal, IUSSP, 25 August - 1 September, 21 p.
- E. Boserup, 1981, *Population and Technology*, Blackwell, Oxford, 255 p.
- Commission Mondiale sur l'environnement et le développement, 1988, *Notre avenir à tous*, Montréal, Les Editions du fleuve, 455 p.
- Commission Sud (Rapport de), 1990, *Défis au Sud*, Paris, Economica, 324 p.
- B. Commoner, 1991, 'Croissance démographique rapide et pression sur l'environnement', in Tapinos G., Blanchet D. et Horlacher D.E. (ed.), *Conséquences de la croissance démographique rapide dans les pays en développement*, INED, Congrès et colloques, No. 5, pp. 145-175.
- UNFPA, 1990, *Etat de la population mondiale*, New York, 56 p.
- G.C. Gallopin, P. Gutman and N. Maletta, 1989, 'Appauvrissement à l'échelle du globe, développement durable et environnement: une perspective théorique', *Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales*, No. 121, pp. 412-437.
- P. Harrison, 1992, *The Third Revolution, Environment, Population and a Sustainable World*, I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., Publishers, 358 p.
- D.H. Meadows et al., 1972, *Rapport sur les limites de la croissance*, Fayard, Paris.
- UNEP, 1991, *Environmental Data Report*, Basil Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, 404 p.
- F. Ramade, 1987, *Les catastrophes écologiques*, McGraw-Hill, 309 p.
- J. Simon, 1981, *The Ultimate Resource*, Princeton University Press.
- D. Tabutin, 1992, 'Un demi-siècle de transitions démographiques dans le Sud', communication à la Chaire Quetelet 1992 sur *Transitions démographiques et sociétés*, Louvain-la-Neuve, 39 p.
- D. Tabutin and E. Thiltgès, 1992, 'Relations entre croissance démographique et environnement, du doctrinal à l'empirique', *Revue Tiers Monde*, t. XXXIII, pp. 273-294.
- E. Thiltgès and D. Tabutin, 1992, *Population et environnement, une synthèse des faits, doctrines et politiques dans les pays du Sud*, Cahiers du CIDEP, No. 15, Academia, Louvain-la-Neuve, 85 p.
- World Resources Institute, 1990, *A Guide to the Global Environment*, Oxford University Press, 385 p.



## 5. DEMOGRAPHY AND DEVELOPMENT FROM THE ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW

Professor TAPINOS, Institute of Political Science, Paris

I am sorry to have missed the talk by my colleague Mr Tabutin, which would have allowed me to get my bearings. I should mention that, being unfamiliar with this type of event, I am not quite sure what to expect of my listeners, and I hope that at the end of my talk I shall have the opportunity to answer your questions as best I can. What I intend to do in the twenty minutes allowed me is to give a general overview of the issue. If I have understood correctly, and to judge by the names of the other contributors, you would like me to look at demography and development issues from an economic point of view. I shall be dealing with three points.

First I shall look at the nature of the issue; secondly I shall try to see, by assessing briefly what has been done in recent years, what are the main 'mistakes' or misapprehensions which need to be remedied if progress is to be made; thirdly, I should like to deal more specifically with one subject - international migration -, about which I would like to make some specific suggestions; I shall conclude with two or three remarks of a more political nature.

On the first point, it is quite clear - it is superfluous or commonplace to state - that a demographic problem exists in the Third World. But, having said that, it is important to be accurate about its impact on development and, in particular, not to blame population growth for all these countries' development problems. And it is important, consequently, not to assume that the hoped-for drop in population growth will automatically solve development problems. I believe that this is absolutely essential. If we take each problem in turn, whether it be poverty, or famine, or the environment, there is of course a link with population growth, but it is often quite a tenuous link. To take an example, famines lead to a rise in mortality, but an analysis of the mechanisms of famine shows that demographic factors are relatively insignificant and that other factors, such as political problems, access to resources, control of resources, etc., have been more important in the etiology of the great famines. If one takes the environment, and I presume that Mr Tabutin has already discussed this particular question, demographic factors do play a role, of course they do, but so do relative prices, technological choices, etc. So here again demography is significant, but its significance is limited.

A second introductory remark: the question of the interaction between demographic variables and economic variables is a controversial one, and the controversy has been going on for a long time. We have made progress since Malthus, and our analysis of the question has changed, but I would like to stress that there is a debate. One may be a supporter of a particular theory, which could be at one of the two extremes; on the one hand, the theory supported by many economists that 'essentially, demography has no impact' - it changes the size, but not the nature, of the economic problem; the other is the view that there is a kind of demographic determinism - 'almost everything is linked to demography'. That would be exemplified by the Club of Rome a few years ago, or even by the populationist theories, since everything is linked one way or another. By this I mean that there is a real debate. This means that progress has been made in analysing the question, that policies do not need to be based on simplistic models, which has been the problem in many countries, especially in Africa, where, in the hope of cutting birth rates, people managed to fob

these countries off with some very simplistic models by claiming that population growth was a disaster and that was all there was to be said about it. The progress made in analysing the problem must be borne in mind, but at the same time I think it very important that there should be a clear distinction between analysis and policy, since in a subject where there is a technical debate, the debate progresses at the technical level, but policies must be decided before any final conclusions have been reached. It is no good imagining that a clear-cut conclusion will be reached from the scientific point of view and that then we shall act. The two things are happening in parallel.

My third introductory point: I should like to outline very briefly the changes in thinking on this question and the main causal connections which have been made. Without going into great detail, things happened roughly as follows. About twenty years ago, in the sixties and seventies, a view of the economic effects of population growth was developed which led us to take a rather pessimistic, even catastrophic, view. Population growth was blamed for a number of things, or at least a number of negative effects were attributed to it.

Briefly:

- At first it was thought that economic growth was linked to an accumulation of capital and that the more children people had, the less they would save; and therefore that high birth rates, large numbers of children in families, would depress saving; since in the past demographic growth implied specific forms of investment, there was a demand for investment linked to demography which could not be satisfied, particularly since population growth depressed saving. This argument is very important; it was the economic argument used as the basis of, and the justification for, family planning policies.
- The second argument was linked to age structures. The underlying idea was that high birth rates led to a disproportionate number of young people (young = not old enough to be in employment) and that this had a correspondingly negative effect on the ratio of employed to unemployed people. If birth rates are too high, there will be a higher proportion of people too young to work. This argument also gave demographic variation a bad name and militated in favour of population restriction.
- The third argument was concerned with maternal health and the survival of mother and child, the theory being that multiple births at short intervals affected both the likelihood of the mother dying and infant mortality rates.

That is a very brief overview of how people saw things. This was more or less the view of the Club of Rome in the sixties and seventies, etc. Things have changed. What happened first was that argument no. 1, the one linking savings to population figures, collapsed for lack of proof. It is no longer possible to maintain that there is an inverse ratio between the number of children in a family and its capacity to save. We can see very clearly what happened by looking at international institutions, such as the World Bank, which used this argument over a long period. However, if you look at the Bank's report for 1984, which I believe corresponds to the Mexico Conference, the argument has disappeared and instead we see arguments such as the cost of education, the environment, soil deterioration, etc., being used to support a policy of population restriction.

The argument of maternal and infant health is still a valid one, but it is not the strongest argument. It was often used by countries like China which for a long time did not want to use an economic argument that they considered too Malthusian, and which did not fit their ideology since it would have suggested that the demographic problem had nothing to do with social organization.

The argument concerning the ratio of the employed to the unemployed turned out to be highly ambiguous. People said that high birth rates produced large numbers of young unemployed and that, therefore, if birth rates fell, the proportion of people in employment would grow. But there was a detail which had perhaps been overlooked or underestimated, namely the fact that what was really being compared was age categories. It would have been correct to say, 'a drop in birth rates raises the relative number of people of an age to be in employment in relation to young, non-employed people'. The real problem is to increase the number of people in work, and what happened in many Third World countries is interesting, because it has been one of the disappointing things about certain birth regulation policies, for example in the Maghreb countries. In the Maghreb countries, unlike sub-Saharan Africa, the current population growth rate is higher among people of employable age than in the population as a whole. If the growth rate of the economy is not such as to enable these people of working age to be absorbed, unemployment rises. So the conclusion was a little hasty. It is useful to consider the ratio of people of working age to that of people under working age, but only if the people of working age are actually in employment. This is one of the limitations of an argument which has been used for a very long time.

So the old arguments have been rethought, in a way, and there has also been a certain amount of progress in analysing the situation. It has been shown that the effects of population growth are more complex than the earlier, simplistic view had suggested. It has been shown, for example, that when the effects of age structure are studied the impact of population growth could be a positive one. It has been suggested that population growth is one of the factors enabling a system of property rights to be put in place; that is to say that in a system where there are no property rights, [.....], a crucial element in growth; the idea behind this view is that growth is not so much a question of capital or labour, as of the individual having an incentive to engage in economic activity. And it is clear that for the individual to be motivated to save and invest and work for growth, he must see some return for his efforts. And this return is largely linked to property rights. In the Third World the absence of property registers, for example, is a factor which stands in the way of a number of types of investment because it is impossible to record the nature of the property. So a number of new factors have been introduced into the debate.

The progress made has tended to exonerate population growth; the overall tendency has been to show that population growth has an impact, but that it is rather more subtle than some of the models presented in the fifties which blamed it for almost everything. It must be admitted, however, that there is a certain ambiguity in this new view of things because, while it is true that there has been a change, that new factors have entered the analysis, there has also been an ideological change. There is no doubt, for example, that a different view of economic growth came into being in the United States under the Reagan administration. It was thought that growth consisted essentially of putting in place market mechanisms, and people came to the conclusion that population figures would follow, that the real problem was to establish or return to a market economy, which would bring about a rise in the standard of living and

that eventually this would somehow solve the population problem. Here the new view contains a mixture of analytical elements and of other elements which are more ideological (not a criticism), but perhaps more sensitive to fluctuating fashions.

The second thing I should like to do is to stress what I shall call, if I may, three 'misapprehensions', three errors of analysis which were made in the past and which perhaps led to misguided policies.

Firstly, population growth was reduced to, or identified with, the birth rate. It was assumed that 'demographic growth' was synonymous with the birth rate. Of course there is some truth in this, in so far as the long-term development of a given community will depend essentially on the birth rate. It is one of the indisputable conclusions of the studies made. But while it is true that in the very long term the evolution of a community, its age structure and rate of growth will depend on the birth rate, in the medium term (in economists' terms, one generation, i.e. twenty or thirty years) variations in mortality and life expectancy in particular, as well as migratory patterns, have a significant demographic and, above all, economic impact. This is an essential point because the demographic policy implications and the economic effects are totally different depending on whether population growth is a result of a high birth rate or a rise in life expectancy. Just by way of an example, I said a few moments ago that there is no evidence that when people have more children they save less. But on the other hand, it can be shown that if people live longer they save more. In particular, if they anticipate a period of retirement at the end of their working life, the expected length of this period has an effect on their saving behaviour. Thus there is a link between life expectancy and saving. This means that it is important to be clear on a point which had been entirely neglected - whether, when talking of demographic growth, people were referring only to the birth rate - as was in fact the case - or whether life expectancy was also being taken into account.

The second 'error' (in inverted commas) has to do with the birth rate (I think one of my colleagues is going to talk about family planning): in the sixties and seventies, the great age of family planning programmes, it was implicitly assumed that the interests of couples and the interests of the community, let us say of the country, were identical; that it was in people's interests to have fewer children and that it was in the interests of the country to slow down population growth and therefore that if people had more children than they were assumed to want, it was because the cost of contraception was too high or because people did not really know what was in their own interests.

Policies (the Indian policy, for example, which was one of the first) were therefore directed at reducing the cost of contraception, educating people and providing access to contraception. And yet, more recent studies have shown beyond any doubt that in some societies - many societies, even - it is desirable to have a high birth rate, I mean economically desirable. In many societies people need to have a lot of children, because children are an insurance, children are an investment, because there is no social security system; a person may want to have a daughter available when they reach the age of 50, for example, and to guarantee a surviving daughter at that age you need to have a lot of children. This is not true everywhere, but it is true in many parts of the world. So here we have the following problem: a reduction in the birth rate may appear desirable for the community; but on the other hand, from the point of view of the individual, of the couple, it is economically desirable to have many children; so there is a conflict, which may be resolved by a population

policy, but, of course, if the problem has been incorrectly analysed, and it was thought that people wanted to have fewer children, the policy will no longer be effective. Of course, policy-making becomes more difficult in this case. People will say, of course, 'Setting up a social security system would be a more effective way of lowering the birth rate'. Obviously. But it is more difficult to set up a social security system, one effect of which might be to lower the birth rate, than to devise a population policy. This also poses a problem of implementation, because demographic policy is the sphere of a number of different institutional departments.

The third misapprehension lies in an underestimation of institutional and political factors. There was a received version of the economic effect of population growth, which was based on the experience in Asia - it was, if I can put it that way, an Asian model, conceived for Bangladesh, India, etc. It was then applied to almost everywhere else, regardless of the institutional aspect, which is so central. What does this mean? That population growth can have favourable or unfavourable economic effects, depending on the institutional variables through which it operates. And this is important, because in many countries, even if there is a population problem, even if a long-term reduction in the rate of population growth would have a positive effect on living standards, this fact is not actually perceived, is not 'internalized'. Let me give you an example: every year in Paris we hold a seminar on population and development issues, to which we invite administrators and civil servants from the statistical services of the French-speaking African countries, who are working on population programmes, funded mainly by UNFPA, whose message is to put a brake on population growth. At this seminar I always hold one 'psychoanalytical' session, where I ask the participants, who are all experienced people, to try to forget everything that's said, everything we're told in the literature, and to tell me what they themselves see as the problem with development in their countries. Why is there a problem? What is the handicap? And it is most interesting to see that, when people get away from the received facts, there are in fact, for a number of different reasons, very few participants who mention demographic reasons. They talk about more traditional things - history, colonisation, etc. But it is very clear that when people really think, leaving aside the accepted ideas, they forget population - perhaps a little too much, sometimes. I would like to stress this point, and Africa is a very typical example; there is an international debate on the question of Africa, which is solidly based but has not necessarily been internalized by the people who are actually going to implement the policies. They are the ones who, sooner or later, will have to act.

My third point, a rather more specific one, concerns a particular aspect of the economic dimension of development and demography - that of international migration.

What is the situation here? Let us take the case of Europe. In the late fifties and the sixties there was a wave of emigration to Europe, which happened for economic reasons; the essential reason was the situation in Europe, the demand for labour; it was the attraction of Europe that made people come, not the poverty in their countries of origin, as is sometimes claimed. But we felt a bit guilty in Europe and we rationalized the problem by saying, 'Yes, we got people to come because that suited our own interests, but emigration, people leaving, is also good for development'. Good for development because people leaving reduces the pressure of unemployment, or underemployment, because the money sent home to their families by emigrants (remittances, as they are called) improves the standard of living there and because when the emigrants return

home, any professional experience they may have gained will be of use to their country. So we rationalized the whole thing by saying, 'Okay, we gain from it, but the others don't lose anything; there is a kind of international transmission of development as a result of migration'. Here again, it is rather difficult to see what the outcome really was, but on the whole it seems to be relatively positive. There are comparatively few examples of countries which have declined as a direct result of migration. And then came the second stage: in about 1973-74 the European countries, for reasons of their own, suspended or put a stop to immigration. And so a whole new set of problems was born: we began to say, 'Instead of bringing people here, we'll start encouraging them to go back; we'll promote delocalization of companies, so that, for example, a French company which employs Moroccans will start a branch in Morocco with the help of a French subsidy, an interest subsidy, and perhaps it will even give the Moroccans it employed in France jobs in Morocco when they return home. It was what was called the new international division of labour. The effect was extremely limited, for a number of reasons.

And this brings us up to the present. There has been a change recently: the underlying idea is still the same, the aim is the same, but in Europe there is now a stronger desire to close our frontiers (and in fact this makes the whole thing more plausible). The countries of Europe are going to keep their borders closed, certainly for several years to come. But we are aware that we cannot continue in the long term with a prosperous Europe alongside other countries with small or negative growth - as has been the case in many of the sub-Saharan countries of Africa for at least ten decades - and so something must be done. So we have to think of an alternative to migration, which would consist of opening up commercially, on the one hand, and, on the other, practising a cooperation policy the effect of which would be to give people fewer reasons to leave their own countries, thus providing an indirect solution to the migration problem. NAFTA is another example of the same thing. It is a new free trade agreement, which does not mention migration, but migration is nevertheless what lies behind it: the idea is that the development of Mexico, which might lead to outside openings in terms of goods and capital, would, in the long term, reduce the Mexicans' need to leave. I think we can only agree that NAFTA is necessary and useful; at any event I am in favour of it; we must support it, but at the same time we must be absolutely realistic. What do I mean by 'realistic'? I mean two things: first, the fact that migration never starts because of a difference in living standards. A difference in living standards makes existing migration patterns continue, but migration almost always starts when the country of origin begins its own process of development; in other words, migration is the result of the process of development, and not vice versa. If one looks at what happened in Europe in the sixties, in almost every case it was the start of the development process which caused migration to begin. Here again, there were specific reasons. This means that to begin with these policies of removing trade barriers and of cooperation will favour migration. The free trade agreement between the United States and Mexico will increase Mexican migration over the next ten years. And an agreement such as that envisaged between the EU and Morocco will have the same effect in the short term. That is the first point.

The second point is this: migrants are at home neither in their new country nor in their country of origin. There are individual differences. For cooperation policies to lead finally to a situation where people have less cause to emigrate (which is probably desirable from their point of view, since people in general prefer to stay where they are), cooperation policy and the removal of trade barriers must influence people's decisions to emigrate; they must influence

their calculations. The question is in fact the following, and I will take a concrete example to illustrate it. Take a possible candidate for emigration - a Turk or a Moroccan, say. What is the situation for him? Having read the economics textbooks, he may expect an improvement in his standard of living as a result of the developments in the economy of his country brought about by an opening up of trade. This is the Mexican model. Or else he packs his bags and goes to a new country. These are the two options. They are simplified, but they illustrate the basic problem. There are two fundamental differences between the two options: the first is the question of who decides, the second is how long it will take for the man's standard of living to improve. In countries of origin where there is great political uncertainty and very little confidence in the ability of the government to carry out development policies - in many countries therefore, although we will not name them - the migrant will obviously prefer to be master of his own fate and his own standard of living to waiting for the political system to act for him. And secondly, it is also clear - here one can do the sums, and I have - that he will improve his standard of living more quickly by making a move himself than by waiting for this to happen as a result of his country's development policies. Fundamentally, migration is an individual strategy to improve one's standard of living, an active move to change an unsatisfactory situation, as opposed to the nineteenth-century vision of the working classes influencing their fate through collective action. These points seem very important to me, since they mean that cooperation policies are necessary, that they will have an effect in the long term, but that we must be realistic and not attempt to sell people the idea that in a few years' time there will be no reason to emigrate any more simply as a result of trade deregulation or cooperation.

Finally, I should like to emphasize two other points.

The first is that one of the problems in discussing demographic-economic links is the fact that there are conflicts of interest. And where there are conflicts the solution must be arrived at via the political system, i.e. through the voicing of political preferences. But in many of the countries in question political opinion does not necessarily reflect the sum of national preferences. There are conflicts between individuals and the nation. There are conflicts between generations. There is the question of the environment. What is the environment in fact, from an economic point of view? If the world lasted only a few moments, there would be no environmental problem. I would be well advised to consume as much as possible and use as many of the existing resources as I could. But if the world lasts for a long time, I have to strike a balance between what I consume today and what I shall consume tomorrow. The individual will not strike this balance. It has to be struck through the political system.

The second, which seems to me to be of crucial importance, is the question of the time scale. It has to be said that the international institutions and governments are in rather too much of a hurry (they speak of the decade of development). No country in the history of humanity has ever developed in ten years. The idea is meaningless. I think it is very important to understand that we are talking about very long-term developments here and that, even with rapid growth rates, economies which are centuries behind because of problems connected with education, technology, custom, work organization, etc. cannot be brought up to date overnight. And there is a great danger here, because, since we find it intolerable that an economic situation cannot change in ten years, we have a tendency to say, 'But population problems can be dealt with here and now, and at least something will have been done'. I think this is a great danger, because the ultimate effect will simply be to increase frustration and

the expectation of change, and in my opinion this is one of the underlying reasons for migration.



## 6. FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMMES IN LDC'S

Mr Van Ginneken, Dutch Institute of Population Studies, the Hague

I will talk about one aspect of population policies in developing countries namely family planning programmes in LDC's.

- My presentation will consist of three parts. Firstly I will describe the current situation with respect to family planning programmes in developing countries. Then I will outline what has to be achieved in the next 7 to 10 years in terms of decrease in fertility, increase in contraceptive practice and in funding. Finally, I will argue that a substantial lowering of fertility in developing countries will not be achieved by family planning programmes alone; they should be part of a comprehensive population policy.

### 1. Achievements by family planning programmes so far

- The most important components of a family planning programme are the actual provisions of contraceptive methods and an outreach component. Contraceptive services are often provided by clinics and hospitals as part of maternal and child health services. But contraceptives are also distributed through other channels such as pharmacies and drug stores. Another important component consists of visits by fieldworkers who make home visits to motivate couples and to distribute contraceptives. Those fieldworkers often also provide information on maternal and child health. They are therefore not comparable with family planning programmes as we know them in countries of the European Union.

This leads to the question what family planning programmes have achieved so far. In developing countries the contraceptive prevalence rate is now about 50. This means that about 50 % of couples (married or living together) use contraceptives (modern or traditional methods). A contraceptive prevalence rate of 50 % is already fairly high, but one reason why it is so high is the fact that China is included. If China is excluded, the contraceptive prevalence rate goes down to 35 %. And this CPR is actually lower in Africa (about 16 %). (It used to be 25-30 % in about 1965-70.)

To give an idea how this situation contrasts with MDC's I can mention that the CPR is about 70 % to 75 %.

The most frequently used contraceptive methods in LDCs are female sterilization (33 %), followed by the IUD (22 %), the pill (13 %), male sterilization (11 %) and the condom (7 %).

In order to provide these services, many LDCs have developed impressive programmes. In order to get an idea about what we are talking here, I will give a few figures on personnel employed in the largest of these programmes: China 150.000 persons, India 114.000, Indonesia nearly 55.000 and Colombia 12.000.

- How much do these family planning programmes in LDCs cost? Rough estimates come to nearly 4 billion US\$. This amount is made up of 3 billion \$ spent

by governments of LDCs themselves and about 750 million \$ in the form of development aid from MDCs as well as the World Bank. A considerable amount of the aid from MDCs is channelled through UNFPA. The US is by far the largest bilateral donor with a budget of nearly 250 million \$.

The 750 million \$ seem a lot but in practice it is very little; it is actually 1.2 % of the total development aid.

## 2. Family planning in LDCs in 2000 and financial implications

- We now come to the question what has to be achieved with respect to family planning in LDCs in the future and in particular in the next 7 years until 2000. Estimates on future levels of financial inputs have been made by the UNFPA and the World Bank. Their estimates date from about 1990 and I will summarize the findings starting from 1990. How much needs to be achieved depends on the objectives which LDCs want to realize. We can aim at realizing the medium-variant of the projections of the UN for LDCs which lead to an increase in the population of LDCs from 5.3 billion in 1990 to 6.4 billion in 2000. It would be even better to aim at achieving a low variant of the UN projection which would mean that the population would increase to 6.1 billion in 2000.

If we aim for the medium level expected population increase, the contraceptive prevalence rate will have to increase to 56 % and in this figure China is included. This means that there will be 520 million couples who will be family planning users and this means 164 million more than now. If LDCs as a whole decide to adopt the low variant of the UN projections, the CPR will increase to 64 %. This would mean that there would be about 570 million users, an increase of 210 million users in a period of around 10 years.

- These figures show that an enormous effort is required in the near future in terms of personnel and funds.

It has been calculated that if we were to aim at the low variant of the UN in 2000, the total budget would be 8 billion US \$ per year roughly twice as much as is currently spent. It has been proposed that 4,5 billion should be made available by LDCs themselves, an increase of 50 % in comparison with the amount currently spent (3 billion) and 3,5 billion \$ by MDCs which would mean an increase of 2,75 billion in comparison with the current level of 750 million \$ (an increase of 350 %).

- If this were to be done, the percentage of development aid spent on FP would go up from 1,2 % to 5 % and this 3.5 billion \$ would amount to two hundredths of one percent of the Gross National Product of the MDCs.
  - Expansion of the development aid of the European Union for FP could therefore make an important contribution towards achieving this objective. If we accept the figures cited above, this means that the funds to be made available by MDCs have to increase from about 750 million \$ in 1990 to about 3,5 billion in 2000.
3. a. No coercion - it is unethical and it is counterproductive in the long run and couples should decide freely.

- b. Family planning programmes together with other social programmes, in particular education of women, improved quality and quantity of such services; family planning programmes are not synonymous with population policy.

## 7. THE GERMAN POSITION ON POPULATION POLICY AND FAMILY PLANNING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Dr Michael Bohnet, Ministerialdirigent, Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, Germany

Mr Chairman,

Thank you for this opportunity to give a brief account of the German position on population policy and family planning in developing countries.

I have recently returned from the meeting of ministers of the non-aligned countries on 9-13 November in Indonesia, and I should like to begin by summing up my main impressions of that conference.

What was most striking was the clear support for family planning, the emphasis on preserving the family as the foundation of all social life, the declining importance of religious issues for family planning, and the view that international migrations are an unavoidable corollary of historical events. The recommendations drawn up for the Cairo conference of non-aligned countries are very detailed, very concrete and largely free of ideological baggage. The outstanding successes in family planning achieved by many countries of Asia (e.g. China, Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia) stand as an example to the countries of Africa and some Latin American states.

I should now like to set out Germany's position on the topic of population and development.

Population growth is the most pressing problem the world has to tackle. Global politics must embrace population policy. The population of the world stands at around 5.5 billion, and is growing by a quarter of a million daily or 100 m every year - more than the population of the Federal Republic of Germany. By the year 2000 there will be 6.25 m people in the world. 80% of this population increase will take place in the cities; it is equivalent to 10 new cities the size of Paris every year.

But population growth cannot be expressed solely in figures. When we discuss of population we have to look at the complex relationship between population and available resources. In many developing countries the growth in the population is outstripping economic growth, with the result that per capita income is falling. Progress achieved in providing people with social infrastructures in the field of education or health is being cancelled out by the rising population. It is the poorest developing countries, which are also those with the highest rates of population growth, which are hardest hit in this respect.

Of course poverty, famine, environmental damage, migrations and armed conflicts in the world have many causes. But there is no doubt that the rapid growth of the world's population is a central factor which considerably exacerbates these problems. The human time-bomb is ticking. We must get away from the notion that economic, social and environmental progress can be achieved as widely and as fast as the constantly growing world population demands. The problem can only be resolved once we have succeeded in stabilizing the world population.

At the UNCED Conference the links between population growth, the environment and sustainable development were already on the agenda, and measures to slow down population growth were described there as an essential precondition for sustainable development. This interaction between population, environment and development will be the central topic of discussion at the International Conference on Population and Development to be held in Cairo in 1994, which is expected to provide important incentives to population and development policy.

Many developing countries have already begun to integrate population policy measures into their development strategies. In this they are supported by the Federal Republic of Germany, which has declared population policy to be an important aspect of combating poverty in the context of its development policy for the 1990s. In our cooperation on population issues we are pursuing a double strategy, which targets the two main causes of the high rate of population growth, namely the lack of family planning facilities and the poor economic and social situation in the countries concerned.

The first priority of Germany's support programme is therefore to provide people with information on methods of contraception and with family planning facilities. By family planning we mean a couple's free and informed decision on the number of children they have and the interval between them. This definition of family planning excludes the use of abortion, compulsory sterilization or material inducements (e.g. financial support), since these may impair the freedom of decision of the often desperately poor target group.

The poor health care provision in many developing countries, to which family planning is to a large extent linked, is one of the reasons for the as yet inadequate distribution of family planning facilities. This is a major problem particularly in rural areas with poor overall infrastructures. The German Government therefore supports complementary methods of contraceptive distribution, e.g. community-based distribution, social marketing (distribution of subsidised contraceptives using a marketing strategy) and the participation of non-governmental organizations. The family planning programmes aim to target men as well as women, since it is particularly important to raise men's awareness of the importance of family planning.

The German Government's second priority in terms of population policy is to support measures in the fields of health, education, nutrition and promotion of the role of women. Experience so far shows that improvements in these areas influence reproductive behaviour. Enhancing the role of women is particularly important. How can a woman who has had no education, is economically dependent and has no rights take a decision as an equal partner on whether and when to have children? It is notable that in almost all countries women's education is linked to a drop in the birth rate. Women who have had seven years education are 2 1/2 times more likely to use contraception than those with no schooling at all.

The total bilateral and multilateral aid accorded by Germany in the field of family planning in developing countries doubled from 1990 to 1993, from DM 74 m in 1990 to around DM 155 m in 1993. Bilateral measures accounted for around two-thirds of the support (DM 103 m) while the remaining third (DM 52 m) went on support for multilateral organizations, notably the UN's Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) (DM 43.2 m in 1993) and the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) (DM 8.8 m in 1993).

If the developing countries and the industrialized countries work together it may be possible to achieve the necessary reduction in the world population and in this way to create the conditions for effective development cooperation in all areas. Hopeful signs can already be seen. Worldwide the average number of children per mother has fallen from 5 to 3 within a generation, with a particularly marked decline in the developing countries. Over the same period the use of contraceptives has risen from 9% to around 50%, meaning that in practice half of all couples in developing countries are using contraception (e.g. 70% in Thailand, 50% in Indonesia, 45% in India, 40% in Bangladesh, 50% in Mexico, 12% in Tanzania and 10% in Nigeria). However, it is estimated that around 100 m couples who would like to practise contraception are unable to do so because the facilities are not available. One side-effect of this is the number of abortions, which currently stands at around 25 m per year in developing countries.

Many governments, particularly in African countries, which only a decade ago were very reluctant to discuss population problems, have now changed their attitude. The meeting of ministers of the non-aligned states, attended by 71 countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America, expressed clear support for family planning. The importance of religious issues in family planning is declining more and more, proving that cultural and religious objections to contraception can be overcome. Buddhist Thailand, Islamic Indonesia and the countries of the Caribbean, notably Jamaica, have shown that it is possible to bring about a perceptible reduction in fertility rates in widely differing societies in a surprisingly short time. China, Korea, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Colombia, Chile, Mauritius and Tunisia have also achieved massive reductions in their rates of population growth.

The developing countries have declared their willingness to cooperate on population issues and have set quantitative targets for slowing the rate of their population growth, though they cannot achieve these aims without international aid. The conditions for action are in place, and it is now time to take that action, for tomorrow's parents have already been born. Failure to do so could have incalculable consequences.

## ANNEX

### Resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 11 March 1994

#### Resolution on the demographic situation and development

##### The European Parliament,

- having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr Galland on demography and development (B3-1655/91),
  - having regard to the resolution of the Development Cooperation Council of 18 November 1992 on European cooperation in the field of family planning and the work to be done in this area by Member State and Commission experts,
  - having regard to the Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament of 4 November 1992 on demography, family planning and cooperation with developing countries (SEC(92)2002),
  - having regard to the observations made during the hearing on the subject in question held by its Committee on Development and Cooperation on 25 November 1993,
  - having regard to the Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1959 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989,
  - having regard to the World Population Action Plan (1974) and the Mexico Declaration (1984),
  - having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,
  - having regard to the report by the Committee on Development and Cooperation (A3-0052/94),
- A. whereas in absolute terms population densities are much higher in economically advanced countries than in underdeveloped countries,
- B. whereas in many cases, in comparison with developed countries, underdeveloped countries are rich in raw materials and have vast areas of territory which are not exploited,
- C. whereas therefore economic and social underdevelopment is due less to demography than to other factors, such as inadequate vocational training and centuries of exploitation by rich countries to the detriment of poorer countries,
- D. whereas it is currently a feature of the world population situation that there are enormous differences between regions of the world as regards population density, health, pollution, consumption of resources, consumer behaviour etc.; whereas poverty is causing great difficulties, particularly to the so-called developing countries, while disproportionate consumption of resources occurs in industrialized and rich countries,

- E. whereas the race between industrialized countries to produce and consume most, and the need to export goods which is forced upon developing countries, are aggravating existing problems and imbalances, including the imbalance between population density and the availability of resources in these countries, and hence fundamentally endangering all efforts to achieve international justice and sustainable, acceptable development,
- F. whereas the relationship between consumption, technology and population is very complex; recognizing the impact of consumption patterns in the North on environmental destruction,
- G. whereas not only this demographic situation but above all the fundamental global imbalance, covered in recent years in particular by the Brundtland Report ('Our Common Future') and the UNCED on behalf of the United Nations, are factors leading to destabilization of the political and social situation of nations worldwide and present fresh challenges to whole regions because of the migration they cause,
- H. deploring the fact that to date female sterilization remains the most common means of birth control; noting that there are often grounds for doubting whether it is genuinely carried out with the full awareness and free consent of the women concerned, because the overriding objective of reducing the birth rate in developing countries is sometimes pursued quite ruthlessly, so that measures have even come to light which were carried out without the women concerned being informed, in some cases with serious consequences for their health,
- I. deploring the fact that so-called family planning policy has to date largely been characterized by the absence of self-determination for women, respect for their health and mental and physical integrity, comprehensive and objective information about risks and side-effects associated with contraceptives and studies and information about natural methods of birth control, reliable medical prior care and aftercare, the involvement of men in preventing unwanted pregnancies, and the education required in order to make a genuinely free decision to opt for parenthood,
- J. whereas the EU should increase its support to ACP states engaged in structural adjustment programmes, to help them maintain and improve upon their basic social expenditure in the education, health and housing sectors, which is critical for efficient family planning,
- K. whereas the level of education of women is the most important factor in the decision on how many children to have; whereas in every country there is a direct link between raising the level of education of women and reducing the birth rate,
- L. whereas acceptable birth control can only succeed in the context of an overall political strategy in the health, education, social, cultural, information, consumer behaviour, resource consumption and economic areas; whereas there is a need, first and foremost, for an ethical decision on self-restraint everywhere where the imbalances so far created no longer spontaneously correct themselves,
- M. whereas every couple has the inalienable right to opt for responsible parenthood,



- N. whereas all family planning policies must be founded on a due regard for the fundamental rights and freedom of choice of the individual; whereas any move to use coercion - regardless of the institution behind it - is completely unacceptable and must be rejected as unethical, since forcible population policy (either to increase or reduce the population) is a highly questionable and often brutal form of interference in people's private lives,
- O. concerned at the distortions in demographic patterns caused by AIDS, which may alter the population structures of certain countries,
- P. whereas with regard to issues concerned with self-restraint in consumer behaviour, population density and population trends, consumption or conservation of natural resources, international environmental pollution and the like, the European Union has so far displayed inaction or simply made statements,
- Q. whereas it is important to consider demographic issues from an ethical point of view in order to avoid adopting a merely economic approach to them;
1. Stresses that the socio-economic growth of the poorest peoples depends primarily on the solidarity of rich peoples, on the establishment of trade relations between developed and developing countries which are fair and opposed to any form of exploitation, and on education based on the values of life, the family, solidarity, responsibility, and thorough vocational training for young people;
  2. Emphasizes the link, specific to each case, between a balanced population density and socio-economic development and takes the view that economic and commercial structures which are fair for all peoples are needed if excessive population growth is to be corrected by means of a comprehensive equalization of social conditions;
  3. Takes the view that the formulation and implementation by the Union of an effective policy with comprehensive objectives to achieve population balance and sustainable development towards international equity are preconditions for practical action;
  4. Calls accordingly for intensified and better coordinated efforts by the Member States and the European Union;
  5. Calls for the Commission to establish the appropriate preconditions in terms of staffing and organizational arrangements to enable it to formulate the objectives called for in paragraph 3 in an appropriate manner and ensure that they are taken into account in all other fields of policy;
  6. Considers that statistical systems equipped to collect reliable data and family planning services should be set up in the developing countries;
  7. Is aware that a process of rethinking is needed both in industrialized and in relatively unindustrialized countries and urges that this process be reciprocal so that both parties remove part of the burden on the global environment in accordance with their specific responsibility and capacities;

8. Stresses that the main thrust behind this change of approach will come from women, provided that the social, economic and cultural preconditions are right, and therefore recommends the active promotion of self-organization and improvements in women's educational and occupational opportunities in both developing and industrialized countries;
9. Takes the view that no authoritarian family planning policy of any kind - whether to increase or limit population - would be ethically acceptable, and calls for all family planning measures to take full account of the cultural, social and economic conditions of the population concerned and the basic requirements of international justice;
10. Calls for family planning to be planned, decided, organized and implemented by the population concerned, and especially by women, and to form part of a broad health policy which should also include psychological, health and social assistance in dealing with difficult or unwanted pregnancies; takes the view that appropriate and suitably sensitive advisory services (accessible both to women and to their male partners) could help to provide the necessary information; calls for NGOs and relevant local associations to be given the opportunity to play a central part in this;
11. Takes the view that family policy should also provide for the education of, and the promotion of literacy among, adolescents and young people of both sexes, and should include the provision of information on reliable and legal methods of birth control - which could be undertaken as part of schooling and vocational training as well as in other social learning processes, through the media and so on - and stresses the fundamental role of education for women;
12. Believes that it should be possible for free decisions of women or couples to employ birth control measures to be carried out without any financial burden or social impediments;
13. Calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure that they do not provide any support for family planning programmes which involve coercive measures or health risks for the people concerned;
14. Considers that, given the interaction between demographic and economic factors, secure prospects must be offered to women and men in the areas of employment and the equitable distribution of resources, land, appropriate technology, education and access to credit, and that family support programmes, child care and pension schemes must be altered accordingly;
15. Firmly believes that it should be actively involved in the third United Nations International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in September 1994;
16. Urges the Commission to pay greater attention to the demographic impact of large-scale development programmes, not least in the area of health care and education, particularly in view of the need to improve the level of women's education and their social status;
17. Insists that the Commission and Council should always inform and consult it promptly with regard to Union plans and measures, particularly with

reference to the Union's participation in the forthcoming world population conference in Cairo, to which it resolves to send a delegation;

18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Co-Presidents of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly, the governments of the Member States and the UN Secretary-General.